

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1037

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|--------------|-------------|
| #1 cable | Deptel 1203 to Seoul confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 2 p 06/26/64 | A |
| #2 cable | Seoul 1709 confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> | 1 p 06/23/64 | A |
| #3 cable | Seoul 1696 confidential <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 open RAC 9.19</i> | 4 p 06/20/64 | A |
| #3a cable | Seoul 1696 [section 2 of 2] confidential <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> " | 2 p 06/20/64 | A |
| #4 cable | Deptel 1159 to Seoul confidential <i>sanitized 1-22-93 NLS 92-1602</i> " | 2 p 06/17/64 | A |
| #5 cable | Seoul 1660 confidential <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 open RAC 9.19</i> | 1 p 06/15/64 | A |
| #6 cable | Seoul 1651 secret exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>EXEMPT PER RAC 8.15.07</i> | 1 p 06/12/64 | A |
| #7 cable | Deptel 1134 to Seoul secret <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 open RAC 9.19</i> | 2 p 06/11/64 | A |
| #8 cable | Deptel 1133 to Seoul confidential | 2 p 06/11/64 | A |
| #9 cable | Deptel 1126 to Seoul secret exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 1 p 06/08/64 | A |
| #10 cable | Seoul 1620 secret <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i> | 6 p 06/06/64 | A |
| ### cable #11 | Seoul 1620 1619 Secret <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC-NLS 118103</i> | 5 p 06/06/64 | A |
| #12 cable | Seoul 1604 secret <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 open RAC 9.19</i> | 1 p 06/04/64 | A |
| #13 cable | Seoul 1598 confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #14 cable | Seoul 1597 secret <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160</i> <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i> | 3 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #15 cable | Seoul 1596 Confidential <i>sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 open RAC 9.19</i> | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
Korea, vol. 1

Box 254

RESTRICTION CODES

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|------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------|
| #17 cable | Seoul 1593 confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 4 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #19 cable | Seoul 2542 secret | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #20 cable | situation report confidential exempt 1-19-93 NLJ 93-163 <i>Exempt per RAC-NIS 901-254-3 1/8/03</i> | 1 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #21 cable | #002970 Korea confidential | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #22 cable | Deptel 1110 to Seoul secret exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #23 cable | Deptel 1109 to Seoul Secret exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 2 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #24 cable | Seoul 664 secret exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 5 p 05/24/-- | A |
| #25 cable | Seoul 1532 secret sanitized 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 3 p 05/24/64 | A |
| #26 cable | Deptel 1059 to Seoul confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160</i> | 1 p 05/19/64 | A |
| #29 cable | #012999 to JCS secret <i>open 4-4-94 NLJ 92-164</i> | 1 p 05/16/64 | A |
| #30 cable | Seoul 1488 confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-160</i> | 1 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #31 cable | Seoul 1486 confidential " " | 1 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #32 cable | Seoul 1485 confidential <i>open 4-14-94 NLJ 92-164</i> | 2 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #33 cable | #012021 to JCS confidential | 4 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #34 cable | Deptel 1047 to Seoul secret <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-160</i> | 2 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #35 cable | Seoul 1460 secret exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 3 p 05/12/64 | A |

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|-----------------------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| #36 memo | to Mac from RWK <i>open RAC 9-19</i> secret exempt NLS 92-162 | 1 p 05/19/64 | A |
| #36a cable | Deptel 1029 to Seoul confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 3 p 05/08/64 | A |
| #37 cable | Seoul 1438 confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 " | 2 p 05/08/64 | A |
| #38 cable | Deptel 1029 confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 3 p 05/08/64 | A |
| #39 cable | Seoul 1433 confidential exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 " | 4 p 05/06/64 | A |
| ### cable #40 | Deptel 1018 to Seoul confidential 4 <i>open 6-25-93 NLS 92-160</i> | 2 p 05/06/64 | A |
| #41 cable | Seoul 1405 Secret open 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 | 1 p 05/02/64 | A |
| #42a cable | Seoul 1398 secret " | 1 p 05/01/64 | A |
| #43 cable | Deptel 1000 to Seoul secret " | 1 p 05/01/64 | A |
| #44 cable | Deptel 999 to Seoul secret | 1 p 05/01/64 | A |
| #45 cable | Deptel 995 to Seoul secret open 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 | 1 p 04/30/64 | A |
| #46 cable | Seoul 1388 secret sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open 8-15-07</i> | 5 p 04/29/64 | A |
| #47 cable | Seoul 1374 secret sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open 1/10/14</i> | 5 p 04/27/64 | A |
| #48 cable | Seoul 1367 secret sanitized 8-12-92 NLS 92-160 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 3 p 04/25/64 | A |
| #49 cable | Seoul 1359 confidential sanitized 6-25-93 NLS 92-160 " | 3 p 04/24/64 | A |
| #50 cable | Deptel 976 to Seoul Secret sanitized 1-22-93 NLS 92-160 | 1 p 04/24/64 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------|
| #51a cable | Seoul 1353 secret <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161 per RAC 9-19</i> | 1 p 04/23/64 | A |
| #51c cable | Seoul 1353 secret <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i>)) | 3 p 04/23/64 | A |
| #52a cable | Seoul 1352 secret <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i>)) | 2 p 04/23/64 | A |
| #53 cable | Seoul 0289 <i>open 4-4-94 NLS 92-161</i> top secret (gp 1) | 2 p 04/20/64 | A |
| #54 memo | to Secretary from Thomas L. Hughes confidential <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 2 p 04/20/64 | A |
| #55 cable | Seoul 1334 confidential <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> <i>open 1/10/14 per NLS/RAC 12-16</i> | 4 p 04/20/64 | A |
| #57 cable | Seoul 1330 confidential <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> <i>open 1/10/14 per NLS/RAC 12-16</i> | 4 p 04/20/64 | A |
| #59 cable | SEoul 1328 confidential <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161 per RAC 9-19</i> | 2 p 04/19/64 | A |
| #61 cable | Seoul 1316 secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 04/17/64 | A |
| #62a cable | Deptel 944 to Seoul secret <i>open 6-2-93 NLS 92-161</i> | 2 p 04/17/64 | A |
| #63a cable | Seoul 1307 secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 5 p 04/16/64 | A |
| #64 cable | Seoul 1277 confidential <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 8 p 04/09/64 | A |
| #65 cable | Deptel 920 to SEoul confidential <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 04/10/64 | A |
| #66 cable | Deptel 918 to Seoul confidential <i>sanitized 12-22-92 NLS 92-161</i> <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 2 p 04/09/64 | A |
| #67 cable | re: meeting with Pres. Park secret | 2 p 04/05/64 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|--|--------------|
| #68 cable | Seoul 1244 secret <i>exemption upheld 6-11-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal</i> <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/31/64 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | A |
| #69 cable | Deptel 879 to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/30/64 | A |
| #71 cable | intelligence information cable confidential <i>sanitized 1-19-93 NLJ 92-163 RAC-NLJ 1/8/03</i> | 03/26/64 | A |
| #72 cable | intelligence information cable confidential <i>exempt 1-19-93 NLJ 92-163</i> | 03/26/64 | A |
| #73 cable | intelligence information cable confidential <i>EXUMPT PER RAC 8-15-07</i> <i>exempt 1-19-93 NLJ 92-163</i> | 03/26/64 | A |
| #75 cable | Seoul 1221 secret <i>EXUMPT PER RAC 8-15-07</i> | 03/26/64 | A |
| #77 cable | Seoul 19618 top secret <i>sanitized 4-4-94 NLJ 92-164</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC-NLJ 1/8/03</i> | 03/25/64 | A |
| #78 cable | Seoul 1213 confidential <i>open RAC 9-19</i> <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/25/64 | A |
| #79 cable | Seoul 1211 confidential <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC-NLJ 1/8/03</i> | 03/25/64 | A |
| #80 cable | Intelligence information cable confidential <i>sanitized 1-19-93 NLJ 92-163</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC-NLJ 1/8/03</i> | 03/24/64 | A |
| #83 cable | Seoul 1198 confidential <i>open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/23/64 | A |
| #84 cable | Seoul 1137 secret <i>open RAC 9-19</i> <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/10/64 | A |
| #85 cable | Seoul 1128 secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 03/07/64 | A |
| #87 cable | Seoul 1066 secret <i>exemption upheld 6-11-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal</i> <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> <i>open RAC 9-19</i> | 02/22/64 | A |
| #88 cable | Seoul 1047 confidential <i>open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 02/18/64 | A |

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|------------------|--|-----------------|---------------------------|
| #89 cable | Deptel 716 to Seoul secret exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 <i>exemption upheld 6-14-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal</i> | 2 p 02/14/64 | A <i>open RAC 9.19</i> |
| #90 cable | A-574 from Seoul Secret open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 | 3 p 02/13/64 | A |
| #91 cable | Seoul 1025 confidential sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 4 p 02/10/64 | A |
| #92 cable | Seoul 992 confidential open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 | 1 p 01/30/64 | A |
| #93 cable | Seoul 989 secret sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 3 p 01/30/64 | A |
| #94 cable | Seoul 953 secret sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 <i>open 8.15.07</i> | 3 p 01/21/64 | A |
| #95a cable | Seoul 896 secret open 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 | 1 p 01/09/63 | A |
| #96 cable | Geneva 989 confidential open 6-14-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 1 p 12/30/63 | A |
| #99 cable | Deptel 486 to Seoul confidential sanitized 6-14-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> | 1 p 12/03/63 | A |
| #100 cable | Seoul 750 confidential exemption upheld 6-14-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 3 p 11/29/63 | A |
| #101 cable | Deptel 476 to Seoul confidential exemption upheld 6-14-94 NLJ 92-161 appeal <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161</i> <i>open RAC 9.19</i> | 1 p 11/29/63 | A |
| #103 cable | Seoul 731 confidential sanitized 7-2-92 NLJ 92-161 | 2 p 11/24/63 | A |
| #112 Memcon | Pres. meeting with Korean PM confidential open 8-13-93 NLJ 92-162 | 2 p 04/09/64 | A |
| #113a memcon | Pres. Meeting with Korean PM confidential " " | 2 p 4/09/64 | A |
| #115 memo | to Mac from RWK secret sanitized 8-13-93 NLJ 92-162 <i>open 10-31-01 NLJ 01-204</i> | 1 p 06/03/64 | A |
| #116 memo | to McGB from RWK secret open 8-13-93 NLJ 92-162 | 1 p 05/15/64 | A |

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|------------------|---|--------------|--------------|
| #117 memo | to McG. Bundy from Ben Read secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 05/15/64 | A |
| #118 memo | to Mac from RWK secret <i>exempt NLS 92-162</i> <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 1 p 04/21/64 | A |
| #120 memo | to Mac from RWK secret <i>sanitized 8-13-93 NLS 92-162</i> <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 1 p 03/26/64 | A |
| #123 memo | to President from Komer secret <i>sanitized 8-13-93 NLS 92-162</i> <i>OPEN 8-15-07</i> | 2 p 01/22/64 | A |
| #124 memo | to Roger from Forrestal confidential <i>open 8-13-93 NLS 92-162</i> | 1 p 12/27/63 | A |
| #124b memo | to Hilsman from Marshall Green confidential <i>sanitized 6-14-94 NLS 92-161 appeal</i> <i>exempt 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 3 p 12/20/63 | A |
| #125 memo | to U. Alexis Johnson from McG. Bundy secret <i>open 8-13-93 NLS 92-162</i> | 1 p 12/20/63 | A |
| #126 memo | to U. Alexis Johnson from McG. Bundy secret " | 1 p 12/20/63 | A |
| #126a memo | to McG. Bundy from U. Alexis Johnson secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 12/18/63 | A |
| #126b cable | Seoul 784 secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 2 p 12/06/63 | A |
| #127 memo | to McG. Bundy from U. Alexis Johnson secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 12/18/63 | A |
| #128 memo | to McGeorge Bundy from U. Alexis Johnson secret <i>open 7-2-92 NLS 92-161</i> | 1 p 12/18/63 | A |
| #130 report | re: troops in Korea secret <i>Dep. # 74a, Paper # Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, B43</i> <i>sanitized 8-13-93 NLS 92-162</i> | 1 p 12/07/63 | A |
| #133 memcon | re: US-Korean relations confidential <i>open 7-20-90</i> | 1 p 11/25/63 | A |

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Kim's reported intention to return to Korea in September, and that we consider it highly important that he remain out of Korea at least for planned one year period.

GP-2.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

File
W H

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 21260
Rec'd: June 23, 1964
4:05 A.M.

0

FROM: Seoul

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1709 Priority

DATE: June 23, 4 P.M.

Cy 14 destroyed
6/23 013

AGREEMENT CHANNEL

Reference: Embassy telegram 1692

1. Embassy has received agreement, in writing, dated June 23.
2. GP-3.

for Wm. Brown

BERGER

RKB/16

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ✓

Bundy 3

55
Action
FE
Info
SS
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NSC
INR
CIA
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OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
COM
TRSY
RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 19965
Rec'd: JUNE 20, 1964
8:17 PM

FROM: SEOUL
ACTION: SECSTATE 1696 PRIORITY
INFO: TOKYO 736
BONN 22
DATE: JUNE 20, 8 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)
REF: A. DEPTTEL 1159; B. DEPTTEL 1029 RPTD TOKYO 2913

This has gone very far.

how much of P's time is involved?

1. PRIMIN HAS IN PAST WEEK BROACHED SEVERAL TIMES HIS DESIRE TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN JULY. HE SAID HE HAD INVITATION FROM BONN WHERE HE HOPES TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID AND WOULD LIKE TO COMBINE TWO VISITS. I DISCOURAGED VISIT AS NOT LIKELY BE FEASIBLE DURING U.S. ELECTION YEAR.

2. PRIMIN REPRESENTS PROPOSED VISIT AS PART OF PLAN TO PAVE WAY FOR ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT. ASSERTS IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR KOREAN GOVT TO MAKE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN OWING TO HOSTILITY OF STUDENTS AND OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION WHICH CAPITALIZES ON POPULAR ATTITUDES AND FEARS OF JAPANESE DOMINATION. ALTHOUGH SITUATION OUTWARDLY CALM UNDER MARTIAL LAW, GOVT EXPECTS RESISTANCE TO K-J SETTLEMENT WILL REAPPEAR WHEN MARTIAL LAW ENDED, AND IS ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT STUDENT REACTION WHEN UNIVERSITIES REOPEN IN FALL. HOWEVER, IF GOVT CAN OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL LOANS FROM GERMANY, A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE AID LOANS IN WASHINGTON, AND AGREEMENT OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND POSSIBLY OTHERS, INCLUDING JAPAN, TO SUPPORT A MULTI-NATIONAL APPROACH TO KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HE FEELS HE WILL HAVE SOLID BASIS FOR SELLING A SETTLEMENT TO OPPOSITION AND KOREAN PEOPLE. HE WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO WRAP THIS ALL UP IN COURSE OF SUMMER, BEGINNING WITH VISIT TO GERMANY, RETURNING VIA WASHINGTON, AND STOPPING ON WAY BACK FOR INFORMAL TALK WITH IKEDA. RESULTS OF TRIP WOULD

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Authority RAC001R-254-3-25
By JON vARA Date 8-28-19

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-2- 1696, JUNE 20, 8 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: SEUL

BE ANNOUNCED ON RETURN TO ROK, FOLLOWED SHORTLY, IF ALL WENT WELL, BY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOJ.

3. PRIMIN SAID HE HAD PRESIDENT PAK'S SUPPORT FOR THIS PLAN. JUNE 19 PRIMIN TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY DEFENSE MINISTER AND VICE MINISTER ECONOMIC PLANNING. DEFENSE MINISTER VISITED GENERAL HOWZE JUNE 18 AND STATED HE PLANNED VISIT U.S. ACCOMPANYING PRIMIN LEAVING ON JULY 10. ASKED HOWZE TO FACILITATE MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND DEPUTY SECRETARY VANCE FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING INCREASED MAP, MAINTENANCE OF US AND ROK FORCES AT CURRENT LEVELS, SUSPENSION MAP TRANSFER AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR PAY INCREASES FOR KOREAN FORCES.

4. VICE MIN ECONOMIC PLANNING TOLD KILLEN AND ECON COUNSELOR PRIMIN HOPED TO BRING BACK ECONOMIC AID PACKAGE FROM WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD INCLUDE \$15-20 MILLION ADDITIONAL SA IN 1964, PROMISE OF \$90 MILLION SA FOR 1965, LOAN COMMITMENTS FOR TWO FERTILIZER PLANTS, AGREEMENT PURCHASE POL FOR US AND ROK MILITARY FROM NEW REFINERY AT ULSAN, AND AGREEMENT TO FUND RAW MATERIAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS RESULTING FROM MAP TRANSFER.

5. MY CHECK WITH GERMAN AMB BUENGER REVEALED THAT PRIMIN ON BASIS GERSTENMAIER'S OPEN HANDED INVITATION TO VISIT GERMANY HAD THIS WEEK SOUGHT TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC INVITATION FOR VISIT IN LATTER HALF OF JULY. REQUEST HAS BEEN REFERRED TO BONN. BUENGER SAID PRIMIN HOPED OBTAIN FROM VISIT ONLY GENERAL ASSURANCE IN FORM OF COMMUNIQUE THAT GERMAN GOVT WAS INTERESTED AND WILLING HELP KOREA. BUENGER TOLD ME SUCH ASSURANCES EASILY FORTHCOMING BUT NO PROSPECT OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL NEW COMMITMENTS THIS YEAR.

6. BUENGER TOLD ME HE RECOGNIZES THAT PURPOSE VISIT WAS TO HELP KOREAN GOVT STABILIZE SITUATION, HELP STRENGTHEN POSITION OF CHONG IL-KWON, AND HELP IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE FOR A ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT. FOR ALL THESE REASONS HE FAVORS VISIT IN PRINCIPLE. HOWEVER, HE SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF ARRANGING VISIT ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE AND SO INFORMED PRIMIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1696, JUNE 20, 8 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: SEOUL

7. JUNE 19 I LET PRIMIN KNOW OF MY DISPLEASURE THAT HIS PLANNING FOR WASHINGTON TRIP HAD BEEN CARRIED SO FAR WITHOUT ANY INDICATION FROM USG THAT VISIT IN NEAR FUTURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. I HAVE ALSO TOLD HOWZE TO INFORM DEFENSE MIN US HAS NOT AGREED TO PROPOSED VISIT. I PROMISED PRIMIN TO INFORM WASHINGTON OF HIS AND PRESIDENT'S DESIRES BUT SAID I COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCE THAT WASHINGTON WOULD AGREE TO A VISIT AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT SEEN REFTEL A I MADE MOST OF POINTS CONTAINED PARA 2 THAT MESSAGE.

8. PRIMIN NO DOUBT RECKONS THAT SUCCESS OF HIS PLAN WILL STRENGTHEN HIS POLITICAL POSITION, BUILD UP HIS OWN IMAGE IN THE COUNTRY AND ESTABLISH HIM AS POLITICAL LEADER INDISPENSABLE TO PAK. ALSO, WHETHER OR NOT IT SUCCEEDS IN ACHIEVING STATED PURPOSE OF MAKING POSSIBLE RENEWED K-J NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOOD PROSPECT OF SETTLEMENT, DRAMATIC TRIP TO EUROPE AND U.S. RESULTING IN PROMISE OF ADDITIONAL AID WILL HELP PAK GOVT AS WELL AS PRIMIN. HOWEVER, IT IS MAINLY IN TERMS OF ITS PROBABLE CONTRIBUTION TO K-J SETTLEMENT THAT WE SHOULD APPRAISE PROPOSED VISIT.

9. WHILE PLAN HAS EARMARKS OF A GIMMICK AND IS NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT IT REPRESENTS KOREAN CONTRIBUTION TO PROBLEM WHICH CONCERNS US GREATLY, I.E., HOW TO PUSH ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT "OVER TOP". WE SHOULD THEREFORE CONSIDER HOW PRIMIN'S PROPOSED STRATEGY MIGHT FIT IN WITH ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY DEPT IN REF B (PARAS 3 AND 4). I GRAVELY DOUBT WHETHER, EVEN WITH OUR BLESSING, EVERYTHING WOULD FALL IN PLACE ON BASIS PRIMIN'S PLAN AND TIMETABLE BUT WITH CAREFUL PLANNING AND PREPARATION IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PULL ALL THIS TOGETHER WITH SOME HOPE OF CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

10. I AM AWARE THAT U.S. GOVT COULD NOT COMPLY WITH MOST OF PRIMIN'S SPECIFIC REQUESTS AND KILLEN AND ECON COUNSELOR HAVE SO INFORMED VICE MIN ECON PLANNING IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS. NO USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY HAVING DEFENSE MIN

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-4- 1696, JUNE 20, 8 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: SEOUL

ACCOMPANY TO DISCUSS MILITARY MATTERS. EXTENT OF PROBABLY WASHINGTON COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE, I SHOULD THINK, TO BE LIMITED TO OFFER OF EXPANDED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED "BASIC ECONOMIC SUPPORT" DESCRIBED IN PARA 3, REF B. THIS, BY ITSELF, MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT IN PRIMIN'S CALCULATION TO MAKE TRIP WORTHWHILE, BUT IT IS ONLY KIND CD WASHINGTON OFFER THAT CAN BE MEANINGFULLY RELATED TO K-J SETTLEMENT. THERE IS OF COURSE RISK THAT DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO LIMIT SCOPE OF TALKS PRIMIN WOULD STILL EXPECT TO PRESENT EXTRAVAGANT SHOPPING LIST WHEN HE GOT TO WASHINGTON.

BERGER

MRJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 19972
Rec'd: JUNE 20, 1964
8:40 PM

Action

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS ACTION: SECSTATE 1696 PRIORITY

G

SP INFO: TOKYO 736
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H

EUR DATE: JUNE 20, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

IO

E

AID 11. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER A VISIT BY PRIMIN THIS SUMMER OR
P FALL COULD BE ACCOMMODATED BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS
USIA CONCERNED. HOWEVER, IF IT COULD BE FITTED IN, THERE IS
NSC SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR IT ON THE LIMITED BASIS DESCRIBED
INR ABOVE, I.E., TO EXPLORE AND POSSIBLY CONCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS OF
CIA THE KIND SUGGESTED IN REF B. PRIMIN IS TO SOME EXTENT
NSA "OUR MAN", HE IS KNOWN AS A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE U.S. AND
OSD FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS (HE IS ABLE AND ENERGETIC), IT IS
ARMY IN OUR INTEREST TO TRY TO HELP HIM. IF THERE IS PROSPECT
NAVY HE CAN GO TO BONN AND WASHINGTON AND COME BACK WITH SOME
AIR GENERAL PROMISE OF A MULTI-NATIONAL LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT AID
COM PROGRAM TO GO INTO EFFECT ON CONCLUSION OF K-J SETTLEMENT AND
TRSY IF THIS WILL HELP OVERCOME THE OPPOSITION TO A SETTLEMENT,
RMR WE SHOULD GIVE THE VISIT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. IN THIS
CONNECTION I SUGGEST DEPT ASK EMB BONN TO ASCERTAIN
WHETHER AND HOW FAR FRG IS PREPARED TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AID
COMMITMENT TO ROK AND IF FRG THINKING IN TERMS MULTILATERAL
AID COORDINATION FOR ROK. ACCORDING TO BUENGER, FRG OPPOSED
TO CONSORTIUM BUT AGREEABLE TO CONSULTATIVE GROUP APPROACH.

12. IF DEPT AGREES WITH ABOVE, AND IF A 2-3 DAY VISIT TO
WASHINGTON IS POSSIBLE, I WOULD TELL PRIMIN THAT US HAD AGREED
TO VISIT ON BASIS THAT TALKS WOULD BE EXPLORATORY AND IN
CONTEXT MUTUAL INTEREST IN K-J SETTLEMENT. I WOULD EMPHASIZE
LIMITED NATURE OF COMMITMENT WASHINGTON COULD OFFER AND WARN
HIM NOT TO EXPECT SA OR MAP BONUS. IF HE ACCEPTED ON

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Authority: RA 00119-254-334
B: JDL *ARA Date: 8-28-19

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-2- 1696, JUNE 20, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM: SEOUL

THIS BASIS, MUCH WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE BY WAY OF PREPARATION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS BOTH IN BONN AND TOKYO. ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD AGAIN SOUND OUT IBRD/IDA ON NEED FOR CONSULTATIVE GROUP AND ROLE IT COULD PLAY IN SUCH GROUP REGARDLESS HOW LITTLE OWN FUNDS IDA MIGHT BE WILLING TO PUT INTO KOREA. IN THIS CONNECTION IMF-IBRD MEETING TOKYO THIS SEPT MIGHT PROVIDE OCCASION FOR DISCUSSION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORMATION OF CONSULTATIVE GROUP IF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BY THAT TIME TO PERMIT IT.

DOUBT IBRD WOULD BE INTERESTED INFORMATION CONSULTATIVE GROUP UNTIL ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT ASSURED, BUT ITS ANNOUNCED WILLINGNESS TO DO SO, ADEQUATELY PUBLICIZED, COULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN TERMS OF GETTING KOREANS TO ACCEPT ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT.

13. AS I SEE IT, WE MAY HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THIS MAJOR AND LONG-STANDING OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY AND SHOULD IN THESE NEXT MONTHS EXAMINE EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS TO THIS END.

14. GP-3.

BERGER

MRJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

MFG. 11-63
11035

INDICATE: COLLECT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BELK
B. BECK
C. B. BOSTON
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JOHNSON
KEENEY
KELIN
KORER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
SMITH, WM. Y.

Korea Act

Jun 17 5 10 PM '64

1159

Korea

45

Origin
FE
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

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JOINT STATE-AID MESSAGE

1. Korean Embassy officers on June 15 and 16 raised informally with officers of Korean desks in AID and State possibility of high-level economic mission to U.S. to request additional economic assistance headed by EPB Minister or higher. Korean officials referred particularly to Korean Govt's internal political need for evidence of U.S. support. Koreans argued that new numbers Korean cabinet officials should talk with opposite/~~mission~~ here particularly in view of unrest in Korea based in large part on economic situation.

2. State and AID officials referred to ~~proposals~~ such proposals in past years and pointed out level of economic assistance was determined by program requirements, should be discussed between Korean and U.S. officials in Seoul, and could not be subject of negotiations between govts in Washington. They also pointed out that Congressional hearings are now under way on economic assistance programs and that presidential conventions and election campaigns are in immediate offing. Mission to seek additional assistance would under these circumstances be futile and likely to attract adverse reaction, and redound to political disadvantage of delegation. FYI: We also feel timing of visit soon would be particularly unfortunate in view pending change

Drafted by: *LAN*
FE: KA: CANorred Jr; bhm 6/16/64
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Robert W. Barnett

EA - Mr. Fearey *RF*

AA/FE - Mr. Poats (draft)
AA/FE/Korea - Mr. Ives (draft) *lan*

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JUN 18 1964

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FORM DS-322 8-63

Authority: RAC del 11-254-3-4-3
By: *JNW* *ARA Date: 8-28-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director USOM. END FYI.

3. Korean Embassy officials appear to recognize such mission would be ~~unduly~~ out of order and to be seeking counter-arguments and alternative suggestions.

Would appreciate Embassy/USOM comments and recommendations.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 5

48

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Action

Control:
Rec'd:

13517
JUNE 15, 1964
2:37 AM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 1660 PRIORITY

SS

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SP

INFO: TOKYO 724
CINCPAC UNNUMBERED

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DATE: JUNE 15, 3 PM

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NSC

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NSA

OSD

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NAVY

AIR

RMR

1. DRP SPOKESMAN MORNING JUNE 15 ANNOUNCED KIM CHONG-PIL PLANNING TO LEAVE ROK JUNE 18 TO ATTEND HARVARD SUMMER ECONOMIC SEMINAR. PRESS REPORTING THAT KIM SAID DEPARTURE PLANS MADE KNOWN TO PRESIDENT PAK AND AMBASSADOR BERGER AT TIME HE RESIGNED FROM DRP CHAIRMANSHIP. KIM QUOTED AS EMPHATICALLY DENYING THAT TRIP POLITICAL, SAYING VAGUELY THAT ANY "GAP" IT MIGHT CAUSE ROK POLITICS WOULD EXIST WHETHER HE LEFT OR NOT. KIM ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE PLANS STAY US "FEW WEEKS" BEYOND 7-WEEK SEMINAR COURSE. KIM WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND AIDE KIM SANG-IN.

2. DETAILS KIM'S ITINERARY WILL BE FURNISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KIM'S ANNOUNCEMENT OBVIOUSLY INTENDED PROVIDE MEASURE OF "FACE-SAVING". WE RELIABLY INFORMED NO POSSIBILITY CHANGE IN PLANS AT THIS STAGE. SUGGEST DEPT LIMIT COMMENT AND AVOID IMPLICATION US INVOLVED IN ACTION.

3. GP-3.

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Authority RA 00117-254-3-52
By JOK WARA Desc 8-28-19

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Korea

33
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1134

JUN 11 12 23 PM '64

SS
Info

INFO : Amembassy TOKYO 3219
CINCPAC
USUN 3255

924

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

Seoul's 1635, rptd Tokyo 714, CINCPAC Umm, USUN 76

Kissinger's International Seminar at Harvard commences July 1, lasts six weeks, and membership is restricted to about 40 highly selected participants who may attend only if invited by Kissinger personally. Kissinger agrees invite conditioned only on concurrence Dean of Harvard, and hopefully will cable KIM June 12. Harvard may be reluctant accept Kim if doing so would invite universal condemnation by Korean Harvard alumni and/or student population. Request you obtain at once PriMin CHUNG's personal view on this possibility and notify us.

Study for following school year ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ would be arranged later. Sponsoring organization would be Southwestern Research Society, 3582 Turtle Creek Drive, Dallas, Texas.

FYI: YI Ki-ho (Danny LEE) also attending seminar under auspices Asia Foundation, which will have information on it. Southwestern Research will telegraph invitation per your instructions. Asia Foundation declined sponsor

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Drafted by: <i>am</i> FE:RWBarnett; FE:EA:CANorred Jr: bhm | | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green <i>mg</i> |
| Clearances: 6/11/64 EA - Mr. Bacon <i>mg</i> | | CU/FE - Mr. Ranard (subst) <i>am</i> |

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

authority RA001R-254-3-6-1
By: Joh ARA Date: 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

Kim Cheng-p'il out of fear of effect it would have on image Foundation has developed in Korea. Same consideration, plus Korean fear of early return (para 3 reftel), rules out even more firmly any U.S. Govt grant. In view Kim's unpopularity in Korea, official show of U.S. favor at this time would have damaging future effects. We hope arrangement para 1 above will prove adequate persuade him to come. END FYI.

GP-2.

END

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

Korea

06921

INDICATE: COLLECT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 11 12:22 PM '64

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VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1133

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Following is text of telegram sent to Dr. Henry Kissinger of Harvard

June 11 by R. Douglas Payne, Executive Director, Southwestern Research Society:
BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

Southwestern Research Society wants to support KIM Chong P'il for participation in your 1964 International Seminar. We are prepared, of course, to finance his travel costs and all costs attendant upon his being with you in Cambridge for six weeks of Seminar. We understand that aside from transportation cost may run between \$800 and \$1000.

Kim Chong P'il is young man of 37. He has been President PAK's closest political associate over number of years and until very recently has been Chairman of Democratic Republican Party.

While having acted as vigorous and controversial political personality, he has also had, we are persuaded, intellectual and academic interests which, because of his active life, have been given small opportunity for development. Kim Chong P'il is now eager to spend part of this coming year in U.S. in study of economic and political affairs. The investment that you would make in his instruction could be, we are convinced, of considerable long-term value to him and Korea.

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Authority Drang 4
By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by: AM
FE:RWBarnett; FE:EA:CANorred Jr: bhm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green mg

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bacon bm

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I am aware that for you to accept a nomination at this late date presents you with real difficulties. I would be less than frank, as well, if I did not admit Kim Chong P'il suffers certain deficiencies as participant in your seminar: his auditory comprehension of English is good, but it is most unlikely that he would attempt to speak up except through interpreter. Happily, Daniel Lee, who is being sponsored by Asia Foundation, is qualified to perform this function for him, and we expect the two men will have much to offer one another. Notwithstanding obvious difficulties, I sincerely hope you can decide accept Kim Chong P'il as participant in your Seminar, and extend invitation at once to him at National Assembly, Republic of Korea.

With best wishes, I am

Very truly yours.

GP-4.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04978

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Korea

57

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 1126

59

Info

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO 3191
CINCPAC
USUN 3224

Jun 8 8 25 PM '64

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

Seoul's 1621, rptd Tokyo 706, CINCPAC 679, USUN 69.

After your talk with KIM Chong-p'il about study grant, we would appreciate your views on following questions: 1) Does Kim have any serious intention to study? 2) How can grant be handled so that it will not ultimately give him boost in eyes of Korean public as implying U.S. Govt favor and support? 3) Should we make efforts to train him or alter his views, or should we simply try to keep him out of way?

Dept believes that to include Kim in regular Dept exchange program would be damaging to image of that program, and that accordingly other arrangements will have to be made if he decides to come. If it is considered worthwhile to spend effort on him, we could possibly approach Bowie's International Center at Harvard. Otherwise our preference would be to place him on the Pacific Coast, to reduce his meddling and publicity-seeking.

GP-2.

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Authority: RA cclR-254-3-7-0
By: NARA Doc:

END

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorredJr:bhm 6/8/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

RUSK

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bacon
CU/FE - Mr. Ranard (subst)

OSD/ISA - Col. Moorman (informed)

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Action

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Korea

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1964 JUN 6 PM

CO RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUALOS 11E 06/1535Z
O 061510Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEKCR/SECSTATAMWASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEONE OFTWO IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 1620 INFO
TOKYO 705 CINCPAC 678 USUN 68 JUNE 6, 12 MIDNIGHT

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PASS WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA

LIMDIS

REF: EMBTEL 1619 RPTD TOKYO 704 CINCPAC 677 USUN 67.

1. GENERAL HOWZE AND I CALLED ON PRESIDENT PAK TO ASK HOW HE VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MARTIAL LAW INVOKED AND WHAT WAS OUTLOOK.

2. HE SAID NEXTTWO OR THREE DAYS WOULD BE CRITICAL. MOST UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAD BEEN SENT HOME. HE EXPECTED THEY WOULD TRY TO STIR UP TROUBLE IN THE COUNTRY. BUT IF SITUATION REMAINED QUIET, OUTLOOK WOULD BE FAVORABLE. HE GAVE US NUMBERS OF "TROUBLEMAKERS" ARRESTED IN VARIOUS CATEGORIES WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY. HE THEN MENTIONED THE CFN 1620 705 678 68 6 12 1619 704 677 67 1. 2.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 11E ~~SECRET~~
SEVERAL MEASURES TAKEN TO REMOVE POPULAR GRIEVANCES WHICH HE HOPED WOULD HELP STABILIZE SITUATION: NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT ABOLISHED; DRP SECRETARIAT AND STAFF CUT BACK; LEGISLATION TO BE DRAFTED TO PROVIDE FOR PUBLICATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARTY FUNDS; AND KIM CHONG-P'IL RESIGNATION AS CHAIRMAN DRP. IN A FEW DAYS FIVE HUNDRED CORRUPT GOVT OFFICIALS WOULD BE REMOVED.

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Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. XXIX, #15
By sj, NARA, Date 4-8-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1620, JUNE 6, MIDNIGHT, FROM SEOUL (SEC ONE OF TWO)

3. I SAID GEN HOWZE AND I NOT ONLY WISHED HAVE HIS VIEW OF SITUATION, BUT ALSO WISHED TELL HIM OF DISTURBING REPORTS WHICH HAD COME TO US IN LAST THREE DAYS. ESSENCE THESE REPORTS WAS THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING MARTIAL LAW INDEFINITELY BECAUSE THIS WAS ONLY WAY TO GOVERN KOREA. UNDER MARTIAL LAW PRESS AND OTHER CRITICISM COULD BE CURBED, CRITICS ARRESTED, ASSEMBLY ABOLISHED IF NECESSARY, AND IT WOULD THEN EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO SETTLE WITH JAPAN. I ASKED PRESIDENT TO COMMENT ON THESE REPORTS.

4. HE SAID IT IMPOSSIBLE GOVERN KOREA UNDER MARTIAL LAW AND HOPED IT COULD BE LIFTED SOON. AT SAME TIME HE WAS WORRIED AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN MARTIAL LAW LIFTED. IF THIS MEANT MORE RIOTING, RESUMPTION (SIC) IRRESPONSIBLE. CFN 3. -4.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 11E ~~SECRET~~

ASSEMBLY CRITICISM, CONTINUING ASSEMBLY SABOTAGE OF GOVT ADMINISTRATION BY REQUIRING CONTINUOUS APPEARANCE OF MINISTERS IN ASSEMBLY, AND UNRESTRAINED PRESS CRITICISM, IT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO RENEWED RIOTING AND MARTIAL LAW WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOKED AGAIN. HE HAD TO CONFESS HE WAS WORRIED; HE HOPED MARTIAL LAW COULD BE LIFTED SOON. WHEN ASSEMBLY MET JUNE 10 HE EXPECTED IT WOULD VOTE FOR LIFTING MARTIAL LAW, BUT THIS DID NOT SEEM A SOLUTION AND HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

5. TO THIS EVASIVE REMARK, I SAID I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY HE COULD NOT GOVERN. HE WAS ELECTED AS PRESIDENT. HE HAD VAST POWERS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. HIS PARTY WITH 110 OF 175 HAD AN EASY MAJORITY IN ASSEMBLY. WHY COULD THEY NOT ORGANIZE THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY? WHY COULD HE NOT GOVERN CONSTITUTIONALLY? AS FOR THOSE EVCQBOW, SPOKE OF MARTIAL LAW AS THE ONLY SOLUTION, I COULD TELL HIM THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE, TO THE KOREAN ARMED FORCES, OR TO KOREA'S FRIENDS ABROAD, INCLUDING THE US. WE WERE COMMITTED TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT IN KOREA AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES. CFN 10 5. 110 175

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-3- 1620, JUNE 6, MIDNIGHT, FROM SEOUL (SEC ONE OF TWO)

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 11E ~~SECRET~~

6. HE SAID HE AGREED IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GOVERN BY FORCE OR BY MARTIAL LAW. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THE PUBLIC HAD LOST CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN HIS GOVT.

7. I INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT AND SAID GENERAL HOWZE WISHED TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT YESTERDAY'S INCIDENT INVOLVING PARATROOPERS BRISKING INTO DONGA ILBO NEWSPAPER OFFICE (IN WHICH THEY THREATENED TO SABOTAGE PRINTING PRESS). GEN HOWZE SAID HE WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THIS SECOND INCIDENT INVOLVING SPECIAL FORCES. THIS WAS A POLITICAL ACT AND IT WAS APPARENT THESE TROOPS WERE NOT PROPERLY DISCIPLINED. WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES WOULD TAKE A SERIOUS VIEW OF THIS SECOND INCIDENT: WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO USE MAP FUNDS TO SUPPORT UNDISCIPLINED TROOPS WHICH THREATEN ORDERLY PROCESSES. PAK SAID HE HAD ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER. GEN HOWZE SAID THAT THE TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND AND RETURNED TO THEIR NORMAL GARRISON.

8. I PICKED UP THREAD OF MY PART OF CONVERSATION BY SAYING I AGREED BASIC PROBLEM WAS PUBLIC DISTRUST HIS GOVT AND WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE STABILIZE SITUATION OR GOVERN NORMALLY UNTIL CONFIDENCE RESTORED. I SAID I HAD BEEN IN KOREA NEARLY THREE YEARS. USG HAD DONE ITS UTMOST TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO HIS PROBLEMS AND TO HELP HIM BOTH IN DAYS OF MILITARY GOVT, DURING CRITICAL TIMES LAST YEAR, AND SINCE ELECTION.
CFN 6. 7. 8.

PAGE FIVE RUALOS 11E ~~SECRET~~

I WOULD NOW SPEAK IN WAY I HAD NEVER DONE BEFORE. MOST OF HIS PROBLEMS DURING PAST THREE YEARS CAME FROM ACTIVITIES OF KIM CHONG-PIL. HE HAD BEEN A DISTURBING AND DIVISIVE FORCE AND HIS CONTROVERSIAL ACTIVITIES HAD SO OCCUPIED AND DISTRACTED EVERYONE'S ENERGIES AND ATTENTIONS THAT THE GOVT HAD NEVER GOT DOWN TO ITS REAL JOB WHICH IS TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY. I REMINDED PAK OF HIS FREQUENT MENTION TO ME MANY DIFFICULTIES KCP HAS CAUSED HIM.

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~~SECRET~~

-4- 1620, JUNE 6, MIDNIGHT, FROM SEOUL (SEC ONE OF TWO)

9. PRESENT SITUATION WAS TERRIBLY SERIOUS AND ONCE AGAIN KCP WAS THE SOURCE OF MOST OF PRESIDENT PAK'S TROUBLE. HE HAD ONCE AND FOR ALL TO FREE HIMSELF OF KCP SO THAT HE COULD RESTORE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE AND GET DOWN TO BUSINESS OF GOVERNING.

10. FREEING HIMSELF OF A PROBLEM WHICH HAD PLAGUED AND DISTRACTED HIM FOR SO LONG WAS ONLY WAY I COULD SEE TO SAVE OBJECTIVES FOR WHICH HE HAD WORKED SO HARD FOR THREE YEARS, HIS GOVT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM. IT WOULD BE A DECISIVE MOVE THAT WOULD RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN HIM. IT WOULD BRING BACK THOSE WHO HAD BEEN ALIENATED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS AND ENABLE HIM TO BROADEN THE BASIS OF HIS SUPPORT.

BERGER

BT

CFN 9. 10. * AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 1:36 PM, 6/6/64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA AT 2:50 PM, 6/6/64.

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

34
Action
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info

OO RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUALOS 12E 06/1605Z
O 061510Z ZFA
FM AMEMBASSYSEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC

006370
1964 JUN 6 PM 1 42

BT
~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 1620 INFO
TOKYO 705 CINCPAC 678 USUN 68 JUNE 6, 12 MIDNIGHT

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PASS WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA

LIMDIS

11.- GENERAL HOWZE INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT AND SAID THE ARMED FORCES WERE LOYAL TO PAK BUT IN A CRITICAL SITUATION WOULD NOT SUPPORT KCP. THIS DIVISION IN THEIR LOYALTIES COULD BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM. GENERAL HOWZE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD SHOOT CIVILIANS TO KEEP KCP IN OFFICE. HE SAID KCP SPEAKS OF HIMSELF AS THOUGH HE WERE RUNNING KOREA. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT PAK ASSERT IT IS HE WHO IS PRESIDENT AND RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTRY, NOT KCP.
CFN 11.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 12E ~~SECRET~~

12. PAK ASKED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR KCP TO GO TO US FOR STUDY. I SAID WE HAD MADE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER CASES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND COULD DO SO AGAIN. I SUGGESTED KCP SHOULD TAKE HIS FAMILY AND PLAN TO STAY FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS SO AS TO GIVE PRESIDENT FREEDOM TO GOVERN AND CHANCE TO STABILIZE SITUATION WITHOUT EVER-PRESENT WORRY OF KCP'S IMMINENT RETURN. I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY DEPARTURE.

13. PAK SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO KCP TONUANT "AND TRY TO PERSUADE HIM" TO REMOVE HIMSELF. I SAID IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY, PAK, CONSTITUTION, AND EVEN KCP HIMSELF THAT HE LEAVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IF HE LEFT

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-2- 1620, JUNE 6, MIDNIGHT FROM SEOUL (SECTION II OF II).

SOON THERE WAS A CHANCE OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND UNITY, A CHANCE TO REESTABLISH PAK AS A POPULAR LEADER OF THE COUNTRY, AND A CHANCE FOR A JAPANESE SETTLEMENT. IF HE STAYED I SAW NOTHING BUT CONTINUING TROUBLE AHEAD.

14. AS WE GOT UP TO GO I SAID CASUALLY THAT TEN MINUTES BEFORE COMING TO BLUE HOUSE I HAD BEEN GIVEN A REPORT THAT A LIST OF ASSEMBLYMEN SLATED FOR ARREST WAS BEING PREPARED, WHICH INCLUDED A LARGE NUMBER OF ANTI-KCP MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY AS WELL AS SOME OPPOSITION LEADERS. I ASKED IF HE
CFN 12. 13. 14.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 12E ~~SECRET~~
KNEW ANYTHING OF THIS. HE SAID HE DID NOT. I SAID HE AND HAD BEEN CAUGHT BY SURPRISE SEVERAL TIMES BY ACTIONS TAKEN HERE OVER THE LUAST THREE YEARS WHICH WE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT. I HOPED THIS WAS NOT GOING TO BE REPEATED. HE SAID WITH A SMILE THAT SUCH ARRESTS WOULD REQUIRE HIS SIGNATURE. I SMILED BACK AND SAID IF SUCH ARRESTS OCCURRED THERE WOULD BE REAL TROUBLE IN KOREA AND WE COULD NOT REMAIN SILENT.

15. COMMENT: I HAVE NO CERTAINTY THAT PAK WILL FOLLOW THE LEAD WE HAVE GIVEN HIM. WE ARE LETTING OUR POSITION BE KNOWN TO KEY GOVT AND MILITARY LEADERS ON WHOM PAK RELIES AND WHO WILL REINFORCE OUR ADVICE TO HIM. KCP REMAINS CAPABLE OF DESPERATE ACTION BUT MAY VERY PROBABLY COME TO REALIZE BALANCE OF FORCES IS STRONGLY AGAINST HIM. IN THAT CASE HE WILL GO QUIETLY. IF SO WE WILL NEED TO COOPERATE IN MAKING POSSIBLE ONE OR TWO YEARS OF STUDY IN US FOR KCP AND POSSIBLY ONE OR MORE OF HIS ASSOCIATES.

16. GP-2.
BERGER
BT
CFN 15. 16. GP-2.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA
at 3:10 P.M., JUNE 6, 1964

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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34
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PP RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUALOS 08E 06/1110Z
P 051030Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
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CONTROL: 6103
RECD: JUNE 6, 1964
8:16 A.M.

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TOKYO 704 CINCPAC 677 USUN 67 JUNE 6, 7 P.M.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD


DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA

LIMDIS

1. DESPITE ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 5 OF RESIGNATION KIM CHONG-PIL (KCP) FROM CHAIRMANSHIP DRP, SITUATION IN KOREA CONTINUES TENSE. KCP HAS ANNOUNCED HE INTENDS STAY IN COUNTRY AND CONTINUE IN PARTY AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY KCP HAS NOT ABANDONED INTENTION PRESERVE POLITICAL POWER. HIS RESIGNATION MAY HAVE BEEN FEINT TO PUT HIS OPPONENTS OFF-GUARD.
CFN 1519 704 677 57 6 7PM 1. 5

PAGE TWO RUALOS 08E ~~SECRET~~

2. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE EXTREME ACTIONS BEING CONSIDERED OR PLANNED BY FOLLOWERS OF KCP. PRESIDENT PAK RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE CONSIDERING CERTAIN EXTRAORDINARY ACTIONS INCLUDING ASSEPTION SPECIAL POWERS WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM TO GOVERN WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION.



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Authority RAC-NLJ 001-254-3-2
By ms NARA, Date 11-7-02

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-2- 1619, JUNE 6, 7 P.M. FROM SEOUL. (SECTION I of II)

1.3(a)(5)

4. [REDACTED]
THAT PRESIDENT PAK HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM A PLAN CONSISTING OF FOUR ALTERNATIVES DESIGNED DEAL WITH CURRENT SITUATION. THESE ALTERNATIVES DESCRIBED AS:

A. PAK WOULD ASK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO VOTE HIM SPECIAL POWERS TO GOVERN BY DECREE AND THEN DISSOLVE ITSELF.

B. IF THIS NOT FEASIBLE, INSTEAD OF DISSOLVING ITSELF AFTER VOTE OF SPECIAL POWERS, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS WOULD AGREE TO ONE-YEAR HOLIDAY WITH PAY.

1.3(a)(3)

CFN 2. 3. [REDACTED] 4. 6

PAGE THREE RUALOS ~~SECRET~~

C. IF CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS PRECLUDE EITHER ABOVE ACTIONS, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD INSTEAD CALL FOR A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THE PUBLIC WOULD BE ASKED TO GRANT THE SAME POWERS, THEREBY AMENDING CONSTITUTION.

D. IF NONE OF ABOVE IS FEASIBLE THEN PAK WOULD CALL UPON NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO DISSOLVE ITSELF, HE WOULD RESIGN AS PRESIDENT, AND NEW ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE HELD.

5. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5),
(9)

CFN 5. 7 10

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 1619, JUNE 6, 7 P.M. FROM SEOUL (SECTION I OF II)

PAGE FOUR RUALOS Ø8E ~~SECRET~~

6. WE HAD HEARD OF THESE PROPOSALS PREVIOUSLY FROM

1.3(a)(5)

7. CERTAIN EXTREMIST SUPPORTERS OF KCP HAVE ALREADY BEGUN ATTEMPTS AT INTIMIDATION OF OPPONENTS AND PRESS. ON NIGHT OF JUNE 5 A GROUP OF PARATROOPERS LED BY A MAJOR FORCIBLY ENTERED PREMISES OF DONGA ILBO, INTIMIDATED EMPLOYEES AND THREATENED SMASH PRESSES. THIS INCIDENT WIDELY KNOWN IN SEOUL ALTHOUGH UNDER CENSORSHIP NOT PUBLISHED.

1.3(a)(3),
(5)

CFN 6. 7. 5

PAGE FIVE RUALOS Ø8E ~~SECRET~~

8. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DRP MET THIS AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER PROPOSAL TO REQUEST CHANG KYONG-SUN TO RESIGN AS VICE SPEAKER AND MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. THIS MOVE UNDOUBTEDLY INSTIGATED BY KCP TO ELIMINATE MOST FORMIDABLE OPPONENT FROM DRP. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE PRESENTED TO PAK AS MEANS OF APPEASING KCP SUPPORTERS AND PRESERVING BALANCE BETWEEN FACTIONS. ALSO REPORTED THAT DRP MOVING TODAY TO OUST OTHER ANTI-KCP ASSEMBLYMEN AS CHOE CHI-HWAN AND MIN KWAN-SIK.

1.3(a)(5)

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~~SECRET~~

-4- 1619, JUNE 6, 7 P.M. FROM SEOUL (SECTION I of II)

1.3(a)(9)

9.

[REDACTED]

5 THAT HE WAS GREATLY CONCERNED FOR SURVIVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN KOREA. HE DESCRIBED PLANS OF KCP SUPPORTERS TO TAKE EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES TO SUSTAIN KIM'S POWER, INCLUDING WIDESPREAD ARRESTS AND SMASHING OF DONGA ILBO AND KYONGHYANV SINMUN. HE BELIEVES, [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(9),(5)

[REDACTED] IT IMPERATIVE KCP BE SENT FROM THE COUNTRY, OTHERWISE SUCH PLOTS AND PLANS WILL CONTINUE. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5)

BERGER
BT

CFN 8. 9. 5

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA
at 10:50 A.M. JUNE 6, 1964

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

34
Action

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PP RUEHCR RUEHDT
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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
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
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~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO PRIORITY ACTION DEPT 1619 INFO
TOKYO 704 CINCPAC 677 USUN 67 JUNE 6, 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA

LIMDIS

10. AT SAME TIME WE ARE RECEIVING REPORTS THAT MODERATE ELEMENTS ARE SEEKING A SERIES OF ACTIONS BY PAK TO REESTABLISH A MORE NORMAL BASIS OF GOVERNMENT. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER YI HYO-SANG HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING DEVELOP MEASURE OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH OPPOSITION AND IN EFFECT REESTABLISH AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND CONSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.



1.3(a)(5)

AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOWZE ARE SEEING PRESIDENT PAK 1700 HOURS JUNE 6. SUBSTANCE AND OUTCOME THAT MEETING WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

11. GP-2.
BERGER
BT
CFN 1700 6 11. GP-2.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10 AM, 6/6/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA AT 9:45 AM, 6/6/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ PRIORITY ACTION DEPT 1604 INFO TOKYO 699 CINCPAC
673 JUNE 4, 7:30PM

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: A. DEPTTEL 1109 B. DEPTTEL 1110

1. AS WE HAD HOPED BUT COULD NOT BE SURE, INTERNAL PRESSURES AGAINST PRESIDENT PAK TO TAKE REMEDIAL MEASURES, TO REMOVE KIM CHONG-PIL, CLEAN UP CORRUPTION AND REORGANIZE DRP ARE MOUNTING NOW THAT MARTIAL LAW DECLARED. PAK HAS HAD STREAM OF VISITORS TODAY INCLUDING MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL MIN KI-SIK, YI HU-RAK, PROSECUTOR GENERAL SIN CHIK-SU, KIM HYING-UK, KIM SE-PAE, WITH OTHERS TRYING TO GET 'EE HIM AND ALL URGING ON HIM DANGER OF NOT TAKING ACTION NOW. NEARLY ALL REPORTS ARE THAT PAK HAS AGREED TAKE ACTION, OR IS MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION, BUT WE STILL HAVE RESERVATIONS.
2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I FEEL WE SHOULD LET THESE PRESSURES DEVELOP A LITTLE MORE BEFORE I ASK SEE PAK. I ALSO WANT TO GET A BETTER FEEL FOR COUNTRY'S REACTION TO MARTIAL LAW.
3. I DO NOT THINK KIM CHONG-PIL WILL REMAIN IDLE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. I AN SURE HE WILL MANEUVER IN VARIOUS WAYS TO WEATHER STORM. HE MAY TRY FOR A PURGE OF HIS ENEMIES IN DRP AND ELSEWHERE, OR EVEN MORE DESPERATE MEASURES. EVEN IF FORCES INTO EXILE HE WILL AT MINIMUM TRY TO MAINTAIN HIS CADRE ORGANIZATION MORE OR LESS INTACT. WE SHOULD NOT COUNT HIM OUT PREMATURELY.
4. FIRST DAY OF MARTIAL LAW HAS GONE OFF QUITE WELL IN SEOUL, WHICH NOW APPEARS ALMOST NORMAL. HOWEVER, ELSEWHERE IN COUNTRY THERE HAS BEEN TROUBLE, AND MARTIAL LAW MAY BE EXTENDED. POPULACE IN ALL AREAS SEEM TO WANT NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. WE SHALL KNOW MORE IN TWO OR THREE DAYS.

5. GP-2.
BERGER

~~SECRET~~

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Authority RAcod/R-254-3-8.9
By Jnl VARA Date 8.28.19

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

13

Korea

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160

By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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FE DE RUALOS 01E 04/0230Z
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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
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1964 JUN 3 PM 11 23

L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1598 INFO TOKYO
H 693 CINCPAC 670 JUNE 4 12 NOON

AID
P CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CU 1. AS OF 1000 HOURS JUNE 4, CITY QUIET WITH ELEMENTS OF
USIA 6TH AND 28TH DIVISIONS IN POSITION AT FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
NSC TOKSU PALACE, HYOCHANG PARK, CITIZENS HALL, NAMTAEMUN POLICE
INR STATION, NAMSAN HILL, SEOUL STADIUM, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY,
CIA SONGKYONKWAN UNIVERSITY, KOREA UNIVERSITY, TONGKUK UNIVERSITY,
NSA AND SEOUL HIGH SCHOOL.

OSD 2. ALL SCHOOLS CLOSED.
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NAVY
AIR

SCA PAGE TWO RUALOS 01E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RMR 3. MORNING PRESS APPEARED WITH MANY ITEMS BLANKED OUT BY CENSORS,
INCLUDING ALL COMMENTS BY OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS. PRESS
CARRIED WITHOUT COMMENT EMBASSY ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PROCLAMATION
MARTIAL LAW WAS MATTER FOR ROKG DECISION. ALL RADION STATIONS
ON AIR BUT BROADCASTING ONLY MUSIC, EXCEPT FOR GOVERNMENT RADIO,
WHICH IS LIMITING NEWS BROADCASTS TO READING OF MARTIAL LAW
PROCLAMATION. IN ABSENCE NEWSCASTS PUBLIC UNDOUBTEDLY
LISTENING TO RADIO PYONGYANG WHICH CARRYING FULL BUT
DISTORTED COVERAGE.

4. OPPOSITION STATEMENTS REACTING TO MARTIAL LAW WILL BE
REPORTED AS SOON AS OBTAINED. OPPOSITION STATEMENTS JUNE
3 INCLUDING FOLLOWING:

A. SAMMINHOE FLOOR LEADER YU SONG-KWON SAID RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SITUATION LIES WITH PRESIDENT PAK, WHO SHOULD MEET WITH
OPPOSITION LEADERS IN EFFORT SETTLE SITUATION;

B. CRP LEADER YUN PO-SON STATED HE HAD ASKED VICE SPEAKER
NA YONG KYUN TO ARRANGE FOR YUN TO MEET PAK;

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1598, JUNE 4, NOON FROM SEOUL

C. PARTY AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DP) HELD EMERGENCY MEETING AND ISSUED STATEMENT CALLING ON PAK TO STEP DOWN PEACEFULLY, HOLD NEW PRESIDENTIAL AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, FORM INTERIM GOVERNMENT HEADED BY
CFN3 4

PAGE THREE RUALOS 01E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
"FAIR AND HONEST" INDIVIDUAL AND FORM COUNCIL TO STUDY MEASURES FOR SETTLEMENT OF EMERGENCY SITUATION.

5. NATIONAL POLICE INFORMED EMBASSY THAT JUNE 3 CASUALTY FIGURES WERE AS FOLLOWS: 118 DEMONSTRATORS ARRESTED, OF WHOM 101 WERE NON-STUDENT CIVILIANS; 548 POLICE INJURED, OF WHOM 88 REMAIN IN HOSPITAL THIS MORNING, POLICEMEN REPORTED KILLED JUNE 3 SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS SERIOUSLY INJURED.

6. POLICE INFORMED EMBASSY THEY ARE EXPECTING FOLLOWING DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE OF SEOUL JUNE 4: PUSAN, APPROXIMATELY 1,000 STUDENTS (UNIDENTIFIED) IN ADDITION TO 1,000 TONGA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS; KWANGJU, ABOUT 100 STUDENTS; CHINCHU AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE; CHUNCHON AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE.

7. AT 1030 HOURS, 500-750 STUDENTS REPORTED DEMONSTRATING IN KWANGJU.

8. GP-3.

BERGER

BT

CFN 5 3 118 101 548 88 3 6 4 1,000 1,000 100 7 1030 500-750

8. GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of Sta

14

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1964 JUN 3 PM 4 02 0

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669 PRIORITY TOKYO 692 JUNE 4, 3AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LINDIS

REF: EMBTEL 1593 RPTD TOKYO 688 CINCPAC 665

1. LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WITH SOME CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION FOLLOWED BY DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW JUNE 3 POSE QUESTION WHAT WE SHOULD DO AND SAY.
2. MARTIAL LAW MAY SUCCEED IN RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER BUT SITUATION MIGHT QUICKLY WORSEN IF STUDENTS RESIST, POPULACE JOINS IN, AND TROOPS ARE FORCED TO EXTREME MEASURES. APRIL 1960 PRECEDENT MIGHT THEN BE REPEATED. GOVT EXPECTS NEXT CFN 1597 692 669 4 3AM 1593 688 665 1. 3 2. 1960

PAGE TWO

TWO OR THREE DAYS WILL BE CRITICAL, SINCE ALL INFORMATION INDICATES STUDENTS INTEND CHALLENGE MARTIAL LAW.

3. SHOULD SITUATION DEVELOP ON THESE LINES PAK GOVT MIGHT BE ABLE HEAD IT OFF BY ANNOUNCING IMMEDIATE MEASURES THAT WILL IMPRESS UPON PUBLIC THAT GOVT IS SERIOUS ABOUT DEALING WITH LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES.
4. OUR EFFORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO TRYING TO HELP GOVT STABILIZE SITUATION HENCE GEN HOWZE AND I AGREED TO RELEASE OF TROOPS. IF GOVT RESORTS ONLY TO FORCE WITHOUT REMEDIAL MEASURES AND IS FACED WITH A MASS UPRISING, QUESTION WILL ARISE WHETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. TIME THEREFORE HAS COME FOR US TO RECOMMEND TO ROKG WHAT ACTIONS IT MUST TAKE IF IT EXPECTS TO WEATHER DIFFICULTIES AND COUNT ON OUR SUPPORT..

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Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. XXIX, #14
By SJ, NARA, Date 1-8-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1597, JUNE 4, 3 AM, FROM SEOUL.

5. IN THIS SITUATION I RECOMMEND US TAKE FOLLOWING POSITION AND SO INFORM PAK:

A. US REGARDS MARTIAL LAW AS AN EMERGENCY STEP TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC DISORDER.

B. PAK MUST TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ESTABLISH PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVT. THESE MEASURES WOULD INCLUDE FOLLOWING:

(I) MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GOVT MUST MAKE PLAIN IT DOES NOT RPT NOT INTEND SUBSTITUTE MARTIAL LAW FOR NORMAL PROCESSES OVER EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.
CFN 3. 4. 5.

PAGE THREE

(II) GOVT SHOULD APPEAL TO RESPONSIBLE LEADERS OF OPPOSITION WHO ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE IN NATIONAL CRISIS. PAK SHOULD CALL MEETINGS WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS AND LEADERS THOSE ELEMENTS (PRESS, UNIVERSITY, MILITARY) OF COMMUNITY WHO COMMAND PUBLIC RESPECT AND SEEK THEIR ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH SITUATION. HE SHOULD ALSO MAKE A PERSONAL EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A FAVORABLE IMAGE OF HIMSELF BEFORE THE PUBLIC, IN THE PROCESS EXPLAINING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON EACH PRESSING ISSUE.

(III) KIM CHONG-P'IL SHOULD RESIGN FROM POLITICAL OFFICES AND LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

(IV) DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY SHOULD BE RECONSTITUTED, ITS CORRUPTION ELIMINATED, ITS SECRETARIAT VASTLY REDUCED, AND ITS UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN GOVT ENDED.

6. GOVT'S PAST INEPTITUDE, CORRUPT PRACTICES, AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE HAVE CAUGHT UP WITH IT. WE ARE NO LONGER CONFIDENT THAT PAK ABLE CONTROL SITUATION FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. WE DO NOT RPT NOT PREDICT THAT PAK GOVT CANNOT SURVIVE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, BUT INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE MAY TRY TO DO SO BY USE OF FORCE AND SUPPRESSION OPPOSITION PRESS, STUDENTS, AND POSSIBLY EVEN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD BE NEITHER ACCEPTABLE NOR VIABLE SOLUTION.

CFN 6.

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-3- 1597, JUNE 4, 3 AM, FROM SEOUL.

PAGE FOUR

7. WITH DEPT'S CONCURRENCE I INTEND SEE PAK AT APPROPRIATE TIME AND CONVEY SENSE OF FOREGOING.. I PLAN TO TELL HIM THAT UNLESS HE TAKES ACTIONS OF THIS SORT WE FORESEE THAT ROKG WILL SOON FIND ITSELF IN SITUATION WHERE IT CAN SURVIVE ONLY BY REPRESSIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN MEASURES IN WHICH USG WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIM. BY TAKING RECOMMENDED MEASURES PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY, HE WILL BE ACTING TO SAVE HIS GOVT AND PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN ROK.

8. I DO NOT INTEND ISSUE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS HERE OTHER THAN THOSE GIVEN EMBTEL 1591 AND SUGGEST DEPT FOLLOW S/IT ALONG WITH INDICATION OUR CONCERN AND WATCHFULNESS AT THIS POINT.

9. GEN HOWZE CONCURS.

10. GP-2.
BERGER

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY S/S-O 6/3/64 AT 4:08 PM.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6/3/64 AT 4:10PM.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15
Korea

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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STATE GRNC
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003048

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1964 JUN 3 PM 3 24 1596 INFO TOKYO
691 CINCPAC 668 JUNE 4, 3AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. I MET WITH PRIMIN LATE EVENING JUNE 3. HE SAID SITUATION GRAVE AND NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS COULD SETTLE FATE OF GOVERNMENT. HE EXPECTED AT LEAST 7,000 STUDENTS WOULD BE ON STREETS JUNE 4 AND MUCH DEPENDED ON ABILITY TROOPS TO HANDLE THEM WITH SKILL UNDER MARTIAL LAW. HE WAS HOPEFUL GENERAL PUBLIC WOULD NOT JOIN DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT CONFESSED HE WAS NOT CERTAIN.

2. PRIMIN SAID ALL UNIVERSITIES IN SEOUL WILL BE CLOSED FOR SUMMER AND WILL NOT RE-OPEN UNTIL FALL. PRESS WILL BE CFN 1596 691 668 4 3AM 1. 3. 7,000 4 2.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 14E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CENSORED AND GOVT WILL DEAL WITH THOSE ELEMENTS AGITATING STUDENTS, SOME OF WHOM HE CHARACTERIZED AS "COMMUNIST."

3. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD RECEIVED REPORT OF GEN HOWZE AND MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PAK. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY PAK AND BY CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS GENERAL KIM CHONG-O. I GAVE HIM SUMMARY OF EXACTLY WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

4. I ASKED PRIMIN IF HE HAD ANY OPINION AS TO WHAT MEASURES ADDITIONAL TO MARTIAL LAW GOVT NEEDED TAKE TO DEAL WITH SITUATION. HE SAID HE HAD SEEN PAK (AFTER OUR MEETING) AND TOLD HIM HE MUST DO TWO THINGS:

- A. REMOVE KIM CHONG-P'IL FROM SCENE;
- B. REORGANIZE DRP AND ELIMINATE CORRUPTION WHICH HAD ITS ORIGIN IN PARTY AND WAS PLAGUING GOVT., PRIMIN SAID THIS IS FIRST TIME HE HAS SPOKEN TO PAK OF NEED REMOVE KIM CHONG-P'IL.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RA 6011R-254-3-9-8
By: JDK xARA Date: 8-28-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1596, JUNE 4, 3 AM, FROM SEOUL

5. PRIMIN SAID THAT GENERAL KIM CHONG-O HAD SEEN PAK BEFORE MEETING WITH GENERAL HOWZE AND ME AND HAD TOLD PAK THAT KIM CHONG-P'IL HAD TO GO. PRIMIN AND GENERAL KIM BOTH TOLD PAK THAT IF KIM CHONG-P'IL STAYED ON PAK WOULD GO DOWN WITH HIM. (KIM CHONG-O HAS TOLD US IN PAST THAT IF MARTIAL LAW IMPOSED HE INTENDED TELL PAK THAT DECISION GET RID OF KIM CHONG-P'IL CFN 3. 4. 5.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 14E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WOULD NEED TO BE MADE AT SAME TIME.) PRIMIN ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN VISITED JUNE 3 BY LEADERS KOREAN CHRISTIAN CHURCHES WHO HAD URGED SAME ACTION AND HE HAD SO INFORMED PAK.

6. PAK GAVE PRIMIN AND KIM CHONG-O SAME ANSWER HE HAD GIVEN ME WHEN I RAISED QUESTION. PAK SAID IF KIM CHONG-P'IL LEFT DRP WAS FINISHED. PRIMIN SAID HE REPLIED THAT DRP WAS NOT NECESSARY AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED. PAK GAVE PRIMIN NO INDICATION OF ANY WILLINGNESS ACCEPT ADVICE BEING RECEIVED. PRIMIN SAID IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE WHY PAK CONTINUED CLING TO KIM CHONG-P'IL.

7. I TOLD PRIMIN GOVT MUST DECIDE ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS AND LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES. HE AGREED AND SAID THAT HE AND ENTIRE CABINET HAD APPROVED DECLARATION MARTIAL LAW BUT HE BELIEVED OTHER ACTIONS WERE NEEDED. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THEY WOULD BE TAKEN.

8. COMMENT: I DID NOT PRESS ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS OR SOLUTIONS ON PRIMIN. HE WAS EXTREMELY NERVOUS AT OUTSET CONVERSATION BUT SETTLED DOWN. HE RATHER EMBARRASSINGLY DEMONSTRATED HIS INABILITY TO INFLUENCE PAK TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS IN ADDITION TO MARTIAL LAW.

9. GP-2.

BERGER

BT

CFN 3 6. 7. 8. 9. GP-2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02631

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1114

PRIORITY *Korea*

SS

Info:

Jun 4 5 04 PM '64

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In order expedite dissemination to interested agencies here, until further notice include White House, OSD, JCS, CIA and USUN as addressees on telegrams dealing with current political crisis, including those captioned LIMDIS and EXDIS.

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RUSK

Drafted by:

WBC
S/S-O: WBConnett, Jr. 6/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Benjamin H. Read

Clearances:

FE/EA - ~~Mr. Schaefer~~ (by phone) *MR*

OC/T - Mr. Newton *H*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea

17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50
Action

SS
Info

OO RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 13E 03/1400Z
O 031330Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STJNE GRNC

2 6 6 6

1964 JUN 3 AM 11:05

037

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (1593) INFO
IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 665 PRIORITY TOKYO 688 JUNE 3, 10:30PM

LINDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: EMBTEL 1589

1. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS OF PRESIDENT PAK'S MEETING WITH
GENERAL HOWZE AND ME AFTERNOON JUNE 3 (SEE REFTEL).

2. PAK SAID:

A. GOVT HAS UP TO TODAY BEEN PATIENT AND LENIENT IN TREATING
WITH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS; STUDENT AIM NOW IS TO BRING GOVT
DOWN.

B. TODAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS HAD TURNED INTO RIOTING WITH POLICE
STATIONS DESTROYED, GOVT TRUCKS AND JEEPS SEIZED AND A POLICE
ARMORY BROKEN INTO. POLICE HAD SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES.
(DURING MEETING REPORT CAME IN THAT A POLICEMAN HAD BEEN
KILLED BY STUDENTS.)

C. PRESIDENT OF SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, MAIN SOURCE OF
STUDENT ACTIVITY, TODAY SENT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THROUGH
VICE SPEAKER NA YONG-KYUN (OPPOSITION) THAT HE HAD INFO
60 STUDENTS AND A NUMBER OF PROFESSORS ENCOURAGING DEMONSTRATORS
CFN 1593 665 688 3 10:30PM 1589 1. 3 2. 60

PAGE TWO RUALOS 13E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WERE COMMUNISTS. HE HAD BEEN AFRAID TO PASS THIS INFO BUT
WAS DOING SO IN VIEW OF TODAY'S RIOTING.

D. PRESIDENT HAD SUMMONED PRIMIN, OTHER CABINET MEMBERS
CONCERNED, CHIEFS OF ARMED SERVICES, AND MEMBERS NATIONAL

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Authority FRUS, '64-'68, Vol. XXIX, #13
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-8-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1593, JUNE 3, 10 PM, FROM SEOUL

SECURITY COUNCIL TO SPECIAL MEETING THIS AFTERNOON, WHICH CAME TO CONCLUSION THAT MARTIAL LAW REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE IMPOSED TONIGHT, AND HE REQUESTED GENERAL HOWZE TO RELEASE 6TH AND 28TH DIVISIONS.

E. MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE CONFINED TO SEOUL INITIALLY, BUT MIGHT HAVE TO BE EXTENDED TO OTHER AREAS DEPENDING ON HOW SITUATION DEVELOPED. IN THAT CASE MORE TROOPS MIGHT BE REQUIRED.

3. IN RESPONSE MY REQUEST FOR DETAILS OF MARTIAL LAW, PAK SAID:

A. ALL SCHOOLS DOWN TO PRIMARY WOULD BE CLOSED AT OUTSET, AND WOULD BE REOPENED GRADUALLY AS SITUATION PERMITTED.

B. MANIPULATORS OF STUDENTS WOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND INDICTED BY PROSECUTOR GENERAL.

C. PRESS CENSORSHIP WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

D. CIVIL CASES WOULD BE TRIED BY CIVIL COURTS. MORE IMPORTANT CASES BY MILITARY COURTS.

E. GENERAL MIN KI-SIK WOULD BE MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER. CFN 6TH 28TH 3.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 13E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F. HE COULD NOT SAY HOW LONG MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE KEPT ON. HE HOPED NOT LONG.

4. I SAID NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NOW IN ADJOURNMENT, BUT COULD BE CONVENED BY MEMBERS. ASSEMBLY WOULD WANT TO DEBATE MARTIAL LAW DECISION. IN VIEW DIVISIONS IN ASSEMBLY GOVT ACTION MIGHT

FACE HEAVY CRITICISM IN ASSEMBLY ADDING CONFUSION TO SITUATION. PAK SAID DRP LEADERS HAD MET TODAY AND PLEDGED FULL SUPPORT OF THIS ACTION. I ASKED IF THIS WAS DRP ASSEMBLYMEN OR PARTY ACTION. HE SAID PARTY LEADERS WHICH INCLUDE SOME ASSEMBLYMEN.

5. I SAID WE RECOGNIZED SITUATION HAD BECOME SERIOUS AS RESULT TODAY'S RIOTING BUT MARTIAL LAW WAS NO RPT NO SOLUTION TO BASIC PROBLEMS. WHAT FURTHER MEASURES DID PRESIDENT CONTEMPLATE TO DEAL WITH STUDENT AND PUBLIC GRIEVANCES. PAK SAID IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO DEAL WITH RIOTING AND HE HAD NOT GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO FURTHER ASPECTS OF PROBLEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1593, JUNE 3, 10 PM, FROM SEOUL

6. I SAID WE OF COURSE HOPED THAT LAW AND ORDER WOULD BE QUICKLY RESTORED UNDER MARTIAL LAW, BUT IN LIGHT OF APRIL 1960 EXPERIENCE THERE WAS DANGER OF MASSIVE STUDENTS AND POPULAR ACTION IN STREETS. SHOULD THIS BE CASE IT WOULD CREATE FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF SUPPORTING HIS GOVERNMENT FACE OF GENERAL PUBLIC DISAPPROVAL. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THIS, BUT IF FACED WITH UNCONTROLLABLE POPULAR OPPOSITION HE WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN.
CFN 4. 5. 6. 1960

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 13E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. I SAID WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER TO TRY TO HEAD OFF THIS POSSIBILITY BY ANNOUNCING MEASURES THAT WOULD MEET POPULAR GRIEVANCES. HE REPEATED THIS MUST WAIT UNTIL LAW AND ORDER WAS RESTORED. I THEN SAID "MR. PRESIDENT, I KNOW HOW PAINFUL THIS SUBJECT IS BUT THE SITUATION IS SERIOUS, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SPEAK FRANKLY. SINCE MARCH 23 AT LEAST A DOZEN KOREAN LEADERS, WHO SUPPORT YOU, HAVE TOLD ME THAT IF MARTIAL LAW IS INVOKED, YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN SERIOUS DANGER UNLESS KIM CHONG-PIL IS REMOVED. I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT I AM NOT RPT NOT SAYING HE SHOULD BE REMOVED, BUT THIS IS WHAT SOME OF YOUR MOST LOYAL SUPPORTERS ARE SAYING."

8. PAK REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT KCP "HAS LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING SOME IN THE ARMED FORCES AND IN THE PARTY." HE THEN RECOUNTED EVENTS OF MAY 31-JUNE 2: HIS MEETING WITH KCP ON MAY 31 TO DISCUSS RESIGNATION; KCP'S RESIGNATION JUNE 1; THE DANGER OF CONFLICT IN DRP IF HE DID RESIGN; THE MEETING WITH DRP LEADERS JUNE 1 WHERE ONLY ONE VOICE, CHANG KYONG-SUN, SUPPORTED RESIGNATION;
CFN 7. 23 8. 31 2 31 1 1

REPAGE FIVE RUALOS 13E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAK UNSURE WHAT DECISION TO MAKE AND DECIDED TO LEAVE IT TO THE DRP PARTY CONVENTION THIS SUMMER. HE SAID AS I KNEW FROM PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH HIM, HE BELIEVES KCP SHOULD RESIGN AS CHAIRMAN OF DRP, BUT NOT UNTIL THIS SUMMER AFTER ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT MADE. I DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER EXCEPT TO SAY THAT PUBLIC ANIMUS WAS DIRECTED AT KCP AND NOT PAK.

9. GENERAL HOWZE THEN REFERRED TO PAK'S REQUEST TO RELEASE TWO DIVISIONS AND SAID HE PREPARED DO SO WITH MY CONCURRENCE. I AGREED. GENERAL HOWZE THEN COMPARED CURRENT SITUATION WITH APRIL 1960, WHEN HE WAS IN KOREA, SAYING AT THAT TIME THERE WAS UNIVERSAL HOSTILITY TO FRAUDULENTLY ELECTED GOVT; THIS NOT THE CASE NOW. HOWEVER, KOREAN MILITARY FORCES WERE CLOSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1593, JUNE 3, 10 PM, FROM SEOUL

TO PEOPLE AND REFLECTED THEIR VIEWS AND FEELINGS. IN APRIL 1960 MARTIAL LAW PEOPLE CHEERED ARRIVAL OF ARMED FORCES. GEN HOWZE WAS NOT SURE THIS WOULD BE THE CASE THIS TIME. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF PEOPLE CAME TO THINK THAT GOVT REQUIRED PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES IN ORDER STAY IN POWER.

10. GENERAL HOWZE WAS ASSURED THAT TANKS WOULD NOT BE BROUGHT INTO SEOUL AND THAT LIVE AMMUNITION WOULD BE HELD BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS. PAK SAID ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT RPT NOT FIRE EXCEPT WITH HIS EXPRESS AUTHORITY.

11. I THEN SAID QUESTION WILL ARISE AS TO WHETHER US GOVT APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED MARTIAL LAW. I WANTED MAKE CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT HAD NOT ASKED FOR OUR APPROVAL BUT ASKED FOR RELEASE OF TROOPS. I WISHED HIS GOVT COULD AVOID ANY CFN 9. 1960 1960 10. 11.

PAGE SIX RUALOS ~~13E CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATEMENT THAT IMPLIED OUR APPROVAL OR AGREEMENT. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN BY ROK GOVT IN ITS SOVEREIGN CAPACITY. PRESIDENT AGREED.

12. I THEN REPEATED POINTS WE HAD MADE SO THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

A. WE AGREED SITUATION WAS SERIOUS.

B. INVOCATION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS DECISION OF KOREAN GOVT.

C. WE AGREED TO RELEASE OF TROOPS AT KOREAN GOVT'S REQUEST.

D. MARTIAL LAW WOULD NOT SOLVE BASIC PROBLEMS.

E. WE HOPED PRESIDENT WOULD CONSIDER WHAT MEASURES MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED TO DEAL WITH POPULAR GRIEVANCES. IN THIS CONNECTION THAT KIM CHONG-P'IL MUST BE REMOVED ALONG WITH MARTIAL LAW HAD BEEN EXPRESSED TO ME BY KOREAN LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED PRESIDENT.

13. PRESIDENT, KIM CHONG-O AND MIN/DEFENSE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY THE VIEWS WE HAD EXPRESSED.

14. GP-1
BERBER
BT

CFN 12. 13. 14. GP-2.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:18 AM 6/3/64
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:45 AM 6/3/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lower

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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002506

1964 JUN 3 AM 9 12

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1591 INFO PRIORITY
TOKYO 686 CINCPAC 663 JUNE 3, 9:45 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: EMBTEL 1589, RPTD TOKYO 684, CINCPAC 661

1. WE ARE RECEIVING PRESS QUERIES ON US AGREEMENT IMPOSITION
MARTIAL LAW. MARTIAL LAW NOT RPT NOT YET DECLARED.

2. IN RESPONSE QUERIES WE ARE SAYING:

"DECLARATION MARTIAL LAW IS MATTER FOR KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO
DECIDE. QUESTION OF US AUTHORITIES AGREEING OR APPROVING,
THEREFORE DOES NOT ARISE. WHETHER OR NOT MARTIAL LAW SHOULD
BE IMPOSED IS DECISION FOR ROKG TO MAKE WITHIN ITS OWN
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION."

FURTHER PRESS QUERIES RECEIVING ANSWER THAT "WE HAVE NOTHING
MORE TO SAY ON CURRENT SITUATION."

CFN 1591 686 663 3 9:45 PM 1589 684 661 1. 2.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 12E

3. UPON DECLARATION MARTIAL LAW IF WE ARE ASKED WHETHER
GENERAL HOWZE AGREED RELEASE TROOPS UNDER HIS CONTROL WE INTEND
SAY:

"AFTER RECEIVING FORMAL REQUEST FROM KOREAN GOVERNMENT,
GENERAL HOWZE RELEASED TWO ROK DIVISIONS WHICH WERE UNDER
HIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL."

4. GENERAL HOWZE CONCURS.

BERGER
BT

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 9:30 AM, 6/3/64.

CFN 3. 4. NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 9:20 AM, 6/3/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 19

~~SECRET~~
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35
Action

Control: 2542
Rec'd: JUNE 3, 1964
9:33 AM

FE
Info

FROM: CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE UCS WASHDC

105

G

INFO: CINC PAC

SP

CINCUSARPAC

L

WHITE HOUSE

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STATE DEPT

SAL

AID

DATE: 031208Z JUNE 60432
FLASH

P

CU

LARGE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS THIS AFTERNOON CONDUCTED ANTI-GOVT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEOUL WHICH TOOK ON SOME OF THE ASPECTS OF GENUINE RIOTING. ONE POLICEMAN REPORTED KILLED, ONE POLICE ARMORY PLUS A NUMBER OF POLICE VEHICLES AND SOME ARMY TRUCKS CAPTURED BY STUDENTS.

USIA

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PER

SCA

IN THE COURSE OF A ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR CONFERENCE AT BLUE HOUSE, PRESIDENT PAK, AFTER INDICATING HIS OPINION THAT SITUATION WAS VERY SERIOUS, STATED TO THE AMBASSADOR AND TO ME HIS INTENTION TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW IMMEDIATELY, AND REQUESTED RELEASE OF THE 6TH AND 28TH ROK DIVISIONS (ACTIVE DIVISIONS IN RESERVE POSITIONS CLOSE TO SEOUL), LESS THEIR ARTILLERY, FROM MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL. WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EARLIER GUIDANCE FROM YOU, I GRANTED THIS RELEASE.

RMR

THE AMBASSADOR MADE PLAIN HIS OPINION THAT IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO THE SITUATION, THAT IT WAS VERY NECESSARY TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT IF A PERMANENT SOLUTION WAS TO BE FOUND. HE STATED HOWEVER THAT HE WAS POSING NO OFFICIAL OBJECTION TO MARTIAL LAW INASMUCH AS THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY. THE DETAILS OF THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH THE PRESIDENT WILL BE FOUND IN MESSAGE WHICH HE WILL DISPATCH TO STATE.

I EXPRESSED MY BELIEF THAT A DIFFERENCE EXISTED IN THE COMMITMENT OF THE ARMY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ITS COMMITMENT IN 1960. IN 1960 THE ARMY WAS WELCOMED BY THE POPULACE BECAUSE IT BROUGHT ORDER

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Authority Group 4

By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

~~SECRET~~

-2- 031208Z JUNE 60432, FROM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA

TO A CHAOTIC SITUATION WHICH HAD ALREADY CAUSED MUCH BLOODSHED, WHERE AS THE USE OF THE ARMY NOW WOULD MAKE IT CONFRONT THE STUDENTS DIRECTLY IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE THE STUDENTS' OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM. I STATED THAT ONE OF THE GREAT STABILIZING FORCES IN KOREA WAS THE EXISTING SYMPATHY BETWEEN THE MIL AND THE POPULATION, AND THAT I REGRETTED ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ALIENATE THESE TWO SEGMENTS.

I STATED ALSO THAT THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE USE OF MAJOR MILITARY FORCES CONSTITUTED A COMMITMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S RESERVES AND AS A TACTICAL MOVE WAS PERHAPS TOO EARLY, SUGGESTING THAT THE INSTITUTION OF THE CORRECTIONS EARLIER MENTIONED BY THE AMBASSADOR MIGHT SUFFICE.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADER, THIS INDICATING THAT HE ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE POPULACE--AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE APRIL 1960 SITUATION WHEREIN THERE WAS VERY GREAT POPULAR RESENTMENT AGAINST THE NEWLY RE-ELECTED SYNGMAN RHEE - LEE KI PUNG GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE NOW TO RAISE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES A DEBATE AS TO WHETHER THIS CURRENTLY PROJECTED MOVE WAS NECESSARY.

MARTIAL LAW HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED, BUT THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT IT WILL BE TONIGHT. MIN KI SIK, CHIEF OF STAFF, ROKA, WHO WENT IN TO SEE THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR CONFERENCE, TOLD ME SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW AND HAS GIVEN MIN KI SIK ORDERS TO MOVE THE TWO DIVISIONS LESS ARTILLERY. MIN EXPECTS TO START THEIR MOVEMENT BEFORE SUNUP TOMORROW.

GP-4.

HMR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:49 6/3/64

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 21

54

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RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
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RUAROP/COMAFKOREA
ZEN/COMNAVFORKOREA
ZEN/AMEMB
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002970
1964 JUN 3 PM 2 41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UK 60427 BJ

SPOT REPORT - STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN KOREA (U)
1. (U) AS OF 031430I ABOUT 5 THOUSAND STUDENTS FROM ABOUT TEN SCHOOLS ARE CURRENTLY DEMONSTRATING IN SEOUL. 2000 STUDENTS FROM KOREA UNIVERSITY AND SNU COMMERCIAL COLLEGE HAVE FORCED THEIR WAY THROUGH SEVERAL TEAR GAS BARRAGES AND HAVE PASSED EAST GATE. 1500 STUDENTS FROM SNU AND SONGKYUN KWAN HAVE REACHED CHONGNO 5GH ST. TEAR GAS HAS BEEN USED AGAINST 500 YONSEI STUDENTS NEAR EAST GATE. SMALL GROUPS OF TWO OR THREE HUNDREDS HAVE BEEN REPORTED INSIDE POLICE LINES AT THE ASSEMBLY AND AT VARIOUS POINTS DOWNTOWN.

PAGE 2
KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE ESTIMATE 500 MORE STUDENTS ARE RALLYING ON VARIOUS CAMPUSES. LARGE CROWDS ARE FOLLOWING THE DEMONSTRATORS WHOSE SLOGUNS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF YEATERDAY AND ARE ANTI-PAK GOVERNMENT. APPROXIMATELY 200 STUDENTS ARE NOW LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. AS OF 1330I A DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD IN TAEJON INVOLVING AN ESTIMATED 700 SUTDENTS. POLICE ARRESTED 150 OF THE DEMONSTRATORS. IN CHONJU AND ESTIMATED 1500 STUDENTS REPORTED BOARDING A TRAIN FOR SEOUL. PUSAN POLICE REPORT THAT THIS AM A DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD AT PUSAN UNIVERSITY WITH ANTI-US OVERTONES. AT TONGA UNIVERSITY IN PUSAN A RALLY IS SCHEDULED FOR LATER TODAY ALSO REPORTED TO CARRY ANTI-US OVERTONES. SOME RIGN LEADERS

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Authority Group 4
By us, NARS, Date 1-22-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- UK 60427 BJ, 030839Z, JUNE, FROM COMUSKOREA.

HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN ARRESTED. AND ESTIMATED 300 TO 400 STUDENTS FROM SUWON UNIVERSITY ARE REPORTED MARCHING ON FOOT TO SEOUL AND AS OF 1430 I HOURS ARE IN THE VICINITY OF ANYANG-NI APPROXIMATELY 15 MILES SOUTH OF SEOUL.

2. G2, EIGHTH ARMY COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF SERIOUS INJURIES THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE WORSENING IN THAT SPECTATORS ARE JOINING THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE APPEAR UNABLE TO PREVENT THE DEMONSTRATORS FROM REACHING THE DOWNTOWN AREA. DEMONSTRATIONS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE AND WILL

PAGE 3

PROBABLE GROW IN SIZE. KIM CHIN WI, COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND REPORTED TO EIGHTH ARMY THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO MOVE INTO THE SEOUL AREA TO BOLSTER THE POLICE. KIM STATED HIS CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION. THE SITUATION REMAINS FLUID.

GP - FOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02167

22

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Rnea

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Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL 1110 IMMEDIATE

INFO: AmEmbassy TOKYO 3144

JUN 3 8 21 PM '64

CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *sj/c*, NARA, Date 5-22-07

Seoul's 1597 rptd Tokyo 692, CINCPAC 669

Agree you should call on Pak soonest to convey recommenda-
You are
tions cited para 5 reftel. ~~and~~ ~~you~~ authorized to say, as may
be necessary to give adequate emphasis, that your views shared
by Washington. Leave it to your judgment as to how to present
these points to Pak in way most likely to gain his cooperative
response.

The following suggestions are keyed to sub-paras 5B
reftel:

1. This point initially met in ROKG declaration martial
law reported Seoul's 1594, but it would be useful for President
Pak personally continue to re-emphasize it. More importantly,
he should observe his pledge to lift martial law ASAP and in
meantime guarantee maximum freedom.

2. President has obligation to take such action in

Drafted by: FE:CNorredJr./MGreen:ej 6/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

EA - Mr. ~~Baker~~ Fearey

Mr. Solbert (subs) *am*

RFE - Mr. Hulen *am*

OSD/ISA - ~~Collyer~~ ~~Murphy~~

Joint Staff (informed) *am*

S/S - Mr. deMartino

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connection declaration martial law, although he may not elicit a cooperative response from opposition. Such consultations might also include elements of Democratic-Republican Party favoring reform.

3, and 4. Believe problem of Kim Chong-p'il should be posed as part of need for over-all reform of Party. We are concerned, as we know you are, to avoid overplaying our hand with Pak on KCP.

Defense concurs.

GP-1

RUSK

END

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02031

Korea

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin
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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL 1109 IMMEDIATE
CINCUNC "

Jan 3 7 01 PM '64

INFO: AmEmbassy TOKYO 3139 IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By *sijz*, NARA, Date 5-22-07

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

LIMDIS

(A) Seoul's 1593, rptd Tokyo 688, CINCPAC 665; (B) CINCUNC's 60432

1. We approve positions you have taken with President Pak paras 4-11 reftel A, and in reftel B.

2. We believe our efforts should be directed toward preventing development of cycle of disorder and repression, by dissuading ROKG from taking repressive actions that would incite further disorders, and by urging ROKG to take measures to meet public grievances. We see danger in tying ourselves closely to ROKG in this situation.

3. We commend initiative you have already taken, using release of two divisions as moral justification for representation, to encourage ROKG to meet public grievances. You may also wish to urge ROKG to take promised punitive action against paratroopers who invaded judge's home.

Drafted by:

cur
FE: EACANorred Jr: bhm; e; j

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green *mg*

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bacon *mg*

OSD/ISA-Adm. Blouin (subs) Director, Joint Staff (subs) *cur*

OSD/ISA - Col. Moorman *cur*

RFE - Mr. Eulen (substance) *cur*

S/S - Mr. deMartino *cur*

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

4. We are prepared to respond quickly to any recommendations you may wish to send in, but we recognize situation may require quick decisions on your part, with little detailed guidance from Washington.

5. ~~XXXXX~~ Embtel 1597 just received. Urgently preparing reply.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

05031

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24

Korea

35

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

031

CONTROL: 19685
 REC'D: MAY 24, 10:04 AM
 FROM: SEOUL
 ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1534 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)
 INFO: TOKYO 664
 CINCPAC FOR POLAD 644
 DATE: MAY 24, 9 PM

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS

1. CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL KIM CHONG-O MAY 23, AND WITH PRIME MINISTER AND DRP ASSEMBLYMAN SK KIM (KIM SONG-KON) MAY 24, REINFORCED OUR BELIEF THAT GOVT IS RAPIDLY MOVING TOWARD INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CRISIS.
2. I TOLD PRIME MINISTER WE WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER DEVELOPMENTS LAST TWO DAYS, FOLLOWING PARATROOPER INCIDENT AND PREDICTIONS OF RENEWED STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY 25, AND ASKED HOW GOVT INTENDED TO HANDLE SITUATION.
3. INFO HE VOLUNTEERED OR SUPPLIED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SHOWS HOW CONFUSED AND DISTURBING SITUATION IS BECOMING. IT CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. MAY 23 CABINET MEETING OF KEY MINISTERS WITH C/S ARMY GENERAL MIN KI-SHIK PRESENT DECIDED UPON QUICK AND DECISIVE INVESTIGATION AND COURT MARTIAL OF PARATROOPERS IN ORDER HEJD OFF OR MODERATE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED MAY 25. PRIMIN SAID HE SHARED OUR SUSPICION THAT GEN. MIN WAS AWARE OF PARATROOPER ACTION IN ADVANCE PRIMIN NOT CONFIDENT GEN. MIN WILL GARRY THROUGH FORCIBLY. ALSO CONFIRMED THAT ELEMENTS CLOSE TO KIM CHONG-PIL WEU BEHIND PARATROOPERS ACTION.
 - B. PRIMIN CONFIRMED THAT MARTIAL LAW TO DEAL WITH RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS IS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN GOVT. OPINION DIVIDED BETWEEN THOSE WHO FAVOR ITS IMMEDIATE USE IN EVENT OF RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS AND THOSE (INCLUDING PRIMIN) WHO BELIEVE IT WILL IMPERIL GOVT IF INVOKED BUT PREPARED USE IT IN EXTREMIS.
 - C. PRIMIN BELIEVES THAT SOME HARD-CORE ELEMENTS SEE IN MARTIAL LAW AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH STUDENTS, AND GET RID OF OPPOSITION,

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authority RA 6001R-254-3-10-G
 By JOW KARA Date 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1534, MAY 24, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

PRESS AND EVEN ASSEMBLY. HE SUSPECTS THAT PARATROOPER INCIDENT MAY BE STEP ONE OF THIS PLOT. HE DID NOT SPECIFY KIM CHONG-PIL, BUT INFERRED THAT IT IS PEOPLE AROUND KCP WHO ARE THINKING IN THESE TERMS. PRIMIN SAID PAK SPEAKS OF TAKING HARD LINE WITH STUDENTS, PRESS AND OPPOSITION BUT HAS NOT MENTIONED ABOLISHING ASSEMBLY. D. PRIMIN WORRIED OVER PROBABILITY PRESIDENT PAK WOULD NAME GENERAL MIN AS MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER, PARTLY BECAUSE HE THINKS MIN IS WORKING SECRETLY WITH KIM CHONG-PIL ELEMENTS, PARTLY BECAUSE MIN IS ERRATIC AND DANGEROUS IN WAY HE MAKES DECISIONS, AND PARTLY BECAUSE MIN IS NOT RESPECTED BY OTHER SENIOR ARMY LEADERS.

3. I SAID WE SEE SITUATION IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS PRIMIN. I ASKED HIM TO TELL PRESIDENT PAK THAT IF MARTIAL LAW BECOMES NECESSARY, AND ANY ATTEMPT IS MADE IN PROCESS TO ABOLISH ASSEMBLY, OR ANY ATTEMPT MADE BY EXTREME ELEMENTS TO STAGE A COUP, PRESIDENT PAK MUST NOT ASSUME US WILL GO ALONG. PRIMIN SAID IT UNTHINKABLE THAT FIVE MONTHS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT NEW GOVT, IT NECESSARY ABOLISH ASSEMBLY AND GOVERN UNDER MARTIAL LAW.

4. SK KIM SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED POLITICAL COUNSEOLOR OF MEETING 15 DISSIDENT DRP LEADERS EVENING MAY 23. PRESENT WERE SPEAKER YI HYO-SANG, VICE SPEAKER CHANG KYONG-SUN, DRP DEPUTY FLOOR LEADERS, AND OTHERS. IT WAS UNANIMOUS OPINION SITUATION CALLED FOR DRASTIC ACTION. SPEAKER YI AND CHANG WERE DESIGNATED TO CALL ON PRESIDENT PAK MORNING MAY 24 AND ADVISE HIM:

- A. TO REMOVE KIM CHONG-PIL FROM PARTY POSITION AND SEND HIM OUT OF COUNTRY.
- B. TO RETIRE FROM PARTY PRESIDENCY AND ALLOW DISMANTLING OF DRP IN ORDER PAVE WAY FOR NEW OR RECONSTITUTED MAJORITY PARTY.
- C. TO SEEK COOPERATION POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND BRING IN CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS FROM ALL GROUPS IN EFFORT BROADEN GOVTS SUPPORT. (RECOGNIZING ADAMANCY YUN PO-SUN'S POSITION THIS PLAN BASED ON ALLEGED WILLINGNESS OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS WORK WITH RE-ORGANIZED GOVT ELEMENTS ONCE KIM CHONG-PIL INFLUENCE REMOVED).
- D. REORGANIZE CABINET TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATION FROM OPPOSITION.

5. SK KIM SAID ANTI-KIM CHONG-PIL LEADERS BELIEVED GOVT WOULD BE WRONG TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW AS PROPOSED BY HARD-LINE IN DRP. SAID PROSPECTS LARGE-SCALE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CREATED DILEMMA IN THIS REGARD BUT IF GOVT TOOK STRONG ACTION AGAINST PARATROOPERS, AT SAME TIME ANNOUNCING EXILE KIM CHONG-PIL, CLEANUP DRP AND PROMISE OF NEW POLITICAL LINE-UP, CHANCES WERE GOOD FOR QUIETING STUDENTS.

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-3- 1534, MAY 24, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

6. ACCORDING TO SK KIM, DISSIDENT GROUP DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE PAK WOULD FOLLOW THEIR ADVICE. PRESIDENT SEEMS EMBARKED ON COURSE BEING LAID OUT BY HARD-LINE ELEMENT IN DRP. MOREOVER, PRO-KIM CHONG-PIL ELEMENTS IN ARMED FORCES MAY TAKE STRONG ACTION.

7. KIM SAID IF PAK REJECTS ADVICE GIVEN, SPEAKER YI, CHANG, HE AND OTHERS PLAN RESIGN POSITIONS AND SPLIT INSIDE GOVT AND DRP WOULD BE IRREVOCABLE. SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD FOLLOW BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON STUDENT ACTIVITY AND GOVT'S REACTION TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS. IN OPINION DISSIDENT GROUP THER ADVICE REPRESENTS ONLY WAY FOR PAK TO PROTECT HIS OWN POSITION AND PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES.

GP-2.

BERGER

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

35
Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

031

CONTROL: 19684
REC'D: MAY 24, 10:10 AM
FROM: SEOUL
ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1534 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
INFO: TOKYO 664
CINCPAC FOR POLAD 644
DATE: MAY 24, 9 PM

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS

8. GENERAL HOWZE RETURNED SEOUL MAY 24 AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON CURRENT SITUATION.

9. COMMENT:

A. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST WITH RESPONSIBLE ROKG POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES THAT PERSONS INVOLVED IN AND RESPONSIBLE FOR PARATROOPER INCIDENT BE IDENTIFIED AND PUNISHED, NOT ONLY AS MATTER NORMAL MILITARY DISCIPLINE BUT AS NECESSARY POLITICAL STEP TO DEMONSTRATE EQUALITY ALL GROUPS UNDER LAW AND TO PREVENT MILITARY FORCES FROM ASSUMING THEY CAN TAKE LAW INTO OWN HANDS. NOT LIKELY IN ANY EVENT THAT REAL INSTIGATORS WILL BE REVEALED.

B. AS TO MARTIAL LAW, WE SHOULD NOT PREJUDGE SITUATION. GOVT MAY NEED RESORT TO MARTIAL LAW TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER WHILE TAKING TIME TO WORK OUT NEW COURSE OF ACTION. ON OTHER HAND, IF PAK REJECTS ADVICE DRP DISSIDENTS, HE AND KIM MAY REACT BY TAKING EXTREME AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES TO DEFEAT AND DISARM ANTI-KCP GROUP AND AT SAME TIME CRACK DOWN ON OPPOSITION, PRESS AND STUDENTS. IN LIGHT OF THAT POSSIBILITY, REQUEST AUTHORITY TO WARN PAK AT APPROPRIATE TIME THAT US POLICY TOWARD HIS GOVT BASED ON ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER AND THAT US WILL NOT SUPPORT ATTEMPT UNDER COVER OF MARTIAL LAW TO SUSPEND OR ABROGATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES.

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-2- 1534, MAY 24, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

C. WHILE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PAK OF ANTI-KCP DISSIDENTS-- IF MADE IN FORM INDICATED ABOVE -- REPRESENT POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF PRESENT CRISIS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXERCISE CAUTION AND FLEXIBILITY SO AS NOT TO IDENTIFY OURSELVES WITH THE SPECIFICS, LEST IT BE MADE TO APPEAR THAT THEY REPRESENT OUR SOLUTION. KOREANS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO WORK THEIR WAY OUT OF THIS CRISIS AND WE SHOULD LET THEM COME UP WITH SOLUTIONS SO LONG AS THESE REMAIN WITHIN A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. SITUATION AND FORCES NOW IN MOTION ARE GOING TO POSE PAK WITH HIS GRAVEST DECISION AND THE MORE THIS DECISION IS THE PRODUCT OF KOREAN FORCES THE MORE LIKELY IT WILL SUCCEED.

D. WE STILL DO NOT HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT YI, CHANG AND SUPPORTERS HAVE MADE THEIR DEMARCHE TO PAK. WHETHER MADE OR NOT, WE THINK IT UNLIKELY ANY DECISION WILL BE TAKEN UNTIL EXTENT AND SERIOUSNESS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THIS WEEK ARE KNOWN.

10. GP-2

BERGER

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

Korea

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Action

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55
Info

CONTROL: 19642
RECD: MAY 24, 1964, 4:31 A.M.

FROM: SEOUL
ACTION: SECSTATE 1532 PRIORITY
INFO: TOKYO 662
CINCPAC FOR POLAD 642
DATE: MAY 24, 2 P.M.

31

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS

1. IMMEDIATE SITUATION IN KOREA HAS AGAIN REACHED A PEAK OF UNCERTAINTY, UNREST AND DISARRAY. WE HAVE HAD SUCH PERIODS OFF AND ON FOR OVER A YEAR BUT PRESENT MOOD STRIKES US AS MOST GRAVE AND FRAUGHT WITH DIFFICULTY SINCE THE MAY 16, 1961 COUP.
2. PAK GOVT IS UNDER STRONG ATTACK BY POLITICAL OPPOSITON, PRESS, AND STUDENT ELEMENTS. MOREOVER, THE INTERNAL DISPUTE IN GOVT BETWEEN THE PRO AND ANTI KIM CHONG-PIL GROUPS, IS HEATING UP AFTER MOMENTARY LULL OF PAST FEW WEEKS.
3. POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS BECOME MORE STRIDENT AND MORE PURPOSEFUL IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN PAK GOVT. MAJOR ELEMENTS AMONG THE OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY IN LEADERSHIP OF CIVIL RULE PARTY, ARE STEPPING UP CAMPAIGN OF CRITICISM AND AGITATION IN AND OUT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IF FACED WITH UNITED STAND WITHIN GOVT THESE EFFORTS WOULD NOT BE SO THREATENING, BUT PROFOUND DISSENSION WITHIN RULING GROUP HAS WEAKENED GOVT'S ABILITY AT TIME WHEN IT FACES ITS GREATEST CHALLENGE.
4. STUDENT THREAT COLORS ENTIRE SCENE AND PROVIDES AN ELEMENT OF MASS ACTION WHICH POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS ITSELF NOT BEEN ABLE TO GENERATE BUT WHICH IT CAN EXPLOIT. IN MARCH, APRIL AND MAY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED WITH A REGULARITY WHICH PROMISES THEIR CONTINUATION.

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Authority RAc 001R-254-3-11-5
By J7h ARA Date 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1532, May 24, 2 p.m., from Seoul

5. IN WAKE OF LATEST STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS BEGINNING MAY 20 HAS COME INCIDENT OF PARATROOPER INTERFERENCE WITH COURTS. THIS HAS ADDED TO STUDENT DISSATISFACTION AND PROVIDED FOCAL POINT FOR MORE DEMONSTRATIONS AT TIME WHEN ROK JAPAN ISSUE WAS FADING. OPPOSITION HAS ALSO BEEN HANDED AMMUNITION TO USE AGAINST GOVT, WHILE PRESS AND PROFESSIONAL CIRCLES ARE SHOCKED AND CRITICAL. THREAT OF FORCE IMPLICIT IN PARATROOPER ACTION GOES BEYOND THEIR BEHAVIOR AND HAS RAISED AGAIN QUESTION POLITICAL ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AND DEGREE OF DISCIPLINE EXERCISED OVER CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN FORCES. FAILURE OF GOVT TO IMMEDIATELY, UNANIMOUSLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY CONDEMN PARATROOPERS AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM DESPITE PRIMIN'S INITIAL EFFORT TO DO SO HAS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT GOVTS INTENTIONS AND WEAKENED GOVT'S ABILITY DEAL WITH STUDENT THREAT. WE ARE RECEIVING RELIABLE REPORTS OF IMPENDING LARGE-SCALE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY 25 BASED ON THIS LATEST ISSUE AND OTHER DISSATISFACTIONS.

6. WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT PARATROOPER ACTION WAS DELIBERATELY STIMULATED BY EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN KIM CHONG-PIL GROUP, WITH SUPPORT FROM ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MIN KI-SIK AND PROBABLY AT LEAST TACIT APPROVAL PRESIDENT PAK. CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS KIM CHONG-O HAS VOICED TO EMBASSY HIS GREAT CONCERN OVER INTERJECTION ARMED FORCES INTO SITUATION AND HAS BEEN STRONGLY CONDEMNATORY OF GENERAL MIN, KIM CHONG-PIL, AND OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. VICE SPEAKER CHANG KYONG-SUN TAKES SAME VIEW AND PRIME MINISTER CHONG IS WORRIED.

7. WE ARE NOW GETTING A SPATE OF RUMORS AND REPORTS OF NEW MOVES BY ALL ELEMENTS CONCERNED. THE ANTI-KIM CHONG-PIL DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE GOVT ARE AGAIN MOVING FOR EARLY REMOVAL OF KIM AND CLEAN UP OF DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY. THE SUPPORTERS OF KIM AND OTHER PROPONENTS OF A HARD-LINE ARE REPORTEDLY THINKING OF AND PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE PRESS THE OPPOSITION AND THE STUDENTS. IN THE NAME OF RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER MARTIAL LAW IS BEING DISCUSSED AND IN THE EVENT OF MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IS LIKELY TO BE INVOKED. RUMBLINGS OF COUPS ARE HEARD, BOTH FROM THOSE DISSATISFIED WITH GOVTS ACTIONS AND FROM THOSE WHO SEEK TO PRESERVE KIM CHONG-PIL AND LOOK TO AUTHORITARIAN AND REPRESSIVE ACTION AS A WAY TO MEET THREAT TO HIM AND GOVT. OPPOSITION AND

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-3- 1532, May 24, 2 p.m., from Seoul

AND STUDENTS ARE NOT GOING TO BE QUIETED EASILY AND OPPOSITION PRESS IS MORE AND MORE OPENLY ON THEIR SIDE.

8. IN LIGHT ABOVE I SOUGHT MEETING WITH PRIMIN MAY 24 WHICH BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY, ALONG WITH OUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

9. GP-3.

BERGER

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10366 26

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1059

Love

MAY 19 7 44 PM '64

LIMDIS

White House pressing Dept for your comment and suggestions requested

Deptel 1029.

att

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-160
By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

Drafted by: FE:EA:CANorredJr:can 5/19/64
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Robert W. Barnett

Clearances:
White House - Mr. Homer (subst)
S/S - Mr. Tueller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Mr. Smith:

Cyrus ²⁴
5/20

Do you know exactly how this was handled?
This is what I got from the Press Office.

Telephoned by ^{pay} Press Office
to wine services

27a

Korea

DRAFT STATEMENT IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT

I have been informed by the United Nations Command in Seoul that Captain Carleton W. Voltz of Frankfort, Michigan, and Captain Ben W. Stutts of Florence, Alabama, who had been detained unjustifiably by the North Koreans since May 17, 1963, were released by Panmunjom at 12:07 PM Korean time (11:07 EDT). We have made great efforts to obtain their release, and have had the help -- for which we are grateful -- of humanitarian organizations and a number of other countries. I am sure we all share the joy of their families at the news of their release. The men will be in touch with their families as soon as possible.

Used Conference Call 5/¹⁶~~15 (16)~~ 12:30 AM

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

Korea 28

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| PRECEDENCE (ACTION) | PRECEDENCE (INFO) |
| FLASH | FLASH |

Z 160317Z

FM CINCUNC

TO RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPDA/SECSTATE

INFO RUEPDA/OSD/PA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/OSD/ISA
ZEN/AMEMB SEOUL
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC

UNCLASS UK 70514 AS. PASS TO WHITE
HOUSE REPEAT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE.

RELEASE OF UNCL PILOTS. RECAP-WW.

1. REFERENCES:

- A. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG NR. 879, 30 MAY 64.
- B. UNC MSG UK 60355 DTG 150834Z, MAY 64.
- C. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG NR. 1047, 15 MAY 64.

2. THE TWO UNC PILOTS CAPT VELTZ AND CAPT STUTTS WHO HAVE BEEN HELD BY THE KPA/CPV SINCE 17 MAY 1963 WERE RELEASED AT 0307Z HOURS, 16 MAY 1964. TRANSFER WAS MADE AT PANUMMJOM, KOREA THROUGH THE 269TH MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONING INDICATED THE PILOTS ARE IN G O O D CONDITION.

3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW.

BT

ACT.....J3-7

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J1-1 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14
NMCC-2 JSSC-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 OSD-15 RRA-1(CMC)-10
(WHITE HOUSE)-3 FILE-1 (77)

ADVANCE COPIES TO NMCC, OSD, DIA, CSA, CSAF, AND CNO.

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| DUTY OFFICER TWC ✓ | PAGE OF PAGES 1 1 | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION | |
| | | CITE NO. 70514 | DTG 160317Z MAY 64 |

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Korea

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RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
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~~SECRET~~ UK 60361 IOJ.
RELEASE OF UNC PILOTS. RECAP-WW
(U)

012999 077
1964 MAY 16 AM 2 34

FLASH

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-164
By ing, NARA, Date 3-29-94

- 1. REFERENCES:
 - A. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG NR. 1047, 15 MAY 64.
 - X. UNC MSG UK 70514 DTG 160317Z
 - C. UNC MSG UK 70515 DTG 160338Z.
- 2. (U) NO QUERIES FROM PRESS RECEIVED REGARDING REFERENCE 1B SO FAR.
- 3. (U) NO ADDITIONAL PRESS RELEASES CONTEMPLATED
- 4. (S) IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED FROM PRESS, FOLLOWING

PAGE 2 RUAMC 066 ~~SECRET~~
GUIDANCE BASED ON PARA 3 OF REFERENCE LA WILL BE USED AS BASIS FOR ANSWERING QUERIES: "UNC REPRESENTATIVES WERE PREPARED TO SIGN AND DID SIGN A RECEIPT WHICH, PURSUANT TO KPA DEMANDS AS A CONDITION FOR RELEASE OF THE PILOTS, INCLUDED A STATEMENT THAT HELICOPTER PILOTS COMMITTED ESPIONAGE. SUCH AN ADMISSION IS OF COURSE MEANINGLESS. THE TWO PILOTS WERE IN UNIFORM AND ENGAGED IN AN ASSIGNED MILITARY MISSION SPECIFICALLY THAT OF CHECKING AIRCRAFT WARNING MARKERS SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND , THEREFORE, CLEARLY WERE NOT REPEAT NOT ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE. THE RECORD IS CLEAR, THE FACTS HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT CHANGED AND ANYBODY CAN READ THE TRUE SITUATION FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE."

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O MAY 16, 2:36 A.M.; PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE MAY 16, 2:44 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 30

48
Action
SS
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 11922
Rec'd: May 15, 1964
6:44 a.m.

FROM: Seoul

ACTION: Secstate 1488 Immediate
Melbourne 1 Immediate

DATE: May 15, 9 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By *ju*, NARA, Date *6-23-93*

032

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

HELICOPTER PILOTS

1. PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM LT. GENERAL BROADMURST TO GENERAL HOWZE:
2. SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC MET PRIVATELY WITH SENIOR MEMBER KPA/CPV AT LATTER'S REQUEST IN JOINT SECURITY AREA AT 1100 HOURS 15 MAY KST.
3. CHANG DEMANDED THAT BEFORE RELEASE TIME COULD BE DISCUSSED RECEIPT BE SIGNED AND AGREEMENT MADE TO HAVE BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN PRESS PRESENT. COMBS AGREED TO TERMS AND SIGNED RECEIPT WHICH CONTAINED ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE. CHANG PROPOSED RELEASE AT SECRETARIES MEETING 1100 HOURS 16 MAY KST.
4. WE ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE PILOTS AT MEETING OF SECRETARIES 1100 HOURS 16 MAY KST. NO ADVANCE DISCLOSURE PLANNED AND WASHINGTON HAS BEEN ADVISED MAKE NO STATEMENTS PENDING CONFIRMATION PILOTS IN UNC CUSTODY.
5. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. JCS, STATE AND OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED.
6. GP-3,
BERGER
BT
CFN 1100 16 4. 1100 16 5. 6. GP-3.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:48 A.M. MAY 15, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DEFENSE, 5-15-64 - 7:00 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 31

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

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1964 MAY 15 AM 7 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (1486) INFO
IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 623 MAY 15 5:25 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OSD, JCS AND DA

REF: EMBTEL 1485 RPTD CINCPAC 622

JOINT EMBASSY/CINCPAC MESSAGE

1. EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID PREMATURE DISCLOSURE CONTENTS REFTEL WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDIZE EXPECTED RELEASE. PROCESS OF RELEASE AT SECRETARIES' MEETING MAY 16 MAY TAKE SEVERAL HOURS. WASHINGTON SHOULD AVOID ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS UNTIL RECEIPT OF MESSAGE FROM US CONFIRMING THAT PILOTS IN UNC CUSTODY.

2. GP-3.
BERGER
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:26 AM, MAY 15.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, DA, AT 7:45 AM,
MAY 15.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By fw, NARA, Date 6-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Copy to Wellington

32

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 MAY 15 10 56

Kevin

SM 0233
OO RUEPWW
DE RUEHCR 11922 15/1055Z
O 151050Z ZEA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN BUNDY
RUEPDA/DEFENSE
O 150920Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDCRT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-1164
By 118, NARA, Date 3-29-94

41237

STATE GRNC

~~Confidential~~

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 148 MELBOURNE ONE

MAY 15, 920PM

DEPT PASS AMCONGEN MELBOURNE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

HELICOPTER PILOTS

1. PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM LT. GENERAL BROADHURST TO
GENERAL HOWZE:

2. SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC MET PRIVATELY WITH SENIOR MEMBER
KPA/CPV AT LATTER'S REQUEST IN JOINT SECURITY AREA AT 1100
HOURS 15 MAY K F.

3. CHANG DEMANDED THAT BEFORE RELEASE TIME COULD BE DISCUSSED
RECEIPT BE SIGNED AND AGREEMENT MADE TO HAVE BOTH NORTH AND
SOUTH KOREAN PRESS PRESENT. COMBS AGREED TO TERMS AND SIGNED
RECEIPT WHICH CONTAINED ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE. CHANG PROPOSED
CFN 1488 15 6:20PM 1. 2. 1100, 15 3.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 09E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RELEASE AT SECRETARIES MEETING 1100 HOURS 16 MAY KST.

4. WE ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE PILOTS AT MEETING OF SECRETARIES
1100 HOURS 16 MAY KST. NG MAVANCE DISCLOSURE PLANNED AND
WASHINGTON HAS BEEN ADVISED MAKE NO STATEMENTS PENDING
CONFIRMATION PILOTS IN UNC CUSTODY.

5. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. JCS, STATE AND OTHER
APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED.

6. GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BERGER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UK 60355 AS. SECTION ONE OF TWO

RELEASE OF UNC PILOTS. RECAP-WW.(C)

1. (U) REFERENCES:
 - A. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE NR. 879, 30 MARCH 64.
 - B. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE NR. 920, 10 APRIL 64.
 - C. JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE NR. 900, 3
2. (C) SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC, MAJOR GENERAL CECIL E. COMBS MET PRIVATELY TODAY WITH THE SENIOR MEMBER KPA/CPV MAC, GENERAL CHANG CHUNG HWAN IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA AT 1100 HOURS, 15 MAY 1964 KST. GENERAL CHANG FIRST GAVE LENGTHY RESUME OF CRIMES COMMITTED

PAGE 2 RUAMC 123 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 BY STUTTS AND VOLTZ, STATED THAT DPRK SHOULD PUNISH THEM. HOW EVER, DUE TO GENERAL HOWZE'S LETTERS ADMITTING THE VIOLATIONS AND PROMISING NOT TO REPEAT THEM, THE SUPREME COMMANDER HAD DECIDED TO DEAL LENIENTLY WITH THE TWO PILOTS AND WAS PREPARED TO RELEASE THEM. CHANG STATED THAT RELEASE WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA WITH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT. GENERAL COMBS STATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE THEM WITH THE PRESS PRESENT AND THEN ASKED FOR THE TIME OF RELEASE GENERAL CHANG DEMANDED THAT RECEIPT BE SIGNED PRIOR TO DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE RELEASE. GENERAL COMBS ASKED HIM WHEN AND WHERE RELEASE WOULD TAKE PLACE. GENERAL CHANG REITERATED THE DEMAND THAT THE RECEIPT MUST BE SIGNED FIRST. RECEIPT WAS OFFERED. THE ENGLISH VERSION WAS SIGNED BY GENERAL COMBS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCE 1C. GENERAL CHANG THEN PASSED KOREAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Group 4

By *is*

NARS, Date

1-22-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 150834Z, MAY, FROM CINCUNC, (SEC. ONE OF TWO)

VERSION FOR SIGNATURE. IT WAS SIGNED AND RETURNED. COPIES OF RECEIPTS WERE ASKED FOR BY GENERAL COMBS AND WERE GIVEN, GENERAL COMBS AGAIN ASKED FOR DETAILS OF RELEASE. GENERAL CHANG PROPOSED THAT RELEASE BE AT A SECRETARIES MEETING AT 1100 HOURS, 16 MAY 64 KST. HE REITERATED THAT IT MUST BE A PUBLIC MEETING WITH BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN PRESS PRESENT. THIS CONDITION WAS AGREED

PAGE 3 RUAMC 123 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO AGAIN. MEETING TERMINATED AT 1125 HOURS, 15 MAY 1964 KST. OTHER PERSONNEL PRESENT CONSISTED OF THE SECRETARY FROM EACH SIDE, ONE INTERPRETER FROM EACH SIDE, PLUS ONE KPA RECORDER AND ONE KPA PHOTOGRAPHER.

3/ (C) VERBATIM TEXT OF RECEIPT SIGNED BY THE SENIOR U. S. MEMBER OF THE MAC FOLLOWS:

"MAY 15, 1964

RECEIPT

ADMITTING THE CRIMES OF ESPIONAGE AND ILLEGAL INTRUSION BY CAPTAIN BEN WEAKLEY STUTTS AND CAPTAIN CARLETON WILLIAM VOLTZ, THE U. S. PILOTS WHO WERE CAPTURED BY THE SELF-DEFENCE MEASURE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WHILE THEY WERE COMMITTING MILITARY ESPIONAGE ACT, AFTER ILLEGALLY INTRUDING INTO THE AIR OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. J YDTMFNC*SIDE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE THAT UNC RELEASE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AT PANMUNJOM AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME ON 16 MAY: "THE TWO UNC PILOTS, CAPTAIN CARLETON W. VOLTZ AND CAPTAIN BEN W. STUTTS, WHO HAVE BEEN HELD BY THE KPA/CPV SINCE 17 MAY 1963 WERE RELEASED AT (TIME) HOURS, 16 MAY 64. TRANSFER WAS MADE AT PANMUNJOM, KOREA AT THE 269TH MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION PRELIMINARY LHNBN (POOR OR GOOD) CONDITION."

5. (C) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED NORTH AND

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 150834Z, MAY, FROM CINCUNC, (SEC. ONE OF TWO)

PAGE 5 RUAMC123 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
SOUTH KOREAN PRESS PERSONNEL WILL OBSERVE THE PROCEEDINGS ON 16
MAY. IN THIS REGARD UNC IS RELEASING AT 1500 HOURS, 15 MAY
64 THE FOLLOWING ROUTINE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AS FOLLOWS: "SEOUL,
KOREA, MAY 15, 1964 (UNITED NATIONS COMMAND)- THE 269TH MEETING
OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION SECRETARIES WILL BE HELD AT
PANMUNJOM AT 11 A. M. SATURDAY (MAY 16). THE MEETING WAS CALLED BY
THE COMMUNIST SIDE."

SUBJECT OF MEETING IS NOT BEING RELEASED.

6. (C) THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE KPA/CPV MAY
PERMIT BOTH THE SOUTH KOREAN AND NORTH KOREAN PRESS TO INTERVIEW
THE PILOTS WHILE STILL IN THEIR CUSTODY, THEREBY ENABLING THEM TO
SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS BEFORE WE HAVE ACCESS TO THE PILOTS.

7(C) AFTER PILOTS ARE IN UNC CUSTODY, WE PROPOSE TO MAKE
FOLLOWING STATEMENT REGARDING SIGNATURE OF RECEIPT.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

"U. S. REPRESENTATIVES WERE PREPARED TO SIGN AND DID SIGN
A RECEIPT WHICH INCLUDED AN ADMISSION THAT HELICOPTER PILOTS WERE
GUILTY OF ESPIONAGE, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CUSTODY OF THE PILOTS.
SUCH AN ADMISSION IS OF COURSE MEANINGLESS SINCE THE TWO PILOTS
WERE IN UNIFORM AND ENGAGED IN AN ASSIGNED MILITARY MISSION, AND

GP-4
GP-FOUR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:57 AM, 5/15/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8:10 AM, 5/15/64.

* As RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
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1964 MAY 15 AM 7 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UK 60355 AS. FINAL SECTION OF 2
THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO MILITARY LAW, COULD NOT BE GUILTY OF
ESPIONAGE. THE RECORD IS CLEAR, THE FACTS HAVE NOT CHANGED AND
ANYBODY CAN READ THE TRUE SITUATION FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE."
END VERBATIM TEXT.

8. (C) 1 431785 NO RELEASE TO PRESS UNTIL RECEIPT OF PILOTS
CONFIRMED BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE MESSAGE FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.
IT MAY BE A MATTER OF HOURS AFTER MEETING BEGINS BEFORE WE HAVE
ACTUAL CUSTODY OF PILOTS.

9. GP-FOUR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 May 15 at 7:34 a.m.
Passed White House May 15 at 7:40 p.m.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL FLASH 1047
CINCUNC FLASH

INFO: CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCUNC's UK 60355

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By *JW*, NARA, Date 6-23-93

091
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1. We congratulate you on working out ~~arrangements~~ arrangements for release of helicopter personnel.

2. In May 16 meeting at Panmunjom, primary objective is to obtain release of men. Subject to that consideration you should endeavor minimize publicity damaging to U.S. Government.

3. Suggest your proposed statement para 7 reftel ~~by~~^{be} reworded as follows:
QTE The two pilots were in uniform and engaged in an assigned military mission specifically that of checking aircraft warning markers south of the clearly Demilitarized Zone and, therefore, ~~clearly~~ were not engaged in espionage. The records is clear, the facts have not changed and anybody can read the true situation from the facts of the case. UNQTE Since the North Koreans initial announcement of the May 15 meeting has not quoted wording of receipt we do not rpt not think it appropriate to include that wording in our statement. However, if they do so during May 16 meeting then use first part your text reworded as follows: QTE UNC representatives were prepared to

| | |
|--|---|
| Drafted by: FE:EA:CAN <i>red</i> Jr:gh 5/15/64 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - XXXXXXXXXXXX William P. Bundy |
| Clearances: EA - Mr. Bacon <i>WMB</i> FE/P - Mr. Manell (draft) <i>ds</i> P - Mr. Reap (draft) L/UNA - Mr. Bilder (draft) <i>ds</i> UNP - Mr. Jones (draft) <i>ds</i> | DASD/PA - Mr. Lennartson (draft) <i>ds</i> OSD/ISA - Col. Moorman (draft) <i>ds</i> FE - Mr. Green (subst) SECRET |

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sign and did sign a receipt which, pursuant to ~~KEX~~ KPA demands as a condition for release of the pilots, included a statement that helicopter pilots were guilty of espionage. Such an admission of course meaningless since....(and continue with statement as worded above).

4. After pilots are in your custody, if they wish to make immediate repudiation of any admissions North Koreans may have forced them to make in May 16 meeting, suggest you permit them to do so.

5. ~~KEX~~ Confirm receipt of pilots immediately by FLASH message. Also send text your actual release same precedence.

GP - 3

RUSK

END

~~SECRET~~

South Korea - Japan

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 8586 *Kuree*
Rec'd: MAY 12, 1964
6:57 AM

FE FROM: SEOUL
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ACTION: SECSTATE 1460, PRIORITY

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G INFO: TOKYO 637
SP CINCPAC 615

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H DATE: MAY 12, 7 PM

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INR 1. PRIMIN CHONG IL-KWON WAS BUBBLING WITH ENTHUSIASM AND IDEAS
CIA WHEN I CALLED MAY 12 TO CONGRATULATE AND ASSURE HIM OF OUR
NSA CONTINUED SUPPORT AND COOPERATION. HE SAID HE WISHED CONTINUE
OSD OUR REGULAR WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETINGS (WHICH DOHERTY AND HABIB
ARMY ALSO ATTEND) AND MAINTAIN INTIMATE AND CONFIDENTIAL WORKING
NAVY RELATIONS. PRIMIN THEN SAID HE WANTED GIVE ME BACKGROUND TO
AIR CABINET CHANGES.

RMR 2. TOWARD END LAST WEEK IT HAD BECOME APPARENT TO PRESIDENT
PAK THAT GOVT IN SERIOUS TROUBLE IN COUNTRY AND THAT MAJOR
CHANGES NEEDED TO WIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. CHOE TU-SON READILY
AGREED TO RETIRE. CHONG IL-KWON NOT SURPRISED WHEN PRESIDENT
ASKED HIM BECOME PRIMIN. SOME OF CHONG'S FRIENDS ASKED HIM
NOT TO TAKE JOB, BUT GOVT AND COUNTRY WERE IN CHAOTIC STATE
AND HE FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT. HE DOES NOT KNOW
WHETHER HE CAN SUCCEED IN BRINGING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STABILITY, BUT HE THINKS THERE IS A CHANCE.

3. IN LAST FOUR DAYS HE HAD LONG TALKS WITH PRESIDENT, KIM
CHONG-PIL AND CHANG KI-YON, SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER, AND
ESTABLISHED FOLLOWING:

A. HE TOLD CABINET IN FRONT OF PAK THAT HE WILL NOT TOLERATE
ANY LATERAL DEALINGS BETWEEN CABINET MINISTERS AND DRP MACHINE
OR ASSEMBLYMEN. IN GENERAL CABINET WILL DEAL WITH PAK THROUGH

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Authority RAcc/IR-254-3-12-4
By Jdw vARA Date 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1460, MAY 12, 7 PM, FROM SEOUL

HIM AND VICE VERSA. CABINET AS A WHOLE WILL HEREAFTER BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECISIONS. MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS AND STATEMENTS WILL REQUIRE HIS APPROVAL. CORRUPTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION IS TO BE ROOTED OUT NO MATTER WHO IS INVOLVED.

B. HE HAD A FRANK TALK WITH KCP ABOUT EXCESSIVE SIZE OF DRP MACHINE, SOURCE OF ITS FUNDS, ITS INTERFERENCE IN GOVT ADMINISTRATION, AND THE HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF THE COUNTRY TOWARD DRP. KCP GRANTED HE HAD MADE MISTAKES AND PROMISED TO CUT AND CLEAN UP PARTY. PAK AND KCP HAVE HAD "MANY FIGHTS" IN RECENT WEEKS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM ARE NOT GOOD. KCP IS NOW UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FROM ALL QUARTERS AND CHONG THINKS KCP WILL BE REMOVED IN A MONTH OR TWO.

C. PRIMIN WILL SEE YUN PO-SUN AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS WITHIN FEW DAYS IN EFFORT OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO GIVE HIM TIME TO CLEAN UP MATTERS AND STABILIZE SITUATION.

D. NEITHER PRESIDENT NOR LAST PRIMIN LIKED PRESS CONFERENCES AND THEREFORE UNABLE TO USE OR INFLUENCE PRESS. HE DOES NOT INTEND MAKE THIS MISTAKE. HE WILL HOLD PRESS CONFERENCES WEEKLY, PARTLY TO EXPLAIN GOVT POLICY, PARTLY TO LISTEN TO PRESS. HE ALSO PLANS BROADCASTS TO NATION AND FREQUENT VISITS IN CITY AND COUNTRY TO SEE FOR HIMSELF. (HE HAS ALREADY MADE FIRST BROADCAST, VISITED MARKETS AND POORER QUARTERS.)

E. HE PLANS SEND WON YONG-SUK, MIN WITHOUT PORTFOLIO, TO JAPAN NEXT WEEK TO RESTART FISHERY TALKS. STUDENTS ARE TO BE FIRMLY HANDLED IF THEY START DEMONSTRATIONS. HIS BROADCAST ADVISED THEM TO CONFINE THEIR ACTIVITIES TO CAMPUS AND NOT DISTURB LAW AND ORDER. I ASKED IF HE WERE AWARE OF PLANS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS THIS WEEK AGAINST KCP-SUPPORTED SECRET STUDENT ORGANIZATION KNOWN AS YONG THOUGHT SOCIETY. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AND KNEW NOTHING OF THE SOCIETY. I SUGGESTED HE MIGHT LOOK INTO IT.

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-3- 1460, MAY 12, 7 PM, FROM SEOUL

F. CHONG SAID CABINET MEETINGS WILL HEREAFTER BE HELD IN EVENING SO MINISTERS WOULD BE FREE DURING THE DAY TO DO THEIR WORK. MEETINGS WOULD BE CRISP AND WELL ORGANIZED TO PRODUCE DECISIONS.

G. CHONG SAID PRESIDENT, CHANG KI-YON AND HE COULD WORK TOGETHER WELL. PRESIDENT HAD BEEN TOO ISOLATED AND RETIRING AND IT IMPORTANT HE COME OUT MORE AND MIX WITH MINISTERS. ALSO PRESIDENT MUST SEE MORE OF ME. HE INTENDED ARRANGE SMALL, QUIET EVENINGS.

H. CHONG THEN DWELT ON PUBLIC'S LACK OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN GOVT AND HIS HOPE THAT HIS CAN BE WON BY SHOWING THAT A NEW AND VIGOROUS GOVT IS IN CONTROL. HE FELT HE NEEDED TWO MONTHS FREE OF TROUBLE TO MAKE A SHOWING AND SIX MONTHS TO MAKE AN IMPRESSION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE SOME INTERPRET NEW CABINET AS VICTORY FOR KCP WITH NO IMPAIRMENT OF KCP'S STRENGTH, APPARENT FROM FOREGOING THAT CHONG TAKES A DIFFERENT VIEW. HE SEES CHANGE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO SAVE PAK AND PAK'S GOVT AND GRADUALLY TO REPLACE KCP AS MAN ON WHOM PAK CAN AND MUST RELY. KCP CAN THEN BE QUIETLY REMOVED. ALL THIS MAY HOWEVER BE WISHFUL THINKING. NEW CABINET REQUIRES NEW APPRAISAL OF SITUATION HERE WHICH WILL BE SENT SOONEST.

5. GP-3.

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Authority McOAR-254-3-133
By JDW KARA Date 8-28-19

Handwritten initials

SECRET

May 19, 1964

Mac -

Top priority in NE Asia today is ROK/Jap settlement. This could mean so much more in the way of long-term US dollar saving than a troop cut that there's no comparison. We're still spending over \$300 million a year on 20 million ROKs, with no end really in sight. So we've got to find someone to share the long-term burden, and it's logically the Japs. Settlement would pump \$.6 to 1 billion of public and private funds into ROK, with more later.

But many of us fear that if talks (now on brink of success after 11 years) break down once more, Japs will lose interest. They don't need ROKs that much. Also, Jap Diet will adjourn soon.

We badly need that extra push which might put us over the top. State/AID have a scheme for packaging \$100 million in DL (which we'd spend anyway) to promise ROKs a bait if they'll sign with Japs (see attached). But this should be given oomph by sending a high-level salesman. It would even be worth it to send WPB (though doubtless too busy) or at least Bob Barnett to Seoul and Tokyo. Or how about cranking up Wilson Wyatt?

*Emergency link WPB
I'd agree to
Bob or Wyatt*

RWK
RWK

*Why not have Bob
sell WPB / miff*

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Amembassy TOKYO 2913

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LIMDIS Authority RAC 011-254-3-15-1
B. JON ARA Date 8/28/19

1. Department believes that in this crucial period of ROK-Japanese negotiations careful consideration should again be given to possibility of U.S. initiative which might help to drive agreement over the top. Although Department has ~~not~~ always been willing consider useful initiatives enhancing possibilities of agreement, conclusion to date has been that any sign of U.S. "interference" would be counter-productive. It remains of utmost importance that terms of settlement be arrived at by two parties on their own responsibility. Care must be taken to avoid any appearance that Japan settled at behest of U.S., and on Korean side we should carefully avoid appearance of inducing ROKG to "knuckle under" to Japanese.

2. Serious obstacles to full and final agreement nevertheless ~~lie~~ lie on Korean side. Korean Opposition, recognizing ROKG's lack of popularity, has seized on ROK-Japan negotiations issue to try to bring Government down, playing in part upon suspicions that ~~KIM~~ Kim Chong-p'il, and others have, or hope to, profit personally from settlement. Underlying political maneuverings and emotional attitudes appear to be two widespread fears: 1) fear of Japanese domination, but little appreciation of economic benefits of normal relationship with Japan

BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
BRUCE
CHASE
DUNGAN
FERRELL
GIBSON
HENRY
JONES
KELLY
LAWRENCE
MURPHY
NEASE
RICHARDS
SMITH, WM
TAMM
TROTTER
WALSH
WATSON
WHELAN
WILSON
WOODRUFF
YERGEN

Bacon
good man

Drafted by: FE:RWBarnett EA:RAFearey Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

FE:EA:FEVettel:CANorred Jr./pmh 5/8/64

EA - Mr. Bacon
FE - Mr. Green
AID/FE - Mr. Poats

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MAY 13 1964
FORM DS-322
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with Japan, and 2) fear that with normalization US would attempt shift burden of Korea to Japan and perhaps QUOTE abandon UNQUOTE Korea. Overcoming first problem requires education and experience on which only limited gains possible in short time.

We wonder, however, if there is some action US might take at this time which might help significantly to dispel fears that we hope to unload Korea on Japan. New Cabinet's professed intention resume negotiations (Embtel 1453) may offer favorable opportunity for such action.

3. One possible action for your consideration and comment with understanding that it has not been fully cleared in USG would be: Ambassador Berger would inform announce ROKG that USG would be prepared to ~~XXXXXX~~ upon successful conclusion of ROKG-GOJ negotiations that subject to parliamentary ratification of settlement USG will support an expanded Korean capital development program, specifically (1) Take initiative in seeking to form international aid consultative group for Korea to broaden, enlarge and coordinate capital assistance to Korea; (2) Establish a \$100 million AID development lending program with goal of allocating funds for development projects and capital goods import programs over a two-year period, in consultation with other lenders; (3) Continue basic economic support of a ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ sustained Korean financial stabilization policy through adequate provision of Supporting Assistance and PL 480. Development lending program assumes, of course, unprecedented Korean effort in development acceptable projects which US, Japan, International Agencies and other members of consultative group could ^{help} finance. Expansion of US development lending also assumes parallel expansion of availability additional local funds. Recognizing profound ~~XX~~ effects on stabilization effort

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and counterpart allocations of such an expanded inflow of capital, we need your assessment advantages and disadvantages such USG public commitment.

4. In suggesting to Koreans possibility of offer, we would hope that ROKG would see it as means to obtain needed additional popular support ~~XXXXXX~~ to help conclude ROK-Japan settlement, and to overcome current lack of confidence in government. We recognize of course danger that ROKG, instead of being encouraged by our offer to move to immediate settlement, might bargain for more favorable offer, or even worse, regard offer as substitute for Japan settlement. Fact is, however, utility of offer is dependent, as practical matter, upon establishment of new relationship with Japan and availability Japanese resources, especially as far as Korean trade expansion prospects ~~XXXXXXXX~~/concerned. We must be prepared therefore to say offer will not stand unless settlement reached. Embassy Tokyo meanwhile must appraise impact this type offer on Japan's motivations in settling affairs with Korea, and possible Japanese fears that we intend to QUOTE manage UNQUOTE their aid.

5. Request comment and suggestions from both addressee Embassies.

GP-3

END

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CINCPAC POLAD 607 MAY 8 5PM

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NAVY

AIR

RMR

1. YI HU-RAK, PRINCIPAL PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY, MAY 7 TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT PAK WILL SHORTLY ANNOUNCE NUMBER OF CABINET CHANGES. WHILE PAK HAS NOT RPT NOT MADE FINAL DECISION, HE WILL NOT APPOINT ALL DRP CABINET WHICH KIM CHONG-PIL URGING. HOWEVER, CHANGES WILL BE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN TWO OR THREE WHICH PAK CONTEMPLATED LAST WEEK. HE SAID ALL ECONOMIC MINISTERS WILL BE REPLACED, BUT NONE OF NEW MEN WILL BE DRP MEMBERS. CHANG KI-YONG EXPECTED TO BE ~~SLG~~

CHAIRMAN. NEW EDUCATION MINISTER WILL ALSO BE NAMED AND POSSIBLY FEW OTHERS.
CFN 1438 628 607 8 5PM 1. YI 7 NOT NONE

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY YI SAID PRESIDENT STILL UNDECIDED ABOUT PRIMIN. FIFTY - FIFTY CHANCE HE MAY BE CHANGED NOW, OTHERWISE IT WILL BE LATER THIS YEAR. PAK TU-CHIN IS PRESIDENT'S CHOICE AS NEW PRIMIN. I WCKED IF PAK HAD BEEN APPROACHED. HE SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN, INDIRECTLY. ASKED IF I THOUGH PAK WOULD TAKE JOB, I SAID I DID NOT KNOW, BUT MY UNDERSTANDING LAST FALL WAS THAT PAK READY TO ACCEPT SUBJECT TO HIS CONDITIONS, I.E., FREEDOM FROM INTERFERENCE BY DRP AND POWER TO CHOOSE HIS KEY MINISTERS. IF NEW KEY MINISTERS NAMED WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH PAK, IT MIGHT AFFECT PAK'S DECISION.

3. FONMIN CONFIRMED MAY 8 HAT CABINET CHANGES WILL BE ANNOUNCED NEXT WEEK. HE DOES NOT KNOW EXTENT, BUT UNDERSTANDS SEVERAL ECONOMIC MINISTERS WILL BE SHIFTED. SAID PRESIDENT ASKED SEE HIM TONIGHT (MAY 8) TO DISCUSS CHANGES. HE DOUBTS PRIMIN WILL BE CHANGED. THEN SAID CASUALLY PRESIDENT HAD ASKED IF HE WOULD

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Authority RAC 001R-254-3151
By J04 WARA Date 8-28-19

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-2-1438, May 8, 5 p.m., From Seoul

CONSIDER BECOMING PRIMIN, BUT HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT THAT HE IS "TOO YONG". (THIS TYPICAL KOREAN ANSWER DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN "NO".)

4. FONMIN THEN SAID CABINET CHANGES WILL NOT SOLVE KOREA'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS OR PROBLEMS OF UNITY IN GOVT RANKS, BUT REPRESENTED FIRST STEP. SECOND NEED WAS TO CUT BACK DRP MACHINE AND TACKLE CORRUPTION. THIRD STEP WAS TO UNIFY DRP ASSEMBLYMENT BEHIND PAK, WHICH MEANT THAT CERTAIN PERSONS WOULD HAVE TO GO. HE SAID PAK MOVING RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT WITH HESITATION, HE NEITHER OPTIMISTIC NOR PESSIMISTIC.

5. GP-3. BERGER

BT

CFN 2. NOW PAEK TU-CHIN NOT 3. 8 NOT 8 NOT "NO" 4. NOT NOR 5. 3

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TELEGRAM Department of State

OBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

Korea

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1029
Amembassy TOKYO 2913

MAY 12 7 54 PM '64

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Authority RACCOLI-254-3-151
By JOW *ARA Date 8-28-19

1. Department believes that in this crucial period of ROK-Japanese negotiations careful consideration should again be given to possibility of U.S. initiative which might help to drive agreement over the top. Although Department has ~~xxxx~~ always been willing consider useful initiatives enhancing ~~possibilities~~ ^{possibilities} of agreement, conclusion to date has been that any sign of U.S. "interference" would be counter-productive. It remains of utmost importance that terms of settlement be arrived at by two parties on their own responsibility. Care must be taken to avoid any appearance that Japan settled at behest of U.S., and on Korean side we should carefully avoid appearance of inducing ROKG to "~~ix~~ knuckle under" to Japanese.

2. Serious obstacles to full and final agreement nevertheless ~~xxx~~ lie on Korean side. Korean Opposition, recognizing ROKG's lack of popularity, has seized on ROK-Japan negotiations issue to try to bring Government down, playing in part upon suspicions that KIM Chong-p'il and others have, or hope to, profit personally from settlement. Underlying political maneuverings and emotional attitudes appear to be two widespread fears: 1) fear of Japanese domination, but little appreciation of economic benefits of normal relationship with Japan

FE:RWBarnett EA:RAFearey
 Attel:CANorred Jr./pmh 5/8/64
 EA - Mr. Bacon
 FE - Mr. Green
 AID/FE - Mr. Poats

Telegraphic transmission and
 classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

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with Japan, and 2) fear that with normalization US would attempt shift burden of Korea to Japan and perhaps QUOTE abandon UNQUOTE Korea. Overcoming first problem requires education and experience on which only limited gains possible in short time. We wonder, however, if there is some action US might take at this time which might help significantly to dispel fears that we hope to upload Korea on Japan. New Cabinet's professed intention resume negotiations (Embtel 1453) may offer favorable opportunity for such action.

3. One possible action for your consideration and comment with understanding that it has not been fully cleared in USG would be: Ambassador Berger would inform ROKG that USG would be prepared to ^{announce} ~~announce~~ upon successful conclusion of ROKG-GOJ negotiations that subject to parliamentary ratification of settlement USG will support an expanded Korean capital development program, specifically (1) Take initiative in seeking to form international aid consultative group for Korea to broaden, enlarge and coordinate capital assistance to Korea; (2) Establish a \$100 million AID development lending program with goal of allocating funds for development projects and capital goods import programs over a two-year period, in consultation with other lenders; (3) Continue basic economic support of a ~~continued~~ sustained Korean financial stabilization policy through adequate provision of Supporting Assistance and PL 480. Development lending program assumes, of course, unprecedented Korean effort in development acceptable projects which US, Japan, International Agencies and other members of consultative group could ^{help} finance. Expansion of US development lending also assumes parallel expansion of availability additional local funds. Recognizing profound ~~xxx~~ effects on stabilization effort

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and counterpart allocations of such an expanded inflow of capital, we need your assessment advantages and disadvantages such USG public commitment.

4. In suggesting to Koreans possibility of offer, we would hope that ROKG would see it as means to obtain needed additional popular support ~~XXXXXX~~ to help conclude ROK-Japan settlement, and to overcome current lack of confidence in government. We recognize of course danger that ROKG, instead of being encouraged by our offer to move to immediate settlement, might bargain for more favorable offer, or even worse, regard offer as substitute for Japan settlement. Fact is, however, utility of offer is dependent, as practical matter, upon establishment of new relationship with Japan and availability Japanese resources, especially as far as Korean trade expansion prospects ~~XXXXXX~~/concerned. We must be prepared therefore to say offer will not stand unless settlement reached. Embassy Tokyo meanwhile must appraise impact this type offer on Japan's motivations in settling affairs with Korea, and possible Japanese fears that we intend to QUOTE manage UNQUOTE their aid.

5. Request comment and suggestions from both addressee Embassies.

GP-3

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:
Rec'd:

4558
MAY 6, 1964
11:34 PM

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FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SESTATE 1433 PRIORITY

INFO: TOKYO 626
CINCPAC POLAD 605

DATE: MAY 6, 10 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11)

REF: EMBTEL 1420, RPTD TOKYO 623, CINCPAC 604

1. EX-PRIMIN KIM HYON-CHOL ASKED TO SEE ME MAR 5 AND TALKED FOR OVER TWO HOURS. HIS QUESTIONS AND REMARKS REFLECTED A MAN DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT DEVELOPING SITUATION AND FATALISTIC AS TO ITS OUTCOME.

2. HE BEGAN BY SAYING PRESIDENT PAK HAD ASKED HIM TAKE CHARGE OF ROK-JAPAN TALKS BUT HE HAD NOT YET ACCEPTED. HE WISHED OUR VIEWS ON WHETHER JAPANESE STILL SERIOUS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. I SAID WE HAD BEEN ASSURED JAPAN READY TO RESUME TALKS AS SOON AS KOREAN GOVT FEELS IT CAN GO AHEAD. REAL QUESTION IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN KOREA IF TALKS RESUMED AND SETTLEMENT REACHED. IF NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE AGAINST BACKDROP OF MORE DEMONSTRATIONS, IF JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN ARE AGAIN THREATENED, AND IF KOREANS STILL HOSTILE, ATMOSPHERE HARDLY ONE THAT WOULD PERMIT FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THIS OPENED A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF SITUATION IN WHICH KIM'S VIEWS CAN BE BOILED DOWN TO FOLLOWING:

A. OPPOSITION IS TRYING TO BRING GOVT DOWN. GOVT IS SERIOUSLY DIVIDED. POPULATION IS RESTIVE. HE EXPECTS MORE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEARS POPULACE MAY THIS TIME SUPPORT THEM. IF ONLY STUDENTS COME OUT THEY COULD BE HANDLED BY POLICE BUT IF PEOPLE CAME OUT IN STREETS CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE VERY GRAVE FOR PAK GOVT. FOCAL POINTS OF ATTACK WOULD BE CORRUPTION.

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Authority RAC 01R-254-3-16-0

By JDL VARA Date 8-28-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1433, MAY 6, 10 PM, FROM SEOUL (SECTION 1 OF 11)

REMOVAL OF KIM CHONG-PIL, HIGH PRICES ACCENTUATED BY DEVALUATION, AND GOVT'S FUMBLING ECONOMIC POLICIES. IF MARTIAL LAW INSTITUTED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, SITUATION COULD BEGIN TO RESEMBLE LAST WEEKS OF RHEE GOVT. HE HAD WARNED PAK AGAINST DANGERS OF MARTIAL LAW, SAYING IT WOULD SOLVE NOTHING AND SHOULD BE INVOKED ONLY IN EXTREMES TO PREVENT BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER AND LOOTING.

B. ONLY WAY HE SEES TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON GOVT AND REESTABLISH CONFIDENCE IN PAK IF FOR KCP TO LEAVE COUNTRY FOR TWO OR THREE YEAR'S STUDY "IN ORDER TO LEARN SOMETHING." HE AND MANY OTHERS HAD PRESSED PAK TO DO THIS BUT PAK EITHER NONCOMMITTAL OR REPLIES THAT "NOW NOT THE TIME." PAK UNDERSTANDS PROBLEM OF KCP, BUT IS RELUCTANT TO BREAK WITH HIM. NEAREST PAK HAS COME TO A DATE IS "AFTER ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT INITIALLED", WHICH KIM THINKS WOULD BE ABOUT JULY. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY KIM SAID IF KCP LEFT NOW, IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO NEGOTIATE WITH JAPANESE AND EASIER TO OBTAIN KOREAN SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT.

C. PAK'S HESITATION TO SEND KCP AWAY ARISES FROM HIS FEAR THIS WOULD BREAK UP DRP AND BASIS OF GOVT SUPPORT BUT PAK IS WRONG. IT IS RETENTION OF KCP AND NOT HIS REMOVAL THAT WILL ENDANGER PAK GOVT. DRP ASSEMBLYMEN ARE SPLIT THREE WAYS -- PRO AND ANTI KCP AND THOSE IN MIDDLE WHO ARE MORE ANTI THAN PRO -- WITH ABOUT 30 TO 40 IN EACH GROUP. HE HAD TOLD PAK THAT WHILE PARTY DIVIDED ON KCP, THEY WILL SUPPORT PAK AND HE MUST THEREFORE TAKE THE LEADERSHIP HIMSELF TO HOLD PARTY TOGETHER. PAK FEARFUL THAT IF HE MOVES TOO FAST TO REMOVE KCP IT WILL PUT TOO GREAT A STRAIN ON PARTY UNITY. PAK HAS HOWEVER AGREED THAT DRP MACHINE MUST BE CUT BACK HARD AND STAFF IS BEING PRUNED.

D. CRACKS IN DRP WERE PATCHED OVER LAST WEEK AS RESULT OF PLEAS FROM PAK TO CHANG KYONG-SUN, KCP AND OTHERS. BUT NOTHING IS SETTLED AND FIGHT WILL BREAK OUT AGAIN BEFORE LONG. CHANG HAS RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM STUDENTS AND OTHERS SUPPORTING HIM AND THIS IS ENCOURAGING HIM TO CONTINUE FIGHT. CHANG MADE STUPID MISTAKE BY GOING TO PRESS IN EFFORT TO HURRY PAK'S DECISION TO REMOVE KCP.

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-3- 1433, MAY 6, 10 PM, FROM SEOUL (SECTION 1 OF 11)

4. KIM ASKED IF US COULD COME OUT IN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF PAK AT THIS TIME TO STABILIZE SITUATION. I SAID SECRETARY MADE A STATEMENT OF APPROVAL AFTER DEVALUATION, AND I COULD NOT SEE HOW WE COULD SAY ANYTHING MORE. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT IF MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED. I SAID HE KNEW ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION AS WELL AS I. IF POPULACE WAS SUPPORTING STUDENTS OR THERE WAS PROSPECT OF SUCH SUPPORT, WE WOULD BE IN GREAT DIFFICULTY, ESPECIALLY IF KCP WAS ON SCENE.

5. KIM THEN REVERTED TO ROK-JAPAN TALKS SAYING PAK WAS DETERMINED TO SETTLE AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF TALKS WOULD PROBABLY BE MADE NEXT WEEK. AGRICULTURE MIN WON YONG-SOK WOULD PROBABLY BE SENT TO TOKYO TO FINISH OFF FISHERY TALKS WHICH WERE ALREADY CLOSE TO AGREEMENT. CHOE KYU-HA WOULD GO AS WELL TO SUPERVISE DETAILED DRAFTING. IF HE (KIM) DECIDED TO HEAD THE DELEGATION HE MIGHT GO AT SAME TIME OR A LITTLE LATER. HE ASKED ABOUT US ATTITUDE IF TALKS FAILED TO PROVIDE SETTLEMENT. I SAID WE WOULD BE TERRIBLY DISAPPOINTED. HE ASKED IF US WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO KOREA IF NO SETTLEMENT REACHED. I SAID WE WOULD PROVIDE NEITHER MORE NOR LESS; SUPPORT ASSISTANCE WAS GRADUALLY COMING DOWN WHETHER SETTLEMENT MADE OR NOT.

6. EX-PRIMIN SAID THERE WOULD BE A FEW CABINET CHANGES SOON, BUT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT MAJOR REORGANIZATION, INCLUDING NEW PRIMIN, WILL WAIT UNTIL ABOUT AUGUST AFTER ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT INITIALED.

7. I SAID I HAD SEVERAL TIMES URGED PAK TO APPOINT STRONG ABLE MEN AS ECONOMIC MINISTERS AND HOPED KIM WAS GIVING HIM SAME ADVICE. HE SAID HE AGREED BUT STRONG AND ABLE MEN WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE OR WOULD NOT ACCEPT. I ASKED WHO HE HAD IN MIND. HE MENTIONED PAK TU-CHIN, EX-MINISTER OF COMMERCE UNDER RHEE (AHN), YU CHANG-SUN, HO JUNG AND YU CHIN-O.

GP-3.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FE

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

MAY 6, 1964

Info

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

10:21 P.M.

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(1433) INFO TOKYO 626 INFO CINCPAC POLAD 605 MAY 6 10PM

SAL

8. KIM ENDED CONVERSATION ON PESSIMISTIC NOTE. HE SAID SITUATION WAS FLUID, FLUID, FLUID, COULD BECOME DANGEROUS, AND HE WOULD NOT PREDICT WHAT WILL HAPPEN. HE WAS DOING HIS BEST. HE PROMISED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH ME. I SAID IF PAK INTENDS TO REMOVE KCP HE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO DO IT BEFORE TROUBLE DEVELOPS AND NOT UNDER PRESSURE. HE AGREED.

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PAGE TWO RUALOS 07E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RMR

9. COMMENT: EVER SINCE LAST YEAR'S CRISIS, KIM HAS BEEN WILLING TO TALK FAIRLY FRANKLY TO ME. BECAUSE HE HE IS ONE OF THE MORE SAGACIOUS OBSERVERS HERE, HIS VIEWS ARE WORTH LISTENING TO. HIS ANALYSIS AND FEARS ARE BORNE OUT BY SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS WE HAVE BEEN GETTING FROM OTHERS IN AND OUT OF GOVT AND ACCORDS WITH OUR OWN VIEWS. HOW ROK-JAPAN TALKS CAN BE PRESSED TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION BY A GOVT AS RIVE AND SHAKEN AS THIS ONE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. I DOUBT IF KIM IS AS SANGUINE IN THIS RESPECT AS HE MAKES OUT. MOREOVER HIS FEELING THAT PAK "UNDERSTANDS THE SITUATION" AND WILL IN THE END REMOVE KCP DOES NOT SQUARE WITH HIS PESSIMISM.

10. GP-3. BERGER

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CFN 9. SAGACIOUS NOT 10 GP-3

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Origin
FE
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 1018
CINCUNC PRIORITY

Mar 7 7 24 PM '64

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INFO: CINCPAC

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JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

SP

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- A) Seoul's 1389
- B) Deptel 1002

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-160

By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93

1. Assume you will keep us informed on current priority basis of all developments helicopter case.

2. We will endeavor to consult you beforehand on text of possible high-level USG statement, as requested para 5 reftel A. News conferences are often arranged on short notice, however, and full coordination may not be possible. If interested Senators issue statement, high-level Executive Branch statement may be immediately necessary. As matters now stand, our statement could do little more than describe in general terms what we have done, indicate serious concern over case, and reaffirm determination to continue efforts to obtain release of personnel.

3. We believe press questions on which you asked guidance para 6 reftel A are more ~~lik~~ likely be raised in Washington than Seoul and to be phrased in more general terms, such as: A) What is basis for North Korean charge that pilots on espionage mission and B) What ~~role has UN played in~~ ^{role has UN played in} ~~is necessary for North Korean~~

Drafted by: CL Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE Marshall Green

Clearances:

OSD/ISA - Col. Moorman (subst) CL, P - Mr. Gaiduk
 FE/P - Mr. Gaiduk TAG, L/UNA - Mr. Bilder (draft) els.
 EA - Mr. Bacon MB, UNP - Mr. Jones M
 FE:RA - Miss McNutt * **CONFIDENTIAL**

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efforts obtain release of personnel? Query A can be answered by restating our position that there no basis to North Korean charge, referring to North Korean admission on February 18 that no cameras or weapons were aboard their helicopter, and pointing out men were in American Army uniform and therefore obviously not quote spies unquote. There is simply fact of inadvertent crossing of boundary while on routine mission. Query B can be answered by defining relationship of UNC to Unified Command and UN, referring to report by Unified Command to UNGA December 1963 and subsequent debate, and making general statement that many member countries, especially others of Sixteen have been helpful in many ways. You may wish to point out also that the UN has played role by designating U.S. as Unified Command to act for UN.

GP - 3

RUSK

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Karen

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CONTROL: 976
RECD: MAY 2, 1964, 8:05 A.M.

FROM: SEOUL

Cy S. destroyed

ACTION: SECSTATE 1405, IMMEDIATE

DATE: MAY 2, 8 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

REF: DEPTEL 999

EXDIS

1. ROKG ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEVALUATION EXPECTED BETWEEN 9:00PM AND 12:00PM, KST, MAY 2.

2. GP-3.

CFN 999 1. 9:00 12:00 2. Gp-3.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 8:25 AM, 5/2/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8:30 AM, 5/2/64.

BERGER

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-160

By *ju*, NARA, Date *8-10-92*

~~SECRET~~

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42

1. ~~Mr. Forrestal~~
2. Return to Bromley Smith

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control:
Rec'd:

Kove
122
MAY 1, 1964
5:08 AM

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1398 PRIORITY

002

DATE: MAY 1, 4 PM

Cy # 3 dest 7/13/64

EXDIS

REF: A. DEPTTEL 995

1. SUBSTANCE REFTTEL PASSED MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

2. OFFICIAL CONCERNED FELT THAT ACTION COULD NOT BE INITIATED BEFORE IMF RESPONSE. HE WAS MOST ANXIOUS THAT REPLY BE RECEIVED BEFORE CABINET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 2:00 PM KST, MAY 2, (12:00 PM EST), MAY 1. PLEASE PASS THIS TO VAN CAMPENHOUT.

3. GP-3.

BERGER

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By *pw*, NARA, Date *8-10-92*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 1000

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MAY 1 7 56 PM '64

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Cy # 2 dect 7/13/64 001/21

EXDIS

Assuming devaluation is effected May 3, Department will remove on May 4 the Exclusive Distribution (EXDIS) designation of telegrams pertaining to this matter. This will permit normal distribution of the messages to interested offices throughout USG.

Series includes:

- 1) Embassy Seoul telegrams: 1307, April 16; 1352 and 1353, April 23; 1367, April 25; 1385, 1387 and 1388, April 29; 1398, May 1.
- 2) Deptels: 944 April 17; 976 April 24; 980 April 28; 994 and 995 April 30; 966 May 1; this telegram and any subsequent cables that may be exchanged prior to devaluation.

GP - 3

RUSK

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-160
By *fw*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

| | |
|---|--|
| Drafted by: <i>com mil</i> | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>/s/ Robert W. Barnett</i> |
| Clearances: FE:EA:EGallagher:gh 5/1/64 | |

AID - Mr. Carey (subst)
E - Miss Milne (subst)

EA - Mr. Bacon
S/S - Mr. Rowe

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~~SECRET~~

WH 44

00810

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin
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Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 999

May 1 7 56 PM '64

Op #3 dest 7/3/64

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EXDIS

In connection with press statement which Dept planning to make, request Embassy inform us in separate IMMEDIATE telegrams: (1) Expected timing of ROKG announcement of devaluation; and (2) confirmation that ROKG has actually made announcement.

GP-4.

RUSK

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *Group 4*
By *sis*, NARS, Date *1-22-82*

| | |
|---|--|
| Drafted by: FE:EA:EGallagher:bhm <i>can</i> 5/1/64 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Robert W. Barnett <i>RWB (jms)</i> |
| Clearances: EA - Mr. Bacon <i>WJ</i> S/S - Mr. Rowe | SECRET FE/P - Mr. Lockhart |

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Forecast

INDICATE: COLLECT
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VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

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APR 30 8 44 PM '64

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EXDIS

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2/13/64*

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Embtel 1388

Van Campenhout, Executive Director representing ROK on IMF, has requested following message be transmitted to Tong Kyu Park, ROK Minister of Finance. Begin Verbatim Text (unnecessary words omitted):

HIS EXCELLENCY TONG KYU PARK

MINISTER OF FINANCE

SEOUL KOREA

Your communication to Mr. Schweitzer received last night and transmitted stop I also acknowledge your personal communication stop Hope to have matter on Board agenda ~~tomorrow~~ tomorrow May first Washington time which is the earliest possible moment stop I anticipate Board decision can be transmitted to you during morning May first Washington time stop Regards.

SIGNED: van Campenhout

END VERBATIM TEXT.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-160

By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

HARRIMAN

GP 3

Drafted by:

OFE - MLMilne:mlp 4-30-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Robert W. Barnett

Clearances:

Mr. Fearey
EA - ~~MLM~~

U.S. Ex. Dir. IMF - Mr. Dale

S/S - Miss Moor

~~SECRET~~

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END 655

OO RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 23854 29/1640Z

O 291633Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 291145Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

1388 IMMEDIATE, APRIL 29, 9 PM

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1964 APR 29 16 48

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By sj/jc, NARA, Date 5-22-07

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Copy sent Forrestal

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SECRET

EXDIS

EXDIS -

FOR BELL, GREEN AND POATS

FROM BERGER AND KILLEN

REF A. DEPTTEL 944

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING TWO MESSAGES TO ADDRESSEES ON RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAM. COPY OF TELEGRAM TO MANAGING DIR. IMF, SHOULD BE PASSED TO CAMPENHOUT.

2. BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED):

MR. PIERRE PAUL SCHWEITZER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY FUND, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DEAR MR. SCHWEITZER:

GOVT REPUBLIC OF KOREA WISHES TO INFORM INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OF FUNDAMENTAL REVISION ITS EXCHANGE SYSTEM WHICH WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE IN FEW DAYS. WE INTEND TO ESTABLISH UNITARY, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE WITH FLOOR BELOW WHICH IT CANNOT APPRECIATE, BUT NO PREDETERMINED LIMITATION ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH EXCHANGE RATE CAN DEPRECIATE. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, MARKET RATE WILL BE CREATED BY PURCHASE AND SALE CERTIFICATE DENOMINATED IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE.

THIS NEW MEASURE, WHICH AMOUNTS TO DEVALUATION, HAS BEEN REQUIRED BY THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN PRICES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1961 WHEN RELATIONSHIP OF WON TO US DOLLAR WAS LAST CHANGED. RESULTANT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT, PARTICULARLY IN 1963, HAS LED TO DRASTIC TIGHTENING OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS, SEVERE DRAIN OF EXCHANGE RESERVES AND INCREASE SHORT TERM BORROWING ABROAD. HOWEVER, STRICT BUDGET AND CREDIT POLICY SINCE 1963 HAS SHARPLY REDUCED INCREASE OF MONEY SUPPLY. PRICES OF COMMODITIES OTHER THAN GRAIN ARE NOW REACHING EQUILIBRIUM.

ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZING AS ULTIMATE GOAL, ESTABLISHMENT REALISTIC FIXED UNITARY EXCHANGE RATE, WE BELIEVE THAT KOREA'S PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE FLEXIBLE RATE SYSTEM FOR TIME BEING. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NEED TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE OUR EXPORT AND OTHER EXTERNAL EARNINGS IN ORDER MAINTAIN NECESSARY IMPORTS FOR REASONABLE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ADJUST TO GRADUALLY DECLINING VOLUME OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM ARE:

- A. CERTIFICATE WHICH WILL BE GENERATED BY SURRENDER FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUTHORITY OR ISSUED ON BACKING OF EXCHANGE RESERVE HOLDINGS;
- B. CERTIFICATE WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAYMENTS;
- C. EXCEPTIONS TO THESE RULES WILL BE EXCHANGE SURRENDERED BY NON-RESIDENTS, E.G., FOREIGN GOVTS, TOURISTS, ETC., AND SALE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROVIDED BY FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS, E.G., US SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE, IE 480 PROGRAM, ETC., WHERE NO CERTIFICATE WILL BE CREATED OR REQUIRED;
- D. NEGOTIATED (AS RECD. CC TO FOLLOW) ISSUED BY FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUTHORITY (COMMISSION. CC TO FOLLOW) FREELY NEGOTIABLE AND THERE WILL BE (COMMISSION. CC TO FOLLOW) RESTRICTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS OR INSTITUTIONS THAT MAY BUY AND SELL THEM; CERTIFICATES WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY BANKS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOANS; THEY WILL BE GOOD FOR 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF ISSUANCE; THEY MAY BE SOLD TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUTHORITY AT ANY TIME BEFORE THEY EXPIRE FOR WON;
- E. ALL EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AT MARKET RATE ESTABLISHED IN CERTIFICATE MARKET, WHETHER OR NOT CERTIFICATE IS INVOLVED;

F. BANK OF KOREA WILL MANAGE EXCHANGE SYSTEM UNDER THE BASIS OF REFERENCE ESTABLISHED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE; BANKS CURRENTLY LICENSED TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN EXCHANGE MARKET; BANK OF KOREA WILL SET BUYING AND SELLING RATES TWICE DAILY;

G. FLOOR RATE WILL BE 255 WON/1\$US;

H. EFFECTIVE DATE WILL BE 12:01 AM, KST, MAY 3, 1964.

WE PROPOSE THAT FLOOR RATE OF 255 WON/1 US DOLLAR BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ALL EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

ESTABLISHMENT OF REALISTIC EXCHANGE RATE WILL PERMIT SIMPLIFICATION OF CURRENT EXCHANGE AND LICENSING SYSTEM IN NEAR FUTURE. EXPORT-IMPORT LINK SYSTEM WILL BE ABOLISHED AND SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN PROPORTION OF IMPORTS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC APPROVAL LICENSING WILL BE UNDERTAKEN SHORTLY AFTER DEVALUATION. IMPORTS REQUIRED TO FILL EXPORT ORDERS ARE ALREADY BEING LICENSED FREELY BUT WITHIN LIMIT OF GLOBAL QUOTA BY BANK OF KOREA.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS EXCHANGE REFORM WILL BE IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN REESTABLISHING STABILITY TO KOREAN ECONOMY. WE HOPE THAT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND WILL HAVE NO OBJECTION, AND THAT WE MAY HAVE REPLY BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS, MAY 1, KST.

SIGNED: /S/ TONG KYU PARK, TONG KYU PARK, MINISTER OF FINANCE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MR. ANDRE VAN CAMPENHOUT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. VAN CAMPENHOUT:

I HEREBY AUTHORIZE YOU TO SERVE AS SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF
REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND OF PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN MY TELEGRAM TO
MANAGING DIRECTOR.

SIGNED: /S/ TONG KYU PARK, TONG KYU PARK, MINISTER OF FINANCE,
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

END VERBATIM TEXT.

3. TRANSMISSION THROUGH EMBASSY FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY
AMBASSADOR.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

4. GP-3.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

47

Bundy
Kane

~~SECRET~~

34
Action
SS
Info

Control: 21839
Rec'd: APRIL 27, 1964
1:13 PM

030

FROM: SEOUL
ACTION: SECSTATE 1374, PRIORITY
INFO: TOKYO 611
CINCPAC 589
DATE: APRIL 28, 1 AM (SECTION 1 OF 11)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD
LIMDIS

1. SITUATION HERE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY HIGHLY-PLACED PERSONS AS "SERIOUS." DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OPPOSING GROUPS IN GOVERNMENT AND IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (DRP), COUPLED WITH THREAT OF RENEWED STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND DETERMINATION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO BRING DOWN GOVT HAVE CREATED MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS.
2. WE ARE AND HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUOUS TOUCH WITH KEY FIGURES IN AND OUT OF GOVT AND BECOMING CLEARER EVERY DAY THAT PRESSURE HAS TO BE RELIEVED SOON. MORE AND MORE ELEMENTS IN MILITARY AND IN GOVT FEEL THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY TO REDUCE PRESSURE AND SAVE PAK AND THAT IS FOR PAK TO REMOVE KIM CHONG-PIL (KCP), REORGANIZE DRP, AND CLEAN UP MAIN SOURCE OF CORRUPTION. DURING PAST TWO WEEKS THIS VIEW HAS BEEN EXPRESSED TO US REPEATEDLY BY KOREAN LEADERS WHO SUPPORT PAK.
3. STRONGEST ADVOCATES THIS ACTION ARE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VICE-SPEAKER CHANG KYONG-SUN, CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF KIM CHONG-O, DRP ASSEMBLYMAN KIM SONG-KON, (SUK KIM) DRP ASSEMBLYMAN KIM TONG-HWAN AND EX-PRIME MINISTER KIM HYON-CHOL. FONMIN CHONG IL-KWON MORE CAUTIOUSLY OF SAME OPINION, AND RELIABLE REPORTS INDICATE CIA DIRECTOR KIM HYONG-UJON PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK, AND MINISTER DEFENSE KIM SONG-

UN ARE ALSO IN
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

By UUB NLJ/RAC 12-16
NARA, Date 12-27-2013

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1374, APRIL 28, 1 AM FROM SEOUL. (SECTION 1 OF 11).

UN ARE ALSO IN ANTI-KCP CAMP.

4. MOVEMENT AGAINST KCP HAS GATHERED FORCE RAPIDLY DURING PAST FEW DAYS. CHANG KYONG-SUN INFORMED DCM APRIL 25 HE HAD SAME DAY PRESENTED PRESIDENT PAK WITH ULTIMATUM TO GET RID OF KCP AND THAT PAK HAD AGREED. ACCORDING TO CHANG, PRESIDENT PLANNED TO NOTIFY KCP WHO WOULD BE ASKED RESIGN FROM ALL POLITICAL POSTS AND GO ABROAD "TO STUDY." CHANG OFFERED MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THIS ACTION BUT PRESIDENT PAK SAID HE WOULD DO SO HIMSELF IN NEXT FEW DAYS AFTER SEEING KCP. CHANG SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD GENERAL KIM CHONG-O THAT IF PAK DOES NOT ACT IN FEW DAYS, HE (CHANG) WILL PUBLICLY BLAST KCP AND DEMAND HIS RESIGNATION. (WE HAVE LATE REPORT THAT ON EVENING APRIL 27 CHANG ANNOUNCED TO PRESS HIS VIEW KCP MUST GO AND FACT THAT PRESIDENT PAK HAS BEEN SO ADVISED.) CHANG SAID HE HAD PROPOSED AND PAK AGREED THAT DRP LEADERSHIP BE GIVEN TO ASSEMBLY SPEAKER YI HYO-SANG WHO RECENTLY SUBMITTED RESIGNATION IN WAKE OF ASSEMBLY TURMOIL OVER KIM CHUNG-YON CASE.

5. CHANG SAID MOST DRP ASSEMBLYMEN WOULD SUPPORT THESE MOVES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH ASSEMBLY CONTROL OF PARTY, REDUCE POWER OF PARTY SECRETARIAT AND ITS INTERFERENCE IN GOVT ADMINISTRATION, AND TO SHARPLY CURTAIL PARTY STAFF.

6. CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS KIM CHONG-O IN CONVERSATION WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR APRIL 23 AND AGAIN ON APRIL 26 ALSO EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN RECENT COURSE EVENTS AND THREATENING PROSPECTS. HE BELIEVES IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR GOVT TO PREVENT FURTHER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IF NECESSARY BY MILITARY FORCE UNDER MARTIAL LAW. HOWEVER HE FEELS MARTIAL LAW WILL NOT PRODUCE STABILITY UNLESS THE GOVT AT SAME TIME TAKES ACTION TO CLEAN HOUSE. HE DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL EXTENT AND IMPACT OF CORRUPTION IN DRP. ISSUE HAD TO BE MET HEAD ON IN ORDER TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS THINK FOR THEMSELVES, DO NOT LIKE WHAT THEY SEE AND COULD BECOME A FACTOR IN SITUATION.

/7. GENERAL KIM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1374, APRIL 28, 1 AM FROM SEOUL. (SECTION 1 OF 11)

7. GENERAL KIM CONCLUDED THAT HEART OF PROBLEM WAS KCP AND THAT HE MUST BE REMOVED. UNLESS THIS DONE BLAME FOR GOVTS FAILURES AND ACTIONS WOULD BE LAID ON PAK HIMSELF AND EVENTUALLY ENGULF HIM.

8. GENERAL KIM HAS IN MIND MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND CHIEFS OF STAFF PUTTING ISSUE SQUARELY BEFORE PRESIDENT PAK, ESPECIALLY IF SITUATION DETERIORATES TO POINT WHERE MARTIAL LAW IS REQUIRED. GENERAL KIM BELIEVES THREE OF THE FOUR CHIEFS AND MND ARE CONVINCED OF NEED TO REMOVE KCP, BUT GENERAL MIN KI-SIK REGARDS THIS AS POLITICAL MATTER AND DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED. KIM CHONG-O IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CHANG KYONG-SUN AND FAVORED LATTERS APPEAL TO PAK, WHICH GENERAL KIM HAS SAID HE INTENDS TO FOLLOW-UP BY GIVING SAME ADVICE PERSONALLY TO QHY.*

9. EX-PRIME MINISTER KIM HYONG-CHOL IN CONVERSATION WITH AMB ON APRIL 25 SAID HE HAD AGAIN URGED PRESIDENT TO REMOVE KCP AND CUT DRP MACHINE TO BONE IN ORDER GET AT GRAFT, REVIVE CONFIDENCE OF PEOPLE IN PAK AND PREVENT RENEWED STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. HE SAID PAK LISTENED BUT MADE NO REPLY. HE WAS SEEING PAK AGAIN THIS WEEK AND WOULD REPEAT HIS ADVICE. PAK IS GETTING THIS ADVICE FROM OTHERS AS WELL AND KIM HYON-CHO THINKS PAK IS MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION.

10. ASSEMBLYMAN S. K. KIM TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR APRIL 27 PAK UNDER STRONGEST PRESSURE FROM MANY SUPPORTERS TO REMOVE KCP AND CLEAN UP MESS TO SAVE HIS GOVT. HE SAID PAK IS NOW ABOUT 70 PERCENT CONVINCED OF NEED FOR THIS ACTION, THAT THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL PRESSURE DURING NEXT FEW DAYS AND HIS IS INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT PAK WILL MAKE DECISION. S K KIM SAID VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN AND OUT OF PARTY COULD BE ENLISTED IN SUPPORT OF PAK AND IN SUPPORT OF STRONGER CABINET AS SOON AS THIS BASIC DECISION MADE.

GP-2.

BERGER

MBK-21

~~SECRET~~

* AS RECEIVED. WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

476

~~SECRET~~

34
Action
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Info

PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 02E 28/1600Z
P R 281510Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
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1964 APR 27 PM 1 53

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CINCPAC 589 APR 28, 1 AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

11. KCP TOLD AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICER THAT HE IS UNDER HEAVY ATTACK. SAID HE WILL NOT RESIGN BUT WILL LEAVE IF PAK ASKS HIM TO. EVIDENT FROM THIS AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH PEOPLE CLOSE TO KCP THAT KCP KNOWS HE IS IN A DESPERATE POSITION, THAT HE IS BEING DESERTED BY ERSTWHILE SUPPORTERS, AND THAT HIS FUTURE DEPENDS ON PAK. KCP'S CLOSE ADVISOR CFN 1374 611 589 28 1AM 11.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 02E ~~SECRET~~

CHANG TAE-HWA TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON APRIL 27 THAT KCP IS THINKING OF LEAVING BUT IS STILL HOPEFUL THAT PAK WILL ACCEPT KCPS PROPOSALS FOR MEETING CURRENT PROBLEMS. KCP HOPES CHANGES IN CABINET, SOME CHANGES IN PARTY, AND NEW EVIDENCE OF GOVTS INTENTION TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO QUIET IMMEDIATE PRESSURES. THIS SOUNDED LIKE PLAINTIVE EFFORT HOLD ON TO ILLUSION KCP MAY YET SURVIVE STORM.

12. KIM TONG-HWAN TOLD DCM APRIL 27 THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED KCP HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH LEADERSHIP OF PARTY AND "MUST GO." HE SAID HE WOULD SO ADVISE KCP, AND PREDICTED MATTER WOULD BE DECIDED IN FEW DAYS. HE WAS TROUBLED BY PROBLEM FINDING SUCCESSOR TO KCP BUT FELT ESSENTIAL OUTCOME WOULD BE GOOD.

13. FORMER PRIMIN HO CHONG TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR APRIL 27 THAT SITUATION CRITICAL. HE DOES NOT FAVOR CURRENT MOVES BY YUN PO-SUN WHO IS OUT TO TOPPLE GOVT. HO BELIEVES AS A FIRST STEP, HOWEVER, THAT KCP MUST BE REMOVED FROM SCENE. HO IS NOT CONVINCED THIS WILL RESOLVE PROBLEMS OR THAT PAK CAN THEN BE DEPENDED ON TO PROVIDE TYPE OF LEADERSHIP NEEDED.

CFN 27 12. 27 13. 27

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-2-1374, April 28, 1 a.m., from Seoul

PAGE THREE RUALOS 02E S E C R E T
NEVERTHELESS, IN HOS VIEW PAK MUST TAKE THIS STEP IF HE IS TO
HAVE EVEN A CHANCE OF RESTORING ORDER WITHIN HIS OWN POLITICAL
CIRCLE.

14. COMMENT: SITUATION MOVING VERY FAST AS WE PREPARE THIS
TELEGRAM. PAK LEFT SEOUL FOR ONYANG APRIL 27 PRESUMABLY TO
MAKE HIS DECISION. ALL SIGNS POINT TO EARLY DECISION. PRE-
SSURES AGAINST KCP APPEAR IRRESISTIBLE AND HIS GOING WILL
ENTAIL A MAJOR SHAKE-UP IN PARTY AND PROBABLY IN GOVT.

15. GP-2.

BERGER

BT

CFN 14. 27 15. GP-2.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy 4/8

M

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Action CONTROL: 20905
RECD: APRIL 25, 1964, 4:46AM

Kern

SS
Info FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1367

DATE: APRIL 25, 5PM

002

SECRET

Cy # 3 dest 7/13/64

EXDIS

REF: (A) DEPTTEL 944 (B) EMBTEL 1352

1. KIM, YU-TAIK CALLED KILLEN TO HIS OFFICE APRIL 24 AND MADE ANOTHER STRONG PLEA FOR ADDITIONAL AID. FINANCE MINISTER ALSO PRESENT. KIM ASKED IF WE HAD REPLY FROM WASHINGTON. KILLEN REPLIED IN NEGATIVE ADDING THAT ROKG SHOULD NOT RPT NOT EXPECT CHANGE IN AMOUNT U.S. CAN PROVIDE AS STATED BY HIM DURING EARLIER TALKS.

2. KIM SAID HE HAD REPORTED EARLIER CONVERSATION TO PRESIDENT WHO VERY UNHAPPY AND INDICATED SOME UNCERTAINTY WHETHER ROKG COULD AFFORD TO QUOTE RISK UNQUOTE DEVALUATION WITH U.S. SUPPORT SO LIMITED. KILLEN SAID AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM OF PRESIDENT'S SEEMING RETICENCE ON QUESTION BUT HE (KILLEN) COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT ROKG COULD CARRY THROUGH ON FIRM AND UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENT GIVEN ON APRIL 10. ANY OTHER CONCLUSION RAISED MOST SERIOUS QUESTION RE INTEGRITY OF ROKG AND WE WERE INDEED LOATHE TO ACCEPT THIS AS POSSIBILITY. DEVALUATION WAS DESIGNED FOR BENEFIT OF ROK RATHER THAN OF U.S. USG HAD AMPLE PROTECTION SHOULD ROKG FAIL TO FOLLOW THROUGH AS STATED ON DEVALUATION ISSUE. INTER ALIA, REVISION OF U.S. USE RATE UNDER NINTH PL 480 AGREEMENT TO 35-40 PERCENT WOULD ENABLE U.S. MILITARY TO COVER ALL ITS WON COSTS WITHOUT RESORT TO BOK.

3. DEPUTY PREMIER RE-AFFIRMED DATE OF DEVALUATION AS GIVEN EARLIER. KEPT PRESSING FOR ADDITIONAL AID. MADE REFERENCE TO STORIES OUT OF WASHINGTON THAT SUPPORT ASSISTANCE WOULD PROBABLY STOP IN COUPLE OF YEARS, WIDESPREAD KOREAN BELIEF THAT U.S. INTENDED TO PUSH ROK/JAPAN SETTLEMENT AND THEN WITHDRAW AID, AND TALK OF WITHDRAWING US FORCES FROM KOREA. SAID ONLY \$10 MILLION AS STABILIZATION FUND APPEARED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THESE FREQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED KOREAN VIEWS.

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Authority RAC 001A-254-3-18-8
By JW *ARA Date 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1367, April 25, 5 p.m. from Seoul

4. KILLEN REFERRED TO RUSK-PARK TALKS AND ASSURANCES GIVEN THEREIN, PLUS OTHER RECENT OFFICIAL US STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE REMOVED ANY BASIS FOR FEARS KIM CITED. SAID US HAD NO RPT NO INTENTION OF EITHER WITHDRAWING AID OR TURNING KOREA OVER TO JAPAN. US WAS HOWEVER INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH CALIBER AND QUALITY OF ROKG SELF-HELP MEASURES AND ITS AID POSTURE WOULD CERTAINLY BE INFLUENCED THEREBY. FELT THAT ASSISTANCE US WAS PROVIDING AND HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE PURSUANT DEVALUATION SEEMED TO HIM BOTH SUBSTANTIAL AND RESPONSIVE TO KOREAN REQUESTS. IF PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND USED IN CONCERT WITH OTHER ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL RESOURCES, IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO KOREAN ECONOMIC HEALTH.

5. KIM THEN ASKED ABOUT OFFICIAL WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF PROPOSED ADDITIONAL AID, ASKING IF KILLEN WOULD GIVE HIM LETTER SETTING FORTH AMOUNTS TO BE PROVIDED. KILLEN SAID IF DEPUTY PREMIER WERE TO ADDRESS LETTER TO HIM STATING ROKG DECISION ON LEVEL AND AGREED DATE OF RATE CHANGE AND ASKING WHAT HELP US COULD GIVE, HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO REPLY. KIM SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND HOPED RESPONSE WOULD CITE AID LEVELS HIGHER THAN ALREADY VOICED. HE ASKED IF KILLEN COULD INCLUDE IN LETTER STATEMENT INDICATING PROSPECT OF MORE ADDITIONAL AID LATER IN YEAR. KILLEN SAID HE DOUBTED POSSIBILITY OF THIS. SAID HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON MIGHT MAKE STATEMENT AFTER DEVALUATION, VOICING BELIEF KOREAN ACTION THIS RESPECT MOST CONSTRUCTIVE AND RE-AFFIRMING ITS CONTINUING INTEREST IN KOREAN ECONOMIC MATTERS. HE ASKED IF DEPUTY PREMIER THOUGHT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL. KIM SAID MOST ASSUREDLY SO.

6. KIM INDICATED HE WOULD SEND KILLEN LETTER DESCRIBED ABOVE EARLY IN WEEK. HE WOULD ALSO GIVE US MESSAGE FOR IMF TO BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH US CHANNELS BY END OF DAY APRIL 28. HE ENDED CONVERSATION BY AGAIN ASKING FOR MORE.

7. KILLEN AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR A STATE/ AID STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING DEVALUATION ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) PLEASED TO SEE LONG STEP TOWARDS STRENGTHENING OF KOREAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING CAPABILITY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUILIBRIUM IN HER EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS;

B) CONFIDENCE IN EFFECTIVENESS OF FLOATING RATE AS DEVICE TO THIS END;

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 1367, April 25, 5 p.m. from Seoul

C) ACTION MARKS GROWTH OF RESPONSIBILITY IN ROKG FINANCIAL MATTERS; AND

D) US WILL MAINTAIN CLOSEST REVIEW IN CONCERT WITH ROKG OVER 1964 STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND IMPORT/EXPORT PROBLEMS TO THE END THAT NATION'S CAPACITY FOR, AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF, HEALTHY ECONOMIC PROGRESS SHALL NOT BE DIMINISHED.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT.

9. GP-3.

CFN 944 1352 1. 24 2. 10 480 35-40 3. \$10 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
GP-3.

BERGER

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea 49

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action
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PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 06E 24/0725Z
P 240707Z ZEA

~~FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL~~
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

01.9745
1964 APR 24 AM 3 30

P R I O R I T Y

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1359 INFO
CINCPAC 582 APRIL 24, 4PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OSD, JCS AND DA

JOINT CINCUNC/EMBASSY MESSAGE

REF: A) DEPTTEL 941 B) DEPTTEL 900 C) DEPTTEL 455 D) EMBTEL 1254
E) EMBTEL 1237 F) EMBTEL 761

1. IN CONSIDERING WHAT NEXT STEP SHOULD BE, WE BELIEVE
FOLLOWING FACTORS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT:

A. RELEASE OF RB-66 PILOTS HAS PROBABLY HAD ADVERSE EFFECT ON EARLY
RELEASE HELICOPTER PILOTS, SINCE NORTH KOREANS UNLIKELY TAKE
CFN 1359 582 24 4PM 941 900 455 1254 1237 761 1. 66

PAGE TWO RUALOS 06E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
ANY ACTION THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS FOLLOWING SOVIET
EXAMPLE. RB-66 CASE, THEREFORE, MAY DELAY, TO GREATER EXTENT
THAN PREVIOUSLY ANTICIPATED, KPA/CPV REPLY TO CINCUNC LETTER
25 MARCH WHICH DECLARED UNCMAC SENIOR MEMBER READY TO NEGOTIATE
AND AWAITING INFORMATION FROM KPA/CPV SENIOR MEMBER.

B. REMOTE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT KPA/CPV PLANS RELEASE
HELICOPTER PILOTS AFTER HOLDING THEM FOR PERIOD COMPARABLE TO
THAT IN WHICH UNC HELD KPA OFFICER. (TWO KPA LIEUTENANTS
CAPTURED BY ROKA 5 SEPTEMBER 1962. ONE RELEASED TO KPA AT
HIS REQUEST 21 AUGUST 1963, AFTER 15 DAYS LESS THAN ONE YEAR
CONFINEMENT. OTHER OFFICER RELEASED FROM MILITARY CUSTODY
28 SEPTEMBER 1963 AND REPORTED RESIDING SEOUL IN ACCORDANCE
HIS DESIRE.) WE SHOULD AVOID JEOPARDIZING POSSIBLE RELEASE
OF ONE OR BOTH HELICOPTER PILOTS IN EARLY MAY AT END OF PERIOD
CORRESPONDING TO THAT FOR WHICH KPA OFFICER HELD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAE cod R-254-3-19-7
By JON *ARA Date 8.18.14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1359, APRIL 24, 4 P.M. FROM SEOUL

C. KPA/CPV HAVE NOT YET REFERRED TO RELEASE OF PILOTS. ANY FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY UNCMAC AT THIS TIME COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT BY PLACING KPA/CPV IN POSITION WHERE RELEASE OF PILOTS WOULD APPEAR TO BE RESULT OF UNCMAC PRESSURES. AT SAME TIME, UNCMAC SHOULD MAINTAIN DIGNIFIED POSTURE AND
CFN 66 25 5 1962 21 1963 15 28 1963

PAGE THREE RUALOS 06E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AVOID UNNECESSARILY DEGRADING STATEMENTS.

2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES MENTIONED ABOVE, VARIOUS FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION APPEAR POSSIBLE:
 - A. ATTEMPT BY UNCMAC SR MEMBER TO MEET PRIVATELY AND DISCUSS WITH KPA/CPV SR MEMBER;
 - B. HIGH-LEVEL USG PUBLIC STATEMENT;
 - C. INDIRECT PRESSURES ON DPRK;
 - D. RECESS MAC MEETINGS UNTIL PILOTS RELEASED.
3. REF PARA 2A, SINCE MARCH 23 LETTER STATES KPA/CPV SR MEMBER ENTRUSTED WITH SETTLEMENT, LOGICAL NEXT STEP APPEARS TO BE DISCUSSION WITH HIM. THEREFORE, IF PILOTS NOT RELEASED EARLY MAY ON BASIS CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED PARA 1B, WE ARE CONSIDERING ASKING FOR PRIVATE MEETING SR MEMBERS, AS AUTHORIZED PARA 5, REF B.
4. REF 2B, PUBLIC STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OR SECSTATE MIGHT BE USEFUL IN TERMS US DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT IT WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON KPA/CPV AND MIGHT EVEN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.
5. REF 2C, WE BELIEVE BEHIND-SCENES DENIALS BY OUR ALLIES OF TRADE AND VISAS TO NORTH KOREANS SHOULD BE CONTINUED.
6. REF 2D, RECENT MAC HISTORY SHOWS MOST MEETINGS CALLED
CFN 2. 3. 2A 23 1B 5 4. 2B 5. 2C 6. 2D

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 06E C O N F I D E N T I A L
BY KPA/CPV. CLEARLY, THEY HAVE DEEMED MEETINGS BENEFICIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1359, APRIL 24, 4 P.M. FROM SEOUL

TO THEM. THEREFORE, THREAT TO HOLD NO MORE MEETINGS UNTIL PILOTS RELEASED MIGHT BRING ABOUT RELEASE. HOWEVER, THIS STEP DANGEROUS, FOR IT WOULD EXPOSE UNCMAC TO PROPAGANDA CHARGES OF TRYING TO WRECK ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTERFERE WITH OPERATION OF MAC. IT WOULD ALSO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT WHEREBY KPA/CPV IN FUTURE COULD USE SAME TACTIC AGAINST US. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD PLACE UNCMAC IN AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING TO FOREGO MEETING OR ELSE MAKE HUMILIATING RETREAT FROM ITS POSITION, IF SOME UNEXPECTED HAPPENING SHOULD MAKE MEETING IMPERATIVE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. ON BALANCE, THIS COURSE OF ACTION APPEARS UNDESIRABLE AT THIS TIME.

7. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KPA/CPV WILL ADHERE TO DEMAND FOR ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE AS CONDITION FOR RELEASE OF PILOTS. ALSO POSSIBLE THEY WOULD NOT RELEASE THEM EVEN IF UNCMAC DID ADMIT ESPIONAGE AND DELIBERATE VIOLATION DEMILITARIZED ZONE. IF THEY ADHERE TO DEMAND, WE PLAN ACTION IN ACCORDANCE REFS B AND D.

8. SUMMING UP, WE FAVOR CONTINUANCE OF PRESSURES ON NORTH KOREANS THROUGH DENIAL OF TRADE AND VISAS BY THIRD CFN 7. 8.

PAGE FIVE RUALOS 06E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COUNTRIES. IF PILOTS NOT RELEASED EARLY MAY, WE PROPOSE SEEK PRIVATE MEETING OF SR MEMBERS. IF SUBJECT RAISED BY KPA/CPV AT MEETING OF MAC OR SECRETARIES WE WILL PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE REF B AND D.

BERGER
BT
CFN B AND D.

NOTE: RELAYED TO JCS, OSD, DA, 4-24-64, 3:55 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Korea

APR 24 8 13 PM '64

B
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 976

EXDIS

JOINT STATE - AID - Treasury Message

004
ag #5 draft 7/13/64

You may inform ROKG Washington agencies fully support your position, as indicated Embtel 1352, para 6.

considers
If Embassy/~~regards~~ it helpful, may inform ROKG of impending change in IMF rules, expected to be effective June 1, which will permit drawings by countries which have not had initial par values agreed with IMF. Thus after month or so experience with new exchange rate ROKG could consider requesting IMF for drawing, if additional foreign exchange resources then regarded as necessary.

GP-3.

RUSK

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-160
By ig, NARA, Date 1-21-93

Drafted by:

RM
FE:EA:EGallagher:gh 4/24/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: /s/ Robert W. Barnett

Clearances:

AID - Mr. Carey (draft) *TC*
E - Miss Milne (draft) *TC*
S/S = Mr. Moose

Treasury - Mr. Syvrud (subst) *TC*
FE:EA - Mr. Bacon *TC*

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~~SECRET~~

1. Mr. Komer ~~X~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

51

Komer

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

CORRECTION ISSUED
4/23/64 845p.m. RPG

~~SECRET~~

L
Action
SS
Info

CONTROL: 18873
RECEIVED: APRIL 23, 5:26 A.M. 1964
FROM: SEOUL - CORRECTED PAGE ONE
ACTION: SECSTATE 1353 PRIORITY
DATE: APRIL 23, 5, P.M.

✓ W/D

002

Kuro
Cy # 3 dest 7/13/64

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 944

FOR BELL, GREEN AND POATS FROM BERGER AND KPLEN

1. ACCEPTANCE OF 255 AS FLOOR RATE FLOATING CERTIFICATE SYSTEM (PARA 2 REFTTEL) RESULTS FIRM COMBINATITN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND BARGAINING CONSIDERATIONS, WE HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT 240 WAS CURRENT REALISTIC RATE. SETTING FLOOR RATE AT 260-270 LEVEL WOULD HAVE INVOLVED (A) ESTIMATED FIVE PER CENT PRICE INCREASE AS RESULT DIRECT COST PUSH AND (B) ANOTHER 5-10 PERCENT ARISING FROM DELAYED ADJUSTMENT, IN FOLLOWING 3-4 MONTHS, OF WAGES, UTILITY RATES, ETC., INCLUDING THOSE

MOVEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED EVEN IN ABSENCE DEVALUATION. IDEALLY TO TAKE ACCOUNT THESE FACTORS AND NOT RPT NOT RELY ON ROKG GOOD FAITH IN ANY DEGREE, FLOOR RATE OF 265-275 WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST DESIRABLE. RATE OF 255 WAS CHOSEN TO HASTEN CONCLUSION NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEW ROKG REAL OR FEIGNED PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO 100 PERCENT OR MORE DEVALUATION (130-260). WE ARE, IN EFFECT, RELYING ON ROKG GOOD FAITH TO ALLOW RATE TO FLOAT TO LEVEL WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR (B). IF RATE DOES NOT FLOAT AT ALL IT WILL SOON BE SLIGHTLY OVERVALUED ALTHOUGH STILL VERY USEFUL IN INCREASING INVISIBLE REVENUES AND DISCOURAGING CORRUPTION.

2. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE EXPECT FLOATING RATE TO FLOAT (PARA 3 REFTTEL). OUR BASIC ASSURANCE THAT PLAN WILL WORK IS OUR DETERMINATION TO MAKE IT MAJOR OBJECTIVE AND GENERAL LEVERAGE WE CAN EXERT (SEE PARA 4). FOR REMAINDER THIS YEAR THIS COMBINATION PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN FLOATING RATE PROVIDED DEPRECIATION NEITHER TOO RAPID OR FAR-RANGING. IF, IN 1-2 MONTHS FOLLOWING DEVALUATION, RATE DOES NOT RISE BEYOND 270-280

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