

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 703, FEBRUARY 3, 5 PM FROM SEOUL (SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS)

HE CONSIDERES HIS OWN EFFORTS WITH TOP LEVEL OF GOJ, AND THE SCENARIO WHICH HE IS COMPOSING FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT LEVEL AS CRUCIAL. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF US SUPPORT TO THIS NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AS WELL AS IN MINIMIZING OPPOSITION WITHIN KOREA TO SETTLEMENT.

4. YI SAID IN COURSE OF WASHINGTON VISIT HE WANTED TO GET A RE-STATEMENT OF US COMMITMENT TO KOREA IN ORDER TO QUIET OPPOSITION CHARGES THAT US TURNING OVER ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN KOREA TO JAPAN. HE WISHED TO DISCUSS AND ANNOUNCE TIMING OF PRESIDENT PAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THE REMAINING ISSUES IN SOFA NEGOTIATIONS SO AS TO INSURE EARLY CONCLUSION OF SOFA WHICH WOULD IMPROVE GOVT'S POSITION IN THE COUNTRY AT A TIME WHEN ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE REACHING CLIMAX. FINALLY HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO REFER TO PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT DAC CONSULTATIVE GROUP AS AND ADDED ANSWER TO THOSE FEARFUL OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF KOREA FOLLOWING NORMALIZATION.

5. YI OBVIOUSLY PAINED AND SURPRISED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR'S UNWILLINGNESS GIVE IMMEDIATE AND ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT TO WASHINGTON VISIT. HE SPOKE HEATEDLY OF IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO VISIT AS PART OF PHASED APPROACH TO NORMALIZATION.

6. AFTERNOON PRESS IN SEOUL FEBRUARY 2 AND MORNING PRESS FEBRUARY 3. CARRIED REPORT, ATTRIBUTED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER EXPECTED TO VISIT WASHINGTON TOWARD END OF FEBRUARY FOR A SERIES OF HIGH - LEVEL ROK-US TALKS." YI IS REPORTEDLY EXPECTED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN PRESS IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT INCLUDE ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION, ARRANGEMENT FOR PAK VISIT, EARLY SIGNING SOFA, MAP TRANSFER PROGRAM AND SITUATION IN VIETNAM. PRIMARY ATTENTION IS PAID TO ROK-JAPAN PROBLEMS AND PRESS CITES FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE AS SAYING YI IS LIKELY TO SEEK ACTIVE US ROLE IN BRINGING JAPAN TO TERMS KOREA EXPECTED TO OFFER IN SETTLEMENT OF VARIOUS PENDING ISSUES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 703, FEBRUARY 3, 5 PM FROM SEOUL (SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS)

7. AMBASSADOR ASKED TO SEE YI AND CALLED ON HIM FEBRUARY 3. YI REPEATED HIS DESIRES TO VISIT WASHINGTON. THIS MEETING IS REPORTED IN FULL IN NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

COMMENT:

8. YI IS DEAD SET ON A TRIP TO WASHINGTON. THE REASONS HE GIVES ARE ONLY A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH HE ATTACHES TO SUCH VISIT. YI WANTS TO USE VISIT TO BUILD UP HIS PRESTIGE IN KOREA AND JAPAN, WHICH HE SEES AS DESIRABLE PRE-REQUISITE TO NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH HE WILL BE BEARING BRUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND CRITICISM. MOREOVER, HE HOPES TO ENLIST US SUPPORT FOR OVERCOMING JAPANESE RELUCTANCE TO MAKE EXTRA CONCESSIONS WHICH HE WILL BE SEEKING.

9. WHEN HE DID NOT RECEIVE EMBASSY'S BLESSING FOR WASHINGTON VISIT HE PROBABLY THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO RESORT TO PRESSURE; HENCE THE NEWS LEAK. WE CONSIDERED REBUKING HIM FOR THIS ACTION BUT DID NOT DO SO IN ORDER NOT TO DIVERT HIM FROM COURSE TOWARD SETTLEMENT ON WHICH HE HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY EMBARKED.

10. YI IS PERSISTENT AND DEMANDING. HE IS ALSO EGOTISTICAL AND EXTREMELY CONSCIOUS OF HIS "FACE." THERE IS NO QUESTION, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS PURSUING ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT WITH DETERMINATION AND CAREFUL PLANNING. HE SEES HIS OWN ROLE, ESPECIALLY IN MEETINGS WITH SHIINA AND SATO, AS CENTRAL. HE FEARS ADVERSE REACTIONS TO SETTLEMENT IN KOREA, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO CREATE ENVIRONMENT AND MOOD CALCULATED TO LIMIT SUCH REACTIONS. TO DO THIS HE PLANS USE US INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE AS A TRUMP CARD WHICH HE WILL BE SEEKING TO PLAY AT EACH STAGE OF SETTLEMENT PROCESS, WINDING UP WITH PAK VISIT AS FINAL TOUCH TO GAIN GREATER SUPPORT FOR GOVT'S POLICY.

11. WE BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO GIVE YI SOME FREE REIN AND SUPPORT, PROVIDED HE DOES NOT GET COMPLETELY OUT-OF-LINE. WE FIND HIM, AS ALWAYS, HARD TO CONTROL BUT NEVERTHELESS AMENABLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 703, FEBRUARY 3, 5 PM FROM SEOUL (SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS)

TO DIRECTION ON MAIN ISSUES. WITH SHINA VISIT AND MOVEMENT ROK-JAPAN TALKS TO HIGH LEVELS YI WILL SEEK TO BREAK DEADLOCK ON SETTLEMENT. UNLESS THERE IS SOME UNFORESEEABLE BREAKDOWN, HE WILL BARGAIN FOR FINAL AGREEMENT WITH JAPANESE AND WILL BE ANXIOUS TO SUCCEED. HE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM PAK TO DO SO AND FOR THIS REASON DARE NOT FAIL.

BROWN

RFK-28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action  
FE

ZCZCM JA061

UTK GEIVZCZCALA913W OSA600

Info

RR RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 10E 03/0900Z

R 030810Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RUHPA/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SETWO OF TWO ACTION DEPT (703) INFO TOKYO

257 CINCPAC 20 FEBRUARY 3, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

02158

1065 FEB 3 AM 5 00

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12. WHATEVER HIS SHORTCOMINGS, YI IS COLDLY CALCULATING AND ANXIOUS TO USE WHATEVER HE CAN TO FURTHER HIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE. I BELIEVE WE CAN AT THIS STAGE GO ALONG WITH HIS SCENARIO BUT CHECK IT AT EACH STAGE. I HAVE INDICATED TO HIM THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS BUT THIS IS AN UNENDING STRUGGLE WITH YI, WHO HAS EYE CONSTANTLY ON HIS "IMAGE" AND HIS PRESTIGE. AT THIS POINT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO YI THAT PROSPECTS FOR A WASHINGTON VISIT ARE DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. CFN 703 257 20 3 5 12. YI

RMR

PAGE TWO RUALOS 10E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IF WE ARE QUERIED BY PRESS ON HIS VISIT WE INTEND TO SAY:

"THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY FOREIGN MINISTER YI TONG-WON HAS BEEN RAISED WITH US. THERE ARE NO DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS AT THE PRESENT TIME."

13. I SUGGEST WE KEEP AN OPEN MIND ON ARRANGING WASHINGTON VISIT. I BELIEVE IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE USEFUL AND DESIRABLE, BUT THINK WAY CAN POSTPONE DECISION UNTIL LATER THIS MONTH, WHEN PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS SHIINA VISIT WILL BE APPARENT.

14. GP-3.

BROWN

BT

CFN YI TONG-WON 13. 14. GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

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Action

19405

JAN 26 AM 2 38

FE PP RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 03E 26/0700Z

Info P 260545Z ZEA

SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

P R I O R I T Y

G RUEKDA/DOD

SP INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

L RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

H RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

P STATE GRNC

BT

USIA

NSC

INR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 670 DOD UNN INFO  
CIA PRIORITY SAIGON 41 TOKYO 247 COMUSMACV THREE CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
NSA UNN JANUARY 26, 3 PM

AID NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTED JANUARY 26 BY SECRET BALLOT ON  
GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST APPROVAL DESPATCH ROK TROOPS TO VIETNAM.

RMR WHEN ASSEMBLY APPROVED USE OF SECRET BALLOT YUN PO-SON AND  
23 CRP ASSEMBLYMEN WALKED OUT, LEAVING 125 MEMBERS. 106  
VOTED IN FAVOR, 11 VOTED AGAINST, 8 ABSTAINED.

BROWN

BT

CFN 670 247 41 26 3PM 26 23 125 106 11 8

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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87  
Action

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Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

011592

1965 JAN 15 PM 8 17

ZCZCMJA528CALA236  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 01E 16/0015Z  
R 160001Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 633 INFO TOKYO 234  
JAN 16, 9AM

LIMDIS

REF: TOAID 908

FOR BUNDY AND POATS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By iss, NARS, Date 1-22-82

1. REFTEL CONTAINS MAIN ELEMENTS OF WHAT WE CONSIDER SENSIBLE AID PROGRAM FOR KOREA NEXT YEAR.

2. IN CONSIDERING THIS PROGRAM WE SHOULD REMEMBER THE IMPORTANT SPECIAL ELEMENT OF PROBABLE US VISIT BY PRESIDENT PAK IN SPRING. MAIN PURPOSE THAT VISIT WILL BE TO INDICATE US FRIENDSHIP FOR AND SUPPORT OF PAK REGIME WHEN IT FACING POSSIBLY CRITICAL CHALLENGE ON ISSUE ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT. PAK WILL WANT AND NEED A SUBSTANTIAL TOKEN OF THAT SUPPORT IN ANY  
CFN 633 234 16 9AM 908 1. 2.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 01E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EVENT AND IF, AS WE HOPE, ROK-JAPAN SETTLEMENT IS THEN IN SIGHT, CHARACTER AND AMOUNT OF THIS ACTION MAY BE CRUCIAL IN BUILDING UP PRESTIGE VALUE OF VISIT AND HELPING PAK WIN SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT TO ASSURE RATIFICATION PEACEFULLY.

EM AS DISCUSSED WITH WASHINGTON PREVIOUSLY, LARGEST POTENTIAL ELEMENT OF THIS TOKEN OF SUPPORT AND THE MOST SUITABLE FROM US VIEWPOINT WOULD BE A MULTI-YEAR DEVELOPMENT LOAN PACKAGE, FOR PROJECTS TO BE AGREED. OUR PRESENT THINKING IS THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO OFFER A THREE YEAR PACKAGE TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND REDUCE PRESSURES TO ACCEPT BAD PROJECTS. THE SIZE MIGHT BE AROUND \$150 MILLION. WE COULD RESERVE POSSIBILITY AT LATER DATE OF IMPLEMENTING SOME OF THE DL COMMITMENT VIA PROGRAM LOANS, IF SCARCITY OF GOOD PROJECTS AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE THIS DESIREABLE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 633, JANUARY 16, 9 AM FROM SEOUL

4. ADDITIONAL ELEMENT MIGHT BE SECOND FL 480 SLICE UNDER TENTH AGREEMENT IF TIMING AND LOCAL CONDITIONS FOR THIS ARE ADEQUATE. DEPENDING ON CONDITIONS IN SPRING, MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ADDING PERHAPS \$10 MILLION TO PROGRAM LOAN AVAILABILITY FOR FOURTH QUARTER 1965, IF OTHER ELEMENTS TOOK PACKAGE AS LAST RESORT, SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO UNDERMINE  
CFN 3. \$150 4. 480 \$10 1965

PAGE THREE RUALOS ONE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(A) CREDIBILITY, ESTABLISH AFTER ONG EFFORT, OF US DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN GRADUAL DOWNWARD TREND SA, (D) DEPENDENCE OF SA ON CAREFUL STABILIZATION PLANNING.

5. QUESTION HOWEVER REMAINS WHETHER ABOVE PACKAGE WOULD DO THE JOB. THE STUBBORN FACT IS THAT IN KOREA TYPE AID WHICH HAS THE GREATEST POLITICAL IMPACT IS SA, EVEN IN MODEST AMOUNTS. IF THEREFORE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS ARE REALLY CLOSE TO SETTLEMENT AT TIME OF PAK VISIT AND IF SA FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FROM REGIONAL FUNDS OR FY 1966, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER INCLUSION OF \$10 MILLION SA IN THE PACKAGE AS ONE SHOT EXCEPTION TO GENERAL RULE, IF UNDER CONDITIONS THEN EXISTING WE FEEL THAT ITS INCLUSION COULD MATERIALLY ENHANCE THE PROSPECT OF SETTLEMENT. IF ADDITIONAL SA NOT AVAILABLE, THIS ELEMENT OF PACKAGE COULD BE PROVIDED BY PROGRAM LOANS.

6. GP-4. BROWN

BT

CFN 5. -'66 \$10 6. GP-4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of Sta..*

51

45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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USIA

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RMR

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 12E 30/1015Z  
O 301007Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
RUHPA/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-165  
By ing NARA, Date 7-17-92

1964 DEC 30 AM 10 28

02 275

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 588 DOD UNN  
INFO IMMEDIATE SAIGON 25 CINCPAC 11 DECEMBER 30, 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

REF: (A) DEPTTEL 572 RPTD SAIGON 1367 CINCPAC UNN  
(B) EMBTEL 587 RPTD SAIGON 24 CINCPAC UNN

VERBATIM TEXT

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION RESOLUTION APPROVING  
DESPATCH ADDITIONAL FORCES TO VIET NAM DRAFTED BY ROKG FOR  
SUBMISSION TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:

"A. IT IS AGREED HEREBY THAT REPUBLIC OF KOREA DISPATCH  
CFN 588 25 11 30 7PM 572 1367 587 24 1.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 12E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, BY A DATE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE  
ROK GOVERNMENT OF BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS,  
A NON-COMBAT MILITARY FORCE COMPRISING 1,500 MEN AT MAXIMUM  
IN ADDITION TO THE 140 MAN FORCE INCLUDING ONE MOBILE SURGICAL  
HOSPITAL AND A SECURITY CONTINGENT WHICH WAS DISPATCHED ON  
11 SEPTEMBER 1964.

"B. THE FUNDS TO BE REQUIRED FOR DISPATCHING THE AFORE-  
MENTIONED UNIT SHALL BE APPROPRIATED FROM THE GOVERNMENT  
RESERVE FUND IN THE BUDGET FOR 1965."

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-2-588, December 30, 7 PM from: Seoul

2. SUPPORTING ARGUMENTATION REFERS IN TWO SEPARATE INSTANCES TO FACT THAT THIS AID WAS REQUESTED BY USG THROUGH ROK AMB WASHINGTON. NOT CLEAR AT PRESENT WHETHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENT INTENDED TO BE PART OF RESOLUTION BUT WE WILL ATTEMPT SECURE DELETION THESE REFERENCES IN ANY CASE. ROKG HAS ALREADY BEEN ADVISED ALONG LINES REF A AND POSTPONEMENT OF SUBMISSION TO ASSEMBLY (REF B) WILL GIVE US TIME TO MAKE ADDITIONAL EFFORTS THIS REGARD.

3. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN 1500 140 11 1964 1965 2. 3 GP-3.

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 10:35 AM 12/30/64  
Passed to the White House at 10:45 AM 12/30/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 03E 21/0725Z  
R 210705Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

015110  
1964 DEC 21 AM 3 36

035

~~SECRET~~ 557  
DEC 21, 4PM

LIMDIS

REF: EMBTELS 551 AND 553

1. AFTER COURTESY CALL BY SENATOR MONRONEY DECEMBER 21 I TOOK PRESIDENT PAK ASIDE AND SAID THAT I HAD THOUGHT OVER VERY CAREFULLY WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME ON DECEMBER 18 ABOUT RETURN OF KIM CHONG-P'IL. I NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT IT WOULD CAUSE A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE FOR ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR POLITICAL STABILITY IN KOREA IF KCP RETURNED BEFORE THE ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENDED. I SAID THAT I WANTED HIM TO  
CFN 557 21 4PM 551 553 1. 18

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E ~~SECRET~~  
KNOW THAT WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM ON SATURDAY WAS NOT ONLY MY OWN PERSONAL OPINION BUT THAT I HAD CONVEYED TO HIM THIS MESSAGE BY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

2. AT THESE WORDS, THE PRESIDENT DREW IN HIS BREATH SHARPLY, LOOKED DOWN AT THE FLOOR FOR SOME TIME, SHOOK HIS HEAD AND SAID: "I UNDERSTAND".

3. AT THE DOOR THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE COULD NOT FORCE KCP TO STAY AWAY BUT THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND SOME WAY TO ADVISE HIM VERY STRONGLY TO DO SO. HE COULD NOT SAY THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THE US WANTED HIM TO STAY AWAY. SOME OTHER REASON WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND. I AGREED IT WOULD BE A VERY GREAT MISTAKE IF KCP WERE TOLD THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STAY AWAY BECAUSE THAT WAS WHAT AMERICANS WANTED. THIS WAS A KOREAN DECISION AND I WAS SIMPLY GIVING THE PRESIDENT, AS A FRIEND OF HIS AND A FRIEND OF KOREAS, THE ADVICE THAT A FRIEND WOULD GIVE WHEN ASKED. I REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO ATTRIBUTE KCPS EXILE TO PRESSURE FROM THE US. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD NOT CONTINUE ITS OPPOSITION TO KCPS RETURN.

4. ABOVE REPRESENTS PROGRESS AND INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT APK GOT MORE OF MY MESSAGE ON DECEMBER 19 THAN YI HU-RAK INDICATED AND HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT IT. BUT THIS BATTLE IS BY NO MEANS YET WON. I THEREFORE RENEW RECOMMENDATION PARA 2 EMBTEL 553.

5. GP-2.

~~SECRET~~

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BROWN  
BT  
CFN 2 3 4 19 553 5 2

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PAC 001/R-254-4-12-3

By JDN WARA Date 8-30-19



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action NNNNZCZCM JA014VZCZCALA741 OSA760  
SS PP RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 04E 19/2320Z  
Info P 192320Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-71  
By ms NARA Date 5-27-92

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1964 DEC 19 PM 8 50

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (552) INFO PRIORITY SAIGON 20  
CINCPAC POLAD 9 FM SEOUL DEC 19, 10PM

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV PRIORITY UNN

LIMDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 531 RPT SAIGON 1294 CINCPAC CMS COMUSMACV UNN

1. I CONVEYED PRESIDENT JOHNSONS REQUEST CONTAINED REFTTEL TO PRESIDENT PARK THIS MORNING (MEMCON FOLLOWS). HE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT ROKG WOULD BE HAPPY TO ASSIST AS FAR AS POSSIBLE WITHIN ITS MEANS AND AUTHORIZED ME TO HAVE GENERAL HOWZE GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH MND. I EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON. PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED VIEW CFN 552 20 9 19 11PM 531 1294 1.

PAGE TWO RUALOS 04E ~~SECRET~~  
THAT FURTHER FURTHER OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND INCREASED US EFFORT SHOULD HAVE BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN SVN. HE SAID ROKG WAS READY TO PROVIDE TWO COMBAT DIVISIONS FOR SVN AT ANY TIME THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED. I EXPLAINED FOREIGN COMBAT TROOPS NOT BEING SOUGHT.

2. GENERAL HOWZE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH MND SHORTLY. HIS HEAD-QUARTERS IS CANVASSING POSSIBILITIES IN RESPONSE TO INSTRUCTION FROM CINCPAC. HIS PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE JUDGMENT IS THAT ROK FORCES COULD PROVIDE CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS ENGINEERS AND SIGNAL CONSTRUCTION UNITS, ALSO ROK NAVY COULD ASSIGN ONE OR MORE SHIPS TO VIETNAM.

3. PROBLEM WILL ARISE IF IN ACCORDANCE WITH CIRC 1099 AND CIRC 1135 WE INSIST THAT ROKG AS DONOR BEAR SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF COST. CIRC 1135 WOULD INVOLVE ARRANGEMENTS MORE BURDENSOME FOR ROKG THAN THOSE IN EFFECT FOR ROK MOBILE ARMY SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MASH). GENERAL HOWZE AND I AGREE THAT PRESSING ROKG TO DEFRAY SUBSTANTIAL COSTS FOR UNITS MADE AVAILABLE WOULD BE FRUITLESS

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 552, DECEMBER 19, 10 PM FROM SEOUL

AND WOULD DEFEAT MAJOR PURPOSE. WE SEE NO POINT IN MAKING DEMANDS ON ROKG WHICH IN OUR VIEW ROKG WILL CERTAINLY REJECT, AND FROM WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO RETREAT IN ORDER TO GET THE CONTRIBUTION WE WANT.

CFN 2 3 1099 1135 1135

PAGE THREE RUALOS 04E ~~SECRET~~

4. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT WE ASK ROKG TO BEAR ONLY THOSE EXPENSES WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE ADDITIONAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES (E.G., NORMAL PAY FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL) AND DO NOT INVOLVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS (E.G., TRANSPORTATION USING ROK NAVAL VESSELS OR ROK MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT). WE ALSO WISH TO AVOID ASKING ROKG AGREE TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHARGES AGAINST ALREADY INADEQUATE KOREAN MAP, ALTHOUGH BELIEVE MAP COULD FUND FUEL OIL FOR NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVED IN MOVEMENT OF MILITARY UNITS SINCE SUCH MOVEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE USEFUL TRAINING.

5. I SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE FROM KOREA IN FORM OF COMMODITIES OR CIVILIAN TECHNICAL PERSONNEL SINCE THESE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN KOREA. ROK, HOWEVER, HAS SUBSTANTIAL CEMENT SURPLUS WHICH IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE GLAD TO PROVIDE IF MEANS OF PAYMENT COULD BE FOUND.

6. IN VIEW OF TIME URGENCY EXPRESSED DEPTTEL 531, GENERALRU TO INITIATE DETAILED TALKS WITH MND VERY SOON. HOWZE WILL HAVE REQUEST CONFIRMATION COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED PARA 4 ABOVE.

7. GP-3.

BROWN

BT

CFN 4 5 6 531 4 7 3

~~SECRET~~

54

RECEIVED  
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1964 OCT 23 13 36

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TO RUEKDA/JCS  
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPDA/DA  
RUECW/CNO  
RUEAHQ/DIA  
RUEAHQ/CSAF  
ZEN/AMEMB SSOUL  
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT  
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC  
ZEN/COMNAVFORK  
RUAROP/COMAFK  
ZEN/CGEUSA  
ZEN/CGUSARJ  
ZEN/COMNAVFORJAPAN  
RUABFB/CGUSARYIS  
BT

UNCLAS UK 50559 AS. JCS FOR OASD/ISA; DA FOR TAG, ACSI  
AND DCSOPS; USARJ FOR CO JAP DET USAB&VAPAC.

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE 281ST MEETING OF THE  
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE  
COMMISSION.

1. THE 281ST MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES TO THE  
MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION CONVENED ON CALL OF THE  
KPA/CPV AT 1100 HOURS, KST AND RECESSED AT 1147 HOURS,  
KST 22 OCTOBER 1964.
2. THE KPA/CPV:

PAGE 2 RUAMC 075 UNCLAS

A. ORALLY CHARGED THE UNC WITH GROUND VIO-LATIONS CONSISTING OF FIRING, IMPLACING MACHINE GUNS AND UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL IN THE DMZ.

B. PASSED A LIST OF 925 GROUND VIOLATIONS MAINLY CONSISTING OF IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION.

C. DENIED 55 VIOLATIONS THE UNC CHARGED AT THE 278TH AND 277TH SECRETARIES EETINGS.

3. THE UNC:

A. STATED CHARGES WOULD BE INVESTIGATED.

B. DENIED 822 GROUND VIOLATIONS CHARGED BY KPA/CPV AGAINST UNC AT THE 279TH SECRETARIES MEETING.

4. THERE WERE NO UNUSUAL INCIDENTS. KPA/CPV HAD 52 MILITARY PERSONNEL, NO GUESTS AND NO PRESS PERSONNEL PRESENT. THE UNC HAD 119 GIEETS AND 5 PRESS PERSONNEL IN ATTENDANCE

BT

NNNN



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

40

Action

SS

Info

CONTROL: 16496

REC: OCT. 20, 12:40 PM

FROM: SEUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 372

DATE: OCTOBER 20, 2:00 PM

002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

FOR ASST SEC BUNDY

REF: DEPTELS 333 AND 337

1. FONMIN STATES HE INQUIRED OF KIM HYON-CHOL THROUGH HIS CHIEF SECRETARY ABOUT HIUAGYZAED \*AMERICAN WIFE BEFORE MAKING APPOINTMENT DEFINITE. WORD CAME BACK FROM KIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DIVORCE AND SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT; THAT HE WAS SURE THERE WOULD BE NO EMBARRASSMENT, AND IF HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE ANY EMBARRASSMENT HE WOULD NOT GO TO THE US FOR A MILLION DOLLARS. FONMIN SAID THAT SINCE KIM IS "VERY CAUTIOUS MAN" HE ACCEPTED THIS ASSURANCE AT ITS FACE VALUE.

2. GP-3. BROWN

BT

FN 333 337 1. NO NOT 2. GP-3.

\*As received, will be serviced upon request.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-77

By ch NARA, Date 3-25-13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

56

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3  
Action DE RUALOS 03E 13/0555Z  
O 130545Z ZEA

SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC

Info STATE GRNC  
BT

0100113

OCT 13 AM 2 16

I M M E D I A T E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE 351  
OCTOBER 13, 3PM

EXDIS

012

DEPTEL 333

1. FONMIN TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR OCT 12 THAT ROK CIA HAS REPORTED US OBJECTION TO APPOINTMENT KIM HYON-CHOL. REPORT ALLEGEDLY BASED ON WASHINGTON SOURCE, WHICH WE SUSPECT IS KIM UN-YONG. FONMIN ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH TO REPORT AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT WAS "NOT POSSIBLE" FOR U.S. TO OBJECT. HE WAS TOLD REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT RECEIVED ONLY LAST FRIDAY CFN 351 13 3PM 333 1. 12 NOT

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(OCTOBER 9) AND IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. POLITICAL COUNSELOR EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBT THAT DEPT HAD VOICED OBJECTION TO KIM'S APPOINTMENT.

2. IN LIGHT ABOVE I AM RELUCTANT TO RAISE QUESTIONS SET FORTH REFTTEL AT THIS TIME. FONMIN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM AT FACE VALUE BUT WOULD SEE THEM AS SUBSTANTIATING SUSPICIOUS U.S. OBJECTED TO APPOINTMENT. I WOULD PREFER RECEIVE AGREEMENT, AND WITH IT IN HAND, TO MAKE SURE FONMIN AWARE OF POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT TO ROKG FROM MARTIAL QUESTION. THIS COURSE WOULD ENSURE ROKG NOT OVERLOOKING THIS ASPECT OF KIM HYON-CHOL APPOINTMENT WITHOUT RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF U.S. MOTIVE. IF ROKG THEN DECIDES RE-CONSIDER AND CANCEL KIM APPOINTMENT, ONUS WOULD NOT BE ON U.S.

3. REQUEST DEPT'S FURTHER ADVICE EARLIEST.

4. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN 9 NOW 2. NOT NOT ONUS NOT 3. 4. GP-3.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:28 AM, OCTOBER 13  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 2:49 AM, OCTOBER 13

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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By ch NLJ 12-77  
NARA, Date 3-25-13



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

4/

Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 03E 10/1120Z  
O 101100Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1964 OCT 10 AM 10 17  
008803

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE (343, OCT 10, 8PM

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 327

1. OUR FILES REVEAL PROBABILITY KIM HYON-CHOL WENT THROUGH AT LEAST FORM OF MARRIAGE WITH AMERICAN WIFE LILLIAN. MENTION MADE OF DESIRE INSTITUTE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN 1958 BUT NO RECORD OF ACTION. WE ALSO HAVE HEARD REPORT OF FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT. LOCAL SOURCES REPORT TWO ELDEST DAUGHTERS INVITED KOREAN EMBASSY RECEPTIONS IN 1963 AND IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES CFN 343-10 8 EXDIS 27 1 KIM HYON-CHOL 1958 NO 1963

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AS HIS DAUGHTERS.

2. I NEVERTHELESS DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE ANY REASON QUESTION HIS APPOINTMENT. AFTER ALL HE IS FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND GENERALLY RESPECTED HERE. HIS MARITAL PROBLEMS COULD CONCEIVABLY PLAGUE HIM PERSONALLY BUT WE DO NOT SEE THEM AS MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT GOVTS CONCERNED, CERTAINLY NOT TO US.

3. KIM WILL BE UNINSPIRING AS AMBASSADOR BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS FOUND HIM EASY TO WORK WITH. HE IS USED TO DEALING WITH AMERICANS AND UNDERSTANDS OUR POINT OF VIEW. HE HAS RETAINED CONFIDENCE PRESIDENT PAK AND AT TIMES HAS HAD SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT'S THINKING.

4. GP-3

BROWN

BT

CFN 2 NOT NOT NOT NOT 3 4 3

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:26 AM, 10/10/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:50 AM, 10/10/64.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-77

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By ah NARA, Date 3-25-13



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

30-32

Action

FE

Info

SS

G

SP

ARA

EUR

NEA

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

CPR

RMR

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUALOS 05E 07/0900Z  
R 070835Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE COPY

1964 OCT

6 34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION (DEPT 334) INFO TOKYO 127 OTTAWA  
MEXICOCITY BERN GENEVA KUALALUMPUR HONGKONG BANGKOK BUENOS  
AIRES NEWDELHI CINCPAC UNN OCT 7, 6 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: EMBTEL 328 RPTD TOKYO 125 CINCPAC UNN

1. NEWS OF WIDESPREAD AMBASSADORIAL CHANGES (REFTEL) APPEARED  
SEOUL PRESS OCTOBER 7 FOLLOWING EXPECTED LEAK OF CABINET ACTION  
TAKEN PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING PRESS ACCOUNTS, FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT  
CHANGES WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER SECURING OF AGREEMENT FROM COUNTRIES  
CFN 334 127 7 6 328 2125 1 7 AGREEMENT

PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INVOLVED. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS OF CHANGES AND EMB COMMENT:

2. KIM HYON-CHOL (HENRY KIM) APPOINTED AMB TO US REPLACING  
KIM CHONG-YOL. KIM HYON-CHOL WAS PRIMIN UNDER MILITARY REGIME  
AND CONSIDERED ASTUTE AND INTELLIGENT, ALTHOUGH COLORLESS  
AND UNDYNAMIC. WE BELIEVE AS PRIMIN HE TRIED WITHIN LIMITS  
PLACED BY MILITARY JUNTA TO WORK ON CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE  
BASIS WITH USG. KIM SHOULD MAKE COMPETENT IF UNIMPOSING  
REPRESENTATIVE. WE SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT CASE OF ABANDONED  
AMERICAN WIFE BE EXAMINED AS SOURCE POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT OR  
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST KIM.

3. KIM CHONG-YOL, CURRENT AMB WASHINGTON APPOINTED AMB TO  
CANADA. KIM IS FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND CHIEF OF STAFF  
ROK AIR FORCE. THERE SOME DOUBT THAT HE WILL BE WILLING ACCEPT  
APPOINTMENT TO HEAD SMALL TWO OR THREE-MAN MISSION WHICH ROKG  
PLANNING OPEN OTTAWA BEFORE YEAR END. HIS REMOVAL FROM WASHINGTON  
FOLLOWS KNOWN CLASH WITH FONMIN. IN ADDITION IT IS BELIEVED  
ROKG NOT SATISFIED WITH HIS ABILITY GAIN ADDED US ECONOMIC  
SUPPORT.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-77

By ch NARA, Date 3-25-13

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-2- 334, October 7, 6 P.M., from Seoul.

4. KIM TONG-CHO, DIRECTOR KOREAN TRADE PROMOTION ASSOCIATION (KOTRA) APPOINTED AMB ROK MISSION TOKYO, REPLACING PAE HI-HWAN. KIM WAS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS DURING LAST DAYS RHEE  
CFN 2 3 NOT 4 KOTRA

PAGE THREE RUALOS 05EIX ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REGIME (NOT CHANG REGIME AS MISTAKENLY REPORTED REFTEL).  
HE IS SOMETIMES CRITICIZED FOR BEING UNPRINCIPLED AND IS  
GENERALLY CONSIDERED CLOSE TO KIM CHONG-PIL. AT SAME TIME.  
KIM HAS REPUTATION AS COMPETENT DIPLOMAT AND HASUONE CREDITABLE  
\*HE ON KOTRA.

5. MUN TOK-CHU, CURRENTLY CONSUL-GENERAL HONG KONG NAMED  
VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPLACING CHONG IL-YONG.  
MUN HAS SERVED AS CONSUL GENERAL IN NEW YORK AND AS FONOFF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUREAU DIRECTOR. HE IS CONSIDERED ONE  
OF MOST COMPETENT CAREER DIPLOMATS IN ROK SERVICE.

6. CHONG IL-YONG, CURRENT VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
APPOINTED MINISTER IN GENEVA MISSION. CHONG IS FORMER MINISTER  
IN ROK EMB IN PARIS. AS VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHONG DID ABLE  
JOB IN RUNNING DAILY AFFAIRS OF MINISTRY. RECENTLY THERE HAVE  
BEEN REPORTS THAT CHONG HAS NOT BEEN GETTING ALONG WITH FONMIN.

7. O CHON-SOK APPOINTED AMB TO MEXICO, REPLACING YI SONG-KA.  
O IS FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION UNDER CHANG MYON GOVT  
AND RECEIVED MOST OF HIS SCHOOLING IN US. ALTHOUGH NOT  
FORCEFUL PERSONALITY, HE IS IMPRESSIVE SPEAKER AND WELL  
DISPOSED TOWARD AMIS.  
CFN NOT KOTRA 5 6 NOT 7 O IHON-SOK O NOT

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
8. CHANG SONG-HWAN APPOINTED AMB TO THAILAND, FILLING POST  
LEFT VACANT BY JULY APPOINTMENT YI TONG-WON AS FONMIN. CHANG  
IS RETIRED AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHO WAS AIR FORCE CHIEF  
OF STAFF UNTIL JULY 1964. HE HAS SERVED IN WASHINGTON AS  
MILITARY ATTACHE. CHANG CONSISTENTLY COOPERATIVE AND FORTH-  
COMING WITH AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS.

9. CHOE KYU-HA, AMB-AT-LARGE AND FORMER VICE MINISTER FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, APPOINTED AMB MALAYSIA, REPLACING CHO HONG-HUI. CHOE  
IS CONSIDERED ONE OF MOST EXPERIENCED AND SHREWD MEMBERS OF  
FONOFF AND SHOULD MAKE HIGHLY CAPABLE ENVOY. SINCE CHOE HAS  
LONG BEEN CONSIDERED CONTENDER FOR POST OF FONMIN THERE SOME  
POSSIBILITY THAT NEW APPOINTMENT IS MOVE ON PART FONMIN  
REMOVE HIM FROM SEOUL.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 334, October 7, 6 P.M., from Seoul.

10. YI YONG-HUI, POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR AT SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, NAMED AMB TO SWITZERLAND. YI HIGHLY RESPECTED ACADEMICIAN WHO SERVED AS ADVISER TO GOVT DURING MILITARY REGIME. AS SPECIALIST IN FOREIGN RELATIONS HE HAS PERENNIALY BEEN CONSIDERED FOMIN MATERIAL AND APPEARS TO BE UNEXCEPTIONABLE CHOICE AS AMB TO BERN.

11. PREUNT ROK AMB IN JAPAN PAE UI-HWAN APPOINTED AMB TO ARGENTINE EMB, WHICH CURRENTLY UNDER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. PAE IS A FORMER BANK OF KOREA GOVERNOR. HE WAS EDUCATED IN US AND HAS AMERICAN WIFE. HE IS BEING REMOVED BECAUSE OF BELIEF  
CFN 8 1964 9 YI 10 YI 11

PAGE FIVE RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HE HAS NOT PURSUED ROK DEMANDS ON JAPAN WITH SUFFICIENT VIGOR. ROKG ALSO WISHES RECONSTITUTE REPRESENTATION IN JAPAN PRIOR TO POSSIBLE RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS FOR NORMALIZATION ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS.

12. IM PYONG-CHIK (BEN LIMB) FORMER FOMIN AND HEAD ROK UN OBSERVER DELEGATION, NAMED CONSUL-GENERAL IN INDIA WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK. IM IS NEARING SEVENTY AND ALTHOUGH FAR PAST HIS PRIME, MANAGES TO WIN JOBS BECAUSE OF TIES TO PRESIDENT PAK AND SERVICES TO RULING DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY. UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE HAPPY WITH APPOINTMENT AS CONSUL-GENERAL, DESPITE DEVICE OF AMBASSADORIAL RANK.

13. HONG KONG CONSULATE-GENDSAL TO BE HEADED BY CHIN PIL-SIK, CURRENT CHIEF OF MISSION IN GENEVA. CHIN IS COMPETENT PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT WITH LONG AND RESPONSIBLE SERVICE IN FONOFF AND OVERSEAS.

14. CURRENT AMBASSADORS YI SONG-KA IN MEXICO AND CHOE HONG-HUI ASSIGNED TO FONOFF, RETAINING AMBASSADOR TITLEGY PRESENT GENEVA MISSION CHIEF YI HAN-PIN HAS REPORTEDLY RETIRED.

15. GP-3

BROWN

BT

CFN 4 101312 IM PYONG-CHIK BEN LIMB ROK UN IM 13 CHIN PIL-SIK

\* AS RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

59

✓  
*Bundy*

31  
Action

~~SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

3250  
OCTOBER 5, 1964  
6:58 AM

SS  
Info

FROM: SEOUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 321

DATE: OCTOBER 5, 6 PM

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SEC BUNDY

002

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT

1. FRENCH AMBASSADOR CHAMBARD TODAY SHOWED ME TEL FROM FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOKYO IN WHICH LATTER STATED ASST SEC BUNDY'S VISIT NOT WELL RECEIVED IN TOKYO. HE SAID BUNDY HAD URGED GOJ MAKE GREATER ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS AND SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT WITH KOREA. SHIINA HAD REPLIED AGREEMENT WITH KOREA MOST DIFFICULT IN VIEW KOREAN SEIZURES JAPANESE VESSELS AND HAD SAID THAT MATTERS WHICH MIGHT SEEM IN WASHINGTON TO BE MERELY ADMINISTRATIVE HAD "DELICATE POLITICAL OVERTONES IN TOKYO."

2. FRENCH AMB TOKYO COMMENTED THAT BUNDY-SHIINA TALK WAS LIKE DIALOGUE OF TWO DEAF PEOPLE, NEITHER HEARING NOR RESPONDING TO THE OTHER'S ARGUMENTS.

3. FRENCH AMB TOKYO ALSO STATED SENIOR JAPANESE OFFICIAL HAD COMMENTED TO ONE OF HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES THAT JAPAN FELT THAT THEY HAD BEEN READ A LESSON BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE AND THAT THE US IN TALKING WITH GOJ ALWAYS TOOK KOREAN POSITION.

4. FRENCH AMB TOKYO FINAL COMMENT WAS THAT JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD KOREAN SETTLEMENT HAD DEFINITELY HARDENED AFTER BUNDY VISIT.

DECLASSIFIED

authority RA 66-10-254-4-13-2  
By JOW NARA Dec 8-30-19

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 321, OCTOBER 5, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

5. PLEASE DO NOT DISCLOSE THAT CHAMBARD SHOWED ME HIS COLLEAGUE'S TELEGRAM.

6. GP-2

BROWN

BAP

SECRET



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

60  
ALEXANDER  
BATOR  
BIRK  
BRUCECK  
CHASE  
CRISTAL  
JOHNSON  
KEENY  
KLEIN  
KONER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
SMITH, WM. Y.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE COPY

01-6825

1964 AUG 20 AM 6 06

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUALOT 377D 20/0850Z  
P 200835Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (TOKYO)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
RUHPA/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 641 INFO PRIORITY  
SEOUL 40 CINCPAC 106 FROM TOKYO AUGUST 20 6PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF SEOUL'S 54 (163 TO DEPT)

WE HAVE READ REFTEL AND PRECEDING COMMUNICATIONS FROM SEOUL WITH MUCH INTEREST AND AGREE WITH PROPOSED BASIC APPROACH OF PARA 2. WE ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT REGARDING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS A, B AND D IN PARA 4. WITH ADEQUATE PREPARATION FOR YOSHIDA VISIT, INCLUDING PROBABLY JAPAN-KOREA AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE ON SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF VISIT, IT MIGHT HAVE CFN 641 40 106 20 6PM 54 163 2 A B D 4

PAGE 2 RUALOT 377D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SOMEWHAT SAME SALUTARY EFFECT AS YOSHIDA'S VISIT TO GRC. THOUGH WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT ENTIRELY SAME AND YOSHIDA DOES NOT HAVE SAME LONGSTANDING FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH KOREAN LEADERS THAT HE HAS WITH THOSE OF GRC. EMBASSY STANDS READY TO SOUND OUT GOJ AND YOSHIDA HIMSELF IF DEPT WISHES.

REGARDING RECOMMENDATION C WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS. THE ONLY VALUE OF ANY TRIPARTITE MEETING OR IMPLICATION OF SUCH MEETING (SUCH AS VISIT TO KOREA OF HIGH US OFFICIAL AT SAME TIME AS YOSHIDA) WOULD BE THROUGH MAKING IT KNOWN TO KOREAN PUBLIC, BUT THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECTS IN JAPAN AND WITHOUT CREATING IMPRESSION US "INTERVENING" DIRECTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE STILL FEEL IS MOST UNWISE. ANY SEMBLANCE OF DIRECT INTERVENTION WOULD OPEN DOOR TO FUTURE RECRIMINATIONS FROM BOTH KOREA AND JAPAN. A TRIPARTITE MEETING TO ENCOURAGE NORMALIZATION OR ANY OTHER ACTUAL OR SEEMING US INTERVENTION WOULD ALSO BE EXPLOITED BY LEFTISTS IN JAPAN, MAKING IT HARDER FOR GOJ TO MAKE CONCILIATORY MOVES TOWARD KOREANS AND COMPLICATING PROBLEM OF RATIFICATION. BEYOND THIS IT WOULD BE RESENTED BY GOJ THAT AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE CFN GRC NOT NOT GRC GOJ C US US GOJ GOJ

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED RAC ODR-254-4-14-1

By Jm WARA Date 8-30-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-641, August 20, 6 P.M. from: Tokyo

PAGE 3 RUALOT 377D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCOURAGING IT TO TAKE STRONGER AND MORE DARING STAND ON WORLD PROBLEMS IN JAPAN'S OWN INTERESTS, WE INSIST ON OPENLY PLAYING MOTHER HEN ROLE ON ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS ON WHICH GOJ IS DARING TO TAKE SUCH A STAND.

ABOVE DOES NOT MEAN THERE WOULD BE ANY OBJECTION TO VISIT TO KOREA OF HIGH US OFFICIAL SO LONG AS IT IS NOT AT SAME TIME AS YOSHIDA VISIT. IF SOME FURTHER EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IS REQUIRED IN KOREA IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR SECRETARY BUNDY TO VISIT KOREA FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO JAPAN (SINCE SECRETARY BALL HAS UNFORTUNATELY HAD TO CANCEL HIS ATTENDANCE IMF MEETING TOKYO).

WE REALIZE THAT KOREAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES ARE CHIEF PRESENT BLOC TO NORMALIZATION AND THAT TO HELP OVERCOME THIS US MAY HAVE TO DO THINGS IN KOREA WHICH RUN RISKS IN JAPAN. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT A TRIPARTITE MEETING OF LEADERS OR ANY OPEN INJECTION OF US IN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RUN UNACCEPTABLE RISKS IN JAPAN. IN ADDITION TO VISITS TO KOREA SUGGESTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THAT MAXIMUM US COULD SAFELY DO WOULD BE TO INCREASE BEHIND-SCENES PRESSURE IN BOTH KOREA AND JAPAN, ATTEMPT TO HELP PREPARE KOREAN PUBLIC FOR ACCEPTANCE OF CFN HEN GOJ NOT NOT

PAGE 4 RUALOT 377D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NORMALIZATION, AND THEN, WHEN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED, EXPRESS STRONG OPEN SUPPORT FOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT.

GP-3. REISCHAUER

BT

CFN GP-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

FILE COPY 0115779

1964 AUG 19 AM 6 56

FE PP RUEHCR  
Info DE RUALOS 05E 19/0858Z  
P 190830Z ZEA  
SS FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
SP STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 163 INFO PRIORITY  
TOKYO 54 CINCPAC UNN AUG 19 6PM

AID CINCPAC FOR POLAD

P REF: A. EMBTEL 155, RPTD TOKYO 51, CINCPAC UNN  
USIA B. EMBTEL 158, RPTD TOKYO 53, CINCPAC UNN  
NSC

1. IT IS CLEAR FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH KEY FIGURES REPORTED  
REFTELS THAT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW EXIST WITHIN ROKG ON HOW TO BEST  
ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE KOREA-JAPAN NORMALIZATION. FOREIGN MINISTER  
WHISHES TO PROGRAM STRATEGY FOR GAINING FULL NORMALIZATION,  
DOD WHILE PRIME MINISTER PROPOSES MORE MODEST GOAL OF PARTIAL  
NORMALIZATION. PRESIDENT PAK TAKES SOMEWHAT MIDDLE GROUND IN  
RMR CFN 163 54 19 6PM 155 51 158 53 1.

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER

BATOR PAGE TWO RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BELK THAT HE SUPPORTS ATTEMPT ACHIEVE FULL NORMALIZATION BUT IS  
DEUBECK PREPARED RECONSIDER AND ACCEPT SOMETHING LESS IF CIRCUMSTANCES  
CHASE SO DICTATE.

JESSUP 2. I BELIEVE PRESIDENTS POSITION REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL IN THAT  
JOHNSON FAILURE ACHIEVE FULL NORMALIZATION WILL NOT RPT NOT PRECLUDE  
KENNY SHIFTING OBJECTIVE TO LESSER GOAL IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY.  
KIDIN I DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE SHOULD ABANDON PREFERENCE FOR  
MOODY FULL NORMALIZATION WITHOUT FULL TEST OF POSSIBILITY.

REEDY 3. PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER APPEAR  
SAUNDERS CONVINCED ROKG CANNOT SIMPLY REACH AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN, THEN  
SAYRE FORCE ITS ACCEPTANCE BY USE GOVT MAJORITY IN ASSEMBLY AND WITHOUT  
SMITH, W "PRUDENT REGARD" (PAK'S EXPRESSION) TO PUBLIC OPINION. I AGREE  
AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD GAUGE OUR ACTIONS AND SUPPORT WITH  
THIS IN MIND.

4. I RECOMMEND WE PURSUE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION AT THIS TIME:

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RA-0011-254-4-15-0

By JDU WARA Date 8-30-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 163, AUGUST 19, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

1. EMBASSY TOKYO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY EARLY YOSHIDA GOOD WILL VISIT TO SEOUL. WE BELIEVE SUCH VISIT WOULD GIVE SUBSTANTIAL BOOST TO GOVT EFFORTS IMPROVE PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND MAKE EASIER RESUMPTION FULL SCALE NEGOTIATIONS. IF JAPANESE RESPONSE CFN 2. NOT NOT 3. 4.

PAGE THREE RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FAVORABLE WE WOULD ARRANGE ROKG INVITATION. WE CAN ACCEPT PRESIDENT PAK'S AND YI TONG-WON'S ASSURANCE YOSHIDA WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH RESPECT.

B. WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH PLANS FORM DAC COORDINATING GROUP. WE WILL DISCUSS SUBJECT INTENSIVELY WITH ROKG IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND BELIEVE WE CAN OBTAIN ROKG AGREEMENT MAKE FORMAL REQUEST. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE THESE EFFORTS SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER CONSIDERATION AS TO BEST TIMING IN RELATION TO RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REACTIONS MAY AGAIN PRESENT PROBLEM TO ROKG.

C. WE SHOULD DISCUSS WITH JAPANESE AND KOREANS FEASIBILITY AND UTILITY ARRANGING MEETING OF US, JAPANESE AND KOREAN LEADERS TO PROMOTE RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR US NOT RPT NOT TAKING ON ROLE OF MEDIATOR, ARBITRATOR OR CO-NEGOTIATOR. I HAVE IN MIND POSSIBLE MEETING IN SEPTEMBER BETWEEN UNDER SECRETARY BALL, SHIINA AND HIGH ROKG FIGURE (YI TONG-WON OR SOMEONE ELSE). ALTERNATIVELY WE COULD THINK IN TERMS SIMILAR MEETING IT TIME ASST. SECRETARY BUNDY WILL BE IN AREA. WHETHER MEETING SHOULD BE IN TOKYO OR SEOUL NEEDS CFN B. C. NOT

PAGE FOUR RUALOS 05E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO BE DETERMINED. KOREANS WOULD PREFER SEOUL, BUT IF YOSHIDA VISIT PRECEDES, THEY MAY MORE READILY ACCEPT TOKYO MEETING.

D. ROKG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED ACTIVATE EARLY CAMPAIGN SECURE MAXIMUM PUBLIC, PRESS AND OPPOSITION ACCEPTANCE NEED FOR NORMALIZATION ON REALISTIC TERMS. WE CAN HELP DISCREETLY WITH KEY OPPOSITION FIGURES, ESPECIALLY IF GOVT MAKES SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO BRING OPPOSITION ALONG, E. G. BY INCLUDING LEADING OPPOSITION OR NON-PARTISAN TTDSRK\* ROK DEL WHEN NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 163, AUGUST 19, 6 PM, FROM SEOUL

5. ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO IMPLY SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER US ROLE IN RESOLVING SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN, BUT RATHER TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE FOR RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS. I RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MAY BE CONSTRUED AS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, AND THAT EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO DRAW US INTO SUCH A ROLE. ON BALANCE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE SUCH RISK. PAST EFFORTS IN WHICH WE CAREFUL TO REMAIN IN BACKGROUND HAVE NOT ENDED IN SUCCESS, THROUGH NO FAULT OF OURS. IF WE ARE TO MAKE NEW EFFORT NOW, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO EXTEND OURSELVES AND OUR INVOLVEMENT WITHIN CAREFULLY PREDETERMINED LIMITS.

6. GP-3. BROWN

BT

CFN D. 5. NOT NOT NO NOW 6. GP-3

\*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea 12*

45

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Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

25056  
JULY 31, 1964  
5:03 AM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 101

SS

INFO: TOKYO 31  
CINCPAC UNNUMBERED

G

S P

L

H

IO

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AID

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ARMY

NAVY

ATR

RMR

DATE: JULY 31, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. IN FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE FOREIGN MINISTER YI TONG-WON STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BASIC GOVT FOREIGN POLICY. ANNOUNCED GOVT WILL STRESS "SUPRA-PARTISAN DIPLOMACY" IN DEALING WITH ROK-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS, CALLED FOR EARLY NORMALIZATION BUT SAID NO DEFINITE DECISION YET MADE ON TIMING RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS SAID HE NOT PLANNING TO RESHUFFLE ROK DELEGATION ROK-JAPAN TALKS AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTOR THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

2. FONMIN SAID MAJOR REASON FOR FAILURE PAST NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN WAS JAPANESE INSINCERE AND UNCOOPERATIVE ATTITUDE AND SUCCESS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS LARGELY DEPEND GOJ ATTITUDE.

3. YI TOUCHED ON UNIFICATION PROBLEM SAYING THERE WILL BE NO (#) TOWARD UN. SAID INTERNATIONAL SITUATION NOT FAVORABLE TO ROK POSITION RE UN FORMULA AND KOREA FACES MORE DIFFICULTIES THAN EVER IN ACHIEVING UNIFICATION THROUGH UN SUPERVISED ELECTIONS. THEREFORE GOVT HAS TO MAKE GREATER EFFORTS IN ITS "UN DIPLOMACY". ADDED PERSONAL COMMENT THAT UN VOTE ON KOREAN ITEM MIGHT BE LESS FAVORABLE THAN IN PAST YEARS.

4. IN OTHER COMMENTS YI SAID GOVT WILL CONTINUE STRENGTHEN FRIENDLY TIES WITH US AND OTHER FREE NATIONS AS WELL AS STEP UP ITS ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY TO BCOST KOREAN EXPORTS. PREDICTED

/STATUS OF FORCES

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-2- 101, JULY 31, 5 PM, FROM SECUL

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH US WILL BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THIS YEAR. YI SIDE-STEPPED PRESS QUERIES ABOUT POSSIBLE RE-SHUFFLE RANKING ROK DIPLOMATS.

5. COMMENT: YI'S REMARKS ON JAPANESE "INSINCERE" ATTITUDE OBVIOUS ATTEMPT ADOPT "HIGH POSTURE" FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. WE THINK IT IS A CASE OF SPEAKING WITHOUT WEIGHING POSSIBLE JAPANESE REACTION.

DOHERTY

LM

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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35

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Action

Control:  
Rec'd:17375  
JULY 22, 1964  
8:30 AM

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 66, PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: TOKYO 21,  
CINCPAC UNNUMBERED,

L

H

P

DATE: JULY 22, 5PM

USIA

NSC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

1. CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION OVER LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW REMAINS CENTRAL AND UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF CURRENT POLITICAL CONTROVERSY IN ROK. OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE NOW AGREED RELUCTANTLY TO RE-ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (DRP) ON MEASURES FOR SETTling POLITICAL SITUATION. AFTER STRENUOUS EFFORTS BY SPEAKER YI HYU-SANG NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME JULY 22 WITH THREE PY# TIME LIMIT.

2. OPPOSITION CALLING FOR EARLY LIFTING MARTIAL LAW, WHILE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES DEMAND PRIOR "GUARANTEES" OF LAWS TO CONTROL PRESS AND STUDENTS. CERTAIN LEADERS ON GOVERNMENT SIDE (ESPECIALLY YI HYU-SANG) HAVE HINTED AT GOVERNMENT WILLINGNESS MODIFY STRONG POSITION IN RETURN FOR OPPOSITION AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT LESS RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS. MAIN BUT NOT ONLY STUMBLING BLOCK APPEARS TO BE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE CONTROL PRESS, WHICH OPPOSITION STRONGLY RESISTING. POSSIBLE COMPROMISE SEEN IN SUPPORT BY SOME GOVERNMENT LEADERS OF LEGISLATION RE-ORGANIZING, STRENGTHING AND GIVING LEGAL STATUS TO PRESS ETHICS COMMISSION AS A "SELF-CONTROL" ORGAN, IN PLACE OF DIRECT GOVERNMENT CONTROL BY LAW.

3. AMONG OPPOSITION LEADERS THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SAMMINHOE AND CIVIL RULE PARTY (CRP).

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Authority RAC 00/R-254-4-16-9  
By JHL ARA Date 8-30-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-66, JULY 22, 5PM, FROM SEOUL

SAMMINHOE LEADERS MIGHT ACCEPT COMPROMISE LEGISLATION TO STRENGTHEN PRESS "SELF-CONTROL" ORGANS AND LEGISLATION TO PROTECT CAMPUS FREEDOM BUT REJECT GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF PRESS AND GOVERNMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO RESTRICT CAMPUS POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

4. EVEN WITHIN CRP THERE IS SPLIT OPINION. MODERATE ELEMENTS PREVAILED SUFFICIENTLY TO GET AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE. ADAMANT FACTION, LED BY YUN PO-SUN, STILL DEMANDS IMMEDIATE END TO MARTIAL LAW WITHOUT ANY LEGISLATION REGARDING EITHER PRESS OR STUDENTS. YUN STRATEGY IS TO FORCE GOVERNMENT EITHER CONCEDE COMPLETELY, OR RISK MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS BY RAMMING LEGISLATION THROUGH ASSEMBLY OVER STRONG OPPOSITION PROTESTS.

5. ALTHOUGH CONSENTING TO CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS, PRESIDENT PAK PRIVATELY REMAINS FIRM IN HIS INSISTENCE ON PASSAGE OF RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION PRIOR TO LIFTING MARTIAL LAW. DESPITE SOME ADVICE TO CONTRARY PAK HAS NOT DISCARDED PLAN TO FORCE LEGISLATION THROUGH ASSEMBLY. THUS EVEN IF DRP-OPPOSITION NEGOTIATIONS PRODUCE COMPROMISE, PAK (LIKE YUN) MAY NOT BE WILLING TO ABIDE BY RESULTS.

6. IN THIS UNCERTAIN AND DIFFICULT SITUATION EMBASSY HAS BEEN COUNSELLING BOTH SIDES TO AVOID CRISIS IN ASSEMBLY AND INTENSIFY EFFORTS REACH NEGOTIATE COMPROMISE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE RESTRICTIVE LAWS FOR PRESS AND STUDENT CONTROL AS DEMANDED BY PRESIDENT PAK ARE NECESSARY NOR DO WE BELIEVE THEY WILL SOLVE GOVTS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. WE HAVE QUIETLY BEEN TELLING THIS TO GOVT AND DRP LEADERS INCLUDING PRIMIN CHONG, VICE PRIMIN CHANG KI-YONG, FORMER PRIMIN KIM HYON-CHOL, GENERAL KIM CHONG-O, YI HU-RAK, AND SPEAKER YI. WE HAVE ALSO TOLD THEM THAT MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE LONGER GOVT DELAYS THE MORE DIFFICULT ITS POSITION WILL BE. AT SAME TIME WE HAVE JUDICIOUSLY LENT OUR SUPPORT TO SPEAKER YI HYO-SANGS AT TIMES SINGLE-HANDED EFFORTS TO SURMOUNT CURRENT GOVT-OPPOSITION CONFRONTATION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-66, JULY 22, 5PM, FROM SEOUL

7. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OPPOSITION WE HAVE URGED NECESSITY OF TRYING AGAIN IN NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE REJECTION EARLIER BY GOVT-DRP OF RESULTS FIRST ROUND NEGOTIATIONS (SEE EMBASSYS A-7). WHILE NOT PRESSING OPPOSITION LEADERS TO ACCEPT GOVT PROPOSED LEGISLATION WE HAVE COUNSELED THEM TO CONSIDER COMPROMISE APPROACH WITHOUT COMPLETE CAPITULATION BY ONE SIDE OR OTHER. AS TO SAMMINHOE AND SOME CRP MODERATES, WE HAVE RECEIVED FAVORABLE RESPONSE THOUGH THEY REMAIN PROFOUNDLY SUSPICIOUS PRESIDENT PAKS INTENTIONS. YUN PO-SON GROUP HAS NOT BUDGED FROM ITS INTRANSIGENT POSITION.

8. IN ASSESSING OUTLOOK FOR NEGOTIATIONS WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE A SMALL CHANCE THAT CURRENT ROUND WILL REACH SAFE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND DRP. HOWEVER THE INTRANSIGENCE OF YUN PO-SON, AND PRESIDENT PAKS CONTINUED REFUSAL TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO THE COURSE OF MODERATION ARE ALMOST INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES. YUN CANNOT BE CHANGED BUT US THE GOVT AND THE DRP WERE SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, YUNS EXTREMEIST HARD CORE MIGHT BE ISOLATED.

9. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE INTEND CONTINUE ALONG OUR PRESENT LINES URGING GOVT TO BACK DOWN FROM BASICALLY UNTENABLE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE POSITION AND URGING OPPOSITION TO NEGOTIATE ON ASSUMPTION GOVT WILLING TO COMPROMISE. OUR VIEWS ARE GETTING TO PRESIDENT PAK THROUGH PRIMIN, CHANG KI-ZLING, YI HU-RAK AND OTHERS. THEREFORE WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT USEFUL AT THIS TIME TO MAKE ANY DIRECT APPROACH TO PRESIDENT ALTHOUGH THAT MAY BE NECESSARY AT SOME LATER TIME IF SITUATION SHOULD WORSEN.

10. DEPARTMENT VIEWS REQUESTED.

11. GP-2.

DOHERTY

MCA

# AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Korea*

34-32

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Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

16369  
JULY 21, 1964  
6:20 A.M.

FE

FROM: SEOUL

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 61

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SP

INFO: TOKYO 15  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD UNNUMBERED

L

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DATE: JULY 21, 3 P.M.

P

USIA

REF: A. TOKYO 13, TO DEPT 232, CINCPAC 38  
B. EMBTEL 1725, RPTD TOKYO 71, CINCPAC UNN

NSC

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CIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

1. IN COURSE OF DAY LONG INSPECTION TRIP TO CHUNG CHONG PUKTO PRIME MINISTER AGAIN APPEALED TO ME FOR US SUPPORT IN BRINGING ABOUT PARTIAL SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN. HE WAS AWARE OF TRADE AND CREDIT TERMS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY JAPANESE (REFTEL A) AND DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THEM, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT RPT NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO SEND CABINET OFFICER TO TOKYO ON PROCUREMENT MISSION (PARA 7 REFTEL A).

2. HOWEVER PRIMIN SAID NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SEOUL WOULD BE PUBLICLY MANIFESTED GOOD OFFICES HIGH LEVEL US OFFICIAL (REFTEL B). PREFERABLY SECRETARY RUSK. HE OUTLINED PLAN FOR A MEETING SOME TIME IN AUGUST OF HIMSELF PRIME MINISTER IKEDA AND SECRETARY RUSK. PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WOULD BE SHOW US INTEREST IN FORWARD STEP TOWARD NORMALIZATION. INITIAL MEETING WOULD BE ONLY MEETING IN WHICH US WOULD PARTICIPATE AND WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SEVERAL MORE BETWEEN IKEDA AND CHUNG AFTER WHICH ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE OF KOREA-JAPAN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SEOUL.

3. PRIMIN CHUNG REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT ONLY SUCH IDENTIFICATION OF US WITH DECISION WOULD ENABLE HIM TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF OPPOSITION LEADERS. IF US WOULD AGREE, HE FEELS SURE HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF OPPOSITION PARTIES TO BE REPRESENTED ON HIS DELEGATION TO TOKYO. HE MENTIONED SPEC-

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Authority: RAC 0017-264-4-17-8

By: JDL vARA Date: 8-30-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 61, JULY 21, 3 P.M., FROM SEOUL

IFICALLY FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER CHONG IL-HYONG AS REPRESENTING SAMMINHOE. HE CONCEDED IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT YUN PO-SON WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE BUT HE FELT THAT MORE MODERATE CIVIL RULE PARTY LEADERS WOULD GO ALONG.

4. I POINTED OUT TO PRIMIN THAT USG HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELUCTANT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER WASHINGTON HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT PROPOSAL WHEN WE HAD CONVEYED IT SOME WEEKS AGO (REFTEL B) AND EMBASSY TOKYO FELT JAPANESE WOULD NOT BE FRIENDLY TO ANY MOVE WHICH WOULD SUGGEST US PUTTING PRESSURE ON GOJ. HOWEVER, I PROMISED TO TRANSMIT HIS PROPOSAL AGAIN, NOTING THAT IN EVENT WASHINGTON WILLING TO CONSIDER IT, WE WOULD NEED THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE ASSURANCE THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD IN FACT COOPERATE. I FURTHER EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SECRETARY WOULD BE WILLING OR ABLE BECOME INVOLVED PERSONALLY AND INQUIRED IF OTHER HIGH RANKING US OFFICIAL MIGHT SERVE SAME PURPOSE. HE SUGGESTED IF SECRETARY UNAVAILABLE, OTHER PROMINENT OFFICIAL SUCH AS ATTORNEY GENERAL KENNEDY OR SENATOR MANSFIELD WOULD DO IF COMMISSIONED PERSONALLY BY THE PRESIDENT.

5. COMMENT: I AM FULLY AWARE OF CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING OUR TRADITIONAL AVERSION TO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA-JAPAN TALKS, BUT I BELIEVE PRIMINS PROPOSAL SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AGAIN. I DOUBT OPPOSITION CAN BE HANDLED AS EASY AS PRIMIN INDICATES. OUR PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS OF OPPOSITION LEAD US TO THIS CONCLUSION. ANOTHER CRUCIAL FACTOR OF COURSE IS ATTITUDE OF GOJ. HOWEVER WE DO NOT WISH REJECT PRIMINS PROPOSAL WITHOUT FURTHER CONSIDERATION RECOGNIZING MAIN PURPOSE OF PROPOSED MEETING WOULD NOT BE TO INVOLVE US IN NEGOTIATIONS BUT TO CREATE OPTICAL EFFECT (IN KOREA) OF US ENDORSING NEW INITIATIVE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS.

6. REQUEST LATEST DEPT/TOKYO THINKING THIS QUESTION.

7. GP-3.

DOHERTY

MV

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

07768

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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85

Origin

FE

Info

SS

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USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

CPR

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL  
INFO: Amembassy TOKYO  
CINCPAC

IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
PRIORITY

176  
472

AUG 14 6 53 PM '65

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Seoul's 157.

REF: ~~Daptel 169 to Seoul repeated Tokyo 165, CINCPAC JNN~~

1. Following is President's statement on Korean ratification of K-J  
at Ranch Sunday morning (August 15).  
agreements, to be released/inter today

2. QUOTE: The United States Government has for many years  
believed that the establishment of normal relations between the Republic  
of Korea and Japan would be a historic step that would ~~bring~~ bring important  
and durable benefits to both nations and to the free world.

3. I was pleased to learn that the Korean Government has just ratified  
the Basic Relations Treaty with Japan and its associated agreements. The  
establishment of normal relations between these two countries will be  
~~wel~~ welcomed by all friends of the Republic of Korea and Japan. END QUOTE.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:EA/K:DO'Donohue:mm 8/14/65

classification approved by:

FE - Samuel D. Berger

EA - Mr. Fearey

FE/P - Mr. Lockhart

P/ON - Mr. Thirkield (subs)

S/S - Mr. Gordon

White House - Mr. Cooper

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

07713

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45  
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL  
INFO: Amembassy TOKYO  
CINCPAC

IMMEDIATE 173

Aug 14 1 38 PM '65

470

030

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

REF: Seoul's 157.

Deliver at 8:00 a.m. Sunday, August 15 local

1. We believe that with ratification K-J agreements, ROKG should move quickly to heal political scars of ratification struggle, urging opposition to resume a constructive parliamentary role. We are encouraged by apparent desire Peoples Party moderates not to resign from Party (reftel), and it is obviously highly important for Korea's orderly political development that their pending resignations from Assembly be refused by DRP majority (as was case with CHOE Hui-song resignation). You should continue make these views known to ROKG and DRP leaders as well as to opposition moderates.

2. Presumably in August 15 Liberation Day address by President Pak will personally appeal to opposition that they return to their parliamentary duties in the interest of national unity and development of orderly constitutional processes. We would hope that President would reiterate previous ROKG

Drafted by:

FE:EA:DO'Donohue:mm 8/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Samuel D. Berger

Clearances:

FE:EA - Mr. Fearey (draft) *SSD*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: *NY 001R-254-4-18*

By *SA*, NARA, Date *2/3/12*

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assurances that the economic benefits K-J settlement will be handled on supra-partisan basis with representatives from political opposition as well as from social, economic, and educational fields playing significant role.

3. Assume you have already conveyed foregoing to Pak, but you might consider putting this to Blue House informally, if possible before Pak speaks.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

07601

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE

169  
465

AUG 13 8 20 PM '65

FE

Info

INFO : CINCPAC PRIORITY

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CPR

1. Ambassador Kim passed on request from Seoul that we issue statement after K-J agreements ratified by Assembly, which he was informed would be done tomorrow.

2. Following for Seoul's and Tokyo's IMMEDIATE comment is statement we propose to make here, possibly by President.

3. QUOTE: The United States Government has for many years believed that the establishment of normal relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan would be a historic step that would bring important and durable benefits to both nations and to the free world.

I was pleased to learn that the Korean Government has just ratified the Basic Relations Treaty with Japan and its associated agreements. This is an act of statesmanship which will be welcomed by all friends of the Republic of Korea and Japan. END QUOTE.

4. Seoul should report ratification by immediate telegram as well as any developments which might effect issuance above public statement.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

~~Robert A. Fearey~~ FE:SDBerger:lgn

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification, approved by:

EA - Robert A. Fearey  
~~Robert A. Fearey~~

Clearances:

~~Robert A. Fearey~~  
White House - Mr. Thomson

S/S - Mr. Gordon

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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~~SECRET~~

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Origin

Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY

166

AUG 12 7 45 PM '65

LIMIT DIST.

REF: Embtel 1278

From Berger.

1. Secretary Army told me he will be sending COMUSKOREA in day or so decisions taken on reducing US forces in Korea for gold-flow reasons. Decisions were within the framework of your tel and discussions here with Bundy. They involve

a. Level to be reduced to and held at 53,000 including transients. Since numbers have fluctuated from present 56,000 to 48,000 in recent years without evoking Korean response or their even knowing it, there is no rpt no need to inform Koreans of reductions or this figure.

b. Inchon will no longer be used except for Pol. This can be presented to Koreans as justified by improved communications from the South.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-20

By ing, NARA, Date 9-20-91

Drafted by:

FE:SDBerger:eb

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - SDBerger

Clearances:

Aug. 12, 1965

EA/K - Mr. Turpin

OSD/ISA/FE - Capt. Boxes

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~~SECRET~~

c. Pershing Missile Unit and some medium helicopters  
planned for Korea will not rpt not be sent.

2. COMUSKOREA will have more detail.

GP 3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04241

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUG 9 5 23 PM '65

87

Origin

FE

Info:

SS

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CU

USIA

NSC

CPR

SY

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

147

1. White House has received letter from You Chan YANG, Executive Vice President Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, requesting that Korean children's folk dance group "The Little Angels" perform at White House during its September visit to Washington. Yang was last Korean Ambassador here under Rhee Government.

2. Request any information available to Embassy on "The Little Angels" as well as Embassy comments political implications, if any, <sup>of</sup> ~~any~~ Cultural and Freedom Foundation's connection with group.

GP-4.

END.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By iss, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by:

FE/EA/K:DO'Donohue:tom 8-7-65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - R.A. Fearey

Clearances:

S/CPR - Mr. Carter (subs)

S/S - Mr. Rattray

~~CU/FE - Miss Downing (subs)~~

FE/P - Mr. Reed (subs)

CU/FE - Miss Downing (subs)

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☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

00585

AUG 2 8 14 PM '65

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Origin

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 121

INFO : JCS PRIORITY  
CINCPAC PRIORITY  
COMUSKOREA PRIORITY

034

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

- A - COMUSKOREA's 020830Z;
- B - JCS 7281 DTG 022246Z;
- C - Deptel 91 to Seoul and JCS rptd CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA;
- D - Seoul's 97 rptd CINCPAC 48.

1. In ref A COMUSKOREA reports that on August 4 he plans tell ROKG that UH-1B helicopters in Korea being prepared for deployment to Viet-Nam and will be replaced in Korea. Ref B provides detailed JCS guidance on timing of deployment of helicopters. However, at present overriding concern of USG is to secure early Assembly approval Korean division by mid-August. In view of Embassy Seoul warning that premature news of deployment helicopters might cause adverse reaction, we are reluctant to inform ROKG of our intentions at this time.

2. Request Embassy Seoul comments soonest.

3. GP-1.

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END

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI 91-20

By lig, NARA, Date 9-20-91

RUSK

Drafted by: FE/EA:DAO'Donohue:lgn:rg 8/2/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Robett A. Fearey RF

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Capt. Boyes DB

Joint Staff - Vice Admiral Mustin (Substance) DM

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

0271471

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AVG 5 6 56 PM '65

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

133

Info:

INFO : Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY  
CINCPAC PRIORITY

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. UPI Seoul reports MND Kim told National Assembly Committee that U.S. "will equip one Korean army division, a marine division, and three army reserve divisions." Also quoted as stating Americans would probably help to promote South Korean exports to SVN and that negotiations for that purpose were "progressing satisfactorily."
2. Request soonest/~~Embassy confirmation~~ report Kim's Assembly statement and recommendation for handling press queries here.
3. Is Embassy planning any public statements re U.S. actions in support ROK dispatch division to Viet-Nam?
4. GP-4.

END

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RUSK

Authority Group 4  
By ics, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by:

FE/EA/K:LO'Donohue:rgb 8/5/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Josiah W. Bennett

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Capt. Boyes (draft)

VN - Mr. Warne (substance)

FE/P - Mr. Gaiduk (draft)

P - Mr. Wright (substance)

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ACTION: Amembassy SEUL 934

APR

PARK VISIT

Korean Embassy has given us following list members official party

Park visit:

Deputy Prime Minister Key Young CHANG

Foreign Minister Tong Won LEE

Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM and Mrs. Kim

Minister of National Defense Sung Eun KIM

Minister of Information Jong Chul HONG

Chairman, National Assembly Armed Services Committee, Chong Kap KIM

Principal Secretary to the President, Hu Pak LEE

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Chong Oh KIM

Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, In Han PAK

We realize composition group reflects ROKG desire emphasize ROK-US economic-military problem areas during Pak visit. Embassy should, however, caution Koreans against coming to Washington with intention engage in round of detailed negotiating sessions on these matters. We will, of course, be prepared discuss broad economic and military assistance subjects with President Park, but necessary groundwork for such discussions should be laid in Seoul in advance of visit, with our Embassy as channel U. S. views.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By *idg* NARA. Date 7-17-92

SEUL 934

FE:EA:DAO'Denchuo:lgm 4/2/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
distribution required

FE - Marshall Green

EA - Mr. Bennett

AID/FE/EA - Mr. Block (draft)

FE - Mr. Barnett

DOD/ISA - Capt. Boyes (substance)

Protocol - Mr. King (draft)

White House - Mr.

S/S - Miss

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Classification*

In that regard, we understand from Korean Embassy source that Deputy Prime Minister Chang also considering coming to Washington in advance Park visit for preliminary discussions on economic matters. As appropriate Embassy should strongly discourage Chang or other ROKG officials from coming here in hope of engaging in negotiations preliminary to Park visit.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

EXOX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Classification*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATI

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1387  
clear to S/S 4 PM  
4/3/65  
45  
April 3, 1965

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*OK*  
gc.  
Thompson  
*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Seoul.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Delt ON 7-26-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassy SEOUL

PARK VISIT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-165  
By 118 NARA Date 7-17-92

Korean Embassy has given us following list members official party

Park visit:

Deputy Prime Minister Key Young CHANG

Foreign Minister Tong Won LEE

Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM and Mrs. Kim

Minister of National Defense Sung Eun KIM

Minister of Information Jang Chul HONG

Chairman, National Assembly Armed Services Committee, Chong Kap KIM

Principal Secretary to the President, Hu Rak LEE

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Chong Oh KIM

Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, In Han PAIK

We realize composition group reflects ROKG desire emphasize ROK-US economic-military problem areas during Pak visit. Embassy should, however, caution Koreans against coming to Washington with intention engage in round of detailed negotiating sessions on these matters. We will, of course, be prepared discuss broad economic and military assistance subjects with President Park, but necessary groundwork for such discussions should be laid in Seoul in advance of visit, with our Embassy as channel U. S. views.

FE:EA:DAO'Donchue:lga 4/2/65

FE - Marshall Green

EA - Mr. Bennett

AID/FE/EA - Mr. Block (draft)

FE - Mr. Barnett

DOD/ISA - Capt. Boyes (substance) Protocol - Mr. King (draft)

White House -

S/S -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

two

Amembassy SEOUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In that regard, we understand from Korean Embassy source that Deputy Prime Minister Chang also considering coming to Washington in advance Park visit for preliminary discussions on economic matters. As appropriate Embassy should strongly discourage Chang or other ROKG officials from coming here in hope of engaging in negotiations preliminary to Park visit.

GP-3.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

73  
09387

*Bundy*

*S*

80

Origin

55

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

PRIORITY

68

JUL 19 8 18 PM '65

EXDIS

002

Purpose of this message is to alert you to decisions and actions on Vietnam ~~expected to~~ <sup>that might</sup> be taken following return of Secretary McNamara and to request your comments and suggestions on best way of handling vis-a-vis ROK. You will appreciate that specifics ~~is~~ of decisions listed below are subject to modification in line McNamara findings in Vietnam and further consideration here. Timing of various actions is also subject to change, particularly if it is decided to negotiate commitments from GVN regarding parallel actions to be taken on their side.

Basic decisions ~~expected to~~ <sup>may</sup> be along following lines:

(1) US forces to be increased from present level of 75,000 to 175,000 by November 1.

(2) To achieve such buildup without weakening of overall defense posture, legislation to be requested to permit call up of reserves and extension of tours of duty. Some 225,000 reserves would be called up and tours would be extended at ~~ax~~ rate of 20,000 a month.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-20

By *W.F.* NARA, Date *5-22-91*

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:SEA:WCTrueheart/EA:RAFearey/113

Clearances:

7/19/65

Classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Rattray

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) To permit release of reserves and termination of extended tours of duty, legislative authority to be requested to increase regular strength of armed services by 400,000 over next year.

(4) A budget supplement will be sought to support buildup but not necessarily at this time.

(5) It is not expected that there would be any change in current bombing policy and mission of US forces in SVN would remain unchanged, although it is expected that US forces would take on increased share of ground fighting.

(6) Overall US objectives would remain the same. Buildup is necessitated solely by inability build up GVN forces rapidly enough to cope with Viet Cong at present and anticipated strengths.

(7) It is not anticipated that additional US forces would be deployed to Thailand, although additional base construction there is expected. Also no action further stretching 1962 Accords on Laos is presently envisaged. ~~PP~~ As to timing, McNamara will return July 21. Ensuing Executive Branch decisions might lead to final Presidential decision by 26th, followed by Presidential statement to joint session of Congress 28th.

In view of ROK's direct interest, we plan to inform ROKG of our planned course of action, along with Thai and Philippine Governments, at least one or two days prior to President's statement to Congress. Main presentation will be by you in Seoul on basis cabled instructions

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

to follow, with more general presentation to Ambassador Kim here. In view tense and fast moving political situation in Korea, would appreciate soonest any thoughts you may have on slant, emphasis and general handling of both presentations to enhance prospects of favorable ROKG and Korean public response and favorable Assembly action on Korea-Japan settlement and division.

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~



SUMMARY

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

05065

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

044

84  
Origin

## ACTION:

Ambassador SEOUL  
Ambassador SAIGONIMMEDIATE  
IMMEDIATE45  
99

JUL 11 7 37 PM '65

INFO: COMUSMACV  
CINCPAC

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/AID/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Public Treatment of U. S. Support for ROK Forces RVN

Reference Seoul's 41, rptd Saigon 4, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC 21.

For Seoul--

Although disclosure of ~~XXXX~~ US support could have regrettable effects in Viet-Nam, in third-country relations, and possibly in US, we see no alternative but to authorize you to make public statement following lines: QTE Simultaneous with discussions between ROKG and GVN regarding dispatch of Korean troops to SVN, ROK has also been discussing transportation, communication, equipment, supplies, other additional matters, and administrative and logistic arrangements. USG, of course, has long been supplying large-scale military assistance to ROK for forces in Korea, and has agreed to help ROK meet ~~xxxxx~~ new logistical, administrative and financial burdens. UNQTE

We urge you avoid further details of arrangements if possible, and in particular avoid mention of way in which ~~payments~~ ~~payments~~ made, such as para Deptel H(2) ~~xxxxx~~ 15, and that you endeavor impress upon DefMin possible serious

Drafted by: FE:EA: CANorred:can

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - RAFEarey

Clearance: FE:VN:JFRafferty 7/12/65

FE - Mr. Unger (subst) RAY  
FE/P - Mr. Reed (subst) RAY  
P - Mr. Montgomery (subst) RAYAID/FE - Mr. Stoneman (subst) RAY  
Defense (OSD/ISA) - Capt. Boyes RAY~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLJ001R-254-4-19  
By: SP NARA, Date 2-3-12FORM  
8-63 DS-322



~~SECRET~~

consequences of "mercenary" charges if detailed publicity is given direct US payments.

Recognizing, however, that details of payments may become public, we wonder if Country Team would wish to reconsider its recommendations regarding method of paying overseas allowance (Seoul 7) in favor of more complex system parallel to that used in paying defense budget support, and less likely to attract adverse comment: 1) Korean National Assembly would authorize overseas pay, in amounts equal to our overseas allowance; 2) We would release additional blocked counterpart for such payments, and 3) We would provide for convertibility of such Korean currency to dollars. We would expect <sup>END</sup> ~~and~~ result to be same as present, with Korean Defense Ministry securing dollars.

If you are pressed for further details on U.S. support of ROK forces SVN, queries should be forwarded to Washington for basis of reply. Notwithstanding fact this fast-breaking situation, we feel it desirable that Washington approve U.S.-ROK statements re U.S. support for ROK forces SVN.

For Saigon --

You are authorized at your discretion to brief SVN on possible ROK and US public statements and reasons therefor.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

15536

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

83

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

INFO: COMUSKOREA  
CINCPAC  
COMUSMACV

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

COMUSKOREA's UK 52380

Would appreciate earliest your assessment of Defense Minister's requests  
reftel and your recommendations, keeping in mind that Korean IMAF troops  
urgently required Viet-Nam.

GP-4.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Draug 4

By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by:

FE:EA:RTWillner:bhm 6/25/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Josiah W. Bennett

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Moore  
FE/VN - Mr. Rafferty (draft)

OSD/ISA - Capt. Boyes (draft) x now  
JS - Capt. Harkins (informed) x now

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

83

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78  
05056

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 1123

FE

Info

SS

CPR

NSC

FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. BROWN

MAY 10 6 02 PM '65

Following received from White House Social Secretary :

"The President and Mrs. Johnson invite you to black tie dinner honoring the President of the Republic of Korea and Mrs. Park, Monday, May 17, 1965 at 8 o'clock. Formal invitation follows. RSVP."

END

RUSK

☒ BUNDY-SMITH  
☒ BATOR  
☒ BOWDLER  
☒ BOWMAN  
☒ CHASE  
☒ COOPER  
☒ HAYNES  
☒ JESSUP  
☒ JOHNSON  
☒ KEENE  
☒ KLEIN  
☒ KOMER  
☒ MOODY  
☒ REEDY  
☒ SAUNDERS  
☒ TUCKER

Drafted by:

FE:EA:DAO'Donohue:lgm 5/10/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Robert A. Fearney

Clearances:

O/CPR - Mr. Kuhlman

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

09907

~~SECRET~~

88  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

VERBATIM TEXT

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

1290  
2928

039/44  
JUN 16 8 10 PM '65

LIMDIS

Deptel 2895 to Saigon, rptd Seoul 1278.

Following conversation reported reftel Korean Ambassador called on White June 15 House staff/and said President PAK's letter to him implied Pak would like message from President Johnson on additional troops for Viet-Nam which he could use publicly in securing Assembly approval.

should  
Unless you perceive objection you/~~amembassy~~ convey following message from President Johnson to President Pak for public use as President Pak wishes.

QTE: Dear Mr. President:

I have been informed of the request to you by the Government of Viet-Nam security for additional/~~combat~~ troops for service in Viet-Nam. I am confident that your response will be in the best interest of Korea and the Free World.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQTE

GP-2.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-20

By sig NARA Date 6-29-92

Drafted by: am

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:EA:CANorredJr;FE/VN:JFafferty:bhm

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

EA/P Mr. Bennett  
S/S Mr. Mich Henderson

White House Mr. MC Closkey  
Mr. Cooper

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~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00168

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1077  
FE Amembassy RABAT 641

May 1 5 52 PM '65

Info: SS  
G INFO: ALGIERS 2455  
SP NICOSIA 692  
SAH KUWAIT 220

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165  
By ing NARA. Date 7-17-92

AF Ref: Algiers 2550

NEA P Second A-A Conference - ROK Attendance

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

Dept agrees it preferable for ROK await results our inquiries in Cyprus and Kuwait which we hope forthcoming shortly. In view Algerian relations with North Korea, agree ROK likely to gain little or nothing by trying to approach Algerian Govt. directly. But in light Seoul's 1101 April 30, it would seem neither practical nor desirable to try dissuade ROK Ambassador to Morocco from contacting friendly members of Preparatory Committee in Algiers next week when key decisions may be made by Committee.

Suggest Embassy Seoul pass foregoing to ROKG and Embassy Rabat to Ambassador Shin. Dept informing ROK Embassy of our views. GP-3. END.

Drafted by:

FE/RA:PWManhard:tm

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE/RA - Joseph RUSK Mendenhall

Clearances:

5-1-65

EA - Mr. Norred

AF - Mr. Steigman

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00155

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1075  
FE " TOKYO 2830  
Info:

MAY 1 4 58 PM '65

SS INFO: CINCPAC

G FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BUNDY

SP SAH Deptel 1067 and 107; Embtel 1104

L H P 1. Believe Deptel 1067 and your reaction to it

USIA overstate position taken by Poats and Barnett. In

NSC INR any event Bundy conversation with Kim followed these.

CIA NSA Thus we would hope Kim reports will stress line Bundy

DOD took. Actually, Bundy recollection is that he said we

AID would certainly have basic material in communique

E even if final agreement had not been signed at time

of visit.

2. We fully appreciate that ROKG and, as reported in Tokyo's 3532 (371 to Seoul), GOJ as well are making every possible effort complete agreements. You should be sticking with ROK to Bundy line as amplified para 1 above.

Nonetheless,

Drafted by:

FE:WMBundy:tm 5-1-65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Barnett  
AID/FE - Mr. Poats  
FE/EA - Mr. Norred

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3. Nonetheless, we must recognize among ourselves that if agreement not finally signed we will have internal problem in obtaining necessary approval for communique along lines Deptel 1038. We might also have somewhat greater problem in explaining matter to Congress, although this now looks susceptible of being handled.

4. Immediate problem we see is to frame language in draft communique that would not rpt not make commitment paragraphs conditional upon final agreement in any identifiable way, but that would make clear what we might call our assumption that final agreement would now be reached and that commitment paragraphs were in effect reiteration and amplification in more concrete terms of Deptel 1038 (minus specific years and with resulting adjustments) of basic position taken in Rusk statement of January 1964 and subsequent repetitions by Bundy and others. We will be drafting urgently along these lines and would welcome suggestions you may have.

GP-3.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

17622

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86

Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1069

FE

Info

CINCUNC IMMEDIATE

SS

RPTD INFO TOKYO 2822

G

CINCPAC

SP

DOD PRIORITY

SAH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L

SEOUL'S 1100 to Dept, rptd info CINCPAC 150

H

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

EUR

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

NIC

SUMMARY

APR 30 6 33 PM '65

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-165

By ju, NARA, Date 8-25-92

Appreciate that RB-47 incident ~~apparently not~~ technically not within purview

MAC but feel ~~x~~ attack distinct violation spirit of armistice agreement, and can reasonably be discussed at MAC, particularly on grounds that it was an attack upon a craft belonging to a member of the UN Command responsible for the security of the Republic of Korea.

If Communists refuse meet May 1 as requested, suggest you convey protest in May 3 meeting already scheduled.

~~REF~~  
Dept spokesman April 30 read statement contained Deptel 1064 and in ~~REF~~ reply question whether our views would be transmitted to North Koreans at Panmunjom said "We have that under consideration." (See FEF 135).  
GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:EA:RIWillner:rtw

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: G - Ambassador Thompson

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey

L/UNA - Mr. Murphy (draft)

FE/P - Mr. Gaiduk (draft)

FE/RA - Miss McNutt (draft)

GPM - Mr. Meyers

FE - Mr. Bundy

IO - Mr. Sisco (draft)

Defense OSD/ISA Capt Boyes

JCS/JRC Cole

S/S-Mr. Hilliker

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

15032

83

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

87

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 1053

FE

Info:

Apr 27 5 56 PM '65

SS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BUNDY

NSC

Highly desirable have you here several days in advance Park's May 17

O

CPR

Washington arrival to participate in final round of preparations. Important advantages also of course to your accompanying Park on Presidential plane. Appreciate your cabled views, also Mrs. Brown's itinerary.

END

~~BUNDY-SMITT~~  
~~BATCH~~  
~~BOWMAN~~  
~~CHASE~~  
~~CUTLER~~  
~~MAYNES~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KEENE~~  
~~KLIEN~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~MOODY~~  
~~REEDY~~  
~~SAUNDERS~~  
~~SAYRE~~  
~~THOMSON~~

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE-BA-RA Fearey:pmh 4/27/65

FE - William P. Bundy

FE/EX - Mr. Trueworthy (draft)  
O/CPR - Mr. King (draft)

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

14051 84

FS

40  
Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1042  
INFO: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 2421

Apr 26 2 51 PM '65

EXDIS.

Embtel 1072.

001  
21

We appreciate desirability giving Pak frank picture our possible future plans, but there are grave drawbacks to telling him now that we may eventually ask for as much as a division.

Basic factor is, as stated in our 1039, that we are most anxious avoid any publicity for deployments before they are firmly agreed with GVN and preferably before they actually arrive. We realize that in case of ROK units alerting and shipping arrangements alone would probably lead to necessity for announcement well prior to arrival, and it is for this reason, in part, that we did not visualize ROK RCT, even if fully agreed, closing SVN until mid-June at earliest.

Secondly, if we do not go through with proposed additional 2-3 enclaves, we are most anxious to have this appear--as indeed is the fact--as a limited measure to secure particular areas and conduct limited operations from them. Any foreshadowing of much greater deployments to come would jump the gun.

Drafted by:

FE:WPBundy:mk 4/26/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NY 001R-254-420  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 2-3-12

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

in view of the very tentative character of our thinking at this point, and would inevitably create the impression that we were simply moving inexorably to a large ground involvement. Obviously, if Pak were to seek Assembly approval for a ROK division, even if he made it clear that it would not be dispatched immediately in toto, it would inevitably lead to conclusion by press and other governments that if ROK was considering a force of this size we ourselves must have in mind something very much greater.

For these reasons it seems to us vital that Pak not repeat not seek any Assembly approval for a division at least before the end of June and probably not until we have had a much better chance to evaluate effectiveness of more limited deployments now contemplated. It also seems to us, unless you can be really sure of security factor, to that it would be most risky/XX tell him firmly that we even have in mind the possibility of a division-size ROK combat contribution. If it is humanly possible, we must take this thing one bite at a time in order to avoid most serious consequences in GVN and in world attitudes.

We suppose that part of your problem is that XX ROK Assembly may recess during summer. We wonder, however, if it could not be recalled if required.

Hence, we would vastly prefer you stick to original instructions while not foreclosing possibility additional contribution might later be requested. Please handle accordingly unless you have reply comments.

XXXX

XXXX

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Moreover, any publicity even for RCT proposal at this time would be most inopportune. We do not have GVN reaction to any additional deployments and would need to work out details even when and if both GVN and Pak are agreeable in principle. Moreover, exact timing of any public indication--much less formal seeking Assembly approval--will have to be weighed very carefully in total picture of public impact added deployments. Hence, you should make perfectly clear to Pak that we would need to consult very closely with him on future handling and that all publicity must be avoided for now.

GP-3.

End.

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

NARA. Date 6-29-92

APR 24 6 43 PM '65

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

PRIORITY 1038

By *sig*

JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE

LIMDIS

Your 1045 ~~and~~ and 979.

Following is operative portion of draft Presidential determination (NSC Action 1550) which would authorize assistance commitment to Republic of Korea. Has been partially cleared in Washington. Language of commitment would be based on this draft.

QTE It is determined that in order to contribute to Republic of Korea's continuing economic development, security, stability, and confidence, U.S. Govt will announce that it intends, subject to applicable legislation and availabilities, to continue substantial U.S. assistance to Republic of Korea during period of its development and, specifically, that during ~~1965-68~~ 1965-68 (present term of office of President of U.S.) U.S. Govt plans:

1. To provide AID Development Loan assistance in amount of \$150 million over current and next few years, as may be required to finance projects and programs under terms of AID legislation and policies. After obligation of this sum, it is anticipated that further development/loan funds would be made available. (We estimate confidentially that \$150 million commitment would be fulfilled at average rate of \$50 million in each of CYs 1965, 1966, and 1967. This amount may include one or more non-project commodity loans to be justified in terms of continued progress of Korean economy, provided Korean Govt continues to carry out measures necessary for financial and monetary stabilization and economic development.)

2. To provide AID Supporting Assistance for foreign exchange financing to cover unmet requirements for imports essential to maintenance of Korean economy, in support of agreed programs of economic stabilization, and in conjunction with Korean efforts to achieve self-support. (Since Koreans

Drafted by AA/FE/EA:SBIVes SBI *per can*  
FE/EA:CANorred:can 4/24/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - Robert W. Barnett *B*

Clearances:

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

regard Supporting Assistance levels as barometer of U.S. aid to and support of ~~the~~ their country, in part because of local currency counterpart generated for budget support, this Supporting Assistance commitment is peculiarly central to achievement of purposes sought under this determination.)

3. To continue technical assistance and training grants.

4. To continue to provide available commodities under Title I of Public Law 480 for commercial sale in Korea, to extent that domestic requirements for such commodities cannot be supplied by Korean production; to continue to provide available agricultural commodities from programs authorized under Titles II and III.

5. To continue to assist ROK to meet its military security requirements, including modernization of its forces, through U.S. Military Assistance.

These commitments in fact state our present plans for Korea but offer assurance, albeit qualified, of continuing U.S. support beyond current fiscal year.

Commitments will be phrased as being in anticipation of continuation and expansion of Korean self-help efforts. END QTE

Would appreciate your comments soonest.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

08051 86

NSC

83

Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 982 PRIORITY  
Amembassy SAIGON 2314 PRIORITY

APR 14 7 11 PM '65

INFO: CINCPAC  
COMUSMACV  
COMUSKOREA  
Amembassy CANBERRA 869  
Amembassy WELLINGTON 881

042

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

Ref A. Seoul 948 to Dept rptd info Saigon 62, CINCPAC 100, COMUSMACV  
10.

Ref. B. Seoul 994 to Dept.

FOR SEOUL: Although we appreciate political difficulties in Korea, after highest level discussion here reviewing situation in SVN it has been determined there is urgent need for introduction of additional Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops in SVN. We have in mind a Korean regimental combat team of approximately 3,000 men, with terms of US support same as for current ROK contingent. However, probable that requirement will develop for total ROK force commitment of one division which will include aforementioned RCT.

Concur

Drafted by:

FE/VN:JFRafferty:gm/hst 4-14-65

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

AID - Mr. Poats (substance)  
DOD/ISA - Adm. Blouin

White House - Mr. Cooper  
S/S - Mr. Mills

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority NJ0018-254-4-21  
By Q, NARA, Date 2-3-12

FORM DS-322  
8-63

~~TOP SECRET~~

Concur with your recommendations in Ref B.

FOR SAIGON: Ref B recommends that a formal request from GVN prior to publication of request for additional military assistance to SVN would be important to avoid charges that Republic of Korea is acting as US tool. Suggest Embassy Saigon discuss with GVN possibility of additional ROK military as outlined this message and suggest GVN make request ASAP to ROK Government.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

18169

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-165

By lip NARA Date 7-17-92

84

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

PRIORITY 915

SS  
Info

MAR 30 8 47 PM '65

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BUNDY

Our recent talks with you and Bernstein have reinforced our belief that a statement of U.S. long-term commitment of assistance for Korea's economic development and security, suggested in draft National Policy Paper on Korea, is highly needed in context of Korea-Japan settlement. Korea-Japan settlement accompanied by such U.S. commitment would afford real hope for progress in Korean economic and social system which could not be based on only one factor or other. We are prepared seek Presidential statement of such commitment in as strong terms as feasible. (Draft letter being forwarded by air-pouch for your comment.)

We ~~was surprised to learn that you do not~~ believe statement of commitment made shortly after signing of Korea-Japan agreement, would best facilitate its ratification and effective acceptance in Korea. Bernstein letter to you favoring this view written March 29. Park Govt's own time table for phasing its efforts is crucial. Would appreciate your views as soon as possible as to whether President's message after signing or ~~in~~ during May-June ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ would more effectively support those ~~efforts~~ efforts.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorred Jr: can 3/30/65

Telegraphic transmission and

Robert W. Barnett

classification approved by:

FE - ~~William B. Bunker~~

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearay (subst)  
S/S - Mr. Merriam  
White House - Mr. Thomson  
glw

AA/FE - Mr. Poats (draft)

AA/FE/EA - Mr. Ives (draft)

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

15392

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

83

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

894

MAR 25 6 19 PM '65

LIMDIS

Re Deptel 874 and Urtel 883

26

Henceforth messages referring to US contribution to funding of salaries and allowances of International Military Assistance Forces should bear LIMDIS, rather than EXDIS, caption unless content otherwise requires EXDIS handling. Distribution within Dept. and elsewhere in Washington will continue to be made on a strict need-to-know basis ~~xx~~ to a few previously designated officials.

This is for administrative convenience and in no sense changes sensitivity of subject which is of concern at highest levels and should continue be handled on highly restricted basis.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-165

By 129, NARA, Date 7-17-92

Drafted by: S/S: LHoffacker/AID: GKamens: pp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

~~EXXXXX~~ S/S - Mr. Read

Clearances: (substance)

FE - Mr. Clunan White House - Mr. ~~Thomson~~  
S/S-O - Mr. Axelrod

AA/FE - Mr. Walter Stoneman

~~SECRET~~

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10604

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

Classification

81  
Origin  
SS  
Info:

SENT TO: AmEm SEOUL PRIORITY 874  
COMUSK PRIORITY EXDIS

MAR 17 10 00 25 '65

INFO: AmEm SAIGON 2017  
COMUSMACV  
CINCPAC

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-165  
By ju, NARA, Date 8-25-92

JOINT STATE/AID/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: (a) Seoul Embtel 768  
(b) Seoul Embtel 865

Have received receipt. Ref (a) discussed payments in terms of quarterly allotments. Ref (b) requested payments in monthly allotments. Do you want monthly payments for purpose of control or applying leverage? We believe quarterly allotment more desirable since it reduces number of transactions both in Seoul and in Washington, [redacted]

1.3(a)(5)

[redacted]  
If acceptable we will issue quarterly allotment for \$294,000.

Request your comments ASAP.

Drafted by:

GKamens:FE/DP:AID

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Walter G. Stoneman, AA/FE: AID

Clearances:

JRafferty:FE/VN

WHamilton:DOD/ISA (subs)

C. Herrod, FE/EA  
S/Sgt. Mr. deMartino

Col. Boston:DOD/Jt.Staff (subs)  
FE - Mr. Barnett

Capt. Branbilla:DOD/Jt.Staff (subs)

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02119

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 816

FE

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO 2211  
CINCPAC

MAR 3 9 20 PM '65

Info:

SS

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P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

O

CP

SY

A

AEX

OPR

CINCPAC for POLAD

Reference Deptel 808 to Seoul, rptd Tokyo 2184, CINCPAC unn.

White House has approved 10-15 minute call on President by ~~XXXXXX~~ Foreign  
Minister LEE March 17 at 11:30 AM. Korean Embassy advised.

GP-4.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Draft 4By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82Drafted FE:EA:RTW:illner:can 3/365Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Josiah W. Bennett

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey (draft) AMOCPR - Mr. KING (subst) AMS/S - Mr. Rattray AMWhite House - Mr. Cooper (informed) AM~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00909

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 808

FE

Info

INFO : Amembassy TOKYO 2184  
CINCPAC

MAR 2 4 10 PM '65

SS

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USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

O

CPR

SY

A

AEX

OPR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Seoul's 790, rptd Tokyo 296, CINCPAC 56

Inform FonMin LEE Secretary looking forward to meeting him in Washington during March 15-17 period. Secretary plans host luncheon in Lee's honor. FYI: We are seeking White House agreement to brief courtesy call by Lee on President. END FYI.

Embassy requested cable Lee's U.S. itinerary including flight times soon as available.

GP-4

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE-BA-DAO-D Donohue:blm:pmh 2/25/65

The Secretary

EA - Mr. Fearey

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

FE - Mr. Green

White House - Mr. Cooper

O/CPR - Mr. King

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

846  
Told  
Alice-Mone  
912  
March 1, 1965

Date

BY DCH ON 7-26-60

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*for Lewis H. Roeder*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to SEOUL

3/2/65 OK - Cooper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amembassy SEOUL

INFO : Amembassy TOKYO  
CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Seoul's 790, rptd Tokyo 296, CINCPAC 56

Inform FonMin LEE Secretary looking forward to meeting him in Washington during March 15-17 period. Secretary plans host luncheon in Lee's honor. FYI: We are seeking White House agreement to brief courtesy call by Lee on President. END FYI.

Embassy requested cable Lee's U.S. itinerary including flight times soon as available.

GP-4

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Brang 4  
By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

FE:EA:DAO'Donohue:bhm:pmh 2/25/65

The Secretary

EA - Mr. Fearey  
FE - Mr. Green  
O/CPR - Mr. KingS/S -  
White House -~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

15562

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

82  
Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 799

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 1846  
COMUSK  
COMUSMACV  
CINCPAC

FEB 27 5 44 PM '65

002

FS

EXDIS

(A) Seoul's 789, rptd DOD Unn, COMUSMACV 9, Saigon 55, CINCPAC 55 (230845Z);

~~(B) Deptel 768 to Seoul, rptd Saigon 1775;~~

(B) Deptel 768 to Seoul, rptd Saigon 1775;

(C) Seoul's 793.

JOINT STATE/AID/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. Embassy authorized inform ROKG U.S. will assume costs overseas allowances for MASH and taekwondo instructors as part commitment re ROK IMAF, using payment channel proposed for IMAF ~~proposed~~ (ref B).

2. Check for \$70,500 payable to ROKG MND being pouched to Ambassador per ref C. Presume it still your desire that General Howze deliver. Amount includes IMAF costs through March 31 as well as one month's costs for MASH and instructors.

3. Opposition elements National Assembly may raise question who is paying MASH/Instructors allowances after expiration current ROK appropriation, as well as IMAF payments. Assume ROKG will use discretion re MASH/Instructors as in case IMAF costs (ref C). Please inform how ROKG proposes handle these questions.

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CGSeasword;FE/DP:GKamens:bhm

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Leonard Unger

Clearances:

AA/FE - Mr. Stoneman

EA - Mr. Fearey

S/S - Mr. Mills

SVN - Mr. Rafferty (draft)

DOD/ISA/FE - Admiral Blouin (subst)

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NLJ001R254-4-23  
By: [Signature], NARA, Date: 2-3-12

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

4. Also request reaffirmation you satisfied ROKG taking maximum feasible prevent knowledge our security to ~~accord with our extraordinary precaution of securing Presidential Determination and~~ use of unvouchered funds.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11812

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

FS

81  
Origin  
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SEOUL / PRIORITY 768  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 1775  
COMUSK / PRIORITY  
COMUSMACV EXDIS

FEB 19 9 55 PM '65

INFO: Amembassy Bangkok 1280  
Amembassy Manila 1320  
CINCPAC  
~~where MOVEMENT~~  
CINCPAC FOR Polad  
JOINT STATE-AID-DEFENSE MESSAGE

REFS: A. Deptel 733 to Seoul; 1719 to Saigon

B. Seoul Embtel 754

C. Seoul Embtel 768

D. Saigon TOAID 3059

1. Use of unvouchered cash grant (from non-Korea SA funds) outlined in ref. A has been approved here.

2. In view of strong GVN reluctance to making dollar payments for IMAF personnel (ref. D), entire overseas allowance costs will be included in grant to ROKG as CT Seoul suggested para. 6 ref. C. ROKG will be responsible for disbursement to troops in SVN.

3. Appreciate CT Seoul's difficulties (ref. B.) in trying to keep ROKG from supplementing in SVN \$1.00 per man per day, particularly since ROKG will be responsible for entire disbursement, but you should make all reasonable efforts to hold the line. As indicated in para 4, ref. C, ROKG should take all possible measures to avoid identification of U.S. origin

Drafted by:

GKamens:mab:FE/DP:AID

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

State, FE  
Leonard Unger, /~~SECRET~~

AID Clearances:

S/S- Mr. Mills  
DBell, A/AID (Subst.)  
RMPoats, AA/FE (Draft)  
SBIves, Jr., FE/EA (Subst.)

STATE: CANorred, FE/EA (Subst.)  
JRafferty, FE/VN (Draft)  
AID: HReynolds, AA/PC (Subst.)  
ASwan, GC (Subst.)  
~~SECRET~~ S/S- Mr. Mills

Whitehouse: Mr. Bundy (Subst.)  
RADm. Blount, DOD (Subst.)

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FORM DS-322  
8-61

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NLT 001R-254424  
By: SP, NARA, Date: 2-3-12



~~SECRET~~

~~was~~ of funds. We assume that dollars not used for paying allowances in SVN will be placed in general ROKG foreign exchange reserves. Please advise.

4. We will attempt to complete details here so that you will receive amounts suggested in ref C ASAP to be disbursed according to procedures you outlined therein.

5. GP-3.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

87

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 764

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO 2102  
CINCPAC

FEB 19 01 PM '65

030

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LINDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Seoul's 744, rptd Tokyo 272, CINCPAC 35.

Please convey President's invitation to President and Mrs. PAK for ~~Formal~~ State Visit to U.S. this spring. Referring to President Pak's expressed desire to visit Washington after settlement reached in Korea-Japan negotiations (Seoul's A-372), you should propose visit of two days and two nights in Washington, starting May 17, followed by tour of U.S. of up to eight days (details of itinerary to be worked out in Washington between Korean Embassy and Dept).

If that time inconvenient to President Pak because of May 16 Anniversary Military Revolution or other reasons, you may suggest as alternative dates May 10-11 for Washington segment of visit. However, Secretary will be out of U.S. from May 3-15. Please reply soonest on Korean Government view ~~on~~ re timing.

We are reluctant delay public announcement Pak visit until projected mid-March visit of FonMin YI (para 4 reftel) in view danger Koreans will prematurely leak invitation, either here or in Seoul. Unless Embassy has

Drafted by:

FE:EA:DAO'Donohue:lgn:bmm 2/18/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Robert A. Fearrey

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Green  
O/CPR - Mr. King  
White House - Mr. Chase

Mr. O'Neill  
FE/P - Mr. Gaiduk  
P - Mr. McCloskey  
S/S - Mr. Hilliker

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

strong objection we plan simultaneous announcement visit in Washington and Seoul as soon after President Pak's acceptance is received as possible. Embassy should coordinate release with Korean Govt and Dept should be given at least 24 hours notice to arrange release here. 10:30 a.m. or 4:30 p.m. Washington time are preferred release times.

You should also inform Korean Govt that we prefer details of visit be worked out in Washington between Korean Embassy and Dept.

GP-4.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7/1/65

Mr. Bundy - re attached  
on Pak visit

1. Dates <sup>mentioned</sup> are O.K. with JV
  2. Substance O.K. with
- // Jim Thompson. O.K. with you?

OK  
myB

GC SS (H. B. Jones)  
informed  
2/19/65  
GC



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 18, 1965

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy Seoul.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY Det ON 7-26-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

94c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassy SEOUL PRIORITY

INFO: Ambassy TOKYO  
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

92-165

By

NARA. Date

7-17-92

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

Seoul's 744, rptd Tokyo 272, CINCPAC 35.

Please convey President's invitation to President and Mrs. PAK for farthest State Visit to U.S. this spring. Referring to President Pak's expressed desire to visit Washington after settlement reached in Korea-Japan negotiations (Seoul's A-372), you should propose visit of two days and two nights in Washington, starting May 17, followed by tour of U.S. of up to eight days (details of itinerary to be worked out in Washington between Korean Embassy and Dept).

If that time inconvenient to President Pak because of May 16 Anniversary Military Revolution or other reasons, you may suggest as alternative dates May 10-11 for Washington segment of visit. However, Secretary will be out of U.S. from May 3-15.

*Please do not let a Korean Ambassador know of this.*  
We are reluctant delay public announcement Pak visit until projected mid-March visit of Forster XI (para 4 ref'd) in view danger Koreans will prematurely leak invitation, either here or in Seoul. Unless Embassy has

FE:EA:DAO'Donohue:lgns:bha 2/18/65

EA - Robert A. Fearey

FE - Mr. Green  
O/CPR - Mr. King  
White House -Mr. O'Neill  
FE/P - Mr. Caldwell  
P - Mr. McCloskey  
S/S -~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WORK COPY

2

SEOUL, rptd TOKYO, CINCPAC

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strong objection we plan simultaneous announcement visit in Washington and Seoul as soon after President Pak's acceptance is received as possible. Embassy should coordinate release with Korean Govt and Dept should be given at least 24 hours notice to arrange release here. 10:30 a.m. or 4:30 p.m. Washington time are preferred release times.

You should also inform Korean Govt that we prefer details of visit be worked out in Washington between Korean Embassy and Dept.

~~Deliberately~~  
CP-4.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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FILE COPY

08186

95

BURB  
BATE  
BELL  
BOWEN  
CHANE  
COWEN  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KLEIN  
KORP  
MORSE  
REED  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
THOMAS

87

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 738

FE

Info

INFO : Amembassy TOKYO 2046  
CINCPAC

FEB 15 5 24 PM '65

SS

G

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SP

L

(A) Seoul's 742, rptd Tokyo 270, CINCPAC 33;  
(B) Tokyo's 2462, rptd Seoul 242, CINCPAC 448.

H

IO

P

Concur your reasoning Ref A, based in part on Tokyo assessment Ref B.

USIA

NSC

Suggest you inform Yi that if after Shiina visit he continues to believe

INR

informal visit to Washington in March will be opportune for ROK-Japan settle-

CIA

ment, we will be glad to welcome him at date to be agreed during that month.

NSA

DOD

You should remain unencouraging on President's receiving Yi, and should urge

O

CPR

that prospective visit remain confidential until after assessment Shiina

SY

A

visit.

AEX

GP-3

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-166

By fw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

Drafted by:

FE:EA:RAFearey:ikb:lg 2/12/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearance:

O/CPR - Mr. King (draft) *[initials]*

S/S -

Mr. Hilliker

White House -

Mr. Thompson

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 12, 1965

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*for* *Howe*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to SEOUL

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT BEING A SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY DCB ON 7-26-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amembassy SEOUL

INFO : Amembassy TOKYO  
CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

- (A) Seoul's 742, rptd Tokyo 270, CINCPAC 33;  
(B) Tokyo's 2462, rptd Seoul 242, CINCPAC 448.

Concur your reasoning Ref A, based in part on Tokyo assessment Ref B. Suggest you inform Yi that if after Shiina visit he continues to believe informal visit to Washington in March will be opportune for ROK-Japan settlement, we will be glad to welcome him at date to be agreed during that month. You should remain unencouraging on President's receiving Yi, and should urge that prospective visit remain confidential until after assessment Shiina visit.

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-166  
By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

FE:EA:RAFearey:ikb:lgn 2/12/65

FE - Marshall Green

O/CPR - Mr. King (draft)

S/S -

White House -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

88-81

0 5 9 0 2

83

Origin  
AID ACTION: Amembassy Seoul Priority 724  
COMUSK  
Info: Amembassy Saigon Priority 1689  
COMUSMACV

SS  
G  
SP INFO: CINCPAC  
L  
H -DEFENSE  
JOINT STATE-AID/MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED Feb 10 3 25 PM '65  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-166  
By ju, NARA, Date 8-25-92

Ref: (A) Embtel 721 (Seoul) (D) EMBTEL 2453 (Saigon)  
(B) TOAID 1056 (Seoul)  
(C) Deptel 1605 (Saigon); 695 (Seoul)

FE  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
DOD  
ICA  
BOB  
TRSY

1. Appreciate fact General Howze's discussions with ROKG based on instructions and guidance which may have led ROKG to expect overseas allowance to Korean IMAF would be paid entirely in U.S. dollars. Our intent was to attempt get GVN pick up part bill in Saigon and we assist ROKG meet remainder costs in won in Korea. Recognize possible validity CT assumption ROKG expects to be paid in dollars. You should seek agreement with ROKG for payment in won per ref. (C) for that part allowances which will now be paid in Korea (i.e. that ~~was~~ portion over \$1 per day per man which will be paid in Saigon). Reply urgent, repeat Saigon. Should point out that original discussions based on presumption all allowances would be paid in Vietnam as with Mobile Army Surgical Hospital thus requiring ROKG outlay foreign exchange --but now that portion is to be paid in Korea in won, payment in dollars appears unjustified and could be met from counterpart. Promised U.S. support need not be interpreted to mean dollar reimbursement for won costs.

Drafted by:

WGStoneman, AA/FE--CKamens, FE/DP

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: Leonard Unger, STATE/FE

Clearances:

CCooper, White House (subs)  
RSSmith, AID/FC (draft)  
SSilver, AID/FE/DP (draft)  
Sives, AID/FE/EA (subs)

AClaxton, BOB (subs)

VMazzacco, AID/FE/VN (subs)

CStephenson, AID/GC (subs)

R.Adm. FBlouin, DOD/ISA/FE (draft)

~~SECRET~~

ARubin, DOD/ISA/GC (subs)

Col. HPorter, Jr. Staff (draft)

RFeary, STATE/FE/EA (draft)

JRafferty, STATE/FE/VN (draft)

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~~SECRET~~

2. If ROKG at appropriate level states that won payment not acceptable, US Mission Saigon should immediately request GVN pay full amount of allowances in dollars to ROKG (tentatively estimated \$1.1 million per 12 month period. Saigon please confirm and advise whether any other commitments for US payments have been made and if so in what form.) ROKG would then be responsible for all arrangements for paying overseas allowances to its IMAF, but not more than \$1 US per man per day to be disbursed in SVN (Seoul comment feasibility ROKG handling payment this way). To alleviate the GVN balance of payments problem which we recognize would be exacerbated by such a new and unprogrammed outlay, we would offer add \$1.1 million to Vietnam SA-funded Commodity Import Program by ~~issuing~~ <sup>issuing</sup> new PA for commodities which we would not otherwise be financing. Seems to us that CIP standby agreement need not be affected.

3. If ROKG will accept won reimbursement \$30,000 (equivalent) per month for portion of allowance paid in Korea, GVN payment to ROKG would be reduced by \$360,000 for first twelve month period and MBS releases to ROKG increased by equivalent amount per ref. (C).

4. Have explored other possible financing procedures. Due legal and/or policy restrictions on MAP, SA, PL 480 and other courses of action, foregoing alternative seems be only practicable resolution this urgent problem.

FOR SAIGON: While CT Seoul proceeding on para. 1 above, request immediately your comments on possibility negotiating para. 2. However, if Seoul unsuccessful re para. 1, Saigon proceed promptly finalize arrangements if possible.

BALL

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

03925

*Cooper*

708

ACTION: Amembassy ~~TAIPEI~~ SEOUL PRIORITY

FEB 7 7 21 PM '65

LIMDIS

Bundy briefed Ambassador Kim afternoon February 7 on reprisal actions against North Viet-Nam. Briefing covered much same ground as public statements by Ball and McNamara with following additional points or emphases:

030

A. Timing of attacks, targets, presence of Kosygin in Hanoi, all suggested strongly that attacks were designed to be a clear test of US will and determination.

B. Kim was informed that weather had prevented carrying out of all but one of planned attacks. He was told that one additional strike by Vietnamese airforce was planned for tonight.

C. Bundy described decision to evacuate dependents as additional demonstration of determination but not of itself as indication of any action beyond that already taken.

Kim asked whether US planned send additional units to SVN.

Bundy said that, beyond announced Hawk Battalion, there might be small increases to meet needs such as those now being met by

US

Drafted by: *RAF*  
FE:EA:RAFearey:tom 2-7-65  
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green *Wg*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-166

By *W*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

US and planned Korean forces. We had nothing major now in mind nor any change in role played by US and prospective Korean forces.

Kim recalled US industrial mobilization during Korean War and asked whether similar mobilization now planned. Bundy saw no need for additional mobilization to meet Viet-Nam war requirements.

Kim noted Peiping speaking of Thailand as next target after Viet-Nam. Asked whether if Chicoms start something in Thailand similar to Viet-Nam, US would react same as in Viet-Nam - Bundy replied we would do what situation, which might be different from that in Viet-Nam, called for. Dispatch of ground forces might be indicated; we had had ground forces there before. We consulting closely with RTG and have been giving them equipment. Have told them we prepared to help in any way that seems useful.

~~GP-3~~ Kim asked whether there was anything ROKG could do to help. Bundy replied what ROK was now doing was of greatest assistance. He knew of nothing additional ROK might contribute at present moment, beyond assuring that its contingent arrives on schedule. Kim said that if US decides more is needed- he was sure ROKG would be prepared to provide it. Bundy said this was good news.,

GP-3.

END.

BALL

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01750

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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VERBATIM TEXT

83

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 592

FE

Info: INFO : Amembassy TOKYO 1683

SS

G

Seoul's 605 rptd Tokyo 223

P

USIA

NSC

If queried by press here on possible Pak visit, Dept ~~press~~ spokesman

will limit reply to following statement:

"I understand that there have been preliminary discussions about the possibility of a visit, but ~~no date has been set.~~ no date has been set."

In response press queries, Embassy should reply in same vein.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:EA:DAO'Donohue:lga 1/6/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - M. A. Fearey *mf*

Clearances:

FE/P - Mr. Henderson (draft) *De*  
P - Mr. McCloskey (substance) *De*  
W.H. ~~xxx~~ White House - Mr. Bundy *B*  
(phone)

FE - Mr. Green *mf*

G. - Mr. Hackler *mf*

S/S - Mr. DeLoach *mf*

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

83-S

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 557  
Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 1341

DEC 23 7 20 PM '64

Info:

SS

INFO: CINCPAC  
COMUSKOREA  
COMUSMACV

G

SP

SVN

CINCPAC for POLAD

NSC

INR

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

Reference a) COMUSKOREA UK ~~XXXX~~ 50915 190839Z Dec; b) Seoul's

552, rptd Saigon 20, CINCPAC POLAD 9.  
prompt action reference messages

Appreciate/ ~~early and prompt responses~~ and have noted COMUSKOREA  
recommendations for ROK contribution.

Suggest you begin negotiations ROKG ~~ex~~ on basis ref a and para 4  
ref b.

Current thinking here is for initial ROK force just over one thousand  
units  
personnel. Would like/such as engineers in SVN ASAP.

Request Saigon coordinate directly on forces desired with Seoul  
and CINCPAC.

Request Embassy Seoul submit proposals Washington ASAP for final  
approval.

GP-4.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Draft 4

END

By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

Drafted by:

Defense(OSD/ISA): JBoyes: can 12/23/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Robert A. Fearey

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Rafferty (subs) can

Defense (OSD/ISA) - Adm. Blouin (draft) can

Joint Staff - Col. Gibbons (draft) can

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10275

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 549

FE

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC

Dec 21 7 25 PM '64

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P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

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AID

CPR

AEX

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Seoul's 550, rptd ~~CINCPAC~~ Unn.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-166

By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

~~Assistant Secretary~~ Bundy expressed concern to Korean Ambassador today about reported Korean National Assembly special mission to urge suspension of MAP transfer program. Bundy said we frankly were a little perturbed about this visit. We could not engage in anything resembling negotiations with them, and would be able merely to receive courtesy calls and listen to their views. They may wish make calls on Congress also, but effect on Congressional action unlikely be favorable. Visit would highlight fact Korean MAP has consumable component, which could once be justified but is now susceptible of criticism. Mission probably would have reverse/effect intended, making action on whole MAP more difficult.

Ambassador Kim said he questioned whether mission could accomplish anything, but it was decision made by legislature about which he could do little. Bundy recognized difficulty of executive intervention, but requested Ambassador to ~~convey~~ convey his views to Korean Govt. Amb Kim said he would do so.

GP-3.

END

1/11/75 RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorredJr:bhm 12/21/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey 1/11/75

FE - Mr. Green 1/11/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

08587

05

80  
Origin SS  
Info  
ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL 532

Dec 17 4 41 PM '64

EXDIS

Re Deptel 531

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-1166

By JW, NARA, Date 8-10-92

In carrying out instructions contained reftel, you should feel free in your conversations with President Pak to draw on information, as you consider appropriate, contained in Deptels 501 and 502 in order to set forth for his benefit general measures we now taking to improve SVN political stability and to promote pacification program following up on Ambassador Taylor's recent visit to Washington.

GP-3.

BALL

END

Drafted by:

FE:MGreen:ej 12/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey  
S/VN - Mr. Rafferty (draft)

SECRET

S/S - Mr. Davies

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

08586

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

85  
Origin

33  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY 531  
CINCUNC PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 1294  
CINCPAC PRIORITY  
COMUS MACV

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

DEC 17 4 40 PM '64

038

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-166

By ju, NARA, Date 7-2-93

1. Ambassador Brown requested convey following to President PAK as oral message from President Johnson;

a. President is very concerned about situation in Viet-Nam, and knows Korea shares that concern. In face of Communist threat, it is important that there be Free World solidarity, manifested in participation of many Free World countries in Vietnamese struggle. We know Korea fully appreciates this, and in this spirit has contributed 130-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital at Vung Tau Station and 10 taekwondo instructors, and has indicated it is willing to do all it can to help.

b. Need has arisen to broaden and enlarge participation of other countries. President is appealing to various Far Eastern countries to send military units or additional ~~milit~~ military units to Viet-Nam. He wishes to urge at this time that Korean Govt send additional units as soon as possible, hopefully to arrive in Viet-Nam in next 30 days.

c. Type of units might well be military engineers or additional

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorredJr:bhm 12/16/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey  
FE - Mr. Green  
Mr. Rafferty (draft)  
S/VN - Mr. Corcoran

White House - Mr. Cooper (draft)  
OSD/ISA - Adm. Blouin (draft)  
Joint Staff - Adm. Mustin (draft)  
S/S - Mr. Davies  
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military medical units. We believe it desirable they be self-supporting and self-contained, so as to provide assistance to Vietnamese without straining latter's limited capacity to receive and absorb outside assistance in terms of providing interpreters, transportation, building security, and services. There is, for example, much road repair and bridge-building to be done in flood-damaged areas of Central Viet-Nam. Foreign combat units would not be desirable: it is not that kind of war.

d. If Korea is willing provide additional forces, further discussion of types of units and arrangements could be held between our Ambassadors in Saigon and between Korean officials and CINCUNC.

2. If ROK reaction to above is favorable, request Embassy/<sup>Seoul</sup>~~CINCUNC~~ telegraph recommendations, repeating Saigon, regarding types of units and arrangements. In addition to engineers and medical, you may wish consider other service units, such as transportation. ~~Expansion of defense forces of that area could reasonably comprise expansion of ROK Air Force and ROK Navy supply activities.~~ Are any LSTs available support operations in Viet-Nam? for ~~other functions?~~ Could ROK supply military pilots for air transport?

GP-3.

END

BALI.

ACTING

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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DEC 10 8 10 PM '64

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Origin

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Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL 501

INFO: " SAIGON 1248

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-166

EXDIS

By fw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

At Ambassador Kim's request, Green briefed him today re situation in Viet-Nam, concentrating on measures being taken to improve political stability and promote pacification program following up on Ambassador Taylor's recent visit to Washington. On plus side, Green pointed out potentiality for stronger and more capable government under Huong who has shown courage in meeting challenges and displays wisdom and maturity. Also on plus side is support which new civilian government receiving from General Khanh and military. On other hand, despite technical competence of Cabinet members, Government being sniped at by some Buddhists and others for varying reasons. Moreover, pacification program stalemated and infiltration from North Vietnam has increased.

In this situation we feel the first task is to improve Government's stability and control, centrally and locally, for which reason Ambassador

Drafted by:

FE:MGGreen:ej 12/10/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

SVN - Mr. Corcoran

S/S - Mr. Christensen

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Taylor is talking frankly with SVN leaders and opposition. A second closely related task is to improve pacification program which calls for wide-ranging actions on which we would be cooperating closely with GVN. Problem of infiltration remains worrisome and might call for additional measures. (Green carefully avoided any further discussion on this point except to say that we might later on be in touch with the ROKG regarding this problem).

Finally, Green stressed great importance we attach to third country support in the pursuit of our vitally important common goals in South Vietnam. We welcome in particular what the Republic of Korea could and might do to be of further assistance. He said that Ambassador Brown would be taking this matter up shortly with appropriate ROKG authorities.

Green also briefed Ambassador Kim on general situation in Laos, stressing our continuing support for the Geneva Accords despite fact that PL/Viet Minh have deeply and repeatedly violated accords by (a) retaining and introducing North Vietnamese military into Laos, (b) using Laos as corridor in infiltration of men and supplies from NVN to SVN, and (c) refusing to allow ICC to operate in any Communist-controlled areas of Laos.

FYI: Believe it desirable that you take occasion within next several days to discuss South Vietnam situation with President Pak or PriMin and to seek additional ROK support in Viet-Nam. This will be subject separate

~~SECRET~~



Page 3 of telegram to SEOUL 541

~~SECRET~~

instruction. Meanwhile we sending by septel memo conversation between Bundy and GRC Ambassador Tsiang to which instruction will refer.

GP-3.

END

BALL

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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02618

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Origin  
FE

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL 485

Dec 4 7 18 PM '64

Info:

INFO: AmEmbassy, BANGKOK 846

SS

" CANBERRA 431

G

" KUALA LUMPUR 480

SP

" MANILA 854

L

" SAIGON 1216

H

" TAIPEI 543

SVN

" TOKYO 1478

IO

" WELLINGTON 451

P

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-166

By yw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

USIA

NSC

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Foreign Ministers' Conference

INR

1. In order to help combat Korea's sense of isolation as well as that of

CIA

some other Far Eastern countries, we sympathetic to Korean FonMin's

NSA

proposal for conference next spring of FonMins of ~~aligned~~ aligned FE countries,

DOD

provided that conference is intelligently organized with useful and politically practicable agenda.

NIC

AID

PC

E

2. Seoul has stated that conference could be particularly beneficial in

buoying up flagging public confidence in ROK's international position, an attitude currently feeding confused debate in ROK on unification issue.

Taipei has reported that conference would be helpful psychologically in

reducing GRC feeling of isolation and discouragement (growing in part

out of political impact on GRC of Chinese Communist nuclear explosion) and

Drafted by:

12/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

FE/RA:JAMendenhall:avm:ej

EA - Mr. Fearey

FE - Mr. Green

SEA - Mr. Trueheart

SPA - Mr. Cuthell

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~~SECRET~~

in giving GRC greater feeling of working together in group of countries with many common interests.

3. We believe conference could usefully engage in general discussion of Far Eastern problems. As Thai FonMin Thanat has reportedly suggested to ROK (Seoul's 501), conference should avoid solely negative anti-Communist pitch though discussion of Communist China as central threat to area could not and should not be avoided.

4. Topics on which participants might engage in fruitful exchange include following: 1) security against Communist military threat (GRC, Korea, Australia and New Zealand could make useful contributions); 2) insurgency and counter-insurgency, including security, economic, social and psychological countermeasures (Viet-Nam, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines could play valuable role in dealing with this topic); 3) economic development (Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines could make helpful suggestions); 4) expansion of regional collaboration in diplomatic, economic and perhaps other spheres -- for example, how to meet common GRC, ROK and GVN problems in diplomatic representation in Africa.

5. In addition to exchanges of views on such topics as above, it is possible that conference might consider ways and means of keeping countries concerned in closer touch with each other on matters of common interest.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. For SEOUL: Suggest Ambassador take early occasion to approach ROK FonMin in order to discuss conference. Say we will be interested in having more precise information as to how ROK proposes to approach and organize conference and what agenda items it has in mind to discuss. If, as is likely, ROK FonMin asks for your views on agenda, you may draw on ideas suggested in paras 3 and 4 above.

7. Until we have received Korean Government reaction, info addressees should refrain from approaches to host governments unless latter seem about to take negative decision on conference. In that case, host government should be informed US now actively considering position on proposed conference and would hope discuss with host government shortly.

GP-3.

BALL

END

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 429

Nov 18 2 29 PM '64

LIMDIS

023

Your 436.

In anticipation of new Korean Ambassador's raising question soon after his arrival of visit by President PAK to U.S., would appreciate your views on visit and its timing. Matter should not be discussed with Korean Govt at this time.

We understand from Korean Embassy officers that Ambassador KIM/~~Hyun-ah~~ Chong-yol recommended last September that President make visit in April, which may be basis of press reports of March or April visit cited refTel.

GP-3x FYI: Ambassador Takeuchi inquired on instructions November 16 whether visit by Prime Minister Sato would be feasible around January 10.  
END FYI.

GP-3/

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-166

By gn, NARA, Date 8-10-92

Drafted by:

DM

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:EA:CANorredjr:bhm 11/17/64

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green Ang

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey RA

G - Mr. Hackler

O/CPR - Mr. Sanchez-Bonet

S/S - Mr. Davies

White House - Mr. Komer

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*Class 3/5  
for Nov 18*

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

5741

*1012*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*1. K. X. OK*

November 17, 1964

Date

*2. Ed.*

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*Benjamin H. Read*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Seoul.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *Deid* ON *7-26-90*

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

NOV 18 1964



~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassy SEOUL

LINDIS

Your 436.

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We understand from Korean Embassy officers that Ambassador KIM/Chong-yol recommended last September that President make visit in April, which may be basis of press reports of March or April visit cited refel.

GP-3x FYI: Ambassador Takeuchi inquired on instructions November 16 whether visit by Prime Minister Sato would be feasible around January 10.  
END FYI.

GP-3/

END

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-166  
By fw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

FE:EA:CANorredJr:bhm 11/17/64

FE - Marshall Green

EA - Mr. Fearey  
O/CPR - Mr. Sancho-Bonet

G - Mr. Hackler  
S/S -

NOV 18 1964

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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106 ✓

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED November 12, 1964

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-168

Mac - By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93

As attached will show, old bird dog Komer keeps after his prey. A word from you to Rusk or at least WPB that ~~our leader~~<sup>W/H</sup> continues to be interested in a success here would be most helpful. ~~Are NSAMs in fashion any longer? They're great for the history books too!~~

(post-meeting amendments)

RWK  
RWK



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NJT 100R-254-4-25  
By: §, NARA, Date: 2-3-12

~~SECRET~~

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Nov 11 12 34 PM '64

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Origin

FE

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USIA

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CIA

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AID

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 407  
Amembassy TOKYO 1291

The Administration attaches high priority to early ROK/Japan settlement and is actively considering whether or not the U. S. should take more positive role, even extending to mediation, in achieving one. Moreover, Japan's growing interest in normalization of relations with Chicoms increases pressure on us to get ROK/Japan settlement first.

Following paras intended to elicit from you contributions to current USG exploration of possible initiatives. We are prepared consider seriously pressures, if likely to be productive, both on Seoul where we have direct leverage and on Tokyo where we can appeal to Japan's great capabilities and the responsibilities which should go with them.

1. One possible ~~action~~ move would be to tell the ROKG quietly that we are supporting ROK forces for use against Communists and not as means for pursuing controversy with another U. S. ally--at very time when U. S. and ROK should both be trying to engage this other ally in providing support to ROK development. Future MAP appropriations for Korea, already under severe Congressional examination, could be affected by Korea's use of its security and defense equipment in ways to inflame relations with Japan.

Drafted by: White House: RWK/Komer:mk 11/10-1/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Robert W. Barnett

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey

OSD/ISA - Admiral Blouin (subs)

AID/Korea - Mr. ~~Block~~ Stoneman

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

2. Another possibility is to hinge a substantial portion of further DL to an ROK/Japan settlement in some credible manner. We could say to ROKs that U.S. development aid not really effective until it can be augmented by complementing aid from other countries, particularly Japan. It is up to ROKs themselves to prove to us development intentions serious by gaining access to Japanese aid. ROKs would be far wiser to normalize now, when major U.S. presence still available as counterweight to any Japanese ambitions, than to risk loss of U.S. interest which would leave ROK eventually much more dependent on Japanese.

3. General feeling here is that we <sup>must</sup> ~~must~~ achieve normalization of ROK/Japan relations before prospective normalization of Japan/Chicom relations introduces major new uncertainty. Would there be any mileage in delicately intimating to GOJ that U.S., which is in effect carrying whole burden of <sup>support of</sup> ~~maintaining~~ Korean buffer-zone for Japan, would find it most difficult to be confronted with steps toward normalization of relations with Chicom prior to normalization with ROK? This would simply not be understood by U.S. Govt and public, which would see Japan as failing to live up to its strategic responsibilities in Northeast Asia. We would naturally wish avoid implying to Japanese that, <sup>once</sup> ~~once~~ ROK/Japan settlement achieved, we would have no further objection to any Japanese moves toward Peiping. However, we estimate that some such moves are in the offing anyway, and that inserting ROK/Japan settlement as condition precedent might actually serve to delay rather than accelerate them. Similarly, would it be useful to impress on ROKs wisdom of normalizing relations with Japan before Japan moves closer to Communist China (and by inference to North Korea)?

Above are at present merely ideas on which we invite Embassy comments. We would also be grateful for Embassy suggestions as to other ways in which ROK/Japan settlement could be brought closer.

GP-2.

~~SECRET~~

END. RUSK



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

80

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

IMMEDIATE

337

EXDIS

07008  
107  
F 06  
S  
Oct 13 8 03 PM '64

Cyff 7 desk

Embtel 351.

1. If ROKG again raises report of U.S. objection to appointment Kim Hyon-chol you should state there no truth to report and repeat that request for agreement now being acted on in Washington.

2. Concur course of action proposed paragraph 2 of ref.tel. on receipt agreement.

GP-1

End.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 001K-254-4-26  
By Q, NARA, Date 2-3-12

Drafted by:

FE:EAJWBennett:mfh 10/13/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey  
CPR-- Mr. King (substance)

EA/K - Miss Gallagher

S/S - Mr. Tueller

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

K 6

Oct 12 7 45 PM '64

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 333

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

Embtel 343

Department and other agencies unable determine from own resources in time available whether Kim Hyon-chol ever settled with American wife Lillian. Possible that settlement made informally out of court and therefore unrecorded. Although, as ambassador, Kim would be immune from legal process, danger remains of attempts by wife's lawyers create trouble with unsavory publicity for Kim and ROK. Since we not sure ROK has taken this into account, Department suggests you approach Foreign Minister very confidentially and in low key making points:

- 1) Washington acting urgently on ~~agreement~~ agreement for Kim;
- 2) however, we understand that Kim once married to American woman and are not sure that divorce obtained or settlement yet made with her;
- 3) we want to be sure ROKG aware these circumstances since possibility exists that attempts by American wife take legal action against Kim (though unavailing because of diplomatic immunity) could lead to unfortunate publicity which would embarrass both Kim and ROK.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:EA:JWBennett:mfh 10/12/64

classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

L/FE - Mr. Salans

EA/K - Miss Gallagher

S/S - Mr. Tueller

EA - Mr. Fearey

O/CPR - Mr. King (substance)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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8-63

NLJ 12-77

By ch NARA, Date 3-25-13



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department thinks chances fairly good that ROK has assured self on matter. However, we think it advisable make certain now that ROKG has considered this aspect in proposing Kim.

If above action would cause you no serious problems request you make approach to Foreign Minister ASAP.

GP-1.

RUSK

End.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

05369 <sup>109</sup>

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

82  
Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 327

OCT 9 7 04 PM '64

FS

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BUNDY AND GREEN

Embtel 334

Based on various sources examination of marital background KIM Hyon-chol (para 2 reftel) reveals following:

According marriage and divorce records Washington, no evidence of legal relationship established with an American woman with whom he lived for an unknown length of time back in the 1930's and war period when he was in Washington. (She is a negro.) Eldest of three children from this union is daughter who, according to these records, was married to Caucasian in Washington in 1962. No record here of current residence of daughter or of wife and other two children. Youngest child is minor.

According to KIM Ung-yun (Mickey), Ambassador-designate sent substantial sum of money as form of settlement to his American wife six years ago and instituted legal divorce proceedings at same time. (Place where this allegedly occurred is unknown.) Mickey Kim said that matter is settled and no problem is envisaged. (We have been unable to substantiate this statement from any other source.)

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CLSterner:bhm 10/9/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bennett

S/S - Mrs. Davis

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-77

By ch NARA, Date 3-25-13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Incumbent Ambassador informed Dept officer October 8 that KIM Hyon-chol married prior to leaving Korea in twenties, that he established various casual relationships while here (including one resulting in above family) and that he now married to Korean woman having divorced first wife. Understanding here that current wife will accompany him to Washington. He also said this "mixed" marital background already subject of gossip and concern in Korean community.

Request soonest any additional data available to Embassy, and Ambassador's ~~views~~ views and recommendations regarding this appointment. We are of course apprehensive that Kim's marital background may cause him embarrassment as well as govts concerned.

Incidentally, we have learned/~~that~~ that incumbent Ambassador ~~that~~ has declined Ottawa assignment, that he has spoken to President PAK by phone about it, and that he plans to leave for Seoul around October 20.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

August 3, 1964

*Korean*  
*110*

Mac -

I think I've got rolling another effort at ROK/Jap settlement, utilizing arrival of new ambassador and LBJ's willingness to weigh in personally.

Regrettably, LBJ/Brown encounter Friday night was quite hurried (Dirksen was waiting). Also LBJ clearly hadn't digested his brief; in fact, I had to rescue it from his desk so I could get his approval of Rusk memo proposing oral message to Pak.

So I can't throw much light on your earlier comment that you didn't know how much LBJ is signed on to (a) troop cuts; (b) ROK/Jap exercise. However, he did say we seemed to have a lot of troops there, and when Brown explained our ROK/Jap scenario he warmly endorsed, said he regarded settlement ~~had~~ "top priority" (thank God), and told Win "I'll pray for you."

At any rate, we now have State brought around to point where it agrees US should take a direct hand in pushing settlement through. We've got LBJ saying so orally to Pak through Brown, and we've got Brown ginned up and willing to fire up Reischauer. Attached give the play; I'll keep the fires lit.

*RWK*  
RWK

~~SECRET~~

*Good*  
*mfr*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-168  
By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93



00183

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

59

CONFIDENTIAL

Origin

FE

Info:

SS

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SP

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IGA

AID

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USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

CEA

COM

TRSY

## ACTION:

Amembassy SEOUL  
Amembassy TOKYO  
INFO: Amembassy OTTAWA (VIA POUCH)  
~~INFO: Amembassy~~ PARIS (VIA POUCH)  
Amembassy BONN  
Amembassy LONDON  
Amembassy ROME  
Amembassy CANBERRA  
CINCPAC

PRIORITY 97  
PRIORITY 331

97  
331

Typed for Embassy and USRO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-166

By ju, NARA, Date 7-2-93CINCPAC FOR POLAD (pass Ambassador Brown)  
ADCR

Reference A) Seoul's 61, rptd Tokyo 15, CINCPAC un; B) Tokyo's 300

rptd Seoul 18, CINCPAC 51; C) Tokyo's 336, rptd Paris 11, Seoul 20; and

D) Deptel 1029, rptd Tokyo 2913..

1. President has assigned top priority to Korean-Japanese settlement and is prepared support actions necessary to that end. He has charged Ambassador Brown to deliver oral message to President PAK on Korean-Japanese settlement, urging immediate reopening of negotiations and stressing risk of further delay. Text follows septel.

2. In Tokyo, suggest ~~Ambassador Reischauer coverage~~ minimum publicity meeting between ~~Ambassadors Reischauer and Brown~~ and key Japanese officials. If Ambassadors consider advisable Brown can return later for talks in ~~the~~ Japan. In present visit suggest he (a) inform Japanese he bears oral Presidential message urging Koreans move toward settlement, (b) join Ambassador Reischauer in briefing Japanese officials more fully on conception of (guidance follows septel) multi-national consultative group, and (c) urge positive, forthright

Drafted by: mg

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:Green:FE:EA:CANorred: can 7/31/68

Classification approved by:

The Under Secretary ju

Clearances:

EA-Mr. Fearey RAY  
FE-Mr. Barnett BS  
Amb. Brown (draft)  
White House-Mr. Komer (a)  
S/S - Miss Moor

Matlock  
AA/FE-Mr. Rosta  
AA/FE/Korea-Mr. Ives  
IDOS-Mr. Palmer (subs)

RPE-Miss Phillips (draft)

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AUG 3 1964

CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Japanese action for settlement.

3. Upon arrival Seoul, Ambassador Brown plans include reference to Korean-Japanese settlement in arrival statement, text septel. He will later deliver oral presidential message to President Pak and refer to and draw upon that message in talks with Korean Govt and Opposition leaders.

4. Immediate objective is (a) resumption of active negotiations between Korea and Japan in hope of early complete agreement or, failing that, substantial agreement with remaining differences subject to later negotiations, and (b) development at earliest possible date of specific interim arrangements or understandings of benefit in themselves and likely facilitate general settlement, such as:

(1) Korean commitment not to seize Japanese fishing vessels except in territorial waters;

(2) further Japanese easing of quotas on key Korean exports to Japan, and facilitation of import licenses for Korean goods;

(3) interim Japanese credits to Korea;  
(4) ~~(2)~~ mutual expediting of issuance of visas;

(5) ~~(4)~~ expansion of study in Japan for Korean students as well as in ~~Japan~~ Japan on-job training/for technicians; and

(6) ~~(5)~~ establishment of Japanese trade mission in Seoul.

5. FYI: Visits of Under Secretary Ball and Chairman Thorp in September offer possibility of further constructive ~~U.S.~~ steps. Our ultimate objective remains full settlement, without which there will be little contribution to Korean economic development. ( Until claims provision of settlement comes into effect, multi-national consultative group cannot be expected to begin activity,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and possible establishment \$100 million AID development lending program mentioned ref D would not be appropriate.) A minimum objective should be establishment diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in order to improve ROK international position, forestall expansion of Japanese-North Korean ties, and provide facilities for improving ROK-Japanese relations, including settlement of outstanding issues. END FYI.

7. Request priority comments.

GP-3

END

RUSK

NOTE: POUCHED BY OCT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00185

1106

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59

VERBATIM TEXT

Aug 2 1 55 PM '64

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 99  
Amembassy TOKYO 333

SS

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD (pass Ambassador Brown)

~~COMINTS~~~~LIMDIS~~~~CINCPAC FOR POLAD~~

Deptel 97

026

Following is text of oral message from President Johnson to President PAK to be ~~del~~ delivered by Ambassador Brown:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

President Johnson asked me to give you his warm personal regards. He also asked me to speak to you for him about the negotiations for normal relations between Korea and Japan, which he discussed with you last November. He hopes that you will move forward shortly to establish normal relations and reach a settlement with Japan. It is not healthy for Korea to continue long to be so exclusively dependent upon a single outside friend as it is at present. Korea needs greater trade and a wider circle of strong supporters from abroad. A settlement would be of great benefit to Korea, both economically and politically, and would have good effects for Korea far beyond the direct arrangements established between Korea and Japan. It would also benefit the Free World position in the Far East.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-168

By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93

Drafted by:

FE:EA:CANorredJr:bhm 7/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Fearey  
Ambassador Brown (subst)

AID:FE:EA-Ives

S/S - Miss Moor  
White House - Mr. KomerREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President hopes that delays will not continue, fearing that Korea's diplomatic and economic prospects and the Free World position in Asia will deteriorate unless this normalization is soon achieved. The United States Government is prepared publicly to support such a settlement, and to make clear that it will not affect the basic United States policies of economic assistance to Korea. In fact, such a settlement would make United States assistance more fruitful, for it would be working in a stronger and more broadly based economy.

It is because the President holds these views strongly that he authorized me to stress United States support of a Korea-Japan rapprochement in my public statement on arrival. END VERBATIM TEXT.

GP-3.

RUSK

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT/  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

15808

*Korea*

57

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PHNOM PENH 61

FE

INFO: " SEOUL 73

Info:

USUN New York 231

JUL 28 5 31 PM '64

SS

SVN

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CIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

Embtel 40 info Seoul 2.

Department concurs your recommendation make written protest to RKG keyed to UN actions on Korean issue and known RKG prohibition polemical material. Suggest Embassy Note draw upon following points at your discretion:

1. Aggression. UN Commission on Korea reported to UN SYG June 26, 1950 that North Korean invasion ROK was "calculated coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy." Next day UN SC adopted resolution stating "armed attack upon ROK by forces from North Korea constitutes breach of peace...recommends UN Members furnish such assistance to ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in area." October 7, 1950, UNGA Resolution established UNCURK and noted "an attempt has been made by armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Gov ROK." February 1, 1951, UNGA adopted Resolution stating in part "by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against UN forces there, Communist China has itself engaged in aggression in Korea."

2. Armistice was not a defeat; UN forces repulsed ~~and~~ unprovoked aggression of North Korea. Sixteen countries participated in Korean

Drafted by: FE:EA:CLSterner/

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:SEA:TJHirschfeld/IO:UNP:JWKimball

Classification approved by:

SEA - William C. Trueheart

Clearances:

FE/UN - Miss McNutt (draft)

FE - Mr. Green

IO:UNP - Mr. Moffitt (draft)

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15846

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conflict, answering UN call for assistance after NK refused abide by UN demand for withdrawal. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and UK can hardly be termed puppets of US.

3. Bacteriological warfare. UNGA Resolution April 23, 1953 (adopted 51-5-4) requested "governments and authorities concerned" to permit a 5-nation UN Commission to travel freely to areas of North and South Korea, Chinese mainland, and Japan... and to give Commission free access to "such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary...". On July 28, UNGA President reported that US, ROK, and Japan had accepted proposal; neither North Korea nor Communist China had replied. April 23 UNGA Resolution also noted that North Korea had refused an offer by the ICRC to conduct investigation of the germ warfare charges.

4. UN forces (including ROK military and civilian) suffered over one million casualties, US figure 136,000 (30,000 killed); bulk of casualties (nearly one million) suffered by ROK. We estimate 1,420,000 Communist casualties during conflict.

5. US fully supports UNGA Resolution adopted 18th GA December 13, 1963 (65-11-24) which "1) reaffirms that objectives UN in Korea are to bring about, by peaceful means, establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area; 2) calls upon the North Korean authorities to accept those established UN objectives which have been repeatedly affirmed by the GA; 3) urges that continuing efforts be made to achieve those objectives."

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6. Although Cambodia has abstained since 1957 on annual UN Resolution on "Korean question", Cambodia in 1956 voted in favor of Resolution calling for Korea-wide elections under UN supervision. Also, Cambodia provided food during 1951-52 as part of UN Emergency Relief Program.

Delivery of Note should be coordinated with prospective ROK approach but not repeat not dependent on ROK action. Note should contain request that Press Bulletin publish text your protest in light of "known Cambodian policy of neutrality."

END

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

02042

112

Korea

~~SECRET~~

55

Origin  
SVN

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL 12

JUL 3 5 17 PM '64

Info:

SS

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 33  
CINCPAC

G

SP

REF: Seoul's 1748

L

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USIA

NSC

INR

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OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-166

By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

076

We suggest that you give following explanation to Korean officials as to why we do not consider Korean combat units appropriate in Viet Nam at this time:

Struggle against Viet Cong is a guerrilla war in which enemy is elusive and difficult to find and fix. He seeks to attack by surprise and to choose those situations where his forces far outnumber forces of government. He does not ordinarily stand to fight when confronted by forces of government of Viet Nam in strength. When being pursued he often melds into population. Under such circumstances it is difficult even for forces of Vietnamese Government with their knowledge of language and customs to distinguish foe from local populace and it would be virtually impossible for foreign troops no matter what their source to make this distinction. Koreans should understand this very well as result

Drafted by:

S/VN: JAMendenhall:mda 7/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/VN - Mr. Mendenhall

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Norred

DOD - Lt. Col. Miller

FE - Mr. Green

JCS - Col. Brownfield

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

result of their own successful guerrilla campaign before Korean War.

US itself has not been asked by GVN to ~~xx~~ introduce combat ground force units into Viet Nam. We would not consider it appropriate or suitable under current circumstances of guerrilla warfare to put fighting ground force troops into this situation. Similarly we do not see any suitable role at this time for ground units from Korea or other third country sources.

We continue however to believe that Korean Special Forces personnel could play very useful role as advisers and trainers. They would be functioning in capacity similar to that of American and Australian advisers and training personnel. They would be subject to same dangers as our personnel and could make military contribution to struggle in Viet Nam. We would therefore hope that Korean Government in military aspects of its aid to Viet Nam could place focus at this juncture on supplying Special Forces personnel for purposes indicated. We pleased GVN and ROK also considering possible use Korean Air Force personnel, field hospital and Karate instructors.

~~Assume Saigon replying to the balance of the first part of ROK request to ROK for assistance~~

~~request to ROK for assistance~~

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



CIA CABLES

113

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY SOUTH KOREA/JAPAN

DATE OF INFO. 17-18 SEPTEMBER 1964

DISTR. 19 SEPTEMBER 1964

SUBJECT

ROK GOVERNMENT ORDERS FOR LARGE-SCALE SEIZURE OF  
JAPANESE FISHING BOATS IN KOREAN WATERS

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ.

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL:

REF

IN 77300

1. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PRESIDENT PAK  
CHONG-HUI ON 17 SEPTEMBER ORDERED  
[REDACTED]  
LARGE-SCALE SEIZURE OF JAPANESE FISHING BOATS POACHING IN KOREAN  
WATERS IN JOINT OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE.  
THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS IS TO TAKE THE LEADING ROLE IN  
THIS CAMPAIGN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVE IS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCK ORR OO EXO  
AD/CI 2

SANITIZED  
Authority RAC-NLS ODI-254-4-4  
By ilo, NARA, Date 3-22-02



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
TO DEMONSTRATE THE ROK GOVERNMENT'S STRONG POSITION TOWARD  
THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE ON A 20 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN.

1.3.(a)  
C (4)  
2. [REDACTED] PRESS ANNOUNCED ON 18 SEPT  
HOME MINISTER YANG WAS IN PUSAN TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION OF THE  
PEACE LINE.)

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

[REDACTED]  
(END OF MESSAGE)  
[REDACTED]