

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The U. S. Military Command in Saigon

I do not know anyone, except perhaps Max Taylor, in the top circles of your government who believes that General Harkins is the right man for the war in Vietnam now. The evidence on this is very strong, and Bob McNamara recognizes it. He has a plan for a change, but it will take several months. I believe that you may wish to talk most frankly and privately with him and tell him whether this is good enough for you.

The evidence on Harkins' performance comes from many sources -- samples are:

(1) Harkins has been unimpressive in his reporting and analyzing, and has shown a lack of grip on the realities of the situation, in a number of meetings with Washington officers. I have had direct experience of this, and Mike Forrestal has had more.

(2) There is solid evidence that Harkins is not trusted by the new Vietnamese regime. As a sample, the best young Vietnamese economist -- a man well and favorably known to economists here -- was here last week and told Harriman and me separately that Harkins was not trusted by the Generals. (This may not be Harkins' fault, but it undermines his effectiveness.)

(3) McNamara himself was shocked by the quality of a number of senior members of Harkins' staff on his December visit, and still more shocked by finding that Harkins and Co. have been dead wrong about the military situation for months.

What protects Harkins is:

(1) He is a fine man with a good field record who began well in Saigon.

(2) There has been some press talk against him, and Lodge and Hilsman are against him. In the Pentagon, Lodge and Hilsman are dirty words, so the defensive reaction is fierce.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-08

By , NARA, Date 7/21/94

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

Jan. 9, 1964

But McNamara himself thinks Harkins should be replaced, and his plan is to proceed by selecting and sending a first-rate Deputy (General Westmoreland) and then after several months having Westmoreland promoted and Harkins returned. He proposes to break this news gradually to Max Taylor; as far as I know, the only people who know of his precise plan are Rusk, Gilpatric, and myself.

You might be able to speed up this whole schedule by talking with McNamara and then with Taylor to make clear your own desires as Commander-in-Chief. This case is much too important to be decided by Bob McNamara's reluctance to offend Max Taylor.

I have said these things to McNamara myself, and could do so more forcefully if you prefer it handled that way. But he has much more direct experience of Vietnam than I, and I doubt if my words can be decisive. You, on the other hand, can give him a direct order to do what in his heart he knows he should. He is a soldier.

McG. B.

Vietnam
Memo for
the Pres

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comments on Senator Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam

On Monday you asked for short comments by Rusk, McNamara, and myself on Senator Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam. These comments are attached -- Rusk at Tab A, McNamara at Tab B, and Bundy at Tab C. The Mansfield memorandum itself is at Tab D. I have two small additional comments, as an ex-historian:

The political damage to Truman and Acheson from the fall of China arose because most Americans came to believe that we could and should have done more than we did to prevent it. This is exactly what would happen now if we should seem to be the first to quit in Saigon.

Mansfield's analogy with Korea neglects the fact that a very solid ~~and~~ anti-Communist base existed in South Korea when the armistice was worked out in 1953. Moreover, the U. S. presence has continued. There is literally no comparison between this solution and proposals for "neutralization" and U. S. withdrawal in the present situation in South Vietnam. When we are stronger, then we can face negotiation.

Perhaps you can trade with Mike Mansfield: his support for the war effort against our support, which is real, for new and energetic political, social, and economic programs in South Vietnam.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 5/12/81 NNLJ80-65
By Lhw/ky, NARA, Date 8-21-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

File

36

January 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

De Gaulle Visit and De Gaulle Recognition of China

The attached cables show the latest from Paris on de Gaulle. I believe you will want to check with Secretary Rusk before making a final decision, but I have the following suggestion:

1. I do not believe you should meet with de Gaulle in Martinique, and I think the correct answer is the one Bohlen suggests:

a. That you still very much hope that he will come to the United States:

b. That if you accept an invitation from one major ally in 1964, you will have to accept a number of others and you simply cannot break away from Washington for a series of such visits. Only a great crisis or an important breakthrough toward peace could lead you to foreign travel this year.

2. On threatened French recognition of China, I strongly concur with Bohlen that you should not get into personal communication with de Gaulle. Instead, I think the Department of State should be instructed to generate as many expressions of concern to Paris from other countries as possible. You yourself will want to be in a position to shrug this off if it happens.

McG. B.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

36-H
Action

SS

Info

CONTROL: 3986
RECD: JANUARY 8, 1964 8:47 A.M.
FROM: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
NO: 3177, JANUARY 8, 1 P.M.

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

I SAW COUVE DE MURVILLE LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND HAD ABOUT HALF AN HOURS CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON THE CHINA ISSUE.

COUVE SAID THAT HE COULD TELL ME THAT THE DECISION "IN PRINCIPLE" IN FAVOR OF THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA (OR RATHER THE IDEA OF RECOGNITION) HAD BEEN MADE BUT THE TIMING AND THE CONDITIONS WERE NOT YET FIXED. HE SAID HE WOULD ENDEAVOR TO ASCERTAIN MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TIMING FROM GENERAL DE GAULLE AND LET ME KNOW IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS.

I RAN THROUGH BRIEFLY THE ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN CA-6631. COUVE DID NOT QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF MOST OF THE ARGUMENTS AND INDEED RECOGNIZED THAT ANY FRENCH RECOGNITION WOULD HAVE NO RELATION TO THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE PER SE. HE DID SAY HOWEVER THAT DE GAULLE FELT THAT BECAUSE OF THE DISPUTE CHINA WAS NOW PURSUING A PURELY AUTONOMOUS CHINESE POLICY AND NO LONGER UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

COUVE THEN ASKED ME WHAT WOULD BE THE US ATTITUDE IF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AGREED THAT FRANCE COULD MAINTAIN FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GRC AND THE LATTER ALSO ACQUIESCED. I TOLD HIM THE QUESTION WAS SO HYPOTHETICAL THAT IT WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER. I COULD NOT SPEAK AT ALL FOR THE CHICOMS ALTHOUGH THEY HAD ALWAYS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN A POSITION AGAINST THE "TWO CHINA" APPROACH, BUT THAT THE GRC HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY PLAIN THAT IT ALSO WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS THESIS AND THEREFORE THE PROBABILITIES WERE EXTREMELY HIGH THAT THE GRC WOULD ITSELF BREAK OFF WITH THE FRENCH. COUVE SAID THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE BUT IF BY ANY CHANCE THIS SOLUTION COULD BE FOLLOWED (HE SAID THEY HAD HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY

EXDIS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-204

By JW, NARA, Date 6-9-94

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 3177, JANUARY 8, 1 PM, FROM PARIS

KIND FROM THE CHICOMS IN THIS DIRECTION) THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE FRENCH COMMUNITY OF AFRICAN STATES AS WELL AS JAPAN, CANADA, ETC., TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE,, A THESIS THAT I QUESTIONED.

COUVE PERSONALLY STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST ANY COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DE GAULLE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THAT DE GAULLE KNEW OUR POSITION FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY AND ME AND THAT A COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT WOULD "PERSONALIZE" THE MATTER AND WOULD DO LITTLE GOOD AT THE PRESENT TIME.

DURING THE DISCUSSION I EMPHASIZED TO COUVE HOW POOR A YEAR 1964 WOULD BE IF ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT AROSE SINCE THE ELECTION ITSELF WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE US REACTION. HE THOROUGHLY AGREED WITH THIS STATEMENT.

AT THE ELYSEE DINNER AND RECEPTION LAST NIGHT I HAD A FEW WORDS WITH DE GAULLE ALONE IN WHICH I MERELY MENTIONED THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THE CHINESE MATTER WITH COUVE. THE CONVERSATION WENT NO FURTHER. LATER ON IN CONVERSATIONS WITH JOXE, MALRAUX, AND MAURICE SCHUMANN THE QUESTION OF CHINESE RECOGNITION WAS DISCUSSED IN GENERAL. ALL THREE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF ANY FRENCH RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA IF THIS INVOLVED A RUPTURE WITH THE GRC. THESE OF COURSE WERE MERELY PERSONAL OPINIONS BUT RATHER STRONGLY HELD, PARTICULARLY BY JOXE AND MAURICE SCHUMANN.

COMMENT:

MY RECOMMENDATION AT THE MOMENT IS THAT WE WAIT AND SEE WHAT COUVE DE MURVILLE COMES UP WITH IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. I BELIEVE THE SITUATION IS AS DESCRIBED BY HIM, NAMELY THAT THE FRENCH IN PRINCIPLE FEEL THAT A RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD BE DESIRABLE BUT THAT NO DECISION ON TIMING AND CONDITIONS HAS BEEN MADE. COUVE AT LEAST SEEMED TO BE FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE EFFECTS OF ANY RECOGNITION WHICH WOULD INVOLVE A RUPTURE WITH GRC. I WOULD THEREFORE RECOMMEND AGAINST ANY COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DE GAULLE, PARTICULARLY AT THIS JUNCTURE.

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 3177, JANUARY 8, 1 PM, FROM PARIS

THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IS SEEING DE GAULLE TOMORROW AND TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO RAISE THE MATTER OF CHINESE RECOGNITION, POINTING OUT IF NECESSARY THE VERY ADVERSE EFFECT ANY SUCH FRECH ACTION WOULD HAD IN JAPAN. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT CHIANG-KAI-SHEK HAD SENT A LETTER TO DE GAULLE (EMBTTEL 3124) SUGGESTING THAT TAIPEI BE AUTHORIZED TO PUT OUT A PUBLIC RELEASE DENYING ANY INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE COMMUNIST CHINA. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALSO HEARD SOME OF THE FRENCH AFRICAN COMMUNITY STATES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AT THE RUMORS OF POSSIBLE FRENCH RECOGNITION. THE AMBASSADOR PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW THE RESULT OF HIS TALK WITH DE GAULLE.

CFN CA-6631 1964 3124

BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36-b

~~SECRET~~

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Action

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 2-11-77

SS
Info

CONTROL: 3995
RECD: JANUARY 8, 1964 8:52 A.M.
FROM: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
NO: 3178, JANUARY 8, 1 P.M.

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

AS I MENTIONED TO YOU INDIRECTLY ON THE PHONE COUVE DE MURVILLE HIMSELF RAISED THE QUESTION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON VISITING MARTINIQUE, IN DISCUSSING DE GAULLE' TRIP TO MEXICO AND THE FRENCH ANTILLES (BUT NOT RPT NOT CUBA), HE ASKED IF I HAD HEARD OF ALPHAND'S INVITATION. I SAID THAT I HAD AND WHILE I COULD GIVE HIM NO ANSWER I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE RATHER DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHO HAD IN GENERAL NO INTENTION OF TRAVELLING ABROAD DURING THIS ELECTION YEAR. I ALSO REMINDED COUVE THERE HAD BEEN A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION AT THE TIME OF THE FUNERAL (WITH WHICH HE COMPLETELY AGREED) BUT THAT TECHNICALLY OUR INVITATION WAS STILL OPEN, STATING THAT MEXICO WAS NOT VERY FAR FROM THE U.S.

COMMENT:

I THOUGHT IT WISE TO UNDERLINE THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF OUR INFORMATION IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING THE U.S. PUT IN THE POSITION OF APPARENTLY REFUSING TO MEET WITH DE GAULLE IN MARTINIQUE, A FEW MILES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST. IN DISCUSSION WITH JOXE AND MAURICE SCHUMANN, BOTH OF WHOM KNEW OF THE INVITATION; (IN FACT SCHUMANN CLAIMS IT IS HIS IDEA) THEY FELT THAT DE GAULLE WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES GO TO THE U.S. ONE OF THE REASONS BEING GIVEN WAS THAT HIS VISIT WAS TO MEXICO AND TO FOLLOW IT BY ONE TO THE U.S. WOULD APPEAR TO PLAY DOWN THE MEXICAN VISIT. I OF COURSE POINTED OUT THAT THE VISIT TO THE U.S. HAD BEEN AGREED WITH KENNEDY AND THAT THERE NEED BE NO QUESTION OF THE DENIGRATION OF ONE OR THE OTHER. IN GENERAL HOWEVER THEY FELT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF DE GAULLE SHIFTING HIS GROUND.

~~SECRET~~

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EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3178, January 8, 1 p.m. from Paris

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO AVOID A TURN-DOWN OF DE GAULLE'S INVITATION TO COME TO MARTINIQUE WITHOUT PUTTING THE U.S. APPARENTLY IN THE WRONG BEFORE WORLD OPINION SINCE WE CAN COUNT FOR CERTAIN ON THE INVITATION AND THE REJECTION BEING PUBLICIZED. ONE METHOD WOULD BE TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT OUR INVITATION STILL STOOD AND THAT DE GAULLE'S INVITATION TO MARTINIQUE REPRESENTED A SHIFT IN PLANS AND POINT OUT THE PRESIDENT DECIDED NOT TO LEAVE THE US FOR ANY VISIT AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE MEET WITH DE GAULLE OUTSIDE THE U.S. WITHOUT PROCEEDING TO EUROPE IN ORDER TO SEE ERHARD, HOME, ETC.

BOHLEN

GP-4

~~SECRET~~

36-C

Bundy

POU 17-4 US-FR

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM
 (Departmental and Foreign Service)

55
A-1503
NO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By VB NARS, Date 2-11-77

FROM : Amembassy PARIS

DATE: January 3, 1964

SUBJECT : New Years Greetings from General de Gaulle

REF :

At his New Years Reception for diplomatic corps yesterday, President de Gaulle asked me to convey his warm best wishes for the coming year to President Johnson. President de Gaulle also included the government and people in his well wishing and used words somewhat as follows: "When I speak of the friendship we have for your great country, you know all that this implies, etc." He also said that he had "a few moments" talk with President Johnson, as I knew, in Washington and he hoped that these talks would be renewed in the coming year, adding: "We shall talk about that later." He also asked after Ambassador Bohlen and requested me to extend his best wishes to the Ambassador.

I replied in a similar vein and told him that I knew the President was looking forward to continuing their conversation. Both of us avoided any indication of where these would take place.

Later when talking with the Prime Minister, M. Pompidou, who likewise conveyed similar messages of friendship, I told him what President de Gaulle had said about continuing his conversation with President Johnson. M. Pompidou said he hoped very much that a meeting between the two Chiefs of State would take place.

M.

In answer to my direct question/Pompidou said that he thought President de Gaulle would be visiting Mexico in March.

M. Pompidou confirmed that he, himself, would be visiting Japan in April.

GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3-year intervals. Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

Cecil B. Lyon
 Cecil B. Lyon
 Chargé d'Affaires

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

FORM DS-323 11-61

Drafted by:

MTN:CE Lyon:nb

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Chargé: CE Lyon

Clearances:

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116

EUR:WRTyler:mt
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7

Memorandum of Conversation

319

APPROVED FOR DISTRIBUTION
BY S/S - 1/7/64

DATE: January 7, 1964

SUBJECT: De Gaulle Visit

Bundy

PARTICIPANTS: Charles E. Bohlen, Ambassador to France
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: S/S
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White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-204
By ju, NARA, Date 6-9-94

I called Ambassador Bohlen on the secure line at 9 a.m. Washington time. With regard to numbered paragraph 2 of his telegram 3139 of January 6 on the subject of the de Gaulle visit, I told him of Ambassador Alphan's démarche on January 6, and that he could tell Couve that he knew about it and that a reply would be coming from Washington. I suggested that he not express any opinion as to the likely nature of the reply.

Subsequently, the Secretary told me that he would prefer that the Ambassador leave the initiative of raising the subject of a meeting with de Gaulle to Couve de Murville. Should the latter raise it, the Ambassador could say that he was familiar with Ambassador Alphan's démarche, and he should add that, while the reply would come from Washington, he personally had the impression from what he had gathered while he was in Washington that there is a problem in the President's mind about leaving the country this year. The Secretary asked that Ambassador Bohlen be requested to call back after he had seen Couve, as the Secretary would be seeing the President late this afternoon.

I called Ambassador Bohlen at 10:15 a.m. and conveyed the foregoing to him.

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EUR:WRTyler:mt
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8

318

Memorandum of Conversation

APPROVED FOR
DISTRIBUTION BY S/S
1/7/64

DATE: January 7, 1964

SUBJECT: Recognition of China by France

Brundy

PARTICIPANTS: Charles E. Bohlen, Ambassador to France
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: S/S
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-204
By JW, NARA, Date 6-9-94

During a conversation with Ambassador Bohlen on the secure line this morning at 9:00 a.m., I told him that with regard to numbered paragraph 1 of his telegram 3139, January 6, on recognition of China by France, I had discussed the matter with Governor Harriman on the previous evening and that it was in order for him to raise the subject with Couve de Murville, and he should stress to Couve that if de Gaulle intended to recognize Communist China it was important that such recognition should be postponed at least until next year. The effect by that time would not be as bad in this country as it would be in this year. I also asked the Ambassador, following his talk with Couve, to tell us whether he felt there should be a Presidential letter to de Gaulle, or whether it would be preferable for the Ambassador to make an oral démarche first on the basis of which we could then decide whether a Presidential letter was desirable.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

January 7, 1964

*memos for the
Pres
37*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Defense and CIA have together prepared a plan for covert operations against North Vietnam which has been reviewed by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and myself, and we are united in recommending that you approve it. In essence, the proposed program would involve the following:

1. Expansion of intelligence collection by U-2 and by communications/electronics intelligence missions.
2. Expansion of psychological operations by leaflet drops and phantom covert operations and increased black and white radio broadcasts from South Vietnam.
3. Intensified sabotage operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel.

Sabotage and propaganda operations in North Vietnam in the last year and a half have been most disappointing. The operators now believe that substantial improvements can be achieved, and the policy officers are all in favor of trying.

Specific views are as follows: McNamara is highly enthusiastic. McCone thinks you should understand that no great results are likely from this kind of effort. Rusk is favorable. While he believes 98% of the problem is in South Vietnam and not in cross-border operations, he thinks that an increase in such operations will help to persuade Hanoi that we have no intention of quitting, and may help also to put muscle behind our argument that the trouble comes from the north and that when that trouble stops, our presence in South Vietnam can become unnecessary.

I myself recommend that you approve this general program for detailed development of operational plans in the field, these plans in turn to be reviewed as usual within the Government by the Special Group which monitors all covert programs. You may recall that this group consists of McCone, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson and myself.

McG. B.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. 1, Vietnam, pp 4-5

By ng, NARA, Date 3-21-44

~~TOP SECRET~~

12
37a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

3 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Attached for your review is a copy of a Draft
Memorandum for the President, subject: [REDACTED]

3.4 (b) (1)

The proposed program was developed by a committee
composed of representatives of State, Defense and CIA.

I hope Messrs. Rusk, McCone, Taylor, Bundy and
McNamara can meet together on either Monday or Tuesday
to discuss the proposed program.

RMEN

Robert S. McNamara

cc: Mr. McG. Bundy ←

DR/9876 in Senate
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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-24
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00

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7/1/64

~~SECRET~~

*Memos for the
Pres 38*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comment on Memoranda by Senator Mansfield

I recommend the following points in your conversation with Senator Mansfield.

1. We should certainly stress that the war is essentially a Vietnamese responsibility, and this we have repeatedly done, particularly in our announced policy on U. S. troop withdrawal. At the same time we cannot disengage US prestige to any significant degree. US news reports are bound to place a heavy US cast on the action. Moreover, the whole history of our support of South Vietnam going back to 1954 makes it inevitable that the US is deeply involved, and this would have been true even if we had not made the decision to intervene on a substantial scale in the fall of 1961.

2. The security situation is serious, but we can still win, even on present ground rules. The government has experienced extreme turmoil incident to the coup d'etat. Almost every key official from the head of State to the village mayor has been changed, as well as most of the military leaders. Order, cohesion and direction are only now beginning to appear. In the past few days there have been early evidences of strength and resolution. The military command

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 10/26/77
By WMC, NARS, Date 11/10/77

structure has been further streamlined, more combat forces have been concentrated in the critical provinces and there is direct response to our urging to consolidate and strengthen strategic hamlets on a systematic basis. In any case, the current dry season in the Delta is the critical time, and the next four months will disclose whether the new government can establish its presence in terms of a cohesive base of popular confidence. During that period anything other than exhibitions of resolution and encouragement on our part could do serious hurt to the Vietnamese cause.

3. Senator Mansfield's suggestion about dividing South Vietnam by present areas of control is impractical. The GVN exercises some degree of control throughout the country. The same is true with the Viet Cong. In much of the country the people are more committed to peace and security than to any political organization, and there could be no negotiated division which would be a meaningful reflection of political control. More basically, although present government has popular support - probably more than any predecessor -- it could not survive a partition. Any deal either to divide the present territory of South Vietnam or to "neutralize" South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new government in Saigon that would in short order become Communist-dominated. By hypothesis, any such "division" or "neutralization" would involve complete US withdrawal, and the situation would then collapse.

4. The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremely serious both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for the US position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key areas of the world.

a. In Southeast Asia, Laos would almost certainly come under North Vietnamese domination, Cambodia might exhibit a facade of neutrality but would in fact accept Communist Chinese domination, Thailand would become very shaky, and Malaysia, already beset by Indonesia, the same; even Burma would see the developments as a clear sign that the whole of the area now had to accommodate completely to Communism (with serious consequences for the security of India as well).

Basically, a truly "neutral" Southeast Asia is very unlikely to emerge from such a sequence of events, even if the US itself tried to hold a firm position in Thailand, if Malaysia too tried to stand firm, and even if such remote and uninvolved powers as France backed the concept of "neutrality."

b. In the eyes of the rest of Asia and of key areas threatened by Communism in other areas as well, South Vietnam is both a test of US firmness and specifically a test of US capacity to deal with "wars of national liberation." Within Asia, there is evidence -- for example, from Japan -- that US disengagement and the

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- 4 -

acceptance of Communist domination would have a serious effect on confidence. More broadly, there can be little doubt that any country threatened in the future by Communist subversion would have reason to doubt whether we would really see the thing through. This would apply even in such theoretically remote areas as Latin America.

5. Thus, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are so high that, in our judgment, we must go on bending every effort to win. In the final analysis, Senator Mansfield is challenging what he regards as the gross imbalance between the extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia and our narrow self-interests in the area. My assessment of our important security interests is that they unquestionably call for holding the line against further Communist gains. And, I am confident that the American people are by and large in favor of a policy of firmness and strength in such situations.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Pres. 39
P. McNamara
Jan 18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

January 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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Specific views are as follows: McNamara is highly enthusiastic. McCone thinks you should understand that no great results are likely from this kind of effort. Rusk is favorable; While he believes 98% of the problem is in South Vietnam and not in cross-border operations, he thinks that an increase in such operations will help to persuade Hanoi that we have no intention of quitting, and may help also to put muscle behind our argument that the trouble comes from the north and that when that trouble stops, our presence in South Vietnam can become unnecessary.

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McG. B.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Authority FRUS, Vol. 4, Vietnam, pp. 4-5

By hgz . NARA, Date 3-21-94

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File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You have made some comments on the current AID issue which make me fear that you may be losing confidence in Dave Bell. It would be a great loss if this should happen -- (1) because Bell is an outstandingly able, loyal, and modest public servant of the sort we need, and (2) because if he should resign -- as he would feel bound to do if he decided that he lacked your confidence -- the impact in and out of the government would be severe. This would be a sad result, because Bell really is your kind of man. He is the sort of man who will do his damndest, even if you decide his whole agency has to be abolished -- as long as he knows he has your personal backing. But he won't stay where he thinks he's not wanted.

I think you ought to have him to lunch -- perhaps with Ralph Dungan and Bill Moyers -- as soon as can be.

And I'm damned sure Dave is not leaking to Tad Szulc. Some of his people may be (I have heard some of them at second-hand from the cocktail circuit myself) -- but not with his approval -- he is not that kind.

inc. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID Otr. 4/27/78
By lhw, NARS, Date 7/11/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

January 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ted Sorensen relayed your request that I check into the possibility that someone in AID was the source for Tad Szulc's story in Saturday's New York Times.

I have done so, and I am reasonably sure that AID was not Szulc's source. The evidence is as follows:

1. Szulc himself, on inquiry from a mutual friend, while he would not identify his source, said unequivocally that his story did not come from anyone in AID.
2. I have checked with each of the half dozen people in this Agency who knew enough to have been a potential source of the Szulc story; each denies it, and I believe them. They are all top officials in this Agency whom I believe to be thoroughly reliable.

With respect to reporters and the Ball Committee, I gave instructions last week -- and have repeated them with emphasis today -- that we should respond to inquiries by saying the Committee was under instructions from you to examine a wide range of alternatives, and by refusing to comment on the merits of any of the alternatives or on the views of any of the Committee members.

David E. Bell

David E. Bell

cc: Under Secretary Ball
Mr. Sorensen

41
January 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The U. S. Military Command in Saigon

I do not know anyone, except perhaps Max Taylor, in the top circles of your government who believes that General Harkins is the right man for the War in Vietnam now. The evidence on this is very strong, and Bob McNamara recognizes it. He has a plan for a change, but it will take several months. I believe that you may wish to talk most frankly and privately with him and tell him whether this is good enough for you.

The evidence on Harkins' performance comes from many sources -- samples are:

(1) I myself saw him perform weakly and with no sense of command or mastery in a day-long meeting in Hawaii. Mike Forrestal reports similar but even stronger impressions from an intensive visit to Saigon.

(2) The best young Vietnamese economist -- a man well and favorably known to economists here -- was here last week and told Harriman and me separately that the current South Vietnamese regime does not trust Harkins or respect him. Other reports confirm this view. (This may not be Harkins' fault, but it undermines his effectiveness.)

(3) McNamara himself was shocked by the quality of a number of senior members of Harkins' staff on his December visit, and still more shocked by finding that Harkins and Co. have been dead wrong about the military situation for months.

What protects Harkins is that there has been some press talk against him and that Lodge and Hilsman are against him. This puts everybody's back up in the Pentagon. So McNamara's plan is to proceed by selecting and sending a first-rate Deputy (General Westmoreland) and then after several months having Westmoreland promoted and Harkins returned. He proposes to break this news gradually to Max Taylor; as far as I know, the only people who know of his precise plan are Rusk, Gilpatric, and myself.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-290

By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

Jan. 6, 1963

You might be able to speed up this whole schedule by talking with McNamara and then with Taylor to make clear your own desires as Commander-in-Chief. This case is much too important to be decided by Bob McNamara's reluctance to offend Max Taylor.

I have said these things to McNamara myself, and could do so more forcefully if you prefer it handled that way. But he has so much more direct experience of Vietnam than I, that I doubt if my words can be decisive. You, on the other hand, can give him a direct order to do what in his heart he knows he should. He is a soldier.

McG. B.

January 6, 1964

42
Memo for the
President

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Max Taylor asks me to make available to you some of the figures on the Indian gross national product as a result of his conversation with you before Christmas. The information which he has produced is as follows:

For 1962, India's GNP was approximately \$37.2 billion with an average annual increase of over 4% per year over the last 5 years.

In terms of population the GNP is about \$83 per capita. The Indian goal was to double per capita income in the period 1951 to 1976. In 1951 it was \$50.

McG. B.

42a

605



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 December 1963

Mac:

During my meeting with the President yesterday on the subject of my trip to India and Pakistan, he inquired as to the value of India's gross national product. Unfortunately, I did not have the figures available.

For 1962, India's GNP was approximately \$37.2 billion with an average annual increase of over 4% per year over the last 5 years.

In terms of population the GNP is about \$83 per capita. The Indian goal was to double per capita income in the period 1951 to 1976. In 1951 it was \$50.

Would you please pass the foregoing information to the President?

MOT
M. D. T.

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
The White House

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1964

Memos for the Pres.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senator Mansfield's Views on South Vietnam

1. To neutralize South Viet Nam today, or even for the United States Government to seem to move in that direction, would mean the following:

a. A rapid collapse of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam, and a unification of the whole country on Communist terms.

b. Neutrality in Thailand, and increased influence for Hanoi and Peking.

c. Collapse of the anti-Communist position in Laos.

d. Heavy pressure on Malaya and Malaysia.

e. A shift toward neutrality in Japan and the Philippines.

f. Blows to U. S. prestige in South Korea and Taiwan which would require compensating increases in American commitment there -- or else further retreat.

2. We may have to move in these painful directions, but we should do so only when there is a much stronger demonstration that our present course cannot work. If we neutralize, it should not be because we have quit but because others have. Today a move in this direction would be regarded as betrayal by the new regime in Saigon and by all anti-Communist Vietnamese. There are enough of them to lose us an election.

3. The right course is to continue to strengthen our struggle against the Communist terror (which is exactly what it is). For this we need new and stronger leadership in the U. S. effort. In particular, we need a wholly rejuvenated military command and a rapidly stepped-up political effort of the sort which Lodge has at last recommended in the attached cable.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State let 10/26/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 11/10/77

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

January 6, 1964

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Viet Nameese Situation.

This memo is responsive to your telephone request during Christmas week to Frank Valeo. I have discussed thd request with him and would respectfully refer you to my memo of December 7th, a copy of which is enclosed.

As you remarked to him on the telephone, we do not want another China in Viet Nam. I would respectfully add to this observation: Neither do we want another Korea. It would seem that a key (but often overlooked) factor in both situations was a tendency to bite off more than we were prepared in the end to chew. We tended to talk ourselves out on a limb with overstatements of our purpose and commitment only to discover in the end that there were not sufficient American interests to support with blood and treasure a desperate final plunge. Then, the questions followed invariably: "Who got us into this mess?" "Who lost China?" etc.

We are close to the point of no return in Viet Nam. A way to avoid another Korea and, perhaps, another China may be found in the general policy approach suggested in the memo of December 7th. If so, there ought to be less official talk of our responsibility in Viet Nam and more emphasis on the responsibilities of the Vietnamese themselves and on a great deal of thought on the possibilities for a peaceful solution through the efforts of other nations as well as our own.

C
O
P
Y

December 7, 1963

TO: President Lyndon B. Johnson
FROM: Senator Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Southeast Asia and Viet Nam

Pursuant to our conversation last Thursday night, attached herewith are memoranda which were sent to President Kennedy over the past years. They deal with the Southeast Asian situation and Viet Nam in particular. In addition there is appended a speech of mine of two years ago and a report to the Senate a year ago. Subsequent events have changed some of the details. But it seems to me that the basic observations and conclusions remain valid. In some specifics, actions of the Executive Branch coincide with these observations and conclusions. In many they do not. In any event, this material may be useful by way of background.

I would add only these thoughts on the present situation:

1. Present policy says that there is a war which can be won in south Viet Nam alone. It says that the war can be won at a limited expenditure of American lives and resources somewhere commensurate with our national interests in south Viet Nam.

Both assumptions may be in error. There may be no war to be won in south Viet Nam alone. There may be only a war which will, in time, involve U. S. forces throughout Southeast Asia, and finally throughout China itself in search of victory. What national interests in Asia would steel the American people for the massive costs of an ever-deepening involvement of that kind? It may be that we are confronted with a dilemma not unlike that which faced us in Korea a decade ago. It will be recalled that Mr. Eisenhower's response was not to pursue the war to victory but to go to Korea to make peace, in reality, a truce.

2. Similarly, there may be a truce that could be won now in Viet Nam alone and eventually a peace which might be won throughout Southeast Asia at a price commensurate with American interests. That peace should mean, in the end, a Southeast Asia less dependent on our aid-resources and support, less under our control, not cut off from China but,

still, not overwhelmed by China. If there is any opportunity of winning that kind of truce and peace it would appear to involve initially the following actions:

a. It would involve an effort to strengthen the hold of the Saigon government on those parts of south Viet Nam which it now controls. What is called for are political and social acts of popular benefit by the Vietnamese authorities where they can act, even if it means curtailing the present elusive and so far unsuccessful chase of the Viet Cong all over the land.

b. It would involve an astute diplomatic offensive which would seek to enlist France, Britain, India and, perhaps, even Russia and all other sources of potential use in a bonafide effort to bring about an end to the North-South Vietnamese conflict. A settlement might be on terms which reduced our influence (and costs) provided it also inhibited Chinese political domination. France is the key country.

c. It would involve U. S. understanding, sympathy and sensible encouragement for the Cambodian desire to stand on its own feet without one-sided U.S. aid. At this time, Cambodia would appear to be the principal prototype of any eventual peace for Southeast Asia. It would be an independent Southeast Asia, not dependent on a costly U.S. prop. If Cambodia falls, to its neighbors or if it goes over to China, we may as well resign ourselves to an involvement of years in all of Southeast Asia at great cost in resources and, probably, lives. Or alternatively, we will be faced with an ignominious and dangerous abandonment of the Southeast Asian mainland to Chinese political domination. In connection with these alternatives we need to keep in mind the rising public hostility towards foreign aid in particular and government costs in general.

January 4, 1964

44
Memo for the
Pres

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here is a final wrap-up prepared in the State Department which shows, I think, that the Erhard talks got a good press. I would like to think that our backgrounding helped it, but the truth is that it was the meetings themselves, and Erhard's own reaction, which had most to do with it.

McG. B.

Memorandum for Pres.

CITE CAP 64006

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

January 2, 1963

TO MR. MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BUNDY

1964 JAN 3 01 07

1. Wholly new version of foreign affairs section of State of the Union message follows by courier tomorrow with explanatory comment.
2. Plans have been made for day-long session Saturday under Dean Rusk to produce effective initiatives for peace.
3. Problem of Indonesia well reviewed in useful meeting this afternoon and basic outline now exists for a strong Johnson position on this hot problem. It will require a Presidential determination, but the surrounding justification and exposition can be made vastly stronger and more persuasive than anything you have yet seen. The option of refusing to sign such a determination of course remains open until and unless you are persuaded. Documents on this will need weekend for preparation and will be available on your return.
4. Basic outline of Lippmann plan for peace is as follows:
 - a. Soviets and West reassert as long-run target the peaceful reunification of Germany. Lippmann suggests 25-year time limit.
 - b. Pending reunification, Soviets and West reaffirm freedom of Berlin and Western presence and access.
 - c. Pending reunification, Soviets, Western Powers, and all German authorities on both sides agree to encourage increased contact

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Authority State Bu 7/20/00, 47506/2/31/78
By mmg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

and communication among Germans, looking toward peaceful reunification.

My curbstone judgment is that this plan would be acceptable to the Germans with proper preparation, and just possibly to Soviets as well. This and other possibilities will be reviewed intensively in the next three days.

1

5. Lippmann and Alsop both agree that Erhard's meeting is first step toward peace. As long as they can be kept from learning of this agreement, you are in a strong position.

6. For your information, Ambassador Thompson's first comment on the Soviet message is as follows:

"I consider the Soviet message to President Johnson just a propaganda gimmick and is nothing we should worry about. The main point is that they expect us to have East Germany sign but not Taiwan, and this is impossible."

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1964 JAN 3 01 37

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State letter 7/20/78
NSC letter 2/3/78
By Pls. NARA, Date 7/18/94

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FROM MR BUNDY
TO MR MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP64006

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1. WHOLLY NEW VERSION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION OF STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE FOLLOWS BY COURIER TOMORROW WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENT.
2. PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR DAY-LONG SESSION SATURDAY UNDER DEAN RUSK TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE INITIATIVES FOR PEACE.
3. PROBLEM OF INDONESIA WELL REVIEWED IN USEFUL MEETING THIS AFTERNOON AND BASIC OUTLINE NOW EXISTS FOR A STRONG JOHNSON POSITION ON THIS HOT PROBLEM. IT WILL REQUIRE A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, BUT THE SURROUNDING JUSTIFICATION AND EXPOSITION CAN BE MADE VASTLY STRONGER AND MORE PERSUASIVE THAN ANYTHING YOU HAVE YET SEEN. THE OPTION OF REFUSING TO SIGN SUCH A DETERMINATION OF COURSE REMAINS OPEN UNTIL AND UNLESS YOU ARE PERSUADED. DOCUMENTS ON THIS WILL NEED WEEKEND FOR PREPARATION AND WILL BE AVAILABLE ON YOUR RETURN.

PRESERVATION COPY

4. BASIC OUTLINE OF LIPPMANN PLAN FOR PEACE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. SOVIETS AND WEST REASSERT AS LONG-RUN TARGET THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. LIPPMANN SUGGESTS 25-YEAR TIME LIMIT.

B. PENDING REUNIFICATION, SOVIETS AND WEST REAFFIRM FREEDOM OF BERLIN AND WESTERN PRESENCE AND ACCESS.

C. PENDING REUNIFICATION, SOVIETS, WESTERN POWERS, AND ALL GERMAN AUTHORITIES ON BOTH SIDES AGREE TO ENCOURAGE INCREASED CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION AMONG GERMANS, LOOKING TOWARD PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION.

MY CURBSTONE JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS PLAN WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS WITH PROPER PREPARATION, AND JUST POSSIBLY TO SOVIETS AS WELL. THIS AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES WILL BE REVIEWED INTENSIVELY IN THE NEXT THREE DAYS.

5. LIPPMANN AND ERHARD BOTH AGREE THAT ERHARD'S MEETING IS FIRST STEP TOWARD PEACE. AS LONG AS THEY CAN BE KEPT FROM LEARNING OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOU ARE IN A STRONG POSITION.

6. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S FIRST COMMENT ON THE SOVIET MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"I CONSIDER THE SOVIET MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON JUST A PROPAGANDA GIMMICK AND IS NOTHING WE SHOULD WORRY ABOUT. THE MAIN POINT IS THAT THEY EXPECT US TO HAVE EAST GERMANY SIGN BUT NOT TAIWAN, AND THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE."

DTG: 03/0107Z JAN 64

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAP 64001

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for me
46

FOR MOYERS OR VALENTI FOR THE PRESIDENT, ~~COPI FOR BALINGER~~
FROM BUNDY

RECEIVED
WHASA

Memor for
the Pres.

1964 JAN 1 19 20

PRESS COVERAGE OF ERHARD VISIT GROWS LIGHTER BUT REMAINS EXCELLENT. TODAY MOST COLUMNS ARE ON WIDER YEAR-END THEMES AND LEAD ME TO A RECOMMENDATION THAT YOU MIGHT DO NETWORK TV SESSION OF THIS SORT BEFORE YOU RETURN HERE. MORE ON THIS LATER.

SPECIFIC REACTIONS ARE:

1) THOUGHTFUL ARTICLES TODAY BY FRIENDLY IN POST AND FRANKEL IN TIMES SHOW IMPACT OF RUSK'S BACKGROUNDER MONDAY PM. FRANKEL HAS STIRRED ^{IN} ~~THE~~ CHARACTERISTIC PERSONAL JAB AGAINST ACHESON BUT THIS IS UNAVOIDABLE. MY OWN THOUGHTS IS THAT WE NEED TO BE ^{JUST} A LITTLE CAREFUL ABOUT TALK ABOUT FURTHER CONCRETE STEPS UNTIL WE GET BETTER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO PUT FORWARD. (THIS WILL BE URGENT BUSINESS NEXT WEEK AND POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR YOU TO CONSIDER AS SOON AS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE IS OUT OF THE WAY.)

2) STRONGLY FAVORABLE REACTION IN GERMAN PRESS SUMMARIZED NEXT FOLLOWING IN MESSAGE FROM BONN. ~~WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED~~ THIS HAS BEEN PICKED UP IN ONE OR TWO NEWS STORIES FROM THERE, BUT NOT MANY. STILL THIS IS BETTER THAN THE FORMER TRADITION OF SNIPPY AND CRITICAL COMMENTS WHICH USED TO FLOW BACK FROM GERMANY AFTER ADENAUER'S VISITS.

3) MY OWN EXPLORATIONS WITH REPORTERS HAVE BEEN VERY FRIENDLY SO FAR. ALSOP SEES NO COLUMN IN IT, BUT HE AGREES IT WAS A MOST SUCCESSFUL MEETING. HE IS TILTING AT THE VIETNAMESE WINDMILL, AND BOB MCNAMARA AND I HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD IN TALKING WITH HIM TO TRY TO PREVENT DAMAGE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority unsc ltr 2/5/78 State ltr 9/20/77
By img, NARS, Date 3/3/78

HIS BASIC REACTIONS ARE GOOD -- AGAINST NEUTRALIZATION AND IN FAVOR OF ENERGENIC ACTION, BUT HE IS ERRATIC.

DREW PEARSON WAS MOST CORDIAL AND EXPRESSED PRAISE OF MEETING. I GAVE HIM AN EARFULL ON ~~YOUR~~ PERSONAL DIPLOMACY WITH ERHARD, AND WE AGREED THAT THIS KIND OF INTIMATE, ~~PERSUASIVE~~^{AND} CANDID TALK IS LBJ TRADEMARK. WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE DIFFERENCE NOW IS THAT WAS NOT JUST ADENAUER TALKING TO A FRIENDLY HOST, BUT ERHARD HEARING FROM THE PRESIDENT. I HOPE PEARSON WILL SAY SOME OF THIS IN PRINT, BUT MY FINGERS ARE CROSSED.

QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER WE HAVE GOT AS MUCH MILAGE AS WE SHOULD OUT OF THIS MEETING AND MY OWN PRESENT THOUGHT IS THAT FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS YOU MIGHT DO A WRAP-UP TV INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, ON YOUR FIRST SIX WEEKS. (IF YOU DID DO THIS, YOU MIGHT HAVE PIERRE SALINGER PASS THE WORD PRIVATELY TO THE NETWORKS A DAY AHEAD SO THAT THEIR REALLY GOOD MEN MIGHT COVER IT). IN THAT WAY I THINK YOU COULD GET YOUR BASIC ATTITUDES ON FOREIGN POLICY STATED TO THE WHOLE COUNTRY, YOU COULD PROTECT THE FORMAL PLACE OF THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE AND STILL CONVEY IMPORTANT IMPRESSIONS. ~~OF ERHARD AND OF THE MEETING~~ IN THIS CONTEXT, YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF ERHARD AND OF THE MEETING COULD BE STRONGLY STATED. IN SUCH A QUIET DISCUSSION YOU COULD GET ACROSS TO INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS A PICTURE OF YOUR PERSONAL ATTITUDES AS FORMAL SPEECHES JUST DO NOT CONVEY TO THEM AS WELL.

I THINK OF FOUR THEMES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

FIRST, YOUR COMMITMENT TO ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE -- THE MIKOYAN TALK, U.N. SPEECH, THE NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO KHRUSHCHEV, THE ERHARD VISIT, THE SEARCH FOR NEXT STEPS.

SECOND AND EQUALLY ESSENTIAL, YOUR BELIEF IN LEADING FROM STRENGTH--MCNAMARA'S ACHIEVEMENTS, OUR LOYALTY TO ALLIES, YOUR REASSURANCE TO ERHARD.

THIRD AND PLAINLY, YOUR INSISTANCE ON THE FAIR INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES--YOUR DISCUSSION OF THE KENNEDY ROUND WITH ERHARD, YOUR INSISTANCE ON THE OFFSET AGREEMENT FOR THE SIX DIVISIONS.

FOURTH AND FINALLY: YOUR EQUAL BELIEF IN RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS-- YOU TOLD ERHARD THERE WOULD BE NO BARGAIN AGAINST GERMAN INTERESTS, AND YOU UNDERSTOOD AND RESPECTED HIS ELOQUENT STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF ALL GERMANS TO FREE CHOICE OF THE KIND OF SOCIETY THEY WANT TO LIVE IN.

NOTE: ALSO SENT BONN 2309.

IMMEDIATE

APG 36

~~Confidential~~

Memo for Pres ⁴⁷

CONFIDENTIAL

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December 30, 1963

FOR: SALINGER FOR THE PRESIDENT

1963 DEC 30 23 02

FROM: BUNDY

Following is press follow-up report No. 1. Today I talked on telephone to William White, Joseph Kraft, Walter Lippmann, and Chalmers Roberts. White is of course a friend, and seemed sympathetic to our view of meeting. Kraft will come in for further discussion tomorrow, and seems moderately cheerful. Roberts has already written one excellent article and I doubt if we will get much more now. Lippmann said he had already written one which he thought we would like, but agreed to talk some more on Thursday at lunch.

Tonight I am having dinner with Joseph Alsop, and tomorrow I have an appointment with Drew Pearson. I understand Dean Rusk is seeing Friendly, Lippmann, and Reston late this afternoon.

The over-all ^{view} ~~impression~~ here is of a serious and successful meeting in which President made strong personal impression going beyond atmospheric, good as these were. Salinger also running well.

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By mg, NARS, Date 8/18/77

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Authority NSC 68 2/5/78 State 7/20/77

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By mg, NARS, Date 3/5/78

December 27, 1963

File 48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Basic Talking Points for the President with Erhard

1. U. S. Troop Presence and the Offset Agreement

The Germans have performed well so far on Gilpatric/Strauss agreement of 1961. They have agreed to offset gold cost of U. S. defense presence (including dependent spending) at the current rate of about \$675 million a year. On present 2-year agreement for calendar years '63 and '64, Germans are only about \$50 million behind in payments, and Defense Minister von Hassel assured William P. Bundy in December that payments would be maintained even under 19.3 billion D-Marks Defense budget (we prefer 20 billion D-Marks).

Chancellor should be left in no doubt that performance under offset agreement is indispensable for our continued six division presence.

2. German Defense Budget

This budget has gone from 13 billion D-Marks in 1961 to 18 billion D-Marks in 1963. We want 20 billion D-Marks in 1964, but present German planning is 19.3 billion D-Marks. McNamara hopes President will press Chancellor strongly on advantages for Western defense and in U. S. Congress of continued German increase. Best talking point: German defense expenditures are now only about 5.1% of GNP, against U. S. level of ~~5.2%~~ 9.8%

3. East-West Relations

- (1) Germans can count on U. S. not to bargain over their heads with Khrushchev.
- (2) President personally is confident of Western strength and determination.
- (3) U. S. does believe in maintaining contact with Soviets and in seeking advantageous areas of agreement.
- (4) In particular, U. S. welcomes proposed review of Western proposals on Berlin and Germany.
- (5) President and Chancellor should maintain closest contact in these matters.
- (6) As a starter, how does Chancellor now view this problem? In particular:
 - (a) What about Christmas passes?
 - (b) Can there be improved guarantees for Berlin?
 - (c) What hope is there of peaceful progress toward reunification?

~~SECRET~~

Dec. 27, 1963

4. The Common Market and the Kennedy Round

President would welcome Chancellor's description of basic results of Brussels negotiations. President may wish to leave detailed comment to George Ball and afternoon session, but he will want to emphasize to the Chancellor U. S. need for proper access for agricultural products, and U. S. interest in major reciprocal concessions in industrial tariffs.

5. Cuba

(1) The Germans have been responsive to our arguments on Cuba in the past. In particular they got their ships out of the Cuban trade after a JFK appeal in September 1962. They have also broken relations with Castro, but this was because he recognized East Germany.

(2) We now want further cooperation in reduction of West German exports to Cuba, running about \$5-1/2 million a year. Selectively, some of these are important (e. g., telecommunications equipment, mining machinery, and diesel engines). We will be in touch with Germans on specific items.

(3) President may wish to emphasize political importance of Cuban question in the U. S. and value of U. S. -German solidarity in isolating Castro. In particular, it might be helpful if Erhard would agree to a sentence on this subject in communique, something like this: "President and Chancellor, in discussing danger of Communist subversion, agreed on importance of maintaining and increasing isolation of subversive Communist regime in Cuba."

6. Aid to Less Developed Countries

- (1) A field where we both have problems (Chancellor will know of our Aid appropriation battle).
- (2) President agrees with Erhard's well-known view that trade and free enterprise are of first importance.
- (3) Still there is a major role for development lending (e. g., growth of India, and even rebuilding of Europe itself).
- (4) German lending level of \$188 million for '64 is low and will discourage others. And German terms (now around 4%) are a little stiff.
- (5) At a minimum, Chancellor should understand U. S. President is watching him closely on this issue.

McG. B.

December 23, 1963

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have called the following to make the basic argument in the memorandum on the President's powers:

1. Russ Wiggins - Washington Post. He tells me he couldn't agree more and will go back to the subject again tomorrow. He says he will include some of the absentee liberals along with the Republican leadership in his criticism, but he said he would praise those who have come back. He specifically agrees that the President's powers are the heart of the issue.

2. McElway - Star. He also agrees thoroughly and says that today's Star will support our position. Unfortunately there will be no chance to put more material in the Star before tomorrow morning' but he will keep on top of it.

3. I have calls in to John Hightower and James Reston, and also to Mr. Kiker of the NY Herald Tribune, but they are out Christmas shopping. I may be called out of this meeting to take their calls.

McG. B.

December 23, 1963

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have called the following to make the basic argument in the memorandum on the President's powers:

1. Russ Wiggins - The Washington Post. He tells me he couldn't agree more and will go back to the subject again tomorrow. He says he will include some of the absentee liberals along with the Republican leadership in his criticism, but he said he would praise those who have come back. He specifically agrees that the President's powers are the heart of the issue.

2. McElway - Washington Star. He also agrees thoroughly and says that today's Star will support our position. Unfortunately there will be no chance to put more material in the Star before tomorrow morning but he will keep on top of it.

3. Kiker - White House correspondent for the N. Y. Herald Tribune. He himself agrees thoroughly and I think he will use as much as our argument as is appropriate to the Herald Tribune. He reported that he himself thinks this is bull-headed foolishness on the part of Charlie Halleck. He asked me if you personally regarded this as a test of the Presidential power, and I said you did and were determined not to leave the Presidency smaller than you found it. He is sure you are going to win.

December 20, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suspension of PL 480 aid to Ceylon

Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 which you signed on December 16, we must suspend assistance in expropriation cases under PL 480 as well as under the Foreign Assistance Act itself.

The only country where this provision is immediately important is Ceylon, where assistance under the earlier Hickenlooper Amendment was suspended on February 7, 1963.

Under the law we have no alternative but to suspend PL 480 for Ceylon, although there is little practical effect since there is no food undelivered, but only a few projects using the rupee proceeds of previous sales.

We would like to execute this action quietly and just a little slowly, in order not to entangle it in a last-ditch effort to bring off an oil settlement. Accordingly, I recommend that you approve this suspension and that I be authorized to convey your decision to Ceylon with all deliberate speed. This will still leave about four days for a last try at an oil settlement, and that is the best we can do.

McGeorge Bundy

December 20, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

When you talk to the Secretary of State after the Chamizal signing, I think you may want to raise with him the question of preparations for the Erhard talks.

There are essentially two choices: The first is that you should sit down with Rusk and Ball and Herter before you go to Texas. The second is that you might wait and do your preparations in an intensive discussion at the Ranch, perhaps on December 27. A third choice -- and in some ways the best one -- is to do both.

The Erhard meeting is an important one because if it goes well it can lay a basis for your leadership, both within the alliance and in relations with the Soviet Union. If it goes badly or is handled in such a way as to be misinterpreted, it may easily give de Gaulle the handle he needs for some new stroke at his January press conference. Such a stroke, given his nature, is almost bound to be framed as a challenge to U. S. leadership and so to you.

McG. B.

Stata

December 19, 1963

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a letter for your signature accepting Ed Martin's resignation, as drafted by State Department. I think it would probably be good for relations if you signed it as it is and added a handwritten line of your own: "I mean all this and more, and I am going to find a good time to say so publicly."

McGeorge Bundy

December 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Checklist of Topics the Foreign Press may raise, and shorthand answers

1. Meetings with Foreign Statesmen and your travel plans.

I suggest that you explain exactly what you have done and why. Toughest problem is de Gaulle, where what is needed is good humored and easy acceptance that there appears to have been a misunderstanding and that we certainly have no objection if General DeGaulle feels he should not come to the United States in 1964. You yourself do not see how you can get to Europe in that same time. Nevertheless this is not a cause for alarm or despair.

2. Relations with the Soviet Union

Your first diplomatic purpose was to assure Mikoyan and Khrushchev of your desire to sustain lines of communication opened under President Kennedy and your determination that the US will meet anyone half way for peace. You do not expect a summit meeting but you do expect to continue discussion in search of possible agreements. You will not wish to comment on specific issues, and in particular you will want to be careful about questions suggesting that the British are more optimistic than we are. The fact is that they are, but that we do not want to make an issue of it publicly.

3. South Vietnam

Your determination to carry on the effort there has been made clear to all concerned. You and Lodge are in the closest touch. You assume that while he is on the job he will not engage in politics(!) You believe that progress is being made both here and in the field toward unity and an end of backbiting -- which you detest.

4. Cuba

You have indeed asked for a review of Cuba policy (Max Frankel story a couple of days ago) and you regard this as one of the major continuing problems of our foreign policy. While that review is under way and until you have a chance to consider its results, you have nothing more to say than that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere.

5. Alliance for Progress

There is no higher priority on your agenda and you are working closely with Secretary Rusk to find ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the Government's work on this whole subject.

6. On the Kennedy Round

You had a good talk with Governor Herter this afternoon; you have confidence in him; the focus of discussion is now in Europe among the members of the Six, on the agricultural issue, and this is not the time for you to do more than to say that you have strongly supported the objectives of the Trade Expansion Act right from the beginning and that you mean to carry on toward the basic objectives set by President Kennedy two years ago.

7. Malaysia

There is a real prospect of new adventures by Sukarno here, and you will probably not want to say more than that the situation is one which you are watching very closely and on which we are in very close consultation, not only with the countries immediately concerned but with the United Kingdom and Australia.

8. Cambodia

I think you will want to be very reserved. Sihanouk has been making outrageous statements, but the fact is the problem is pathological and not diplomatic, and it would be dangerous to comment even off-the-record today.

9. Wheat Deal

You are in favor of it, but the question is still one of price bargaining between the Russians and the traders, and your position is what President Kennedy's was: let the negotiators negotiate.

10. Yemen and the Middle East

I think you may wish to dodge the questions by saying this is another of the matters you are having studied and will be reviewing in the next two days, and you would prefer not to comment tonight.

11. MLF

You are well briefed on this, and made your own position clear in Brussels earlier this fall.

McG. B.

55
Memos for
the Pres.
December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Mexican Ambassador called to say that President Lopez Mateos looks forward very much to the prospect of meeting with you and that his choice, from among the times and places tentatively discussed, is Los Angeles in February.

As I understand it, this was Pierre Salinger's idea on the ground that it would make a great hit in California where there are so many Mexicans.

You may want to discuss the ways and means of getting this settled finally with Tom Mann when he comes in at 3:00 this afternoon.

McG. B.

(blended by Ed Martin)

56 ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 10, 1963

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-290

By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with David Nes at 12:15 p. m.

Nes is the nominee of Rusk, Ball, Harriman and Hilsman for the job of DCM to Lodge. I have reviewed his record, obtained additional recommendations, and talked with him. Subject to your interview and assessment, I agree with the recommendation.

I attach answers to overnight queries which I sent to John Ferguson, the Ambassador in Morocco, a shrewd man who was Nes' last boss, and a message from David Bruce who knew him ten years ago in Paris, and this year while he has been at the Imperial Defense College. You will see that they both rate him very high.

Nes is soft-spoken and a little bit more Ivy League than I myself like in tone and accent. He is also shrewd and knowledgeable, and while there is nothing quite like the job in Saigon, it is true that the job in Morocco was complicated and varied.

Nes showed justified confidence in his ability to cope with AID and CIA. He said the main problem would be with the juggernaut of the military, with lots of brass, lots of money, and a limited sense of politics. I agree with him.

I told Nes that a major problem in this case would be to combine loyalty to a quite strong-minded Ambassador with effective management of all kinds of details in which the Ambassador would not be interested. He showed immediate comprehension. Indeed, what I liked most was his eagerness to take on an assignment in which it may easily be impossible for him to satisfy us all. A timid man would not want to be Lodge's deputy right now.

If you approve the recommendation, it is planned that Nes should go with Bob McNamara to Saigon and then check back in Washington to finish his briefing, and in London to get his family. We can get him on the scene in the first week of January, fully briefed and organized, and I think more haste would make less speed in this case.

I will pursue you after your meeting to get your orders.

McG. B.

McG. B.

57

THE WHITE F. JOSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1963

TO: Mr. Bundy
FROM: Mr. Dungan

Returned.

Rec'd
12-9-63
6:03 pm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Ike and Cabot Lodge

Joe Alsop has just called to tell me that Felix Belair swears up and down that General Eisenhower told him personally of his interest in having Cabot Lodge get into the race, and specifically said that he had let Lodge know of this interest. Joe said that General Eisenhower called Belair today, however, to say that Lodge was only one of many and that he (Eisenhower) could not support any one candidate over another because his travel expenses in all his Republican travels were paid by the Republican National Committee!

Mike Forrestal is just back from Saigon and reports that Cabot has indeed begun to think in terms of political possibilities. Mike's guess is that Lodge would very much like to be honorably free of his responsibilities in Saigon and is hoping to be able to report to you in about two months that the situation is so much better that he can now fairly ask for relief.

I report all this because you may want to have it in mind in your last instructions to Bob McNamara before he goes out there. If I understand your thinking correctly, it might be desirable to have Bob say flatly to Lodge that if he can leave the situation clearly better than he found it, after six months, it will be entirely reasonable for him to ask for relief in February. (He went out in late August.)

McG. B.

McG. B.

5-2
Memos for the
President

December 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Under Secretaryship for Latin American Affairs
and Ed Martin

I should have told you before that one important problem, if you get someone like Tom Mann to be Under Secretary for Latin American Affairs, is to deal fairly with Ed Martin. His first reaction to this proposal last month was that if it meant putting someone in over him, he would want to be shifted to a different assignment.

I am sure this would be his final decision, especially if he could have a new rank like Deputy Under Secretary. But in any event, it would be very important to make it clear to him that his extremely energetic and devoted work in the last year and a half is recognized. I think he might like best to go to one of the agreeable smaller West European Embassies -- although it would be better if he would stay for two or three months at least, and better yet if he were to be persuaded to stay on the team with the new Under Secretary.

Martin himself is just a little too fussy and detail-minded for the top job here, but he is a dedicated public servant and he deserves generous treatment.

McGeorge Bundy

December 8, 1963

Basic Argument for Establishing an Under Secretary for Latin American Affairs, and Answers to Arguments Against It

1. Latin American Affairs works best when there is a single officer in Washington with full authority over all aspects of our Latin American policy and activity, under the Secretary of State and the President.
2. The importance of this responsibility justifies the rank of Under Secretary, and indeed almost requires it if the officer is to have effective seniority in dealings with other agencies like AID, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and CIA.
3. The creation of this office for Latin America does not mean that similar rank will be needed in other geographic bureaus. The Secretary of State and the two present Under Secretaries by the nature of their duties as well as their interests give very substantial parts of their time to European, Middle Eastern, and Far Eastern matters. Africa is demonstrably of lower present importance to us (the magnitude of our expenditures is about ten to one in favor of Latin America.)
4. One of the important reasons for a new Under Secretary is the deep sensitivity to rank and prestige of the Latin Americans. A new post of this kind, properly filled by an officer well known and respected by Latin Americans, would give an important psychological boost to the Alliance for Progress at this time.
5. The President has in mind an officer of undoubted stature who commands the confidence of leaders of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Latin American world.

McGeorge Bundy

Memo for the Pres

December 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Four U. S. Hostages in Bolivia

This memorandum (1) reports the present course, (2) argues against military moves at this time, and (3) offers some additional steps we can take.

1. Present Course

-- to get them out by supporting Paz in pressure plus negotiation, pay no blackmail, avoid military action if possible, and try to make Lechin lose ground in the upshot.

Probable Result:

--that 4 will be released eventually, but only after haggling and delay. Possibility of harm exists under this course but is low.

Supporting this basic course:

- State Department
- Defense Department
- Joint Staff
- CINC South (General O'Meara)

2. Unrecommended Alternatives

- a. To encourage military action by Paz;
- b. To threaten U. S. military intervention;
- c. To execute U. S. military intervention.

All of these courses are strongly disapproved at present by all advisers, on following grounds:

(1) Securing release of 4 Americans, plus Belgian and German, is responsibility of Bolivian government which has assured us it will make every effort. This government has not yet had time to show what it can

do -- few kidnappings, political or other, are solved in the first two days.

(2) Bolivian military action, though it may become necessary later, greatly increases danger to hostages, is likely to weaken government, and increase danger of civil war.

(3) Any U. S. military threat or action now would sharply undermine Paz government (by showing our lack of confidence in it.)

(4) Such U. S. threat or action would be regarded as impulsive and intrusive, and would bring strong criticism from all over the hemisphere.

(5) If USG, against its own expert advice, should follow a stronger course, and harm should come to 4 Americans, very heavy criticism, both foreign and domestic, would fall on the new Administration.

3. Additional Steps Available to Us

(1) A statement from White House can be made. Such a statement should show:

(a) careful Presidential attention to case

(b) support for efforts of Bolivian Government and solidarity with it

(c) readiness to help in every way

(d) general determination of USG to take all necessary steps in support of its officers on duty abroad

(e) emphasis that these officers were on peaceful business and that they had no involvement in internal matters and no relation whatever to arrests which preceded kidnapping.

(State will have a draft along these lines.)

(2) Background comment can be added to this effect:

(a) President does not propose to accept a series of terrorist kidnappings. He recognizes that responsibility for prevention and cure rests

in first instance on friendly governments, and he knows they are doing their best, but if Americans on peaceful mission are not properly protected, he will be forced to consider new steps. (I recommend against this one, for the present. It can be used later if necessary.)

(b) The United States has many hundreds of officers and dependents in Bolivia, and thousands elsewhere, whose duties do bring them within danger of terrorist attack or harassment. This is a necessary part of the struggle against Communist subversion. When the safety of such officers is threatened the US will do its best to protect them, but it must always do so in ways that do not weaken its friends or strengthen its enemies. (I do recommend this one now.)



(c) The miners are reacting against Paz, not primarily against US, and until Paz has a chance to deal with the matter, it does not help U. S., or hostages, or Paz himself for U. S. to take over responsibility for action. (I recommend this one too.)

(3) We can make it plain to Paz -- more plain than we yet have -- that we wish upshot of this affair to carry penalties to those responsible for kidnapping. Release with no loss to them is not good enough, in view of our need to develop deterrence against a rash of kidnappings.

McG. B.

Memorandum to the President
Subject: the 4 ~~to~~ U.S. hostages in Bolivia
~~Plans to~~

This memorandum ^① reports the present course, ~~and~~
~~gives alternatives~~ ^② argues against military moves at
~~the hazard of~~ ^③ offer some additional steps we can
take
Present Course



- to get them out by supporting Paz
in ~~negotiation~~ pressure plus negotiations, ^{pay us} but ~~will~~
as blackmail, ~~and a host of~~ ~~measures~~ to
make Echazurrutu ^{guilt} lose in the upshot.

avoid military
actions if
possible, and
try to

Probable Results:

- that 4 will be released eventually, but only
after haggling and ~~some~~ delay.
Possibility of harm exists under this course

Recommendations


Supporting this basic course:

State Dept.

Defense Dept.

Joint Staff.

Cino Smith (General O'Meara)



Arguable issues:

~~we have discouraged use of military force by~~
~~Paz. Should we take a more hands-off position,~~

L

2. Unrecommended Alternatives:

(1) ~~ⓐ~~ To encourage military action by
Peru



(2) ~~ⓑ~~ To threaten ^{U.S.} military ^{intervention} action of our own

(3) ~~ⓒ~~ To execute ^{U.S.} military intervention.

~~Alternative ⓓ~~ All of these courses are strongly
at present
disapproved by all advisers, on following
grounds:

(1) ~~ⓐ~~ Securing release of 4 Americans, ~~in function~~
plus Belgian + German, to responsibility of Bolivian
government which has assured us it will make every
effort. This government has not yet had
time to show what it can do - ~~of~~ few kidnappings,
~~ⓑ~~ political or other, are solved in the first
two days.

(2) ~~ⓑ~~ Bolivian military action, though it may become
necessary later, greatly increases danger to
hostages, ~~is likely to~~ ^{is likely to} weaken government, and
increase danger of civil war.



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7

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Any
(3) ~~(4)~~ U.S. military threat a ~~military~~ ^{now} action, would sharply undermine Bay government (by showing ^{our} lack of confidence in it)

~~U.S.~~

(4) ~~(5)~~ South U.S. threat a action would ^{not} find ~~good~~ be regarded as ^{infringement} ~~infringement~~ and ^{intrusive} ~~intrusive~~, and would bring strong criticism from all over the hemisphere.

(5) ~~(6)~~ If U.S. gov., against its own expert advice, should follow a stronger course, and harm should come to 4 Americans, very heavy criticism, both foreign and domestic, would fall on the new Administration.

~~3~~ -
(3) Additional Steps Available to ~~the~~ us.

① A Statement from White House ~~stating~~ can be made. Such a statement ~~would~~ ^{should} show

① careful Presidential attention to case

② ~~the~~ support for efforts of ^{Bolivian} responsible Government and solidarity with it.

③ readiness to help in ~~any~~ every way.

④ general determination of USG to take all necessary steps ~~to~~ in support of its officers on duty abroad

⑤ emphasis that these officers were on peaceful business & that they had no involvement in ~~the~~ internal ~~political~~ ~~system~~ ~~of~~ ~~facto~~ matters and no relation whatever to events which ~~to~~ preceded kidnapping

(State will have a draft along these lines)

⑥ Background comment can be added to this effect:

① ~~The~~ President does not propose to ~~take~~ ^{accept} a series of farcical kidnappings. He recognizes that responsibility for present ~~and~~ ^{current} rests in first instance on friendly governments,


and he knows they are doing their best, but if ~~this sort of thing is not stopped~~, he as American or peaceful mission are not properly protected, he will be forced to consider ~~for~~ new steps (I recommend against that one, for the present. It can be used later if necessary.)

The United States has ^{many hundreds} ~~literally thousands~~ of officials and dependents in Bolivia, and thousands elsewhere, whose duties do bring them within the danger of terrorist attack a harassment.

This is a necessary part of the struggle against ^{Communist} subversion. ~~and~~ when such ~~an~~ officials are attacked the safety of such officials is threatened the U.S. will ~~not~~ do its best to protect them, but it must always ^{do} ~~not~~ so ^{in ways that do} ~~not~~ ^{weaken its friends or strengthen its enemies.} (I do recommend this one too)

The unions are reacting against Paz, not pinned against U.S., and until Paz has a chance to deal with the matter, it does not help U.S., a hostage, or Paz himself for U.S. to take ^{on} responsibility for action.

(I recommend this one too)



(3)

We can make it somewhat plain to say - more plain than we get here - that we ~~very much~~ work upshot of this affair to carry penalties to those responsible for kidnappings. Release with no loss to them is not good enough, in view of our need to develop deterrence against a rash of kidnappings.

61
memos for the Pres.

RE: Your Lunch with Dean Acheson

Acheson is a determined believer in the "hard line." He sees Germany as the center of our policy and believes in paying no attention to General de Gaulle. He and Lippmann are at opposite poles; Acheson believes in action even in an election year (he remembers what Truman accomplished in '48) and he has little patience for less-developed countries, the UN, Adlai Stevenson, George Kennan, etc. He got on well with President Kennedy although the President seldom took his advice but found him deeply stimulating. These opinions are not what he can help you with now. What I would probe him on is the skills and qualities of the individuals now serving you in the whole national security area.

After you have seen him you may want to see Averell Hartman who is at the opposite pole, if only to hold the Liberals in line.

McG. B.

December 6, 1963

December 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Meeting on Multilateral Force with Rusk, Merchant, Ball and William P. Bundy, McG. Bundy, McNamara

1. This is a most complex issue of tactics and timing on which no big decision is needed. Today you will be asked only for two authorizations on which there is general agreement: (a) to let staff administration advocates of MLF brief selected Congressional leaders on current state of Paris negotiations with seven other interested nations; (b) to let the same people brief General Eisenhower in the hope of holding his support for this force. Behind these simple requirements is a tension which existed for many months between MLF advocates in State Department and President Kennedy. President Kennedy wanted to avoid getting pinned to a very complex and difficult treaty commitment that might not be easy to get through the Senate. Thus he felt the main initiative and pressure should come from Europeans rather than from US. Department advocates (not so much Dean Rusk) have felt that US must get MLF into being by active leadership and diplomatic pressure on every front. This view has now been adopted by Dean Acheson.

President Kennedy's instruction to me was to watch negotiations closely and make sure we did not present him with a debatable treaty in 1964. In due course I need your guidance on this point but not necessarily today.

I should add that Bob McNamara has always been cool to this force although willing to have it staffed out and proposed. Navy is for it as another element of Naval nuclear power.

The Europeans are divided every which-way with only the German Government clearly and solidly in favor.

Memos for the Pres.

December 5, 1963

63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Remarks to the National Security Council

The following is cast in the form of a short talk by you, but it is really intended only as a memorandum of what you said this morning for you to draw on as you please.

1. I want to say a word of welcome to the Speaker who will be with us from time to time when his very heavy duties permit it. I hope that all members of the Council will show the same readiness to keep him fully informed in this great field that they showed to me as Vice President.

And I want to welcome you all to the first NSC meeting of this Administration. Most of us have served together now for nearly three years; I know the quality of your work and place great reliance on all of you.

2. This Council is the formal meeting place for the men in the Executive Branch who have top responsibility for the safety of our nation. I want you to know that I look on these matters of security as the No. 1 business of the Government, and I propose to run my own office and my own business with that priority. Not all the work of National Security can be done in meetings of this Council, and I expect to go on with special meetings for special purposes, but I do plan to use this Council from time to time as a

forum in which these matters can be examined. I welcome candid and open expression of views and differences of opinion, and I also welcome the opportunity which these meetings give for making my own positions clear.

As a beginning, I want to take a few minutes this afternoon to state the essentials of U. S. policy as I see it.

4. The greatest single requirement on the world's statesmen today is that we should find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in this nuclear age. This group knows better than most what a general nuclear war would be like, and my view is simple: such a war would be the death of all our hopes, and it is our task to see that it does not happen.

5. From this there follow two basic rules for U. S. policy: (1) we must be strong, and (2) we must be temperate.

6. On strength and the need for fully effective defenses I yield to no one. I have been concerned with the strength and effectiveness of our Armed Forces for 30 years, and I mean to continue with energy the great work which Bob McNamara and the Defense Department have carried forward in the last three years. He and I have reemphasized the need for economy in recent days and we mean it -- but we do not mean the kind of economy cuts

into the necessary strength of the Armed Forces. The basic improvement in the balance of power which has taken place in the last three years is one-half of the explanation for the sense of hope that was developing in President Kennedy's last months. I have not become President to give away this advantage.

7. But we must be temperate, too. One of my first concerns after the terrible event of November 22 was to make it clear to the Soviet Government and to Mr. Khrushchev personally that the U. S. will go its part of the way in every effort to make peace more secure. I do not agree with everything Walter Lippmann says, but I do agree with him on the importance of the progress we made in this area, too, in the last three years. I made this point forcefully to Mr. Mikoyan at the same time that I was emphasizing our continued and intense interest in the strength of our alliances to such men as Chancellor Erhard and Prime Minister Douglas-Home. I strongly supported the limited test ban treaty and I want Bill Foster to know that I look on his work as part of National Security, just as much as the work of Bob McNamara.

8. I won't take your time today to give views on all the major issues we will be working on together, but I do wish to signal my concern on two specific issues:

(1) We are heavily committed in South Vietnam with 18,000 Americans there, and we should all of us let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.

(2) We have to live on the same world with the Soviet Union, but we do not have to accept Communist subversion in this Hemisphere -- or, indeed, in any free country that can use our help effectively. But especially in this Hemisphere I think we should let no day pass without asking what more we can do against Communist subversion and against the Castro government in particular.

I have scheduled separate meetings on both these subjects next week.

9. But being against subversion is not just a matter of fighting Communism. We have the positive job of helping to make the democratic system effective and attractive, both in our own country and wherever we have influence. This positive job, too, is of first importance.

10. I'll make just one more comment: We are all here to serve the interest of the United States, but I think we can serve that interest better if we always remember that the other man

sees things in his own way. We need to show patience and understanding of other systems as well as our own, and each of us should ask himself when he deals with other nations how he would feel if he were in the other man's place.

11. The business of this meeting is to hear the intelligence assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union, and I will ask Mr. McCone to take over.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is a Syncom in Huntsville.

It can be orbited over the Equator. USIA programs can be beamed from this Syncom to South America.

Don't know cost. Dr. Weisner has said that we will be able to orbit one of these satellites for as little as \$10,000.

Don't have any estimate of the cost for carrying forward this project.

Notes for Remarks to the NSC

1. Welcome to the Speaker -- Council members to keep him fully informed -- welcome to all present.
2. National security number one business of Government and of President. Work through NSC meetings and other channels, both.
3. Brief statement of essentials:
4. Statesmen must find path to survival.
5. a. We must be strong.
b. We must be temperate and just.
6. On strength: President's own thirty -year record. McNamara and Defense record. Need for economy but not weakness.
7. Temperate and just. President's emphasis to Mikoyan. Agreement with Lippman on progress we have made -- test ban treaty support.
8. Special importance of (1) Vietnam and (2) resistance to Communist subversion in this Hemisphere -- special meetings on these subjects next week.
9. Positive job of making democratic system effective.
10. Each of us should ask how we would feel in the other man's place.
11. Meeting turned over to McCone.

Another possible
question:

McLane told us
what our cameras
are doing over USSR.
What about their
cameras - what is
their intelligence
doing in USA?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-392
By isp, NARA, Date 7-7-95

One possible question
could be asked of
McLane and General
McKee about why
USAF estimates
on Soviet ~~air~~
missile and bomber
strength are
higher.

66
December 5, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Don Hornig

Don Hornig, who was President Kennedy's choice as Jerry Wiesner's successor, needs to know reasonably soon whether this choice is satisfactory to you. He had planned to leave Princeton at the end of this term, and he has an obligation to tell the Princeton authorities promptly. Walter Jenkins tells me that you obviously need to know something about him before you confirm the appointment, and the next paragraphs are aimed to meet that need.

Hornig is a physical chemist of international stature. He was trained at Harvard and has taught at Brown and Princeton. He went to Princeton at a time when the Chemistry Department there was in very bad shape. He was recommended by the top chemists in the country as the best young chemist-administrator in sight, and in the last six or eight years he has justified this promise. The Department has been greatly strengthened, and Hornig has the respect and support of his colleagues and of the Princeton administration in unusual measure. Hornig has served for several years as a member of the Science Advisory Committee which assists the President's Adviser. In that field, one of his particular interests has been space, and he is well and favorably known to Defense and NASA scientists. Here again he has shown himself sensible and effective.

There are not many men who have the combination of qualifications needed to succeed Wiesner. The man has to have an outstanding reputation so that the prima donnas of science will be glad to work with and for him. He has to be a proven administrator, because otherwise he will get lost in the labyrinth of government. He ought to have some experience of the shape of scientific problems as they appear in Washington. He should have a temperament and talent for expert testimony on the Hill. Hornig meets all of these qualifications, and I am not surprised that he is strongly recommended not only by Wiesner but by the Science Advisory Committee as a whole and by previous Science Advisers like Killian and Kistiakowsky.

Hornig, in fact, is just the kind of first-rate man in his forties that you have told me to find more of.

McG. B.



Mr. President:

David Schoenbrun called. He will be in Washington Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday and return to Paris after that. When he returns to Paris he is going to have audiences with Andre Malraux and General DeGaulle, and in view of these forth-coming audiences he would like to have a few moments with you to discuss the situation. He will be at the Jefferson Hotel, telephone DI7-4704.

I feel that in the event that you do see Dave, it would be well to consult with McGeorge Bundy.

GER /cg
Dec. 4
2:30 ap.m.

Printed

December 3, 1963

7 68
Memor to the
Pres.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the passage from U. S. News and World Report that must have troubled the Secretary. As you will see, he is worried not for himself but because it sounds as if the State Department were casting off on you. This is characteristic, and it goes without saying that he had no part in this story. As a matter of fact, I doubt if any senior State Department officer was the source of this story. They all know as well as you do that the Department was trying to put on your calendar just as many foreign dignitaries as it could, for just as much of your time as you could possibly spare.

Two pages back, at the paper clip, is a paragraph showing your confidence in him, so he was certainly not complaining on his own behalf.

McG. B.

P.S. I had a pleasant five minutes heckling Charlie Bartlett and I told him that he, of all people, ought not to be talking as if President Kennedy's best appointment were likely to desert President Kennedy's successor. He told me that what he thought was that there might be some interference in Defense contracting, and I told him that the reverse was the case -- that one of your very first acts was to make sure that a wall was set up between the White House and this Defense responsibility.

69

December 3, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The British have been having some high-level bilateral exchanges with the Soviets, on the relation between a non-aggression pact and the Berlin-Germany problem, and it is time now for us to weigh in with them. Here is the situation and Rusk's recommendation, in which I concur:

The Germans have violently opposed a non-aggression pact which did not bring real improvement in Berlin or Germany. Khrushchev has now suggested to Douglas Home that a non-aggression pact might be accompanied by a unilateral Soviet declaration opposing the use of such force for such problems as Germany and West Berlin.

This is not nearly enough for the Germans or for us, and the UK has suggested that they might propose an amendment which would require the Soviet Union to state that it would refrain from any unilateral action affecting the situation in Berlin or western access to that city.

We think this is not good enough, plainly because it would be regarded as weakness in Germany and because British bargaining in particular arouses suspicion on the Continent.

So our plan is to tell the British that we prefer to have them fend off this Soviet ploy (which is all it seems to be right now) but that if they insist on going forward, they ought to check directly with the French and the Germans, rather than to put the matter in the North Atlantic Council.

I have watched this one carefully, because the Department tends to be more rigid on these matters than President Kennedy wanted, but in this case their recommendation seems right, and I know from private conversations that David Ormsby Gore personally agrees with our view and not that of his own Government.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-26
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

December 3, 1963

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the passage from U. S. News and World Report that must have troubled the Secretary. As you will see, he is worried not for himself but because it sounds as if the State Department were casting off on you. This is characteristic and it goes without saying that he had no part in this story.

Two pages back, at the paper clip, is a paragraph showing your confidence in him, so what he was doing was apologizing for some foolish State Department worrywart, not complaining on his own behalf.

McG. B.

✓ 71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You said you would call Adlai Stevenson. He has now delivered his speech. It is an eloquent affirmation of our purpose of cooperation with the Soviet Union and a rehearsal of our practical efforts to cooperate with all nations on space. What you might say to him is:

1. It is a first-rate speech.
2. You personally appreciate his willingness to revise it to show the continuity of policy and your own long-time commitment to this purpose.
3. This is no more than what you would have expected after his moving remarks in the Cabinet last week, which you greatly appreciate.
4. You are sure there will be many more issues where his eloquence and understanding will be of critical importance to your Administration, and you are grateful for this first-rate beginning.

McG. B.

December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Your meeting with Secretary Rusk

He tells me he plans to raise the following with you:

1. Some personnel matters -- a different and less touchy job for Frank Coffin; a good recommendation for Bell's Deputy (Bill Gaud, who has been very good indeed); I do not think he means to mention Elbrick to Yugoslavia, but you might want to repeat your doubts.

2. Press conferences. He wants to ask you about this problem and to get a sense of your needs for preparation.

3. He wants to pledge himself to economy in the Department of State and indicate his plans for getting it.

4. I believe he has a new nomination for Chief of Protocol. This job is so personal to you that I think you should hold judgment unless you know the nominee very well and favorably.

You may wish to hit him hard on management in Vietnam; policy in Cuba; a head for the Alliance for Progress; a replacement for McConaughy in Pakistan.

McG. B.

December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

73

Foreign Policy Talking Points for Leadership Breakfast

1. The biggest thing Congress can do for prestige of the US is to pass your program.
2. The specific bill which affects your powers in foreign affairs is of course the Aid Bill. The gut requirements here are: (a) no further big cut in the appropriation stage and (b) maintenance of essential flexibility (See separate memo from Komer for details.)
3. You have acted on two basic fronts this week: (a) to reassure major allies in NATO by meetings and plans for meetings; (b) to make it plain to Khrushchev that we are firm but not trigger-happy, and ready to go our full share towards peace. You can properly say that diplomatic feed-back shows both allies and Soviets to be impressed.
4. The leadership is somewhat leaky, so you will want to choose your words with care, but I think it will be well to point out that South Vietnam is an object of great concern to you and that you have emphasized this concern to Lodge and to State, Defense and CIA in no uncertain terms.
5. You may want to say a word about consulting with leadership on these issues, since they have often felt unconsulted in the last these years.

McG. B.

Your 5:30 Meeting with McNamara et al on NAC Meeting

74 Dec 2

I am informed that Rusk and McNamara have reached agreement on the tactics and policy for this forthcoming meeting, so I believe this can be a short session, but I believe it is important to have it, so as to make it clear that the USG position for this meeting has been established with your participation and approval. I would begin by asking Rusk to state the broad outlines of our policy and then asking McNamara for comment. When they have done so, you may wish to indicate your own judgment on such issues as the following:

1. The avoidance of any indication of further troop withdrawals at this time.
2. The need for a brief Presidential statement for presentation at this meeting. (This is very much needed and everyone is in favor of it, and we can get it prepared later this week.)
3. Whether you think this is or isn't a good time for a lot of argument on levels of European performance and the disagreements on strategy which bedevil NATO. As I said in last night's memorandum, my own instinct is to avoid these things at this time.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

December 1, 1963

75

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting on Monday at 5:30 with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara et al

The attached papers are very good background for your meeting with Rusk and McNamara and others tomorrow at 5:30 to lay guidelines for the forthcoming December meeting at NATO in Paris.

The three issues that I believe you may wish to focus on are these:

(1) How hard should we press our Allies to do better on their military commitments? We have been doing it for a couple of years, without much progress, and I think there is some question whether the first meeting of your Administration should strike this tone very sharply.

(2) What is your judgment on the difference between State and Defense on going forward with certain additional redeployments from Europe for balance-of-payment reasons now? My own recommendation here is that we should not do something which President Kennedy had firmly decided to do -- namely, redeploy some tactical air squadrons early in the year. This doesn't have to be decided tomorrow, but some sense of your intention will be important for Rusk and McNamara in Paris.

(3) How far should we now have any strategic confrontation with the French? (No good papers are at hand on this particular problem, I am ashamed to say, but President Kennedy had decided -- I think rightly -- to damp down this controversy, and he never had a chance to say so to Rusk and McNamara.)

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 2/3/78 State Dec 9/20/77
By smg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

Four Meeting with Jeeb Halaby

76

November 29, 1963 FAA

You want to talk to Halaby about OXCART; he wants to talk to you also about his trip to Russia scheduled next week, which will make him the first man in your Administration to go to Moscow.

1. On OXCART, you want to defer the surfacing until March, and Jeeb will think this is very hard on the competitors for the SST. I assume you want him to find a way that will permit the competitors to have fair treatment without leaks in the next three months. I believe that if the necessary priority is given to it, a secret which has been kept by thousands for 5 years can be kept by a few hundred more in a number of firms for 3 additional months. What McNamara can accept Halaby can too.

2. On his trip to Russia - the State Department (Alexis Johnson and Tommy Thompson) thinks Jeeb should go through with the scheduled visit, and I concur. Further delay might give a wrong signal in the first weeks of your Administration, and Kohler has repeatedly reported that visits of high-level specialists are very good for our contacts with and knowledge of Soviet officials.

TOP SECRET

McG. B.

✓

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Lu 8/24/77
By JK/mng, NARS, Date 9/28/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

77

Your Conversation with Glenn Seaborg

Seaborg has guardedly told me that he wants to discuss with you a nuclear weapons development relating to "a third country." I could not get out of him over the phone whether this was France or Israel. My uneducated guess is the latter.

Whatever he tells us, I think it is going to be most important to run a double check through the CIA and other sources.

McB. B

Seaborg may also mention the nuclear production cut-off problem. Our guideline from President Kennedy on this was to defer any visible decision during 1964.

November 29, 1963

November 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM MOYERS

The attached list was dictated to me by the President and I think he may need it at hand while he completes negotiations on the group to review the events in Dallas.

McG. B.

The Chief Justice

The Honorable John J. McCloy

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

Representative Hale Boggs

Senator Richard Russell

Senator John Sherman Cooper

TOP SECRET

79 V

Subject: Your meeting on OXCART, 10:30
McCone, McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy

November 29, 1963

1. The question here is whether and how to surface this major secret technological triumph -- a Mach 3 aircraft already in successful test flight.
2. In favor: McCone, ^{has been} because of glory for his agency and intimate relation of OXCART to supersonic transport development. ^{Now the counsels delay.}
McNamara, because existence of OXCART weakens case for B70 and other expensive Air Force projects.

Halaby, because of SST problem.

Against: President Kennedy, because he thought it was best to keep it until later in a campaign year.

Bundy, because of danger of criticism early in your Administration that you are making political capital out of a great intelligence secret.

Recommendation: That you listen to the arguments and reserve judgment until you are ready. You will receive a briefing paper you can keep for review.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 8/24/77
By JK/mg, NARS, Date 9/20/77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

A few weeks before all this, at the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Robert Oppenheimer read a speech on Comprehension and Communication of Scientific Knowledge. It is a good speech, stretching to a variety of topics and quite without political overtones, except for the following passage which is so splendidly appropriate that you might consider quoting it back at him on Monday:

"We are now clearly engaged in a great enterprise testing whether we can live in a world in which war does not play its traditional part, an enterprise in which not only long inherited human institutions, but even older, even other more permanent human attitudes, of anger, hatred, solidarity, self-importance, righteousness, which war has fed, can permit the change. We are in this too deeply, I think, to let the good news or the bad news of the day or month or year affect or limit our hope and, where it is possible for us, our engagement in this great, open, unsettled action of man's history."

McG. B.

81
u r Pres.
✓
Nov. 26, '63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Schedule for your Meetings on Tuesday

9:00 AM Prime Minister Douglas-Home of Great Britain

9:15 Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR

9:30 Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan

? 9:45 Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey

? 10:00 Prime Minister Pearson of Canada

Break

10:30 Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia

? 10:45 President Shazar of Israel

? 11:00 King Baudouin of Belgium

? 11:15 President Park of Korea

? 11:30 President de Valera of Ireland

11:45 President Macapagal of the Philippines
of Colombia

12:00 noon Former President/Lleras Camargo ~~of Colombia~~

12:15 PM Chancellor Erhard of Germany
Minister of Foreign Affairs Schroeder of Germany

Revised to format ✓ 82

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Meetings with Foreign Statesmen Monday and Tuesday

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Duke now recommend that you should invite the principal foreign dignitaries to a reception after the interment tomorrow afternoon, probably at 5 o'clock. The numbers make it necessary that this meeting be in the reception rooms on the eighth floor of State Department. (Blair House is too small.) At this meeting, if you agree to it, it would be possible to have appropriate words of private conversation with a number of sensitive dignitaries who do not merit a private meeting with you at any other time. (A good example is President Segni of Italy.)

Secretary Rusk and I both believe that you should receive about eight individuals for private conversations, mainly on Tuesday morning. The one exception to this time is General de Gaulle, who has asked for a meeting Monday morning or Monday evening. We believe you will probably not wish to have such meetings the morning before the funeral, but that it should be possible to talk with General de Gaulle after the reception on Monday evening. In some ways your meeting with him, for purely symbolic reasons, may be the most important of the lot.

The leading candidates for Tuesday interviews appear to be the following:

- Prime Minister Douglas Home
- Chancellor Erhard
- Mikoyan
- Inonu of Turkey
- Macapagal of the Philippines
- Ikeda of Japan
- Pearson of Canada (although he could easily come back another day)

Haili Sa

Sharon
Amayo

These seven appointments could be completed over a period of less than three hours, if we allow twenty minutes to half an hour for each conversation. This is all anyone has asked for, and I myself am

confident that the impression made by these meetings would be most favorable both at home and abroad. I also believe that it would be good for these men to be able to take back at first hand a clear impression of our President.

The decisions which we thus need are:

A. Will you receive appropriate senior members of delegations Monday afternoon?

B. May we make appointments and prepare briefing papers for those who are to have private meetings with you Monday evening and Tuesday morning?

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Bundy -

For the Presidents'

O.K. — yes or

no?

Please return
to me red tag.

Sandy Foy

Reception for these people

P's concern for number 2..

Muchlin

x AID conference differences

x ~~but~~ Murphy Bill

and main line of
argument.

AID } Leadership - President

Budget of 1969

ACTIONS RESULTING FROM MEETING OF 11/24/63 -3PM

1. Arrange 30 minute meeting for early next week for Chiefs of Delegations

Talk to Ambassador Duke

Prepare remarks

2. President desires that Erhard visit take place in Texas on December 27 and 28

Rusk knows and will be talking to EUR

Talk to Elvid Klein

3. Call Ted Reardon

The President expects members of the Government who have scheduled speeches during the mourning period to keep their engagements if they are not political or merely social, and if they advance the business of government or are serious occasions.

4. Talk with Mr. Dungan about

Elbrick

Coffin

Corry

Attwood

5. The NATO meeting is confirmed for 5:30 on Monday.

6. Arrange for a meeting on Cuba.

November 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: CABINET MEETING

My own hunch is that this meeting should be very short and that you should not today ask the Cabinet's immediate comment on the problem of your first statement. A number of them -- and perhaps still more some of the others who regularly attend Cabinet -- are quite numb with personal grief, and in keeping with your own instinct of last night you will wish to avoid any suggestion of over-assertiveness. Your own confidence and your own sense of your office will communicate themselves without extended discussion today.

The probability is that Mr. Rusk will say that the Cabinet is at your service and that the resignations of all its members are in your hands. I assume you will want to respond to this comment in line with your conversation with General Eisenhower in asking Cabinet members to carry on over the week end and past the funeral. You will certainly want to repeat to them what you have said to some of us already, that you are available instantly for any matter requiring your attention and decision. You may then wish to ask them for suggestions and comments in the form of a memorandum for an address to the Joint Congress which you plan for Tuesday or Wednesday.

I think this is all there is to it, except for a few words about President Kennedy, and perhaps a moment of silence in his memory at the beginning or end of the meeting.

McGeorge Bundy