

Memos & Misc



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

August 20, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

*Called Jan
8/26/65*

Subject: Letter to the President from the
Korean Christian Ministers'
Committee

Enclosed is an airgram from our Embassy in Seoul which transmits a letter to the President from the Korean Christian Ministers' Committee expressing concern over the recent ratification of the Korea-Japan normalization agreements. At the time of delivery, our Embassy thanked the messenger and stated that his letter would receive due consideration.

Since the Embassy has already orally acknowledged receipt of the letter and the United States' support of Korea-Japan normalization is well known in Korea, the Department believes no reply is necessary.

[Signature]
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Airgram from Embassy
Seoul.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

AIRGRAM

POL JAPAN-KORS

FOR RM USE ONLY DOD

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RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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A-54
NO.

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TO : Department of State

INFO : AmEmbassy TOKYO

FROM : AmEmbassy SEOUL

SUBJECT : Korean Christians' Concern over Normalization of Relations with Japan

REF :

Action assigned to RM

Action Taken AM 8 59

Date of Action _____

Action Office Symbol _____

DATE: August 13, 1965

Name of Officer _____

Direction to _____

HANDLING INDICATOR

1. On August 6 Rev. KANG Se-myong, also known as Simeon C. KANG, called at the Embassy to present a letter addressed to President Johnson from the Christian Ministers' Committee on Behalf of the Nation, signed by Rev. HAN Kyong-chik, Chairman, and Kang as Secretary General. A copy of the letter is enclosed. The letter is moderate in tone and expresses the concern of Korean Christians over the pending normalization of ROK-Japan relations. Kang was thanked for delivering the letter and was told it would be given due consideration.

2. In an extended conversation, the heart of Rev. Kang's opposition to normalization appeared to be that he fears the good faith of his own government and its ability to protect Korea from Japanese economic, cultural and political encroachment, and he fears that Japan has not changed its colonial aspirations. Kang does not believe that Japanese Foreign Minister SHIINA made the apologetic remarks attributed to him upon arrival in Korea, quoting different versions of the remarks which appeared in the Japanese press as an example.

3. Kang emphasized that the Christian ministers do not wish to push their protest movement beyond constitutional limits. They have vigorously rejected suggestions from the political opposition and church-affiliated youth groups to mount street demonstrations. Kang expressed personal respect for President PAK and recognized substantial progress which had been made by the Pak regime, but expressed fear that Pak, like President RHEE, was being cut off from the people by those who surround him.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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In Out

FORM 4-62 05-323

Drafted by:

POL: DCAdams:moc

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL: RMHerndon RMH

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
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GROUP 3-Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

NLJ 92-166

By fw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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Encl. 1
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To the President of the United States of America

Mr. President:

We understand that your government wishes to see the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. We also, as Korean Christians, earnestly wish for a spirit of goodwill and peace between the two nations. However, we hope that you will also understand the concern of the Korean people lest their renewed history should once again succumb to Japanese domination in the name of goodwill. We are compelled to recognize that the terms of the proposed treaty with Japan show unmistakable signs of a new attitude of domination on the part of Japan, and that the people of Korea are reacting against the treaty with an attitude of determined opposition.

For the sake of unity and peace we ask first of all that the stronger nation should renounce its domineering attitude towards the weaker. Japan should first of all admit her crimes against Korea during half a century of invasion and aggression and make due restitution and give comradely assistance.

Only thus can the fears of the Korean people be allayed and strong and true friendship established between the two countries. It is especially to wipe out the memory of Japan's cultural invasion of Korea, in which nationalism masqueraded under the forms of religion, an experience which has left a lasting bitterness.

Although the doors are not yet officially open, already Japanese cultural invasion in the form of such deceptive faiths as Sokka Gakkai and Tenrikyo has begun in Korea. The people of Korea naturally fear that this is the prelude to economic, military and political domination in the near future.

Therefore until normal relations can be established by the radical reformation of the Japanese attitude, it is matter of anxiety lest they may in fact worsen and also our friendship with the American people be impaired.

We Korean Christians, sincerely hoping that the new life which our nation has been enjoying and developing since the war, especially in our firm stand against communism, will not be turned to tragedy, address you in the belief that this letter may be of some assistance to you in forming your policies with regard to Korea and Japan.

1 August 1965

The Christian Ministers' Committee
on behalf of the Nation

/s/ Simeon C. Kang
Rev. Simeon C. Kang, D. D.
General Secretary of the Committee

/s/ Kyung Chik Han, D.D.
Rev. Kyung Chik Han, D.D.
Chairman of the Committee

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
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Seoul's A- 54

4. Kang and other religious leaders are being met almost daily by ROK CIA officials who try to persuade them to drop their protest movement. These officials have not satisfactorily answered the questions about normalization that have been posed to them. Kang says that if the ROK Government has a good case for normalization, they have failed to explain it well. All the Christian pastors want is to have their doubts set at rest or taken into account by the Government. The pastors also recognize the need for normalization but object to the lack of safeguards and excessive concessions in the present agreement.

5. Kang expressed fear that the Sokka Gakkai and Tenrikyo religions were a form of cultural penetration perpetrated by the Japanese, a form of neo-Shintoism. He criticized the Government for attacking the religions as religions, and concurred with the court decision not to outlaw them, realizing that religious suppression could be extended to other religious groups as well. The Government should have limited its attack to the cultural aspects of the religions only. Kang claimed that each Sokka Gakkai "missionary" has 500,000 won a month to spend and pays 3,500 won for each convert, and that this accounts for the religion's rapid growth and potential danger.

For the Ambassador:


Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy for
Political Affairs


Enclosure:

Letter to the President from
the Christian Ministers'
Committee on Behalf of the
Nation.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File 117
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August 11, 1965

MR. BUNDY

Mac:

Attached for your information
is a copy of my report to the
President on the Korean trip.

Don Hornig

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

**Regarding the Feasibility of Establishing in
Korea With U. S. Cooperation an Institute
for Industrial Technology and Applied Science**

by

**Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant
for Science and Technology, and the Group
that accompanied him to Korea July 8 - 15
1965**

Submitted August 4, 1965

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Regarding the Feasibility of Establishing in Korea With U. S. Cooperation an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Regarding the Feasibility of Establishing in Korea With U. S. Cooperation an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science

SUMMARY

1. Following up your offer to President Park to have me look into the possibility of establishing in Korea with U. S. cooperation an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science, I assembled an advisory group which included Dr. James E. Fisk, President of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, which many consider to be the best research and development laboratory in the United States, Dr. B. D. Thomas, President of the Battelle Memorial Institute, a distinguished laboratory which provides research services on a contract basis to industry, primarily in the United States and Europe, and Dr. Albert H. Moseman, Director, Agricultural Sciences, The Rockefeller Foundation, whom you have just appointed to be Assistant Administrator for Technical Cooperation of the Agency for International Development. We were in Korea from July 8 to July 15, and in a closely packed schedule conferred with top Government officials, key industrialists, scientists, and educators, and visited laboratories in universities, industrial plants, and governmental and private research establishments.

2. The Proposal for Establishing an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science was enthusiastically received in Korea. Our Mission was warmly greeted and received widespread coverage in the press and on television. The Koreans are convinced that increased attention should be devoted to science and technology and are grateful to you for focusing interest on the problem.

3. The proposal is timely with respect to the prospects for rapid growth of Korean industry. Korean exports have risen from \$20 millions in 1959 to \$119 millions in 1964 and are still rising strongly. Additional funds for capital investment will become available when the normalization agreement with Japan enters into effect. A new generation of Korean industries is being born to which the proposed Institute could make a substantial contribution.

4. We found that there were encouraging examples in Korea of modern industry and of laboratories operated on modern principles that can serve as models for future development. We found no existing Korean institutions within government or industry that could provide, either by themselves or in combination with each other, all of the needed services.

5. There is a shortage of highly trained technical leadership in the universities and in the existing industrial and agricultural research institutions. The pool of available Ph. D. s in science in Korea from which leadership for the proposed Institute might be selected is estimated to range from 50 to 75. However, we found evidence that under inspired leadership and with increased salaries (\$150 per month for a science Ph. D. as compared with the \$75 per month paid to such scientists by the Korean Government under normal civil service pay ceilings) certain institutions were successful in recruiting able, patriotic and idealistic young Korean scientists trained in the United States. This points to the possibility of the growth of the proposed Institute beyond the limitations imposed by the inadequate supply of highly trained people currently residing in Korea.

6. Our group finds that the possibility does exist of creating an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science under able leadership, along the lines spelled out in the body of this report, which could realize the high objectives envisaged by you and President Park. We are optimistic that the Institute will take root and serve as a symbol for the world of Korean advance in modern science and industrial technology.

7. The group believes that the Institute may also serve as a model for other countries in providing a foundation for the adaptation of modern industrial technology to the needs of a developing country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that

1. You go forward with your proposal to establish an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science in Korea with U. S. Government cooperation and support:
2. You assign responsibility to AID in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology for assisting Korea in establishing as promptly as possible the Institute along the lines proposed in this Report; and
3. You request AID promptly to enter into a preliminary contract with an American technical organization, as identified in the Report, for the purpose of assisting in the early organization of the Institute and proposing the terms and scope of U. S. and Korean support.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Regarding the Feasibility of Establishing in Korea with U. S. Cooperation an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science

I. Visit to Korea July 8 - July 15

A. Purpose of Visit

The possibilities for United States cooperation in establishing in Korea an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science were discussed with President Park of Korea during the course of his visit last May. It was your thought that such an Institute could provide technical services and research for developing Korean industry as well as afford advanced Korean specialists trained in the United States opportunities to put their training to use. President Park welcomed your offer to send me to Korea to confer with industrial, scientific and education leaders in order to explore the possibilities for further action.

B. Members of Group

I assembled the following eminent experts to accompany me to Korea:

Dr. James B. Fisk, President
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Murray Hill, New Jersey

Dr. Albert H. Moseman, Director
Agricultural Sciences
The Rockefeller Foundation
New York City

and Dr. B. D. Thomas, President
The Battelle Memorial Institute
Columbus, Ohio.

Additional members of the group were my wife, Dr. Lilli Hornig, a chemist, of Trinity College, Washington, D. C., and Mr. Daniel F. Margolies, a Foreign Service Officer presently on my staff.

C. Schedule

We arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of July 8 and departed on the afternoon of July 15. Our closely packed schedule provided us with an opportunity to confer with leaders of the national and local governments, industrialists, scientists and

educators, and to visit laboratories in industrial plants, in universities and in government and private research institutions, in the neighborhood of the capital city Seoul, and in the industrial centers of Inchon, Suwon, Taegu, and Pusan.

Our schedule was briefly as follows:

July 9

AM Meeting with Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, USOM Director Joel Bernstein, and members of their staffs.

Noon Luncheon at Korean Chamber of Commerce at which I delivered an address on "The Needs and Possibilities in Korea for Advanced Technical Development"

PM TV interview at Dong Yang TV
Further conferences at the Embassy

July 10

AM Meetings with
(1) The Prime Minister
(2) The Deputy Prime Minister
(3) The Economic Planning Board
(4) President Park, Chung Hee

Noon Luncheon at the Blue House with President and Mme. Park

July 10 (continued)

- PM (1) Visit to Suwon by Dr. and Mrs. Hornig and Dr. Moseman (including visit to the Agricultural Research Institute and its Laboratories)
- (2) Visit to Inchon by Messrs. Fisk, Thomas, and Margolies (including visits to steel plant and electrical machinery plant)
- Evening Reception to meet Prominent Korean Industrial, Educational and Civic Leaders

July 11

- AM Briefing by General Yarborough
Trip to Panmunjon
- PM Meeting with Mr. B. C. Lee, Korean industrialist
Meeting with Sogang University President and members of Science Faculty
- Evening Dinner by the Economic and Scientific Council

July 12

- AM National Industrial Research Institute
- Luncheon Korean Government and Education Leaders
- PM Seoul National University (College of Engineering)
Atomic Energy Research Institute
- Dinner Korean Ministers and officials

July 13

- All Day (1) Visit to Taegu (Drs. Hornig, Fisk, and Thomas and Mr. Margolies)
Aluminum plant
Woolen Mill
Lace Factory
Kyong-Pook provincial laboratory (government)
Kyong-Pook University
Kyong-Pook University Industrial Research Institute
- (2) Visit to Pusan (Dr. Lilli Hornig and Dr. A. H. Moseman)
Fisheries Research
Fisheries Market
Vegetable Production
Agriculture Marketing Center
Sulfuric Acid Plant
Electrical Equipment and Appliances Plant
Plastics Manufacturing
Plywood Factory
Pottery Plant

July 14

- AM: Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy
- Noon Luncheon with Korean Government and Business Leaders
- PM Meeting with Minister of Education and his Advisory Council
- Evening Dinner by Deputy Prime Minister

July 15

AM Meeting with Ambassador Brown and
USOM Director Bernstein
Meeting with Economic Planning Board
Meeting with President Park
Press Conference

2:00 PM Departure

II. Timeliness of Proposal

A. Interest on part of Koreans

The group was impressed by the timeliness of the proposal for establishing an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science in Korea. This was reflected in the intense interest which the proposal aroused on the part of Korean Government, business, and education leaders, and in the front page coverage accorded to the group by the Korean press during its visit. The Korean Government had devoted much effort to preparing plans for establishing an Institute which were presented to the group on its arrival. In addition, a ferment of activity had developed within universities and research establishments to outline programs, many of them objective and without

seeking to advance special interests, for the guidance of the group. Indeed, one of the useful by-products of the visit was the stimulus which it applied to the Koreans themselves to assess their level of scientific and technological progress and to devise means for moving ahead in these areas.

E. Korean Industry Today

There are grounds for believing that Korean industry is on the brink of a "take-off" which will lead the country to a healthy and rapid rate of economic growth. This was the conclusion stated by W. W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, in his speech at Seoul National University on May 3, in which he ably summarizes the factors justifying this optimistic view. In fact, exports of non-traditional products have already been rising sharply in recent years, from around \$20 million in 1959 to \$119 million in 1964, showing the fruits of substantial U. S. assistance in improving roads, harbors, electric power, and other components of the infrastructure of the economy, together with the benefits resulting from courageous self-help measures in raising government revenues and in curbing inflation. Liberal legislation to

attract private foreign capital has been adopted. The prospect for rapid capital formation is further enhanced by the recent signing of the normalization agreement with Japan, which among other benefits will, when in effect, afford investment funds of about \$80 million per year for a period of ten years. Given reasonable political and financial stability Korea should be able over the years immediately ahead to earn the foreign exchange needed for full-scale industrialization. To be sure, closing the gap between imports and exports, which in 1964 amounted to \$286 million, will require not only the expansion of existing productive facilities but the formation of new plants and factories at a rapid rate. The provision of an adequate technological base for the development of a new generation of Korean industrial plants is therefore an urgent task.

The spectrum of Korean industry ranges from very primitive to advanced, with relatively little in the latter category. On the other hand, we observed an evident and widespread determination

to modernize and develop Korean industry. The group visited a few industrial operations which were not only up-to-date, but as modern as anything of their kind anywhere. These demonstrate that under good leadership and with foreign assistance industrial plants embodying the latest in modern technological practices can be successfully set up in Korea. What is lacking at present is the indigenous capability to do more than copy - to adapt and develop healthy industries that can grow and compete in world markets.

C. Korean Science and Technology Today

The group was impressed by the quality of many Korean scientists and the possibility of further technical progress. The group also visited certain laboratories which are well organized and well operated.

However, it was apparent that no existing institution or combination of institutions could serve the purpose envisaged. However, we did find two laboratories which could serve as a nucleus around which to build.

Science and technology activities within the Government are carried on by a variety of ministries and agencies including the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, Education, Agriculture-Forestry, Commerce and Industry, National Defense, Construction, Transportation, Communications, and Public Health, and the Office of Atomic Energy. There are a total of 86 identifiable organizations for scientific and technical activities in Korea, 58 of which are directly operated or supported by national or provincial governments. The remaining 28 comprise mainly college and university laboratories, plus a few attached to government-owned or private enterprises. These facts identify the government as the major source of support for science.

The total funds expended on these institutions in 1964 amounted to approximately the equivalent of \$4.5 million, 83.3% of which went to public institutions. Most of these funds were used for administration, including maintenance. In the words of the

report of the Economic Planning Board prepared for the group, "The fact of the matter is that most of the so-called scientific and technical institutes in Korea are relatively insignificant laboratories which deal merely with testing, inspecting or analyzing as a part of the carrying out of administrative services by the government and its agencies. Basic, applied, or development research activities are negligible in Korea."

It is true that with the possible exception of the AERI none of the existing facilities is adequately housed or equipped. The limiting factor in performance, however, seemed to be not these physical deficiencies but rather the shortage of qualified scientists and scientific managers. This lack of technical leadership leads directly to one of the striking weaknesses - the absence of efforts to invent, construct, and service apparatus and equipment locally if the ready-made version is not available, and to train technicians and machinists for these purposes.

Government laboratories appeared to be seriously handicapped by the application of civil service salary ceilings and by

personnel recruitment and promotion policies, procurement restrictions, and uncertain budgetary support. The National Institute of Industrial Research was found to be performing useful and important functions as a testing and quality control institution, being capably guided in this direction by Mr. Niels Beck of USOM, but it cannot provide the base for the proposed new Institute.

The pool of available Ph. D. s in science in Korea from which a nucleus of capable scientists for the proposed Institute might be selected is estimated to range from 50 to 75. In contrast, several times as many live and work in the United States.

It is apparent that the shortage of highly qualified scientists in Korea is not due to a lack of native ability on the part of the Korean population. On the contrary, able, hardworking and talented Korean students are educated in great numbers and at considerable sacrifice each year. In the science fields, many of the ablest Koreans have pursued their advanced training abroad and have not returned to Korea because of a lack of suitable opportunities. Many of them might be induced to return by a

combination of factors including adequate salaries and facilities, and if possible some modification of the requirement for three years of military service.

We encountered several examples of the reverse of this "brain drain", where capable, patriotic, and idealistic young Korean scientists trained in the United States and Japan were brought back to accept employment in Korean institutions.

This occurred in connection with the staffing of the Atomic Energy Research Institute and of the Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy. These two institutions, both organized and inspired by the same man, Dr. Choi Hyung Sup, displayed seeds of excellence. Dr. Choi, who received his doctorate at the University of Minnesota, possesses genuine talent for leadership. He has enlisted able scientists and engineers; he has worked out effective personnel and salary practices; he has established close relations with industry and universities; and he has shown a talent for selecting research and development problems, interesting technically and significant in the Korean economy.

In both instances, a combination of inspired leadership and moderate salary inducements (\$150 per month for a scientist with a Ph. D. degree as compared with the normal top salary for scientists in government agencies of \$75 per month) sufficed to attract twelve highly trained Korean scientists from abroad to the Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (a private organization) and six to the Atomic Energy Research Institute. Sogang College, following a similar salary practice, has recently succeeded in bringing back six highly trained Korean scientists from abroad to join its science faculty, although the college still has only temporary laboratory facilities.

The high staff morale and sound achievements at all three of these places afford proof that such institutions can flourish in Korea on a basis of realistic planning for step-by-step development and can be productive even in their early stages.

The Atomic Energy Research Institute has also benefited from a "sister laboratory" arrangement developed with the Argonne National Laboratory under which it obtains assistance in overcoming minor bottlenecks in equipment and also counsel

and guidance in planning its programs. The scientists at AERI laid heavy emphasis on the importance of the intangible benefits derived from this relationship, which gives them moral support derived from a sympathetic interest in their work on the part of an internationally known body of scientists and satisfaction from a shared excitement in the results of research in this advanced area of science. On the other hand, the recent failure of the Korean Government to maintain an adequate salary policy has adversely affected morale in the Institute and has led to one or two resignations on the part of staff members who accepted positions abroad.

The experience of these institutions is an encouraging demonstration that under favorable circumstances foreign trained Korean scientists can be attracted back to Korea, and points to the possibility of the growth of the proposed Institute beyond the limitations imposed by the inadequate pool of highly trained scientists currently residing in Korea.

It is apparent that an Institute capable of attracting and holding talented, highly trained engineers and scientists must have freedom from existing civil service salary and personnel practices, procurement procedures, and budgetary uncertainties. In addition, the work of the Institute must be significant, guided by an inspired leadership, and sustained by a close association with a highly qualified American technical institution.

The group was of the opinion that under proper leadership and with the ingredients listed above the possibility does exist of creating an Institute which could achieve the objectives outlined by you to President Park last May.

III. Science and Technology in an Industrial Economy

In my discussions with President Park, we touched on the dominant force which science has exerted on our lives in modern times and on the vital role which science and technology play in shaping the development of modern nations. We noted that a society which is entirely dependent on foreign technology and technicians cannot realize its full potential and cannot be truly free and independent until it can participate itself in creating the technology it needs.

Granted the central importance of science and technology to industrial development, a nation must decide not only how much of its resources it can afford to devote to research and technological development but also how to allocate its support between these two areas. It is important to recognize (a) that even in the most advanced countries "pure" research utilizes only a small percentage of the total scientific expenditures, and (b) that applied research and technological development often require more ingenuity, imagination, and creativity than basic research.

Our own experience has shown clearly that technological processes and improvements, both in industry and agriculture, can seldom be transferred as a package, either within our own industrial structure or from it to the developing countries. They must be adjusted and adapted to the new environment and its human and material resources. This transfer, to be successful and enduring, must be made to a community that has achieved a technological level within reach of the technology offered and which is making its own contribution to the common understanding of the problems involved. There is a wealth of scientific and technological "know-how" in the rest of the world which can be drawn upon and adapted to the solution of Korean problems, provided that there are in Korea people whose knowledge and experience enable them to take an active part in this process. In order to take from the world, Korean engineers and scientists must contribute to it as well.

This point was made to me by a leading Korean industrialist who expressed his support for the proposal to establish the Institute. He said that although he had built the finest plant which

he could purchase with the aid of foreign know-how, he was concerned with his ability in a period of rapid technological change to keep abreast of new developments and to maintain his competitive position. He also noted the availability of foreign capital for new investments in Korea, and said that the Korean Government and Korean industry needed sound advice based on an understanding of local factors as well as of world market conditions to direct its investments in new plants prudently. He mentioned idle factories standing in the neighborhood of Seoul which were monuments to bad investments. We were in agreement that the new Institute had an important role to play in both these areas and that the Institute should be closely geared to the requirements of Korea's expanding industrial sector.

I reported to President Park that I was optimistic about the prospects of the Institute taking root and serving as a symbol for the world of Korean advance in modern science and technology. We were in agreement that the contributions which the Institute could make would be essential to the long-run development of Korea and be a vital factor in the fulfillment of Korea's national future.

IV. Principles to be Followed in Establishing the new Institute

A. Korean Proposals

As I mentioned above, the group was presented with advice from many sources regarding the establishment of a new Institute. The Economic Planning Board, in particular, had prepared a careful and wide-ranging proposal in which it had recognized the need for establishing the Institute as an independent non-profit organization. The Board further elaborated an organizational chart and budget designed to support activities by the Institute in a wide range of scientific pursuits.

There was an awareness of the danger of creating an institution which would become a monument to mediocrity and bureaucracy and of the importance of selecting the leadership of the new organization with care. Concern was also expressed that hasty and careless recruitment on the part of the new Institute

would strip the universities of the scarce supply of highly trained scientists on their faculties and would jeopardize scientific training in the universities.

In our discussions with the Economic Planning Board, I emphasized the importance of grounding the Institute solidly at its beginning. I explained the need to define its purposes clearly and to find dedicated leaders who are prepared to devote many years of their energy to making it serve the progress of Korea. I explained that an institution does not consist of buildings, elaborate equipment, and a formal organization. It is a living organism which like a tree must take root and grow on Korean soil and be nurtured by Korean gardeners if it is to become strong and vital. I stated that it must somehow, of course, be made strong enough at its birth to attract the best in Korean young men and perform some services effectively from the outset.

This idea met with some disappointment at our unwillingness to identify without delay the order of magnitude of the investment to be made in the Institute and the shape of its budget.

I insisted on the principle, however, that the aim of the Institute should be excellence by world standards in everything it undertakes. I proposed that it be developed progressively as fast as key scientific leadership for each of its central tasks can be identified and suitable technical staff assembled. The growth rate of the Institute should be limited only by the availability of talented and properly motivated personnel.

B. Characteristics of the Institute

We believe the Institute should be organized along the following lines:

(1) It should be grounded on secure financial support derived from Korean Government and private industrial sources as well as from the United States Government. These arrangements should not preclude support from other sources.

(2) It should be an independent, non-profit organization that will provide requisite latitude for a dedicated professional leadership and for flexibility in staffing and budget sufficient to attract and retain the best Korean scientists and engineers.

(3) It should interact closely with Korean industries and should improve their efficiency and the utilization of Korean resources. It should provide a foundation for new industrial activities. This implies:

(a) Knowing what the problems of Korean industry are;

(b) Knowing enough about technology and economics to make sensible choices in planning programs;

(c) Establishing and maintaining management and working arrangements with industry to insure (a) above and to insure that new findings are put to use promptly.

(4) It should be related intimately to the universities and should make use of university facilities and university faculties and students in its programs.

(5) The Institute should have a first-class scientific and technical library, and provide information services.

The group feels that highly competent technical leadership is essential to the success of the Institute. We feel sure that such leadership can be found since we met at least one man in whom we would have complete confidence.

An attractive concept is that of building the new Institute around the Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy and the Atomic Energy Research Institute. The former organization has plans under way to move its facilities to land adjacent to the

Atomic Energy Research Institute which is located near the College of Engineering of the Seoul National University. This concentration of local talent suggests that the new Institute be located in the same area. They would provide a nucleus for the new Institute, and it would profit from the tradition of high standards built up and maintained in these institutions. It is not clear whether the institutions would be prepared to merge themselves with the new Institute nor whether the legal complications involved could be easily resolved. The feasibility of this suggestion must await exploration by the preparatory groups.

C. Cooperative Arrangement with American Technical Organization

A cooperative arrangement should be worked out with a highly qualified American technical organization in order to enable the Institute to get off to a rapid start. Initial elements of the Institute should be in being, if at all possible, within twelve months, and growth thereafter should take place as rapidly as qualified talent for the selected tasks can be found.

Prompt steps should be taken to arrange a preliminary contract with one of the following institutions:

Battelle Memorial Institute

A. D. Little, Inc.

Stanford Research Institute

in order to work with the Korean Government Preparatory Committee (already appointed) in organizing the new Institute, recruiting its key management, and in planning its program. It is desirable that the organization selected agree to send a small group of qualified experts to Seoul before September 1 to carry on discussions with the Korean Preparatory Committee. A contract embodying broader relations between the American organization and the new Institute should be arranged after the Institute has been created.

D. Prototype for Other Areas

The group believes that the new Institute might well serve as a prototype for institution building as part of the developmental programs for other newly developing countries.

V. Gift to President Park

On July 15, during the course of my last interview with President Park, I offered him in your name a set of standard weights and measures, designed and produced by the National Bureau of Standards, to be delivered to the new Institute at such time as suitable housing for the delicate equipment is available. The full set costs approximately \$60,000 including the cost of installation. As a token of the gift, I presented President Park with a handsome box containing standard weights which had been prepared by the Bureau of Standards. President Park expressed gratitude to you for the gift, and for the visit of our group. He assured me that the initiative you had taken with respect to the Institute would be strongly supported in Korea.

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Ambassador Kim of Korea come in today, primarily to discuss the Vietnam situation.

He was pleased with the President's speech, but two matters seemed to be troubling him:

The first one was the matter of "free elections", especially as they might take place in the North (I stressed that the President stated that the elections should be held under international supervision and that I doubted that the DRV would subscribe to this). Kim was obviously worried about precedents and parallels in connection with his own country.

The second matter was in connection with Chinese Nationalist troops. He said that the President tended to "by-pass" the question. (I told him that a request for Chinese Nationalist troops was not presently contemplated, but was unable to predict what would happen in the future).

I reviewed the situation in Vietnam as I saw it. I pointed out that while it had deteriorated over the past year, there were many indications that the VC was having serious problems of its own, and that in my own view its timetable had been badly upset by the display of our determination and force.

The Ambassador said he had been instructed by President Park to "take a sounding" about the Vice President visiting Korea on October 1 (Korean Armed Forces Day), together with a few Senators and a couple of Congressmen. I told him I would take such soundings, but pointed out that it would be difficult for the Vice President to visit Korea only, once he was out in the Far East. Such a trip would involve more than the few days in Seoul. Consequently, even though Congress might be out of session, it was a matter that would take careful consideration by the President and Vice President. I promised Kim that I would give him a tentative reading on this possibility some time during the course of the next week.

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-2-

I asked the Ambassador when he thought the ROK division would clear through the Assembly. He felt it would be a matter of another two weeks. He asked whether we expected more than one division and how soon we wanted the troops. I told him that with respect to the former, he should ask DOD; with respect to the latter, the sooner the better.

He concluded the session by saying that if there was anything else we wanted from his government, we need "but ask".


Chester L. Cooper

cc: William Bundy

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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July 19, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: . Transportation to Korea for
Body of Syngman Rhee and Party

The Korean Government has requested that the United States provide transportation from Honolulu to Seoul for the remains of President Syngman Rhee. The Korean Consulate in Honolulu has indicated that the body would be accompanied by Mrs. Rhee, their adopted son, and one or more representatives of the Korean Government. Ambassador Brown in Seoul supports the Korean request.

Although Rhee has been a difficult and controversial figure, in view of his unique stature as a Korean leader and his close relationship with the United States in the past, we believe the request should be honored.

It is therefore requested that the Department of Defense be instructed to provide the necessary transportation on a non-reimbursable basis for President Rhee's body and the accompanying party.

Alexander Rattig for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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FE INFO: CINCPAC

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Info: CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SS
G The following messages were sent commercially by White House and
P Department:

USIA "Mrs. Syngman Rhee,
NSC Maunalani Hospital,
CPR 4113 Maunalani Circle,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

"Dear Mrs. Rhee:

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of your husband. His lifelong devotion to the cause of Korean independence and his invincible courage during the Korean War will be long remembered by the American people, who join me in this expression of sympathy and sorrow.

Lyndon B. Johnson "

"Mrs. Syngman Rhee,
Maunalani Hospital,
4113 Maunalani Circle,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

"Dear Mrs. Rhee:

deep
Please accept my ~~heartfelt~~ sympathy on the death of your husband. The many Americans who were inspired by the unflagging courage of Syngman Rhee during the Korean conflict join me in mourning the

Drafted by: *WLC*
FE/P:RAGaiduk:jm 7/19/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE/P:FP Loeckhart

Clearances:
P - Mr. Freeman *(initials)*
S/S - Mr. Rattray *(phone)*

EA - Mr. Fearay
White House - Mr. Thompson (substance)
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mourning the death of this brave leader.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk"

and
White House/~~and/or~~ Department do not plan release, but no objection
if ~~it~~ addressee wishes to do so.

END

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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88-81

Origin ACTION: Mrs. Syngman Rhee,
FE Maunalani Hospital,
Info: 4113 Maunalani Circle,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

JUL 19 7 27 PM '65

SS
G
P
USIA
NSC
CPR

Dear Mrs. Rhee:

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of your husband.
cause
His lifelong devotion to the /~~cause~~ of Korean independence and his
invincible courage during the Korean War will be long remembered by
the American people, who join me in this expression of sympathy and
sorrow.

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

Drafted by: *Walt*
FE:EA:RGaiduk:lga 8/19/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: FE - Mr. Berger

Clearances:
EA - Mr. Fearey
FE - Mr. Berger
P - Mr. Freeman (telephone)
O/CPR - Mr. Carter (substance)

S/S - Mr. ~~Ray~~ Rattray
White House - Mr. Thompson

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1- Thompson
2- Ret. 121

MAY 13 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Development Loan Commitment to Korea

Recommendation:

That you authorize announcement of the Development Loan commitment in the Joint Communique as outlined below.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Work is well advanced on the Communique for President Park's visit with you May 17-19. Both we and the Koreans hope that the visit will contribute significantly to the effort President Park must make on his return to secure public acceptance and legislative ratification for the Korea-Japan settlement. The settlement continues to meet strong opposition in Korea, where the Opposition parties charge that the U.S. favors a settlement primarily in order to shift its economic and security burdens in Korea to Japan.

Your authorization is requested to include in the Communique the statement that the U.S. Government plans, subject to applicable legislation and appropriations, to make available to the Republic of Korea over the next few years \$150 million in Development Loan funds for projects and programs agreed to by the U.S. Government under the terms of AID legislation and policies. It would also be announced that after the use of these funds, we anticipate making further development loan monies available. This commitment would form part of a public statement of our intention to continue various forms of assistance

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NJ 91-20

By mg NARA, Date 6-29-92

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- 2 -

to Korea, of which only the Development Loan portion would be quantified.

The \$150 million in Development Loans and the other planned assistance is no more than we plan to provide in any event over the next three fiscal years, but its announcement at this time may be crucial to the Korea-Japan settlement.

This request has the concurrence of AID Administrator Bell.

/s/ GEORGE W. BALL

Acting Secretary

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Mr. McGeorge
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM MOYERS
THE WHITE HOUSE

The enclosed memorandum concerning the Panmunjom talks on the Korean War was prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in response to your request to Under Secretary Ball last Saturday. In the Under Secretary's absence, I am sending it directly to you.

Please let us know if we can provide any further information on this matter.

GRANT G. HILLIKER
Benjamin H. Read

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN

1965 MAY 4 PM 1 02

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM : Mr. [Name]
Mr. [Name]

SUBJECT: [Subject]

[Text]

[Text]

[Text]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 4 1965

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

May 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Panmunjom in Retrospect

We have reviewed the Panmunjom talks on the Korean War for their possible relevance to problems we face elsewhere. Two aspects have particular interest: the question of a cease-fire during negotiations and the reasons for the Communists' final acceptance of our terms. While obviously not definitive in terms of historical research, our conclusions are offered below.

Cease-fire Or Continue Hostilities?

The Panmunjom talks between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Communists (North Korea and Communist China) lasted from October 25, 1951 to July 27, 1953, with a six-month hiatus in the winter of 1952-53. Reduced to its essentials, the prolonged deadlock resulted from a UNC assumption that greater concessions could be wrung out of the enemy side through continued military pressure while the enemy, in turn, assumed that wearing down the United Nations will to fight would eventually redound to Communist benefit.

At the outset, however, the Communists probably did not envisage continued hostilities lasting so long. They initially agreed to the talks on the assumption that the fixing of a demarcation line would be the first matter of business. This would secure a de facto cease-fire, relieving them from UNC air attacks. Then if the final settlement proved unattractive, the Communists could simply dig in on an improved defense line and count on a UNC reluctance to resume hostilities with leaving them in possession of North Korea.

This calculation misfired, but not until a one-month cease-fire, November 27-December 27, 1951, provided a sufficient respite to permit intensive tunneling of Communist lines roughly along the 38th parallel. While the respite did not prevent a resumption of UNC offensive action, it contributed to improved Communist defense capabilities against air and ground attack.

The United Nations Command hoped that air power could interdict all supply lines between the Yalu River and the 38th parallel. In addition, air raids levelled the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, destroyed strategic power installations serving Manchuria as well as North Korea, and hit virtually every military and industrial target in the country. Along the front UN artillery and aircraft attacked Communist positions whenever the

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NJ 92-166
By ju, NARA, Date 7-2-93

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- 2 -

opportunity permitted, although avoiding offensives that might prove costly in terms of casualties.

Once having dug in, the Communists resorted to ingenious ways of mobilizing manpower so as to frustrate UNC efforts to break their will. They travelled only at night. They dotted highways with revetments for quick truck dispersal. Damaged trucks and trains were left in view or even mocked up in dummy form to simulate destruction. Bridges contained "dropped spans" that could be photographed as "destroyed" by day and raised into place by night. Tracks were removed by day and replaced by night. Coolie labor forded streams, blasted tunnels and caves, and kept the front supplied throughout two winters of ceaseless air and naval bombardment.

Along the 38th parallel, small amounts of ground changed hands frequently but the overall line ran roughly the same after eighteen months of talk-fight as it had at the outset. Neither side succeeded in breaking through the trenches or tunnels of the opponent. Defenses in depth frustrated all spectacular efforts at decisive attack, whether by Communist manpower or United Nations air power.

Why Did The Communists Quit?

The military stalemate was probably as evident to the Communists in mid-1952 as it was in early 1953. If attrition did not lead them to compromise with UN terms then, why did they so move in 1953? Secretary of State Dulles believed, according to his account of the time, that indirect threat of recourse to nuclear weapons -- communicated in May principally to Peiping through Indian channels -- brought about this change. Yet the first signs of a change on the Communist side came in April, within weeks of Stalin's funeral. The Panmunjom talks which had been suspended for six months because of deadlock on the handling of prisoners of war resumed April 27 with token concessions from the Communists.

Thus if the Dulles threat of nuclear war affected Communist resolve it was in a different context, namely the threat raised by Syngman Rhee's defiance of Washington just when the Panmunjom talks seemed headed toward a settlement. Rhee's threat was twofold: to withdraw his forces from UN command and to release all anti-Communist prisoners of war unilaterally. It may well be that the threat of nuclear war stayed the Communist hand while Seoul and Washington wrangled and when Rhee actually released the POW's. It may also be that the nuclear threat made the Communists compromise more quickly and completely on the POW issue.

However, the critical element in bringing about the end of the talk-fight situation was probably Stalin's demise. The variables considered amongst the Communist powers go well beyond the range of this memorandum,

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but amongst them must have been the need of both Moscow and Peiping to reallocate resources from military to industrial development, the futility of persisting intransigently on the stalemated Korean front, the relative acceptability of UNC terms, the requirements and prospects of the Indochina War, and finally, North Korea's three years of aerial punishment.

Relevance For Vietnam?

Obviously comparisons between Korea and Vietnam are inviting, but they are also hazardous. In Korea, the Communists had bogged down in bloody stalemate which could only be broken at an incredible cost of Chinese manpower or the introduction of Soviet airpower. In Vietnam, the Communists have yet to experience a genuine stalemate nor have they exhausted their options of increased inputs at relatively low costs and risks. Moreover, the limited front in Korea juxtaposed conventional armies in direct confrontation while the absence of any definable front in Vietnam permits the enemy to disengage, regroup, and attack anew with relative impunity. His lines of communication remain invisible and his logistics requirements are light, especially when compared with the requirements of US-GVN forces scattered in isolated outposts throughout the countryside.

Yet two points of comparison may be pertinent. First, North Vietnam has yet to suffer the losses of North Korea, but should it so choose, it can count on its own experience in fighting the French and on the Chinese experience in Korea to keep supplies moving to South Vietnam by sheer ingenuity and manpower. Second, should the Viet Cong anticipate a prolonged seige, it may well use the respite from air attacks afforded by the rainy season (mid-May to mid-September) for extensive cave and tunnel development. This, together with the natural shelter afforded by jungle cover, would cut down its losses considerably throughout much of the central and interior provinces even should US-GVN air forces move to more intensive attacks next fall.

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1 - Cooper 3/26
2 - Ret.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

MAR 25 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation
between the President and
Korean Foreign Minister LEE

Enclosed for White House approval is a memorandum of conversation between the President and Korean Foreign Minister LEE.

The President's remarks are sidelined in blue.

Assistant Secretary Bundy has reviewed this memorandum of conversation.

/s/ Herbert Gordon

h
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

Korea
124

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Korean Fisheries Problem


The fisheries question lies at the heart of the Japan-Korea dispute.

In brief, the Koreans announced a "Peace Line" (formerly called the "Rhee Line") in the early years of the Occupation and have sought to enforce their exclusive fishing rights within these waters ever since. Since the line is arbitrarily drawn to include waters as much as 100 miles offshore, and since the Japanese are relentless fishers, violations have long been the rule. The Koreans attempt enforcement periodically by seizures of vessels and imprisonment of their crews. The last such vessels and crews were released in December in order to create a better atmosphere for the resumption of negotiations. (The Japanese have now taken to providing armed escorts for their fishermen.)

Since nearly 800,000 Koreans are partially dependent on fishing for their livelihood, Pak's Government, while understanding the absurdity of the Peace Line, faces an intense domestic uproar if it appears to yield too easily. The hope is (a) that the immediate financial advantages of a Japan-Korea settlement (some \$600 million in loans and grants from Japan) will offset any concessions on the Peace Line, and (b) that opposition elements can be kept under reasonably firm control.

The present negotiations in Tokyo -- which began December 3rd, recessed for the holidays, and are scheduled for re-opening January 18 -- are crawling toward the following possible solution: (a) a "6-and-6 formula", i. e. a 6-mile limit, with the next 6 miles subject to negotiation; and (b) in the guise of "conservation measures", an agreement by the Japanese to limit the number of their vessels and the amount of their take within the old area of the Peace Line. In addition, Sato has told Reischauer that Japan is considering a \$70-million allocation in "fishery cooperation" funds to ease the way for the Koreans.

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Authority NLS 001R-254-4-27
By 9, NARA, Date 2-3-12


James C. Thomson, Jr.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Korea that the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Office of the Chief of Protocol

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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October 16, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy at Seoul which states that the Government of Korea has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Korea to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador of Korea at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Korea of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hyon Chol Kim
 Newly Designated Ambassador Extraordinary and
 Plenipotentiary of Korea to the United States

Born in Seoul in 1901, Ambassador-designate Hyon Chol Kim graduated from an engineering college in 1923 and taught for three years in a missionary-operated girls' school in Korea before going to the United States to continue his education. He remained in the United States until 1953. During that time he attended Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Lynchburg University and American University, from which he earned a Doctor of Philosophy in economics in 1932. He then joined the "Korean Provisional Government" of Syngman Rhee in Washington, and worked during and after World War II for several United States Government agencies including the United States Board of Economic Warfare [redacted] He also worked for the Korean Embassy. (25X1)

Upon his return to Korea in late 1953, Dr. Kim rose rapidly in Rhee's administration. After serving in the Office of Planning and as Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry until 1955, he became the Minister of Reconstruction and later (from 1957 to 1959) the Minister of Finance. He was forced to resign because of his opposition to the use of government funds to support Rhee's Liberal Party. Following the overthrow of Rhee in April 1960, he ran as an Independent for the National Assembly in the July elections, but was defeated and later deprived by the military government of his civil rights for seven years.

In mid-1962 Dr. Kim again was considered for a high government post and, through the intercession of friends, was named first as Chairman of the Economic Planning Board and a month later as Prime Minister. It is said that Dr. Kim was selected on the basis of his pro-Western appeal stemming from his many years of residence in the United States and association with United States officials in his various positions. The

American Embassy

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Authority

NLJ.001.254.004/5

By jc

NARA, Date

5-22-07

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
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and declassification.

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- 2 -

American Embassy at Seoul comments "(Dr. Kim) is considered astute and intelligent, although colorless and undynamic. We believe as Prime Minister he tried within the limits placed by military junta to work on close and cooperative basis with U. S. Government. He should make a competent if unimposing representative."

25X6



At present, the Ambassador-designate lives with a Korean woman who is accepted as his wife and who, it is understood, will accompany him to Washington. He is a Methodist and a Rotarian; drinks only moderately but enjoys a party; and is known to his American associates as "Henry". He speaks fluent English and some French.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Bill: (Penny)

September 14, 1964

Since we've mounted quite an operation to stir up Win Brown and Reischauer (and through them the ROK and GOJ) to move toward an ROK/JAP settlement, I hope you'll keep the heat on during your trip. We over here are well aware of the obstacles, but a degree of hortatory overbidding from Washington seems indicated to counterbalance the natural caution of our reluctant dragons in the field.

The chief problem seems to be to get the ROKs to move. I'm coming around to view that we should increasingly tie any new aid, etc. (beyond normal carrying charges) to ROK self-help via a settlement. Only if ROKG comes to realize that we will no longer fill any gaps they can fill otherwise are we going to get them to bite the bullet.

RWK

cc: McGB

~~SECRET~~

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Authority MLJ001R-254-4-28
By CA, NARA, Date 2-3-12

✓ McGB
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EYES ONLY

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September 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Christopher A. Norred

SUBJECT: KIM Chong-p'il (KCP) - Comments on the Possibility of Finalization of ROK-Japan Talks

1. As I mentioned to you previously, I am forwarding herein the brief comments made by KCP on his views toward the possibility of finalization of the ROK-Japan talks. These comments were made to me on 25 and 26 July 1964 during my meetings with KCP in New York.

2. In raising the problems of the ROK-Japan talks, I told KCP that I would appreciate his views on how best the Koreans and Japanese could achieve finalization of this issue. I told KCP that we would like to know what he thought about the possibility of compromises being made by the ROK and Japanese Governments on the various specific matters now being discussed. He said that in his opinion the Japanese leadership wanted to finalize the talks as soon as possible. He continued that the current political situation in South Korea, however, was not conducive to settlement for possibly six to ten months. He said that President PAK must try to settle the most immediate problems of the local situation before again trying to push for a final settlement of the normalization issue. He said that he felt there could be compromises by both sides which could pave the way for normalization but that in his opinion to push for settlement in the immediate future would probably result in renewed opposition on the part of the other political parties and the students. At a later meeting, he commented that the major reason the opposition politicians so strongly opposed the normalization issue was that they felt very strongly that whichever government finally settled this issue would be able to remain in power for the next ten to twenty years. He continued that the normalization of relations with Japan would most certainly open the door to economic progress and industrial development of South Korea in view of the receipt of reparations money and private and governmental loans which would then be available through Japanese sources.

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NLJ/RAC 13-171
By LICD NARA, Date 06-05-2014

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2. The above is not very much but will give Mr. Marshall Green a little insight into KCP's thinking on the normalization talks.

Clarence W. Edwards
Clarence W. Edwards

4459

Korea

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2. 2/1*

129

AUG 21 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Research Project on Korean Leadership by Dr. Kee Il CHOI

As discussed with Mr. Alexander of your office in February 1964, and recently with Mr. Thomson, we have corresponded and talked with Dr. Kee Il CHOI about a possible research project on the development of Korean leadership.

We believe this project could be of great value to United States policy. A key problem in Korea is the development of effective, soundly motivated leadership. An American scholar, William A. Douglas, has explored the problem in an excellent article in the Spring 1964 issue of "Pacific Affairs," entitled "South Korea's Search for Leadership."

Dr. CHOI is scholastically well qualified to undertake such research, having received a Ph.D. in political science and economics from Harvard University. Through that training, and his absence from Korea since 1948, he has gained an essential degree of objectivity on Korean affairs, while retaining a Korean's understanding of the Korean social system and basic attitudes. Because of his absence from Korea since 1948, however, it would be necessary that he revisit Korea for a major part of the study.

An outline for such a study is enclosed, based on papers submitted by Dr. CHOI.

We would like to suggest that Dr. CHOI present this project to Harvard University, with the understanding that we would be prepared to make favorable recommendations on the project and his role in it.


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Dr. CHOI is well known in Harvard and we believe the most practical procedure would be for Harvard to finance and manage the project. Although we would like to have the benefit of the results of the project we are not in a position to manage it. Moreover, we believe it would be wise not to place Dr. CHOI in a position to exploit United States Government involvement in the project. We would appreciate your support with Harvard.


Grant G. Hilliker
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Study Outline

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DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP IN KOREA

1. Problem of leader selection in Korea
 - a. class and family structure
 - b. factionalism and corruption
 - c. Korean criteria of leadership

2. The American role
 - a. American criteria of leadership as applied to Koreans
 - b. Korean attitudes toward the United States
 - c. Extent of American influence

3. Government social and economic leadership
 - a. Development; 1945-47
 - b. The Rhee Period; 1948-60
 - c. Current

4. Changes in the leadership patterns and expectations
 - a. The effect of massive educational programs
 - b. The military influence
 - c. Differences among age groups

5. Conclusions

✓ 130

~~SECRET~~

Tokyo, August 21, 1964

Dear Mac:

In reply to your note of August 13, let me say that the message on Korean normalization brought by Win Brown from the White House got through to us loud and clear.

Actually this problem has always stood at the top of my list of priorities. During a visit to Korea in the autumn of 1960, I became convinced that, without the economic boost that Korean-Japanese normalization would bring to Korea, we would never be able to build a solid economic foundation on which a viable political regime could develop there. I promised certain Korean leaders that I would try to convince people in Washington of this when I got back. I was in Washington for this purpose in January 1961 when the Department asked me to take my present job. So you see I have appreciated the vital importance of this problem for a long time.

A major difficulty is that, to get normalization over the very great hurdles of party conflict and public opposition in Korea, we will probably have to push more openly for it in Korea than we have in the past, but any seeming intervention on our part makes the problem more difficult in Japan. This situation requires a careful balancing act between needs in Korea and risks in Japan. However, we do have a considerable margin of safety on the issue here, so I believe it may be possible to put on the needed pressure in Korea

Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President,
The White House.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By JW, NARA, Date 7-2-93

Copy sent to RWR

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without building up unacceptable reactions here. Still it remains a delicate political operation to determine just what is the maximum degree of pressure we can safely exert. The present exchange of telegrams (see our 641, ^(checked) for example) is directed toward this end.

In any case, please rest assured that we here in Tokyo regard the whole normalization problem as being of the greatest importance and are prepared to do everything we can and run considerable risks to get it satisfactorily solved.

Cordially,



Edwin O. Reischauer

cc: Amb. Winthrop G. Brown,
Amembassy, Seoul.

* filed in Korea Country file Vol. II

~~SECRET~~

August 13, 1964

Kover

131

Dear Ed:
~~SECRET~~

We asked Win Brown to tell you of the President's own interest in bringing about at long last a ROK-Japanese settlement and normalization of relations. This note is simply to follow up and make sure you were told that it's "top priority", to use the President's words.

Of course, all here are conscious of the many complexities and possible pitfalls in this exercise. We also realize that in the last analysis it is the Koreans rather than the Japanese who will have to walk the final mile. This is precisely why the President talked with Brown.

We know this is easier said than done, and that the mean job of turning words to acts falls on you and Win, and your respective embassies. But you can count on any support you need from here.

Cordially,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable
Edwin O. Reischauer
U. S. Ambassador
American Embassy
Tokyo, Japan

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NGJ001R-254-4-29
By g, NARA, Date 2-3-12

~~SECRET~~

July 31, 1964


Loren
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132

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Purpose of seeing Winthrop Brown, our new Ambassador to Korea, is so you can tell him personally why you want movement on our Korean policy, especially a Korean/Japanese settlement. Five minutes should suffice.

We've poured into South Korea more than \$6.6 billion in aid (\$3.8 billion economic, \$2.8 billion military) since World War II. Despite all our aid, this nation is still an unstable U.S. stepchild. Part of the problem is the absence of leadership after years of Japanese occupation, but part stems from bad planning and neglect by the US.

Brown is a top man (he did a great job as our man in Laos 1960-62); he'll follow through on what you tell him. Suggested talking points are:

- 
1. You are concerned over the long and frustrating record of U.S. involvement in Korea--with so little to show for it. We simply can't keep paying with so few results (we're planning \$350-400 million in aid for FY 1965).
 2. So you give top priority to the long-delayed Korea-Japan settlement. Let's get Japan to start sharing the burden. Aside from \$600 million in Jap aid which a settlement would bring, we want to redevelop the natural economic ties between Korea and Japan. Brown should tell Reischauer in Tokyo your views when he goes through en route.
 3. You'll put your personal weight behind getting a settlement in any way necessary.
 4. To start off, Rusk suggests attached oral message for Brown to deliver to President Park. We have word that Park has told his new foreign minister to give priority to a settlement, so these words will come at a good time.
 5. You are personally inclined to cut our 50,000 US troops in Korea; our needs are more in Southeast Asia. Defense of Korea is vital; but can't we do it with fewer men? Such big ROK armed forces (550,000) are also a terrible drag on the economy of such a poor country. You've held off on these cuts because they might give the wrong signal to the Chicoms just now, but Brown should keep a close eye on when it might be feasible.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-168

By *JW*, NARA, Date *6-23-93*

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Korea

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RFE-52, July 30, 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: Unification - As Seen From North and South Korea

The division of Korea, undramatized in recent years by a Berlin Wall or a communist guerrilla offensive, remains a fundamental political problem. It could become a more active international issue.

ABSTRACT

Some Moves Toward Negotiating Positions. A mood of change is reflected in both the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (North Korea). The South Korean position has been softening for several years, and a trend toward more conciliatory proposals by North Korea has been noticed in the past ten months.

North Korea's Economic Advantage. Although North Korea's claims of dramatic economic growth cannot be accepted at face value, Pyongyang has a significant advantage over Seoul. The agricultural program has not been very successful in North Korea, and structural growth problems are now beginning to pose difficulties for the communists. In heavy industrial output, however, they have far outstripped their democratic rivals.

Public Attitudes Pose More Problems In South Korea. The public desire for unification is a major force. In South Korea, it seems likely eventually to erode the bitter hatred of the communist regime which was a heritage of the Korean

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By is, NARS, Date 1-22-82

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after
date of origin.

War. International athletic contests, in particular, may open the door for further contacts. In North Korea the regime does not seem to be under as much emotional pressure and, consequently, is in a better bargaining position.

Communists Hold Initiative. The North Korean regime has consistently tied proposals which would serve their ends to the unification theme. They seem particularly anxious to force the United Nations presence and United States troops out of Korea, and to initiate direct dealings with Seoul. In contrast, the South Korean Government has no active policy on unification and has left this initiative in the hands of the enemy.

In mid-May 1964 there were several reports in the international press which indicated that France was disposed to extend its good offices for the neutralization and unification of Korea, as well as of Vietnam, and that this objective had been discussed by French and South Korean representatives. The report was indignantly denied by the South Korean Government, while the South Korean press criticized the whole French concept of neutralization. Subsequently there has been no convincing evidence that the French made, or even considered, the approaches attributed to them.

Nevertheless, the views attributed to the French may come to exercise greater appeal in the Korean stalemate. The division of Korea at about the 38th parallel, originally a line between United States and Soviet areas of military occupation, was reestablished with only minor geographical changes by the military armistice of 1953. For eleven years a no-man's land two and a half miles wide and 151 miles long has interposed a virtual quarantine between the north and the south. Only birds, spies, and the Swiss and Swedish members of the armistice commission pass through.

Foreign powers and international organizations with a direct interest or obligation in Korea, are apparently resigned to the status quo. The United States and the fifteen other nations which came to the support of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1950 have not taken significant initiatives toward a solution of the Korean problem since the breakdown of the first Geneva Conference in 1954. The annual United Nations debate on the Korean question helps sustain South Korean morale but has opened no avenues for a reconciliation. On the other side, most of the available evidence indicates that both the Soviet Union and Communist China are in no hurry to see Korea unified, and that North Korea is maintaining a very long-range campaign for unification without much consultation with the two major communist powers.

It would not be realistic to expect that this situation will continue unchanged, and, in fact, unification remains a very live political issue for Koreans, if not for the world at large. Internal forces are at work which may accelerate a settlement, perhaps on terms not consistent with free world interests. Of these the most significant, and from the standpoint of the United States the most unfavorable, are rates of economic growth which favor North Korea. Popular attitudes, at least in South Korea, also show some signs of softening. Although there seems to be no immediate subversive threat to internal stability, extensive communist efforts mounted both from North Korea and from Japan indicate that Pyongyang is trying to create a revolutionary apparatus in the south.

I. PUBLIC POSITIONS

A. South Korean Position Is Slowly Shifting

South Korean Government policies, which were almost completely inflexible between 1950 and 1960, have been marked by an increasing pragmatism during the past four years.

The Republic of Korea has held that it is the only legitimate government in the Korean peninsula by virtue of its establishment through the 1948 elections supervised by the United Nations. Prior to the Korean War one third of the seats in its National Assembly were reserved for legislators to be elected from the areas occupied by the North Korean regime. After 1950 there could be no realistic hope that unification might be achieved on these terms, but the formula was still cited from time to time, interspersed with President Rhee's demands for unification by a "march north."

There has been no more talk of marching north since Rhee was forced to resign in 1960. The short-lived parliamentary government of 1960-61, the military junta of 1961-63, and the present regime, have held that unification should be achieved through nationwide elections under the supervision of the United Nations. At the same time, however, less official comments have reflected some urgency to move toward unification, recognition that North Korea will not agree to the United Nations formula, and a tendency to turn to other methods.

For example, in The State, The Revolution and I, published in 1963, President Pak Chong-hui, who is also President of the Democratic Republic Party, stressed that partition came about as the result of big power conflicts, and noted a change at the UN General Assembly session of 1961-62, stemming from the West's recognition of changing circumstances, particularly the emergence of a third force. In the external field, Pak advocated concentration on this third force, primarily the Afro-Asian bloc, as the way to bring about unification. While Pak may now have more appreciation of the difficulties and dangers of unification - and important figures of his government are certainly aware of these dangers - the emotional drive for unification probably remains strong.

One relatively conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Assemblyman, So Min-ho, has, independently of his party, emerged as an outspoken proponent of unification. He foresees an international mood favorable to unification within three years and has stressed the need to prepare for it. In 1961 So sponsored a bill calling for an exchange of mail with North Korea. This act landed him in jail when the military regime took power, but, undaunted, he has again joined a group which introduced a similar measure.

B. North Korean Proposals Now Couched In More Conciliatory Terms

The North Korean regime apparently regards unification as a distant although absorbing goal, while remaining alert for opportunities which promise quick returns. In 1960-61 it advocated the establishment of a confederation under which the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang would remain in existence and retain most

of the attributes of sovereignty. From time to time economic blandishments have been directed at the south. These have usually been timed to exploit particularly difficult economic circumstances or natural disasters in South Korea and have included offers of relief grains and fertilizers and suggestions that South Korean vessels might fish in North Korean waters.

Pyongyang had often called for the formation of an "anti-US front for national salvation" with revolutionary, like-minded groups in South Korea, to bring about the expulsion of the United Nations forces from South Korea and either overthrow or dominate the government in Seoul. However, there is no evidence that Pyongyang has laid the foundation for a clandestine "liberation front" which might form the nucleus of a communist-dominated revolutionary government for South Korea, nor has it been in a favorable enough situation to probe for the "neutralization" of South Korea.

For some months now North Korean unification proposals have been predominantly conciliatory.* The changed approach was formulated by Choe Yong-kon, the second-ranking leader of the ruling Korean Workers (Communist) Party. He struck the keynote of a more conciliatory approach - which has since been amplified and embroidered but not essentially changed. In September 1963, he proposed:

- a. negotiations between North and South Korea;
- b. the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea and the reduction of their armed forces to 100,000 men or less conditional upon the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea;
- c. unification by means of "north-south free general elections without any interference from outside forces".

The new line has subsequently been embroidered in North Korean diplomatic conversations, radio and press comment and, on March 27, 1964, in a unification appeal issued by the North Korean Supreme Peoples Assembly. In general, two noteworthy trends since last September have been an increasing emphasis on various sorts of north-south exchanges (e.g., mail, journalists, scientists, and economic goods) and the more specific direction of the proposals toward South Korean legislators and politicians.

* A contrary note was struck in Premier Kim Il-song's New Year message for 1964 when he exhorted the South Koreans to drive out the United States troops and overthrow the Pak Chong-hui Government. However, the message evidently was not designed to be an important pronouncement on the unification issue, since only a small part of it was devoted to the issue. Pyongyang also revived revolutionary appeals during the student demonstrations which shook Seoul in the late spring of 1964.

North Korean propaganda has not neglected the economic sphere. A November 17, 1963 article in the official party newspaper, Nodong Sinmun, called for joint action "rehabilitating" the South Korean economy. Its sweeping proposals for reforms in South Korean agriculture included the abolition of "feudal" land ownership in South Korea, and the application of North Korean technical knowledge and machinery to irrigate new areas. "Fuel and power, machines, and raw materials" for the construction of new industrial facilities were also pledged.

The Supreme People's Assembly appeal of March 27, 1964 contained a pledge to give annually to South Korea 300,000 tons of rice, 100,000 tons of structural steel, 1 billion kilowatt hours of electric power, 10,000 tons of chemical fiber, and unspecified amounts of "cement, timber, and machinery"; moreover it promised to give unemployed South Koreans (of whom there are a large number) jobs in North Korea. However, by implication, all this was to be contingent upon the formation of "...a nationwide anti-US, anti-Japanese national salvation united front..." and "the early convocation of a joint conference of political parties and social organizations of North and South Korea...to realize economic and cultural cooperation, travel of people and exchange of correspondence..."

II. ECONOMIC FACTORS

A. South Korean Economy Has Faltered

While there has been much economic improvement in South Korea and, particularly consumption has increased tremendously from the low levels which marked the end of the Korean War in 1953, the national economy has not grown consistently. Periods of rapid expansion have been followed by years during which there was little or no increase in the average per capita income. Repeated devaluations have been followed by inflation which made new devaluations necessary. In recent years the gross national product has grown at an average rate of only about 4 percent annually, while the population has increased by nearly 3 percent per year.

This hit-and-miss improvement has not been an effective counter to corrosive social problems. A growing number of university graduates have not been able to find what they consider to be acceptable employment. Rising expectations - and it should be noted that South Koreans have been long exposed to the much higher living standards which prevail in the United States and Japan - have left the public unsatisfied even where there has been substantial improvement. Finally, there is a prevailing apprehension that South Korea cannot be master of its own fate until a pattern of self-sustained economic growth is established.

B. North Korea Progresses, But At A Recently Reduced Pace

Since 1958 North Korea has maintained a rapid rate of economic growth, estimated at about 10 percent annually. Factors contributing to this growth include a favorable natural resource base, massive assistance from the communist countries, and the regime's ability to restrain consumption increases while reordering its society for investment and production.

In the process of replacing housing destroyed during the Korean War, the regime has expanded the cities and reduced the farm population from about two-thirds to one-half of the 11.6 million total population. Basic heavy industries have been restored and machine and light industries, particularly textiles, have been expanded. Mechanization of agriculture on a modest scale has offset the withdrawal of farm labor, but with the population 25 percent larger than in 1944 and growing at a rate of 2.7 percent a year, North Korea continues to depend on supplemental grain imports.

Rapid economic growth, assuming the continued allocation of about 25 percent of GNP for investment, can probably be maintained, but there are increasing structural obstacles. The regime needs to expand farm output to meet rising consumer expectations and the growing population. Adjustment to a cessation of grants and credits from communist countries, as well as the repayment of existing credits, may pose difficult problems.

Economic policies of recent years have given no indications that an early unification is envisaged. The announced goals of the current Seven Year Plan (1961-67) make no provision for unification, and the Korean Workers (Communist) Party in 1963 and in February 1964, seemed to chart a course which had no connection with any unification plans.

C. Economic Comparisons

If due allowance is made for the difficulties encountered in obtaining accurate information on North Korea, the following table of economic comparisons with South Korea can serve as a useful reference.

Economic Comparisons - South Korea, North Korea

<u>Item</u>	<u>South Korea</u>	<u>North Korea</u>
Area (000 sq. miles)	37	48
Population (millions)	27 (1963)	11.6 (1963)
Population Density (per sq. mile)	730 (1963)	242 (1963)
Rate of Natural population increase (percent)	2.9 (1962)	2.7 (1962)
Total population increase 1944 to 1963 (percent)	68**	25**
Cultivated acreage per capita (acre)	0.2 (1962)	0.6 (1962)
Percent of arable land to total area	21 (1962)	15 (1962)
GNP per capita (US\$)	85 (1963)	N.A.*
Estimated average annual growth of GNP (percent)	3.9 (1959-1963)	10.4 (1958-1962)
Average annual growth of industrial output (percent)	13 (1960-1963)	14 (1960-1963)
Percent of GNP devoted to investment	14 (1962)	25 (1960-1963)
Total external economic aid (US\$ million)	3,673 (1946-1963)	1,500 (1950-1963)
Average annual economic aid (US\$ million)	205 (1946-1963)	107 (1950-1963)
External aid as percent of GNP	8.1 (1963)	under 3 (1963)

* Exceeds that of South Korea.

** There were large migrations from North Korea to South Korea during 1945-51.

Generally Pyongyang seems to have a considerable advantage, particularly in heavy industry.

Production of Selected Items, 1963

	<u>South Korea</u>		<u>North Korea</u>	
	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>(Per capita)</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>(Per capita)</u>
Coal (million m.t.)	8.8	(328 kg)	14.0	(1207 kg)
Power (billion kwh)	2.2	(.82 kwh)	11.8	(1017 kwh)
Cement (000 m.t.)	778	(29 kg)	2,530	(218 kg)
Crude steel (000 m.t.)	160	(6 kg)	1,022	(88 kg)
Cloth (million meters)	202	(7.5 meters)	227	(19.6meter)
Chemical fertilizer (000 m.t.)	98	(3.6 kg)	853	(74 kg)
Grains (million m.t.)	4.7	(174 kg)	3.15	(278 kg)*

* Data for 1962.

III. ATTITUDES

It appears that there is a strong popular feeling for unification in both the north and the south. Probably neither government would dare to take a public stand which implied acceptance of a permanent partition. However, pressures for action are apparently greater in the south although it is evident that Pyongyang wants to give the impression that it is in the forefront of efforts to achieve unification.

A. Pressures Upon North Korean Leaders Apparently Limited

Lacking more reliable indicators of popular attitudes, the popular view of unification must be deduced from the attitudes of the North Korean leaders. These seem to reflect only limited internal pressures and the comfortable conviction that time is on their side.

Several developments could conceivably occur in the future which probably would aggravate differences among the North Korean leaders over unification tactics. The death or disability of Premier and Korean Workers Party Chairman Kim Il-song and the conclusion of an agreement with South Korea on some step or steps leading to unification are two examples of such developments. The conclusion of a "normalization" agreement between South Korea and Japan probably would increase pressures on Pyongyang. Soviet or Chinese Communist efforts to influence a settlement of the unification issue might well introduce more factionalism and strains into Pyongyang's top leadership group.

Very little is known about the attitudes of top North Korean leaders upon unification tactics. The downgrading of certain pro-Soviet leaders, such as Nam Il and Pak Chong-ae, may have been caused in part by their advocacy of the less militant Soviet line on unification. Outwardly, however, the top leadership has preserved a show of unity. The Political Committee of the Korean Workers Party, the fulcrum of power, includes no members who are known to have been born in South Korea or to have engaged in clandestine subversive activities there for many years - and who might therefore be inclined toward especially militant action to unify the two parts of Korea.* At least sixteen of the eighteen known members of the Political Committee were born north of the Thirty-eight Parallel. Also, Kim Il-song's apparently firm control in recent years probably has served to reduce factionalism on the unification issue.

B. Public Attitudes In South Korea Are Softening

Painful first-hand experience during 1950 and 1951 induced in South Korea a hatred of communism which contrasted sharply with the ideological confusion of the late 1940's. However, this revulsion did not destroy the desire for a united Korea and as the decade wore on President Rhee's hard line on unification seemed increasingly unrealistic. Immediately after he was forced out in April 1960, there were calls for peaceful unification with the north, or at least for exploratory probes in that direction. During the election campaign that summer the "progressives," i.e., socialists or semi-socialists, advocated the establishment of ties with the north without specifically endorsing political unification. Some university groups were also particularly active in 1960-61, generally advocating cultural interchange rather than political talks. Students remain most susceptible to unification themes.

During most of the period of military government (May 1961-December 1963) "progressives" were severely repressed, students were intimidated, and unification was not a safe subject for public expression. It is evident from the upsurge of

* In September 1963, and subsequently, some published statements of the regime have listed Hong Myong-hui and Chong Chun-taek along with the members of the Political Committee. Both of them were born in South Korea. However, the regime has never stated formally that they are Political Committee members.

comment during the past six months, however, that these heavy-handed methods only temporarily repressed and did not lessen interest in unification.

While the South Korean press has not taken up unification as a major topic, some recent comments indicate a softening here too. Tonga Ilbo, indisputably the most highly regarded newspaper of the nation, has contrasted the complete division of Korea with the relatively less restricted conditions in Berlin where "Exchange of mail...has never been blocked," and advocated the exchange of mail, suitably censored, between North and South Korea.

C. Sports Provide A Common Ground

During the past eighteen months Seoul has been forced into unprecedented negotiations with Pyongyang in order to preserve a position in the Olympic games. South Korean and North Korean volleyball teams have competed, and the South Korean press has shown pride in the achievements of North Korean athletes.

1. The 1964 Olympics

International Olympic Committee pressures for a joint Korean Olympic Team resulted in the first face-to-face bilateral talks between Seoul and Pyongyang since the Korean War.

Despite meetings in Switzerland, in January, 1963, and in Hong Kong in May and again in July, 1963, on the two latter occasions with no participation by the International Olympic Committee, there was no agreement. Faced with a stalemate, the International Olympics Committee decided that there should be two Olympic teams from Korea, one designated as the "North Korea" team. South Korea presumably will retain the "Korea" designation which it has used previously.

As far as is known both teams intend to participate in the Tokyo Olympic games scheduled for October 1964. The South Koreans have sought to bar North Korea from participation in Olympic volleyball competition on the basis of their volleyball teams having taken part in the GANEFO games in November 1963, but, as yet, there is no report of action resulting from this protest. The North Koreans have broadcast their objections to the "two Koreas" solution, but apparently have not made any direct protests to the International Olympic Committee and recently sent a group to Tokyo to inspect facilities for their athletes.

2. Volleyball At New Delhi

There is at least one recent precedent to common Korean participation in international sports competition. In the pre-Olympic Asian volleyball tournament, held at New Delhi, in December 1963 South Korean teams were actually matched with teams from North Korea in the finals. The South Korean men and the North Korean women won, while the North Korean men and the South Korean women placed second.

3. GANEFO

South Korea did not participate in the Indonesia-sponsored Games of the Newly Emerging Forces, which took place in Djakarta in November 1963. However, the South Korean press gave extensive coverage to the excellent showings of the North Korean marathon runners and of a female sprinter who set several new records.

IV. OUTLOOK

Since Pyongyang has sided with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the fundamental strength of its position becomes more questionable to the extent that Soviet economic, military and political support becomes uncertain. For the immediate future, however, it will probably continue to hold the initiative, while the South Koreans will find it necessary to react to further unification gambits from the North.

A. North Korean Objectives

Clearly, Pyongyang attaches primary importance to Korean rather than Chinese Communist or Soviet objectives, and it apparently hopes to splinter South Korea in preparation for a political takeover by its own disciplined minority. In pursuing this objective it can play upon the strong desire of almost all Koreans for a united country, the traditional anti-foreign, and, thus, latent anti-American feeling, and the belief that a unified Korea will, per se, be more prosperous. Concomitant objectives include the desire to force the United States troops out of South Korea, to improve its international position, to open some kind of direct talks with Seoul, and to initiate controlled exchanges of persons.

However, while paying lip service to the idea of closer ties, at this time Pyongyang would probably not risk unfavorable political arrangements which might result from any unification scheme which made due allowance for South Korea's much greater population, nor would it be in a position to make good on its extravagant promises of economic aid for South Korea.

1. Withdrawal Of United Nations Forces And Reduction Of South Korean Forces

Pyongyang probably would give the highest priority to securing the withdrawal of the United Nations Command (with a total strength of approximately 55,000 troops, nearly all provided by the United States.)

Beyond this a Seoul-Pyongyang non-aggression pact and mutual troop reductions would be advantageous on military and economic grounds to North Korea. Reductions to equal force levels would require far greater proportional cuts in the South Korean armed forces, and the military manpower released could be put to much better use in North Korea, which has had a shortage of civilian labor.

2. Pyongyang's Drive For International Respectability And Recognition

Progress toward international acceptance is clearly a major policy of the regime, and equally clearly has been a major factor in shaping Pyongyang's conciliatory overt posture toward unification in recent months. An important focus of this interaction is the UN General Assembly's annual consideration of the Korean problem. The substantive resolution on the Korean question has long been a handicap to both the drive for international status and the unification campaign. It annually evokes memories of the Korean War and calls for United Nations supervision of Korea-wide elections for unification - which Pyongyang strongly opposes. The Korean War has made it more difficult for North Korea to gain diplomatic recognition and, in turn, this paucity of international status helps the passage of United States-sponsored resolutions on the Korean question.

3. North-South Exchanges

Pyongyang probably would also favor visits between North and South Korea. With its more extensive internal security network, North Korea could exercise tighter controls over visitors from the South. By keeping their bona fide contacts with the North Korean population to the minimum, and, by controls on its own press coupled with guided tours for visiting journalists it would hope to gain a propaganda advantage. In addition, exchanges would increase the opportunities for communist subversion in the south.

4. Economic And Political Arrangements

Offers of large-scale economic aid to South Korea appear to have been made largely for propaganda effect, since some of the commodities offered, such as grain, have clearly been in short supply in North Korea. Preliminary negotiations for a north-south economic confederation, with a view to obtaining psychological gains with the South Korean public, would, however, be desired. Pyongyang's attitude toward actual implementation of such proposals probably would depend upon the details of the arrangements which could be worked out.

The Pyongyang regime appears to have significant reservations about any country-wide elections, reflecting concern about the much smaller population of its area and the strong anti-communist feelings of many South Koreans. Moreover, Pyongyang has made clear its rejection of United Nations supervision of any elections for unification.

B. South Korean Alternatives

The Republic of Korea, to date, apparently has no settled policy for the major sub-surface political problem of unification. Instead it temporizes by talking in terms of studying the situation. A government party assemblyman introduced a Territorial Unification Research bill in late March, 1964, but no action was taken during the most recent Assembly session which ended in early June. The government probably reasons that the establishment of such a research organization will demonstrate its interest in the issue without forcing it to announce a specific program.

If there seems to be a softening of the United States commitment in East Asia, or if the French views on the neutralization of Indochina should gain wide support, the pressures on the South Korean government could greatly increase. Having had a long history of accommodation to stronger neighbors, it would be only natural for some South Koreans to explore alternatives to the status quo. These they may see as a resurgent Japan taking over the Korean position held since World War II by the United States, or a neutralized, confederated Korea. The first, implying the return of the former overlord, is less attractive than the second.

A majority of the Seoul leadership is fearful of any negotiations with North Korea and feels that unification can be asked only when the south is stronger than the north. Here hope lies in a further deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations which might shake the Pyongyang regime, or in a settlement with Japan which might stimulate the South Korean economy, or in a gradual stabilization of the political situation in South Korea. This point of view has some logic. Its great weakness is that it continues to leave the initiative in the hands of the enemy.

Even while the barriers to political and economic rapprochement remain formidable, increasing pressures for the reinstatement of athletic contests, cultural relations and communications continue. Major steps toward the resumption of ties in these fields may be forced upon a reluctant South Korean Government.

V. CONCLUSION

Unification is strongly desired in both the South and the North. There is a gradual trend toward greater consideration of unification; it is a live political issue for Koreans.

After a decade of inflexibility, South Korean policy during the past four years has become increasingly pragmatic. The South Korean leadership probably hopes that either: a) the Sino-Soviet dispute will weaken the Pyongyang regime to the point where consideration of unification would not be a threat to stability in the South, or; b) normalization of relations with Japan will strengthen South Korea to the point at which it can take the risk of serious contemplation of unification. But this temporizing leaves the initiative to North Korea.

The Communists find it easy to push for unification as long as there is little likelihood that Seoul will seriously respond. Pyongyang plays upon latent anti-foreign sentiment among Koreans and looks for means of reducing the disparity in north-south military strength. The North Korean regime searches for a way to utilize their disciplinary techniques to counter the South's much larger population.

The outlook is for both regimes to continue to seek a formula that first guarantees their own security and then offers hope for gains at the expense of the other. The greater the degree to which each regime feels secure, the greater will be its flexibility in exploring means of evolving toward unification.

Done File
134

9

July 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KOMER

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President
-- Ambassador Brown

The President has agreed to see Ambassador
Winthrop Brown on July 31 at 5:30 P.M. State
has been informed.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Valenti
Gwen King

Greg Thomson
7/9

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-1166

By *fw*, NARA, Date 8-10-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 28 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Economic Assistance to Korea

This is in response to the telephone request from Mr. James Thomson for data on United States economic aid to Korea during FY 1964-65. This information is summarized below (in million dollars).

	<u>FY 1964</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 1965</u> <u>(Planning)</u>
Supporting Assistance	\$ 76.2	\$ 75.0
Development Loans	29.6	40-65
Technical Cooperation	3.7	4.5
Public Law 480:		
Title I (sales)	97.3	75.2
Title II (donations)	27.9	10.0
Title III (donations)	<u>8.6</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Total	\$243.3	\$208.1- 233.1

United States economic aid to Korea from FY 1946 through FY 1964 aggregated \$3.8 billion.

The enclosed publication ("Country Assistance Strategy Statements") describes the Korean aid program. The data given on page 6 of the section devoted to Korea are programmed figures; while those shown above are actual data as of June 30, 1964, for FY 1964, and latest AID planning figures for FY 1965.

Total military assistance (MAP) has aggregated about \$2.8 billion. The MAP program was \$153.2 million in FY 1964 and is planned at \$145.8 million for FY 1965.

JOHN de MARTINO
Benjamin H. Read *FOR*
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

"Country Assistance
Strategy Statements"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By ju, NARA, Date 7-2-93

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Korean 136
Greg Kouss
7/28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 28 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Oral Message on Korean-Japanese Negotiations to Be Delivered to the Korean President from you by Ambassador Brown

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed oral message from you to President Park.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

I ask your approval of the enclosed draft oral statement on the Korean-Japanese negotiations which Ambassador Brown would deliver in your name to President PARK Chung Hee.

The negotiations for normal relations between Korea and Japan, which are of great importance to us as well as to the Koreans and Japanese, have been at a standstill for several months because of internal opposition in Korea. We believe a message from you to President Park would be a good means of pressing the Koreans to go ahead. Ambassador Brown could also draw upon the message to good effect in his conversations with Korean Opposition leaders and with Japanese Government officials.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft oral message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Oral Message from the President

President Johnson asked me to give you his warm personal regards. He also asked me to speak to you for him about the negotiations for normal relations between Korea and Japan, which he discussed with you last November. He hopes that you will move forward shortly to establish normal relations and reach a settlement with Japan. It is not healthy for Korea to continue long to be so exclusively dependent upon a single outside friend as it is at present. Korea needs greater trade and a wider circle of strong supporters from abroad. A settlement would be of great benefit to Korea, both economically and politically, and would have good effects for Korea far beyond the direct arrangements established between Korea and Japan. It would also benefit the Free World position in the Far East.

The President hopes that delays will not continue, fearing that Korea's diplomatic and economic prospects and the Free World position in Asia will deteriorate unless this normalization is soon achieved. The United States Government is prepared publicly to support such a settlement, and to make clear that it will not affect the basic United States policies of economic assistance to Korea. In fact, such a settlement would make United States assistance more fruitful, for it would be working in a stronger and more broadly based economy.

It is because the President holds these views strongly that he authorized me to stress United States support of a Korea-Japan rapprochement in my public statement on arrival.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-168

By fw, NARA, Date 6-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korea

137

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA MR. VALENTI

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-168
By SW, NARA, Date 6-23-93

A five-minute pep talk to our new ambassador to Korea (a top man) would be well worth the time. He should hear personally from you that (1) you are dead serious about wanting an early ROK/Jap settlement so that Japs can help carry the aid load for South Korea (still running over \$300 million a year); (2) you favor in principle withdrawal of some U.S. forces, once doing so wouldn't look like retreat in face of Red China.

We expect to propose you send an oral message through Brown urging President Pak to press ahead on ROK/Jap settlement.

If you don't have time to talk to him, you can have a picture with him, and I'll give him the pep talk.

McG B
McG. B.

Approved for: 5-minute talk
picture only
Disapproved

*5:30
July 31*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*h. Pic K to
Kerrill*

*Todd Bundy
Todd Secretary
7/30*

137a
To Komer + Rusk



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for Ambassador-designate Winthrop G. Brown (Korea)

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Ambassador-designate Winthrop G. Brown briefly for a conversation before his departure for his post in Seoul on about August 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

This visit would enable him to press more effectively with the Korean Government for early settlement in the Korean-Japanese negotiations to establish normal relations. The Korean Government has asked that the United States involve itself in such a settlement by sending me or another high United States official in the belief that this would make it difficult for the Opposition to obstruct the settlement. Embassy Tokyo has pointed out, however, that the Japanese would be repelled by such an American involvement. I believe that with evidence of your backing and mine, Ambassador Brown should be able upon his arrival to press President PAK to move ahead quickly toward a settlement with Japan, which would be of great benefit at this time.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador-designate Brown is enclosed.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Group 3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By *JW*, NARA, Date 7-2-93

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Ambassador-Designate Winthrop G. Brown (Korea)

Born in Maine in 1907, Mr. Brown attended Yale University, where he obtained B.A. and LL.B. degrees. After graduating from law school in 1932, he practiced law for nine years.

In 1941 Mr. Brown joined the Lend Lease Administration and served as Executive Officer of the mission in London until the end of World War II. From 1945 until 1952 he served in the Department of State, becoming Director of the Offices of International Trade Policy and International Materials Policy.

Mr. Brown returned to London in 1952 as Counselor of Embassy; in 1955 he became Director of the ICA Mission in the United Kingdom. Following assignments to New Delhi and Katmandu, Nepal, as Minister-Counselor, he was appointed Ambassador to Laos in 1960. For his service in Laos the late President Kennedy presented the Distinguished Federal Civilian Service Award to Mr. Brown. He has served as Deputy Commandant of the National War College since 1962.

Mr. Brown is married to the former Peggy Ann Bell, and they have three children.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1964

Komer
McG Bundy
138 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL BUNDY

Here's a strong plug for Marshall Green's idea that we shoot for a limited ROK/Jap normalization, so long as prospects for early agreement on the full package seem limited. I still wonder why the ROKs would settle for so much less, but if Marshall, Embassy Seoul, and Chong-II-Kwon are all interested why not try.

Marshall mentioned separately to me his idea that as part of the exercise the US would depart from its backstage role to make strong direct approaches, especially to the ROKs. I note that Chong II-Kwon also wants the US to associate itself publicly with the enterprise. To me, the potential gain is well worth the risk.

Wouldn't Win Brown's arrival be a good time to spring this one? We could even arm him with some words from the President; we could use a few foreign policy plusses before November, and ROK/Jap normalization might just be made into one.

R. W. Komer

cc: McG. Bundy ✓
Marshall Green
Bob Barnett

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-168
By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93

Korea
Orig. Dwyer 7/21

July 20, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your telegram of July 20 advising me that you are today nominating me as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

I am greatly honored by this assignment and look forward with the greatest anticipation to serving you in this new capacity. I assure you that I will do my utmost to carry out to your satisfaction the mission which you have given me.

Very respectfully,

Winthrop G. Brown

The President,

The White House

140

Kearse

July 9, 1964

Lucy Ferguson
7/10

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNNY
THE WHITE HOUSE**

Subject: Gift Photograph for the President

Forwarded herewith is a velvet case containing an autographed photograph of President Chung Hee PARK of Korea and a sealed letter addressed to the President. These were delivered to the Department of State by the Embassy of Korea with the request that they be forwarded to the White House. The inscription at the bottom of the photograph reads in translation: "To the esteemed President Johnson - Chung Hee Park."

DON T. CHRISTENSEN
Benjamin H. Read FOR
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Case containing photograph

MEMCON'S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Bundy

142

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology
Yoonsae Yang, Chief, Over-All Program Division,
Economic Planning Board, Seoul, Korea
Daniel F. Margolies, Assistant to Dr. Hornig

SUBJECT: Korean Institute for Industrial Technology and
Applied Science

DATE: October 1, 1965

1. Popularity of Institute in Korea

Mr. Yang said that the Deputy Prime Minister had asked him to call on Dr. Hornig and express appreciation for his interest in developing the proposed Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science in Korea. He said that the project had caught the popular imagination in Korea and was being talked about in many places. He wanted to assure Dr. Hornig that the project continued to have the full support of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Prime Minister, and the President.

2. Communist Propaganda Directed Toward Korean Scientists in the United States

Mr. Yang said the reason he called upon Dr. Hornig was to draw his attention to a problem which he regarded as very serious. He said that the Communists in North Korea were directing their propaganda against Korean scientists resident in the United States with a view to enticing them to come to North Korea and support the Communist movement there. He said if even one such defection on the part of a well-known Korean scientist should occur it would represent a major propaganda victory for the Communists and would have most unfortunate repercussions on the Government of South Korea.

He said that he himself had been a student in the United States, and had returned to Korea in 1961. He had been entirely unaware of any Communist propaganda effort then. Evidently as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision the United States Post Office no longer screens

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

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By iw

NARS, Date

1-22-82

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propaganda originating from foreign Communist countries which now is delivered to the addressees. He had been told of this by his brother who is studying at the Illinois Institute of Technology. According to his brother much of the Communist propaganda arrives in disguised form: One pamphlet arrived with a Time magazine cover but containing Communist propaganda inside; another item appeared under the guise of a South Korean newspaper but in fact turned out to be a dummy containing Communist propaganda.

Mr. Yang said the Korean people are intensely nationalistic and most of the Koreans who are living in the United States and following scientific pursuits feel something of a sense of guilt that they are not contributing to the economic welfare of their own country. He said the Communists were playing upon this sentiment very shrewdly and were seeking to persuade the Koreans here that although there was no opportunity for them to serve their country in South Korea, their duty lay in returning to their country via North Korea and helping their people there where all facilities would be made available to them for putting their talents to use.

Mr. Yang said he was afraid that some of the scientists, through innocence or naivete, might be taken in by this propaganda, if the South Korean Government did not offer some possibility for them to return to South Korea and participate in the economic development of their country there.

It was for this reason that he felt the formation of the Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science was very timely indeed. It was very urgent, in his opinion, that the Institute be organized as rapidly as possible. He wished to assure Dr. Hornig that in view of these facts as described above he would personally do whatever he could to expedite the establishment of the Institute as a matter of prime political importance.

Dr. Hornig expressed an interest in the fraudulent character of the propaganda that was being distributed and asked whether it had been brought to the attention of the appropriate American authorities. Mr. Yang said he had already passed the information on to the appropriate agencies of the United States through the Korean Embassy in Washington.

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Dr. Hornig thanked Mr. Yang for his visit and said he hoped to be able to visit Korea and to find the Institute in operation in the not too distant future.

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SEC. 1.1(d)

BY Deed ON 7-26-90 6/16/65
Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For your information and files.

Enclosures:
Mem/Con between Korean Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM and Asst. Secy Bundy (FE) re 1) Pres. Park's visit to the US and 2) Possible entry of Korean Farm Laborers into the US dated 6/1/65

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 1, 1965

38

SUBJECT: 1) President Park's State Visit to the United States
2) Possible Entry of Korean Farm Laborers into the United States

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Korean Ambassador
Dong Soon PARK, Third Secretary, Korean Embassy
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

COPIES TO: FE - (3cc) Department of Labor - 1
EA - 4 (3cc) White House - 1
RA - 1 Amembassy Seoul - 2
S/IL - 1
INR - 8

18

1965 JUN 14 AM 11 47

President Park's State Visit to the United States

Ambassador KIM said that when he left President PARK's party in Los Angeles, at the conclusion of the State Visit, both President and Mrs. Park were more than satisfied with the visit. President Park said he had found a good friend of Korea in President Johnson.

Mr. Bundy asked what Ambassador Kim considered to have been the highlights of the visit. Ambassador Kim said that President Park's meetings with President Johnson, of course, were the high point. Mrs. Park, who had never experienced it before, was delighted with the ticker-tape parade in New York City. The party was quite pleased that they had been at Cape Kennedy at the actual time of a launching of a satellite. President Park had also been quite interested in his visit to the Jones-Laughlin steel plant in Pittsburgh.

Possible Entry of Korean Farm Laborers into the United States

Ambassador Kim asked about the prospects for the possible entry of some Korean farm laborers into the United States. Mr. Bundy said that as Ambassador Kim knew we had been going through an extremely difficult period of adjustment after Congress had decided not to renew the legislation enabling the entry of Mexican laborers and serving as the basis for the entry of some Japanese and Filipino laborers. Early this year there had been a test period to see how much of our own labor would come forward if the wages were raised. It now appears

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-166
By pw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

that there may be room for a very limited number of farm laborers to enter from abroad. We may be able to work out very limited programs for the Japanese and Filipinos. We are getting close to a point at which we can look again at the prospects for Korean laborers. This work is seasonal, and a program may be arranged for the laborers to work in the seasonal period and then study agricultural activities for an additional period. Financing has to be found for this, and much consideration must be given to selecting the right type of laborer. The program would have to be worked out very carefully with our own domestic labor people. As soon as we had a clearer idea of the Japanese and Filipino programs, we would then take another look at the Koreans. Ambassador Kim said he had told Secretary Wirtz he did not ask any special favors for Korea, but that if any new groups were to be admitted, he hoped there would be no discrimination against the Koreans, and Secretary Wirtz had assured him the Koreans would be given equal treatment.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

2466
R. Cooper
2. Let 6/15

June 8, 1965

144

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *W.A. Henderson for*
Executive Secretariat

Enclosed for your information and files is a memorandum of conversation between the President and President Park dated May 18, 1965.

Also enclosed is a conversation between Llewellyn E. Thompson and Amb. Ritchie dated June 2, 1965, concerning bombing raids in North Viet-Nam.

Attachments:

Staff # 8286, 8838

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

White House: JThomson/FE:EA:RBF Fearey:
bhm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Approved by White House
6/5/65

May 18, 1965
5:00 p.m.
The White House

SUBJECT : Visit of President Park, Communique Meeting

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Side

- The President
- William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State, FE
- Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand
- Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
- Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs
- James C. Thomson, NSC
- Robert A. Fearey, Director, East Asian Affairs
- Dr. Paul Crane, Interpreter

Korean Side

- President Park
- Key Young CHANG, Deputy Prime Minister
- Duk Choo MOON, Acting Foreign Minister
- Sung Eun KIM, Minister of National Defense
- Jong Chul HONG, Minister of Information
- Hu Rak LEE, Secretary General to the President
- Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM
- Sang Ho CHO, Interpreter

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	S/P	CINCPAC	FOR POLAD

The President welcomed President Park and congratulated him warmly on his Press Club speech of that noon; he understood that it had been very well received, and this was high praise since the Press Club audience was a tough one.

The President said that Ambassador Brown had forwarded him a letter dated May 7 which contained a check from the Korean people to assist the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-93
By ing NARA, Date 3-1-89

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- 2 -

victims of the tornadoes which had devastated the Midwest in April. The letter indicated that the check was intended both to help the victims of the tornadoes and to strengthen friendship between Korea and the United States. This gift was symbolic of the way the people of the two countries feel about each other. This brotherly and neighborly gesture was worth more to us than millions of dollars; it was deeply touching. The President asked President Park to tell the National Council which had sent the letter and check that the money would be used to assist veterans of the Korean War who had suffered loss of their homes or of members of their families in the tornadoes.

The President said that every chair had been filled at the dinner the previous evening. That morning a number of the guests had told Mrs. Johnson and him how indebted they were for having been included to honor President Park and, through him, the people of Korea. The President said that he and Mrs. Johnson had been much pleased to see how many people had been prepared to travel all the way across the country to attend the dinner.

The President said that the previous day President Park and he, at his initiative, had covered a number of topics which he had thought were of greatest interest to President Park and to the Korean people. The topics had included a status of forces agreement, Korean unification, economic assistance, support of the Korean forces, and assurances that the United States would not withdraw armed forces from Korea, at least without first obtaining the understanding of the Korean Government.

The President said that he and President Park appeared to have pretty well covered the waterfront when they finished. He had asked President Park a number of times whether he had something to raise, and had asked him not to hesitate to do so. He would welcome the President's now raising anything he might wish.

The President said that he and Secretary Rusk had been trying to keep the rebels and the loyalists in the Dominican Republic from attacking each other throughout the night.

President Park said that it might seem a small matter but he wished to note that he had discussed the MAP Transfer Program with the Secretary of Defense at breakfast. Secretary McNamara had said that he understood the difficulty, that he would study the matter further, and that he would keep it under review. President Park said that he would like the President, too, to keep it in mind.

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- 3 -

The President said that he was familiar with the program. He would be happy to make the gesture of eliminating this requirement but this would lead to trouble with Congress. He said that he understood the difficulty, however, and that we would be as understanding as we could.

The President said that he still did not have any indication whether he would have three billion dollars or nothing for military and economic assistance in the coming year. As President Park had noted, he had had to postpone certain visits by friends from other parts of the world because he disliked meeting and discussing problems against a background of such uncertainty over his own appropriations.

President Park said that the Republic of Korea had 600,000 men in its armed forces. These men were well-trained and well-disciplined. He wanted President Johnson to realize that these forces really formed part of U.S. forces ready to fight against Communism. In a fight they would be with the United States; but at the same time they were dependent on U.S. assistance.

The President said that President Park's assurance was very heartening. The President emphasized what he had said the day before: that the action the Koreans have taken in sending forces to Viet-Nam is not only a help to us in Viet-Nam, but also on Capitol Hill.

President Park said he had an additional item to raise, that of Korea's diplomatic relations with African nations. He had discussed this matter with Ambassador Brown. Successful diplomacy in Africa was important to Korea, and on this matter they needed our help; but they could also perhaps be of help to us. This was a subject on which the President had undoubtedly been briefed by his advisors, but President Park wanted to emphasize the cooperative role our two nations might play together in Africa.

President Johnson expressed his appreciation of President Park's offer of mutual assistance and said that we would explore this matter further.

President Park commented that his meeting with the Secretary of State that morning had been very successful; he was sure that the President was informed of the results.

President Johnson asked if there were any other matters that should be discussed. He repeated that U.S. Government officials and the guests at the dinner the night before had deeply appreciated the

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- 4 -

chance to meet with Park. He commented on the Administration's high regard for Ambassador Kim and his wife as strong friends and allies; he said that they fitted into our society with ease and worked with our people most effectively. He wanted to compliment the Ambassador.

President Park expressed his thanks for the role played by Ambassador Brown; he noted that a number of problems had been solved since Ambassador Brown's arrival.

President Johnson responded that Ambassador Brown was one of our most trusted and able officials. He then asked if any of President Park's associates desired to raise any further items -- otherwise they could move on to the communique and then to the reception.

Defense Minister Kim raised the problem of the low state of pay of Korean armed forces; the pay scale was so low, he said, that they faced serious difficulties in morale. The United States should be concerned with this matter in considering these forces as its own troops.

The President said that he was not familiar with this problem but would explore it further with our Secretary of Defense. He said that Congress was pressing for pay increases for our own armed forces, which would be difficult within budgetary limits.

President Park then expressed his thanks for the communique and also for the President's new proposal for an Institute for Technology and Applied Science; he was glad to accept this proposal.

President Johnson noted that the two Presidents belonged to the "same lodge" of school teachers.

Deputy Prime Minister Chang asked if it would be possible to strike out the word "annual" on page 5 of the communique; we might substitute the word "applicable". President Johnson agreed to strike the word "annual" without making a substitution. He added, however, that we would have to be candid with our own press and Congress, as they realize that our assistance is subject to annual legislative review.

Secretary General Lee commented that their side understood our legislative system in this regard. He added that since we had helped the Koreans in this way, they would try to work even harder to make good use of our assistance.

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- 5 -

President Johnson said that if he could always produce documents like this where he went, he would get a lot of votes.

He asked if Ambassador Brown or Ambassador Kim had anything to add; both responded in the negative.

President Johnson asked President Park to tell Mrs. Park that he and Mrs. Johnson were looking forward to seeing them at 7 o'clock at the reception; they would be slightly late, because he had some further business on his schedule. He concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that President Park had enjoyed himself, and that he had found U.S. officials helpful and courteous.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S 8286

May 27, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

144b 2260
1- Thompson
2- Pitt.

OK
as amended
on 8/1, HPI.
Thompson

Memorandum of Conversation between
the President and President Park
of Korea, dated May 18, 1965.

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are
sidelined in blue.

Ok'd BKS
4:30
6/5
Virginia
Halle

Page 1
Page 2
Page 3

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation re Visit
of President Park, Communique
Meeting.

~~SECRET~~ Enclosure

White House:JThomson/FE:EA:RAF Fearey:
bhm

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-93

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NARA. Date 3-1-89

May 18, 1965
5:00 p.m.
The White House

SUBJECT : Visit of President Park, Communique Meeting

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Side

- The President
- William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State, FE
- Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand
- Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
- Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs
- James C. Thomson, NSC
- Robert A. Fearey, Director, East Asian Affairs
- Dr. Paul Crane, Interpreter

Korean Side

- President Park
- Key Young CHANG, Deputy Prime Minister
- Duk Choo MOON, Acting Foreign Minister
- Sung Eun KIM, Minister of National Defense
- Jong Chul HONG, Minister of Information
- Hu Rak LEE, Secretary General to the President
- Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM
- Sang Ho CHO, Interpreter

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The President welcomed President Park and congratulated him warmly on his Press Club speech of that noon; ~~it was the only good news he had received that day, he said,~~ and this was high praise since the Press Club audience was a tough one. *he understood that it had been very well,*

The President said that Ambassador Brown had forwarded him a letter dated May 7 which contained a check from the Korean people to assist the

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received,

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- 2 -

victims of the tornadoes which had devastated the Midwest in April. The letter indicated that the check was intended both to help the victims of the tornadoes and to strengthen friendship between Korea and the United States. This gift was symbolic of the way the people of the two countries feel about each other. This brotherly and neighborly gesture was worth more to us than millions of dollars; it was deeply touching. The President asked President Park to tell the National Council which had sent the letter and check that the money would be used to assist veterans of the Korean War who had suffered loss of their homes or of members of their families in the tornadoes.

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The President said that he and President Park appeared to have pretty well covered the waterfront when they finished. He had asked President Park a number of times whether he had something to raise, and had asked him not to hesitate to do so. He would welcome the President's now raising anything he might wish.

The President said that he and Secretary Rusk had been trying to keep the rebels and the loyalists in the Dominican Republic from attacking each other throughout the night. ~~They had left the Situation Room at 5:30 in the morning. He had called the Secretary at 8:30 and had found him already at breakfast.~~

President Park said that it might seem a small matter but he wished to note that he had discussed the MAP Transfer Program with the Secretary of Defense at breakfast. Secretary McNamara had said that he understood the difficulty, that he would study the matter further, and that he would keep it under review. President Park said that he would like the President, too, to keep it in mind.

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- 3 -

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The President said that President Park's assurance was very heartening. The President emphasized what he had said the day before: that the action the Koreans have taken in sending forces to Viet-Nam is not only a help to us in Viet-Nam, but also on Capitol Hill, ~~where we sometimes have as big a war as we have in Viet Nam.~~

President Park said he had an additional item to raise, that of Korea's diplomatic relations with African nations. He had discussed this matter with Ambassador Brown. Successful diplomacy in Africa was important to Korea, and on this matter they needed our help; but they could also perhaps be of help to us. This was a subject on which the President had undoubtedly been briefed by his advisors, but President Park wanted to emphasize the cooperative role our two nations might play together in Africa.

President Johnson expressed his appreciation of President Park's offer of mutual assistance and said that we would explore this matter further.

President Park commented that his meeting with the Secretary of State that morning had been very successful; he was sure that the President was informed of the results.

President Johnson asked if there were any other matters that should be discussed. He repeated that U.S. Government officials and the guests at the dinner the night before had deeply appreciated the

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- 4 -

chance to meet with Park. He commented on the Administration's high regard for Ambassador Kim and his wife as strong friends and allies; he said that they fitted into our society with ease and worked with our people most effectively. He wanted to compliment the Ambassador.

President Park expressed his thanks for the role played by Ambassador Brown; he noted that a number of problems had been solved since Ambassador Brown's arrival.

President Johnson responded that Ambassador Brown was one of our most trusted and able officials. He then asked if any of President Park's associates desired to raise any further items -- otherwise they could move on to the communique and then to the reception.

Defense Minister Kim raised the problem of the low state of pay of Korean armed forces; the pay scale was so low, he said, that they faced serious difficulties in morale. The United States should be concerned with this matter in considering these forces as its own troops.

The President said that he was not familiar with this problem but would explore it further with our Secretary of Defense. He said that Congress was pressing for pay increases for our own armed forces, which would be difficult within budgetary limits.

President Park then expressed his thanks for the communique and also for the President's new proposal for an Institute for Technology and Applied Science; he was glad to accept this proposal.

President Johnson noted that the two Presidents belonged to the "same lodge" of school teachers.

Deputy Prime Minister Chang asked if it would be possible to strike out the word "annual" on page 5 of the communique; we might substitute the word "applicable". President Johnson agreed to strike the word "annual" without making a substitution. He added, however, that we would have to be candid with our own press and Congress, as they realize that our assistance is subject to annual legislative review.

Secretary General Lee commented that their side understood our legislative system in this regard. He added that since we had helped the Koreans in this way, they would try to work even harder to make good use of our assistance.

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- 5 -

President Johnson said that if he could always produce documents like this where he went, he would get a lot of votes.

He asked if Ambassador Brown or Ambassador Kim had anything to add; both responded in the negative.

President Johnson asked President Park to tell Mrs. Park that he and Mrs. Johnson were looking forward to seeing them at 7 o'clock at the reception; they would be slightly late, because he had some further business on his schedule. He concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that President Park had enjoyed himself, and that he had found U.S. officials helpful and courteous.

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Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

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1- Thomson
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Approved in S
525/65

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

May 18, 1965
10:00 a.m.
Secretary's Office

SUBJECT : Joint Communique to Be Issued by Presidents Johnson and Park
PARTICIPANTS: Korean Side

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-1166
by jw, NARA, Date 7-2-93

President Chung Hee PARK
Deputy Prime Minister Key Young CHANG
Acting Foreign Minister Duk Choo MOON.
Defense Minister Sung Eun KIM
Minister of Information Jong Chul HONG
Presidential Secretary General Hu Rak LEE
Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM
Assembly Defense Committee Chairman Chong Kap KIM
Minister Suk Heun YUN, Korean Embassy
Foreign Ministry American Bureau Director Sang Moon CHANG

American Side

The Secretary
AID Administrator Bell
Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy
Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand
Assistant Administrator for Far East Rutherford Poats
Deputy Assistant Secretary Marshall Green
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Barnett
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert
Robert A. Fearey, Director for East Asian Affairs
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

DISTRIBUTION:

S/S AID/FE G Amembassy SEOUL
FE OSD/ISA CIA Amembassy TOKYO
INR/OD S/P CINCPAC FOR POLAD Amembassy TAIPEI
White House - Mr. Thomson

Secretary Rusk said that he wished to extend to President Park a cordial welcome to the Department of State. He regretted he had not been able to remain at the White House the previous evening to say good-bye, but he had worked in his office until 5:00 a.m. He and his staff and associates were available for any matters the President might wish to raise. He suggested, however, that they might address themselves to the Joint Communique.

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automatically declassified

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- 2 -

President Park thanked Secretary Rusk. He said he had had a very good talk with President Johnson the previous day, and had found that President Johnson had a good understanding of the Korean situation. There remained, however, several problems that should be discussed.

President Park said that President Johnson on the preceding day had agreed that there were no serious problems remaining on the status of forces agreement negotiations. On reduction of UN Forces in Korea, President Johnson had said that he hoped there would not be any reduction, but if there were it would be discussed fully with the Koreans beforehand. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in agreement on what should be said on this point -- that the U.S. would continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea. He also reminded President Park that President Johnson in his welcoming speech on President Park's arrival had said that the U.S. would stand side by side with the Koreans as long as a danger exists.

President Park reported that at breakfast with Secretary McNamara and others, he had discussed the "MAP transfer" problem, which has an effect on the Korean economy and morale. He said he hoped that this problem would be carefully considered in the Communique. He then referred to the phrase "over the next few years" which qualified the \$150 million Development Loan funds in paragraph 9B. He said he understood the appropriation and executive processes that would be involved in use of those funds, but that its inclusion in a public Communique would invite Opposition criticism of his Government.

Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations

Secretary Rusk said he always enjoyed talking with President Park because they were clear in their expressions to one another, and did not waste time. He suggested they address themselves to the status of forces negotiations.

Secretary Rusk said he had a statement to make on those negotiations, and he asked that his remarks be interpreted sentence by sentence. Secretary Rusk said that we should all be pleased to note that several major issues had been resolved during recent weeks. A number of important issues remained to be resolved, however, so it did not seem possible to agree upon the text of an agreement during President Park's stay. It seemed that two principal differences remained -- on the criminal jurisdiction and labor articles. With respect to the criminal jurisdiction article, the Secretary said we had gone as far as we could go on the waiver proposal and trial safeguards, and he believed that the Korean Government should try to meet our position on these two points.

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- 3 -

We were not expressing any lack of confidence, the Secretary went on to say, in the legal systems of the two countries. Our attitude had nothing to do with special arrangements, such as those of the 19th Century period which gave so much trouble. We were not raising issues with regard to tourists, businessmen, or others who were in Korea on a voluntary basis. But where we required men under compulsory military service to serve in Korea -- taking farmers from Kansas and workers from Pittsburgh -- we believed they have the right to protection in situations where they inadvertently have difficulty. The formula we had proposed is the one in effect in Germany where the U.S. has over 200,000 troops, and which has worked well on both sides. It would be difficult to explain why this formula would not be acceptable in Korea. We hoped the Koreans could meet us on this point.

On the labor article, the Secretary said we were prepared to accept the Korean proposal on the right of Korean employees to strike if a labor dispute was not resolved by the end of a 70-day period. A Joint Committee would designate certain essential categories where the right to strike would not be exercised. If the Korean Government was willing to agree to our proposals on the waiver and trial safeguards, then we could announce that agreement in principle had been reached and agreement on the remaining issues could be reached in the very near future.

President Park agreed.

"MAP Transfer" Program

Secretary Rusk then referred to the differences of view regarding reference to the "MAP transfer" program in the Joint Communique. He suggested a further addition to paragraph 5 of the Communique, as follows: "It was agreed that the program should be reviewed each year in light of the condition of the Korean economy." President Park agreed.

Development Loans "over the next few years"

Secretary Rusk said that we all understood what was intended with regard to the Development Loan funds of \$150 million, that the language should not be interpreted as a one-year commitment. It was difficult because on the Korean side there were popular sensitivities, while on our side there was the caution of the U.S. Congress. Last year Korea used \$26 million in development loans, while this year it has used \$46 million. It was important that the development loan language in

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- 5 -

Secretary Rusk made the point that it seemed to him that the basic point to be made was that a Korea-Japan agreement would not mean that the U.S. would run away. We were trying to say so eloquently, and it seemed to him that \$150 million was an eloquent figure.

Secretary General Lee said that he believed it would be better not to use the figure if that required the qualifying words "over the next few years". He said it was well understood that the Korean Government would not use the funds in one year, or extend the use over an indefinite number of years.

Ambassador Brown commented that the Communique would say not that \$150 million would be used over the next few years, but that \$150 million plus additional monies would be used in such a period. It should be easy to explain that.

Secretary Rusk said he was concerned lest there be too wide a gap between the explanations of the Communique by the Korean and U.S. Governments. The Korean Government should be able to explain to its Assembly that the U.S. had created a fund of \$150 million, which would be used as rapidly as possible, and then more monies would be available. This should make it clear that the U.S. was not losing interest in Korea.

At this point the Secretary said he had some matters to discuss with President Park alone. He suggested they step across the hall into his office, and let the other members of the party try to resolve language differences in the meanwhile.

* * * * *

In the absence of President Park and Secretary Rusk, the other participants reached agreement on the following changes:

1) The following sentence was to be added to paragraph 7: "He confirmed that U.S. military and economic assistance to Korea would continue to be extended, as set forth in paragraph 9 below, after normalization of Korean-Japanese relations." Accordingly, the following closing words of the first sentence of paragraph 9 would be deleted: "after the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan."

2) The words "over the next few years" would be deleted in the second sentence of paragraph 9B, and the fifth sentence of that paragraph would be rephrased to begin as follows: "Such development loan

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- 6 -

funds would be made available, in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments, to finance...."

* * * * *

Upon their return, Secretary Rusk said that the Korean Government was getting the money, and would it not give the U.S. Government the words? President Park said he did not understand all the words in the Communique, but he was prepared to trust the U.S. Government. Where would we be if we did not trust one another?

Secretary General Lee asked whether it would not be possible to drop the words "in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments". Secretary Rusk said the U.S. could not drop them.

Secretary Rusk suggested that each side name a coordinator to agree upon the approved text, and named Mr. Green for the U.S. President Park named Acting Foreign Minister Moon for Korea.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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H/b
1. Thomson
2. R.T. G/16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
5/25/65

Memorandum of Conversation
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

DATE: May 18, 1965
11:30 a.m.
Secretary's private
office

SUBJECT: Korea-Japan Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
President Chung Hee PARK of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho CHO, President Park's interpreter
Dr. Paul Crane, interpreter

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FE	INR/OD	White House ✓ - Mr. Thomson	Amembassy TOKYO
S/P	L		CINCPAC FOR POLAD

In the course of private talks on other matters Secretary Rusk referred to the Korea-Japan negotiations, and said that we hoped for an early conclusion. He thought this would be in the interest of both countries. President PARK stated that one of the irritating problems, although it was a small one, in the negotiations was Tokto Island (Takeshima). These are uninhabited rocks in the Sea of Japan that are claimed by both Korea and Japan. Korean security forces actually guard them, and the Koreans believe that they historically belong to Korea. The Japanese believe they have a like claim. President Park said he would like to bomb the island out of existence to resolve the problem. Secretary Rusk stated that there had been rocks out in the ocean which had been bones of contention between the U.S. and Great Britain for over 100 years, but both sides thought they were not important enough to endanger relations for, so they just refused to consider them. He suggested that perhaps a joint Korean-Japanese commanded light house be set up and the problem of to whom it belonged left unanswered, letting it die a natural death. President Park commented that a joint light house with Korea and Japan just would not work.

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Authority NLS OOR-2544-30
By [Signature] NARA, Date 2-3-12

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Crane: bhm
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Copy for: The White House ²³³⁰

Approved by White House
5/28/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

1- Johnson
2- Ret. 6/15
8285
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DATE: May 17, 1965
5:00 p.m.
The White House

SUBJECT: U.S.-Korean Relations

PARTICIPANTS: President Johnson
President Chung Hee Park of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho Cho, President Park's interpreter
Dr. Paul Crane, President Johnson's interpreter

COPIES TO:	FE/VN	AmEmbassy TOKYO	S/P
	INR	" SAIGON	
White House ✓	G/PM	CINCPAC	
S/S	AID/FE	CINCPAC for POLAD	
FE	OSD/ISA	G	
EA	AmEmbassy SEOUL	INR/OD	

President Johnson said that the U.S. planned to extend all possible aid to Korea. It planned to keep its troops there, and no reduction of troop strength was contemplated. However, if there were an adjustment, President Park would be the first to know about it, and full consultation would be held beforehand.

President Johnson congratulated Park on the happy progress of the Korea-Japan negotiations and said that he considered President Park to be the chief ingredient in the success of these negotiations. He felt that it was due to Park's leadership that things had been going so well. He realized that it had been a very tough and touchy problem. He felt that conclusion of the Korea-Japan treaty would also assist our mutual effort in Viet-Nam. President Park said he felt that the Korea-Japan negotiations could be concluded within a month, by early or middle June. He said that there were certain irresponsible people who were trying to block the negotiations, but he felt his public relations and other efforts would ensure conclusion of the agreement.

President Johnson congratulated President Park on his assistance in the struggle in Viet-Nam, and said, with reference to that aid that we would keep in Korea a military strength equivalent to that at present so that, in accordance with our commitments under the 1954 treaty, Korean security would not suffer.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-92
By iq NARA Date 8-29-89

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- 2 -

President Johnson then emphasized how much more difficult it was now to get aid through Congress than it had been 20 years ago when the aid program first began. He said that the 2,000 Korean troops that had been sent to Viet-Nam in his opinion had helped save the aid bill in Congress. He asked President Park whether he felt additional Korean troops could be sent to Viet-Nam from Korea. President Park stated that the Korean Government would have to study that matter. The people in Korea were worried whether they might not invite further activity from North Korea if they weakened the line by sending too many troops to Viet-Nam. However, he said that he personally would like to send more troops to Viet-Nam.

President Johnson then asked President Park if he could send one division. If President Park could raise the commitment to one division, this would help a great deal in the struggle there. President Park repeated that it was his personal feeling that Korea could make larger commitments of troops to Viet-Nam, but this would have to be studied by his Government, and he could not make a commitment on it at this time.

President Johnson said that at the present time he was searching for a diplomatic solution in Viet-Nam. He also hoped that eventually there could be a solution to the problem of the unification of Korea; but this would have to be done under the UN formula of UN supervision of free elections.

President Johnson said he wanted to tell the Korean Government that aid would be assured to that country and that the U.S. would finance essential imports and development loans, technical assistance, and food for peace. The impression the American Government had of Korea had never been better. After his visit to Korea, Dr. Rostow had reported great progress in the economic field.

President Park said he hoped very much that there would be no indication from Washington that there would be any withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. This sort of talk made it very difficult for him to help in Viet-Nam, because his own people became very disturbed any time there was any talk of withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. President Johnson referred to the strong support in the Congress for his Viet-Nam program and said he would see to it that Korea's security is ensured, that troops and money enough will be provided to ensure this in accordance with the 1954 treaty. He said that, if any troops were to be removed from Korea, it would only be done with prior consultation.

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- 3 -

President Johnson said he believed that, if they can get an agreement or some basis for agreement in South Viet-Nam, this would also relieve the pressure from North Korea. He hoped that the Australians, the Filipinos, and New Zealanders would all help in Viet-Nam and he also hoped to get a Korean division into Viet-Nam so that they could get a total of 70,000 to 80,000 troops in Viet-Nam from various nations to be able to win there.

On the status of forces agreement President Johnson stated that Ambassador Brown was working on that problem and that we would follow the same formula as was used in Germany. This had worked very well in Germany and should work well in Korea. He was glad the negotiations were going ahead well; but he did not think they could be concluded during this State Visit. President Park said that he thought these negotiations had gone on too long and were becoming a major irritant to many of his people, particularly the Opposition. He hoped President Johnson would break into the negotiations with an order to somehow bring them to a speedy conclusion.

President Park said 1967 was the last year of his first economic development program and that a second five-year development program was planned. Koreans would need continued assistance from the U.S. to help them with this. President Johnson spoke of the \$100 billion foreign aid which the U.S. had given since World War II to countries overseas and the 160,000 U.S. casualties which we have suffered since World War II. He said there were many people in Congress who had opposed spending this \$100 billion. The way that some countries acted made it very difficult to get aid out of Congress. He said that when Sukarno burns USIA libraries and offices, people in Congress are of a mind to cut off all foreign aid. He considered Korea's conduct very helpful. He said that Park's policy in Korea went all the way in backing up the Viet-Nam effort, and again he stated that this was a great help to him and that it improved the military situation in Viet-Nam.

Asked whether the Koreans had asked any other nations in Asia to help out in Viet-Nam, President Park said no they had not. President Johnson said the U.S. feels the same way about its commitments in Viet-Nam and Korea, and feels that Korea has been the greatest assistance in helping to bring pressure to bear so that other countries like Australia and New Zealand would come in. Britain, he realized, was very much occupied in Malaysia. The President concluded by repeating the hope that Korea would increase its commitment to one division.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 27, 1965

Note for Mr. Smith:

I have reviewed the
Johnson-Park memcon, and
I attach a note of clearance
to Ben Read.

Jim
James C. Thomson, Jr.

May 27, 1965

~~SECRET~~ Enclosure

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Clearance of Memcon between the
President and President Park of Korea

The attached memorandum of conversation is cleared for distribution as indicated, with two amendments (which have already been reported to Mr. Josiah Bennett of FE); substitution of language as indicated in paragraph 3 of page 1; and deletion of paragraph 4 on page 2.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

Att: File #2248

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

148b

May 27, 1965.


~~SECRET~~ Enclosure

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Executive Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

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James C. Thomson, Jr.

Att: File #2248

~~SECRET~~ Enclosure
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S 8285

May 20, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Called 2248
(Jan Jessen)
28 May 65
4:45
-1- Thomson

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Return to
S/S

Approved

revised

BKS

Memorandum of Conversation between
the President and President Park
of Korea, dated May 17, 1965.

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are
sidelined in blue.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation re
U.S.-Korean Relations.

~~SECRET~~ Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 17, 1965
5:00 p.m.
The White House

SUBJECT: U.S.-Korean Relations

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-92

By sig NARA. Date 8-29-89

PARTICIPANTS: President Johnson
President Chung Hee Park of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho Cho, President Park's interpreter
Dr. Paul Crane, President Johnson's interpreter

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	INR	" SAIGON	
White House	G/PM	CINCPAC	
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FE	OSD/ISA	G	
EA	AmEmbassy SEOUL	INR/OD	

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- 2 -

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President Johnson reiterated that Park's leadership had helped him very much in his dealings with Congress on aid problems. The critics of the aid program always were trying to point out that aid did not produce results; but Park's Government and its stand in Viet-Nam was a very strong indication that aid could be well used in building up strong allies.

President Park said he hoped very much that there would be no indication from Washington that there would be any withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. This sort of talk made it very difficult for him to help in Viet-Nam, because his own people became very disturbed any time there was any talk of withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. President Johnson referred to the strong support in the Congress for his Viet-Nam program and said he would see to it that Korea's security is ensured, that troops and money enough will be provided to ensure this in accordance with the 1954 treaty. He said that, if any troops were to be removed from Korea, it would only be done with prior consultation.

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- 3 -

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 29, 1965

- SUBJECT:**
- 1) Impressions of Leader Grant Tour
 - 2) Korea-Japan Settlement
 - 3) Korean Military Assistance in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS:

KIM Yong-t'ae, Assemblyman (Democratic Republican Party "main-stream" faction leader), Leader Grantee
 PAK Kun, Political Counselor, Korean Embassy
 O Sung-hwan, Secretary to Assemblyman Kim
 YI Ki-hyong, Interpreter for Assemblyman Kim
 Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for FE Economic Affairs
 Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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EA	- 4 (3cc)	AA/FE/EA	- 1	Amembassy Tokyo	- 1
FE/VN	- 1	OSD/ISA	- 1	Amembassy Saigon	- 1
CU/FE	- 1	White House (Mr. Thomson)	- 1		
INR	- 8				

22

Impressions of Leader Grant Tour

Mr. Barnett asked Mr. Kim for his principal impressions of the U.S. during his leader grant tour. Kim said that the vastness of the U.S., although he had read and heard of it, exceeded his conception. He had noted how much it was a multi-racial country, yet there was much kindness shown everywhere. Through this kindness, which seemed to him to be the basic national characteristic, and through industriousness, the U.S. had achieved its greatness.

Mr. Barnett said Mr. Kim seemed to have made friends everywhere. Mr. Kim said he had received five keys to cities and two honorary citizenships. The former, which were not given to him so personally as the latter, he proposed to share with others. He planned to give one key to the Korean unit in Viet-Nam together with 2,000 undershirts he was giving, another to his constituency, and others to various cities.

Mr. Barnett said he hoped Mr. Kim had found that the American people have a great sense of identification with Korea. Americans fought side by side with the Koreans, and are now defending with them the Korean frontier, which is as critical to the Americans as to the Koreans. Thousands of Americans have sharp memories of Korea. They also have a strong affection for Korea, and satisfaction and pride as they see Korea moving ahead.

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Korea-Japan Settlement

Mr. Barnett said he was interested in the Korean plans for the final settlement with Japan. He had been twice in Korea recently, and understood very well how difficult it was to establish this settlement. The way the settlement had been handled by the Korean Government in recent weeks, and the Government's efforts to develop popular support for the settlement, had shown high statesmanship. The demonstrations had at first worried him, and he had been relieved to see the Government handle them with restraint.

Mr. Kim said he had frequently telephoned associates in Korea about the Korea-Japan settlement. He first wanted to reiterate that he believed the settlement was not only to the benefit of the Free World as a whole but also to the mutual benefit of Korea and Japan. He said that a recent public opinion poll by the "Tonga Ilbo" indicated that 64 percent favored a settlement. It had originally been planned that ratification would be completed by the end of May, but this was not coming about, because of the Japanese upper house elections. The Koreans would keep pace with the Japanese to an extent and ratify by the end of August. President Pak planned that the signing would take place just about as he departed for his State Visit to the U.S. Commotions based on the settlement would continue, but the Government would carry through on the settlement.

Mr. Barnett commented that he had always thought it highly important that the settlement have wide acceptance. Any effort to push it through without public support would mean problems in the future. At the same time, he had observed in his own system of politics that if debate is too long prolonged public attention is distracted from the main points to many side problems. One must move quickly enough to maintain a focus of interest, and not too quickly to gain support. Too prolonged a debate is just as bad as too short a one.

Korean Military Assistance in Viet-Nam

Mr. Kim said that the U.S. had a greater interest in the Viet-Nam situation than other countries, and unquestionably a far deeper insight into it. There was no question that the war would be won. He was more concerned with the handling of the situation afterward. He said he thought President Johnson's offer to negotiate unconditionally with the Communists had been well conceived to gain domestic political support.

Mr. Kim said that the 2,000 Koreans in Viet-Nam were not enough to maintain their own security. Prudent men of both sides politically in Korea had said that a least a division-size unit was needed for that reason. The unit had already been subjected to a surprise attack. He favored sending additional troops, after the Korea-Japan settlement controversy had passed.

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Mr. Kim said he had told reporters as well as the U.S. Defense Department that he believed the U.S. should not be the only foreign country making sacrifices in Viet-Nam. As in the Korean War, others should come forward to participate in an international force, although not necessarily under the UN. He mentioned in particular the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Their participation would enhance unity of policy on Viet-Nam and make victory more significant psychologically. He said he understood some 24 nations were making contributions in Viet-Nam, but many of them were giving only agricultural supplies or boxes of medicines, which certainly would not help much toward victory.

Mr. Barnett said that the U.S. believes the issue in Viet-Nam involves the security of the Far East and of the world as a whole. The issue is whether Communist aggression will succeed or fail. The troop issue is important and requires much consultation. He expressed his great appreciation of Korea's declaration of common cause with us.

Mr. Barnett said he noted Mr. Kim had not mentioned the Government of the Republic of China among the countries he believed should contribute, and asked whether that had been because Mr. Kim forgot to mention it, or deliberate. Mr. Kim said it had been deliberate. It would not be wise to give the Chinese Communists a pretext to fight against the Chinese Nationalists in Viet-Nam.

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E. J. Bennett:mfb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in M
4/26/65

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 16, 1965

SUBJECT: Long-Term U.S. Commitment to Korea; Consultative Group; Morse Amendment; Aid to Southeast Asia; "MAP Transfer"

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Ambassador, Embassy of Korea
Pyong Whi MIN, First Secretary, Embassy of Korea
Under Secretary Mann
Mr. William T. Pryce, Staff Assistant, M
Josiah W. Bennett, Deputy Director, Office of East Asian Affairs

COPIES TO:

S/S	EA-3	Amembassy SEOUL	White House
G	E	AID/FE/EA	
S/P	H	Amembassy TOKYO	
FE-4	INR/OD		

During a courtesy call on Under Secretary Mann April 16 Ambassador Kim referred to the student demonstrations now taking place in Seoul against a Korea-Japan settlement, saying that although the demonstrations are getting worse, he thought President Pak would be able to control them. The Ambassador went on to explain why the students were against a settlement with Japan. Rightly or wrongly, they are convinced that a settlement with Japan would mean that the U.S. is shifting its responsibilities in Korea to Japan. This is why the ROKG hopes that the U.S. will agree not to remove its divisions from Korea and to maintain its economic aid, including PL 480, for a reasonable period of time.

Mr. Bennett noted that one of the purposes that would be achieved by President Pak's State Visit in mid-May was to demonstrate continuing U.S. support for Korea. Mr. Mann told the Ambassador that we were hopeful that a statement expressing our continued commitment to assist Korea could be arranged in connection with the President's visit.

Ambassador Kim mentioned the proposed Consultative Group on aid to Korea and said that the Japanese for reasons he did not know were holding off from participation until after the Korea-Japan settlement. The Ambassador hoped that formation of the Group could be speeded up. Mr. Mann said that he had no information for the Ambassador on this subject.

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NLJ 92-166
By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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Ambassador Kim then mentioned the Morse amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, recently reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which calls for a special committee to review the whole question of foreign aid. cause
Mr. Mann assured the Ambassador that this amendment should give him no immediate /
for concern. The amendment had not yet passed the Senate as a whole; and the
Senate Committee's action did not mean action by the House of Representatives.
Even if the amendment did pass Congress, it would not mean the end of foreign
aid.

Mr. Mann said that there is a minority in Congress, and has been all along,
which is opposed to foreign aid; but this group does not speak for Congress as
a whole.

we regard Korea as a
staunch friend of the United States, one with whom the U.S. has especially
close and friendly ties. Korea need not worry about our support.

Ambassador Kim referred to Ambassador Lodge's impending visit to Korea and
said that he wanted Mr. Mann to know that Korea was ready to assist in President
Johnson's projected aid program to Southeast Asia. Korea does not have much
capital to contribute to such a program but it does have trained manpower which
could be used. Mr. Mann thanked the Ambassador for his offer but pointed out
that it would be some time yet before anyone knows what the proposed program of
aid to Southeast Asia will look like. It will not be possible to give a
meaningful answer to the Ambassador's suggestion until the program has taken shape.

At the end of the call Ambassador Kim brought up the subject of "MAP
transfer," explaining that this program as now envisaged placed too great a
burden on the Korean budget. Mr. Bennett mentioned that it was presently
planned to transfer from MAP to the ROK budget a total of about \$40 million in
gradually increasing bites over the next five years. We feel that this transfer
program is necessary in view of the attitude in the Congress on foreign aid; and
we believe that over the long run it will bring benefits to the Korean economy
and lead to increased employment. There was then a discussion of the relation
between MAP transfer and budgetary support. Mr. Mann concluded by telling
Ambassador Kim that he would look into the matter for him.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

S/S 4434

March 25, 1965

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
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation
between the President and
Korean Foreign Minister LEE

Enclosed for White House approval is a memorandum of conversation between the President and Korean Foreign Minister LEE.

The President's remarks are sidelined in blue.

Assistant Secretary Bundy has reviewed this memorandum of conversation.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 17, 1965

SUBJECT: The Korean Foreign Minister's Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy
Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand, Chief of Protocol
Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, American Ambassador to Korea
Tong Won LEE, Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea
Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM, Korean Ambassador

COPIES TO:

S/S INR/OD Amembassy SEOUL
G White House Amembassy TOKYO
S/P Amembassy SAIGON
FE-4

Foreign Minister LEE expressed the warm appreciation of his government and people for the help given them by the United States. He congratulated the President on the firm policy now being pursued by the United States in South Viet-Nam and said that the United States could count on firm Korean support in good times and bad, especially the latter when it would be most needed.

The President expressed great appreciation for the prompt and generous contribution being made by Korea in support of the efforts of the United States and the Government of Viet-Nam in South Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister said that Korea would contribute more if it were needed.

The Foreign Minister expressed the determination of his government shortly to conclude a satisfactory settlement with Japan and the hope that Korea could count on continued U.S. support thereafter. The President congratulated him on progress made and said Korea could count on continued U.S. support.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-168
By JW, NARA, Date 6-23-93

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

March 23, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

*W.A. Henderson
for*

Attached for your information and files is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Lee of Korea dated 3/15/65 re Current Korean Problems.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

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*C. Cooper
J. Ref*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S
3/22/65

DATE: March 15, 1965

SUBJECT: Current Korean Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Tong Won LEE, Foreign Minister of Korea
Hyun Chul KIM, Ambassador of Korea
~~PARTICIPANTS~~ Sang Moon CHANG, Europe-America Bureau Director, Korean Foreign Office
The Secretary
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Winthrop G. Brown, Ambassador to Korea
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Robert A. Fearey, Director for East Asian Affairs

COPIES TO:
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FE DOD/ISA Amembassy MANILA
E White House ✓

After an exchange of greetings, the Secretary said that he had been looking forward to a discussion of a number of problems with Foreign Minister LEE. He invited the Foreign Minister to lead off.

Viet-Nam

Foreign Minister Lee said that he did not want to take time for a long speech of appreciation for all the help which the U.S. had given Korea in the past. The Secretary said that he wished to express our gratitude for the solidarity which the Republic of Korea had shown in Viet-Nam, which was of great importance to the Free World position there. The Foreign Minister said that much was owed to Ambassador Brown's assistance in securing the Korean Assembly's approval of the resolution on dispatch of Korean forces to Viet-Nam. There were always a number of "stoneheads" in the Assembly ready to cause trouble. The Secretary said that not only is there the practical contribution the Korean forces make to our collective strength in South Viet-Nam, but they are also a reminder of what North Viet-Nam is trying to do in South Viet-Nam. This form of aggression has happened before and should be of concern to all small countries.

Foreign Minister Lee said that President Park and the Korean Government as a whole were happy to have the opportunity of being of some assistance in preserving peace in that part of the world. The Korean people appreciate the

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United States' endeavors in South Viet-Nam, and are getting more optimistic as a result of United States measures against the sources of Viet Cong strength in North Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister said that he hoped the U.S. would continue to be a little tougher in Viet-Nam, applying a firm policy against the guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam and its main sources in North Viet-Nam. As long as the U.S. remains on the right course Korea would be happy to continue its support, on a bigger scale than now if required. There was no intention to support the DeGaulle approach to the South Viet-Nam situation. Quite a number of people still favor a negotiated approach. Korea too desires a settlement in Viet-Nam but it was hard to see what one could get out of such negotiations. The Foreign Minister said that his country was very concerned over the situation in Viet-Nam because whatever happened there would affect South Viet-Nam's Asian neighbors, first in Southeast Asia and later in Korea. Ultimately Japan too would be affected, not physically but psychologically.

The Secretary said that men continue to come from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. This just had to stop. But there was no sign of its stopping. So we were going to have some trouble. The Foreign Minister said that the same sort of situation existed in Korea in 1950. The only way it could be stopped was through demonstration of America's determination backed by force. This increased the Korean people's own determination to fight against North Korea. The Secretary recalled that he was closely involved in the events of 1950, having been at dinner with the Secretary of the Army when news of the North Korean attack came.

Secretary Rusk said that the Vietnamese situation presented difficulties for our side, but also for the other side. We should not underestimate the serious difficulties the other side faces. We of course hope very much to achieve a Government in Saigon which can bring a measure of stability and unity. There is much instability and confusion in Saigon, which though confined to perhaps 200-400 principal / leaders gets in the way of international support, and also impairs the morale of the American people on Viet-Nam. Most importantly, it sends the wrong message to Hanoi. Hanoi interprets the confusion to mean that if it persists in its present course it will succeed. The Secretary expressed the hope that the Korean Government in its contacts with South Viet-Nam would emphasize the importance of unity and the need for a strong base in order to achieve a strong program of action against North Korea.

Foreign Minister Lee said that if the U.S. Government remains firm in its determination to clean up the Vietnamese problem, including achievement of a stable South Vietnamese Government, the Korean Government would have no hesitation in supporting U.S. Viet-Nam policies to the end. At the same time, some Koreans are worried. Korea sent troops to Viet-Nam to support victory.

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Korea seeks to work with the U.S. to prevent Communist infiltration there and to preserve freedom, but if the U.S. hesitates in applying positive measures the Opposition will attack and the Park Government will be in trouble. The Korean people will ask why Korea sent its boys to Viet-Nam for such a dishonorable result. The Foreign Minister said that notwithstanding these popular concerns, the Korean Government has confidence in U.S. leadership and steadfastness.

The Secretary observed that there had been some speeches by Senators and others critical of our Viet-Nam policies but these speeches reflected the views only of a small minority. The Joint Resolution adopted by Congress last August by a vote of 502 to 2 remained the center of our Viet-Nam policies.

Korea-Japan Settlement

The Secretary congratulated Foreign Minister Lee on the progress of the discussions with Japan. Initialling of the Basic Relations Treaty had been a very important step. He hoped that Korea and Japan were close to a final settlement. The U.S. had been very strongly interested in a settlement for some years. Delay itself was costly.

Foreign Minister Lee said that recently there had been very satisfactory developments, though the US might be of assistance in producing a satisfactory and speedy result. Mr. Bundy had been of great assistance during his visits to Korea and Japan last fall. Ambassador Brown had also been doing very effective work behind the scenes. The Basic Relations Treaty concluded a few weeks ago dealt with the most fundamental and important issues, which were now settled. A few minor issues, such as fisheries, the status of Korean residents in Japan, and economic cooperation and trade relations still remained. The Korean Government was negotiating with Japan for a quick settlement of all these issues.

The Foreign Minister said that he planned to stop in Tokyo for three days on his way back to Korea, when he would try to bring an end to the long-drawn-out negotiations and sign an agreement. He had told this to Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina. (The Foreign Minister interjected that Prime Minister Sato had asked him to convey his personal greetings to the Secretary.) Sato had said that Korea should make concessions on the fisheries question. The Foreign Minister said that he had told Sato that fisheries were a little matter and that making small concessions in such a little matter should present little difficulty for Japan. In Korea, however, the issue meant a lot, emotionally and politically. It was Japan's fault that this was so, because of its actions of the past half century. The Foreign Minister said he told Sato that Korea needs not just normal relations with Japan but

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good relations. Conclusion of the negotiations was very important, but it was even more important that the treaty be accepted by the Korean people. Korea did not want a treaty that caused instability and which might shake the foundations of the Park Government. The Korean people were very emotional on the subject of Japan; Japan should take this fact into account.

The Foreign Minister said that Foreign Minister Shiina had said that maybe it was still too early for a settlement. Foreign Minister Lee said he had replied that Korea and Japan had been talking for the past 14 years and had no more to say. If Japan was prepared to proceed in a spirit of concessions the agreement could be concluded in two hours and signed in half a minute. Shiina nevertheless continued to express doubt that a settlement could be achieved so soon.

The Secretary asked when Foreign Minister Lee planned to return to Tokyo. The Foreign Minister replied that he would arrive there March 23. He had told Sato and Shiina that they should bring a pistol and kill him if a settlement were not achieved -- his loss of face would be so great he could not return to Korea. The Secretary demurred, saying that this would set a dangerous precedent among Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Minister said he was sure the Japanese would try very hard to reach agreement. Now was the best time, the golden opportunity.

The Secretary observed that strong propaganda had been coming out of Pyongyang and Peiping against a settlement. He asked what influence this propaganda had in the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister replied that it had none. He said that when Shiina was recently in Korea there were no big demonstrations but that when he (Lee) was recently in Japan there had been demonstrations wherever he went. The demonstrations in Japan were by Communists, directed from Peiping. In Korea, on the other hand, the demonstrations were of a nationalistic nature growing out of Korea's past humiliating experience with Japan. The two should not be confused. The opportune time for a settlement had arrived in Korea. The Park regime is very stable and in a good position, and the people are enlightened on the question of a settlement with Japan, understanding the necessity for good relations with Japan. They appreciate the economic benefits which such a settlement would bring Korea. The atmosphere is good and it is most important that the existing momentum not be lost.

The Secretary asked whether Foreign Minister Lee's initialling of the Basic Relations Treaty had caused an adverse reaction in Korea. The Foreign Minister said that it had not, because the treaty was acceptable to the Korean public. He said that the Korean people were poor but well educated; they were enlightened enough to have sound judgment on certain things.

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The Foreign Minister went on to say that a couple of words in Foreign Minister Shiina's arrival statement had helped a good deal. Shiina had said that he was sorry for the past and looked to a new and different future. Shiina was the first Japanese ever to say that, and his statement had had a most helpful effect. It was most important that solutions of remaining issues be acceptable to the Korean people; otherwise the whole purpose of the settlement would be defeated. Korea did not ask that the U.S. apply pressure to Japan — he knew that we could not do that — but he did hope that we would talk frankly with the Japanese. This would be much appreciated by the Korean Government.

The Secretary said that he would take note of the Foreign Minister's comments. He observed that we had been talking to the Japanese concerning a settlement during the four years that he had been Secretary, and before that time.

Situation in North Korea

The Secretary asked what was going on in North Korea. The Foreign Minister replied that the Korean Government's information was limited. The North Koreans let out very little information on the situation there. Available information indicated, however, that the North Korean military forces were still strong, in fact stronger than ever. There was still a state of tension at the DMZ. Living conditions were not good but the fundamental economic situation was good. The regime had close relations with Peiping, much closer than with Moscow.

The Secretary asked how large a presence Peiping maintained in North Korea. How many Chinese Communist technical people were there? The Foreign Minister replied that there were some but he did not know the number. Peiping provided a certain amount of grant assistance and loans, which had also previously been received from Moscow.

Status of Forces Agreement

Foreign Minister Lee said that he wished to raise the still unresolved matter of a U.S.-Korea SOFA. The Korean Government was anxious to finalize the agreement. Concluding it would not bring Korea anything from the United States except legal restrictions but it would be very useful politically. The Korean people were suspicious that with the conclusion of a settlement the U.S. would seek to reduce its responsibilities in Korea, turning them over to Japan. The Korean Government knew this would not be the case but the people were suspicious. Conclusion of a SOFA would give the impression that the U.S. was extending its commitment in Korea instead of withdrawing, that it was bringing something in in its suitcase instead of taking something away.

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The Foreign Minister said that for this reason it would be very helpful if a SOFA could be concluded by the end of March or in April. Spring is a difficult period in Korea, when Korean politics are hot and anything can happen. Announcement of the favorable conclusion of a SOFA at that time would create a very good impression among the Korean people, helping to counterbalance their concerns growing out of a settlement with Japan. It would be desirable if President Park could initial the agreement in Washington. Foreign Minister Lee said that he knew we were not accustomed to initialling such agreements in Washington. Korea, however, is a poor country and always expects presents on the return of its leaders. It was much to be hoped that the SOFA could be used for this purpose, and that the U.S. would not be too narrow-minded in the matter.

Mr. Bundy said that the Korean SOFA had been discussed at Baguio and that every effort was being made to finalize the agreement as soon as possible. The Secretary said we would do our very best. We too wanted the agreement behind us. Status of forces questions raised troublesome problems all over the world. The presence of U.S. forces sometimes raises difficulties, even in our own country.

U.S. Commitments to the Republic of Korea

Turning to the question of U.S. commitments to Korea, the Secretary said that in one sense he did not know what we could say that would be of help. Since World War II the U.S. had taken 160,000 casualties, most of them in Korea. He suggested that any Koreans who doubt our commitment visit some of our cemeteries in Korea, if they want to know what our commitment means. Basic questions of integrity are involved. He hoped the Koreans themselves would help to meet this problem. He was concerned that if we repeated our commitment too often doubts might be generated. He had been asked at his last press conference whether the U.S. could defend Korea. He had replied that the Korean and U.S. forces together could defend Korea. He was sure that the other side knew this and hoped that the Republic of Korea did not doubt it.

The Foreign Minister said that the Korean Government had no doubt, but that he was concerned about the Korean public. There was much in what the Secretary had said, but the public forgets and repetition of the U.S. commitment could be very helpful at this stage in connection with the Korea-Japan negotiations. The Secretary said that he was sure that President Johnson and President Park would take the occasion of President Park's visit to join in a strong reaffirmation of our commitments to each other. The Secretary said he would look personally into the matter of the SOFA and that we would do our best.

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Republic of Korea Exports

The Secretary said that we were much encouraged by the Republic of Korea's expanding exports. The Foreign Minister said that they had increased markedly, but faced two handicaps. Japan was close by and had a large capacity to absorb Korean products but imposed restrictions on the import of Korean products. This was under current discussion in the Korea-Japan trade talks. At the same time Japan was a very effective, tough and skillful competitor in Asian markets. The Foreign Minister said that Japan should be more generous toward Korean products, lifting its restrictions on Korean imports into Japan and doing more to afford Korean products a favorable market elsewhere in Asia. The U.S. Government too, in addition to its aid, should do more to assist the expansion of Korean exports.

The Secretary asked what the Republic of Korea's principal exports were. Ambassador Kim replied that they were seafood, going mostly to Japan, and textiles, going largely to the U.S., on which the U.S., however, had placed quota restrictions. Korea also exported radios, tires, tubes and other products to Southeast Asia and Europe. The target for Korean exports in the current Korean fiscal year was \$170 million. The Ambassador thought that this target would be easily reached and that a rate of \$200 million would be achieved by the end of the fiscal year. The Secretary said that this was an outstanding achievement, particularly when one looked back to the level of Korea's exports four years ago. Ambassador Brown noted that Korean exports at that time were only \$25 million.

Waste of Korean Manpower

Foreign Minister Lee said that Korea had a large quantity of manpower on "endless vacation" due to the lack of jobs. This was a big waste for the Free World. Secretary Rusk asked whether, in connection with educated Korean unemployed, Korea was familiar with our land grant universities, which were started to contribute to our economic and cultural development. A by-product of these universities was that many of our educated people were prepared to work with their hands; education was not allowed to become a barrier to such work. The Secretary observed that in many countries there was a strong aristocratic tradition against manual labor, and asked whether this was a problem in Korea, i.e. whether educated Koreans were willing to work in their shirtsleeves alongside farmers and industrial workers.

Foreign Minister Lee thought that most educated Koreans, if afforded opportunity to perform farming, handicraft or other manual labor, would be very glad to do so. At present, however, such people were greatly discouraged. He hoped the Secretary would keep this problem in mind. In the U.S. there was too much money and too little men; in Korea the situation was reversed. The Secretary observed that the U.S. had nearly 4 million unemployed but that most were untrained.

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U.S. Immigration Legislation

The Secretary said that we were optimistic that Congress will approve changes in our immigration laws, including elimination of the Pacific Triangle. Korea would be affected by these changes, which we hoped would be approved at this session of Congress. He hoped that the amendments would be well received in Korea.

Foreign Ministers' Conference

Foreign Minister Lee noted that the Korean Government had proposed an Asian Foreign Ministers' Conference which he hoped would be held in Korea. Invitations had been issued to nine countries. A few days previously a preparatory meeting had been held in Bangkok, presided over by Foreign Minister Thanat. Foreign Minister Lee said he had talked with Thanat about the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Seoul last November or December; he was sure that Thanat had run the preparatory meeting well. The reason the Korean Government had proposed the Conference was that it thought the time had come for free Asian nations to get together to discuss family affairs. For a long time those nations had relied on U.S. assistance and support, and now it was time for them to be of some help to the U.S., particularly if they could unite. The Foreign Minister said he was very glad the U.S. Government had decided to support the success of the Conference. Thus far information on the preparatory meeting indicated it had gone well. He hoped the U.S. would continue to support the idea.

The Foreign Minister said that he had discussed the matter with President Macapagal, explaining that Korea sought merely to continue what the Philippine Government had started in 1962. Macapagal had appreciated this point but appeared to desire that the Conference be held in Manila where it would enhance his prestige for coming elections.

The Foreign Minister said Japan had been negative on the Conference idea. He had had a good discussion of the matter with Foreign Minister Shiina in Seoul. He had reminded Shiina that Japan's big brother, the U.S. had been very generous to Japan, sometimes sacrificing itself for the younger brother's strength and stability. Now Japan was the big brother in Asia, but it had been too selfish, mainly looking after its own prosperity. It was time that Japan shared the responsibility heretofore borne by the U.S. In proposing the Conference, Korea, a small nation, was not attempting to establish hegemony over Asia. It appreciated its relatively minor position vis-a-vis Japan and accorded Japan respect as a big brother. Shiina had been concerned that the Conference might involve military purposes. Foreign Minister Lee said he had told him that Korea had a military alliance with the U.S. which was quite sufficient and that it needed no other. Shiina had said that he would consider the matter.

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In response to a question by the Secretary on Malaysia's attitude toward the Conference, the Foreign Minister said that he had discussed the matter with the Tunku who had changed his mind and agreed to attend, on condition that efforts would be made up to the last moment to persuade Japan to come in. The Tunku said that personally speaking he had no respect for Japan.

The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Minister and he continue their discussion at lunch.

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Approved in U
3/15/65

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 11, 1965

SUBJECT: United States-Korea Policy Questions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-1166

By pm, NARA, Date 8-10-92

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Ambassador of Korea
Dr. Kun Pak, Counselor, Embassy of Korea

George W. Ball, Under Secretary
Robert A. Fearey, Director, EA

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	EA	Vice President's Office	
	INR/OD	Amembassy SEOUL	

After greeting Ambassador Kim, Under Secretary Ball said that he was looking forward to Foreign Minister Lee's visit the following week. The Ambassador said that he was sure that the visit would further strengthen U.S.-Korea relations. He added that although he had arrived in Washington over two months ago, he had regrettably not called on the Under Secretary, who had been in Europe at the time. Now that the Foreign Minister was arriving, followed in May by President Park's State Visit, he had been particularly anxious to call on the Under Secretary.

Under Secretary Ball said that we were grateful for Korea's assistance in South Viet-Nam. He understood that part of the forces had already arrived. He asked how the Ambassador saw the development of Korea's relations with Japan.

Ambassador Kim said he understood the recent negotiations in Tokyo had proceeded well. There was still some difficulty over fisheries, but he believed these could be untangled before the end of March. The Under Secretary said that the U.S. believed that a Korea-Japan settlement would have great value.

Ambassador Kim said that President Park was determined to achieve a settlement, which it was hoped might be ratified in May. Some trouble was expected in Korea in connection with a settlement, but most of the Korean people believe that this time a settlement must be achieved. The Ambassador said that in conversation with Assistant Secretary Bundy some time ago he had asked that the U.S. do something to alleviate public hesitation in Korea on a settlement. What this U.S. action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

might be, he did not yet know. The Under Secretary said that he would discuss the matter with Mr. Bundy on his return.

Ambassador Kim said that he had also discussed the situation in South Viet-Nam with Mr. Bundy. A long stalemate there would have a serious psychological effect in Korea. The South Vietnamese were worried about what would happen to them if they stuck their necks out to help and then the U.S. withdrew. The Korean people were similarly concerned, not knowing what the U.S. would do in South Viet-Nam. President Johnson had shown his determination to see things through and this had reassured the Korean people, who were now less worried. The Under Secretary said that the Korean Government and people should take very seriously the determination of the U.S. Government to see things through in South Viet-Nam.

We see difficulties and dangers ahead but the danger of withdrawing would be even greater.

Ambassador Kim said that one purpose of Foreign Minister Lee's visit is to ascertain U.S. policy toward Korea after the settlement with Japan. A settlement would result in an inflow of approximately \$50 million worth of Japanese resources a year. The Korean people were worried that the U.S. would as a result cut down its aid. The Foreign Minister would accordingly seek reassurances on this point. Under Secretary Ball said that we would be prepared to discuss this matter fully with Foreign Minister Lee.

Ambassador Kim said that the Korean Government would be willing to provide additional troops for South Viet-Nam if the South Vietnamese Government felt there was need for such troops. Under Secretary Ball said that we would have to wait to see how the situation develops there and what the requirements will be. The troops already contributed by Korea were most welcome and helpful.

Ambassador Kim said that the Republic of Korea has a large number of skilled young people without adequate employment. The Korean Government was prepared to send these people to Africa and other less developed areas but was handicapped in this effort by lack of foreign exchange. The Government hoped that the U.S. would be able to finance such projects. Ambassador Kim said that he had taken the matter up with Assistant Secretary Bundy and with the Vice President, both of whom had said that they wished to consider it. The Under Secretary said that it was a very interesting idea and that he would discuss it with Mr. Bundy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador Kim
Chester L. Cooper

I saw Ambassador Kim at 5:00 o'clock yesterday afternoon. I informed him that the President had agreed to see Foreign Minister Lee the latter part of March. He was ecstatic. He was aware that the President saw few foreign ministers.

Kim told me that he had just been informed that there was a good likelihood that the Korean-Japanese settlement would be "finalized" on the 10th of March when Lee passed through Tokyo on his way to Washington. Kim felt this might be pushing it a bit but, in any case, the settlement would certainly be worked out before the end of March.

Kim said he had talked to State (Protocol) about the possibility of Mrs. Park remaining here for approximately three weeks after the official visit (Mrs. Park is very much interested in social work, and wants to look into various programs in this country). There was a problem about financing; the Department was looking into it. I was sure that every effort would be made to help Korea out on this problem, but that the Department faced the problem of precedent. I asked him to let me know how the problem was resolved.

Kim asked if there would be any interest in a Korean offer of combat troops for Vietnam. Since he was scheduled to see the Army Chief of Staff sometime soon, I suggested that he indicate Korea's willingness to General Johnson. I told him that there was no present intent to use Third Country ground forces.

Kim is scheduled to see the Vice President on 10 March, at which time he will raise the question of Mr. Humphrey visiting Korea (Park will apparently deliver a formal invitation when he arrives).


Chester L. Cooper

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WASHINGTON

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Kim
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January 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador Kim
CIA Director Kim
Chester L. Cooper

Ambassador Kim called and asked me to meet with CIA Director Kim on the afternoon of Thursday, January 14. I told the Director that we had been watching the progress of his Agency over the years and were pleased to find it becoming a competent, professional and non-political organization.

I asked the Director if there were any particular matters that he wished to raise. There were three. The first was his concern about cutbacks on Korean aid programs. I went into considerable detail on the history of our aid to Korea and the interest and concern of the President and other key officials in Korean economic prospects. I pointed out that the President was anxious to reduce our tremendous burden of foreign aid and that, while we had no intention of ignoring Korean problems, Korea as well as every other aid recipient was under increasingly closer scrutiny. I pointed out that our military and economic aid program to Korea was one of the largest. Although I didn't know the details of the present program, I was sure that Korea would not suffer. I gave them a copy of the President's aid message.

The second matter was Vietnam. He assured me that President Pak considered Vietnam as a very high priority problem and was willing to do almost anything that President Johnson requested. I told him of the President's keen interest in and appreciation of the forthcoming Korean contribution and that we all look forward to the arrival of the Korean contingent in early February. In this connection, Ambassador Kim asked if we could arrange to have some of the materials (e. g. , cement) needed in

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Vietnam purchased in Korea. I pointed out that this was consistent with our approach to the MAP Transfer Program and that Korea would, as a result, be in a much better position a few years from now to provide such materials. But I assured him I would look into the present possibility.

The final subject (undoubtedly prompted by the Ambassador) was a run-down on the Sato visit. I was aware that the Ambassador had gotten a briefing from Marshall Green and gave them pretty much the same story. The Ambassador was especially interested in whether we had mentioned the Japan-Korea settlement to the Japanese. I told him that the President and Sato had an hour alone and that I wasn't certain what had transpired in that session, but that the Secretary had dealt with the matter in his discussions with the Japanese party.

I told Ambassador Kim that we had been thinking about his request for a Pak visit in April and that, while we were sympathetic with President Pak's desire to come at that time, we were not yet certain of the President's schedule. In any case, we hoped to get a better reading on the progress of Korea-Japan relations before we could give a definite answer.


Chester L. Cooper

cc: William Bundy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMIT DISTRIBUTION (Attachment)

January 4, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information and files is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Kim and William P. Bundy dated December 26 regarding Possible Visit to the U.S. by the Korean President.

Attachment:

As stated.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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This document consists of...
Number...

Memorandum of Conversation

3

DATE: December 26, 1964

SUBJECT: Possible Visit to the U.S. by the Korean President

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Korean Ambassador
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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Ambassador KIM asked Mr. Bundy whether any decision had been reached regarding a possible visit by President PAK to the U.S. Mr. Bundy said none had yet been reached, and that in considering the visit thought was being given to its timing. His own individual view was that if the visit were to be used in connection with a Korea-Japan settlement, the best time would be immediately after the conclusion of the agreement and before its ratification. The visit would, of course, have to be fitted into President Johnson's schedule. He knew of no obstacle to it. The timing, however, would have to depend upon an assessment as to when the issues under negotiation between Korea and Japan were likely to be resolved, and, as in all difficult negotiations, this would be difficult to predict.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-166
By fw, NARA, Date 8-10-92

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachments)

December 9, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *with Henderson*
Executive Secretary

Attached for the information and files of MR. KOMER are two memoranda of conversation between William P. Bundy and Hyun Chul KIM dated December 2 regarding:

1. Korea-Japan Settlement, and
2. Possibility of State Visit by Korean President to the U.S. in the Spring of 1965.

Attachments:

As stated.

Let's tell Park he can come after a settlement, not before.
PAK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachments)

DEC 10 1964

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

6

DATE: December 2, 1964

SUBJECT: Korea-Japan Settlement

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-166

By ju, NARA, Date 8-10-92

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Korean Ambassador
Kun PAK, Counselor, Korean Embassy
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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	AA/FE/EA	- 1		

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Ambassador KIM said that the Korean Government was determined to conclude a settlement with Japan, before the end of February if possible. There was no question that the Government will do everything it can to reach an agreement. Establishment of normal relations with Japan is a cornerstone of the Korean Government's foreign policy. The success of the negotiations depended upon new Japanese Prime Minister Sato.

Ambassador Kim urged that the U.S. be generous in support of the Korean Government during this period, to strengthen its ability to carry through an agreement with Japan. The Opposition, elements of the intelligentsia, and the students would raise difficulties, and the spring hunger season would be troublesome. He urged in particular early and generous action on a PL 480 agreement for Korea (see separate memcon).

Ambassador Kim said that the Republic of Korea was contributing to the defense of Japan. Mr. Bundy agreed, and pointed out that in his recent speech in Japan he had stressed that the defense of Korea was inseparable from the defense of Japan. Ambassador Kim said he had advised President PAK that Korea should develop military cooperation and consultation with Japan. He had pointed out that the times had changed, and suggested that basic attitudes be reexamined. Mr. Bundy said this was an interesting suggestion and should be studied. He said this looked beyond a settlement. Ambassador Kim said it could not be brought up until after a settlement between Korea and Japan. Mr. Bundy agreed, saying that the settlement should first be completed and the Korean and Japanese public satisfied with it.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)
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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 2, 1964

SUBJECT: Possibility of State Visit by Korean President to the U.S. in the Spring of 1965

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-166
By , NARA, Date 8-10-92

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun Chul KIM, Korean Ambassador
Kun PAK, Counselor, Korean Embassy
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, EA/K

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Ambassador KIM said that before his departure from Seoul President Chung Hee PARK and Prime Minister Il Kwon CHUNG had asked him to approach the U.S. Government regarding a possible visit to the U.S. by the President in the spring of 1965, perhaps in April. He said that Ambassador Brown had indicated he would do his best to secure favorable consideration of this suggestion. He explained that the timing was tied in with the Korea-Japan talks. The Korean Government was determined to conclude a settlement with Japan, before the end of February if possible. It expected trouble from the Opposition, elements of the intelligentsia, and students when the agreement was concluded. Mr. Bundy commented that he understood the students would be on vacation until March 1, and the Ambassador confirmed that the students are on vacation from the end of December to the beginning of March. The Ambassador continued that a state visit by President Park to the United States after the Korea-Japan settlement would help soothe the internal situation in Korea.

Mr. Bundy said that the U.S. had had the possibility of such a visit in mind. The President's schedule probably would be decided upon in the near future, and we would endeavor to place this proposal very high on it. He recalled that President Park had visited the U.S. in 1961, and had made a brief but much-appreciated visit to attend the funeral of the late President Kennedy in 1963.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

September 25, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

MRH

Attached for the information of MR. KOMER is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Yim Yun-yong and Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE, regarding Korea dated September 14, 1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

SEP 25 1964

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Emb. Seoul

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-205
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-5-02

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 14, 1964
Seoul, Korea
Prime Minister's Office

SUBJECT: Korea

PARTICIPANTS: The Prime Minister
Mr. YIM Yun-yong,
Principal Secretary to
the Prime Minister
(interpreting)

Mr. Robert W. Barnett,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Department of State
Edward W. Doherty,
Deputy Chief of Mission, Seoul

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WH - Mr. Komer

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1. What was intended to be mainly a courtesy call (Mr. Barnett and the Prime Minister have many mutual friends both at Harvard and at Oxford) turned into a wide-ranging discussion of Korea's problems over lunch in the Capitol dining room. The problems discussed are recounted here more in the order of their importance than chronologically.

2. Korea's prospects: In answer to Mr. Barnett's query, the Prime Minister said that the first task for the Government of Korea was to achieve a self-supporting economy and it was to this end that the Government had recently developed a seven-year plan for agriculture which was intended to make the country self-sufficient in foodstuffs and to increase the variety and quality of the diet. After that the economy must be modernized in order to satisfy the aspirations of the younger and better educated generations and to keep them from turning to communism. The Prime Minister observed that since his return from a number of years abroad late in 1963, the popular opposition to communism seems far less resolute than was the case five or six years ago. If the Republic of Korea is not able to progress economically, he fears that this tendency will accelerate with the possibility of an internal subversion movement eventually developing. For this reason the Government attaches great importance to its five year development plan and is making particular effort to expand exports so that economic growth will not be at the expense of economic liability. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the U. S. would send experts to Korea to work with the Korean economic planners in extending and improving existing plans for development. It was also important, he said, that the Government and people of Korea should be assured by the United States of its

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continuing assistance, preferably in the form of a commitment by the U. S. to maintain at least the present level of overall economic aid. (The inference was that the Koreans would be discouraged from taking measures to improve and expand the economy if they thought such measures would lead to offsetting reductions of external assistance.)

3. Mr. Barnett expressed agreement with the Prime Minister's views that a general feeling of progress toward a better life was necessary to sustain the people's commitment to free institutions. He thought, however, that a sense of dynamic participation in the economic and political life of the Free World would in the long run prove more effective in motivating the people than a negative anti-communism. In reference to the Prime Minister's request for more assistance in the field of development planning, Mr. Barnett pointed out that the USOM was not simply an agency for administering the delivery and utilization of aid supplies, but was also very much concerned with the process of development planning and had a very competent staff for that purpose. Mr. Barnett referred also to the team of economists working on development planning at present in Korea under USOM contract with the Robert Nathan Associates. He had spent a number of hours talking with that group and knew that they were competent and dedicated technicians whose advice to the Government of Korea would be very valuable.

4. Korean-Japanese Settlement: Mr. Barnett asked the Prime Minister for his assessment of the prospects for a settlement with Japan. Instead of answering the question directly, the Prime Minister launched into a plea for the more active involvement of the U. S. in the negotiations. The U. S. could not remain aloof, he said, because the U. S. had committed itself in the San Francisco Treaty, "which you drafted", and which stipulated that Japan and Korea would settle their relations through negotiations. Going back to the Portsmouth Treaty, the Prime Minister said he was unable to understand the reluctance of the U. S. to become involved when the U. S. was in part responsible for the Japanese occupation of Korea by facilitating that treaty. At the end of World War II when U. S. armies had defeated the Japanese, the U. S. had brought about the independence of Korea. This fact too, said the Prime Minister, required the U. S. to take responsibility for actively assisting the two governments to normalize their relations. Finally, the Prime Minister referred to the division of Korea at the 38th parallel, implying that this fact imposed a special responsibility on the U. S. for facilitating the treaty since the division weakened the bargaining position of the Korean Government.

5. Mr. Barnett said he would comment later on the reasons which prevent the U. S. from arbitrating a settlement and asked the Prime Minister what he thought the U. S. could do specifically if it undertook such a role. Characteristically,

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the Prime Minister ticked off three points on which the U. S. could be helpful: (a) improving the terms of the settlement; (b) helping to create the conditions internally for public acceptance of a settlement; and (c) influencing the domestic political situation. In regard to terms, the Prime Minister observed that there were segments of the opposition which were now attacking the Government for having agreed on a financial settlement with Japan in a total amount of \$600 million, when allegedly the Japanese Government, in the person of Foreign Minister Kosaka, had previously agreed to a settlement figure of \$760 million. The Prime Minister recognized that this claim was undocumented, but it nevertheless was effective as a political maneuver and was embarrassing the Government and making it difficult to resume negotiations with Japan without re-opening the Kim-Ohira agreement. This maneuver, however, could be defeated if the U. S. would offer additional aid in the form of loans in the amount of \$160 million to bring the total up to the figure of \$760 million which Chong Il-hyong (DP) claimed to have reached when he was Foreign Minister.

6. Responding to the Prime Minister's remarks on the desirability of intervention by the U. S., Mr. Barnett said that in the course of his conversations last week in Tokyo, Japanese officials had again expressed their anxiety lest the U. S. seem to be pushing Japan into a settlement. They had pointed out, and Mr. Barnett believed they were speaking the truth, that if the U. S. did anything which could be made to look like dictating the terms of a settlement with Korea, the impression would be widely and effectively exploited by the press and the Socialist opposition and would make it impossible for the Government to proceed. Likewise from the point of view of U. S. -Korean relations, there were good reasons to think that open identification of the U. S. with the negotiations would be resented as interference and would diminish rather than increase the popular support of a settlement. Japanese officials, however, fully recognized the importance of the U. S. Government's keeping in close and continuing touch with the negotiators on both sides.

7. As to what the U. S. could do to help to establish the conditions within Korea which would make the settlement acceptable, the Prime Minister said that the main contribution the U. S. could make would be to convince the Koreans that U. S. aid policies and programs would continue after a settlement, thus helping to allay Korean fears of Japanese economic domination. Mr. Barnett pointed out that this had been done at the time of Secretary Rusk's visit but that he thought that it could be done again and perhaps elaborated. It might be possible in connection with a settlement to make some announcement about the future level of U. S. development aid. The Korean public seemed to attach great importance to the global amounts of aid without being acquainted with the components. Mr. Doherty pointed out that

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American development aid (soft loans) were being made in Korea at a rate of more than \$40 million a year and at this rate such loans in four years would probably more than make up the difference between \$600 and \$760 million. Mr. Doherty observed, however, that the U. S. could not be put in the position of paying for a settlement, or making up an alleged "deficit" in the Japanese financial settlement. Mr. Barnett said that even without assuming a role of arbitrator or identifying itself explicitly with the negotiations, the U. S. could still be helpful in this connection and would consider how our commitment to assist in the development of the Korean economy could be represented publicly in a way that would assist the ROKG in reaching a settlement.

8. The principal requirement for making a settlement acceptable in Korea, the Prime Minister said, would be through "unification of the domestic political situation." Mr. Barnett told the Prime Minister that if he meant translating the issue into a national goal as opposed to a party or government goal, then he could not agree more, and the U. S. wanted to help in this connection if it could. He asked, what might the U. S. do? In reply the Prime Minister suggested that the U. S. Government invite to Washington a delegation of politicians and National Assembly members for a conference at which the U. S. would explain why it attaches so much importance to a Korean-Japanese settlement. Such a conference would be widely publicized in Korea and could help the Korean Government stress the benefits of a settlement as well as allay popular anxiety about a U. S. withdrawal. Mr. Barnett thought that such action by the U. S. would be misconstrued if specifically related to the Korean-Japanese negotiations. As the Prime Minister knew, however, the U. S. had in the course of this year invited a number of leading figures from the various political parties to visit the U. S. on leader grants. Mr. Barnett said he had talked with all of these visitors and the Korean Embassy in Washington had indicated to them that the talks had been extremely useful. Mr. Barnett offered to consider a possible expansion of this existing program provided resources could be made available either by the U. S. Government or the Korean Government.

9. Yoshida Visit: The Prime Minister said another way in which the U. S. could be helpful would be to encourage the Japanese Government to agree to a good will visit by former Prime Minister Yoshida. Such a visit would be regarded by most Koreans as a great honor since Yoshida was well known in Korea as the greatest post-war Japanese statesman. It would do a great deal to restore the faith of the Korean people in the Japanese and also help to erase lingering feelings of hostility. If Yoshida could in the course of his visit, as the Prime Minister felt he would, make some expressions of regret for the past, the importance of the visit would be all the greater. Yoshida would not be expected to repudiate past policies or to admit to any Japanese legal responsibilities in connection with the

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past but only to express the consideration of the Japanese people in a way that would convince Koreans of the sincerity of the Japanese and thus help to counter charges that the Korean Government is seeking a settlement through "humiliating" or "low posture" diplomacy. Possibly a joint communique could be issued at the conclusion of the Prime Minister's visit which would refer to his meeting with President Pak but there would be no effort on the part of the Koreans to negotiate or even to discuss the substantive issues of the negotiation. Hopefully, on his return, Yoshida would be able to convey an impression to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese people which would increase their desire for a settlement. Mr. Barnett said that he knew from his discussions in Tokyo that the Japanese were very much interested in the possibility of a visit by Yoshida but they wanted to be assured that it would be arranged, handled, and timed in a way which would contribute substantially to the resumption of negotiations. He asked the Prime Minister if he could, on his return to Tokyo, assure the Japanese that it was the expectation of the Korean Government that the visit of Yoshida would, if all went well, make it possible to resume negotiations. Mr. Barnett said he had received the assurances of the Korean Foreign Minister on this point and would like to have also the assurances of the Prime Minister for confirmation. Mr. Barnett pointed out that he was planning to meet on Tuesday with Mr. Ushiroku. The Prime Minister replied that he believed Mr. Barnett could make such a statement as his own opinion based on conversations with Korean Government officials but without quoting the Prime Minister.

10. Seizure of Fishing Boats: Mr. Barnett asked the Prime Minister if there was anything particular that he thought Mr. Barnett should bring to Ushiroku's attention. The Prime Minister referred to the recent seizure of another Japanese fishing boat. The Prime Minister said that the boat seized was one of a large number of Japanese vessels which came so far into Korean coastal waters that they penetrated the 12 mile limit based on a line agreed to by the Japanese in the negotiations last spring. The clamor of the Korean fishing interests in such cases is so vociferous that the Korean Government has no alternative but to take action. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Barnett to urge Japanese officials to insure that Japanese vessels do not penetrate so deeply into Korean coastal waters. Mr. Barnett said that he knew that the continued seizure of Japanese vessels by the Korean authorities was a matter of serious concern to the Japanese and he said he would convey the Prime Minister's request, hoping that if the Japanese were more careful about staying greater distances from the Korean coast in the future, the Korean authorities would be more restrained and try to avoid seizures.

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11. Fisheries: The fisheries problems in the Korean-Japanese negotiations were not discussed in detail but Mr. Barnett pointed out to the Prime Minister that Japanese fisheries were worldwide and that to some extent the legal position of the Japanese Government in its negotiations with Korea was based on the need to protect this international position. If the Koreans sometimes felt that Japan was uncompromising on certain technical or legal points, Mr. Barnett thought it would be well to keep in mind that the great interests of Japan and its fisheries around the world deprived the Japanese negotiators of some flexibility.

12. Development Assistance Commission: Mr. Barnett explained to the Prime Minister the position of Mr. Thorp, the chairman of the DAC, as an international civil servant and gave a brief account of his discussions in Tokyo with Mr. Thorp, particularly on the subject of a possible DAC group for Korea. Mr. Thorp had had some very useful conversations also with Korean delegates to the Bank and Fund meetings, including the Minister of Finance. Mr. Barnett said he hoped the Korean Government would continue to pursue its interest in a consultative group as a possible contribution to the task of allaying Korean anxiety about Japanese economic domination of Korea. In this connection Mr. Barnett made some general comments to the effect that a number of countries, for example Holland in its relations with Germany, and the Government of the Republic of China in its relations with Japan, had managed to pursue cooperative economic policies in their mutual self-interest despite past or current political differences or grievances.

13. Prime Minister's Visit to Tokyo: The Prime Minister said he hoped to accept an invitation to visit Taipei on the occasion of the Double Ten celebration and he was thinking of stopping in Tokyo on his return to Seoul. He had asked for Ambassador Brown's advice and was waiting for us to tell him if we thought this might be a good idea. Mr. Barnett asked the Prime Minister what he thought to accomplish by this visit. The Prime Minister said he would expect to have meetings with Prime Minister Ikeda and talk with him about the prospects for resuming negotiations for normalization. He also wanted to point out that the Kim-Ohira agreement was widely misconstrued in Korea because of the public distrust of KIM Chong-pil and he wanted to explore with Ikeda the possibility, if not of re-opening the agreement, at least giving it a new name. The Prime Minister said that if there is, however, a good prospect of Yoshida's visiting Korea this year, he would give up the idea of a visit to Tokyo since he would wish in that case to avoid the impression that instead of returning his visit, Ikeda had merely sent Yoshida to repay the call.

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14. Bundy Visit: The Prime Minister expressed his pleasure at the expected visit of Mr. Bundy. Mr. Barnett pointed out that Mr. Bundy had spent most of his time in office dealing with the problems in Southeast Asia, leaving the more manageable problems in other parts of East Asia to Mr. Barnett and Mr. Green. The recent coup in Viet-Nam might make it necessary for Mr. Bundy to cancel his visit to Tokyo and this, of course, would rule out his coming to Korea. Predictably, when Viet-Nam was mentioned, the Prime Minister repeated his often expressed wish to be allowed to send combat forces (this time he specified volunteers recruited from among personnel retired from the ROK forces). Mr. Barnett restated the reasons why this would not be advisable. The Prime Minister referred again to this subject at the end of the discussion and laughingly asked Mr. Barnett to tell Mr. Bundy that he would be glad to go to Viet-Nam as an observer and then visit Washington to report his observations to Mr. Bundy. Mr. Barnett asked: "Do you really mean it?" And the Prime Minister nodded his assent.

15. COMMENT: Much of the above is not new, but the Prime Minister was pleased to see Mr. Barnett and evidently intent on making a good impression. Perhaps of most significance was the keen expression of interest in the usefulness of a good will visit by Yoshida in paving the way for a resumption of negotiations with Japan. Mr. Barnett's explanation of the reasons for the United States policy of avoiding direct involvement in the negotiations will be helpful in disabusing ROKG officials of their unrealistic hope that we will get the settlement for them and remove the onus from them.

16. The reference to a possible visit to Viet-Nam, although made jokingly, is one more in a series of deliberate attempts by the Prime Minister to get invited to Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

*1. Korea
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August 19, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Mr. Anderson

Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between The President and Ambassador designate to Korea, Mr. Winthrop Brown dated August 10, 1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

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Approved By White House
8/18/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11810

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.
August 10, 1964.

Participants: The President of the United States
Mr. Robert Komer - Executive Office of the President
Winthrop G. Brown - Ambassador-designate to the
Republic of Korea.

Copies to: The White House ✓
S/S for the Secretary
Ambassador Brown

Place/Date: The White House - July 31, 1964.

The President asked about the current prospects for political stability in Korea and for an early settlement with Japan. After receiving a brief resume of the current situation on these points from the Ambassador, the President stated that he regarded an early settlement between Korea and Japan as a matter of top priority.

The President then approved the draft oral message from himself to President Pak which had been submitted by the Secretary of State for his approval.

Summary of Action: Copy to FE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-168

By ju, NARA, Date 6-23-93

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August 17, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between
the President and Winthrop G. Brown -
Ambassador-designate to the Republic
of Korea.

Enclosed for White House approval is the
Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and Winthrop G. Brown - Ambassador-designate to
the Republic of Korea.

The President's remarks are sidelined in
blue.

This Memorandum of Conversation has been
drafted by Ambassador Brown.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 1-24-92

AUG 17 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By JW, NARA, Date 6-23-93