

*Pres 25*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your brief meeting with General Lemnitzer  
at 11:30 this morning

The primary purpose of this meeting is that it should exist, with a picture. If the Supreme Commander of NATO did not meet the U. S. President, there would be bad rumors.

General Lem is in close touch with us on Cyprus and has been helping to keep Turks and Greeks on board as far as possible. He fully supports our current effort to get peace-keeping troops on the island. This one is in good shape at his end -- if not in Turkey and Cyprus themselves.

On the RB-66, Lemnitzer has put in a buffer zone until this episode is fully checked out (which cannot happen until pilots are returned). He points out that lost Soviet pilots violate Western air space quite frequently, but our standing orders do not lead to shoot-downs. He stoutly defends our orders as more humane and fitting to our tradition ("it makes no sense to shoot some poor goddam lost pilot just because they do").

Lemnitzer finds the French troublesome in private, but maintains a good public posture of serenity, and all in all I think he is in good shape.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *State ltr 4/29/77*  
By *mg*, NARS, Date *5/10/77*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may or may not want these for night reading, but you should have them available:

At Tab A is McNamara's full draft report of which you got a brief this morning.

At Tab B is his draft White House statement which both Dean Rusk and I think needs a lot of revision.

At Tab C is a fascinating document prepared for possible publication in FOREIGN AFFAIRS by Ambassador Lodge.

For the TV show on Vietnam, I myself would <sup>quietly</sup>~~urgently~~ but firmly spell out the following themes:

1. Neutralization of the whole area has been repeatedly denounced by the Communists and is therefore not practicable now.
2. The right of people to choose their own course is exactly what we are supporting, and if foreign interference and subversion should end, the need for our help will end.
3. While the danger of the threat continues, American support will be firm and strong.
4. Secretary McNamara and a first-rate team have made a most careful study which has led to constructive suggestions that are now being reviewed within the Government.
5. We are strong, calm and determined, in a situation which has danger but also hope.
6. The Ambassador is our top man in the field, and you are proud of the U. S. unity which has been developed both here and in Vietnam in the first hundred days.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

A

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN  
PERMISSION OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

DRAFT - 13 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 9/10/75  
By JTB, NARS, Date 2/28/77

28

This report addresses two questions:

1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the trend of the counterinsurgency program, how stable is the Khanh government, and what is the effectiveness of our current policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid, military training and logistical support?)

2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and prospects of the Khanh government and what more should they be doing, and what more should the U.S. be doing under present or revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?)

To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.

I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become snaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.

All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."

~~SECRET~~

Copy 6 of 21 copies

~~SECRET~~

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors.

## II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam

We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U.S. combat forces. We are not acting against North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists) - a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes.

## III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam

The key elements in the present situation are as follows:

A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate.<sup>a/</sup> Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment replacement and additions in U.S. personnel are indicated under current policy.

B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes.

C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoa; and 85% of An Xuyen.

a/ Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos.

~~SECRET~~

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent:

a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. For example:

a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons.

b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were disarmed because of suspected disloyalty.

c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun).

d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 strategic hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control.

e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government troops there are reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern and northern areas of the IV Corps.

4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing:

a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see classified annex).

b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not previously encountered in South Vietnam, have been captured from the Viet Cong:

Chicom 75 mm. recoilless rifles.  
Chicom heavy machine guns.  
U.S. .50 caliber heavy machine guns on Chicom mounts.

In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90 mm rocket launchers and mortars.

c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions and chemicals for the production of explosives: Approximately 50,000 pounds of explosive-producing chemicals destined for the Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending March 1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and one-half tons were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong arsenal. Ninety percent was of Chicom manufacture.

D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain (he has the serious problem of the jailed generals). After two coups, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero.<sup>a/</sup> Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high.

E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is more able than under any previous regime,<sup>b/</sup> highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in

a/ Mr. McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this paragraph implies.

b/ Mr. McCone, while encouraged by Khanh's evident ability, does not believe that we have had enough experience with the members of Khanh's government to be able to make this judgment.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

at least token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support.

#### IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action

##### A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization"

While de Gualle has not been clear on what he means by this -- and is probably deliberately keeping it vague as he did in working toward an Algerian settlement -- he clearly means not only a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an alliance structure (both of which we could accept) but also withdrawal of all external military assistance and specifically total U.S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this basis -- indeed without specifically rejecting it -- would simply mean a Communist take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U.S. presence after 1954 held the South together under far more favorable circumstances, and enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide "free" elections in 1956. Even talking about a U.S. withdrawal would undermine any chance of keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug would probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.

##### B. Initiate GVN and U.S. Military Actions Against North Vietnam

We have given serious thought to all the implications and ways of carrying out direct military action against North Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U.S. action is attached as Annex A.) In summary, the actions break down into three categories:

###### 1. Border Control Actions. For example:

a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian overflights to permit low-level reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights are required to supplement the currently approved U-2 flights.

b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos, without the presence of U.S. advisors or re-supply by U.S. aircraft.

c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U.S. advisors and re-supply by U.S. aircraft.

d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and destruction of VC bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian line.

e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by South Vietnamese forces.

5  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:

a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U.S. or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong.

b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.).

c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U.S. assistance) of the major NVN ports.

3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U.S. Forces.

This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and the U.S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57s presently in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation.

The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2(b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the problem of communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than improved. The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh government needs the reinforcement of some significant success against the North and without them the in-country program, even with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be sufficient to stem the tide. On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section B below, I recommend against initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U.S. military actions against North Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam.

There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy -- the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term <sup>period.</sup> To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization."

Basic U.S. Posture

1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing.

3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in Annex B), and particularly the basic theory -- now fully accepted both on the Vietnamese and U.S. sides -- of concentrating on the more secure areas and working out from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide economic improvements. This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior commanders and clarify their responsibilities and relationships.

Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Civil and Military Mobilization

4. To put the whole nation on a war footing -- to obtain the manpower for these efforts described below and to remedy present inequities and inadequacies in the use of manpower -- a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government. The present structure of decrees, dating from the Diem Government, is haphazard and produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National Mobilization would both greatly increase the effectiveness of the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the Government's determination and will. Full attention should be given to the way it is presented so that it appears as a remedy for past injustices and not as a repressive or totalitarian act.

5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. About 15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces (ARVN) to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill the existing paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The balance of 30,000 men is required to increase the strength of the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized (see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures are illustrative and subject to review, which review I have directed General Harkins to make in consultation with General Khanh.)

6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five men each are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to go into hamlets after they have been cleared, start the rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on. School teachers and health technicians are now assigned in some hamlets, many more are needed, and those on the job need to be retrained to higher competence. Many other types of technicians (e.g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers. Taking into account the fact that many hamlets are not now secure, and that adequate training is required, the initial goal during 1964 should be at least 7,500 additional persons; the ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in 2500 villages and 43 provinces. The administrators would come largely from the areas in which they serve and would be paid by the national government. The U.S. should work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be made to make use of the available trained personnel by assignment to provincial and village administration where needed.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Improved Military Forces

7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and reorganized.

Specifically:

a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related forces of a part-time nature for hamlet defense) should be consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force compensated by the national government.

b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved at once. A reasonable course of action would be to raise the pay scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the regular Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self Defense Corps approximately to the present level of the Civil Guard. In addition, measures should be taken to improve the housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that they can live decently in areas near where the forces are operating.

c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by conscription, effectively enforced, and by more centrally directed recruitment policies.

d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces.

e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and improving the police, the AID Mission should make special arrangements to draw on the advice of the present British training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its experience in Malaya. (Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the USOM Chief, to accomplish this.)

8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Such a force could be organized around present Ranger Companies and ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and advice by U.S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight to the VC on their own basis in advance of clear-and-hold operations on the conventional pattern.

Additional Military Equipment for the GVN

9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by the substitution of 25 A-1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s. The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and slightly better speed. a/

---

a/ Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate operation will be increased by assignment of A-1E aircraft in replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another important area we are strengthening the U.S. intelligence and reporting system.

9  
~~SECRET~~

10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in other forces, we should act at once to replace the present M-114 armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to provide additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should also be met at an estimated cost of approximately \$10 million.

Economic Actions

11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should be particularly stressed and expanded and publicly announced. Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting season (April - June) should probably be doubled for the next season and trebled the following season, both to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to improve the rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional ton of fertilizer costing around \$70 can, if properly applied, produce additional yield of an equivalent two tons of rice, which might be sold for \$110 per ton. Thus, the potential export improvement alone could be on the order of \$20 million from this year's 85,000 ton input.

US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions

The above actions will involve a limited increase in U.S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly, they involve significant increase in Military Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself, with the latter requiring additional US economic aid. The estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:

<u>Action</u>	<u>GVN Budget Costs</u>	<u>Cost to U.S.</u>
a. Raise military and paramilitary numbers and pay scales	5-6 billion piastres	\$30-40 million <sup>a/</sup>
b. Enlarge civil administrative cadre	250 million piastres (1st year)	\$1,500,000 (first year)
c. Furnish additional military equipment		\$20 million (one time)

a/ Increases in GVN budget expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in U.S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later refinement, an increase of 5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget expenditures might require an increase of \$30-40 million worth of imports financed through U.S. economic aid. Some of the imports undoubtedly could be obtained under P.L. 480.

Conclusion

If the Khanh Government can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out rapidly, it is our judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the next three to four months.<sup>a/</sup> The present deterioration may continue for a part of this period, but we believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will become visible during the period. We therefore believe that this course of action should be urgently pursued while we prepare such additional actions as may be necessary for success.

---

a/ Mr. McCone believes that the situation in South Vietnam is so serious that it calls for more immediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: "(1) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on Khanh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2) Khanh's three Vice Premiers cannot give him the solid help that he needs because two of them, Hoan (an important political figure in Dai Viet Party) and Oanh (a capable economist and professor) have been out of the country for ten years or more and are therefore out of touch, and General Mau is known to be an affable but not a strong figure. General Khiem (Minister of Defense) is not particularly impressive. Parenthetically, it is reported to me that Generals Khiem, Mau and Thieu (Khanh's Chief of Staff) are the trio who conceived the January 30th coup. (3) I have received so many reports that the ARVN, from field grade officers down, lack the motivation and will and/or techniques to confront the enemy that I cannot but accept this as probable truth. This is also present among the middle and lower level civil officials. (4) The morale of the people in the hamlets and villages and countryside is reported as very low. (5) The irregular forces, i.e., Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, are ineffective and the Hamlet Militia have virtually disintegrated. (6) The Viet Cong situation is improving militarily, organizationally, and in their political power over the people of the countryside."

He concurs in the actions outlined in the previous pages and in Sections V and VII below, but states that they are "too little too late." In addition he would: (1) Have General Khanh meet immediately with Sihanouk for the purpose of developing a joint South Vietnam-Cambodia program to clear the Cambodian border. And, if there is no successful meeting, General Khanh with U.S. assistance would stop all traffic on the Mekong River into and from Cambodia, and would implement immediately "border control" item (d) on page 5 above (i.e., "hot pursuit" into Cambodian territory). (2) Implement immediately "border control" item (b) on page 5 above (i.e., Vietnamese patrols, with appropriate U.S. aerial resupply, into Laotian territory). (3) Have Khanh negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek for the movement of two or possibly three divisions into the southern tip of the Delta in order to give impetus and support to the hard-pressed ARVN effort in that area. (4) Implement immediately "retaliatory" item (a) on page 6 above (i.e., overt U.S. air reconnaissance over North Vietnam). He recommends that the overflights be over populous areas for psychological in addition to intelligence purposes.

V. Possible Later Actions

If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously -- inspiring confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made -- or if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.) Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border Control"<sup>a/</sup> and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.

In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but until such time as "rear-area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations against the North.

In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to denigrate the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex D.

VI. Other Actions Considered but Rejected

We have considered the following actions, but rejected them for the time being except to the extent indicated below:

1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy be continued of permitting dependents to return home on a voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so. The security situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and ordering dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, have a serious impact on South Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be shortened. Thus, unless there are further serious indicents, or unless we were taking more drastic measures generally, we believe compulsory return should not be undertaken.

---

<sup>a/</sup> Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and of "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.

2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.

3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would amount in practice to effective command. Again, the judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice -- although it has not yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent. At the same time, MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels.

VII. Recommendations a/

I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government:

1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels.
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s.

a/ Mr. McCone believes that these recommendations, in which he concurs without reservation, are inadequate to meet "the very serious situation confronting us in Vietnam and recommends the additional actions stated in the footnote to the Conclusions to Section IV of this Report for the reasons there stated."

~~SECRET~~

9. To provide the Vietnamese Army 63 M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately \$5-10 million of additional material.

10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two years to doubling the amount of fertilizer made available.

11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

~~SECRET~~

29

B

DRAFT

Proposed White House Statement

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Vietnam, the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government, and the need for U.S. assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Vietnam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge. Omitting those parts which must remain classified for the present, the highlights of the report were as follows:

Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unquestionably been substantial setbacks. The degree of government control of the countryside and population has been reduced considerably, notably in the Delta area but to some extent in other key areas in the center and north.

The principal reasons for this decline have been three:

1. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of the two changes in government that flowed from the "deeply serious" political situation that existed in October and was highlighted in those words in the report then rendered. Frequent changes in civil and military leaderships have produced disorganization and reduced the ability to react to stepped up Viet Cong actions.
2. There were serious weaknesses and over-extension in the basically sound Hamlet program. These were only partially apparent in October but were exposed and exploited by later Viet Cong action.
3. The supply of key categories of arms and trained cadres from the North has continued and appears to have increased. Careful and sophisticated central control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent throughout this difficult period. Evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi continues to mount.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military, action to ensure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom. Instructions under this plan are being transmitted to the chiefs of the various provinces, who must play a critical role in carrying them out, and special attention is being focused on provinces now under severe pressure.

In order to carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Vietnam, partly to augment the strength of his regular and especially his paramilitary forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service, General Khanh proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able-bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages. This plan to put the nation on a true war footing will be a major step forward.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces, usually raised in local areas and frequently bearing the brunt of the fight. Within the regular forces, special training is needed to create an offensive guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong at its own game and in its own areas. Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

These various steps will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on U.S. economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased U.S. training activity both on the civil and military side. However, the total number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam need not be increased, and the policy should continue of withdrawing U.S. personnel where it is clear that their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese without sacrifice to combat capability.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their over-all conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the decline in the situation could be arrested and significant progress made in the coming months. [They also noted the need to prepare appropriate countermeasures to meet the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency campaign by North Vietnam.]

00

23

31



32  
1

Saigon, Viet-Nam,  
March 3, 1964.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dear Averell:

I get a surprisingly large mail out here asking me for a complete statement as to why Viet-Nam is important, how we are doing, and what we should do in the future.

There seems to be a real demand for a "full dress" presentation on what to you and me are obvious fundamentals.

I therefore have written a magazine article which I am told might interest Foreign Affairs. I understand further that Foreign Affairs is widely commented on by columnists, editors and so called "opinion makers" generally.

Could you look at the enclosed yourself - or have it looked at - and let me know whether you would like me to go ahead with it? Naturally, I would understand perfectly if, for any reason, you thought it was wiser to be silent. Possibly, however, the material in the article might be helpful to what we are all trying to accomplish. There are some personal opinions which may go beyond official declarations, although not beyond what I understand to be official thinking.

Undoubtedly, the most important single factor in the whole Viet-Nam problem is support from the American home front.

The Honorable  
W. Averell Harriman,  
Under Secretary of State.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

Emily joins me in many messages to you and Marie.

As ever yours,

*Henry C. Lodge*

Henry Cabot Lodge

Enclosure

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 2, 1964.

PERSISTENCE IN VIET-NAM

by HENRY CABOT LODGE

In his inaugural address of January, 1961, the late President Kennedy described the challenge of the 1960's "not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need -- not as a call to battle, though embattled we are -- but a call to bear the burden of a long, twilight struggle year in and year out..."

Viet-Nam is, I think, actually emerging from the twilight, but these words of the late President Kennedy nonetheless apply directly to American policy there. For in Viet-Nam the Vietnamese and ourselves are indeed embattled. We bear arms -- and a subtler and ultimately more crucial burden: of bringing about a state of affairs in which the people think that their safety and welfare lie with the Viet-Nam government. Indeed the minute a substantial number of them think this, the war will be over.

Viet-Nam is thus typical in both respects of the struggle to which President Kennedy referred.

It is also unique in that it is the only place in the world today where Americans are under fire. <sup>undoubtedly because</sup> ~~This is probably due to the likelihood that Communist China wants to turn Viet-Nam into a satellite.~~

One may call the enemy the Viet Cong; one may say that most of the men who belong to it are recruited in South Viet-Nam; one may point out that the supplies and the men who direct the war came from North Viet-Nam. But the strong likelihood is that Ho Chi Minh, the ruler of North Viet-Nam, would have a hard time stopping the war in South Viet-Nam even if he wanted to, because Communist China would move heaven and earth to keep him fighting. The war in South Viet-Nam is advertised by them all over the Communist world as a "war of liberation" - on which they base their propaganda line that their brand of Communism is superior to the Soviet brand; and that the United States is both the

world's greatest imperialist power and also a paper tiger which is unable or unwilling to use the power which it has.

The tone of the Chinese Communist press, the general world-conquering aim of Communist doctrine, and the course of Chinese history, when added to the quantity of Chinese Communist weapons captured from the Viet Cong and the fact that the North Vietnamese contribution to the war is larger than one would expect from a country of North Viet-Nam's size -- these things all argue that there is a strong Chinese Communist desire for Viet-Nam to become a dependency of Peking.

This alone would be enough to make Viet-Nam important. But there are other reasons:

Geographically, South Viet-Nam is a sort of linchpin or keystone for all of Southeast Asia. It is the hub of an area which is bounded on the northeast and east by Formosa and the Philippines, on the south by Indonesia and on the west by Burma. Communist seizure of South Viet-Nam would put the Communists squarely into the middle of Southeast Asia - whence they could radiate all over.

Then the Mekong River, one of the ten biggest rivers in the world, comes down from the Himalayan Mountains and spreads its great delta into the southern end of South Viet-Nam. This is an extraordinary geographical phenomenon because of the great Lake Tonle Sap in Cambodia which contains a large part of the overflow of the Mekong River during the rainy season. Therefore, the country is seldom deeply flooded and a much more intensive cultivation of the delta can take place than would otherwise be possible. The delta is therefore a fabulous producer of food -- and Asia is teeming with millions of starving people. Possession of the Mekong Delta is thus of enormous importance.

The loss of South Viet-Nam would also immediately disturb Cambodia and Laos, with strong repercussions further west in Thailand and Burma. It would shake Malaysia to the south. It

would surely threaten Indonesia and would, whatever their government said, increase their fear of Communist China. If Indonesia were unable or unwilling to resist, the Chinese Communists would be on the front doorstep of Australia. Eastward the repercussions for the Philippines and for Formosa would be severe. Therefore, when we speak of Southeast Asia, we are not talking of some small neck of the woods, but of an area about 2,300 miles long from north to south and 3,000 miles wide from east to west -- with about 240 million people.

If the Communist Chinese, using North Viet-Nam as a catspaw, were to take over South Viet-Nam, it would be interpreted as a vindication of the fanatic Chinese methods over that of the Soviets.

It would also be regarded in the free world as reflecting a general lack of ability or lack of will power by the United States to prevent Communist aggression.

Finally, the loss of South Viet-Nam, with its attendant weakening of the whole free world position in Southeast Asia, would have a distressing effect on American public opinion, and many voices would arise in America urging us to wash our hands of the world -- in effect, to resign from it, to fall back onto our "Fortress America" and gird up our loins for a contest with guided missiles.

At stake here is not only a great strategic area, possessed of valuable resources, the loss of which would shake the world, but here also at stake is the Vietnamese people. Having lived among them and knowing them, I pay tribute to their dynamic qualities and their willingness to fight for their rights. Their age-old aversion to being dominated by the Chinese - or by anyone else - is an inspiring part of their national history. The abandonment of such a people, which has been so willing to give of itself for the sake of freedom, would be still another blow to confidence in the United States and in the free world.

Thus the importance of this place and this people has been recognized by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. It

*has, in the noblest sense, been recognized by those Americans who have laid down their lives in Viet-Nam. We are forever in their debt. They gave their lives in a place in which the vital interests of the United States were -- and are -- deeply involved.*

*the 16 Americans who have been killed in action in Viet-Nam since 1959. We think also of the 78 others who lost their lives there.*

\* \* \* \* \*

There are some valid reasons for faith in the future prospects for Vietnamese independence:

The downward spiral which began in the spring of 1963 has been arrested.

We are not deluded by falsely optimistic reports; we know the truth, however bleak it is.

The decision has been made to concentrate on the seven key provinces around Saigon -- the most difficult problem in the whole country. If we succeed there, the back of the snake will have been broken.

There is more night-fighting by small units instead of big daytime battles on the World War II model. Clearly, we must fight the Viet Cong where he is. If you want to defeat a mean cat in a dark alley, you send in a meaner cat -- not a dog.

There are able Province Chiefs, who are the key people in the Viet-Nam government, and competent military commanders.

The new Prime Minister, General Khanh, appears as a man of impressive ability.

There is very little compulsory moving of people from their homes into strategic hamlets, as once used to be the case.

The Vietnamese are attacking one obstacle at a time: clearing an area and leaving qualified civil administrators and citizen soldiers behind so as to hold what has been gained.

There is now a vivid recognition that the Viet Cong campaign is above all a political affair; that we must organize for the

political conflict as carefully as we have organized for military success; and that there must be a true civil-political organization to go hand in hand with the military.

For the strength of ~~the Viet-Cong~~ the Viet-Cong does not consist in fortresses to which they retire for rest and repair. They ~~have~~ have no rear area behind the front to which they can go. In the western sense there is no front. When the Viet-Cong have had enough and decide to stop fighting, they simply melt in with the people. If the people were to deny them, they would thus have no base; they would be through.

This explains the late General Edell Smith's remark to French Prime Minister Bidault in 1954 who had spoken of relieving the French general responsible for the fall of Dien Bien Phu. "Any second-rate general," said Smith, "should be able to win in Indochina if there were a proper political atmosphere." The problem is still to create the proper political atmosphere. The government recognizes the problem and is trying to solve it.

But militarily we do not face the situation which existed in Dien Bien Phu in 1954 when the Communist General Giap had a big army in the field. 1964 is not 1954. There is nowhere in the whole country where a Viet-Cong battalion can march down the road in the daytime with flags flying. The most they have been able to do, and that very seldom, is to hold a village for 24 hours.

Also in this year of 1964, we have something we have never had before, and that is a great American organization which has been built and completed under the leadership of General Harkins and which, in its turn, has helped to build a big Vietnamese army. And as a companion to it all is an economic and social organization in the building of which the United States has also participated, which identifies the cause of victory with that of a better life for ordinary people.

Americans, working with the Vietnamese, have accomplished much in Viet-Nam. We have in some ways transformed the country

and are making it into a very strong country for its size. This is due in a fundamental sense to the Vietnamese effort. It is also partly due to our money, our weapons and our machines. Our expert technicians and advisers have made schools, health clinics and better farms a reality. Finally, the courage of our young Americans - military and civilian - in risking their lives every day is particularly inspiring.

But Viet-Nam -- for all its American equipment, training and economic and social programs and for all its own many fine qualities -- has not yet won the war. The Vietnamese and ourselves are engaged in a long, drawn out contest of wills which as of last February was deadlocked. Stopping fatal deterioration, which has been done, is not victory. It is undoubtedly true that we cannot be pushed out against our will. But that is not enough.

On the other hand, Communist victory requires more than the wave of terrorism in the movie theaters and baseball grandstands of Saigon and the Communist-inspired "neutralism" campaign which we had during the winter of 1964. Communists are far from invincible -- even in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines and Malaysia, they eventually gave up. It will not require miracles to tip the balance against them if we and the Vietnamese do our very best. Here are a few suggestions as to what Americans can do in addition to what we are already doing.

1. We must not be easily discouraged. One asset which the Communists possess in Viet-Nam is that of mole-like patience. When told that something will take 50 years to accomplish, they are not horrified. If we and the Vietnamese persist in carrying out realistic political and military policies, we will win -- provided the hostile outside pressures on Viet-Nam stay about as they were last summer. Undoubtedly, the adverse turn of events in Viet-Nam in late 1963 and early 1964 was largely due to increased infiltration by North Viet-Nam of men, weapons, and supplies.

2. If we do make up our minds that we are going to live with this thing year in and year out, we will undoubtedly wish to consider a personnel program whereby politically mature and very unobtrusive American advisers are, upon the request of the Viet-Nam government, stationed in the various areas of Viet-Nam for periods of at least 2 years and preferably more. It is not possible to ~~be~~ be thoroughly competitive with Communism when you rotate people through Viet-Nam as fast as we are now doing.

3. Then if we make up our minds that we are going to stay with the Vietnamese for as long as it will take, we should also think again about the scope of the entire problem. The Communists do not tie themselves down to a patchwork of petty piecemeal nationalistic restrictions. They consider Indochina as a strategic unit, and the Mekong as an immense river which gives all of the countries having to do with it very close common strategic relationships. They certainly do not feel themselves hamstrung by the Cambodian border or the Laotian border <sup>or the</sup> North Vietnamese border. We too should consider Indochina as a unit when it comes to ending aggression in Viet-Nam.

4. We should also be sure that we are making full use of the things in which we excel and in which the Communists are deficient. For example, we can probably not as a general rule surpass a young oriental guerrilla fighter who doesn't mind the heat, who can get along on a handful of rice and who can lie under water for hours at a time breathing through a straw. But we can do better in other things, such as: the use of airplanes, both military and civil; the art of medicine; <sup>and</sup> the development of democracy, political energy and justice.

\* \* \* \* \*

The forces working against us are strong and subtle, and sheer persistence may not suffice because outside pressures grow too great. These pressures may therefore require us to do something

more. One cannot now tell what that "something more" might be. Two things are clear: Viet-Nam must not be abandoned to the Communists; and while we would be justified in paying a high price to prevent a Communist take-over (if what was done were truly effective), we must not expend our very life blood in Viet-Nam.

The phrase "outside pressures" suggests first any one of several neighboring lands which are used as a "sanctuary" from which Viet-Nam can be attacked and the Viet-Cong helped with impunity. Obviously when one is engaged in a life and death struggle, such a "sanctuary" must not go on forever. It should be possible to deal with it by peaceful means.

And "outside pressures" also suggest "neutrality", although there is really more desultory talk about it, chiefly by the Viet-Cong, than there is real pressure.

Those who preach "neutrality" seem never to talk about neutrality for North Viet-Nam; they only talk of neutrality for South Viet-Nam. Yet, surely, if one wished to be fair -- and if one wishes to be realistic -- one would never envisage a conference in which one of the two parties came as a weak neutral and the other came as a strong member of the Communist bloc.

We must also insist, before even discussing any kind of new relationship between North and South Viet-Nam, that the North should, first of all, stop its aggression against the South. No conversations with North Viet-Nam are even conceivable while this interference in South Viet-Nam's internal affairs is going on. They must withdraw immediately. The minute they do so there will be peace. In a country which is defending itself against aggression, to speak of "neutralisation" is the same thing as disarming it, while leaving the military potential of its aggressor intact. To do this in the case of Viet-Nam would be the prelude to communizing the whole country.

We have had some practical illustrations of exactly what "neutrality" can mean in Southeast Asia. Consider two agreements - one reached in 1954 concerning Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, and another in 1962 concerning Laos only. In both cases the accords were violated by the Communists when the ink was hardly dry.

In Laos, the Communist forces, backed and directed from North Viet-Nam, attacked the neutralist forces. They have tried ever since to cut the country in two, and the International Control Commission, which was hailed as a marvelous diplomatic device, has been unable even to investigate these shocking and violent actions, because the Communists<sup>simply</sup> will not let these<sup>Communist</sup> function. No wonder that Souvanna Phouma, the Chief of Government of Laos, says that the Communists deliberately refuse to let neutrality work.

We thus see before our very eyes in Southeast Asia that the Communists cannot be trusted to carry out a neutralization treaty. One suspects that Peking will always feel free to agree to neutrality with one hand and then to intensify the guerrilla war with another. Indeed Peking has said publicly that what they call "the war of liberation" must go on.

Why, therefore, complicate a very simple situation by using such a woolly and deceptive word as "neutrality" without specifying exactly when "neutrality" would be applied?

If so-called "neutrality"<sup>54"</sup> had been applied to France at anytime between 1940 and 1944, the German army would have remained in occupation in France. In fact, the initial German occupation before the collapse of the Vichy government was virtually the same kind of neutrality with regard to France which some appear to advocate today with regard to Viet-Nam. Those of us who have always wanted a strong France and are glad that France is strong today would have opposed "neutrality" for a France occupied by a hostile army in the '40's, just as we oppose "neutrality" for a Viet-Nam, which, though not occupied in the same sense, is under

hostile attack in the '60's. And, one might add, just as we oppose "neutrality" for Berlin.

\* \* \* \* \*

In a struggle which interests Communist China so closely there are no short cuts, neutralistic or otherwise. Viet-Nam is thus not a problem which can be "turned over" to a Geneva conference or to the U. N. At this <sup>rough and dangerous</sup> stage, both for Vietnamese and for Americans, there is no substitute for force and the will to use it, even though a total solution to the problem cannot be achieved solely by military means.

We Americans therefore must, for our part, continue to be superior in the fields where we are now superior. And we must become superior in the fields where the Communists are now ahead of us. This superiority of theirs can be summed up in the words "patience and persistence" and in the fact that they do not *neglect* the political-psychological side.

As John Adams was told by his wife in 1776, we should try to subdue one obstacle at a time, and not be depressed by their greatness and their number. Many things have been called "impossible", she said, which became easy for those who know how to take advantage of time, opportunity, lucky moments, and the faults of others.

At the U. N., I noticed that Communists think they can count on American impetuosity and impatience. Pham Van Dong, the prime minister of North Viet-Nam, says that he is in no hurry because he is sure the Americans will lose interest. We must prove him wrong.

The war in Viet-Nam is our concern. It is not one which Viet-Nam can handle alone because external forces, <sup>undoubtedly</sup> ~~probably~~ including the Chinese Communists, are so heavily involved. If it were not for these forces, there would in Viet-Nam merely be the banditry and piracy which has existed for a long time and

... which local forces could cope. Given the international importance of the struggle, is it unreasonable for the United States to spend in Viet-Nam in one year roughly the cost of one airplane carrier? And is it unreasonable for us to decide to spend whatever length of time it takes to make sure that this area can stand by itself without fear of foreign conquest? ~~Forces are at work in Viet-Nam which could change the history of the world.~~

History tends to show that whenever China is united, it becomes imperialistic. One is told that in the thirteenth century, it took the Vietnamese 75 years to get rid of the Mongols, which the Vietnamese were ~~intensely~~ <sup>EVIDENTLY</sup> willing to spend.

The pendulum of history ticks faster now. If we do what we are capable of doing, it will not take us 75 years, or 50 years or 25 years, in the 20th century. But it may take more than one year or two. I would not be surprised to see the Delta totally cleared by the end of 1955. Time and chance will tell.

If we in America are persistent, the outlook is good.

If we in America are impatient and easily discouraged, the outlook is bad.

If the Vietnamese and ourselves persist, if we watch for the breaks, if we take advantage of them, and if we have a little luck, Viet-Nam will surely get into a posture where it need never fear defeat, whether on the battlefield or at the conference table.

The answer to the problem lies partly in Viet-Nam; but it also lies in the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Israel

Mike Feldman and I have talked further about tanks for Israel and we agree that the best way to put it up to you at this stage is by sending you two memoranda -- Mike's is at Tab A and mine is at B.

Since Mike agrees with my Tab B, you can expedite this by giving a signal of approval -- and keep Mike's longer memo for leisure reading. The consequences of such approval would be that we would not decide on tanks before June.

m.f.B.  
McG. B.

Tab B Approved WBF ✓

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Rick:  
Will you  
draft a comprehensive  
NSAM to carry out

B  
mfb  
orig in NSAM 290

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Israel

I agree with the Bundy memorandum. However, I would urge that we make the decision as soon as possible as to whether or not we are going to supply tanks to Israel, leaving for a later determination the terms under which they will be acquired.

If it is decided that we should supply the tanks, I should like to be able to convey this decision, in confidence, to the leaders of the Jewish community. They have shown in the past that they can keep a secret.

Attached is an elaboration of my views on this problem.

Myer Feldman

33-6

A

TANKS FOR ISRAEL

In an earlier memorandum I set forth the political problems we might face if the decision was deferred too long. There are foreign policy aspects to the delay which are even more important.

It seems to me that the logic in favor of providing tanks for the Israeli armed forces is inexorable. In view of the commitments expressed many times by many Presidents to come to the assistance of Israel if she is attacked, our basic policy must be directed toward the prevention of any aggression. Our policy must be such that American intervention will not be necessary.

Basic to the prevention of war is the maintenance of a balance of forces between Israel and her neighbors. There is no doubt of the growing preponderance of Arab tank strength. Nor is there any question about the Israeli need for modern tanks if Israel is to be able to meet the military threat posed by Russian tanks in Arab hands. Israel feels she must have at least half as many tanks as Egypt. I believe that everyone who has considered this problem believes that the balance of forces needed to prevent conflict requires that a means be found to provide the Israeli Government with between 300 and 500 modern tanks.

There are four problems:

1. It is said that any announcement indicating American military support for the Israeli army would disrupt our relationships with the Arab nations. I must confess that I am somewhat skeptical of this argument. I have heard it in connection with every American action designed to give comfort to Israel. We should remember that most of the nations depend upon us for large-scale aid. I notice that, even so, they more often support the Soviet Union than the United States in the United Nations. I read their constant denunciations of American imperialism; and I am more inclined to believe that firmness will attract respect than that concessions will win their favor.

Anyhow, if carried too far, this argument will result in actions justifying and encouraging forces in Israel, which have had very little success thus far, that are much more militant.

2. It is said that a decision should be deferred as long as possible. We have already waited five months. These are long-lead time contracts. Unless the Israeli Government receives some indication that American tanks may be provided, it will be compelled to make its plans on the basis of other assumptions. Already, I understand, they have agreed to purchase 90 British tanks.

Those who favor letting the Israeli Government purchase their tanks elsewhere overlook the shock to American-Israeli relationships which would result from our action, the balance of payments effects and, most important, the inability of the Israeli Government to purchase any substantial number of tanks if they are sold on the usual terms for military purchases. Besides, ours are the best tanks. To prevent war, these tanks are needed before the disparity between Egyptian and Israeli equipment becomes too great.

3. There is some feeling that we should not agree to the tank sale unless the Israeli Government gives up its intention to purchase ground-to-ground missiles. I find myself sympathetic with this position. However, it is difficult to tell a sovereign power what weapons it needs for its defense. The existence of Egyptian missiles and the fact that the Israeli Government has already contracted for 25 experimental missiles from France makes it impossible to condition the sale of tanks upon a renunciation of missiles.

But there are two alternatives. First, Israel could give up its right to missiles of any kind, including Hawks, if Egypt would enter into a similar agreement. Israel would agree to this, but there is little chance that Egypt will.

Second, we might be able to persuade Israel to refrain from any further purchases of missiles without prior consultation with us. In order to do this, however, it would be necessary for me to explore the question frankly and candidly with Prime Minister Eshkol, and I would have to know what we might be prepared to do in consideration for such an understanding.

4. Finally, and most important of all, there is the problem of terms of sale. Assuming it is decided that we supply Israel with the tanks, a 500 tank order would cost in the neighborhood of \$75 million. This is a staggering sum for a country with a total budget of only \$1 billion. The Israeli Government has asked for grant aid. We have explored various other kinds of assistance in the past; we have often increased the amount of development loans in order to free funds for the purchase of military equipment. But with the steadily decreasing foreign aid appropriations this is becoming increasingly difficult. Thus far I have seen no proposal looking toward the solution of this problem.

MF - 3/14/64

33-d

B.

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tanks for Israel

I still think the best way to go ahead with this issue is to push any decision ahead of us. I think we should use Mike Feldman's visit to Israel as a reconnaissance in force, providing him with a detailed set of probing questions and comments, but carefully withholding any U. S. Government decision on the ground that such decision should await the meeting between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol.

In this same spirit I would now send out a White House directive to State, Defense, and CIA to review all aspects of this problem -- tanks, missiles, Arab reactions, actual levels of Israeli procurement elsewhere, etc. etc., with the object of presenting a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation, with dissents, not later than May 1. I would plan to review this recommendation here, with Feldman, Komer, and myself participating, and then bring it to you for decision safely ahead of the Eshkol meeting.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-108  
By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~SECRET~~

354

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Feldman

I wonder if we wouldn't save the President time if we combined our papers on the tank issue. Here is what I would send, along with your most recent memo, if it is agreeable to you.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wish you'd look at this file. Chester Bowles is most anxious to come back briefly to touch base with you, Rusk, and McNamara. As you know, Bowles sees big things as cooking in India/Pakistan and reportedly feels the top echelon in State is not paying enough attention to his repeated warnings. Komer, who watches these matters closely for us, thinks he's more right than wrong.

You'll see that we tried pointedly to sidetrack Bowles, but didn't succeed. Our own instinct is still to keep him on the job, although if you would like to have a top level review of Indian policy it would be useful to call him back.

Bowles also poses a bit of a morale problem, largely of his own making. He's obviously worried as to his standing back here. Since he's done a good defensive job and is probably the best man we could have in India now, we might cheer him up by a message from you if you don't want him back just now.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 11-2-78By kg, NARS, Date 6-20-79

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Your appointment with Ambassador Bohlen

Attached are two memoranda that you may want to look at before you talk with Ambassador Bohlen tomorrow. At Tab A is Bohlen's own view of matters, and at Tab B is a report on what de Gaulle told the Italians, which comes from an Italian source that has been found unusually reliable over a long period of years.

Bohlen's summary view is that there is not much to be done, but that we should not look as if we enjoy what the General is doing very much.

I checked my rather gloomy report on Bohlen's own state of mind with Bill Tyler, who has known him longer and is a very cool head, and he reports that I must have caught Bohlen at a bad moment. He thinks he is fundamentally in a fairly cheerful frame of mind, and that a talk with you is bound to help him along. Since neither Tyler nor I share Walter Lippmann's hope of working any wondrous change in de Gaulle, we are not inclined to attribute trouble on that front to Bohlen, but Bohlen himself has always been sensitive to the fact that people did expect wonders of him when he went, and this may be a part of his frustration.

Tab B represents a recent and striking piece of evidence of de Gaulle's own attitude towards the United States. I am afraid that it rings true, although I do not think we need to find French agents under every bed as Joe Alsop does.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

*Bohlen will bring a memo on de Gaulle and  
Lodge's requests.*

35a

A

356

1362

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 11 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bohlen Memorandum on French Foreign Policy

Enclosed is a memorandum Ambassador Bohlen has prepared on current French foreign policy together with a number of recommendations which I believe you will find of interest. Ambassador Bohlen is calling on you tomorrow morning at eleven o'clock.

*DR*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:  
Bohlen memorandum.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority STATE 8/12/74  
By JR, NARS, Date 3/1/77

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority STATE 8/12/74  
By TB, NARS, Date 3/1/77

REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY  
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper does not deal with domestic problems since de Gaulle has this situation very well in hand and pending his decisions on elections, there should be no change.

Fundamental and basic element in de Gaulle's foreign policy is his strongly held and unchangeable conviction that the nation (the state and not the people) represents the permanent unit in international affairs. Its authority and sovereignty must under no conditions be watered down or weakened in any way. The conception of France as a nation is imbued with almost mystical quality and de Gaulle is embodiment of this national spirit (see first page of his War Memoires.)

If this concept is fully understood almost all de Gaulle's actions in foreign affairs in last five years are logical, deductible, and quite consistent. It explains de Gaulle's antagonism to the organization of NATO, his aversion to anything that smacks of integration. It is the reason why he has withdrawn French fleet from NATO control and Air Force and two French divisions. It is also national concept which has caused him to refuse permission for storage of American atomic weapons on French soil.

De Gaulle's conception of nation in defense matters was well expressed in 1959 talk at French Military Institute. His concept of alliance is old-fashioned 1914 type, i. e. , alliance operates only in times of crisis (war danger) but not in interim periods. This explains his solidarity with United States and Alliance at time of Berlin crisis and his support of United States in Cuba. It should, however, be emphasized that support in time of crisis when issue of war is present does not (repeat not) obtain a non-crisis period. De Gaulle has in effect withdrawn France from Alliance in political or diplomatic sense and, to a large extent, in military matters.

No actions of any importance that he has taken in diplomatic field have been in consultation or even after discussion with any of his allies: Veto of Britain in Common Market, recognition of Communist China, attitude on Cyprus, actions in Africa, ~~and trip to South America~~ are cases in point.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

De Gaulle's conception of the nation is particularly relevant when it applies to relations of a middle-sized power (France) and a great power (United States.) This conception conditions all of de Gaulle's attitudes towards United States and forces him by its logic to take opposite position as matter of principle because of his belief that too close association would cause France automatically to become satellite. It is also explanation of force de frappe which, in turn, logically requires distortion of postwar history in order to justify current policy; for example, doubt as to United States intentions in event of war must be spread by French propaganda in order to justify heavy expenditures for force de frappe.

Communist Chinese Recognition: Recognition is primarily act demonstrating French independence of American control in foreign affairs. It is noteworthy that no consultation of any kind with any other country was involved. Evidence would indicate that actual discussions took place in Switzerland and that Edgar Faure's role in this matter has been considerably exaggerated. It appears that Chinese asked two conditions: a) French support in UN, and b) breach with Formosa. France refused accept these conditions as formal conditions for recognition, but it is very probable that Chinese were told sub rosa that they would be met since French actions subsequent in both fields would appear to bear this out. In addition, France possibly foresaw crisis in Vietnam and wished France to be installed in Peking in order to take advantage of crisis when it comes.

Four levels of opinion can be discerned in France:

1. De Gaulle
2. Government, Ministers, Civil Servants, etc., of which I would say ninety percent do not agree with de Gaulle's conduct of foreign affairs and, on the whole, are basically friendly to the United States.
3. Young Gaullists, UNR. These are irresponsible, unintelligent, authoritarian-minded, and go farther than de Gaulle in anti-American attitudes. Peyrefitte

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

belongs to this group and his conduct of French propaganda is clearly marked by strong anti-American trend.

4. French people as a whole. Up to the present time, French people, on balance, seem to have little anti-Americanism, but this is situation that can, of course, change if current propaganda continues.

There would seem to be little chance of any change occurring for the better as long as de Gaulle is in power. It is very doubtful if he wants anything from the United States and more likely that he prefers a certain amount of friction. He is, however, well aware of the fact that French survival is dependent on American military protection. At the present time, he seems to have forgotten about Europe and his major attention seems to be to so-called "third world," particularly South America. The danger here is that he will start currents which will be stronger than he anticipates. It is not clear whether he recognized the hard core anti-American feeling in Latin America is Communist inspired, which since 1944, has treated United States as public enemy number one.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is always easier to say what should not be done in regard to de Gaulle than what should be done. For the purposes of elimination, I shall start with attitudes or actions which I am convinced would be unwise to take in regard to General de Gaulle.

1. At the present moment, there seems to be no question of any meeting with de Gaulle. There would appear to be no subjects that could be profitably discussed, and since de Gaulle will not come to the United States and the President will not leave the country before the elections, there is no possibility at least until the elections.
2. No concession or bribe of any kind will affect de Gaulle's attitude or policies. He would regard any such gesture on our part as confirmation of the correctness of his views and his just due without seeing any necessity to change his position at all.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

3. The only type of action which would affect de Gaulle's policy would be a fairly basic change in circumstances in which these policies operate. However, it appears obvious that any change in our European policy would affect other Europeans equally if not more than France. For example, a shift in our strategy which would threaten an important cutback in our troops in Europe would be quite unacceptable to the Germans and even if threatened for the sake of influencing France, would be most upsetting to the Germans and plant suspicions which would continue. The same effect would be produced on Italy and other European Allies who have, on the whole, remained faithful to the United States. We should avoid pinpricks and small actions which look as though they are based upon irritation or ill temper. These could only help de Gaulle without producing any change whatsoever in his attitude or policies.
  
4. In any bilateral relationship with France, whether military or scientific, we should make sure that the United States receives an adequate quid pro quo for anything that it gives. In the psychological and publicity field, we should avoid giving the appearance that all is well with our relations and that the differences are merely superficial. I would certainly not recommend we say the opposite, but I think that whenever we apply soothing words (which however occasionally may be necessary for United States public opinion) we should realize that these are seized upon by de Gaullist publicity machines to support the contention that de Gaulle is on the right track. My recommendation, wherever possible, is that there should be no statement from leading officials -- i. e., the President or Secretary of State, dealing directly with our relations with France. We should avoid taking the initiative in any statements, and if reply to questions is necessary, it should, on the whole, be confined to generalities which say very little one way or another.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

5. We should keep under constant review the possibility of halting the delivery of tanker aircraft in the event that French policies become more blatantly hostile to our purposes or there is some single issue which is given great publicity.
6. In regard to Europe, we should continue our advocacy, although not stated too often, of our belief in and support for European unification and for partnership with the United States.
7. In the economic field, we should continue to work for the Kennedy Round, but we must be cognizant of the fact that in direct bilateral economic relations, the United States is heavily favored. (United States exports to France were up sixteen percent for a total of over nine hundred million dollars. Imports in 1963 were down a few percentage.) Since we enjoy a very profitable trade with France, this is not the subject on which we can initiate any retaliation. The same, I would say, goes for the financial questions.
8. We should, if asked, say we welcome French interest and involvement in Latin America. At the same time, we should observe most carefully the tone and substance of General de Gaulle's statement on his two visits insofar as they deal with the United States and adjust our attitude accordingly.

In short, there would appear to be very little that we can do to make plain our displeasure with current French attitude; I think calmness and attention to detail so that we do not go too far in the direction of polite soothing remarks, avoiding the other extreme of petulant and ill-tempered criticism. It should always be borne in mind that de Gaulle cannot have very many more years of being in power, and the present indications are that a very large portion of the objectionable features of current French policy would disappear with his departure from power.

CONFIDENTIAL

35d

B

35e

1343

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

*Bundy 35-R*

10 MAR 1964


*Shift  
meet  
Wed*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Views of President Charles de Gaulle  
Regarding the United States, Europe  
and NATO; and Italian Reaction

1. The following report reflects remarks made by President Charles de Gaulle during a conversation with a restricted number of the Italian delegation accompanying President Antonio Segni on his visit to France from 19-22 February 1964 and Italian reaction to those remarks. The information on which this report is based was acquired in part on 22 February and in part on 3 March

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs  
(S)



- a. De Gaulle is reported as saying that France is violently opposed to the blatant American imperialism now rampant in the world. France will continue to "attack" and to oppose the United States in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. In this connection, de Gaulle used the Gabon incident as an illustration of American meddling and imperialistic aims.
- b. De Gaulle spoke of "equality" and "partnership" with the United States in terms which indicated he meant Franco-United States equality rather than European-United States equality.
- c. He said that Britain does not want to merge herself into Europe and will not come into the proposed union.
- d. Regarding European Union policy, de Gaulle held to his old view that he would accept only the oft-repeated plan for a "Directorate" for Europe and nothing else. He

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 2000

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-28**  
**By is, NARA Date 4-7-00**



~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

*This is untrue  
We sent a debriefing  
answer.*

said that he had written the then President Eisenhower and then Prime Minister Macmillan in September 1958 suggesting a three-power directorate for Europe, but that he had never received a reply.

e. At one point de Gaulle spoke of a formal treaty between Italy and France, one somewhat like the Franco-German treaty. When asked what need there was for such a treaty since Italy and France were already allied in NATO, de Gaulle replied, "NATO, blah, blah, blah..."; and, whenever NATO was mentioned, de Gaulle changed the subject.

2. Minister of Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Saragat, members of the Italian delegation, and other high level officials of the Italian Foreign Office reacted strongly to de Gaulle's views and comments. The de Gaulle conversation was described as follows: It was a shocking experience; the General is very dangerous and will seek to have his way at all costs. The United States can look forward to a very real French anti-United States activity in Latin America very soon. Although any United States pressure directly on de Gaulle at this time would be counterproductive and may even worsen the situation, de Gaulle will listen when spoken to as strongly and as clearly as the Italians spoke. Moreover, if Benelux representatives and the Germans speak to him equally strongly and equally clearly, the effect may be beneficial, for five Powers talking strongly may cause him to review his thinking.

3. Despite the strong feelings rampant among knowledgeable Italian officials, the Italian Government is not considering any action or proposals at this time in respect to the information set forth above.

4. A copy of this report is being made available to the Department of State for Ambassador Bohlen.



Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

CSDB-3/659,794

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

Orig.: The Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U.S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

The Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs  
Department of State

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

-3-

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Responses to Ambassador Lodge

This is Mike Forrestal's summary of our responses to Lodge's requests. The only partially open questions are stated at 1 and 2 in his memorandum, and I think we are in slightly better shape on both issues than Forrestal makes out. In any event, I do not think we should do more while McNamara is away. The time to make our side of the record complete is after his return.

McG. B.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State 10-27-78; NSC 8-24-79  
By isp, NARS, Date 9-24-79

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Responses to Ambassador Lodge

I have reviewed all of the State, CAS and some of the AID messages between Saigon and Washington since January 1, 1964 to ascertain the extent to which we have responded to Lodge's requests.

Lodge has made two major policy requests to which we have not responded completely because the complexity and gravity of the issues they raise require considerable planning and decisions at the highest level:

1. French Stand on Neutralization

On January 29th Lodge asked us to go to de Gaulle, tell him that we had unconfirmed reports of French plotting against the GVN, and ask him what he could do to correct any false impressions. He raised the same question more specifically again on February 24th when he asked the Department to try to get a public statement from de Gaulle clarifying the French stand on neutralism. There have been a series of exchanges between Bohlen, the Department and Lodge in an effort to comply with Lodge's request. To date Bohlen has not gone further than making a rather mild case with Couve de Murville, whose reaction was not very satisfactory. Bohlen is coming home; and Lodge has been told that McNamara will speak with him and the Secretary directly about this matter on McNamara's return from Saigon. In my opinion this needs watching, since my reading of the cables suggests that neither the results achieved nor our efforts so far are yet responsive to the force of Lodge's request.

2. Action against North Viet-Nam

In two cables in the early part of February, Lodge raised in a very tentative way the possibility of bringing pressure to bear upon North Viet-Nam, and he referred to a memorandum which he had left with Governor Harriman on the subject last fall. As early as January 20th

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00017444

By ju/ics NARA. Date 10-16-98

~~SECRET~~

36  
✓ Pres

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

he suggested that our objectives should not be the overthrow of Ho Chi Minh, nor a direct challenge of the entire Communist bloc. Instead the pressures should be designed to permit the North to give ground and save face; and they should have maximum deniability. In both his memorandum to Harriman and subsequent cables, he has recommended that we use a carrot as well as a stick. The two carrots he has in mind are sales of rice from the South to the North and eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops. We have responded that we agree in general with his suggestions and have set our planning people to work. One of the major objects of McNamara's visit to Saigon is to develop recommendations along these lines. I think we are in pretty good shape on this one. (Relevant cables are attached.)

#### Miscellaneous

Shortly before the last coup Lodge asked for a Presidential message to General Minh. The following day such a message was dispatched.

Lodge requested that the services of an expert in political organization be made available to assist the GVN. Mr. Napolitan has been made available at Larry O'Brien's suggestion.

Lodge asked for authority to designate additional areas for crop destruction; such authority has been granted.

Lodge asked for advance authority to permit dependents to travel home, and this has been given. He is not in favor of a mass involuntary evacuation of dependents but is about to discuss this with McNamara in Saigon.

In response to a Saigon intelligence cable, the Secretary of State has urged Lodge to take all possible measures to protect himself against assassination and accident.

Lodge recommended U.S. economic support for the pay increases to the GVN military and paramilitary organizations. AID has replied by earmarking between \$10 - \$15 million of the President's contingency fund for this purpose if it becomes necessary. At the moment Embassy Saigon appears to agree with Minister of Finance Oanh that the pay increases can be absorbed in the GVN budget.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Embassy Saigon forwarded a report from the GVN Minister of Economy that rice shortages were developing in Saigon and would have an adverse political effect on the government. AID replied that we were prepared to deliver PL 480 rice if this became essential. Later messages implied that Embassy Saigon is satisfied.

There is attached for future reference a list of the relevant cables.

Michael V. Forrestal

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 11/17/75  
By JTB, NARS, Date 3/1/77

~~SECRET~~

LIST OF CABLES

CAS Saigon 3902: Lodge prescribes guidelines for increased pressure on North Vietnam.

DE ESI CAS (01/0841Z): Lodge agrees with Kennedy decision on change of policy and personnel.

Saigon 1413, 1431: Lodge suggests first approach to De Gaulle.

SecState 1130: Department says such approach would be forthcoming.

Saigon 1398: Lodge asks for letter to General Minh.

Saigon 1257: Lodge asks for political organizer.

SecState 1031 and 1095: President and State act on above request.

Saigon 1543: Lodge asks authority for crop destruction.

SecState 1357: Crop destruction authorized.

SecState 1309 and Saigon 1621: SecState tells Lodge take all personal precautions against accidents.

Saigon 1622: Lodge appreciates prompt action on dependent travel. Does not want total evacuation.

Saigon 1613: Lodge again asks for statement from De Gaulle.

SecState 1340: Secretary's answer to above, saying we are trying.

Saigon 1612: Request for troop pay and reservation of \$10 - \$15 million in President's contingency fund.

AIDTO 2335: Affirmative answer to above.

AIDTO 1284 and TOAID 2334: Saigon rice problem.

Saigon 1583: Lodge's original request for troop pay.

CAP 14047: President's affirmative answer.

Saigon 1594: Lodge suggests Hanoi be told every attack on US personnel will produce a reaction against NVN.

~~SECRET~~

PI 002  
PPBSF  
DEFSI 94964A 23/05Z Jan  
~~A 23/0005Z JAN~~

36-C

P 230004Z

RECEIVED  
WHASA

FM CIA

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~1964 JAN 23 00 42~~

STATE

DOD

JCS

DDI

31844

*Guid Nam*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR MR. KOMER

JOINT STATE-DOD-CAS MESSAGE 94964A (sent also as 94963)

PERSONAL FOR: AMBASSADOR LODGE, GENERAL HARKINS AND CAS CHIEF

1. THE COMPREHENSIVE 12-MONTH MILITARY/CAS PLAN FOR INCREASED PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO MR. MCNAMARA AND MR. MCCONE IN SAIGON ON 19 DECEMBER, WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THEIR RETURN. AT THEIR RECOMMENDATION, THE PRESIDENT CREATED AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE REPRESENTING STATE, DEFENSE AND CAS TO SELECT FROM THE SAIGON PLAN THOSE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE MOST FEASIBLE, AND WHICH PROMISE THE GREATEST RETURN FOR THE LEAST RISK. MEANWHILE, ASSEMBLY OF REQUIRED MATERIEL HAS PROCEEDED AT HIGH PRIORITY.

2. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE WERE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT. THAT APPROVAL EMBODIES EXECUTION, IN A FOUR-MONTH PERIOD COMMENCING ON 1 FEBRUARY, OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS OF COMUSMACV PLAN 34A-64:

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-298**  
**By cb, NARA Date 9-20-99**

A. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION: ACTIONS NUMBERED THROUGH 4, APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C, AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WILL SUPPORT ACTION NUMBER THREE AS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THERE SHOULD BE NO GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ACTION INTO THE DMZ.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: ACTIONS NUMBER 5 THROUGH 14, AND 18 THROUGH 22, APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C.

C. PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION ACTIONS: ACTIONS NUMBERED 31 (TO BE REPEATED ONE TIME), 32, 33, 35, 37, 42 THROUGH 48, 54, AND 55, APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C. NONE OF FOREGOING WILL INVOLVE OVERFLIGHTS OF LAOS.

D. THE FOREGOING TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY FURTHER DETAILED PLANNING, FOR CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE PROGRAM IF SO DIRECTED.

3. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE ACTIONS SELECTED CAN BE PLAUSIBLY DENIED BY THE US. OUR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT DENIABILITY BY THE GVN, WHILE LESS PERSUASIVE, SHOULD STILL BE ATTEMPTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PURPOSES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE BASIC PLAN MAY, IN SOME CASES, BE BETTER ACHIEVED BY GVN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THEIR COMPLICITY. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT.

4. THE FOLLOWING STRUCTURE FOR EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 HAS BEEN APPROVED BY ALL AGENCIES HERE, SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS FROM THE AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV, OR CAS CHIEF, SAIGON:

- A. OVER-ALL POLITICAL CONTROL IN SAIGON - AMBASSADOR
- B. OVER-ALL OPERATIONAL CONTROL - COMUSMACV.
- C. PLANNING, LIAISON, LOGISTICS, TRAINING AND ADVICE - JOINT MACV-CAS TASK FORCE, REPORTING DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV. CHIEF OF TASK FORCE TO BE A COLONEL LEVEL MILITARY OFFICER SELECTED BY COMUSMACV; DEPUTY CHIEF OF TASK FORCE TO BE A CAS OFFICER TO BE SELECTED BY CAS CHIEF, SAIGON.

D. OTHER PERSONNEL OR TASK FORCE TO BE CONTROLLED BY MACV AND CAS AS REQUIRED AND AGREED LOCALLY.

5. ALL OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WILL BE UNDER THE TASK FORCE DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND ALL IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES OF THE US MILITARY AND CAS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT OF APPROVED OPERATIONS. ASSUME AMBASSADOR WILL MONITOR PROGRAM ON CONTINUING BASIS.

6. REPORTS OF ACTION TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE PLAN APPROVED HEREIN WILL BE FORWARDED VIA CAS CHANNELS WEEKLY, WITH STATE, OSD, JCS AND CASAS ADDRESSESS, AND WITH INFO COPIES TO EMBASSY SAIGON, AND CINCPAC. HIGH LEVEL GROUP HERE WILL REVIEW THESE REPORTS.

7. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOW REQUIRED IN SAIGON TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROGRAM ARE:

A. THE NEED FOR THE GVN TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE PLANNING PROCESS, ON A MOST DISCREET BASIS, SINCE COVERT USE OF THE BEST OF THEIR REGULAR FORCES, AS WELL AS SOME OF THEIR MILITARY RESOURCES, WILL BE REQUIRED. THIS MAY BE DONE AT ONCE, IN THE MANNER CONSIDERED BY YOU AND GENERAL HARKINS TO BE MOST SECURE.

B. SECURITY AND COVER ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CREATED TO SUPPORT THE EXPANDED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. COMMENTS ON THIS, WHEN CRYSTALLIZED, ARE REQUESTED.

GP-1

4300

~~TOP SECRET~~

I 011

PP ESF

DE ESI 95716 20/2150Z JAN

P 201951Z

RECEIVED  
WHASA

*C-Alexander for  
Forrestal*

*36 d*

FM: CIA

TO: WHITE HOUSE

1964 JAN 20 22 19  
MR. MC GEORGE BUNDY

*Wed Nov*

ZEN/PENTAGON

**31627**

MAJ GEN VICTOR H. KRULAK

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (SACSA)

ZEN/STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROGER HILSMAN

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAR

EASTERN AFFAIRS

*S*

ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Jan. 20*

FOLLOWING IS CAS SAIGON 3902

REF  WASHINGTON 94963 (SAME AS 94964 RECEIVED BY ADDRESSEES)

FOLLOWING ARE AMBASSADOR LODGE'S COMMENTS ON REF.

1. YOUR  WASHINGTON 94963. HEREWITH MY COMMENTS AS REQUESTED  
YOUR PARAGRAPH 4.

2. I WELCOME EXERTING INCREASED PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM WITH  
THE DOUBLE AIMS OF BRINGING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE BY VC AND PATHET LAO  
AND THE NEUTRALIZING NORTH VIETNAM, TURNING IT INTO AN ORIENTAL  
YUGOSLAVIA. I DO NOT THINK IT PROFITABLE TO TRY TO OVERTHROW HO CHI  
MINH, AS HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TOUGHER THAN HE IS.

3. WE SHOULD HAVE IT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT GVN INTENSIFIES  
ITS EFFORTS AS OUR OPERATIONS START IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DEFINITE  
COMMITMENT APPROVED BY MACV.

**SANITIZED**

Authority NLS-019-001-001/4

By jc NARA, Date 11-19-09

**MORI**

Presidential Library Review of State Department Equities is Required

4. REUR PARAGRAPH 7, PROPOSE TO BRING GVN INTO TRAINING

PROCESS BY PERSONALLY EXPLAINING TO GENERAL MINH THE PURPOSE AND GENERAL TYPES PLANNED OPERATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION GENERAL MINH LIKELY TO ASK FOR U.S. ESTIMATE OF ACTIONS NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) MIGHT TAKE IN RETALIATION. I INTEND TO ASK GENERAL MINH FOR GVN ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE NVN RETALIATORY ACTIONS IN ANY EVENT, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ESTIMATE OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE HAVING IN MIND POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS.

5. ASSUME THAT ACTUAL OPERATIONS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING POLITICAL ACTIONS DESIGNED TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN MINDS OF NVN LEADERS (AND THEIR CHINESE MENTORS AND SOVIET ASSOCIATES IF ANY) THAT THESE OPERATIONS ARE MERELY FIRST PHASE AND EXAMPLES OF TYPE OF TREATMENT NVN CAN EXPECT IF THEY PERSIST IN THEIR SUPPORT OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION IN SEA. IN THIS REGARD, WE HOPE THAT OUR PRESSURE PROGRAM COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD: (A) PERMIT HO CHI MINH TO GIVE GROUND WITHOUT LOSING FACE; AND (B) NOT GIVE APPEARANCE OF A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE ENTIRE COMMUNIST BLOC. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE THEREFORE IS TO MAINTAIN THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE DENIABILITY ON PART OF OURSELVES AND GVN (PARAGRAPH 3 REFTEL).

6. IN GENERAL WE BELIEVE THE SOONER THE NVN LEADERS REALIZE THEY ARE DEALING WITH THE U.S. (ALBEIT FROM DISCREET SOURCES) THE BETTER. FURTHER, NVN WOULD TEND TO LOSE LESS FACE IN GIVING GROUND TO U.S. RATHER THAN TO SVN.

7. AS A RELATED SUBJECT, WE WONDER WHETHER IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INJECT A CARROT ALONG WITH THE STICK AT SOME LATER STAGE IN THE PRESSURE PROGRAM. THE CARROTS MIGHT BE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL (ASSUMING WE ARE GOING TO DO IT IN ANY CASE) AND SOME SVN RICE TO ASSUAGE NVN'S OBVIOUS AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES. DEPENDING ON PROGRESS OF EVENTS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO GAIN SOME ADVANTAGE FROM ANTICIPATED U.S. ACTION, (I.E., WITHDRAWAL OF SOME U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL) WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD NOT BE MATCHED BY ANY CORRESPONDING ACTIONS ON PART OF NVN.

8. DO NOT CONSIDER THAT  WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY CHANNEL WHEN, AS, AND IF THE TIME COMES THAT WE WANT TO GET A THOUGHT ACROSS TO NVN.

25X1

9. GENERAL HARKINS CONCURS.

GP-1

2400

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

36 e

*Will Tom File*

TO : WASHINGTON HONOLULU  
FROM : SAIGON 3943, 21 JANUARY 1964  
REF : CAS WASHINGTON 94963

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE. PASS TO SECSTATE,  
JCS. HONOLULU PASS TO CINCPAC, POLAD.

1. ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, GEN HARKINS AND CAS STATION CHIEF,  
I SPENT TWO HOURS WITH GENERALS MINH AND KIM, PRIME MINISTER  
THO AND FOR MIN LAM LATE YESTERDAY ON PLAN FOR EXPANDING  
OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM PER CAS WASHINGTON 94963.  
DISCUSSION OF RECENT FRENCH ACTIONS AND OF LAOTIAN MATTERS IN  
SEPARATE TELEGRAMS.

2. I OPENED DISCUSSION WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

QUOTE: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS DRAFTED A PLAN,  
WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, FOR EXPANDED  
OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BEGIN  
FEBRUARY 1. WE DESIRE YOUR AGREEMENT AND THAT YOU SHOULD  
CARRY IT OUT. THE EXECUTION OF THE WHOLE PLAN WOULD TAKE  
12 MONTHS.

AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT IS CONTEMPLATED, THERE WOULD BE  
CLANDESTINE, AGGRESSIVE AND DARING ATTACKS, PRINCIPALLY IN THE  
NATURE OF SABOTAGE, AGAINST THE PORT OF HAI PHONG; AND DESTRUCTION  
OF PETROLEUM RESERVES AND OF NAVAL INSTALLATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFK 477-10001-10405  
By fw, NARA. Date 10-16-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE GOAL IS TO CONVINCING THE RULERS OF NORTH VIETNAM THAT IF THEY CONTINUE THEIR WAR-LIKE ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THERE WILL BE REACTIONS FROM OUR SIDE WHICH WILL BE MORE AND MORE EXPENSIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE FOR THEM. AFTER OPERATIONS AT AN ACCELERATED RATE, THE WORD WOULD BE GOTTEN TO THE CHIEFS OF NORTH VIETNAM THAT THEY OUGHT TO CEASE FIRE AND THAT THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE. THEY SHOULD KNOW THAT SOUTH VIETNAM, WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES, INTENDS TO INCREASE THE RATE AND THE EXTENT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, THUS CAUSING IMMENSE DESTRUCTION ON THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM, IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY.

THE OPERATIONS ARE IN THREE PHASES OF INCREASING INTENSITY. PRESIDENT JOHNSON, ASSUMING THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, HAS APPROVED THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST PHASE ON FEBRUARY 1 FOR FOUR MONTHS, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MAC/V.

WE CONSIDER THAT YOU HAVE GREAT ASSETS HERE AND THAT THE PERSONNEL OF THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL BRANCH WHICH HAS BEEN SO WELL TRAINED CAN SERVE AS A FOUNDATION ON WHICH A MORE EXTENSIVE ORGANIZATION CAN BE BUILT. PERHAPS YOU WILL WANT MAC/V TO MAKE A CONTACT WITH THE SPECIAL BRANCH OF YOUR SPECIAL FORCES HIGH COMMAND. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL. UNQUOTE.

~~TOP SECRET~~<sup>2</sup>

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. REACTION GEN MINH AND OTHERS WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND CONSISTED EXHAUSTIVE CANVASS VARIOUS EVENTUALITIES AND PROBLEMS WHICH COULD RESULT IMPLEMENTATION FIRST PHASE. MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS RAISED AND OUR RESPONSES WERE:

A. AS PAST EXPERIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS IN NORTH HAD BEEN LARGELY FAILURE, DID THIS PLAN OFFER ANYTHING NEW WHICH PROMISED GREATER CHANCE SUCCESS? WE SAID RISK TO PERSONNEL REMAINED HIGH BUT POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS PARTICULARLY IN SABOTAGE OPERATIONS FAR GREATER. LESSONS HAD BEEN LEARNED FROM PAST, AND TARGETS THIS PLAN NOW QUITE DIFFERENT AND MORE FAR REACHING.

B. WHAT WAS OUR REAL MOTIVE? IN SEEKING "CEASE FIRE" WAS THERE NOT POSSIBILITY THIS IN REALITY ONLY DISGUISED STEP TOWARD NEUTRALITY CONFERENCE? GEN KIM HERE RAISED AFP STORY -- HANDLING OF WHICH SUBJECT SEPARATE TELEGRAM THROUGH STATE CHANNELS. I COUNTERED THIS EXTREME SENSITIVITY ANY IDEA "CEASE FIRE" BY ASSURING MINH THAT WHAT WE ALL WANTED HERE WAS UNILATERAL "CEASE FIRE" BY VIET CONG ON ORDERS FROM HANOI RESULTING FROM OUR INCREASING PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. ONCE VC HAD STOPPED FIGHTING GVN AND U. S. WOULD DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C. WHAT WOULD BE UN AND WORLD REACTION? I POINTED OUT OPERATIONS ENVISAGED WOULD BE CLANDESTINE AND IMPLICATION GVN AND U.S. WOULD BE PUBLICLY DENIED, THOUGH OF COURSE HO CHI MINH WOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND WHY. SHOULD GVN AND/OR U.S. EVENTUALLY BECOME PUBLICLY INVOLVED OUR ACTIONS WOULD BE PORTRAYED AS SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION. I BELIEVED THIS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY DONE.

D. REACTIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND CHICOMS. HERE GEN MINH AND OTHERS CITED FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES FOR WHICH PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE IN COURSE DETAILED PRIOR PLANNING EACH OPERATION CONTEMPLATED.

1. GREATLY INTENSIFIED VIET CONG ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN SABOTAGE OF INSTALLATIONS IN SOUTH. WE AGREED RVNAF COULD MEET THIS THREAT. I SAID OUR REACTION COULD ALSO BE STEPPED UP OPERATIONS IN NORTH.

2. IF ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY AGRICULTURE, IN NORTH AS FRAGILE AS REPORTED HANOI MIGHT RESORT TO DIRECTED MASS FLIGHT SOUTH HUNGRY REFUGEES INCLUDING MANY SUBVERSIVE AND COMBATANTS. MINH SAID TRAINED DIVISION COULD EASILY BE HIDDEN IN MILLION REFUGEES. HOW COULD GVN HOPE TO COPE WITH THIS? THEY COULD NOT PREVENT SUCH A MARCH; THEY COULD NOT PUT PEOPLE INTO

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPS; THEY WOULD BE OVERWHELMED. WE AGREED CONTINGENCY PLAN MEET THIS POSSIBILITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.

3. TWO NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS PRESENTLY IN NORTH LAOS MIGHT BE MOVED SOUTH TO "PROTECT REFUGEES". GEN HARKINS POINTED TO IMPOSSIBLE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND EXPRESSED VIEW RVNAF COULD ADEQUATELY MEET ANY OVERT INVASION THIS QUARTER.

4. HOW COULD RVNAF EFFECTIVELY MEET AIR ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM NORTH VIETNAM OR CHINA AND WHAT WOULD U. S. BE PREPARED DO IN THIS EVENTUALITY? MINH SUGGESTED HOSTILE AIRCRAFT COULD BE JETS FLOWN BY CHINESE AND CARRYING EITHER NORTH VIETNAMESE MARKINGS OR NO MARKINGS. I SAID ENTIRELY NEW WAR WOULD RESULT.

5. GEN MINH ASKED WHETHER U. S. PUBLIC PREPARED SUPPORT USAF RETALIATION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE CHINESE TARGETS. WOULD U. S. RETALIATE AT ALL?

E. WOULD ACTIONS CONTEMPLATED INVOLVE MEN AND MATERIALS WHICH COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY BE EMPLOYED AGAINST VIET CONG OR AGAINST CAMBODIA? VERY FAST BOATS WERE BADLY NEEDED IN WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE REPLIED THAT ONLY 200-400 MEN WOULD BE INVOLVED AND EQUIPMENT CONTEMPLATED NOT OF TYPE NEEDED AGAINST VIET CONG.

~~TOP SECRET~~

F. THO SAID THEY WOULD PREFER ACT AGAINST CAMBODIA THAN NORTH VIETNAM. MINH AGREED THIS PREFERABLE FROM MILITARY BUT NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. CAS CHIEF EXPLAINED EQUIPMENT DESIGNED FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM NOT EQUALLY APPROPRIATE FOR USE AGAINST VIET CONG.

G. ON OWN INITIATIVE MINH SUGGESTED ANY ACTIVITIES AGAINST NORTH SHOULD BE PARALLELED BY SOME FORM OF INTENSIFIED EFFORT AGAINST VIET CONG. WE AGREED.

H. IN CONCLUSION GEN MINH STRESSED HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PICK PLAN TO PIECES BUT MERELY WISHED CANVASS ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES SO AS TO BE READY TO MEET THEM. HE FELT PLAN FULLY DESERVED PENETRATING AND CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY AND WOULD ASSIGN GENS DON, KIM, AND CHIEU TO PROCEED FORTHWITH. FINALLY HE EMPHASIZED FACT WE PRESENTING SUCH PLAN AT THIS TIME DEMONSTRATED CONTINUED U. S. DETERMINATION VIGOROUSLY PURSUE WAR IN VIETNAM.

4. GEN DON HAS JUST CONTACTED GEN HARKINS AND SUGGESTED THAT HE AND CAS CHIEF MEET WITH GEN KIM ON 23 JANUARY TO DISCUSS MILITARY DETAILS THIS PLAN.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE JOINT STATE-DOD-CAS COMMENTS ALL POINTS RAISED AND IN PARTICULAR ON 4. D AND E.

6. GEN HARKINS HAS READ AND CONCURS IN THIS MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TOP SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS

V F S

*Printed from...*

L  
Action  
SS  
Info

CONTROL: 14251  
RECD: FEBRUARY 20, 1964, 1:50 PM  
FROM: SAIGON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 1594  
DATE: FEBRUARY 20, 8 P.M.

*Wid*  
*copy 3 sent 2/24*

*Wid of as received  
J.A. [unclear]  
C.V. [unclear]  
27/64*

~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter SEP 5 1978  
By *ing*, NARS, Date 7-16-79

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE.

THIS IS IN FURTHER REPLY TO YOUR 1256.

1. I BELIEVE VARIOUS PRESSURES CAN AND SHOULD BE APPLIED TO NORTH VIET NAM TO CAUSE THEM TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM THEIR MURDEROUS INTRUSION INTO SOUTH VIET NAM. I HAVE MADE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS IN A MEMO DATED OCTOBER 30, 1963, OF WHICH UNDER SECRETARY HARRIMAN HAS A COPY, AND TO WHICH I BELIEVE I REFERRED BRIEFLY TO YOU WHEN YOU RECEIVED ME ON NOVEMBER 24.

2. IN LIGHT OF RECENT TERRORISM AGAINST AMERICANS IN SAIGON, I BELIEVE NORTH VIET NAM SHOULD BE TOLD SECRETLY THAT EVERY TERRORIST ACT AGAINST AMERICANS IN SOUTH VIET NAM WILL PROVOKE SWIFT RETALIATION AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM.

3. ON THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE AVAILABLE TO ME, I DO NOT THINK THIS WILL BRING ON NUCLEAR WAR WITH CHICOMS OR WITH ANYONE. IT SIMPLY PUTS U.S. AND SOUTH VIET NAM ON A PAR WITH CHICOMS AND NORTH VIET NAM IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET CONG. AT PRESENT, WE LET THEM HAVE A SANCTUARY FROM WHICH THEY OPERATE AGAINST US, WHEREAS WE NOT ONLY HAVE NO SANCTUARY, BUT DO NOT OPERATE AGAINST THEM IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY.

4. IF THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATION IS ADOPTED, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ANNOUNCING JUST BEFORE UNDERTAKING IT THAT WE ARE EVACUATING ALL U.S. DEPENDENTS. OUR ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THIS STEP IS BEING TAKEN BECAUSE WE ARE CLEANING THE DECKS FOR ACTION AND INTEND TO MAKE THINGS TOUGHER FOR THE V.C. EVACUATION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO BE A FRIGHTENED RESPONSE DUE TO VIET CONG TERRORISM.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1594, FEBRUARY 20, 8 PM FROM SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

5. BELIEVE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE EXPECT US TO BE BRAVE AND THAT THERE ARE BIG ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY NOT DISAPPOINTING THEM.

6. MY PRESENT POLICY REGARDING AMERICAN DEPENDENTS IS THAT ANY AMERICAN WHO WISHES TO LEAVE VIET NAM AND RETURN TO THE U.S. BE ALLOWED TO DO SO. I RECKON THAT ONLY A FEW WILL WANT TO GO BUT THAT THOSE WHO ARE UNHAPPY HERE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO STAY.

7. IN REGARDS U.S. CHILDREN IN SAIGON, I AM IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PARENTS ORGANIZATION WHOSE PRESENT ATTITUDE IS NOT TO CLOSE SCHOOL. THEY HAVE QUESTION UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW. GENERAL KHANH TOLD ME THIS MORNING HE HOPES TO MOVE SCHOOL VERY SOON TO A MORE SECURE LOCATION.

8. IN ANSWERING YOUR TELEGRAMS, I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED, AND AT THE SAME TIME, NOT GIVE YOU TOO MUCH TO READ. IF YOU WISH MY WIRES TO BE DIFFERENT IN LENGTH AND FORMAT, PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-1.

CFN 1256 1. 30 1963 24 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 1

LODGE

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT, 2/20/64, 8:05 PM.  
Advance copies SS, 2/20, CWO-L.

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

10118

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  collect  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-3-76

By JB, NARS, Date 3-1-77

FEB 21 5 23 PM '64

B  
Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy, SAIGON 1281

EXDIS FOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

I appreciated your 1594 which corresponds to much of my own thinking. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, with my approval have already begun preparing specific plans for pressure against NVN, both in the diplomatic and military fields. Secretary McNamara will be visiting you early in March to review with you that subject and other aspects of the counter-insurgency campaign. Then or very soon thereafter we should make definite decisions.

I agree that any announcement of the evacuation of dependents must be made in such a way as to show we are getting tougher, not softer, and Bob McNamara will take this up with you also. In the meantime, the policy you have suggested in your paragraph 6 is just what I have already instructed the departments to implement.

I value these direct exchanges with you on top policy matters. We should keep them up.

GP-1

Drafted by:

The White House - 2/21/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/VN - William H. Sullivan

Clearances:

The Under Secretary (in draft)

S/S - Mr. Rowe

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

36-h

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action  
SS

Control: 20474  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 29, 1964  
1:46 A.M.

038

Info

FROM: SAIGON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 1663 PRIORITY  
INFO: VIENTIANE 161  
BANGKOK 245  
PHNOM PENH 286  
CINCPAC 872

DATE: FEBRUARY 29, 2 P.M.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPTEL 1319

GENERAL PROGRAM SET FORTH IN REFTEL WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPACT ON KHANH AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERS AND IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM, SHOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. RESOLVE TO RESIST COMMUNIST PRESSURE IN AREA. GVN AND VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO DEPLOYMENT OF F-100'S AND U.S. GROUND FORCES TO THAILAND AS EVIDENCE U.S. INTENTION DEFEND WESTERN POSITION IN SEA.

GP-1.

LODGE

KGG/26

DECLASSIFIED

NOTE: HANDLED AS LIMDIS PER SS-0

Authority \_\_\_\_\_  
By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

361 12101

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

58  
Origin  
55  
Info.

ACTION: AmEmbassy VIENTIANE 664 PRIORITY  
" " BANGKOK 6438 PRIORITY  
" " SAIGON 1319 PRIORITY

FEB 26 8 19 PM '64

INFO: CINCPAC  
AmEmbassy PHNOM PENH 577

Following is a draft memorandum for the President on which your views requested soonest. This memorandum focusses principally on the situation in Laos leaving the Viet-Nam situation to be covered separately following SecDef's visit.

QTE The Communists may well see an opportunity for broad forward movement in the recent course of events in Southeast Asia. The political climate is dominated by widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area sparked by France's recognition of Communist China and deGaulle's statements as well as Prince Sihanouk's efforts to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening to turn to Hanoi and Peiping. The Communists may well believe that the US is unwilling to exert its power effectively to defend its positions in Southeast Asia. They, as well as deGaulle and Sihanouk, must be disabused to any such ideas; and our friends, especially the Thais and Vietnamese, must be reassured as to our

Drafted by: FE - Marshall Green:ej | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances: DoD:ISA - Mr. Solbert  
FE - Mr. Hilsman (in substance)

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM DS-322 5-61

**SANITIZED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-29  
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00



~~TOP SECRET~~

our actions stem from our concern over the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole, and that our actions with respect to Thailand and Laos are indeed coordinated with our assistance to South Viet-Nam.

While none of the actions we propose is decisive in itself, a number of them taken together should represent some actual increase in U.S. military capability within Southeast Asia and demonstrate our concern over the course of recent events together with our determination to reverse that course.

#### Reconvening of Geneva Conference?

We do not propose to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos at this time. Nevertheless, the Communist side could do so, and Prince Souvanna might if he became extremely discouraged over the situation in Laos. Moreover, at some future time, it might actually be in our interest that a Conference be held. In any event, the measures which we are proposing would tend to put us in a stronger position to participate effectively in such a Conference should one occur.

#### Regional Cooperation

In view of Souvanna's key importance in the Geneva settlement, it is essential to coordinate closely with him, obtaining his support or tacit acquiescence.

Because Thailand is an avenue for introducing U.S. power, we must obtain full Thai cooperation and support, consulting in advance and treating the Thai as partners.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

This coordination is particularly important because both Souvanna and the Thai may have reservations on varying specific actions to be taken. Their reaction will be conditioned by the intensity of Communist pressures and our willingness to meet them squarely.

The actions we propose will not in themselves cause Prince Sihanouk to accelerate his timetable to threats unless they are executed in such a manner as to cause suspicion that they are directed against Cambodia.

Recommendations:

1. That we resume the US program of graduated actions which were contained in the memorandum for the President attached to NSAM 256 of July 31, 1963. Specifically, it is recommended that the following actions be taken promptly (exact timing to be determined by the Department of State with the concurrence of the Department of Defense):

a) With regard to Laos:

(1) Encourage selective use of six Lao F-28s against military targets without limitation as to type of weapons involved.

(2) Expand use of PARUS  and other specialist covert teams, approximately doubling the present 65 man strength.

E.O. 3.4 (b) (6)

(3) Resume use of limited South Vietnamese border patrols at the approximate November 1, 1963 level to report on the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam/through Laos and to

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

conduct guerrilla operations against such men and supplies. This would require air re-supply by non-US military crews and appropriate arrangements to coordinate these actions with Hardnose.

(4) Further enlarge guerrilla units in Laos and expand operations in enemy held territory, adding some 5,000 men to the present strength of approximately 23,000.

(5) Expand sabotage operations against the North Vietnamese within Laos and in areas of North Viet-Nam adjacent to Laos by guerrillas launched from Laos.

(6) Continue to conduct high level aerial photo reconnaissance of Laos (timing as mutually agreed by Department of State and Department of Defense).

b) With regard to the deployment of U.S. forces, deploy promptly to Thailand twelve more F-100 aircraft to bring the squadron to full strength of 18. A decision as to the deployment of additional forces, with composition to be recommended by DOD, will be deferred until after the forthcoming conference in Viet-Nam.

c) It is recommended that the current Joint US/Thai Special Warfare Exercise in Thailand be expanded or extended as feasible.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. Among diplomatic measures to be taken, we will:

(a) Consult fully with Thailand. Continue to encourage the  
to  
Thai/strengthen their military forces in Northeast Thailand.  
Coordinate with Thailand the extent and character of SEATO  
approval and involvement, and/or Phoumi

(b) Consult with Souvanna Phouma/in order to obtain his  
support or tacit acquiescence in our course of action.

(c) Obtain maximum support and contributions from the UK,  
Australia and New Zealand.

(d) Urge the British demand Co-Chairmen action in support of  
Souvanna. If the Soviets continue to stall, the British should  
issue a unilateral statement in reply to Souvanna's appeal.

(e) Follow up the British approach with a direct approach of  
our own to the Soviet Co-Chairman.

(f) Inform the Indian and Canadian governments and their ICC  
Commissioners of our projected actions, and continue to press  
them and the Poles for more forceful action in the ICC.

(g) Publicize as appropriate Communist actions in Laos in  
violation of Geneva Accords.

3. Since the solution to the Laotian problem is intimately linked  
with the solution to South Viet-Nam and its relationship to North  
Viet-Nam, it is recommended that the Laotian and South Vietnamese  
problems be discussed further in conjunction following the return

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor from Saigon. UNQTE

For Vientiane: What is your estimate of reactions of Souvanna and Phoumi to above program? What actions should be cleared formally or tacitly with Souvanna and/or Phoumi? Appreciate your comments on initiation of low level photoreconnaissance over Laos, using US or third country aircraft. Request your comments on most effective use of T-28s in Laos, including types of weapons and their employment.

For Bangkok: In addition to your estimate of Thai reactions to foregoing, request your comments on best means to handle with Thais. Request your comment (as well as comments of Vientiane and Saigon) re our intention to bring in F-100s in low key.

For Saigon: We would make clear to Khanh and other military leaders our general program of action. What is your estimate of impact of above actions on situation in South Viet-Nam? Particularly would movement of F-100s to Thailand have salutary impact? What is your estimate South Viet-Nam reaction to deployment US ground forces to Thailand?

GP-1

RUSK

NOTE: Handled as LIMDIS per SS-0

END

~~TOP SECRET~~