

4/21/64 ltr
PM Choi to LBJ



S/S-6658

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1964

✓ 1. Bundy to note
✓ 2. File

Int in Korea

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from
Prime Minister Doo-Sun Choi

Enclosed is a letter addressed to the President from the Prime Minister of Korea in which the Prime Minister thanks the President for receiving him during his recent visit to Washington in connection with the funeral of General MacArthur.

No reply to the letter is believed necessary.

John H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to the President
from Korean Prime Minister.

105a

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

April 21, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

I was very pleased to have an opportunity to meet you during my recent visit to the United States to attend the funeral of General MacArthur.

Knowing the tremendous demands upon your time, especially under conditions then prevailing, I am the more appreciative of your courtesy in granting me a personal interview.

With best wishes for your continued good health and success,

Yours sincerely,



Doo-Sun Choi

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Forrestal/Komer/Paik
MemCon - 4/16/64

106

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in White
House 4/23/64

DATE: April 16, 1964

SUBJECT: General Situation in Korea

PARTICIPANTS: Too Chin PAIK, former Korean Prime Minister
Yie Joon CHANG, Economic Attaché, Korean Embassy
Michael Forrestal, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Robert Komer, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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|------------|-----------------|---------------------|
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Mr. PAIK said he thought it was important that there be no resort to force majeure in Korea, whether external or internal. Mr. Forrestal asked whether this was likely, and Mr. Paik said no one could tell. He said he was independent and non-partisan now that he had left the government. He believed, however, that the Korean people should be better off. Korea has constructed substantial economic establishments. It had, however, a serious balance of payments problem, and serious unemployment -- about two million persons. More capital investment was needed. Korea could produce more necessary commodities if it had the plants to do so. Two fertilizer plants had been constructed, but these met only half of Korea's requirements. Before World War II, Korea imported millet and sorghum, and exported rice, which gave Japan the economic power to attack Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Paik said that the student demonstrations in Korea might be resumed. He said the government had been meeting the problem, but had not yet solved it. Mr. Forrestal asked whether the Korean government did not need more political education activities. Mr. Paik said the government was doing all it could.

Mr. Paik said that Koreans fear that the old pattern of Japanese domination would be repeated, in the form of economic exploitation. No one could assure that past history would not be repeated. Although he was away at the time, he did not believe that the student rioting was incited by the Opposition. It was spontaneous. He said the Korean government should undertake a program to strengthen its position. This would take time.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

Mr. Komer asked how much time would be required. Mr. Paik said he could not tell exactly. He referred to the statements of Kubota and Yoshida, which had complicated the negotiations, and expressed hope that Japan would be careful in its statements. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that the chances of agreement were declining each year, and urged that Korea not let the chance slip away. Mr. Paik said that the average Korean did not consider the terms generous. Mr. Komer pointed out that Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia had concluded agreements, and Korea was the last to negotiate.

Mr. Paik said Koreans were afraid that history would repeat the 1905 Japanese assumption of control over Korea. Mr. Komer pointed out that Korea then had had no ally like the U.S. Mr. Paik referred to the Amity Treaty of 1904 between the U.S. and Korea. Mr. Komer pointed out it had been merely an amity agreement, such as the U.S. had even with the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Forrestal asked whether the Japanese in Korea were conducting themselves well, and Mr. Paik said they were. He said there were many commercial representatives in Seoul. Mr. Forrestal asked if Korea did not have control over foreign investors, and Mr. Paik said it did. Mr. Paik said that many were suspicious of Japan. They wondered how Japan could provide adequate assistance, as compared with the much wealthier U.S.

Mr. Komer said Foreign Minister CHONG Il-kwon had been doing a good job. Mr. Paik agreed. He said the Foreign Minister had been subject to severe nervous tension. Mr. Komer said that the Foreign Minister's thesis at Harvard had attached importance to a settlement with Japan.

Mr. Paik said Korea needed U.S. assistance for a long time. Mr. Komer said that while the Japanese GNP had been increasing by 11 percent annually, the Korean improvement had been relatively small. The disparity was growing. The hopes for Korean unification depended upon a growing economy in the ROK. There was a poetic justice in Japan's investing in the independence of the ROK. Mr. Paik contended, however, that it would be wise not to hurry about settlement with Japan, and to follow roundabout channels. Japan should make clear its sincerity in negotiations with Korea.

Mr. Paik said the Japanese in the Diet referred to Korea as "Chosen," the colonial terminology, and in the negotiations had used the familiar term "Kun" for the Korean negotiator Pae. Mr. Forrestal asked whether Mr. Paik had talked with the Japanese about these matters, and Mr. Paik said he had done so with college classmates of himself and his wife.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (Attachment)

April 24, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

4/25
Attached for your information and files are two copies of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Michael Forrestal, Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council, and former Korean Prime Minister Paik regarding the General Situation in Korea dated April 16, 1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (Attachment)

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100
Sub-Korea Country

2142
128
LIMITED OFFICIAL 1 ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

April 22, 1964

To: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

From: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation
between Messrs. Forrestal
and Komer and Too Chin PAIK,
former Korean Prime Minister

For approval prior to distribution.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 16, 1964

SUBJECT: General Situation in Korea

PARTICIPANTS: Too Chin PAIK, former Korean Prime Minister
Yie Joon CHANG, Economic Attaché, Korean Embassy
Michael Forrestal, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Robert Komer, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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Amembassy Tokyo - 2
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S/P

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- 2 -

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Rusk/Choi MemCon
4/9/64

(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

APPROVED: 5

DATE: 5/2/64

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RECORDING & DISTRIBUTION

5/5/64

DATE: April 9, 1964

SUBJECT: Call on the Secretary by the Korean Delegation to General MacArthur's Funeral.

PARTICIPANTS: Doo Sun CHOI, Prime Minister of Korea
 Chung Yul KIM, Korean Ambassador
 Kyung Soon CHANG, Vice Speaker, Korean National Assembly
 Myung Sup CHUNG, Member of Korean National Assembly
 Hyung Il KIM, Member of Korean National Assembly
 Yoon Young LIMB, Secretary to the Prime Minister

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Secretary
 William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for FE Affairs
 Christopher A. Norred, Jr., OIC of Korean Affairs

Distribution:

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 G-FE-2 ACA CIA AID/Korea Amembassy SEOUL CINCPAC/POLAD

The Secretary said that he was deeply touched by the sending of the Korean delegation to General MacArthur's funeral, and that he was sure the American people appreciated it. Prime Minister CHOI said the Koreans wished they could do more to express how sorry they were.

The Secretary said that the situation in Korea had not been without interest during the past 3 or 4 weeks, and asked the Prime Minister to tell him about it. Prime Minister CHOI said the situation had returned to normal, and expressed the view that with further effort to dispel popular misunderstandings further improvement could be made. The Secretary asked whether the demonstrations had been purely in objection to the Korean-Japanese normalization or had been held with other matters in mind. Prime Minister Choi said he believed they had been due entirely to a misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement and the conduct of the negotiations. The demonstrators were also expressing profound feelings against the 30 years of Japanese occupation.

The Secretary expressed the hope that recent events would not present any formidable obstacle to an agreement. In negotiations, even when agreement is reached in broad terms, there will still often be some points with which each side will have difficulty. He said he hoped these points of difficulty could be worked out in the Korean-Japanese negotiations. He added that he realized that foreign policy problems often involve domestic politics. President PARK

Exempted from automatic decontrol

had his full understanding on this issue. He would be spending the entire afternoon fighting in Congress for foreign aid. Many Congressmen would prefer that there be none, but the administration believes it is important for Korea and many other countries. We realize that these problems are not easy.

Ambassador Kim reintroduced the three legislators who were members of the delegation, describing their parties. He explained that because of the great contributions of General MacArthur, all groups had wanted to express their sorrow. Secretary Rusk addressed himself to them and said that he appreciated their coming very much. He said that while General MacArthur had been in some respects a controversial figure, this did not affect the sorrow of the American people. He commented that he had been with President Truman when he met with General MacArthur at Wake Island in the middle of the Korean hostilities. Ambassador Kim explained to the delegation that Secretary Rusk had at that time held the post of Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, which Mr. Bundy now held, and which like General MacArthur's position was a key one in American policy toward the Korean hostilities.

Looking to the future, the Secretary referred to the difficulties between Moscow and Peiping. He said one could not know exactly what would develop. If a break should develop between them, however, the implications for Korea and for Indo-China would be profound. If Communist China were isolated, it would be weakened, and there would be a new situation in the Far East. For this reason, it was important that Korea proceed with confidence and energy. The U. S. had been encouraged by the expansion of Korean exports and other economic progress, and would be very close to Korea in these situations.

The Prime Minister referred to the Secretary's remarks concerning domestic politics. He said the Korean Government could not ignore domestic politics in the negotiations with Japan, and would have to take them into consideration. At the same time, however, the Government was concentrating on economic development. It was trying to improve the livelihood of the people and to stabilize prices. It was concerned about securing sufficient food.

The Secretary commented that delay is costly. A Korean-Japanese agreement 5 years before would have had important economic consequences already for 5 years. Further delay in concluding the agreement would continue to delay the economic benefits Korea would derive. He expressed the hope that both sides would take that factor into consideration.

The Secretary said he had enjoyed very much his recent visit to Korea. He mentioned the skill of the ROK Air Force pilots who had escorted his

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- 3 -

plane, flying practically wing to wing. Prime Minister Choi said he hoped the Secretary kept in mind the matters he had discussed with President Park during that visit, and the Secretary assured him he did.

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WASH. D.C.

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LBJ/PM Choi Memcon
4/9/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

White House
5490 112
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Approved by White
House 4/14/64

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 9, 1964

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with the Korean Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: UNITED STATES

The President
McGeorge Bundy
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs

KOREA

Prime Minister Choi Doo Sun
Ambassador Kim Chung Yul
Lim Yoon Young, Chief Secre-
tary to Prime Minister
(interpreter)

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AIDEXSEC

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-162

By *lig*, NARA, Date 7-14-13

The President expressed appreciation that Korea should be represented at General MacArthur's funeral by Prime Minister Choi and he extended a warm and cordial welcome.

The President said he earnestly hoped for improvement in ROK-Japanese relations, that it was a matter of highest level interest in the United States. He understood that negotiations were now at a critical stage and he merely wished to reaffirm a long-standing U.S. hope that the talks would move along toward a successful conclusion. The President said it was the firm intention of the United States to stand firmly by its commitments and with free nations in opposing Communist expansion. He trusted that the Korean Government would do what it could to strengthen our common stand.

Prime Minister Choi replied that he was in "perfect agreement" with what the President had said and that the Korean Government would move to concluding negotiations with Japan as soon as possible. He added that, as the President knew, there were some disturbances in Korea over a settlement with Japan but that the ROK Government was nevertheless resolved to proceed with negotiations and aimed at reaching a settlement with Japan soon. (At this point the President had to leave the room to answer an urgent telephone call.)

GROUP 3

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matically declassified

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-2-

Upon his return, the President reiterated his hope that relations between two of our good friends, Korea and Japan, could be worked out soon. The Prime Minister agreed that this was an important objective and he again thanked the President for the honor and pleasure of calling at his office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

5490

April 13, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Memorandum of conversation
between the President and
the Prime Minister of
Korea

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are side-
lined in blue.

Attachment:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1970
1132
5480

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 9, 1964

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with the Korean Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: UNITED STATES

The President
McGeorge Bundy
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs

KOREA

Prime Minister Choi Doo Sun
Ambassador Kim Chung Yul
Lim Yoon Young, Chief Secre-
tary to Prime Minister
(interpreter)

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G " TOKYO
S/AL
FE - 4
AIDEXSEC

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-162
By lig, NARA, Date 7-14-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN

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Memo's & Misc.

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SECRET

Mac -

June 3, 1964

FYI, Marshall Green thinks ROK rioting quite serious. Pak will probably impose martial law, which we oppose. We fear it will only bottle up popular resentment, which will burst out even more violently sometime later. Also martial law instead of concessions will enable Pak to hold on to his Rasputin, Kim Chong Pil. In fact, one report has it that KCP actually encouraged student riots for this purpose.

We're worried lest we be over-identified with yet another repressive campaign by one of our Asian clients. This may also spell the end of ROK-Jap settlement hopes this year. It's regrettable that irresponsibility of a minority of the students, egged on by an irresponsible opposition, is undermining the ROK's real future hopes. This country isn't ready for democracy yet, any more than it was for Rhee-style dictatorship in the Fifties. Our Korean policy has been a mess from the beginning, except for the war period itself.

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RWK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-204

SECRET

By *Sj*, NARA, Date 10-24-01

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~~SECRET~~

✓ McGB:

May 15, 1964

Notes. We expect our two Korea helicopter pilots to be released about 10 tonight. Reedy clued and press release ready. We had to sign receipts which NK may use to say we admitted espionage but this vital to get the men out, and we'll refute pronto once they're in our hands.

John Ferguson will try to get 10 minutes with you (we've talked twice). He says convincingly things are looking up in Morocco (except the economy). But Hassan thinks LBJ doesn't love him like Kennedy so we're concocting a letter for John to take back (he grasps that meeting LBJ unlikely).

G. Ball is all upset about Algeria, since Ben Bella's disgraceful performance in Moscow. Has called for review of our policy and possible aid clamp down. This is silly (all we give is \$25-30 million food anyway). Pressure will just make this flighty fanatic lean farther east. But I think Ball will calm down; if not I may scream.

Korea. I'm all for US and ROK cutbacks but timing is lousy and short term B/P gain insufficient to justify moving before December. Let's get ROK/Jap settlement first, and also make sure pull out in Northeast Asia doesn't raise question about will to stay in Southeast.

clm afraid Boten's VSM 44 was a little confusing to the troops, but no matter.

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-162

By *ing*, NARA, Date 7-14-93



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 15, 1964

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Xerox Komer 5/16

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Statement by the President When U.S. Helicopter
Personnel Are Released by the North Koreans

The Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command has reported (telegram UK 60355) that the two U.S. helicopter personnel held unjustifiably by the North Koreans are to be released in Panmunjom at 10:00 p.m. Washington time tonight.

Attached is a draft statement, concurred in by the Department of Defense, for release in the name of the President. Since the North Koreans have demanded that North and South Korean news representatives be present, there is no way to delay press knowledge of the release. They may make use of purported confessions broadcast February 18. CINCUNC has been requested to inform us by FLASH message when the men actually have been released, so that the statement here could be issued promptly.

Also attached is a background briefing for use by your press officers.

Senators Douglas, Hart, and Sparkman have followed this case closely. The first two wrote Secretary Rusk very recently, asking for more intensive action on the case, and the Acting Secretary asked them to hold up any public statements for a time, in the hope that a release might be obtained around the time of the first anniversary of their detention, May 17. We understand Senator Sparkman did not join with the others because he did not wish to criticize the Departments of State and Defense. The Senators have been informed of the present developments and asked not to make any public statements until the release of the men has been effected.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By pu, NARA, Date 6-30-92

/s/ BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Draft statement by the President
Background information

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3
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MAY 18 1964

DRAFT STATEMENT IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT

I have been informed by the United Nations Command in Seoul that Captain Carleton W. Voltz of Frankfort, Michigan, and Captain Ben W. Stutts of Florence, Alabama, who had been detained unjustifiably by the North Koreans since May 17, 1963, were released by Panmunjom at 12:07 PM Korean time (11:07 EDT). We have made great efforts to obtain their release, and have had the help -- for which we are grateful -- of humanitarian organizations and a number of other countries. I am sure we all share the joy of their families at the news of their release. The men will be in touch with their families as soon as possible.

16
Used Conference Call 5/15-~~16~~ 12:30 AM

This statement was read to the wire services over the phone by the Press office.

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If queried whether they were guilty of military espionage:

The facts of the case are well known. The helicopter did cross into North Korean territory; we have stated many times in the Military Armistice Commission meetings that the crossing was inadvertent. The men were in uniform, were performing the military mission of checking aircraft warning markers south of the Demilitarized Zone, and had no weapons or cameras in their possession. It is preposterous to allege they were engaged in military espionage. We have often heard such allegations in the past from the North Koreans.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Captain Ben W. Stutts, USA, of Florence, Alabama, and Captain Carleton W. Voltz, USA, of Frankfort, Michigan, were pilot and passenger respectively of a United Nations Command helicopter that landed May 17, 1963, just inside North Korean territory after being fired on. They were on a routine military mission checking aircraft warning markers when they crossed the Demilitarized Zone, we believe inadvertently, and flew over North Korean territory. Upon landing, the officers were observed stepping out of their helicopter and being led away to nearby trucks by North Korean soldiers.

On the day they were taken into custody, and in ten subsequent meetings of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the United Nations Command demanded the release of the men and the helicopter. Despite our expression of regrets at the intrusion and assurances that measures would be taken to prevent recurrence, the North Koreans at these MAC meetings would state only that the officers were in their custody, in normal condition, and that it was for the North Koreans to decide what would be done with the men.

In addition to these meetings, the assistance of international humanitarian organizations was sought to obtain additional information on the welfare of the men and to arrange for the exchange of mail between the officers and their families. After many months of effort, we were told indirectly that letters from the families had been delivered to the officers, but we will have to await confirmation of this report from the men themselves.

In addition, we have had the assistance of a number of countries in seeking additional information on the officers and in exerting influence or pressure whenever possible. We also made a special report to the UN General Assembly last December on North Korea's unjustified detention of the men.

We can only speculate as to why the North Koreans are now releasing the men. One year less one day has passed since the men were taken into custody and the North Koreans may have decided to make a magnanimous gesture at this time. As far as we know, the men were never sentenced, although purported confessions were broadcast on February 18, 1964. The North Koreans have never revealed their intentions in continuing to hold them for this period of time. There was no quid pro quo arrangement.

Two known incidents of this nature have occurred since the 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed. The first occurred in 1954 when a Marine Corps Colonel landed an L-19 by accident at a North Korean airport; he was held for about eight months before being

released unharmed along with a U.S. soldier who had been wounded in a mine field along the Demilitarized Zone. A more recent incident occurred in 1958 when an Air Force pilot was shot down over North Korean territory after becoming disoriented. He was released unharmed eleven days later.

FYI: North Korea continues to hold three American soldiers who defected within the last two years. There are no other known Americans in North Korean custody.

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Farr.
Fal.
Lion
Met
Taylor

~~SECRET~~

✓ Korea
April 21, 1964

Mac -

We may have an internal crisis in Korea shortly (Seoul 1330). The students, obstreperous ever since they triggered overthrow of Rhee in 1960, are demonstrating again. If Pak's police kill a few we may have a "student revolt." Equally dangerous is internal split within ruling DRP between supporters and opponents of Kim Chong Pil, Pak's "eminence grise."

Berger, who's always detested Kim Chong Pil (and almost seems to carry on personal vendetta against him), is worried. He doubts Pak will dump Kim, but can't see how Pak can cure internal split in DRP without doing so.

All this clouds prospects for ROK/Jap settlement. Since Kim is great promoter of this (for graft involved, partly) opposition is opposing settlement largely as means of getting at Kim. ROKG in turn is thinking of imposing martial law.

Am keeping in touch, and keeping State's eye on ROK/Jap angle. Will clue you if any WH-type problem arises.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, '64-'68, Vol. XXIX, #8
By Sj, NARA, Date 4-19-05

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Bring out
to Reedy by
D.O.

Kear

APR 10 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Statement by the President if U.S. Helicopter
Personnel are Released by the North Koreans

With reference to Mr. Reedy's request of April 10, 1964, for a draft statement which could be used if the North Koreans release the two U.S. helicopter personnel they have been holding, there is attached a draft for possible use by the President. The White House is to be notified by the United Nations Command when the men are released. A meeting called by the North Koreans, which may deal with the helicopter personnel, is to be held in Panmunjom at 11:00 AM April 11 (9:00 PM April 10 Washington time).

The enclosed draft is concurred in by the Department of Defense.

J. H. Read

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft statement by the President

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I take great pleasure in announcing that at _____ in Panmunjom, the North Koreans released Captain Carleton W. Voltz of Frankfort, Michigan, and Captain Ben W. Stutts of Florence, Alabama, who had been detained since May 17, 1963. I am sure we all share the joy of their families at their release from detention. The men will be in touch with their families as soon as possible.

Background: The two captains were pilot and passenger on a United Nations Command helicopter which landed in North Korean territory May 17, 1963, after being fired on. We have been trying to obtain their release ever since, through the Military Armistice Commission and through many diplomatic channels. Since February 17, 1964, the North Korean military officials have apparently been moving toward release of the men.

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1964

Mac -

Korean student riots, ostensibly against ROK-Jap settlement but actually against ROKG, are getting worrisome. No one expected they'd reach such intensity (students are normally feisty this time each year).

Marshall Green, who knows his ROKs, sees better than even chance that ROK/Jap settlement is scuttled for 1964. Too bad if so, since gradual Jap cooling toward bailing out ROK has made us look on 1964 as year of decision. Also Pak government be in danger and nothing as good in sight.

All in all, instead of urging Pak and his Rasputin, Kim Chong-pil to be more democratic, maybe we ought to tolerate a little more dictatorship in this messy fief. Korea is still a mess (one of our great failures despite billions in pump priming). So I'd settle for a bit more stability, which would permit us to cut our bill some more (still around \$300 million per annum, all told). I'll sing this song to WPB and Green. Perhaps you could too.

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Authority FRUS, '64-'68, Vol. XXIX, #7
By sj, NARA, Date 4-19-05

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

Copy

*Dungen 2/29
(along w/
White background
file)*

FEB 28 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Reply to Governor
Burns' Letter to the
President

Enclosed for your consideration is a draft
reply to a letter sent by Governor Burns of Hawaii
concerning his attendance at the Korean presidential
inauguration ceremonies as President Johnson's
personal representative.

R. MOOSE
Benjamin H. Read *FOR*
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Letter.

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Governor Burns:

The President has asked me to thank you for so ably representing him at the Korean presidential inauguration ceremonies, as well as for the photographs and your report.

The President appreciated receiving President Park's very warm and obviously sincere expressions of gratitude to him and the American people for the assistance the United States has given Korea. Remembering President Park's reserve at their last meeting in November, the President enjoyed your report of President Park's reaction to the photograph and gift.

You may be interested to know that the Korean press commented very favorably on the distinguished manner in which you represented the President and on the part played by your charming wife at the inauguration celebrations.

I was also asked to thank you for taking the opportunity while in Japan to extend on the President's behalf his warmest regards to the Emperor and Empress of Japan.

Sincerely yours,

McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable
John A. Burns,
Governor of Hawaii,
Honolulu.

*Korea
Center*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

February 3, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

2/3

Attached for the information and files of Mr. Forrestal is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. EA Chae-hang and Mr. Green regarding Korean Opposition Views on Korean-Japanese Negotiations, dated January 27, 1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

copy 1 c. 1.1.1.1

✓ Karna

123

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

January 22, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

This is for background, because Rusk and McNamara plan to take up with you shortly force cuts in Korea.

They met yesterday and reportedly agreed that rather than cut both ROK and US forces we should cut neither now! McNamara does favor both a 70,000 man cut in the 580,000 man ROK army (phased over two years) and a 12,000 man cut in US forces by the end of 1964. This is a big step forward from the military's previous adamant position.

Rusk was perfectly willing to buy the ROK cut; State feels that such a small reduction probably would have little adverse political implication. But Rusk is strongly opposed to a simultaneous US cut, announced now. He fears it would upset the Japs and Koreans, and even worry all our Asian allies that we're disengaging from Asia.

So McNamara then said that if we didn't cut US forces he didn't want to cut ROK forces either; this would be hard to defend on the Hill because it ran counter to our MAP theory of buying cheap infantry (i. e. why cut local forces instead of bringing our boys home?).

It would be a pity to postpone entirely once again a long-needed shift which would also save some money. There is never a good time to cut, but the plain fact of the matter--no longer denied by anyone--is that we're overinsured militarily in Korea at a time when we need strength much more elsewhere. The big danger area is in Southeast Asia not Northeast Asia, and has been ever since the Korean War.

Since the issue seems to be more one of timing than of substance, why can't we take a decision in principle now, while allowing ourselves tactical flexibility in execution? We ought to be able to devise some way of fuzzing up our action enough to forestall the adverse reactions State fears. For example, we could:

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Authority FRUS, '64-'68, Vol. XXIX, #2
By Sj, NARA, Date 4-19-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

1. Decide now to go ahead with the ROK cut, but play it in low key so as to avoid the problem bothering McNamara. Rusk could tell the ROK when in Seoul that we desire a gradual streamlining of their forces, but feel that they and we should handle it in such a way as to minimize any political splash. The ROKs have as much incentive as we to avoid publicity. And a cut of only 35,000 per year out of 560,000 could be presented here if necessary as revamping, not a main cut.

2. Decide now within the USG, at least tentatively, on a substantial cut in US forces by the end of 1965, if not 1964. Planning should begin, but no announcement of any kind would be made until State and DOD present a final plan to you for decision by 30 June 1964.

3. State and Defense should work out together the optimum timing for such a cut, with an eye to mitigating any adverse political impact in the area. Perhaps doing it in several bites over an 18-month period would help. We could also begin to lay the public relations groundwork by pointing out the erosion of Chicom military capabilities as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, and how we're over-insured in Northeast Asia so may need some redeployment to increase the forces available for Southeast Asia.

- - - - -

While any force cuts will always entail some pain, and I don't wish to play down State's concerns, we cannot always let this be an excuse for no action at all. So I urge you keep the pressure on State and Defense via some such proposal as that described above.


R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

✓

Kova

December 27, 1963

Personal and Confidential

Roger:

Subject: Marshall Green's memo to
you of December 20, 1963

This sort of thing stinks of State bureaucracy
and is less than I would expect from Marshall Green.

The questions the President is interested in are:
Where does the thing stand now and what are we
doing to push it along? The answers seem to be:
at dead center and nothing. Is this right, or do we
have a definite plan for action against which we can
measure progress?

Michael V. Forrestal

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-162

By ig, NARA, Date 7-14-93

5✓

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY


124a

December 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Michael Forrestal

Roger thought you would be interested
in seeing Marshall Green's comments on
your memorandum of December 17 on
ROK-Japanese relations.


Joseph W. Neubert

Attachment

~~Confidential~~ Memorandum

FE 124h


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : FE - Mr. Hilsman
FROM : FE - Marshall Green
SUBJECT : ROK-Japanese Relations

December 20, 1963

In considering Mike Forrestal's attached December 17 memorandum, two things should be clearly distinguished -- the importance and urgency of a ROK-Japan settlement, and the tactical question whether Presidential letters now would promote that objective or actually hinder it, while spending that important arrow in our quiver.

I hope it is unnecessary to defend FE's devotion and efforts toward the objective of a ROK-Japan settlement. We have taken steps throughout the long history of the negotiations to insure that both sides were keenly aware of the importance we attach to a settlement and why (i.e., their own clear national interest); and we have sought by every conceivable, effective means to facilitate and hasten agreement. At the same time we have recognized that a ROK-Japan settlement, involving agreement on a variety of complex claims and other issues growing out of forty years of Japanese occupation, and in the face of strong public suspicions and antagonism on both sides, has not been an easy negotiating task for either Government. We have felt that if an agreement was to be achieved and was to last, it had to be worked out by the two governments on the basis of what each considered its true national interests. We have felt that the US should avoid evidence of such great concern or impatience as possibly to lead the parties to believe that our real interest was to ease our own burdens in Korea, that by maintaining stiff enough negotiating positions they could lead us to exert pressures on the other, or that recalcitrance would eventually result in our assuming part of the financial burdens of a settlement.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161appa

By ju, NARA, Date 5-13-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

As indicated in my earlier memorandum, the present situation appears to me and to the Office of East Asian Affairs to be one in which the Japanese and Korean Governments, though still divided on fisheries and other lesser matters, are both anxious to move ahead. Each gives every evidence of awareness of the timeliness of a determined effort to finalize the negotiations, and each appears to be seeking to work out terms which it will be able to sell to its people and parliament. If there were any doubts of US views, it would have been removed by the President's November 22 statements here to Ikeda and Pak, _____ by the final paragraph of Secretary Rusk's December letter to Ohira, _____, and by the Department's December 4 instruction _____ to Ambassador Berger to remind Pak of his Washington conversations on the normalization question and to reiterate our hope and expectation that the issues can now be finalized.

It remains our considered view that Presidential letters in these circumstances would not enhance prospects of an early settlement, and might in fact have exactly the opposite effect. Coming so soon after the above steps, we feel that Ikeda and Pak would resent the letters as reflecting undue US pressure. We see no possibly way in which they could assist solution of the substantive and public opinion problems which both Ikeda and Pak are faced with as they seek to bring the negotiations to a close.

136X5)

We intend to maintain the closest possible watch over the situation and to recommend Presidential letters immediately should the negotiations develop along lines in which they might be helpful.

Mr. Forrestal also refers to the question of troop reductions and to economic trends in Korea in light of reduced AID abilities, and states that if Presidential letters are considered inadvisable now we ought at least to devise a program for other types of action. As you know, State (FE, G/TI and E), Defense and AID are urgently addressing ourselves to these problems and hope soon to be in a position to submit joint recommendations to the White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

1.3(a)(5)



Attachment:

Memorandum from Mr. Forrestal

FE:EA:RAFearey/FE:MGreen:cj .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korea

~~SECRET~~

December 20, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Korea

I have your memorandum of December 18 on force reduction in Korea. I agree that we need to develop a political-military plan of U. S. action which will deal with all of the implications of U. S. and ROK force reduction.

The President is most anxious that we get some action on this matter which has been hanging fire for so long; and in this connection I assume that State will want to consider not only how to convey to the Koreans the rationale for the suggested force reductions, but would also want to formulate a diplomatic plan for achieving an ROK-Japanese peace treaty in the very near future. This is especially important in light of the economic impact of a U. S. force reduction and the diminished funds we will have available for economic assistance to Korea in the coming year.

B/

McGeorge Bundy

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-162
By sig, NARA, Date 7-14-93

Dispatched 12/20/63

~~SECRET~~

Korea
S 126

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 20, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Korea

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In a

McGeorge Bundy

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-162
By 48, NARA, Date 7-14-93

~~SECRET~~

Dispatched 12/20/63

483

126a

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Force Reduction in Korea.

I refer to our conversation on force reduction in Korea and the task Ros Gilpatric and I were given in this regard. For your background information, the Howze recommendations, on which Ambassador Berger based the view in his 784 that the time was ripe to come to grips with planning for an ROK and U.S. force reduction in Korea, did not envisage any American unit withdrawal until at least the end of 1965. However, the Howze recommendations have not been accepted even by the Army, much less the JCS. Thus, we are faced, not with reacting to the plan that Ambassador Berger had in mind, but rather constructing a political-military plan to give effect to the purposes of the President.

I believe that we can do this in a matter of weeks based upon the previous work that was accomplished last summer. In order to do the thorough job required for a decision by the President on this important subject, including the economic factors and the ramifications throughout the Far Eastern area, I would hope that we could have until the middle of January. In any event, we are proceeding as urgently as possible, with the full cooperation of DOD, and I will keep you informed of our progress.


U. Alexis Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By fw, NARA, Date 6-30-92

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

1262

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

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BUNDY-SMITH

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ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBECK

CHASE

CLINGMAN

DUNGAN

ECKEL

FORRESTAL

JOHNSON

KILDUFF

KLEIN

KOMER

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

SMITH, WM. Y.

~~SECRET~~ (784)
DEC 6, 6PM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-161

By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

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REF: EMBTEL 608 **FILE COPY**

1. REFTEL CONVEYED MY VIEW THAT QUESTION OF ROK FORCE LEVELS REDUCTION SHOULD SHORTLY BE REEXAMINED. I MENTIONED THAT GENERAL HOWZE WAS FORWARDING PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD AND SAID I WOULD WITHHOLD FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL WASHINGTON HAS RECEIVED HIS PROPOSALS.

2. RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS HERE HAVE UNDERScoreD IMPORTANCE CFN 784 6 6PM 1. 2.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 08E ~~SECRET~~

OF EARLY DECISION IF FORCE LEVELS ARE TO BE CUT. NEW GOVT OF PAK CHONG-HUI WILL HAVE LARGE MAJORITY IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SHOULD AT LEAST FOR A WHILE COMMAND SUFFICIENT POLITICAL STRENGTH TO BE ABLE MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS, INCLUDING THIS ONE. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS MAY WEAKEN GOVT'S STRONG POSITION AND REDUCE ITS CAPABILITY IN THIS REGARD. EXAMPLES OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE SHARPENING OF FACTIONAL DIVISIONS WITHIN GOVT, A BREAKUP OF THE GOVT PARTY, OR GROWING POPULAR DISCONTENT STEMMING FROM CONTINUED INFLATION.

3. PREVIOUS MESSAGES HAVE EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY REASONS FOR FORCE REDUCTION AND THESE CONTINUE TO HOLD.

4. GENERAL HOWZE HAS SUBMITTED PROPOSALS THAT WOULD PERMIT A MODEST REDUCTION IN BOTH KOREAN AND US FORCES BASED ON A RESTRUCTURING OF THE US FORCES IN KOREA, AND WOULD ALSO UNLOCK US FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT FORWARD POSITION. SINCE PROPOSALS ARE STILL BEING CONSIDERED IN CINCPAC, I DO NOT THINK IT APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO DISCUSS THEIR DETAILS. GENERAL HOWZE'S

SECRET

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126c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1963

Mac:

Would you care to add your weight
which is greater than mine with
U. Alexis.

Mike

Mike Forrestal

Attachment: Ltr. to Mr. Johnson

Mr. Bundy

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Lower County 127
683
Show to Gen. Clifton ✓
CC & Forrestal

December 18, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Force Reduction in Korea.

I refer to our conversation on force reduction in Korea and the task Ros Gilpatric and I were given in this regard. For your background information, the Howze recommendations, on which Ambassador Berger based the view in his 784, that the time was ripe to come to grips with planning for an ROK and U.S. force reduction in Korea, did not envisage any American unit withdrawal until at least the end of 1965. However, the Howze recommendations have not been accepted even by the Army, much less the JCS. Thus, we are faced, not with reacting to the plan that Ambassador Berger had in mind, but rather constructing a political-military plan to give effect to the purposes of the President.

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/s/ U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-161

By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

128
Show to Gen Clifton
CC to Forrestal

December 18, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Force Reduction in Korea.

I refer to our conversation on force reduction in Korea and the task Ros Gilpatric and I were given in this regard. For your background information, the Howze recommendations, on which Ambassador Berger based the view in his 784 that the time was ripe to come to grips with planning for an ROK and U.S. force reduction in Korea, did not envisage any American unit withdrawal until at least the end of 1965. However, the Howze recommendations have not been accepted even by the Army, much less the JCS. Thus, we are faced, not with reacting to the plan that Ambassador Berger had in mind, but rather constructing a political-military plan to give effect to the purposes of the President.

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/s/ U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson

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NIJ 92-161

By ju, NARA, Date 6-30-92

~~SECRET~~



18661

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Press Release Announcing Appointment of Governor John A. Burns
as Presidential Delegate to Korean Inaugural Ceremonies.

The enclosed press release is submitted for your approval and issuance by the White House. A memorandum for the President recommending the designation of Governor Burns and Ambassador Berger as his representatives at the inauguration of Chung Hee Park on December 17 is being submitted separately. It is recommended that release be made at Mr. Salinger's morning briefing on Thursday, December 12.

/s/ C.C. Moor
for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Press Release

SUGGESTED PRESS RELEASE

The White House announced today that President Johnson has appointed Governor John A. Burns of Hawaii as his Personal Representative to attend the ceremonies incident to the inauguration of His Excellency Chung Hee Park as President of the Republic of Korea on December 17, 1963. The Honorable Samuel D. Berger, United States Ambassador to Korea, will also serve as a representative of the President. President-elect Park is the chairman of the military junta which has governed Korea since the military coup in May, 1961. He was elected President on October 15, 1963.

Governor Burns is now in Japan on State business and will proceed to Seoul on December 16, 1963.

~~SECRET~~

✓ 130
Korea
December 7, 1963

Among the places where we might save money and troops, Korea stands quite high. For years we've maintained almost a 600,000 man ROK army, plus two US divisions in Korea against the threat of a resumed Chicom/North Korean attack. This force is far larger than needed to meet the North Koreans alone, since they never built back up to beyond 350,000 or so after Korean war.

We do not regard threat of overt Chicom aggression as high. [REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5) [REDACTED] So Korea simply no longer looks like such a high priority target as to tie up the large proportion of US assets it still does.

The ROK regime now wants to cut 100,000 men. We should let them do it; it will save us at least some MAP costs.

A more important saving would result from redeploying one (or even two) of our understrength US divisions there. These forces could be reconstituted as a strategic reserve for Southeast Asia. If redeployed to the US or Hawaii, we would reduce gold drain.

Ambassador Berger thinks that now is the time to move. While some increased strategic risk is naturally involved, we would not reduce our forces in Korea, or the ROK forces, below what we consider to be the danger point.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLTJ 92-162
By sig, NARA, Date 7-14-93

~~SECRET~~

Korea



Department of Defense
DOD Battle Casualties In The Korean War
By Period of Occurrence

| | Battle Deaths <u>a/</u> | Wounds Not Mortal |
|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| By Fiscal Year: | | |
| 1950 | 33 | 8 |
| 1951 | 20,801 | 53,664 |
| 1952 | 5,999 | 25,643 |
| 1953 | 4,897 | 20,404 |
| 1954 | 1,838 | 3,565 |
| 1955 | <u>61</u> | <u>-</u> |
| TOTAL | 33,629 | 103,284 |
| By Calendar Year: | | |
| 1950 | 14,070 | 29,529 |
| 1951 | 11,358 | 43,576 |
| 1952 | 4,386 | 19,211 |
| 1953 | 3,403 | 10,968 |
| 1954 | <u>412</u> | <u>-</u> |
| TOTAL | 33,629 | 103,284 |

a/ Consists of killed in action, died of wounds, and died while missing or captured. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force "findings of presumptive death" under the Missing Persons Act are shown for the period in which the official date of death was established. Army "findings of presumptive death" are shown for the period in which the man was designated as missing in action.

15 October 1956

Department of Defense

TENTATIVE FINAL REPORT OF U.S. BATTLE CASUALTIES IN THE KOREAN WAR a/

| | Total Dept. of Defense | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force |
|---|---------------------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1. TOTAL CASUALTIES (Sum of lines 3, 4, 5 and 6) | <u>142,091</u> | <u>109,958</u> | <u>2,087</u> | <u>28,205</u> | <u>1,841</u> |
| 2. TOTAL DEATHS (Sum of lines 3, 4a, 5a and 6a) b/ | <u>33,629</u> | <u>27,704</u> | <u>458</u> | <u>4,267</u> | <u>1,200</u> |
| 3. Killed in action - Total | <u>23,300</u> | <u>19,334</u> | <u>279</u> | <u>3,308</u> | <u>379</u> |
| 4. Wounded in action - Total | <u>105,785</u> | <u>79,526</u> | <u>1,599</u> | <u>24,281</u> | <u>379</u> |
| a. Died of wounds | 2,501 | 1,930 | 23 | 537 | 11 |
| b. Wounds not mortal | 103,284 | 77,596 | 1,576 | 23,744 | 368 |
| 5. Missing in action - Total | <u>5,866</u> | <u>4,442</u> | <u>174</u> | <u>391</u> | <u>859</u> |
| a. Died while missing | 5,127 | 3,778 | 152 | 391 | 806 |
| b. Returned to military control | 715 | 664 | 13 | 0 | 38 |
| c. Current missing | 24 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 15 |
| Captured or interned - Total | <u>7,140</u> | <u>6,656</u> | <u>35</u> | <u>225</u> | <u>224</u> |
| a. Died while captured or interned | 2,701 | 2,662 | 4 | 31 | 4 |
| b. Returned to military control | 4,418 | 3,973 | 31 | 194 | 220 |
| c. Refused repatriation | 21 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

a/ These data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action during the period 25 June 1950-27 July 1953. The figures reflect findings of presumptive death and other determinations; changes in status, and revisions processed through 30 September 1954.

b/ Includes 4,735 findings of presumptive death under the Missing Persons Act.

Progress Reports and Statistics
Office of Secretary of Defense
4 November 1954

LBJ/Park Memcon
11/25/63

Approved by White House
12/2/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

17064

*Memorandum of Conversation*DATE: November 25, 1963
at the President's Reception
at the State Department

SUBJECT: United States-Korean Relations

UNITED STATESKOREAPARTICIPANTS: The President
Mr. Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Acting President Chung Hee PARK
Foreign Minister Yong Shik KIM
Ambassador Yong Chul KIMCOPIES TO: White House ✓
S/S
G
S/P
S/AL
FE-3
American Embassy, Seoul
American Embassy, Tokyo

President Park expressed the condolences of the Korean people on the death of President Kennedy, but their satisfaction that a man of President Johnson's stature had succeeded him.

President Johnson thanked the Korean President and stressed the regard of the American people for Korea and the continuity of United States foreign policy.

President Johnson noted United States pleasure at the fulfillment of the military junta's pledge to return to civilian rule and the moderation marking the recent elections in Korea.

President Johnson mentioned our pleasure at indications that the negotiations for normalization of relations between Korea and Japan had been progressing and expressed the hope that the completion of elections in both Japan and Korea would set the stage for a rapid and successful completion of the negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Group 4

By us

NIP Date

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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