

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 2009

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
22	memo	Bundy to the President re nuclear weapons (same sanitization as previous version 9/12/01, NLJ 99-35)	TS-	1	undated	A
44	memo	Bundy to the President re Zanzibar (Sanitized 7/8/99, NLJ 97-09) <i>same sani per RAC 8/16/05</i>	S	1	4/1/64	A
44c	cable	Cmmwlth. Sec. to HiComer (Exempted 5/22/00, NLJ 97-22)	S	5	undated	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President

Folder Title "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 3, 4/1-30/64"

Box Number 1

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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11/19/2009

[Signature]
Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: Commerce Department		
#27d Memo	minutes of meeting, Export Control Review Board S 3 p	1/20/64 <i>open 7-17-79 inf</i>	A
#27i Memo	Hodges to Pres. S 1 p	8/15/63 <i>open 7-17-79 inf</i>	A
#27j Memo	Export Control Review Board to Pres. S 23 p	8/9/63 <i>open 7-17-79 inf</i>	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff File~~, ~~McGeorge Bundy~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#27h Memo	Agency: White House, for Commerce concurrence. JFK to Export Control Review Board <i>open 7-17-79 insg</i> S 1 p	9/19/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff File~~ ~~_____~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22 Memo	Agency: White House, for ERDA concurrence. <i>Sanitized ERDA letter 6/2/77, NSC letter 8/1/77</i> Bundy to Pres. re "High Yield Nuclear Weapons" TS-RD 1 p <i>sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ 99-35</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State Department		
#9b Memo	<i>State ltr 4/27/77</i> Rusk to Pres. re meeting w/PM of Trinidad C 2 p	4/23/64	A
#9c Biog.	<i>State ltr 4/27/77</i> on PM Williams C 1 p	4/21/64	A
#9d Biog.	<i>State ltr 4/27/77</i> on Sir Clarke C 1 p	4/21/64	A
#9e Memo	<i>State ltr 4/27/77</i> background on Trinidad/Tobago C 1 p	undated	A
#26b Memo	<i>Exempt, State ltr 4/20/77</i> Harlech to Pres., transmittal of #26c below S 1 p	4/10/64	A
#26c Memo	<i>Exempt, State ltr 4/20/77</i> Douglas-Home to LBJ S 1 p	4/10/64	A
#38d Cable	<i>Exempt, State ltr 4/20/77</i> 4615 fm Paris S 5 p	4/2/64	A
#38e Cable	<i>State ltr 4/20/77, vsc ltr 4/20/77</i> 4793 to Paris S 5 p	3/24/64	A
#38g Cable	1606 fm ██████████ Saigon (dup. #21, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 4) <i>Exempt, State ltr 4/20/77</i>	3 p 2/22/64	A
#44b Memo	PM to Pres. re Zanzibar S 1 p	3/30/64	A
#44c Telegram	Cmmwlth. Sec. to HiComer S 5 p	undated	A
#44e Cable	1631 fm Nairobi <i>Exempt, State ltr 4/20/77</i>	2 p 3/31/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~██████████~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25b Ltr.	Agency: State Department Exempt State Dec. 4/23/77 Khrushchev to President TS 6 p OPEN 10.22.98 STATE GUIDELINES	4/2/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff File~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>all decisions per NSC ltr. 1/11/77</i> Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
#6a Memo	Forrestal to Pres. re Laos <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt 6/27/80 NS 99-34</i> S 1 p	4/29/64	A
#21 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re NSAM S 2 p (dup. #16, NSF, NSAM, "NSAM 295" OPEN 10.22.98)	4/20/64	A + G
#27 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re NSC meeting S 2 p	4/14/64	A
#27c Memo	"summary positions of departments" S 3 p	undated	A
#36 Memo	Bundy to Pres. (dup. #27 above) S 2 p	4/6/64	A
#36a Memo	"summary positions..." (dup. #27c above) S 3 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff Files~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#27L Paper	Agency: NSC <i>NSC Doc 6/13/77</i> US Economic Defense Policy... TS 4 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#3 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Fulbright Mission	S 1 p 4/30/64	A
	<i>Example, State ltr 8/31/77</i>		
	<i>OPEN 10.14.98 STATE GUIDELINES</i>		
#5 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re ltr. to Khrushchev	C 2 p 4/30/64	A
	<i>State ltr 8/31/77, 7/5/10/1/77</i>		
#7 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re meeting w/Butler	S 2 p 4/29/64	A
	<i>open 7-25-95 NLS 93-265 Example, State ltr 8/31/77</i>		
	<i>Box #3, UK, meetings with Butler, 4/69, Box 213</i>		
#9a Memo	Bundy to Pres. re meeting w/Williams	C 1 p 4/27/64	A
	<i>State ltr 8/15/77</i>		
#17 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Indira Gandhi	S 1 p 4/22/64	A
	<i>State ltr 8/15/77</i>		
#20 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Betancourt	C 1 p 4/21/64	A
	<i>State ltr 8/15/77</i>		
#26e Note	Pres. to Prime Minister	S 1 p undated	A
	<i>Example, State ltr 8/31/77</i>		
	<i>OPEN 10.22.98 STATE GUIDELINES</i>		
#34 Memo	Bundy to Pres. on Rusk trip	C 1 p 4/9/64	A
	<i>State ltr 8/15/77</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#44 Memo	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence. <i>Exempt CIA la 8/24/77</i> Bundy to Pres. re British and Zanzibar Exempt per NLJ 82-17 + 5-10-83 ^S 1 p + <i>Aug # 238, NSF files, McGeo Bundy,</i> SANITIZED 6/19/05 Chem file "Agree '64") <i>NLJ 97.09</i>	4/1/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<p>Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence.</p> <p>#30 Memo Bundy to Pres. on Billotte's plan re tanks <i>Serial NSC 8-14-78 in 8</i></p> <p>S 1 p <i>4/13/64</i></p> <p><i>OPEN 10.14.98</i></p> <p><i>STATE GUIDELINES</i></p>		<p>A</p>

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~NSC Staff File~~ ~~_____~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24 Memo	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence. <i>OSD ltr 6/17/77</i> Bundy to Pres. on rules of engagement TS 1 p	4/17/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~WCS/SA/...~~, McGeorge Bundy,
 Memos for the President, Vol. 3, 4/1-30/64

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1
2

April 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: East-West Center

The attached memorandum (Tab A) from Elmer Staats explains the enclosed documents. The main document at Tab B is a good report by Roy Larsen of TIME on the work of the East-West Center in Hawaii. This report is designed to help get more support for the Center in Congress, and in general it is a good document. We would like to get it out this week, with a covering letter from you, of which a draft is attached at Tab C.

The one remaining question relates to the composition of a Public Advisory Board. Everybody agrees that such a board is a good thing, but whereas Larsen & Co. recommend that Governor Burns of Hawaii be the chairman, both Fulbright and Rooney strongly oppose putting a State Governor in charge of a commission which is to advise the Secretary of State. Both because of Rooney's strategic position and because of its own sense of proper administrative procedure, the Bureau of the Budget memorandum (Tab A) recommends against the Governor as chairman. In our first telephone conversation, on the other hand, you indicated a different feeling.

In my own judgment, the best solution is not to decide this matter in your own letter (Tab C), but to make it clear, informally, that while you do not think the Governor as such should be ex officio chairman, you do believe that Governor Burns himself, because of his interest and effectiveness, deserves this appointment. This would give Burns the first chairmanship while not violating the principles to which Fulbright, Rooney and the Bureau have attached themselves.

If this intermediate solution is agreeable, a check in the box below and signature of the letter at Tab C will do the job.

One advantage of a decision is that this would give us something good to announce on Saturday.

Approved _____

McG. B.

Evans 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Last night I talked with thirty-odd University presidents who are members of the AAU. I found them:

1. Very enthusiastic about the Johnson Administration.
2. Very keen on Bob McNamara as the ideal candidate for Vice President.
3. Very sensitive to the problem of student activity on civil rights during the summer, and grateful for your oral message on this subject which I conveyed. They promised to do what they can for peace and good sense with their students, but several of them also suggested that before the summer holidays a statement in the same sense from you would be very helpful. I pointed out that you had already spoken more than once not only about civil rights but about peace and good sense, but I am passing their comment by copy of this memorandum to Bill Moyers for inclusion in our forward speaking plans.

McG. B.

McG. B.

OK
no public announcement

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fulbright Mission

George Ball is back from Ottawa, and I have asked him to coordinate the Fulbright mission. This is a good way of doing it because he and Bill get on very well, and also because George has handled the two accounts which are involved: (1) getting our view of Cuba across in Western Europe, and (2) Athens and Cyprus.

and Ankara

George is working with Bill Fulbright to get this visit to London, Paris, ~~and~~ Athens done next week. He and I agree that in the circumstances these are the three crucial capitals for the immediate undertaking, and they are as much as we can get done in the time that Fulbright can reasonably expect to take off right now.

The one thing that George Ball strongly urges is that there should be no public announcement whatever as to the underlying purpose of the Fulbright mission at this time. If we announce that he is going on your behalf to preach our Cuban gospel, we can expect violent feedback from the British politicians and the British press, which will pin the British Government; and, to a lesser degree, we would get the same trouble in Paris. So unless you have different orders we will say nothing about Fulbright's mission, as a Government matter, at this time. After the visit, a different position may become workable, and we will keep an eye on that. Will you let me know if this is in any way unsatisfactory? This is so much your own play that it is very important for us to do it exactly as you have it planned in your own mind.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *fw*, NARA, Date *10-14-98*

~~SECRET~~

April 30, 1964

Handwritten initials and number:
4
—
C
" "

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Dillon's foreign travel plan

Attached is Douglas Dillon's foreign travel plan for the period between now and the elections. I recommend that it be approved, in the light of the argumentation he develops.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

April 30, 1964

u r ce j 5
(this is a re-do of 4/27 memo)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Khrushchev

The attached draft letter to Chairman Khrushchev is designed to respond to his most recent communications in a way which will open the possibility of cooperation on the use of nuclear energy for desalting sea water, while protecting our flank from his proposal of a reduction of U. S. troop levels in Germany. The draft reply is at Tab A, and his last letters are at B and C. Your last message to Khrushchev is at Tab D.

It seems to us important that this private correspondence should show plainly that we are not getting drawn into any secret agreement that affects German interests, and the language has been designed to be polite to Nikita, while permitting us at the same time to show the relevant paragraphs of our answer to Chancellor Erhard on a most confidential basis. We want the Chancellor himself to feel totally confident that he knows what is going on between you and the Soviet Union whenever it affects German interests, and this seems to us the best way of doing it.

We have left out the proposal of an exchange of television appearances which you made to Dobrynin. Tommy Thompson thinks that the Chairman may not be able to accept this proposal because of his current troubles with the Chinese, and yet it would be something of an affront if he were to turn it down directly on the basis of a personal invitation from you. So what Thompson suggests is that when he delivers your message to Dobrynin, in the usual way, he should remind the Ambassador of the suggestion which you have already made to him and ask if the Soviet Government is interested in going forward with such an exchange.

The reason for the designation of Hornig (working with Seaborg) as your agent in the desalting discussions is that the problem of using nuclear reactors for desalting of sea water falls in many departments. The AEC of course has the nuclear reactor problem, but the desalting problem falls mainly in Interior, and is the more difficult of the two

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED *11/1/77*
Authority *State Dec 8/3/77, 4256/77*
By *mmg*, NARS, Date *12/7/77*

at present. It is Hornig's office which has already produced the only good interdepartmental report on the subject. Inquiries in the various departments suggest that Hornig will have the confidence of all concerned, and that probably no one else would. Moreover, Hornig is a quiet and sensible person and has considerable professional understanding of this particular problem.

Any proposal for cooperation always raises the possibility of criticism at home, but our judgment is that this one can be handled in such a way that in this case the criticism should be manageable. We are not dealing with highly classified materials, and the object is one of cooperation in which with any luck both sides would gain. In a case of this kind, where the cooperation is between Government technologists, the kind of issues that arise when we talk about export licenses should be avoidable.

If you canstand it, I think this plan for cooperation should be kept private for the present. I do not think it will leak here, and it ought to be done by a joint announcement which cannot easily be arranged for Saturday morning. The letter proposes such a joint announcement as soon as the USSR has chosen a man.

McG. B.

with from Mrs. X

6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: NSC Meeting on April 29

The main business of this meeting is to review intelligence information indicating greatly increased use of Laos for infiltration from North to South Vietnam. I think you may want to follow the following order of discussion:

1. Briefing by McCone on this situation.
2. Briefing by State (presumably Bill Bundy) on the political and paramilitary situation in Laos.
3. Consideration of measures to get more hard evidence on North Vietnamese use of the Laos corridor -- State and Defense.

I doubt if you will wish to authorize specific actions today. It may be better to hear the argument and let the meeting continue without you to prepare a coordinated recommendation. I think such a recommendation can be developed by State, Defense and the White House promptly, but it is not in hand now.

McG. B.
McG. B.

attached is Mike Forrestal's summary of problem.

6-a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Laos Cross Border Operations

There will be raised with you this afternoon at the NSC meeting the question of authorizing military operations from South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows:

1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area of Tchepone in central Laos, together with some apparent supply bases. There is a feeling in the JCS that we should take direct ground and air action against these targets if intelligence proves them out.
2. Ambassador Unger discussed this problem with Assistant Secretary Bundy in Saigon. He is very much opposed to any kind of cross border operation into Laos which would be internationally visible, particularly at a time when Souvanna Phouma's position in Vientiane is not secure.
3. The Department of State will suggest a compromise designed to reduce the risk of causing trouble in Laos. They would permit small-scale, carefully controlled intelligence sorties into Laos organized in such a way as to avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating an international hue and cry. State will probably recommend against direct involvement of U. S. personnel, except for emergency air support to the intelligence teams. They will also recommend low level reconnaissance by U. S. aircraft. You may wish to ask what Ambassador Lodge's position is on this question, since it is not clear from the cables.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-019.001.002/1

By jc NARA. Date 11-19-09

Hills
Michael V. Forrestal

~~SECRET~~

7 ✓
— u r G

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with R. A. Butler

The first item you may want to take up with Butler is Cuba. Rusk has argued with him once about this, but he needs to hear from you yourself how important it is that Her Majesty's Government find quiet ways of discouraging trade with Cuba. The British constantly look for ways of saying that we don't quite mean what we say on this, and word from you will make the difference.

The main topic Butler wants to take up is the Mideast (it's a commentary in itself on UK policy that when they say Mideast they mean Aden and Yemen). Butler's pitch to Rusk is that the British intend to fight fire with fire, and take the offensive against Nasser in the UN and in Yemen.

We're from Missouri on this one, and healthy skepticism is the order of the day. We simply doubt the British have thought through this matter. First, we don't see how going to war with Nasser (the British have already been needling him in Yemen covertly for months) will get him out of Yemen and relieve the threat to Aden. As he's already shown, he's much more likely to send more troops down there and raise more hell about getting UK colonialist bases off Arab soil. We can't win in the UN either, on a straight anti-colonial issue. Just as shooting up Harib, it will hurt more than it helps.

Worse yet, this is a game where Nasser is likely to up the ante. Jousting with him right now might well generate an across the board US/UK falling out with the Arabs, with repercussions on Libya as well as Aden, and even on our oil. This wouldn't be just a war with Nasser. All Arabs but the Saudis are highly suspicious of the US on Israel and the Jordan Waters, especially in an election year. They'd all back the UAR as a matter of Arab solidarity if we backed the UK against the UAR. But even if we don't join the UK, we'll suffer too, in Libya for example, from the Arab backlash against

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-265
By lip, NARA, Date 6-23-95

against them. So we hope you'll go further than denying Butler's plea, and seek to persuade him our way.

For what it's worth, even the UK Foreign Office experts seem to join with ours in worrying over the bloody-mindedness of their ministers. This is just not the time to start a war with Nasser -- especially one which, like the Aswan Dam fiasco, we're not likely to win. And if Labor comes in next October, UK policy will probably become more like ours.

McG. B.
McG. B.

H. W. Komer

C
2

April 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: East-West Center

The attached memorandum (Tab A) from Elmer Staats explains the enclosed documents. The main document at Tab B is a good report by Roy Larsen of TIME on the work of the East-West Center in Hawaii. This report is designed to help get more support for the Center in Congress, and in general it is a good document. We would like to get it out this week, with a covering letter from you, of which a draft is attached at Tab C.

The one remaining question relates to the composition of a Public Advisory Board. Everybody agrees that such a board is a good thing, but whereas Larsen & Co. recommend that Governor Burns of Hawaii be the chairman, both Fulbright and Rooney strongly oppose putting a State Governor in charge of a commission which is to advise the Secretary of State. Since it is Rooney whose help we need now, we are inclined to go along with his view. On this arrangement, the Governor of Hawaii would of course be a member of the commission -- but not the chairman -- and we would deal with the chairman by asking the Secretary of State to designate one on his own responsibility.

If you agree with this recommendation, I suggest that Walter Jenkins or I should call Governor Burns to explain that our decision is motivated by a desire to get money, that our respect for him is unchanging.

Alternatively, if you feel strongly that we should make a further bow to the Governor, we could possibly designate the Governor of Hawaii and the Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs as Honorary Co-Chairmen. This seems slightly messy and indecisive, but it could be done.

McG. B.

Approved as recommended _____

Make the Governor an Honorary Co-Chairman _____

Speak to me _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Received
by Mrs Roberts
4/28/64
9*

April 27, 1964

Mr. President:

I am seeing Williams at lunch, and
if I learn anything more I will send
it in.

McG. B.

9a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago

1. Dr. Williams is in the U. S. for a few days after touring extensively in Africa, Geneva, London, Tehran, Belgrade, and Ottawa. The small, young-looking (52 years old) Williams wears a hearing-aid and dark glasses. A scholar-politician trained at Oxford, he is at once brilliant, mercurial, difficult, dynamic, aggressive, sensitive, and proud. He is probably the most outstanding leader in the Caribbean and has connections and some influence in that area as well as in the Commonwealth and Africa. Under Williams (since December 1961), Trinidad has become independent (mid-1962), has made significant progress in economic development and has an excellent record of self-help.

2. On an official level, U. S. /Trinidad relations, once quite unpleasant, are now on an upswing. In large part, this is a consequence of the settlement of the aid issue related to our Chaguaramas Naval Base and to prompt U. S. disaster assistance to the islands after Hurricane Flora. On an unofficial level, Williams seems to be making his personal peace with the U. S. Among other things, he seems to have shelved (or suppressed), his recollections of the imagined and real racial slights he suffered during his teaching years at Howard University. He has taken a constructive position on Cuba, British Guiana, and Caribbean anti-subversive surveillance.

3. We want to strengthen our sweetening relations with Trinidad, one of the few bright lights in an often-turbulent, unhappy area of the world (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, British Guiana). Accordingly, you may want to give Williams a pat on the back -- e. g. we are pleased that, in less than two years, Trinidad has been able to make a smooth transition from colonialism to independence and that it is an enlightened democracy which is making good development progress. You may also want to get Williams' views on Africa, British Guiana, other Caribbean countries, and UNCTAD.

Williams may press you on the following: First, he may ask for more bilateral aid although he has not yet used the aid we have already given him. You can assure him that we are interested in Trinidad's progress and will give any requests thorough consideration. Second, he may propose a "Colombo Plan for the Caribbean." You can say that the idea is interesting and that we should explore it further with other interested countries.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 8/15/77
By smg, NARS, Date 8/22/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Orig. Trinidad Tobago

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Briefing Memorandum for Your Visit
with Prime Minister of Trinidad and
Tobago, April 27

Dr. Williams comes to Washington after an extensive tour of Africa with additional stops in Geneva, London, Tehran, Belgrade, and Ottawa. Earlier today he will have lunched with me. He will be accompanied by his Ambassador, Sir Ellis Clarke, Assistant Secretary Mann, and our Ambassador, Robert G. Miner.

Eric Williams, a brilliant, unpredictable, and difficult man, has been doing an exceptional job leading his newly independent country. Biographic sketches and background information are enclosed.

The specific questions he intends to raise with you remain unidentified, but our embassies in Africa report that he may seek additional bilateral assistance, and the British report he will propose a "Colombo Plan" for the Caribbean.

While Trinidad may need United States assistance in the future, there is no apparent immediate requirement. In 1962 we concluded a \$30 million aid agreement in return for continuation of our naval base rights in Trinidad. Three \$5 million annual installments remain due under this agreement. The \$15 million already paid is unspent, although there are plans to use it promptly. Trinidad's current Five Year Plan seems satisfactorily financed through 1965.

If Dr. Williams seeks assistance, you might reaffirm our willingness to consider specific requests on the same basis and under the same criteria that apply to other countries in like circumstances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 4/27/77
By hmg., NARS, Date 5/10/77

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The "Caribbean Colombo Plan" idea is an interesting one and we should explore the idea further with other interested countries.

Other less important questions that might be raised are:

1. Nonquota Immigration Status - The Administration's immigration bill submitted last July to the Congress would accord Trinidad and Jamaica (the only Western Hemisphere nations subjected to quota restrictions) the non-quota status they desire.

2. OAS Membership - Williams resents the delay in arranging Trinidad's entry but realizes the U.S. is trying to overcome opposition by Guatemala and the apathy of most other members. He will be discussing this question with OAS Secretary Mora during his Washington visit.

3. Surveillance - We agreed in principle to Williams' request for United States cooperation in maintaining surveillance of Trinidad's coasts against possible Castro-Communist penetration. Details are being worked out by armed forces of the two countries and our Embassy in Port of Spain.

If there is an opportunity, it might be useful to obtain Dr. Williams' views on (a) Africa; (b) British Guiana; (c) other Caribbean countries; and (d) the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. We remain deeply concerned about the pro-Communist trend in British Guiana and its increasing ties with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Biographic Sketches of Prime Minister Williams and Ambassador Clarke.
2. Background Information - Trinidad and Tobago.

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure 1

DR. ERIC EUSTACE WILLIAMS

Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
of Trinidad and Tobago

Dr. Williams is a scholar-politician with an extremely mercurial, dynamic, and aggressive temperament.

At the head of his Peoples National Movement he decisively defeated (20 of 30 seats) the opposition Democratic Labor Party in the December 1961 elections. He thus became the man who led Trinidad and Tobago into independence as a member of the Commonwealth on August 31, 1962.

He is a sensitive proud man who was subjected in his youth to racial slights both in the United States (while teaching at Howard University) and the United Kingdom which he finds it difficult to forget.

Dr. Williams is small in stature, uses a hearing aid and wears dark glasses almost constantly. Born in Trinidad in October 1911 he seems much younger than his 52 years.

The Prime Minister can be characterized as generally pro-Western and anti-Communist although he is perfectly capable of following a policy hostile to the United States to attain his immediate objectives. During the past twelve months he has become increasingly friendly and cooperative towards the United States in contrast to the highly critical attitude adopted in earlier years.

Dr. Williams received a B. A. degree with high honors in 1936 and a Ph.D. in 1939, both from Oxford University. He has been a prolific author of books and pamphlets, producing such titles as "Capitalism and Slavery," "The Negro in the Caribbean," and "History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago." Married three times, Dr. Williams now lives with the daughter of his second marriage, Erica, to whom he is deeply devoted.

April 21, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State Sec 4/27/77
By MMG, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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Enclosure 1

SIR ELLIS E. I. CLARKE

Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago to the United States
and Head of UN Mission

Sir Ellis is a "smooth operator" in the sense that he speaks well and in a manner suggesting sincerity and full command of his subject. He is intelligent, reasonable, and approachable and considered friendly to the United States.

Although reportedly without party affiliation Clarke enjoys the confidence of Prime Minister Williams and accompanied him throughout his recent African tour. As special adviser to the Prime Minister Clarke played a major if not predominant role in drafting his country's independence Constitution. He is regarded as a very capable official both by his Trinidadian colleagues and United States officials who have worked with him.

Sir Ellis was born in Trinidad on December 29, 1917. He obtained his primary and secondary education on the island, earning various scholastic awards. He received an LL.B. from London University with first class honors. After engaging in private law practice for a number of years he was appointed Solicitor General in 1954, Attorney General in 1957, acting Chief Justice in 1960 and Ambassador to the United States in 1962.

In 1952 Clarke married the former Emyntrude Hagley of Grenada; they have a son and daughter. The Ambassador was knighted by Queen Elizabeth in 1963.

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Authority State la 4/29/77
By RMG, NARS, Date 5/10/77

April 21, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

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Enclosure 2

BACKGROUND INFORMATION - TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Trinidad, under the leadership of Prime Minister Williams and his Peoples National Movement, has a stable democratic government based on a relatively viable economy. The opposition Democratic Labor Party is badly split and there is no visible alternative to Dr. Williams' leadership. His government is anti-Communist, fully aware of the threat of Castroism, and determined to resist subversion in any form. The country is basically friendly to the United States and its objectives are largely consonant with our own.

In the past Dr. Williams has often been harshly critical of United States actions and policies, particularly in military and economic matters. More recently, since agreement was reached on procedures for fulfilling certain United States aid commitments (related to our naval base rights in the Island), Williams has become increasingly friendly and cooperative. Indications of the change worth noting are adoption of an openly pro-Western foreign policy on most matters including Cuba and British Guiana and full cooperation on anti-subversive surveillance activities in the Caribbean.

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State Sec 4/27/77

By

mg

NARS, Date

5/10/77

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April 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Attorney General's Trip to Berlin

I have spoken to the Attorney General this morning and told him that you approve of his trip to Berlin for June 26 unless there should be some urgent crisis on civil rights which would make it inappropriate for him to be out of town. The Attorney General has told me that he fully understands this reservation and would have no intention of going to Berlin if in fact the civil rights situation is tense at the time. We can always provide a substitute on this ground, since our fight for civil rights is very well understood in Berlin, and especially at the Free University where the Attorney General is expected to speak.

McG. B.

CC: The Attorney General

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 25, 1964

Mr. President:

I attach a copy of a memorandum
which I sent out yesterday after
Bill Moyers relayed your desires
from the plane.

m.f.B

McG. B.

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April 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The President has noted on several occasions in recent weeks that heads of Departments and Agencies have been absent from the country at times when important legislation or other business closely affecting their departments was reaching a critical stage. The President also has the strongest recollection of the difficult situation in which the Government found itself on the 22nd of November, when the President and the Vice President were out of town, and half the Cabinet was on its way to Japan, at a moment of national disaster.

The President requests, therefore, that Cabinet officers and heads of executive agencies submit for his personal approval all plans for travel outside of the United States. He further requests that such plans be reported at the same time to the Secretary of State, in order to afford opportunity for advice to the President on the foreign policy aspects of such travel.

h/r v. c.
McGeorge Bundy

u v ce.



MR PRESIDENT

Mac Bundy would like answers on the following:

- 1. R. A. B. Butler, foreign minister of England, is in town. Suggests you let him pay you a visit. Short.

APPROVED DISAPPROVED

- 2. Sir Alec Douglas Home has been invited to Princeton for a speech. He doesn't choose to come unless he can get an hour with you. Bad politics back home unless he can do this. Bundy says you should, of course, say yes.

YES NO

- 3. John McCone is back from a talk with Eisenhower. Would like a moment with you in next several days.

YES NO

JV
4/27/64

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AGENDA FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

The agenda for this meeting should be the same as for the Leadership this morning:

1. Secretary Rusk's report on his trip to SEATO and Vietnam supplemented by my brother Bill's report on his trip to Vientiane.
2. The current situation on the nuclear production cutback. Here there is no need for an extensive briefing, and you may simply wish to explain your own view and to express appreciation for the cooperation of State, Defense, AEC, CIA and the disarmament people, all of whom have had a hand in this particular operation.

McG. B.

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April 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AGENDA FOR BREAKFAST - April 22, 1964

- 1. Southeast Asia, Vietnam, and Laos. Secretary Rusk will be prepared to comment on the SEATO meeting, on his visit to Saigon, and on the current situation in Laos.**

- 2. The nuclear production cutback and the parallel Soviet announcement.**
 - a. Secretary McNamara will be prepared to describe the military requirements for nuclear material and their relation to your decisions on cutbacks.**

 - b. I will be ready to describe the process of communication with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government and how our parallel announcements do not constitute either a secret agreement or unilateral disarmament. (This is at Secretary Rusk's request because he is not so immediately familiar with the correspondence.)**

 - c. Director McCone will be prepared to describe our assessment of Soviet nuclear production facilities and of the meaning of Chairman Khrushchev's announcement.**

 - d. You may wish to sum up by reiterating your own view that:**
 - 1. We do not want a nuclear WPA;**

 - 2. When we make decisions in our own interest, it is only common sense to see if others are willing to move in the same direction.**

McG. B.

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April 22, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

✓ Here is General de Gaulle's answer to your telegram of sympathy. I have suggested to George Reedy by a copy of this memo that unless he gets different instructions from you, he should find an early occasion to say for background that there has now been a friendly exchange of messages with General de Gaulle -- a message of sympathy from your side and a warm acknowledgment from the General. I do not think the full text should be released simply as a matter of courtesy.

McG. B.

April 22, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is an intelligent but somewhat discouraging first report from Ambassador Vaughn in Panama.

For your information, Mr. Anderson now plans to go to Panama on his courtesy visit next week.

McG. B.

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April 22, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT,

THROUGH MR. MOYERS

We join State in strongly recommending that you see Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi for at least a few minutes. We've been valiantly keeping Indians off your calendar for months now, and they're beginning to get edgy.

Also, Indira is a special case. Though out of government now, taking care of her father, she's a political wheel in her own right and could well be the next foreign minister or even PM. She also has a message to you from Nehru.

Mrs. Johnson is seeing her at 11:00 a. m. Monday. We could bring Indira to your office first to deliver her letter, and then take her right over to the Mansion, or put her at any other time.

R. W. Komer

McG. B.

Approve; schedule with Moyers: _____

Disapprove _____

All this is still being kept at a very low level of net time expended.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 8/15/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 8/22/77

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You decided yesterday to call Mike Pearson and to say to him that Dean Rusk will be bringing an important personal message from you when he goes up to the Ministerial discussions on U.S.-Canada relations next week. You may or may not want to indicate to Pearson that this message deals with our view that the very best possible Canadian should be assigned to the ICC team in Vietnam with the specific mission of conveying to Hanoi both warnings about its present course and hints of possible rewards in return for a change.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: PROS AND CONS OF KEEPING BILL BUNDY IN SE ASIA

PRO: 1. Because of his rank and his Washington standing, he is a symbol of our concern in Laos and provides that much reinforcement to Ambassador Unger.

2. If he comes back promptly and then things come apart, it may look as if ~~we~~ had failed to make an adequate effort.

3. If he should stay two or three days and the coalition is put together again, it would be a real plus for a Presidential emissary, and would give some advantage to us on that score.

CON: 1. As a practical matter, both Bill Bundy and everyone else agree that Unger is first class and can be counted on to play every card with skill and energy in Vientiane. Indeed the whole Laotian country team has performed outstandingly in this crisis.

2. The high probability is that negotiations for a reconstituted government with or without Souvanna will go on for many days, no matter what pressures we bring. The clocks in Laos run on their own time.

3. There are very important operational responsibilities here which have been waiting Bill's return, and we lose effectiveness on some issues in Vietnam and elsewhere as long as he is away.

4. If the current negotiations should break down and we should need to move in a new direction in Laos, we could always get Bill Bundy back out there in 24 hours, and if he came fresh from up-to-date deliberations in Washington he would be in a stronger position to act for us in such a crisis.

On balance, my own judgment is that we should bring Bill back, and I believe this is also the view of Secretary Rusk.

McG. B.

Handwritten notes:
- 21 19
- 21 12:45
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Venezuela's Ex-President, Romulo Betancourt

1. Romulo Betancourt, the undefeated ex-President of Venezuela, recently arrived in the U.S. to begin a four month vacation after turning over the reins to President Leoni.

2. An insignificant looking man (short, plump, near-sighted, and sometimes sloppy), Betancourt proves the point that appearances don't count much. He is a skillful, decisive, and confident political leader who recently, in a spectacular victory for democracy, became Venezuela's first popularly elected president to complete his term (1959-1964). To do so, Betancourt had to survive conspiracy and insurgency by the right and left. His scarred hands are the result of Trujillo's attempt to kill him.

Ideologically, Betancourt is the classic example of the leftist revolutionary (a communist as a student) who turned evolutionary, democratic, moderate reformer. Internationally, he has been a staunch friend of the U.S. and a vigorous partner in the Alliance for Progress. An outspoken foe of Communism and Castro, he recently made it very clear to the British that Venezuela heartily disapproved of UK/Cuban commercial dealings.

3. You will want to congratulate Betancourt for his administration's progress and for his great courage and tenacity in demonstrating the feasibility of democracy in Latin America.

Betancourt may press you on the following: He may advocate the Venezuelan policy of non-recognition of Latin American governments that take power by overthrowing democratic, constitutional governments. You can say that while we are with Venezuela in spirit, in the absence of OAS consensus, we will continue to consider each case on its merits and exert whatever influence we can to encourage the earliest restoration of democracy. Second, he may want to talk about OAS action on the Venezuelan arms cache. You can assure him that we support Venezuela. Third, he may bring up Canada vis-a-vis U.S. oil import policy. You can tell him that Venezuela's favorable position in our oil market has not been prejudiced by Canadian imports; the U.S. will continue to recognize Venezuela's vital interests.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Authority State ltr 8/15/77
By mg NARS Date 8/22/77

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McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 10-22-98

April 20, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Sometime within the next year, and perhaps within the next month or so South Africa may refuse to abide by a World Court decision which will probably forbid South Africa to extend apartheid to its mandated territory of South West Africa. We would have no real alternative except to uphold the Court's authority, particularly in light of our own Article 19 case, and therefore may find ourselves in the near future in a major confrontation with South Africa. The attached NSAM represents the substantial agreement of State and Defense on a program to deal with this problem.

Specifically the NSAM will --

1. Suspend military sales (already being done, in practice) and government loans or guarantees.
2. Begin contingency planning for alternate tracking station sites if we have to give up our South African facilities.
3. Direct the State Department to develop a program to persuade the South African Government to accept the authority of the Court.

The only significant disagreement with this NSAM is that of the JCS who continue to want military sales to South Africa. However, their position has been previously overruled and they are now restating it for the record. In any event the JCS can reopen the question any time Defense wishes to do so. I believe, therefore, we should proceed with the NSAM but I have prepared it for my signature rather than involve you directly so that you can more freely re-consider the issue at a later time if this becomes necessary.

Under this program, we have a year in which to solve the World Court problem, and, at the same time, make a start on the underlying problem of getting the South Africans to adopt a more practical policy than apartheid.

I don't think we can get the imagination and flexibility, or the high level talent, or the kind of action we need, however, if we depend on the usual processes of the State Department. Instead I propose to discuss with Secretary Rusk the

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- 2 -

appointment of a special representative to handle South Africa -- a distinguished man, on a part-time basis but with a staff of his own and with full authority, reporting directly to the Secretary. I think we would also need a new Ambassador in South Africa with some real skill in personal diplomacy and I propose to explore this with Walter Jenkins and Ralph Dungan.

If you agree I will sign off the NSAM and talk with the Secretary along these lines.

APPROVE _____
TALK TO ME ABOUT THIS _____

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment:

As stated

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-35
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-17-01

~~TOP SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: High Yield Nuclear Weapons

b.1(a)

A year ago President Kennedy requested the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission to re-examine the need for the development of very high yield nuclear weapons -- particularly a weapon in [redacted] category. He also requested a review of the question of developing a high yield warhead to be delivered by presently programmed missile systems.

b.1(a)

AEC and DOD have now recommended that we should not proceed with the development of a high yield weapon [redacted] for delivery by a B-52 bomber. The B-52 can now carry [redacted] bombs, which bombs are already in the stockpile and are compatible with dual carriages in the B-52. [redacted]

[redacted] expense of developing [redacted] option is not warranted. They have also recommended that we should not develop a high yield warhead for present missiles. The additional expense is not justified by the increase in the capability of these missiles.

b.1(a)

The memorandum also recommends that we should continue to conduct a vigorous program of research, experimentation, and underground testing directed toward the advancement of the state-of-the-art to the extent possible under the Limited Test Ban Treaty for the development of very high yield weapons of advanced design in the order [redacted] or higher. The AEC is already pursuing this research objective without further authorization. The report also recommends that we improve our capability to test such large weapons in the atmosphere if the Treaty is broken. I believe this recommendation is justified and is consistent with the "safeguards" assurances we have given to the Congress and the terms of the partial test ban treaty.

If you approve, I will send the attached memorandum to Mr. Vance.

McGeorge Bundy

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

~~TOP SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

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J 23
April 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here are two additional copies of Monday's speech. I thought you might want to give one to Fulbright and one to Lippmann who has told me he will be at the wedding. The only change from the draft you approved at lunchtime is the omission of the sentence about Khrushchev's action, which we cannot safely show to anyone outside the family at this stage because the Russians have not finally confirmed it.

As a matter of manners, you may wish to suggest to Senator Fulbright and Mr. Lippmann that if they have any particular suggestions or worries you would be glad to know about them. If you prefer not to be bothered by direct messages from them, you could tell them to let me know if they have such suggestions.

Bob McNamara has asked that we tell you from him personally that he thinks this is a "magnificent" speech.

I talked to Wiggins and I think I shook him quite a lot, although of course our assertion that the story is inaccurate has stirred all Marder's pride. Still it is best to stick to that position until Monday, although the Post, as you say, will never admit that it was in factual error. I do think Wiggins understands the wider issue, and now that I have spoken to him, I will speak also to Kay Graham whom I am seeing at dinner tonight.

When one paper gets ahead of another on a story like this, one can sometimes make money on the other side of the street. If you think well of the idea, I might give an advance text to Reston tomorrow in the hope of getting him to do a thoughtful comment on it for Tuesday's Times. I will ask you about this in good time.

Have fun at the wedding -- Mary says we were not asked, and anyway she says she would prefer to have me get some more of that sleep that you caught me getting last night.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 17, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cuban Attack on Military Forces of
Friendly Nations - Rules of Engagement

Back in January Bob McNamara asked for your approval on Rules of Engagement to cover a situation in which Castro Cubans attack friendly foreign military aircraft or ships near Cuba. (These would probably be British, and no such situation has yet occurred.) The proposal is intended simply to cover a gap in our contingency planning and has been reviewed and approved by the State Department as well as Defense and myself. These would be classified rules with no foreign dissemination, designed simply to permit our forces to help in a contingency in which such help would be obviously desirable in terms of allied relations, provided assistance is requested.

I think you may have seen this memorandum before, but I do not have a record of your explicit approval of it, and I therefore bother you with it again.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Not approved _____

Speak to me _____

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Authority OSD Sec 6/17/77
By MBA, NARS, Date 7/1/77

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April 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
12:30, April 17, 1964

Ambassador Thompson will join you for this meeting, and there are three matters which I think you wish to discuss with the Ambassador.

The first is the delivery of a reply to the Chairman's message on the RB-66 overflight. At Tab A is a copy of the answer, together with an envelope containing the text for your delivery to the Ambassador. This text has been cleared with Secretary McNamara and Ambassador Thompson, and is designed to be straightforward but never unfriendly. It can be amended in the morning to meet your own desires. If you wish to comment on it orally to Dobrynin, I suggest the following basic propositions:

1. We continue to believe that there were officials on the Soviet side who were seeking to change the arrangements on the autobahn last fall, but we are glad that this matter now seems to be satisfactorily settled.
2. The RB-66 flight represents a serious failure on the part of the American Air Force officers concerned, and we regret it and are taking action to prevent any recurrence.
3. At the same time, we strongly believe that it is wrong to have a policy of shooting first and questions later on these matters. A more restrained policy on the Soviet side would be a real contribution to the lowering of tension.
4. A similar kind of unnecessary tension is represented by the East German campaign of accusations against our military vehicles in East Berlin, and it would be helpful if the Soviet Government would check these accusations and see if it can help to restrain them.

*Orig package files
USSR. W. Dobrynin Conf.*

The second item for discussion with the Ambassador is a further private message to the Chairman, telling him of our present plan to announce a further cutback in the production of nuclear materials. (Tab B) If you wish to make further comments orally, the following are my suggestions:

1. We are moving to our own announcement because we have not heard further from the Chairman for more than a month, and because our own plans now have to be announced to permit orderly management of the coming reductions.

2. We are glad to know of the Chairman's intent not to build large new plutonium plants, but we do continue to hope that he will be able to reduce his planned production of uranium 235.

3. We hope that this may become another example of the practice of what the Chairman has called "mutual example."

The third item suggested is the Chairman's birthday and the message which you have sent, together with the explanation of the circumstances in which we sent it. (Tab C) It seems to me that you will probably want to add your own personal touch in comments to the Ambassador, and the one thought that occurs to me is that I think you can fairly describe your two private messages as designed to hit the spirit of a birthday celebration.

Ambassador Thompson will be here at 12, half an hour before your meeting with Dobrynin, and will be available for any additional discussions you may want. His preliminary judgment, which I share, is that you will probably not wish to press Dobrynin on other matters like Vietnam, Laos, or Cuba on this occasion.

McG. B.

April 17, 1964

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome your letter of April 2, 1964, because of the spirit in which it was written. It is certainly incumbent upon both of us to do anything we can to strengthen our relations and to prevent incidents which could adversely affect those relations.

I found your letter particularly interesting because it seems to me it so clearly illustrates the ease with which misunderstandings can arise. You referred to the incidents on the autobahn which occurred last October. Our investigation showed that in the six months preceding these incidents, eighteen convoys with a configuration similar to those that were stopped were processed through your checkpoints without dismounting and without difficulty, except in the case of two which were delayed for short periods of time. It was, therefore, most natural for us to consider that it was your side that had changed procedures. But I am happy that this matter has now been resolved, and trust that there will be no further difficulties.

With respect to the airplane incidents, I can quite well understand your concern that within a short period of time two American airplanes crossed the demarcation line. There is little I can say about the incident involving a training plane, since the crew were killed and we are unable to ascertain what actually happened. I am disturbed that in both cases, however, there does not appear to have been justification for the rapidity with which there was a resort to force by Soviet planes. The American planes should not have been there, but I believe that this fast and violent reaction is quite unjustified. Avoidable acts of force which can bring death in peacetime do not contribute to an improvement of our relations. All of our pilots have long had rigid instructions that if by error they found themselves in Eastern Germany, they should promptly obey signals to land.

The RB-66 was on a training flight from Toul Rosieres in France and was scheduled to pass over Hahn, Dortmund and Nordholz in Germany at high level, to descend to low altitude over Hamburg for a photographic exercise, and to return to high altitude on the return trip to its base. It is normal for planes on missions of this kind to test the cameras en route to see that they are in working order, but to use them only for the assigned mission. A thorough investigation has shown that the compass was faulty and that through a series of errors,

To be given to DeLoynia at Pres Mtg w/ him 4/17/64

adequate further checks of position were not made. Our Air Force has had procedures to prevent incidents of this kind, and when our radar station detected an unknown plane proceeding toward East Germany, the plane was ordered to turn back. The instructor navigator states he heard this instruction but says he thought that he was over Nordholz at the time and that the signal did not apply to him. Appropriate steps are being taken to deal with those responsible for the errors made.

From the debriefing of the crew, we can find no basis for the conclusion that "the crew knew exactly where it was." I was particularly interested in your statement that you had received information, according to which the American command in Europe intended to continue reconnaissance flights over Eastern Germany. I should be glad to have any additional information bearing on this statement. From our own most thorough investigation, I am convinced that any suspicion that this violation was a deliberate provocation is unfounded. I recognize that this is an astonishing series of errors, and upon my instructions the American military authorities have established the most rigorous procedures possible in order to prevent any repetition of such an incident.

I think it most important that we deal with each other frankly in matters of this kind. I shall be glad to cooperate with you in reducing tension in this most sensitive area of the world. In this connection, may I tell you that I have been disturbed that the East German press has for some time been carrying on a campaign of accusations of alleged violations of traffic regulations by our military vehicles in East Berlin. After most careful investigation, it appears that, with rare exceptions relating to quite accidental episodes, these allegations have no basis in fact. I was, therefore, disturbed when your military authorities protested to ours on the basis of these allegations. For my part, I have given renewed instructions that our military vehicles take every precaution to avoid any incident in the future, and I hope that your own authorities will carefully investigate and establish, to your own satisfaction, whether or not East German allegations of this kind are well-founded.

- 3 -

I have already sent you birthday greetings but I would like to repeat them in this message and to close by sending you again my best wishes for continuing health and strength.

Sincerely,

LS NO. R-12, T-93 / R-13
Russian

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By July, NARA, Date 10-22-98

Dear Mr. President:

I felt a need even earlier to send you a message of this content. But I put it off somehow, thinking that perhaps the reasons for which I decided to address myself to you would not be rightly understood. Now, I believe, you will understand me correctly.

During the last few months there have occurred one incident after another, causing much unpleasantness and adding to the tension in the already complicated relations between our two countries.

In the first place some member of the United States Armed Forces assigned to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin wanted to change, without prior permission, the procedure for checking documents of military personnel on the routes of communication with West Berlin passing through the territory of the German Democratic Republic. To be sure, United States Government organs insisted in the correspondence carried on subsequently through diplomatic and military channels that the Soviet side had changed the conditions while the Americans adhered to the old rules that had been agreed upon. But I can assure you that this was not so at all. We did not change anything in the procedure for checking documents of the military personnel of the United States, Great Britain and France. On the contrary, the American command adopted some sort of internal instructions changing the practice agreed upon, and required that others take this into account.

Why do I

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

Why do I come back to this question? If this were an isolated act, it could have been taken as constituting an unpleasant occurrence, but unfortunately similar acts are not few in number and it is not always easy to avoid the impression: are these not links in the same chain with which certain circles are striving to keep the United States of America and the Soviet Union from throwing off the shackles of the "Cold War"?

Incidents on the ground have finally been settled. Now they happen in the air. On January 28, an American military aircraft intruded in the air space of the German Democratic Republic. In spite of the warning and of the order to land, the aircraft continued to fly deep into the GDR until it was shot down. The American side stated that this violation was unintentional, that this was not a military plane but a training plane which had lost its bearings.

It is difficult to agree that even a training plane could stray off course in such clear weather and over territory which is quite familiar to flying personnel. Nevertheless we took into account the statement made by your government that this was an accidental flight and that USA authorities are taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future.

But hardly six weeks had gone by and on March 10 there occurred a new violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic. This violation was committed by a military aircraft, a reconnaissance-bomber equipped with air cameras as well as radio reconnaissance facilities which were in operation at the time of the flight. According to the

official

official version, the RB-66 aircraft committed a navigational error and accidentally found itself over an area where something of interest to the American military command was taking place.

Can we fail to reach the conclusion, Mr. President, that the RB-66 intentionally violated the air space of the GDR and did so in order to engage in air reconnaissance, if a film on which important military objects had been recorded was found in the wreckage of the plane and if throughout its flight, the crew knew exactly where it was and maintained two-way communication with its land bases?

Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States, told the Soviet Ambassador, in your name, that the United States of America regrets the occurrence, that the US Government is in no way involved in the intrusion of the RB-66 within the GDR and that you had given strict instructions not to allow such violations in the future. Mr. Rusk also said that a careful inquiry will be conducted and the culprits will be called to account. In view of these assurances, the Soviet Government and the Government of the GDR have found it possible to return the crew members of the intruding aircraft to the American authorities.

I believe that the flight of the RB-66 was arranged without instructions from the President of the United States of America. But I declare to you that I do not accept the idea that this was an accidental border violation. I will say more: soon after the January incident, we received information according to which the American command in Europe, intended to continue reconnaissance flights over

GDR

GDR territory. It developed that we did not have to wait very long to receive confirmation of the accuracy of this information. Therefore, accepting your declaration that the Government of the United States did not order aircraft of the American military air forces to fly over the GDR for reconnaissance purposes, at the same time, I exclude the possibility that what has happened is the result of an error of the pilot.

It remains to assume that among the American military command in Germany there are people, and perhaps such people also exist within the military departments in Washington, who seek a worsening of the relations with the Soviet Union and who use, to that end, the very areas where the absence of settlement for many questions related to the defeat and the destruction of the German Reich during the Second World War, is felt more acutely, where there are greater possibilities for all sorts of collisions and conflicts, where American forces located in West Germany confront the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR.

All this has prompted me to address myself to you and to express my concern that unless an end is put to the actions of those who provoke these incidents, our efforts to improve the relations between the USSR and the USA and to suppress everything that is a source of unnecessary complications and that maintains the Cold War climate, may prove to be vain efforts. It need not be said that the state of Soviet-American relations exerts to a great influence upon the situation throughout the world. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of American will not be set completely right; we have only just begun to make real progress in the solution of the most important problems of our time. Can disarmament negotiations, for example, yield much result

if instead

if instead of being accompanied by the day-to-day efforts of all parties striving to establish confidence, they are accompanied by sabre-rattling?

Then what is the result? American aircraft violate the borders of a Socialist state, authorities of the USA publicly protest against the defensive action of our military, and the American press launches a noisy anti-Soviet campaign. All this merely creates additional difficulties for the achievement of an understanding in those fields and on those problems where such an understanding now seems possible or favorable preconditions for it may be ripening. Apparently this is also the very intention of those who organize various incidents at one time on land and at another time in the air.

And it is not so much a matter of what material damage such incidents produce and even, perhaps, not in the incidents themselves as such, as it is in their dangerous political consequences for the interests of our two countries, for the interests of the entire world. People hear statements concerning the aspirations of statesmen for peace and for improvement of the international situation. At the same time incidents occur one after another which indicate that the statements remain statements and tension continues. Can this really create an atmosphere necessary for arriving at a proper normalizing of the situation?

The problems which confront us must be solved in one way or another if we are to promote the cause of the strengthening peace and eliminating the causes for disputes which may entail the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. We are convinced that it is in our general interest not to postpone the

the solution of these problems and, at least, in any case not to complicate their solution.

I have already mentioned that certain American military circles are organizing incidents in that very spot where there is a great deal of powder, and this cannot fail to emphasize the timeliness and importance of a German peace settlement. If such questions as the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, the formalization of the existing borders of the German states, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and other such questions were solved, then tension in this key spot for the fate of world peace would no doubt decline, which would be reflected most favorably in the international situation.

I shall not enumerate here all the specific problems requiring solution and requiring no little cooperation on our part. There is first of all the problem of universal and complete disarmament. Of course, it would not be proper not to note with satisfaction that a good beginning has already been made and that during the past year some success has been achieved even in regard to those questions the solution of which not so long ago appeared to be almost unattainable. But this, of course, is only the beginning.

The fundamental position of the Soviet Union is the improvement of Soviet-American relations and strengthening peace, and we would prefer, of course, not to engage in demonstrations of force, of hard firmness, and in the elimination of the consequences of incidents provoked by the acts of American military forces, and to concentrate, with you, our efforts toward guaranteeing to the peoples of our two countries a durable peace.

I should like to hope that you will consider with understanding these words of mine which are dictated by a sincere desire to avoid the unnecessary complications for the interests of our two countries.

With respect and esteem

April 2, 1964

April 17, 1964

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have decided to announce our plan for an additional cutback in the production of Uranium 235 in an address on foreign policy on April 20.

I had hoped to make this announcement in conjunction with parallel announcements by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. I still hope that this will be possible. We are under considerable pressure, however, to proceed promptly with this announcement since major long-term electric power contracts must be renegotiated immediately if the action is to be accomplished in an orderly and expeditious fashion. I have not heard from you on this matter since my oral message of March 9, and I do not think I should delay further the public actions necessary to initiate this cutback in the production of Uranium 235.

In my speech, I will announce that I have ordered a further reduction of our production of Uranium 235 by an additional 25 percent -- which will result in a total reduction of some 45 percent below present levels. This reduction will take place in an orderly fashion over the next four years.

I was very gratified to learn in your message of March 2 that the Soviet Government was prepared to announce the ending of construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. At the same time, I urged you in my message of March 9 to consider seriously the possibility of some action on your Uranium 235 program since it is our understanding that this program is continuing to expand. I hope that you have decided that such reductions will be possible and that your announcement can more closely parallel those of the United Kingdom and ourselves.

To be delivered when Pres meets Subcom 4/17/64

- 2 -

Unless I hear from you before April 20, I do not plan to refer in my speech to the possibility of parallel actions by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom since I am not certain how you will wish to proceed in this matter.

Sincerely,

April 16, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

We sent your birthday greetings to Khrushchev yesterday per attached, so as to be sure to get them there safely ahead of the 17th, Moscow time. The substance is what I checked with you on the telephone sometime back, and then checked out with Tommy Thompson also. We had originally meant to get Dobrynin in in time for your to deliver the telegram to him personally, but the schedule did not work out that way.

You can still give Dobrynin a personal birthday message for the Chairman tomorrow in any case, above and beyond the telegram.

McG. B.



On the occasion of your seventieth birthday I send you
my warm congratulations. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending cordial
greetings to you and to Mme. Khrushcheva and to all your family.
We wish you both long years of continued good health and strength.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have been slow in getting this to you this week because I thought we ought to discuss it, and you have been terribly busy. Since time has passed, I think it may be best to send it to you this way and ask for your judgment.

At Tab A is a message from the Prime Minister which came in over the week end, and at Tab B is a draft answer. The draft answer is agreed between State Department and my office with the exception of the bracketed clause, which Bob Komer and I would like to include, and which George Ball and the European experts are wary of. I think it is important to put it in in order to leave the Prime Minister in no doubt of your own personal feeling, but it can be argued that it is better for Rusk to make this point to Butler. The disadvantage of the Rusk-Butler line on this issue, however, is that the Secretary of State is personally and understandably so hostile to Nasser that there is some question whether he will get the message across.

I think it is safe to add that Ambassador Harlech thinks it would be wise to include something like the bracketed clause.


McG. B.

Approved including bracketed clause _____

Approved without bracketed clause _____

Speak to me _____

26a



~~SECRET~~



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 10, 1964.

206

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked by the
Prime Minister to pass to you
the enclosed message.

Yours sincerely
Harold

The President
of the United States of America.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines, 7/21/97
By ju, NARA, Date 10-14-98

26c

~~SECRET~~

TEXT OF MESSAGE

April 10, 1964.

I should like to thank you most warmly for your decision to abstain on the resolution in the Security Council on Thursday, despite the doubts of most of your own people. I am most grateful for this act of solidarity.

I should now like to build on this decision and see whether we cannot achieve a sense of common purpose and align our common policies more closely over the whole problem of the Yemen and Aden. Experience has shown that the general Western interest, as well as the particular British and American interest, are best served when British and American policies are in harmony. I should now like to do for the Middle East what we did for South-East Asia last February.

Our respective Secretaries of State are shortly to meet. I hope you will agree that they should use this occasion to reach a general understanding over these questions.

Alec Douglas-Home


DECLASSIFIED

Authority UK Guidelines
By JW, NARA, Date 10-14-98

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

~~SECRET~~



26e

~~SECRET~~

TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. Many thanks for your note. Our decision to abstain was indeed an act of solidarity, [but I feel I must tell you ^{quite privately} I approved it reluctantly because I do not myself believe that in this specific case the action that had been taken was wise.] We may have to pay heavily for the abstention in a loss of authority and an awkward precedent that can be used against us.

2. I, of course, have no illusions about Nasser or the mischievous game he is playing. But I quite frankly doubt that at this point in time abrupt challenges to the Arabs are useful for our joint interests.

3. So I agree that this incident and its aftermath make it more than ever important that we concert our Near Eastern policies more closely. I hope that Rusk and Butler will be able to reach some solid conclusions when they meet during the CENTO session later this month. We both have such great interests to guard in that tortured part of the world that we cannot afford to pursue divergent policies.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By *gml/vj*, NARA, Date 10-22-98