

Mrs. Roberts,

~~27~~ 3/10/64

37

For the President's casual reading.

McGeorge Bundy's office

37a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

George McGhee delivered your letter to the Chancellor and reports Erhard saying he is in complete agreement with all the points raised (Tab A).


This exercise was a net gain for us in terms of German-American relations generally, and on the specific issues raised in your letter (Tab B). The most urgent item of business is the question of military offset purchases and we have this one tied down more tightly than before. In addition, we have a point of reference for getting German support - if we want it - in dealing with some other problems (e. g., Vietnam, Cuba and Latin America) which were dealt with in your message to Erhard.

George McGhee will be in Washington at the end of next week, and we will get a fuller play-back from him then.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachments

memo for the
Pres. 37-b



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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

DK
let's make a
brief package
for President on this
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3186 FROM BONN MARCH 6, 8 PM

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By VRS, NARS, Date 2/14/77

EXDIS

DEPTEL 2411

I CALLED ON CHANCELLOR ERHARD TODAY TO PRESENT HIM THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON RECEIVED IN DEPTEL 2411. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE ENDING OF THIS LETTER AND THE HELPFUL PERSONAL REFERENCE IT CONTAINED.

AT MY SUGGESTION, THE INTERPRETER READ THE LETTER TO THE CHANCELLOR. WHEN HE HAD FINISHED THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT

PAGE 2 RUFDBG 930 ~~SECRET~~


HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON ALL POINTS. THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN ARRIVING AT A FULL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US ON ALL QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE LETTER. I TOOK THIS TO INCLUDE HIS ENDORSEMENT OF THE REFERENCE TO THE GERMAN OFFSET PURCHASES, WHICH IT WAS A VERY GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE IN THE LETTER PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WENT SOMEWHAT BEYOND THE CORRESPONDING STATEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE TEXAS MEETING.

OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN THE MEETING WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. GP 4. MCGHEE
BT

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *fw/rj*, NARA, Date *10-22-98*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Defense
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EXDIS

Please deliver the following message to Chancellor from

President:

QUOTE

March 4, 1964

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Ambassador McGhee has told me of his recent meetings with you. I want to tell you how grateful I am for your thoughtfulness and candor in your discussions with him. As I mentioned at the Ranch, the Ambassador has my fullest confidence, support and trust, and your use of him as a channel of communication with me, I feel, is advantageous to both of us.

In this spirit, Mr. Chancellor, I have asked Ambassador McGhee to deliver to you this letter giving you my thinking on some of the problems currently concerning us here in Washington.

As the outset, may I say how much I appreciate your

Drafted by

Draft received from White House

3/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S:Mr. McKesson

Clearances

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continuing personal efforts for achieving an ever-closer relationship between a more cohesive Europe and the United States. As you know from our talks last December, we in the United States are following with sympathetic interest the efforts for strengthening European unity, and it is our sincerest hope that there will be a close identity of views between us all as we move into the very important Kennedy Round.

Among the more urgent issues occupying our attention these last weeks ~~are~~ are Cyprus, Viet-Nam and Cuba.

I personally was pleased with the prompt attention you gave the question of possible German participation in the proposed peace-keeping operation on the embattled island of Cyprus. Although our original peace plan has been set aside, we continue to believe, as we have from the outset, that in the first instance peace must be restored to the island. This is not only necessary for humanitarian reasons; it is an essential prerequisite for a political solution. The issue is now before the Security Council and we are hoping for constructive action there. Events, however, continue to move rapidly and I know we can count on your constructive support in dealing with this grave problem which involves three of our NATO allies.

The problem in Viet-Nam remains difficult. We are firmly committed

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to assist the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam in maintaining their independence and freedom against externally directed and supported subversion and aggression. We believe this struggle can be won and that the new Government of South Viet-Nam under General Nguyen Khanh is capable of bringing this about. Clearly the fight is uphill and the situation serious. And it is for these very reasons we consider proposals for neutralization unfortunate and even harmful. They can serve only to create doubts among the Vietnamese people about the determination of the Free World to help them repel the Communist aggressors. I hope therefore that you and your Government will find ways and means to demonstrate your support for the Government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in their struggle against Communist aggression.

In connection with Cuba, I want to express my personal gratitude for the cooperation we have been receiving from the Federal Republic in limiting Castro's access to those Free World commodities which are so important to his economy. Given the nature of this continuing and complex problem, we will be looking to you and your Government for further assistance in attempting to make clear to our other NATO partners that increased trade and transportation ties with Castro's Cuba, as well as ~~the Government's~~ insurance credits for that

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regime, not only jeopardize our efforts to reduce the Cuban-Communist threat to Latin America; they also undercut our broader purpose of achieving an orderly and progressive development in Latin America.

In this connection, let me say how pleased we were to learn that the Federal Republic and France were considering enlarging their economic assistance to Latin America. This is a constructive gesture, and I hope we can so coordinate our programs that our combined contributions will make for a maximum effort there. In this connection, it has occurred to us that perhaps the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD might provide a useful mechanism for this purpose.

As for aid to the developing nations, I was glad to learn of the Federal Republic's increased contributions during 1963. I hope this contribution can be expanded in 1964. It is increasingly clear that such help is urgently needed for stabilization and growth in the developing areas, which, in turn, affect the Free World's political and economic interests.

At Geneva, where the resumed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference has been meeting since January, there has been little significant progress thus far. But I do not feel there is any reason for pessimism or despair. On the contrary, I hope and think it likely that during the next ~~mi~~ months the Soviet Union will find it in its own self-interest

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to negotiate seriously on the basis of the proposals I set before the Conference on January 21. I firmly believe the proposals I made can lead to a reduction in tensions, and hope that the German Government will not only support our position but will also have additional proposals to suggest. In any event, we intend to continue to consult closely with you as we try to move forward in this very important area, so vital to the security and political objectives of our countries. For there is no doubt in my mind, Mr. Chancellor, that, in the last analysis, a slowing down in the arms race is more likely to help us achieve a free and reunified Germany, than an uncontrolled arms competition which strengthens those elements in Eastern Europe determined to resist change and perpetuate the present division of your country.

Before closing, I should tell you also that I have had very much in mind our exchange of views at the Ranch on defense matters. I particularly appreciated your clear understanding of the importance to the United States -- in adhering to its commitment to maintain six divisions in Germany as long as needed -- of continued offset purchases of military equipment by the Federal Republic. This arrangement clearly is beneficial to ~~both~~ both countries, and, without question, should continue as long as needed. It is a matter of major importance to both our Governments that offset arrangements produce German military orders and payments to

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the United States fully equal to the annual levels of United States dollar defense expenditures of benefit to the Federal Republic's balance of payments. I have been assured by my staff that discussions between our respective defense organizations for future military equipment procurement will be resumed during the next weeks. I also understand from Secretary McNamara that he will be meeting in May with Minister von Hassel to consider the results of these discussions and conclude agreements which will provide for full offset in orders and payments for the periods of 1963-64 and 1965-66. In this connection, Mr. Chancellor, I would personally appreciate your continuing support in this endeavor which is so important for the military security and financial strength of the Atlantic Community.

Thank you again for your kindnesses to Ambassador McGhee. I very much want to remain in touch with you and hope you will feel free to use Ambassador McGhee for this purpose.

Mrs. Johnson and I often talk about your visit last December which we enjoyed so much, and she joins me in sending personal best wishes to you and Frau Erhard.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

UNQUOTE
END

RUSK

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I said last week that in my talk to the Overseas Press Writers I never said anything like what Eli Abel said I said, but a review of the transcript shows that I remembered one of my comments and not the other. If you are still interested, you will find what I did say on this subject marked at pages 7 and 16 of the enclosed copy. I will add only that in my own view these were not incendiary remarks, although in the mood in which Abel found himself I can see that they may have contributed to the trouble.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Talk by McGeorge Bundy
to Overseas Press Writers
at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel
February 26, 1964

Introduction by Mr. Stringer) This is background only -- there is to be no attribution in any way, shape, or form.

Mr. Bundy: Mr. Stringer, ladies and gentlemen. When I was teaching at Harvard, we had an arrangement that since everybody wanted to talk to as large classes as possible about American foreign policy, we would divide the courses up, and we had two. One was called American Foreign Policy and was about great cosmic issues of the day, and I gave that one. And the other one was on the conduct and control of foreign policy and somebody who really knew what he was talking about gave that one. I am happy to reverse the situation now and to take on the assignment of talking about the conduct and control of foreign policy, at least within the Executive Branch, because it's a fair and proper question which necessarily comes up when there is a change in the Presidency. I recall with what insistent urgency people pressed around the White House in the early months of 1961, to try to find out how President Kennedy conducted his business. It's entirely proper that the same kind of interest should develop when there is a change, as so tragically there has been.

Let me say, though, that when I undertook to discuss substance, as a college teacher, it was by design, because the orderly and analytic exposition of just how people should solve a little problem like Berlin, or Germany, or relations with the Soviet Union, is very much easier than it is to say anything really sensible about a process as flexible, variable, and multiple as the process by which the foreign policy decisions are made and carried out. I think one of the things we get into trouble with is the easy assumption that there must be an organizational chart, or an organizational diagram of flow, that will show that things are done in this, that, and the other orderly way. This is not a new problem. Many of you will remember the astonishment with which William Howard Taft once remarked to a friend that he had been having a discussion about the machinery of government with a damfool who really thought it was machinery.

Let me take some examples of the processes that happen to be fresh in my mind because we have been concerned with them in recent weeks. Some of the most important and basic decisions which are taken with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs are taken in the annual budgetary

process. You can't move them out of that process. You can't put that process into the National Security Council or an Executive Committee or any other process than the one which has been developed across the years between the President, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the heads of the great operating departments and agencies. We will be going up fairly soon with the Foreign Aid message, but the guts of that message, the "what" and "how much" and "for what" of that message, have been determined in the budgetary process. This is as it should be -- it's a process which I think gets much less attention from you gentlemen than some others, perhaps because the Bureau of the Budget is more secure than any other agency, or perhaps because you really don't know, some of you, that that is where some of the stories are being hammered out.

Take another example, at the other extreme. When the water is turned off in the island of Cuba for the base of Guantanamo, you have a short-lived and not a very large-scale matter of critical judgment, but it is inevitably a matter which has to be decided by the President, and it is equally inevitably a matter on which he will have to have the responsible counsel of at least three agencies, and at more than one level. He will have to know what the Secretary of State thinks; what the Assistant Secretary for the area thinks; what the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs think; what the man thinks who knows most about the operation of the base -- in this case, a Rear Admiral recently returned. He will probably wish to know what his intelligence advisors assess the meaning of this matter to be, and since he will have to make a judgment rapidly, he will want them all together. And so you get, in a microcosmic form, the process of judgment which was used for the very much larger, more long-drawn-out, and more complex set of deliberations which led to the creation of the so-called Executive Committee in October of 62.

Or take a very complicated interlocking diplomatic question like Cyprus; there you are likely to find that there is an intense discussion involving a number of persons directly with the President, while a basic decision is being hammered out -- in this case, "Will the United States commit its diplomatic effort and concern in tandem with the United Kingdom in response to an urgent request that this be done?" When that decision has been made and when a principal negotiator has been designated, the case will turn into a matter of reports, of regular analysis of what is coming in, of hearing the news, and of occasional judgments about turns of the road, and a close relation will develop between the Secretary and the President and the principal negotiator. If the matter turns, or threatens to turn, to the United Nations, another direct line running both to the Secretary and the President will be opened, because both the stature

of Governor Stevenson and the tradition of the relation between the Ambassador to the United Nations and the White House and State Department require that double channel. It's right that it should be there, and it is necessary that it be open. And this has been true in both Administrations, on a moment-to-moment basis, if there is a vote or a judgment or a decision which commits the President of the United States in that multilateral forum. There is a sense in which the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations is something like the Majority Leader on the Hill, and there is a parallel requirement for direct communication with the head of the government -- though obviously the great role of the Secretary of State enters into any decision which has primarily foreign policy implications.

When you get to the process of preparation for and the conduct of a meeting with a foreign leader, you have meetings in very different sizes and shapes. And you get necessarily a lot of reading; you get a lot of preliminary arguments as to what issues you do and do not wish discussed; you have the usual problem that, as often as not -- at least in my three years of exposure -- you cannot be sure ahead of time what the principal topic of conversation is going to be. You can tell generally with the Germans, because the principal topic of conversation there will be the rediscovery, which in some curious way always seems to have a certain freshness for both governments, that they do in fact trust each other, that they are able to conduct their policies in reasonable harmony, and that it's a good thing for both of them. In our relations with the United Kingdom I think the paperwriters, working as they necessarily do well ahead of the game, have almost invariably been wrong as to what the principal item of actual discussion and argumentation would be. And so you have a different process for that.

Then you have a whole series of problems which work in terms of small incremental change, or modification, or continuous encouragement -- they may be no more than a comment on a telegram or a telephone call about a particular issue. And you have the very large influence which, in the years in which I have been in Washington, is exerted upon the Presidency by the fact that the Presidents I have known read the newspapers. But it would be a great mistake to increase your self-importance and sense of prestige by enlarging on that topic other than to say, in all seriousness, that the conduct of the Presidency requires this kind of attention to what is being said. It's not only that there is a great deal of information in the papers, but that what is in them is what is before the citizen. It's very easy (and it's a thing which both President Kennedy and President Johnson have religiously avoided) --

it's very easy to become the prisoner of a document whose importance is asserted primarily because it has a cover sheet and a series of code words on it -- a document that is somehow claiming to be important because nobody else has seen it. There are many people in Government who think that a paper is more important for that reason, but people who have lived through the process of politics and the process of collecting and sifting information -- people who are used to testing their judgment not only through formal but informal channels -- people, in other words, with the kind of experience and attitude toward the process of assessment and judgment which has been common to both President Kennedy and President Johnson, will use the press -- if only as a second lens upon reality, an opportunity for what one of them has called a stereoscopic look at the thing.

Then you have another kind of process of decision which it's always a mistake to leave out -- utterance: preparation for a press conference; the drafting and clearance of a speech, whether by the President or by a Cabinet member; these are parts of the process of decision. If you look back in history, you can see how often it was that the great judgments of Franklin Roosevelt were crystallized (and sometimes melted a week later) by the process of what he said and did not say in his speeches. It is still true that a speech must go forward with that kind of sense of its significance. So there is obviously a need for consultation and discussion over what will be said, and again it is not a thing which you can do, usually, by a massive process of interdepartmental formal committee organization. It simply doesn't operate that way.

What I am trying to suggest, gentlemen, is that this is a multiple, varied process, which can engage the President's judgment, or his delegation of judgment, by immediate crisis, by constitutional or fiscal process, by the requirement of utterance, by the emergence of a thrust of direction, by conditions set in terms of opinion or legislative attitude, by the initiatives of other governments, and of course, not least, by his own sense of central purpose and direction. The most notable instance of that last force in this Administration that comes right to my mind is the development, under intense Presidential pressure, of a fresh position for the Geneva disarmament negotiations in January.

All of these processes, working together, constitute the moving and multidimensional mosaic of action in the Executive Branch. And there isn't ever going to be a good chart of it, and nobody is going to be able to tell you in any clear-cut way in what way it is alike, and in what way it is different, in one man's Administration from one year to another or in two different individuals' Administrations.

Change does take place when Administrations change. There is a process of learning the job, and more often perhaps of learning the people -- there is a process of finding out what kinds of signals are needed and not needed. This is self-evident. All of you have seen executives and administrators move in and out of desks and chairs, and it takes them awhile. The Presidency, and especially the Presidency when it is concerned with issues of war and peace, is a job which we all know about and which none of us has experienced, and moving into it takes a little time.

But within that requirement of time and that need for familiarization, I will tell you just as a personal matter that the extraordinary thing to me has been the ease, the sense of responsibility, and the running start which President Johnson has brought to this undertaking. And I want also to say, because there has been (there always is) gossip about foreign policy advisors in the White House, that his sense of the relation between White House staff officers and the State Department, has been, I think, generous and sensible. I know that my friends in the State Department and I myself feel as we did six months ago that we don't have much trouble with each other, and we try not to give the President any trouble, because there is plenty of trouble for us all in that other course I used to teach -- on the principal problems of American foreign policy.

(end of opening statement - questions & answers follow)

(Questions & Answers, Overseas Press Writers lunch, Feb. 26, 1964)

Mr. Morgan: Mac, you furnished a lot of the pieces of the mosaic. Can you go a little farther and tell us, particularly since this is for background, what the difference is in your own observation between the approach, both philosophically and day-to-day operation -- the Johnson approach and the Kennedy approach to foreign affairs? I am thinking in part about the speculation that because the President is so specialized in domestic affairs he almost automatically would leave more of the foreign matters to Mr. Rusk, to yourself, to other people in the State Department, and to Mr. McNamara.

Mr. Bundy: Well, let me say first of all -- I'll just take one point and get it very clear -- that you cannot delegate responsibility to a staff officer within the White House. We are either doing a job that we are quite clear that the President wants done, and in the way in which he wants it done, or we'd better get out of people's hair. So he's not devolving authority and responsibility on staff officers, certainly not on me.

The second thing I would say is that it's really quite wrong and, to me, astonishing, that knowledgeable people should so often say that President Johnson is a man who hasn't been heavily engaged in foreign affairs. We used to teach, as a sort of a first law (when I was out of government) that with the Second World War the legislature became not merely indispensable but central, in the process of American foreign relations. Certainly since 1947 (if you don't choose to take the ratification of the UN Charter as a starting point, or the Lend Lease Act) -- certainly since the Greek-Turkish aid program and the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been, in Congress, concern with and responsibility for the major decisions in our foreign affairs which is inescapable when you commit resources. This is true on the Defense side, with which Senator Johnson was deeply concerned. It is true also on the foreign policy side. It really seems to me preposterous, for example, that people should assume that someone like myself is, at least by implication, some sort of an "expert" in these matters when I don't know anything like as many heads of government; I haven't been in as many countries; for example, I haven't as clear a sense of the feelings which animate the parties on Cyprus as the President does. He has been around and around and around the world. He has been in and out of legislative argument both on policy and on defense matters. He had, I suspect, more to do

with discussion and decision in these fields (as between the President and the Majority Leader of the Senate) than some of those **who sat faithfully** through the National Security Council in the **eight Eisenhower years**. I am not impressed by the notion that the President is **uninformed or inexperienced** or without interest in foreign affairs. So in a sense I deny your premise.

And indeed I deny your premise in a larger sense. Certainly there are differences in taste and style and personal approaches to the way business is done, But the notion that one man was only a reader and the other man only a talker, or that the telephone is the only instrument of communication, or that there is a different kind of consultation within the government -- I genuinely would have to say to you, Ed, that the similarities seem to me very much greater than the differences in this process.

There is the same wariness about one-sided staff advice, the same eagerness to know what the other side of the argument is, the same insistence that the alternatives be presented, the same readiness to decide when there is a need for decision. But there is a wonderful passage in Sorensen's book about the way in which strong Presidents wait to decide until they want to decide, and that has been true of both the Presidents I have worked for.

So they are more alike than different. There are a lot of differences. You see a different approach to the process of communication with the press -- a different approach to the day-to-day management of information in some ways -- a difference perhaps in the back-and-forth of what is immediately interesting. But differences in the sense of responsibility of the Presidency, differences in basic assessment of the qualities and effectiveness of members of the Administration, and differences on fundamentals -- are marginal, compared to the similarities, in my judgment.

Mr. Lisagar: (reference to President Johnson's speech at UCLA about Vietnam.... Does this supply a microcosm?)

Mr. Bundy: It certainly would, and I think I won't comment -- other than to say that it was properly and carefully considered in a way which would be appropriate for the speech as a whole and for any passages in it that were of particular operational importance. I think it's really best to leave that subject where it is now; there is no way in which I can say more about it without its becoming an additional fact in the process, and I think it's better not to, right now.

Mr. McNeil: Well, I was going to perhaps ask that same question in a more general way. You talked about one of the problems being relations with the press, statements, utterances, etc. Why does this collide with the old-fashioned idea of a quiet diplomacy, operating strictly through diplomatic channels? To what extent do you think that we have now satisfactorily solved the problem of developing policy by both anticipating public opinion and reaction, and using public opinion, and I have particular relevance to the fact that sometimes we seem to over-react to public criticism -- at other times we seem to completely fail to consider the public opinion and reaction, which in fact might well destroy a whole policy.

Mr. Bundy: Well, it's a little hard to do more than philosophize, given the way you framed the question. I was certainly resisting comment on a particular passage in a particular speech, and on the resulting discussion and effort by various members of the government with various views to make it clear that this speech was what they meant, and meant what they meant. But I didn't mean to say that I won't discuss any substantive question, because that wouldn't be very helpful to you, and not very sensible for me.

I do think that there is a permanent and necessary tension between the kinds of things, limited in number, that you want to do really privately, and the problem of public exposition of them. We had a marvelous example of that (and this is not my immediate business, because it was handled, and I am bound to say I think responsibly handled, by the appropriate offices of the State Department) in the question of the administration of Section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, as affected by Section 614 (a) of the same legislation. I refer to these sections because reading them is a very therapeutic exercise.

What the Department was faced with was the requirement of dealing with a piece of law which told the government to cut off aid, in certain circumstances, unless the President thought it was "important to the national security" to do otherwise. It told the government not to give assistance to people who had not taken "appropriate steps" to get their shipping and their aircraft out of the Cuba trade. So the Department had a problem of negotiation, and it conducted, I think, on balance, a very successful series of negotiations, one obvious condition of which was that if governments were to find it useful to take "appropriate steps," they must not be taking those appropriate steps under a public gun.

When the allotted 60 days expired and a good deal had been accomplished, it looked as if something had come swarming out with no notice, and you had a lot of trouble. This is an example of the dilemma you are speaking of, and I don't myself see how the Department of State and the AID agency could have said \$7200 to the UK was a matter

which the President must find was "important to the national security." On the other hand, the way the thing turned out it looked as if somehow we thought cutting it off was important to the national security, which we didn't think at all.

So there is a problem between public and private discussion, and in this case there is another joint in it -- a declaration of Congressional policy. There it is in the act, and you are going to have to go in for some more money. What sort of a record do you think you need to have to show a reasonable effort to execute the laws?

So these problems are not simple. They are not subject to easy resolution by any procedural device known to me. If you look at the forces involved in the different aspects of the shipment of wheat to the Soviet Union you find an even more complex and difficult pattern in which one extraordinary and necessary element in the situation was that the actual bargaining on price with the Soviet Union could not be conducted by the United States Government, which nevertheless had contingent commitments to a number of sectors of American society. This is not a matter of the Kennedy or the Johnson Administration, because it obviously involves both. But it is an illustration of the complexities of executive action in a government which is still subject not only to the constitutional division of powers but to the processes of what Galbraith calls countervailing power in significant sectors of society. It is what you get into when you have a trade negotiation. It's what you get into when you try to develop a trade expansion act. And it's sometimes hard even to keep the Special Assistants in the White House in touch with each other (let alone the responsible departments of government) when you get a really tough one like that.

Mr. Finney: Are there any indications that the American election is being taken into consideration by our opponents in the world?

Mr. Bundy: Well, anybody concerned with world affairs who isn't aware of the significance of the 3rd of November 1964 ought to be replaced forthwith. So the answer is that of course people are taking into account the existence of an American election. What they're doing with it is quite another question, and one to which I would have to give a much more uncertain answer. I don't think we have a sharp view as to how they assess this election. We all know Mr. Khrushchev's past complaint that it's impossible to negotiate with these wretched people in the West because they're always having an election. But at the moment I don't think that is his complaint. I think if we didn't have an election he might need one to explain why he's not in a hurry to negotiate.

Q. What's the view of the impact of these two prospective elections upon the processes of settlement between the U. S. and Panama?

Mr. Bundy: My own judgment is that the election in Panama is a much more important element in this process than an election in the United States. Yes, I think we could probably lose the election here by giving the Canal away, but I don't think that's bloody likely, or would be in a non-election year, whereas there is no question about it that candidates who do not maintain a satisfactorily nationalist position in terms of Panamanian opinion are in very tough trouble, and that this is more true before an election than after it. But I wouldn't have thought you needed me to come here to tell you that. I don't mean to be rude at all, but I don't think I've added much.

Mr. Marder: I'd just like to follow up a small point on a question raised by Mike O'Neil on the cutoff of some small amounts of aid, and sections 620 and 614 (a) and so on. I'm puzzled as to what modified purpose was served by the deliberate obfuscation of these figures involved. You yourself just mentioned 7200.

Mr. Bundy: Is that right, or have I got it wrong?

Mr. Marder: Well, this is about what I was going to ask. You mentioned \$7200 to the UK. It so happens that these figures are still not available -- at least no concrete set of figures are available. There have been umpteen sets of figures available and I would assume that in a judgment made as to cutting off aid there must have been necessarily present in the decision a knowledge of what it is that was being cut off. Frankly, if the amount that was being cut off was so marginal -- which is what many of us were originally told -- I do not see what either public or allied relationship function was served by magnifying the figure except possibly to placate Congress.

Mr. Bundy: Murray, you obviously followed this with your usual intensity and precision, and I don't myself understand that there was a magnifying of figures in the cases of the aid that was cut off. So I can't really argue with you on that. My own view is that the cutoff with respect to Britain, France, and Yugoslavia was a cutoff which not to make would have involved you in the absurdity of saying that these trivial amounts were important to the national security, when they obviously were not. Now with respect to Spain and Morocco, we're dealing with unfinished business. To me any legitimacy there may be in not telling you all the facts and figures is in part that they relate, some of them, to classified undertakings, and there may be simply a bureaucratic business of whether those should be declassified -- but more seriously, that this is unfinished business. It is a process of diplomatic negotiation, and it's not to our advantage either to put or to appear to put public pressure on governments

with which we are engaged in a legitimate bargaining process. That would be my argument. But let me say hastily that this is primarily a matter which has been handled (I think with considerable professional energy and skill) in the Department, and I don't want even to seem to be trying to second-guess what they've been doing, even if they're in bad with you.

Mr. Meyer: (refers to report in OAS of finding that Cubans were guilty of shipping arms to Venezuela, and asks what choices are as to what we can do in OAS, particularly reports that Brazilians and Mexicans would resist stiffening of sanctions...)

Mr. Bundy: That's a very good question and a very difficult question. There isn't any doubt that the report is an important and interesting one and as far as this kind of evidence can be, it seems to be unusually persuasive, clear, and responsibly set forth. You are absolutely right when you say that there are important governments in the hemisphere which prefer not to regard this as a very serious matter; their line of argument is rather that in fact the arms were discovered, in fact Venezuela conducted her elections effectively, and in fact this has been frustrated, so you should at most do something that sort of indicates that this is international bad manners. I can reflect on it, but I can't give you answers -- in part because, while we know that there is divergence of opinion - these opinions as against the very strong opinions held by the countries most immediately affected, those which can be reached by this kind of shipment across water, and those which have a certain vulnerability, as indeed many countries do, to carefully planned terrorist and subversive activity. Countries which have this concern feel very differently from those which are less worried, partly out of an honest feeling that it's very small and far away and doesn't bother them, and partly out of a political feeling that it's not smart to get angry about it. That's a tension which has to be measured out in two kinds of ways: by working through the whole roster of the American states to see just which ones will go what distance, and by working together with those who feel as strongly as the Venezuelans do as to what the diplomatic and political possibilities are. I'm sorry I can't do much more at this stage than describe that as the framework of the problem. I think that, broadly speaking, it would be our view that while both we and the Venezuelans -- any country -- must maintain the right to take necessary action against this kind of aggressive act, it is nevertheless greatly to our advantage, so far as we can, to hold the Organization of American States and hemispheric opinion together on this.

There is one aspect of it that's worth perhaps just a sentence more. Part of the trouble that we get into in argumentation with our good friends in Europe who do not share our view of the relative values of sale and non-sale of non-strategic items to Cuba -- part of the trouble we get into here is that they honestly believe that our concern must be irrational because they don't think the United States is threatened. They forget, of course, that we ourselves had a very intimate experience of Cuba as a lively center of menace for a short but intense period in October of 62. But what I think they tend to overlook even more is that there are countries which have a real issue here and which are quite specifically in some danger. One mustn't overstate this; we don't want to paint Castro as 10 ft. tall or increase his influence by sounding as if we were scared to death. But at the very least one can say that the concern which is felt by responsible and reasonably democratic regimes in Venezuela and Colombia and related countries is a concern which doesn't always penetrate to the rest of the world because Washington is heard so loudly. And one advantage of this episode and of OAS attention to it may be to increase the balance as between U. S. concern with the nature and purpose of the Cuban regime and the concern of other smaller Latin neighbors.

Mr. Salpeter: I would like to come back to the Cyprus question, in two questions, actually: one, how serious is the danger of a Soviet foothold in the island as a result of the present dispute; and, two, in a wider sense, what can be done over the fact that whenever there is a dispute, particularly involving two friendly countries, one party would always say to the West, "If you don't act as I would like, we will go to the Soviets." Is there any new thinking on the question how this can be faced by the U. S.?

Mr. Bundy: I think it's absolutely standard practice, and there is a good deal of evidence that it's going on both in New York and on the island, that the Soviet Government will try to take advantage of differences among the Western allies. No doubt about that. And therefore there will always be a certain inclination when people get at odds with Western countries, for one or another party to hope that he will find a more friendly response, or some form of support, in Moscow. If your question suggests that we should be alert to this kind of thing, I agree with it. If it suggests that we should not invariably assume that such a threat requires us to fall all over ourselves trying to meet the desires of the man who poses it, I also agree with that. If you are asking me to comment right hard and specifically to the existing situation in Cyprus, I really think that you can find people who know more, and I probably ought not to talk much about it anyway.

Mr. Collins: You mentioned the factor of Presidential sense of direction and purpose, and you offered the example of the new positions to be presented at Geneva, as others have done. What was the new sense of direction and purpose that was manifested there? If there was something new to be done, how did it happen that it had not been done before? Do you not run the deep risk of presenting a purely ersatz position simply to have a new position to satisfy the new direction and purpose? Will you discuss that a bit?

Mr. Bundy: Yes, and I have stopped beating my wife. You do have a problem, whenever you go back to the drawing boards for disarmament, of whether you can find something responsible and new and reasonable to say. And it's not necessarily a virtue to say something new if you have nothing to say. My own opinion in the matter, for what it's worth, is that there's always a lot to be said in this field, that we have not fully cleared the ground in our own processes as a nation, let alone in the West as a whole, as to the things that we ought to be able to put forward. We have done very much better than the Soviet Government, both in 1964 and in earlier years. But I happen to believe that the question of finding effective ways to turn down the danger of the nuclear age is a No. 1 kind of question, and I think that there are inertias about the way it is approached, in all kinds of governments, which make the role of the President of the United States extraordinarily important. And that's why I pick this particular example -- because it seems to me an example also of the kind of thing that was strongly characteristic, of President Kennedy^{and} (leaving aside matters of organization and effectiveness for the moment, where I make no judgment either way -- I wasn't here) and, for that matter, in purpose too, of President Eisenhower.

Now with respect to the particular proposals you are talking of, I think they are important and that they are another step, that they do offer new hope, because in a sense they are real. I don't say we've got it all fleshed out or that we've argued out all the things that need to be argued out among all those concerned, but these proposals are practicable as some others are not, for the present. It's very difficult today to conceive of any early inspected and verified general and complete disarmament, or even of stages moving in that direction, in a situation in which we don't have international agreement on what is a soldier, let alone what is a weapon. But in this field of strategic weapons and strategic delivery systems and materials for strategic weapons,

one could conceive quite readily of processes of verification that would be manageable -- persuasive to those who need to believe in them on our side, and enduring in what would be required as an opening of one's country on the other side. So I think it is a real proposal, and I can assure you that without pressure by the President it wouldn't be there. Does that come somewhere near your question?

Mr. Collins: Yes. I don't know that you have answered my first question, which was what was within the President's mind, the new sense of direction?

Mr. Bundy: I think the separable proposal for a strategic freeze not only on nuclear materials but on nuclear delivery weapons is a new proposal; it was certainly so construed, to the point of panic, by some of those involved in the process when it was put forward to them before it was presented.

Mr. Brandon: Will you tell us whether you see any difference in concept between that of the late President and President Johnson? We sometimes hear or read that President Johnson is more influenced by national consideration than by international, or that he is more of what is called a "hard-liner" than President Kennedy was.

Mr. Bundy: Well, Henry, I'll have to start on that question with President Kennedy. President Kennedy had an extraordinary interest in, and immediacy with, all sorts and conditions of people, and he certainly made an enormous effort to establish a process of communication with other peoples, and the degree to which his face and his feeling and his purpose were understood around the world was made terribly clear at the end of November. But I never thought he was a "soft-liner" as against a "hard-liner." He was in fact a very tough man in lots of ways, and not all of his opinions about the United States and what it had done around the world were made public. But if you look carefully at some of his more reflective backgrounders and other documents that I think are available, you will see how often he refers to the fact that the United States carries heavy burdens, has met great responsibilities, has nothing to be ashamed of. He was an American, as well as a leading Western politician. I think he began from his American base and widened it.

I think it probably would be true of any of us, if we were moving into the Presidency and had in fact still to validate that enormous responsibility by the more regular process than that of succession to death, and it would be true also, let's be candid, if we came in in the fourth year

of our quadrennial cycle -- that we would be concerned first about making it clear to ourselves, to our government, to our people, that we were properly leading the United States of America. In a measure, President Kennedy himself would have looked forward to 1964 as that kind of a year. I was planning to have more time off in 1964, partly for that reason, and that is actually how I happened to be out of town for two weeks in January.

But if you mean to suggest that this is not a man who understands the turbulence and concern of the non-aligned part of the world, or if above all you mean to suggest that the President is not aware of the degree to which he and the other holder of strategic power in the nuclear age have a shared responsibility, then I would say that's not so. The thing that most impressed me, in the immediate process of the first few days, was the rapidity with which the President made it his business to communicate, both in his public words and in his private interview with Mikoyan, his understanding that this responsibility is not merely an American responsibility, but a human responsibility, + that it is inevitably his. So I'm afraid, Henry, that again, except for the natural differences of one man having been in three years and the other man picking up a dropped standard and having to carry it his own way in an election year without having been through an election in his own right -- except for that difference, I would be very wary of large-scale conclusions, or even small ones, that went along this rather complex and rather misleading scale of hard-to-soft or hawk-to-dove which we too readily play -- I'm bound to say inside the government as well as out.

Mr. Raymond: (difficult to hear him, but part of it goes): For several years we have had a number of fairly optimistic statements from Government spokesmen on the situation in Vietnam... or was the Government itself misled... How did you arrive at the end of 1965 as the time when most Americans could be withdrawn from South Vietnam?

Mr. Bundy: Well, you know the answer to your second question is one that I can give you only in an indirect way. That is the result of an assessment by Secretary McNamara as to the likely date at which the principal supporting functions, troop-using functions, of our effort out there could in fact be devolved to adequately trained, managed, and operated Vietnamese force. It has nothing to do with whether we would continue our basic commitment, or whether we would give up our purpose, or whether we think there is a date at which all of South Vietnam will be cleaned up. It has to do with the particular business of how many Americans will be needed for certain kinds of specific undertakings at what time;

the distinction is an important one which the Secretary has repeatedly tried to make and which I am happy to repeat.

The wider question I think I will answer this way. It's an incomplete answer but I think it's an honest one. Until quite recently, and I won't say now that we're surely past the point of difficulty, there have been deep, honest differences within departments and from department to department and from level to level and man to man, in the United States Government in Washington as there were within the United States enterprise in South Vietnam, as to how well things were going, how fast progress was being made, and what the right combination was for this safe. There is no doubt that in that process, as in the differences among members of the press, argument got higher and the process of statement became embroidered with the process of argument, and of course it is also true that no sensible person who is engaged in a war announces that he is losing it. I don't mean to say, and I would not admit, that there was any sort of deliberate obfuscation -- I don't really think that's what happened -- I think you had these hard-fought feelings, these strong commitments, and then strong differences of view, and they have sometimes become explosive. One reads in the papers where high government sources say thus and so, and then you say to yourself, "There goes that so-and-so again," and you reach for the telephone to do a little talking of your own; or if you're smart you hope the telephone will ring, which it usually does, and then you have a chance to add to the confusion.

Now, the more serious question, I think, and the right way of answering your question, is that we do think it's important to do everything that can be effective and that can serve the purpose, which is not a purpose of maintaining forever some U. S. military presence -- it's the purpose, as President Kennedy repeatedly said, of creating a situation in which there won't be a need for U. S. military presence. That's a hard thing to do, and it's not something which depends solely on the United States. Neither is it something which can be certainly and forever confined to the particular kind of contest and particular rules of engagement which have been set by those who started the trouble in the first place. That's why, as the President said last week, there is danger in it. I hope, Mr. Raymond, that you will find that the government is working its way toward a more clearly articulated process, but the United States Government will always be composed of able and determined men who are not likely to succeed entirely in concealing their personal opinions when they feel strongly.

Mr. Morgan: Mac, just a quick question to clear up a point in terms of what you just answered to Mr. Raymond. Is the inference that seemed to be invited by your statement just now correct: that the deep and honest differences in the government here and in the U. S. establishment in Vietnam are much less deep than they were until recently?

Mr. Bundy: I have that impression. I don't say that as we go down this road we won't find other moments of division and difference. Sometimes these things are less deep than they really seem, and that's one of the reasons we're trying to argue them out and work them through, but I think that would be my impression, Ed. I wouldn't want to be held to it.

Mr. Roberts: (not to clear on the tape) Why is it that the American Government seems to have so much trouble articulating a position, such as its attitude towards the different Communist governments in the world, or towards the problem of Vietnam, until it is driven to it by criticism, foreign and domestic, and circumstances? And when it is, as in the case of how to deal with various Communist governments, is this not the job of the President to articulate, even more than, say, the Secretary of State?

Mr. Bundy: I wouldn't think so, Chal. What you're saying is that the President should have made the speech the Secretary made yesterday, and that seems silly to me. The Secretary of State has every right, it seems to me, to prepare a major statement of this kind. Like every other senior officer of the government, he has the responsibility to be sure that what he says is in line with the President's own purposes and assessments, and that of course was done in this case. But as I look back over the records of American foreign policy, I think it would be a queer doctrine that would remove Mr. Stimson's letter to Mr. Borah, or that would remove Mr. Acheson's speeches from the records of 1949-50-51 and 52, or that would imply that John Quincy Adams had no role in our foreign policy until he became President. I think that's pretty foolish.

Mr. David: Sir, how do you assess the effects of General de Gaulle's recognition of Communist China and the impact this would have in the Far East?.... Will it force a change in our policy?

Mr. Bundy: It certainly won't force a change in our own policy with respect to Peking. It may, to a degree that's not clear yet at all, complicate the process of preventing a Red Chinese admission to the United Nations. It has an impact on the states of mind of people varying from place to place. There is no doubt about it that some of

the governments most closely affected by any increased prestige for the Red Chinese take this matter seriously. I think it's also possible to exaggerate it. I recall very clearly the argument that went on in 1949 and 50 -- when people said that British recognition would have an overwhelming effect upon the politics of the process. I think it's important for the United States in its relations with General de Gaulle always to concentrate on what is really happening and not on what is being said -- always to concentrate its attention upon the action and not upon the staging. I'll give you a small example. There was a great fuss, not in the government, but there was some sense of fuss and furor a year or so ago because General de Gaulle^{*} was going to Turkey and that was going to end the U. S. / Turkish alliance. It was a silly sentiment which looks even sillier now in the light of the French relationship to the Cypriot problem. It doesn't serve the serious community of our real purposes with France, nor the problem of establishing civil relations with General de Gaulle, to exaggerate, even if he wants us to.

Question: I have a question on this question in Cyprus -- on your last answer regarding the danger of the USSR trying to take advantage of the divisions among allies. There was a report this morning based, I understand, on an interview in Le Monde to the effect that Makarios would like to see de Gaulle intervene in the Cyprus question. Could you tell us what your attitude would be to such a use of the good offices of the French President?

Mr. Bundy: Not a priori, no. I don't think it would be wise to guess ahead of time. I don't know whether you all have heard rumors of what the French suggestion might be, but I don't think I'd better talk about it because I don't know exactly where we are on that.

Let me say, gentlemen, I am conscious as I look back that I gave some tart answers, and I'm sorry, I didn't mean to -- there's no point trying to be clever about these things -- I was trying to show my opinion of the problem, and certainly not my opinion of any individual. But I don't apologize for being tart with Mr. Roberts, because I remember so well the press conference in which he was introduced to the President of Chile as living disproof of any undue kindness on the part of the American press.

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* error - it was Benyaiklan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Rec'd
Mar 9, 1964
3pm
m. b.

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March 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

In cleaning out my files, I found this Stewart Alsop article which was released on February fifteenth, six days before your Los Angeles speech. It seems to me to make it very clear that gossip in and out of government about new activity in Vietnam began well before that speech. Given the deadlines of the Saturday Evening Post, this must have been written not later than the first week of February.

McG. B.

McG. B.

FOR RELEASE

39a

SATURDAY P.M. February 15, 1964

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Public Relations Office

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

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Vietnam: the awful alternative

WASHINGTON: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has promised to "take all necessary measures to prevent a Communist victory" in Vietnam. What measures?

That question may confront President Lyndon Johnson with the gravest decision of his career, well before next November's election. It may also confront the United States and the world with a crisis as dangerous as the Cuban crisis of October, 1962.

The plain fact is that our side has been losing the war in Vietnam, and the Communist side has been winning it. It is too early to assess the consequences of the most recent coup in Vietnam. Perhaps the new regime will be able to turn the tide. No one hopes so more fervently than the President and his Secretary of Defense. But it is at least possible that what McNamara calls the "considerable progress" the Communists have been making will continue and accelerate, to the point where the Saigon regime is threatened with disintegration. In that case, the moment of decision for the President will be near.

Theoretically, there are three courses which the United States can adopt if a Communist victory in Vietnam appears imminent. One is to adopt the French formula of "neutralization." Secretary of State Rusk has described this as "a formula for surrender." It will not be adopted.

The second course is to intervene directly with American combat troops. The tide might be turned by a few American battalions—if the North Vietnamese and or the Chinese Communists did not intervene in their turn.

This second course has been at least studied seriously. But at all levels there is a positively anguished reluctance to adopt it—and not least in the White House. For the Korean War taught a lesson: that a little bit of intervention, when it involves the use of American combat forces, is hardly more possible than a little bit of pregnancy. And direct U.S. intervention, this time without U.N. support, could mean a war as long, as unwinnable, and as internally divisive as the Korean War—perhaps more so.

The third course is, in effect, to change the present rules of the game. Under the present rules Ho Chi Minh's Communist North Vietnamese government is at liberty to use all means short of invasion to help the Communist Viet Cong. Trained cadres, which form the hard core of the Viet Cong, reach Vietnam via the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." Arms come both over the trail—through Cambodia—and by boat to the Viet Cong-controlled seacoast. Overall military and political control of the Viet Cong is maintained via radio from Hanoi, in North Vietnam.

All this is in flat contravention of the 1954 Geneva treaty which split Indochina. Certain of the policy makers have maintained for some time—in the case of one of them, for four years—that the war in Vietnam simply cannot be won as long as our side continues to play the game according to these rules.

Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman and others dissent. They claim that outside aid for the Viet Cong is no longer a key factor in the struggle, and that the real problem is to stiffen and reform the Saigon government. But the opinion is growing, even in the State Department, that if there is any further deterioration, the rules of the game *must* be changed.

There are various versions of how these rules might be changed, but the basic version runs something like this. First, Ho Chi Minh would be warned, probably secretly, that he could no longer continue to support the Viet Cong without reprisals—unspecified—on our part. If there were no results of this warning, this country would take two simultaneous further steps.

We would go to the United Nations, produce copious proof of North Vietnamese intervention in aid of the Viet Cong in contravention of the 1954 treaty; and we would announce that we had no choice but to institute reprisals. We would not ask for a vote. We would unilaterally undertake the reprisals.

The reprisals might take various forms. We might arm, equip and overtly support an anti-Communist guerrilla force raiding Communist territory across the border from bases in Vietnam. We might drop high-explosive (not nuclear) bombs on certain selected Vietnamese targets: airfields, dams, new factories near Hanoi. Or we might adopt a combination of such actions.

The point is that the reprisals would be designed not to defeat the North Vietnamese regime in open war but to hurt, and hurt badly. In this situation Ho Chi Minh and his Chinese Communist allies might well prefer to withdraw support from the Viet Cong and permit the establishment of a stable government in South Vietnam, rather than to risk a direct confrontation with American power.

They might not. The Ho Chi Minh regime might respond by marching on South Vietnam, in which case we would have a rather big small war on our hands. Or the Chinese might intervene, in which case we would have at least a small big war on our hands. But the Communists would first have to decide that they were ready for war with the United States.

"If the Chinese intervened," says one policy maker, "we would at least have a heaven-sent opportunity to hit certain targets in China." The targets are, of course, the Chinese atomic plants. "In any case," he added, "overt hostilities with the Chinese could hardly be more dangerous than Communist victory in Vietnam, which would be the beginning of the end for Asia."

No one can really foresee what might happen if President Johnson decides that the rules of the game in Vietnam must be changed. But the alternatives listed above, which are currently the subject of passionate debate at the highest levels of the American Government, suggest why Lyndon Johnson may soon be faced with the gravest decision of his career.



Robert S. McNamara

Stewart Alsop

*Memo for the
40 J Pres.*

~~SECRET~~

March 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Walter Jenkins has passed to me the attached memo from Mike Feldman about tanks for Israel and told me that you would like to have a recommendation. It happens that I have been talking in recent days with both State and Defense on this matter so that I am able to give you a prompt answer.

It has been our position, as you know, that we would not make a firm decision on tanks for Israel until later in the year. Mike Feldman feels strongly the other way, in part for reasons stated in his memorandum and in part because he quite naturally would like to be able to carry this decision with him on his visit to Israel later this month. Our current problem is simply that the Arabs are in an excited frame of mind and are likely to get more excited later this spring and summer as Israel begins to use the Jordan waters. Moreover, the Israelis have been very reluctant to deal frankly with us on their apparent desire to buy surface-to-surface missiles from the French, a move which we think full of danger for them and for us. The Israelis have a nuclear reactor which could make plutonium, and if they buy modern missiles from the French we may have a wholly new level of escalation in the Middle East arms race. Nasser's missiles, by contrast, are both conventional and clumsy and are more for show than for use.

Komer and I feel very strongly that it would be wrong to make a commitment on the tanks now, and that you should reserve decision until Prime Minister Eshkol comes. Harriman, who ought to know his New York vote, agrees with us. The State Department, below Rusk, feels strongly the same way, but Rusk himself is more of the view that the matter is already decided in principle and that you can make your own political choice as to when to tell the Israelis. McNamara is also quite pragmatic about it, as a tank merchant, and I do not think that he has concentrated on the politics of missiles or the politics of Arab reaction. I am not sure that either McNamara or Rusk has been the very strongly worded cables from all our Ambassadors in the Arab countries warning of the violent reaction to any tank deal. ~~Harriman, who~~

On balance, I recommend that you continue to push this decision ahead of you, and that we indicate firmly to our Israeli friends the grave impropriety of turning any Republicans loose on this point while the missile matter is unsettled. My own guess is that if the Israeli missile issue were to get into

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-108

By mg, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

Orig filed in NSAM 290

March 8, 1964

the public domain, there would be a very serious backlash of criticism against the Israelis. I think we should deal with this by quiet diplomacy if possible, and much the best time for a full-scale review of it is your meeting with Eshkol in June.

If you agree that we ought to wait, I suggest that you sign the enclosed NSAM, but before we support it, I would wish to talk with Mike Feldman and try to help him understand why it is important to wait. Let me add, finally, that if we hastily give in on something as difficult as the tank deal in March, I hate to think what we will be asked for between now and November. The Israelis use all sources of pressure in an election year, and the heat is really quite low so far.

At Tab A is Mike Feldman's memorandum.

At Tab B is a summary of U. S. Arab problems.

At Tab C is a detailed statement of the Arab-Israeli missile problem.

At Tab D is the memorandum that you may wish to sign.

McG. B.

Signed _____

Not signed _____

Speak to me _____

Call a meeting of those most concerned _____

40 "

A.

40-b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1964

TO: McGeorge Bundy

FROM: Walter

The President would like for you to take this up with State and Defense and give him a recommendation.

40c

10/21
WMS
11/12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Israel

I met yesterday with Congressmen Celler, Gilbert, Farbstein, Toll and Multer. They expressed great dissatisfaction with stories they had been hearing about the reluctance of the United States to supply tanks to Israel.

I tried to mollify them and I cautioned them against saying anything publicly. I pointed out if the Republicans used this as a point of attack, it would be dangerous to all Democrats. They promised to cooperate for the time being.

If we are going to supply tanks to Israel I feel it would be foolish to wait too long before announcement is made. If Keating, Javits, Scott or any of the other Republicans make a public statement and we then agree to supply tanks we would appear to be reacting to their demand -- it gives the Republicans too much credit.

If on the other hand, we do not react to the Republican demand we give them an excellent issue.

I am not suggesting a public statement on this matter. But word could be passed discreetly and the secret can be kept. The secret of the HAWKS sale was kept for two months after it was told to leaders of the Jewish Community.

Myer Feldman

40 J

B.

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

PNK

25 February 1964

And still they come?

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 6-64

SUBJECT: Storm Warnings Up For US-Arab Relations

SUMMARY

A. In 1964, as in previous US election years, the Arabs will be hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that Israel is getting special favors from Washington. Hence, US-Arab relations will inevitably be somewhat abrasive. However, as long as the US refrains from concrete support for Israel on issues that threaten Arab security, Arab reactions are not likely to be so violent as to do serious or lasting damage.

B. A serious issue may be involved in the Israeli request for up to 500 US tanks. To provide them would reverse a long-standing US policy, and we would face a sharp decline in relations. The Arab states would probably seize opportunities to demonstrate their unhappiness with the US. These might include moves in the UN on such questions as the admission of Red China and could well put US-Arab relations back to the level obtaining in 1957-1958.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 8-18-77; State 10-27-78
By isp, NARS, Date 9-24-79

FEB 28 1964

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

1. For the past year or so, the US has enjoyed relatively good relations with the eastern Arab states. Though both the UAR and Saudi Arabia have been at times critical of US intervention in the Yemen problem, both have recognized that US efforts to resolve the impasse were in the ultimate interest of both Cairo and Riyadh. The US has avoided getting caught in the recurring cross-fire between Nasser and the Ba'thist regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. Irritations between oil producing governments and US companies have not assumed major proportions. US aid programs in the UAR and Jordan have gone forward without major frictions. Most important, there have been no significant flare-ups in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the root cause of bad feeling between the Arabs and the US.

2. This atmosphere is changing. The Arabs have long criticized Israel's plans to divert water from the Jordan valley and have threatened to prevent any such diversion, by force if need be. But the pipes and pumping stations are now installed, withdrawal of water is imminent, and Arab frustration is again to the fore, with Israel as the direct object, but with the US also affected.

3. The "Arab Summit" meeting in Cairo recognized that the Arab powers lacked the strength to block Israel's Jordan water project. It concentrated on devising plans to cope with Israel

- 2 -

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in the longer run, and on establishing a common Arab position. The top leaders of all the Arab States sat down together in considerable harmony, steps were taken toward the resolving of bitter disputes between the UAR and Saudi Arabia and between Morocco and Algeria, and relations between the UAR and Jordan and Iraq greatly improved. The tone of the resolutions and communiques was relatively moderate, in contrast to those of a number of earlier Arab League meetings. Altogether, the Arabs had reason to feel that they had conducted a mature and statesmanlike conference.

4. Hence their feelings were considerably hurt by the lack of positive reaction in Western circles. A routine speech by the US Deputy Undersecretary of State soon after the close of the Cairo meeting failed to mention it, and in an address to the Friends of the Weizmann Institute a few days later, President Johnson also ignored it, and went on to suggest US-Israeli cooperation to use nuclear energy to de-salt water. The mention of nuclear energy, water, and Israel in the same speech further stimulated Arab criticism of the US.

5. There is one other reason why the Arabs are especially sensitive to US attitudes just now. They are always conscious of the weight of the Jewish vote in many US constituencies and are prone to regard US political leaders as pro-Israel until proven otherwise. After an initial period of concern, Arab leaders had

- 3 -

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~~S E C R E T~~

come to consider the late President Kennedy as a man who understood their problems and who was at least reasonably impartial on Arab-Israeli questions. The accession of President Johnson has revived Arab fears that a Democratic administration in Washington is bound to favor Israel, especially in an election year.

6. This mood of frustration and suspicion will certainly make for touchy US-Arab relations over the next several months, and we can look for bitter and often unreasonable criticisms of US actions and attitudes. Some of these can be avoided or mitigated, without giving ground on matters of substance, by presenting our statements or actions in a manner that takes account of Arab sensibilities. In the absence of concrete manifestations of US support for Israel on issues that threaten Arab security, Arab reactions are not likely to be so violent or profound as to do any serious or lasting damage.

7. However, Israel has embarked on an intensive campaign to persuade the US to provide it, on a grant basis, with substantial numbers of tanks. The Israelis argue that the only vehicles capable of matching the UAR's T-54 are the US M-48 and M-60, and that they will need to get up to five hundred such tanks in the next few years. These would be to replace their own older equipment and to match growing UAR armored strength.

- 4 -

~~S E C R E T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

8. Agreement to provide tanks to Israel would represent a fundamental break with the 15-year old US policy of not being a major supplier of arms, especially offensive ones, to either Israel or the Arab states. A decision to provide tanks to Israel would produce sharp and violent reactions in virtually all the Arab countries, which would regard it as materially increasing Israeli striking power. In all probability, the Arab leaders would see such a step, not as a mere political gesture in the context of a US election, but as evidence of a firm decision on the part of Washington to choose Israel over the Arabs. The intensity of Arab reaction would vary with the size and time limit of the arrangement. At the very least, US relations with most of the Arab world would deteriorate sharply, and the various Arab capitals would generally seize opportunities to show their unhappiness with the US.

9. There are a variety of troublesome issues already existing between the US and the several Arab states, which could be aggravated in such circumstances. US oil interests could expect, not nationalization or confiscation, but a sharp increase in pressure from the host countries for larger shares in oil revenue. In the UN, such questions as the admission of Red China and the extension of the relief program for the Arab refugees are ones on which the US could find Arab support wanting, perhaps even from some of the monarchies.

- 5 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

All in all, US-Arab relations could well be put back to the level obtaining in 1957-58.

10. A period of sharply deteriorating US-Arab relations would give the Soviets opportunities which they would almost certainly use to improve their position in the Middle East. They would probably not make any dramatic gains but would probably get the "non-aligned" Arabs to incline more to the East. The USSR would probably be helped in this respect by the Israelis themselves, since the dominant policy makers in Tel Aviv would welcome the opportunity to use the Cold War as a device to assure themselves of closer-US-Israeli ties, particularly in the military field.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Albert Smith

for

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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C.

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~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1964

THE UAR/ISRAELI MISSILE PROBLEM

Superficially, the Israeli position seems unassailable. Since the UAR is allegedly building up a huge missile stockpile, Israel needs a counter-deterrent.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-2
(S)

[REDACTED]

1. Nasser has said that if Israel seemed to be going nuclear, he might have to launch a pre-emptive attack.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-25
(S)

[REDACTED]

2. In any event escalation of the arms race will force the Arabs to re-insure further with Moscow. They'll seek better missiles and more arms from the Soviets.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-25
(S)

[REDACTED]

3. Israeli acquisition of a missile capability will be highly expensive, and in our view, wasteful. Why should Israel waste its own money this way, while seeking economic and now military aid from us?

4. Our whole stand against nuclear proliferation will be adversely affected if Israel goes nuclear.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-2
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-2
(S)

R. W. KOMER

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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40-1

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Military Needs

1. Though I am most sympathetic to Israel's growing need for better armor, I see no need to make any firm decision on whether or how the US might help meet this need until my meeting with Prime Minister Eshkol on 1 June. I am also concerned over the possibilities of escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race, and over likely Arab reactions if we go ahead on tanks.
2. Therefore, we should use the intervening time to explore these problems more fully. I hope we can discuss with the Israelis our views as to the risks of escalation if they prematurely enter a missile race with the UAR. While recognizing the limitations on our ability to sway Israel from such a course, we may want to forestall if possible a risky move which seems quite premature on the basis of present evidence.
3. We should also explore ways and means of meeting Israeli needs which will minimize the risk of compromise in our relations with the Arabs. While direct sale seems the most likely prospect, we should also look at such alternatives as (a) steering Israel to its traditional suppliers, the UK and France; (b) limiting US supply to refitted secondhand M-48A3s, if this would significantly reduce the Arab reaction; and (c) postponing the issue to early 1965, or at the least making Israeli secrecy on this matter until then a condition precedent. I would like the State and Defense Departments to make a joint recommendation to me, including analysis of feasible alternatives, no later than 15 May 1964.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter NOV 2 1978
By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

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March 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Memo for the Pres.

SUBJECT: Press conference material

I myself would recommend against an opening statement on decreasing tensions and pressures. It seems to me there is a risk that the smart-aleck press will say that you are patting yourself on the back if you open on this theme. On the other hand, you should respond to a question in this vein, and my own inclination would be to turn from any question on Vietnam, Panama, Cyprus, or Cuba to a comment like this:

I think we have to understand that in this turbulent world there will be new trouble spots every month. This week we have made some real progress in Cyprus, and we remain hopeful that there will be progress also in Panama. The episode of the Cuban fishing vessels has been ended, and the water at Guantanamo is no longer a problem. A partisan threat to our whole foreign trade policy has been beaten back, and our confidence in our national security has been increased by public knowledge of a great new airplane development. We are still working for progress in disarmament at Geneva. We have reorganized our effort here in Washington to work on Vietnam; we have a very strong mission in the field there. We are working ahead in our relations with the Soviet Union, on which I had a good report yesterday from Ambassador Kohler. But there will be new troubles in the months ahead, and we will deal with them as they arise, with firmness and restraint, with patience and fortitude.

McG. B.

March 7, 1964

*Memo for
Pres. JF
42*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible questions and answers for a press conference

1. Vietnam

I think you will want to parry questions by referring to the McNamara mission and recent statements by Rusk and McNamara, to which it is not useful to add.

2. DeGaulle

Are we critical of France? What do we think of de Gaulle's policies in Southeast Asia? Do you agree with Secretary Rusk?

The simple answer is to refer to Rusk's statement. A somewhat more responsive line might be the following: We regard France as a strong and useful ally, and indeed we would be glad if France were even stronger all around the world. We think it is important to judge these matters not by rumor but by reality. As Secretary Rusk said yesterday, we think some of the talk about neutralization in Southeast Asia has caused confusion because it lacks clarity. But our belief is that the French Government understands very well the need for effective power to sustain the peace in Southeast Asia in the face of the pressures of expansive Communism.

3. Soviet trade

The U. S. has always favored peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, as long as it does not involve strategic items. The wheat sale was a special case, with special terms, because wheat is a subsidized product. The general Soviet expression of a desire for improved trade is not new, and the biggest obstacle to expansion is that the Soviets usually prefer bilateral trade, and the number of Soviet products that are wanted here has so far been quite limited. But on our side, we are always glad to examine the possibilities for expanding peaceful trade.

4. Soviet vehicles sold to Colombia

This is, of course, a matter for the Colombian government, but our present understanding is that this is merely a matter of a small shipment of jeeps bought with funds created by a coffee sale some time ago. Colombian trade with bloc countries in recent years has been only about 1% of Colombian foreign trade, and it seems premature to talk of any large Soviet trade

offensive on the basis of the evidence we have.

McG. B

March 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I have talked twice to Dorothy Fosdick, and her reluctant decision is that she should not leave Senator Jackson this year at least. She puts this decision on three grounds: (1) she has assignments there which she could leave only at great cost to a staff process in the field of government to which she has devoted many years; (2) Scoop Jackson faces an election and she is his principal speech writer and would be leaving him in the lurch at a tough moment; (3) you ought to be willing to leave some women in place on the legislative side, and she is the only woman who is a staff director on the Senate side.

I think she was genuinely flattered to be asked, and I think her reasons for not joining us are responsible. I have told her that the least she can do is to nominate some other ladies who may be less resistant.

McG. B.

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Memo for the Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

(attached)

We have one extremely interesting and disturbing intelligence report to the effect that when Castro heard about the fishing boat incident, one of the things he thought of doing was to shoot down one of our U-2 planes in retaliation. This report underlines the fact that the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba are coming increasingly under Cuban and not Russian control, and that there is therefore a need to take measures to warn Castro and his Russian friends once more on the dangers of interference with our regular high-level surveillance. I therefore suggest that you may wish to sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State asking for a diplomatic scenario aimed at strengthening our position on this matter.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Signed *[Signature]*

Disapproved _____

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Authority NLS. 019.001.001/7
By pc. NARA. Date 11-19-09

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*Orig in Cuba
filed*

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J

March 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State

Recent intelligence reports indicate that Castro may have an itchy finger on the trigger of the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba. It seems to me very important that we take every possible step to warn both the Cubans and their Soviet friends of the risks involved in any interference with our high-level surveillance. I would be glad if the Department would promptly prepare a plan for appropriate, strong, high-level warnings on this point.

1s/ LBJ

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Authority STATE letter OCT 27 1978
By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Bundy

5 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Current Thinking of Cuban Government Leaders

1. The information in this memorandum was obtained in February 1964/

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Authority CIA ltr 8/18/77
By mg, NARS, Date 8/24/77


Desire for Negotiations with the U.S.

2. According to Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Fidel Castro sincerely desires to enter into negotiation with the United States with the aim of reducing tension between the two countries and permitting Cuba to strengthen its basic position.

3. While Castro was in Moscow in January 1964, Soviet Premier Khrushchev discussed with him the general question of the United States attitude towards Cuba. Castro has stated to his top aides that Khrushchev convinced him that a "Caribbean peace" had been established, "thanks to the USSR." Khrushchev elaborated by saying that it was, in effect, due to the "accord" that existed between the United States and the USSR on the question of Cuba that "peace" existed in the area. Castro, Khrushchev pointed out, was the beneficiary of this situation and it behooved him to do what he could to "consolidate the accord." Khrushchev urged him to negotiate with the United States to this end.

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4. Roa also said that Castro regards Khrushchev's analysis and advice as sound, and that he wishes to act upon it. According to Roa, a further factor underlying Castro's desire to improve relations with the United States is a conviction on the part of Castro himself and leading Fidelistas that, despite Soviet good will, Cuba cannot again achieve a state of prosperity with Soviet economic aid alone.

5. Roa did not indicate what Castro contemplated offering the United States as a quid pro quo for negotiating a détente with Cuba. It may be, however, that he will propose a change of his own policy towards Latin America in this regard.

6. Castro reacts with strong irritation or "rage" to events which increase tension between the United States and Cuba. This was particularly true in the recent case of the fishing boats which were interned in Florida. Castro's initial reaction was one of anger that anyone in the U.S. should seriously believe that the boats, which were on a simple fishing expedition, could be engaged in espionage or provocation. He assumed, however, that they would be soon released. When it became clear that this was not going to be the immediate case, his rage grew at the fashion in which U.S. authorities were handling, and complicating, the affair.

7. Despite Castro's basic concern that the situation should not get out of hand, his prestige was obviously at stake in the eyes of the Cuban populace. His irritation at American handling contributed to the forces shaping his response. He was constrained to take action to restore his prestige. He related to a high régime official that he saw three courses of action open to Cuba.

A. To send Cuban supersonic MiG fighters over the USS OXFORD, stationed off Havana, to harass the ship and break glass on it with effects created by passing the sound barrier in its vicinity. The Cuban populace was given indirect warning that this might occur through a newspaper announcement which referred to possible aerial maneuvers.

B. To fire at a U-2 plane as it overflew Cuba. These flights apparently are being accurately tracked.

C. To cut off the Guantanamo water supply.

8. It appeared that in deciding on Guantanamo, Castro had taken the "least hard" course open to him, that is the course least likely to exacerbate relations with the U.S.

9. Throughout the period of concentration of attention on the fishing boats and Guantanamo, Castro and leading Fidelistas manifested privately no concern that the United States would actually invade Cuba. Contrary to earlier fears held by Cuban leaders, they are now convinced that the Soviet Union will indeed intervene with force to prevent such an invasion.

10. For a time during the early days of the "Guantanamo affair," Castro and his principal lieutenants more or less lost sight of the question of U.S. reaction, because of their preoccupation with imagining what the reaction of Khrushchev would be to the incident. They were convinced that "Nikita" would be panicked at the thought that Guantanamo might confront him with an unpleasant situation vis-à-vis the United States, and top Cuban leaders generally gave themselves over to amusement at the situation and commented "Nikita must be soiling himself with fright."

11. The Guantanamo affair focused Castro's attention on a question which in any event concerns him: that of a possible recent change of American administration response to incidents involving Cuba. He stated to top aides that he attributed to President Johnson responsibility for the way the fishing boat issue had been handled, and felt that President Kennedy would have responded in some other fashion.

Soviet and Cuban Intentions in Latin America

12. Roa said that Castro returned from his January 1964 trip to Moscow convinced that Premier Khrushchev "wants nothing to do with revolutionary movements in Latin America." Castro said that Khrushchev had not stated this in so many words, but from his general conversations with Khrushchev, Castro had concluded that Khrushchev "would never send a single revolver" to Latin America.

13. Roa remarked that Khrushchev wants to continue his present relations of partial détente with the United States, which would be adversely affected by Soviet backing of Latin American revolutionary activity.

14. Roa stated that unknown to Khrushchev a meeting was held with Latin American Ambassadors assigned to Havana. Castro informed the Ambassadors that he would like very much to get rid of "Betancourt and company," meaning Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt and those in other Latin American countries whom Castro lumps together with him. Castro added, however, that he wanted "much more than that to be left in peace." Therefore he stated, if the Latin American countries would stop "conspiring" against him, he in turn would "formally engage" not to become involved in any revolutionary plots in or against Latin American countries. Castro asked that the Ambassadors present transmit his views to other Latin American countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Cuba.

15. Roa stated that he viewed Castro's offer as serious and was sure that Castro would uphold his pledge if the Latin American countries accepted his proposed agreement. Roa did not say when the meeting took place.

16. Castro also added that in adhering to a policy of avoiding involvement in Latin American revolutionary activity, he would "in consequence not be following the Chinese Communists, who are very interested in such plots." Roa commented that Castro regards the Communist Chinese as being "comedians" in their Latin American policies in that they encourage activity which they have no effective means of supporting.

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17. According to Roa, the principal reason for Castro's trip to Moscow in January 1964 was to solicit Soviet economic aid. Castro has stated to his top lieutenants that he is very much pleased with the aid granted him. The details of the aid officially announced to the press are accurate.

Plans to Provide Consumer Goods

18. On the basis of personal observation and conversations with Roa and other upper and medium-level officials, it appears that the current major domestic preoccupation of the Cuban régime in general and Fidel Castro in particular is to satisfy the traditional consumer needs of the Cuban populace. This concern affects the orientation of government policy across the board. Fidel Castro is determined that the Cubans shall "eat, dress well, and dance," in traditional fashion, without making the "sacrifices" which have become the classic pattern elsewhere for "constructing Socialism."

19. This policy is taken very seriously and great efforts are being made in regard to restaurants, hotels, and sports. There is great concern with increasing the availability of consumer goods. The guideline is: "to the extent practicable, material well being." This policy is in considerable part coldly calculated to secure and maintain popular support for Castro and his régime. To a considerable degree, however, there is a second underlying motivation: a desire by Castro and Fidelistas at all levels to avoid "Russification," and to construct Socialism in Cuba in a uniquely Cuban way, rather than according to the Russian pattern which has obtained in other Communist-dominated areas.

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March 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

We have one extremely interesting and disturbing intelligence report to the effect that when Castro heard about the fishing boat incident, one of the things he thought of doing was to shoot down one of our U-2 planes in retaliation. This report underlines the fact that the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba are coming increasingly under Cuban and not Russian control, and that there is therefore a need to take measures to warn Castro and his Russian friends once more on the dangers of interference with our regular high-level surveillance. I therefore suggest that you may wish to sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State asking for a diplomatic scenario aimed at strengthening our position on this matter.

McG. B.

Signed McG. B.

Disapproved _____

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Authority NLS.019.001.0047

By jc . NARA. Date 11-19-09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memos for the Pres.

March 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA: MR. VALENTI

A group of OSS graduates in New York operate an award called "The William J. Donovan Award." It has only two previous winners, Allen Dulles and John J. McCloy. They would now like to give it to you, in a celebration in New York at the end of May.

I don't know what alternatives this should be weighed against, but I think there is a kind of rock-like virtue in succeeding Allen Dulles and Jack McCloy, which may be very useful with middle-of-the-roads all over the place. The party could be televised and you could make a short speech on Bill Donovan, bravery, and the national security, which might do a lot of good. And all this would be in a most effectively nonpartisan environment.

You may be interested to know that the committee on nominations prefers you to Dwight Eisenhower, who may be their second choice.

The one thing the committee asks is a reasonably quick answer because they have to go back to the drawing boards if you are not interested.

McG. B.

Yes _____
No ✓ *WJ*

Speak to me _____

John Shaleen
TR9-1666
TN 7-0250

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LJ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is the first direct account of an interview with Khrushchev which we have had in some time, and while there is nothing very startling in it, it gives something of the current flavor of what he is saying, at least to Westerners.

McG. B.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Bundy

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Rec'd: March 3, 1964
2:21 p.m.

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FROM: Copenhagen

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ACTION: Secstate 572

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DATE: March 3, 4 p.m.

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RMR

PARIS FOR USRO

Prime Minister Krag gave me late yesterday full account his visit to Soviet Union together with his impressions of Khrushchev. Memcon being pouched. Highlights of Krag's remarks as follows:

1. Soviets had been very cordial to him and he was well satisfied by "open and friendly talks." He thought possible one reason for generally cordial atmosphere was preparation for Khrushchev's visit to Denmark in June. Krag received impression Khrushchev in excellent health and taking extremely good care of himself.

2. Berlin question brought up only once and in rather joking way. Khrushchev made fun of fact that when delayed on Autobahn few months ago, American troops sat comfortably in tanks all night while Russian soldiers sat in snow. Khrushchev expressed concern about Germany's increased military power and influence in NATO. Krag said "Khrushchev hates Germans viciously" quoting Khrushchev as saying if Germans made trouble Russians had one bomb which would destroy all Germans but they would use three of

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-2- 572, March 3, 4 p.m., from Copenhagen

them.

3. On de Gaulle, Khrushchev said France had no influence in world affairs and realized it. (In separate conversation today with Director General Fischer of Foreign Office who accompanied Krag, Fischer told me Khrushchev said de Gaulle had done well in solving Algeria problem and in recognition Communist China, but had made mistake in recently interfering Gabon affairs.)

4. On Great Britain, Khrushchev said he not impressed with Harold Wilson. Added it made no difference whether Britain had Labour or Conservative government since Wilson would do exactly same as Conservatives.

5. On India, Krag queried Khrushchev as to what would happen on death of Nehru. Khrushchev responded this is question "no one would like to answer." Khrushchev agreed with Krag's statement it would be dangerous if political leadership disintegrated in India. Khrushchev expressed confidence in Indian working class, said it was stronger than people think.

6. When Khrushchev expressed hope of obtaining long term credits from Denmark, Krag said this impossible, pointing out while Denmark had favorable balance of trade at moment, this situation might change.

7. Krag indicated Denmark's willingness buy coke, coal and oil. (When I queried about oil, Krag said it would not be purchased in any "substantial amounts.")

8. After several references by Khrushchev of need for peaceful Baltic area Krag reminded Khrushchev of Litvinov statement "peace is indivisible" and told Khrushchev USSR should be more cooperative at disarmament talks in Geneva.

9. Khrushchev did not raise subject of nuclear free zones. Krag said Kekkonen plan was raised "in nice way" by Gromyko during Kremlin reception to which Krag replied "it completely unrealistic" to seek agreement on such a plan among four

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-3- 572, March 3, 4 p.m., from Copenhagen

countries, two of whom belonged to NATO and who in different ways were neutral.

10. At one luncheon Khrushchev told Krag if US harms Cuba USSR would first take Berlin; then Iran, and if that did not create desired effect, "it will be your turn." Khrushchev then laughed and said he was only joking. Krag's impression was, however, Khrushchev only joking about Denmark.

GP-3.

BLAIR

KGG/17

March 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Questions you might put to Walter Lippmann

1. What prospect is there that any neutralization in Southeast Asia would be more than a way-station to Communist take-over?
2. Cuba- What can be done to minimize political pressure for unwise action?
3. Arabs and Israelis- Does he have any comment to make on the problem of maintaining stability in that area this year?
4. Panama - You might be safe in telling him that we are on the edge of a settlement which will reopen discussions and negotiations with no preconditions whatever. He is the one newspaperman who keeps his mouth shut. And he values confidences.
5. The Vice Presidency, -both as a problem in legislation and as a problem in personal choice. You might find it interesting to listen to him, although certainly not to talk to him.

McG. B.

P. S. Walter's favorite subject is ending the cold war by ignoring the Germans, but I personally find him so boring on this one that I do not recommend it.

March 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. JACK VALENTI

Jack--

We have an NSC meeting tomorrow on Vietnam and the OAS action against Cuba. The President has expressed concern about the size of these meetings, and for this reason I do not want to send out an invitation list until he has checked to see if he wants any of the people on this list omitted.

Item 1 is a reduced list of regular NSC attendance, except that the President can pick and choose among the White House personnel. The people listed for Items 2 and 3 are the genuine experts on the subjects concerned.

McG. B.

Mr. Bundy:
The President approved the list, and wants Walter Jenkins added. I told Polly.

49 d

Officers to be Invited to NSC Meeting -- March 5, 1964

1. Attending for entire meeting

Speaker McCormack
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Secretary Dillon
Attorney General
General Taylor, JCS
General Carter, Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Director McDermott, Office of Emergency Planning
Director Rowan, U.S. Information Agency
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Pierre Salinger
General Clifton
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Jack Valenti
Mr. Bromley Smith

2. Additional Attendees for Item One - Vietnam

Under Secretary Ball
Under Secretary Harriman
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Mr. William Sullivan, State
Director Bell, AID
Mr. William Colby, CIA
Mr. Michael Forrestal

3. Additional Attendees for Item Two - OAS Action

Deputy Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary Mann
Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, State
Mr. Ward Allen, State
Mr. John Crimmins, State
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA
Mr. Ralph Dungan

March 3, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The lard matter is alive again, but the longer memorandum suggests that it is not instantaneously urgent.

McG. B.

March 2, 1964

51
- 2

Pres

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Article for Foreign Affairs

Here is the final version of what I have done for Foreign Affairs. I have had to be a little careful about sounding like a direct White House propagandist for the new Administration, but I have done what I could, at pages 22 and 23 particularly, and also at pages 2, 5 and 19. The Editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, tells me he thinks the piece will do some indirect good at least for the Administration, and I only hope that he is right.

McG. B.

March 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum shows what Wilson has been saying in other places so far.

George Ball gave a lunch for Wilson today, and at my request he has explained to Wilson exactly how we feel about any public statements he may make. Wilson has assured Ball that he does not intend to discuss Cuba in any way, shape or form, and that he will limit his comments to the press, as he did with President Kennedy, to a general statement that "we discussed common interests of the Alliance and of the defense of the West." Ball says he got the signal loud and clear, and remarked that while Home had used buses for domestic mileage, he would do nothing of the sort if only because it would seem repetitive and thin at home.

I am seeing him at 4:30 before he sees you, and I will convey the same message again. I will also give him a few words on British Guiana, which it may be better for you not to mention yourself, in the light of the fact of our private understanding with Home, which must be carefully protected.

McG. B.

March 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached are two cables, one from Kohler reporting a conversation with Gromyko, and one from Lodge on Khanh. I pass them on to you partly for their own sake and partly as an illustration of some of the cables which I have not been showing to you regularly and which you may wish to see. Would you please check your reaction for me?

I want to see this sort of cable _____

I don't unless it needs a decision _____
or is immediately urgent

I would prefer a brief summary to _____
the full cable.

McG. B.

(- - - -)
L

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Authority State for 4/28/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

March 1, 1964

[Handwritten signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on UN Problems *- for information only*

The Secretary of State has authorized Ambassador Stevenson to begin exploratory negotiations with the Russians on (1) future UN peacekeeping arrangements, and (2) UN financial problems. Stevenson will explore the following areas with the Russians:

1. Strengthening the Security Council so that peacekeeping operations first come to the Council, and go to the General Assembly only if the Council cannot act because of a veto. Also, Stevenson will propose the creation of a new finance committee, heavily weighted in favor of permanent Council members and large contributors, so that financial arrangements for peacekeeping will be controlled by those who pay the most.

2. Stevenson will propose a new scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations by which large contributors would pay a larger percentage than for the regular budget. We believe we could keep our share to less than 40%, which would represent a saving over the approximately 46% we have paid for the Congo and the Middle East operations.

3. Another financial arrangement we would be willing to consider would allow a permanent member of the Council to be excluded from any assessment for a peacekeeping operation of which it did not approve.

4. We plan to stick to our policy of insisting that the Soviet Union lose its vote in the General Assembly if it is still two years

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

financially in arrears when the next General Assembly convenes.
(after November, unless a meeting is forced by some crisis sooner)
The Secretary and Ambassador Stevenson believe that if we take this reasonable approach rather than a "Cold War" one, there is hope for resolving some parts of these problems.

The Congress is being kept fully informed. Assistant Secretary Cleveland has individually briefed Senators Aiken, Church, Hickenlooper, Sparkman and Fulbright. Ambassador Stevenson, accompanied by Cleveland and Chayes of the Department, met with the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 26. The meeting went satisfactorily, and the Department plans to keep the Senators informed as the negotiations progress.

On the House side, Cleveland already has briefed Representative Fascell (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Organizations), who thought it would be helpful if Cleveland briefed the full House Foreign Affairs Committee next week. Cleveland plans to do so.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached are two cables, one from Kohler reporting a conversation with Gromyko, and one from Lodge on Khanh. I pass them on to you partly for their own sake and partly as an illustration of some of the cables which I have not been showing to you regularly and which you may wish to see. Would you please check your reaction for me?

I want to see this sort of cable ✓ *Thanks -*

I don't unless it needs a decision _____ *or is immediately urgent*

I would prefer a brief summary to _____ the full cable.

McG. B.
McG. B.

B/S:
keep an eye
out
McG

~~SECRET~~

55a
February 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

President's private conversation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home
Wednesday, February 12 (as described by the President at 12:45)

The President and the Prime Minister met privately from 11 o'clock
until just before 12.

They discussed the problem of Cuba. The President made clear
the depth of American concern on trade with Cuba. The Prime Minister
said that he quite understood the importance of this problem to the
United States. He said that the British had a firm national policy in
favor of peaceful trade with any country -- a policy which he could not
reverse. He said that the British Government might be able to help
quietly in slowing down the delivery of buses, and he would speak to
the Foreign Secretary about improved efforts to limit British shipping
to Cuba.

The President reminded the Prime Minister of the understanding
between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan with respect
to British Guiana. The Prime Minister at once replied that he under-
stood this agreement and supported it: the United States could be
assured that there would be no independence under Jagan before
November 1964.

The President also raised with the Prime Minister the question of a
planned raise in the British bank rate. The Prime Minister undertook
to report the President's concern to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Mr. Maudling, and said that the British government had understood
that the U. S. Federal Reserve might be planning to raise the re-
discount rate, for its own reasons.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed Southeast Asia, and
the Prime Minister agreed that in the case of Vietnam the British
government would do what it could to help, although it must help very
quietly because of its peace-keeping role under the agreements of 1954.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 10-14-98

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-290

By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

The Prime Minister and the President also discussed the problem of Indonesia and Malaysia. In particular they reviewed the Attorney General's recent mission. The President explained the need for a decision about aid to Indonesia in the light of new provisions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, and the decision to send the Attorney General as the best emissary available to review the situation and to attempt to create an environment in which assistance to Indonesia would not have to be ended in circumstances damaging to U. S. interests. Up to this point the mission had been successful. The Prime Minister made it clear that he fully understood the purpose of the Attorney General's mission and believed that it had been genuinely helpful. Unfortunately, it had been badly reported and much criticized in the British press. (Later in the day in a larger meeting the Prime Minister made it clear that during his visit he would find an opportunity to inform the press of his favorable impression of the Attorney General's mission.)

The President and the Prime Minister spoke briefly about Zanzibar and the Prime Minister indicated that he would see what his government could do to improve the situation there.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the political situations in their own two countries. The Prime Minister informed the President that his party was gaining with each passing month. If certain London elections should go well in the spring, he would call the election at once. Otherwise he might put it off as late as October. The Prime Minister spoke particularly of his affection and respect for the Secretary of State.

The President and the Prime Minister briefly discussed East-West relations and confirmed to each other their strong desire to find new areas of peaceful settlement with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister expressed his disappointment at the positions being taken by the Germans and his belief that they had not yet come up with anything very promising.

The President and the Prime Minister talked briefly about General de Gaulle. In response to a question from the President, the Prime Minister said that he really did not know what made General de Gaulle tick. He had certainly done a great deal with the internal affairs of France, but on the world scene he was a problem.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~
March 7, 1964

55-1
Memos for the
Pres ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Harold Wilson, March 2, 4:30 PM

Harold Wilson, the British Labor Party's leader, is making his third trip to the United States since taking charge of the British Labor Party last year. He met with President Kennedy last April and invited himself to Washington for the funeral in November.

This visit is timed to follow closely on the heels of your meeting with Douglas-Home. It is important for the British election campaign, and you will have to give him about an hour. (I am still about 2 hours ahead of you on my hour-a-week program).

I think you will find Wilson interesting, affable, persuasive, and seemingly sincere, (although he is widely accused of opportunistic insincerity). His detractors say that he has a photographic memory and can "spout names, dates and quotations like a champion quiz kid." He is a cold man.

His political line is friendly to the United States except for reservations appropriate for a Socialist leader and a defender of British national prestige. He insists publicly and privately that Labor will be a more reliable political partner for the United States than the Tories have been.

You probably will want to let him tell you his views of British domestic problems and major international issues. He enjoys talking.

You also will want to give him a sense of your own basic policies. (The State Department memorandum (Tab A) provides useful checklist for this purpose.) In particular, I think you may want to emphasize as you did with Home, our views on Communist trade with Cuba, so that Wilson will take back the same impressions Home did. At Tab B is my memorandum of your conversation with Home. You might also want to stress, for Wilson's benefit, our continuing interest in the multilateral force (MLF), emphasizing that we look at the MLF as

originally conceived -- a response to Allied wishes and not a project being hoisted on our partners. The State Department brief takes a somewhat stronger line than I would. It is also important that Wilson be fully aware of your determination to pursue the search for peace at Geneva and elsewhere.

For background purposes, I am attaching CIA's biographic statement on Wilson (Tab C). In this connection you might also be interested in David Bruce's judgment -- that Wilson's "greatest danger might be a tendency to express his views with unnecessary freedom and verbosity without having sufficiently weighed the complexities of the problems covered."

McG. B.