

May 11, 1964

48

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Walt Rostow is on an airplane on his way back from Atlanta, and will not be in until 5:00 p. m. We have made arrangements to get in touch with him the moment he lands, and meanwhile Tom Mann is clearing his name with those concerned who may be involved with CLAP nominations. With luck you should be able to announce the appointment in connection with your public speech at 5:30. Meanwhile I have redesigned the next to last paragraph of Tom Mann's talking points to take account of this possibility. The redrafted talking points are attached at Tab A.

McG. B.

May 11, 1964

48u

Talking Points for the President's Meeting at 4:45 p. m.

I am obliged that the Ambassadors from the countries which are our partners in the Alliance for Progress and Dr. Sanz have met here today to exchange thoughts about the Alliance.

First of all, I wish to pledge to you the continued dedication of the U. S. to the Alliance for Progress program as it was outlined in the Punta del Este Charter. We are determined to make the Alliance succeed and to increase the speed of progress.

We know that it has in the past taken our bureaucracy too long to reach decisions about particular projects and loans and grants. We have already taken steps to coordinate better the Latin American Bureau of the State Department and the Latin American division of AID by establishing a single line of command and reducing the number of clearances and vetoes that are required in reaching decisions.

We also intend to review, step by step, the handling of applications to eliminate unnecessary delays and to speed up the decision-making process on all applications for aid assistance.

There is another problem which I know is of concern to you -- the problem of simplifying requirements of existing procedures which relate to our balance of payments difficulties. I have asked Mr. Mann to give this priority and to make a report to me of what we can do to simplify our procedures as well as speed them up.

We are going to do our part in regard to these and other problems which exist and we know that we can rely on other American Republics to do their part in preparing the right kind of applications and in taking the steps within each country which are so vital to the success of the Alliance.

The Alliance is not a program of U. S. aid. It is a partnership venture in which each of our countries must play its full part if we are to succeed.

It is in the area of better understanding between our peoples and our governments and a better coordination of our respective efforts in support of the Alliance that we look to Dr. Sanz and his Inter-American Committee for leadership. We have been sorry to lose the important help of Teodoro Moscoso on this committee, but we are hopeful that an appropriate American successor can be found very promptly indeed.

I would be glad to hear from you your views on what the American community of nations can do to live up to the ideals of the Alliance and to the hopes of peoples throughout the Hemisphere.

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May 11, 1964

I am happy to announce that the U. S. is proposing the Honorable Walt W. Rostow to be the new U. S. Representative on the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress. If this nomination is accepted by the Inter-American Committee, Dr. Rostow will hold this office in addition to his present appointment as Counselor of the Department of State.

~~SECRET~~

May 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached dispatch shows Chancellor Erhard's reaction to the QUICK article, in a long conversation with McGhee. I do not believe it needs any reply, and I think McGhee did a pretty good job in reassuring the Chancellor, but it does show how sensitive they are.

On page 2 the Chancellor expresses a worry that we may be forcing them into negotiation with the East Germans. This makes no sense at all with respect to anything you or your Administration have done. Indeed, the QUICK article itself quotes you as rejecting any negotiations with the East German Government. My guess is that this is an echo of an interview recently given by Walter Lippmann to DER SPIEGEL in which Lippmann does explicitly say that reunification will require negotiation between the two Germanies. My quite private guess, moreover, is that Lippmann is right, although it would be very dangerous for any of us to say so while Ulbricht is around.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-10-77, NSC 8-14-78
By if, NARS, Date 6-7-79

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May 6, 1964

Mr. President:

For information.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA

for the 5:30 meeting, May 6

1. Speak to the Secretary of State on Cuban warning
2. Speak to the President on Ambassador Kemal
(memo attached at Tab A)
3. Oral message to Chancellor Erhard (Tab B)
4. The Vietnamese situation, to include Lodge messages
and the "Kittyhawk" overflight (Tab C)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 425C/62 7/27/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 8/8/22

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51-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: UAR Ambassador Kemal

Bob Anderson has filled me in on his talks with Nasser and his subsequent talks with the UAR Ambassador, Kemal. He tells me that Kemal three times repeated to him his view that one of the great constructive elements in US/UAR relations in President Kennedy's Administration was the fact that he, Kemal, had been allowed to have an entirely private 10-minute audience with President Kennedy. Kemal also said that he has Nasser's authority to have a similar private interview now if you invite him.

I have no evidence that Kemal in fact was very important in President Kennedy's time, but I share Bob Anderson's view that a private conversation with him before the Eshkol visit would be very valuable political insurance with Nasser and therefore with the Arabs generally. Nasser is the only Arab leader of first-rank importance, and message to his Ambassador would undoubtedly be received by him as a personal compliment.

My suggestions are:

1. That you authorize me to book Ambassador Kemal -- off the record -- for a 15-minute private session between now and the end of May. This might well be done on one of those days you have mentioned when Jack Valenti organizes 40 appointments and you give up the day to your insistent staff.

2. That you authorize me to tell Bob Anderson that this will be done. He believes that if he can tell Kemal such an invitation is coming, it will have a most helpful effect on Kemal and so on Nasser right away. Anderson would like this authority promptly so that he can show the Egyptians how quickly we are responding to their conversation with him.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Ca 4/3/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 7/5/77

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May 5, 1964

ORAL MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

In recent correspondence which I have had with Chairman Khrushchev concerning the reduction in the production of fissionable material for military purposes, Mr. Khrushchev raised some matters which I would like to report to you. I am most anxious that my correspondence with Mr. Khrushchev remain entirely confidential, but Mr. Khrushchev raised matters directly concerning your country and I want you to know in the strictest confidence what he has said and what I have said in reply.

In a letter to me in the middle of April, after a discussion of our separate decisions to cut back in the production of fissionable material, Mr. Khrushchev turned to the subject of our troops in Europe, in the following passage:

"This is not a disarmament measure. However the very fact that we have succeeded in undertaking certain practical steps as a matter of mutual example -- I have in mind both the present agreement and mutual reduction of military budgets -- shows that this approach can also be applied beneficially in a number of other instances.

"Why, for example, do we not attempt to agree in the same manner on the reduction of foreign troops on others

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 11, items 24+26

By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

territories? I am familiar with the declarations to the effect that the U. S. A. intends to withdraw from Western Germany 7,500 soldiers and officers transferred there additionally in 1961. We welcome this step of yours. If you would be prepared to go farther and proceed to the reduction of those American troops which are permanently stationed on the territory of the FRG, then I can say right now: we in that case will also be prepared to reduce our troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic with the provision, naturally, that the reduction of your troops would not be compensated by the further increase in the number of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany itself. It is no secret that recently the West German Bundeswehr is swelling quickly. Your Minister of Defense declared recently that the number of NATO troops in Europe already exceeds the number of troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and we understand that this on the whole is directly connected with the rapid growth of the West German Army. All this we must naturally take into consideration.

"I would be happy to know your views on this score."

From time to time in other messages, Mr. Khrushchev had commented on similar matters in a more general way and I had made

no comment in my replies, but the rather specific character of the remarks I have just quoted led me to make the following comment in my answering message:

"You refer to the problem of the reduction of troop levels, especially in Germany. I am sorry to have to tell you that I do not think this subject is one on which we can expect to make progress by private discussion between us at this time. The American forces in Germany are there for entirely defensive purposes, and their presence is a matter of great importance for the people and government of West Germany. For there to be any substantial additional reduction in the level of the U. S. forces in Germany there would have to be changes in the situation which would make it possible for the Germans and others in Western Europe to feel secure in other ways. In the meanwhile, I hope we can continue to cooperate in reducing the level of tension in Central Europe.

"The problem of the future of Germany is a most important one, and nothing could be better for the peace of the world than a real settlement. We on our side remain ready for such a settlement, which could serve the legitimate interests of the German people as well as the other peoples involved, including your own. "

I have had no further comment from the Chairman on this matter, and I assume that he will understand from what I have said that the United States is not interested in making arrangements about Germany that do not take full account of the interests of the German people, and of the Federal Republic in particular. It remains true, as you know from our talks in Texas, that I am determined to miss no opportunity for honorable agreements which truly serve the cause of peace.

In the light of the close and frank relations which you and I have with each other, I want you to know exactly what the Chairman recently suggested and how I have dealt with it.

If you have any views to express on these matters, Ambassador McGhee will report them to me most privately. Let me merely repeat in closing that the privacy of these exchanges with Chairman Khrushchev is a matter of the greatest importance to me, and that I therefore hope that this message may be treated as a matter entirely between the two of us.

Sincerely,

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-10-77; NSC 8-14-78
By if, NARS, Date 6-7-79

This is to remind you that I have delayed execution of the Secretary of State's suggestion that aircraft from the carrier "Kittyhawk" overfly a region of South Vietnam around the city of Hue and the area between that city and the 17th Parallel. The Secretary proposed that this be done in connection with the move of the carrier and its escorting vessels to a point off Hue which would enable its aircraft to patrol a circle which would extend from the South Vietnam coast to a point approximately 30 miles off Hainan Island.

You may wish to raise this at the meeting tomorrow in the event that no one else does. Lodge does not think that this sort of action will accomplish much, and it is technically a violation of the 54 Geneva Accords, which generally provide that no outside power will introduce military forces into North or South Vietnam. I don't see any particular objection to our planes overflying international waters, even so close to Hainan Island, although again I worry about the kind of signal this represents to Peiping.

A related subject is the proposal which emanates from Lodge and is concurred in by the Secretary of State (Saigon's 2101) that we construct a naval installation in Cam Ranh Bay, about midway up the coast of South Vietnam. Lodge's arguments are set forth in the attached cable. I think this is an idiotic notion.

Such a base would serve no useful military purpose and would only provide another tempting focus for Viet Cong attacks against U.S. installations. It would have to be defended, and I am very much afraid that we might be forced out of there before we could give it up gracefully.

I probed the Sullivan Committee this afternoon on the proposition, and no one is in favor of it. I also understand that the JCS doesn't

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

particularly like the idea. You don't have to do anything about it until it comes to the President's attention, and I will make sure that in one way or another it does.



Michael V. Forrestal

Attachment: Saigon 2101

~~SECRET~~

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Forrest

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1964 MAY 2 AM 8 UR

3 of
Action
SS
Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 05A 02/1140Z
R 021052Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (2101) INFO CINCPAC 1088 FROM SAIGON
MAY. 2, 7 PM

Proposal for naval air exercises off Hawaii

L I M D I S

1. HEREWITH MY COMMENT, AS REQUESTED, ON YOUR 1815.
2. IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT PROPOSED ACTION WOULD ADD MUCH PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO WHAT WE HAVE NOW. AND EVIDENTLY THAT IS THE PURPOSE. THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN SUCH THINGS ASSUME THAT 7TH FLEET IS ALWAYS JUST OVER THE HORIZON AND THAT MARINES FROM OKINAWA ARE NOT FAR AWAY. DOUBT WHETHER SUGGESTED AIR OPERATIONS WOULD ACHIEVE MUCH PSYCHOLOGICALLY. ACTUAL RECON CFN 2101 1088 2 7 1 1815 2 7TH

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 05A ~~TOP SECRET~~
FLIGHTS OVER NVN WOULD BE NEEDED TO DO THAT.

3. I SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE LAYMAN WOULD CALL A "U.S. NAVAL BASE" AT CAM RANH BAY. THERE NEED NOT--SHOULD NOT--BE AN EXPENSIVE SHORE INSTALLATION. BUT THE FLAG WHOULD FLY, THE U.S. PRESENCE THERE SHOULD BE KNOWN AND A GENEROUS AND DEEP BEACHHEAD SHOULD BE PROVIDED.
4. I THINK, BUT AM NOT SURE, THAT LAND AREA AROUND CAM RANH BAY IS NOT REPEAT NOT HEAVILY POPULATED, AND I PLAN TO LOOK AT IT ON THE GROUND NEXT WEEK. I UNDERSTAND IT IS THE DRIEST LAND IN ALL SEA.
5. A GENEROUS EXPANSE OF EMPTY LAND SHOULD MAKE THE BASE READILY DEFENSIBLE ON THE GROUND. OUTSIDE OF THE BEACHHEAD USG MIGHT HAVE A "SHOW PLACE" MODEL COMMUNITY FOR VIETNAMESE.
6. I UNDERSTAND GENERAL KHANH WOULD APPROVE.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority *State 8-7-78, CIA 4-15-70, OSD 11-18-78*
By *isly*, NARA, Date *8-21-92*

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2101, MAY 2, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

7. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BASE WOULD DO THE FOLLOWING:
1. ESTABLISH A U.S. PRESENCE IN A WAY WHICH IS DEFENSIBLE WITHOUT DEPENDING ON VIET-NAM AND WITHOUT POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS OR INVOLVEMENT OF DEPENDENTS.
 2. IT WOULD ENABLE US TO DERIVE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM NAVY, AIR POWER, AND MARINES. OBVIOUSLY, IN THE INTERIOR OF VIET-NAM
CFN 3 4 5 6

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 05A ~~TOP SECRET~~
THE ARMY PLAYS THE DOMINANT ROLE, AND IT IS FULL OF STRONG AND SUBTLE COMPLICATIONS AND TIED TO MANY FACTORS OUTSIDE MILITARY CONTROL, YET HAVING A STRONG EFFECT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS.

C. BUT A U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE AT CAM RANH BAY WOULD BE PURELY U.S. AND PURELY MILITARY--NOT DEPENDENT ON VIET-NAM, AND WITHOUT HAMPERING INFLUENCE OF CIVILIANS.
RE. PRACTICALLY NO CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE INVOLVED, THEREFORE, WITH LITTLE EFFECT ON THE GOLD FLOW.

3. POSSESSION OF THIS BASE COULD BE A USEFUL TRUMP CARD AT A DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE WHEN, AS, AND IF ONE SHOULD EVER BE HELD. IT WOULD BE SOMETHING WE COULD READILY WITHDRAW IF THE PRICE WERE RIGHT. GP-1. LODGE

BT
CFN GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

W/D 51h
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COMMERCIAL TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

MAY 5 3 00 PM '64

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy, SAIGON 1838 FLASH
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

NODIS

Your 2108 has been considered carefully at the highest levels. It raises extremely grave issues and we feel that our reactions must be developed with care. We will be meeting with the President again tomorrow afternoon on this matter prior to departure (departure issues with you) of McNamara (who will be taking up these questions) and would like to have your answers to the following questions before Noon, Washington time, May 6 if possible:

1. What is your assessment of Khanh's motivations? He obviously entered on this train of thought after considering the problem of issuing a mobilization declaration. Do you detect any pique because we have been urging him to place the country on a more austere war footing? Do you feel that he believes such a mobilization program would make sense only as a prelude to military action against North Viet Nam?
2. We detect a trace of despair in Khanh's remarks. Has he reached the conclusion that he cannot successfully win the war in the South unless he undertakes military action against the North?

S/VN:WHSullivan:pp 5/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

White House - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Joe Martino

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority State let 8-7-78

By WPH, NARA, Date 8-21-92

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy, SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

There is, of course, a distinct inconsistency between his statements about QUOTE: making the agony endure UNQUOTE and his claim to be systematically regaining control over the entire population.

3. When Khanh discussed action against the North with McNamara, he spoke of the need to consolidate his base in the South before he acted. When he talked with me recently he spoke about the political nature of counterinsurgency and the need to undertake a long slow struggle. Do you feel that he has changed his view on these matters and that he wants to move now regardless of the progress in the South? Experience in Greece, Malaya and Korea demonstrates the need for a sound structure of support before active advances can be made, and this would seem to mean genuine progress in South Viet Nam itself before action against the North.

4. Khanh's description of the mobilization program, and especially the talk of evacuation plans for all 2 million people in Saigon seem to take on exaggerated proportions. Is this merely his way of telling us that he does not have the administrative machinery capable of carrying out any mobilization which he should declare?

5. Were his remarks concerning warnings to Hanoi and to Cambodia, as well as the actions to be taken against the French all part and parcel of mobilization, as he envisages it? Or would this merely indicate the course of events which he would expect to ensue if air strikes were mounted against North Viet Nam? Of course, if Khanh has convincing evidence against French nationals, he should move now to have them

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

Page _____ of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

expelled rather than having to wait for a mobilization program. Similarly, with respect to Cambodia, it would be logical for Khanh to react if Sihanouk actually carries out his threats; but for the present we are inclined to regard them as needling gestures which the Vietnamese have very sensibly ignored to date.

6. Do his remarks concerning QUOTE: an army corps UNQUOTE of US special forces represent, in your opinion, a genuine desire on his part to have US or other foreign combat forces introduced into Viet Nam? Or, was he merely illustrating the contingent use of such forces in the event of Chicom or DRV conventional intervention?

7. Finally, do you consider that there is any sort of limited mobilization program, within the capacity of the GVN to administer, which Khanh could put into effect with good results as a step toward the elimination of a QUOTE: business as usual UNQUOTE mentality without necessarily moving to the more spartan extremes which he has suggested?

We are earnestly attempting to gauge our view of the issues raised in your cable both on the basis of Khanh's needs as well as your own assessment of his state of mind. It becomes most important to us to know whether this conversation represented an accumulation of frustrations which Khanh sees in facing up to all the hard questions or whether it is a forced effort to determine the ultimate US intentions if he asks us to assist him in carrying the war to North Viet Nam in the near future. Obviously, Khanh's attitude has a bearing on the Canadian matter, but I am confident we should not discuss this with him at this time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

END

RUSK

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W/d
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 3556
RECD: MAY 6, 1964, 5:55 A.M.

Info FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2125 FLASH
DATE: MAY 6, 4 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FLASH

N O D I S

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

YOUR FLASH 1838

HEREWITH MY BEST ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS:

1. YOUR PARA 1 - I BELIEVE KHANH IS THINKING MUCH AS ANY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WOULD THINK WHOSE WHOLE TRAINING IS TO GET A VICTORY AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. I DO NOT DETECT ANY PIQUE. I THINK HE HONESTLY IS TRYING TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS IN HIS OWN MIND HOW FAR HE SHOULD GO IN PUTTING THE COUNTRY ON A WAR FOOTING. OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE MANY VARIANTS IN DOING THIS, AND HE WAS IN A SENSE THINKING OUT LOUD WITH ME.

2. YOUR PARA 2 - I DON'T THINK HE HAS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT HE CANNOT WIN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH WITHOUT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH. AND, YOU ARE, OF COURSE, RIGHT THAT THERE IS AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN HIS STATEMENTS ABOUT "MAKING THE AGONY ENDURE" AND HIS CLAIM THAT HE HAS REGAINED CONTROL OVER TWO MILLION PEOPLE, WHICH HE REPEATED TO ME AGAIN LAST NIGHT. THIS LAST IS A VERY INTERESTING POINT FOR MANY REASONS, INCLUDING PUBLIC RELATIONS. I UNDERSTAND MACJ J-2 WILL TRY TO PLOT THESE TWO MILLION ON THE MAP. ALSO LAST WEEK'S 60,000.

3. YOUR PARA 3 - I DON'T THINK HE WANTS TO MOVE REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS IN THE SOUTH. HE IS TOO INTELLIGENT FOR THAT.

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Authority State Sec 8-7-78
By isplg, NARA, Date 8-21-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2125, May 6, 4 p.m., from Saigon

4. YOUR PARA 4 - I AGREE THAT A PLAN TO EVACUATE TWO MILLION PEOPLE FROM SAIGON SEEMS UTTERLY FANTASTIC. MOREOVER, I THINK SAIGON HAS VALUE AS A SHOWCASE OF WHAT LIFE IN A NON-COMMUNIST STATE CAN BE. IN THE WHOLE "CLEAR-AND-HOLD" CONCEPT, SAIGON IS THE BIGGEST EXAMPLE OF "HOLD", AND I WOULD HATE TO SEE THE PEOPLE LEAVE IT. OF COURSE, IF IT WERE TO BE BOMBED, A REGULAR CIVIL DEFENSE EVACUATION PLAN WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. I DO NOT THINK HE WANTS TO EVACUATE SAIGON, BUT HE WANTS US ALL TO THINK THROUGH WHAT IS INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE COMMUNIST RETALIATION ON SAIGON. HE ALSO THINKS THERE SHOULD BE A CIVIL DEFENSE PLAN AND THAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE IS SUCH A PLAN. IT MIGHT SOBER THEM.

5. YOUR PARA 5 - I BELIEVE THAT THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS "YES". I TOLD HIM MANY TIMES AND AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT HE SHOULD TRY AND GET CONVINCING EVIDENCE AGAINST FRENCH NATIONALS. MANY THINGS COULD BE DONE BY HIM AND BY US THAT ARE NOT NOW POSSIBLE IF HE HAD SUCH EVIDENCE.

6. YOUR PARA 6 - I WOULDN'T SAY HE WAS ASKING FOR AN ARMY CORPS OF US SPECIAL FORCES NOW. WE WERE DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH, BOTH FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND COMMUNIST CHINA, AND THIS LED HIM TO ASK ME WHAT WE COULD DO. WHEN I EXPRESSED GREAT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR A LARGE US GROUND FORCE IN ASIA, HE BROUGHT OUT THE IDEA OF AN "ARMY CORPS" OF SPECIAL FORCES.

7. YOUR PARA 7 IS A PUZZLER. - I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIGURE OUT A WAY TO GET RID OF "BUSINESS AS USUAL" THINKING WITHOUT DOING AT LEAST SOME OF THE THINGS WHICH HE WANTS TO DO.

8. I DON'T THINK KHANH IS BECOMING PESSIMISTIC, BUT HE IS REALIZING WHAT A HARD JOB HE HAS, WHICH IS WHY HE HAS ASKED US FOR ADVISERS. I AGREE WE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE CANADIAN MATTER NOW. GP-1

LODGE

BT

KCFN 1838 1 1 2 2 2 60,000 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 1

LODGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

600
Z. File
I have read it
LBJ 5/13
52

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is the transcript of Fulbright's Voice of America program of November 30, which is probably the one that has been reported to you as irritating General de Gaulle.

The Senator's remarks on de Gaulle are at pages 3, 4, 5 and 6, and one can see how these remarks, especially if reported second-hand by some anti-American like Minister Peyrefitte, might have irritated de Gaulle. It seems unlikely that de Gaulle will have read the full text or seen the qualifying phrases which Fulbright used. It is also very unlikely that the French Minister of Information would understand that Fulbright was in no sense speaking for the United States Government and that USIA would attempt no control over his text. The French Information Service works on entirely opposite principles.

Therefore, it seems to me quite plausible that de Gaulle may have been greatly irritated by what he heard of this broadcast.

At the same time, it seems to me essential not to overemphasize the importance of any one episode. Even before the release of this program, for example, General de Gaulle had refused to come to see you, in spite of the contrary indications which he gave in your meeting on November 25. Moreover, the General's basic attitudes toward the United States are much too deep-seated and have too many sources for us to put all the weight on a single broadcast. The overwhelming weight of comment on General de Gaulle's visit for the funeral was highly favorable and friendly, as the French Embassy will surely have reported.

Obviously it would have been better if Senator Fulbright had bowed to the General's courtesy in coming to the funeral, but I do not see what we can do about it now.

But in all the circumstances, it is probably just as well that Paris and General de Gaulle are not on the Fulbright itinerary.

MfB,
McG. B.

WWS: file copy

FOR RELEASE
SATURDAY NOON, November 30, 1963

U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.

TRANSCRIPT OF VOICE OF AMERICA PROGRAM "PRESS CONFERENCE, USA"

Guest: J. William Fulbright
Senator of Arkansas

ANNCR: Press Conference USA, a discussion program in which well known Washington correspondents question a leading personality in the news. Our guest is the Senator of Arkansas. To introduce our guest and the panel of correspondents, here is William McCrory, the moderator of Press Conference USA.

McCRORY: Welcome once again to PRESS CONFERENCE USA. Our guest this week is Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. Mr. Fulbright is one of the most influential and respected members of the United States Senate, an expert in international affairs and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and author of the educational exchange program that bears his name. Senator Fulbright was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University following his graduation from the University of Arkansas. He returned to his home university in 1939 to serve as President of the institution for two years. In 1942 he won election to the House of Representatives and began his career in Congress -- now in its 22nd year. Mr. Fulbright is now serving his fourth term as a Senator. In addition to chairing the Foreign Relations Committee, he is a member of the Senate's Finance Committee and a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Cultural Center in Washington.

Senator Fulbright it is a pleasure to welcome you to PRESS CONFERENCE USA.

FULBRIGHT: (RESPONSE)

McCRORY: Now I'll ask the panel of correspondents to identify themselves:

VON ZAHN: Peter Von Zahn of the Deutschlandfunk, Germany.

VOSS: Earl Voss, Washington Evening Star.

HEREN: Louis Heren of the Times, London.

McCRORY: For the first question to Senator Fulbright, I will call on you, Mr. Heren.

HEREN: Senator, I would like to ask the obvious question - would you like to comment on the significance of the President's address to the Joint Session of Congress?

FULBRIGHT: I thought it was a-first, I may say, an excellent address. He was among friends. We have known him on the Hill for many years. I have known him twenty odd years. He has been on the Hill thirty-two years altogether and it was, I thought, an excellent address for the purpose. I would say the principal theme was his devotion to the policies as developed by his predecessor, the late Pres. Kennedy. I do not expect any drastic change, especially in foreign policy or domestic policy, although this man is a very positive character and in due time I am sure he will develop what would be called a Johnson style in any case although the substantive legislation and policies in both fields, I expect to continue quite along the line that has already been developed.

McCRORY: Mr. Voss.

VOSS: Senator, the President's address emphasized action. This implied that there has not been action in the recent past. What hope do you see for action now?

FULBRIGHT: Well, of course, it is no secret that this has been the longest peacetime session in the history of Congress as far as I know - and there has been great difficulty in moving the bills, all bills, through the Congress. Mr. Johnson, President Johnson, was noted as a majority leader for his capacity to get things done, that is, he was an activist, he was a doer, and I think this is quite normal for him to emphasize that and I fully expect him to live up to this promise.

VOSS: He was a doer by compromise as I understand it.

FULBRIGHT: It was more than compromise, he did know how to reconcile divergent views, but more than that he was able to achieve action in the Senate, for example, when no other leader that I have ever known could have done so.

VOSS: How do you think he could apply this in the case of de Gaulle in the NATO situation?

FULBRIGHT: Well, this is completely beyond my capacity to prophesy. President de Gaulle is, I think, a unique character and other presidents of great force and vigor such as Roosevelt, and Prime Ministers such as Churchill, had their difficulties with President de Gaulle. I would not want to prophesy that he can do very much with President de Gaulle that President de Gaulle does not

FULBRIGHT:
(CONT.)

wish to do. This is a different matter, I think, from our normal relations with other countries.

McCRORY:

Mr. Von Zahn.

VON ZAHN:

You have been rather critical of Mr. de Gaulle lately but perhaps you could enlarge your remarks now in the direction of what should be done in the Atlantic Alliance by the new President to heal some of the rifts that have developed.

FULBRIGHT:

First, let me say I hope this statement that I am critical of President de Gaulle is in proper context. I certainly recognize him as a great man, a great figure, a forceful and great leader, and I along with, I think nearly every one in this country was delighted when he came to power and rescued France from the very chaotic political situation. And he has rendered great service to France. My criticism was certainly not of a personal nature but at his policy as it was first announced in his famous press conference of last January and is I thought a rather unnecessary way of expressing his opposition to what came to be called the Atlantic partnership and community and rather, I thought contemptuous reference to the Anglo-Saxons as though they were a species beneath notice, and I thought it was unnecessarily offensive. And then substantively I think that in all candor he has been a very disruptive influence upon the progress toward a much closer association of the Atlantic countries and by association, I do not mean a federation into a government but to the adoption of similar policies particularly in the military and economic field and political field and I still think that President de Gaulle has interrupted a movement that was gathering momentum toward a much closer association of all of those Western European countries and the American, North America, including Canada, of course, Canada and some other Commonwealth countries and I still regret that and I still insist that this is in the long term an unwise policy. I feel that he is tending to return to the nationalism which contributed certainly to two World Wars.

VON ZAHN:

Well then, I take it that you would feel the line taken by the American, British, German, French governments, say until 1959, should be taken up again and pursued now with new vigor?

FULBRIGHT: Until last January , I thought it was moving quite well until last January - when the break came in the, to me, rather abrupt rejection of the admission of Great Britain into the Common Market. This, I thought, was a break with the continuity of policy which had been gradually developing; and I hope this does not prove to be permanent. Mr. de Gaulle is, of course, a very positive character, but I don't accept the idea that either he, or even Mr. Krushchev, are absolutely immune to change with proper reasonable persuasion. So that I have not given up on the idea that our objective was the right one. I believe that most of the other countries of Western Europe still subscribe to the idea that for this kind of a world a close association involving intimate consultations with regard to military and political and economic affairs is essential.

McCRORY: Well, Senator Fulbright, to follow this up a bit in general terms, how do you see this status, the current status, of the Atlantic Alliance?

FULBRIGHT: Well, as I say, I thought this disrupted that movement and it has been somewhat on dead center, making no particular progress toward it; if anything, tending to a degree of disarray. I have been quite puzzled by some of the subsequent statements of President de Gaulle. I really don't know what he means when he professes his dedication to friendship with the United States and so on and yet what he does and says in other connections seems to be directly contrary to this. So I am quite puzzled about what he intends to do. I have the feeling from all that he has said that he really has no confidence in what we call an Atlantic partnership of equals. He still feels that each country must rely upon its own resources. That, to me, is what I said, a return to nationalism. ✓ ||

McCRORY: Mr. Heren.

HEREN: Senator, it seems to me if we are going to make progress in the Alliance, we must have France participating. We know how difficult President de Gaulle has been in the past but in 1958, I believe, he did propose a three-power directorate in NATO, that is, the United States, Britain and France. That proposal was ignored for very good reasons - but do you think the time has now come a directorate, perhaps a four-power directorate including West Germany, is the lesser of the two evils - and would it be acceptable to the United States?

FULBRIGHT:

Well, it probably would to the United States, I question the wisdom and I would have to consider this at greater length. Off the cuff, I question the wisdom of drawing such clear cut distinction between four countries of a broad alliance and then the others being considered rather second class. For example, I think the Italians warrant a great consideration. The Italians have done a remarkable job of running that country since World War II. The stability of their government and the progress they've made warrants a great deal of credit and I don't know whether it is wise to set these arbitrary, say we are the directors and everyone does as we say. I think there are more subtle and better ways to solve this. I look at it more, as I said, as a high degree of consultation not just among the four, of course, the four being the most powerful, inevitably will in accordance with their power exercise influence and have responsibility. But I don't know whether I would like to put it in the context which if I understand you correctly, you put it in. It seems to me participation by all of them in these matters is called for. We have other international organizations which function quite well and which we don't quite call them directorate, and so on, although there are such devices as weighted voting and so on which have been made to work but everyone participates.

McCRORY:

Mr. Voss.

VOSS:

Senator, you mentioned a moment ago the need for a high degree of consultation. Do you see any prospect for summit conferences either with our Western Allies, perhaps Britain, France and West Germany, early next year?

FULBRIGHT:

I did not have that in mind when I used that phrase, I mean day to day regular institutionalized conferences. Summit conferences have come to have a rather special meaning and I think if they are to be nothing but ceremonial, they must be preceded by very long and fruitful negotiations. I do think the Americans have probably been at fault in not bringing into their confidence, especially in the military field, more closely their allies in Western Europe. We have had an obsession beginning from back in the forties when we did have a monopoly of nuclear weapons, a kind of obsession that we could trust no one else but ourselves in the direction of this weapon. Now, many things have changed since then and I think this is the area in which I think they should be brought in and allowed to play a part in the development of common policies with regard especially to defense.

VOSS: You think that might change some of President de Gaulle's attitude if we could share more with him in the consultation and perhaps information?

FULBRIGHT: I would hope so. This is one of the things I had in mind when I said, I don't accept the idea he can never be changed. I hope I make it clear I don't think the United States has been without fault, that we haven't contributed to some of the difficulties. Goodness, we are inclined to do that. I wish to make it quite clear I think we have contributed our share of the difficulties during this period. We are inclined to be a very self-righteous people. ✓

(MORE)



McCRORY: Mister Von Zahn?

VON ZAHN: What role would you give in your system of common defense to the Federal Republic beyond the role which . . .

FULBRIGHT: Of Germany?

VON ZAHN: Yes.

FULBRIGHT: Goodness it is a very great role--I mean the Federal Republic has proved--we know how important it is to the common defense. And I have always felt that because of our past experiences with Germany that this only emphasizes one of the principal reasons why the Common Market--looking toward another political association of some kind--was all important. I felt the movement was so promising up until last January and one of the major reasons is the inherent strength of the German Republic, the German people, they're remarkable people in their energy, in their ingenuity, in their scientific capacity, all of these things. It is a very important role.

VON ZAHN: If I may pinpoint--sharpen my question a little more--do you think it is wise to have the Germans participate in a common atomic Atlantic Atomic force equipped with rockets?

FULBRIGHT: Well, this depends upon the nature of that, of the organization--the institutions I mentioned which control it. I mean I don't wish to be offensive certainly, because I am most sympathetic to the Germans--as a matter of fact my paternal ancestors are Germans and I have perhaps more admiration for many of their qualities than many people may have. But nevertheless they have been a dangerous people, and this is why I think they should be a part of an organization in which these other countries participate and this is--I hope you understand this is no way a reflection--and I think the present Government, the Germans have done a remarkable job since World War Two. I was extremely pleased with the new Chancellor Erhard's speech at Frankfurt which I had the honor to hear just a short time ago and what he has said has been most reassuring from my point of view as to his attitude toward what we call the Atlantic Alliance, so what I want to do is for us to follow policies that make it possible for him to continue and to maintain the support of his own people in this policy. And there I couldn't over-emphasize the importance of this.

McCRORY: Mister Heren?

HEREN: I would like to get back to the United States and the new President. In his address to the Congress last Wednesday he made it quite clear that he intended and hoped to cooperate closely with the Congress. Could you tell us how

HEREN: your committee, for instance, the Foreign Affairs Committee would cooperate more in the process of formulating American foreign policy?

FULBRIGHT: Well, actually the formulation of policy under our Constitutional system and by tradition is primarily the President's responsibility and, of course, with the assistance of his Secretary of State. The function of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress is rather that of the critic after it is formulated to criticize it and possibly refine it and to approve it. I know there will be no difficulty--I have to speak for myself--I have a committee composed of some very positive individuals, members who have their own views but I think that this President knows this, he is personally acquainted with all the members; he had much to do as a matter of fact, with placing several of these members on this committee but I think that we will not have much trouble in that sense. But the formulation I emphasize of policy is really largely the President's. We play a secondary role as critic in approval of it. I personally have found myself in agreement with President Kennedy's views in foreign relations particularly. The differences I have had have related to such things as space and some domestic matters.

HEREN: It would seem to me, Senator, that I was a great admirer of the late President and his policies--sometime things came unstuck because they did not appear to be normal traffic of ideas between the White House and the capital Hill. Could this be improved, you think?

FULBRIGHT: Well, it can be improved and I think the relationship that President Johnson has had and the experience he has had in itself gives promise of improving this. He was a much more powerful and influential figure in the Congress than President Kennedy ever was. President Kennedy was on my committee, as a matter of fact, but you will recall that during the latter part of his service in the Senate he was preoccupied with running for the presidency whereas the then Senator Johnson and now President Johnson was a man who spent 18 hours a day running the Senate and there is a difference here. I think that Senator Johnson understands the Senate and how to make responsive to his policies better than President Kennedy did.

McCRORY: Well, Senator Fulbright, to go further on this, you have known, of course, our new President for many years and worked with him, in fact I believe he was a member of your committee at one time. Could you expand a bit on President Johnson the man?

FULBRIGHT:

Well I, of course, am a great admirer of his. I am sure I could be accused of being prejudiced about him. He has certain faults as we all do. I think they are of a relatively minor nature. I think he was one of the greatest political animals I have ever seen, in the best sense of that word. He had an instinct for politics. He was as dedicated to the practice of politics in the best sense of that word as any man I have ever seen. It was remarkable the attention he used to give to every bill--big and little--small and unimportant as they may be. He used to call me at seven in the morning and say had you thought of this or ll at night. It didn't make any difference when--he was utterly ruthless in his job of making the Senate run. I have great admiration for him in this sense. I think he was one of the greatest Senate leaders that I have seen. Now this is a different function from being President, I grant, and we just have to wait whether or not these same qualities can be translated into being a really great President. Only time can tell. I think there is a much better than average chance that he will be a great President. Because I think he knows how to organize--he knows how to get people to work for him. He knows how to arouse their exertions, you know, their own dedication to his purposes. And I think this is a great secret to the job he has. I don't think he will make the mistake of some Presidents of trying to do everything himself. He knows how to get people to do things for him which is essential. I think he has the basic ingredients for making a great President. No one can prophesy that absolutely indefinable quality known as judgment of major things until they're exposed to it. It is sort of legend--folklore--in this country when a man becomes President he changes and becomes a different man, and there is something to this. Who would have said, I think, that Truman would have performed as well as I believe it is generally agreed now that he did. He had far less in my view promise of making a fine President than this man has. This man comes to this job with more experience in the field, the relevant field, than anyone I can think of in modern history, and he certainly is a vigorous man, and so I have great hopes that this President Johnson will make a great President. But we all know that this question of judgment is something that can only be proved in action. It is a very subtle thing.

McCRORY:

Mister Voss?

VOSS:

Senator we been concentrating on Europe. I'd like to combine a question about foreign aid with the rest of the

VOSS: world. Do you see any hope that your program and President Kennedy's program for foreign aid will fare any better under the leadership of President Johnson?

FULBRIGHT: Mister Voss, you know we've just gone through the most painful struggle since I have been in Congress, three weeks of struggling with this bill. There has never been anything like it, the struggle--you know the opposition led by Senator Morse who is an extremely able man--and this time for reasons that I do not understand, determined far beyond his normal determination. Our committee had anticipated even before we knew of this that this present pattern of foreign aid had about served its time. It accumulated many barnacles of criticism that couldn't be gotten rid of. They just couldn't scrape them off the bottom of the boat like you do real barnacles. They just stuck there. These criticisms of this and that. So our committee recommended that if you will recall, and I had something to do with that, the Administration take a new approach to this program. We didn't say we should abandon the function, but that some new approach should be taken and otherwise we would have more and more serious trouble. I had more serious trouble this time than I had anticipated. I thought we'd be given another year to make a transition, but in any case I think it can be done. I have some ideas which I suggested in my speech presenting the bill, if you will recall, although no reason for you to recall it, it wasn't a world shaking speech--and I don't think we have time to go into it now. But I do think that with some otherwise rearrangement of this program that it can be presented in a much more acceptable form than it was this year and I predict we'll take a new start and I think it can be done and will be done.

VOSS: Will the total be changed or merely rearranged?

FULBRIGHT: It will be rearranged more than changed. There has also been a major part of this military aid. I don't think military aid ought to be in this bill at all. It is part of the defense function and should have never been in it. That in itself will make a great difference.

McCRORY: Mister Von Zahn?

VON ZAHN: Senator, I happened to be in Africa when the sad news of Mister Kennedy's assassination came through, and the African Negroes immediately said this is the consequence of the racial conflict in the United States, which it turned out not to be, but may I ask as a Senator from the South whether you would think the Civil Rights program will go through Congress soon and help to sort of dispel such notions?

FULBRIGHT: Well, I of course, am not a prophet. I would have to say this that President Johnson as Majority Leader is the only man who has succeeded in passing two Civil Rights Bills through the Senate, 1957 and 1960, and if I have to make a prediction I would say that there is a great likelihood he will succeed in passing one as President.

McCRORY: Senator, one final question. It seems that throughout the years of the history of this country when there has been crisis, when there is tragedy, there has always been the tendency for the American people to close ranks and pull together. You think this again may influence the passage of the various pieces of legislation?

FULBRIGHT: I do. I think this will contribute to it. I think one of the great virtues and goodness knows we have our faults, but one of the great virtues of our system is the provisions built into it for continuity of the government and the passage of power from either one party to another or one person to another as this has happened and under the tragic circumstances of this particular end of one era and passage to a new man, I think it will at least for an appreciable time in itself contribute to a greater unity and to a tendency to work with the new President and Administration.

McCRORY: Gentlemen, I am sorry our time is up. Thank you Senator Fulbright, and thank you, correspondents.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Routine for Reception of Ambassador Kabanda of Rwanda, Miske of Mauritania, and Moreno of Panama

1. I have appointed myself Deputy Chief of Protocol to make sure that these birds get in and out in five minutes, but this can only be done if you follow the following stage directions.

2. They will come in on Jack Valenti's signal and Angie Duke will pose everybody for a picture exchanging formal documents.

3. The photographers will be admitted to take the picture.

4. The photographers will be removed and you should ask the Ambassador to sit down for just a moment of personal conversation, with you in the rocking chair and the Ambassador on the sofa. Angie Duke and I suggest that you should simply ask about their families, tell them how glad you are that they will be in Washington, and hope that they will have the most effective relations with Secretary Rusk and his subordinates.

5. With my eye on the stop watch, I will get up, and you must get up too. This will end the interview, and nothing else will.

McG B

McG. B.

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54

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is the transcript of Fulbright's Voice of America program of November 30, which is probably the one that has been reported to you as irritating General de Gaulle.

The Senator's remarks on de Gaulle are at pages 3, 4, 5 and 6, and one can see how these remarks, especially if reported second hand by some anti-American like Minister Peyrefitte, might have irritated de Gaulle. It seems unlikely that de Gaulle will have read the full text or seen the qualifying phrases which Fulbright used. It is also very unlikely that the French Minister of Information would understand that Fulbright was in no sense speaking for the United States Government and that USIA would attempt no control over his text. The French Information Service works on entirely opposite principles.

Therefore, it seems to me quite plausible that de Gaulle may have been greatly irritated by what he heard of this broadcast.

At the same time, it seems to me essential not to overemphasize the importance of any one episode. Even before the release of this program, for example, General de Gaulle had refused to come to see you, in spite of the contrary indications which he gave in your meeting on November 25. Moreover, the General's basic attitudes toward the United States are much too deep seated and have too many sources for us to put all the weight on a single broadcast. The overwhelming weight of comment on General de Gaulle's visit for the funeral was highly favorable and friendly, as the French Embassy will surely have reported.

Obviously it would have been better if Senator Fulbright had bowed to the General's courtesy in coming to the funeral, but I do not see what we can do about it now.

But in all the circumstances, it is probably just as well that Paris and General de Gaulle are not on the Fulbright itinerary.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: UAR Ambassador Kemal

Bob Anderson has filled me in on his talks with Nasser and his subsequent talks with the UAR Ambassador, Kemal. He tells me that Kemal three times repeated to him his view that one of the great constructive elements in US/UAR relations in President Kennedy's Administration was the fact that he, Kemal, had been allowed to have an entirely private 10-minute audience with President Kennedy. Kemal also said that he has Nasser's authority to have a similar private interview now if you invite him.

I have no evidence that Kemal in fact was very important in President Kennedy's time, but I share Bob Anderson's view that a private conversation with him before the Eshkol visit would be very valuable political insurance with Nasser and therefore with the Arabs generally. Nasser is the only Arab leader of first-rank importance, and message to his Ambassador would undoubtedly be received by him as a personal compliment.

My suggestions are:

1. That you authorize me to book Ambassador Kemal -- off the record -- for a 15-minute private session between now and the end of May. This might well be done on one of those days you have mentioned when Jack Valenti organizes 40 appointments and you give up the day to your insistent staff.

2. That you authorize me to tell Bob Anderson that this will be done. He believes that if he can tell Kemal such an invitation is coming, it will have a most helpful effect on Kemal and so on Nasser right away. Anderson would like this authority promptly so that he can show the Egyptians how quickly we are responding to their conversation with him.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority state letter 6-3-77

by gullimp NARA. Date 10-15-98

May 6, 1964

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56

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Routine for Reception of Ambassador Kabanda of Rwanda,
Miske of Mauritania, and Moreno of Panama**

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McG. B.

May 6, 1964

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17

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

(given to
Mr. Reedy
in mess)

SUBJECT: Item for Press Conference

You may well get asked about Ngo Dinh Can, who has lost his appeal for clemency and faces execution by the guillotine in the next four days. (You have received the attached telegram from Mme. Nhu on the case, and it has already hit the wires.)

The Embassy has announced in Saigon that Lodge has done everything he could to save Can's life, and if you are asked you might simply say that the U. S. Government as a whole has urged clemency, but that the matter, in the end, is one for the Government of South Vietnam to decide.

McG. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassadors Moreno and Illueca

At 12:30 P.M. today you will begin the first of two appointments with Panamanian officials.

1. At 12:30 P.M. the new Panamanian Ambassador, accompanied by Angie Duke and Tom Mann, will present his credentials to you. This is strictly an affair of protocol, as stated in my earlier memo.
2. Right after this meeting you will meet with Special Ambassador Illueca; Tom Mann and Ambassador Moreno, already present, will stay on for this appointment. Ambassador Illueca will present his credentials to you as Special Ambassador in the same manner as Bob Anderson presented his to President Chiari.

There are a couple reasons why you may want to avoid substance and limit your talk with Illueca to pleasant generalities -- i.e. your earnest hope for a mutually satisfactory outcome of the Anderson/Illueca talks in view of their importance to both countries, the hemisphere, and the free world. First, Illueca has not yet given Bob Anderson the Panamanian positions. Second, Illueca may be replaced as Special Ambassador sometime after the Panamanian elections on May 10 or after the October inauguration.

For your background, Illueca has a long record of anti-Americanism. You should also know that Illueca may be susceptible to personal flattery. Reportedly, his ego and social pretensions are large.

McG B

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-37
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

60

5/6/64

TO: Mr. Bundy

FROM: Jack Valenti

Don

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers show that General O'Meara has invited the Attorney General to Panama on the 8th, 9th or 10th of June to address a seminar on strategic intelligence which is aimed at the senior military men of Chile, in the context of the forthcoming Chilean elections in which there is a grave risk of a Communist front victory.

The reason for the invitation is that the Attorney General has been particularly interested in counterinsurgency problems, and this interest is known by General O'Meara, who has reported several times to the Committee on Counterinsurgency of which the Attorney General has been an active member.

The Attorney General has said that he would be willing to go if you approve.

My recommendation is that this trip be approved, subject always to delay or cancellation if the battle for the Civil Rights Bill makes it necessary. There is every reason for all of us to show a maximum concern with the Chilean election, and the Attorney General is very good at this kind of mission.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me ✓

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

PRIORITY *MAY*
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority Army Lt 5/9/77
By MMG, NARS, Date 7/15/77

~~SECRET~~ SC3321A LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

EXCLUSIVE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY

FROM GENERAL O'MEARA. DELIVER AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY
DURING WORKING HOURS.

ON 15 APRIL I CONFERRED WITH SECRETARY TOM MANN IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON WAYS IN WHICH THE CHILEAN MILITARY MIGHT BE MADE MORE AWARE OF THE DANGERS WHICH THE COMMUNISTS POSE TO THEIR COUNTRY TODAY. THERE IS A REAL NEED OF SUCH EDUCATION AS THE CHILEAN MILITARY, IN PARTICULAR THE HIGHER MILITARY LEADERS, HAVE HELD THEMSELVES ALOOF FROM POLITICS FOR SO LONG THAT THEIR PROFESSIONALISM IS QUITE NARROW AND UNSOPHISTICATED IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S THREATS. IN THE PAST THEY HAVE RESISTED OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE THEM ANY TYPE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY INSTRUCTION ON THE BASIS THAT NO INSURGENCY THREAT EXISTS IN THEIR COUNTRY.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE CHILEAN MILITARY NEED A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE CURRENT THREATS. THE PROBLEM IS TO GET IT TO THEM WITHOUT AROUSING THEIR RESISTANCE. IF WE LET THEM SUSPECT WE CONSIDER THEIR PRESENT OUTLOOK UNSOPHISTICATED, WE WILL GET NOWHERE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THIS CABLE IS CLASSIFIED SECRET.

I AGREED WITH SECRETARY MANN THAT I WOULD RUN A COURSE IN THE CANAL ZONE WHICH WOULD CONVEY THE NEEDED IDEAS AND WOULD BE PRESENTED IN SUCH A FASHION AS TO ATTRACT THE PRESENCE OF KEY CHILEAN OFFICERS. TODAY OUR PLANS ARE WELL ADVANCED. I WILL CONDUCT A STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SEMINAR IN THE CANAL ZONE FROM 8 TO 17 JUNE. I WILL SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE CHIEF OF EACH MILITARY SERVICE IN SOUTH AMERICA; AND TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF EACH COUNTRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SAYING THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CAUSED ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR THE REVIEW WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED AT THIS SEMINAR. I WILL RECOMMEND THAT EACH SERVICE CHIEF SEND KEY REPRESENTATIVES

DA IN 278764

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XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

EXCLUSIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

MESSAGE

NR: SC3321A

OF HIS SERVICE TO THE SEMINAR. WE WILL ASK FOR GUEST LECTURERS FROM BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA. WE WILL COVER THE CUBAN CASE WITH U.S. RESOURCES.

THE PROBLEM NOW IS TO ATTRACT FROM CHILE, AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICIPANTS OF ADEQUATE SENIORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS IS BY BEING ABLE TO CITE HIGH LEVEL U.S. PARTICIPATION. THE MILITARY SERVICES HAVE BEEN GENEROUS IN PROVIDING SENIOR OFFICERS OF KNOWN STATURE AS SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT YOU MIGHT BE WILLING TO DEVOTE A DAY TO JOIN THE SEMINAR AND TO ADDRESS IT. IF I WERE ABLE TO SAY THAT YOU WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE SEMINAR, THE PROBLEM OF ATTRACTING THE RIGHT TYPE OF OFFICERS FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE SOLVED. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION TO BEING MY GUEST AND PARTICIPATING AT LEAST ONE DAY IN THE SEMINAR. ANY DAY DURING THE WEEK OF 8 JUNE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE MOST SUITABLE DAY, HOWEVER, WOULD BE EITHER 8, 9, OR 10 JUNE.

I SHOULD ISSUE MY INVITATIONS TO THE CHIEFS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES NOW. IT IS IN THESE INVITATIONS THAT THE ENUMERATION OF HIGH LEVEL U.S. PARTICIPATION IS NEEDED. I WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE AN EARLY REPLY FROM YOU.

GP-3

ACTION: JUSTICE

DA IN 278764

PAGE 2

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

60C 2369



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

5 May

MEMO TO: Mr Bundy

Subject: More on RFK speech

Attached is a cable from Genl O'Heara setting forth his reasons for inviting the AG to speak in Panama.

The AG has said he is willing to go, if it is all right with everyone.

If you agree it is OK, I will pass the word to General Taylor who, in turn, will tell the AG.

WJS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The decision to sell the TF-30 aircraft jet engine to France should be reassessed since it has developed that the French may use it in a new aircraft with a strategic as well as a tactical capability.

The TF-30, one of the most advanced jet engines in the world, has been developed by Pratt and Whitney for use in our TFX aircraft. Last fall, Pratt and Whitney agreed to sell to France two TF-30 engines for use by SNECMA, a French engine firm with close operating ties with Pratt and Whitney, and is now negotiating the sale of an additional dozen. It was originally assumed that the TF-30 would be used in the French Mirage III V, a relatively short range, tactical fighter bomber with a vertical take-off capability.

It now appears, however, that the French may also use the TF-30 engine in a new aircraft, the Mirage III F, which although advertised as a tactical fighter bomber, will have a strategic capability comparable to the Mirage IV, the present French strategic bomber.

A separate and equally important consideration is that the French apparently hope to market the Mirage III F as an alternative to our TFX, anticipating that its lower cost will compensate for its reduced capability. The availability of this French aircraft, powered by U. S. engines, probably would put pressures on this country to make the TFX available to our other allies, a decision we have deliberately postponed for reasons relating to its strategic capabilities.

The arguments in favor of continuing the agreement to sell the TF-30 engine to France, despite the above considerations, is that: (1) Cancellation of the existing agreement to sell the TF-30 engines would probably have significant political repercussions; and (2) the French could buy a comparable engine for the Mirage III B from the British (i. e., the SPEY engine produced by Rolls Royce).

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~SECRET~~

32

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Item in Diplomatic Summary

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

Most of these [redacted] are not worth your attention, but you may be interested in this thoughtful summary of your Associated Press speech on April 20 by the [redacted]

M.P.B.
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment
(Dipsum 5 May)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-38
By is, NARA Date 4-7-00

7 ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File

May 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: NSC Agenda, Tuesday, May 5, 1964

1. Cuban Overflight Problem -

This matter will be under discussion in a preliminary meeting that starts at 12:45 and we should be ready to give you an up-to-date report at noon.

The examination of alternative means of overflight which you directed on Saturday has led to a sharp rise in support for handling this matter by drones. It appears that we have drones which ~~could~~ *might* do this job with a level of efficiency which would enable them to continue ~~indefinitely~~ even if Castro tried to bring them down, because new drones could be supplied faster than he could bring them down. This at least is the position of the Defense Department civilians. The Joint Chiefs have not yet expressed a final view. Probably the result of today's discussion should be a direction to accelerate preparation for the use of drones, and production of additional drones in case we decide to shift to them.

On ECM for U-2 planes, I am told that the Chiefs have reached a negative recommendation, and my impression is that Bob McNamara will not advise overruling them, but you will wish to satisfy yourself on the matter. *Because even ECM will not make U-2 safe.*

If there is time, I think you should hear a brief discussion on contingency planning in the event of an attack on overflights. But this part of the problem is not fully worked out yet.

2. Laos

I am told that the issue that divided the Departments last week has now been settled, and my brother Bill will have a coordinated recommendation for immediate action to improve our knowledge of North Vietnam activities through Laos to South Vietnam. Unfortunately this agreement was reached only last

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Doc 7/29/77
By smg, NARS, Date 8/8/77

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

night and no paper has yet been delivered.

It is quite likely that these two matters will not take a full hour, and my suggestion is that you allow the meeting to end early if it turns out that way, and adjourn, with the two Secretaries, McCone and Taylor, and me, to the Mansion for lunch. The agenda for the luncheon meeting is longer, and more complex, as the attached sheet shows.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 2/27/77
By mg; NARS, Date 8/8/77

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McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

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May 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Sec 7/27/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 8/8/77

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McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Tripartite Non-Dissemination Declaration

The British have proposed a tripartite (U.S., U.K., French) declaration of intention on non-dissemination (Tab A) which they want discussed at the Hague during the NATO Ministerial meeting. Apparently this subject was touched upon at Manila with Couve who wanted time to think it over.

The British feel that such a declaration would demonstrate the possibilities of joint US-UK-French action; make it less likely that the French would stand aside if an agreement were reached with the Soviets; and undercut impressions of French coziness with the Chinese Communists.

Although the State Department is not optimistic about French concurrence, the Secretary believes that there might be advantage in pursuing the exercise at the Hague and has some modifications to propose in the British text (Tab B). These are designed to:

- (1) Bring the declaration into line with our previous proposals;
- (2) Keep the MLF maneuvering ground free; and
- (3) Leave room for the European nuclear force which the French profess to have in mind.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-10-77, NSC 8-14-78

By if, NARS, Date 6-7-79

~~SECRET~~


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Proposed Declaration on Non-Dissemination

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United States and the United Kingdom discussed the importance for world peace of forestalling the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries that did not now possess them. They agreed that the emergence of new nuclear powers would be likely to lead to demands for nuclear weapons in other countries that felt themselves threatened: and that this process could create new risks of war that might be difficult to limit or control. They affirmed that it is the intention of the French, United States and United Kingdom Governments to work together to prevent the dissemination to other countries of nuclear weapons or of information and material required for their manufacture.

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U.S. Revision of U. K. Declaration on
Non-Dissemination

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United States and the United Kingdom discussed the importance for world peace of forestalling the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of individual states not now possessing them /to countries that did not possess them/. They agreed that the emergence of new nuclear powers would be likely to lead to pressures /demands/ for nuclear weapons in other countries that felt themselves threatened; and that this process could create new risks of war that might be difficult to limit or control. They affirmed that it is the intention of the French, United States and United Kingdom Governments to work together to prevent the dissemination into the national control of other individual states /countries/ of nuclear weapons or of information or material required for their manufacture, and to seek an international agreement to this end.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY
The White House

Subject: Republican Candidates Briefings

You may be interested in the present status of arrangements with various Republican Presidential Candidates who have been offered national security briefings by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and John McCone.

Governor Rockefeller accepted the invitation under date of April 24, leaving any meeting date indefinite. I called his office in Albany May 1 and stated that I stood ready to organize a session on a mutually agreeable date and should be considered the immediate point of contact. I believe that we should leave the matter in this posture so the ball is in his court rather than ours.

Senator Margaret Chase Smith accepted the briefing offer April 28 and I called her office to leave the situation in the same stance as with Rockefeller.

Governor Scranton has accepted and requested a briefing in Washington May 21. This meeting will likely set the pattern for any others; subject to your guidance, I suggest that the briefing for him consist of (a) an intelligence briefing by John McCone; and (b) a policy briefing by Secretary Rusk and a subordinate from the Defense Department, or by George Ball and Secretary McNamara. Tying up the Secretaries of State and Defense for the briefing seems to me to play it in a higher key than is desirable. All the briefing sessions should be in the Secretary of State's conference room in order to avoid the inevitable press and so forth going to the CIA, and so that the only press exposure will be when the candidate comes into the

Department in the morning and goes out around noon. If he moves around to different buildings, there will be press and TV coverage each time; and the whole affair will turn into more of a carnival than would be desirable. The only individuals present would be Governor Scranton, the principals giving the briefing, and possibly two staff aides for the latter -- due to the classified nature of the material Scranton would not have an aide present unless he had already been cleared for top secret material.

Senator Goldwater turned down the offer of a briefing April 23; and a reply from Secretary Rusk was sent April 27 stating that we would nevertheless stand ready to meet with him if he should later change his mind.

Mr. Nixon has indicated in the press that he has refused the briefing; but no communication has been received to date.

Mr. Stassen and Governor Wallace have not yet been heard from.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Fred". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Frederick G. Dutton

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u v l e

May 4, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Tripartite Non-Dissemination Declaration

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McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-10-77; NSC 8-14-78
By ij, NARS, Date 6-7-79

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached cable from Rusk to Lodge shows where we now stand on the bargain with Mike Pearson. It looks satisfactory, and I do not think there is anything more you need to do about it now.

McG. B.
McG. B.

OK
~~WJ~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 1821

PRIORITY

May 1 8 34 PM '64

Info:

INFO: Amembassy OTTAWA 989

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

EXDIS

I flew up to Ottawa yesterday to talk with Mike Pearson and Martin concerning the Canadian presence in Hanoi. I found our Canadian friends in close concert with the thoughts you and I discussed in Saigon and they assure me that they are most willing to cooperate with us.

Their new ICC Commissioner will be J. Blair Seaborn, an expert in communist affairs, who has recently returned from an assignment as Counselor of the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. The exchange with Cox in Saigon has been scheduled to take place some time this summer, but they agreed to attempt to step this up by a few weeks.

They readily agreed that Seaborn should plan to spend much more time in Hanoi than have his predecessors in this assignment.

They

Drafted by: S/VN:WHSullivan:adc 5/1/64	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Rowe

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS 64-68 vol. 1, item 134

By JW NARA. Date 10-15-98

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They also accept as part of his mission an effort to establish ready access to and close contact with senior authorities in Hanoi, beginning with Ho Chi Minh. We discussed several points which we would like Seaborn to undertake for us. I ~~have~~^{am} having talking papers prepared here in the Department and will send an officer to Ottawa in the near future for further development of this matter directly with Seaborn.

Following are some of the matters which we roughed out in Ottawa and which I will have further developed here. I would appreciate your comments on these points together with any additional suggestions for talking points which we can give to the Canadians:

1. Seaborn should start out by checking as closely as he can what is on Ho Chi Minh's mind. We want to know whether he considers himself over-extended and exposed, or whether he feels confident that his Chinese allies will back him to the hilt. We want to know whether his current zeal is being forced upon him by pro-Chinese elements in his own camp, or whether he is impelled by his own ambitions.

2. Seaborn should get across to Ho and his colleagues the full measure of US determination to see this thing through

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through. He should draw upon examples in other parts of the world to convince them that if it becomes necessary to enlarge the military action, this is the most probable course that the US would follow.

3. Seaborn should spread the word that he is puzzled by Hanoi's intentions. The North Vietnamese should understand that the US wants no military bases or other footholds in South Viet Nam or Laos. If Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone, the US presence in the area would diminish sharply.

4. The North Vietnamese should understand that there are many examples in which the Free World has demonstrated its willingness to live in peace with communist neighbors and to permit the establishment of normal economic relations between these two different systems. We recognize North Viet Nam's need for trade, and especially food, and consider that such needs could be fulfilled if peaceful conditions were to prevail.

Pearson also agreed to instruct Seaborn and his people in general to work more actively on trying to break the Hoies off from constant
and

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and active espousal of North Vietnamese aggression. He felt, however, that the Poles are playing something of a middle role in Sino-Soviet matters these days and doubted that there would be much profit in this.

CP-1.

RUSK

END

~~SECRET~~

May 3, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached cable from Rusk to Lodge shows where we now stand on the bargain with Mike Pearson. It looks satisfactory, and I do not think there is anything more you need to do about it now.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your instructions, I have talked to Bob McNamara and Bill Gaud in AID about cutting down the totals of unobligated funds and getting obligated money spent in fiscal 64. Gaud persuaded me that reports twice a month would be more efficient and productive than a weekly Saturday report. A naked report of figures simply does not tell the story, and 15-day periods will give us a better picture of specific actions which have been taken in line with your instructions.

McNamara and Gaud agree that Washington can do a lot to get larger funds obligated, and so cut down on one of the main arguments against the AID bill. But for different reasons they both believe it will be less practicable to insure that funds already obligated are actually spent between now and June 30. McNamara says that in meeting overall expenditure guidelines, the Defense Department has much bigger and better instruments (and he says that he and Kermit Gordon are in close touch on ways to meet your budget figures for both '64 and '65, while Gaud says that payments on economic projects depend on the actions of hundreds of individual contractors and shippers and that any general effort to get their bills presented in FY64 would almost surely leak and create a backfire. Nevertheless he thinks that by rifle shots he can do quite a lot, and my memoranda (attached) are designed to get reports on this specialized effort.

M. G. B.

MCG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID 4-12-78 letter

By ing, NARS, Date 9-24-79

Memo for the Pres.

May 2, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The marked passages on this report of Erhard's speech show that he did a good job yesterday, and it seems clear that there is no trouble between him and you.

McG. B.

Memos for the Pres
72

May 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I was talking with Clark Clifford on another subject today, and he and I agreed on the ideal method of keeping John McCone really happy about the level of his contact with you: Golf.

McCone is an energetic and agreeable golfer, and while he does not disprove the Reston Rule as effectively as Valenti or me, he has more free time and he can pay his own Burning Tree Greens fee.

McG. B.

May 1, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Absence of Cabinet members

I believe you will be discussing the absence of Cabinet members in the Cabinet meeting tomorrow, and you may wish the attached background memorandum on the US-Canada Committee which was established in 1953 and which brought about the absence of so many Cabinet members this week in Ottawa. I might add that I myself have been sensitive to the need for being extra polite to Canadians ever since George Ball and I knocked over the Diefenbaker government by one incautious press release.

MCC. n

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Thompson-Dobrynin conversation

The attached paper reports an informal conversation which I authorized after consultation around the government a few days ago. What Tommy Thompson did was to make it clear to Dobrynin that if he wanted our cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear explosions to deal with the catastrophe threatening Samarkand they could count on us. The object of this was to make a record, in a low key, which may be useful at some later time when we face the problem of the sea-level canal.

We have had no reaction from the Russians, and from a strictly technical standpoint the probability is that nuclear explosions would not be helpful in this case. Moreover, any public disclosure of this gesture would probably lead to exposure of its technical weakness, so unless you differ we plan to keep it quiet -- if we can.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1964

Mr. President:

This is what I sent to McGhee last night. I repeated it to Berlin because that is where Erhard is today, so that it is important that the message be available there, too.

h.p. B.

McG. B.

FOR EARLIEST DELIVERY FRIDAY A. M.

4/30/64

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: AmEmbassy Bonn for Ambassador McGhee

From: McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-10-77, NSC 8-14-78

Repeat BERLIN for Calhoun only.

By ib, NARS, Date 6-7-79

Your 3981 and message via Germans from Carstens have led me to review Quick article with President, and he asks that I pass you this message as from me -- not from him -- for your use with Chancellor, Carstens, or others as appropriate. The President's remarks in his informal conversation with a Quick editor have no other significance than a restatement of exactly what he has said on a number of other occasions, including the Texas meeting. His comments to the Quick reporter, as to everyone else, were aimed simply at the point that we must all do our full share for peace and that each of us must take account of the interests and concerns of others. The Quick article presents a quite incomplete view of the President's policy as a whole, since obviously the President knows well and has repeatedly stated that the Federal Republic has legitimate interests and concerns of its own and a need for security against external threats from others. The President does not believe that anyone could suppose that an informal conversation of this kind was intended in any way to bring pressure on anyone in Germany.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

4/30/64

The President greatly values his close personal contact and warm understanding with Chancellor Erhard.

For your personal information, President does not wish any public denial of remarks attributed to him. This would only lead to accentuation of charges and countercharges when real purpose is to deflate casual conversation as soon as possible. And at the same time we should give no ground whatever on President's determination to seek honorable peace in every possible way, and his belief that friends like Germany should do the same.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(page 2 of 2 pages)