

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 2009

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
09	memo	Bundy to the President (Sanitized 1/19/01, NLJ 99-25)	TS-	1	2/21/64	A
16b	memo	re British Guiana (Sanitized 10/4/96, NLJ 94-290)	S	1	undated	A
37a	memo	McNamara to Sec.State, DCI (Sanitized 2000, NLJ 99-24)	TS	1	1/3/[64]	A
37b	memo	to the President (exempted 1/11/00, NLJ 99-24)	TS	7	undated	A
60	memo	Bundy to the President		1	12/7/63	C

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President

Folder Title "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 1, 11/63-2/64"

Box Number 1

Restriction Codes

(A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.

(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.

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11/19/2009

jc
Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 13

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37a Memo	Agency: ██████████ NSC <i>same restriction 3-10-00 NL 99-24</i> McNamara to SecState, DCI TS 1 p Sanitized, NSC Dec 6/9/77	1/3/63(4)	A
#37b Memo	to the President TS 7 p <i>exempt 3-10-00 NL 99-24</i> Example, NSC Dec 6/9/77	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~██████████~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Agency: Treasury Department			
open 2-8-93	NLJ 96-150	empty Treasury ltr. 2/13/77	
#7a Memo	Dillon to Bundy C	1 p 2/17/64	A
open 2-8-93	NLJ 90-150	empty Treasury ltr. 2/13/77	
#7b Ltr.	Dillon to Maudling C	2 p 2/17/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~100-307777-118~~, ~~McGeorge Bundy~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17k Cable	Agency: Navy <i>Navylet 4/20/57</i> unnumbered to Guantanamo S 1 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: Department of State		
	██████████	██████████	██████████
	<i>all decisions per State for 4/22/77 unless otherwise noted</i>		
<i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-277</i>	██████████	██████████	██████████
#4b Cable	2457 fm New Delhi S 5 p (dup. #s 42/47/117b in NSF Country File, India, Vol. 1)	2/20/64	A
#36a Cable	<i>Sanitized</i> 3177 fm Paris <i>open 6-17-94 NLS 94-204</i> S 3 p	1/8/64	A
#36d Memcon	<i>Sanitized</i> Bohlen/Tyler <i>open 6-17-94 NLS 94-204</i> S 1 p	1/7/64	A
#36e Memcon	<i>Sanitized</i> Bohlen/Tyler <i>open 6-17-94 NLS 94-204</i> S 1 p	1/7/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ██████████, ██████████, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#1 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re space negotiations with Soviets <i>State bu 7/20/77</i>	2/29/64	A
#2b Memo	Chase to Bundy re lard to Cuba <i>State bu. 7/22/77</i>	2/29/64	A
#4 Memo	Bundy/Komer to Pres. re India <i>open 11/20/96 NLS 94-290</i> Example State bu 7/23/77	2/26/64	A
#5 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Panama <i>State bu 7/22/77</i>	2/25/64	A
#8 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Cyprus <i>NSC bu 2/3/78, State bu 7/20/77</i>	2/21/64	A
#15 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re PM Home visit <i>NSC bu 2/3/78, State bu 7/20/77</i>	2/11/64	A
#16a Memo	re Cuba trade	undated	A
#16b Memo	re British Guiana <i>Sanitized 11/20/96 NLS 94-290</i> Example State bu 7/20/77	undated	A
#16c Memo	re Brit. bank rate <i>open 11/20/96 NLS 94-290</i> Example State bu 7/20/77	undated	A
#17 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Mansfield meeting <i>NSC bu 2/3/78, State bu 7/20/77</i>	2/10/64	A
#18a Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Stikker meeting <i>NSC bu 2/3/78, State bu 7/20/77</i>	2/4/64	A
#23 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Panama <i>open 9-11-98 NLS 97-354</i>	1/14/64	A + C
#25 Memo	Bundy to Pres. steps for peace <i>NSC bu 2/3/78, State bu 7/20/77</i>	1/13/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~88-022-24-178~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#75. Memo	WH/State continued. <i>NSC file 213178, State 7/20/77</i> Bundy to Pres. re meeting w/Rusk 5 1 p	12/1/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~██████████~~, ~~██████████~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a Memo	Agency: White House, for USDA concurrence. <i>USDA ltr 4/12/79</i> Chase to Bundy C 1 p	2/29/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF-~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40 Memo	Agency: White House, for AID concurrence.		
	Bundy to Pres.	C 1 p 1/6/63(4) <i>AID ltr. 4/27/78</i>	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ██████████ ██████████, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76 Memo	Agency: White House, for FAA concurrence. Bundy to Pres. <i>State ltr 8/24/77</i> TS 1 p	11/29/63	A
#79 Memo	Bundy to Pres. <i>State ltr 8/24/77</i> TS 1 p	11/29/63	A
#60 Memo	Bundy to the President re J. Burke Knapp 1 p	12/7/63	C
#65a Notes	handwritten questions for McGone <i>open 7-27-95</i> open 7-27-95 1 p NLS 94-392	undated	A
#69 Memo	Bundy to the President re British bilateral 1 p exchanges with the Soviets on the relation between a non-aggression pact and the Berlin-Germany problem <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-26</i>	12/3/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~██████████~~ ~~██████████~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence. <i>open 12-10-93 NLS 93-08</i>		
#33 Memo	Bundy to Pres. TS 2 p	1/9/64	A + C
	<i>C restriction removed 8/21/92 per TH</i>		
#34 Memo	Bundy to Pres. (dup. #33 above) TS 2 p	1/9/64	A + C
#37 Memo	<i>open 3/21/94</i> Bundy to Pres. TS 1 p	1/7/64	A
	<i>Exempt under 8/11/77, 050 Dec 6/28/77</i>		
#39 Memo	<i>open 3/21/94</i> Bundy to Pres. (dup. #37 above) TS 1 p	1/7/64	A
	<i>Exempt as above</i>		
#41 Memo	Bundy to Pres. [REDACTED] TS 2 p	1/6/64	A + C
	<i>open 11-20-96 NLS 94-290</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 Memo	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence. more info released 3-8-96 NLS 99-2-318 Bundy to Pres. TS [redacted] 1 p sanitized 1-24-01 NLS 99-25 (more info.) sanitized nationwide	2/21/64	A
#10 Memo	Bundy to Pres. TS [redacted] 1 p open 1-24-01	2/19/64	A

FILE LOCATION
 NSF [redacted], McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32 Memo	Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence. Exempt NSC la 6/13/97 Bundy to Pres. -8 2 p Reinitiated 1-27-95 NLJ 94 392 open per JFK Act 1998	1/9/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 1, 11/63-2/64

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mas for the Pres
V G

February 29, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This good report from the Administrator of NASA is in response to your request made in November to study and report on possible projects for substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union on outer space. The report represents a consensus among NASA, State, Defense, CIA, the Science Advisor, and the Executive Secretary of the Space Council.

In brief, the report contains guidelines to govern negotiations with the Soviet Union that have a reasonable chance of success, yet protect our national interests. It proposes a graduated approach calculated to develop mutual confidence, exchange information, and lay the foundation for consultative planning of specific projects. Careful consideration has been given to cultivating favorable Congressional and public attitudes. The specific proposals now being considered all relate to a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing.

No immediate public action is recommended because we are in need of Soviet performance on present agreements. We will continue to show interest, through the existing Dryden-Blagonravov channel, in obtaining a positive Soviet answer to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by you. Meanwhile, we will watch the performance of the Soviet Union under existing agreements.

The Administrator is keeping this program under his continuing personal review and clearly understands your interest in it. He will keep you advised of progress and may call upon you for further initiative sometime around the first of May; by then the Soviet Union will have had ample opportunity to make clear its intentions.

at Tab A

Attached is a National Security Action Memorandum for your signature, giving your general endorsement to the report and recommendations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 7/20/77
By mg, NARS, Date 8/18/77

Signed and Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

McGeorge Bundy

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February
November 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: LARD

The attached memoranda show:

1. that we do not know just how much of a lard deal was planned;
2. the non-food uses of lard are almost surely irrelevant to any lard deal.

In the light of this information, I think we should say simply that:

The Commerce Department has announced that it will require licenses for any shipment of lard because of reports of possible very large shipments *which raise question.*

If the question is asked whether this means a change in the policy of sales of foods and medicine, I think we should answer:

Not at this time.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Uses of Lard

USDA's Jim Hartman, who is apparently our commodity expert and who consulted with other experts last night, made the following points about the uses of lard.

1. Lard is used almost exclusively for food -- either directly as a cooking fat or blended with other ingredients to make margarine. It can also be added to livestock feed.
2. Lard can be used to manufacture soap and steric and oleic acids, and turkey red oil (these are industrial acids which are definitely not strategic). In practice, however, lard is generally not used for these purposes. Both inedible tallow and tall oil which are substitutable for lard, are plentiful and are cheaper. (Mr. Hartman knows of no other uses for lard).
3. Cuba can be expected to use 100% of any lard it gets for edible purposes.
4. Mr. Hartman added that it would probably ^{HAT} be credible to take the line that we have decided to stop shipments of lard because it is not solely a food.

cc

Gordon Chase

The Cuban food ration has recently been publicly reported at 2 pounds of lard per person per month, so 50 million pounds of lard would be no more than a four-month supply.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority USDA ltr 4/12/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 4/21/77

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Lard to Cuba

State and Commerce (FDR Jr.) seem to agree that the following is what we know and what we don't know about the supposed lard deal involving the U.S., Canada, and Cuba. Our information is limited because thus far we have refrained from approaching the pertinent U.S. companies. FDR Jr. feels that such an approach might well precipitate a question as to the status of U.S. subsidiaries, a question which we would just as soon avoid for now.

1. We know there is a Cuban trade mission in Canada, probably in Montreal.
2. Trade contacts in Chicago indicate that this mission may have approached Swift Corporation and International Packers in Canada (and possibly one other company) to buy lard. We have no confirmation of this, however.

We understand that these are U.S.-controlled subsidiaries.

3. We do not know the size of the reported transaction (reports vary from \$2 million to \$15 million).
4. We do not know whether there is any interest in U.S.-origin lard.

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 7/22/77
By mg, NARS, Date 8/4/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Jim Rowe's is a most interesting memorandum. I have no doubt myself that if we could turn the clock back to the Roosevelt press conferences, they would be an excellent medium for you. The trouble is that there are now about 1000 reporters in Washington who are habituated to twenty years of a different tradition. They constitute so much of the process of informing the public that if they are unhappy it hurts you. That is why I strongly support the venture of an open press conference tomorrow. If it works, as I am sure it will, then it seems to me that you might consider a variable pattern.

In such a pattern you might have a full-scale press conference like tomorrow's every three weeks or so, and perhaps once or twice in between you might call in the White House press to say what is on your mind -- and you might well try out on them the Roosevelt rules -- no direct quotation without specific approval, and what is off the record stays off the record.

McG. B.

Memo for the Pres.
RL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may want to read attached two cables from Bowles. Despite his wordiness, they bring into sharp relief how our India affairs are sliding backwards from the high point of our vigorous response to the Chicom attack in October 1962. This trend is largely inevitable, as the Chicom attack recedes and the more normal factors which plague our relations like Kashmir assume their usual place. But as Bowles points out, it is costing us.

The Soviets faltered when Peiping attacked India, while we responded magnificently. But as the Sino-Soviet split widens, Moscow has been making up for lost time. Soviets are now doing more than we to woo the India military establishment. Meanwhile, our Pak friends are doing their best to prove their thesis that India isn't serious about China, by forcing India to focus on Pak-Indian issues. The more they distract Delhi from Peking the more they hurt us.

This is not a trend likely to create great complications for us this year, or maybe next. Only if the Paks press Kashmir to the point of open violence is a crisis likely. But it is a trend of great long term significance. India, as the largest and potentially most powerful non-Communist Asian nation, is in fact the major prize in Asia.

We have already invested \$4.7 billion in the long-term economic buildup of a hopefully democratic power. But our politico-military policy has never matched our economic investment, partly because Pakistan shrewdly signed two alliances with us as a means of reinsurance against India. For this Pakistan has gotten some \$700 million in US military aid, all of which has in fact gone to protect it against India. Per capita, the Paks have got much more aid from us than the Indians. We can and should protect Pakistan against India, but we cannot permit our ties -- or our taste for Ayub against Nehru -- to stand in the way of a strong Indian policy. This would permit the tail to wag the dog, which is just what Paks are trying to do.

With India heading into a succession crisis, we have to keep a sharp eye out. If India falls apart we are the losers. If India goes Communist, it will be a disaster comparable only to the loss of China. Even if India reverts to pro-Soviet neutralism, our policy in Asia will be compromised. These risks are real, and the irony is that they are dangerous for Pakistan as well.

Bowles makes wordy sense on this problem, we think.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-290

By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

McGeorge Bundy

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

4a

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~EXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KELLEN~~
- ~~KOSMID~~
- ~~SALINGER~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WMM, Y.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- Action
- NEA
- Info
- SS
- G
- SP
- L
- SAL
- EUR
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- AID
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- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
- NSA
- OSD
- ARMY
- NAVY
- AIR
- RMR

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT
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 R 200541Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 RUQVAM/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
 RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
 STATE GRNC
 BT

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1964 FEB 20 PM 2 10 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO ROUTINE
 FEB 20, 1130AM FROM NEW DELHI.

ACTION DEPARTMENT (2445), INFORMATION LONDON 805, KARACHI
 868, USUN 139.

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE.

SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON KASHMIR HAS TOUCHED OFF PRE-
 DICTABLE EMOTIONAL OUTBURST IN BOTH INDIAN OFFICIAL AND
 PUBLIC CIRCLES WHICH HAS DAMAGED UK-U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS
 AND FURTHER WIDENED GAP BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
 CFN 2445 805 868 139

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 706 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 ON BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH MPS NOW IN DELHI FOR
 CURRENT LOK SABHA SESSION AND WITH GOI OFFICIALS AND
 DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, IT IS CLEAR FEELING NOW RUNS DEEP.
 ALTHOUGH BRITISH BEARING FULL BRUNT OF INDIAN INDIGNATION
 AND RESENTMENT, U.S. IS IN STRONG RUNNER-UP POSITION.

IN CALCUTTA PRESS CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY ATTENDED BY SOME
 FIFTY NEWSMEN, QUESTIONING ON U.S. POSITION IN REGARD TO
 KASHMIR-PAKISTAN WAS MORE RELENTLESS THAN ANYTHING I HAD
 PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED IN INDIA. I REFUSED TO COMMENT ON
 U.S. POSITION IN REGARD TO KASHMIR ON GROUNDS STEVENSON HAD
 NOT YET SPOKEN AND UNDERScoreD AS ON SIMILAR OCCASIONS
 URGENT NEED FOR SOME SOLUTION TO PAK-INDIA IMPASSE
 ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. WHEN ANTI-BRITISH STATEMENTS BECAME
 EXTREME I REMINDED PRESS REPS THAT UK AS WELL AS U.S. HAD BEEN
 QUICK TO COME TO INDIA'S AID WHEN CHICOMS ATTACKED WHILE
 USSR WAS UNABLE TO MAKE UP ITS MIND. EVEN MORE MODERATE INDIAN
 PRESS REPS SUGGESTED AFTERWARDS THAT MY REMARKS WERE BEYOND
 CALL OF DUTY.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 2/11/76
 By JB, NARS, Date 2/28/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2445, FEBRUARY 20, 11 AM FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 706 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AT SMALL STAG DINNER AT MY HOME LAST NIGHT ATTENDED BY
ASHOKA MEHTA, LAKSHMI JAIN OF INDIAN COOPERATIVE UNION,
S.K. DEY, MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND
COOPERATION, VKRV RAO, PITAMBER PANT AND RAJ KRISHNA, ALL
OF PLANNING COMMISSION, SUBJECT OF KASHMIR-PAKISTAN-U.S.
RELATIONSHIP WHOLLY ABSORBED AN EVENING THAT HAD BEEN SET
ASIDE FOR ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS. EVEN THESE FIRM FRIENDS OF
U.S. WITH THEIR DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE TO
BOLSTER INDIAN ECONOMY WERE, WITH SINGLE EXCEPTION OF ASHOKA
MEHTA, EMOTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE.

GENERAL THEME RUNNING THROUGH DISCUSSION WAS THAT WHILE
INDIANS ARE APPRECIATIVE FOR OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MATTERS OF NATIONAL PRIDE HAVE BECOME SO INVOLVED
IN KASHMIR-PAK SITUATION THAT INDIANS CAN NO LONGER AFFORD
TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 706 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MOOD WAS BOTH STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-CHINESE
WITH NO SUGGESTION OF COMPROMISE ON EITHER POSITION. HOWEVER,
HEAVY EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON FACT THAT NEHRU ERA IS DRAWING
TO CLOSE AND REGARDLESS OF EFFORTS OF PRESUMABLY SOBER PEOPLE
LIKE THEMSELVES INDIA WHICH HAD BEEN DENIED CLOSE RELATIONS
IT WANTED WITH U.S. WOULD NOW FIND ITSELF DRIFTING FURTHER
FROM WEST AND TOWARDS ADMITTEDLY RAMBUNCTIOUS AND UNAPPEALING
ROLE WHICH THEY ASSERT HAS BEEN PRACTICED SUCCESSFULLY BY
OTHER NATIONS.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND FOLLOWING IS OUR ESTIMATE OF FOUR
FACTORS WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WIDESPREAD EMOTIONAL
REACTION. HOWEVER UNREASONABLE THEY MAY APPEAR TO US IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE UNDERSTAND THEM IF WE ARE TO ACT
REALISTICALLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

1. FACTORS THAT APPLY IN GENERAL TO INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP
TO WHAT IS LOOSELY KNOWN AS "THE WEST":

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-3- 2445, FEBRUARY 20, 11 AM FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 706 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOLLOWING CHICOM AGGRESSION IN OCT 1962 AND PAK FLIRTATION
WITH OUR MAJOR ASIAN ENEMY THERE WAS DEEP CONVICTION WITHIN
GOI AND AMONG INDIAN PEOPLE THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH WEST
WOULD NOW BE ON NEW AND MUCH CLOSER FOOTING. THEY FELT THIS
ASSUMPTION WAS PARTICULARLY VALID IN VIEW OF THEIR EFFORTS TO
MAINTAIN MODERATE RESPONSE TO WHAT THEY GENUINELY BELIEVE TO
BE ACCELERATED PAK EFFORT TO STIR UP SUBCONTINENT AND THEREBY
PREVENT CLOSER INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS.

overhaul!
EFFORTS TO WHICH THEY REFER INCLUDE DECISION OF YEAR AGO,
AGAINST THEIR BETTER JUDGMENT, TO HOLD TALKS ON KASHMIR AND
TO OFFER WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS;
AGREEMENT IN DECEMBER NOT TO CLOSE SHILLONG IN RETALIATION FOR
RAJSHAHI; RESTRAINT FOLLOWING SECOND WAVE OF PAK RIOTS
ON JAN 18; AND 20; NANDA-SHASTRI PROPOSAL FOR JOINT REVIEW
OF COMMUNAL RIOTS BY HOME MINISTERS; GOI WILLINGNESS TO
NEGOTIATE QUESTION OF ILLEGAL MUSLIM SETTLERS IN ASSAM AND
TRIPURA AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AS REQUESTED BY GOP (IF THOSE
MEETINGS WENT WELL THEY ASSERTED THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO
DISCUSS KASHMIR ITSELF), ETC.
BOWLES
BT

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USUN 139 FROM DELHI FEB 20, 11:30 A.M.

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USIA

WHEN PAKISTAN FAILED TO RESPOND TO THESE GOI EFFORTS TO EASE TENSIONS AND TOOK ISSUE TO SC INDIANS WERE KEENLY AWARE THAT WE DEPLORED THIS ACTION, AND THEREFORE JUMPED TO CONCLUSION THAT UK-US POSITION WOULD AT BEST FAVOR GOI AND AT WORSE REMAIN NEUTRAL.

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AIR

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 706-2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

RMR

2. FACTORS INVOLVING THEIR OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS:

GOI IS EMBITTERED OVER FACT THAT FOLLOWING NEHRU'S ILLNESS PAKISTAN HAD SEEMED TO TAKE RUTHLESS ADVANTAGE OF PERIOD OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY WHICH IS NOW AGGRAVATED BY CHOU EN-LAI'S STATE VISIT TO PAKISTAN.

FURTHER TO FEED GOI FRUSTRATION IS EMBARRASSMENT CAUSED BY THEIR BELATED RECOGNITION THAT KASHMIR GOVT WHICH THEY BUILT AROUND BAKSHI IN ADDITION TO BEING CORRUPT HAD NO PUBLIC SUPPORT WHATSOEVER. AT SAME TIME THEY ARE RESENTFUL OF WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE DELIBERATE APPEALS BY PAKS TO AROUSE RELIGIOUS ANTAGONISM PREVIOUS TO AND FOLLOWING THEFT OF SACRED RELIC, APPEALS WHICH THEY FEEL GRAVELY THREATENED THEIR VISION OF SECULAR STATE IN INDIA IN WHICH ALL RELIGIONS CAN LIVE PEACEFULLY TOGETHER.

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FEB 21 1964

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-2- 2445, FEBRUARY 20, 11 AM, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

FINALLY NEW GROUP HEADED BY SHASTRI AND KAMARAJ WHICH IS GRADUALLY MOVING INTO LEADERSHIP OF GOI WAS ITSELF PERSUADED OF NEED FOR FINDING SOME BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT KASHMIR DISPUTE AND NOW FINDS ITSELF BADGERED BY EXTREMISTS WITH LITTLE HOPE OF MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

3. FACTORS WHICH PRODUCED PARTICULARLY STRONG ANTI-BRITISH REACTION:

EVER SINCE TURN OF CENTURY MOST INDIANS HAVE BEEN PERSUADED THAT BRITISH DELIBERATELY BACKED MUSLIM MINORITY AGAINST HINDU MAJORITY AS BASIC MEANS OF FORESTALLING INDIAN INDEPENDENCE. THEY FEEL THAT THIS BRITISH POLICY WAS THEREBY RESPONSIBLE FOR FINAL PARTITION WHICH IN THEIR VIEW UN-NECESSARILY SPLIT CONTINENT WIDE OPEN AND LED TO PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

INDIANS LOOK ON BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY WITH PARTICULARLY DEEP DISTRUST. DUNCAN SANDYS AND HOME ARE CONSIDERED LINEAL DESCENDENTS OF BRITISH VICEROYS WHO SUPPORTED BY CONSERVATIVE GOVTS IN LONDON WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PUTTING ALMOST EVERY MEMBER OF PRESENT GOI IN PRISON FOR AT LEAST ONE OR TWO TERMS.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 706-2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THEY WERE INFURIATED BY BRITISH SC SUGGESTION THAT ORIGINAL ACCESSION OF KASHMIR TO INDIA IN 1947 APPROVED BY VICEROY AND BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. MOREOVER IN ENDORSING PAST SC RESOLUTIONS BOTH BRITISH AND OURSELVES HAVE EMPHASIZED SELF DETERMINATION FEATURES OF AUGUST 1948 RESOLUTION WHICH INDIANS KNOW HAVE GREAT APPEAL TO PEOPLE ALL OVER WORLD WHILE FAILING TO MENTION RELATED REFERENCE IN SAME RESOLUTION THAT PAKS MUST AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM AZAD KASHMIR AS PREREQUISITE OF SELF-DETERMINATION PROCESS.

4. FACTORS WHICH RELATE TO INDIAN CRITICISMS OF US:

IN INDIA PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS LOOKED UPON AS SPECIAL FRIEND WHO WAS AUTHOR OF INDIAN RESOLUTION IN CONGRESS, WHO HAD FREQUENTLY SPOKEN IN BEHALF OF INDIAN AID, AND WHO HAD SINGLED OUT INDIA AS GREAT EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY. WITH LOSS OF THIS FRIEND, INDIANS NOW BELIEVE WE FAVOR PAKISTAN IN ITS DISAGREEMENT WITH INDIA AND DISCOUNT INDIA'S IMPORTANCE.

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-3- 2445, FEBRUARY 20, 11 AM, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

FROM THIS BASIC ASSUMPTION HAVE STEMMED TWO FURTHER REACTIONS. FIRST OF THESE IS BELIEF THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH AFTER MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON IN NOV AND PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING MAX TAYLOR'S VISIT HERE TWO WEEKS LATER WAS ASSUMED TO BE FORTHCOMING WAS HELD UP BECAUSE OF PRESSURE BY PAKS ON JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND SECOND, FEELING THAT PAKS WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN KASHMIR ISSUE TO SC IF NOT CONVINCED THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS ORIENTED FAVORABLY IN THEIR DIRECTION. HOWEVER UNJUST THIS MAY APPEAR TO PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THIS IS DEEPEATED CONVICTION THAT RUNS THROUGH INDIAN GOVT, PRESS, LOK SABHA AND INFORMED CITIZENS GENERALLY.

IN THIS FRAMEWORK CHAGLA'S REPORTS THAT US HAD PUSHED GREAT BRITAIN INTO FORWARD ROLE AND QUIETLY URGED IVORY COAST TO PUT FORWARD FORMULA THAT SUPPORTED PAK POSITION RECEIVED CREDENCE WHICH IT DID NOT DESERVE.
BOWLES
BT

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-277

NARA, Date 5-9-95

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBECK

33
Action

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PASS WHITE HOUSE, DEFENSE ✓

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP DEPT AND PENTAGON UP TO DATE ON INDIAN MILITARY PROCUREMENT PLANS, I WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO DRAW ATTENTION TO STEADILY INCREASING ROLE WHICH SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING HERE. IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOI SINCE MY ARRIVAL LAST JULY WE HAVE OPERATED ON ASSUMPTION THAT MAJOR SOVIET INTRUSION INTO INDIAN MILITARY IS TOTAL CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS IN ASIA AND THAT USG SHOULD TAKE EVERY FEASIBLE STEP TO LIMIT AND CONTAIN THEIR EFFORTS, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO INDIAN ARMY AND MORE SOPHISTICATED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT.

DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS IN OCT AND NOV, GOI OFFICIALS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE EAGER TO ACCEPT NEW AND MUCH CLOSER MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASSOCIATION WITH US, PROVIDING WE WERE ABLE TO GIVE THEM REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE MAINTAINED THROUGH FIVE YEAR PROGRAM AND IN AMOUNTS APPROPRIATE TO THEIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. BASED ON MY REPORT IN LATE NOV OF FAVORABLE REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS IN WASHINGTON AND SERIES OF ENCOURAGING TALKS WITH GENERAL TAYLOR WHICH FOLLOWED TWO WEEKS LATER HERE IN NEW DELHI, GOI EXPECTED GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE USG DECISION.

SINCE THEN THREE MONTHS HAVE PASSED WITH NO RPT NO WORD WHATSOEVER FROM US. CONSEQUENTLY GOI, WHICH IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT WEAKNESS OF ITS PRESENT DEFENSE SYSTEM, HAS BEGUN TO MOVE WITH INCREASING VIGOR TO SECURE ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM USSR IN SPITE OF DISADVANTAGEOUS SOVIET FINANCIAL TERMS.
CFN US USG GOI US GOI USG GOI USSR

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-2- 2457, FEBRUARY 20, 7 PM, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

IN EMBTEL 2081 OF JAN 9 WE SKETCHED STATUS OF INDIAN AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT OBJECTIVES, TENTATIVE GOI PLANS WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES AND US EFFORT WHICH WE FELT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GIVE US REASONABLE CHANCE TO LIMIT SOVIET ROLE IN THIS POLITICALLY GLAMOROUS AREA. IN HOPE THAT ADMINISTRATION MIGHT AUTHORIZE SUCH AN EFFORT I HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ATTEMPTED TO SET STAGE BY POINTING OUT TO TOP GOI OFFICIALS THAT CHICOMS CAN BE EXPECTED SOMETIME WITHIN NEXT FOUR TO SEVEN YEARS TO DEVELOP NOT RPT NOT ONLY NUCLEAR BOMB BUT ALSO INTERMEDIATE MISSILES OF 600 TO 800 MILE RANGE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. PROSPECT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, I ADDED, RENDERED INDIAN AIR FORCE PLANS AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM, UNREALISTIC AS WELL AS EXTRAVAGANT, SINCE PROSPECTIVE INDIAN PLANS WOULD BE OBSOLETE BEFORE THEY COULD BE PRODUCED IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY.

ALTHOUGH THIS ANALYSIS WAS LISTENED TO WITH OBVIOUS INTEREST, WE ARE NOT RPT NOT SURPRISED TO HEAR REPORTS THAT IN ABSENCE OF FURTHER WORD FROM US GOI HAS PERSUADED SOVIETS TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IN REGARD TO MIG-21 PRODUCTION, INCLUDING ADDITION OF ALL-WEATHER FEATURES TO MIGS TO BE PRODUCED IN INDIAN PLANTS. CFN 2081 9 GOI US GOI 600 800 GOI MIG-21 MIG

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 740A ~~SECRET~~

ACCORDING TO HINDUSTAN TIMES, SOVIET AIR TO AIR MISSILES WHICH WILL BE BUILT IN HYDERABAD ARE ALSO TO BE PART OF DEAL. IT IS REPORTED THAT USSR WILL ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANUFACTURE OF AIRFRAMES AND ENGINES UNTIL INDIAN PERSONNEL ARE FULLY COMPETENT. FINALLY USSR IS SAID TO BE OFFERING MUCH MORE FAVORABLE FINANCIAL TERMS FOR ALL NEW SOVIET EQUIPMENT.

INFO FROM OTHER SOURCES CONVINCES US THAT THIS STORY IS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT AND THAT DECISION ON THIS MATTER IS NOW RPT NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED BY POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL SOVIET SAMS WILL SOON BE FORTHCOMING.

ACCORDING TO RECENT STUDY BY COL AMOS JORDAN ON MY STAFF. SOVIET MILITARY AID COMMITMENTS TO INDIA IN 18 MONTHS ENDING DEC 21, 1963 TOTAL ABOUT \$125 MILLION WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN OUR OWN. EVEN IF PRESENT FLOW OF SOVIET MILITARY AID IS CUT IN HALF, TOTAL CAN BE EXPECTED TO REACH \$275-350 OVER FIVE YEAR PERIOD. THIS FIVE YEAR PROGRAM IS LARGER THAN ONE I PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN NOVEMBER.

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-3- 2457, FEBRUARY 20, 7 PM, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

MOREOVER THESE SUBSTANTIAL UNDERTAKINGS HAVE BEEN REACHED WITH USSR IN SPITE OF FACT THAT SOVIET FINANCIAL TERMS, WHICH CALL FOR SHIPMENT FROM INDIA TO USSR OF COMMODITIES THAT OTHERWISE WOULD BE EARNING FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ARE GREATLY TO INDIA'S DISADVANTAGE. IF SOVIETS SHOULD RELAX THEIR TERMS, THIS FLOW OF MILITARY MATERIEL MAY BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY. IF CHINESE-SOVIET CONFLICT WORSENS SOVIETS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY MOVE ALONG THESE LINES.

IN VIEW OF OUR OWN DELAYS, SOVIET ACTIVITIES, DISAPPOINTMENT OVER SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON KASHMIR AND INCREASING FEAR OF US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN, OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION AT THIS STAGE IS OBVIOUSLY WEAKER THAN IN OCT AND NOV WHEN GOI RESPONSE TO OUR TENTATIVE PROPOSALS WAS FORTHRIGHT AND EAGER. GREAT GOOD WILL FOR US HOWEVER REMAINS AND MOST GOI LEADERS WOULD STILL FAR PREFER TO WORK WITH US THAN WITH USSR. THEREFORE PRESENTATION ALONG FOLLOWING LINES MIGHT STILL BE EFFECTIVE:

USG HAS BEEN DELAYED IN PROPOSING FIVE YEAR MILITARY AID PROGRAM BECAUSE OF CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER FACTORS. HOWEVER IN REGARD TO AIR FORCE WE WOULD LIKE AT THIS POINT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH INDIAN GOVT ON FOLLOWING LINES:

GP-3 BOWLES

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2/20/64, 2:25 PM.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 2/20/64, 2:20 PM.
PASSED DEFENSE 2/20/64, 1:30 PM.

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30

Action

SS
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~~SECRET~~

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~

~~ALEXANDER~~

~~BELK~~

~~BRUBECK~~

~~CHASE~~

~~DINGEMAN~~

~~DUNGAN~~

~~FORRESTAL~~

~~JESSUP~~

~~JOHNSON~~

~~KLEIN~~

~~KOMER~~

~~SALINGER~~

~~SAUNDERS~~

~~SCHLESINGER~~

~~SMITH, Wm~~

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~~SECRET~~ SET (II OF II) 2457 FEBRUARY 20, 6:45 PM

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PASS WHITE HOUSE DEFENSE

1. ACCORDING TO RECENT ESTIMATES WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE RELIABLE CHINESE WILL HAVE NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED MISSILES BY END OF PRESENT DECADE. CONSEQUENTLY GOI, IN OUR OPINION, SHOULD CONCENTRATE AT THIS STAGE ON AID DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR INTERMEDIATE PERIOD. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM TIME TO ADJUST THEIR THINKING TO IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA AS NUCLEAR POWER BEFORE PREPARING LONGER RANGE PROGRAM. (NOTE - ULTIMATELY INDIA WILL BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN QFN 2457 20 6:45 1 G

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 740B ~~SECRET~~

BUILDING HER OWN NUCLEAR DETERRENT OR FINDING SOME WAY TO ADJUST HER POLICIES TO BRING HER UNDER EITHER US OR USSR NUCLEAR UMBRELLA.)

2. TO FILL THIS INTERMEDIATE GAP US IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE, AS RAPIDLY AS PILOTS CAN BE TRAINED, ONE SQUADRON OF HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT WITH ONE TO TWO ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS TO FOLLOW AS TRAINING PROCESS PERMITS.

US WILL ALSO DISCUSS PROCUREMENT OF SAMS FOR PROTECTION OF THREE NORTH INDIAN CITIES NOT RPT NOT YET COVERED BY SAMS FROM USSR. FINALLY USG IS READY TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTING INDIA IN PRODUCTION OF MODERN, FASTER VERSION OF HF-24.

NO
YES

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2457, FEBRUARY 20, 7 PM, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

COMMENT: WITH PROMPT ADEQUATE ACTION AND CAREFUL HANDLING THIS PROGRAM MIGHT STILL PERSUADE GOI TO ABANDON PRESENT PLANS FOR PRODUCTION OF MIG-21 WHICH WILL BE COSTLY, INEFFECTIVE, OBSOLETE BY TIME THEY ARE AVAILABLE IN ANY QUANTITY, AND CONTRARY TO OUR POLITICAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA. IT MAY ALSO BLOCK FURTHER PURCHASES OF SOVIET SAM'S. WE KNOW T. T. KRISHNAMACHARI, SHASTRI AND OTHERS WOULD MUCH PREFER WORKING CFN US USSR 2 US US SAMS SAMS USSR USG HF-24 GOI MIG-21 SAMS T T KRISHNAMACHARI SHASTRI

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 740B ~~SECRET~~

CLOSELY WITH US THAN WITH RUSSIANS, AND THERE IS APPRECIABLE CHANCE THAT WE MIGHT PULL IT OFF.

IN ANY EVENT I BELIEVE THAT ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CLEARLY UNDERSTAND MAJOR STAKES WHICH ARE INVOLVED AND FACE UP TO POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF RAPIDLY GROWING SOVIET ROLE IN INDIAN MILITARY. EVEN IF OUR MILITARY-POLITICAL POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS MORE SECURE THAN IT APPEARS TO BE, AN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, POLITICALLY STABLE, WESTERN-ORIENTED INDIA IS OF ABSOLUTELY BASIC IMPORTANCE TO US SECURITY INTERESTS BETWEEN SEA OF JAPAN AND MEDITERRANEAN. IF SOUTHEAST ASIA GOES UNDER INDIA WITH ITS 450 MILLION PEOPLE BECOMES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FRONT IN CONFLICT WITH CHINA IN ASIA.

GP-3. BOWLES.
CFN US 450 GP-3

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2/20/64, 10:17 AM.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 2/20/64, 10:25 AM.
PASSED DEFENSE 2/20/64, 10:30 AM.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 25, 1964

Handwritten notes:
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama

I want to tell you quite privately that I agree with Dean Rusk that it would be good to get Panama off the stage for the present, if we can do so without retreat. The two basic elements which you have established and defended without a break since January 9 are that we will not agree in advance to revision of the treaties, and that we will not agree to "negotiate." I believe that any form of language which leads to a resumption of relations and a beginning of talks is a victory for the United States and for you, if these two conditions are met.

There are rumors of deterioration in Panama, and we could well have trouble of various sorts between now and May. Of course these same rumors are helping to move Chiari -- if he is moving. As long as the monkey is clearly on Chiari's back, we can stand any trouble, but if we should have a chance to get language which meets our essential conditions and let it go, I think we could come under some attack. It is not yet clear that we have such language, and there is one word that I would change in the Costa Rican draft, the last word "negotiators." But we are getting close.

I have always supposed that if we did get into talks with the Panamanians we would find ourselves able to agree to significant changes in our existing relations without giving way on gut issues like the perpetuity clause or our own ultimate responsibility for the security and effectiveness of the Canal. Your choice of Vaughan as your prospective Ambassador shows your own readiness to pick a man who has much more basic sympathy for the Panamanians than for the conservative Americans in the Canal Zone (almost too much so, in my judgment).

The talks can go on for a long time, and there should be a clear understanding on both sides that they will. But I myself think they can lead to a new level of understanding, provided we get past election year emotions on both sides.

We have been right so far, and there is nothing cosmic about this issue yet, but I do think it would be good to take talks with no retreat if we can get them.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

McG. B.

Authority State Ca 7/22/77
By smg, NARS, Date 8/4/77

6
Memo for
the Pres
February 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Major Foreign Visitors -- March, April, May and June

The following memorandum relates to Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers that we now know about. It should not be charged against my hour a week for lesser lights, which I have not yet used!

The visits to which we are committed are as follows:

1. Harold Wilson, Leader of the Labor Party, on March 2. This should be about a one-hour conversation. No meal is required.
2. Foreign Minister Halvard Lange of Norway on March 17. A White House appointment of 15-20 minutes is adequate. No meal required.
3. King Hussein of Jordan, April 14-15. One White House lunch.
4. Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago, April 27. No meal required, although a lunch might be a substantial plus with Negroes.
5. Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, June 1 or 2. This is already arranged, and my guess is that you will want to have a large lunch or dinner for admirers of Eshkol and Israel.
6. The Shah of Iran, on June 5 or 6. One meal probably required, although he is in the U. S. only for an honorary degree.
7. Chancellor Erhard of Germany is probably getting an honorary degree at a major Eastern University, and will want a working session with you, presumably with a luncheon which can be small scale and informal, or large scale and official, as you choose.

In addition, Prime Minister Menzies will be in the United States in either April or May, and you will certainly wish to see him.

These are the ones from which there is no escape at present. In addition, I think you probably ought to have one Latin American and one African visitor, if it can be arranged, in May. When you have had a chance to consider this memorandum, I shall be grateful if you will tell me how much of it you can choke down.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Douglas Dillon specifically asks that you see the attached memorandum, but I do not think you need to take the time to read it all the way through. In essence what it does is to bring Maudling up to date on the balance of payments in Washington, and to explain to him how Walter Heller was added to the mystical community of those who know what the British are planning. The main meaning of the letter to me is that it shows once again the need which the bankers feel for extraordinary security on issues of this kind.

McG. B.

McG. B.

7.a

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

The attached copy of my letter to Maudling is for the President's information. The letter was designed to do two things; first, to explain and, in effect, apologize for a breach of confidence in bringing Walter Heller into this matter. This was something that Maudling had particularly wished to avoid because of his fear of press leaks. He had specifically asked that the information be kept to Roosa, Martin, me, and, of course, the President; and only gave Roosa the information when he agreed to this condition. It is most important that the British continue to talk freely with us -- hence the amount of space devoted to this matter.

My second purpose was to put my own views clearly and simply on the record with Maudling, which is done in the next to last paragraph, as well as in the earlier part of the letter where I point out that we can see no compelling reason for British action at this time. I would appreciate it, if, in showing my letter to the President, you would show him this memorandum or explain all this to him.

Douglas Dillon
Douglas Dillon

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-150
By 120, NARA, Date 2-2-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

7-6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-150
By mg, NARA, Date 2-2-93

February 17, 1964

Dear Reggie:

No doubt Eric Roll has kept you informed regarding the matter you discussed with Bob Roosa in January. The day before the Prime Minister arrived I had an opportunity to acquaint President Johnson with the matter.

I understand that the President discussed it in a private meeting with the Prime Minister on Wednesday. There was a second conversation at lunch on Thursday at the British Embassy in which Eric and I joined.

At that time the President made clear his deep concern over your intentions and his hope that you would find a way to avoid any action such as you are contemplating. Our current information does not indicate any weakening in sterling or any important inflationary problems that could not be handled by mild fiscal restraint and a vigorous incomes policy, thus avoiding the need to disturb the present equilibrium in international short term money rates.

I must admit that we pressed our case with some vigor, but Eric made a valiant defense of your overall economic thesis. In so doing he happened to cite a reference by Walter Heller to the need for monetary action to combat an "overheating" of the economy. The President promptly invited Eric to talk with Walter Heller to see if he would indeed agree that monetary action was needed in your present economic situation. Since the Prime Minister raised no objection Eric felt obliged to see Walter and tell him what you had in mind.

Bob Roosa and I have since seen Walter and impressed on him the need for complete discretion. I gather he may stop off in London after the EPC meeting to see if he can talk with you on the subject. I have also asked Bob Roosa to stop in London sometime that same week to give you a complete fill in of our

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- 2 -

thinking. It might be best if he came over the Monday while the EPC is in-session in Paris. I understand that Walter Heller will probably wish to stop by immediately after EPC on Wednesday, when Bob will be tied up in Paris with Working Party 3 and the Group of Ten.

I will not go into substantive matters now since Bob can fill you in in detail. I will only say that we here can see no domestic reason for any action on our part as far as it is possible to look into the future, say six months or more. Naturally, we would be extremely disappointed if we should be forced into an action for balance of payments reasons that was contrary to the needs of our domestic economy, and which would lessen the impact of our tax reduction which we need so much and for which we have had to wait so long.

I am planning to be in Europe in mid-May for the Monetary Conference of the American Bankers Association and am hoping to see you at that time.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

signed
Douglas Dillon

Douglas Dillon

The Honorable
Reginald Maudling
Chancellor of the Exchequer
London, England

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

February 21, 1964

8
Memos for the Pres.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I attach a letter from the Prime Minister which you ought to know about, although it is not immediately urgent.

George Ball reports that the discussions in New York are going somewhat better, and while indications from Cyprus are that Makarios will block any settlement that is satisfactory to anyone else, his representatives in New York are behaving considerably better, at least on the surface.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC let 3/3/78, State let 7/20/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

~~SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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February 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-25
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-01

You asked about the exact status of the OXCART aircraft, and the enclosed status report gives the answers.

CIA has actually taken delivery on a number of these aircraft and has leased them back to the company for further testing. A handful have been put through the entire process and are now back in the hands of the agency, with CIA pilots and complete CIA control.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

February 19, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here is the report on Africa which you asked for from John McCone. I intended to hand it to you earlier, but it looks to me like the sort of thing that it is better to send up for your use when and as you feel the need for it.

McG. B.

SC No. 03001/64 - 10 Feb 1964 TS Dinar

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-25
By cb, NARA Date 1-19-01

February 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A note on unsuccessful news management

When you get to this week's NEWSWEEK you will find a story based on a long file that Chuck Roberts sent up to New York on "how LBJ works." I am one of his sources, and there is a twist in his story which shows how what one man says can be rewritten by an editor. In order to explain to Roberts the care with which you reviewed important matters, and in an effort to knock down the notion that you don't read and study, I told him that from time to time you kept important papers for review, thus avoiding snap judgments. This has got turned around entirely into a "log jam" which does not exist, as we all know.

I jumped on Roberts this morning, and he told me that he himself was disappointed with the story. He asserts that a lot of this is based on other sources, but my own guess is that the particular unfairness of "log jam" remains a gloss on what I told him, and in that sense my fault.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I think it essential to your control of White House briefings that when one goes wrong even a little you should know about it.

McG. B.

cc to Mr Salinger

February 14, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Check list of items needing action
before you go to St. Louis**

1. **Coffee agreement**
2. **White House concern for nuclear safety**
3. **Foreign assistance cut-off for countries
not taking "appropriate steps" to stop
Cuba shipping**
4. **Staff for Lopez Mateos meeting**
5. **Forward planning on Vietnam and Cuba**
6. **Battle Act determinations**

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Check list of items ^{that may} needing action
before you go to St. Louis

1. Coffee agreement
2. White House concern for nuclear safety
- ✓3. Foreign assistance cut-off for countries
not taking "appropriate steps" to stop
Cuba shipping
- ✓4. Staff for Lopez Mateos meeting + Panama
- ✓5. Forward planning on Vietnam and Cuba
- ✓6. Battle Act determinations
- ✓7. Cuban fishermen
- ✓8. Foreign Aid Plan — Black in form.
McG. B.

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February 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

One of our intelligence collecting ships, the USS JAMESTOWN, is being harassed by two Cuban gunboats in international waters about 90 miles off the Cuban coast. One gunboat was 450 yards starboard with guns trained, but appeared to be taking pictures. The other was at portside about 80 yards.

Guantanamo sent fighter aircraft to look over the situation. These fighter aircraft returned to Guantanamo but others are on alert status in the event the Cuban ships fire on the Jamestown.

BKS

(but unsigned)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED 7/20/07
Authority NSC 2/3/78, State Dec
By AMG, NARS, Date 3/3/78
February 11, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Agenda for your Discussion of Prime Minister Home's Visit - Tuesday, Feb. 11, 5:30

The main purpose of this meeting should be to set the agenda and get clear which subjects are of personal interest to you. On this basis we can do memoranda that will supplement the briefing book, which is pretty good.

The schedule of meetings

1. Private talk.

Home arrives at 10:40 Wednesday morning, and after welcoming ceremonies you have a meeting with him here. You will probably wish to begin privately, and you may wish to select as topics for the private discussion on your initiative, from the following:

Cuban trade
British Guiana
The British bank rate

2. Place and persons of larger meeting.

When you and Home have finished your private talk, you can either proceed to the Cabinet Room or be joined from there by a small group of advisers on each side in your office. The British minimum delegation is: the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Butler, Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Sir Burke Trend (Secretary to the Cabinet), Sir Harold Caccia (the Under Secretary of The Foreign Office), and one note-taker. On our side, an equivalent minimum would be: the President, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Bruce, Bundy, and Bill Tyler (plus a note-taker if you agree). A group this size can fit comfortably in your office and the atmosphere would be less formal than in the Cabinet Room.

3. Wednesday morning.

The suggested topic for the first morning is East-West relations and the effort to make new steps toward peace. This involves the situation in Geneva, prospects for a German initiative on Germany and Berlin, and other possibilities. Both you and the Prime Minister have a strong interest

Feb. 11, 1964

in progress here, and Secretary Rusk will be ready to discuss detailed possibilities on our side.

If East-West issues and the quest for peace do not fill the morning, you might go on to the state of NATO and the progress of the MLF.

4. Wednesday afternoon.

No meeting is officially scheduled yet, but we all recommend that you agree to have such a meeting from about 4:30 to 6:30. The primary topic of such a meeting might be the Far East, to include Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and related issues. Harriman and Hilsman have been discussing these matters with the British in the last two days, and there is every advantage in getting as much agreement as possible in this area. For such a discussion Harriman might be added on our side in place of Tyler.

If Harriman comes on Wednesday afternoon, you might also discuss East Africa and Zanzibar at that time. Your personal message to Home got a prompt response saying that he too is deeply concerned about Zanzibar and will be ready to discuss it here.

If we have enough from George Ball we may also wish to try to do something on Cyprus Wednesday afternoon. Alternatively, this one may better wait until Thursday.

5. Thursday morning.

By Thursday morning we will have a draft communique to review, and it will also be useful to talk about such matters as the state of our relations with Europe, nuclear consultation, and Panama, if they have not come up earlier. Salinger for us and Evans for UK should sit in on discussion of communique.

A number of other issues have been set aside for discussion between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Butler, unless you wish to deal with them. These include:

- The Kennedy Round and other trade matters
- International Liquidity
- UN Trade Development Conference
- United Nations Peacekeeping
- Secretary General of NATO
- India and Pakistan
- Cambodia
- West Indies Problems
- Ghana

McG. B.

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Home Via

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach one-page memoranda covering
(1) Cuba trade, (2) British Guiana, and (3)
British bank rate.

Secretary Rusk also suggests that you may
wish to discuss politics and de Gaulle in your
private session.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

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CUBA TRADE

The right of peaceful trade with all Communist countries, including Cuba, is an article of faith for all British politicians and Home has reaffirmed it in Canada. Both public opinion and personal conviction reinforce Home in this position.

He should understand, however, from you privately that increasing British trade with Cuba is bound to be a very serious matter for our public opinion and our government. It is quite possible that British firms trading with Cuba have to choose between Cuban customers and Americans. For example, the Leyland Motors sale of 400 buses may jeopardize the same company's sale of Triumph motor cars in the U. S. (twenty thousand in 1963).

In the same way British flag ships now constitute half of all Free World shipping to Cuba, and if the British Government cannot give us public cooperation we do at least hope for private support in persuading British shippers to get out of this business. You can add that details of trade and shipping will be pressed with Butler by Rusk and his associates. The point of your own discussions with the Prime Minister on this subject is to leave him in no doubt whatever of your own personal commitment on this topic, and to do it in a way that would be hard for him to take in a larger group.

He may well hit back very directly and assert that we are on the wrong track. But we simply must be in a position to say afterwards that you have dealt firmly with this subject.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 475C 602/31/78, State Dept 7/29/77
By img, NARS, Date 3/31/78

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BRITISH GUIANA

Secretary Rusk thinks that the private agreement between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan was not limited in time. My own recollection is very different, and my private impression is that this conversation included only Kennedy and Macmillan and that both Rusk and I are relying on second-hand recollection.

In any event, it is most important to have a clear private understanding with Home, as Kennedy did with Macmillan, that the British will not allow the independence of British Guiana under a Jagan government before November 1964, under any circumstances (although of course we cannot bind Harold Wilson). Since this Kennedy/Macmillan agreement, reached at Birch Grove in June 1963, there has been [REDACTED]

1.5(e)(d)

[REDACTED] working on the British Guiana situation. I have been the U. S. coordinator on this and have kept in close touch with David Ormsby Gore, and you may wish to say to Home that you hope this cooperation can continue. Our professionals are somewhat more hardnosed than the British and would like to see the British resume direct government and throw Jagan out. Neither Rusk nor I feels as strongly as the intelligence people on this, because there is much force in the British argument that such action, unless fully justified by Jagan's behavior, would only make Jagan a martyr.

The British Minister in charge of British Guiana is Duncan Sandys, and the British plan is to have a proportional representation election which we would try to make sure that Jagan did not win. This is a good plan, but it has not been pressed with much energy by the British in recent months because of all the other problems facing Sandys in other parts of the world. That in itself does not matter very much to us, because British Guiana is not an explosive problem to us unless and until it becomes independent with Communists in charge.

I have always supposed myself that an independent Jagan government would be literally unacceptable to us and that we would have to make sure that it was overthrown, by hook or by crook. The whole object of the present exercise is to avoid having to face this choice in 1964 if possible.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By Cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

SECRET

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THE BRITISH BANK RATE

This is the most private subject of all, because any leak from our side would be regarded as very sloppy and would trigger exactly the action which Dillon and the Treasury hope to avoid.

Our Treasury takes the position that the planned 1% rise in British bank rate is very dangerous to our balance of payments because it would lead to heavy short-term flows from New York to London and possibly from New York to Germany, where money rates are currently high and attractive.

Home is bored by economics and bank rates, and the Englishman in charge is Maudling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The reason for you to speak to Home is simply that otherwise the British will not believe Dillon and Roosa in the Treasury.

All you have to say is that this matter is one of very grave concern to us because it might well force an increase in our Federal Reserve rediscount rate from 3-1/2 to 4%. Such an increase would be damaging to our own economic upsurge and very unattractive for that reason.

There is one point in Dillon's memorandum with which I emphatically disagree. He urges that, from our point of view, it would be better to have an early British election and no increase in the British bank rate. That is a parochial Treasury view. The longer the election is postponed the better the slim chance that the Conservatives may win. Home will not think you are very bright or farsighted if you press him to have an election in March in order to avoid a modest interest rate problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

027 17
Memo for the Pres.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Notes for your meeting with Senator Mansfield today at 6:00

1. Vietnam

On Vietnam he continues to believe in the de Gaulle approach, and we don't, though public finger-pointing at de Gaulle is not your line. I suggest you should say to him that for the present any weakening of our support of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam would give the signal for a wholesale collapse of anti-Communism all over Southeast Asia. Khanh's government may be our last best chance, and we simply cannot afford to be the ones who seem to pull the plug on him. For this reason you might wish to urge Mansfield himself not to express his own doubts in public, at least for a while. His Vietnamese memoranda are at Tab A.

You are acting promptly to reorganize the Washington end of our South Vietnamese operations and depending on the success of your conversation with Sullivan, you may wish to tell Mansfield in confidence of your plans. The draft NSAM is attached at Tab B.

2. Panama

Our position remains as you have repeatedly stated it. Mansfield would prefer a more flexible position in which you would in effect agree to negotiate on the Canal in exchange for a return to normal relations. While I am a little more sympathetic to Mansfield on this issue than on South Vietnam, I think our basic position has to be that when the Panamanians cool off, we can get back to serious discussion of every problem, and that while they are trying to use their own riots to force a change in our position, we simply have to wait them out.

The immediate position in the Panama negotiations is that the OAS fact-finding committee goes to Panama tomorrow, and there ^{is} was not likely to be any immediate comment while they are on the job.

Except for the difference in emphasis between you and him, much of Mansfield's memo on Panama makes good sense, if only we could get past the present Panamanian intransigence. His memorandum on Panama is at Tab C.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 2/3/78, State 7/20/77 10/26/77
By hmg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

Feb. 10, 1964

3. Cuba

McNamara's latest instruction is to terminate Cuban commuters who are security risks and poor or marginal performers in the total amount of about 300 -- but without publicity on number or grounds for discharges. The Cubans not discharged may be informed that the base has no instructions for further reductions in the number of Cuban workers, and our plan is to withhold decision on further cuts until we see what else happens. McNamara's telegram is at Tab D.

Otherwise the situation in Cuba has calmed down noticeably, and in my own view the right explanation is that we reacted promptly and straightforwardly. We believe the Cubans have turned the water back on, but we have no intention of using it.

4. Cyprus

George Ball is negotiating on this very sensitive and difficult matter, and depending on your sense of Mansfield's discretion you may wish to tell him most privately that our present view is that U. S. troops would not be helpful. Our problem is to keep the British in the lead and to keep the Turks on board, in a situation in which we are the only ones they trust. Makarios remains determined to present the matter before the UN, and it is not clear that Ball can prevent it or has his mind set on this purpose. (We could probably do more on this if you wish the White House to intervene.) Mansfield's memorandum on Cyprus is at Tab E.

More broadly, you may wish to seek Mansfield's help on spreading the theme you mentioned to us this morning: Our present troubles in the world are not comparable either to Khrushchev's troubles with the Chinese or to some of President Kennedy's really tough moments. Walter Lippmann supports this view in his NEWSWEEK column today (Tab F).

McG. B.

McG. B.

17a



MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: The Vietnamese Situation.

February 1, 1964

I would most respectfully refer to the earlier memorandums which you requested on this subject and which were sent to you under date of December 7, 1963 and January 6, 1964. (Copies are enclosed) In general, these two statements seem to me to remain valid.

The recent developments (the de Gaulle statement and the military coup in Saigon) prompt me to make these additional observations:

General Observations:

1. The second military coup in Viet Nam is not likely to produce any significant improvement in the situation. I had serious doubts about anything constructive emerging from the first which not only ended in the deplorable assassination of President Diem but also severed the slim cord of political legitimacy on which there may have hung at least a slim chance of improvement.

2. It is far from certain that this recent military coup will be the last. On the contrary, it is likely to be only the second in a series, as military leaders, released from all civilian restraint, jockey for control of the power which resides in United States aid. This process

of coup upon coup may be expected to become increasingly divorced from any real concern with the needs of the Vietnamese people. If the people do not go over actively to the Viet Cong, they will at best care very little about resisting them, let alone crusading against them. Indeed, the bulk of the Vietnamese people, as well as the lower ranks of the armed forces, may already be in this frame of mind.

3. If these are in fact the grim prospects, our present policies will be drained of any constructive significance for the political future of Viet Nam. We will find ourselves engaged merely in an indecisive, bloody and costly military involvement and the involvement will probably have to increase just to keep the situation as it is.

4. This indecisive situation could persist for a long time, provided we are prepared to pour in the men and money which it takes to hold it together. Yet, if we are unprepared to do so, there is no real military alternative for us except an abject withdrawal. A deeper military plunge is not a real alternative. Apart from the absence of sufficient national interest to justify it to our own people, there is no reason to assume that it will settle the question. More likely than not, it will simply enlarge the morass in which we are now already on the verge of indefinite entrapment. Indeed, the morass could conceivably be enlarged all the way into North Viet Nam, into Laos, into Cambodia and into China without changing the basic pattern of the difficulty for us.

5. The de Gaulle approach to Southeast Asia offers a faint glimmer of hope of a way to solution at a cost to us somewhere commensurate with our national interests in Southeast Asia. For this reason, it is most

unfortunate that the new military junta in south Viet Nam has seen fit, as one of its first acts, to denounce it.

6. It is glib to make light of the admittedly unsatisfactory situation in Laos, or the situation in Cambodia as a basis for denouncing the de Gaulle approach. Before doing so, we might well ask ourselves: Do we prefer what we have in south Viet Nam to what we have in Laos? Would we want to take on another south Viet Nameese type involvement there and in Cambodia?

Concluding Suggestions:

On the basis of the above observations, I would most respectfully add the suggestions below to those contained in the memorandums of December 7, 1963 and January 6, 1964. These suggestions, as in the case of the others, may or may not have validity in the light of all the facts. They are submitted solely in the hope that they may be helpful to you in the discharge of your grave responsibilities.

1. We have given extraordinary support to two successive governments in Viet Nam. We can do no more and should try to do no more for the third. We are already on the verge of turning a war in Vietnam which is still primarily a Vietnamese responsibility into an American war to be paid for primarily with American lives. I see no national interest at this time which would justify that plunge and I most emphatically do not recommend it.

2. We should discourage the new Vietnamese junta from any belief that its expressions of violent anti-communism and anti-neutralism assure them of a blank check on our aid-funds and the lives of our servicemen. Every effort should continue to be made to reduce our contribution of both.

3. We should not by word or action endorse the new junta's hostile attitude towards France, for if there is any hope of a satisfactory solution in Viet Nam and, indeed, throughout Indochina it rests very heavily on France.

4. We should support French efforts to help Cambodia stay out from under Chinese domination and redouble our efforts to restore a measure of amity in our relations with that country.

5. We should redouble our efforts to draw France into the forefront of the Laotian problem and give full support to any attempts which de Gaulle may be prepared to make to improve that situation.

6. We should be prepared to listen most intently and with an open ear and mind to whatever the French may have to say on Vietnam and to interpose no objections or obstacles to any explorations of a settlement involving the entire country ^{based on the 1954 Geneva Agreement,} which they may seek to pursue.

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

17c
January 6, 1964

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Viet Nam Situation.

This memo is responsive to your telephone request during Christmas week to Frank Valeo. I have discussed the request with him and would respectfully refer you to my memo of December 7th, a copy of which is enclosed.

As you remarked to him on the telephone, we do not want another China in Viet Nam. I would respectfully add to this observation: Neither do we want another Korea. It would seem that a key (but often overlooked) factor in both situations was a tendency to bite off more than we were prepared in the end to chew. We tended to talk ourselves out on a limb with overstatements of our purpose and commitment only to discover in the end that there were not sufficient American interests to support with blood and treasure a desperate final plunge. Then, the questions followed invariably: "Who got us into this mess?" "Who lost China?" etc.

We are close to the point of no return in Viet Nam. A way to avoid another Korea and, perhaps, another China may be found in the general policy approach suggested in the memo of December 7th. If so, there ought to be less official talk of our responsibility in Viet Nam and more emphasis on the responsibilities of the Vietnamese themselves and on a great deal of thought on the possibilities for a peaceful solution through the efforts of other nations as well as our own.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

December 7, 1963

TO : President Lyndon B. Johnson
FROM : Senator Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Southeast Asia and Viet Nam

Pursuant to our conversation last Thursday night, attached herewith are memoranda which were sent to President Kennedy over the past years. They deal with the Southeast Asian situation and Viet Nam in particular. In addition there is appended a speech of mine of two years ago and a report to the Senate a year ago. Subsequent events have changed some of the details. But it seems to me that the basic observations and conclusions remain valid. In some specifics, actions of the Executive Branch coincide with these observations and conclusions. In many they do not. In any event, this material may be useful by way of background.

I would add only these thoughts on the present situation:

1. Present policy says that there is a war which can be won in south Viet Nam alone. It says that the war can be won at a limited expenditure of American lives and resources commensurate with our national interests in south Viet Nam.

Both assumptions may be in error. There may be no war to be won in south Viet Nam alone. There may be only a war which will, in time, involve U. S. forces throughout Southeast Asia, and finally throughout China itself in search of victory. What national interests in Asia would steal the American people for the massive costs of an ever-deepening involvement of that kind. It may be that we are confronted with a dilemma not unlike that which found us in Korea a decade ago. It will be recalled that Mr. Eisenhower's response was not to pursue the war to victory but to go to Korea to make peace, in reality, a truce.

2. Similarly, there may be a truce that could be won now in Viet Nam alone and eventually a peace which might be won throughout Southeast Asia at a price commensurate with American interests. That peace should mean, in the end, a Southeast Asia less dependent on our aid-resources and support, less under our control, not cut off from China but, still, not overwhelmed by China. If there is any opportunity of winning that kind of truce and peace it would appear to involve initially the following actions;

a. It would involve an effort to strengthen the hold of the Saigon government on those parts of south Viet Nam which it now controls. What is called for are political and social acts of popular benefit by the Vietnamese authorities where they can act, even if it means curtailing the present elusive and so far unsuccessful chase of the Viet Cong all over the land.

b. It would involve an astute diplomatic offensive which would seek to enlist France, Britain, India and, perhaps, even Russia and all other sources of potential ~~aid~~ in a bonafide effort to bring about an end to the Vietnamese conflict. A settlement might be on terms which ~~allow~~ our influence (and ~~aid~~) provided it also inhibited Chinese political domination. France is the key country.

c. It would involve U. S. understanding, sympathy and sensible encouragement for the Cambodian desire to stand on its own feet without one-sided U. S. aid. At this time, Cambodia would appear to be the principal prototype of any eventual peace for Southeast Asia. It would be an independent Southeast Asia, not dependent on a costly U. S. prop. If Cambodia falls to its neighbors or if it goes over to China, we may as well resign ourselves to an involvement of years in all of Southeast Asia at great cost in resources and, probably, lives. Or alternatively, we will be faced with an ignominious and dangerous abandonment of the Southeast Asian mainland to Chinese political domination. In connection with these alternatives we need to keep in mind the rising public hostility towards foreign aid in particular and government costs in general.

17e

FOR RELEASE JUNE 10, 1962

4:00 P.M., E.S.T.

INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

Sunday, June 10, 1962, 4:00 p.m., E.S.T.

I am happy to be with you and grateful for the privilege of joining the class of 1962. It is especially pleasant to be here because of past contacts with your faculty and, most especially, with my old friend, Ernest Melby, former Chancellor of the University of Montana.

Members of the Michigan State staff are often encountered in Washington and in the far-flung corners of the world. I cannot remember the number of times, for example, that I have run into your Professor Wesley Fishel and my old colleague from Montana, Professor Guy Fox, in Saigon. Together with the rest of the training-mission of Michigan State, they have made important contributions to the Republic of Viet Nam. As for your President, Dr. Hannah, his travel-mileage on behalf of the nation--and, incidentally, Michigan State--is rivaled only by that of the Secretary of State and Members of Congress.

I have heard it said that the sun never sets on the faculty of Michigan State. It is reassuring, therefore, to come here and discover that the faculty has a natural habitat. It is such a delightful habitat one wonders why so many of its members have been persuaded to leave for the enervating tropics of Asia and Washington.

They have been persuaded, I suspect, even as the nation has been persuaded, to enter into new channels of international activity, by the events of the past two decades. The nation has become deeply committed

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INSERT PAGE 2

I have chosen it, finally, because I suspect you are sufficiently inspired at this moment not to require an inspirational speech from me. Hence, I shall give you what are, in my opinion, the sober facts of one of the situations which confront the Nation, facts to which you are entitled as mature men and women, as citizens of the United States.

throughout the world. Skilled members of this university are among the thousands of Americans who are working abroad with great dedication to discharge that commitment.

It is to this commitment, notably, as it is involved in Southeast Asia which I would address your attention. I have chosen this subject, in part, because of the close association which has existed between Michigan State and Viet Nam. I have chosen it, too, in part because events appear to be moving in Southeast Asia towards a point of critical decision. *Insert*

As you know, we have recently landed combat forces in Thailand. This movement of troops follows the strengthening of the United States military training mission in Viet Nam. Both steps represent a deepening of an already very deep involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland.

In this, as in all cases of foreign policy and military command, the responsibility for the direction of the nation's course rests with the President. It is a grave and difficult responsibility. In discharging it, the President is entitled to the understanding and support of the nation. May I say that he has had both in the Senate of the United States, from the leadership of both parties. He has kept the Congress fully informed on the situation as it has developed. In a similar manner he has tried to keep the people of the nation informed through his frequent press conferences.

Support of the President does not preclude public discussion of the situation in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it presupposes it. The President would be the last to expect a moratorium on public participation of this kind. It is politics that needs to stop at the water's edge, not serious consideration of the nation's course in its relations with the rest of the world. Rather than less, we need more public consideration of this matter.

The need is especially acute with respect to Southeast Asia. Until recent times it has been an area remote from the general awareness of the nation. It is not surprising that the public, even today, knows little about the region. Indeed, it is doubtful that a decade ago, more than a small fraction of the civilian and military personnel of the government and the journalists who are now immersed in its place-names could have quickly located the Kingdom of Laos, let alone its towns and villages, on a map of Asia.

Yet this obscure land on the borders of South China now writes headline after headline in the daily press. It keeps the lights on through the night in the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been the immediate cause of the dispatch of United States combat forces to Thailand and a partial cause of the strengthening of the military mission in Viet Nam. In a decade about \$400 million in U.S. military and other aid has gone into this one nation whose population is far smaller than that of the Detroit Metropolitan region and is scattered in jungle and hill over an area the size of Oregon.

In 1953 when I first visited Laos, just two junior resident State Department officials were deemed sufficient for the protection of all United States interests in the entire country. Almost a decade later, hundreds of officials from half a dozen federal agencies--military and civilian--were on the scene.

This transition in Laos highlights the transition in the United States relationship with all of Southeast Asia. From a minimum of contact and cost scarcely a dozen years ago we have moved, today, to a point of saturated involvement and immense expense. This progressive involvement has not been a party matter--a republican policy or a democratic policy.

It began under a Democratic Administration. It intensified sharply under a Republican Administration. And it is now being dealt with once again by a Democratic Administration.

The roots of this involvement in Southeast Asia lie in the vast dislocation which was produced in Asia by World War II. But in a more specific sense, it dates from the period of the Korean Conflict.

You will recall that about a dozen years ago revolution swept like a giant tidal wave through China. It spilled over the Chinese borders in the north, into Korea. It gave every sign of engulfing Indo-China to the South. That region, itself, was in the midst of a mixed and confusing Communist-nationalist-monarchist upheaval, but in essentials, a revolution against the reassertion of French colonial control after World War II.

Engaged in the conflict in Korea, we sought for strategic reasons to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. So we began to go to the aid, first, of the French and after them, the successor governments of Indo-China--in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

The military situation was eventually stabilized in Korea by negotiations. It was also stabilized in Indo-China largely through the diplomacy which produced the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

A kind of uneasy truce settled over Asia. But there was no change in the deep-seated hostility between Chinese communism and the United States. Peking continued to single us out as the number one enemy of the Chinese people. We continued the policy of wartime boycott of the Chinese mainland--total economic and cultural boycott and almost total diplomatic boycott. The military situation in both the Formosan Straits and Korea remained ominous. The political situation in the divided countries of Laos and Viet Nam remained unsettled.

There followed, then, a United States effort to keep China out of Southeast Asia and to forestall the spread of communism in that region. It was at this point that our direct involvement began to deepen in earnest. We embarked upon a massive military aid program to Southeast Asian nations. All policy was directed preponderantly to the building of strong anti-communist military establishments and governments. We sought, further, to bring the region under the protective umbrella of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO, which was expected to marshal nations both within and without the area for a common defense of the region against communism.

In Laos and in south Viet Nam, particularly, the immense cost of sustaining the large military establishments built by U.S. military aid required, in turn, large annual economic aid-subsidies to these countries. Neither form of aid has had much effect on the economic or social well-being of the ordinary people of these nations. The principal gain of these programs has flowed to a relatively small number of persons in the cities and to military personnel.

In addition, to this massive military and military-support program of aid, some effort was made to help improve the lot of the ordinary people by technical and other assistance for economic and social development.

Finally, I should mention the extension of the information program into Southeast Asia. Again, the contrast in ten years is significant. From a minor operation confined largely to the environs of the cities of Saigon and Bangkok, the voice of America has been carried by radio and pamphlet and motion picture, by boat, plane, jeep and foot and, I would presume even by elephant, into the remotest villages and hamlets of Southeast Asia. The output of words increased massively and impressively. So, too, of course, did the cost to the people of the United States.

Over a ten-year period, the foreign aid-program--military and non-military--alone has resulted in authorized appropriations of the public funds of this nation of well over \$3 billion for these Southeast Asian nations. This total does not take into account the salaries and expenses of the thousands of military and civilian personnel of the government who have seen service in the area during this period. It does not take into account the cost of our participation in SEATO and consequent military deployments such as has occurred in recent weeks in and around Thailand. It does not take into account the cost of the expansion of the information, programs and other government activity.

Altogether, the commitment of resources to Southeast Asia in a decade has been enormous by any measure. Yet it would be a small price to pay if it were to yield a durable peace and safeguard an opportunity for the growth of stable free nations in that region. Unfortunately, the experience of the past decade is not such as to give rise to sanguine expectations in this respect.

We have the experience of SEATO. It is difficult to assess its value in forestalling military adventures by the Communists. Perhaps it has had some effect; perhaps it has not. But one thing has been made very clear by the recent military deployment. We have allies under SEATO to be sure, but allies either unwilling or unable to assume but the smallest fraction of the burdens of the alliance. I say that not as criticism of any member of SEATO. Each nation has its own problems and capacities and I do not presume to judge them. But this nation, too, has its problems. And one of them is to avoid miscalculations in policies which may derive from the gap between the presumed promise and the actual fulfillment in any military alliance.

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Under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, a man for whom I have the highest respect and the deepest admiration, a man whose integrity and honesty are unquestioned, and without whom there would be no free Vietnam, that country has faced extraordinary difficulties in its struggle for survival. Yet, even in . . .

We have the experience, too, of Laos. There has been eight years of military and other aid of the most intensive, indeed, the most extravagant kind to that country. There have been millions of costly words and pictures and sounds on the virtues of freedom and the evils of communism disseminated throughout a Kingdom in which, may I say, neither the concept of Western freedom or Western communism can have much meaning. For it is a kingdom of isolated villagers, still living in a relatively contented, peaceful, Buddhist culture centuries old. Eight years of aid and words and other operations, in the end, have produced scarcely a ripple in Laos, except in the capital city. And what it produced there, to say the least, does not speak well for it. Laos is, clearly, in far more danger, today, of a collapse into a kind of communism under outside domination or, perhaps, to division and destruction as a nation, than when this whole process began--when the country was led by one who tried to think and act in terms of the Kingdom's neutralism and greater self-reliance.

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We have the experience of Viet Nam. In this situation, after years of military assistance of a most costly kind, it is discovered that the aid went to build the wrong kinds of forces and that it is now necessary to build almost from scratch with the aid of thousands of additional American training and support forces and at an even higher level of annual aid. It is also discovered that a great deal more emphasis on political and economic development is now required in Viet Nam, although the need for this latter course has been pointed out time and again in the Congress for many years.

There is no longer any escaping the fact that after years of enormous expenditures of aid in south Viet Nam, that country is more, rather than less, dependent on aid from the United States. Viet Nam's independent survival is less rather than more secure than it was five or

six years ago. Once again the bombs explode in Saigon as they have not done since the early days, which Professor Fishel will remember with me, of the establishment of the Republic in 1953-55.

One can only hope that a similar process of increasing dependency and increasing insecurity is not now about to begin in Thailand.

I think, in all honesty, that we must contrast these situations with those which exist in Burma and in Cambodia. Burma has a non-communist independence which is, at this moment, more secure than that of Laos and Viet Nam. Yet it has obtained little aid from us. Cambodia has received from us a fraction of the per capita aid which has gone to Viet Nam or Laos. It has received aid from many countries, including Communist countries. Yet, its non-communist independence is certainly not less, it is far more secure than that of Laos. Indeed, it is, as of this moment, among the most peaceful and stable of all the nations of Asia.

Now, I think we must realize that situations differ in these various nations. Communist and other pressures--internal and external--vary. So do historic and strategic circumstances. But it is not without significance in our comprehension of the total situation in Southeast Asia that in nations in which our aid-commitment has been relatively limited, the prospects are no worse for the survival of non-communist independence than in those in which we are massively committed.

Before this phenomenon can yield anything of relevance to policy, however, we must get clearly in mind the interests of this nation in Southeast Asia which we are trying to protect. For, I presume, that it is on the basis of these interests that we have made this great commitment.

A nation's interests are of two kinds--those which are basic and enduring and those which are transitory and peripheral. And history indicates to us that our enduring interests in Southeast Asia are limited. History also indicates to us that these limited interests in commerce, culture and security have been, in the past, most effectively safeguarded by a policy of minimum involvement. We have, in the past, avoided interfering in the internal political affairs of the Southeast Asian nations. We have, in the past, minimized our military commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland--even during the grimmest days of World War II. We have, in the past, given appropriate encouragement to the emergence of independent nationhood in the region. We have, in the past, sought to act in a fashion which would not tarnish the symbol of freedom and human decency which this nation has long been in Asia or alienate the friendship of the peoples of that region, regardless of what governments might temporarily hold sway over them. We have, in the past, through diplomacy, sought to do our small share in the preservation of peace in that region as part of our general interest in the maintenance of world peace.

I do not see that these enduring interests have changed in any significant degree. Our commercial and cultural contacts with Southeast Asia are still limited. Our security interests in Southeast Asia, in terms of the defense of the United States are still limited.

Yet, it is obvious that in the past decade the policy of minimum involvement and, incidentally, minimum cost, by which we have traditionally defended these limited interests, has shifted about 180° to the point of very deep involvement and enormous cost.

I have already pointed out how the Korean conflict precipitated this drastic change in course in Southeast Asia. How we reached the present point is understandable. The question which we have not yet faced, the question

which may now be approaching the point of critical decisions is whether this change is to become a permanent part of our foreign policy. If it is, then we must be prepared, at best, to carry an annual burden of several hundred millions of dollars of military and economic subsidies to anti-communist governments in the region for many years. We will have to do that whether or not they are responsive governments in terms of their own peoples needs. We must be prepared to extend this support in Southeast Asia for the indefinite future through the whole costly mechanism of aid and propaganda. We must be prepared to bear the human and material cost of keeping an indeterminate number of combat troops in that region, on garrison duty or for more serious purposes as may be necessary. All these things we must be prepared to do at best. At worst, we must be prepared for a possible conflict of indefinite depth and duration, dependent largely on our forces for its prosecution.

These are the facts, the realities of the situation. Grim as they are, I believe that it is eminently desirable that they be faced now, whatever our decisions may be.

In all candor I must ask: Is a permanent policy of that kind justified on the basis of any enduring interests of the people of the United States in Southeast Asia? Is it more valid now, than in the past, to involve ourselves in internal political situations in the countries of that region--to maintain any government in a state of quasi-dependency on us for the indefinite future? Is it more valid now, than in the past, to assume the primary burden for the political, economic and social future of these lands?

I have raised these questions and I would anticipate that you might raise others. The fact is that these approaches are, at best, doubtful because

they are immensely costly in ratio to any enduring interests of the people of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. They are doubtful because, in the long run, they will yield little to the people of this nation and little to the people of Southeast Asia except a multiplication of their already immense social and economic difficulties. These approaches are doubtful because they bring upon us a vague responsibility for the internal evolution of the nations of Southeast Asia, a responsibility which no nation can discharge for another in this day and age, a responsibility which it is the right and duty of the people and leaders of those nations themselves to assume, a responsibility which, after many costly decades, we relinquished in the Philippines with no intention of assuming elsewhere.

While these approaches are doubtful, there is not assurance that they can be avoided. We have accumulated binding treaty commitments over the years and integrity demands that these be honored. Moreover, one cannot know what other nations may do in this situation; and at this late hour any improvement in the situation depends on the attitudes of many governments. It depends heavily on the Chinese in Peking. It depends heavily on the Soviet Russian government. It depends on political and military leaders in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, it depends on all governments which by reason of their membership in the United Nations have a measure of responsibility for the maintenance of peace wherever it may be threatened.

But let there be no doubt that it also depends on us. Regardless of these other factors, it remains for us, now, to draw clearly the distinction between what is enduring and basic and what is transitory and peripheral in our interests with respect to Southeast Asia. It remains for us to hold fast to the one and seek actively to minimize the other, to the end that the

haphazard commitment and waste of resources in which we have indulged for years in the pursuit not only of our enduring interests but of political slogans and shibboleths may cease.

✓ To the extent that we do what we ourselves must do, I believe we shall begin to discern the basis for a new approach to policy in Southeast Asia. It will be an approach which will:

(1) explore actively, intensely and continuously every possibility of minimizing the unilateral activity of the United States in Southeast Asia in every sphere;

(2) re-examine SEATO in the light of the recent experience in Thailand and not hesitate to attempt to modify or alter it, if other ways of maintaining peace and independence in Southeast Asia become evident;

(3) seek vigorously to diffuse, through the United Nations or through any other feasible grouping of nations, the enormous burden of assisting nations of Southeast Asia to bring their economies and social structures more up-to-date;

(4) place less emphasis on political and military subsidies, propaganda and other devices of the cold war and more emphasis on a vigorous and persistent traditional diplomacy for the development of a more stable situation in the area;


(5) pay more attention to the manner in which the reasonable needs and aspirations of the people of the nations of Southeast Asia are being met by their governments in adjusting the whole range of our relations with those governments;

(6) study afresh all the political problems of the region which contain the seeds of expanded conflict, with special attention to the relevance of the experiences of Burma and Laos. *Cambodia.*

It is not certain that any of these approaches may be fruitful. The difficulties which have been encountered on all sides in attempting to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos is indicative of what is involved in any significant change from the present course in Southeast Asia. But difficulties of change, notwithstanding, the fact remains that the present course is, as it has been for a long time, at best, a mark-time course of years and decades of immense cost to the people of the United States and, at worst, it is a collision course.

It is clearly in the interests of this nation to adjust that course if it is at all possible to do so with honor and decency. May I say, further, that this nation owes apology to no nation if it seeks to lighten its commitments in Southeast Asia through a vigorous diplomacy--as we have been doing with respect to Laos--and a much more discriminating and prudent use of its resources. We have done our share, more than our share to sustain friendly governments in Asia. We will go on doing it. We will meet treaty commitments which are binding on our honor. But, at the same time, let there be no doubt that the time is long past due when we must explore every avenue which may lead to a situation in Southeast Asia, less dependent on the resources of this nation for its cement. In the search for that situation the President needs the understanding and support of the nation and I have no doubt that it will be forthcoming.

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DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. -----

**TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, CIA
The Director, AID**

I have today determined that it is essential to establish in Washington a small committee for the management of U. S. policy and operations in South Vietnam. After consultation with the Secretary of State, I have designated Mr. William Sullivan of the Department of State to serve as Chairman of this working committee, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State.

I now request that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator, Agency for International Development, nominate to me individuals from their departments and agencies to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's committee. The officers so nominated will be expected to give an absolute priority to their obligations as members of this committee and as agents for the execution of approved decisions.


On this basis, I have already designated Mr. Michael Forrestal to serve as the White House representative on this committee.

Major questions of policy and operations will be subject to my approval in consultation with heads of departments and agencies as appropriate. In the execution of approved policy, it is my desire that Mr. Sullivan's committee should move energetically, and that department appeal from Mr. Sullivan's decisions should be kept at a minimum. He is being appointed because he commands the confidence not only of myself and of the Secretary of State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concerned.

It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this committee will permit an energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of the only war we face at present.

LBJ

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MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

January 31, 1964

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: The Panama Situation

I. In response to your request, this memorandum contains observations and suggestions relative to the Panamanian situation. They are based on limited access to the facts and on history. As such, they are, at best, additional yardsticks which may have some use in weighing the difficult decisions which fall within your heavy responsibilities.

II. The following assumptions underlie the observations and suggestions in this memorandum.

A. We have only one fundamental national interest to protect in the present situation. We have got to insure untroubled and adequate water-passage through Central America. It is desirable to seek to secure this interest at a minimum total cost to this nation and, if possible, by ways which do not undermine our capacity to exercise a constructive influence elsewhere in Latin America.

B. The pressure for social change is just short of violent revolution in Panama and in much of the rest of Latin America. The pressure comes primarily from the inside, from the decay and anti-
quation of the social structures of various Latin American countries.

Even if we desired to do so, we could not, as a practical matter, stop the pressure for change. But we may have something constructive to contribute to the form and pace of the change if we play our cards carefully and wisely.

C. Change in Panama is part of the whole problem of change in Latin America. Our actions with respect to the part will have a significant effect on our ability to act constructively with respect to the whole.

D. Our actions in Panama will produce respect, rather than fear and suspicious hostility in Latin America, provided that our unquestionable power is used only with restraint and with justice and in accord with the decent opinion of Latin America.

III. If the above assumptions are accurate and are at the heart of our national interest in the present situation, the following general observations on United States policy will be derived from them:

A. Those United States policies (words and actions) which preserve untroubled water-passage through Central America but also tend to permit reasonable and peaceful adjustments in our relationship to the changing situation in that region make sense in terms of our national interests.

B. Conversely, those policies (words and actions) which enable us to preserve the water-passage only by a large increase in the costs of military and police protection and at the price of intensified

suspicion and antagonism towards the United States throughout Latin America are to be minimized or avoided entirely if at all possible.

IV. Specific suggestions on policy (words and actions):

In the light of these assumptions and general observations the following specific suggestions may be worth considering:

A. Welcome, wholeheartedly, consideration by the OAS of the difficulties in Panama and urge that body's help in finding a solution; offer every facility for on-the-spot study in the Zone.

B. Reject firmly but without fanfare the charges of aggression and also make it clear that we will not accept unilateral dictation from any nation, large or small.

C. Make clear that the President of the United States does not quibble over words such as "discussion or negotiations"; that, if changes are desirable, as well they may be, we are prepared at all times to sit down to discuss, to negotiate and to agree on a mutually acceptable basis.

D. Avoid boxing ourselves in at home against change through the fanning of our own emotions by crediting Castro and Communism too heavily for a difficulty which existed long before either had any significance in this Hemisphere and which will undoubtedly continue to plague us after both cease to have much meaning.

E. Stress with our own involved bureaucracy that our national interest is trouble-free water-passage, not the safeguarding of

an outdated position of privilege (Zonists, understandably, might have difficulty differentiating between the maintenance of their special interests and the national interests). To this end, at an appropriate time:

1. Act to limit continuous service in the Zone for all U.S. military and civilian personnel to a maximum period of four years and seek a sharp reduction particularly in civilian personnel.

2. Cut the commissaries or so alter and limit their character that they will handle only those few unique items of U.S. merchandise which may not be readily available locally.

3. Fully integrate all schools and colleges in the Zone.

4. Tighten up on all salaries and emoluments to Zone employees to bring them in line with general U.S. personnel practices applicable elsewhere to overseas personnel.

F. Indicate a readiness, at an appropriate time and when not under duress, to consider:

- a. Steps to give additional recognition to Panamanian titular sovereignty in the Zone.


- b. Revision of the rental agreement.

- c. An increase of Panamanian participation in the operation of the Canal up to and including some Panamanian representation on the Board of the Canal Company, always, however, contingent upon the need for a trouble-free operation of the waterway.

G. Begin to give serious consideration in diplomacy to marshalling international support for a Mexican-owned and operated canal through Mexico, with a view to sobering the Panamanians in their demands and, also, in recognition of the growing need for additional water-passage through Central America.

Some or none of the above specifics may have applicability in the light of your understanding of all the facts. They are merely suggestive of the kinds of words and actions which, it would seem, might be helpful in the present difficulty. And to ease those difficulties may be the best that can be hoped for until it is crystal clear that another canal will be built and our dependence on this outdated monopoly will have thereby been reduced.

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YOU ARE DIRECTED TO TERMINATE THE SERVICES OF CUBAN
COMMUTERS WHO ARE SECURITY RISKS AND POOREST OR MARGINAL
PERFORMERS IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF APPROX THREE HUNDRED BY
12 FEB 1964. NO STATEMENT OR PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN AS TO
THE NUMBER TO BE DISCHARGED OR REASONS THEREFOR. THOSE
CUBANS NOT DISCHARGED MAY BE INFORMED THAT THE BASE HAS NO
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF CUBAN
WORKERS. FOR YOUR PRIVATE INFO, DECISIONS AS TO FURTHER
CUTS WILL AWAIT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. NEGOTIATIONS ARE

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
UNDERWAY FOR INSTALLATION OF A WATER DESALINIZATION PLANT.
DECISION ON WHICH OF SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE TYPES WILL BE
MADE SHORTLY.

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Authority Navy Lt 4/20/77
By smg, NARS, Date 7/15/77



MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

January 31, 1964

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Observations on the Cypriote Crisis.

The crisis in Cyprus is of greater concern to our European allies--notably to Britain--than it is to us. And we ought to do everything that we can to keep it that way. There is nothing for us to gain by involving ourselves in replacement of Britain as the number one outside power, after Greece and Turkey, in this situation. There is every danger that if we do so we will reap a harvest of cost, blood and resentment and little more. There is no basis that I know of for assuming that we can be more effective than the British or the Europeans in bringing the crisis to a satisfactory and enduring solution.

It would seem to me that any policy which we may pursue which does not begin by facing the above realities is not well founded in terms of United States interests. This is not to say that we can divorce ourselves completely from the Cypriote situation. We cannot, unless we are prepared, at least, for the dissolution of the Eastern wing of N.A.T.O.

What the realities of our interests would appear to suggest is a course of extreme reticence on our part insofar as our direct involvement in military peace-keeping functions on Cyprus may be concerned. This course

would not foreclose any of the following positive and antecedent approaches in policy.

1. We can exert every possible effort in diplomacy, particularly with respect to Greece and Turkey, in support of a predominant British peace-keeping role on Cyprus. In this connection, it should be possible, if necessary, to provide out of foreign aid funds a financial contribution to the British effort to maintain the lid.

2. We may be able to discourage through aid and other diplomacy any precipitous and hostile Greek or Turkish intervention in Cyprus or an outbreak between them on the Eurasian mainland.

3. We should be able to provide a share of financial support for a West European composite peace force on Cyprus, if that promises to be more effective than unilateral British action in maintaining the lid.

4. We can consider support for a U.N. non-involved nations international peace force--in the pattern of the Suez group--if that promises to be more effective than unilateral British or composite European intervention in maintaining the lid.


In short, it would appear to be in our national interest to participate indirectly and in a secondary role in whatever approach seems, on the basis of all available intelligence, to offer the best promise of maintaining a lid on the situation. The need for such a lid may well persist for some years, until either the present Constitution of Cyprus has had an opportunity to establish itself or until some other more satisfactory solution is devised.

Whatever the cost of indirect and secondary participation on our part it will be small as compared with the cost of direct involvement with our own forces. Even more important, by avoiding direct involvement we will have a measure of flexibility which may enable us to exert a constructive influence towards an enduring political solution as opportunities present themselves.

It may be that none of the above alternatives will work. It may be that only U.S. participation in military intervention will prevent the lid from coming off in Cyprus. But before we commit ourselves to such an undertaking, there ought to be no question that our intervention is essential to prevent the total collapse of the Eastern wing of N.A.T.O. in a Greek-Turkish conflict. Further, there ought to be no question that the intervention by the U.S. will, in fact, prevent this collapse, for it would make little sense for us to stop the conflict in Cyprus with U.S. forces only to see it break out on the Eurasian mainland.

Finally, there ought to be no question that European participation in the intervention in Cyprus will include all NATO nations except, perhaps, Portugal and Ireland which has no forces and that its total weight will greatly exceed our own. For if the intervention is necessary to prevent the collapse of the Eastern wing of NATO then the undertaking ought to be of at least as much concern to the Europeans as it is to us. If it is not, the continuing validity of N.A.T.O.'s Eastern wing would then come into question and would compel re-examination of our own basic concepts of policy for that part of the world.

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Less Danger, More Trouble

AFTER some weeks of unusual quiet in the outer world, the President finds himself facing a series of international crises. Directly or indirectly, the United States is concerned with all of them, with Panama and Cuba and Cyprus, with Vietnam and the South Pacific, with Zanzibar and the newly established states of what was once the British Empire in East Africa. Yet the President has refused to let any of them divert him from his main preoccupation, which is to steer a tax bill and a civil-rights bill through Congress.

This would not have been possible a few years ago. Until after the confrontation with the Soviet Union in Cuba and the test-ban treaty which followed it, President Kennedy had to give his first attention to crises like those in Panama and Cyprus, and in Vietnam. This change in the urgency and gravity of international crises is the great new fact in international relations and is altering them profoundly.

The reason for this dramatic change is that for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons have been defused. Therefore, while we are much concerned about these various crises, and while it is very important indeed to overcome them successfully, they have not become direct confrontations of the United States with the Soviet Union, each with nuclear weapons at the alert. This is why President Johnson has been able to treat them as local rather than global crises.

From Freeze to Friction. The subsiding of the nuclear danger has changed decisively the condition of international affairs to which we have become accustomed since the mid-1950s when the Soviet Union made itself a nuclear power. Broadly speaking, we have now come into a time when there is less danger but more trouble. While the threat of incinerating the whole Northern Hemisphere hung over every international dispute, the nations were, so to speak, frozen into a kind of stability and order. There were two centers of international power, the one in Moscow and the one in Washington. From these centers nuclear weapons could be fired. Even those nations which tried not to be aligned with either Moscow or Washington were awed and constrained to avoid any disturbance of the delicate and dangerous balance of terror.

As the nightmare has lifted, the influence of the super-powers has diminished. Neither Moscow nor Washington is any longer the leader, much less the master, of the coalition of its allies. Thus, there is now a cold war within the Communist

camp. The influence of the Soviet Union has virtually disappeared from South-east Asia, and it has declined sharply in Eastern Europe. As for the Russians in Cuba, it would be hard to say whether the Russians regard their relations with Castro as an asset or as a nuisance, rather like having a polecat by the tail.

We, for our part, are having to teach ourselves to live with the fact that while we are still the ultimate protector of the Atlantic community, we are no longer its pre-eminent leader. We have been unable to induce our European allies to follow us in our boycotts of Cuba and of China, and in our idea of squeezing the Soviet Union by limiting credit. We are not being consulted, we are hardly being listened to, on the problem of the political and economic union of Europe. Thus, within the two alliances which divide the world, the discipline of fear has been lifted. That is why weaker allies like Greece and Turkey can threaten to go to war with each other right within the borderlands of Russia.

Changing Tide. And yet, although there is very much trouble over which we have only limited control, on the paramount problem of the age our influence has increased and is increasing. We are doing well in our dealings with the Soviet Union. On the path which John F. Kennedy opened toward a relaxation of tension, we are gaining adherents and supporters.

Thus, there are deep rumblings in the present post-Adenauer Germany. The tide is beginning to run, as we have long hoped it would, toward reunification by increasing intercourse between the two parts of Germany.

No less important is the evolution of General de Gaulle's views of the West's relations with the Soviet Union. Until very recently, he was taking the same view as Dr. Adenauer, that nothing has changed in Moscow and that exploration and talk with the Russians is not only useless but pernicious. Now the French Finance Minister is negotiating with the Russians in Moscow, and in his press conference of Jan. 31, the general recognized that there was under way a relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union. He said that "in the world's enormous evolution . . . such contacts" with China "contribute to the attenuation—*now under way*—of the dramatic contrasts and oppositions between the different camps that divide the world."



February 4, 1964

→ r G 18

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. O'Donnell

Attached is a memo to the President for his meeting with Dirk Stikker on Wednesday at 2:30. The Department wants to send George Ball and Bob Schaetzel, and I see no objection unless the President does -- they can help to carry the discourse, and this is the sort of meeting in which the number of minutes the President spends with the man is almost more important than what gets said. So Ball and Schaetzel will come, unless you give me notice to the contrary.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1964

18 a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Dirk Stikker, Feb. 5, 4 p.m.

2:30 C.M.

Stikker is a Dutchman who has been the Secretary General of NATO for nearly three years. He has been a stalwart friend of the U. S. and of the Alliance. The main point of his visit is for him to have a chance to say that he met with you and had a friendly and intimate talk.

The State Department memo, attached at Tab A, gives all our official positions, and I doubt if you will wish to diverge from them. But Rusk, Ball, and McNamara will say all these things separately to Stikker, and two things you can do best for him are more general:

(1) Let him tell his views, which he enjoys perhaps a shade more than most men.

(2) Give him a clear sense of your own basic policy toward Europe, as you laid it out in Brussels before you were President, and in major speeches since November:

(a) The solidarity of the Alliance and the depth and strength of our commitment to Europe

(b) Our insistent search for new roads to peace, at Geneva and elsewhere

(c) Our confidence that the future belongs to freedom, however hard the road.

You can spice this with accounts of your meetings with men like Erhard and Pearson, and with such elements of the State Department memo as you may wish to emphasize.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75clu 2/3/78. Statute 2/20/77
By hmg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

18-6

DRAFT
February 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Secretary General Stikker at
4 p. m. on Wednesday, February 5

The State Department's memorandum for your meeting with Stikker covers the range of subjects likely to arise. Secretary Ball and Mr. Schaetzel of the State Department would like to sit in with you for this discussion. For this meeting, ^{however} you will probably want to emphasize the following:

1. Reaffirm your confidence in the Secretary General and indicate that you will continue to look to him for guidance on those matters for which he, as the Secretary General, is uniquely competent. (Stikker has been a good friend and has given us a ^{considerable} ~~tremendous~~ amount of support. Undoubtedly one of the things he will be looking for will be some indication of our continued confidence in him.)

2. Bring Stikker up to date on the Cyprus problem, pointing out specifically why an allied force rather than a NATO force is being considered for the exercise.

3. Explain to Stikker your views on handling the East-West problem. In this context, it might be useful to ask Stikker how NATO might best support the efforts we are presently making at Geneva.

4. Ask Stikker for his views on how NATO could more effectively support our efforts to isolate Cuba economically than it is now doing.

5. And finally, if Stikker raises the subject of his imminent retirement, you probably will want to express regret and ask him for his views about the succession.

McG. B.

→ y G 19

January 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested points to be made to Roscoe Drummond

1. Each President works differently. The public has a right to know how he does his job in the national security field. There were more important things to do during these first weeks than getting this type of information to the public. Press stories to date on this subject have been based on comments of people who do not know how I do my job.

2. President Kennedy had to build a national security team. I inherited the Rusk-McNamara team which I knew was good on the basis of its performance. It is working well for me.

3. President Kennedy did his work in one way. I will be doing mine in my way. Comparisons are academic and can be misleading. The transition has been smooth and efficient.

4. The time has come to dispel some of the misinformation. You could be helpful in this connection.

5. An example of how critical problems are being handled is the Panama case.

Rusk - McNamara - Taylor - Mann - Vance - Bunker -
Dungan

Executive Branch meetings - Congressional consultations -
instructions to negotiators - daily progress reports

6. Every President has a shakedown period. The most effective system is rapidly developing. It will take final form shortly and as needs become apparent with the passage of time.

Bromley Smith

January 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Felix Frankfurter called me this morning and said he wanted to trespass on the license you had offered him to give advice even without being asked for it. He said that in connection with Panama, he was being constantly reminded of this quotation from Edmund Burke: "Not the least of the arts of statesmanship is gracefully to grant what eventually cannot be withheld."

I am sure that this thought is not a stranger to you, but I am equally sure that, as I told Drew Pearson yesterday, we cannot let our foreign policy be governed by Molotov cocktails.

McG. B.

January 16, 1964

*Memos for the
Pres*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

**Drew Pearson gave me this this morning.
Ralph Dungan agrees that it would be helpful
for you to see Tejera. But you should know
that he will almost surely urge you to allow
it to be thought that the United States is pre-
pared to negotiate on the treaties.**

McG. B.

22
Memo for
the Pres
January 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The exact situation in Panama does not seem to be as stated in the morning papers.

The operative sentence in Chiari's public statement last night is: "I promised the nation that diplomatic relations would not be re-established with the United States until that country consented to begin negotiations for the drafting of a new treaty, and this promise has been obtained through the mediation of the Inter-American Peace Commission." He goes on to say that Panama will resume diplomatic relations on this basis in a determination that the negotiations shall have the purpose of producing a new treaty.

Martin reports a truce with Solis, reporting that Chiari still has to edge away from the communique as far as possible because of student pressure. It was agreed that Chiari and Martin would meet again at 11 o'clock this morning, and it is too soon to say that the agreement has broken down.

It is evident that statements from Washington about our firmness and our refusal to "negotiate" a treaty revision give ammunition to the students at the moment. There would be some advantage, therefore, in sticking to the letter of the communique in all comments until we actually get diplomatic relations resumed. This does not mean that we should allow anyone to think that we do in fact agree to revise the treaties.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 14, 1964

6
23

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama since August

The last six months of '63 was regarded as serious but not immediately explosive. The Chiari government had been clearly informed that we could not discuss major revision of the treaties, but had been just as clearly informed that we were ready to discuss lesser measures. Indeed in October the Panamanian Foreign Minister Solis suggested that a number of the permissible minor aspects of the treaties might be placed under review during the winter as a means of keeping U. S. - Panama relations out of the campaign. Shortly before the assassination of President Kennedy, we agreed to this proposal and a schedule was laid out for considering the pending issues between the two countries on this basis. Solis expressed his great satisfaction, and it looked as if -- barring accident -- a sensible plan had been made for handling our affairs during the Panama election campaign which is always tense (the election is now scheduled for May).

Among the items open for discussion in this period were such matters as a three million dollar grant which President Kennedy had offered in principle to Chiari, the renegotiation of the commercial clauses of the '36 treaty, the opening of a corridor across the Thatcher Bridge for Panama, the provision of some land from the Zone for the expansion of the city of Colon, and similar minor matters of the sort which were treated also in the '36 and '55 treaties.

This basic diplomatic plan was sound, in my judgment, barring planned or unplanned eruption, but that eruption occurred, as we all know.

The question of the emptiness of the Ambassador's chair is harder to deal with. On July 18 Farland sent in his resignation, to take effect August 31. He resigned mainly because he wanted further ambassadorial assignment and permanent Foreign Service rank. He was offered the latter, but not the former -- there were not that many empty embassies, and the Department offered him a Washington assignment instead.

President Kennedy delayed in appointing a successor to Farland because he decided at quite an early stage that he wanted to keep that post open for Coffin, whom Dave Bell was easing out of the AID agency.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-354

By iw, NARA Date 9-1-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jan. 14, 1964

Thus it was not until shortly before his death that the decision was made and the diplomatic Agreement requested of Panama.

One of your early decisions was that you did not think Coffin was fit for this sensitive and important post. It took you only a few days to make this decision clear, and to request another nomination. But before such a nomination was forthcoming, you decided on the further and more drastic reorganization of Latin American Affairs which centers in the appointment of Tom Mann, and you quite properly felt that no Ambassador should be appointed to Panama except in consultation with Mann. You had such a talk with Mann at the Ranch in December, and you were expecting an immediate recommendation when the outburst occurred. There is no evidence that the presence or absence of an Ambassador has anything to do with the particular explosion of January 9, except that a first-rate man might have reported to Washington the gathering tension of the preceding days, which no other American in Panama thought it necessary to do.

At present, of course, you cannot name an Ambassador because relations are broken. Moreover, Mann and Vance report that the key to the problem may well be in the men who govern the Canal Zone at least as much as in the Ambassador. You know that Milton Eisenhower has recommended that power be centered in the Ambassador, but it is far from clear that a man who reports through the State Department can deal effectively with an installation which has a deep and historical relation to the Department of the Army. This question is now under your personal review, and you expect to make decisions on it soon. Meanwhile, you have kept Ed Martin, a most experienced political officer, in the Canal Zone as your personal representative.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memos for 24
the Pres

January 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Martin's overnight cables report two long sessions of the Peace Commission -- one at 5:30 last night and the other apparently later in the evening. In sum, they show a substantial back-off by Solis from the position taken by Chiari with Mann earlier yesterday afternoon. There is no denunciation of the treaties, and the press conference of the afternoon was a mistake. But emotional diatribes against the U. S. continued.

There is some evidence that the Panamanians are feeling for a way to get discussions going without sticking firmly to their talk of agreement to discuss revision of the treaties. This is clearly what the Peace Commission wants and is pressing them for. But when directly pressed on this point, Solis did not budge and the formal position is just as it has been -- the Panamanians say that relations are broken and will remain broken until we agree to discuss revision of the treaties.

There is another meeting at 10 this morning, and I think we should attempt no further instruction of Martin until after that.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

January 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Next Steps for Peace

This memorandum is entirely personal and preliminary, but we are slow in getting you interdepartmental papers, and this may start your thinking.

The memorandum ends in recommendations, marked at Tab A, and you may want to go straight to those. But the preliminary comments which follow may be helpful in showing why I am led to these particular recommendations.

The biggest single fact about steps toward peace is that in the last two and a half years we have been doing our best to take all the easy ones, so that what are left are harder. In the wider sense even the test ban treaty is a very small matter, since it required only U. S. -Soviet agreement, and did not involve inspection. The larger problems have been terribly resistant, and the best that we have been able to do is to cool them off from such hot moments as Berlin in '61 and Cuba in '62. Specifically, no real written agreement has been registered with the Soviet government on any subject that required the active consent of any third power, whether it be Germany or Cuba, NATO or the Warsaw powers, or even North and South Vietnam. The exception is the Laos Agreement, and the very slender (but useful) meaning of that document proves the rule.

What little we have accomplished, therefore, has not been in the multilateral arrangements involving allies of either side, but in unilateral and bilateral moves, in which the unilateral have been the most important.

On our side, Unilaterally -- we have muzzled the military (more important than it seems) -- changed the tone of our own propaganda -- maintained a high level of courtesy in all Presidential statements and messages -- and supported MFN for Poland and Yugoslavia.

Bilaterally -- a limited test ban (with help from British) -- the wheat deal -- the reciprocally signaled cuts in Defense -- the hot line -- the agreement not to station nuclear weapons in space -- the limited agreement on cooperation in space -- and a certain mutual respect and tolerance with respect to our disagreements which is as hard to define as it is important.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NSC Sec 2/3/78, Sec 1.2/1/77
By hmq, NARS, Date 3/3/78

1/13/64

Multilaterally, we have no concrete achievement. We did successfully meet the small multilateral strains (in Germany) created by the test ban treaty, and there is a certain multilateral success in the de facto situation in Berlin, both in the maintenance of the city's freedom and the relative absence of propaganda which the Russians could plausibly regard as aggressive. But it is a most important fact that the improvement in the atmosphere in the last year has coincided with a very low level of diplomatic activity on the hard multilateral problems. I myself think it very doubtful that we can now put forward any major U. S. proposal respecting Berlin and Germany without one of two bad consequences:

- either the plan will badly shake German confidence;
- or it will be treated by the Russians as a step backward and an essentially negative act.

This emphatically does not mean that there should be no work on the German and Berlin problem, but it does mean that there should not be an early and publicized U. S. initiative. That is why, for example, there is no present plus in the Pell plan.

Thus when I come to recommendations, the things that we can do immediately are either unilateral or essentially bilateral. Where they are multilateral we need to proceed by consultation and, where possible, by initiatives from those whose interests are immediate and deeply engaged. That is why it was so important to press Erhard for German proposals on the German problem, as you did at the Ranch. He has publicly confirmed his acceptance of your challenge.

With this prelude, my recommendations follow. Most of them should be subjected to testing and criticism within the government before you accept them.

McG. B.

Attachment - Tab A

Recommendation for next steps toward peaceA. Immediate

1. The completion of the strongest possible position for the U. S. in the reopened Geneva Conference (starting Jan. 21). Possible starters for this are:

- a. A new non-dissemination package.
- b. A preliminary proposal on control posts (very important but partly multilateral).
- c. An inspected nuclear production cut-off.
- d. A new set of limited disarmament proposals (the so-called "separable first stage").

2. Review and approval by you for circulation to our Allies of a draft answer to Khrushchev, to be delivered within this week. The State draft is good, but not yet good enough.

B. Longer-range

1. Unilateral steps:

- a. Plan and execute a further reduction in the production of special nuclear materials.
- b. Issue standing instructions that the U. S. will always send the first message on ceremonial occasions, like New Year's, and will let the Soviet Union respond to us. Such ceremonial messages always to contain as much substance as possible.
- c. Improve the coordination of CIA and military statements with the particular objective of having both military and intelligence officials sound "peaceful" in public.
- d. Encourage attacks by friends of the Administration on both Goldwater and Rockefeller as war-like candidates (which in different ways they are).

B. Longer-range (cont'd)

- e. Instruct White House staff to be visibly hospitable to responsible peace groups, such as the United World Federalists and Norman Thomas, and possible receive them yourself. *l*

1. At a later date, in about six weeks or two months, make a major Presidential speech on the problem of peace -- more concrete than the Kennedy American University speech -- looking both back to what we have done and forward to where we are going -- and politely but clearly indicating that we could use some real help from the USSR. This should be a speech of reassessment and recommitment, not one of gimmicks, but it can have a lot of substance.

2. Bilateral steps:

- a. Intensify, and increase public attention to, the bilateral negotiations now in progress, on consular visiting, on cultural exchanges, on the Civil Air Agreement, and on our need for a leased line.

One way of stepping up momentum on these matters would be to put Governor Harriman in charge of them -- but you should do this only in consultation with the Secretary of State.

- b. Encourage and promote certain visible "contacts" with the Soviet Government. Possibilities are:

-- Harriman to go to Moscow to work out the minor agreements mentioned above

-- Rusk and Dobrynin to meet frequently on a personal but quite intense basis "

-- LBJ to Khrushchev by private written messages (these are tricky because of the danger of publication by the other side, but they do contribute to an atmosphere of efforts for peace).

In these channels we should probe particularly toward the possibility of further bilateral moves in the field of nuclear weapons and strategic strength. We should also keep constant attention on Cuba and Vietnam where we continue to oppose Communist subversion.

2. Bilateral steps: (cont'd)

- c. Instruct NASA and State to intensify their slow and limited work on practical present proposals for increased space cooperation. At a minimum, we should get the monkey clearly on the Soviet back in this field.
- d. Ask the State Department to consider the practicability of inviting a number of leading Soviet citizens chosen for their good character and their positive interest in peace to come to the United States as your personal guests -- to include a visit to you here or at the Ranch. Any instruction to the State Department on this subject should ask for a specific plan whether State favors or opposes the proposal. Only with a plan before you can you decide.

3. Multilateral steps:

I would make no major proposal here without consultation and, if possible, I would hope the lead could be taken by others. The one exception is in the field of control posts and a nuclear freeze in Europe. There is a possibility that the Poles will make an acceptable suggestion in this field next week, and it seems to me essential that our own opening position in Geneva should be so constructed that we can pick up the Polish proposal if we want to, as a response to our own position. Politically we must not get in the position of playing second to a Polish lead.

At the same time, multilaterally we should press forward discussion of Berlin, Germany, and control posts, and other partial measures in which we need third power participation. You can and should enlist Sir Alec Douglas Home very strongly in this effort during his visit here. But you probably also need a new high-level agreement-seeking negotiator to consult with our Allies and press in this direction. Bill Foster is probably the best man for this job, but only if you give him a firm directive and a pep talk.

✓ 26

Rec'd
Jan 13, 1964

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ January 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama -- Telegrams from the Public

1. The White House had received about 400 telegrams yesterday on the Panama situation. While noting that it may pick up in the next couple days, White House tabulators regard the present flow as medium to relatively light. For example, from October 20 to October 26, 1962, the White House received about 12,700 telegrams on Cuba. On the other hand, telegrams on Panama, which, of course, may turn out to be short-lived, appear to be running at a higher level than during the Vietnam crises and during the debate on the limited test ban treaty.
2. The telegrams so far indicate that sentiment among the cable-writers is running between 10 and 15 to 1 in favor of a firm U. S. position.
3. The hard-line telegrams come from all parts of the country, but the South and West predominate. Out of a sample of 133, about 35% are from the South (including Texas, Oklahoma, Kentucky and Tennessee), 27% are from the West, 25% are from the Northeast and 13% are from the Midwest.

Attached, for flavor, is a random sample of 10 hard-line telegrams.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 7/22/77

By MMG, NARS, Date 8/4/77

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1964

Memo for J. Edgar Hoover
Pres.
27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Attorney General's Trip and a Presidential Determination on Assistance to Indonesia

Further analysis of the problems involved in your making the determination required under the Broomfield Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 suggests that you have two major alternative courses of action:

1. You can make a determination now which legally would stand for an indefinite period until you decided formally or informally to review it. Such a determination would explain that you were keeping in close and personal touch with the assistance programs and were instructing all agencies of government to keep you fully informed. The advantage of this procedure is that it relieves you once and for all of the necessity of having to make another formal determination at a later date (i. e., after the Attorney General's return) when the political impact might be greater. It would also have the advantage of being blanketed by your separate announcement of the Attorney General's trip and the Manila communique. It also somewhat improves the Attorney General's bargaining position, since otherwise Sukarno may well take the position that we are using the determination as a lever, which of course is "unacceptable" to proud neutralists.

The disadvantage of this course would be that you are making this decision before the Indonesians have given any concrete evidence that they are prepared to dampen down their military confrontation in North Borneo.

2. You can decide to defer this whole matter until some time after the Attorney General returns, perhaps for as long as two months from now. You could continue existing programs under an opinion which you have received from the Attorney General to the effect that you have a "reasonable" time in which to review the situation in light of the new Congressional policy. Aside from giving you more time to consider the issues, the advantage of this procedure would be to show that you have taken the Congressional mandate so seriously

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC 2-18-75

By

KR, NARS, Date 3-3-75

Jan. 12, 1964

that you have dispatched a special emissary of Cabinet rank for discussions with Sukarno, and that you are deferring your final decision until his return. The disadvantage is that the making of such a determination at that time will attract greater political attention, since it will reflect an informed decision reached by you after two months' review of the facts and a report from the Attorney General on his mission. It would not be possible to argue that a quick determination was required in order to continue the reduced assistance programs that are now in progress. This second course is also somewhat more open to political attack as an evasion of the legal requirements of the amendment.

The possibilities of a temporary determination at this time, or a flat determination to continue assistance without explanation have been rejected as having most of the disadvantages and few of the advantages of the two courses set forth above. The majority of your principal officers seem now to favor course No. 1. A draft memorandum from you to the Secretary of State making such a determination is attached. If you decide on course No. 2, no formal memorandum of any kind is needed.

MVForrestal

McG. B.

27a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2/18/75
By KR, NARS, Date 3/3/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Administrator, Agency for International Development

You have advised me that under section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended effective December 16, 1963, a determination is required to prevent abrupt termination of all existing programs for assistance to Indonesia under that Act.

I have therefore made such a determination.

However, I herewith direct that these programs be reviewed item by item and I wish the results of these reviews to be reported to me so that the intention of the Congress that all assistance to Indonesia be subject to the scrutiny of the President may be strictly carried out. I also direct that I be provided with prompt and complete information with which I may keep the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed of assistance furnished to Indonesia pursuant to this determination. I expect you to arrange that appropriate officials and agencies of the Government, both in Washington and in the field provide reports for me on all aspects of this problem.

January 11, 1964

28

[Handwritten signature]

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Italian Briefing Papers

*Memos for the
Pres.*

The Italian briefing papers are attached. They are very good, in the main. The exception is, as usual, in the proposed statements. They are being re-worked and we should have something better by Monday afternoon.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1964

29
Memos for Pres.
Ret'd from
Pres. office

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Situation Report, 7:00 p. m.

1. The OAS without debate is sending the peace committee to Panama at once. This committee as now set up includes Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. Dean Rusk says it is friendly to us.

2. Panamanians have sent in a note definitely breaking relations, and their political noise level remains high. We are not confirming break in relations, since after all we expect Mann to see Chiari.

3. The U. S. Security Council meets tonight and while there will be some noise, Rusk expects that the dispatch of the OAS peace mission will hold the line for tonight.

4. On the central front of restoring peace and safety, the immediate prognosis is better. Rusk, McNamara, and I agree that tonight will be the test whether we have a turning point here.

5. Mann has landed.

McG. B.

*Memo for the Pres
Panama 30*

January 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Situation Report, 7:00 p. m.

1. The OAS without debate is sending the peace committee to Panama at once. This committee as now set up includes Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, and, I think, Venezuela. In any event, Dean Rusk says it is friendly to us.
2. Panamanians have sent in a note definitely breaking relations, and their political noise level remains high.
3. Nevertheless, on the central front of restoring peace and safety, the immediate prognosis is better. Rusk, McNamara, and I agree that tonight will be the test whether we have a turning point here.
4. Mann has landed and has put out the attached statement.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 10, 1964

31
Memo for the
Pres.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama 1 o'clock situation report

1. The Mann mission is taking off right now and should be in Panama before your 7 o'clock promise to Chiari.

2. The Mann mission includes Mann, Martin, Vance, Dungan, and several specialists. It is a powerful group.

Harry McPherson

3. The situation in Panama is highly explosive and it is evident that left-wing agitators are going all out to stir further violence. Our Embassy staff is being evacuated and the classified records and code machines are being destroyed.

4. The OAS meets at 4 o'clock and our plan there is to support a proposal for a fact-finding mission of the peace committee to Panama. The Panamanian Ambassador is still here, and he and Rusk have had a relatively good talk which may lead to a combined position on the substance, though of course not on the rhetoric.

5. Ball has gone up to the House, and McCone has been called by Russell to testify at 3 this afternoon. Morse has also called an afternoon meeting.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 7/22/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 8/4/77

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

32 also
p gp file
January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

- (1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;
- (2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and
- (3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFC #177-10002-10030

By JW, NARA. Date 3-4-98

Jan. 9, 1964

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

LBJ to talk to me Namora 30 Jan 68

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

January 9, 1964

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-08
By [Signature], NARA, Date 11-24-93

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The U. S. Military Command in Saigon

I do not know anyone, except perhaps Max Taylor, in the top circles of your government who believes that General Harkins is the right man for the war in Vietnam now. The evidence on this is very strong, and Bob McNamara recognizes it. He has a plan for a change, but it will take several months. I believe that you may wish to talk most frankly and privately with him and tell him whether this is good enough for you.

The evidence on Harkins' performance comes from many sources -- samples are:

(1) Harkins has been unimpressive in his reporting and analyzing, and has shown a lack of grip on the realities of the situation, in a number of meetings with Washington officers. I have had direct experience of this, and Mike Forrestal has had more.

(2) There is solid evidence that Harkins is not trusted by the new Vietnamese regime. As a sample, the best young Vietnamese economist -- a man well and favorably known to economists here -- was here last week and told Harriman and me separately that Harkins was not trusted by the Generals. (This may not be Harkins' fault, but it undermines his effectiveness.)

(3) McNamara himself was shocked by the quality of a number of senior members of Harkins' staff on his December visit, and still more shocked by finding that Harkins and Co. have been dead wrong about the military situation for months.

What protects Harkins is:

(1) He is a fine man with a good field record who began well in Saigon.

(2) There has been some press talk against him, and Lodge and Hilsman are against him. In the Pentagon, Lodge and Hilsman are dirty words, so the defensive reaction is fierce.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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But McNamara himself thinks Harkins should be replaced, and his plan is to proceed by selecting and sending a first-rate Deputy (General Westmoreland) and then after several months having Westmoreland promoted and Harkins returned. He proposes to break this news gradually to Max Taylor; as far as I know, the only people who know of his precise plan are Rusk, Gilpatric, and myself.

You might be able to speed up this whole schedule by talking with McNamara and then with Taylor to make clear your own desires as Commander-in-Chief. This case is much too important to be decided by Bob McNamara's reluctance to offend Max Taylor.

I have said these things to McNamara myself, and could do so more forcefully if you prefer it handled that way. But he has much more direct experience of Vietnam than I, and I doubt if my words can be decisive. You, on the other hand, can give him a direct order to do what in his heart he knows he should. He is a soldier.

inc. 1d.

McG. B.