

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

139

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 cable	Seoul 315 <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i> secret exempt NLS 91-20	1 p 09/27/65	A
#4 cable	Seoul 155 <i>Open RAC 9.19</i> confidential <i>sanitized 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	2 p 08/13/65	A
#5 cable	Seoul 140 <i>Open RAC 9.19</i> confidential <i>sanitized 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	2 p 08/12/65	A
#7 cable	Seoul 126 confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	1 p 08/05/65	A
#8 cable	Seoul 125 secret <i>open 9-25-91 NLS 91-20</i>	2 p 08/05/65	A
#9 cable	Seoul 123 confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	1 p 08/04/65	A
#10 cable	Seoul 104 <i>Open RAC 9.19</i> secret <i>sanitized 7-2-92 NLS 91-20</i>	4 p 07/29/65	A
#11 cable	Seoul 85 secret <i>open 6-17-91 NLS 91-20</i>	1 p 07/23/65	A
#12 cable	Seoul 74 top secret (gp 2) <i>open 7-7-92 NLS 91-20</i>	1 p 07/20/65	A
#13 cable	Seoul 68 <i>sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20</i> secret <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i>	4 p 07/20/65	A
#14 cable	Seoul 38 <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i> Confidential	3 p 07/09/65	A
#16 cable	Seoul 7 secret <i>exempt NLS 91-20</i>	5 p 07/02/65	A
#17 cable	Seoul 40 <i>sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20</i> secret <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i>	6 p 07/10/65	A
18 cable	Seoul 12 <i>sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20</i> secret	6 p 07/03/65	A
#19 cable	Seoul 1310 secret <i>exempt NLS 91-20</i> <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i>	2 p 06/14/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
Korea, vol. 2

Box 254

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

289

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20 cable	Seoul 1283 sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20 Secret open RAC 9-19	2 p 06/07/65	A
#21 cable	Seoul 1254 secret example NLS 91-20 open RAC 9-19	4 p 05/30/65	A
#22 cable	Seoul 1196 confidential open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165	1 p 05/15/65	A
#23 cable	Seoul 1195 confidential "	1 p 05/15/65	A
#24 cable	Seoul 1191 sanitized 8-27-92 NLS 92-165 confidential open 8-15-07	2 p 05/14/65	A
#27 cable	Seoul 1156 secret open 6-17-91 NLS 91-20	1 p 05/10/65	A
#28 cable	Seoul 1151 sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20 secret same sanitization per RAC-NLS 118103	2 p 05/08/65	A
#29 cable	Seoul 1108 confidential open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165	1 p 05/01/65	A
#31 cable	Seoul 1105 open RAC 9-19 confidential example NLS 92-165	3 p 05/01/65	A
#32 cable	Seoul 1103 confidential open 8-27-92 NLS 92-165	1 p 04/30/65	A
#33 cable	Seoul 1101 sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20 secret open RAC 9-19	4 p 05/01/65	A
#34 cable	Seoul 1072 secret open 6-17-91 NLS 91-20	1 p 04/26/65	A
#35 cable	Seoul 1045 confidential open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165	1 p 04/21/65	A
#36 cable	Seoul 1044 secret open 6-17-91 NLS 91-20	1 p 04/21/65	A
#37 cable	Seoul 1022 secret "	1 p 04/16/65	A

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339

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#39 cable	Seoul 979 confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	3 p 04/09/65	A
#40 cable	Seoul 883 <i>exempt NLS 92-20</i> secret <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i>	1 p 03/19/65	A
#42 cable	Seoul 865 secret <i>OPEN 8.15.07</i> <i>exempt NLS 92-20</i>	1 p 03/15/65	A
#43 cable	Seoul 861 confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	2 p 03/12/65	A
#44 cable	Seoul 845 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>Painting 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	3 p 03/08/65	A
#45 cable	Seoul 816 secret <i>open 5-26-92 NLS 92-71</i>	2 p 03/02/65	A
#46 cable	Seoul 793 secret "	1 p 02/24/65	A
#47 cable	Seoul 783 secret <i>open 6-1-92 NLS 92-71</i>	1 p 02/22/65	A
#48 cable	Seoul 703 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>Painting 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	5 p 02/03/65	A
#51 cable	Seoul 588 confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLS 92-165</i>	2 p 12/30/64	A
#52 cable	Seoul 557 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> secret <i>Painting 6-1-92 NLS 92-71</i>	1 p 12/21/64	A
#53 cable	Seoul 552 secret <i>open 6-1-92 NLS 92-71</i>	2 p 12/19/64	A
#55 cable	Seoul 372 <i>C removed per R6/jc 1/24/12</i> confidential <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	1 p 10/20/	A & C
#56 cable	Seoul 351 <i>C removed per R6/jc 1/24/12</i> confidential <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	1 p 10/13/64	A & C
#57 cable	Seoul 343 <i>C removed per R6/jc 1/24/12</i> Confidential <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	1 p 10/10/64	A & C
#58 cable	Seoul 334 <i>C removed per R6/jc 1/24/12</i> confidential <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	3 p 10/07/64	A & C

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Korea, vol. 2

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489

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#59 cable	Seoul 321 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> Secret <i>sanitized 6-1-92 NLJ 92-71</i>	2 p 10/05/64	A
#60 cable	Tokyo 641 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>sanitized 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	2 p 08/20/64	A
#61 cable	Seoul 163 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>exempt NLJ 92-165</i>	3 p 08/19/64	A
#63 cable	Seoul 66 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>sanitized 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	3 p 07/22/64	A
#64 cable	Seoul 61 <i>open RAC 9-19</i> confidential <i>exempt NLJ 92-165</i>	2 p 07/21/64	A
#66 cable	Seoul 170 Deptel 173 confidential <i>exempt NLJ 92-165</i> <i>open 2/10/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 08/14/65	A
#68 cable	Deptel 166 to Seoul <i>open 9-25-91 NLJ 91-20</i> secret	2 p 08/12/65	A
#70 cable	Deptel 121 to Seoul <i>"</i> secret	1 p 08/02/65	A
#72 cable	Deptel 934 to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	2 p 04/02/65	A
#72 cable	work copy of #72 <i>"</i>		
#73 cable	Deptel 68 to Seoul top secret (gp 2) <i>open 6-17-91 NLJ 91-20</i>	3 p 07/19/65	A
#74 cable	Deptel 47 to Seoul secret <i>exempt NLJ 91-20</i>	3 p 07/12/65	A
#75 cable	Deptel 45 to Seoul <i>sanitized 6-17-91 NLJ 91-20</i> secret <i>open 2/10/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 07/11/65	A
#76 cable	Deptel 15 to Seoul <i>exempt per RAC</i> secret <i>exempt NLJ 91-20</i> <i>8.15.07</i>	4 p 07/05/65	A
<i>NOT open!</i> #79 cable	Deptel 1290 to Seoul secret <i>open 7-7-92 NLJ 91-20</i>	1 p 06/16/65	A
#80 cable	Deptel 1077 to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	1 p 05/01/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#81 cable	Deptel 1075 to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	2 p 05/01/65	A
#82 cable	Deptel 1069 to Seoul Confidential <i>open 8-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	1 p 04/03/65	A
#84 cable	Deptel 1042 to Seoul secret <i>sanitized 7-30-92 NLJ 91-20</i> <i>Open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	3 p 04/26/65	A
#85 cable	Deptel 1038 to Seoul Secret <i>open 7-7-92 NLJ 91-20</i>	2 p 04/24/65	A
#86 cable	Deptel 982 to Seoul <i>sanitized 1-17-91 NLJ 91-20</i> Secret <i>Open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 04/14/65	A
#87 cable	Deptel 915 to Seoul <i>open 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i> Secret	1 p 03/30/65	A
#88 cable	Deptel 894 to Seoul " " secret	1 p 03/25/65	A
#89 cable	Deptel 874 to Seoul secret <i>sanitized 8-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	1 p 03/17/65	A
#92 cable	Deptel 799 to Seoul secret <i>sanitized 8-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i> <i>Open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 02/27/65	A
#93 cable	Deptel 768 to Seoul secret <i>sanitized 8-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i> <i>Open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 02/19/65	A
#94c cable	work copy of deptel to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-27-92 NLJ 92-165</i>	2 p 02/18/65	A
#95 cable	Deptel 738 to Seoul confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	1 p 02/12/65	A
#95b cable	work copy #95 "		
#96 cable	Deptel 724 to Seoul secret <i>open 8-27-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	2 p 02/10/65	A
#97 cable	Deptel 708 to Seoul secret <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-160</i>	2 p 02/07/65	A
#100 cable	Deptel 549 to Seoul " confidential	1 p 12/21/64	A

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6289

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#101 cable	Deptel 532 to Seoul Secret <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i>	1 p 12/17/64	A
#102 cable	Deptel 531 to Seoul secret <i>open 7-30-93 NLS 92-166</i>	2 p 12/16/64	A
#103 cable	Deptel 501 to Seoul secret <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i>	3 p 12/10/64	A
#104 cable	Deptel 485 to Seoul Secret "	3 p 12/04/64	A
#105 cable	Deptel 429 to Seoul secret "	1 p 11/17/64	A
#105b cable	work copy of #105 "		
#106 note	to Mac from RWK secret <i>open 6-25-93 NLS 92-168</i>	1 p 11/12/64	A
#106a cable	Deptel 407 to Seoul secret <i>exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i> <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	2 p 11/11/64	A
#107 cable	Deptel 337 to Seoul confidential <i>exempt 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i> <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 10/13/64	A
#108 cable	Deptel 333 to Seoul confidential <i>C removed per RG/jc 1/24/12</i> <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	2 p 10/12/64	A & C
#109 cable	Deptel 327 to Seoul confidential <i>C removed per RG/jc 1/24/12</i> <i>open 4/2/13 per NLS 12-77</i>	2 p 10/09/64	A & C
#110 cable note	to Mac from RWK secret <i>open 6-25-93 NLS 92-168</i>	1 p 08/03/64	A
#110a cable	Deptel 97 to Seoul confidential <i>open 7-30-93 NLS 92-166</i>	3 p 07/31/64	A
#110b cable	Deptel 99 to Seoul confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLS 92-168</i>	2 p 06/31/64	A
#112 cable	Deptel 12 to Seoul secret <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i>	2 p 07/03/64	A
#114 cable	intelligence information cable confidential <i>sanitized 1-12-93 NLS 92-167</i> <i>same denotation per RAC 4/18/02</i>	2 p 09/19/64	A
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789

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#116a cable	A-54 from Seoul <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i> confidential	2 p 08/13/65	A
#119 memo	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read confidential	1 p 07/19/65	A
#121 memo	to President from George Ball Secret <i>open 7-7-92 NLS 91-20</i>	2 p 05/13/65	A
#122 memo	to Wm. Moyers from Ben Read confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i>	1 p 05/04/65	A
#122a report	re: Panmunjom confidential <i>open 7-30-93 NLS 92-166</i>	3 p 05/04/65	A
#124 memo	to Mr. Bundy from Thomson re: fisheries confidential sanitized 6-25-93 NLS 92-168 <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 01/11/65	A
#126a bio sketch	of Hyon Chol Kim confidential <i>sanitized per RAC 8-15-07</i>	2 p undated	A & C
#127 memo	to Bill from RWK secret <i>sanitized 6-25-93 NLS 92-168</i> <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 09/14/64	A
#128 memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Ben Read secret exempt NLS 92-166 <i>exempt per RAC 8-15-07</i>	1 p 09/12/64	A
#128a memo	to Christopher Norred re: ROK-Japan talks secret sanitized 6-17-91 NLS 91-20 <i>open 11/7/14 per NLS/RAC 13-171</i>	2 p 09/05/64	A
#130 letter	to McGeorge Bundy from Edwin Reischauer secret sanitized 6-25-93 NLS 92-168 <i>open 7-30-93 NLS 92-166</i>	2 p 08/21/64	A
#131 letter	to Edwin Reischauer from McGeorge Bundy secret sanitized 6-25-93 NLS 92-168 <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 08/13/64	A
#132 memo	to President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 6-25-93 NLS 92-168</i>	1 p 07/31/64	A
#135 memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Ben Read confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLS 92-166</i>	1 p 07/28/64	A
#136 memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 7-30-93 NLS 92-166</i>	1 p 07/28/64	A

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889

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#136a message	Proposed oral message from President confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-168</i>	1 p undated	A
#137 memo	to President via Valenti from McG. B[undy] confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-168</i>	1 p 07/29/64	A
#137a memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 7-30-93 NLJ 92-166</i>	1 p 07/27/64	A
#138 memo	to Bill Bundy fm R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-168</i>	1 p 07/22/64	A
#143a memcon	re: Pres. Park's State Visit to US confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	2 p 06/01/65	A
#145 memcon	re: Joint Communique by Pres. Johnson & Park confidential <i>open 7-30-93 NLJ 92-166</i> [page 4 missing]	5 p 05/18/65	A
#146 memcon	re: Korea-Japan Negotiations confidential <i>exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i> <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 05/18/65	A
#150 memcon	re: US commitment to Korea confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	2 p 04/16/65	A
#151a memcon	Korean foreign minister's call on the President confidential <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 92-168</i>	1 p 03/17/65	A
#152a memcon	re: current Korean problems confidential <i>exempt 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i> <i>open 2/6/12 per RAC</i>	9 p 03/15/65	A
#153 memcon	re: US-Korea policy questions confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	2 p 03/11/65	A
#156a memcon	re: possible visit to the US by Korean President confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	1 p 12/26/64	A
#157a memcon	re: Korea-Japan settlement confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	1 p 12/02/64	A
#157b memcon	re: state visit by Korean president to US confidential <i>open 8-12-92 NLJ 92-166</i>	1 p 12/02/64	A
#158a memcon	re: Korea <i>sanitized 6-17-91 NLJ 91-20</i> confidential <i>open 4/10/02 NLJ 01-205</i>	7 p 09/14/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#160a Memcon	between President, Komer & Winthrop Brown confidential <i>open 6.25.93 NLJ 92-168</i>	1 p 08/10/64	A
#161 memo	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read confidential <i>open 1-24-92</i>	1 p 08/17/64	A
#161a memcon	is duplicate #160a <i>open 6.25.93 NLJ 92-168</i>		

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~DIST: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J1-1 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2
NMCC-2 SECDEF-5 ASD/ISA-9 DIA-15 WHOUSE-3
CSA-2 CNO-2 CSAF-2 CMC-7 RIAR-1 FILE-1(70)G/D

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Group 4

By

is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

PRIORITY

INFO

PRIORITY

DTG 022246Z AUG 65

FROM

JCS

TO

CINCPAC

INFO:

CSA /ZEN
AMEMB SEOUL
CINCUSARPAC
COMUSKOREA
COMUSMACV
WHITE HOUSE
STATE DEPARTMENT
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP

BUNDY-SMITH

BATOR

BOWDLER

BOWMAN

CHASE

COOPER

HAYNES

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KEENEY

KLEIN

KOMER

MOODY

REEDY

SAUNDERS

THOMSON

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Distribution

CJCS ASD/ISA

DJS SECDEF

SJCS NMCC

J-1 CSA

J-3 CNO

J-4 CSAF

J-5 CMC

DIA

Coordination

Army

B/Gen Tillson

Navy

Capt Vannoy

Air Force

B/Gen Dixon

Marine Corps

Col Ryan

ASD/ISA

RADM Blouin

97/270825Z is

IN 67832

282302Z is

IN 71016

241930Z is

IN 65305

~~SECRET~~ JCS 7281 JCS send

Subj: Activation of Helicopter Company in Korea (U)

Refs: a. AMEMB Seoul 97/270825Z Jul (NOTAL);

b. CINCPAC 282302Z Jul (NOTAL); c. Joint State-Defense
241930Z Jul (NOTAL)

1. (S) Refs a and b in response to ref c indicate that it would be desirable to defer deployment of a helicopter company from Korea to SVN until mid-September in hopes that ROK National Assembly will have approved dispatch of ROK Division to SVN by that time.

DATE

TIME

2

1845

MONTH

YEAR

AUG

1965

PAGE NO.

NO. OF

1

PAGES 2

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

53049

SIGNATURE

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RL/COL A. L. WRIGHT, USA
Pacific Division, J-3R
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TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE

Director for Operations

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

GP-4

DD FORM 173
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM

AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

ACTION

INFO

2. (S) The following guidance in regard to the deployment of the helicopter company is provided:

a. Authority to move the 155th Aviation Company and its supporting detachments from Korea to SVN is withheld until further notice.

b. Continue activation and readiness actions to meet a planned departure date of 15 September 1965. (Insure that no helicopters plan to depart prior to 15 September 1965.

3. (S) In event it appears that National Assembly decision on ROK Division will not be made prior to 15 September, your further recommendations are requested NLT 5 September 1965. GP-4

CONTROL NO.

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MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

INITIALS

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REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS

GP-4

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2

2
Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 22646
Rec'd: September 27, 1965
11:56 p.m.

FROM: Seoul
ACTION: Secstate 315
DATE: September 28

LIMDIS

Reference: Embassy Telegrams 243 and 280.

1. October requirement is \$450,000.
2. GP-3.

BROWN

BC/12

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By sj/jc, NARA, Date 5-22-07

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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47

Action

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (157)
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC PRIORITY 84
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 86
STATE GRNC
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AUGUST 14

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTTEL 169

ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT

1. IN STAND-UP VOTE TAKEN AT 1725 HOURS LOCAL AUGUST 14, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RATIFIED ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT BY VOTE OF 110 TO ZERO WITH ONE ABSTENTION. NO OPPOSITION MEMBERS PRESENT. ONE OF TWO INDEPENDENTS WAS PRESENT AND VOTED FOR LEGISLATION; OTHER WAS ABSENT. WOMAN DRP MEMBER ONLY ABSTENTION.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 83E LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2. FOLLOWING VOTE SPEAKER YI HYU-SANG TOLD ASSEMBLY THAT IT "REGRETTABLE" AGREEMENT RATIFIED IN ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS. SAID HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT RESIGN BUT WOULD WORK TO PERSUADE OPPOSITION MEMBERS RETURN TO ASSEMBLY AND APPEALED TO NA AND GOVT LEADERS TO MAINTAIN SELF-DEPENDENT SPIRIT IN IMPLEM SC IHAX* AGREEMENT.

3. AS INDICATION OF ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD EN MASSE RESIGNATION OF OPPOSITION MEMBERS FROM ASSEMBLY, DRP OVERWHELMINGLY REJECTED SEPARATE RESIGNATION OF CHOE HUI-SONG AFTER VOTE ON AGREEMENT WAS TAKEN.

4. SPEAKER YI ADJOURNED THIS ASSEMBLY SESSION AT 1950 HOURS LOCAL. ALTHOUGH SMALL STUDENT RALLY AT KOREA UNIVERSITY AND INDOOR MEETING BY SAVE-THE-NATION COUNCIL REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE DURING DAY, THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OUTSIDE

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-2- 157, AUGUST 14, FROM SEOUL

ASSEMBLY AND CITY APPEARS CALM AS THIS TELEGRAM SENT.

5. EARLIER IN DAY, PEOPLE'S PARTY (PP) STANDING COMMITTEE IN SHORT BUT TURBULENT MEETING PASSED RESOLUTION DECLARING ANY DECISION ON K-J AGREEMENT REACHED BY ASSEMBLY IN ABSENCE PP MEMBERS "NULL AND VOID". MEETING REPORTEDLY PRODUCED NO OTHER TANGIBLE RESULTS. DESPITE EXERTION EXTREME PRESSURE ADAMANT FACTION FAILED PERSUADE MODERATES TO AGREE TO RESIGN FROM PARTY.

BROWN
BT

* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 10:33 AM, 8/14/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:50 AM, 8/14/65.

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 82

RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 84

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 13

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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1965 AUG 13 AM 6 08

1. ROK POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: DRP CAUCUS DECIDED MORNING AUGUST 13 TO HAVE ASSEMBLY APPROVE DISPATCH OF TROOPS TO VIETNAM AND TO RATIFY ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT IN THAT ORDER. TROOP DISPATCH BILL APPROVED TODAY AND INTERPELLATIONS ON ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT ARE ALREADY UNDER WAY. PEOPLE'S PARTY (PP) MEMBERS, HAVING RESIGNED FROM ASSEMBLY AUGUST 12, DID NOT ATTEND PLENARY SESSION.

2. DRP DECISION RESULT OF EMBASSY INQUIRY MADE BY DCM TO PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK EARLY MORNING AUGUST 13 WHETHER IT FEASIBLE FOR ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER TROOP DISPATCH ISSUE BEFORE TAKING UP ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT. DCM SUGGESTED THAT THIS TACTIC MIGHT SOFTEN IMPRESSION THAT ROK HAD RAIL-ROADED AGREEMENT THROUGH ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER OPPOSITION ASSEMBLY MEMBERS RESIGNED. MOREOVER, SHOULD SOME OPPOSITION MEMBERS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN ASSEMBLY ACTION ON TROOP DISPATCH ISSUE, THEY WOULD THUS BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE ASSEMBLY TAKES UP K-J AGREEMENT. AFTER REPORTING EMBASSY'S VIEWS TO PRESIDENT, YI TOLD DCM THAT PRESIDENT HAD ACCEPTED EMBASSY'S SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, DRP STILL INTENDS IN ABSENCE OPPOSITION PARTY FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO BRING RATIFICATION TO VOTE BY AUGUST 14.

3. NA PLENARY SESSION OPENED AUGUST 13 BY SPEAKER YI HYOSANG, WHO REPORTED RESIGNATIONS OF PP MEMBERS PREVIOUS DAY. ALSO REPORTED THAT SIX PP ASSEMBLYMEN WHO RESIGNED FROM PARTY ARE NOW FORMALLY DISQUALIFIED TO OCCUPY ASSEMBLY SEATS. THEY ARE: YUN PO-SON, SO MIN-HO, CHONG SONG-TAE, IM TO-YUN, CHONG IL-HYONG AND KIM CHAE-KWANG.

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Authority: RA-cod/R-254-4-1-5

By: JAL/ARA Date: 8-27-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 155, AUGUST 13 FROM SEOUL

4. FORMER PRIME MINISTER PAK TU-CHIN TOLD US AUGUST 13 THAT MADAME PAK SUN-CHON HAD DECIDED NOT TO RESIGN FROM PARTY AT LEAST FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. SAID HOWEVER SHE IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM INFLUENTIAL MODERATES IN PARTY, CHIEFLY CHO CHAE-CHON, TO RESIGN IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE HER SINCERITY IN OPPOSING ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT.

5. MADAME PAK ANNOUNCED TO PRESS AT NOON AUGUST 13 THAT SHE WILL NOT RPT NOT RESIGN FROM PARTY AT PRESENT TIME. MOREOVER, SHE REPORTEDLY SAID SHE HAS "MADE UP MY MIND" BUT DOES NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO RESIGN NOW "BECAUSE OF MY POSITION IN PARTY." CHO CHAE-CHON ALSO QUOTED TO EFFECT THAT HE WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO RESIGN FROM PARTY ONLY AFTER MADAME PAK MAKES HER VIEWS KNOWN.

6. ACCORDING PRESS REPORTS, ABOUT 30 MODERATE PP ASSEMBLY MEMBERS MET EVENING AUGUST 12 TO DISCUSS FUTURE STRATEGY IN VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS. INFORMED SOURCES INDICATE THAT MODERATES DECIDED NOT TO RESIGN FROM PARTY AND TO COUNSEL MADAME PAK SUN-CHON ALONG SAME LINES. FORMATION OF NINE-MAN COMMITTEE ANNOUNCED TO COORDINATE ACTIONS OF GROUP. THIS APPARENTLY EXPLAINS MADAME PAK'S ANNOUNCEMENT REPORTED PARA 5.

7. COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS INTIMATED TO VARIOUS POLITICAL LEADERS BOTH DRP AND PP OUR CONCERN FOR CONTINUATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT THROUGH MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM. MADAME PAK'S POSITION IS PRECARIOUS AND SHE DESERVES SUCH ENCOURAGEMENT AS WE MAY BE ABLE DISCREETLY PROVIDE. WE ARE CONVEYING GENERAL VIEWS THIS NATURE THROUGH KNOWN INTERMEDIARIES TO MADAME PAK IN INTEREST OF NOT RPT NOT JEOPARDIZING HER DELICATE POSITION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY.

8. GP-3

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1965 AUG 12 AM 2 33

SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 140
SP INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 78
SAH RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 77
BT STATE GRNC

L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 12

H CINCPAC FOR POLAD
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USIA RECOMMENDED DEPARTMENTAL STATEMENT ON ROK POLITICAL SITUATION

NSC
INR 1. SEPTTEL SUMS UP CURRENT SITUATION IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND
CIA OPPOSITION PARTY AS BILL TO RATIFY K-J AGREEMENTS IS MOVED
NSA OUT OF COMMITTEE TO PLENARY SESSION. EXTREMISTS IN PEOPLES
DOD PARTY ARE NOW MAKING LAST DITCH EFFORT TO BLOCK RATIFICATION
AND EMBARRASS GOVT BY DISSOLVING PARTY. MAJORITY OF PP MEMBERS
RSP NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, UNDER LEADERSHIP MRS. PAK SUN-CHON,
WISH TO CONTINUE PARTY AND RETAIN SEATS UNTIL NATIONAL

1.
PAGE 2 RUALOS 58E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ELECTION IN 1967. THEY ARE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM
MEMBERS STANDING COMMITTEE WHICH INCLUDES MANY PARTY
MEMBERS NOT IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHO ARE UNDER INFLUENCE OF
YUN PO-SUN AND WHO WOULD WELCOME DISOLUTION OF PARTY,
HOPING TO FORCE EITHER GENERAL ELECTION OR BY-ELECTIONS IN
WHICH THEY MIGHT WIN SEATS. UNDER PRESSURE AND ON VERGE
DESPAIR PAK SUN-CHON CONSIDERING RESIGNING HERSELF AND
ABANDONING POLITICS.

2. RESIGNATION OF PP MEMBERS FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THIS
MORNING MAY PROMPT PRESS QUERIES TO DEPARTMENT. IN
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BELIEVE PAK SUN-CHON NEEDS AND WOULD WEL-
COME ENCOURAGING STATEMENT FROM SECRETARY OR OTHER DEPT
SPOKESMAN TO STRENGTHEN HER HAND IN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND
FAST MOVING SITUATION. STATEMENT SHOULD AVOID COMMENT ON
K-J AGREEMENTS AND SHOULD FOCUS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.
APPRECIATE DEPARTMENTS USUAL RELUCTANCE COMMENT ON DELICATE
POLITICAL ISSUE BUT IN THIS CASE BELIEVE INTERESTS BOTH P
AND DRP WOULD BE SERVED AND THAT KOREAN GENERAL PUBLIC WOULD
WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE US COMMENT AT THIS TIME.

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Authority 8AC001A-254-4.24
By JPL *ARA Date 8-29-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 140, August 12, from Seoul

3. SUGGEST STATEMENT BE MADE IN RESPONSE EITHER

PAGE 3 RUALOS 58E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO SPONTANEOUS OR PLANTED QUESTION ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

QUESTION: REPORTS FROM SEOUL INDICATE THAT OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE RESIGNED IN AN EFFORT TO BLOCK RATIFICATION OF K-J AGREEMENTS. CAN YOU CLARIFY THE SITUATION THERE FOR US?

ANSWER: IT IS TRUE THAT THE OPPOSITION PEOPLE'S PARTY IS OPPOSED TO RATIFICATION, REFLECTING DEEP-SEATED FEARS AND EMOTIONS OF MANY KOREANS. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE THE CASE THAT, AS A GESTURE OF PROTEST AGAINST THE GOVT'S INTENTION TO RATIFY THE KOREA-JAPAN AGREEMENTS, ALMOST ALL OF THE PEOPLE'S PARTY ASSEMBLYMEN HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE SPEAKER THEIR RESIGNATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT UNDER KOREAN PROCEDURES, A RESIGNATION FROM THE ASSEMBLY, EVEN OF A WHOLE PARTY, DOES NOT TAKE EFFECT AUTOMATICALLY.

IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT IN THE ROK, WE HOPE THAT THESE RESIGNATIONS WILL NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE AND THAT THE OPPOSITION MEMBERS WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THE ASSEMBLY SOON IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS DEBATES AND MAINTAIN ORDERLY DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES.

4. GP-3. BROWN
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USIA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AUGUST 7

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DOD

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEFENSE COMMITTEE VOTED TWELVE TO
 AID TWO IN FAVOR REPORTING OUT TROOP DISPATCH CONSENT BILL FOR
 E NA PLENARY CONSIDERATION AUGUST 9. ONE OPPOSITION
 COMMITTEEMAN VOTED FOR; ONE DRP MEMBER, PAK CHONG-TAE, AGAINST.

RSR BROWN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 5

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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SUBJ: ROK COMBAT FORCES FOR RVN

USIA

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RSR

1. DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MET MORNING AUGUST 5 WITH OPPOSITION MEMBERS PRESENT. COMMITTEE WHICH HAS BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH DISCUSSION OF KIMHAE INCIDENT, FINALLY GOT DOWN TO BUSINESS AND HEARD TESTIMONY OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE KIM SONG-UN. FOLLOWING TESTIMONY MINISTER WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT PLANS TO INCREASE DEATH AND DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR ROK PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM. HE REPLIED THAT THIS

PAGE TWO RUALOS 29E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE GOVT ALONG WITH THE GENERAL QUESTION OF PAY INCREASES. MINISTER WAS ALSO QUESTIONED ABOUT CHICOM STRATEGY AND JCS CHAIRMAN CHANG CHANG-KUK TESTIFIED ON MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

2. MINISTER'S AIDE INFORMED DCM SESSION WENT SMOOTHLY. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED AUGUST 6.

3. ACCORDING TO PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK DECISION AS TO WHETHER BRING TROOP ISSUE OR K-J RATIFICATION TO FLOOR OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FIRST WILL BE MADE WHEN COMMITTEES FINISH WITH ONE OR BOTH MEASURES. PRESIDENT AND DRP LEADERS ARE COUNTING ON SPEEDIER HANDLING OF TROOP ISSUE BY THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE BUT ARE STILL SOMEWHAT FEARFUL THAT OPPOSITION WILL STALL ON TROOP ISSUE IN PLENARY TO DELAY RATIFICATION. ONCE EITHER MEASURE IS TAKEN UP IN PLENARY SESSION DEBATE WILL HAVE TO BE CONCLUDED AND VOTE TAKEN BEFORE OTHER MEASURE CAN BE TAKEN UP.

GP-3
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By 118 NARA. Date 7-17-92

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*7
Action

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Info

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Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1965
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FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 125

INFO: CINCPAC 62
JCS UNNUMBERED

DATE: AUGUST 5

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT USFK/EMBASSY MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ACTIVATION OF HELICOPTER COMPANY IN KOREA

REFERENCES: A. DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 121, B. CINNEAVI 040138Z

1. AMEMBASSY NOTIFIED BLUE HOUSE AUGUST 4 OF IMPENDING DEPLOYMENT UH1B HELICOPTERS TO RVN. DCM INFORMED YI HU-RAK, STRESSING THAT DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL EARLY OR MID-SEPTEMBER AND THAT HELICOPTERS WOULD BE REPLACED SOME TIME IN 1966 SO THAT DEPLOYMENT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS DELAYED STAGING UH1BS TO KOREA. HE EMPHASIZED HIGH MILITARY UTILITY UH1BS IN RVN AS COMPARED TO PURPOSES OF CONVENIENCE SERVED IN ROK. HE EXPLAINED THAT NOTIFICATION BEING GIVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL US UNDERTAKING TO CONSULT WITH ROKG ON MATTERS AFFECTING LEVELS AND EFFECTIVENESS US FORCES IN ROK. DCM POINTED OUT THAT NUMBER OF UH1B HELICOPTERS RELATIVELY SMALL COMPARED TO NUMBER (ABOUT 175) OF H23 AND OTHER TYPES USED IN FORWARD AREAS FOR OBSERVATION AND LIAISON. SAID PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE INCONVENIENCE TO SENIOR US OFFICERS, VIP VISITORS AND OCCASIONALLY PRESIDENT.

2. YI SAID

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-2- 125, AUGUST 5, FROM SEOUL

2. YI SAID HE WOULD INFORM PRESIDENT PAK AND WAS CONFIDENT PRESIDENT WOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND NEED FOR THIS ACTION. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF BILL AUTHORIZING DESPATCH OF DIVISION TASK FORCE TO RVN, HE ASKED THAT WE NOT NOTIFY MND, BUT ALLOW PRESIDENT TO NOTIFY ROK JSC CHAIRMAN, GENERAL CHANG CHANG-KUK.

3. FOREGOING ACTION DECIDED UPON AS INVOLVING MINIMUM LIKELIHOOD, PREMATURE DISCLOSURE. NOTIFICATION HAD TO BE GIVEN AT THIS TIME SINCE HELICOPTER COMPANY ALREADY BEING ACTIVATED CAMP STANLEY AND UH1BS THEREFORE NO LONGER AVAILABLE CUSTOMARY USES, INCLUDING OCCASIONAL USE BY PRESIDENT PAK. DISAPPEARANCE UH1BS FROM NORMAL EMPLOYMENT BOUND TO BE NOTICED IN NEAR FUTURE.

4. GP-3.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 4

NSA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DOD

COMBAT TROOPS FOR VIETNAM

AID

1. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BEGAN DELIBERATIONS AUGUST 3 ON PROPOSAL DISPATCH COMBAT DIVISION TO VIETNAM.

RSR

DRP MEMBERS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

COMMITTEE, TIRING OF WAITING FOR PEOPLE'S PARTY

(PP) MEMBERS TO CONCLUDE CAUCUS, HELD LATE

AFTERNOON MEETING TO HEAR EXPLANATORY REPORT FROM

MND KIN SUNG-UN.

2. AT END OF REPORTEDLY HEATED CAUCUS AUGUST 3, PP ANNOUNCED THAT IT OPPOSES DISPATCH OF TROOPS AND THAT PP ASSEMBLYMEN WILL EITHER WALK OUT OR ABSTAIN WHEN FINAL VOTE IS TAKEN. THIS POSITION COMPARABLE TO THAT ASSUMED BY YUN PO-SON AND FOLLOWERS IN JANUARY 1965 WHEN ASSEMBLY APPROVED DISPATCH NON-COMBATANT FORCE TO VIETNAM. EMBASSY INFORMED THAT MANY PP ASSEMBLYMEN WOULD PREFER TO SPEAK OUT IN FAVOR OF DISPATCHING TROOPS BUT REGARD ANY SIGN OF COOPERATION WITH ROKG AS POLITICAL KISS OF DEATH AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

3. ROKG LEADERS CURRENTLY EXPECT DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO CONCLUDE HEARINGS AND SUBMIT ISSUE TO PLENARY SESSION FOR FINAL VOTE EARLY NEXT WEEK. THEY ARE STILL PLANNING TO BRING IT TO VOTE BEFORE VOTE ON NORMALIZATION RATIFICATION.

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By 118 NARA. Date 7-17-92

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 104
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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-20
By 10, NARA, Date 5-22-91

1. ON JULY 28 I DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT PAK PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER CONTAINED IN DEPCIRTEL 128, AS SUPPLEMENTED BY DEPCIRTEL 141. I COULD NOT SEE HIM EARLIER AS HE WAS TRAVELING IN THE SOUTH.
2. PRESIDENT PAK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS ADVANCE INFORMATION AND STATED THAT THE U.S. COULD COUNT ON KOREA'S FIRM SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT THE MATTER OF A FURTHER KOREAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SVN STRUGGLE HAD BEEN RAISED BY PRESIDENT

PAGE 2 RUALOS 161E ~~SECRET~~
JOHNSON WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON AND HE HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF A FAVORABLE RESPONSE. THIS ASSURANCE REMAINED FIRM, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT DELAYED BECAUSE OF LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS. THE U.S. COULD COUNT ON A COMBAT DIVISION FROM KOREA.

3. I EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION FOR THIS ATTITUDE AND ASSURANCE.
4. IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE TROOP ISSUE REPORTED IN EMBASSY'S DAILY ROUNDUPS PLUS INTERVIEWS WITH MND REFERRED TO BELOW, THE COUNTRY TEAM AND I CAME TO THE UNANIMOUS CONCLUSION ON JULY 27 THAT IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO EXERT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE. I THEREFORE EXPRESSED TO PRESIDENT PAK OUR CONCERN AT THE INCREASING OPPOSITION IN THE DRP, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSEMBLY, TO ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF A DIVISION FOR VIETNAM BEFORE ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S. OF A SUSPENSION OF MAP TRANSFER, FINANCING OF A MILITARY PAY RAISE, AND INCREASED PROCUREMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.

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Authority APC 00/R-254-4-3-3
By JOh NARA Date 8-29-19

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-2- 104 JULY 29 FROM SEOUL

5. I REVIEWED FOR THE PRESIDENT OUR ATTITUDE ON THESE ISSUES, INCLUDING OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUSPEND THE MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM AS AUTHORIZED BY DEPTTEL 47, AND LEFT WITH HIM A COPY OF THE TALKING PAPER CONTAINED IN THE NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. I PARTICULARLY STRESSED THE URGENCY OF THE TIME ELEMENT.
6. THE BACKGROUND FOR THIS ACTION IS AS FOLLOWS:
7. WHILE THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY SUGGESTION BY THE PRESIDENT OR THE PRIMIN OF ~~ANY~~ BARGAINING IN CONNECTION WITH THE DESPATCH OF A DIVISION TO VIETNAM, THERE HAS BEEN, AS REPORTED IN EMBASSY'S DAILY ROUNDUPS, INCREASING PRESSURE FROM DRP MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE

PAGE 3 RUALOS 161E ~~SECRET~~

CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE DRP OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE, LED BY CH'A CHI-CH'OL, FOR THE ASSURANCES REFERRED TO ABOVE, AS A CONDITION TO FAVORABLE ACTION ON THE REQUEST FOR A DIVISION. THIS CRY HAS BEEN TAKEN UP IN THE PRESS. THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN CH'A CHI-CH'OL AT LEAST TWICE VERY RECENTLY. THE PRIMIN AND KIM CHONG P'IL HAD REASONED WITH HIM, BUT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE THE BIT IN THEIR TEETH AND HAVE PUBLICLY INVOLVED THEIR "FACE" ON THIS ISSUE. MOREOVER, THEIR POSITION SEEMS REASONABLE TO MANY KOREANS, WHO HAVE A TENDENCY TO FORGET WHAT IS BEING DONE FOR THEM WITHIN A FEW DAYS OR WEEKS AFTER IT IS ANNOUNCED. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WHO IS THE MAN UP AGAINST THE GUN IN COMMITTEE, HAS PLEADED THAT HE CAN NOT GET ITS APPROVAL WITHOUT AT LEAST SOME ASSURANCES ON MAP TRANSFER. HE SAYS THAT THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY GENERAL BEACH (EMBTTEL 41) WHICH DIRECTLY RELATE TO THE DESPATCH OF THE DIVISION AND WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO THE COMMITTEE, WILL NOT SUFFICE TO GAIN FAVORABLE COMMITTEE ACTION.

8. THIS HAS PUT US IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. ON THE ONE HAND WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE "BUYING" A DIVISION, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN WANT THIS EITHER. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRUGGLE IN SVN, WE COULD NOT FAIL TO TAKE ANY STEP WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY

PAGE 4 RUALOS 161E ~~SECRET~~
TO GET THE DIVISION APPROVED.

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-3- 104 JULY 29 FROM SEOUL

9. DESPITE OPTIMISTIC AND UNQUALIFIED STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN, AND EVEN DESPITE A REPORT BY THE MND ON JULY 28 THAT THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE PARTY HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE TROOP ISSUE AT THE SESSION OPENING TODAY AND WOULD SO DIRECT THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE, IT WAS THE UNANIMOUS JUDGMENT OF THE COUNTRY TEAM THAT THE SITUATION IS SO UNCERTAIN THAT WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO RISK ANY FURTHER WITHHOLDING OF THE AUTHORITY GRANTED IN DEPTTEL 47. WE THEREFORE WORKED OUT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE MND THE STRATEGY SET FORTH IN THE TALKING PAPER, WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE ADEQUATE POLITICAL USE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUSPEND MAP TRANSFER AND, AT THE SAME TIME, AVOID OUR BEING IN THE POSITION OF EMPLOYING IT AS A DIRECT "PURCHASE PRICE" FOR THE DIVISION.

10. DESPITE THE AUTHORIZATION IN DEPTTEL 47 TO SUSPEND MAP TRANSFER FOR SO LONG AS A KOREAN DIVISION IS IN SYN, I PROMISED TO SUSPEND IT ONLY A YEAR, WITH AN UNDERTAKING TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AGAIN AT THE END OF THE YEAR. I DID THIS SPECIFICALLY TO AVOID THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE SUSPENSION WAS A DIRECT QUID PRO QUO FOR THE DESPATCH OF THE DIVISION. For PC

11. THE FACT THAT SUSPENSION OF MAP TRANSFER WILL INVOLVE USING AVAILABLE MAP MONEY FOR SUPPLIES RATHER THAN MILITARY HARDWARE FOR KOREAN FORCES WOULD BE WELL KNOWN TO MND. THEREFORE, I DID NOT MENTION IT IN THE TALKING PAPER. I NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT IT

PAGE 5 RUALOS 161 ~~SECRET~~

RIGHT TO REMIND THE PRESIDENT OF THIS FACT, AND POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT HIS DEFENSE MINISTER AND HIS GENERALS HAD UNANIMOUSLY SAID THAT THE PAY RAISE HAD FIRST PRIORITY. I DID, HOWEVER, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SUSPENSION WOULD AFFECT THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS MADE BY GENERAL BEACH TO MND IN DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE DESPATCH OF THE DIVISION (EMBTTEL 41).

12. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND WOULD CONSULT WITH THE MND. WHETHER AND HOW HE WILL USE THE INFO GIVEN HIM WILL DEPEND UPON HIS JUDGMENT AS TO THE BEST STRATEGY. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT WE WERE LEAVING THE MANNER AND EXTENT OF ITS USE ENTIRELY UP TO HIM. WE HAVE NOW, HOWEVER, GIVEN HIM OUR MAXIMUM POLITICAL AMMUNITION. WE ARE ALSO NOW COMMITTED TO A SUSPENSION OF MAP TRANSFER FOR AT LEAST A YEAR AND ARE PROCEEDING FORTHWITH TO USE THIS LEVERAGE WITH THE EPB TO SECURE THE BEST POSSIBLE PAY RAISE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A BALANCED BUDGET.

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-4- 104 JULY 29 FROM SEOUL

13. WE ALSO NOW HAVE RENEWED ASSURANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIMIN THAT THIS MATTER WILL BE DECIDED FAVORABLY AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE PRESIDENT'S LAST WORDS TO ME WERE -"I WILL PERSUADE THESE ASSEMBLYMEN. IF PERSUASION FAILS, I WILL USE MY FIST."

14. THE RADIO HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED MND, THE DRP AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO ARRANGE APPROVAL OF A DIVISION FOR SVN AT THIS SESSION. BROWN
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUALOS 125E 2040757

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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~~SECRET~~ JULY 23

16106

1965 JUL 23 AM 4 07

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 83.

BELIEVE PRESIDENT PAK CAN BE REACHED OVER WEEKEND IF NECESSARY.
IF NOT, INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED TO PRIME MINISTER. BROWN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:20 AM, JULY 23, 1965.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD AT 4:30 AM, JULY 23, 1965.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-20
By ing, NARA, Date 5-22-91

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VV MJA706A700WV OSA603
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DE RUALOS 107E 2020140
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1965 JUL 20 PM 10 04

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PRIORITY 74

~~TOP SECRET~~ JULY 21

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 68

THE DECISIONS FORESHADOWED IN REFTTEL WILL BE WELCOMED IN MOST QUARTERS IN KOREA, AND WILL, I BELIEVE, HELP IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR DESPATCH OF A KOREAN DIVISION TO SVN. THE TIMING WILL ALSO BE GOOD, AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IF MADE, WILL COME AT, OR JUST BEFORE, THE OPENING OF ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF THE TROOP DESPATCH ISSUE.

IT WILL BE VERY HELPFUL INDEED FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO INFORM

PAGW 2 RUALOS 107E ~~TOP SECRET~~
PRESIDENT PAK OF THESE DECISIONS A DAY OR TWO IN ADVANCE.
IN FACT THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT.

I HAVE NO SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE FORM IN WHICH THE DECISIONS SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN KOREA. IF AN APPROVING REFERENCE TO KOREA'S UNIT NOW IN SVN COULD BE MADE NATURALLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION TO THE CONGRESS, THIS MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT HELPFUL HERE. THE FURTHER DRAMATIC EVIDENCE OF U.S. DETERMINATION INVOLVED IN THESE DECISIONS IS WHAT REALLY COUNTS AND WILL SPEAK FOR ITSELF. GP-2. BROWN
BT

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By *ij* NARA. Date 6-29-92

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INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 45

RUHKA/CINCPAC 35

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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO SVN AND RATIFICATION TREATY WITH JAPAN

REF: (A) DEPTTEL 67; (B) DEPTTEL 1335; (C) DEPTTEL 47

1. REGRET THAT WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE ANSWER REF (B) SOONER. SITUATION HERE HAS BEEN SO FLUID THAT ANY EARLIER ASSESSMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN OBSOLETE ALMOST AS SOON AS DESPATCHED.

2. AFTER DAYS OF MANEUVERING IN BOTH PARTIES AND MANY HOURS OF DISCUSSION, A CLEAR STRATEGY AND FAIRLY FIRM TIMETABLE NOW SEEM TO HAVE

PAGE TWO RUALOS 101E ~~SECRET~~
EMERGED. THEY CAN PERHAPS BEST BE SUMMED UP IN A STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT PAK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON JULY 15, AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ROKG HAD SUCCEEDED IN PRESENTING THE TROOP AUTHORIZATION AND RATIFICATION BILLS TO THE ASSEMBLY. (EMBTTEL 54.) IT WOULD PRESS THEIR CONSIDERATION IN THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES RESPECTIVELY.

B. IF THE OPPOSITION BOYCOTTS MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEES THEY WILL BE GIVEN A SECOND CHANCE TO ATTEND. IF THEY REFUSE, THE DRP WILL APPROVE AND REPORT THE BILLS TO THE PLENARY.

C. RATIFICATION WILL BE TAKEN UP FIRST.

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By *g/jc* NARA, Date 5-22-07

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-2- 68, July 20, from Seoul

D. IF THE OPPOSITION RESIGNS, THE RESIGNATIONS WILL BE REFUSED. IF THEY WALK OUT, THEY WILL BE ASKED TO RETURN AND GIVEN ABOUT A WEEK IN WHICH TO DO SO. IF THEY REFUSE, THE PRESIDENT WILL GO TO THE NATION ON RADIO AND TV AND SAY THAT THE OPPOSITION IS CLEARLY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, THAT THE DRP HAS URGED THEIR RETURN WITHOUT SUCCESS AND THAT THE DRP AND ROKG WILL NOW TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSAGE OF THE RATIFICATION BILL, LEAVING HISTORY TO BE THE JUDGE OF THE MERITS OF THEIR ACTION. THE TREATY WILL THEN BE RATIFIED.

E. THE TROOP BILL WILL BE APPROVED WITHIN A WEEK THEREAFTER.

3. THE MAIN ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS HAVE BEEN: (A) WHETHER TO CONSIDER TROOP DESPATCH OR RATIFICATION FIRST, AND (B) HOW IF POSSIBLE TO AVOID TOO GREAT AN

IMPRESSION OF RAMMING CONTROVERSIAL BILLS THROUGH WITHOUT PROPER CONSIDERATION.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 101E ~~SECRET~~

4. THE ARGUMENT FOR TAKING UP THE TROOP ISSUE FIRST HAS BEEN THAT IT WOULD GO THROUGH FAIRLY QUICKLY AND WITHOUT EXTREME STRUGGLE BY THE OPPOSITION. THUS A CONTROVERSIAL AND IMPORTANT ISSUE WOULD BE HANDLED FULLY CONSTITUTIONALLY, WITH LESS BITTERNESS AND NOT IN A HALF EMPTY ASSEMBLY. MOREOVER, IF THE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THIS AND TO PERHAPS A WEEK'S RECESS BEFORE TACKLING THE JAPAN ISSUE, IT WOULD MAKE THEM SEEM MORE REASONABLE. ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS ARE, OF COURSE, ATTRACTIVE TO US.

5. THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED TO US VERY VIGOROUSLY BY THE OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY MRS. PAK AND VICE SPEAKER NS, WHO ASKED OUR HELP IN GETTING THE GOVERNMENT TO AGREE TO THIS COURSE AND IN GETTING PRESIDENT PAK TO MEET MRS. PAK. THEY ADDED THAT SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE MODERATES WHO ARE NOW ENGAGED IN INTERNICINE STRUGGLE WITH YUN PO-SUN AND HIS

GROUP. (SEE E.G. EMBTEL 64.) WE CONFINED OUR COMMENTS TO PRAISING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MODERATION AND STRESSING THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE HOPE OF GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS UNLESS THE OPPOSITION COULD COMMIT ITSELF TO SOME FAIRLY SHORT ACTION TIMETABLE.

SECRET

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-3- 68, July 20, from Seoul

6. THESE ARGUMENTS WERE REPORTED TO AND EXPLORED BY THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND BY THE DCM WITH YI HU-RAK. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN TO PRESIDENT PAK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TROOP DESPATCH BEING APPROVED ONLY BY A RUMP ASSEMBLY. IT WAS THIS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN WHICH ELICITED PRESIDENT PAK'S STATEMENT REPORTED PARA 2 ABOVE.

7. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PARTY STRATEGISTS HAVE CONSIDERED THESE ARGUMENTS VERY SERIOUSLY AND HAVE REJECTED THEM. THEIR REASONS ARE:

A. THE TREATY WITH JAPAN MUST BE RATIFIED BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED BY THE JAPANESE DIET. IN THAT CONSIDERATION THINGS WILL INEVITABLY BE SAID ON THE JAPANESE SIDE WHICH WILL BE HIGHLY

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 101E ~~SECRET~~
OBJECTIONABLE AND INFLAMMATORY HERE. THE GOVERNMENT TAKES THIS POINT WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS.

B. THE ROKG WANTS TO GET RATIFICATION BEFORE THE STUDENTS RETURN. DELAYING THEIR RETURN WOULD BE AN INFLAMMATORY ACT.

C. THE ROKG DOES NOT WANT THESE ISSUES TO GO OVER INTO THE SEPTEMBER SESSION WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY LARGELY PREEMPTED BY THE BUDGET.

D. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE OPPOSITION IS NOT TOO STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SENDING THE DIVISION TO SVN, THEY WILL OBJECT AND FILIBUSTER AS A MEANS OF DELAYING CONSIDERATION OF THE RATIFICATION ISSUE AND PUSHING IT INTO A CLIMATE AND TIME PERIOD MORE FAVORABLE TO THEM. THIS CANNOT BE FULLY CONTROLLED. EVERY DAY OF DELAY WILL BE USED BY THE OPPOSITION TO AROUSE FURTHER OPPOSITION AMONG ARTICULATE GROUPS.

E. THE DRP IS NOW UNITED AND GEARED UP FOR ACTION. THIS MOMENTUM MUST NOT BE LOST.

F. DELAY WILL NOT REALLY STRENGTHEN MRS. PAK'S HAND DESPITE HER BELIEF THAT IT WOULD. RATHER WOULD IT HELP YUN PO-SUN IN HIS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT OF HIS ADAMANT OPPOSITION AND TO GET THE PP DISSOLVED BY THE PARTY MEMBERS, THUS VACATING THE PP SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY.

8. IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THESE ARE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS SHARED BY PRESIDENT PAK AND ALL HIS TOP ADVISORS. WE

~~SECRET~~

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-4- 68, July 20, from Seoul

PAGE FIVE RUALOS 101E ~~SECRET~~

DO NOT FEEL THAT WE HAVE ANY CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT THEM AND HOPE FOR THE BEST. THEY MUST DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL TACTICS.

9. WE ARE ASSURED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE PM AND YI HU-RAK THAT BOTH BILLS WILL PASS. THEIR TIMETABLE CALLS FOR THIS BEFORE MID-AUGUST.

10. WE HAVE NOT YET USED THE AUTHORITY GIVEN US IN REF (C) TO SUSPEND MAP TRANSFER DESPITE ANOTHER URGENT PLEA BY MND TO GENERAL BEACH. THIS IS BECAUSE WE ARE ASSURED BY THE PM THAT CH'A CHI-CH'OL AND HIS COTERIE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO BLOCK REPORTING THE TROOP BILL BY THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND THAT NOTHING MORE IS NEEDED FROM US AT THIS JUNCTURE. MOREOVER, NO OCCASION HAS PRESENTED ITSELF IN WHICH SUSPENSION COULD BE ANNOUNCED NATURALLY AND WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF A CLEAR U.S. EFFORT TO BUY THE DIVISION OR YIELD TO BLACKMAIL.

11. THE MATTER IS NOT, HOWEVER, CLOSED. IT WILL COME UP VERY LEGITIMATELY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PAY RAISE ISSUE WHICH WILL SHORTLY COME TO A HEAD. WE BELIEVE THAT SUSPENSION IS NOT ONLY NEEDED AND LEGITIMATE IN THAT CONNECTION, BUT ALSO WOULD BE HELPFUL POLITICALLY AS A SIGN OF APPRECIATION FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE DIVISION FOR SVN AFTER IT IS GIVEN. IT MAY ALSO TURN OUT TO BE NEEDED IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE. SO WE ARE PLAYING THIS ONE BY EAR.

12. HAVE JUST HEARD THAT PRESIDENT PAK MET WITH MRS. PAK THIS MORNING WITH GOOD RESULTS. WILL REPORT SOONEST. GP-1. BROWN

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY [SEOUL]
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC [38]
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 25
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

06773

1965 JUL 9 PM 11 09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (SECTION ONE OF TWO) JULY 10

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By *ing* NARA, Date 7-17-92

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROKG FACES CRISIS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. 51ST SESSION NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH BEGINS JULY 12 AND ENDS AUGUST 10, WILL BE ONE OF MOST CRITICAL SESSIONS SINCE ROK ESTABLISHED IN 1948, ASSEMBLY WILL BE ASKED TO APPROVE SENDING OF COMBAT DIVISION TO VIETNAM AND TO RATIFY BASIC RELATIONS TREATY AND RELATED AGREEMENTS NORMALIZING ROK RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. ASSEMBLY ACTION ON THESE MEASURES WILL HAVE PROFOUND EFFECTS ON FUTURE COURSE OF ROK INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. ROKG IS DETERMINED TO SECURE FAVORABLE VOTE ON BOTH ISSUES BUT ON EVE OF SESSION IS DEVELOPING CASE OF JITTERS BROUGHT ABOUT BY INTENSIFICATION OF OPPOSITION CAMPAIGN AND CONTINUED DISUNITY WITHIN GOVT'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY(DRP), PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NORMALIZATION. OPPOSITION LEADERS CONTINUE TO THREATEN ALL-OUT CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING MASS RESIGNATIONS FROM ASSEMBLY AND, IF NECESSARY, DISSOLUTION OF PEOPLES PARTY, TO PROTEST NORMALIZATION RATIFICATION. SESSION WILL BE STORMY, WITH CRISIS REACHED WHEN NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS PUT TO VOTE, PROBABLY CLOSE TO AUGUST 10.

2. REVERSING ORIGINAL PLANS, ROKG NOW PLANS TO SEEK VOTE ON NORMALIZATION ISSUE PRIOR TO VOTE ON TROOP ISSUE, ALTHOUGH BOTH MATTERS EXPECTED TO BE SUBMITTED TO ASSEMBLY AND REFERRED TO COMMITTEES JULY 12. SOME DRP LEADERS NOW PREDICT THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE ACHIEVE NORMALIZATION VOTE BY AUGUST 10 AND THAT SPECIAL SESSION BEGINNING AUGUST 17 MAY BE NECESSARY. POSTPONEMENT ENTIRE ISSUE BEING CONSIDERED BY SOME WHO THINK IT MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA TO POSTPONE ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION UNTIL WINTER SCHOOL RECESS. ROKG LEADERS WORRIED ABOUT ATTITUDES WITHIN DRP, ESPECIALLY ON PART OF FORMER LIBERAL PARTY POLITICIANS AND OTHER NON-MAINSTREAMERS WHO SEEKING MAXIMUM PERSONAL ADVANTAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR YES VOTE. AT SAME TIME, ROKG REPORTEDLY INDULGING IN INTENSIVE EFFORTS PERSUADE OPPOSITION MEMBERS VOTE IN FAVOR, INCLUDING LIBERAL DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS.

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-2- 38, JULY 10, FROM SEOUL, SECTION I OF II.

3. OPPOSITION LEADERS PLAN ALLOUT CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORMALIZATION RATIFICATION. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE LARGE-SCALE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND WILL SEEK TO INFLAME PUBLIC OPINION THROUGH FURTHER PUBLIC RALLIES SPONSORED BY STRUGGLE COMMITTEE, AS WELL AS BY NEWLY ACTIVE CHRISTIAN GROUPS. OPPOSITION ALSO REPORTEDLY RESORTING TO WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS.

4. WITHIN ASSEMBLY, OPPOSITION PLANS STAGED CAMPAIGN. FIRST STAGE WILL BE SPEECHES AGAINST NORMALIZATION, IN COMMITTEE AND PLENARY SESSIONS. NEXT WILL BE ATTEMPT TO PREVENT VOTE BY PHYSICALLY SEIZING ROSTUM. (ROK OFFICIALS FULLY EXPECT THIS AND FEAR THAT PHYSICAL CLASH BETWEEN OPPOSING FORCES IN ASSEMBLY IS INEVITABLE. SOME DRP MEMBERS FEAR 50-MAN ASSEMBLY SECURITY FORCE UNABLE COPE WITH SUCH SITUATION AND STATE THAT ASSEMBLY LEGALLY PROHIBITED FROM CALLING IN ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES SUCH AS NATIONAL POLICE.) IF ROK SECURES MAJORITY VOTE IN SPITE OF THESE TACTICS, OPPOSITION MEMBERS THREATEN MASS RESIGNATION, WHICH WOULD FORCE BY-ELECTIONS FOR VACATED SEATS WITHIN 90 DAYS. IF RESIGNATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY DRP, OPPOSITION LEADERS PROPOSE

TO HOLD PARTY CONVENTION AND DISSOLVE PEOPLES PARTY, WHICH WOULD AUTOMATICALLY VACATE PP ASSEMBLY SEATS. BY THIS TACTIC, THEY HOPE TO AROUSE PUBLIC AND EXERT SUFFICIENT MORAL PRESSURE ON ROK TO FORCE HOLDING GENERAL ELECTION FOR ENTIRE NEW ASSEMBLY.

5. VIETNAM TROOP ISSUE HAS BECOME MORE SENSITIVE AS RESULT UNFORTUNATE NEWSPAPER DISTORTION OF POATS AND MACNAMARA STATEMENTS, AND ESPECIALLY OF USG VIETNAM PROCUREMENT POLICIES VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND ROK. REACTION TO THESE STORIES HAS BEEN SO ADVERSE (PARTICULARLY WITHIN DRP) THAT ROK HAS DECIDED NORMALIZATION RATIFICATION WILL ASSIST IN GETTING APPROVAL OF TROOP DESPATCH, INSTEAD OF VICE VERSA. OPPOSITION LEADERS PLAN TO VOTE AGAINST TROOP DESPATCH BUT HAVE INDICATED PRIVATELY TO EMBASSY THEY INTEND EXERT THEIR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST NORMALIZATION. IF VOTE ON RATIFICATION IS DELAYED, TROOP ISSUE MAY NOT COME TO VOTE UNTIL SEPTEMBER SESSION.

GP-3
BROWN

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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H INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 25

P RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 18

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USIA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (SECTION TWO OF TWO) JULY 10

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1965 JUL 9 PM 11 23

6. REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF VOTE, THIS ASSEMBLY SESSION WILL LEAVE SCARS WHICH WILL TAKE TIME TO HEAL. ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN GREATLY STIMULATED BY EVENTS OF PAST FEW MONTHS, ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT GENERAL PUBLIC HAS GIVEN WHOLEHEARTED ENDORSEMENT TO OPPOSITION. ENTRY OF CHRISTIAN PASTORS INTO THE FRAY, LED BY PYONGYANG REFUGEE GROUP CENTERED ON INFLUENTIAL YONGNAK CHURCH, HAS INTRODUCED NEW AND DISTURBING ELEMENT INTO SITUATION. IF OPPOSITION STRUGGLE AGAINST RATIFICATION IS UNSUCCESSFUL, PEOPLES PARTY, IF NOT DISSOLVED, WILL BE BORN ANEW BY FACTIONAL DISPUTES, WITH YUN PO-SUN ATTACKING MADAME PAK SUN-CHON FOR INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE ANTI-RATIFICATION STRUGGLE. IF OPPOSITION SUCCEEDS IN SECURING POSTPONEMENT OF ASSEMBLY VOTE UNTIL NEXT SESSION OR LATER, ROKG AND DRP WILL FACE SERIOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AS RESULT THIS SETBACK.

7. POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF ERUPTION OF ANTI-AMERICANISM ON EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE ISSUES. STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY SPORADICALLY INTRODUCED ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS INTO RECENT ANTI-NORMALIZATION DEMONSTRATIONS. OUR TASK IN COMING DAYS WILL BE TO BOLSTER RESOLVE OF ROKG TO OBTAIN FAVORABLE VOTE ON BOTH NORMALIZATION AND TROOP ISSUES, WHILE AVOIDING, IF POSSIBLE, LAYING OURSELVES OPEN TO CHARGES BY OPPOSITION OF UNDUE PRESSURE OR INTERFERENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE EFFECTS.

8. GP-3.

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INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 16
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 23
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JULY 9

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROK-JAPAN ROUND UP

NO STUDENT ACTIVITIES REPORTED JULY 9. EIGHTY-TWO
PROMINENT WRITERS ISSUED STATEMENT IN AFTERNOON PAPERS
JULY 9 CLAIMING THAT ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT FAVORS
INTERESTS OF JAPAN ONLY AND IF RATIFIED PACTS WILL RESULT
IN SUBJUGATION OF KOREA. MEANWHILE, OPPOSITION FORCES
BEGIN TWO-DAY STUMPING TOUR THROUGH EIGHT MAJOR CITIES.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 32E LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
JULY 8 EFFORT BY ASSEMBLY SPEAKER YI HYU-SANG TO OBTAIN COM-
PROMISE AGREEMENT AMONG FLOOR LEADERS OF BOTH POLITICAL
PARTIES FOR HANDLING UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ROK-JAPAN DEBATE
FAILED WHEN OPPOSITION LEADERS, INSTEAD OF EXCHANGING VIEWS
ON ROK-JAPAN PROBLEM, PRESSED SPEAKER YI FOR RELEASE
OF REP. KIM YONG-IL WHO WAS INDICTED RECENTLY FOR
INVOLVEMENT IN COUP PLOT.

BROWN

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 40
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 20
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ (SECTION ONE OF TWO) JULY 10

LIMDIS

REF: A. DEPTTEL 15, B. DEPTTEL 27

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: ROK DEPLOYMENT RVN-MAP TRANSFER AND PAY RAISE

1. IF KOREA PROVIDES A COMBAT DIVISION FOR RVN THIS WILL ADD A NEW DIMENSION TO OUR RELATIONSHIP.
2. KOREA, A SMALL COUNTRY BORDERING ON THE COMMUNIST WORLD, WILL BE IN ACTUAL COMBAT IN ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE AREAS OF RVN AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES. IT WILL HAVE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 38E ~~SECRET~~
PROVIDED VERY SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER COMBAT MANPOWER THAN ANY OTHER FREE WORLD COUNTRY GREAT OR SMALL EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A DECISION OF GREAT IMPORT FOR ANY COUNTRY TO MAKE.

3. IT COMES AT A RATHER CRUCIAL PERIOD FOR KOREA, A SORT OF WATERSHED IN ITS CURRENT HISTORY. FOR IF THE

SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN IS RATIFIED, AS WE HOPE IT WILL BE, A PERIOD OF NEW RELATIONSHIPS AND NEW PROBLEMS WILL BEGIN WHICH WILL PROVIDE GREAT OPPORTUNITIES, BUT ALSO PROBLEMS THE SOLUTION OF WHICH WILL TAX ALL ROKG'S CAPABILITIES AND ALL OUR SKILL AND UNDERSTANDING.

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Authority FRAS, 64-68, Vol. XXIX, #57
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-20-05

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-2- 40, July 10, from Seoul (SECTION I OF II)

4. TENSIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD ARE HEIGHTENING EVERYWHERE. THIS IS NO TIME TO DROP OUR GUARD. RATHER WE SHOULD ACCELERATE OUR EFFORT TO BUILD FREE WORLD STRENGTH WHEREVER OPPORTUNITY OFFERS.

5. AT THE MOMENT TRAINED COMBAT MANPOWER IS A CRUCIAL NEED IN RVN. IT IS FAIR TO SAY TO KOREA THAT THIS BATTLE IS HERS AS WELL AS OURS, THAT SHE CAN AFFORD THE MEN, THAT IT IS HER DUTY TO RETURN IN SOME MEASURE THE HELP RENDERED HER SO UNSTINTINGLY BY THE FREE WORLD

PAGE 3 RUALOS 38E ~~SECRET~~
IN THE PAST, AND THAT WE WILL ENSURE THAT THIS WILL NOT INVOLVE HER IN EXTRA COST.

6. BUT IT IS ALSO A COLD FACT THAT KOREA DOES NOT HAVE TO DO THIS, THAT IT DOES INVOLVE KOREA IN SOME ADDITIONAL RISK, THAT A WELL TRAINED COMBAT DIVISION CAN BE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRUGGLE, AND THAT IT CAN SAVE US A GREAT DEAL IN BLOOD AND TREASURE.

7. THIS QUESTION IS NOW ABOUT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE ASSEMBLY IN AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS HAS BECOME SUPERHEATED AND CAST DOUBT UPON THE OUTCOME. IT IS NOT JUST THE OPPOSITION WHICH IS CAUSING THE TROUBLE, BUT ALSO MANY MEMBERS OF THE DRP. THE QUESTION IS MIXED UP WITH THE FEELING AGAINST JAPAN AND THE EVER PRESENT HAUNTING DOUBTS ABOUT US SUPPORT. THE OPPOSITION, ALREADY IN FULL CRY ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE K-J SETTLEMENT, IS BEGINNING TO ATTACK ON THE SECOND FRONT OF THE TROOP ISSUE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE DRP ARE ACCUSING THE GOVT OF FAILURE TO GET PROPER RECOMPENSE FROM THE US FOR WHAT THE ROKG IS PREPARED TO DO IN RVN. ON TOP OF THIS, PUBLIC OPINION HAS BEEN INFLAMED BY DISTORTED REPORTS THAT THE

PAGE 4 RUALOS 38E ~~SECRET~~
US EXPECTS FLESH AND BLOOD FROM KOREA WHILE CONCENTRATING ITS PURCHASES OF WAR MATERIALS IN JAPAN TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THAT ECONOMY RATHER THAN THE ROK.

8. THE QUESTION OF A PAY RAISE HAS BECOME A CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUE IN SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF SENDING TROOPS TO RVN. THIS PAY RAISE IS UNQUESTIONABLY NOT ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 40, July 10, from Seoul (SECTION I OF II)

JUSTIFIED, BUT IS ESSENTIAL IF MORALE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL SERVICE IS TO BE MAINTAINED. THAT IT IS LONG OVERDUE IS CLEAR FROM THE FACT THAT THE COST OF LIVING HAS INCREASED ABOUT 75 PERCENT SINCE PAY WAS LAST ADJUSTED. THE 1966 BUDGET, SHORTLY TO BE PRESENTED TO THE ASSEMBLY, WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION IN SOME FORM. IN EVERY PHASE OF SERVICE, MILITARY, GOVT, EDUCATION, LOW PAY IS A DRAG UPON PROGRESS AND EFFICIENCY WHICH THE COUNTRY CAN ILL AFFORD. YET THE COST IS ALSO GREAT FOR IT TO AFFORD.

9. A 75 PERCENT PAY RAISE PLUS THE PRESENT MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, INCREASE THE MILITARY BUDGET BY ABOUT 35 PERCENT.

BROWN
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

4
Action

SS
Info

VV MJA946A232 OSA333
PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 39E 1910600
ZNY SSSSS
P R 100520Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

PRIORITY 40

INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 20

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO JULY 10

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

10. I HAVE DEVOTED A LOT OF THOUGHT AS TO WHAT WE COULD DO TO MEET THIS COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN A WAY MOST CONSISTENT WITH OUR CURRENT ECONOMIC STRATEGY. WE NEED A MEASURE WHICH WILL MEET THE POLITICAL OBJECTIONS WHICH THE GOVT FACES IN SEEKING TO SEND COMBAT TROOPS TO RVN, WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST PARTIALLY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC

PAGE 2 RUALOS 39E ~~SECRET~~

PROBLEMS WHICH THE GOVT FACES, WHICH WILL RECOGNIZE THE REAL CONTRIBUTION WHICH KOREA WILL IN FACT BE MAKING, AND WHICH WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR AID POLICY AND STABILIZATION PROGRAM.

11. THERE IS A SOLUTION WHICH MEETS ALL OF THESE CRITERIA AND MEETS MOST OF THEM DRAMATICALLY, NAMELY A SUSPENSION OF THE ROK FUNDING REQUIREMENT OF THE MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM FOR SO LONG AS ROK MAINTAINS SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN RVN BY MEANS OF US OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT FROM KOREA OF THOSE ITEMS NOW SCHEDULED FOR TRANSFER, UPON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ROKG BUDGETARY SAVINGS FROM THIS ACTION BE A CONTRIBUTION TO A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PAY RAISE.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 40, July 10 (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Seoul

12. WE CANNOT GIVE PREFERENCE TO KOREA IN PROCUREMENT FOR RVN AS THEY WANT US TO DO, FOR REASONS OF LAW AND PRINCIPLE. BUT WE CAN MEET POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AND SHOW OUR APPRECIATION WITHOUT SACRIFICE OF EITHER BY THIS ADJUSTMENT OF MAP TRANSFER.

PAGE 3 RUALOS 39 ~~E-S-E-C-R-E-T~~

13. SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT. IT WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE ROKG AS A GREAT POLITICAL VICTORY. IT WOULD GO FAR TO ENSURE UNITED DRP SUPPORT FOR DESPATCH OF A DIVISION TO RVN. IT WOULD CORRECT THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE UNTIMELY RELEASE OF THE POATS AND MCNAMARA STATEMENTS, WHICH HOWEVER, PROPER IN THEIR CONTEXT, HAVE CAUSED UNTOLD POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR US AND FOR THE ROKG HERE. IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S PROMISE TO PRESIDENT PAK TO REVIEW THE MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM IN THE LIGHT OF KOREA'S REAL ECONOMIC NEEDS. IT WOULD NOT FINANCE ALL OF A PAY RAISE, BUT WOULD HELP MAKE A PAY RAISE POSSIBLE. OSP* OF ITEMS PROGRAMMED FOR TRANSFER WOULD CONTINUE THE STIMULATION OF LOCAL INDUSTRY WHICH WE HAVE SO STRONGLY EMPHASIZED AS IMPORTANT AND WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR BUDGETARY TRANSFER WHEN THE ROKG IS EQUAL TO THE TASK. KOREAN DOLLAR EARNINGS WOULD BE INCREASED. THE STABILIZATION AND SA POLICIES WOULD NOT BE WEAKENED.

14. REALIZE THAT THIS COURSE WILL ADD SOMETHING TO OUR DOLLAR OUTFLOW. BUT THE AMOUNT PALES INTO

PAGE 4 RUALOS 39E ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

INSIGNIFICANCE IN COMPARISON WITH THE COST OF SENDING A US DIVISION TO RVN INSTEAD OF A ROK DIVISION.

15. OF COURSE TO SUSPEND MAP TRANSFER AND STILL MAKE GOOD ON OUR RECENT COMMITMENT (REFS A AND B) TO INCREASE ROK ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND TO BRING 3 READY RESERVE DIVISIONS TO FULL EQUIPMENT LEVELS, KOREA MAP FUNDING MUST NECESSARILY BE FURTHER INCREASED. BUT IN MY VIEW THIS IS A LESSER EVIL THAN A RELUCTANT DESPATCH OF THE DIVISION OR FAILURE TO SEND IT AT ALL, OR INDEED THE LOSS OF A SUBSTANTIAL PAY RAISE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 40, July 10 (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Seoul

16. WE MAY LOSE SOME FACE IN YIELDING ON A POINT ON WHICH WE HAVE FOR SO LONG HELD FIRM. BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE OF VIEW WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL DURING THE PAK VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND WE DO HAVE MORE FACTS AND NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. SO THIS DOESN'T WORRY ME.

17. I THINK A SUSPENSION OF THE MAP PROGRAM IS NOW BOTH POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT AND ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY JUSTIFIED.

18. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE AGREE TO IT AND DO SO PROMPTLY, SO THAT IT CAN HAVE ITS EFFECT UPON CURRENT ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF THE TROOP ISSUE.

19. ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM CONCUR.

BROWN

BT

*As received.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

18

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

3-S

Action

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Info

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MJB271A338

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ZNY TTTT

O R 030415Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (12)

INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

RUHKA/CINCPAC 5

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV 1

STATE GRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO JULY 3

REF: A. DEPTTEL 1347

B. COMUSKOREA UK 52380

C. EMB A-641

D. EMBTEL 1171

E. COMUSKOREA UK 52418

F. EMBTEL 1390

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-20

By ing, NARA, Date 5-22-91

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1.


2. FOUR MILITARY QUESTIONS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE HAVE AFFECTED US RELATIONS WITH ROKG IN RECENT YEARS. THESE INCLUDE ROKG DESIRE TO OBTAIN (A) INDEFINITE COMMITMENT THAT US WILL NOT REDUCE ITS FORCES IN KOREA, (B) SUSPENSION OR AT LEAST STRETCH-OUT OF MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM IN ORDER TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON ROK DEFENSE BUDGET AND (C) INCREASE IN MAP. IN ADDITION, (D) MND IS PRESSING STRONGLY FOR US FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN BUDGETING MILITARY PAY RAISE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 12, July 3, from Seoul (SECTION I OF II)



3. NEITHER CTNOR WASHINGTON FAVOR FURTHER CONCESSION ON MAP TRANSFER. WHILE DISCUSSIONS ON ROK MILITARY PAY RAISE ARE PROCEEDING (REF C), PROSPECTS ARE NOT BRIGHT FOR IMMEDIATE, SIZEABLE PAY INCREASE WITHOUT BREACHING US-ROK ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM. MND LIST, HOWEVER, DOES CONTAIN CERTAIN LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS IN RESPONSE TO WHICH EMBASSY BELIEVES USG CAN AND SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

4. FORCE LEVELS. WHILE NO INDEFINITE ASSURANCES ON US FORCE LEVELS CAN BE GIVEN, EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS USG ONCE AGAIN REITERATE TO ROKG THAT IT IS NOT PLANNING FOR MILITARY CUTBACK IN KOREA AFFECTING EITHER US OR ROK FORCES. THIS RECOMMENDATION BASED IN PART ON COMPELLING POLITICAL REASONS RELATED TO ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION OF WHICH WASHINGTON IS ALREADY AWARE

PAGE 4 RUALOS 08E ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND ON ASSURANCES GIVEN PRESIDENT PAK BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. MOREOVER, ROKG AND PRESS HAVE BEEN PRESENTING DISPATCH ROK CONTINGENT TO SVN AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE AMERICAN TROOPS IN KOREA BEING SENT AS REINFORCEMENTS TO VIETNAM. US MILITARY CUTBACK IN KOREA MIGHT ALSO PROMPT ROKG TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM SVN (OR DENY FUTURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ROK TROOPS) ON GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE IN KOREA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 12, July 3, from Seoul (SECTION I OF II)

5. MAP LEVEL FOR KOREA. EMBASSY FULLY ENDORSES COMUSK POSITION THAT MAP FUNDS FOR ROK SHOULD NOT BE USED TO FINANCE NECESSARY INCREASED COSTS FOR

[REDACTED] EMBASSY
BELIEVES THERE ARE STRONG ARGUMENTS FAVORING
HIGHER MAP FOR KOREA (SEE REF D)
[REDACTED]

PAGE 5 RUALOS 08E ~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] AT VERY MINIMUM, SUFFICIENT FUNDS SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR IMPROVEMENT REMAINING, ROK FORCES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESENT DEFENSE CAPABILITY. WHILE EMBASSY NOT IN POSITION TO ADVISE ON HOW ADDITIONAL MAP FUNDS SHOULD BE USED, WE HAVE NO REASON TO QUESTION COMUSK'S RECOMMENDATION

GP-3. BROWN
BT

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2 a.m., July 3
Passed White House at 2:30 a.m., July 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3
Action

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DE RUALOS 09E 1840505

ZNY TTTT

O R 030415Z ZFA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (2)

INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

RUHKA/CINCPAC 5

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV 1

STATE GRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ (SECTION TWO OF TWO) JULY 3

REF: A. DEPTTEL 1347

B. COMUSKOREA UK 52380

C. EMB A-641

D. EMBTEL 1171

E. COMUSKOREA UK 52418

F. EMBTEL 1390

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

6. ROK DEFENSE BUDGET

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1965 JUL 3 AM 2 15


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
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-2- 12, July 3, from Seoul (SECTION II OF II)



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
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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 12, July 3, from Seoul (SECTION II OF II)

8.



1.3(a)(5)

9. USFK AND USOM INFORMED OF CONTENTS THIS MESSAGE.

10. GP-3. BROWN
BT

(#) Obvious omission. Correction to follow.

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 2:30 a.m., July 3
Passed White House at 2:45 a.m., July 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY

039

19

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

6
Action

SS

Info

VV MJA104A700

OO RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 05E 14/0610Z
O 140600Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1310
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY, SAIGON IMMEDIATE 103
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ JUNE 14

LIMDIS

VERBATIM TEXT

SUBJ: GVN REQUEST FOR ROK TROOPS

REF: EMBTEL 1309 TO DEPT RPTD TO SAIGON 102.

1. VICE FONMIN MUN TUK-CHU TODAY GAVE TEXT GVN REQUEST CABLED FROM ROK EMBASSY SAIGON. TEXT, DESCRIBED AS TOP CONFIDENTIAL, FOLLOWS:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

2. EXCELLENCY, FOLLOWING OUR REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO SEND COMBAT TROOPS TO VIETNAM, THE

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~SECRET~~
VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN SEOUL HAVE INFORMED THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY HAVE DECIDED UPON THE DESPATCH OF A KOREAN DIVISION. MAY I EXPRESS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE WARMEST THANKS OF OUR GOVERNMENT FOR SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION WHICH IS MOST FITTING TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS INDEED HAPPY TO ACCEPT SUCH A MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IF YOUR EXCELLENCY DEEMS IT NECESSARY, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND A MISSION OF OUR ARMED FORCES TO SEOUL TO DISCUSS ON WAYS AND MEANS TO IMPLEMENT YOUR DECISION OR TO HOLD THESE DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES. ONCE AGAIN, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO THE KOREANS OUR GRATEFUL FEELINGS FOR THEIR MOST GENEROUS AND VALUABLE AID TO HELP US IN OUR WAR AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. PHAN HUY QUAT PRIME MINISTER
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. END VERBATIM TEXT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By slj, NARA, Date 5-22-07

~~SECRET~~

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-2- 1310, June 14, from Seoul

3. MUN SAID REQUEST HAD TWO DEFECTS: (1) IT REFERRED TO GVN REQUEST OF MAY 5 WHICH MENTIONED ONLY REGIMENT; (2) IT IS MORE AN EXPRESSION OF THANKS FOR WHAT SEEMS TO BE A UNILATERAL

PAGE THREE
JUALOS 05E ~~SECRET~~
DECISION OF ROKG TO DESPATCH A DIVISION. IN PLACE THIS AMBIGUOUS REQUEST ROKG NEEDS SOONEST A SIMPLE STRAIGHTFORWARD REQUEST FOR ONE COMBAT DIVISION PERIOD.

4. MUN ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER IN VIEW RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES SAIGON PRIME MINISTER PHAN HUY QUAT CAN STILL APPROPRIATELY SIGN REQUEST. BROWN
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 2:45 a.m., June 14, 1965

NOTE: Passed White House at 2:57 a.m., June 14, 1965

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*SECRETCORRECTION ISSUED
6/9/65 11 AM MRJ

Control:

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Rec'd:

JUNE 7, 1965
7:48 PM

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FROM: SEOUL - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION: SECSTATE 1283

INFO: SAIGON 97

DATE: JUNE 7

L I I M D I I S S

SUBJ: ROK TROOPS FOR VIETNAM

REF: A. SAIGON 85, TO DEPT 4064 B. DEPT 1231,
TO SAIGON 2788

1. VICE FONMIN MUN TOK-CHU REPEATED TODAY HIS REQUEST THAT US URGE GVN MAKE FORMAL REQUEST FOR "ONE INFANTRY DIVISION" FROM ROKG. HE HAD SEEN GVN CHARGE AGAIN AND INQUIRED WHY REQUEST NOT FORTHCOMING. CHARGE SAID HE WAS DOING HIS BEST TO ELICIT REQUEST AND EXPLAINED DELAY BY REFERRING TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN RVN WHICH PREVENTED MEETING OF GVN SECURITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE REQUEST.

2. MUN SAID GOVT NOW IN GREAT HASTE TO OBTAIN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVAL THIS SESSION (ENDING JUNE 18), SINCE FOLLOWING SESSION STARTING SOME TIME IN JULY WILL PROBABLY BE PRE-OCCUPIED WITH K-J RATIFICATION AND POSSIBLY RATIFICATION OF SOFA. GOVT THEREFORE WISHED TO HAVE ASSEMBLY DEBATE OVER SENDING COMBAT FORCES TO VIETNAM OUT OF WAY. HOWEVER, GOVT CANNOT GO TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT FORMAL REQUEST FROM GVN.

3. GENERAL KIM CHONG-O, FORMER CHAIRMAN ROK JOINT CHIEFS IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH DCM STRONGLY SUPPORTED GOVT'S JUDGEMENT ON TIMING OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

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authority RA cod R-254-4-6-0
By JDN *ARA Date 8-19-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1283, JUNE 7, FROM SEOUL

ACTION. MIN OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS DONE SAME WITH AMBASSADOR..

4. COMMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE PRESIDENT PAK INTENDS SUBSTITUTE ROK FORCE TO RVN FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT K-J NORMALIZATION (REF B). RATHER PAK WISHES TO GIVE EARLY AND DRAMATIC EVIDENCE OF WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE NEW AND CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH U.S. HE EVIDENTLY JUDGES THAT IN AFTERMATH OF VISIT TO US SUCH ACTION WOULD BE POPULAR IN KOREA AND MIGHT EVEN HELP IN GETTING SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION K-J SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PAK HOLDING BACK ON K-J NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY QUESTION IN OUR MINDS IS WHETHER PAK IS WELL ADVISED TO TAKE ON OPPOSITION ON ISSUE OF TROOPS TO VIETNAM ONLY SHORT TIME BEFORE BATTLE IS JOINED IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NORMALIZATION.

5. INDICATIONS ARE THAT OPPOSITION WILL OPPOSE GOVT ON TROOP ISSUE BUT SAVE HEAVY AMMUNITION FOR K-J SETTLEMENT. YUN PO-SUN TOLD AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR HE WOULD HAVE TO OPPOSE ON GROUNDS TROOPS NEEDED IN KOREA FOR DEFENSE OF ROK. PRESS TREATING AS SERIOUS QUESTION.

6. WE SEEM NOW TO HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT PAK'S OWN APPRAISAL OF HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE TWO DIFFICULT ISSUES IN RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPRESS OUR MISGIVINGS TO PRESIDENT PAK AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS BUT DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN "SAVE ROK FROM ITSELF" ON THIS ISSUE BY OPPOSING GVN REQUEST. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT EMBASSY SAIGON BE INSTRUCTED TO TELL GVN WE DO NOT OPPOSE FORMAL REQUEST TO ROKG. DELAYING TACTICS MAY VERY WELL GET REPORTED BACK TO ROKG AND WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULT TIME EXPLAINING OUR EFFORT TO STOP GVN MAKING FORMAL REQUEST. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL, THOUGH NOT DECISIVE REASON FOR ENDORSING REQUEST.

7. GP-1.

BROWN

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC (1254)
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ MAY 31
LIMDIS

SECTION I OF II

038

SUBJ: ROK PARTICIPATION IN AA CONFERENCE

1. AT BLUE HOUSE GARDEN PARTY MAY 28 FONMIN YI TONG-WON ASKED ME IF US COULD FINANCE EXPENSES ROK DELEGATION AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE. SAID ROKG READY TO SEND STRONG DELEGATION HEADED BY PRIMIN AND INCLUDING YI SU-YONG, KIM YONG-SIK, PAEK SON-YUP AND STRONG PROFESSIONAL STAFF. SAID DELEGATION MIGHT TOTAL THIRTY PEOPLE. HOWEVER, FONMINISTRY HAD NOT BUDGETED FOR AA CONFERENCE AND CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS NOT AVAILABLE.

2. I IMMEDIATELY SAID IT HIGHLY DOUBTFUL DEPT COULD OR WOULD WANT PAY EXPENSES ROK DELEGATION. I THEN ASKED YI HOW MUCH HE HAD

PAGE 2 RUALOS 01E ~~SECRET~~

IN MIND AND HE SAID ONE MILLION DOLLARS. I ASKED HIM IF HE WERE JOKING?

COMMENTING THAT I DID NOT SEE HOW EXPENSES EVEN OF LARGE DELEGATION COULD COME TO MORE THAN \$50,000 TO \$75,000. HE REPLIED TESTILY THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK FOR US ASSISTANCE FOR SUCH TRIFLING AMOUNT AND THAT WITH LARGER SUM ROK DELEGATION COULD GO ALL OUT TO IMPRESS AND INFLUENCE SMALLER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. I EXHIBITED EXTREME INCREDULITY, AND SAID IN MY OPINION DEPT NOT PREPARED CONSIDER ANY SUCH PROPOSAL, AND ADVISED HIM TO DROP THE PROPOSAL.

3. MAY 29 YI CALLED FROM BLUE HOUSE AND ASKED ME TO COME AND SEE HIM AT HIS HOUSE. THERE HE TOLD ME PRESIDENT PAK HAD ADDRESSED FOR TWO HOURS LARGE MEETING OF CABINET, AND HIGH GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICIALS ON RESULTS WASHINGTON VISIT. PRESIDENT, SPEAKING WITH GREAT EMOTION OF FRIENDSHIP OFFERED BY US AND WARM PERSONAL TREATMENT BY PRES JOHNSON, SAID US HAD MADE CLEAR ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVT AND GREAT FRIENDSHIP OF AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR KOREA. CONCLUDED BY SAYING ROK WOULD MARCH, FIGHT AND DIE AT THE SIDE OF US.

4. LATER PRESIDENT HAD ASKED YI TO REQUEST US SUPPORT FOR ROK PARTICIPATION IN AA CONFERENCE, CITING CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY RUSK IN WHICH ACCORDING TO YI SECRETARY HAD PROMISED FULL COOPERATION IN SUPPORT ROK EFFORTS WIN RECOGNITION AND INFLUENCE AMONG AFRICAN

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Authority RACODR-254-4-7-9
By JDL WARA Date 8-29-19

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1254, MAY 31, SECTION I OF II, FROM: SEOUL

NATIONS. YI ALSO MENTIONED HIS EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH VICE PRES. HUMPHREY WHEN VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YI US COULD HELP WITH FUNDS IF KOREA COULD SUPPLY MANPOWER. YI SAID PRESIDENT DIRECTED HIM TO ASK ME TO SEND MESSAGE TO BUNDY AND AMB BROWN ASKING FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ROK DEL. AGAIN I PROTESTED THAT DEPT WOULD NOT CONSIDER BUT HE ASKED ME NEVERTHELESS TO CONVEY AS REQUEST COMING FROM PRESIDENT. I SAID IF I CONVEYED REQUEST I WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BREAKDOWN OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES, WHICH I WAS CERTAIN COULD NOT COME TO MORE THAN \$50,000 TO \$100,000. EVEN AT \$10,000 PER HEAD DELEGATION OF 30 WOULD COST ONLY \$300,000. YI ASKED ME TO ASK FOR \$500,000 AND IF NOT ALL SPENT BALANCE WOULD BE USED TO ASSIST IN OPENING THREE NEW EMBASSIES IN AFRICA. I PROTESTED IN VAIN THAT US SUPPORT FOR ROK WAS IN FORM OF GOODS, SERVICES, ETC AND DEPT HAD NO WAY PROVIDE CASH IN SUCH AMOUNTS. YI SAID WE HAD SAID NO TO HIM BEFORE BUT ALWAYS WHERE NEED WAS URGENT AND HE PERSISTED WE CAME THROUGH. THIS WAS SUCH CASE AND HE INSISTED I CONVEY REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.

5. MAY 30 VICE FOREIGN MINISTER, MUN TOK-CHU CALLED ME TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AND GAVE ME BREAKDOWN OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES FOR AA DELEGATION AND "POST CONFERENCE" REPRESENTATION TOUR", TOTALLING \$420,000. MUN SAID ROKG NOW PLANNED TO SEND DELEGATION OF 30 MEMBERS HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. IN ADDITION TO NAMES MENTIONED PARA 1, MUN SAID DELEGATION WOULD INCLUDE AMBASSADORS

PAGE 4 RUALOS 01E ~~SECRET~~

CHOE KYU-HA (KUALA LUMPUR), CHONG IL-YONG (GENEVA), KIM YONG-CHU (KAMPALA) AND SIN (RABAT). BALANCE OF DELEGATION WOULD CONSISTS OF WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS (COUNSELORS AND FIRST SECRETARIES DRAWN FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY AND VARIOUS EMBASSIES) AND CLERKS. IN ADDITION, TWO OR THREE REPRESENTATIVES FROM POLITICAL PARTIES, ONE OR TWO ACADEMIC FIGURES AND A WELL-KNOWN EDITOR OR PUBLISHER WOULD BE INCLUDED. I QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR SUCH LARGE DELEGATION GIVING PERSONAL OPINION THAT SMALLER DELEGATION WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE AT MANEUVER, ESPECIALLY IN WORKING COMMITTEES. MUN CONTENDED DPRK WOULD SEND LARGE DELEGATION HEADED BY KIM IL-SONG WHICH WOULD OVERWHELM EFFORTS OF SMALL ROK DELEGATION. SAID ROKG FELT LARGE DELEGATION NECESSARY TO MAKE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME WITH LARGE NUMBER OF MODERATE AND BORDERLINE DELEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY FROM AFRICA. SAID GOVT WISHED TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT AT CONFERENCE TO ROK EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND RECOGNITION BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

6. I NOTED THAT IN LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS ROKG HAD PUBLICLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO SEND DELEGATION (PRESS REPORTS YESTERDAY SAID GOVT HAD DECIDED DELEGATION WOULD BE COMPOSED OF 20 PROMINENT FIGURES) AND ASKED MUN WHAT ROKG WOULD DO IF USG WOULD NOT OR COULD NOT PROVIDE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1254, MAY 31, SECTION I OF II, FROM: SEOUL

ASSISTANCE. MUN REPLIED USG SUPPORT MEANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LARGE, POWERFUL DELEGATION OF 30 OR MORE MEMBERS AND SMALL, WEAK DELEGATION

PAGE 5 RUALOS 01E ~~SECRET~~

OF 4 OR 5 PERSONS. I TOLD MUN I WOULD COVEY TO REQUEST TO WASHINGTON BUT AGAIN EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBT THAT USG WOULD BE IN POSITION RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY.

7. THE FOLLOWING IS ITEMIZED ESTIMATE OF EXPENSES GIVEN ME BY MUN:

1. EXPENSES FOR DELEGATION:

A. AIR FARES AND PER DIEM: \$100,000.00 B. REPRESENTATION FUND: \$100,000.00 C. PREPARATION OF MATERIALS AND MISCELLANEOUS: \$40,000.00 D. TRAVEL EXPENSES AND ALLOWANCES FOR THE DELEGATES FROM OVERSEAS POST: \$20,000.00

2. POST CONFERENCE REPRESENTATION TOUR:

A. AIR FARES AND PER DIEM: \$50,000.00, B. REPRESENTATION FUND: \$100,000.00 C. COMMUNICATION CHARGES: \$10,000.00 TOTAL 420,000.00

8. COMMENT: FROM VANTAGE POINT SEOUL, WE AGREE WITH FONOFF VIEW THAT LARGE DELEGATION BANDUNG II WOULD BE OF VALUE. NORTH KOREANS PROBABLY SENDING LARGE GROUP, AND IN ORDER COMPETE MOST EFFECTIVELY IN TERMS PRESTIGE AND ACTIVITY, ROK DELEGATION SHOULD BE COMPARABLE. EVEN WITHOUT NK RIVALRY, ROK IDEALLY WOULD PROBABLY NEED SUBSTANTIAL DELEGATION IN ORDER MANEUVER EFFECTIVELY AT CONFERENCE OF SUCH SIZE AND SIGNIFICANCE.

DOHERTY

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~

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1965 MAY 30 PM 8 51

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RR RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 02E 31/0040Z
R 310010Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC (1254)
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION II OF II MAY 31

LIMDIS

9. WE BELIEVE ROKG CONCERN ABOUT FUNDS IS GENUINE AND INCLINED TO ACCEPT STATEMENT THAT ROKG DELEGATION WILL BE SMALL ONE UNLESS SUPPORTED BY US. WHETHER WE SHOULD BEAR THE EXPENSES OF LARGE DELEGATION IS ANOTHER QUESTION. AS DEPT AWARE, FONOFF HAS ALREADY APPROACHED US FOR FUNDS TO FINANCE ROK TECHNICAL AID PROGRAMS IN AFRICA. PRESUMABLY OTHER REQUESTS MIGHT VERY WELL BE MADE IN FUTURE (ONE SUCH REQUEST, CONCEIVABLY, MIGHT BE FOR FUNDS TO COVER

PAGE 2 RUALOS 02E ~~SECRET~~

DOLLAR EXPENSES OF HOLDING PLANNED ASIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE IN SEOUL). PART OF PROBLEM, THEN, IS WHETHER WE WANT SET PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE RECURRENT AD HOC REQUESTS FOR OUR SUPPORT WHENEVER FONOFF DEEMS THAT, AS IN PRESENT CASE, WE HAVE DEEP INTEREST IN ISSUE AT HAND. WE ALSO HESITATE TO BEGIN HAGGLING WITH FONOFF OVER WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY AMOUNT OF MONEY FOR US TO PROVIDE, IF WE DID AGREE TO HELP. FONMIN YI'S REQUEST FOR ONE MILLION DOLLARS DROPPED TO \$260,000 IN TWO DAYS, AND LATTER FIGURE PROBABLY ALSO INFLATED.

10. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE INCLINED TURN DOWN ROK REQUEST DESPITE PROBABLE ADVANTAGES LARGE DELEGATION. PRESUMABLY, SMALLER BUT COMPETENT ROK DELEGATION COULD MAKE ITSELF FELT TO SOME DEGREE AND COULD, AS EASILY AS LARGE ONE, REGISTER VOTES IN FAVOR OF FREE WORLD POSITIONS. WE REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT DEEP US CONCERN OVER ACHIEVING MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS BY MODERATES AT CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY THOSE LIKE ROK, WHO CAN BE EXPECTED SUPPORT FREE WORLD STAND WHOLEHEARTEDLY, MAY OUTWEIGH OUR OBJECTIONS. BELIEVE WE SHOULD REPLY PROMPTLY TO ROKG REQUEST.

DOHERTY

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22

6 00 RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 16E 15/0715Z ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action 0 R 150700Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)

FE TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (1196)

Info INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 429

SS RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 188

G STATE GRNC

SP BT

SAH CINCIPAC FOR POLAD

L REF: A. EMBTEL 1192 RPTD TOKYO 425 CINCPAC 183

H B. DEPTTEL 1151 RPTD TOKYO 2989 CINCPAC UNN

IO SUBJECT: PAK VISIT - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

P

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1965 MAY 15 AM 4 00

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By *inf* NARA. Date 7-17-92

1. HAVE GIVEN ROKG REVISED COMMUNIQUE INCORPORATING INSTRUCTIONS REFTTEL B. WE DID NOT MENTION CHANGES AUTHORIZED BY PARA 3 REFTTEL BE FOR EPB/USOM COMMUNIQUE BECAUSE IN PRESENT STATE OF DISCUSSION WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD ALARM MORE THAN REASSURE.
2. WE HAVE TOLD ROKG THIS AS FAR AS WE CAN GO HERE.
3. BELIEVE KOREANS WILL NEVERTHELESS PRESS QUESTION DELETION "OVER NEXT FEW YEARS" IN WASHINGTON. IF THEY DO, SUGGEST FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION THAT WASHINGTON'S DESIRE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT UTILIZATION OF FUNDS WOULD BE SPREAD OUT ON REGULAR PROJECT BASIS AND KOREAN DESIRE TO AVOID IMPRESSION SMALL AMOUNTS OF AID OVER PERIOD OF TIME COULD BOTH BE MET BY REVISION INITIAL SENTENCES PARA 9B AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE MAKING AVAILABLE SPECIALLY FOR KOREA \$150 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS PROPOSED BY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND AGREED TO BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THESE FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AS RAPIDLY AS THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT DEVELOPS AND PRESENTS ACCEPTABLE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS. AFTER USE OF THESE FUNDS ETC. UNQUOTE.
4. WORDS QUOTE OVER NEXT FEW YEARS UNQUOTE COULD BE RETAINED IN MORE DETAILED EPB-USOM JOINT STATEMENT FOR REASONS GIVEN REFTTEL A.
5. IN MY VIEW THIS WOULD INVOLVE NO SACRIFICE OF US POSITION OR PRINCIPLE AND WOULD GO FAR TO MEET GENUINE ROKG POLITICAL PROBLEM SOLUTION OF WHICH IS ENTIRE PURPOSE PAK VISIT. GP-3. BROWN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:10 A.M., MAY 15, 1965, PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:18 A.M., MAY 15, 1965.

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6

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Action WNNVV MJB495A279 05A063

FE 00 RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 14E 15/0605Z
O R 150535Z ZEA

Info FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

SS TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (IMMEDIATE 1195)

G INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 427

SP RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 186

SAH STATE GRNC

BT

L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 15

H CINC PAC FOR POLAD

P REF: EMBTEL 604

USIA SUBJ: PAK VISIT - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

INR 1. IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE PRESIDENT PAK ATTACHES TO MAP TRANSFER
CIA AND CONTINUING PRESSURE ON HIM BY MND, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
NSA AND PRESS, WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER INSERTION SOME
DOD FACE-SAVING REFERENCE TO MAP TRANSFER AT END PARA 5 IN COMMUNIQUE
IGA ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE IN ADDITION, THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AID TRANSFER PROGRAM HAS RECENTLY BEEN REVISED TO ENABLE THE KOREAN
E GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE A SAVING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE UNQUOTE.

CTR 2. ROKG NEVER PUBLICIZED NEW 1965-70 TRANSFER PROGRAM AMB
COM PRESENTED TO PRIMIN JAN 7 (SEE REFTEL) AND THIS WOULD
ERB BE USEFUL OCCASION TO POINT THAT US HAS MADE SOME ACCOMMODATION.
IKSY WE NOW ESTIMATE NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FROM POL OSP
RMR IN 1965-67 AT ABOUT \$1.8 MILLION (ROK CALCULATION IS
HIGHER) AND IMPORT SAVING OF APPROXIMATELY \$2-3 MILLION ANNUALLY.
WHILE THESE FIGURES ARE NOT INSIGNIFICANT THEY CANNOT, OF
COURSE, COMPARE TO WHAT ROKG HOPED TO REALIZE IN SAVINGS BY
SUSPENSION OR STRETCH-OUT OF TRANSFER PROGRAM. INCLUSION OF
LANGUAGE SUGGESTED ABOVE MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL
CONCESSION FOR USG TO MAKE IN COURSE WASHINGTON TALKS IF,
AS WE EXPECT, ROK DWELLS HEAVILY ON THIS ISSUE.

3. GP-3
BROWN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 3:55 A.M., MAY 15
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 4:10 A.M., MAY 15

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1965 MAY 15 AM 2 54

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-165

By lip NARA. Date 7-17-92

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Action CONTROL: 14418
RECD: MAY 14, 1965 9:04 P.M.

FE

Info FROM: SEOUL

SS

G ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1191
SP DOD PRIORITY UNNUMBERED

L

H INFO: TOKYO 424
NSC TAIPEI 78
INR MANILA 183
CIA CINCPAC 182

NSA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 14

AID CINCPAC FOR POLAD AND SJA USARPAC

SIL REF: EMBTEL 1190 RPTD TOKYO 423, TAIPEI 77, MANILA 182
E CINCPAC 181
LAB

RMR FOR BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. THE LONG AND PAINFUL CHAPTER OF SOFA NEGOTIATIONS IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE. ONLY ONE REAL OBSTACLE REMAINS. THE MEANS OF SURMOUNTING IT WITH SATISFACTION AND RESPECT ON BOTH SIDES ARE SET FORTH IN REFTEL.

2. THE OBSTACLE IN QUESTION IS OUR HITHERTO ADAMANT INSISTENCE ON A PROVISION DENYING KOREAN EMPLOYEES OF US FORCES THE ULTIMATE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE EQUALLY ADAMANT REFUSAL OF ROKG, UNANIMOUSLY AND VOCALLY SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC, LEGISLATIVE AND EDITORIAL OPINION TO AGREE TO THIS PROHIBITION.

3. LONG AND STRENUOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAVE CONVINCED US THAT WE HAVE NO HOPE OF GETTING THE KOREANS TO AGREE TO SUCH A CLAUSE. ITS ENFORCEABILITY IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE. IT WOULD PROVIDE AN INSTANCE OF WHAT ALL KOREANS OF WHATEVER PARTY WILL RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY CONSIDER INJUSTICE AND DISCRIMINATION AND WHICH THOSE WHO WISH US ILL BOTH IN KOREA AND ELSEWHERE CAN AND WILL EXPLOIT TO OUR DISADVANTAGE.

4. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT MOST DIFFICULT SUCCESSFULLY TO DEFEND THIS CLAUSE BEFORE ITS ASSEMBLY AND PUBLIC OPINION. IT DOES NOT APPEAR IN ANY OF OUR OTHER SOFA'S, NOT WITH CHINA, NOR WITH JAPAN, NOR WITH THE PHILIPPINES.

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Authority FRUS, 1964-65, Vol. XXIX, #45

By SJ, NARA, Date 4-20-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1191, MAY 14, FROM: SEOUL

5. THIS IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN KOREA NOW. IF AGREED TO THERE IS SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD OF A STRIKE AGAINST THIS CLAUSE WHEN IT IS ANNOUNCED. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO HELP US AVOID STRIKES, COULD NOT OPPOSE THIS ONE.

6. THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REFTEL GIVES REAL, AND WE THINK SUFFICIENT, PROTECTION FOR OUR INTERESTS. IT EVEN PROVIDES FOR A QUALIFIED NO STRIKE CLAUSE UNDER CONDITIONS OF NEED, BUT DOES SO ON A BASIS ON WHICH THE ROKG WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT US. WE WILL NEED THIS SUPPORT IN SUCH A CASE.

7. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE KOREANS CANNOT BE PUSHED FURTHER ON THIS POINT. I BELIEVE THAT THE CLAUSE WE PROPOSE IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE US, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE SOFA ITSELF AND IN TERMS OF OUR OVERALL INTERESTS IN KOREA AND ELSEWHERE. I BELIEVE THAT WITH THIS CLAUSE IN HAND WE CAN NOW GET SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT AND CLOSE THE DEAL. WITHOUT IT THERE IS LITTLE OR NO CHANCE OF AGREEMENT.

8. I THEREFORE ENDORSE THE REASONING OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM CONTAINED REFTEL AND RECOMMEND WASHINGTON'S SPEEDY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL.

9. FOR CINCPAC: GENERAL HOWZE CONCURS.

10. GP-3.

CFN 1190 423 77 182 181 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10

BROWN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

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Action
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1965 MAY 13 AM 6:51

RMR

PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 08E 13/0545Z
P 130530Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

1177

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWLER
BROWN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE X
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MAY 13

FOR CHIEF OF PROTOCOL FROM AMBASSADOR

APPRECIATE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OUR SUGGESTION.
DO NOT BELIEVE PRESENTATION SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO JUSTIFY
ADDING ANOTHER OCCASION TO SCHEDULE. IF PRESENTATION COULD BE
ARRANGED FOR ALL HERE IN PRESIDENT AND MRS. JOHNSON'S NAME,
IT WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE.
BROWN
BT

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26

46

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RMR

W MJA428A0350SA989
PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 03E 13/0545Z
P 130530Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1176
STATE GRNC
BT

012267

1965 MAY 13 AM 7 17

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FOR BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

IN VIEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE EMBTEL 1090, MRS. BROWN AND I
PROPOSE, UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OBJECTION, TO COME TO WASHINGTON
IN SPECIAL PLANE WITH PRESIDENTIAL PARTY.
BROWN
BT

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~BATOR~~
~~BOWDLER~~
~~BOWMAN~~
~~CHASE~~
~~COOPER~~
~~RAYNES~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KEENEY~~ X
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~THOMSON~~

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27

NSC

~~TOP SECRET~~

4
Action PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 14E 10/0905Z
SS R 100900Z ZEA ZFF-Q

Info FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1156
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 168
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 80
STATE GRNC
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008604

1965 MAY 10 AM 6 52

PRIORITY

029

34

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 10

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTTEL 1127.

1. PURSUANT PARA 4 REFTTEL I TOLD PRESIDENT PAK ABOUT LETTER FROM GSVN WHICH HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE WE FELT CONTRIBUTION KOREAN COMBAT FORCES DESIRABLE, US WAS NOT PRESSING FOR ACTION BY HIM PRIOR RATIFICATION ROK/JAPAN SETTLEMENT IF THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM. I SAID WE HAD NOT KNOWN OF QUAT'S LETTER.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 14E ~~TOP SECRET~~

2. PRESIDENT PAK SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE THE CONTRIBUTION BUT AS HE HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR LODGE, IT PRESENTED HIM WITH CERTAIN POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE THEREFORE APPRECIATED OUR MESSAGE.

3. GP-3. BROWN
BT

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-20

By [signature], NARA, Date 5-22-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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1965 MAY 8 AM 8 20

45
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PP R08HCRI0178
DE RUALOS 11E 08/1000Z
P 080935Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1131
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ MAY 8

REF: DEPTTEL 1115

LIMDIS

1. WE HAVE NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM REPORTED COUP PLOT.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MND HAS TAKEN REPORT OF PLOT WITH
UTMOST SERIOUSNESS. IN PAST FEW MONTHS WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS FROM
VARIOUS SOURCES OF POSSIBLE COUPS BY DISGRUNTLED ARMY OFFICERS
AND YUN PO-SON AND FOLLOWERS HAVE GIVEN VAGUE INTIMATIONS THAT MOVE
TO OVERTHROW GOVT WOULD GET SUPPORT FROM ARMY CIRCLES.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 11E ~~SECRET~~2. OFFICERS REPORTED AS INVOLVED [REDACTED] ARE
MOSTLY RELATIVELY UNKNOWN COLONELS.

[REDACTED] GROUP INCLUDES BOTH STAFF
AND COMMAND OFFICERS. WE CANNOT NOW RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT PLOT
IS FABRICATED BUT ON BALANCE WE THINK NOT. AT ANY RATE NO EVIDENCE
THAT PLOT CONCOCTED AS IN CASE OF PHONEY COUP PLOT OF MARCH
1963 WHICH RESULTED IN ARREST AND JAILING OF NUMBER OF OFFICERS
FROM HAMGYONG. THIS WOULD HARDLY BE TIME FOR GOVT TO BE FABRICATING
COUP PLOTS.

3. LOCAL STRINGER FOR CBS AND NEWSWEEK FILING STORY BASED ROKA
CIC AND MND SOURCES THAT SEVEN KOREAN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED
ON SUSPICION. [REDACTED]

4. IF COUP PLOT AUTHENTIC, ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS HAVE
EVIDENTLY BEEN DASHED BY PROMPT ACTION ROK AUTHORITIES, WHO
ACCORDING TO MND SOURCES AT FIRST HOPED TO KEEP THINGS QUIET
UNTIL AFTER PAK VISIT, BUT AS CONCERN MOUNTED DECIDED TO MOVE
IN. NOW SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN GOVT WILL HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT COUP PLOT WAS HATCHING, DISCLOSE FAV OF ARRESTS AND PROCEED
WITH TRIALS. OPPOSITION WILL SEIZE ON ISSUE EITHER TO CHARGE GOVT

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SANITIZED
Authority RAC-NLS DDI-254-41
By ies NARA, Date 11-19-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1151, May 8, From Seoul

HAS FABRICATED PLOT TO JUSTIFY IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, OR AS REAL DEMONSTRATION OF UNREST AND DISSATISFACTION WITH PAK GOVT EVEN AMONG MILITARY, OR POSSIBLY BOTH.

5. WE CANNOT SAY PRECISELY WHAT PUBLIC REACTION WILL BE. IN PAST GOVT REPORTS OF COUP PLOTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED WITH SKEPTICISM. WITH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS COMING UP, THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT PLOT WILL BE REGARDED AS INDICATION OF GOVT'S WEAKNESS AT CRUCIAL TIME AND ENCOURAGE BOTH STUDENTS AND OPPOSITION TO STEP UP ATTACKS ON GOVT. IN TURN, LIKELIHOOD (NOW QUITE REMOTE) OF GOVT DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW BEFORE PAK'S DEPARTURE MAY BE INCREASED.

6. IF REPORT OF COUP PLOT HAS *THESE* REPERCUSSIONS, IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CAST SHADOW ON PAK VISIT. OPPOSITION MAY INTENSIFY CHARGES THAT US SUPPORTING PAK AGAINST WISHES OF PEOPLE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS US VISIT IN () KOREA-JAPAN SETTLEMENT WILL TO SOME EXTENT BE DISSIPATED, BUT NOT SUFFICIENTLY TO JUSTIFY ANY DEPARTURE FROM PRESENT PLANS FOR VISIT.

7. WHEN REPORTS REACH US PRESS, WE RECOMMEND DEPT PLAY DOWN, CITING UNRELIABILITY OF SUCH REPORTS IN PAST, STRESSING THAT NEITHER TOP LEADERSHIP NOR RANK AND FILE OF ARMY INVOLVED AND POINTING OUT THAT IN ANY CASE ROKG SEEMS CLEARLY TO HAVE NIPPED MOVEMENT IN BUD.

8. GP-2.

BROWN
BT

~~SECRET~~

29

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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Info

VV MJA390A753

1965 MAY 1 PM 9 51

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RR RUEHCR

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DE RUALOS 09E 01/2300Z

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R 011400Z ZEA

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL]

NSC

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC [1108]

INR

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 156

CIA

STATE GRHSWX

NSA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 2

DOD

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

IGA

AID

REF:NMEPTL 1066

RMR

1. AMBASSADOR TODAY GAVE MND POSITION STATED IN DEPTL 1066 AND SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED DISCUSS MND'S PROPOSAL (EMBTL 1101) WITH HIM. MND ESPECIALLY STRESSED REQUEST FOR PAY RAISE FUNDS. PLEASE THEREFORE GIVE US YOUR COMMENTS ON ALL POINTS RAISED IN EMBTEL 1101 EVEN IF NOT PROPOSED FOR COMMUNIQUE.

2. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN 2 1066 1. 1101 1101 NOT 2. GP-3.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 72-165

By ing NARA. Date 7-17-92

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83-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

466

Rec'd:

MAY 1, 1965

10:47 AM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1107
DOD UNNUMBERED

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USIA

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CPR

PMR

INFO: CINCPAC 155
TOKYO 398

DATE: MAY 1 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: EMBTEL 1105

FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED REVISION JOINT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED REFTEL. WE HAVE INCORPORATED ROKG LANGUAGE WHEREVER POSSIBLE WITH MAJOR CHANGES RESERVED FOR SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. SUGGESTIONS DEALING WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE ARE CONSISTENT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS EMBTEL 1101, AND THOSE DEALING WITH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ARE IN ACCORD WITH DEPTTEL 1060 AND TOAID 1551. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS SOONEST IN ORDER TO PERMIT EARLY AND FULL DISCUSSION WITH ROKG.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT PARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 18, 1965

1. AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON OF THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT CHUNG HEE PARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON ON MAY 17, 1965, FOR A TEN-DAY STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND MET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON MAY 17 AND 18 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST TO THEIR COUNTRIES.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KEY YOUNG CHANG, FOREIGN MINISTER TONG WON LEE, DEFENSE MINISTER SUNG EUN KIM, SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN
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By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

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-2- 1107, MAY 1 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM SEOUL

RUSK, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETINGS.

2. PRESIDENT PARK AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMED THE STRONG BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP TRADITIONALLY EXISTING BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR FIRM DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST COOPERATION IN THE PURSUIT OF THE COMMON OBJECTIVE FOR A SECURE AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL.

3. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AGREED THAT THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES AND ACTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS ALLIES IN NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUE TO PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT IN THE AREA.

THEY AFFIRMED THAT THE FREE NATIONS SHOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THEIR SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION TO COPE WITH THE MENACE OF COMMUNIST EXPANSIONISM AND TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS UNDER FREEDOM.

4. PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOTED WITH DEEP APPRECIATION THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TOWARDS THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY IN SUPPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION.

5. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TIES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND AGREED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN STRONG DEFENSE FORCES IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF KOREA.

IN THIS CONNECTION THE TWO PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE COMMON ACTION TO MEET COMMON DANGER FROM ANY THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA.

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-3- 1107, MAY 1 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM SEOUL

PRESIDENT JOHNSON FURTHER AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS ARMED FORCES IN KOREA AT A LEVEL OF STRENGTH SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THE DEFENSE OF KOREA.

6. PRESIDENT PARK STRESSED THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN AND MODERNIZE THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. HE PROPOSED AN ADJUSTMENT IN THE TRANSFER TO KOREAN FINANCING OF CERTAIN ITEMS NOW FUNDED THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SO AS TO REDUCE THE IMPACT ON THE KOREAN BUDGET.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON GAVE ASSURANCE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MAINTAIN AND EQUIP THE KOREAN ARMED FORCES TO MEET DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL BE INCREASED ABOVE PRESENT LEVELS AND THE NEW LEVEL OF AID WILL CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON ALSO AGREED TO REEXAMINE THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ITEMS.

7. THE TWO PRESIDENTS TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ARDENT DESIRE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR REUNIFICATION OF THEIR HOMELAND AND DEPLORED THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PERSISTED IN THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ESTABLISHED UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA, THUS PROLONGING THE ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF KOREA AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE KOREAN PEOPLE.

BOTH PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THE UTMOST EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A UNIFIED, FREE AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action CONTROL: 510
RECD: MAY 1, 12:02 PM

FE

Info FROM: SEOUL

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1107
DOD UNNUMBERED

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INFO: CINCPAC 156
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(SECTION 2 OF 2)

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8. THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE RECENT PROGRESS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN TO NORMALIZE THEIR RELATIONS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BRING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS TO AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

RMR

BOTH PRESIDENTS REITERATED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD NOT ONLY PROMOTE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT ALSO MARK A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ASIA.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, RENEWING THE FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, GAVE ASSURANCE THAT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD NOT AFFECT THE ESTABLISHED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF EXTENDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

9. PRESIDENT PARK EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY. PRESIDENT JOHNSON CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT PARK ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TOWARDS A STABILIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOTED THE IMPRESSIVE INCREASES IN INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, THE INVESTMENTS IN PROGRAMS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS, AND ESPECIALLY THE RECENT PROGRESS

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By *is*

NARS, Date *1-22-82*

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-2- 1107, MAY 1, (SECTION 2 OF 2), FROM: SEOUL

TOWARD ECONOMIC STABILITY, ALL OF WHICH REFLECTS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN THEIR ECONOMIC PROSPECTS.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOTED THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REPRESENTS A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO PURSUE ITS POLICY GOALS OF FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY, GREATER EXPORTS, ACCELERATED INDUSTRIALIZATION, INCREASED NATIONAL SAVINGS AND CONTINUED FINANCIAL STABILIZATION, SO AS TO INCREASE NATIONAL INCOME AND ASSIST THE NATION IN ATTAINING ITS LONG-RANGE GOAL OF A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY.

10. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AFFIRMED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT KOREA COULD LOOK FORWARD TO SUBSTANTIAL UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS ANTICIPATED SELF-HELP EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ITS ECONOMY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON GAVE ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST IN FILLING KOREA'S ESSENTIAL IMPORT GAP AS WELL AS TO MEET ANY FOOD DEFICIT, AND PLANS TO PROVIDE SOME \$150 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS TO ASSIST IN FINANCING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PROPOSED BY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND AGREED TO BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE TERMS OF ITS AID LEGISLATION AND POLICIES. AFTER USE OF THESE FUNDS, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. THROUGH FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAMS, THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE, AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND RELIEF OF NEEDY PEOPLE. U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING GRANTS WILL ALSO CONTINUE.

THE AID DEVELOPMENT LOANS WILL BE USED BOTH FOR SUCH PROGRAM FINANCING AS IS AGREED AND FOR FINANCING OF PROJECTS THAT WOULD SERVE SUCH PURPOSES AS EXPANDING POWER RESOURCES AND SOCIAL OVERHEAD CAPITAL, AND INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND CONSEQUENTLY OUTPUT IN BOTH AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERIES INDUSTRIES. OTHER PROJECT ACTIVITY WILL BE DESIGNED TO OPEN NEW HORIZONS FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT -- LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL -- BENEFITING ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULATION, AND PROMOTING BALANCED INDUSTRIAL GROWTH.

IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS THAT THE LONG-TERM U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO KOREA DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF GREATER STABILITY IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE LIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE,

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-3-1107, MAY 1, (SECTION 2 OF 2), FROM: SEOUL

WHILE AT THE SAME TIME STRENGTHENING KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND FURTHER ACCELERATING ITS DRIVE TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

11. PRESIDENT PARK EMPHASIZED THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY IN KOREA DEPENDS GREATLY UPON ITS ABILITY TO EXPAND TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. HE REQUESTED THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN PROVIDING EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EXPORT OF KOREAN PRODUCTS AND COMMODITIES, AND IN PROVIDING KOREA WITH INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCUREMENT FUNDED BY UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFORTS WHICH KOREA IS MAKING TO EXPAND ITS EXPORTS AND PROMISED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO ALL IT CAN TO HELP THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ACHIEVE A BETTER BALANCE IN ITS FOREIGN TRADE.

12. PRESIDENT PARK EXTENDED A CORDIAL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO VISIT KOREA AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. PRESIDENT JOHNSON EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO VISIT KOREA. BOTH PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT TO CONTINUE TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND PEACE.

END VERBATIM TEXT

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Action CONTROL: 429
FE RECEIVED: MAY 1, 1965, 10:15 AM
Info FROM: SEOUL
SS ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1105
G DOD UNNUMBERED
SP
SAH INFO: TOKYO 397
L CINCPAC 155
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USIA DATE: MAY 1 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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FOLLOWING IS TEXT PROPOSED JOINT JOHNSON-PARK COMMUNIQUE
RECEIVED FROM ROKG. TEXT OUR SUGGESTED REVISION IN NEXT
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT PARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING
TALKS IN WASHINGTON D.C. MAY 17 AND 18, 1965

1. AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRESIDENT CHUNG HEE PARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARRIVED IN
WASHINGTON ON MAY 17, 1965, FOR A TEN DAY STATE VISIT TO THE
UNITED STATES, AND MET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON MAY 17
AND 18 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
AND MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST TO THEIR COUNTRIES.

THE MEETINGS TOOK PLACE IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY COOPERATION
AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND FURTHER CEMENTED THE SOLIDARITY
OF PURPOSES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KEY YOUNG CHANG, FOREIGN MINISTER TONG
WON LEE, DEFENSE MINISTER SUNG EUN KIM, SECRETARY OF STATE
DEAN RUSK, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS
PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETINGS.

2. PRESIDENT PARK AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMED THE STRONG
BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP TRADITIONALLY EXISTING BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC

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Authority RACODR-254-4-8-8

By JDA NARA Date 8-29-19

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-2- 1105, MAY 1 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SEOUL

OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR FIRM DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST COOPERATION IN THE PURSUIT OF COMMON OBJECTIVE FOR A SECURE AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES.

3. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AGREED THAT THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES AND ACTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS ALLIES-NOTABLY THE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIET-NAM CONTINUE TO PRESENT AN INCREASINGLY GRAVE THREAT IN THE AREA.

THEY AFFIRMED THAT THE FREE NATIONS SHOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THEIR SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION TO COPE WITH GROWING COMMUNIST MENACE AND TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS UNDER FREEDOM.

4. PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOTED WITH DEEP APPRECIATION THE CONTRIBUTION BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TOWARDS THE DEFENSE OF VIET-NAM AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION AND RE-AFFIRMED A FIRM DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESIST AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM TO ENSURE THE PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REITERATED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO CLOSELY COOPERATE IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO HELP ASSURE IT INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM.

5. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TIES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND AGREED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE FORCE IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA AGAINST ANY RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND THREATS OF AGGRESSION.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ANY ARMED ATTACK AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RENDER FORTHWITH AND EFFECTIVELY ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA INCLUDING THE USE OF ARMED FORCES, IF THERE IS ANY RENEWAL OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON FURTHER AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS ARMED FORCES IN KOREA AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF STRENGTH UNTIL CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING PEACE HAVE BEEN SECURED IN THE AREA.

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6. PRESIDENT PARK, NOTING THE GROWING COMMUNIST BELIGERENCY AND THREATS, STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING THE MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NEED OF DEFERRING THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN ITEMS NOW FUNDED THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE KOREAN FINANCING UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SHALL HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDEN ON THE KOREAN ECONOMY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO FURNISH NECESSARY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND WOULD EXAMINE SYMPATHETICALLY THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ITEMS.

7. THE TWO PRESIDENTS TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ARDENT DESIRE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR REUNIFICATION OF THEIR HOMELAND AND EXPLORED THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PERSISTED IN THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE ESTABLISHED UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES FOR UNIFICATION OF KOREA, THUS PROLONGING THE ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF KOREA AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE KOREAN PEOPLE.

BOTH PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE UTMOST EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A UNIFIED, FREE AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action CONTROL: 542

FE RECD: MAY 1, 1965 1:04 PM
Info

SS FROM: SEOUL

G ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1105
SP DOD UNNUMBERED

SAH
L INFO: TOKYO 397
H CINC PAC 155
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USIA SECTION TWO OF TWO

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AID 8. THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE RECENT
E PROGRESS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
CPR AND JAPAN TO NORMALIZE THEIR RELATIONS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE
THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BRING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS TO AN
EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

RMR BOTH PRESIDENTS REITERATED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE NORMALIZATION
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD NOT
ONLY PROMOTE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT
ALSO MARK A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE AND PROGRESS
IN ASIA.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, RENEWING THE FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, REASSURED
THAT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN
WOULD NOT AFFECT IN ANY WAY THE ESTABLISHED POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES TOWARD KOREA - THE POLICY OF EXTENDING MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO HELP
ASSURE ITS SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT TOWARD A FREE, DEMOCRATIC
AND SELF SUPPORTING NATION.

THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE NORMALIZATION
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN, CONTINUED
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS REQUIRED
AND ESPECIALLY THE SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED
AT THE PRESENT LEVEL SO AS TO LIGHTEN THE DEFENSE BURDEN ON

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By us, NARS, Date 1-22-82

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-2- 1105, MAY 1, FROM SEOUL

THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND TO ENABLE THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO DEVOTE ITS ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN TO FURTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

9. PRESIDENT JOHNSON CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT PARK ON THE REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENTS MADE BY THE KOREA GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TOWARDS A STABILIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOTED THE IMPRESSIVE INCREASES, IN PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS THE INVESTMENTS IN PROGRAMS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS, AND ESPECIALLY THE RECENT PROGRESS TOWARD ATTAINING ECONOMIC STABILITY--ALL EXPRESSIONS OF THE CONFIDENCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN THEIR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ALSO EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND RESPECT FOR THE DESIRE OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMY, AND FOR THEIR DEMONSTRATED EFFORTS TOWARD THIS END. HE NOTED THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REPRESENTS COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT CONSISTENT WITH KOREA'S POLICY OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY, GREATER NATIONAL SAVINGS AND CONTINUED FINANCIAL STABILIZATION WHICH WILL THEREBY INCREASE NATIONAL INCOME AND ASSIST THE NATION IN ATTAINING ITS LONG-RANGE GOAL OF OVER-ALL ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

10. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AFFIRMED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT COULD LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONTINUED SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND TO SUBSTANTIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE TO KOREA NEEDED FOR ITS SELF-HELP EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ITS ECONOMY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST IN FILLING KOREA'S ESSENTIAL IMPORT GAP AS WELL AS TO MEET ANY FOOD DEFICIT, AND WOULD EARMARK AT THIS TIME SOME \$150 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS TO ASSIST IN FINANCING AGREED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PROPOSED BY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT. THE U.S. WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THROUGH FOOD FOR PEACE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AT A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE.

THE AID DEVELOPMENT LOANS WILL BE USED BOTH FOR PROGRAM FINANCING OF SUCH PROJECTS AS THOSE WHICH WILL EXPAND POWER

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-3- 1105, MAY 1, FROM SEOUL

RESOURCES AND SOCIAL OVERHEAD CAPITAL, AND THOSE WHICH WILL INCREASE EFFICIENCY AND CONSEQUENTLY OUTPUT IN BOTH AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERIES INDUSTRIES. OTHERS ARE THOSE CAREFULLY AIMED AT THE OPENING OF NEW HORIZONS FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT-- LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL-BENEFITING ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULATION, AND INSURING BALANCED INDUSTRIAL GROWTH.

IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS THAT THE LONG TERM U. S. ECONOMIC AID TO KOREA DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF GREATER STABILITY IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE LIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME STRENGTHENING KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND FURTHER ACCELERATING ITS DRIVE TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

11. PRESIDENT PARK EMPHASIZED THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY IN KOREA DEPENDS GREATLY UPON ITS ABILITY TO EXPAN TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND REQUESTED THE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN REDUCING THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON THE IMPORT OF KOREAN PRODUCTS AND COMMODITIES, INCLUDING TEXTILE PRODUCTS AND IN PROVIDING KOREA WITH INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCUREMENTS FUNDED THROUGH UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFORTS WHICH KOREA IS MAKING TO EXPAND ITS EXPORT AND ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY THE REQUESTS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ACHIEVE A BETTER BALANCE IN ITS FOREIGN TRADE.

12. THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF KOREAN FARM LABOURS IN THE UNITED STATES.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXPLORE APPROPRIATE MEANS OF IMPORTING LABOURS FROM KOREA FOR EMPLOYEMENT IN FARMS IN THE UNITED STATES.

13. PRESIDENT PARK EXTENDED A CORDIAL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO VIST KOREA AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. PRESIDENT JOHNSON EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE THAT HE COULD VIST KOREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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-4- 1105, MAY 1, FROM SEOUL

14. THE TWO PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT THE MEETINGS JUST HELD WOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT TO CONTINUE TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND PEACE. END VERBATIM TEXT

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1965 APR 30 PM 11 54

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DE RUALOS 03E 01/0320Z

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1103

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 394

RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 71

RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 172 /

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 152

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 01

CINCPAC FOR POLAD AND SJA USARPAC

REF: DEPTTEL 1031 RPTD INFO TAIPEI 1050 MANILA 1781 TOKYO 2732
CINCPAC UNN

SOFA NEGOTIATIONS

1. DURING 76TH NEGOTIATING MEETING APRIL 30, US NEGOTIATORS
TABLED PROPOSED REVISIONS TO KOREAN DRAFT CLAIMS ARTICLE,
AS AUTHORIZED BY REFTEL. KOREANS PROMISED STUDY AND RESPOND
AT NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED MAY 7.

2. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND LABOR ARTICLES NOT DISCUSSED.
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH FONOFF OFFICIALS INDICATE THEY NOT
YET PREPARED ACCEPT US POSITIONS THESE TWO ARTICLES.
POSSIBILITY CONCLUDING AGREEMENT BEFORE PAK WASHINGTON VISIT
FADING FAST.

3. GP-3. BROWN

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CFN 01 1031 1050 1781 2732 1. 76 30 7 2. NOT NOT 3. GP-3.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-165

By *fw*, NARA, Date 8-25-92

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*46
Action-S-S
Info~~SECRET~~Control: 148
Rec'd: MAY 1, 1965
1:04 A.M.

044

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1101

INFO: DOD UNNUMBERED
CINCPAC 151

DATE: MAY 1

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PASS TO AID

REF: (A) DEPTTEL 1045 (B) DEPTTEL 1061 (C) DEPTTEL 1038
(D) EMBTEL 979 (E) EMBTEL 909 (F) CINCPAC MSG TO OSD
DTG 310518Z (G) COMUSKOREA UK 51910 (H) A-111 DTD AUGUST
16, 1964

SUBJEC: PRESIDENT PAK'S VISIT.

1. IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE ATTITUDE OF FULL ROK SUPPORT ENCOUNTERED BY AMB LODGE AND EVIDENCED BY ROK CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS TO SVN, AND HELP ROKG ACHIEVE RATIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN, IT IS IN MY VIEW ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE AS GENEROUS AND AS SPECIFIC AS WE CONSCIENTIOUSLY CAN IN OUR ASSURANCES TO PRESIDENT PAK OF CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR KOREA.

2. IF THE BRIEF GENERAL STATEMENT IN PARA 5 OF DEPTTEL 1038 IS INTENDED AS THE COMMITMENT WHICH WILL APPEAR IN THE COMMUNIQUE, IT IS IN MY VIEW INADEQUATE AND WOULD BE RECEIVED HERE WITH A SENSE OF COMPLETE LET DOWN.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RACODR-254-4-9-7
By JDL WARA Date 8-29-19~~SECRET~~

3. MINISTER
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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, MAY 1 FROM SEOUL

3. MINISTER NATIONAL DEFENSE CONFIRMED TO ME APRIL 29 THAT ROK MAIN REQUESTS WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

A. STRONG PLEA FOR A FIRM AND INDEFINITE ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL NOT WITHDRAW EITHER OF OUR TWO DIVISIONS OR IN ANY WAY REDUCE OUR FORCES HERE. COMMENT: I AND OTHERS HAVE TOLD ROKS PRIVATELY THAT WE CANNOT GIVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE, BUT THAT WE HAVE NO PRESENT PLANS FOR SUCH WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THEY WOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY SUCH ACTION WERE TAKEN. SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE AS A PRIVATE ASSURANCE. FOR THE COMMUNIQUE I FEEL THAT AT LEAST THE TYPE OF STATEMENT SUGGESTED IN PARA 3(D) OF EMBTEL 979 IS ESSENTIAL. VISIBLE RESTRICTING OF FORCES SUCH AS CITED IN EMBTEL 909 SHOULD BE AVOIDED. (CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT MESSAGE THAT ROKG WILL LEARN SUBSTANTIAL FORCE REDUCTION HAS IN FACT TAKEN PLACE REMAINS ACUTE).

B. A REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE THAT PRESENT ROK FORCE LEVELS RECEIVE INCREASED MAP AND THAT PRESENT LEVEL OF ROK DEFENCE BUDGETRY SUPPORT MAINTAINED. COMMENT: NEED FOR MORE MAP IS CLEAR AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD GO AS FAR AS WE CAN ON THIS POINT; USFK AND USOM ARE VERY MUCH OF THIS OPINION. FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST THE STATEMENT SUGGESTED IN PARA 3(E) OF EMBTEL 979. CURRENT PLANNING IN WASHINGTON FOR FY 1966/71 SHOULD SUPPORT SUCH A STATEMENT. FOR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF EMB/USOM AND USFK ON MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT SEE A-111.

C. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR A MILITARY PAY INCREASE. MINISTER WILL ASK SECRETARY MACMAMARA FOR \$30 MILLION PER YEAR FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOR THIS PURPOSE, ABOUT ONE-THIRD IN CASH, ONE-THIRD IN FOOD, AND ONE-THIRD FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION. COMMENT: A PAY INCREASE IS CLEARLY NEEDED. BUT THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO PROVIDE FOR IT IS VERY COMPLEX AND AFFECTS NOT ONLY THE MILITARY SECTOR BUT ALSO THE WHOLE STABILIZATION PROGRAM.

IF PROVIDED

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-3- 1101, MAY 1 FROM SEOUL

IF PROVIDED LARGELY FROM ADDITIONAL COUNTERPART WON, FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE INFLATIONARY. PAY RAISES FOR CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. THE FORM OF THE INCREASE, WHETHER IN CASH OR IN KIND, HOW IT IS TO BE FINANCED FROM LOCAL RESOURCES, THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, ALL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY STUDIED.

(1) THEREFORE I FEEL THAT THE PROPER COURSE IS FOR US TO SAY THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PAY INCREASE, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, THAT IF THEY WILL WORK OUT PROPOSALS TO ACCOMPLISH IT IN REALISTIC STAGES WE WILL BE GLAD TO WORK WITH THEM, AND THAT WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT MOST IF NOT ALL OF IT CAN BE FINANCED FROM THEIR OWN RESOURCES IF THEY MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO INCREASE DOMESTIC REVENUE, WE WILL BE GLAD TO CONSIDER HOW WE COULD CONTRIBUTE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SOUND STABILIZATION PROGRAM.

(2) THIS WILL GIVE ROKS SOMETHING THEY HAVE NOT HAD BEFORE, NAMELY UNIFIED U.S. SUPPORT FOR A SERIOUS ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DIRECT U.S. HELP. I WOULD NOT HESITATE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO RECOMMEND A SUITABLE PL-480 CONTRIB-
UTION TO SUCH A PROGRAM, OR THE USE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY TO GENERATE LOCAL CURRENCY FOR HOUSING (REFERENCE F), OR EVEN A NON-INFLATIONARY COUNTERPART CONTRIBUTION IF ONE COULD BE WORKED OUT.

(3) THIS WILL NOT SATISFY ROKS COMPLETELY BUT I FEEL THAT FORMULATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH A PLAN WOULD GIVE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST AND THAT WE SHOULD TRY THIS OUT BEFORE WE CONSIDER LETTING UP ON OUR LONG PRESSURE ON THE ROKS TO GENERATE THEIR OWN SAVINGS AND DEVELOP THEIR OWN RESOURCES WHICH IS SLOWLY BEGINNING TO HAVE EFFECT, OR DO ANYTHING TO JEOPARDIZE SERIOUSLY THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS PLAN MAY ALSO LESSEN POTENTIAL DANGER OF UNILATERAL ROKG ACTION TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. THIS SUBJECT SHOULD NOT BE

MENTIONED AS SUCH

~~SECRET~~

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4- 1101, MAY 1 FROM SEOUL

MENTIONED AS SUCH IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

D. MINISTER WILL ASK FOR SUSPENSION OR AT LEAST A STRETCH-OUT OF THE FY 66/69 MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM TO 1975. (ROKG HAS NOT BEEN AND SHOULD NOT BE INFORMED OF FY 71 AND 72 SCHEDULE). COMMENT: THIS IS OF MAJOR POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO PRESIDENT PAK. I STRONGLY URGE SOME ACCOMMODATION SORT OF A FIVE YEAR STRETCH-OUT. A THREE YEAR STRETCH-OUT OF THE FY 65-70 PROGRAM TO 65-73 WOULD, WITH DEFERMENT OF THE PLANNED 71-72 TRANSFER TO 73-75, MAKE A TEN YEAR INSTEAD OF A SEVEN YEAR PROGRAM. IT APPEARS THAT EXTENSION OF THE POL TRANSFER PERIOD OFFERS THE SIMPLEST MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS AND WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE ROKG WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO EARN ADDITIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IT COULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT TO THE ROKG THAT THE BUDGET SAVINGS FROM THIS STRETCH-OUT COULD BE USED TO MEET SOME OF THE NEED FOR A MILITARY PAY INCREASE WITHOUT INFLATIONARY EFFECTS. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE MAJOR POLITICAL BENEFITS HERE. WHILE URGING WASHINGTON RECONSIDERATION MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM IN ABOVE TERMS, WE ARE GIVING ROKG NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO EXPECT ANY ACCOMMODATIONS.

4. MINISTER ALSO WILL REQUEST ROK PARTICIPATION IN BIDDING FOR DOD FURNISHED SUPPLIES TO SVN AND SERVICING OR REPAIR WORK FOR SVN. COMMENT: FAVORABLE REFERENCE TO THIS POSSIBILITY IN THE COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IT MAKES SENSE TO USE SKILLED CHEAP LABOR AVAILABLE HERE. CASE SEEMS PARTICULARLY STRONG FOR EQUIPMENT REHABILITATION OR OTHER U.S. EXPENDITURES ALREADY BEING MADE OUTSIDE OF THE U.S. ROKS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS POSSIBILITY AND IT HAS RECEIVED WIDE PUBLICITY HERE. BELIEVE LANGUAGE COULD BE DEvised WHICH WOULD AVOID SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SVN OR IMPLICATION OF QUID PRO QUO FOR ROK TROOPS IN SVN. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND MAXIMUM FEASIBLE U.S. RESPONSIVENESS TO THIS REQUEST.

5. REFERENCE TO MILITARY HOUSING PROGRAM (REFERENCE F) WOULD BE HELPFUL.

6. I AGREE WITH GEN HOWZE'S COMMENTS ON SUBSIDIARY POINTS ONE THROUGH FOUR IN REFERENCE G PARA 6 (D THROUGH G).

7. GP-3.

BROWN

AHA

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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5
ActionSS
Info~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNNVV MJB722A9840SA536

00 RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 08E 26/0955Z

O 260945Z ZEA ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC (IMMEDIATE 1072)

STATE GRNC

BT

I M M E D I A T E

21242

1965 APR 26 AM 6 14

002

~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 26

EXDIS

RE DEPTTEL 1040

1. PROBLEM WE HAVE IN MIND IS THAT ROKG MUST OBTAIN ASSEMBLY APPROVAL FOR DISPATCH FURTHER UNITS TO SVN. IF POSSEBILITY REQUEST FOR A DIVISION IS REAL, PRESIDENT PAK SHOULD BE ADVISED NOW, AS HE MIGHT WELL FEEL IT PREFERABLE SEEK AUTHORITY IN ADVANCE TO DISPATCH UP TO DIVISION SIZE CONTINGENT RATHER THAN TACKLE PROBLEM PIECEMEAL.

2. GP-3., BROWN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 6:19 A.M., 4/26/65

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 6:23 A.M., 4/26/65

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-20

By 48, NARA, Date 5-22-91~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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022

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Action

Info

NNNNVV MJB224A421

RR RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 09E 21/0835Z

R 210825Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOULTO SECSTATE WASHDC 1045

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ APRIL 21

LIMDIS

PAK VISIT

REF: A. EMBTEL 970 B. EMBTEL 979 C. DEPTTEL 934 D. DEPTTEL 1006
E. DEPTTEL 10121. WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY WASHINGTON REACTION REF A AND B SO I
CAN DISCUSS PACKAGE IN GENERAL TERMS WITH PRESIDENT IN ACCORD
WITH PARA 2 REF C.2. DESPITE VIEWS AMB KIM (REF D AND E) WHICH WERE PROBABLY
EXPRESSED WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, I CONTINUE TO HOLD VIEWS EXPRESSED
IN REF A.

3. GP-3

BROWN

BT

CFN 1045 21 970 979 934 1006 1012 1 - 2 3 3

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BATON
BROWN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KORNER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

17141

1965 APR 21 AM 5 56

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By ug NARA Date 7-17-92

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

~~TOP SECRET~~

2
Action

55

Info

OO RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 10E 21/0850Z
O 210845Z ZEA ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1044
STATE GRNC
BT

17046

1965 APR 21 AM 4 40

IMMEDIATE

003

~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 21

EXDIS

PASS SAIGON

REF: DEPTTEL 992 INFO SAIGON 2343

1. IMPORTANT APPROACH PRESIDENT PAK BY APRIL 23 IF POSSIBLE
AND NOT REPEAT NOT LATER THAN APRIL 24. WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE
SEE HDM APRIL 25 AND AMBASSADOR LODGE ARRIVES TWENTY-SIXTH.
URGE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS BE EXPEDITED.

2. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN 21 EXDIS 992 2343 1. 23 NOT NOT 24 25 2. GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:51 A.M. APRIL 21
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5:20 A.M. APRIL 21
NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-20

By 148, NARA, Date 5-22-91

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37

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

F5

86

Action

~~TOP SECRET~~

SS

Info

1467002

W MJA641A018 OSA319
PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 05E 17/0400Z
P 170350Z ZEA

1965 APR 16 PM 11 21

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1022
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 68
RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 120 (170400Z)*
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 992, RPTD SAIGON 2343, CINCPAC UNN

HAVE NOT APPROACHED ROKG. CONCUR PROCEDURE SET FORTH REFTEL.

GP-3.

BROWN

BT

CFN 1022 68 120 (170345Z) 17 992 2343 3

*(170400Z) confirmed as (170345Z)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

By ing, NARA, Date 5-22-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

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38

82

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VV MJA613A365VV OSA135

1965 APR 11 PM 7 00

FE

RR RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 07E 10/2345Z

Info

R 101030Z ZEA

09540

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

G

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SP

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

L

STATE GRNC

H

BT

IO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT (983) INFO TOKYO 354

P

CINCPAC 107 (101030Z) APRIL 10, 7PM

CU

USIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC

INR

OPPOSITION TO ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

AID

O

SY

SCA

SCS

A

1. ON MORNING OF APRIL 10 ABOUT 500 SEOUL NATIONAL UNIV. STUDENTS HELD CAMPUS RALLY OPPOSING CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN. FOLLOWING RALLY ABOUT 300 STUDENTS PARADED TOWARDS CENTER OF CITY AND WERE STOPPED BY SOME 500 RIOT POLICE IN FRONT OF PAGODA PARK. POLICE TOOK 170 OF MARCHERS INTO CUSTODY, BUT ALL EXCEPT FEW ARE EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED SHORTLY. SLOGANS AND PLACARDS IN RALLY AND MARCH CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF PEACE LINE, END TO "HUMILIATING DIPLOMACY" AND NULLIFICATION ALREADY INITIALED AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN. DECLARATION ADOPTED AT RALLY ALSO CALLED UPON US TO CEASE INTERFERING IN ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT.

PER

OPR

OC

RMR

2. ON PREVIOUS DAY SOME 500 TONGKUK UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HELD ANTI-ROK-JAPAN RALLY ON CAMPUS. GROUP ATTEMPTED STREET MARCH BUT WERE PERSUADED BY SCHOOL AUTHORITIES REMAIN ON SCHOOL GROUNDS. SMALL NUMBER SONGKYUNKWAN UNIV. STUDENTS ALSO STAGED CAMPUS RALLY OPPOSING BOTH CURRENT SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN AND GOVERNMENT'S ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT PREFERENTIAL LOAN SCANDALS.

3. GOVERNMENT NOW TAKING MORE IMMEDIATE STEPS IN PREPARATION SUPPRESS POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS. BATTALION OF CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND TROOPS MOVED INTO SEOUL APRIL 10 AND STATIONED BEHIND CAPITOL BUILDING. AT SAME TIME POLICE IN SEOUL AND REST OF NATION PUT ON ALERT. BROWN

BT

CFN US 2. 500 TONGKUK UNIVERSITY SONGKYUNKWAN UNIV. 3. 10

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39
035

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SS

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 01E 10/0215Z
R 100200Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY **SEOUL**
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 979
APRIL 10, 11AM

LIMDIS

REF: EMBTEL 970

PAK VISIT

8850
1965 APR 9 PM 10 53

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWMAN
CASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KORNER
MOORE
REELY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-165

By hig NARA Date 7-17-92

1. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTIONS FOR COMMITMENTS AND STATEMENTS ON OCCASION PAK VISIT. THESE POINTS COULD BE DIVIDED BETWEEN COMMUNIQUE AND APPROPRIATE ACCOMPANYING LETTER OR MEMORANDUM IF DESIRED.

2. PAK'S VISIT WILL BE OCCASION FOR CONNECTING ALL ASPECTS US-ROK RELATIONSHIP. FOCUS SHOULD NOT BE ON AN AID PACKAGE ALONE. WE WILL NEED TO RESTATE TOTAL US COMMITMENT, INCLUDING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ELEMENTS IN MOST REASSURING WAY. ROKG HAS BEEN PLANNING FOR VISIT IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAVE SOUGHT CONSISTENTLY TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS, ESPECIALLY IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DEPUTY PREMIER. THOUGH WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT KOREANS WILL BE WHOLLY REALISTIC IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS, WE BELIEVE ROKG EXPECTATIONS CAN BE REDUCED IN THE END TO WHAT IS FEASIBLE.

3. COMPLETE PACKAGE FOR PAK VISIT SHOULD INCLUDE;

A. GENERAL COMMITMENT REPEATING EARLIER US ASSURANCES OF LONG TERM SUPPORT FOR KOREA. SPECIFIC SUPPORT FOR ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT AS CONTRIBUTION TO FREE WORLD STRENGTH SHOULD BE EXPRESSED ALONG WITH INDICATION US COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE AND PROGRESS OF KOREA WILL NOT BE ALTERED BECAUSE OF NORMALIZATION.

B. B. COMMENDATION AND APPRECIATION OF KOREAN EFFORTS IN VIETNAM AS RESOLUTE ACTION IN DEFENSE FREEDOM IN ASIA.

C. COMMENDATION OF RECENT ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN KOREA AND EXPRESSION OF OPTIMISM FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

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-2- 979, APRIL 10, 11 A.M. FROM SEOUL

D. STATEMENT OF US READINESS TO MAINTAIN AMERICAN AND KOREAN ARMED FORCES AT LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO INSURE DEFENSE OF KOREA. PAK WILL BE SEEKING FLAT COMMITMENT THAT NEITHER US NOR ROK FORCES WILL BE REDUCED FROM PRESENT LEVELS. WHATEVER COMMITMENT FINALLY EVOLVES SHOULD BE SO PHASED AS NOT TO GIVE IMPRESSION EARLY REDUCTION OF FORCES CONTEMPLATED.

E. ASSURANCE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN AND EQUIP ROK ARMED FORCES IN LINE WITH DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. MAP SUPPORT HAS DECLINED TO EXTENT WHICH IT CONSIDERS DANGEROUSLY LOW IN TERMS MAINTENANCE ADEQUATE MILITARY STRENGTH. IT IS UNDERSTOOD FY 1965 PLANS CALL FOR OVER \$20 MILLION INCREASE IN MAP FROM FY 1965 LEVEL. THIS PLANNED INCREASE WOULD PERMIT STATEMENT THAT MAP WOULD BE RAISED FROM PRESENT LEVELS BY ABOUT 20 PER CENT AND WOULD HAVE MAJOR FAVORABLE IMPACT PARTICULARLY IF COUPLED WITH ASSURANCE NEW LEVEL IS EXPECTED CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

F. BROAD ECONOMIC AID COMMITMENT COVERING SA, PL480, DEVELOPMENT LOANS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT. THIS WILL BE FOREMOST IN KOREAN MINDS. THEY WILL ARGUE NEED FOR RELATIVELY "SMALL SUMS" TO PROMOTE RAPID PROGRESS UNDER STABLE CONDITIONS IN KOREA AS COMPARED WITH HIGHER COSTS ELSEWHERE WHEN SITUATION DETERIORATES. PAK WILL SEEK MAINTENANCE PRESENT SA LEVEL, PROVISION PROGRAM LOANS, ASSURANCE NEEDED PL 480, AND COMMITMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS.

G. IN ADDITION TO SUGGESTION PUT FORTH IN DEPT'S DRAFT PRESENTIAL LETTER DATED MARCH 31 I RECOMMEND:

(1) EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE, IN THE CONTEXT OF ROKG PLANS, CONSISTANT WITH NEEDS AND KOREAN EFFORTS TO EARN AND CONSERVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE;

(FYI - DEPENDENT UPON STRENGTH OF KOREAN FEELING WE MAY FEEL IT DESIRABLE TO UNDERTAKE AT LEAST TO MAINTAIN SA LEVEL AT \$70 MILLION FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION AS FORESHADOWED IN EMBTEL 633. I WOULD PREFER TO FEEL OUT SITUATION FURTHER HERE BEFORE RECOMMENDATION ON THIS POINT. (END FYI)

(2) ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF PROGRAM LOANS (\$10 - \$30 MILLION) IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 979, APRIL 10, 11 A.M. FROM SEOUL

(3) INDICATION OF GENERAL SECTORS FOR WHICH \$150 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT LOANS AVAILABLE AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUBJECT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION BETWEEN USOM AND EPB. (MORE DETAILED THOUGHTS BEARING ON THESE POINTS AND QUESTION OF PL480 AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOLLOW BY POUCH.)

H. COMPLETION STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT EITHER IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO VISIT, OR SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ACCOMPLISHED TO ENABLE OPTIMISTIC PREDICTION OF EARLY COMPLETION.

4. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN 480 4. GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 17062
Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1965
3:25 AM

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 883 PRIORITY

DATE: MARCH 19, 5 PM

002

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

REF: DEPT TEL 874

1. REFTEL REFERS TO QUARTERLY ALLOTMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND PREVIOUS DECISION WAS TO USE CHECKS RATHER THAN ALLOTMENT PROCEDURE. IF COMUSK COULD RECEIVE QUARTERLY ALLOTMENT WITH MONTHLY CHECKS TO BE ISSUED HERE BY LOCAL U.S. MILITARY DISBURSING OFFICER TO ROK MINISTRY NATIONAL DEFENSE, THEN WE WOULD PREFER QUARTERLY ALLOTMENT. HOWEVER, IF ISSUE IS QUARTERLY VERSUS MONTHLY CHECKS ISSUED FROM WASHINGTON (AS WITH FIRST CHECK), WE PREFER MONTHLY PAYMENTS WHICH WILL PROVIDE BETTER CONTROL THIS END.

2. REQUEST DEPT PASS TO DOD.

3. GP-1.

DOHERTY

WJH

NOTE: NOT PASSED DOD BY OC/T

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ij/ji* NARA, Date *5-22-07*

~~SECRET~~

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83

Action

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USIA

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INR

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DOD

AID

RMR

VV MJB255A628
RR RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 11E 18/0930Z
R 180900Z ZFA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1965 MAR 18 PM 9:11

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
KEENE
KLIEN
KUMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

Carroll

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT 879 INFO TOKYO 325 CINCPAC FOR
POLAD 82 (180900Z) MARCH 18, 6 PM

REF: EMBTEL 878, RPTD INFO TOKYO 324, CINCPAC 81

1. WASHINGTON VISIT FONMIN YI TONG-WON DOMINATING KOREAN PRESS,
WITH REFERENCES TO HIS CALL ON PRESIDENT, CONVERSATIONS WITH
VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA, BUNDY AND NATIONAL
PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON. EMBASSY REPORTING SEPARATELY WIDE PRESS
COVERAGE OF YI'S SOFA DISCUSSIONS.
CFN 879 325 82 18 6 878 324 81 1

PAGE TWO RUALOS 11E LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2. PRESS QUOTES YI THAT DISCUSSION WITH SECY INCLUDED ROK-JAPAN,
SENDING ROK COMBAT TROOPS TO VIETNAM, ASIAN FONMINS CONFERENCE,
AND SOFA. YI REPORTEDLY TOLD SECRETARY ROK-JAPAN
NORMALIZATION "IN SIGHT FZ ALTHOUGH NOT POSSIBLE PREDICT DATE.
HE IDENTIFIED OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AS FISHERIES, STATUS KOREAN
RESIDENTS JAPAN, JAPANESE IMPORT QUOTAS ON KOREAN GOODS. ON
VIETNAM, YI SAID IS US AND RVN REQUEST ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IN
FORM COMBAT TROOPS, REQUEST WOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
BY ROKG, ALTHOUGH HE FEELS DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT PREMATURE
AT PRESENT TIME.

3. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA, YI ANNOUNCED,
ACCORDING TO REPORTS, THAT US PLANS NO CHANGE IN NUMBER US TROOPS
IN KOREA. YI REPORTEDLY EMPHASIZED KOREAN PEOPLE'S FEAR THAT US
TRYING GIVE ROK DEFENSE BURDEN TO JAPAN, THEREFORE US MUST MAKE

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-2- 879, MARCH 18, 6 PM, FROM: SEOUL

FIRM COMMITMENT OF INTENTION TO MAINTAIN TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN ROK. MCNAMARA REPORTEDLY PROMISED NO BASIC POLICY CHANGES. YI REITERATED THAT FUTURE REQUESTS ROK AID TO VIETNAM WOULD BE CONSIDERED, EXPRESSED OPINION GRC AND PHILIPPINES WOULD ALSO BE WILLING ASSIST IN VIETNAM. KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN, IN FRONT PAGE COMMENT, SAID YI ATTEMPTING BARTER DISPATCH OF ROK COMBAT
CFN 2 3

PAGE THREE RUALOS 11E LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DIVISION TO VIETNAM IN RETURN FOR NO REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN ROK AND FOR CONSLUSION SOFA. SEVERAL PAPERS NOTE THAT YI URGED SUSPENSION MAP TRANSFER IN MEETING WITH MCNAMARA.

4. ALL PAPERS HEADLINE INVITATION TO VICE PRESIDENT TO VISIT KOREA; KYUNGHYANG ANNOUNCES INVITATION ACCEPTED "IN PRINCIPLE", SPECULATING VICE PRESIDENT WILL VISIT ASIA AS PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY TO MATCH ASIAN VISIT SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN. CHOSON ILBO CARRIES DESPATCH FROM WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT THAT VICE PRESIDENT HAS "MADE CLEAR HIS WILLINGNESS ACCEPT PRESIDENT PAK'S INVITATION."

5. REPORTS OF YI'S NATIONAL PRESS CLUB REMARKS EMPHASIZE HIS COMMENTS ON IMPORTANCE OF ASIAN FONMIN'S CONFERENCE AS FIRST MEETING THIS TYPE. YI QUOTED AS SAYING IT "ABOUT TIME FREE ASIAN NATIONS GET TOGETHER AND SHARE SOME OF RESPONSIBILITY" FOR ASIAN SECURITY.

6. YI'S CALL ON PRESIDENT GIVEN PROMINENT POSITION ALL SEOUL PAPERS. PRESS REPORTS YI CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT RESPECT OF KOREAN PEOPLE AND THEIR CONGRATULATIONS ON U.S. POLICIES BEING FOLLOWING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PRESIDENT JOHNSON REPORTEDLY TOLD YI HE HOPED KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD FIND MUTUALLY AGREEABLE WAY FOR SETTLING OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES.
DOHERTY

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VV MJB605A137

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 04E 15/0700Z
P 150635Z ZEA
FM AMEMBYSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHNW
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ PRIORITY 865
MARCH 15, 4 PM

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MAR 15 AM 2 08

P R I O R I T Y

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

REF: A. DEPTTEL 799, FEB 27, 1965 B. EMBTEL 768, FEB 18, 1965

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

1. REQUEST CHECK FOR APRIL IN AMOUNT \$98,500. THIS INCLUDES \$94,630 FOR APRIL PLUS \$3,870 SHORTFALL IN INITIAL CHECK COVERING COSTS THROUGH MARCH 31.

2. THIS IS CHANGE IN MONTHLY AMOUNT FROM PREVIOUS ESTIMATES PROVIDED IN REF B. THIS REQUEST BASED ON ACTUAL GRADE STRUCTURE CFN 865 15 4 799 27 1965 768 18 1965 1 \$98,500 \$94,630 \$3,870
31 2

PAGE TWO RUALOS 04E ~~SECRET~~
WITH ROK IMAF IN VIETNAM.

3. MAY REQUIREMENT BASED ON 31 DAY MONTH, AND, ASSUMING NO CHANGE IN GRADE STRUCTURE, WILL BE \$97,750.

4. REQUEST DEPT PASS TO EMBASSY SAIGON, COMUSMACV AND DOD.

5. GP-1
DOHERTY

NOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON, COMUSMACV, DOD, BY OC/T

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By g/jr, NARA, Date 5-22-07

~~SECRET~~

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43

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By *ing* NARA. Date 7-17-92

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 09E 12/0845Z
P 120825Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

10756

1965 MAR 12 AM 4 30

P R I O R I T Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 861 MARCH 12, 530PM

1. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK HAS OUTLINED SUBJECTS WHICH PRESIDENT PAK HOPES TO COVER DURING WASHINGTON VISIT. YI SAID NOT ALL ITEMS WOULD BE DISCUSSED PERSONALLY BY PRESIDENT PAK, SOME COULD BE LEFT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY, BUT RESULTS COULD BE PART OF THE "PACKAGE" WHICH IT WAS HOPED WOULD DERIVE FROM VISIT.

2. SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION GIVEN AS FOLLOWS:

- A. SITUATION IN ASIA AND US POLICY PK AREA.
 - B. SITUATION IN VIETNAM
 - C. KOREAN UNIFICATION PROBLEM AND US HELP IN ITS SOLUTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS.
- CFN 861 12 530PM 1. 2

PAGE TWO RUALOS 09E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D. US COMMITMENT TO KOREA'S SECURITY

- (1) NO REDUCTION OF US FORCES
- (2) MAINTENANCE KOREAN FORCE LEVELS
- (3) INCREASE IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MAP)
- (4) MODERNIZATION OF ROK MILITARY EQUIPMENT

E. MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM

- (1) INDEFINITE SUSPENSION, OR
- (2) EXTENSION OF TRANSFER PROGRAM OVER TEN YEAR PERIOD.

F. PROCUREMENT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN KOREA FOR US FORCES.

G. US PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SERVICES (REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE) IN KOREA FOR VIETNAM.

H. US SUPPORT FOR KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

- (1) COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT FOR 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
- (2) INCREASE IN CURRENT LEVEL SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE
- (3) CONTINUATION OF SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE FOR FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM.

I. KOREAN FARM LABOR PROGRAM IN US

J. ESTABLISHMENT DAC CONSULTATIVE GROUP OR ITS EQUIVALENT.

K. CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR KOREA IN ITS DEALING WITH JAPAN AFTER NORMALIZATION.

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-2- 861, MARCH 12, 5 PM, FROM: SEOUL

L. CONCLUSION OF STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT.
(DESCRIBED BY YI AS SOMETHING THAT "MUST BE DONE.")
CFN 1 2 3 4 1 2 1 5 2 3

PAGE THREE RUALOS 09E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M. POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A FOOD RESERVE STOCK IN KOREA USING
PL 480 GRAIN.

N. PROMOTION OF TRADE BETWEEN US AND KOREA

(1) INCREASING KOREAN EXPORTS TO US

(2) INCREASING LOCAL PROCUREMENT BY US FORCES IN KOREA

O. PROPOSAL FOR JOINT US-ROK ANNUAL MEETING AT CABINET LEVEL TO
DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

3. YI SAID THESE AND POSSIBLY OTHER SUBJECTS PRESENTLY BEING
REVIEWED INSIDE ROKG IN PREPARATION FOR VISIT. HE RECOGNIZED THAT
SOME OF THE ITEMS LISTED WERE NOT REALISTIC AND COULD BE DELETED.

4. YI SAID FINAL DECISION NOT YET MADE ON COMPOSITION OFFICIAL
PARTY. SO FAR PRESIDENT IS CONSIDERING TAKING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
CHANG KI-YONG, FOREIGN MINISTER YI TONG-WON, DEFENSE MINISTER KIM
SONG-UN, CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS KIM CHONG-O, PRESIDENTIAL SEC-
RETARY YI HU-RAK, AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL PAEK IN-HAN. TWO RE-
MAINING POSITIONS IN OFFICIAL GROUP MIGHT BE FILLED BY PRESIDENTS
SECRETARY-INTERPRETER CHO SANG-HO AND CHIEF OF SECURITY PAK
CHONG-KYU, OR BY CHO AND VICE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING
KIM HAK-YOL BE.

5. GP-3.

DOHERTY

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CFN 480 1 2 3 4 5 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUMJIO/AMEMBASSY BAGUIO
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
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1965 MAR 8 AM 7 48

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BUNDY-SK
BATOR
DOHMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLIEN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAVRE
WILKINSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (545) BAGUIO TWO
INFO TOKYO 311 CINCPAC FOR POLAD 68 MARCH 8, 7PM

BAGUIO FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN

1. FOLLOWING IS ROK FOREIGN MINISTRY DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT
TO BE RELEASED FOLLOWING VISIT FOREIGN MINISTER TO WASHINGTON:
BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT
"FOREIGN MINISTER TONG WON LEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MADE A THREE-DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D. C. FROM MARCH 15 TO 17,
1965. DURING THE VISIT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ON PRESIDENT
JOHNSON AND VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY AND HELD MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY OF
CFN 845 311 68 8 7PM 1. 15 17 1965

PAGE TWO RUALOS 08E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STATE RUSK, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA AND HIGH OFFICIALS OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MATTERS
OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

"DURING THE COURSE OF A WIDE RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, MINISTER
LEE AND SECRETARY RUSK REVIEWED THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR, THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHEAST
ASIA. THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST
CHINA CONTINUE TO MENACE THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF ASIA, AND
AGREED THAT THE FREE NATIONS OF THE REGION SHOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN
THE UNITY AND COORDINATION SO AS TO PERSUE THEIR PROGRESS AND
PROSPERITY UNDER FREEDOM. SECRETARY RUSK, IN THIS CONNECTION,
PAID TRIBUTE TO THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR
THEIR CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION.

"FOREIGN MINISTER AND SECRETARY RUSK EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE
RECENT PROGRESS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN AND SECRETARY RUSK NOTED THAT THE
RECENT INITIALING OF THE BASIC RELATIONS TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES HAS SET FORTH AN IMPORTANT MOMENTUM FOR
AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE LONG PENDING TALKS. SECRETARY OF STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority: RA 001R-254-4.10.5

By: JON VARA Date: 8-29-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 845, MARCH 8, 7 PM, FROM SEOUL

PAGE THREE RUALOS Ø8E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUSK REASSURED THAT THE FORTHCOMING NORMALIZATION OF THE RELATIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT THE BASIC US POLICY OF EXTENDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT DEFENSE STRENGTH AND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF HER ECONOMY.

" THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY ALSO REVIEWED THE PROGRESS OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED THE DESIRE OF HIS GOVT TO SETTLE THE LONG-PENDING ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT; NAMELY, THE ARTICLES ON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, CIVIL CLAIMS AND LABOR PROCUREMENT, IN LINE WITH THE POSITION MAINTAINED BY THE NEGOTIATORS OF KOREAN SIDE AND SECRETARY RUSK ASSURED THAT THE US GOVT WOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE VIEWS AND POSITION OF THE KOREAN GOVT. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT BOTH GOVTS SHOULD EXERT THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE THE NEGOTIATIONS SO AS TO BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATION IN A SHORT PERIOD, PREFERABLY PRIOR TO THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY PRESIDENT PARK." END VERBATIM TEXT

2. REFERENCE TO LEE'S CALLING ON VICE PRESIDENT IN FIRST PARAS
STEMS FROM REQUEST TO BE MADE THROUGH AMBASSADOR KIM. WE
CFN 2.

PAGE FOUR RUALOS Ø8E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNDERSTAND KIM IS CALLING ON VICE PRESIDENT MARCH 10 AT WHICH TIME HE WILL SUGGEST CALL AND ALSO EXTEND INVITATION FOR VICE PRESIDENT TO VISIT KOREA.

3. PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT DESIGNED TO PROVIDE SOME DEMONSTRATION OF ACCOMPLISHMENT ON PART FOREIGN MINISTER. HE HOPES THEREBY DERIVE ADDED PRESTIGE TO BE USED GAIN ACCEPTANCE FOR HIS EFFORTS NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

4. WE BELIEVE DRAFT PROVIDES BASIS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE JOINT STATEMENT. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT AGREED THAT ANY JOINT STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED BUT INSTEAD HAVE TOLD LEE THIS WILL BE FOR DEPT TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE HARD TO DISSUADE HIM FROM SOME SORT OF COMMUNIQUE AT END OF VISIT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 845, MARCH 8, 7 PM, FROM SEOUL

5. LEE HAS ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT (A COPY OF WHICH HAS GONE TO ROK EMBASSY WASHINGTON). DEPARTMENTS VIEWS REQUESTED BEFORE MORNING MARCH 10, IF POSSIBLE. WHILE DRAFT CAN BE WORKED OVER WITH LEE IN WASHINGTON WE MAY BE ABLE TO SIMPLIFY TASK BY GETTING SOME CHANGES ARRANGED HERE.

6. FIRST THREE PARAS APPEAR TO NEED ONLY MINOR CHANGES IN WORDING. IN FOURTH PARA WE BELIEVE SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES UNWIELDY AND TOO DETAILED. THEY COULD BE CHANGED TO READ, "THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED THE DESIRE OF HIS GOVT TO CONCLUDE CFN 10 3. 4. 5. 10 6.

PAGE FIVE RUALOS 08E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE LONG-PENDING AGREEMENT. SECRETARY RUSK ASSURED HIM THAT THE US GOVT WOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE VIEWS OF THE KOREAN GOVT. IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH GOVTS WOULD SEEK TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." LEE LIKELY TO PRESS FOR MORE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON SOFA WHICH HAS BEEN GETTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN KOREAN PRESS LATELY.

7. GP-3.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SS PP RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 01E 03/0045Z

Info P 030020Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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1965 MAR 2 PM 9 00

~~SECRET~~ PRIORITY (816)

MARCH 3, 9AM

DEPT PASS DOD

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
✓ NLJ 92-71
By ing, NARA, Date 5-20-92

REF: A. DEPTTEL 799, B. EMBTEL 748

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

1. PROMPT ACTION AND DECISION ON ROK MASH APPRECIATED.
2. CHECK HAS BEEN RECEIVED HERE AND WILL BE DELIVERED TO MND.
3. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED REF B, SINCE INCEPTION OF DISCUSSION OF ROK IMAF IT HAS BEEN EXPECTATION OF ROKG AND KOREAN PUBLIC THAT USG WOULD PAY COST OF ALLOWANCES. SINCE NATL ASSEMBLY AWARE THAT CFN 816 3 9AM 799 748 1. 2. 3.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 01E ~~SECRET~~
FUNDS FOR ROK MASH HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY ROKG ONLY THROUGH FEB, THERE IS STRONG PROBABILITY ASSEMBLY WILL SEEK REASSURANCE THESE COSTS BEING PAID. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY ASSEMBLY REACTION TO USG ASSUMING THESE COSTS. ASSEMBLY REACTION WOULD HAVE COME IF USG HAD NOT ASSUMED COSTS.

4. WE ARE AGAIN, HOWEVER, MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO APPROPRIATE MND OFFICIALS TO SOLICIT THEIR COOPERATION IN MAKING EFFORT TO CONFINE ANY SUCH DISCUSSION TO EXECUTIVE SESSION

OF DEFENSE
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN FINAL ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, IF QUESTION IS RAISED ANSWER WILL HAVE TO BE THAT USG IS SUPPORTING THESE ALLOWANCES.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 816, MARCH 3, 9 A.M. FROM SEOUL

5. AS TO FACT THAT UNVOUCHERED FUNDS ARE BEING USED, ROKG HAS NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE INFORMED THAT UNVOUCHERED FUNDS ARE SOURCE OF PAYMENT.

GP-1

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NOTE: PASSED DOD, 3/2/65, 9:25 P.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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41
Action

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Info

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 793, PRIORITY
DOD
COMUSMACV
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

CONTROL: 20185
RECD: FEBRUARY 24, 1965
7:07 A.M.

DATE: FEBRUARY 24, 6 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-71

By *ing* NARA, Date 5-20-92

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EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

REF: DEPTTEL 768 TO SEOUL, SAIGON 1775, COMUSMACV UNN, CINCPAC UNN, MANILA 1320

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS PARA 3 REF MSG, WE HAVE AGAIN APPROACHED MND OFFICIALS IN EFFORT TO PERSUADE THEM TO RESTRICT PAYMENT OF OVERSEAS ALLOWANCE TO BE PAID IN SVN TO ONE DOLLAR PER MAN PER DAY AS WELL AS TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ATTRIBUTION OF FUND SOURCE TO USG.
2. THEIR REACTION FAVORABLE AS TO RECOGNITION NEED FOR DISCRETION RE IDENTIFYING USG AS SOURCE OF FUNDS. MND OFFICIALS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH OUR DESIRES ON THIS POINT AND WILL COOPERATE.
3. ON MATTER OF PAYING ONLY ONE DOLLAR IN SVN, MND OFFICIALS STATE THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH OUR REQUEST SINCE TROOPS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADVISED AS TO AMOUNTS THEY WOULD DRAW IN SVN AND CHANGING RULES NOW WOULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE TROOP MORALE. HENCE, MND PLANS REMIT ENTIRE OVERSEAS ALLOWANCE TO ROK INAF PERSONNEL IN SVN.
4. GP-3.

BROWN

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2 of 8

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Action

Info

CONTROL: 18670 ~~TOP SECRET~~

RECD: FEBRUARY 22 , 1965 7:01 AM

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 783 PRIORITY

INFO: TOKYO 292

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-71
By ing NARA. Date 5-27-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPT PASS INFO PRIORITY SAIGON 54 TAIPEI 43 MANILA 114 VIENTIANE
TWO BANGKOK 26 CANBERRA 18 WELLINGTON NINE

MODIS

REF: DEPTELS 751, 771, AND 773

1. I CONVEYED MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTELS TO PRESIDENT PAK.
HE SAID HE FELT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECISION ENTIRELY CORRECT.
THE ONLY MESSAGE COMMUNISTS UNDERSTAND IS FORCE AND ANY INDICATION
US WEAKENING OR WITHDRAWAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION WOULD
ONLY INVITE FURTHER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.
2. PRESIDENT PAK STATED HE FELT US ACTIONS AND THOSE
NOW CONTEMPLATED SHOULD ALSO HELP BRING ABOUT POLITICAL STABILITY
IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE RECALLED THAT ARRIVAL UN TROOPS AND
STRONG UN DETERMINATION TO PROTECT KOREA HAD BENEFICIAL EFFECT
DURING WORST DAYS OF KOREAN WAR UPON POLITICIANS AND OTHERS
WHO WERE WAVERING IN THEIR SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISTS
AND EVEN PREPARING TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.
3. GP-3.

CFN 54 48 114 26 18 751 771 773 1 2 NOW 3 3

BROWN

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NOTE: Not relayed by OCT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48

CONFIDENTIAL

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Control: 2168
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 3, 1965
5:09 AM

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FROM: SEOUL

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ACTION: SECSTATE 703

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INFO: TOKYO 257
CINCPAC FOR POLAD 20

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DATE: FEBRUARY 3, 5 PM (SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS)

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~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~BATOR~~
~~BELK~~
~~BOWMAN~~
~~CHASE~~
~~COOPER~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KEENEY~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SAYRE~~
~~THOMSON~~

1. FOREIGN MINISTER YI TONG-WON SPOKE TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON FEBRUARY 1 OF HIS DESIRE VISIT WASHINGTON IN MID-MARCH. YI SAID IT NOW APPEARS THAT UN WILL NOT DEBATE KOREA QUESTION, DEPRIVING HIM OF OCCASION VISIT US IN NEAR FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS HE WISHED TO ARRANGE VISIT AND HOPED TO MEET WITH SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY. YI ALSO PLEADED FOR OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE BRIEF "COURTESY CALL" ON PRESIDENT.

2. WE HAD ANTICIPATED YI'S REQUEST. POLITICAL COUNSELOR THREW COLD WATER ON YI'S IDEA OF CALLING ON PRESIDENT AND QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY ON PURPOSE OF VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME. WITH ASPERITY YI SAID HE CONSIDERED WASHINGTON VISIT A NECESSARY PART OF HIS PLANS TO ACHIEVE NORMALIZATION RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. HE INTENDS TO SEEK COMPLETION NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN BY END OF MARCH, LEAVING APRIL AND IF NECESSARY MAY FOR ASSEMBLY RATIFICATION. FOLLOWING VISIT TO SEOUL BY SHIINA AROUND MID-FEBRUARY, YI PLANS TRIP TO TOKYO IN EARLY MARCH TO "MEET WITH SHIINA AND SATO" AND CARRY NEGOTIATIONS CLOSER TO SETTLEMENT. HE HOPES THEN TO GO TO WASHINGTON FOR PURPOSE OF DRAMATIZING US SUPPORT FOR K-J NORMALIZATION AND THUS INCREASING ACCEPTABILITY OF SETTLEMENT IN KOREA.

3. YI EXPRESSED MEASURE OF OPTIMISM OVER PROSPECTS SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID CURRENT WORKING LEVEL NEGOTIATION WOULD MAKE SOME PROGRESS ON BASIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE CONSIDERED ALLOWED FOR SOME CONCESSIONS. HOWEVER, HE MADE IT CLEAR

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Authority RAC odR-254-4-11-4
By JNW vARA Date 8-29-19