

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 2009

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
02a	memo	Bundy to the President re Zanzibar (Sanitized 5/10/83, NLJ 82-81; Dup. #233a, NSF, CF, Zanzibar, vol. 2)	TS	1	3/29/64	A
02c	memo	Bundy to the President re Zanzibar (Exempted 7/7/00 NLJ 99-30; dup. #233b, NSF, CF, Zanzibar, vol. 2)	TS	2	3/29/64	A
02e	cable	deptel 6267 to London (Sanitized 1999; dup. #167, NSF, CF, Zanzibar, vol. 2)	S	3	3/27/64	A
02g	report	re Zanzibar (exempted 4/7/00, NLJ 99-28)	S	2	undated	A
04	memo	Bundy to the President re nuclear test (sanitized 7/8/09 NLJ 08-204 - same sanitization as previously)	S-	2	3/25/64	A
35e	memo	Helms to DCI (Sanitized 4/7/00, NLJ 99-28)	S	3	3/10/64	A
36d	cable	Saigon 3902 (sanitized per RAC 8/16/05 - more released than previous version)	TS	3	1/20/64	A
36i	cable	deptel 664 to Vientiane (Same sanitization as previous version 1/11/00, NLJ 99-29)	TS	7	2/26/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President

Folder Title "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 2, 3/1-31/64"

Box Number 1

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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11/19/2009

jk
Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
40g	memo	from Komer, re UAR/Israeli missiles (same sanitization as previous version per RAC 8/16/05)	S	1	3/6/64	A
44b	memo	Helms to DCI (Sanitized 1977)	S	5	3/5/64	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2g Memo	Agency: WH, for NSC concurrence Exempt 1-17-77 "You are instructed to..." S 2 p Exempt 7-27-95 NLJ 94 392 Exempt 4-14-00 NLJ 99-28	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4 Memo	Agency: WH, for ERDA concurrence. Sanitized, ERDA la 5/6/77 Bundy to Pres. re nuclear test S 2 p sanitized 6-17-81 NLJ 86-94 Same sanitization 2-9-00 NLJ 99-31 same sanitization 7-23-09 NLJ 08-204 (NSA)	3/25/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~SECRET~~, ~~SECRET~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2c Memo	Agency: WH, for CIA concurrence. Bundy to Pres. re Zanzibar TS 2 p (dup. #233b, NSF Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2) Exempt per NLJ 82-80	3/29/64	A <i>NSF Files 7</i> <i>McGeorge Bundy, Chron file</i> <i>"March 1964"</i>

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff File~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: WH, for CIA concurrence.		
#44 Memo	_____ Searched 7/17/00 NSF 96-30 Bundy to Pres. re Cuba S 1 p (dup # 36 NSF, CG Cuban, "Overflight Vol. 1")	3/6/64	A
#45 Memo	_____ + # 231, NSF, File of Mc Geo Bundy Chron file 3/64 " exempt Bundy to Pres. (dup. #44 above) S 1 p	3/6/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35e Memo	Agency: CIA Sanitized CIA ltr. 8/18/77 CSDB-3/659,794, Helms to DCI S 3 p Sanitized 4-14-80 NL 599-28	3/10/64	A
#40e Memo	Special Memo No. 6-64 S 6 p agen 9-24-79 up	2/25/64	A
#44b Memo	Sanitized CIA ltr. 8/18/77 unnumbered Helms to DCI S 5 p (dup. #366, NSF CF, Cuba, Oneflight, Vol. 1)	3/5/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSO X BAR X R X R X R X R X R X~~ ██████████, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: WH, for State concurrence.		
#2 Memo	Bundy to Connell, cover for #2a below TS 1 p (dup. #233, NSF Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2)	3/29/64	A
#2a Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Zanzibar TS 1 p (dup. #233a, NSF Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2)	3/29/64	A
	<i>open 5-10-83 per NLI 82-81</i> <i>sanitized per NLI 82-81</i> <i>5-10-83 us</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: WH, for State concurrence.		
#3 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Panama S <i>open 6-20-78 inf State 10-27-78</i> 1 p	3/25/64	A
#5 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re press attacks on LA policy S 1 p	3/25/64	A
#6 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Cuban warning S 1 p	3/24/64	A
#23 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Vietnam S <i>open 9-24-79 inf</i> 2 p	3/15/64	A
#25 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Lemnitzer of NATO C <i>State ltr 4/27/77</i> 1 p	3/13/64	A
#33e Memo	Bundy to Pres. re tanks for Israel S <i>open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i> 1 p	3/13/64	A
#34 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Bowles & India/Pak S <i>open 6-20-79 inf State 11-2-78</i> 1 p	3/11/64	A
#36 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Vietnam S <i>open 9-24-79 inf</i> 1 p	3/11/64	A
#36a Memo	Forrestal to Bundy re Vietnam S <i>OPEN 10.16.98</i> 3 p (dup. of #50, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 5)	3/9/64	A
	_____	_____	_____
#40 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Israeli tanks S <i>open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i> 2 p	3/8/64	A
#40g Memo	<i>sanitized</i> Komer on UAR/Israeli missiles S <i>Exempt per State 11-2-78</i> 1 p <i>1-20-93 NLS 91-109 Serial 7/17/00 NS 99-30</i>	3/6/64	A
#40i Memo	draft re Israeli military needs S <i>open 6-20-79 inf State 11-2-78</i> 1 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ _____, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH/State continued.		
#44a Memo	Pres. to Rusk re Cuban warning S 1 p	3/6/64	A
	<i>open 6-20-79 sup State 10-27-78</i>		
#54 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re UN C 2 p	3/1/64	A
	<i>State let 4/28/77</i>		
#55a Memo	Bundy for the record on LBJ-PM Home talk	2/13/64	A
	<i>EXEMPT STATE let 4/21/77</i>		
	<i>OPEN 10.14.58 STATE GUIDELINES</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC 541000 File~~, McGeorge Bundy
 Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State Department		
#36d Cable	CAS Saigon 3902 fm Lodge TS <i>sanitized 4-20-81</i> <i>Sanitized 4-14-00 NLS 99-28</i> 3 p	1/20/64	A
#36e Cable	Saigon 3943 fm Lodge TS <i>sanitized 4-20-81</i> 6 p	1/21/64	A
#36h Cable	1663 fm Saigon <i>open 6-20-79</i> TS 1 p	2/29/64	A
#36i Cable	664 to Vientiane <i>sanitized</i> TS 7 p <i>same sanitization 2-16-00 NLS 99-29</i>	2/26/64	A
#36c Cable	to Lodge, Harkins & CAS TS <i>sanitized</i> 3 p <i>Open 9-27-99 NLS 96-298</i> <i>per State 9-5-78</i> <i>CLA 12-19-80</i>	1/23/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF NSC State Dept ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 2, 3/1-31/64

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March 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: BRAZIL

There is no substantial change in the situation from that reported to you this afternoon by Secretary Ball. If you want further information, call either of us or Tom Mann.

We have alerted the Department and Agency heads for a meeting tomorrow, and we can arrange the time to suit your convenience in the morning.

The Situation Room will keep us fully informed, and if there is any important development requiring action before morning, you will be notified.

Ralph Dungan

McGeorge Bundy

Returned by Col Connell
4/11/64 7PM
2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

COLONEL CONNELL

The enclosed memorandum should be shown only to the President, and should be protected from any other eyes. The President should see this paper today, but he may well prefer to make only a brief limited decision and hold the papers until tomorrow. You should hand him the memorandum and take the instruction on his preference.

DECLASSIFIED

McG. B.

Authority NLS 82-81

McGeorge Bundy

By ss, NARS, Date 5-10-83

~~TOP SECRET~~

1730 CST Sunday 29 Mar 64 -

Reply phoned to Mr. Swift, WH Sit Room:

"I approve the message to the Prime Minister. I will talk more about the matter to Bundy tomorrow."

*The President"
(at 1730 CST 29 Mar 64)*

*James M. Connell
LT Col Jaf*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SANITIZED

ra
2a
2a

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached papers cover the Zanzibar problem and Dean Rusk and I would like to talk with you about them on the telephone at your convenience on Monday. The one question which you may wish to decide today is whether you would like to send a reinforcing cable to Home so that we can be sure of top-level British attention to this problem beginning tomorrow morning. Dean Rusk and I think it would be somewhat better to do so than to wait until tomorrow.

new release

The telegram to Home which we both suggest would read as follows:

"Dear Prime Minister:

π

[Redacted area]

If you will tell Colonel Connell whether this message is satisfactory, that is all that we need to do on Easter Day.

The memorandum at Tab A contains a more extensive discussion of the problem.

Handwritten notes:
Please read report
all to talk to President
3/30/64
N. Johnson 3/29/64

McG. B.

SANITIZED

NLS 82-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

510-83

26

A

19

2d

B

~~SECRET~~
Classification

The situation is indeed dark but with decisive and early action I believe that there is still a chance that it may be salvaged. I realize that your Government has been keeping in close touch with the East African leaders, as indeed we have. Nevertheless, because of the urgency of the matter and the special role which you have in East Africa, I would urge that a high-ranking representative of your Government immediately see Kenyatta once again, and possibly also Nyerere and Obote, and explain to them that the situation in Zanzibar is considerably worse than it was when Duncan Sandys was in East Africa two weeks ago. I would hope that your man would underscore the implications of a Communist-dominated island for the adjacent East African territories and stress the importance of their making Karume see what was happening in Zanzibar and urging him to take remedial action before it was too late.

E.O.
3.4(b)(1)(2)

[REDACTED]

quickly
I am hopeful that plans will be developed which will have the full support of both governments and which can be put into effect immediately. My own judgment is that we must act without delay [REDACTED] to reverse the totally unsatisfactory situation in Zanzibar.

E.O. 3.4(b)(1)(2)

I would appreciate receiving urgently your views on the subject.

Sincerely,

Dean UNQUOTE

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

2 f

C

u r e

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: PANAMA

I have spoken with Tom Mann and set in train the negotiating process you authorized last night.

Ambassador Bunker will be going to Moreno today and will make the following presentation:

1. We have made our statement;
2. You have made your statement;
3. Why don't you resume relations at once?
4. If you resume, of course we will resume and send an Ambassador forthwith.

If the Panamanians accept this demarche, we are in. If they come back and ask questions about our view of the OAS two-paragraph formula, then Bunker will come back to Mann, and Mann will instruct him to say that if the Panamanians wish to go this more complicated route, we would have to insist on minor modifications in the formula. Tom would then negotiate to get the Panama Canal and the word "negotiations" out of the two paragraphs. This second phase is not being discussed even with Bunker until we see how the first phase works.

In all this we are keeping the number of those informed as small as possible, and we are pointing out to the Panamanians that we can negotiate quietly to resume relations, or make our case to the newspapers, but we can hardly do both at once. But we do not kid ourselves that Moreno or his compatriots will be as quiet as we would like.

DECLASSIFIED
STATE letter OCT 27 1978
Authority _____
By ijp, NARS, Date 6-20-79

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On March 13, the AEC tested a small [redacted] nuclear device that partially vented, sending up a dense black cloud, estimated to have contained about [redacted] of the fissionable debris produced. The AEC analysis of the event indicates that it did not produce a health hazard anywhere outside the test site. There were, however, measurable quantities of radioactive debris at considerable distances from the test site. Although there is no evidence that the debris was detected outside the U. S. or that the Mexican authorities were in a position to measure it, the possibility cannot be excluded that measurable quantities of debris did, in fact, cross into Mexico. There remains, therefore, a remote possibility that charges may be made subsequently that this event constituted a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 6.2(a)

The cloud was tracked by aircraft into southern Nevada, northern Arizona and California, adjacent to Arizona. South of this area the cloud broke up and was detected in spots only by sensitive monitoring equipment aboard one aircraft. The weather pattern near the Mexican border was such that some of the air mass from Arizona entered Mexico and returned to the U. S. over the Texan border. The Air Force found no radioactivity in the returning air mass. The heavier radioactive particles from the cloud produced a light, although measurable, fallout in a narrow zone from the Test Site to Boulder City, Nevada. Traces of lighter particles and gaseous debris were found in spotty depositions south of Las Vegas, Nevada, as far as Yuma, Arizona.

On March 17, the U. S. Public Health Service detected a very low level of radioactive iodine in the milk from a dairy near Yuma, Arizona. By March 19, no radioactivity was found in the milk from this dairy. There is a slight possibility that Mexican Health Authorities immediately south of the border might have detected radioactive iodine in milk.

SANITIZED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 08-204 (#5a)
 By isl, NARA, Date 7-8-09

Reporting by ground sampling stations is sometimes very slow and additional reports from various U. S. stations of data collected shortly after the event may be coming in for some time.

This test was conducted in a section of the Test Site where 13 underground shots had previously been fired without untoward results. Analysis of the shot reveals that the venting was caused by a crack, 8 to 10 feet long, about 130 feet from the zero point. The probable cause of the crack was a local weakness of the earth which fractured under the shock of the detonation.

Although we will probably not have any further problem with this incident, it has emphasized the need for even greater caution on our underground test program. A directive describing these measures is now being prepared for your approval.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am not sure whether you have seen the attached memorandum in which Tom Mann discusses the problem of press attacks on our Latin American policy. This is an important memorandum, and to me a somewhat disturbing one.

Tom seems to assume that all our trouble comes from a few far-left-wingers. A lot of it does. A lot comes also from honest misunderstanding. For example, there is no reason to lose Drew Pearson or Marc Childs on this issue, even if we have trouble with Szulc, Raimont and Kurzman for special reasons.

On the other hand, Tom is dead right about the importance of fighting back on a number of the issues in his paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and it is highly desirable that he should make some strong speeches.

The risk is that if these speeches aren't skillfully done, they will be turned against us by people who should be our friends. We simply have to hang on to the support of men like Munoz and Betancourt, and the sensible press as distinct from Herbert Matthews.

So my suggestion is that I should tell Mann that you want him very much to make these speeches and to schedule them promptly, and that you want to review the text yourself so that it can be clear that these are official U. S. statements. We will be in a good position to watch over the drafts and make sure that they do the job Tom has in mind but with a minimum danger of a boomerang effect.

The Ambassadorial duties which you have imposed on me make me additionally sensitive to this problem.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter OCT 27 1978
By ip, NARS, Date 6-20-79

mp

McG. B.
Special Ambassador to the
New York Times and Washington Post

~~SECRET~~

*File
agreed to this
but did not read
JMB*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1964

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT:

On March 6 we sent the Secretary of State a memorandum asking for a strong plan to warn "the Cubans and their Soviet friends" against any interference with our high-level surveillance in Cuba. The Department has now come back with a plan which is intelligent as far as it goes. In essence it is that we should send a diplomatic warning to the Cubans by way of the Czechs, and follow this up by certain covert statements which will reach Cuban ears and show that we are entirely serious.

The Department thinks we should not go straight to the Russians, and after discussing the matter with Ambassador Thompson, I now find his arguments persuasive.

I do think that one further element is needed -- and that is an appropriate public warning from you at some appropriate time -- perhaps in answer to a question at an early press conference. If you agree, I will see to it that such a question comes up.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter OCT 27 1978
By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

6a 1580

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1964

SECRET - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE McGEORGE BUNDY
The White House

Alexis Johnson has discussed with me your views on notification to the Soviets of our attitude toward a possible Cuban shoot-down of a U-2 after the Cubans assume control of the SAM sites.

I feel sure that even an informal approach will prompt a reply from the Soviets and that they would be bound to state that the Cubans have every right to defend their sovereignty over their air space. The important thing, in my view, is that if the Cubans do shoot down a U-2; we will want to treat our retaliatory action as a purely United States/Cuban affair. This would be much harder to do if we were on prior notice from the Soviets that they would support the Cubans in their defense of their sovereignty, which is a quite possible Soviet response to any direct approach on our part. I feel confident that before turning over the SAMs to the Cubans, the Soviets will have had some understanding with them about their use. If the Cubans should shoot down a plane without prior agreement with the Soviets, I think it quite possible that the Soviets, while making fierce noises, would not, in fact, give the Cubans real support and would use the violation of their understanding as an excuse for not doing so.

T

Llewellyn E. Thompson

SECRET - SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 5/5/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 7/15/77

66

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

March 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Warning to Cubans and Soviets Against Interference with our Aerial Surveillance of Cuba

1. I recommend that the warning to the Cubans and Soviets against interfering with our overflights of Cuba, which you requested in your memorandum of March 6, 1964, be done in the form of a note to the Cuban Government to be delivered through the Czech Ambassador in Washington. By using this method and channel we can be sure that the Soviets will also get the message without our incurring the disadvantage of making a special, direct approach to them on the subject. There is enclosed for your consideration and approval the text of a proposed note.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. I also recommend that as a further deterrent we get word to Castro through "black" channels that: (a) we have taken very careful note of his recent public statements on overflights, (b) we interpret these statements as a threat to shoot down our surveillance flights, and (c) we would like nothing better, and we are prepared to react immediately to such an eventuality.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The late President Kennedy and I on various occasions following the missile crisis made public statements indicating that in the absence of inspection on the ground we would maintain our surveillance flights over Cuba and that any interference with those flights would invite a dangerous situation. A compilation of these statements is enclosed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 82-89
By ncw, NARS, Date 7-6-82

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Last June the Cubans sent us a note protesting U.S. overflights and warning that: (1) Cuban gunners had orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory, and (2) the Cuban Government was stepping up its preparations to shoot down any war plane that violated Cuban air space at any altitude. In our reply, sent to the Cubans through the Czechs, we reminded the Cuban Government of our publicly expressed position on the dangers of any interference with air surveillance and pointed out that our position remained unchanged. We considered sending the note through the Czechs tantamount to notifying the Soviets of our position. The text of our reply is enclosed.

In recent months Fidel Castro has repeatedly alluded to violation of Cuban air space by U.S. aircraft. The most forthright of his statements was made in a press conference with foreign newsmen on February 6, 1964. Castro said: "The Government of Cuba has repeatedly warned the United States of the consequences which may result from violations of our air space. It must not be forgotten that this is an arbitrary action which may create problems and incidents."

The foregoing statement, made in the context of the fishing boat incident, gives us a good occasion for sending a warning to the Cubans on the overflights. Since in the next few days we plan to send a routine reply to the Cubans, via the Czech Ambassador, on their notes concerning various aspects of the fishing boat incident and Guantanamo, we would use the same occasion to deliver the warning note. By sending the note through the Czech Ambassador we can be sure that it will reach the Soviets. This will avoid our having to make a special, direct approach to the Soviets on this matter, which could be counterproductive in that the Soviets would feel compelled to respond and thus commit themselves more formally in ways they may otherwise desire to avoid.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

Enclosures:

Proposed Note of Warning to Cubans on Overflights
Note Sent to Cuba, Via the Czechs, on Surveillance
Flights (September 2, 1963)
Statements on Air Surveillance Over Cuba

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED NOTE OF WARNING TO CUBANS ON OVERFLIGHTS

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in charge of diplomatic and consular representation for Cuba in the United States and requests that he convey the following note to the Government of Cuba:

The Government of the United States has noted that Prime Minister Fidel Castro in his press conference of February 6, in which he spoke at length concerning the detention of the Cuban fishing boats, made repeated references to United States aircraft overflying Cuba. The Government of the United States wishes to take this occasion to call again to the attention of the Cuban Government the contents of the note relating to aerial surveillance which was delivered through the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington on September 2, 1963. In the present circumstances the Government of the United States desires to reaffirm its publicly expressed position on this question, pointing out once again that it remains unchanged.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 515/100
By rmg, NARS, Date 7/15/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE SENT TO CUBA, VIA THE CZECHS, ON SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in charge of diplomatic and consular representation for Cuba in the United States and requests him to inform the Government of Cuba that the Government of the United States has taken note of the statements contained in the note of the Government of Cuba of June 24, 1963, that Cuban gunners have orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory; and that the Government of Cuba is stepping up its defense preparations in order to be ready to intercept and shoot down any war plane that violates Cuban air space at any altitude.

The Government of the United States wishes again to call the attention of the Government of Cuba to the well-known, publicly expressed position of the Government of the United States on this question. The position of the Government of the United States on this matter has not changed.

Department of State,

Washington, September 2, 1963.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority AMG/LSM
 By AMG, NARS, Date 11/5/77

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STATEMENTS ON AIR SURVEILLANCE OVER CUBA

By President Kennedy

Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to be protected against offensive weapons, this government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems, and will also be withdrawn in due course. (President's Press Conference, November 20, 1962)

Q: Mr. President, could you define for us the term of "offensive weapons" in the context of the Cuban situation, and are you satisfied that such weapons no longer are in Cuba?

A: I would refer you back to the exchange of letters between Mr. Khrushchev and myself for our definition of offensive weapons.

On the second part of your question, it is our best judgment that the missiles have been removed from Cuba, and the planes. Now, these things are never 100 percent, and it is for that reason that we are insisting on verification, or if we can't get that kind of international inspection, we will continue to use our own method of verification, which we believe gives us assurance against a reintroduction of these weapons into Cuba, and I think that the methods we are using to determine the status of military activity in Cuba are very effective, and are being used frequently.

(President's Press Conference, December 12, 1962)

Q: Mr. President, because we depend so much on photo reconnaissance, what would be our position if the President of Cuba should forbid that and perhaps take a protest to the United Nations about what you call our daily scrutiny over their territory?

A: I would think we would deal with that situation when it comes up. This is a substitute, in a sense, for the kind of on-site inspection which we hoped to get and which was proposed by the Secretary General of the UN at the time of the October crisis. The US cannot, given the history of last fall, where deception was used against us, we could not be expected

to merely trust the words in regard to a potential buildup, so we may have to face that situation, but, if we do, we will face it.

(President's Press Conference, February 7, 1963)

By Secretary Rusk

"Third, we must keep taking a look at Cuba to assure ourselves as well as we can about what is going on in that island--a surveillance which we feel, and which we are confident, is thoroughly based upon the OAS structures and the OAS resolutions, but a surveillance which we believe is necessary under all the circumstances."

Q: If the Soviets know that we are not going to war over Cuba--we have practically told them that, I gather--what incentive is there for them to get their troops out?...

A: Well, there were some highly dangerous elements in the Cuba situation today that continue to be there. The necessity for surveillance could lead to a very dangerous situation very quickly.

Q: On their part, you mean?

A: If there were any interruption with our surveillance, if Soviet forces in Cuba were to take action against Cubans, that could create a highly dangerous situation..."

(Remarks to Advertising Council, March 12, 1963)

"Now, at the present time President Kennedy has made it utterly clear that we would not accept a reintroduction into Cuba of weapons which could strike at its neighbors, including the United States; that we would not permit any arms that are in Cuba to be used outside of Cuba; that we would enforce the right to use international airspace and international waters freely by ourselves and others; that we would enforce the necessity of keeping a careful watch over what is going on in Cuba; that if any attempt were made to launch forays against any other countries, that those would meet the armed forces of the hemisphere, including those of the United States. So that these are the present military commitments of the United States with respect to Cuba."

(Remarks to General Federation of Women's Clubs, April 13, 1963)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for meeting with Secretaries Rusk
and McNamara, 1:00 p. m., March 24

1. Vietnam
 - a. Instructions to Bohlen
 - b. Secretary McNamara's speech
 - c. Initial Presidential view on Lodge article
2. The State Department visa file problem
3. The warning to Cuba on surveillance
4. Lard to Cuba
5. Instructions for emergency nuclear action

McG. B.

March 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Agenda for meeting with Secretaries Rush
and McNamara, 1:00 p. m., March 24**

1. Vietnam
 - a. Instructions to Bohlen
 - b. Secretary McNamara's speech
 - c. Initial Presidential view on Lodge article
2. The State Department visa file problem
3. The warning to Cuba on surveillance
4. Lard to Cuba
5. Instructions for emergency nuclear action

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chiari statement: our next move

I. If you find the Chiari statement unhelpful and wish to back away from any resumption of relations, I think we should quietly but promptly let it be known that the Chiari statement has not increased our hopes. We could point quietly to his references to the contractual clauses of the treaty and his desire to solve all differences and all problems "once and for all." We could also note his reference to "the necessary constitutional procedures," which means a treaty. On this course, we should simply be back where we were, and you would be standing pat on your statement of last Saturday.

II. A second course would be to say that you find the Chiari statement interesting but that we need to examine more closely the two OAS paragraphs before we come to a final agreement. On this course, we could put to the OAS language which does not mention the Panama Canal directly and which replaces the words "discussions and negotiations" by less fought-over phrases. Tom Mann thinks there is a fair chance of success in this course and that with luck he could win the OAS representatives back on to our side. I think Bill Moyers has language to propose on this course.

III. The third course is to decide that a prompt de facto resumption of relations is more important than the fact that any Panamanian politician will have to speak in terms somewhat like those which Chiari uses. If we take this view, then I would advise an immediate announcement along the lines of the draft statement attached.

I think these choices are quite clear-cut, and I doubt if we need a long discussion of it.

*P. took still another
version a sort of III
in which we try to resume
without agreeing to 2 P formula*

McG. B.

March 24, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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III. The third course is to decide that a prompt de facto resumption of relations is more important than the fact that any Panamanian politician will have to speak in terms somewhat like those which Chiari uses. If we take this view, then I would advise an immediate announcement along the lines of the draft statement attached.

I think these choices are quite clear-cut, and I doubt if we need a long discussion of it.

McG. B.

March 24, 1964

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DRAFT STATEMENT - Alternative III

I have read with interest President Chiari's statement of today, and I am happy to repeat that the United States is ready to review all of the matters of interest to our two countries at any time and at any place, with no precondition and no precommitment, and in the hope of reaching a fair and just agreement. This is what I said on Saturday and this is what we have aimed to achieve all along. It is in this spirit that the United States could accept the language put forward by the Organization of American States earlier this month, and if there is no misunderstanding of this position of the United States, there is no reason why relations should not now be resumed and the traditional friendship of our two countries restored.

III

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Gaston Defferre

The attached memorandum gives a good picture of Defferre's current position. You may wish to know that he made a very weak impression in the Bildeberg meetings in Williamsburg. He appears^{ed} to lack force and clarity. But this was a very "sophisticated" audience and its rather snobbish judgment may not be sound.

The most interesting question about Defferre's visit is whether you should take a minute to point out to him the damaging effect of nebulous talk about neutralization from Paris, along the lines of our demarche to de Gaulle. The standard professional view would be that you should not, but my own guess is that it would be useful to speak generally about the danger which is created when a possible future solution is confused with the immediate present necessity to stand our ground, and strengthen a gravely threatened non-Communist government.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 2/14/77

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Gaston Defferre, Socialist
Parliamentarian and Mayor of Marseille,
March 24, 4:30 p.m.

Purpose of Visit

Mr. Defferre is seeing you for prestige reasons. It is domestically important for him to demonstrate that he can get along better with the United States than de Gaulle. Defferre has come to the United States to attend the Bilderberg meeting at Williamsburg. This is his sixth visit. He was here on a Leader Grant in 1960.

Defferre's Chances

Defferre is the only French politician who has thus far announced his intention to run in the French presidential elections which would normally become due at the end of 1965. The French Socialist Party has endorsed his candidacy and other left-of-center groups may also support him. Defferre is not soliciting Communist support although he is quite aware of the fact that he has no chance of winning without Communist votes. He believes the Communists will have to vote for him in any event. Even with Communist votes he could probably not beat de Gaulle but his chances would be good against a person other than de Gaulle. As the campaign progresses Defferre is likely to become increasingly prominent.

Defferre's Political Views

Defferre is only now becoming a national figure although he was well known in political circles as a most effective and anti-Communist mayor of Marseille. Also, as Minister for Overseas Territories (1956-57) he initiated legislation which prepared the way for the ultimate independence of the French colonies in Africa.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years

CONFIDENTIAL

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Paradoxically, Defferre has a long-standing admiration for General de Gaulle against whom he is now campaigning. He has voted for the Constitution and his candidacy for the Presidency signifies that he accepts the concept of a strong Presidency although he has criticized the amount of power concentrated in de Gaulle's hands. He has also fully supported de Gaulle's Algerian policy. In general, Defferre has been more critical of de Gaulle's methods than of his objectives. Thus he is for de Gaulle's Southeast Asian policy, including recognition of Communist China, but critical that this was done without consultation of France's allies

There are, however, important disagreements on objectives. Defferre is against the force de frappe as beyond France's means. He favors a supra-national political Europe and opposes de Gaulle's emphasis on nationalism. He believes that the UK and the Scandinavian countries should join the Common Market.

Defferre stresses the theme of European independence, particularly in the economic field. He warns about the powerful American firms and believes that the Common Market must not be extended to the Atlantic until European companies can match their American counterparts. He says that by choosing the military field for competition between Europe and the United States, de Gaulle risks losing on the economic level "where the real battle will take place". In military matters, he advocates close cooperation in NATO but is cool towards the Multilateral Force.

Items for You to Raise

1. Ask him about his impressions from the Bilderberg conference, particularly with regard to US-European relations. This will afford Defferre an opportunity to set forth his views and to demonstrate that he will be more reasonable than de Gaulle.
2. Tell him about our current views on relations with the Soviets. Defferre was in Moscow in October/November 1963 and he advocates greater participation of France in working for a detente between East and West.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

3. Discuss our views on Southeast Asia and why we oppose recognition of Communist China. Defferre will agree that there should have been closer consultation although he may uphold the principle of Chicom recognition. Explain that we shall continue to help the Vietnamese win the war.

4. Ask him how he views his political chances.

Items which Defferre May Raise

Like every Frenchman, Defferre will wish to discuss de Gaulle. We should not give the impression that we are opposed to de Gaulle in principle.

Mr. Defferre will be accompanied by Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs. Mr. Defferre understands English and speaks it in a somewhat hesitating manner. An interpreter (Mr. Glenn) will be standing by.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memos for the Pres.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

A special Board of Zoning Adjustment meets this week to discuss the Soviet application for permission to construct an embassy residence and chancery building at 6036 Oregon Avenue, N. W. The Secretary of State will be submitting a letter to place on record the fact that the Department of State supports the Soviet application for new quarters (without passing judgment on this particular site or upon technical problems of zoning). Charlie Horsky would like to include in this letter a sentence to the effect that "The President has informed me that he too recognizes the desirability of permitting the Soviet Government to relocate its chancery in an appropriate way." This is a paraphrase of a sentence used by Dean Rusk in an earlier letter in the time of President Kennedy, and Horsky feels that if there is no reference to your views, the omission may be noticed and it may be thought that the White House opposes a Soviet shift.

The Soviet Embassy on 16th Street is hopelessly antiquated, and so are our own Embassy quarters in Moscow. The object, therefore, is to work out a trade in which both embassies may be advantageously replaced. So I think it is right for you to give this much support -- although there are good reasons for avoiding any explicit commitment to the virtue of this particular site, which is quite large and which gives our security people some concern because surveillance of it will be difficult.

So I recommend that the inclusion of this careful sentence be approved in Rusk's letter to the Board of Zoning Adjustment.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Recommendation approved ✓ [Signature]
Disapproved _____

Talk to me _____

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement of decision to continue Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia

The underlying announcement of your recent action is for release by the State Department this week. Its purpose is to tell Congress (as required by the law) and the public that you have used the authority granted you by Congress to continue most-favored-nation trade treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia.

The aim is to keep the announcement low-key. An accompanying background statement explaining the reasons for your action will be handed out at the State Department.

We could do this at the White House if you prefer, but my understanding is that you have wished to handle this particular decision quietly and not to attach the Presidency to it any more than is necessary. Internationally, of course, the net impact will be very favorable, so that if you thought it acceptable on domestic grounds, a White House statement would have real advantages. In recommending a State Department announcement, I am going on my understanding of your preference.

Before this decision becomes public, the State Department will inform the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Finance Committees and the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means Committees.

McG. B.

Go ahead as planned _____

Talk to me about this _____

STATEMENT BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

By direction of the President, the Secretary of State today reported to the Congress, as required by Section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, that a determination has been made to extend the benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States to products of Poland and Yugoslavia.

March 23, 1964

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McG. B.

Go ahead as planned _____

Talk to me about this _____

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STATEMENT BY THE ~~WHITE HOUSE~~ OR THE STATE DEPARTMENT

By direction of the President,

The Secretary of State today reported

~~The President today directed the Secretary of State~~

~~/The Secretary of State was today directed by the President/~~

~~to report~~ to the Congress, as required by Section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, that a determination has been made to extend the benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States to products of Poland and Yugoslavia.

D R A F T

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement of ~~your~~ decision to continue Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia

The underlying announcement of your recent action is for release by ~~either the White House or~~ the State Department this week. Its purpose is to tell Congress (as required by the law) and the public that you have used the authority granted you by Congress to continue most-favored-nation trade treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia.

The aim is to keep the announcement low-key. An accompanying background statement explaining the reasons for your action will be handed out ~~either here or~~ at the State Department.

Before ~~your~~ decision becomes public, the State Department will inform the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Finance Committees and the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means Committees.

McGeorge Bundy

Go ahead as planned _____

Talk to me about this _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/22

FROM: Mr. Valenti

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Attached are two parting memoranda from Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk which are worth your attention when you have a chance to read them. With exceptions, I think they are a good and clear assessment of the basic view of the matter which this Government has had right along. Roger is a better analyst than administrator, and this is the sort of thing he has done best. His specific proposal that we put some troops in Thailand is more attractive to State Department and White House staff than to the Pentagon, because its object is political and not military. I think you may hear more of this proposal in coming weeks.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *JW*, NARA, Date 10-14-98

March 14, 1964

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I leave Government service and the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, I thought it might be useful for me to set down my thoughts on the persistent and stubborn problem of Southeast Asia, which has plagued us for the past decade.

Although our ability to control the course of events in Southeast Asia is inherently limited, I think the root of our present troubles there--in South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and even Thailand--lies primarily in the gnawing doubts of both the Southeast Asians and the Communists as to our ultimate intentions in the region.

Since the fall of Dienbienphu, all Asians have wondered about our determination to fight in Southeast Asia, should fighting become necessary. Given the facts of life in a nuclear world, they are not impressed with the totality of our power even though the strategic balance tips heavily in our favor. Both free and Communist Asians scrutinize our actions and words for signs of U.S. determination to use appropriate force, tailored to the essentially limited political objectives we seek in this part of the world--that is, free and independent nations rather than bastions of anti-communism. But of such determination they seem to feel they have seen few signs. The alacrity with which the Communists fell into line after we introduced troops into Thailand following the fall of Nam Tha illustrates the effectiveness of such moves as well as the fact that the Communists continue to worry that we might well fight if they push us too hard.

It seems to me that these doubts about our ultimate intentions are fundamental and recurrent wherever you look in Southeast Asia. We all say that Sihanouk is misbehaving because he feels that we are

The Secretary,
Department of State.

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losing in South Viet-Nam. But even Sihanouk understands the extent of American power, and what he means by his statement that communism is the wave of the future is most probably that he feels the United States is not prepared to do what is necessary to preserve Southeast Asia as a whole. Generosity, maturity, and restraint have not worked with Sihanouk. But so far it must seem to him that we are acting from weakness, and he might respond quite differently if he thought we were acting from strength.

In Laos, the Communists have pursued a two-track policy. They scratch away at the neutralist and conservative positions with one hand, pausing on each occasion to assess our reaction. With the other hand, they continue to toy with talks about a Government of National Union and implementation of the Geneva Accords. Quite clearly, they are keeping both lines open--ready to go ahead with implementing the Geneva Accords if and when they finally become convinced that we are both able and determined to permit them no other honorable alternative, and ready to nibble our position away completely if we appear indecisive.

The Thais, with infinite patience, are merely waiting. Although their indecision shows occasionally in reminiscences about their past successes in balancing off the rivalries of Great Powers, most Thais are prepared to be stubborn: they will match what they think is vigor with vigor and what they think is indecisiveness with indecisiveness.

The South Vietnamese are equally concerned. DeGaulle, Lippmann, and Mansfield have set the neutralist hares running with self-fulfilling prophecies that dishearten those who wish to fight and encourage coup-plotting among both the true neutralists and the simple opportunists. But what gives these lofty, unrealistic thoughts of a peaceful neutralist Asia their credibility is, again, fundamental doubts about our ultimate intentions.

A corollary to the preceding analysis is that we have so far failed as a Government to mesh fully the many different instrumentalities of foreign policy and thus to obtain full benefit from mutually reinforcing

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actions. This is true throughout Southeast Asia, but especially in South Viet-Nam. It applies to all instrumentalities of foreign policy equally, but it can best be summed up by Clausewitz's dictum that war is politics pursued by other means. We must learn better how to tailor our military might, aid, etc., to political purposes and, most important, to orchestrate military power more neatly with diplomacy and politics.

If we can successfully convince our friends and allies as well as the Communists and those, such as de Gaulle and Sihanouk, who tend to serve the Communists' purposes, that we are determined to take whatever measures are necessary in Southeast Asia to protect those who oppose the Communists and to maintain our power and influence in the area, we will have established an atmosphere in which our problems in Laos, Viet-Nam and Cambodia may be amenable to solution. In such an atmosphere, the Communist side must inevitably be more cautious as it contemplates the possibility that we might escalate hostility to a level unacceptable to them. It is not necessary that they be certain of what we will do; but we must give them reason to assume that we are prepared to go as far as necessary to defeat their plans and achieve our objectives.

I believe, therefore, that we must urgently begin to strengthen our overall military posture in Southeast Asia in ways which will make it clear that we are single-mindedly improving our capability to take whatever military steps may be necessary to halt Communist aggression in the area. Because Thailand, a loyal friend and ally, is the keystone of our position in Southeast Asia, we should begin by introducing substantial U. S. ground and air forces into that country in order (1) to imply clearly that we are prepared to introduce U. S. ground forces into Laos if necessary, and (2) to guarantee that, whatever else happens, Thailand itself will not be left to the mercy of Communist aggression. This step, in which some of our SEATO allies should be willing to join, must be accompanied by a diplomatic offensive designed (1) to reassure our friends as to our determination, and (2) to warn the Communist side that they are indeed playing a "deeply dangerous game."

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I scarcely need add that I do not envisage this U. S. buildup of a military presence in Thailand as susceptible to dismantlement in the short term. No matter what we do, our problems in Southeast Asia are not going to vanish overnight and we must be prepared to maintain a strong military posture in the area quite indefinitely. (I believe the Thais will gratefully accept and fully cooperate with such a determined U. S. approach to the mutual threat; as I say, all that really bothers them is doubt as to our intention to remain in the area.)

At the same time, we should keep clear in our own minds an important distinction between means and objectives in Southeast Asia. A strong military posture in Thailand is an instrument, not an objective. Its purpose will be served once Thailand and its neighbors have the wherewithal to maintain their own freedom and independence--whether through new collective security arrangements or a gradual receding of the Communist threat.

Meanwhile, the strengthening of our position in Thailand, together with our flat assertions of determination to take whatever steps the situation in the area requires and our clear commitment to a victory in the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam, would, in my view, make all of the problems we face in the area more susceptible to effective treatment.

By way of conclusion, I would say that we have not yet lost the struggle for Southeast Asia, and I see no reason for despair. But I believe we must focus on the essentials of the problems confronting us and pursue an integrated and coordinated policy toward the area as a whole if we are to come out on top. We must take action that will make it clear to friend and foe alike that we mean to fulfill our responsibilities in Southeast Asia.

I am attaching a separate summary of my views on the situation we face in South Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,


Roger Hilsman

Attachment (1)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~



TO : The Secretary
FROM : FE - Roger Hilsman
SUBJECT : South Viet-Nam

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter SEP 5 1978
By ing, NARS, Date 7-16-79

In my judgment, the strategic concept that was developed for South Viet-Nam remains basically sound. If we can ever manage to have it implemented fully and with vigor, the result will be victory.

The concept is based on the assumption that villagers in Southeast Asia are turned inward on themselves and have little or no sense of identification with either the national government or Communist ideology--that the villagers are isolated physically, politically and psychologically. In such circumstances, it is not at all difficult to develop a guerrilla movement. In Burma during World War II, about 150 Americans created a guerrilla force of 30,000, and did it with white faces. It is hardly surprising that the Viet Cong could do equally well or better in South Viet-Nam.

A corollary to this assumption is that the villagers' greatest desire is security and that, if the villagers are given security, some simple progress towards a better life, and--most important of all--a sense that the government cares about them and their future, they will respond with loyalty.

The recent USIA survey of Long An gives some evidence of the validity of this assumption. 1,250 families were interviewed in Long An, which is among the worst of the Delta provinces. The results were as follows: In insecure villages, 75 percent of the people expressed an attitude towards the Viet Cong and the government that was essentially "a plague on both their houses", and 25 percent of the people were silent. In relatively secure villages --those which could be penetrated by large Viet Cong groups but not by small patrols--50 percent of the people took a "plague on both their houses" point of view, and 50 percent were mildly pro-

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- 2 -

government. In very secure villages, which had also received some benefits, such as a school or a well, the people were 100 percent pro-government and expressed a determination to fight the Viet Cong.

On the basis of such an apparently valid assumption, the strategic concept calls for primary emphasis on giving security to the villagers. The tactics are the so-called oil-blot approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly, making sure no Viet Cong pockets are left behind, and using police units to winkle out the Viet Cong agents in each particular village.

This calls for the use of military forces in a different way from that of orthodox, conventional war. Rather than chasing Viet Cong, the military must put primary emphasis on clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages under attack. It is also important, of course, to keep the Viet Cong regular units off balance by conventional offensive operations, but these should be secondary to the major task of extending security.

All this requires careful coordination of military operations, police efforts and rural development towards the primary objectives: the extension of security over the heavily-populated regions of the Delta, the cutting off of Viet Cong sources of supplies and especially recruits, and their dispersion into the jungles and mountains where they can be worn down by attrition, starvation and more conventional military means.

At the heart of the strategic concept are two basic principles:

The first is that of the oil blot. In the past, the GVN sought to blanket the whole country with so-called strategic hamlets which in many cases involved nothing more than wire-enclosed villages doused with political propaganda, with the Viet Cong agents left in place. The result was to blanket the Delta with little Dienbienphus-- indefensible, inadequately armed hamlets far from reinforcements, that lacked both government benefits and police facilities to winkle out Communist sympathizers, with Viet Cong pockets left behind. In

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- 3 -

effect these were storage places of arms for the Viet Cong which could be seized at any time. After November 1st, the military began to demobilize some of these vulnerable villages and outposts, and a race developed between the government and the Viet Cong. The race may have ended in a tie, but the result is that the Viet Cong now have much better weapons and greater stocks of ammunition than they ever had before.

The second basic principle is that the way to fight a guerrilla is to adopt the tactics of the guerrilla--night ambushes, small patrols, and so on. In spite of all our pressures, this has never been done in Viet-Nam. Instead, the emphasis has been on large operations, artillery and air bombardments, and the use of cumbersome battalion-sized units which telegraph their movements to the Viet Cong.

As to the question of operations against North Viet-Nam, I would suggest that such operations may at a certain stage be a useful supplement to an effective counterinsurgency program, but that they would not be an effective substitute for such a program.

My own preference would be to continue the covert, or at least deniable, operations along the general lines we have been following for some months with the objective, since these are only pinpricks, not of forcing North Viet-Nam to its knees but of keeping the threat of eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind. Then, after we had made sufficient progress in the Delta so that all concerned began to realize that the Viet Cong were losing the support of the population, and that their ability to continue the war depended solely on North Vietnamese support, I think we should indicate as much privately to the North Vietnamese and follow this by selected attacks on their infiltration bases and training camps.

In my judgment, significant action against North Viet-Nam that is taken before we have demonstrated success in our counterinsurgency program will be interpreted by the Communists as an act of desperation, and will, therefore, not be effective in persuading

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- 4 -

the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. What is worse, I think that premature action will so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of domestic opinion that the pressures for neutralization will become formidable.

In sum, I believe that we can win in Viet-Nam with a number of provisos.

The first proviso is that we do not over-militarize the war--that we concentrate not on killing Viet Cong and the conventional means of warfare, but on an effective program for extending the areas of security gradually, systematically, and thoroughly. This will require better teamwork in Saigon than we have had in the past and considerably more emphasis on clear-and-hold operations and on police work than we ourselves have given to the Vietnamese.

The problem of getting effective teamwork is troublesome. Ideally, what we need is what the British had in Malaya--a Gerald Templar who has absolute authority to hire and fire anyone in any agency or department and through whom all reporting and all orders are transmitted.

My second proviso is that there be political stability in Saigon. The talk of neutralization is clearly very dangerous. It tends to be in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy--talk about neutralization disheartens those who must fully and vigorously implement the strategic concept and encourages those who are plotting for a neutralist coup.

I think we can counter such dangers most effectively by the proposals in my letter to you of March 14 dealing with the whole of Southeast Asia; if necessary, however, we might also station a Marine battalion in Saigon. Publicly, we could explain this as a move to protect American dependents; privately, we could pass the word in Viet-Nam that we wanted no more coups.

To reiterate, I think that we have made the necessary and fundamental policy decisions on the over-all strategic concept. What remains is to implement this concept vigorously and with effective coordination.

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no one in
Saigon agrees

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- 5 -

CC of letter and attachment to:

Mr. McNamara
Mr. McCone
Gov. Harriman
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William P. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

In case you did not see it in this morning's Herald Tribune, Cargill has announced firm shipping arrangements for 354 thousand tons of American shipping, thus moving safely over the half-way mark on the total sale of 700 thousand tons. So we are over the hump on the wheat deal with one million seven hundred thousand tons sold, and no unfinished problems as of the moment.

Cargill also appears to have denounced the 50% requirement, and the long-term policy issue of grain trade with Bloc countries does remain open for later decision, because these deals have not left the grain trade fat. But the immediate crisis is successfully past.

McG B

McG. B.

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March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Ken Galbraith's letter.

Ken Galbraith's letter on the tariff negotiations is a characteristic combination of cuteness, acuteness, arrogance and insight.

Galbraith is right that the Trade Expansion Act was passed in a relatively uncritical frame of mind. He is wrong in suggesting that any American ever had anything to do with naming it the "Kennedy Round." He is right in suggesting that we have hard bargaining ahead, and wrong in suggesting that State Department and Chris Herter do not know it. He is right in saying that the Common Market has protectionist tendencies, but wrong in suggesting that we must lose in even a successful negotiation. We are taking quite elaborate precautions to prevent just that.

More broadly, Galbraith is right in saying that a bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Common Market alone is a dangerous framework, but wrong in suggesting that we are not aware of the problem. Indeed, both Herter and Ball are very strongly in favor of developing plans to negotiate more directly with the Outer 7 as Galbraith recommends, and quiet discussion is already going forward with Wilbur Mills (per memorandum at Tab A) to insure that the necessary legislation modifying MFN requirements is available if needed.

I happen to be able to respond quickly on this one because my own doubts led me to ask Carl Kaysen for a careful review just a week ago. But I do agree with Galbraith that a technical advisory committee would be useful at a somewhat later stage, and I also agree with his assessment of Jim Tobin as the best possible adviser. I will keep an eye on this unless you want something further done now.

McG. B.

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MAR 12 10 21 AM '64

RECEIVED

Handwritten signature/initials

Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

March 11, 1964

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

This is a note I promised Bill Moyers on the tariff negotiations. For a long time, going back to the ill-conceived effort to shove Britain into the Common Market (which I may say I opposed), the State Department has been following a badly out-dated policy. This policy has been adjusted to the needs of the Common Market and not the United States. Prior to his death President Kennedy had, I think, become concerned about the course of our tariff policy. This letter is to urge its dangers--dangers which, I would gather, are being sensed by Chris Herter as well as members of your staff. Here are the basic facts:

- (1) The Department follows the traditional liberal conviction that all tariff reductions are good.
- (2) It is for the Common Market on broad political and economic grounds.
- (3) It has assumed that the Common Market will meet the United States half-way in tariff reductions--that the dominant French view of tariff policy is like ours.
- (4) This policy has largely blinked the fact that the creation of the Common Market, by the elimination of internal tariffs and by the averaging up of those rates principally affecting the United States, has increased tariffs sharply against us. We have accepted this as the price of European Unity. We have assumed that a unified Europe will later move toward free trade as we wish.

In fact:

- (1) The Common Market is a strongly protective high-tariff club. This can no longer be disguised.

March 11, 1964

- (2) Having first raised tariffs the Common Market is in a position to offer bogus concessions to us in return for new concessions on our side. (It is as though you were saving money on those now famous lights by first turning them on then turning them off!)
- (3) In the forthcoming bargaining we must reduce tariffs on manufactured goods where sales respond to lower tariffs and lower prices. The Common Market will, in general, make concessions on machinery and industrial equipment which they must buy anyway. Our imports will increase more than our exports. This means even successful negotiation will be against us.
- (4) But the Common Market, as exemplified by policy on agricultural products, is so protectionist that I doubt that we will get even the adverse concessions just mentioned.
- (5) Meanwhile we have built up a large political commitment to the negotiations. The country has been told over and over and over the gains that will come from The Trade Expansion Act and the negotiations thereunder. This is the result of automatic, unthinking liberal doctrine. In fact if the negotiations succeed we lose. And if they fail, which would be better for us, another Administration enterprise will have gone sour. (I am not very charitable about this for the dangers were foreseen--and dismissed.)
- (6) If we are screwed on tariffs this will have an enduringly adverse effect on the balance of payments. It will be a serious problem for you for years to come.

Here is what I urge:

- (1) You carefully avoid investing any of your own political capital in these trade negotiations. The fact that you inherited them is a great advantage.
- (2) Make it clear as occasion offers that, while we wish the Common Market well, we are becoming reconciled to its protectionist tendencies. Accordingly our first concern must be the position of the United States.

President Lyndon B. Johnson

-3-

March 11, 1964

- (3) Encourage any delays possible in the so-called Kennedy round. (If you wonder at my annoyance with the past handling of this matter, I ask you to reflect, as a politician of considerable experience, on the political acuity of coupling a President's name with anything as unpopular and as uncertain as tariff bargaining.)
- (4) Consider at some stage impaneling a small committee of highly qualified and completely independent people for a study of policy with particular reference to the protectionist tendencies of the Common Market. This would include development of policy toward the Outer Seven countries where we have more chance of success. Everything here depends on appointing the right men. James Tobin of Yale, formerly on the Council, has a very clear head on these matters.

A turn-around on this issue involves some difficult problems for you. The American public has been over-sold on tariff reduction. In proceeding to a policy that is in keeping with our interest there is danger that you will be charged by the public and press with simply yielding to conservative tariff lobby pressure. This could do considerable damage--it is always supposed that any refusal to reduce tariffs is the result of political weakness. One of the purposes of the Committee I have mentioned would be to protect your flank.

It might also be helpful if certified liberals like myself were to run interference with warnings on the present course. I have something of this sort in mind.

Yours faithfully,


John Kenneth Galbraith


JKG/mj

1487
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
WASHINGTON

3/16/64

McGeorge Bundy:

Apropos of our conversation today, I thought you should have a record of the telephone conversation between the Governor and Mills. As indicated in the last paragraph, the Congressman was particularly anxious that you alert the President of this.


W. M. Roth

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1487

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Governor Herter and Congressman Wilbur Mills
March 16, 1964

Governor Herter telephoned Congressman Mills and said he was most interested in the talk which Congressman Mills and Carl Gilbert had recently, and that the latter had also written Governor Herter the gist of that talk.

Congressman Mills said they were going ahead with the preliminary drafting of a bill with lawyers, and that Congressman Johnnie Burns was going to join him in introducing it.

Governor Herter said he thought this was a matter which should be kept quiet, and Congressman Mills agreed. He suggested that Governor Herter let him know when he wanted the bill introduced.

Governor Herter said he felt that State would oppose this measure, and Congressman Mills said he was equally sure they would. Governor Herter said he felt it was also important that the economists get together on this and get statistics together. Congressman Mills agreed.

Congressman Mills said he felt it would be desirable to have someone alert the President what is being done and why, so he would not be taken by surprise, if there should be a leak. Governor Herter agreed, and said he would alert the President.

I'm not so sure - Ball is interested

DAC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 12-19-79 letter
By ief, NARS, Date 1-15-80

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March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BILL MOYERS

You may be interested in the attached correspondence. It has immediate bearing on a request which you have pending for the President to meet briefly with the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations. I enclose a copy of the papers which Herter's office has sent to me on the subject. I agree with Galbraith that the President ought not to tie his own prestige too tightly to the negotiations, but I think it is important not to seem to disengage sharply at this time. Therefore, a brief, informal meeting with this group of fat cats seems to me a pious idea and one which can do the President some good. A carefully balanced comment of about four sentences would be all he need to add to a personal handshake for each mogul.

McG. B.

March 18, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President's Intelligence Review

The CIA now puts out, for you only, a twice-a-week review of the general situation which seems to me to be well edited and useful. I think the best way to get it to you is for night reading, unless you disagree. I'll take silence as consent and keep it coming this way unless I hear from you.

In the current issue item 2 is of particular interest because of the timing suggested by the North Vietnamese, even though their assessment of our purpose is wrong. Item 9 is also interesting.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

Ma 18, 1964

To: Mrs. Roberts

From: McGeorge Bundy

Subject: President's Intelligence
Review

I think that the best way to get the
President's twice-a-week intelligence
review before him is maybe to try
through you. Would you give him
this for night reading?

McG. B.

TOP SECRET attachment

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March 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Mundt's letter is really not much more than an acknowledgment of your previous note to him, and I think this brief answer is all that is needed. It keeps you essentially one ahead.

McG. B.

March 18, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the main hall of Groton School-- which I attended and of which I am now a Trustee -- they have a set of letters from all the Presidents. They would now like to add yours, and I have drafted the attached letter as one which might possibly fill the bill, if you are willing.

McG. B.

20
Memos for the Pres.
Panama

March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PANAMA

Ralph Dungan tells me that he spoke to you about a proposal which Sterling Cottrell has made for the next step on Panama. Cottrell's proposal was made to Tom Mann, and I have not yet had a chance to get Tom's comment on it, but here it is:

We should announce our readiness to resume normal relations in the following language -- or alternatively, and to me less effectively -- we could have the OAS urge this course on both countries in closely parallel language:

"The Government of the United States proposes that normal relations with the Government of Panama be restored through the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. It also proposes that Special Ambassadors from each country be appointed to ascertain and examine all outstanding issues between the two countries and to prepare a joint recommendation to both governments as to how these issues can be resolved in fair and satisfactory manner.

"If the Government of Panama agrees, relations will be restored immediately and the Special Ambassadors will be appointed within 30 days thereafter."

If you should wish to do this, it could be announced by Pierre after your OAS meeting this afternoon. My own instinct is still to wait a day, but you may wish to turn discussion to a new proposal and away from the difficulties of recent days.

McG. B.

Memorandum
Co 215

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report on Panama

In the light of your deep interest in Panama, you may be interested in the most recent intelligence report. The essence of it is in the summary conclusions on pages 1 and 2, but the rest will probably tell you more than you want to know about Panamanian politics. On page 7 is a persuasive explanation of what lies behind Moreno's double talk.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(SNIE 84-64 - files
NIE drawer)

*In Mr. Donnell's
office*

*10 am
7. 2. 17*

*22
J. Edgar
Memos &
Pres.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Captain O'Neill

Captain the Right Hon. Terence Marne O'Neill is the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, which makes him the Head of Government for all but "matters of imperial concern" and certain matters "reserved to the UK Parliament."

Captain O'Neill entered the White House scene last year about this time when he sent a most cordial invitation to President Kennedy to open the Giant's Causeway in Northern Ireland. President Kennedy refused for tactical reasons, but a very friendly exchange of letters followed and the Captain has always since then had a sort of half confirmed date to call on the President when he came to Washington. How he has arrived on St. Patrick's Day, of all things.

He has paid a personal call on Mrs. Kennedy, and I incautiously promised the same with you before learning of Larry O'Brien's concern. He has undertaken to keep this off the record, and it may not last more than a minute or two with a picture. If you simply speak of President Kennedy's warm feeling toward him, the job is done.

Many thanks.

McG. B.

✓ Pres.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VIETNAM

This memorandum is designed to help to clarify the issues that are likely to be before you at 10 A. M. Monday. As I see it, the problem of our next steps with respect to Vietnam falls into four parts:

1. Action in South Vietnam itself.
2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos.
3. Action against North Vietnam .
4. Relations with France.

Following are my comments on each item.

1. Action in South Vietnam itself.

I think we have agreement all around on Item 1, which remains the most important of the lot. Bob McNamara assured me today that his twelve recommendations fully cover everything Lodge is asking for within South Vietnam, and then some. He further assures me that Lodge himself spoke of six crucial needs for action in Vietnam, and that all six are more than covered within his recommendations.

2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos .

The McNamara report is so drafted as to leave you leeway in these two areas. It would authorize hot pursuit and ground operations over the Laotian line, but it is noncommittal about operations across the Cambodian border. ^{McCone} McNamara and Lodge would like to go further, especially with respect to Cambodia, and I find that Dean Rusk is also strongly inclined to move in this direction if the right combination of political and practical steps can be devised. I think there is room here

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-27-78; 715C 8-24-79
By isf, NARS, Date 9-24-79

for you to move in a direction which is at once useful to South Vietnam and effective as a response to the Ambassador's own desires. We will not have final plans on this tomorrow morning, but I think the field is a productive one and that a good resolution can be found. I think it is particularly desirable that we should have Lodge work on the practical process of this matter with Khanh directly.

3. Action against North Vietnam.

On this one we have agreement between McNamara and Khanh, at least for the present, that overt action against North Vietnam is undesirable. There is also agreement that the covert program should be intensified. As a practical matter, McNamara believes that this program will not amount to very much, and I agree with him, but I believe it essential that we authorize Lodge to strengthen it in any way that he can work out with Khanh. The one specific Lodge request which is still outstanding in this area is his proposal of late February that we warn the North Vietnamese of direct retaliation in response to any terrorist attack on Americans. McNamara tells me that the concern over the lives of Americans had been greatly reduced by the time of his visit last week, and that therefore this is not now a live issue. But at the end of the current deliberations, you will wish to go back to Lodge again.

4. Relations with France.

It is now agreed that Bohlen should go to work directly with General de Gaulle, as soon as possible after the General's return from Mexico. This will not be for about another ten days. The Department will be drafting a detailed instruction to Bohlen this week, and Dean Rusk's current intent is to let Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Bohlen both comment on this instruction before it is made final. This seems to us the best we can do to keep all parties in line.

There are other questions which need to be discussed tomorrow morning, like the shape of the White House statement to follow the more formal meeting on Tuesday. For internal Pentagon reasons, McNamara is very eager to put out a substantial account of the current situation in terms which are acceptable to his military colleagues. I myself doubt that this should be done at the White House level, and we will have alternative statements for your consideration in the morning.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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March 14, 1964

Memorandum for the President

BROAD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON VIETNAM

1. Why is South Vietnam important to us?

First, it is a key element in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in turn is an area whose size and importance are plain to see--almost 250 million people and a land and sea area stretching from China to Australia, and from the Philippines to India. Second, we have a commitment there in honor and in national interest. Ten years ago President Eisenhower rightly decided to support the new government of South Vietnam and we have continued that support ever since in good times and in bad. Indeed the language of that first commitment reminds me very much of the language we still use (Eisenhower letter to Diem attached at Tab A.) It speaks of our assistance against subversion and aggression. It speaks of the need for effective performance and reform in Vietnam. It speaks of the need to respond to the aspirations of the people of Vietnam themselves.

In recent months the danger and difficulty in Vietnam have increased, but this is no time to quit, and it is no time for discouragement.

2. What are the prospects now?

I am working right this week end with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on this problem, and I can tell you that while there have been troubles and difficulties in recent months out there, we are going to keep right on with our basic present program and purpose. I am proud of the improvement in the coordination of the American effort both here and in Saigon, and we expect to take further measures to strengthen our support for the free people of South Vietnam.

I am particularly encouraged by reports from the Ambassador and from Secretary McNamara on the quality of the present leadership of South Vietnam. I have had an encouraging personal message from

General Khanh, and we are very hopeful that his government will be able to take the strong and effective measures which are needed on every front out there.

I am sure the Vietnamese people will respond to this kind of leadership because it is quite foreign to the traditions of the area to give in to pressures which are directed from Peking. (Some deliberate connection of the Communists with China may be helpful in Saigon.)

3. Can this be ended by 1965?

1965 has never been anything more for us than a target for the completion of certain specific forms of technical training and assistance. A struggle of this kind needs patience and determination. We and our friends in Vietnam entirely agree that as time goes on the responsibility for effective work in all fields should be carried more and more by the Vietnamese themselves. No one who is working effectively against Communism need be worried about American determination and persistence. We mean to keep at it out there.

McG. B.

Excerpt from letter from President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, 10/25/54

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standard of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.