

516

1. Mr. Komer

2. Return to Bromley Smith

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

VWA 51c

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Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 18873  
 RECEIVED: APRIL 23, 5:26 A.M. 1964  
 FROM: SEOUL  
 ACTION: SECSTATE 1353 PRIORITY  
 DATE: APRIL 23, 5, P.M.  
 SECRET  
 EXDIS  
 REF: DEPTTEL 944

002

*Cy #3 dest 7/13/64*

FOR BELL, GREEN AND POATS FROM BERGER AND KPLEN

1. ACCEPTANCE OF 255 AS FLOOR RATE FLOATING CERTIFICATE SYSTEM (PARA 2 REFTTEL) RESULTS FIRM COMBINATITN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND BARGAINING CONSIDERATIONS, WE HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT 240 WAS CURRENT REALISTIC RATE. SETTING FLOOR RATE AT 260-270 LEVEL WOULD HAVE INVOLVED (A) ESTIMATED FIVE PER CENT PRICE INCREASE AS RESULT DIRECT COST PUSH AND (B) ANOTHER 5-10 PERCENT ARISING FROM DELAYED ADJUSTMENT, IN FOLLOWING 3-4 MONTHS, OF WAGES, UTILITY RATES, ETC., INCLUDING (#)

YOMNHOSE  
 MOVEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED EVEN IN ABSENCE DEVALUATION. IDEALLY TO TAKE ACCOUNT THESE FACTORS AND NOT RPT NOT RELY ON ROKG GOOD FAITH IN ANY DEGREE, FLOOR RATE OF 265-275 WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST DESIRABLE. RATE OF 255 WAS CHOSEN TO HASTEN CONCLUSION NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEW ROKG REAL OR FEIGNED PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO 100 PERCENT OR MORE DEVALUATION (130-260). WE ARE, IN EFFECT, RELYING ON ROKG GOOD FAITH TO ALLOW RATE TO FLOAT TO LEVEL WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR (B). IF RATE DOES NOT FLOAT AT ALL IT WILL SOON BE SLIGHTLY OVERVALUED ALTHOUGH STILL VERY USEFUL IN INCREASING INVISIBLE REVENUES AND DISCOURAGING CORRUPTION.

2. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE EXPECT FLOATING RATE TO FLOAT (PARA 3 REFTTEL). OUR BASIC ASSURANCE THAT PLAN WILL WORK IS OUR DETERMINATION TO MAKE IT MAJOR OBJECTIVE AND GENERAL LEVERAGE WE CAN EXERT (SEE PARA 4). FOR REMAINDER THIS YEAR THIS COMBINATION PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN FLOATING RATE PROVIDED DEPRECIATION NEITHER TOO RAPID OR FAR-RANGING. IF, IN 1-2 MONTHS FOLLOWING DEVALUATION, RATE DOES NOT RISE BEYOND 270-280

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

authority RAC 001R-254-3-20-5  
 by JDL vARA Date 8-28-19



~~SECRET~~

-2-1353, April 23, 5 p.m., from Seoul

RANGE, PRESSURE FROM NERC US OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS TO MOVE TO FIXED RATE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE SERIOUS. RISE TO 300 IN SAME PERIOD MIGHT PROVOKE REACTION. MAINTENANCE OF REALISTIC MARKET RATE WILL ALSO BE FAVORED BY WIDESPREAD UNDERSTANDING AMONG BUSINESS COMMUNITY (IN CONTRAST TO 1960 AND 1961) THAT RISING EXPORTS KOREA NEEDS TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE ITS LEVEL OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY REQUIRES REALISTIC EXCHANGE RATE.

3. ROKG TECHNICIANS ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON NECESSARY REGULATIONS. WE DO NOT AS YET HAVE COMPLETE PICTURE. SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY OUTLINES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR CERTIFICATES WILL ESTABLISH MARKET RATE;

B) CERTIFICATES WILL BE GENERATED BY SALE OF KFX TO BOK OR BY BOK RESERVE HOLDINGS; ALL KFX PAYMENTS WILL REQUIRE PRIOR POSSESSION OF CERTIFICATE;

C) SYSTEM WILL BE UNITARY;

D) AID AND PL 480 DOLLARS WILL BE SOLD AT RATE ESTABLISHED IN CERTIFICATE MARKET BUT NO CERTIFICATES WILL BE ISSUED;

E) US GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES WILL OBTAIN CERTIFICATE RATE BUT NOT CERTIFICATE; (OUR ORIGINAL REQUEST THAT RIGHT TO CERTIFICATE BE RETAINED AS DEFENSE, IF NECESSARY, AGAINST DISCRIMINATION WAS DROPPED);

F) TRADING OF CERTIFICATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO LITTLE OR NO LIMITATION;

G) NBOK WILL SET, DAILY OR MORE FREQUENTLY, BUYING AND SELLING RATES ON BASIS MOVEMENTS OF ITS ON RESERVES AND MARKET TRENDS. POINT F. AS OUR BEST PROTECTION THAT RATE WILL NOT BE FROZE BECAUSE CHANGE DOES NOT REQUIRE EXPLICIT GOVERNMENT OR BOK DECISION IN CONTRAST TO CURRENT SYSTEM. MOVEMENT MARKET RATE WILL APPLY PRESSURE AND GIVE RATIONALE TO BOK TO MAINTAIN REALISTIC LEVELS.

4. RE PARA 4 KEFTEL DURING WEEKS FOLLOWING REVALUATION. USOM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-1353, April 23, 5 p.m., from Seoul

PROPOSES TO REVIEW WITH ROKG ENTIRE PICTURE IMPORT LEVELS AND AVAILABLE FUNDING FOR BALANCE CY 64. WHILE RELEASE OF ANOTHER \$10 MILLION FY 64 SA WILL PROBABLY BE DESIRABLE SHORTLY AFTER ROKG ACTS. RATE AND TIMING RELEASE REMAINING AMOUNTS. INCLUDING ADDITIONAL \$10 MILLION, SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON BASIS THIS REVIEW. WILL ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER FY 65 SA AVAILABILITIES IN PLANNING FOR YEAR-END PIPELINE POSITION AND STABILIZATION TARGETS.

5. ROKG OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR ENLARGED GRANT OF SA AND PL 480 PURSUANT DEVALUATION. OUR ANSWER REMAINS SAME (EMBTel 1307, PARA 4). WE WOULD FAVOR HOWEVER SOME SPEED-UP OF SHIPMENT OF AMOUNTS UNDER NINTH AGREEMENT AFTER RPT AFTER ROKG ACTION ON RATE CHANGE. WILL MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION WHEN TIME COMES COVERING PROPOSED SHIPPING SCHEDULES AND RELEASE TO MARKET OF NINTH AGREEMENT AND ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS.

6. OUR POSITION ON DEVELOPMENT LOANS REMAINS UNCHANGED FOR PRESENT.

7. WILL COMMENT ON WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT (PARA 8 REFTel) LATER.

8. RE PARA 4 REFTel, MINISER EPB TOLD KILLEN ROKG WAS PREPARING MESSAGE FOR IMF ALONG PROPOSED LINES. DESIRED TRANSMISSION THROUGH US CHANNELS TO PREVENT PROBABLE LEAK IF ROKG CHANNELS USED.

9. GP-3.

CFN 944 1. 255 2 240 260-270 5-10 PERCENT 3-4 265-275 255 100  
130-260 2. 3 4 1-2 270-280 300 1960 1961 3. 480 4. 6 64 \$10 64 \$10  
65 5. 480 1307 4 6. 7. 8 8. 4 EPB IMF 9. GP-3.

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

BERGER

~~SECRET~~



1. Mr. ~~Korner~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

52

*Korner*

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

522

*Kover* ✓

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Action

SECRET

Control:  
Rec'd:

19252  
APRIL 23, 1964  
12:06 PM

SS

Info

FROM: SEOUL  
ACTION: SECSTATE 1352  
DATE: APRIL 23, 5 PM

*Cy # 3 dest 7/13/64*

002

EXDIS

FOR BELL, GREEN AND POATS

1. IN COURSE MY CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT PAK ON APRIL 20 HE SAID GOVT PLANNED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEVALUATION "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." I SAID KIM YU-T'AEK HAD TOLD US DATE DEFINITELY FIXED FOR MAY 3 WITH HIS APPROVAL AND DID "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" MEAN THAT THERE WAS A CHANGE. HE SAID HE HAD NEVER GIVEN APPROVAL OF A DEFINITE DATE, BUT MAY 3 WAY TO BE STUDIED TO SEE IF IT WAS POSSIBLE IN LIGHT OF ASSISTANCE WE WERE PREPARED TO OFFER.

2. I SAID WE HAD FROM VERY BEGINNING MADE CLEAR THAT TWO PROBLEMS WERE SEPARATE, AND THAT WE HAD ONLY INDICATED WHAT WE PREPARED TO DO TO HELP AFTER BEING GIVEN A FIRM DATE. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM WHAT PRESIDENT SAID THAT WE WERE MISLED. HE SAID KIM YU-T'AEK MUST HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD HIM. I SUGGESTED HE TALK TO KIM YU-T'AEK AND THEN HAVE HIM TALK WITH US, AFTER WHICH KILLEN AND I MAY WISH TO SEE HIM (PRESIDENT) ON THIS MATTER.

3. FOLLOWING DAY KIM YU-T'AEK ASKED SEE KILLEN, ME SEPARATELY HE MADE PITCH FOR ADDITIONAL \$20 MILLION SA OR PROGRAM LOAN. 300,000 TONS OF GRAIN ON GROUNDS AMOUNTS WE HAD INDICATED WERE INADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH SIDE EFFECTS; WOULD LEAD TO CRITICISM OF GOVT FOR SETTling FOR LESS THAN \$20 MILLION GIVEN CHANG MYON GOVT IN CONJUNCTION PREVIOUS DEVALUATION; WOULD BE USED AS EVIDENCE BY OPPOSITION THAT U. S. NOT SUPPORTING /PAK GOVT;

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Authority RAC001R-254-3-214

By JDA ARA Date 8-28-19



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1352, APRIL 23, 5 PM, FROM SEOUL

PAK GOVT; WOULD CAUSE SPECULATION THAT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP THE NEW GATE STABLE; AND WOULD ADD TO PRESENT UNREST CAUSED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. HE ASKED OUR SUPPORT IN SUBMITTING THIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.

4. WE ANSWERED THESE ARGUMENTS AND KIM YU-T'AEK ABANDONED REQUEST FOR MORE GRAIN, CONCENTRATING ON PROGRAM LOAN. WE SAID WE HAD OBTAINED AS MUCH SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON AS WAS POSSIBLE, THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE REQUEST BUT WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT IT TOGETHER WITH HIS ARGUMENTS.

5. WE THEN ASKED ABOUT MAY 3 DATE AND WERE ASSURED IT WAS STILL FIRM.

6. COMMENT: THEY ARE NOW TRYING TO BARGAIN AND OUR STAND SHOULD BE FIRM. WE PROPOSE TO INFORM KIM YU-T'AEK IN DAY OR OR TWO THAT WASHINGTON HAS CONFIRMED OUR POSITION.

7. GP-3.

BERGER

AD

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

*Korea* 53  
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

P 200830Z

FM CINCUNC SEOUL, KOREA

TO RKEKDA/CHAIRMAN, JCS

INFO RUHLHQ/ CINCPAC  
RUHLHS/ USARPAC

~~TOP SECRET~~ / 0289.

FOR GENERAL TAYLOR FROM HOWZE.

## REFERENCES:

- A. UK 50558, 24 AUG 63.
- B. JCS 2535, 18 SEP 63.
- C. UK 60213, 26 MAR 64.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-164  
By *inf*, NARA, Date 3-29-94

1. YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TO EMBASSY SEOUL MESSAGE TO STATE, 1328, 20 APRIL 64.

2. EMBASSY HAS APPARENTLY FIRM INFORMATION THAT ROKG MAY INVOKE MARTIAL LAW VERY SOON TO COPE WITH EXPECTED CONTINUATION OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, AND ALSO PLANS ON MOVING STRONG MILITARY FORCES NOT PART OF CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND INTO SEOUL.

3. U.S. AMBASSADOR WILL CONFER WITH PAK CHUNG HUI THIS AFTERNOON EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERN OVER APPARENT MOUNTING INSTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT AND ALSO INFORMING THE PRESIDENT OF MY DESIRE THAT REQUESTS FOR RELEASE OF TROOPS OTHER THAN THOSE IN CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND (AUGMENTED AS REPORTED IN REFERENCE C) MUST HAVE PRESIDENT'S PERSONNEL APPROVAL.

ACT.....J3-7(1-7)

CJCS-2(8-9) DJS-3(10-12) SJCS-3(13-15) J4-2(16-17) J5-1(18)  
SACSA-5(19-23) DIA-3(24-26) NMCC-2(27-28) NWSE-1(29) JSSC-1(30)  
SAMAA-1(31) CSA-2(32-33) CSAF-2(34-35) CNO-2(36-37)  
CMC-10(38-47) OSD-15(48-62) (WHITE HOUSE)-3(63-65) RRA-1(66)  
(STATE) (CIA) FILE-1(67) (1-67)

ADV COPY TO CJCS.

NOTE: REF A IS DTG 240500Z AUG 63.  
REF B IS DTG 181428Z SEP 63.  
REF C IS DTG 260245Z MAR 64.

64

DUTY OFFICER  TWG <i>XX</i>	PAGE OF PAGES 1 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO. 0289	DTG 200830Z APR 64

FORM NO  
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~TOP SECRET~~



**INCOMING  
MESSAGE****THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**~~**TOP SECRET**~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

4. IN ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS I INTEND TO PROCEED  
ACCORDING TO THE INTENTIONS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPHS 16, 17, 18 AND 19  
OF REFERENCE A AND IN CONSONANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF REFERENCE B.  
NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO REFERENCE C.

5. THE AMBASSADOR CONCURS.

GP-1

BT

DUTY OFFICER

PAGE OF PAGES

2

2

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

CITE NO.

0289

DTG

200830Z APR 64

FORM NO  
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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~~**TOP SECRET**~~

RECEIVED  
N. S. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note

APR 20 1964

54  
Korea  
BUNDY/SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DUNGAN  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KLEIN  
KOMER  
SAUNDERS  
COL. W.Y. SMITH

APR 21 3 09 PM '64

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

Subject: South Korean Government Plans To Meet Student Challenge With Force

Student Riots So Far Relatively Small Scale. Embassy Seoul has estimated that no more than 400 South Korean students have so far taken part in demonstrations on April 20 and that a maximum of 800 participated in those on April 19, the anniversary of the Rhee Government's overthrow in 1960. This contrasts with 30-40 thousand students estimated to have participated in demonstrations against the government's conduct of negotiations talks with Japan during a single day in late March. The government was prepared for the demonstrations this week-end, and armed policemen dispersed the demonstrators without any reported casualties. The students demanded the abrogation of the normalization talks with Japan, punishment of Kim Chong-p'il and expulsion of Japanese businessmen from Korea.

Government Prepared to Impose Martial Law. Although the number of demonstrators has been relatively small and serious incidents have apparently so far been avoided, President Pak has threatened to take more drastic action if necessary to bring an end to the demonstrations. A spokesman for Pak informed our Embassy that an order would be issued on April 20 forbidding student demonstrations and that further turmoil would result in a declaration of martial law. If that became necessary, the universities would be closed and troops placed at key points in Seoul.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-161

By *ju*, NARA, Date *6-30-92*



Severity May Reflect Intra-Government Dissension. Factional struggles within the government have intensified since Kim Chong-p'il was recalled from Japan on March 28 and divested of his role in the Tokyo negotiations. The government party itself appears to be approaching a crisis in which Pak would be forced to make a choice either to fire Kim Chong-p'il or to face a possible threat to bring down the whole government as the result of growing opposition to Kim. While Kim's dismissal would remove a focal point of dissatisfaction, it would deprive Pak of a long-time close associate and the man upon whose counsel he relies most heavily. Pak may hope that by forcibly putting a stop to the student demonstrations, he could avoid their being used to build up pressure upon him to take action, and that he may thus gain time to work out a compromise which would not necessitate either jettisoning Kim or the Japan talks. There is danger, however, that strong repressive action by the government against the students might result in an incident which would inflame student resentment and face the government with much more serious demonstrations than it has yet faced, or at best simply defer the problem temporarily until another occasion when it will again burst out.

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea*

55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

16539  
APRIL 20, 1964  
7:52 P.M.

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1334

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SP

INFO: TOKYO 596  
CINCPAC 51

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SAL

DATE: APRIL 20, 9 P.M.

IO

AID

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

USIA

NSC

REF: EMBTEL 1328

INR

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NAVY

AIR

SY

OC

SCA

1. I HAD ONE AND HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT PAK. I DECIDED AS MATTER OF TACTICS NOT TO REVEAL WHAT YI HU-RAK TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR THIS MORNING (REFTEL). I OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT WE HAD BEEN WATCHING STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OVER PAST MONTH AND DISPUTES DEVELOPING INSIDE GOVT PARTY BUT DID NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO SEE PM PERSONALLY. IN LAST FEW DAYS IT APPEARED THAT MATTERS WERE BECOMING MORE SERIOUS, AND THEREFORE I WISHED TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM HIM HOW HE VIEWED THE SITUATION.

RMR

2. PAK SAID GOVT HAD TAKEN A PATIENT AND LENIENT VIEW OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE BEGINING ON GROUNDS THAT STUDENTS WERE YOUNG AND WERE MANIFESTING THEIR PENT-UP FEELINGS ABOUT JAPAN. GOVT HAD ANTICIPATED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OPPOSITION TO A SETTLEMENT AND FELT IT BEST TO LET THIS BE EXPRESSED FOR A TIME IN THE HOPE IT WOULD THEN SUBSIDE.

3. SOME STUDENT GROUPS HAD MISINTERPRETED THIS MODERATE ATTITUDE OF GOVT AND WERE SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. NEW SLOGANS OF A MORE SERIOUS NATURE WERE NOW APPEARING DIRECTED AGAINST THE GOVT ITSELF. GOVT'S MODERATIONS ALSO BEING INTERPRETED IN SOME QUARTERS AS EVIDENCE OF WEAKNESS A LACK OF /SELF-CONFIDENCE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-16

By UCLB NARA, Date 12-27-2013



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1334, APRIL 20, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL

SELF-CONFIDENCE, AND AN INABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

4. STUDENTS HAD DEVELOPED THE "HABIT" OF DEMONSTRATING IN THE STUDENT REVOLUTION WHICH BROUGHT DOWN THE RHEE GOVT. IF PRESENT DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE IN THE NAME OF "PATRIOTISM AND NATIONAL INTEREST" THIS GOVT AND EVERY SUCCESSIVE GOVT WOULD BE ENDANGERED. STUDENTS WOULD GET THE IDEA THEY CAN DO AS THEY PLEASE, IGNORING GOVT, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND LAW AND ORDER. CERTAIN LEFTIST ELEMENTS WERE OPERATING IN THE SITUATION, AND THERE WERE SOME MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM.

5. ACCORDINGLY, HE HAD INSTRUCTED MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS TO ISSUE STATEMENT THIS MORNING THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD NO LONGER BE TOLERATED AND FIRM MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN BEGINNING TODAY. HE EXPECTS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL CONTINUE NONETHELESS, AND "CANNOT NOW PREDICT WHAT WILL HAPPEN." HE HOPES THE STUDENTS WILL REALIZE THAT THEY CANNOT GO ON DEMONSTRATING BUT IF THEY DO GOVT WILL BE FORCED TO RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES.

6. HE ASKED MY VIEWS AND I SAID HIS WAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY ELECTED GOVT AND HAD NO RECOURSE EXCEPT TO MAINTAIN ITS AUTHORITY AND LAW AND ORDER. WHEN I ASKED TWICE WHAT HE MEANT BY EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES, HE EVADED ANSWERING. I FINALLY ASKED IF THIS MEANT CLOSING THE UNIVERSITIES AND INVOKING MARTIAL LAW. HE SAID HE HOPED THE POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION BUT IF NOT HE HAD THESE IN MIND.

7. I SAID THAT GENERAL HOWZE AND I MET AFTER READING THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER'S STATEMENT AND THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE. GENERAL HOWZE HAD ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS REQUEST THAT IF MARTIAL LAW IS INVOKED AND THE USE OF TROOPS UNDER HIS COMMAND CONTEMPLATED, HE WISHED THE PRESIDENT TO INFORM HIM PERSONALLY OR DESIGNATE IN ADVANCE THE PERSON WHO WOULD CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST. PAK SAID HE WOULD INFORM GENERAL HOWZE AND ME IN ADVANCE OF ANY SUCH MOVE EITHER PERSONALLY OR THROUGH MINISTER DEFENSE.

8. PAK SAID ROK-JAPAN TALKS TEMPORARILY STALLED BECAUSE OF DEMONSTRATIONS. HE HAD NOW INSTRUCTED PRIMIN AND FONMIN TO  
/PROCEED AND

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1334, APRIL 20, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL

PROCEED AND KIM YUNG SIK WOULD HEAD THE TALKS. THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED AT CABINET MEETING APRIL 21.

9. PAK THEN SAID THERE WAS "MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT A DRP REQUEST FOR A CABINET RESHUFFLE NOW. HE FELT THIS NO TIME TO RESHUFFLE.

10. TURNING TO MY QUERY ABOUT DIFFERENCES INSIDE DRP, HE SAID "THERE IS MUCH NOISE BUT DIFFICULTIES WILL BE HANDLED AND BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. TOO THERE WAS DISCONTENT AND DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY THE PARTY OPERATED. SOME FAVORED HAVING THE DRP NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMEN CONTROL THE PARTY, ELIMINATING DUAL LINES OF AUTHORITY. OTHERS WANTED THE ASSEMBLYMEN TO HAVE MORE KEY POSTS. OTHERS WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE FLOOR LEADERS.

11. I SAID THE U.S. COULD NOT HELP BUT BE CONCERNED AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THERE WERE REPORTS OF RESIGNATIONS OF HIGH LEADERS AND DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CHINHAE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE IMPRESSION I HAD WAS THAT THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS AND THAT THE UNITY OF THE PARTY WAS IN DANGER. PAK REPLIED THAT THE DRP WOULD BE REVISED AND REORGANIZED IN DUE COURSE IN ORDER TO BRING SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. I SAID THAT STATEMENTS WERE CIRCULATING ABOUT U.S. VIEWS OF THESE MATTERS, AND INVARIABLY PEOPLE WERE TRYING TO INVOLVE OR USE US. IF HE HAD ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR POSITION I WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM. HE SAID HE HAD NONE. EVIDENT HE NOT PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT INTERNAL PARTY MATTERS AND I DID NOT PRESS.

12. FINALLY PAK SAID GOVT UNDER ATTACK BECAUSE OF SCANDALS INVOLVING "GOVT EMPLOYEES." HE HAD INSTRUCTED LEGAL AUTHORITIES TO "INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH" THE GUILTY IN ORDER TO ERADICATE CORRUPTION AND WIN CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE. TALKS ENDED ON THIS NOBLE STATEMENT

13. COMMENT: PAK WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS MEANINGFULLY THE INTERNAL POLITICAL DISSENSIONS WHICH HE FACES. HE GLOSSED OVER SEVERITY OF DISPUTE IN DRP AND DID NOT MENTION KIM CHONG-JIL WHO IS AT CENTER OF THAT DISPUTE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT PAK'S BLAND ASSURANCES THAT INTERNAL DISSENSION CAN BE "HANDLED" EASILY. THE POSITION HE HAS TAKEN DEMONSTRATES HIS ATTACHMENT TO KIM.

14. IT WAS ONLY BY MY PRESSING THAT HE REVEALED HIS INTENTIONS  
/WITH RESPECT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1334, APRIL 20, 9 P.M. FROM SEOUL

WITH RESPECT TO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POSSIBLE MARTIAL LAW AND EVEN THEN AVOIDED THE EXPLICIT TERMS OF YI-HU-PAK (EMBTel 1328) HE IS PROBABLY AWAITING REACTION TO OFFICIAL WARNINGS OF MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICE CONTROL OF DEMONSTRATORS BEFORE CARRYING OUT THREAT OF MARTIAL LAW. PAK SURELY RECOGNIZES THAT RECOURSE TO MARTIAL LAW LIKELY AGGRAVATE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON GOVT, NEVERTHELESS HE APPEARS DETERMINED TAKE THIS STEP IF HE DEEMS IT NECESSARY.

15. I SUGGEST THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT POSITION OF OBSERVING DEVELOPMENTS BUT AVOID COMMITTING OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC SOLUTION OR COURSE OF ACTION. GENERAL HOWZE AND I HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE REQUEST BY PAK FOR RELEASE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO QUELL DISTURBANCES AND AGREE SUCH REQUESTED SHOULD BE GRANTED.

16. WE SEE NO RPT NO NEED FOR EMBASSY TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS AT THIS TIME AND RECOMMEND DEPT FOLLOW SUIT.

GP-2

BERGER

CMR/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

56

*Korea*

UNCLASSIFIED

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Action

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RR RUEHC  
DE RUAMKK 030 20/0905Z  
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R 200900Z ZNH  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUAPFD/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

016302

1964 APR 20 PM 1 14

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 1332 INFO TOKYO 594 CINCPAC 570 FROM SEOUL  
TWENTIETH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY HOME  
MINISTER CM MIN-YONG, APRIL 20, 1964 (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED):

1. ALTHOUGH DEMONSTRATIONS STAGED BY SOME STUDENTS IN PERIOD  
FOLLOWING MARCH 24, AGAINST HUMILIATING DIPLOMACY TOWARD JAPAN,  
HAVE DAMAGED DOMESTIC SOCIAL ORDER, GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDING  
THAT THESE DEMONSTRATIONS MOTIVATED FROM GENUINE PATRIOTIC SENTIMENTS  
OF YOUNG STUDENTS, HAS AVOIDED INTERFERING AND HAS ONLY APPEALED FOR  
SELF-DISCIPLINE TO PREVENT POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS AND HAS ASKED STUDENTS  
CFN 1332 594 570 20, 1964 1. 24,

PAGE TWO RUAMKK 030 UNCLAS  
USE PROPER PROCEDURES IN MAKING PATRIOTIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
EXPRESSING OPINIONS.

2. HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATIONS STARTED APRIL 17 BY SOME STUDENTS  
HAVE USED RADICAL SLOGANS AND PLACARDS AND HAVE SPREAD HANDBILLS  
ATTEMPTING AGITATE GENERAL PUBLIC. SINCE THIS SORT OF CONDUCT WOULD  
CREATE SOCIAL ANXIETY, IT DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER AS THAT OF GENUINE  
STUDENTS. FURTHERMORE, SOME STUDENTS INTENTIONALLY EVADED  
ATTENDING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CEREMONY ON APRIL 19, AND HELD  
OWN MEETING AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THEY EVEN CURSED POLICE  
OFFICERS ON DUTY AND THREW STONES AT THEM, CAUSING INJURY TO SOME  
40 PEOPLE. IT DEEPLY REGRETTEED THAT STUDENTS, BY THESE ACTIVITIES,  
SOUGHT AGGRAVATE SITUATION.

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-2- 1332, APRIL 20, FROM SEOUL

3. IF THIS SITUATION CONTINUES, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE MAINTAIN LAWFUL ORDER. DOMESTIC PUBLIC SECURITY WILL CERTAINLY BE ENDANGERED BY RAMPANT PARTICIPATION OF EX-CRIMINALS AND OTHER UNCLEAN ELEMENTS, WHICH WOULD ONLY CREATE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FIFTH COLUMN WHICH IS ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTION OF NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT.

4. AT SAME TIME, GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY PROMISED GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO DEMANDS OF STUDENTS EXPRESSED THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL CFN 2. 17 19, 40 3. 4.

PAGE THREE RUAMKK 030 UNCLAS  
BE PROPERLY REFLECTED IN GOVERNMENT POLICY.; IT IS THEREFORE HOPED THAT STUDENTS WILL REMAIN IN SCHOOLS FROM NOW ON AND FULFILL EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR PARENTS AND THE PEOPLE BY DEVOTING THEMSELVES SOLELY TO STUDIES. IT IS AGAIN STRONGLY REQUESTED THAT STUDENTS DISCIPLINE THEMSELVES SO THEY MAY NOT CONTRAVENE THEIR PROPER DUTIES AND OWN INTELLIGENCE. IF IN FUTURE ANY STUDENTS, IN EAGERNESS PARTICIPATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS, VENTURE USE DISORDERLY DEMONSTRATIONS OR VIOLENCE THAT WOULD CAUSE SOCIAL DISORDER, AND ENGAGE IN RECKLESS CONDUCT IN NAME OF LIBERTY, WARNING IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO TAKE RESOLUTE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

BERGER

BT

CFN

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

51

*Korea*

34  
Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 15796  
Rec'd: APRIL 20, 1964  
2:58 AM

FE  
Info

FROM: SEOUL

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1330 PRIORITY

G

INFO: TOKYO 593

SP

CINCPAC FOR POLAD 569

L

DATE: APRIL 20, 3 PM

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REF: EMB 1322, RPTD TOKYO 587, CINCPAC 564

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1. INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE SUMMARIZED REFTEL INCREASINGLY SERIOUS. DIFFERENCES INSIDE GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY UNSOLVED AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY OPEN IN THEIR CRITICISMS AND ARE DIRECTING A CONSTANT BARRAGE OF CRITICISM AGAINST KIM CHONG-IL (GROUP).

2. OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL PERSON, EACH OF WHOM HAS STRESSED SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND DANGER TO PAK GOVERNMENT.

3. FONMIN CHONG IL KWON TOLD AMBASSADOR APRIL 16, FOLLOWING CHINHAE MEETING AND ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT PRESSURES ON PAK INCREASING. CHONG BELIEVED PAK'S CHINHAE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOWED KCP WAS FORCED GIVE GROUND IN AGREEING TO CUT IN DRP SECRETARIAT AND TO ALLOW DRP NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS GREATER VOICE IN PARTY AFFAIRS. CHONG ALSO SAW KCP DEFEAT IN PAK'S REFUSAL AGREE TO KCP'S DESIRE TO REPLACE CERTAIN ECONOMIC MINISTERS. CHONG PREDICTED GENERAL CABINET RESHUFFLE IN AUGUST, PROBABLY INCLUDING PRIMIN. CHONG REITERATED KCP IN REAL TROUBLE AND BECOMING MORE AND MORE ISOLATED. CHONG FORESAW CRISIS WITHIN MONTH OR SIX WEEKS.

4. CHANG KYUNG-SUN, DRP VICE SPEAKER, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CALLED ON DCM APRIL 19 FOLLOWING RETURN FROM MACARTHUR FUNERAL. DISCUSSING INTERNAL SITUATION, CHANG SAID BASIS ISSUE NOW

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-16

By UCLD NARA, Date 12-27-2013



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-- 1330, APRIL 20, 3 PM, FROM SEOUL

FACING GOVERNMENT IS **ELIMINATION KCP FROM DRP** AND LIQUIDATION OF SIKEDCAEA#CORRUPTION BY WHICH KCP KEEPS DRP ORGANIZATION INTACT. CHANG SAID HE PLANNED RECOMMEND STRONGLY TO PRESIDENT PAK WITHIN COMING WEEK THAT KCP BE REMOVED AS DRP CHAIRMAN. IF PAK AGREED, DRP, MILITARY AND ENTIRE COUNTRY WOULD SUPPORT HIM. ELIMINATION KCP WOULD DEPRIVE OPPOSITION OF BIGGEST CLUB AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND WOULD SATISFY STUDENTS. RESULTANT GOVERNMENT STRENGTH WOULD PERMIT ROKG RESUME ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS. IF PAK REFUSED, CHANG SAID HE WOULD RESIGN AS VICE SPEAKER AND LEAVE POLITICS. CHANG INDICATED OTHER DRP MEMBERS, INCLUDING FINANCE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KIM SONG-KON, THINKING ALONG ABOVE LINES.

5. FOLLOWING UP EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH KIM SONG-KON ALONG SAME LINES, POLITICAL COUNSELLOR WAS TOLD ON APRIL 19 BY EMISSARY THAT KIM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT KCP MUST BE FORCED TO GIVE UP POWER AND ACCEPT BLAME FOR CORRUPTION AND POLICY MISTAKES OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER PRESERVE GOVERNMENT AND RETAIN PAK LP PRESIDENT. KIM INDICATED CONFIDENCE THAT HE COULD EVENTUALLY MUSTER SUFFICIENT STRENGTH WITHIN DRP TO FORCE KCP'S OUSTER. MENTIONED POSSIBILITY KYONGSANG GROUP HEADED BY HIMSELF JOINING FORCES WITH CHOLLA GROUP HEADED BY CHANG KYUNG-SUN. IN SECOND CONVERSATION APRIL 20, KIM'S EMISSARY SAID KIM BELIEVED IT USELESS TO PRESENT PAK WITH ULTIMATUM SEEKING KCP'S OUSTER UNTIL OPPONENTS WERE IN POSITION TO SHOW PAK THAT KCP COMPLETELY ISOLATED IN PARTY AND THAT THEY COULD EVEN BRING PAK DOWN UNLESS HE AGREED. KIM'S ULTIMATE NCSAT#TO PAK WOULD BE IMPEACHMENT BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. KIM MAINTAINS THAT DEFECTION OF ONLY 25-30 DRP ASSEMBLYMEN SUFFICIENT TO MAKE IMPEACHMENT THREAT STICK. EMISSARY INDICATED KIM NOW PLANNING RETRACT HIS THREATENED RESIGNATION AS CHAIRMAN, ASSEMBLY FINANCE COMMITTEE, AND TO WALK ACTIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES TO SECURE KCP'S DOWNFALL. HOWEVER, LIKE CHANG KYONG-SUN, KIM ALSO CONSIDERING RESIGNATION FROM PARTY AND ASSEMBLY IF MOVE TO UNHORSE KCP FAILS.

6. EARLIER IN WEEK MINISTER DEFENSE DISCUSSED GRAVITY OF

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1330, APRIL 20, 3 PM, FROM SEOUL

SITUATION WITH POLITICAL COUNSELLOR. DECRIED CONFUSION IN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY AND DIFFICULTY OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING IN FACE STUDENT ACTIVITY AND PARTY SQUABBLING. MINISTER DEFENSE SAID HE HAD NO LOVE FOR KCP BUT BELIEVED THAT HE COULD NOT NOW BE REMOVED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ONE TO TAKE HIS PLACE IN CONTROLLING DRP.

COMMENT:

7. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, CONTINUING REVELATIONS GOVERNMENT SCANDALS AND SPRING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES HAVE BROUGHT DRP AND GOVERNMENT TO BRINK OF INTERNAL CRISIS. KIM CHONG-PIL NOW UNDER HEAVIEST CROSSFIRE FROM SUBSTANTIAL SEGMENTS OF PUBLIC, STUDENTS, OPPOSITION AND INFLUENTIAL DIZ-GOVERNMENT# ELEMENTS WHO UNITED IN BELIEF THAT KIM MUST BE STRIPPED OF POWER AS PREREQUISITE TO STABILIZING SITUATION. HOWEVER, TO DATE PRESIDENT PAK APPEARS DETERMINED TO ~~STUWVY~~ ~~MHM#~~ DESPITE INCREASING PRESSURES FROM MANY QUARTERS.

8. GIVEN PAK'S PAST ATTACHMENT TO KIM, WE CANNOT PREDICT THAT HE WILL BRING HIM SACRIFICE KIM EVEN TO SAVE HIMSELF AND HIS GOVERNMENT. PAK CONTINUES LEAN HEAVILY ON KIM AND TO PUT IMPLICIT AND COMPLETE TRUST IN KIM'S LOYALTY. IF KIM WERE FORCED OUT OF POWER, PAK MIGHT WELL CONSIDER SUCH A STEP AS PRELUDE TO SIMILAR FUTURE MOVES AGAINST HIMSELF. ON OTHER HAND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON KIM CHONG-PIL ARE ALREADY TOO GREAT TO BE CONTAINED. IF PAK DOES NOT BEND, HE RUNS SERIOUS RISK OF SEEING HIS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, WITH POSSIBILITY OF REVOLT BY DRP ASSEMBLYMEN AGAINST KIM AND ULTIMATE PERHAPS AGAINST HIMSELF. TO SAVE KIM, PAK WILL HAVE TO TAKE MORE DRASTIC STEPS AND INVOLVE HIMSELF MORE DEEPLY IN PARTY MANEUVERING THAT IN PAST WITH NO CERTAINTY OF SUCCESS.

9. WILL RESERVE FURTHER COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS UNTIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1330, APRIL 20, 3 PM, FROM SEOUL

AFTER MEETING WITH PAK NOW SCHEDULED 1600 HOURS APRIL 20.

GP3.

BERGER

HMR

# AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

58

42

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1964 APR 20 AM 2 25

PRIORITY

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 03E 20/0559Z  
P 200555Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1329 INFO TOKYO 592  
CINCPAC POLAD 568 APRIL 20 3PM

1. APPROXIMATELY 250 SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS  
REPORTED MARCHING TOWARD DOWNTOWN AREA. AT 1430 HOURS, THEY  
INTERCEPTED BY POLICE NEAR EAST GATE. SKIRMISH NOW GOING ON,  
WITH 20 STUDENTS ARRESTED.

2. POLICE REPORTEDLY EXPECTING UP TO 3,000 KOREA UNIVERSITY  
STUDENTS TO DEMONSTRATE. AS OF 1430 HOURS, HOWEVER, NO  
DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED OTHER THAN THAT IN PARA 1.

BERGER

BT

CFN 1329 592 568 20 3PM 1. 250 1430 NOW 20 2. 3,000 1430 NO 1

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

59

*Korea*

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

15744  
APRIL 19, 1964  
11:19 PM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1328 PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: TOKYO 591 PRIORITY  
CINCPAC 567

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DATE: APRIL 20, NOON

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1. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN YI HU-NAK INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER MORNING OF APRIL 20 THAT GOVERNMENT WAS ISSUING ORDER FOR-BIDDING "ILLEGAL DEMONSTRATIONS". THIS ORDER DIRECTED AGAINST STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. YI SAID ORDER PROBABLY WILL NOT PREVENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS SCHEDULED FOR TODAY. (EMBASSY SOURCES REPORT THREE MAJOR UNIVERSITIES IN SEOUL PLANNING MAJOR SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS ABOUT NOON TODAY).

2. YI SAID GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO PUT AN END TO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND WAS GOING TO CRACK DOWN HARD ON TODAY'S DEMONSTRATORS. STUDENTS PARTICIPATING WOULD BE SEIZED AND **EITHER** RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES AND CAMPUSES OR TAKEN "ELSEWHERE". IF RESPONSE TO THIS ACTION WAS FURTHER TURMOIL, GOVERNMENT INTENDS ANNOUNCE MARTIAL LAW EFFECTIVE MIDNIGHT APRIL 20. AT THAT TIME THERE WILL BE LARGE SCALE MOVEMENT ROKG TROOPS INTO SEOUL TO OCCUPY ALL KEY POINTS. UNIVERSITIES WILL BE CLOSED AND OCCUPIED BY TROOPS AND MASSIVE SHOW OF FORCE WOULD TAKE PLACE IN CITY.

3. FSSWVIGQLTK\* IF MARTIAL LAW IS IMPOSED PRESIDENT PAK WOULD MAKE STATEMENT TO THE NATION ON MORNING OF APRIL 21 TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF MARTIAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION RESTORE ORDER. YI SAID THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT BE DISSOLVED OR ADJOURNED AND WOULD BE CALLED

UPON TO

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Authority RAcc/R-254-3-24-1  
By JDL ARA Date 8-28-19

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-2- 1328, APRIL 20, NOON, FROM SEOUL

UPON TO APPROVE DECLARATION MARTIAL LAW AS REQUIRED BY CONSTITUTION.

4. YI SAID ALL PLANS AND STATEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PREPARED AND GOVERNMENT INTENDS MAINTAIN MARTIAL LAW FOR ONLY THREE OR FOUR DAYS IF POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF FEAR TROOPS IN CITY WOULD BE EXPOSED TO "OUTSIDE PRESSURES".

5. I HAVE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT PAK TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION AND EXPECT TO SEE HIM SHORTLY. GENERAL HOWZE BEING INFORMED.

6. GP-3.

BERGER

HC

\*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

60

*Korea*

42

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Action

FE

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P R I O R I T Y

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INFO RUAPFD/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1323 INFO TOKYO 588 CINCPAC 565  
FROM SEOUL NINETEENTH

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1. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CEREMONY COMMEMORATING 2960 STUDENT  
REVOLUTION, HELD AT CITIZENS HALL APRIL 19 BECAUSE OF RAIN,  
ENDED 1045 HOURS WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN BRIEF SPEECH, PRESIDENT  
PAK GUARANTEED CAMPUS FREEDOM AND SAID THOSE WHO CRITICIZE  
GOVT WITHOUT PUTTING FORTH ALTERNATIVE PLANS THREATEN DESTRUCTION  
OF COUNTRY. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER YI HO-SANG URGED STUDENTS  
TO DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO STUDIES. STUDENT SPOKESMAN FROM SOGANG  
COLLEGE STATED STUDENTS WILL DEMONSTRATE WHENEVER CAMPUS FREEDOM  
OR NATIONAL INTEREST IS THREATENED.  
CFN 1323 588 565 1. 1960 19 1045

PAGE TWO RUAMKK 010 UNCLAS

2. AS OF 1100 HOURS GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS  
SECOND-RANKING UNIVERSITIES ASSEMBLING IN CITY HALL PLAZA  
DESPITE STEADY RAIN. GROUP OF 100 REPORTED ASSEMBLED AT SEOUL  
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY FOR 1100 HOURS CEREMONY TO BE FOLLOWED BY  
MARCH TO CITY HALL, KOREA UNIVERSITY CAMPUS REPORTED QUIET.

BERGER

BT

CFN 2. 1100 100 1100

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Fg WJ*

~~SECRET~~

Control: 14157  
Rec'd: APRIL 17, 1964  
5:31 AM

*B*  
Action  
*SS*  
Info

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1316 PRIORITY

DATE : APRIL 17, 6 PM

EXDIS

FOR BUNDY

REFERENCE: EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1307

ASSUME YOU ARE INFORMING TREASURY AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF  
REFERENCE TELEGRAM.

GP-3.

BERGER

UMT

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*2 destroyed  
4/17*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-161  
By fw, NARA, Date 6-30-92

~~SECRET~~

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62

1. Mr. ~~Komer~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

*Kaw*



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By WJ, NARA, Date 5-27-93

MFG. 6-61

100909

H

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: AmEmb SEOUL 944 PRIORITY  
EXDIS JOINT STATE/AID/TREASURY MESSAGE

APR 17 7 51 PM '64

FOR BERGER & KILLEN FROM ~~SECRET~~ & POATS  
XXXXXXXXXXXX & POATS

References: (A) EMBTEL 1307; (B) AIDTO 1094; (C) DEPTTEL 760; (D) AIDTO 1102;  
(E) AIDTO 1104; (F) AIDTO 1115

1. Congratulations.
2. We would appreciate ~~SECRET~~ summary your economic analysis in support of rate in 255 range.
3. Before accepting finally any exchange rate system, both you and we need assurances that certificate rate will in fact float in accordance with market. Please advise system and your estimate its workability. Be certain full certificate rate will be available to won purchases by U. S. agencies.
4. ROKG should be reminded of its obligation to inform IMF of full details of proposed new exchange rate system with date ROKG wishes put it into effect. Message should indicate hope IMF will have no objection and should be sent so IMF will receive it three business days in advance of proposed effective date new system. Country team should make certain IMF is informed in above terms as otherwise IMF might believe details of new system not fully developed and propose sending IMF mission to Seoul to participate such development.
5. PAAD FE-64-8 for making \$10 million additional SA available to USOM out of \$66.2 million forwarded April 6. See ref (B), para 2 and ref (C).

APR 20 1964

Drafted by:

FE/K-AID - Stephen B. Ives, Jr.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bacon

AA/FE-AID - Mr. Poats (draft)

FE/DP-AID - Mr. Smith (draft) 529

AA/MR-AID - Mr. Waters (para 17)

Treas - Mr. Hinchtritt (subst)

A/AID - Mr. Bell (draft)

OFE - Miss Milne (draft)

Treas - Mr. Cross (draft)

~~SECRET~~ S/S

AA/PC-AID Mr. Harvey

FE - Mr. Barnett (subs)

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~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

para 5. FYI. PAAD for further \$25 million, bringing total to \$66.2 being forwarded to A/AID for signature. End FYI.

6. You have ample authority from refs B, C, D, and E to proceed along lines of Killen statement, para 4, ref (A), and discretion to offer 25,000 MT additional Title I grain above 150,000 MT if you deem it required. See ref. (E). Re additional \$10 million for commodity imports, bringing total to \$76.2 million, assumed here actual sale at BOK will be delayed. See ref (C), para 4. Request your comments.

7. AID/W will approve Title II program for 50,000 to 75,000 MT grain, when and if properly justified.

8. If you so recommend, we would be willing arrange carefully worded, high-level Department statement in support of and following ROKG announcement and ~~xxx~~ on aid actions. Request your comment.

9. We see no need to add to your authority any additional lubrication. With regard to para 8 ref (A), when you consider it appropriate, you are authorized to inform ROKG that you have been instructed that no further commitments can be made at this time, unless you wish to add Taegu water loan.

10. Please advise when you feel DL restraint should be lifted.

~~xx~~ GP-1.

BALL

1. Mr. ~~Adams~~
2. ~~Return~~ to Broadway Mail



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

63a

✓ W 1d

M

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control:

13264

Rec'd:

APRIL 16, 1964

SS

8 AM

Info

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1307, PRIORITY

DATE: APRIL 16, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

*Cy # 3 dest 7/13/64*

EXDIS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By *W*, NARA, Date *6-30-92*

BELL, BUNDY AND POATS FROM BERGER AND KILLEN

1. ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS DURING COURSE OF DEVALUATION DISCUSSIONS, ROKG ASKED WHAT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE US IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE PURSUANT TO ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS ON DEVALUATION. IN DISCUSSION WITH KILLEN FOLLOWING NEGOTIATING SESSION APRIL 8, KIM, YU-TAEK PUSHED VERY HARD ON THIS ISSUE. AFTER LENGTHY ARGUMENT BY DEPUTY PREMIER, USOM DIRECTOR RECALLED AMBASSADOR'S AND HIS RECENT DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT ON THIS SUBJECT AT WHICH TIME PRESIDENT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WHEN ROKG PROPOSED ACCEPTABLE TIME AND LEVEL OF DEVALUATION, US PREPARED TO DISCUSS STEPS IT COULD TAKE TO FACILITATE DEVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION AND OVER-ALL STABILIZATION EFFORT. KIM, TY-TAEK WAS TOLD US NOT DISPOSED TO "OFFER BID FOR" OR ATTEMPT "BUY" DEVALUATION. SUCH ACTION NOT RPT NOT BEING PROPOSED FOR US BENEFIT BUT TO STRENGTHEN PROSPECTS FOR HEALTHY ROK ECONOMY. WE THEREFORE PREPARED TO OFFER ASSISTANCE OF RELATIVELY MODEST VOLUME AFTER ROKG DECISION FIRMLY TAKEN. WE WERE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED IN ADVANCE OF THAT DECISION TO INDICATE WHAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO. KIM UNHAPPY WITH THIS BUT SEEMED TO ACCEPT IT.

2. ON FRIDAY, APRIL 10, DEPUTY PREMIER ASKED KILLEN TO CALL ON HIM. OTHERS PRESENT WERE MINISTER OF FINANCE, VICE MINISTER EPB AND LEE, JAY SUW, CHAIRMAN ROKG SIDE DEVALUATION WORKING PARTY. KIM SAID THAT IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON APRIL 9, DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO A) DEVALUE AS OF MAY 3, B) TO ADOPT FLOATING RATE SYSTEM, AND C) TO ESTABLISH FLOOR RATE OF 255

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1307, APRIL 16, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM SEOUL

WON PER DOLLAR. KIM SAID MAY 3 HAD BEEN SELECTED BECAUSE OF TIME REQUIRED FOR GROUP SENIOR KOREAN OFFICIALS TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES FOR FLOATING RATE SYSTEM AND TO PROVIDE FOR TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING SEVERAL ISSUES, E.G. TRANSFERRING LINK RIGHTS. KILLEN VOICED PREFERENCE FOR DATE ONE WEEK EARLIER BUT DID NOT PRESS IT. KIM ASSERTED IMPORTANCE IN KOREAN EYES OF KEEPING NEW RATE LESS THAN DOUBLE LEVEL OF CURRENT RATE SAYING THAT WITH FLOATING RATE SYSTEM, EFFECTIVE RATE WOULD FIND ITS OWN LEVEL IF ABOVE 260 WHICH US HAD URGED AS ACCEPTABLE MINIMUM. HE ASKED THAT IN VIEW OF PROMPT ROKG DECISION TO MOVE AHEAD AS OUTLINED ABOVE, US CONCUR IN 255/1 RATE. KILLEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PROMPT ROKG DECISION AND SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR ON MATTER. KIM URGED DECISION NOT BE DISCLOSED. BEFORE THIS MEETING BROKE UP, VICE MINISTER EPB RECALLED KILLEN'S STATEMENT TO DEPUTY PREMIER AND HIMSELF ON APRIL 8 AND ASKED IF US NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS ACTIONS US WOULD TAKE ON ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE. KILLEN SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER DURING COMING WEEKS.

3. AMBASSADOR AND USOM DIRECTOR ON APRIL 11 DECIDED TO ACCEPT KOREAN PROPOSAL. KILLEN SO ADVISED VICE MINISTER EPB ON APRIL 13.

4. DEPUTY PREMIER CALLED KILLEN TO HIS OFFICE AGAIN AFTERNOON APRIL 15. HE LISTED NUMBER OF PROBLEMS INCLUDING DESIRE TO REVIEW MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM WHICH REQUIRES ACTION IN NEAR FUTURE. IT SOON BECAME APPARENT HOWEVER HIS PRIME INTEREST INVOLVED US ACTION PURSUANT TO DEVALUATION DECISION. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED CONCERNING AMOUNT ADDITIONAL SA AND PL 480 WHICH US READY TO PROVIDE. SUCH AMOUNTS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT DEVALUATION ON MAY 3. KILLEN VOICED CONCERN RE DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC FIGURES 2-1/2 WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF DEVALUATION ANNOUNCEMENT DUE TO LIKELIHOOD OF "LEAK" TO PRESS PREMATURELY. MATTER DISCUSSED AT

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 1307, APRIL 16, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM SEOUL

CONSIDERABLE LENGTH. HOWEVER, IN VIEW ROKG ACCEPTANCE OF DIRECTOR'S POSITION VOICED PRIVATELY TO DEPUTY PREMIER DESCRIBED PARA 1 ABOVE AND WITH LATTER ASSURANCE THAT MATTER WOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, KILLEN SAID ADDITIONAL AID WOULD INVOLVE A) \$10 MILLION ADDITIONAL SA, B) 150,000 TONS TITLE I GRAIN, AND C) POSSIBILITY OF TITLE II WORK RELIEF PROGRAMS OF 50,000 TO 75,000 TONS GRAIN. THIS LATTER ITEM SUBJECT TO PROPER DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVAL UN AID/W.

5. DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE PLAYED ROLE OF SHOCK AND DISAPPOINTMENT WITH GREAT SKILL. THEY RECALLED THE \$20 MILLION PROVIDED AT TIME LAST DEVALUATION AND EMPHASIZED "MORE CRITICAL CHARACTER" OF KOREAN ECONOMY TODAY AS COMPARED WITH THREE YEARS AGO. ASSERTED THAT KOREAN PUBLIC WOULD BE VERY UNHAPPY WITH THIS "MODEST" AMOUNT AND SAID "PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT" WOULD BE MOST ADVERSE TO GOOD US-ROK RELATIONS. THIS WENT ON FOR NEARLY AN HOUR. USOM DIRECTOR RECALLED IMPROVEMENT IN KFX RESERVES AS OVER \$50 MILLION DURING COURSE OF 1961 FOLLOWING DEVALUATION, IMPROVED KOREAN EXPORT POTENTIAL NOW AS COMPARED WITH THEN, EXPANDED PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF KOREAN ECONOMY OVER THAT OF THREE YEARS AGO SAYING HE FELT TWO SITUATIONS NOT RPT NOT AT ALL COMPARABLE. IN ANY CASE THIS WAS IN HIS JUDGMENT MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL SA THAT US PREPARED TO PROVIDE AT THIS TIME AND WAS OF OPINION THAT IT REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION GIVEN THE DRASTIC CUT IN OVER-ALL AID AVAILABILITIES SINCE JANUARY 1, 1961. WITH RESPECT TO PL 480, KILLEN REVIEWED SITUATION OF LAST YEAR AND EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT AMOUNTS PROPOSED WERE ADEQUATE TO MEET STABILIZATION OBJECTIVES IF PROPERLY HANDLED BY ROKG. HE REITERATED BELIEF THAT AMOUNTS ALREADY PROVIDED UNDER NINTH AGREEMENT WERE ADEQUATE TO CLOSE ANY ACTUAL FOOD GAP. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM VICE MINISTER EPB, HE SAID US HAD NO RPT NO FIRM VIEWS RE CHARACTER OR TIMING OF USE THESE ADDITIONAL TITLE I GRAINS PROVIDED THEY UTILIZED IN FASHION TO HAVE MAXIMUM BENEFIT TO ECONOMY.

BERGER

BAP

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

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CONTROL: 13056  
RECD: APRIL 16, 1964, 3:54AM  
FROM: SEOUL  
ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1307  
DATE: APRIL 16, 3PM

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SECTION TWO OF TWO

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EXDIS

BELL, BUNDY AND POATS FROM BERGER AND KILLEN

6. FINANCE MINISTER THEN ASKED RE POSSIBILITY OF LONG TERM LOAN WHICH COULD BE ADDED TO CURRENT KFX RESERVES FOR PURPOSES OF GENERATING CONFIDENCE IN OVER-ALL ROK FINANCIAL RESOURCES. HE ALSO ASKED IF SUCH A LOAN COULD BE PROVIDED TO MEET CURRENT IMPORT NEEDS SHOULD PRESENT AVAILABILITY PROVE INADEQUATE. HE REFERRED TO OUR DISCUSSION ON DESIRABILITY SOME MEASURE OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION AFTER DEVALUATION WHICH MIGHT ENGENDER TEMPORARY SURGE OF DOLLAR EXPENDITURE.

7. USOM DIRECTOR SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE ANY ASSURANCE WHATEVER IN THIS MATTER. HE FELT THAT AID REACTION TO SUCH REQUEST WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY CHARACTER OF KOREAN EFFORT OVER MONTHS FOLLOWING DEVALUATION TO IMPROVE GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND TO INSURE THAT EXPORT AND IMPORT- SAVING POTENTIALS WERE EXPLOITED TO FULLEST POSSIBLE DEGREE. THEREFORE, IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT AID WOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SUCH A REQUEST NOW.

8. DEPUTY PREMIER WOUND UP THIS 3 1/2 HOUR SESSION BY ASKING THAT ROKG POSITION WITH RESPECT TO ADDITIONAL SA, PL 480 AND POSSIBLE LOAN BE PUT TO WASHINGTON WITH HOPE THAT FAVORABLE ACTION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. HE SAID ROKG HAD DECIDED TO GO THROUGH WITH DEVALUATION AND FELT THAT CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WOULD INDUCE FAVORABLE ACTION FROM WASHINGTON. KILLEN SAID HE WOULD DO SO BUT AGAIN CAUTIONED THE ROKG OFFICIALS AGAINST UNWARRANTED EX-

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-2- 1307, APRIL 16, 3 PM, FROM SEOUL

PECTATIONS OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE AT THIS TIME. HE SAID HE FELT BURDEN OF PROOF RESTED ON KOREANS AND IF THEIR PERFORMANCE WAS GOOD IN MONTHS AHEAD, WASHINGTON WOULD, AS ALWAYS, GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ANY LEGITIMATE NEED THAT WAS WITHIN OUR CAPABILITY. HE ADDED THAT AID FACED COMPETING CLAIMS OF MUCH URGENCY AND FUNDS WERE LIMITED.

9. KILLEN AND I ARE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO RECOMMEND FURTHER COMMITMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL AID BEYOND THAT PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED BY OUR INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS TIME. IT IS ASSUMED THAT WASHINGTON WILL APPROVE A TITLE II PROGRAM OF MAGNITUDE MENTIONED ABOVE IF PROPERLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, PRESENTLY SCHEDULED LEVEL OF MAINTENANCE OF ECONOMY IMPORTS IS ON TIGHT SIDE AND AS PRACTICAL MATTER MAY REQUIRE SOME RELAXATION PARTICULARLY IF DEGREE OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION INITIATED. WE BELIEVE KOREAN EXPORTS FOR YEAR COULD EXCEED PROGRAMMED LEVEL OF \$105 MILLION AND BOK EARNINGS FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT REALISTIC RATE MAY ALSO SURPASS EXPECTATIONS. IF ROKG PERFORMANCE OVER NEXT THREE TO FOUR MONTHS MEETS BASIC REQUIREMENTS AND IMPORT FUNDING AVAILABILITIES APPEAR EXCESSIVELY TIGHT, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR A PROGRAM LOAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

10. DEPUTY PREMIER URGED THAT APPROPRIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT QUOTE LEAK UNQUOTE SUBJECT THIS MESSAGE FROM WASHINGTON SOURCES. HE WAS ASSURED NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

11. WHILE POSSIBILITY OF ROKG REVERSING DECISION TO PROCEED WITH DEVALUATION AT DESIGNATED TIME ALWAYS POSSIBLE, WE BELIEVE IT PROBABLE THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AS STATED ABOVE.

12. GP-1.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Korea 64

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Action

FE ZCZCMJA006VV ALA036VV OSA002

Info PP RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 01E 10/0100Z  
P R 100005Z ZFA

1964 APR 9 PM 8 22

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SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SP INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
L RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
H STATE GRNC  
BT

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-161

By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

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P INFO TOKYO 571 CINCPAC 546 APRIL 10, 8AM

CU CINCPAC FOR POLAD

USIA

NSC REF: A. DEPTTEL 899, RPTD TOKYO 2546 CINCPAC UNN

INR B. DEPTTEL 901, RPTD TOKYO 2551 CINCPAC UNN

CIA PART I - ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SITUATION

NSA

OSD 1. IN AFTERMATH MARCH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PROSPECTS OF THE  
ARMY GOVT'S OBTAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT ARE  
NAVY UNCERTAIN BUT NOT HOPELESS. THIS TEL ANALYZES ESSENTIAL  
AIR ELEMENTS OF THE GOVT'S PROBLEM. IN JUDGING ABILITY OF ROKG  
RMR TO PROCEED TO SETTLEMENT AND DECIDING UPON COURSES OF ACTION  
OPEN TO IT (AND TO US), WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ROK-JAPAN  
CFN 1277 571 546 10 8AM 899 2546 901 2551 1.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 01E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NORMALIZATION IS NOW DIRECTLY RELATED TO WIDER PROBLEM OF  
SURVIVAL OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

2. RECENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON ROK-  
JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND REVEALED WIDESPREAD PUBLIC FEARS OF  
SUBSEQUENT JAPANESE DOMINATION AS WELL AS MISGIVINGS ABOUT  
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND DISSATISFACTION WITH WAY NEGOTIATIONS  
CONDUCTED. THUS DEMONSTRATIONS REFLECTED A GENERAL LACK OF  
CONFIDENCE IN PAK GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH NOT DIRECTED AT PAK  
HIMSELF. ON OTHER HAND DEEP DISTRUST OF KIM CHONG-PIL AND  
HIS ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS WAS GLARINGLY APPARENT.

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3. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS NEVER GOT OUT OF CONTROL. STUDENTS THEMSELVES WERE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND WELL DISCIPLINED. GOVT'S PRUDENT SHIFT AFTER POLICE CLUBBING ON MARCH 24 TO MORE MODERATE TACTICS ON MARCH 25 AND THEREAFTER PREVENTED SITUATION FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND. RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES PLUS GOVT PARTIAL CONCESSION TO STUDENT DEMANDS (RECALL KIM CHONG-PIL, DELAY IN SETTLEMENT) TEMPERED EMOTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS SUBSIDED. CONTINUED VIOLENCE ON PART POLICE MIGHT HAVE ENGENDERED DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION.

4. ALTHOUGH INITIALLY, INSTIGATED BY OPPOSITION, MOST DEMONSTRATORS WERE NOT CONSCIOUSLY ACTING IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL CFN 2. 3. 24 25 4.

PAGE THREE RUALOS DIE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OPPOSITION. OPPOSITION NEVERTHELESS CONTINUES TO JUDGE (CORRECTLY) THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CAN BE USED TO WEAKEN THE GOVT AND SHAKE ITS HOLD ON POWER.

5. IN OPPOSITION RANKS THERE ARE VARYING VIEWS OF DANGERS OF FULL-SCALE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. COOLER HEADS IN CIVIL RULE PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY RECOGNIZE THAT IF PUBLIC TURMOIL BROUGHT ABOUT DOWNFALL OF PAK THERE WOULD BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THEY COULD ACCEDE TO POWER. THEY HOPE INSTEAD OVER NEXT MONTHS TO WEAKEN PAK GOVERNMENT PROGRESSIVELY TO POINT WHERE PAK WOULD BE FORCED TO YIELD POWER WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO SOME AS YET UNDETERMINED SUCCESSOR. THEREFORE, IN PAST WEEK PRINCIPAL OPPOSITION LEADERS, WHILE STILL KEEPING PRESSURES ON GOVT., HAVE SHRUNK FROM ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PRECIPITATE FULL BLOWN CRISIS. THERE ARE EXTREMISTS AMONG OPPOSITION WHO REJECT THIS GRADUALISM AND CALL FOR PAK'S OVERTHROW BUT THEY ARE NOT DOMINANT AT THIS TIME. IF DEMONSTRATIONS RECUR AND GET OUT OF HAND EXTREMISTS MIGHT TRY TO ACT, BUT AT PRESENT THEY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE A PROGRAM OR PLAN OF ACTION.

6. WHATEVER ISSUES AND PERSONAL RIVALRIES DIVIDE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, THEY ARE UNITED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO OPPOSE

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THE GOVT ON THE ISSUE OF ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION. THEY ARE TRYING TO EXPAND BASIS OF PUBLIC DISTRUST BY LAYING CHARGES OF CORRUPTION, INEPTITUDE, AND ECONOMIC FAILURE AGAINST GOVT. THEY ARE ABOUT TO EMBARK ON ANOTHER ROUND OF PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF GOVT'S CONDUCT OF ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS. OPPOSITION ALSO FOCUSSED PARTICULARLY HEAVY ATTACK ON KIM CHONG-PIL TO AGGRAVATE DIVISIONS IN GOVT RANKS. ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION CONTROVERSY HAS STIMULATED KIM'S OPPONENTS INSIDE OF GOVT TO TRY TO EXPLOIT HIS ROLE IN ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS TO GET RID OF HIM. FACTIONAL STRAINS AND PERSONAL RIVALRIES IN GOVT, DRP AND MILITARY HAVE CONSEQUENTLY INTENSIFIED.

7. IN FACE DEMONSTRATIONS, OPPOSITION ATTACKS AND NEGATIVE PUBLIC ATTITUDE, ROKG HAS BACKED AWAY FROM EARLIER TIMETABLE FOR ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AND CONTRIVED "COOLING OFF" PERIOD TO TAKE STEAM OUT OF OPPOSITION AND STUDENT ATTACKS. GOVT HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS INTENTION TO ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN AS SOON AS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE. WHAT IT SEEKS IS WAY TO SECURE SETTLEMENT AND STILL HOLD ON TO POWER. WITH THESE TWIN OBJECTIVES IN MIND, GOVT HAS BELATEDLY BUT ENERGETICALLY LAUNCHED CAMPAIGN TO GAIN STUDENT AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT. FAILING TO GAIN  
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SUCH UNDERSTANDING, GOVT WOULD HOPE AT LEAST TO NEUTRALIZE SOME STUDENT AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION BY JUDICIOUS APPLICATION OF MONEY AND PRESSURES

AS WELL AS PERSUASION.

8. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS OUTCOME GOVT'S PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES AND ITS EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE OPPOSITION. PARADOXICALLY, PAK HAS APPOINTED KIM CHONG-PIL TO LEAD DRP PROGRAM OF PUBLIC PERSUASION. WE ARE TOLD PAK IS DETERMINED GIVE KIM HIMSELF A CHANCE TO DEFEND HIS ACTIVITIES AND BELIEVES THAT KIM'S PERSUASIVE POWERS ARE GREAT ENOUGH TO REVERSE UNFAVORABLE OPINIONS OF KIM AND HIS ROLE IN ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT. IN OUR OPINION, KIM REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL AND VULNERABLE TO HIS OPPONENTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF GOVT. THEREFORE, IF HE CONTINUES TO BE ACTIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NORMALIZATION WILL NOT BE EASY TO OBTAIN.

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PART II - ALTERNATIVES FACING THE GOVT

9. WITHIN GOVT AND RULING PARTY LEADERSHIP THERE ARE SHARP DIFFERENCES OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM. THESE DIFFERENCES MAY BE CATEGORIZED IN THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

A. PROCEED WITHOUT HESITATION TO CONCLUDE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN, USING WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION FROM STUDENTS OR POLITICAL OPPOSITION.

B. POSTPONE DECISION ON SETTLEMENT UNTIL MID-SUMMER, MEANWHILE SEEKING ENLIST PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR REVAMPED NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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INFO TOKYO 571 CINCPAC 546 APRIL 10, 8AM

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C. ABANDON HOPE FOR SETTLEMENT THIS YEAR BUT KEEP NEGOTIATIONS ALIVE AND SALVAGE WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE.

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10. PROPONENTS OF ALTERNATIVE B ABOVE ARE INDECISIVE, HOPING THAT SITUATION WILL SOMEHOW CHANGE SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW FOR EASIER DECISION-MAKING. FOR THIS WISFUL ALTERNATIVE TO SUCCEED WOULD REQUIRE THAT WIDE CONFIDENCE IN GOVT BE ACHIEVED, OPPOSITION MODIFIED, STUDENTS PERSUADED AND LEADERSHIP EXERTED. THE SHARPER CHOICE IS BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES A AND C.

11. THOSE FAVORING ALTERNATIVE A BELIEVE GOVT CANNOT TURN BACK. IN THEIR VIEW, AFTER "COOLING OFF" PERIOD EXTENDING AT LEAST CFN 1277 571 546 10 8AM 10. 11.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THROUGH APRIL 19 ANNIVERSARY OF STUDENT REVOLT OF 1960, GOVT SHOULD PROCEED BOLDLY TO CONCLUDE SETTLEMENT BY JUNE OF THIS YEAR. THIS DECISION INVOLVES READINESS TO USE FORCE TO COUNTER DEMONSTRATIONS AND IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS. DURING COOLING OFF PERIOD THEY HOPE TO GAIN ADVANTAGE OF ANY FAVORABLE RESULTS FROM CAMPAIGN OF PUBLIC PERSUASION AND POSTPONE CONTROVERSIAL ACTION UNTIL AFTER "SPRING HUNGER" PERIOD.

12. THOSE MORE TIMID SOULS WHO WISH TO ABANDON EARLY SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN (ALTERNATIVE C) ARGUE ITS IMPOSSIBILITY IN FACE OF PUBLIC OPINION, OPPOSITION ATTACKS, AND STUDENT THREAT. THEY FORESEE PUBLIC TURMOIL, EXTREME STRUGGLE ON PART POLITICAL OPPOSITION, AND FESTERING CONTROVERSY WHICH WILL MAKE SETTLE-

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MENT CONTINUAL SOURCE INSTABILITY. THEY FEAR THAT STUDENT-  
OPPOSITION ATTACKS WILL EITHER BRING DOWN GOVT OR SPARK COUP  
ATTEMPTS. THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY WISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN  
TO BE BROKEN OFF, AND EVEN SPEAK OF ESTABLISHING FORMAL DIP-  
LOMATIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AS DISTINCT FROM A SETTLEMENT,  
WHICH COULD THEN BE WORKED ON MORE SLOWLY.

PART III - COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO U. S.

13. WE HAVE CONTINUALLY ENCOURAGED ROKG TO SETTLE WITH JAPAN  
AND URGED IT TO BE REALISTIC AND FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS.  
CFN 19 1960 12. 13.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN FOUND OR ARE IN SIGHT FOR ALMOST ALL MAJOR  
POINTS AT ISSUE WITH JAPAN. NOW, ON EVE OF SETTLEMENT, WE  
FACE A NEW BUT NOT NECESSARILY UNEXPECTED SITUATION IN WHICH  
ROKG MUST COMMEND THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS TO KOREAN PEOPLE.  
IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE CAN ONLY TRY TO FACILITATE PUBLIC  
ACCEPTANCE ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT, REALIZING OUR EFFORTS CAN AT  
BEST ONLY BE SUBSIDIARY TO THOSE OF GOVT. WE CANNOT OURSELVES  
MAKE A SETTLEMENT OR GET IT ACCEPTED; ONLY THE ROKG CAN DO THAT.

14. WE MUST RECOGNIZE POSSIBILITY THAT DESPITE PAK GOVT'S  
DETERMINATION AND OUR OWN EFFORTS, PUBLIC FEELINGS, OPPOSITION  
AGITATION AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY FRUSTRATE AN EARLY  
NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT. WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IS CONCLUDED OR NOT  
THE NORMALIZATION CONTROVERSY, IF BADLY HANDLED, MAY ALSO LEAD  
TO FALL OF PRESENT GOVT THROUGH PUBLIC TURMOIL, COUP OR INTERNAL  
DIVISIONS.

15. WITH THESE POSSIBILITIES IN MIND EMBASSY MAKES FOLLOWING  
RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. IN HIS PRESENT MOOD PAK REMAINS COMMITTED TO SETTLEMENT AND  
WE SHOULD LET HIM AND OTHER GOVT LEADERS KNOW THAT WE SUPPORT  
HIM IN THIS DECISION AND ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO  
ASSIST.

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B. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COUNSEL ROKG TO FOLLOW COURSE OF MODERATION AND DESIST FROM HARSH ACTIONS WHICH COULD SPARK VIOLENT REACTION FROM STUDENTS OR OPPOSITION.  
CFN 14. 15.

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT A MAJOR PROBLEM IN REGARD TO PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS ARISES FROM KCP'S CONTINUED DOMINANT ROLE IN GOVT,

E SHOULD NOT NOW INVOLVE OURSELVES IN CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING HIM: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5)

D. SLOGAN "DEFEND THE PEACE LINE" CONCEALS DEEP ANXIETIES ABOUT CLOSER RELATIONS WITH FORMER COLONIAL MASTER, ONE OF WHICH IS THAT KOREA WILL EVENTUALLY BE DOMINATED BY JAPAN AS US REDUCES ITS COMMITMENT. TO COUNTER THIS FEAR WE SHOULD USE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IN BOTH SEOUL AND WASHINGTON TO REITERATE ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED US FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT AND AVOID COMMENTS WHICH INDICATE THAT US ECONOMIC OR MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO KOREA ARE DIMINISHING.

E. OTHERWISE, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR LOW-KEY PUBLIC APPROACH TO ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION CONTROVERSY. WE MAY SOON NEED TO MAKE PUBLIC OUR EXPLICIT VIEWS ON SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NOW IS TIME FOR SUCH A STEP. EMBASSY WILL KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW THE DESIRABILITY OF OUR MAKING APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS AND WILL SO RECOMMEND AT SUCH TIME AS WE BELIEVE THEY WILL BE USEFUL. GIVEN STUDENT PROCLIVITIES WE SHOULD BEWARE

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OF PROVOKING ANTI-AMERICAN OUTBURSTS WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE SITUATION WITHOUT HELPING ROKG TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE JAPANESE SETTLEMENT. (IN RESPONSE DEPT. QUERY REF A, WE DO NOT BELIEVE APPROPRIATE GIVE LIEM MORE THAN PRO-FORMA REPLY).

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F. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO OPPOSITION, PRESS AND CIVIC LEADERS IN ROK DEPTH OF OUR INTEREST IN ROK-JAH, SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS OUR SUPPORT OF PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. WITH OPPOSITION WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR ANY POSSIBLE AREAS OF COMPROMISE. WE ARE NOT HOPEFUL THAT THERE IS MUCH FLEXIBILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO REACH COMMON GROUND ON PART OF OPPOSITION, BUT THIS APPROACH CANNOT BE NEGLECTED. WE SHOULD MAKE MORE ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST GOVT IN ENLIGHTENING OPPOSITION AND GENERAL PUBLIC. IN THESE CONNECTIONS WE ARE REVIEWING ALL US RESOURCES TO DETERMINE HOW THEY CAN BE USED MORE EFFECTIVELY.

G. WITH REGARD TO DEPT'S SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (REF B) ROKG HAS BEEN FOLLOWING GENERAL APPROACH OUTLINED BY DEPT. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO URGE THEM TO DO SO. HOWEVER, DO NOT BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE FOR GOVT TO IGNORE OPPOSITION CRITICISMS OF SETTLEMENT TERMS (FIRST PARA REF B) SINCE GOVT ALREADY INFORMALLY CONFIRMED TERMS KIM-OKIRA AGREEMENT AND, OF COURSE, BEGUN PROCESS OF TRYING TO EDUCATE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE ON PEACE LINE.

16. IN CONCLUSION, WE SHOULD OURSELVES ACCEPT NEED FOR CURRENT BREATHING SPELL. NEXT ROUND OF GOVT, OPPOSITION AND STUDENT ACTIVITY WILL BEGIN SOON, AND OUR EFFORTS SHOULD NOT BE OVERZEALOUSLY EXTENDED BUT SHOULD AWAIT AND BE RELATED TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND IN JAPAN.

17. GP-2.

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CFN 16. 17. GP-2.

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Origin

FE

Info

SS

G

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

ACTION: Amembassy, SEOUL IMMEDIATE 920  
CINCUNC IMMEDIATEINFO: CINGPAC  
CINCUSARPAC

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Reference Seoul's 1281, rptd CINGPAC 547, CINCUSARPAC Unn

Unless circumstances at time of release make it imperative that UNC  
make initial announcement, you requested to notify White House immediately  
as per guidance Deptel 879.

Concur your wording Seoul's 1281 subject to following changes:

- 1) replace "captured" ~~with~~ with "who have been held".
- 2) replace "on" with "since".

GP-3

END

ACTING

BALL

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-161

By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CLStermer:mfs 4/10/54

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

FE/P - Mr. Manell (subs)

P - Mr. McClosky

EA - Miss Vettel

White House - Mr. Reedy (subs)

OSD/ISA - Col. Moorman (subs)

OSD/PA - Mr. Kirby (subs)

S/S - Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

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Classification

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Origin

FE

Info:

SS

G

NSC

INR

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL

PRIORITY

INFO: AmEmbassy TOKYO

PRIORITY

CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Following NOFORN and FYI only based on uncleared memcon.

During courtesy call by PriMin Choi Doo Sun accompanied by

Ambassador Mike Kim on the President today, President took opportunity to express earnest hope for normalization of ROK-Japanese relations which he said was a matter of highest level U.S. Government interest. He said he understood negotiations were now at critical stage and he reaffirmed U.S. Government hope that they could move along to a successful solution.

PriMin replied that he was in "perfect agreement" with what the President had said and he hoped for a settlement "as soon as possible". Despite the fact that there had been some disturbances in Korea over this issue, ROKG was nevertheless continuing steadfastly its efforts toward successful negotiations and hoped to reach settlement as soon as possible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RACCO/R-254-3-26-9

By: JON WARA Date: 8-28-19

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE: MGreen/FE: EA: CANorred, Jr., mls

Classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey

White House: R.W. Komer (draft)

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

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Classification

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Parallel exchange had taken place immediately beforehand in meeting between PriMin and three Korean Assemblymen on one hand, and Secretary and Assistant Secretary Bundy on other. PriMin attributed demonstrations to misunderstanding of terms of Korean-Japanese agreement and of conduct of negotiations, as well as to feelings against 30 years of Japanese occupation. He expressed view that with efforts to dispel these misunderstandings, further improvement could be made. Secretary recognized domestic Korean political difficulties connected with settlement, but emphasized costliness of delay, which has already deprived Korea of substantial economic benefits.

GP-3

END

RIISK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING  
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

67  
~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

R 050430Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHLHQ/ADMINO CINCPAC  
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC  
RUHLKM/PACAF  
RUHLHLWNCINCPACFLT  
RUAUAZ/COMUSJAPAN

~~SECRET~~

TANGO THIRTEEN FOR ADMINO CINCPAC  
MEETINGS WITH ROK OFFICIALS (U)

1. FOLLOWING ARE SIGNIFICANT POINTS OF CONVERSATIONS  
YESTERDAY WITH MINDEF KIM SUNG EUN AND PRESIDENT PARK.

A. WHEN ASKED IF ROK/JAPAN NORMALIZATION TALKS WOULD CONTINUE, MIN KIM REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THE TALKS PROBABLY WOULD SLOW DOWN A DAT AND THAT DURING THIS TIME AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM WOULD BE CONDUCTED. HE SAID AT THAT VERY MOMENT AN OFFICER FROM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFIARS WAS TALKING TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF EXPLAINING THE ADVANTAGES OF NORMALIZATION. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE FOR ALL MILITARY STAFFS AND FOR THE PUBLIC. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE STUDENT RIOTS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE RIOTS WERE AGAINST KIM CHONG PIL AS WELL AS AGAINST CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS WITH JAPAN. HE SAID THAT MANY OF THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT KCP IS TOO CLOSE TO THE JAPANESE. HE SAID THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE SAYING THAT KCP HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A LARGE PORTION OF THE MONEY BEING DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT KCP HAD SPENT IT ON THE LAST ELECTIONS, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT WAS RUSHING THE TALKS TO COVAR UP KCP.

ACT.....J5-6

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-7 SACS-4 DIA-6 NMCC-2 SAMMA-1  
CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15 WHITE HOUSE-3  
SDLO-8 RRA-1 FILE-1 (78) FJC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Group 4

By ics

, NARS, Date 1-22-82

DUTY OFFICER		PAGE OF PAGES		MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
WU/JRL	WD	1	2	CITE NO.	DTG
					050430Z APR64

FORM NO  
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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**INCOMING  
MESSAGE**

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SECRET**

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

B. MIN KIM REMARKED THAT CURRENT STRENGTH OF ROK FORCES IS CLOSELY TIED TO THE TWO U.S. DIVISIONS IN KOREA. HE SAID THAT IF THE U.S. PULLS OUT A DIVISION, THE ROK GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY FORCES PROPORTIONATELY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO CAPITOL INVESTMENT.

C. DURING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK BEFORE LUNCH, HE REFERRED TO NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINES AND ASKED IF I THOUGHT IT A GOOD IDEA FOR ROK TO BE SUPPLIED ALSO WITH SUBMARINES. I

TOLD HIM THAT I DID NO RPT NOT THINK THIS A FEASIBLE OBJECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE VERY LARGE EXPENSE INVOLVED AND THAT A SUBMARINE FORCE FOR THE ROK WOULD BE A LUXURY RATHER THAN A NECESSITY. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ASW TRAINING FOR THE ROK NAVY AND EXPRESSED MY AGREEMENT WITH THE ROK CNO PLANS FOR HIS SURFACE SAILORS TO RIDE OUR SUBMARINES PROVIDING TARGET SERVICES SO AS TO ATTAIN A BETTER APPRECIATION OF SUBMARINE ATTACK AND EVASIVE TACTICS. PRESIDENT THEN HAD A SIDE CONVERSATION IN KOREAN WITH HIS MINDEF AND CNO AND DROPPED THE SUBJECT.

D. THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS REFLECTED MISGUIDED PATRIOTISM COUPLED WITH OPPOSITION PARTY STIMULATION. HE STATED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD CAUSE ONLY A SHORT DELAY IN CONCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN AND THAT MEANWHILE THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO EDUCATE STUDENTS AND OFFICIALS IN THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING A SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN. HE SAID THAT THE CAMPAIGN OF EDUCATION HAD ALREADY BEGUN. HE TOLD ME THAT THE KOREAN FONMIN IS IN JAPAN TO CONVEY THE WORD THAT ROK POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED AND THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE JAPANESE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY RECENT EVENTS BUT HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE GOJ WOULD STILL BE WILLING TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

2. I WILL BE SEEING AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO HIM.

GP-4

BT

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
	2 2	<div data-bbox="812 1776 1120 1798">CITE NO.</div> <div data-bbox="1136 1776 1336 1798">DTG</div> <div data-bbox="1136 1809 1396 1843">050430Z APR64</div>

FORM NO  
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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**SECRET**



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

68

*Polad*

~~SECRET~~

43  
Action

SS  
Info

CONTROL: 22487  
RECEIVED: MARCH 31, 1964, 2:30 A.M.

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1244 PRIORITY

INFO: TOKYO 561  
CINCPAC 538

DATE: MARCH 30, MIDNIGHT (SECTION 1 OF 2)

SECRET

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: EMBTEL 1240

1. I TALKED AT LENGTH TODAY WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIM HYUN-CHOL (NOW ADVISER TO PRESIDENT PAK), GENERAL KIM CHONG-O (CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF) AND KIM CHONG-P'IL IN THAT ORDER. FIRST TWO REGARD PRESENT SITUATION AS GRAVE. LATTER WAS CALM, CHEERFUL, SELF-POSSESSED AND WHILE RECOGNIZING SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO PLACATE STUDENTS, SHOWED NO SIGNS OF INTENDING TO RETREAT FROM FOREFRONT IN ROK-JAPAN TALKS. CONVERSATIONS SHED LIGHT ON DEVELOPING SITUATION WITHIN GOVT ARISING OUT OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, AND UNCERTAINTIES AND FEARS WHICH EXIST.

2. EX-PRIMIN KIM CAME TO SEE ME AT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT PAK. OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE WAS TO ASK US CONSIDERATION FOR FOLLOWING:

A. ACCELERATE PL 480 GRAIN SHIPMENTS SO AS TO HAVE MORE ARRIVE BEFORE JUNE 30, AND SUPPLY ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR A FOOD GRAIN RESERVE;

B. ANNOUNCE SOON RELEASE OF 10 MILLION DOLLARS OF ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ASSISTANCE;

C. USE GOOD OFFICES WITH GOJ TO ENABLE ROK BUY ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES OF COMMERCIAL FERTILIZER FOR DELIVERY BEFORE END OF MAY.

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~~SECRET~~

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authority RA000R-254-3-27-8

By JHw ARA Date 8-28-19



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1244, March 30, Midnight (SECTION I OF II) from Seoul

3. KIM SAID PRESIDENT WAS WORRIED AS A RESULT OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND NEEDED ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM US TO CARRY THROUGH ON DEVALUATION AND ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AS HE IS DETERMINED TO DO.

4. I SAID I WOULD COME BACK TO PRESIDENT'S REQUEST BUT FIRST WANTED TO KNOW HIS (KIM'S) ESTIMATE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. HE REPLIED IMMEDIATELY THAT SITUATION WAS VERY BAD. HE DID NOT BELIEVE STUDENTS WERE PLAYING POLITICS, BUT WERE AROUSED BECAUSE THEY FELT GOVT WAS TOO SOFT IN DEALING WITH JAPAN AND WERE INCENSED BECAUSE OF INVOLVEMENT OF KCP IN ROK-JAPAN DIPLOMACY. HIS OWN ADVICE TO PAK HAD BEEN TO CALL KCP BACK AND REMOVE HIM FROM ROK-JAPAN TALKS COMPLETELY, ALLOWING FONMIN CHONG IL-KWON TO HANDLE. IF THIS WERE DONE THE GOVT MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO ON WITH ROK-JAPAN TALKS AFTER A BRIEF COOLING-OFF PERIOD. IF NOT, STUDENTS WILL BE FURTHER AROUSED AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS UPRISING WHICH COULD RESULT IN FALL OF PAK AND HIS GOVT. LONGER THE DEMONSTRATIONS GO ON GREATER THE CHANCE OF BLOODSHED WHICH WOULD BRING THE PEOPLE OF SEOUL IN ON SIDE OF THE STUDENTS.

5. AT MY REQUEST KIM ANALYZED THE BALANCE OF FORCES WORKING ON PRESIDENT PAK AND KCP. OUTSIDE THE DRP PRESSURES FROM STUDENTS, OPPOSITION, AND FORMER FRIENDS OF PRESIDENT PAK ARE TO GET RID OF KCP. WITHIN DRP, HOWEVER, KIM SAID KCP STILL HAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL AND A SAFE MARGIN OF SUPPORT. HOWEVER, AT LEAST 20 DRP MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND POSSIBLY MORE WOULD BE AGAINST KCP IN ANY CRISIS. KIM WASN'T SURE HOW PAK WOULD REACT TO THESE PRESSURES BUT AT PRESENT HE THOUGHT PAK WOULD DEFEND KCP AND TRY TO KEEP HIM. IF HE PURSUES THIS COURSE TOO FAR, KIM IS AFRAID THE SITUATION WILL DEVELOP AS IT DID IN APRIL 1960, WITH STUDENT AND PUBLIC ANTAGONISM GRADUALLY ENVELOPING PRESIDENT HIMSELF. PAK UNDERSTANDS THE SITUATION BUT DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO RUN THE DRP WITHOUT KCP.

6. KIM HAD NOT SEEN KCP AND WOULD NOT SEEK HIM OUT. IF KCP ASKS HIS ADVICE HE INTENDS TO ADVISE HIM TO GO AWAY AND STUDY, BUT AT ALL COSTS TO LEAVE THE ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT TO SOMEONE ELSE. I TOLD KIM THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF SITUATION CONFORMED GENERALLY WITH MINE AND SAID I HOPED HE WOULD USE HIS UNDOUBTED INFLUENCE WITH PAK TO PERSUADE HIM TO FACE FACTS OF THE SITUATION.

7. AS TO PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PL 480 AND SA, I POINTED OUT THESE QUESTIONS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN TALKS NOW GOING ON BETWEEN KILLEN AND KIM YU-TAEK AND THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT. I SAID I HOPED GOVT WOULD NOT TAKE DECISION ON DEVALUATION OUTSIDE THIS FRAMEWORK.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1244, March 30, Midnight (SECTION I OF II) from Seoul

HOWEVER, I THOUGHT THAT IF OUR TWO GOVTS COULD REACH AN EARLY DECISION ON DEVALUATION QUESTION, REQUEST OF ROKG FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE SYMPATHETICALLY CONSIDERED.

8. GENERAL KIM CHONG-O LUNCED WITH ME BY ARRANGEMENT MADE BEFORE DEMONSTRATIONS END I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW HIM OUT. HE SAID IN EFFECT:

A. HE ATTENDED MARCH 28 CABINET MEETING WHERE PLANS MADE TO DEAL WITH SITUATION.

B. IT WAS AGREED TO GO AHEAD WITH ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AFTER SITUATION HERE STABILIZED.

C. PROBLEM WAS TO EDUCATE STUDENTS AND FACULTIES, AND INTENSIVE EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE DURING NEXT WEEK. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY GOVT HAD DONE ALMOST NOTHING IN THIS REGARD UP TO NOW. EVERYTHING WAS HANDLED BY PAK AND KCP IN GREATEST SECRECY AND EVEN HE WAS CONFUSED AND UNINFORMED ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN AS WERE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND OTHERS.

D. HE DID NOT THINK STUDENTS WERE HOSTILE TO PAK, OR WANTED TO OVERTURN GOVT, AND THEY WERE OPPOSED TO OPPOSITION LEADERS. THEY WERE VICTIMS OF GOVT'S INEPTNESS AND OF OPPOSITION AND SOME LEFTIST AGITATORS. IF STUDENTS PERSISTED IN DEMONSTRATIONS AFTER EXPLANATIONS, THEN GOVT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE. THIS DID NOT MEAN RESORTING TO VIOLENT MEASURES BY POLICE AND MILITARY, WHICH WOULD BE DANGEROUS. ASKED TO EXPLAIN WHAT HE MEANT BY FIRM LINE, HE ONLY SAID: "WE CANNOT LET THE STUDENTS RUN THE COUNTRY."

BERGER

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 22210  
RECD: MARCH 30, 1964, 1 PM  
FROM: SEOUL  
ACTION: SECSTATE 1244 PRIORITY  
INFO: TOKYO 561  
CINCPAC 538  
DATE: MARCH 30, MIDNIGHT (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. HE REGARDED KCP AND HIS-HIGH HANDED AND SECRET WAYS AS MAIN CAUSE OF TROUBLE "JUST LIKE LAST YEAR". HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT PAK ABOUT KCP AND WHILE PAK UNDERSTANDS THIS, PAK THINKS "WITH HIS HEART" WHEN IT COMES TO KCP. GENERAL KIM BELIEVES PAK WILL TRY TO KEEP KCP IN THE BACKGROUND FROM NOW ON BUT IS NOT SURE.

F. HE WAS WORRIED THAT INFLATION, GOVT CORRUPTION, AND KCP'S MONEY RAISING ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF DRP WOULD BECOME ADDITIONAL ISSUES. HE ASKED IF WE THOUGHT CORRUPTION WAS AS BAD AS UNDER RHEE TO WHICH I REPLIED: "SOME SAY IT IS AS BAD, OTHERS SAY IT IS WORSE."

G. HE COULD NOT PREDICT COURSE OF EVENTS AND IN HIS MIND SITUATION WAS VERY WORRYING. HE PROMISED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL HOWZE AND ME.

9. KCP CAME TO RESIDENCE THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST AND REPORTED ON HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN TAIPEI, SAIGON AND TOKYO. EVERYTHING WENT SMOOTHLY IN TOKYO BY HIS ACCOUNT AND HE AND OHIRA AGREED:

A. TO ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED SCHEDULE ROK-JAPAN TALKS.

B. JAPAN WILL EXTEND AT LEAST 70 MILLION DOLLARS COOPERATION LOANS WITH POSSIBLE INCREASE TO 100 MILLION DOLLARS.

C. ON SOLUTION PROBLEM BASELINES AROUND CHEJU-DO AND FISHING ARRANGEMENTS IN ADJACENT WATERS.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1244, March 30, Midnight, from Seoul, (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THESE AGREEMENTS APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE BY MIKI, FUJIYAMA AND MAEO AND CONFIRMED BY IKEDA. HOWEVER, AS RESULT OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEOUL, TALKS NOW TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. KCP IS DETERMINED TO PUSH FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT BUT FEELS IKEDA MAY LOSE DETERMINATION AS RESULT OF DEMONSTRATIONS BOTH IN SEOUL AND IN JAPAN.

10. KCP NOW TURNING ATTENTION TO STUDENT LEADERS. IN HIS VIEW BASIC ATTITUDE STUDENTS WAS UNWILLINGNESS EXCHANGE PEACE LINE FOR ONLY 600 MILLION DOLLARS. THEIR OPPOSITION TO GOVT AND ROK-JAPAN DIPLOMACY CENTERED AROUND THREE POINTS WHICH THEY BLAME ON DRP:

- A. FEAR OF ECONOMIC COLONIZATION OF JAPAN.
- B. LACK OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND MODERNIZATION IN KOREA.
- C. GOVT ATTEMPTS AT MANIPULATION AND ESPIONAGE ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES.

STUDENTS WERE INSPIRED MAINLY BY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS BUT THERE ALSO ELEMENTS OF "DUBIOUS IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION" WHOSE SLOGANS PARALLEL THOSE OF RADIO PYONGYAND AND JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY.

11. KCP ENDEAVORED BLANDLY TO ASSURE ME HE WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING STUDENTS AROUND TO SUPPORT SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN. HE PLANNING SPEECH IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WAS ASSIGNING VARIOUS DRP MEMBERS TO LEADING HIGH SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES TO WORK ON STUDENT LEADERS. OTHER PLANS INCLUDED A TOUR OF OUTLYING CITIES AND RURAL AREAS BY KCP HIMSELF AND A SEMINAR AT SNU'S SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AS TO PAK'S ROLE IN THIS WORK OF PERSUASION, KCP SAID PAK HAD DESIGNATED HIM AS THE VANGUARD. HE HAD MET WITH 30 STUDENTS IN JAPAN REPRESENTING ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO A ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT. STUDENTS WERE AT FIRST HOSTILE BUT AS KCP DEALT PATIENTLY WITH THEIR ARGUMENTS, THEY CAME AROUND TO HIS POINT OF VIEW AND ADMITTED THEY HAD BEEN MISINFORMED. IT WAS EVIDENT TO ME THAT KCP WAS CONFIDENT THAT GIVEN A LITTLE TIME HE COULD DO THE SAME WITH KOREAN STUDENT LEADERS.

12. COMMENT: ABOVE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. SITUATION IS STILL DEVELOPING. POSSIBLE DECISION BY PAK TO REMOVE KCP FROM ROK-JAPAN ARENA AND UNDERTAKE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT NOT YET IN SIGHT ALTHOUGH PAK EVIDENTLY UNDER MOUNTING PRESSURE TO RESOLVE SITUATION IN THIS CASE.

13. GP-1.

~~SECRET~~

BERGER

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15186 69

*Bumby*  
S

*Korea*

Mar 30 7 38 PM '64

57

Origin

ACTION: CINCUNC

FE

Info

INFO: Amembassy SEOUL 879

SS

CINCPAC

G

USUN 2566

SP

US Mission GENEVA 1608

L

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

H

SAL

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

IO

P

USIA

Advance public affairs guidance on possible release of helicopter

NSC

personnel follows:

INR

CIA

Request you notify White House via JCS and STATE (info OSD/PA) immediately

NSA

at time of release of helicopter personnel so we can determine where first

OSD

ARMY

USG public announcement will be made.

NAVY

AIR

FYI Guidance issued to EUCOM concerning release of captured RB-66 flyers allowed immediate photography of flyers by newsmen, but no interviews or other medical confrontations until completion of ~~medical~~ processing and appropriate debriefing and evaluation in Washington END FYI.

Copies of releases subsequent to initial announcement should be addressed to OASD(ISA), OASD (PA) and STATE (P) for info.

GP-3

RUSK

END

Drafted by: <i>WJ</i>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Robert A. Fearey <i>RA</i>
FE:EA:CI:Sterner/OSD/ISA: Col. <i>Loerman</i>	
Clearances: GW 5/30/64	
FE/P - Mr. Lockhart (draft) <i>WJ</i>	DASD/PA - Mr. Lennartson (draft) <i>WJ</i>
P - Mr. Dillon (draft) <i>WJ</i>	FE - Mr. Green <i>WJ</i>

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

70

*Roma*

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

43  
Action  
FE  
Control: 21368  
Rec'd: March 28, 1964  
3:10 a.m.

Info FROM Seoul  
SS  
G ACTION: Secstate 1238 Priority  
SP  
L INFO: Tokyo 557  
H CINCPAC POLAD 533  
SAL  
IO DATE: March 28, 4 p.m.  
AID

CU 1. ACCORDING RADIO NEWS MARCH 28, 700 HIGH SCHOOL AND  
USIA 50 SEOUL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BEGAN DEMONSTRATING AT KIMPO  
NSC AIRPORT PRIOR KIM CHONG-PIL'S SCHEDULED ARRIVAL AT 1310 HOURS.  
INR HOWEVER, RADIO NOW REPORTS KIM AIRPORT ARRIVAL WAS WITHOUT  
CIA INCIDENT. 2,000 SONGYUNKWAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE TAKEN  
NSA TO SEOUL STREETS DEMANDING DEPORTATION YUMIURI AND NY TIMES  
OSD CORRESPONDENTS, AS WELL AS PROTESTING ROV-JAPAN RELATIONS.  
ARMY CFN 1238 557 533 28 4PM 1. 28 700 50 1310 NOW 2,000 YOMIURI  
NAVY NY TIMES  
AIR  
SCA

RR PAGE TWO RUALOS 06E  
STUDENTS IRKED BY YOMIURI DESPATCH SAYING DEMONSTRATIONS INCITED  
BY LEFT-WING KOREAN ELEMENTS IN JAPAN. IRE REPORTEDLY ALSO  
DIRECTED AGAINST NY TIMES PROBABLY RESULT TIMES EDITORIAL  
CRITICAL OF STUDENTS WHICH GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE SEOUL PRESS.  
ELSEWHERE, 4,600 TAEJON STUDENTS AND 700 PUSAN STUDENTS  
REPORTEDLY DEMONSTRATING.

2. IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CIVIL RULE PARTY INTRODUCED MOTION  
CALLING FOR DISCHARGE HOME MINISTER OM MIN-YONG. OF 152  
PRESENT, SEVENTY-SEVEN VOTED FOR MEASURE, 71 AGAINST, 4  
ABSTAINED; HOWEVER, MEASURE FAILED TO PASS SINCE REQUIRED  
APPROVAL OF MAJORITY TOTAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERSHIP. MORE THAN  
20 MEMBERS RULING DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (DRP) REPORTEDLY  
VOTED IN FAVOR MOTION.

3. DURING ASSEMBLY MEETING MINISTER NATIONAL DEFENSE  
KIM SONG-UN QUESTIONED BY OPPOSITION MEMBERS ON USE OF MILITARY  
UNITS TO PROTECT BLUE HOUSE DURING DEMONSTRATIONS. KIM SAID

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-2- 1238, March 28, 4 p.m. from Seoul

PREVIOUS NOTICE OF DISPATCH OF TROOPS WAS GIVEN TO UNC.  
KIM ALSO REAFFIRMED POLITICAL NEUTRALITY OF MILITARY.  
CFN 4,600 700 2. OM 152-71 4 20 (DRP) 3. KIM SONG+UN

PAGE THREE RUALOS 06E

4. DURING MORNING PRIMIN BROADCAST STATEMENT URGING PEOPLE TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT IN EFFORTS TO SETTLE ROK-JAPAN ISSUE. ASSERTING THAT GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION SUPPRESS EXPRESSION OF "PATRIOTIC OPINIONS" HE SAID THERE MANY WAYS OTHER THAN DEMONSTRATIONS EXPRESS SUCH VIEWS. PRIMIN SAID GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTEND HIDE FACTS FROM PEOPLE AND CLAIMED MORE THAN 90 PERCENT OF DETAILS ON ROK-JAPAN TALKS ALREADY MADE PUBLIC THROUGH PRESS REPORTS. PROMISING THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ROK NEGOTIATING CLAIMS, PRIMIN CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT CONTINUED DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD THREATEN SOCIAL ORDER AND PARALYZE ECONOMY.

COMMENT:

5. VOTE OF SIGNIFICAN NUMBER DRP MEMBERS IN FAVOR OPPOSITION MEASURE FIRST SUCH PHENOMENON IN CURRENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND CONSTITUTES ANOTHER INDICATION OF EXTENT TO WHICH DEMONSTRATIONS PRODUCING STRAINS WITHIN DRP.

BERGER

BT

CFN 4. NO NOT 90 5. DRP DRP

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY 71

*Korea*

COUNTRY SOUTH KOREA

DATE OF INFO. 25 MARCH 1964

1.3(a) (4)  
DISTR. 26 MARCH 1964 C

STRATEGY AND ROLE OF THE CIVIL RULE PARTY WITH RESPECT  
TO THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 47666

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL:

1. (SUMMARY: CIVIL RULE PARTY (CRP) LEADERS,

[REDACTED], AGREED THAT  
THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE AND DECIDED, IN SPITE OF PRESSURE FROM  
EXTREMISTS IN THE PARTY, NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS  
AND REQUESTED UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS NOT TO JOIN THE DEMONSTRATIONS  
ON 26 MARCH, AS PLANNED. THE CRP LEADERS ALSO DECIDED THAT UNLESS  
PAK CHONG-HUI MAKES CONCESSIONS, WHICH IS UNLIKELY, THEY WILL BE  
UNABLE TO RESTRICT THE DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE ROK-JAPAN ISSUE FOR MANY  
MORE DAYS. THE CRP IS DIRECTING AND FINANCING THE STUDENT  
DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGH SELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMEN WHO HAVE GOOD

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1.3(a)(4)

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ001-254-3-4

- By *us* NARA, Date 11-7-02



(When Filled In)

PAGE 2

1.3(a)(4)

C

2. [REDACTED] A MEETING OF CIVIL RULE PARTY (CRP-MINCHONG-DANG) LEADERS [REDACTED] TO

1.3(a)(4)  
C

ASSESS THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE MEETING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE AND WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE SERIOUS UNLESS PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND PROMISED TO HOLD A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AT A SPECIFIED DATE WITHIN A YEAR. UNLESS HE DOES SO, WHICH IS UNLIKELY, CRP LEADERS WILL BE UNABLE TO RESTRICT THE DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE ROK-JAPAN ISSUE ALONE FOR MANY MORE DAYS.

3. THE CRP LEADERS HAVE BEEN UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE EXTREMISTS IN THE PARTY TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF DEMONSTRATION TO INCLUDE THE OVERTHROW OF THE PAK REGIME AND TO TAKE TO THE STREETS. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ALREADY DECIDED ON THIS STRATEGY. HOWEVER

1.3(a)(4)  
C

THE CRP LEADERS [REDACTED] DECIDED TO HOLD THE LINE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND AVOID ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND HAVE ASKED THE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, WHO WERE SLATED TO JOIN THE STUDENTS ON 26 MARCH, TO DO THE SAME. WHILE THE CRP LEADERS FORESEE POLITICAL CHAOS, IF EVENTS LEAD TO THE REGIME'S DOWNFALL, THEY WERE UNABLE TO FORMULATE A CONCLUSIVE PLAN TO MEET THE SITUATION,

(When Filled In)

1.3(a)(4)

AS IT IS CHANGING ON A DAILY BASIS.

4. THE CRP IS DIRECTING AND FINANCING THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGH SELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMEN WHO HAVE GOOD CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE AT THEIR RESPECTIVE ALMA MATERS. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] WHILE STUDENT LEADERS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE TO DIRECTION THERE IS A CONSTANT DANGER OF THE LEFTIST ELEMENTS WRESTING CONTROL FROM THE INCUMBENT LEADERS, AS WITNESSED BY THE REFERENCE TO COMPRADOR CAPITALISTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION SLOGANS. THE CRP ASSEMBLYMEN WHO HAD DRAWN UP THE SLOGANS FOR THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAD NOT USED THAT TERM, AND IT IS NOT KNOWN WHO [REDACTED] HAD DONE SO.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC .

END OF MESSAGE

Korea

57

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Action

VFR

FE

PP RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 16E 26/0640Z

Info

P 260615Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

1964 MAR 26 PM 3 05

020337

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

G

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SP

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

L

STATE GRNC

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AID

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1225 INFO TOKYO  
547 CINCPAC 522 MARCH 26, 3PM

P

CU

USIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC

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CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

1. AT NOON MARCH 26 PRESIDENT PAK BROADCAST STATEMENT ON STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND ROK-JAPAN TALKS. IN STATEMENT PAK INDICATED NO CHANGE IN ROKG INTENTIONS TO REACH SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN BL IN PRESENT NEGOTIATING STANCE. HE CALLED ON STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS TO UNDERSTAND NEED FOR SETTLEMENT AND SCORED IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE OF SOME OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING PATRIOTIC MOTIVE BEHIND DEMONSTRATIONS, HE URGED PUBLIC TO HAVE FAITH IN GOVERNMENT AND WARNED THAT CONTINUED DEMONSTRATIONS AIMED AT FORCING HAND OF GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY MAJORITY WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY LEGAL ACTION. SUMMARY OF UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION PAK'S REMARKS FOLLOWS:  
CFN 1225 547 522 26 3PM 1. 26

PAGE TWO RUALOS 16E

2. I UNDERSTAND SENTIMENT OF STUDENTS TAKING PART DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATIONS NOT EFFECTIVE WAY SETTLE DIPLOMATIC ISSUES, AND THEIR CONTINUATION IS AGAINST OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. PEOPLE MUST NOT FORGET GOVERNMENT APPROACHING ROK-JAPAN TALKS WITH SAME SINCERITY AS EXHIBITED BY DEMONSTRATORS. THE PEOPLE SHOULD PLACE CONFIDENCE IN DULY ELECTED GOVERNMENT.

3. GOVERNMENT'S BASIC POLICY ON ROK-JAPAN TALKS MADE PUBLIC IN MY MARCH 1 ADDRESS. WE HAVE WARNED JAPAN AGAINST TAKING ADVANTAGE OF DIVIDED KOREA AND URGED HER BE FAITHFUL TO ASIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONS BY MAKING FAIR SETTLEMENT WITH ROK.

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-2- 1225, March 26, 3 p.m., from: Seoul

4. FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ARE WATCHING NEGOTIATIONS WITH INTEREST AND WITH EXPECTATION. AT PRESENT, NOBODY CAN PREDICT OUTCOME. REGRETTABLY I AM UNABLE TO REVEAL FULL DETAILS NEGOTIATION PROCESS, SINCE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS NECESSARILY SECRET IN ORDER ACHIEVE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS RESULTS. HOWEVER, AFTER IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCCESS OR FAILURE, I WILL PRESENT FULL FACTS TO PEOPLE AND LET THEM JUDGE MERITS.  
CFN 2. 3. 1 4.

PAGE THREE RUALOS UE

5. OPPOSITION MEMBERS HAVE MADE ACCUSATIONS THAT ROK TAKING "LOW POSTURE" IN TALKS. THIS GROUNDLESS CLAIM; IF OUR POSTURE IN FACT LOW, THEN SETTLEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED LONG AGO. OPPOSITION MEMBERS ALSO INSIST THAT WE DEMAND \$2.7 BILLION IN REPARATIONS FROM JAPAN. THIS IS GROUNDLESS DEMAND WITH NO HOPE FULFILLMENT. FINALLY, OPPOSITION MAKING CLAIM THAT SOME SCANDAL INVOLVED IN HANDLING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING OBTAIN POLITICAL FUNDS THROUGH DEALINGS WITH JAPANESE. THIS CLAIM TOO IS GROUNDLESS. UNFORTUNATELY, SOME OPPOSITION POLITICIANS CONTINUE TO MAKE IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS.

6. OUR PRESENT TASK IS TO BUILD FOUNDATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER. DEMONSTRATIONS CAN BE MEANS OF EXPRESSING OPINION, BUT SUCH OPINION CANNOT BE FORCED ON GOVERNMENT WHICH ELECTED BY MAJORITY OF PEOPLE. IF DEMONSTRATIONS VIOLATE NATIONAL LAWS, GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE LEGAL ACTION IN ORDER PROTECT INTERESTS OF ENTIRE PEOPLE.  
CFN 5. \$2.7 6

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 16E

7. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS SHOULD APPROACH SITUATION WITH LONG-TERM VIEW AND WITH EYE TO INTERNATIONAL REALITIES. WE CANNOT SHUT SELVES OFF FROM REST OF WORLD. WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT OPPORTUNITY FOR UNIFICATION THROUGH "VICTORY OVER COMMUNISM" MAY PRESENT SELF IN NUMBER OF YEARS AND WE MUST BE READY FOR IT. WE MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT OUR ENEMIES ARE

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-3- 1225, March 26, 3 p.m., from: Seoul

HOPING CONTINUED DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BRING SOCIAL DISORDER.  
I HAVE CONCRETE PLAN HOW TO USE FUNDS ACCRUING FROM ROK-JAPAN  
SETTLEMENT FOR UNIFICATION THROUGH VICTORY OVER COMMUNISM.  
I WILL MAKE THIS PLAN KNOWN ONCE SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED.

8. I APPEAL TO THE STUDENTS TO RETURN TO THEIR SCHOOLS.  
I HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM IN TOKYO TO TAKE YOUR  
VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION. I HAVE ALSO INSTRUCTED THE FOREIGN  
MINISTRY AND OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENT ORGANS TO EXPLAIN  
PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS TO STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES.

BERGER

BT

CFN 7. 8.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea*

43  
Action  
SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

1964 MAR 25 PM 11 23

OO RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 05E 26/0240Z

O 260225Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

019620

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHPA/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

I M M E D I A T E

035

~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1221 INFO TOKYO 545  
CINCPAC 519 FROM SEOUL MARCH 26, 11:30PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OSD AND JCS

1. ROK ARMY WITH CONCURRENCE CINCUNC, WHO DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY WITH ME YESTERDAY, THIS MORNING MOVED APPROXIMATELY 1500 TROOPS INTO SEOUL COMPRISING THREE CONTINGENTS--ABOUT 500 OR 600 MEN EACH FROM TWO RESERVE DIVISIONS AND SPECIAL FORCES. TROOPS OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNITS OF SEOUL SECURITY COMMAND (FORMERLY CAPITAL DEFENSE COMMAND) DEPLOYED AROUND CAPITOL AND BLUE HOUSE.

CFN 1221 545 519 26 11:30AM 1. 1500 500 600

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~SECRET~~

2. TROOPS ARMED WITH TEAR GAS AND RIFLES. DOUBLE BARBED WIRE BARRICADES BEING ERECTED ON MAIN STREETS LEADING TO CAPITOL AND BLUE HOUSE. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MIN KI-SIK, TOLD UNC THAT TEAR GAS WOULD BE USED IF DEMONSTRATORS BREACHED FIRST BARBED WIRE BARRICADE AND THAT FIREARMS WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EXTREMITY, PRESUMABLY IF DEMONSTRATORS OVERRUN POSITIONS AND ATTEMPT TO FORCE BLUE HOUSE.

3. EVIDENT GOVT EXPECT DEMONSTRATIONS TODAY ON EVEN LARGER SCALE THAN YESTERDAY AND IS PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE ESCALATION OVER NEXT DAYS OR WEEKS IN ATTEMPT OVERTHROW GOVT.

4. GP-4.  
BERGER.

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 11:31 p.m., March 25, 1964

NOTE: Passed White House, OSD, JCS, 3/25/64, at 11:40 p.m.

NOTE: Passed CIA at 12:30 a.m., March 26, 1964

~~SECRET~~

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Authority Group 4

By is NARS Date 1-22-82



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

76  
Korea

45-M

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Action

O P 260225Z ZEA

FE

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

0 1 9 6 2 5

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC

MARCH 25, 1964  
11:57 P.M.

SS

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G

SP

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1220 INFO PRIORITY  
TOKYO 544 CINCPAC 518 FROM SEOUL MAR 26, 11AM

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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1. THIRD DAY OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAS BEGUN WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000 HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS MARCHING PEACEFULLY THROUGH CENTER OF CITY CALLING FOR CESSATION ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND PROTESTING "SECOND JAPANESE TAKEOVER". ROK MILITARY UNITS ARE NOW IN PLACE GUARDING KEY GOVT BUILDINGS. RADIO REPORTS THAT 7-800 CHONNAM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS NOW DEMONSTRATING IN KWANGJU OVER ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS.

2. PRESS REPORTS THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL HOLD PROTEST PARADE THROUGH CENTER OF CITY BEGINNING AT 1200 HOURS TODAY. THERE ARE ALSO UNCONFIRMED RUMORS THAT SOME UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS MAY ALSO STAGE PROTEST MARCH.

3. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NOW MEETING TO CONSIDER RECOMMENDATION CALLING ON GOVT TO INTERPRET CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG AS JAPANESE PATROL BOATS VIOLATE KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS "UNDER PRETEXT OF PROTECTING JAPANESE FISHING BOATS" (PARA 3, EMBTEL 1214). ASSEMBLY MAY ALSO CONSIDER OPPOSITION "NO CONFIDENCE" RESOLUTION AGAINST HOME MINISTER MIN-ONG FOR HIS "IRRESPONSIBLE" REMARKS REGARDING OPPOSITION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ROK-JAPAN TALKS.

4. BOTH SEOUL BAR ASSOCIATIONS HAVE ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT CALLING PRESENT LAW ON DEMONSTRATIONS "UNCONSTITUTIONAL". ALSO ASKED FOR SUSPENSION ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS.

BERGER

BT

CFN 2. 3. 1200 3 1214 4.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O MARCH 26 - 12:03 A.M.  
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE, OSD, CIA, JCS MARCH 26 - 12:09 A.M.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Korea<sup>77</sup>  
77

43-M  
Action  
FE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 19618  
Rec'd: MARCH 25, 1964  
11:20 P.M.

Info

FROM: CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA

025

SS

ACTION: CHAIRMAN JCS UK 60213 FLASH

G

SP

INFO: CINCPAC FLASH

IO

CIA FLASH

INR

STATE FLASH

SCA

WHITE HOUSE FLASH

RMR

DATE: DTG 260245Z

FOR GENERAL TAYLOR FROM GENERAL HOWZE

REFERENCES: A. UK 50558, 24 AUG 63; B. JCS 2535, 18 SEP 63

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEOUL 24 MARCH (ABOUT 5,000 STRONG) AND 25 MARCH (15,000 TO 20,000 STRONG), OSTENSIBLY AGAINST GOVERNMENT ACTION TO CONCLUDE A NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN, ARE EXPECTED BY ROK CHIEF OF STAFF TO BE FOLLOWED TODAY AND ON SUBSEQUENT DAYS BY OTHERS MUCH LARGER IN SIZE. DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALSO OCCURRED IN OTHER CITIES.

1.3  
(a)(4)

[REDACTED] THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PART OF A PLAN WHICH IS POSITIVELY DESIGNED TO BRING DOWN THE CURRENT ROK GOVERNMENT, AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THAT END IS ACHIEVED. [REDACTED]

1.3  
(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

YESTERDAY TROOPS OF THE SEOUL SECURITY COMMAND (OLD CAPITAL DEFENSE COMMAND) WERE DEPLOYED BEHIND THE LINES OF ROK NATIONAL POLICE TO STOP STUDENT SURGES IN DIRECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL MANSION. AT REQUEST OF ROKA CHIEF OF STAFF, TO COPE WITH THE NUMBERS EXPECTED TODAY, I HAVE INDICATED NO OBJECTION TO REINFORCEMENT OF TROOPS IN SEOUL BY PROVISIONAL BATTALIONS FROM CADRES OF THE TWO LOCALLY

SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority RAC-NLJDDI-254-3-7

By ics NARA, Date 11-7-02

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- UK 60213, DATE: DTG 260245Z FROM: CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA

STATIONED REAR AREA SECURITY DIVISIONS AND FROM THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP ALSO LOCATED NEARBY.

I HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, WHO CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, BEING A DULY ELECTED ONE, ENJOYS THE RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND CONCURS IN MY DECISION.

WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF PROSPECTIVE ATTACK BY EXTERNAL COMMUNIST FORCES AGAINST THE ROK.

I INTEND THEREFORE, IN ABSENCE OF OTHER INSTRUCTIONS, TO PROCEED ACCORDING TO THE INTENTIONS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPHS 16, 17, 18, AND 19 OF REFERENCE A AND IN CONSONANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF REFERENCE B.

HLL/26

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:20 P.M. MARCH 25TH.

~~TOP SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*S. Gore* 78

37

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

18890  
MARCH 25, 1964  
8:13 AM

FE  
Info

FROM: SEOUL

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1213, PRIORITY

G  
SP  
L

INFO: TOKYO 541, PRIORITY  
CINCPAC POLAD 511, PRIORITY

H  
AID

DATE: MARCH 25, 6 PM

P

CU

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SCA

RMR

REF: A. DEPTTEL 856, RPTD TOKYO 2440 B. EMBTEL 1211, RPTD TOKYO 540

1. PRESIDENT PAK, WHO LEFT MARCH 24 FOR 3 DAY PROVINCIAL INSPECTION, RETURNED MIDNIGHT AS RESULT MARCH 24 STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OPPOSING ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AND SENT YI HU-RAK, HIS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, MORNING MARCH 25 TO CONVEY TO ME HIS VIEWS OF SITUATION AND PLANS FOR DEALING WITH IT.

2. PAK WISHED US TO KNOW:

A. HE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE DETERRED FROM PRESSING THE ROK-JAPAN TALKS TO CONCLUSION.

B. HE EXPECTS FURTHER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS TODAY MARCH 25, AND DURING NEXT FEW DAYS ON RISING SCALE. (AS I WRITE AT 1530 HOURS, THOUSANDS OF UNIVERSITY, HIGH AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS MILLING AROUND CENTER OF SEOUL AND CAPITOL ON MUCH LARGER SCALE THAN YESTERDAY, SEE REF B.) YI SAID PAK PLANS TO DEAL GENTLY WITH DEMONSTRATIONS HOPING THEY WILL SUBSIDE AFTER STUDENTS LET OFF STEAM. IN EXTREME ANTI-RIOT POLICE WILL BE USED, EQUIPPED WITH CLUBS AND TEAR-GAS. THEY HOPE TO AVOID BLOODSHED, BUT IF SITUATION WORSENS, CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO STRONGER MEASURES, I.E., CLOSING UNIVERSITIES USING CAPITOL DEFENSE COMMAND TROOPS, AND, IF NECESSARY, MARTIAL LAW.

3. YI SAID PAK EXPECTED YESTERDAY'S STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS BUT SURPRISED AT THEIR SIZE. GOVT REGARDS IT AS LARGELY

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Authority RAcc 00/R-254-3-28-7

By JPh \*ARA Date 8-28-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1213, MARCH 25, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

SPONTANEOUS ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATION, WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OPPOSITION, AND WITH RADICAL LEFTISTS IN WINGS. DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOW PATTERN OF APRIL 1960 STUDENT REVOLUTION BUT DO NOT HAVE SAME EMOTIONAL FORCE. IF DEMONSTRATIONS RISE ON SERIOUS SCALE SO AS TO THREATEN GOVT, IT WILL HAVE NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO DEFEND ITS AUTHORITY. YI SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE PAK'S DETERMINATION HANDLE DEMONSTRATIONS IN FRAMEWORK OF LAW AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, BUT GOVT BEING CHALLENGED AND WOULD NOT CONCEDE TO DEMANDS MADE BY STUDENTS. ANY SIGN OF GOVT WEAKNESS WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER DEMANDS. IN THIS SITUATION EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FROM US GOVT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

4. YI SAID PAK ON RETURNING TO SEOUL YESTERDAY HAD MID-NOON MEETING WITH PRIMIN, MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CHIEF OF STAFF ROKA, DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL AND METROPOLITAN POLICE AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF CAPITAL DEFENSE COMMAND, WHERE FOREGOING APPROACH WAS AGREED ON.

5. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERIES, YI SAID:

A. CABINET AND DRP ASSEMBLY MEMBERS NERVOUS AND UNEASY, WITH SOME SENTIMENT IN FAVOR CALLING OFF ROK-JAPAN TALKS. IF PAK STANDS FIRM, THEY WILL SUPPORT HIM.

B. IF YUN PO-SON AND CIVIL RULE PARTY RESIGN FROM ASSEMBLY AS THEY THREATEN IN EVENT ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT MADE, PAK WILL NOT RPT NOT ABANDON EFFORT TO GOVERN BY PARLIAMENTARY MEANS AND WILL HOLD BY-ELECTIONS TO REPLACE THEM.

C. GOVT HAS NO RPT NO PRESENT PLANS TO ARREST OPPOSITION LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO ARE ENCOURAGING PUBLIC DISORDER.

D. SOME IN GOVT ARE FREQUENTLY TEMPTED TO CONCLUDE GOVT WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT THIS IS EMOTIONAL REACTION AND NOT CONSIDERED VIEW, CERTAINLY NOT PAK'S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1213, MARCH 25, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

6. PAK ASKED YI ASCERTAIN MY VIEWS. I SAID OPPOSITION IS TRYING TO BRING GOVT DOWN USING STUDENTS AND EMOTIONAL ISSUE OF ROK-JAPAN TALKS. GOVT HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO DEFEND ITS AUTHORITY. IT SEEMS TO BE APPROACHING PROBLEM AS WELL AS CAN BE EXPECTED, AND I HOPED IT WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTAIN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS.

7. COMMENT: WE ARE WITNESSING FIRST TEST OF GOVT'S ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND CANNOT PREDICT OUTCOME. GOVT CAPITULATION TO STUDENT DEMAND TO CALL OFF TALKS WOULD BE MAJOR VICTORY FOR OPPOSITION, AND WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER OPPOSITION DEMANDS ON GOVT DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THEIR ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF BRINGING GOVT DOWN. YESTERDAY'S MAIN SLOGANS WERE "CALL OFF TALKS," AND "NO RPT NO RETREAT FROM PEACE LINE." TODAY KCP'S NAME FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN SLOGANS COMPARING HIM WITH YI WAN-YONG, WHO SIGNED 1910 AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN, AND THERE WERE SPORADIC CRIES CALLING ON PAK TO RESIGN. GOVT'S ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH STUDENTS BY LETTING THEM DEMONSTRATE IN HOPE FEELING WILL SUBSIDE AS STEAM IS LET OFF MAY SUCCEED, BUT WE MUST FACE POSSIBILITY THAT GOVT MAY BE FORCED TO RESORT TO INCREASED USE OF FORCE AND ULTIMATELY MARTIAL LAW.

8. NERVOUSNESS IN CABINET AND AMONG DRP SUPPORTERS SUGGESTS THAT IF DEMONSTRATIONS ARE NOT BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, PAK, DESPITE YI HU-RAK'S ASSURANCES, MAY FIND IT EXPEDIENT TO AVOID A SETTLEMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

9. WE ARE RECEIVING A FEW UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT SOME POLICE AGENTS IN PLAIN CLOTHES ARE SPREADING RUMORS THAT KOREA WAS FORCED INTO TALKS WITH JAPAN UNDER PRESSURE FROM US AND WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT AND DIRECT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST US.

10. SUGGESTIONS FOR DEPT'S PRESS TREATMENT WILL BE SENT IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

11. GP-3.

BERGER

BAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



43.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

18656

FE

Rec'd:

MARCH 25, 1964

2:35 A.M.

Info

FROM: SEOUL

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1211 IMMEDIATE

G

SP

L

H

INFO: TOKYO 540 IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC 510

AID

P

DATE: MARCH 25, 4 P.M.

CU

USIA

NSC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

INR

CIA

REF DEPTTEL 856, RPTD TOKO 2440, CINCPAC UNN

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

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SY

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RMR

1. SOME 10-15,000 STUDENTS FROM MOST SEOUL UNIVERSITIES HAVE TAKEN TO STREETS MARCH 25 IN DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTINUED INCARCERATION OF STUDENTS ARRESTED FOR MARCH 24 DEMONSTRATION. AFTER PEACEFULLY MARCHING TOWARD CENTER OF CITY, STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING IN FRONT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CAPITOL AND CITY HALL. LARGE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS ALSO GATHERING ON STREET NEAR BLUE HOUSE, AND HAVE DEMANDED PRESIDENT SEE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

2. NUMBER OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS APPEARS TO BE GROWING BUT SPECTATORS SO FAR PASSIVE AND NOT JOINING. POLICE HAVE NOT TRIED TO STOP DEMONSTRATORS BUT RATHER ATTEMPTING TO KEEP STUDENTS MOVING AND UNDER LOOSE CONTROL. SO FAR GOVT HAS NOT ORDERED UP CAPITAL DEFENSE COMMAND OR OTHER TROOP UNITS. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HUARAK INFORMED EMBASSY THAT UNITS CDC IN POSITION NEAR BLUE HOUSE BUT WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EVENT OF ATTEMPT TO FORCE BLUE HOUSE.

3. PRESS REPORTS SMALLER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN PUSAN, TAEGU AND OTHER CITIES TAEGU GROUP ESTIMATED AT 4-5,000.

COMMENT:

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Authority RAC-NLJDDI-254-3-8  
By ms NARA, Date 11-7-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 - 1211, MARCH 25, 4 P.M. FROM SEOUL

COMMENT:

4. ALTHOUGH STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS STILL ORDERLY, SITUATION IS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS. STUDENT GROUPS ARE MUCH LARGER AND MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN MARCH 24 DEMONSTRATORS ALTHOUGH POLICE SO FAR HANDLING THEM WITH KID GLOVES. THERE IS DANGER THAT VIOLENCE MAY TURN DEMONSTRATIONS INTO BROADER ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT;

1.3(a)(5)

5. [REDACTED] UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT IN ORDER DIVERT STUDENTS SOME GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS CIRCULATING STORIES THAT ROKG "LOW POSTURE" IN NEGOTIATIONS DUE TO US PRESSURES.

6. GP-3

BERGER

RKB/23

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:40 A.M. MARCH 25, 1964  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:01 A.M. MARCH 25, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korea 80

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• PRIORITY

## Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY SOUTH KOREA

1.3(a)(4)

DATE OF INFO. 24 MARCH 1964

DISTR. 24 MARCH 1964

BACKGROUND AND SPONSORSHIP OF 24 MARCH STUDENT !  
DEMONSTRATION, AND PLANS FOR FURTHER AGITATION

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 46563

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL:

1.3(a)(4)

C

1. SUMMARY: THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH BROKE OUT IN SEOUL ON 24 MARCH WERE PLANNED AND SPONSORED BY STUDENT LEADERS AT SEOUL NATIONAL (SNU) AND KOREA UNIVERSITY (KU) AT THE DIRECT INSTIGATION OF THE CIVIL RULE PARTY (CRP). THE DEMONSTRATION IS PART OF AN OVERALL SCHEME DESIGNED TO STAGE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS CIVIL DISTURBANCES BASED ON PROTEST AGAINST THE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS. THE ORIGINAL PLAN CALLED FOR A SPREAD OF DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE PROVINCES AFTER THE INITIAL EFFORT WAS MADE IN SEOUL AND A TEMPORARY QUIET IN SEOUL. AS A

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1.3(a)(4)

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-254-3-9  
By ius NARA, Date 11-7-02



(When Filled In)

CONSEQUENCE, NO IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECTED IN SEOUL. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY ALSO THAT EXTREME LEFTIST STUDENTS WERE INVOLVED IN THE DEMONSTRATION.

2. THE CRP HAS BEEN CONDUCTING ITS STUDENT ACTION PROGRAM THROUGH AN ORGANIZATION OF KEY STUDENTS AT SNU AND KU CALLED THE YOUNG WIND SOCIETY (YWS).

THE CRP PLAN IS SCHEDULED IN THREE PHASES:

PHASE ONE CALLED FOR A SMALL DEMONSTRATION ON ALMOST ANY ISSUE. THIS PHASE WAS ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY ON 21 MARCH WHEN A GROUP OF CRP YOUTHS MOUNTED AN IMPROMPTU DEMONSTRATION AFTER THE PAN-OPPOSITION STRUGGLE RALLY PROTESTING AGAINST THE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS. PHASE TWO CALLED FOR A RELATIVELY LIMITED DEMONSTRATION BY STUDENTS AT SNU, KU, AND YONSEI UNIVERSITY (YU) UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE YWS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON 24 MARCH. PHASE THREE CALLS FOR ALL OUT DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AND, HOPEFULLY, THE GENERAL POPULACE AFTER THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TWO PHASES CREATE THE REQUISITE POPULAR ENTHUSIASM.

3. THE IMMEDIATE PLANS FOR THE 24 MARCH DEMONSTRATION WERE MADE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

(When Filled In)

ON 24 MARCH WHEN A MEETING OF THE KEY YWS LEADERSHIP WAS CALLED AT SNU AT 1500 HOURS.

1.3(a)(4)  
C [REDACTED] AT 0900 HOURS ON 24 MARCH A GROUP MET IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENTS LOUNGE AT SNU AND MADE THE NECESSARY DETAILED TACTICAL PLANS FOR THE DEMONSTRATION. AT THIS MEETING WERE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM YU AND KU. SECURITY WAS EMPHASIZED STRONGLY AND ALL STUDENTS NOT IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN WERE REMOVED FROM THE ROOM. THE STUDENTS MET [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)  
C [REDACTED] AND THEN SCATTERED TO THEIR OWN CAMPUSES AFTER IT WAS AGREED TO START CAMPUS AGITATION AT APPROXIMATELY 12 NOON. DURING THE REST OF THE MORNING PLACARDS AND BANNERS WERE SECRETLY PREPARED.

4. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS STARTED ON SCHEDULE AT SNU WITH THE BURNING IN EFFIGY OF YI WAN-YONG, TRADITIONAL KOREAN TRAITOR WHO IS KNOWN FOR HAVING SOLD OUT KOREA TO THE JAPANESE IN 1910. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS SCHEDULED TO MARCH PAST THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING. THE SNU DELEGATION NEVER GOT THAT FAR BUT THE GROUPS FROM KU AND YU WERE ABLE TO MAKE THEIR GOAL.

5. AT 1900 HOURS ON 24 MARCH THE ORGANIZERS OF THE DEMONSTRATION (MINUS THE SIX KEY MEMBERS WHO WERE ARRESTED) HELD A MEETING TO ASSESS THE RESULTS OF THEIR EFFORTS AND TO PLAN FOR FUTURE ACTION. ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING WERE UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT THE DEMONSTRATION HAD BEEN VASTLY SUCCESSFUL. THE ORIGINAL CRP PLAN CALLED

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

(When Filled In)

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 4

FOR A TEMPORARY CESSATION OF ACTIVITY IN SEOUL WHILE YWS MEMBERS SENT OUT TO THE PROVINCIAL AREAS ATTEMPT TO STIR UP DEMONSTRATIONS ELSEWHERE. IF THE ORIGINAL PLAN IS FOLLOWED, THEREFORE, THERE WILL NOT BE DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEOUL FOR THE NEXT WEEK OR TEN DAYS. REGARDLESS OF RESULTS FROM THE PROVINCES, HOWEVER, PHASE THREE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

6 .

1.3(a)(4)

C

THE EXTREME LEFTISTS WERE IN THE VANGUARD OF THE SNU DEMONSTRATIONS TO DATE. THE GENERAL STUDENT MOOD HAS BEEN IN ACCORD WITH LEFTIST PLANS AND WILLING COOPERATION WAS THEREFORE POSSIBLE. SOME OF THE BANNER SLOGANS IN THE DEMONSTRATION, SUCH AS "DOWN WITH COMPRADORE CAPITALISM" WERE PROBABLY INSPIRED BY THE ELEMENTS. ONE STUDENT IN THIS CATEGORY WHO WAS VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE WAS HYON SUNG-IL, A POLITICAL SCIENCE SENIOR AT SNU WHO IS A KEY MEMBER OF THE EXTREMIST RACIAL PROBLEMS COMPARATIVE RESEARCH SOCIETY.

1.3(a)(4)

C

SECURITY WAS WELL MAINTAINED AND IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT RECEIVE WORD OF THE DEMONSTRATION UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE NOON.

1.3(a)(4)

C

ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL PLAN CALLED FOR A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS



## CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

IN 46563

PAGE

5

(When Filled In)

1.3(a)(4)C

ACTIVITY IN THE SEOUL AREA, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE UNEXPECTED SUCCESS OF THE 24 MARCH DEMONSTRATION MAY LEAD THE PLANNERS TO MOVE UP THE SCHEDULE AND TO GO INTO PHASE THREE MORE QUICKLY.

1.3(a)(4)

C

7. DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM  
5-63

2096a

MFG. 6-63

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

81

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State* *Korea*

46-B

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Action

FE

DE RUALOS 08E 24/0930Z

Q 240915Z ZEA

0 1 7 6 7 3

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

1964 MAR 24 AM 4 52

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

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I M M E D I A T E

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 2005 INFO

AID

IMMEDIATE TOKYO 535 CINCPAC 505 MARCH 24, 6:15PM

P

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CU

USIA

REF: EMBTEL 2002 RPTD TOKYO 533 CINCPAC 504

NSC

INR

1. SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY STUDENT DEMONSTRATION NOW  
BROKEN UP. HOWEVER, KOREA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATORS JOINED  
BY SOME 5 TO 600 HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND HAVE NOW BROKEN  
OUT OF POLICE CORDON. THE DEMONSTRATORS AND SPECTATORS WHO  
WERE SWEEPED ALONG IN RUSH PAST POLICE LINE NOW NUMBER SEVERAL  
THOUSAND. POLICE HAVE FALLEN BACK AND ARE APPARENTLY  
REGROUPING AT EAST GATE ROTARY.

NSA

O

A

OC

SCA

CFN 2005 535 505 24 6:15PM 2002 533 504 1. 5 TO 600

RMR

PAGE TWO RUALOS 08E

2. EMBASSY OFFICERS AT SCENE OF KOREA UNIVERSITY DEMON-  
STRATION REPORTS THAT INITIALLY POLICE MADE LITTLE ATTEMPT  
TO STOP DEMONSTRATORS. HOWEVER, POLICE FINALLY RESORTED TO  
TEAR GAS WHICH IS SLOWING CROWD.

BERGER

BT

CFN 2.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 5:14 A.M. MARCH 24, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA (PER SS/O)

3/24/64 - 5:27 A.M.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea*

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44-48

Action

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00 RUEHCR  
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O 240840 Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

0 1 7 6 6 7

1964 MAR 24 AM 4 25

I M M E D I A T E

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (2002) INFO IMMEDIATE  
TOKYO 533 CINCPAC POLAD 504 MAR 24 5PM

1. SERIES STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ERUPTED AFTERNOON OF MARCH 25 AND STILL CONTINUING. SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS NOW ENGAGED IN DEMONSTRATION AGAINST ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND QTE JAPANESE PENETRATION UNQTE OF KOREA. STUDENTS INITIALLY BLOCKED BY POLICE AND UNITS OF SPECIALLY TRAINED RIOT POLICE IN THEIR EFFORT TO LEAVE CAMPUS AND CORE OF DEMONSTRATORS (ABOUT 150 STUDENTS) FINALLY ARRESTED AND TAKEN AWAY. SEVERAL STUDENTS INJURED BY POLICE. AT THIS POINT RIOT POLICE CALLED CFN 2002 533 504 24 5PM 1. 25 NOW 150

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
AWAY FROM SNU IN ORDER TO CONFRONT DEMONSTRATION AT KOREA UNIVERSITY. APPROXIMATELY 300 SNU STUDENTS THEN BROKE THROUGH POLICE CORDON AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO MARCH INTO CENTER OF CITY.

2. SOME 400-500 KOREA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS NOW ENGAGED IN SITDOWN STRIKE IN ROTARY NEAR CAMPUS. GROUP WHICH IS GROWING IN SIZE ALSO PROTESTING ROK-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS PLACARDS STATING QTE PEACELINE IS OUR LIFE LINE UNQTE. POLICE HAVE GROUP SURROUNDED BUT ARE NOT INTERFERING.

3. RADIO NOW REPORTING ABOUT 1000 YONSEI STUDENTS ALSO DEMONSTRATING.

COMMENT:

4. NO INDICATION OF SPONSORSHIP OR MOTIVATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND NOT ESTABLISHED IF ANY COORDINATION BETWEEN THREE UNIVERSITIES.

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**-2- 2002 MARCH 24, 5 P.M., FROM SEOUL**

IN VIEW EARLIER REPORTS ON POSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATIONS PROBABLE  
THAT THESE DEMONSTRATIONS NOT SPONTANEOUS. HOWEVER, AS OF 1600  
HOURS LOCAL TIME NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATORS STILL RELATIVELY  
SMALL AND DO NOT NOW POSE MAJOR SECURITY THREAT.

BERGER

BT

CFN 300 SNU 2. 400-500 NOW NOT 3. NOW 1000 4. NO NOT NOT  
1600 NOT NOW

**NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:33 A.M. MARCH 24, 1964**

**PASSED WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA 3/24/64 - 4:40 A.M.**

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83

*Korea*

58

Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCMJJ051LA021 OSA009

OO RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 02E 24/0240Z

O 240225Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT (1198) INFO  
CINCPAC 501 MARCH 24, 11:30AM

DEPARTMENT PASS OSD AND JCS, DA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT CINCUNC/EMBASSY MESSAGE

VERBATIM TEXT

1. FOLLOWING LETTER DELIVERED THROUGH JOINT DUTY OFFICERS OF  
MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT REGULAR JOINT DUTY OFFICER  
MEETING 1600 HOURS 23 MUCCH KST.

BEGIN QUOTE TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR REPLY LETTER DATED MARCH 5, 1964.

I NOTED THAT YOU APOLOGIZED FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS YOUR SIDE  
COMMITTED BY BEN WEAKLEY STUTTS AND CARLETON WILLIAM  
VOLTZ, PILOTS OF THE U.S. ARMY, AND THAT YOU ASSURED THAT  
YOU WOULD ADHERE FAITHFULLY TO THE KOREAN ARMISTICE  
AGREEMENT IN THE FUTURE.

CFN 1198 501 24 11:30AM OSD JCS DA 1. 1600 23 5, 1964

PAGE ORB RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BUT, YOU ALLEGED IN YOUR REPLY LETTER THAT THE TWO PILOTS OF  
THE U.S. ARMY HAD VIOLATED THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.  
THEREFORE, I CALL YOUR ATTENTION ONCE AGAIN TO THE FACT THAT  
THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT YOUR SIDE HAD DISPATCHED THEM AS FAR  
AS INTO THE AIR OVER RIMHAN-RI, PANMOON COUNTY, NORTH OF  
THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, FOR THE PORPOSE OF MILITARY ESPIONAGE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1964 MAR 23 PM 10 33

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-161  
By *jw*, NARA, Date *6-30-92*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1198, March 24, Noon, From: Seoul

IN READINESS FOR DEALING LENIENTLY WITH THE TWO PILOTS OF THE U.S. ARMY, I HAVE ENTRUSTED THE SENIOR MEMBER OF OUR SIDE TO THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DETAILED PROBLEMS IN THIS CONNECTION.

SUPREME COMMANDER  
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA END QUOTE

2. LETTER ACTUALLY SIGNED BY CHOE KWANG, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, KPA. SAME INDIVIDUAL WHO SIGNED THE 17 FEBRUARY LETTER. NO CHINESE SIGNATURE IN BEHALF OF CPV.

3. OUR PROPOSED REPLY IS BEGIN QUOTE

TO: SUPREME COMMANDER  
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I HAVE RECEIVED AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 23, 1964.

I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND SIDE OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION TO  
CFN 2. 17 3. 23 1964

PAGE THREE RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NEGOTIATE THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DETAILED PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN OUR RECENT CORRESPONDENCE. HE STANDS READY AWAITING FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE SENIOR MEMBER OF YOUR SIDE.

HAMILTON H. HOWZE  
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1198, March 24, Noon, From: Seoul

END QUOTE

4. URGE NO PUBLICITY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE DESPITE FACT THAT  
RADIO PYONG YANG HAS BROADCAST CONTENTS KPA/CPV LETTER 23  
MARCH AND CINCUNC LETTER 5 MARCH.

5. GP-3.

BERGER

BT

CFN 4. 23 5 5. GP-3.

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3/23/64 10:40 P.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, DA 3/23/64 10:58 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

84

*Korea*

33  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 6588  
Rec'd: MARCH 10, 1964  
5:43 AM

021

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1137 PRIORITY

DATE: MARCH 10, 5 PM

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: DEVALUATION.

1. PRESIDENT PAK YESTERDAY AFTER INITIAL RELUCTANCE AGREED TO ESTABLISH SECRET INFORMAL JOINT WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH DEVALUATION AS RESULT 2-1/2 HOUR CONVERSATION WITH KILLEN AND ME.
2. WE OPENED BY PRESENTING CASE FOR DEVALUATION, MARSHALLING USUAL ARGUMENTS, STRESSING THE URGENCY, INDICATING IN GENERAL TERMS OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL IN THE TRANSITION, AND CALLING FOR TALKS WITH END OF MARCH AS TARGET DATE.
3. PAK RESPONDED THAT WHILE HE AGREED POINT BY POINT WITH OUR POSITION THAT DEVALUATION NECESSARY ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS, HE COULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE ON OUR TIMING FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:
  - A. 1964 STABILIZING, PROGRAM SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO OPERATE FOR A WHILE TO BRING INFLATION UNDER MORE CONTROL.
  - B. MARCH-MAY ARE KOREA'S LEAN MONTHS, WHEN FOOD IS SHORT AND PRICES HIGH.
  - C. KOREA-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT WOULD REACH THEIR CLIMAX DURING THIS PERIOD.
  - D. DEVALUATION HAD IMMEDIATE SIDE EFFECTS IN FORM OF PRICE JUMPS UNTIL PRICE LEVEL STABILIZED, AND KOREA ESPECIALLY ERRATIC IN THIS RESPECT.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority RHC 001R-254-3-29-6

By JDL \*ARA Date 8.28.19

~~SECRET~~

-2-1137 MARCH 10, 5 PM FROM SEOUL

E. BEFORE DEVALUATION TOOK PLACE IT WAS ESSENTIAL THERE BE ENOUGH FOOD IN RESERVE TO PUSH DOWN FOOD PRICES IN EXPECTATION OF DEVALUATION AND HOLD THEM DOWN AFTERWARD.

F. DEVALUATION NOW WOULD BE POLITICALLY DANGEROUS, BUT IF FOREGOING PROBLEMS SOLVED HE WOULD BE READY CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS IN MAY.

4. WE DEALT WITH EACH OF THESE POINTS:

A. DEVALUATION IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF 1964 STABILIZATION PROGRAM.

B. DEVALUATION SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE LAST SUMMER OR AUTUMN, BUT HAD TO BE POSTPONED BECAUSE OF ELECTIONS. IMPOSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH HOARDING AND SPECULATION OR STABILIZE PRICES WITHOUT DEVALUATION.

C. KOREA NOW LOSING FOREIGN EXCHANGE AT RATE OF \$40 MILLION A YEAR AND RATE IS RISING EVERY MONTH.

D. 1964 EXPORT DRIVE WOULD RUN INTO TROUBLE UNLESS EXCHANGE RATE STABILIZED.

E. OUTCOME ROK-JAPAN TALKS WOULD BE KNOWN IN THREE WEEKS.

F. THERE WAS AMPLE FOOD IN KOREA BUT WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS ADDITIONAL PL 480 FOOD SUPPLIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEVALUATION AS AN INSURANCE FEATURE DURING THE TRANSITION.

G. IT WAS ESSENTIAL KOREA AND US TECHNICIANS START EXAMINING ALL THESE MATTERS SO THAT WE COULD MOVE QUICKLY WHEN THE TIME CAME.

5. PAK THEN AGREED TO STARTING TALKS, REPEATING HOWEVER THAT HE RESERVED RIGHT TO DECIDE ON TIMING. WE SUGGESTED THAT QUESTION OF TIMING BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

-3-1137 MARCH 10, 5 PM FROM SEOUL

6. COMMENT: PAK'S REACTION IS WHAT WE EXPECTED. IMPORTANT THING IN OUR VIEW IS TO GET STARTED AND SEE HOW FAR AND HOW FAST WE CAN PROCEED. IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES IN RESPONSE ANY QUERIES ON NEGOTIATIONS WOULD REPLY THAT WE KNOW OF NO NEGOTIATIONS ON SITUATION.

GP-3

BERGER

EPL

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

58

~~SECRET~~

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Info

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 07E 07/2310Z  
R 071006Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
STATE GRNC  
BT

005462

1964 MAR 7 PM 8 04

085

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT [1128] INFO SAIGON 11 TAIPEI 44 TOKYO 504  
PARIS 5 MARCH 7, 7 PM.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By *ju*, NARA, Date 6-30-92

## LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REF: A) DEPTTEL 785. B) EMBTEL 1117.

1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIM HYON-CHOL (JUST BACK FROM AROUND-THE-WORLD TRIP) BROACHED IDEA OF OFFER OF ROK FORCES FOR SERVICE IN VIETNAM IN INFORMAL AFTER DINNER CONVERSATION LAST WEEK. OCCASION WAS DINNER GIVEN BY ROK FOREIGN MINISTER CHONG IL-KWON IN KIM'S HONOR; OTHERS PRESENT WERE MINISTER CFN 1128 11 44 504 7 7PM FIVE 785 1117 1. KIM HYON-CHOL CHONG IL-KWON

PAGE TWO RUALOS 07E ~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL DEFENSE KIM SONG-UN, MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO KIM YONG-SIK, AND SECRETARY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SONG SUK-HA.

2. KIM HYON-CHOL SAID IF US AGREEABLE ROKG MIGHT BE PREPARED OFFER THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND TROOPS FROM ROK ARMY TO ASSIST USG AND GVN IN CARRYING WAR TO NORTH VIETNAM.

3. I INQUIRED IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED PROPOSAL OF ROKG AND WAS TOLD THAT NO OFFICIAL POSITION HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY ROKG. THIS CONFIRMED LATER IN WEEK BY FONMIN WHO TOLD ME KIM'S SUGGESTION WAS FIRST HE HAD HEARD ON SUBJECT.

4. KIM SAID OF COURSE AGREEMENT OF UNC WOULD HAVE TO BE OBTAINED FOR RELEASE OF TROOPS FOR SERVICE OUTSIDE ROK. I COMMENTED THAT PROVISION BY ROK OF TROOPS FOR SERVICE IN VIETNAM MIGHT

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1128, MARCH 7, 7 PM. FROM: SEOUL.

COMPLICATE HANDLING OF KOREAN QUESTION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND MIGHT PROVOKE OBJECTIONS FROM AMONG NATIONS SUPPORTING ROKG IN UN. KIM REPLIED ROKG MIGHT GET AROUND THIS PROBLEM BY RECRUITING VOLUNTEERS FROM RESERVES OR VETERANS.

5. MARCH 5 BEFORE RECEIPT OF REFTEL A I URGED FONMIN THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT ANY SUCH PROPOSAL AND CONSULT WITH US AND OBTAIN USG REACTION BEFORE DISCUSSING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, CFN KIM SONG-UN KIM YONG-SIK SONG SUK-HA 2. THREE FOUR 3". NO 4. 5. 5 A

PAGE THREE RUALOS 07E ~~SECRET~~  
INCLUDING VIETNAM AND GRC. I INQUIRED WHETHER KIM CHONG-PIL'S VISIT TO TAIPEI AND SAIGON WERE INTENDED TO EXPLORE ATTITUDES THOSE CAPITALS TO SUCH PROPOSAL. FONMIN INDICATED KCP HAD NO AUTHORITY DISCUSS THIS MATTER AND FONMIN THOUGHT HE WOULD LIMIT HIMSELF TO GENERAL DISCUSSION OF COOPERATION IN COMBATTING COMMUNISM AMONG FREE NATIONS IN EAST ASIA. I POINTED OUT REACTION IN TOKYO TO ROK EFFORTS AT THIS TIME TO FORM OR JOIN MILITARY ALLIANCES OR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PREJUDICE ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT IN FINAL STAGES.

6. COMMENT: EVIDENT FROM REFTEL A GRC MAY ALREADY HAVE APPROACHED ROKG THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY OR DEFENSE ALLIANCES WITH GRC AND SOUTH VIETNAM. UNLESS DEPT RECEIVES OBJECTION WE INTEND TO DRAW ON PARTS A, B, AND C, OF REFTEL A IN EFFORT DISSUADE ROKG FROM PURSUING THIS ADVENTURE.

7. GP-1. BERGER

BT

CFN NO 6. A A B C A 7. GP-1.

SECRET



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

86

*Korea*

45

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P 040220Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
RUMJDH/AMCOUNCIL HONGKONG  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

002004

1964 MAR 3 PM 10 57

P R I O R I T Y

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1105 INFO PRIORITY  
TOKYO 496 CINCPAC 472 TAIPEI 40 HONGKONG 54 FROM SEOUL  
MARCH 4, 11AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. KIM CHONG-PIL, NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN AND CHAIRMAN  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, PLANNING VISIT TAIPEI AND TOKYO.  
KIM LEAVING KOREA MARCH 11, OVERNIGHTING HONG KONG MARCH 11,  
ARRIVING TAIPEI MARCH 12, AND LEAVING MARCH 15 FOR TOKYO FOR  
INDEFINITE STAY.  
CFN 1105 496 472 40 54 4, 11AM 1. KIM CHONG-PIL 11 11 12 15

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E  
2. TRIP TO TAIPEI PORTRAYED PRIVATELY AS EXCUSE PASS  
THROUGH TOKYO TO ENABLE KIM MEET WITH HIGH JAPANESE LEADERS  
ON PROBLEMS ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION. SEOUL PRESS REPORTING  
TRIP IN TERMS KIM'S INTENTIONS EXPEDITE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN.

3. DETAILS AND EMBASSY COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW.

BERGER

BT

CFN 2. 3.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

87

~~SECRET~~

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Action

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Info

CONTROL: 15210  
RECD: FEBRUARY 22, 1964, 8:29 A.M.

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 1066 PRIORITY

INFO: TOKYO 483 PRIORITY  
CINCPAC 459 PRIORITY

DATE: FEBRUARY 22, 6 P.M.

033

~~SECRET~~

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REF: A.) DEPTTEL 729 RPTD TOKYO 2154. B.) EMBTEL 1062 RPTD  
TOKYO 481.

1. I EXPECT PRESIDENT OR FONMIN WILL CALL ME IN SHORTLY, AND DO NOT RPT NOT THINK I WILL HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY PERSUADING KOREANS TO MOVE TO POLITICAL LEVEL TALKS IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS IN DEPTTEL 729. BASE THIS ON THE FOLLOWING:

2. YESTERDAY I HAD INDICATION FROM FONMIN THAT PRESIDENT PAK MAY WISH SEE ME EARLY NEXT WEEK. TODAY EX-PRIMIN KIM HYON-CHOL CALLED TO SAY EITHER PAK OR FONMIN WOULD PROBABLY APPROACH ME IN NEXT FEW DAYS TO ASK S.S. TO APPROACH JAPANESE WITH REQUEST TO LIFT TALKS TO POLITICAL LEVEL BY END OF THIS MONTH. HE SAID THERE IS STILL A LITTLE GIVE IN KOREAN POSITION, AND IF GOJ PREPARED TO BE MODERATELY FLEXIBLE, SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED. HE SAID THERE IS NO POINT IN GOING ON ANY LONGER AT TECHNICAL LEVEL. IN SHORT I EXPECT KOREANS WILL ASK US TO INVOLVE OURSELVES TO EXTENT OF OBTAINING FROM JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO BE FLEXIBLE AND AGREEMENT TO RAISE TALKS TO POLITICAL LEVEL. I PROPOSE TO REPLY THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT ROKG WILL AGREE TO POLITICAL LEVEL TALKS EVEN IN ABSENCE ADVANCE GOJ COMMITMENT TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

3. BOTH FONMIN AND KIM SAID PAK IS DETERMINED TO SETTLE, IS NOW CONFIDENT HE CAN LINE UP HIS OWN GOVT AND PARTY, AND IS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY INTERNAL TROUBLES SHOULD THEY DEVELOP. THEY SAID EITHER EX-PRIMIN OR FONMIN WILL BE NAMED TO HEAD UP POLITICAL TALKS.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 001R-254-3304

By JAH vARA Date 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1066, February 22, 6 P.M., From Seoul

4. I ASKED KIM IF KOREANS WOULD RAISE ANY NEW ISSUES IF FISHERIES QUESTIONS WERE SETTLED, AND HE SAID GOVT HAD NO INTENTION OF RAISING ANY NEW ISSUES.

5. FINALLY KIM SAID THAT OHNO HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE INTENDS WAIT UNTIL FEB. 25 TO SEE IF ANY PROGRESS IS MADE; IF NOT OHNO WILL ASK IKEDA TO RAISE NEGOTIATIONS TO POLITICAL LEVEL.

6. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MEETINGS HERE WITH AMBS PAE AND C FE MAY TAKE A DIFFERENT TURN FROM ABOVE, IN WHICH CASE I WILL SEEKY EARLY MEETING AND URGE APPROACH ON THEM AS INSTRUCTED.

7. IN VIEW ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS I EXPECT KOREANS WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO COURSE OF ACTION IN REFTTEL A. BELIEVE WE SHOULD HOLD SECRETARY'S REPRESENTATIONS TO RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS IN RESERVE UNTIL WE HAVE REACTIONS OF BOTH GOVTS.

8. GP-3.

CFN 729 2154 1062 481 1. 729 2. 3. 4. 5. 25 6. 7. 8. GP-3.

BERGER

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea*

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

FE

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 03E 18/0340Z  
Z 180830Z ZEA

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

SS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

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STATE GRNC

SP

BT

L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 1047 INFO IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC 443 FEBRUARY 18, 5PM

H

SAL

VERBATIM TEXT

EUR

IO

DEPT PASS OSD AND JCS

P

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

USIA

NSC

1. FOLLOWING LETTER DELIVERED TODAY THROUGH JOINT DUTY  
OFFICERS OF MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT REGULAR  
JOINT DUTY OFFICER MEETING 1200 HOURS FEBRUARY 18, KST:

INR

CIA

SCA

SCS

"PYONGYANG, FEBRUARY 17, 1964

RMR

"TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND  
CFN 1047 443 18 5PM 1. 1200 18 17 1964

011780

1964 FEB 18 AM 4 14

FLASH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By *ju*, NARA, Date 6-30-92

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1963.

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU DISTORTED THE SITUATION AS IF BEN  
WEAKLEY STUTTS AND CARLETON WILLIAM VOLTZ, PILOTS OF THE  
U.S. ARMY, MADE A "FORCED LANDING" IN THE TERRITORY OF  
OUR SIDE DUE TO "INADVERTENT INCIDENT" WHILE CARRYING  
OUT A "PEACEFUL MISSION".

SUCH ALLEGATION OF YOURS IS ONLY DESIGNED TO ESCAPE  
YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAVING MADE THE ABOVE PILOTS ILLEGALLY  
INTRUDE INTO THE AIR OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERPETRATE  
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND THEREBY VIOLATE THE KOREAN  
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FLAGRANTLY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1047, February 18, 5 p.m., from Seoul

BEN WEAKLEY STUTTS AND CARLETON WILLIAM VOLTZ ARE SERIOUS CRIMINALS WHO WERE FORCED DOWN AND CAPTURED BY THE SELF-DEFENSIVE GUN-FIRE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WHILE THEY WERE PERPETRATING MILITARY ESPIONAGE ACTS ON MAY 17, 1963, AFTER CROSSING THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE IN VIOLATION OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ON ORDER OF THE 8TH U.S. ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO SPY UPON THE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OF OUR SIDE.

CFN 6 1963 17 1963 8TH

PAGE THREE RUALOS 03E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THEY DESERVE STRICT PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS THEY COMMITTED.

WE ARE PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE TWO PILOTS LENIENTLY IF YOUR SIDE ADMITS THE GRAVE CRIMINAL ACTS ON ITS PART AND GUARANTEES THAT YOUR SIDE WILL NOT PERPETRATE SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS AGAIN IN THE FUTURE AND WILL STRICTLY ABIDE BY THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

SUPREME COMMANDER  
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA"

2. LETTER ACTUALLY SIGNED BY CHOE KWANG, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, KPA.

NO CHINESE SIGNATURE IN BEHALF OF CPV.

3. AFP AND AP STORIES ARE BASED ON PYONGYANG BROADCAST HEARD IN TOKYO WHICH QUOTED ENTIRE LETTER VERBATIM.

4. WE ARE ANSWERING PRESS QUERIES WITH STATEMENT LETTER HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND IS UNDER STUDY. SUGGEST WASHINGTON DO SAME. WE PLAN NO FURTHER PUBLIC COMMENT AT PRESENT. DO NOT CONTEMPLATE RELEASE TO PRESS AT PRESENT OF OUR NOVEMBER 6 LETTER.

CFN 2. 3. 4. 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1047, February 18, 5 p.m., from Seoul

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 03 ~~E C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

5. LETTER UNDER STUDY. INITIAL REACTION HERE IS THAT THIS IS SOLELY PROPAGANDA MOVE. WE SEE LITTLE BASIS, IF ANY, FOR ANTICIPATING EARLY RELEASE. SIGNIFICANT THAT WORD "RELEASE" NOT MENTIONED. FURTHER COMMENTS INCLUDING RECOMMENDED REPLY TO 17 FEB LETTER WILL FOLLOW SOONEST.

6. GP-3. BERGER

BT

CFN 5. 17 6. 3

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 4:17 a.m., February 18

Passed White House at 4:22 a.m., February 18

Passed OSD, JCS at 4:26 a.m., February 18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

06856

*House*

~~SECRET~~

55

Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 716

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2102

FEB 14 7 32 PM '64

8

FROM SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR BERGER

TOKYO FOR AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 0017-254-3-31-3

By JOL \*ARA Date 8-28-79

Barnett has expressed to Ambassador Reischauer opinion, formed on basis talks in Embassy Seoul, that if Japanese would (1) move closer towards Korea's desire for adequate financing modernization its fishing industry and (2) announce intention exercise effective restraint Japanese fishing operations in area between 12-mile limit and Rhee Line, a settlement could be concluded immediately, and no other or new demands would be advanced by Koreans. Provided this present Embassy judgment, Dept would be willing depart from past policy non-involvement in details of negotiations, and instruct Ambassador Reischauer to urge Prime Minister Ikeda or Foreign Minister Ohira to make generous offer in manner best designed help President Pak overcome Korean opposition. Perhaps you -- without consulting Koreans -- would wish formulate with greater precision formula which would meet Korean economic desires and political sensitivities, while taking account Japanese interests and sensitivities. Believe Japanese both flexible and sincere in declared desire <sup>complete</sup> ~~negotiation~~ negotiations, and they would welcome deliberated judgment of U.S. Embassy Seoul that

Drafted by:

FE:RWBarnett:bhm 2/14/64

Clearances:

Mrs. Davis

S/S - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

EA - Mr. Bacon *mg*

FE - Mr. Green *mg*

~~SECRET~~

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S - The Secretary

M - Governor Harriman *mg*

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~~SECRET~~

such offer would bring it off. Embassy Seoul should not lend its support to this tactic unless confident that it would be our only intervention in negotiations, and be successful. Request immediate reply.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



RM/R	REF	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4		
	FBO	AID
S/S	S/P	G
27	1	1
AGR	COM	FRS
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-161  
By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

# AIRGRAM

POL 1 KOR S-2/S  
90  
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-574  
NO.                      ~~SECRET~~

TO : Department of State

INFO: CINCPAC, CINCPAC FOR POLAD, TOKYO

FROM : AmEmbassy SEOUL

DATE: February 13, 1964

SUBJECT: Proposed U. S. Objectives in the Republic of Korea for 1964

REF : Seoul's A-483, January 8, 1964

HANDLING INDICATOR                     

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

23

SB

In the airgram under reference, the Embassy analyzed the present situation within the Republic of Korea, appraised the outlook for the near future, and suggested certain courses of action to be taken by U. S. Government agencies. Those suggestions were not presented in a systematic framework of specific policy objectives. In this message there is set forth in rough order of priority the objectives toward which the Embassy believes U. S. policies and actions in Korea should be directed in calendar year 1964.

## Progress Toward Internal Stability

1. In the political field, our efforts should be concentrated on facilitating the successful functioning of constitutional government and democratic institutions which have now been re-established in the wake of military government. While discouraging the government, if necessary, from resorting to authoritarian methods, we should on the other hand make every possible effort to influence the opposition to act in responsible fashion. At the same time we should seek to avoid giving the impression that the United States is interfering in the internal political affairs of Korea.
2. In the economic sphere, the primary goal for 1964 should be the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies and the stabilization of price levels. The exchange rate will have to be adjusted to a realistic level some time not later than mid-summer 1964.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:PCHabib:sk 2/12/64 Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:PCHabib

Clearances: BA Fleck

In draft: Econ - Mr. Rose ; DCM - Mr. Doherty; USOM - Mr. Killen

GROUP 2  
Exempted from automatic downgrading  
by Philip C. Habib, Counselor of Emb



ROK-Japan Normalization

3. It goes without saying that every effort should be made to encourage Korea and Japan to achieve a settlement this year.

Conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement

4. Full agreement can be reached this year and the pace of negotiations on this agreement should be accelerated. Agreement will remove a vexatious and potentially harmful issue from US-ROK relations.

AID Policy and Effective Use of Available Resources by the ROKG

5. The Embassy and USOM hope that progress can be made during 1964 in persuading the ROK Government to make more efficient use of the resources available to it. We should continue pressing for an increase in exports and for adoption of a more restrictive import policy. We should also continue stressing the need for expansion of agricultural production and seek greater participation in ROK economic development by other governments and international agencies.

With respect to economic aid policy, U. S. assistance programs should continue to be linked to Korean implementation of agreed stabilization goals. The cumulative load of economic adjustments which the ROK economy is being called upon to bear in 1964 and after should be gauged so as not to impose a drag on progress or force a further serious deterioration of the foreign exchange position. We will also need to take into account the ability of the government to bear such adjustments politically in a given period. This will necessitate in the course of the year politico-economic judgements affecting the emphasis and timing of U. S. actions involving among other things the level of support assistance, the MAP transfer program, and the level of PL 480 support.

Force Levels

6. The decision has been made that the U. S. and ROK armed force levels should remain unchanged during 1964. Another review of the military, economic and political factors involved in force level reduction should be conducted toward the end of 1964 to determine whether reductions can be affected in 1965.

Unification Problem

7. In 1964 we should re-examine our position on the Korean unification question and decide whether our strategy should be reformulated in the light of that review.

~~SECRET~~

Page 3 of 3  
Seoul's A 574

Consolidation of the ROKG International Position

8. Continuing support should be given to ROKG efforts to expand its diplomatic relations and strengthen its international position through the widest possible recognition by non-communist governments particularly those African and Asian nations where the ROKG position vis-a-vis the North Koreans appears shaky at present. We should encourage the ROKG to cement relations with those governments with which it has already established diplomatic relations by opening or strengthening, wherever feasible, diplomatic or consular posts and providing technical assistance or training, within its available resources. We should continue to exert our utmost influence against the expansion of North Korean diplomatic relations. As necessary we should be prepared to defend Korea's position in the United Nations General Assembly taking into account any initiatives that may arise from the review proposed in paragraph 7 above.

For the Ambassador:

Philip C. Habib  
Counselor of Embassy for  
Political Affairs

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea* 91

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

6899

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 10, 1964  
11:49 P.M.

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1025

G

SP

INFO: CINCPAC 438

L

TOKYO 467

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EUR

DATE: FEBRUARY 11, 1 P.M.

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AID

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USIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC

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CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

1. SPATE OF RECENT INCIDENTS, INCLUDING TWO FATALITIES, INVOLVING US ARMED FORCES AND KOREAN NATIONALS IS RECEIVING HEAVY PRESS COVERAGE, INCLUDING USUAL DISTORTION OF FACTS AND CLAMOR FOR EARLY CONCLUSION SOFA.

2. INCIDENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

RMR

A. FEBRUARY 2 AT 0500 HOURS TWO INTRUDERS IN MALE CLOTHING APPREHENDED WITHIN CAMP CASEY COMPOUND. IGNORED CHALLENGE BY SENTRIES AND FLED THROUGH HOLE IN FENCE. ONE FATALLY SHOT, OTHER ESCAPED. TWO SECTIONS PIPE FOUND MISSING FROM STORAGE AREA. ONE DROPPED BY INTRUDERS WHEN CHALLENGED. VICTIM WAS WOMAN.

B. FEBRUARY 2 DURING NIGHT KOREAN PROSTITUTE ENTERED A 7TH DIVISION COMPOUND AT INVITATION US PERSONNEL. PROSTITUTE EMERGED NAKED, CLAIMING TO HAVE BEEN RAPED, BEATEN AND ROBBED. THREE EM CONFINED PENDING FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

C. FEBRUARY 6 AT 1240 HOURS TWO INTRUDERS FORCED ENTRY WITH WIRE CUTTERS INTO MAXIMUM SECURITY AREA NEAR CAMP KAISER. BOTH WERE SHOT, ONE FATALLY, WHEN THEY DISOBEYED SENTRY ORDER.

/D. FEBRUARY 9

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Authority RFA 0012-254-3-32-2

BA J04 NARA Date 8-28-19

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1025, FEBRUARY 11, 1 P.M. FROM: SEOUL.

D. FEBRUARY 9 AT 2330 HOURS 12-YEAR OLD BOY WOUNDED WITH BIRDSHOT BY SENTRY AT CAMP PILILAAU, UIJONG U. BOY IN FAIR CONDITION WITH PERFORATED INTESTINES. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE SENTRY ACTED IMPROPERLY AND HE CONFINED PENDING COURT MARTIAL.

3. INCIDENTS LISTED PARA 2(A) AND (C) ABOVE INVOLVED ATTEMPTED LARCENY. THEREFORE, NO SOLATIUM PAYMENT INTENDED. CG 1 CORPS (GROUP) AND CG 7TH DIVISION ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT FEBRUARY 8 EXPRESSING SINCERE REGRET OVER INCIDENT (A). UNC HAS ALSO ISSUED PRESS RELEASES OUTLINING FACTS PRESENTLY KNOWN REGARDING INCIDENTS (A) (C) AND (D).

4. PRESS HAS PLAYED UP INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY (A) AND (C). REGARDING (A), VICTIM'S UNEMPLOYED HUSBAND CLAIMS SHE WAS MERELY COLLECTING OLD CANS IN ORDER FEED THREE SMALL DAUGHTERS. FURTHER FILLIP GIVEN TO INCIDENT BY HUSBAND'S WELL-PUBLICIZED CLAIM SHE WAS IN NINTH MONTH OF PREGNANCY AND PROBABLY CARRYING MALE CHILD. US MILITARY INVESTIGATORS STATE NO EVIDENCE PREGNANCY. REGARDING INCIDENT (C), ALTHOUGH BOTH INTRUDERS APPREHENDED AND SHOT WITHIN SECURITY AREA, PRESS CLAIMS THEY MERELY INNOCENT RABBIT HUNTERS.

5. TONGA ILBO ARTICLE COUNTED "MORE THAN 35" SUCH CASES SINCE 1960, REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO SOME OF MORE LURID ONES. ARTICLE STATED THAT "AT BEST, ASSAULTERS AND MURDERERS IN THESE INCIDENTS HAVE INVARIABLY BEEN LIGHTLY PUNISHED BY FINE, IMPRISONMENT AT HARD LABOR, OR DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE". ARTICLE CLAIMED PROMINENT KOREANS INDIGNANT AND CHAGRINED AND BELIEVE CONCLUSION OF SOFA ONLY SOLUTION. HANKIK ILBO, COMMENTING ON INCIDENT (C), LIKENED IT TO SHOOTING OF A DOG STEALING FOOD FROM KITCHEN. TERMING KILLINGS "UNLAWFUL", EDITORIAL STATED "IN NO OTHER COUNTRY WHERE U.S. TROOPS STATIONED HAVE THERE BEEN SO MANY KILLINGS OF NATIVE WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY AMERICAN SOLDIERS". SAW LITTLE SATISFACTION IN RESPONSES OF U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ROK PROTESTS, EXPRESSED DOUBT AMERICAN SOLDIERS UNDERSTAND KOREAN PEOPLE, /AND STATED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1025, FEBRUARY 11, 1 P.M. FROM: SEOUL.

AND STATED CONCERN OVER WIDENING GAP IN TRADITIONAL US-ROK TIES AS RESULT SUCH INCIDENTS. CONCLUDED THAT ONLY EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION SOFA WILL SOLVE PROBLEM.

6. IN MORE MODERATE EDITORIAL, KOREA TIMES, ENGLISH LANGUAGE COUNTERPART OF HANKIK ILBO, URGED US MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN COOPERATION WITH KOREAN AUTHORITIES WORK OUT ADEQUATE SECURITY MEASURES FOR GUARDING MILITARY COMPOUNDS WHICH WILL ALSO ELIMINATE ELEMENT OF ERROR IN KILLING CIVILIAN "BYSTANDERS". SPECIFICALLY, EDITORIAL CALLED FOR JOINT US-KOREAN SENTRY TEAMS, WIDER USE OF SENTRY DOGS, GREATER EMPHASIS ON TROOP INFORMATION PROGRAM STRENGTHENING OF KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES.

7. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER PAK HAN-SANG, HEAD OF KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, HAS INTERJECTED ASSOCIATION INTO CASES AND HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED INCIDENT (C) TO HAVE BEEN "INTENTIONAL MURDER". PAK HAS ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO PROTEST TO CINCUNC AND AMBASSADOR BUT TO DATE HAS NOT TAKEN THIS STEP.

8. DRP NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN YI MAN-SOP AND 13 OTHERS SUBMITTED MOTION TO ASSEMBLY FEBRUARY 8 CALLING ON ROKG TO CONCLUDE SOFA SOONEST TO PROTECT KOREANS FROM "INDISCRIMINATE" SHOOTING BY AMERICAN TROOPS AND TO ACQUIRE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED BY US FORCES.

9. UNC PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER CALLED ON MANAGING EDITOR KOREA TIMES AND ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR HANKIK ILBO FEBRUARY 10. WHEN ASKED WHY THEY DID NOT USE FACTUAL UNC PRESS RELEASES ON INCIDENTS, THEY REPLIED THIS WOULD NOT HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE. WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY EXPLAINING WHAT PURPOSE WAS, THEY CONTINUALLY REFERRED TO GIRARD CASE. IMPLICATION THAT THEY BELIEVE PUBLICATION INFLAMMATORY AND INACCURATE STORIES WILL HASTEN CONCLUSION SOFA.

/10. UNC PIO CALLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1025, FEBRUARY 11, 1 P.M. FROM: SEOUL.

10. UNC PIO CALLED ON ROK MIN PUBLIC INFORMATION FEBRUARY
11. MINISTER BLAMED PRESS STORIES ON OPPOSITION POLITICIANS ATTEMPTING EMBARRASS ROKG BECAUSE OF DELAY IN SOFA NEGOTIATIONS. MINISTER VOLUNTEERED GENERAL COOPERATION IN ATTEMPTS EDUCATE PUBLIC AND REDUCE NUMBER ATTEMPTED THEFTS FROM US COMPOUNDS.
11. EMBASSY BELIEVES PRESS STORIES AND EDITORIALS APPEARING WITH ROKG ACQUIESCENCE, IF NOT INSTIGATION.
12. GP-3.

BERGER

BA:22.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

92

*Korea*

54  
Action  
SS  
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 02E 31/0210Z  
P 310155Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

022833

1964 JAN 30 PM 10 00

028

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 992  
JANUARY 31, 11AM

LIMDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 660

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-161

By *ju*, NARA, Date 6-30-92

1. SUBJECT SECRETARY'S DESIRES, EMBASSY SEES NO PARTICULAR NEED FOR HIM TO SPEND MUCH TIME WITH FORMER ROK PRIMIN KIM HYON-CHOL, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW RECENT TALKS SECRETARY HAS HAD WITH PRESIDENT PAK AND OTHER ROK OFFICIALS A BRIEF COURTESY CALL WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. WOULD SUGGEST LONGER MEETINGS WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY CFN 992 31 11AM LIMDIS 660 1. KIM HYON-CHOL

PAGE TWO RUALOS 02E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HILSMATH AND PERHAPS UNDER SECRETARY HARRIMAN. APPOINTMENTS WITH AID DIRECTOR BELL, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEFENSE BUNDY WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE.

2. KIM RETAINS AND CAN BE EXPECTED EXERCISE A MEASURE OF INFLUENCE IN ROKG. WHETHER OR NOT HE WILL BE APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO US, AS RUMORED, HE WILL PROBABLY BE GIVEN POSITION OF SOME IMPORTANCE IN FUTURE.

3. IN ADDITION BUILD-UP OF PERSONAL PRESTIGE KIM WILL BE SEEKING PERSUADE ALL THOSE HE MEETS RE ROK NEED FOR INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. SUGGEST US-ROK ECONOMIC RELATIONS BE MAIN THEME OF CONVERSATIONS IN WHICH HE COULD BE IMPRESSED WITH CURRENT US VIEWS THIS SUBJECT AND GIVEN REALISTIC APPRECIATION FUTURE PROSPECTS.

4. GP-1. BERGER  
BT  
CFN 2. 3. 4. 1

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

93

*Korea*

36

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 22146  
Rec'd: JANUARY 30, 1964  
8:23 AM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 989, PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: TOKYO 454  
CINCPAC 426

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DATE: JANUARY 30, 6 PM

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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INR

RMR

1. IN JANUARY 29 LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT PAK AND SECRETARY TOUCHED ON RANGE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PROBLEM DURING CORDIAL THREE HOUR DISCUSSION. MEETING ALSO ATTENDED BY PRIMIN, FONMIN AND KIM CHONG-PIL ON ROK SIDE, AND AMBASSADOR AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARNETT.
2. AFTER EXTENDED DISCUSSION IMPLICATIONS FRENCH RECOGNITION MAINLAND CHINA, PRESIDENT PAK FOCUSSED HIS PREPARED PRESENTATION ON FOUR MAJOR ITEMS:
  - A. ROK SECURITY IN LIGHT RECENT FAR EAST DEVELOPMENTS.
  - B. FORCE LEVELS AND MAP TRANSFER.
  - C. ROK ECONOMIC SITUATION AND US AID.
  - D. ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS.
3. PAK EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RECENT FAR EASTERN DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING FRENCH RECOGNITION OF MAINLAND CHINA AND WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND NATIONALIST CHINA. HE POINTED OUT THAT THESE EVENTS COUPLED WITH RECENT REPORTS REGARDING US TROOP WITHDRAWALS HAVE CAUSED INSECURITY AND APPREHENSION AMONG KOREAN PEOPLE. PAK STRESSED THAT IN PRESENT SITUATION REDUCTION OF EITHER

~~SECRET~~

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Authority: RA001A-254-333-1  
By: *W* ARA Date: 8-28-19

~~SECRET~~

-2-989, JANUARY 30, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

US OR ROK FORCES WOULD BE UNTIMELY, CAUSING UNDUE APPREHENSION AND LOWERING NATION'S MORALE. THEN EXPRESSED HOPE SECRETARY WOULD STATE ON DEPARTURE THAT US NOT NOW CONSIDERING EITHER WITHDRAWAL US FORCES OR REDUCTION ROK FORCES.

4. LEVEL OF US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ROK LINKED BY PRESIDENT BOTH TO PROBLEM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SETTLEMENT ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS. PAK REQUESTED US AID BE KEPT AT PRESENT LEVELS FOR NEXT 4-5 YEARS DURING WHICH TIME ROK WOULD MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE. ALSO ASKED: MAP TRANSFERS BE SUSPENDED FOR 2-3 YEARS; US CONSIDER ESTABLISHMENT GRAIN RESERVE IN ROK TO RELIEVE PUBLIC INSECURITY ON FOOD PROBLEM; AND US AID IN DEVELOPING ROK EXPORT MARKETS.

5. PAK ASSURED SECRETARY THAT THERE NO CHANGE IN BASIC ROK POLICY FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN. DESPITE PROBLEMS OF FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION ROKG RESOLVED TO COME TO AGREEMENT BY SPRING 1964. HOWEVER PRESIDENT PAK EMPHASIZED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDS COOPERATION OF US TO EXPEDITE NEGOTIATIONS, SPECIFICALLY IN COMBATTING PUBLIC FEARS REGARDING FOOD SITUATION AND TO CHECK PRICE SPIRAL.

6. TO FACILITATE ROKG SETTLEMENT EFFORTS PAK SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED:

A. EARLY AGREEMENT ON PL 480 GRAIN IMPORTS AND THEIR TIMELY ARRIVAL IN ROK TO MEET SEASONAL NEED;

B. ADDITIONAL US AID IN THE ORDER OF 20-30 MILLION DOLLARS TO CHECK INFLATIONARY SPIRAL AND TO CONTROL LABOR DISPUTES;

C. US ASSURANCE THAT ITS AID WILL NOT BE REDUCED PROPORTIONATELY TO JAPANESE ASSISTANCE ENTERING KOREA UNDER TERMS OF SETTLEMENT.

7. IN REPLY SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT COME TO DISCUSS REDUCTION OF FORCES AND FURTHER AGREED WITH PRESIDENT THAT

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

434989, JANUARY 30, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

NOW IS NOT TIME TO TAKE UP THAT QUESTION. FORCE REDUCTION IS NOT A PRESENT PROBLEM AND US APPROACH WILL BE TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION WITH THE ROKG SOME TIME LATER ON. IN MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION US POLICY SECRETARY NOTED THAT MILITARY POWER OF US IN FAR EAST HAS GREATLY INCREASED IN PAST YEARS AND IT CAN BE FURTHER INCREASED RAPIDLY BY AIRLIFT; COMMENTED THAT IN FUTURE THERE SHOULD BE CLOSE CONSULTATION ON MILITARY BASIS, IN FIRST INSTANCE, IN VIEWING PROBLEMS FACED IN RESPECT FORCE LEVELS IN THIS PART OF WORLD.

8. ON AID QUESTION SECRETARY EMPHASIZED EXTERNAL RESOURCES ONLY FRACTION TOTAL ROK ECONOMY, ALTHOUGH CRITICAL ELEMENT IN PROVIDING UNAVAILABLE RESOURCES. FURTHER EXPRESSED PLEASURE OVER RECENT GROWTH ROK EXPORTS AND SAID US WOULD LEND ASSISTANCE IN FINDING NEW MARKETS FOR KOREAN EXPORTS. SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT EXTERNAL AID NO LONGER COMES FROM ONE PROGRAM OR FROM ONE GOVERNMENT, BUT FROM COMBINATION OF RESOURCES (E.G. GRANT ASSISTANCE, PL 480, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES).

9. SECRETARY URGED PRESIDENT TO PROCEED WITH TWO THINGS IN MIND: (A) US WILL NOT LET KOREA DOWN: AND (B) THERE ARE MANY WAYS, IN ECONOMIC TERMS, TO SKIN A CAT. INFORMED PAK WE WILL LOOK INTO FOOD PROBLEM WHILE POINTING OUT THERE ARE 100,000 TONS PL 480 GRAIN NOW ON WAY.

10. ON QUESTION ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS SECRETARY TOLD PAK THAT WE ARE UNDER PRESSURE FROM BOTH SIDES TO URGE THE OTHER TO COMPROMISE. HOWEVER BOTH ROKG AND GOJ TEND TO OVERESTIMATE US INFLUENCE. SECRETARY EXPRESSED CONVICTION AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, ALTHOUGH IT NOT FOR US TO DETAIL PRECISE TERMS FOR SETTLEMENT, AND HOPE THAT IT WILL BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ASSURED PAK THAT US DOES NOT CONSIDER ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AS WAY TO REDUCE OUR OWN COMMITMENTS.

11. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWING BY AIR POUCH

12. GP-2.

MCH

BERGER

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

94

*Korea*

36

Action

55

Info

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 14453  
RECD: JANUARY 21, 1964, 8:45 A.M.  
FROM: SEOUL  
ACTION: SECSTATE 953 PRIORITY  
DATE: JANUARY 21, 8 P.M.

029

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS

SENT INFO CINCPAC 417 VIA OTHER MEANS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. I DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE US POLICY NOW STANDS ON REDUCTION OF ROK ARMED FORCES LEVEL AND WITHDRAWING PART OF US FORCES, BUT HAVE IMPRESSION BOTH ARE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION WITH POSSIBILITY OF DECISION AT ANY TIME. IF THIS SO, AND SINCE THIS ITEM WILL BE ON AGENDA OF SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PAK, I OFFER MY LATEST THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. WE ARE FORCING OR TRYING PERSUADE ROK GOVT TO MAKE NUMBER OF DIFFICULT DECISIONS DURING FIRST HALF THIS YEAR: A TOUGH ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM ALONGSIDE REDUCE US AID; A ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT; AND DEVALUATION. WITHIN KOREA PRICE INFLATION OF PAST YEAR HAS PRODUCED, UNDER THREAT OF STRIKES, DEMANDS FOR HIGHER WAGES FOR CIVIL SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES OF GOVT ENTERPRISES AND RESTLESSNESS AMONG JUNIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND NCO'S WITH FAMILIES. GOVT WILL HAVE TO RAISE SALARIES AND PAY SOON, BUT INCREASES WILL FALL SHORT OF PRICE RISE. TO ADD TO THESE DIFFICULTIES PRICE OF RICE IS NOW BEGINNING MOVE UPWARD (FROM 2,750 TO 3,100 WON PER BAG WITHIN LAST WEEK) WHICH IS BOTH EARLIER AND HIGHER THAN NORMAL SEASONAL PATTERN, AND WE EXPECT FURTHER RISES BEFORE BARLEY CROP IS HARVESTED IN JUNE. SPRING MONTHS ARE ALWAYS LEAN FOOD MONTHS AND TIME OF GREATEST ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY AND RESTIVENESS IN COUNTRY.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-16, Vol. XXIX, #1  
By g NARA, Date 4-18-05

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 953, JANUARY 21, 8 PM, FROM SEOUL

3. NEW GOVT IS JUST GETTING UNDER WAY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT IS PREPARING TO TAKE SOME OF TOUGH DECISIONS REQUIRE OF IT, I.E. ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT, AND DEVALUATION. OPPOSITION TACTICS ARE TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS BARRAGE OF IRRESPONSIBLE CRITICISM IN ORDER CAPITALIZE ON GOVT'S DIFFICULTIES AND PUBLIC RESTLESSNESS IN EFFORT BRING GOVT DOWN. OUR EFFORT IT SEEMS TO ME SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE GOVT TO ACT COURAGEOUSLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THESE NEXT FEW MONTHS AND, INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE TO HELP IT BY US STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT IN NEXT FEW MONTHS TO AVOID ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF REDUCTION IN US FORCES AND TO AVOID LOADING ON GOVT REQUIREMENT TO REDUCE ROK FORCES. THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE DECISIONS, BUT TIMING OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CONSULTATION WITH ROKG ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED IN LIGHT OF COMPLEX OF FACTORS DESCRIBED ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR ACTIONS ON THESE TWO MATTERS COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE SECOND HALF OF CY 1964.

5. SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT BOTH ROK AND US FORCES WILL BE REDUCED WOULD COME AS SEVERE JOLT, WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE STABILITY OF ROKG. ACCORDINGLY, IF BOTH ARE TO BE REDUCED, THE SEQUENCE SHOULD BE FOR ROK FORCES TO BE REDUCED FIRST AND AFTER PUBLIC HAS ADJUSTED TO THIS SHOCK, TO DEAL WITH ANY US FORCE REDUCTION.

6. IDEALLY REDUCTION IN ROK AND US FORCES SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOUND PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING AND REPOSITIONING OF TWO FORCES IN ORDER MAINTAIN OR IMPROVE DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IN MY 2-1/2 YEARS HERE I HAVE HEARD REPEATEDLY FROM OUR MILITARY THAT TOO LARGE A PROPORTION OF BOTH US AND ROK FORCES AND RESERVES ARE IN FORWARD AREAS AND THAT MAIN LATERAL LINE OF SUPPLY THROUGH INCHON AND MAIN SUPPLY DEPOT AT ASCOM ARE DANGEROUSLY VULNERABLE IN EVENT OF ATTACK. FURTHERMORE US INSTALLATIONS ARE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND TOO DISPERSED FOR MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OR FOR ECONOMICAL

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 953, JANUARY 21, 8 PM, FROM SEOUL

ADMINISTRATION. I AM TOLD WHAT IS NEEDED AND WHAT HAS LONG BEEN ADVOCATED IS A REPOSITIONING OF THE FORCES, A CONSOLIDATION OF INSTALLATIONS, AND A SPEEDING UP OF PROGRAM NOW UNDER WAY TO DEVELOP OUR SUPPLY DEPOTS IN SOUTH. THE ARGUMENT IS INVARIABLY ADVANCED THAT REPOSITIONING INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE COSTLY, BUT THIS IGNORES FACT THAT OUR TROOPS ARE PRESENTLY INSTALLED IN ANTIQUATED STRUCTURES, SOME DATING BACK TO 1953. MANY OF THESE ARE FALLING APART AND ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT COST ALREADY RUNNING IN MILLIONS ANNUALLY AND WILL GO HIGHER AS OBSOLESCENCE RATE INCREASES. I DO NOT SEE ECONOMIC, LET ALONE MILITARY, WISDOM OF PUTTING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS EVERY YEAR INTO EXISTING INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAVE INHERENT WEAKNESSES DESCRIBED ABOVE. THEREFORE WOULD HOPE THAT ANY ROK AND US FORCES REDUCTION WILL NOT BE DONE BY AXE METHOD OF SIMPLY CHOPPING OFF NUMBERS AND RESHUFFLING REST INTO EXISTING INSTALLATIONS BUT WOULD BE PART OF A CONSIDERED REORGANIZATION FOR IMPROVED DEFENSE OF KOREA.

7. AM AWARE THAT ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS THROUGH A COORDINATED PLAN INVOLVING RESTRUCTURING AND REPOSITIONING MIGHT TAKE TIME TO WORK OUT IN FACE OF PRESSURES TO EFFECT ECONOMIES QUICKLY. NONETHELESS, URGE THAT WASHINGTON TAKE TIME TO WORK OUT BOTH US AND ROK REDUCTIONS IN COORDINATED WAY THAT WILL MEET ALL REQUIREMENTS: MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL.

9. GP-2.

CFN 417 1. US ROK US PAK 2. ROK US ROK-JAPAN NCO 2,750 3,100  
3. ROK-JAPAN US 4. US ROK ROKG CY 1964 5. ROK US ROKG ROK  
US 6. ROK US 2-1/2 US ROK ASCOM US 1953 ROK US 7. US ROK  
8. GP-2

BERGER

~~SECRET~~

95

~~1. Mr. Forrestal~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

W 12

~~SECRET~~

003

H  
Action  
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Info

CONTROL: 4619  
RECEIVED: JANUARY 9, 1963, 12:39 A.M.

FROM: SEOUL  
ACTION: SECSTATE 896  
DATE: JANUARY 9, 11 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 572

REFTTEL DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION RECEIVED JAN 8 AT 9:00 P.M.  
KST. ROKG DELIGHTED YOUR ACCEPTANCE INVITATION AND  
PROSPECT EVEN BRIEF VISIT. QUESTION PRESS RELEASES  
OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. WILL REPLY ON OTHER MATTERS IN  
SEPARATE MESSAGE TO PERMIT WIDER DISTRIBUTION.

GP-3.

CFN [REDACTED] 572 8 9:P.M. KST ROKG GP-3

DOHERTY

RNL/5

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-161  
By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

\* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken \*

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER			
OFFICE SYMBOL			

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

96

*Korea*

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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1963 DEC 30 PM 2 55

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TO RUEHCR / SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 989 INFO SEOUL 18 FROM  
GENEVA DEC 30 5 PM

P

DEPT CA-6385

USIA

NSC

SEC GEN LICROSS (BEER) REPORTS HE QUERIED CHINESE COMMUNIST  
RED CROSS OFFICIAL ON PLIGHT TWO AMERICAN HELICOPTER PERSONNEL  
DETAINED NORTH KOREA DURING HIS RECENT VISIT PEKING. ACCORDING  
BEER CHINESE RED CROSS OFFICIALS DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE MATTER.  
BEER HAS NOW OFFERED RAISE MATTER DIRECTLY NORTH KOREAN RED  
CROSS WHICH IS MEMBER LICROSS. HOWEVER, HE REQUIRES REQUEST  
FOR THIS ACTION FROM LICROSS MEMBER. DEPARTMENT'S INTERVENTION  
WITH ARC TO PROMPT THIS REQUEST NEEDED. EVENT ARC REQUESTS

INR

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NSA

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AIR

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SCA

SCS

RMR

PAGE 2 RUFIV 96 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LICROSS TAKE THIS ACTION, BEER WILL PERFORM IMMEDIATELY IN  
DUE COORDINATION WITH ICRC. BEER MENTIONED LICROSS CURRENTLY.  
ENJOYING GOOD REPUTATION AMONG COMMUNIST MEMBERS LICROSS  
LARGELY RESULT HIS RECENT VISIT RED CHINA. THEREFORE, HE  
REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC RECEIVING REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM  
NORTH KOREAN RED CORSS.

GP-3. TUBBY

BT

CFN 989 18 30 5 6385 3

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-16100peal  
By *fw*, NARA, Date *5/3/94*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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46

Origin

**ACTION:** Amembassy SEOUL

**PRIORITY** 519

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Info:

**INFO:** Amembassy TOKYO

1493

DEC 11 5 52 PM '63

SS

**REPEAT:** CINCPAC For Delivery Governor's Office

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White House will make following release at 11 a.m. Washington time, Dec. 12. **QUOTE:** The White House announced today that President Johnson has appointed Governor John A. Burns of Hawaii as his Personal Representative to attend the ceremonies incident to the inauguration of His Excellency Chung Hee Park as President of the Republic of Korea on December 17, 1963. The Honorable Samuel D. Berger, United States Ambassador to Korea, will also serve as a representative of the President. President-elect Park is the chairman of the military junta which has governed Korea since the military coup in May, 1961. He was elected President on October 15, 1963.

Governor Burns is now in Japan on State business and will proceed to Seoul on December 16, 1963. **END QUOTE.**

Request coordinate local releases with White House release.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

OPR:REPeck:deb 12/11/63

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

R. E. Peck

Clearances:

EA/K - E. Reynolds (in draft)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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53-52

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VV EUA015HAB038  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUAPFD 68 05/0238Z  
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P 050235Z

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

UNCLAS PRIORITY 1673 FIFTH

002750

1963 DEC 4 PM 9 01

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM  
GOVERNOR BURNS:

"PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON.

"I AM DEEPLY HONORED AND PRIVILEGED TO ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION TO  
HEAD THE DELEGATION REPRESENTING YOU AT THE INAUGURATION OF KOREAN  
PRESIDENT PARK ON DECEMBER 17TH. I AM PRESENTLY IN TOKYO ON  
STATE VISIT AND WILL CONTACT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR ON DETAILS  
REFERRED TO IN YOUR WIRE. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF HAWAII  
PLEASE ACCEPT OUR SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONFIDENCE.  
(SIGNED) GOVERNOR JOHN BURNS." REISCHAUER

BT  
CFN 1673 17TH

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 12/4/63, 9:12 PM

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59

Origin  
FE  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 486  
Amembassy LONDON 3404  
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DEC 3 6 41 PM '66

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AIR  
RMR

INFO: Amconsul HONG KONG 534  
Amembassy TOKYO 1423  
Amembassy CANBERRA 474  
USUN 1601

Deptel 469 to Seoul, 3300 to London, CINCUNC Unn, rptd Hong Kong 513,  
Tokyo 1373, Canberra 453.

1.3  
(ax3)

1. [redacted] informed Dept that [redacted]  
[redacted] December 2 informed North Korean trade delegation member of refusal  
of visas to nine North Koreans because of unwarranted North Korean detention  
of two U.S. helicopter personnel. North Korean expressed regret, said he  
could not understand reason for action, and referred to group having waited  
10 days for action.

1.3(ax3)

2. [redacted]
3. GP-3.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-161 appeal  
By fw, NARA, Date 5-13-94

END

RUSK

Drafted by  
FE:EA:CANorred Jr:bhm 12/3/63

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Leonard L. Bacon *lm*

Clearances:  
BNA - Mr. Judd

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

100

Korea

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

FE

NNNNT UZCZCMJAPQZCZMJA074

Info

PP RUEHCR

SS

DE RUALOS 05E 29/0630Z

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P R 290600Z ZEA

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~~FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL~~

AIDA

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INR

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RUHPA/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 750  
INFO CINCPAC 336 TOKYO 357 FROM SEOUL NOVEMBER 29, 3PM  
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

P R I O R I T Y

18640

023

1963 NOV 29 6:40 AM 4052

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. PAEK TU-CHIN ON NOVEMBER 27 INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAS BEEN OFFERED POST OF PRIME MINISTER IN NEW GOVERNMENT. PAEK SAID THAT SCNR VICE CHAIRMAN YI CHU-IL HAD VISITED HIM ON NOVEMBER 25 AND MADE THE OFFER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN PAK. PAEK AGREED CONSIDER OFFER AND IS AWAITING CFN 750 336 357 29 3PM 1. PAEK TU-CHIN 27 YI CHU-IL 25

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN PAK BEFORE REPLYING. WE HAD ANTICIPATED BEING ASKED BY PAEK FOR OUR VIEW OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF POST AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OFFICER SAID WE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE THIS KEY JOB.

2. PAEK SAID THAT BEFORE ACCEPTING POST HE WOULD WORK TO ESTABLISH CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WITH PAK AS TO ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PRIME MINISTER. HE STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE "STOOGES" OR "MESSENGER BOY". NOR DID HE INTEND TO BE "CONTROLLED" BY ANY POLITICAL PARTY.

3. PAEK SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE PAK SOON AFTER THE LATTER'S RETURN FROM THE US. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION HAS NOT LED TO ANY WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFER. NEVERTHELESS, PAEK WONDERED WHETHER

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Authority RA 001R-234-335-9

By JDN WARA Date 8-28-19

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 750, November 29, 3 p.m. from Seoul

OR NOT THE CLEAR ASSEMBLY MAJORITY HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT PARTY MIGHT NOT REDUCE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW INDEPENDENTS SUCH AS HIMSELF A MAJOR ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION. PAEK SPOKE OF KIM CHONG-P'IL (WITH SOME RESPECT BUT NOT WARMTH) AND APPEARED CFN 2. 3. NOT NOT NOT KIM CHONG-P'IL

PAGE THREE RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONCERNED OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH KIM'S POWER WOULD LIMIT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER. HE AGREED THAT THE BASIC ELEMENT DETERMINING THE INFLUENCE AND INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAK AND THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THEM, BUT HE WAS WARY OF KIM'S COMPETING INFLUENCE. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM PAEK HAD DETERMINED THAT KIM WAS NOT OPPOSED TO HIS APPOINTMENT DESPITE SOME OBJECTION FROM WITHIN THE "HARD CORE".

4. PAEK SPOKE IN GENERAL TERMS OF HIS PLANS FOR CABINET APPOINTMENTS. HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT GRAVITY OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING ROKG. IN HIS VIEW, ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND THE HOME MINISTRY WERE KEY SLOTS TO BE FILLED WITH COMPETENT PEOPLE CHOSEN NOT FOR POLITICAL REASONS BUT ON THE BASIS OF ABILITY. HE HAD IN MIND AN UNSPECIFIED MEMBER OF THE JUNTA FOR THE HOME MINISTRY AND A FEW TECHNICALLY COMPETENT BUT POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT FIGURES FOR THE ECONOMIC SLOTS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE CHOICE OF MINISTERS WOULD NOT CFN NOT 4. NO NOT NOT

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BE HIS OWN EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE BUT HE APPEARED TO EXPECT A MAJOR VOICE IN THE SELECTION OF KEY MINISTERS.

5. PAEK ASKED THAT HIS CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, WITH NO MENTION MADE TO ANY KOREAN, AND HELD TIGHT ON US SIDE. HE PROMISED INFORM EMBASSY OF RESULTS MEETING WITH PAK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 750, November 29, 3 p.m. from Seoul

6. PAEK LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WANTED THE JOB BADLY. HE MAY BE DELUDING HIMSELF INTO BELIEVING HE CAN BE MORE "INDEPENDENT" THAN HE WILL BE IN ACTUALITY, OR THAT HE WILL HAVE A MAJOR ROLE IN CHOICE OF CABINET. EMBASSY BELIEVES PAEK WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE. HIS GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, HIS COMPETENCE AND EXPERIENCE IN ECONOMIC FIELD, HIS BASIC CONSERVATISM, AND HIS STRONGLY PRO-WESTERN IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION ARE ALL FAVORABLE FACTORS. DESPITE A REPUTATION FOR OPPORTUNISM AND A CONTROVERSIAL FINANCIAL BACKGROUND, HIS POSITIVE QUALITIES ARE SUCH AS TO MAKE HIM A BETTER CHOICE THAN OTHER NAMES THAT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED RECENTLY IN SEOUL POLITICAL CIRCLES.

7. GP-3. BERGER

BT

CFN 5. NO US 6. 7. 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 476

Info  
SS

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO 1402  
CINCPAC POLAD

G

SP

AIDA

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

INR

RMR

Seoul's 750, rptd Tokyo 357, CINCPAC 336.

Nov 29 7 29 PM '63

039

1. Agree in general with evaluation, in last two sentences of reftel, of PAKK Tu-chin as possible Prime Minister, but are inclined give greater weight ~~weight~~ to adverse factors. Aside from his extreme political opportunism and his corruption exceeding Korean norm, we encountered great difficulties in dealing with him during his tenure as Prime Minister and Economic Coordinator 1952-56, particularly in U.S. economic assistance matters. His attitude toward relations with Japan, while somewhat ambivalent, appears generally hostile. We note he recently signed opposition's joint protest against govt's negotiations with Japan.

2. We recognize there was no practical alternative but to express Embassy's approval to him, last sentence para 1 reftel. Although he is better than KIM Chong-p'il, we hope still better candidate will emerge.  
rpt not  
Suggest Embassy not/endorse him to others.

3. GP-3.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: PAC 0011-254-3-36-8  
By: JON \*ARA Dec 8-28-19

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorred Jr: bhm 11/29/63

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Leonard L. Bacon *mg*

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Green  
*mg*

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

102

Korea

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE43  
ActionControl: 17463  
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 27, 1963  
1:32 AM

FE

Info

FROM: SEOUL

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 741, NOVEMBER 27, 2 PM

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PRIORITY

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AID

ACTION DEPARTMENT 741; INFORMATION CINCPAC 332, TOKYO 353

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USIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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AIR

1. DRP SHOWING HAS SURPRISED ALL OBSERVERS AND UPSET ALL FORECASTS. REASON FOR SWEEP RESTS PRIMARILY ON DIVISION OF OP-POSITION VOTE AMONG SEVERAL CANDIDATES, ENABLING DRP CANDIDATES IN MOST DISTRICTS TO WIN WITH MINORITY OF VOTES CAST, AND OFTEN BY NARROW MARGIN OVER SECOND HIGHEST. CLEAR THAT GOVT PARTY SPENT FUNDS LAVISHLY AND HAD GOVT ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY AT ALL LEVELS WORKING ACTIVELY ON ITS BEHALF BUT THIS DOES NOT EXPLAIN MAGNITUDE DRP SUCCESS.

RMR

2. OPPOSITION LEADERS ALREADY PROTESTING AND COMPARING ELECTION TO MARCH 15, 1960. YUN PO-SUN QUOTED AS SAYING HIS PARTY WILL CHALLENGE LEGALITY ELECTION IN COURTS. LARGE NUMBER SPECIFIC CHARGES ALLEGING DRP ILLEGAL ACTIONS, AND SOME CASES OF CHARGES AGAINST OPPOSITION. NO BASIS AT THIS TIME TO ASSESS VALIDITY OPPOSITION CHARGES REGARDING WIDESPREAD ELECTION RIGGING, PROXY VOTING OR OTHER IRREGULARITIES. WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF SUCH IRREGULARITIES, IT HAS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS A NATIONAL PATTERN OF BALLOT RIGGING AS DISTINCT FROM USE OF MONEY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRESSURES.

3. FULLER ANALYSIS RESULTS WHEN RETURNS MORE COMPLETE. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT AVOID SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON ELECTIONS PENDING THAT ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATION PUBLIC REACTION.

BERGER

LM

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

Korea  
Chulha 103

57

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Action

Control:

16701

Rec'd:

November 24, 1963

FE

2:31 p.m.

Info

FROM: Seoul

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 731, November 24, 8 p.m.

H

P

USIA

PRIORITY

NSC

INR

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 731, INFORMATION PRIORITY CINCPAC 25,  
TOKYO 46

CIA

NSA

OSD

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

Ref: A. EMBTEL 638, info Tokyo 292, CINCPAC FOR POLAD 280

B. EMBTEL 661, info Tokyo 303, CINCPAC FOR POLAD 289

1. Subject: Return of Syngman Rhee to Korea.

2. Embassy in receipt following telegram from Wilbert Choi, Honolulu, who Embassy understands is American citizen of good repute residing in Hawaii and close to Rhee family.

## BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

Please be advised of chartered plane leaving Seoul November 26th to escort Dr. Rhee to Korea over objections of Mrs. Rhee and attending physicians. Mission forcefully attempted would be embarrassing.

## END VERBATIM TEXT.

3. Embassy inquired of MFA (Acting FOMIN Choi) who confirmed that committee for return of Dr. Rhee (headed by Ham Nuta E-Yung\*, former secretary to Dr. Rhee) plans to send chartered KAL DC-4 leaving Seoul November 25 returning November 30. Choi also said ROK Consulate Honolulu has confirmed that Mrs. Rhee and attending physician are opposed and has described proposal for removal of

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-2- 731, November 24, 8 p.m., from Seoul

Rhee as "impossible." MFA has attempted to discourage committee but plan reportedly has approval PRIMIN and Chairman Pak. Embassy has asked MFA make sure committee aware of possible consequences attempt to remove Dr. Rhee against wishes of Mrs. Rhee and doctors.

4. Ambassador took question up with PRIMIN who said that committee arranging for Rhee's return had been told ten days ago that Mrs. Rhee's permission was necessary. PRIMIN said committee was non-official, and that they had made arrangements with some unknown benefactor to pay expenses and care for Rhee upon his return. Government was not prepared assume expenses or assure Rhee's care and safety. PRIMIN promised take up matter with committee and ask them not to send plane for Rhee until and unless Mrs. Rhee's permission granted.

1-3(aX5)

5. Department may wish instruct CINCPAC POLAD ensure local police authorities alerted to possible attempt by committee representatives override Mrs. Rhee if plane proceeds as scheduled to Hawaii.

6. GP-3.

BERGER

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