

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 2009

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 2

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
11a	memo	Bundy to President re Gaud and Vietnam		1	6/24/64	C
13a	memo	from Bundy (Exempted 6/23/09, NLJ 09-6)	TS-	1	6/24/64	A
24	memo	Bundy to the President re news story from Bonn	PCI	1	6/16/64	C, A
32	memo	Bundy re dispersal plan for FY 64 (Sanitized 9/12/01, NLJ 99-39)	S-	1	6/15/64	A
33	memo	Bundy re FY65 underground tests (same sanitization as previous version 9/12/01, NLJ 99-39) (dup. #7, MSC Mtgs., vol. 2, tab 7, box 1)	S-	3	6/13/64	A
42	report	Bundy report re Laos (Sanitized 6/29/00, NLJ 99-40; more released than previous sanitization)	S	5	6/10/64	A
52	memo	Bundy to President re Castro announcements (Sanitized 2/10/00, NLJ 96-106) (duplicate #52a, this file)	S	1	6/3/64	A
52a	memo	Bundy to President re Castro announcements (duplicate #52, this file)	S	1	6/3/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President**Folder Title** "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 5, 6/1-30/64"**Box Number** 2

Restriction Codes

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11/20/2009


Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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69	memo	from Bundy re Israel (Exempted per RAC 3/02) (duplicate #72, this file)	C	1	6/1/64	A
72	memo	from Bundy re Israel (duplicate #69, this file)	C	1	6/1/64	A

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Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State Department		
#57g Letter	Harriman to Gaston-Marin <i>State Dec 4/6/77</i> C 3 p	undated	A
#12 Memo	Bundy to the President re Rusk re-reviewed 1 p <i>Open 12/08/83 8/10/83</i>	6/24/64	C
#13 Memo	duplicates #12 <i>Open 12/08/83</i>	6/24/64	C
#24 Memo	Bundy to the President re news story from Bonn 1 p	6/16/64	C + A
#57e List	plants available to Rumania <i>OPEN 10.22.98 STATE GUIDELINES</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#60 Memo	<i>State ltr 6/15/77</i> Bundy re Rusk/Khanh talk TS 1 p	6/2/64	A
#61 Memo	<i>State ltr 6/15/77</i> Bundy (dup. #60 above) TS 1 p	6/2/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#4 Memo	<i>State ltr 5/5/77</i> Bundy re meeting w/Orrlich of CR C 1 p	6/29/64	A
<i>open 1-10-86 NLJ 83-238</i> #8 Memo	<i>Exempt, State ltr 5/5/77</i> Bundy re Laos S 2 p	6/28/64	A
#10 Memo	<i>State ltr 5/5/77</i> Bundy re meeting w/Taylor & Johnson S 2 p	6/25/64	A
<i>open 5-4-95 NLJ 93-278</i> #13b Memo	<i>Exempt, State ltr 5/5/77</i> Bundy re meeting w/PM Menzies S 1 p	6/24/64	A
#14 Memo	<i>State ltr 5/5/77</i> Bundy re meeting w/Menzies S 1 p	6/23/64	A
#17 Memo	<i>Sanitized, State ltr 5/27/77, NSC ltr 2/3/78</i> Bundy re meeting w/Novikov S 1 p <i>OPEN 10-15-98 STATE</i>	6/18/64	A
#27 Memo	<i>State ltr 9/23/77</i> Bundy re Congo S 1 p	6/16/64	A
#36 Memo	<i>NSC ltr 2/3/78, State ltr 5/27/77</i> Bundy re talk w/Erhard S 1 p	6/12/64	A
#38 Memo	<i>NSC ltr 2/3/78, State ltr 5/27/77</i> Bundy re Erhard briefing papers S 1 p	6/11/64	A
<i>open 10-27-99 NLJ 98-424</i> #46 Memo	<i>Exempt, State ltr 5/27/77</i> Bundy re Greeks/Turks S 1 p	6/9/64	A
#46a Memo	" Bundy (dup. #46 above) S 1 p	6/9/64	A
#57a Memo	<i>NSC ltr 2/3/78, State ltr 5/27/77</i> Bundy re Rumanian negotiations S 2 p	5/29/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
#31 Memo	Bundy re SEA policy w/o Resolution TS 2 p (dup. #40, NSF Country File, Vietnam Memos, Vol. 12)	6/15/64	A
#39 Memo	Bundy re SEA TS 2 p	6/10/64	A
#41 Memo	Bundy re alternative public positions TS 4 p	6/10/64	A
#42 Memo	Bundy re Laos TS 5 p	6/10/64	A
#44 Memo	Bundy (dup. #39 above) TS 2 p	6/10/64	A
#45 Memo	Bundy (dup. #39 above) TS 2 p	6/10/64	A
#53 Memo	Bundy re SEA TS 2 p	6/3/64	A
#56 Memo	Bundy (dup. #53 above) TS 2 p	6/3/64	A

OPEN 10-15-98 FRUS

NSC 100 8/31/77

Example NSC 100 8/31/77

Secret TS 5 p 6/10/64 A
Returned to Secret per NLS 83-238-238 9/27/00 NLS 99-40
NSC 100 8/31/77

NSC 100 8/31/77

Open 8-12-88 NLS 86-247
"C" restriction lifted 8-8-86

Open 11-14-90

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	CIA 10-21-77 NSC 12-15-78 Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence.		
#13a Memo	Bundy re Canada & Australia <i>Exempt</i> TS Codeword <i>Exempt 9/27/00 NLS 99-40</i>	1 p 6/24/64	A
#35 Memo	Bundy re air strike in Laos <i>Exempt</i> TS 1 p <i>Exempt per NLS 83-239</i> OPEN 10-15-98	6/12/64	A
#69 Memo	Bundy re Israel <i>Exempt</i> TS 1 p <i>Exempt 9/27/00 NLS 99-40</i>	6/1/64	A
#72 Memo	Bundy (dup. #69 above) TS 1 p <i>Exempt NLS 91-109 (dup. #320, NSP, Pels, McGeorge Bundy, Chron File, June '64, Box 2)</i> <i>Conf. per NLS 91-105</i>	6/1/64	A

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Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence.		
#52 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Castro announcements S 1 p	6/3/64	A
#52a Memo	Bundy (dup. #52 above) S 1 p	6/3/64	A
#54 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re exile raiders C 1 p	6/3/64	A

Sanitized 6/7/00 NLJ 96-106

Sanitized, CIA ltr 5/17/77

Sanitized, CIA ltr 5/17/77

Exempt, CIA ltr 5/17/77

open 3-27-97 NLJ 96-104

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#11a Memo	Agency: White House, for AID concurrence.		
	Bundy re Gaud & Vietnam <i>AID ltr 5/9/77</i> C 1 p	6/24/64	A C

FILE LOCATION

NSF- [REDACTED] McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for ACDA concurrence.		
#22 Memo	<i>ACDA ltr 5/13/77</i> Bundy re cutoff of fissionable material production		
	S 2 p	6/16/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 5, 6/1-30/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for ERDA concurrence.		
#32 Memo	Bundy re dispersal plan for FY 64 <i>Sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ 99-39</i>	TS-RD 1 p 6/15/64	A
#33 Memo	Bundy re FY 65 underground tests <i>Sanitized 5-29-92 NLJ 92-281</i> <i>Sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ 99-39</i>	S-RD 3 p 6/13/64	A
#50 Memo	Bundy re visit of HMS Dreadnought <i>OPEN 10.15.98</i> <i>STATE GUIDELINES</i>	C 1 p 6/4/64	A

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June 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I talked to Larry O'Brien about Carey's reported comment on the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Larry tells me that it is inconceivable that anyone on the White House staff could have given him any assurances of this sort since the situation is the opposite, and O'Brien and his people know it. He also thinks that Carey knows the situation very well, and thinks there may be a mix-up in the report. He will have one of his people make a check with Carey in a tactful way in the next twenty-four hours and will get you a further comment then.

McG. B.

CC: Larry O'Brien

June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached cables show the results of Bohlen's interview with de Gaulle today, and may be worth a look. I also attach at the back a copy of your letter to the General on Papandreou as it finally went out.

The net of this is that de Gaulle agrees that the Cyprus problem is tough and is being very cagey as to what part, if any, France will play.

On China, the General gives what we have reason to think is an accurate account of his interview with the Chinese Ambassador. We very much doubt Middleton's report of last week that he warned the Chinese on our behalf.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS.

June 29, 1964

31

MR. VALENTI:

Jack --

If you think the President
is likely to do this, you
may want to put it on cards.

McG. B.

June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Possible Remarks on Lodge's Resignation

If you wish to present Lodge briefly to the White House press, the kinds of things you might say are as follows:

Ambassador Lodge has just made his final report to me and now he becomes a private citizen again.

Ambassador Lodge accepted appointment to Saigon a year ago, in a spirit of disinterested and non-partisan patriotism. On that job he has served two Presidents of the United States with distinction and dedication. He has earned the gratitude of the people of Vietnam and the people of the United States. In his letter of resignation, Ambassador Lodge recommends that we persist steadfastly in our policy of firm support for the Government and people of Vietnam. This recommendation has already been accepted, and the country can count on Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Johnson to carry on with the work of Ambassador Lodge.

Ambassador Lodge carries with him into private life my warmest personal good wishes. He tells me that in the coming weeks he expects to devote some of his time to the affairs of the Republican Party, but this is a matter on which I am sure he would rather speak for himself.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4
June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting with President Orlich of Costa Rica

You are scheduled to greet President Orlich at 11:00 AM, June 30. The first business session is immediately after his arrival for 30 minutes. Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, Ambassador Telles and Ralph Dungan would attend if you agree. You and Mrs. Johnson are giving a dinner for President and Mrs. Orlich at 8:00 PM. The briefing memorandum at II of this booklet is clear and good.

On July 1, you meet with President Orlich at 5:00 PM for 30 minutes and issue a Joint Communiqué. At 6:00 PM, President and Mrs. Orlich are giving a reception at the Pan American Union in your honor.

During the visit we want to emphasize publicly our friendly and cooperative attitude toward Costa Rica, which has the longest and most effective democratic traditions in Latin America. This point is emphasized in your welcoming remarks and your toast at the dinner.

Costa Rica has two major problems which currently affect our relations:

1. Mediocre Presidential leadership and frustration in the legislative process where Orlich has a one-vote majority.
2. A general state of anxiety because of the severe economic effects of volcanic ash from Irazu Volcano, which daily sifts over San Jose (the capital), Cartago, and the surrounding coffee lands.

President Orlich is suffering from a slight kidney infection and high blood pressure. He has curtailed his scheduled 8-day tour outside of Washington. His personal physician is accompanying him.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Dec 5/5/77

By *PMG*

NARS, Date

7/18/77

June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation for this evening

Mary and I are giving a small dinner party for Polly Bunting this evening, and as I look over the list it occurs to me that it just might give you an hour or two of relaxation if you wanted to join us either for dinner or afterward.

The guests are the following:

Mrs. Bunting

M. Jean Monnet

The McNamaras

The Restons

Mr. & Mrs. Abe Chayes (Mrs. Chayes is the local Radcliffe leader)

Mr. & Mrs. Cliff Alexander (he is your new Negro assistant, and she is another good Radcliffe girl)

Bill Moyers

I am sure you know that nothing would give us all more pleasure and, equally, that we know very well how pleasant you must find it to stay home after a long day at the office!

McG. B.

6
June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This paper from Stevenson is, I think, the most reliable report on Castro's intentions. I have checked again on the alleged shooting at Guantanamo and I am informing Governor Stevenson that there is just no truth in it as far as we can tell after the most intensive inquiry, and that he can pass to Lisa Howard the most categorical assertion that we have been unable to find evidence of any such episode and that there is most emphatically no plan of provocation.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

7

June 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Possible Remarks on Lodge's Resignation

If you wish to present Lodge briefly to the White House press, the kinds of things you might say are as follows:

Ambassador Lodge has just made his final report to me and now he becomes a private citizen again.

Ambassador Lodge accepted appointment to Saigon a year ago, in a spirit of disinterested and non-partisan patriotism. On that job he has served two Presidents of the United States with distinction and dedication. He has earned the gratitude of the people of Vietnam and the people of the United States. In his letter of resignation, Ambassador Lodge recommends that we persist steadfastly in our policy of firm support for the Government and people of Vietnam. This recommendation has already been accepted, and the country can count on Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Johnson to carry on with the work of Ambassador Lodge.

Ambassador Lodge carries with him into private life my warmest personal good wishes. He tells me that in the coming weeks he expects to devote some of his time to the affairs of the Republican Party, but this is a matter on which I am sure he would rather speak for himself.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-238

By NLS, NARS, Date 12-12-85

~~SECRET~~

June 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers give the background of the decision we face tomorrow on support for a battle Souvanna Phouma is planning. They are worth reading through this evening, I believe. The basic briefing memo is my brother's; the supporting analyses, at Tab A & B and the cables at Tab C are also important.

Souvanna's initial proposal was for quite extensive U. S. involvement in his attempt to beat the Pathet Lao now holding two roads west of the Plain of Jars, between the two capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. As we have examined it, we think we can in fact meet his needs by a relatively modest increase of U. S. transport support (6 planes and civilian pilots), essentially to move and supply an 1800-man force from Southern Laos to the Muong Soui area. As of yesterday Rusk, McNamara, the JCS, and Unger were in favor of this operation. My brother, for good diplomatic reasons, is wary.

The reasons for approval are many:

(1) Souvanna will be deeply disillusioned if we do not support him in a course that has unanimous backing of non-Communist Lao military, and his own strong personal leadership.

(2) The level of new U. S. military commitment is modest (there is no thought of U. S. combat support).

(3) Support of the operation should allow us both to strengthen the neutralists near Muong Soui, and to mitigate the bad effects of a possible defeat there.

(4) As Laotian battle plans go, this one is unusually promising.

The big reasons for wariness are two:

(1) Souvanna's attack is very likely to provide the excuse for a successful Pathet Lao attack on Muong Soui.

(2) Our diplomatic track will be weakened, as Indians and Russians may abandon Polish proposals and begin to press hard for a Geneva meeting.

~~SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

~~SECRET~~

-2-

My own conclusion is that while this is a chance enterprise, our best course today, as for two years past, is prudent support of Prince Souvanna. I would follow the policy outlined in outgoing cable No. 1267 (Tab C).

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

(page 2 of 2 pages)

7

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: An appeal from Prime Minister Douglas-Home on our shipping regulations

1. Home has sent you a message (Tab A) which asks you to join at once in an international conference on jurisdiction over international shipping, and meanwhile to suspend indefinitely the application of the Bonner Act of 1961. Under this act, and after extensive delays, the Maritime Commission has announced a set of standards for model contracts which must be met by July 3, 1964. The British position is that this is an unwarranted extension of U. S. jurisdiction into international trade and even into their own territory. We do not agree. The real thrust of the British position, although not of the British argument, is to prevent any regulation of international shippers. This position is wholly unacceptable to us, both in Congress and in the Administration. So a conference is unlikely to bring any early results.

2. In any case, an indefinite extension of the period of grace before enforcing the Bonner Act would make trouble with Douglas and Celler, would embroil us with the Maritime Commission, and would weaken our bargaining position with other countries (whom the British have informed of the Prime Minister's demarche to you.)

3. Moreover, we think the Prime Minister's message is largely for the record and we do not think his hints of reprisal should be taken at face value.

4. Nevertheless we do not want to meet him head on, and it can be avoided by an answer which essentially does three things:

a. Offers an extension of the period of grace until September 1, as a courtesy to him -- Admiral Harle~~e~~ is content to go along;

b. Offers him a conference, but not on the narrow question of jurisdiction. We would confer on the whole problem of the international regulation of shipping, and instead of doing it now we would do it in a less edgy time than our common election season;


c. Maintains our position, as we must, under the law.


5. A draft answer in this sense is attached at Tab B. It is marginally more polite than the Prime Minister's, which is only fitting from the larger to the smaller power.

Answer approved ✓

Answer disapproved

Speak to me


Francis Bator


McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your 6 PM Meeting with Taylor, Johnson et al

The main purpose of this meeting is to meet with Alexis Johnson before he leaves. His plane goes from Andrews at 10:30 AM tomorrow. The subjects are three: (1) Ambassador Taylor's basic directive; (2) Staff; (3) Your reassertion of basic policy.

(1) Ambassador Taylor's basic directive.

Attached at Tab A is a letter which is worth reading aloud before you sign it. What it does is to give Max full control over everything in South Vietnam. This is something the military never let the Ambassador have before, and now that we have a man whom the military cannot refuse, it is time to establish the principle. This letter represents Taylor's own desire and has been checked with State but not with McNamara.

(2) Staff.

Taylor and Johnson have been working on this very hard in the last 24 hours and can give their own report. The two key questions are: head man for AID and a new DCM.

(3) Basic policy.

If I understand your feelings correctly, the following is a possible outline of what you might want to say.

1. You want the strongest possible U. S. effort to move ahead within South Vietnam. Large-scale moves "to the North" are not the present answer, though we will be ready to consider new decisions at any time, as we did in the case of reconnaissance over Laos.

2. We all know that two things are needed:

- (a) an effective government in South Vietnam;
- (b) an absolutely first-rate team.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 5/5/77
By DMG, NARS, Date 7/18/77

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

We are now getting an absolutely first-rate U. S. team, for the first time since the situation became acute.

The first task of this U. S. team is to strengthen the effectiveness of Khanh and his colleagues, at every level, and by every means.

3. We have had plenty of plans and proposals; what we now need is execution. (This is what Taylor and Johnson want to hear.)

4. But there is still need for all the good ideas we can get. We count on initiative at every level. We shall send out our ideas for comment, and we shall expect energetic demands for support from the field. (This is what they are less eager about but need to hear from you. Today is not the day for a catalogue of new proposals.)

5. You particularly want the new team to get life and energy into Vietnamese efforts to bring other flags in. And the U. S. team too must show imagination and hospitality in making such allies feel welcome and useful. (Max Taylor is bearish on this and needs a spur.)

6. You also particularly want to carry out an information and propaganda effort twice as big as what Eisenhower has asked for.

7. But an ounce of real progress is worth a pint of propaganda and a peck of threats.

8. Washington will back you up.

9. The spirit of Taylor and Johnson, who said "Yes" at once, will be the spirit of the whole U. S. effort.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

11

Mr. President,

Do you want to call Mr. Gaud as suggested
for your consideration by Mr. Bundy in
attached?

 yes
 ✓ no

Name rhymes with Cloud

mjdr
June 26

✓ Tuesday 12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your Secretary of State very much needs a rest. Twice in the last week he has spoken to me about nightmares, and once about his doctor telling him that he must have time off soon. Last night I sat next to Virginia Rusk, and she is deeply worried about him. Since January 1961 he has never had more than two days off at a time, and even such respite has been rare. This is partly his own fault, of course, but it is a fact. I think you should send him away for a solid ten days somewhere between the third of July and the end of the Republican Convention. This may be short notice, and I think the Secretary himself is hoping for some time in August or September, but my own sense of this matter is very strong; that the sooner he goes the better.

The only way in the world to make him go is to give him an order from the President of the United States. I have no travel plans whatever, in this period, and George Ball seems physically very tough right now. Between us, we can mind the store.

I put this matter urgently because it is almost unheard of for either Dean or Virginia to give any sign of weakness, so that when I hear from both of them my ears go up like a beagle's.

M. B.

McG. B.

Home
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L

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1964

extra copy
13-b

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

SUBJECT: Menzies

NEJ 93-278
By ing, NARA, Date 4-21-95

1. Your visit with Menzies is informal and offers no big problem. Bill Bundy will be here with him, but you will probably want to talk at least briefly with the Prime Minister alone.

2. The attached memos give a pretty good summary, but I attach a separate, up-to-date short statement on Australian meat, at Tab E.

3. Menzies himself will be most interested in our problem in Vietnam and his problem with Malaysia.

4. On Vietnam, his Minister of External Affairs Paul Hasluck has recently made a strong statement, and Menzies' government is doubling its training instructors from 30 to 60 and will let them be used in the field as advisory teams. Australia is also providing 6 Caribou transport, and is sending a team to Saigon to see what more can be done in the non-military area.

5. On Malaysia, the immediate diplomatic situation is complex, and if you get into that, Bill Bundy will have the details.

6. In the wider sense, the central point for Menzies is our commitment under the Anzus treaty. The treaty provides that the parties will support each other "in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties, including their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft."

7. There is a tricky legal point as to just what is meant by the "Pacific area;" it could be argued that if the Australians get themselves into trouble in Malaysia, they are not strictly covered by the treaty. But we have taken the opposite course and have said that we expect to support the Australians if they come under serious armed attack anywhere in the area; in return we insist on prior consultation before they make any new military commitments in the treaty area, as for example, in Sarawak or Sabah (in North Borneo).

8. Once or twice Australians have tried to interpret our Anzus commitment as a blank check, but Menzies has never made this mistake. He knows that we are good allies, but that the exact shape of our action under the treaty will depend on your judgment as President, at every stage.

9. At Tab A is a longer memo, and at Tab B is a diplomatic paper on the Anzus commitment which was done under JFK's guidance last year. At Tab C is a proposed toast which has gone up to Valenti to go on cards, and at Tab D is a summary of Menzies' life.

McG. B.

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a good redraft by Douglas Cater of a possible speech on Southeast Asia to Congress. I think it is worth your reading because it is the best connected statement on the subject that has yet been done here. It might be used either as a message a little later in the year or as a speech at some point.

Incidentally, John McCone has been telling everybody in the Government that you can easily get a Congressional Resolution if you want one. However, he has talked only to House conservatives and Senate Republicans, and I have told him that he should convert Morse first.

McG. B.

✓ 14
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State let 5/5/77

By

MMG

Name, Date

7/18/77

Sir Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, is making an informal visit in order to establish personal contact with you. At present, there is no crisis matter which requires urgent consultation.

The Australians responded rapidly when we called on our Allies to assist in South Vietnam. They have recently sent thirty additional training instructors there and will allow them to be used in the field. They also provided six Caribou transport aircraft and are going to send a team to Saigon to consult on ways in which Australian non-military aid might be increased. The Australians have forecasted a significant reduction in meat exports to the U.S. for 1964 (This year's total should be approximately equal to a yearly average for the period from 1959 through 1963.)

The Prime Minister will probably wish to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. Of particular interest in the region is the recently concluded "summit" meeting in Tokyo with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. While the results were not what we had hoped for, the meeting left a faint ray of hope for future progress at the Foreign Ministers' level. The Australians have firmly supported the Malaysians, while attempting to maintain some contact with the Indonesians.

The Prime Minister might wish to discuss the U.S. commitment under the ANZUS Treaty. A copy of the paper which summarizes the understanding between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister on the nature of this commitment is attached.

Prime Minister Menzies, who has been a staunch friend of the U.S., has just recovered from an illness which caused him to cancel a projected visit to Israel.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dave Bell's fourth report on the use of aid funds is attached. You will be pleased to note that he now expects to commit 98.7% of the economic money, 98.0% of the military, and 99.1% of the Contingency Fund. If they make it, the rate for economic aid will be the highest in the entire postwar history of U. S. assistance. (The true rate for economic aid may well be over 99%-- higher than the rate shown on the books. This is because some of the money which appears in the accounts as "available" cannot legally be committed in FY 1964; it has to be reappropriated.)

We shall keep after this until the very end.

McG.B.

Attachment: a/s

16

June 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Soviet Government agreed today to our proposal that, as an initial step in exploring the possibility of U. S. - Soviet cooperation on methods of desalting sea water, a meeting of U. S. and Soviet representatives should be held in Washington on 14-15 July. The Soviets proposed that both countries concurrently release statements announcing the meeting at noon tomorrow. We have asked that the release would be advanced to 10:30 a.m. tomorrow for your press conference and will assume this is acceptable unless we hear to the contrary from the Soviets. Ambassador Dobrynin has been shown the attached draft press release and has promised to give Ambassador Thompson a copy of their release this evening.

The proposal for scientific cooperation on desalting was originally made by Premier Krushchev in one of his oral messages dealing with the nuclear cutback. You indicated interest in the proposal and the Soviets have pursued the idea vigorously, emphasizing the use of nuclear power as the source of energy.

It is not yet clear whether the Soviets are really interested in desalting which is a serious technical problem quite aside from nuclear power or whether their real interest lies either in the possibility of technical discussions on large nuclear reactors or of simply associating themselves with us in this activity which they may feel has far reaching significance in certain areas of the world such as the Near East. In the latter connection, you should recall that we have recently entered into a cooperative agreement with Israel and that we have a continuing program with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is intended that this preliminary meeting will help clarify these questions and provide a basis for deciding how far we can go with the Soviets in a cooperative enterprise without jeopardizing our other commitments in this area.

Finally, there is a problem of internal U. S. Government organization on the desalting problem. Technically, desalting is the responsibility of the Department of Interior; however, the Atomic Energy Commission

has the responsibility for the development of nuclear reactors that would probably be used in any very large scale projects and has the technical manpower and funds that would be required to pursue this project on a large scale. In order to coordinate the activities of these agencies, it was decided to make Dr. Hornig the responsible officer for this activity and he has agreed to serve as Chairman of the U. S. delegation to the preliminary meeting. This procedure and the attached press release have been agreed to by Dr. Hornig, Dr. Seaborg, and Secretary Udall.

McGeorge Bundy

162

June 23, 1964

PRESS RELEASE

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to explore the possibility of scientific cooperation on methods of desalting sea water, including the possible use of nuclear power. As an initial step, a meeting of U. S. and Soviet representatives will be held in Washington on 14-15 July.

The purpose of the initial meeting will be (1) to discuss the general problem of desalting, (2) to review the present activities and plans of the two countries in this area, and (3) to consider possible areas of cooperation. The representatives will then advise their respective governments as to the best way to proceed.

The Chairman of the U. S. Delegation will be Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The U. S. Delegation will also include representatives of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Interior.

June 18, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Soviet Deputy Chairman Novikov

Ambassador Thompson describes Novikov as a "tough baby," tremendously ambitious, not very popular, who might push his luck too far and head for a dramatic fall.

Therefore, he suggests that your conversation with him be kept general and innocuous.

As the State Department memorandum suggests, the Exchanges Agreement concluded in February and the recent Consular Convention can be pointed to as welcome achievements. Ambassador Thompson strongly recommends against getting into anything more specific. And if Novikov should raise some technical problems with which he is concerned -- he has expressed interest in knowing more about our hydromagnetic generators -- he can be assured that the Executive Departments, particularly State and Interior, will listen and be helpful to the extent they can.

Finally, you might want to have him take back to Khrushchev your personal greetings.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~SECRET~~



9019

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Appointment with
Soviet Deputy Chairman Novikov

There is enclosed a briefing memorandum for the
President's use in connection with his appointment
with Soviet Deputy Chairman Novikov today at 7 p.m.

The Americans who will be present at the
appointment will be Secretary of Interior Udall,
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Mr. Curtis Kamman,
State Department interpreter.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

3268

172

→ Mr. Bundy

Dave Klein has original
+ is doing a staff memo.

GC

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Ignatij P. Novikov, Thursday, June 18 at 7 p.m.

Mr. Novikov has been a Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers (Deputy Prime Minister) since 1963 and is in overall charge of the industrial and housing construction program in the Soviet Union. Previously he was Minister of Electric Power Plant Construction (1959-63). In 1960 he headed the Soviet delegation to Egypt for the start of construction of the Aswan Dam. He says he is the fifth ranking Soviet governmental official. He has been a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. since 1961. Mr. Novikov will be accompanied by Soviet Ambassador Anatolij F. Dobrynin and a Soviet interpreter, probably Oleg P. Svetlakov. Mr. Novikov understands very little English.

Mr. Novikov heads a 15-member electric power and construction delegation which arrived in the United States on June 1 for a three-week visit. This trip is in return for the visit of Secretary of the Interior Udall to the Soviet Union in September 1962. Both visits were arranged under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges Agreement. The Department of Interior has been in charge of arrangements for the Novikov tour, and the Soviet group has inspected electric power plants (thermal, hydro-electric and atomic energy) and construction projects in Chattanooga, St. Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, and Washington. The group will also visit projects in and near New York City prior to their departure for the Soviet Union on June 22.

Since Mr. Novikov's background is primarily economic, he probably will not wish to engage in discussion of outstanding political issues.

The President may wish to indicate satisfaction with the signing of the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges Agreement in February and to express the hope that even more extensive exchanges in all fields, including the informational, should be arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union. Regarding economic matters, the President may wish to inquire concerning the progress of the construction program and, particularly, housing in the Soviet Union.

June 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Partners of the Alliance is a program to encourage local and state groups to participate in the Alliance for Progress by developing and helping to carry our community projects in Latin America. A statewide Texas Partners of the Alliance is being launched at San Antonio on Friday, June 19, at 6:30 PM, for the purpose of undertaking projects in Peru. The Peruvian Ambassador will be present.

It is suggested that the attached message be sent to the chairman of the Texas Committee to read at the organizing banquet.

McGeorge Bundy

McGB:RMS:cjf

18a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Mr. Antonio Scott
Texas Partners of the Alliance
c/o St. Anthony Hotel
San Antonio, Texas

I am pleased that the people of Texas are joining with our neighbors in Peru to help us carry out the Alliance for Progress. This direct relationship can contribute in a meaningful way to the goals of the Alliance. I send my warmest best wishes to the Texas Partners of the Alliance and, through you, to your Peruvian Partners.

Lyndon B. Johnson

✓ 19

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is George Ball's draft of the letter to General de Gaulle which I have amended slightly to give you flexibility on the timing of a Pompidou visit. The more I think about it, the more I think the risks in his coming are outweighed by the advantages, as long as you can take the time (which might be comparable to the time required by Erhard last week). The best time would probably be in August, not long before the Convention, because July has now gotten very crowded. But I think it will be a plus in spite of Bohlen's reservations, which appear at Tab A and deal mainly with Southeast Asia.

McG. B.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓

Agenda
Luncheon meeting
June 16, 1964

8
Clifton

1. Four routine but Presidential decisions:


- (1) Nuclear weapons dispersal plan for fiscal '64
- (2) The nuclear cutoff for Geneva
- (3) The nuclear stockpile for fiscal '66
- (4) The cruise of the nuclear-powered squadron

These are worth settling in the presence of the two Secretaries.

2. Southeast Asia

- ~~note~~ ✓ ✓ (a) Personnel → call the man.
done by RSM (b) Immediate operational decisions 37A
recheck ✓ ✓ (c) Mme. Nhu
(d) A speech or message?

3. The Turk and Greek visits -- changes in schedules and general objectives.

✓  send LBT plans
Add \$200,000,000 - Budget Certification on \$500,000,000
100%

21 ①

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Staff Assistance in Latin America

Walter Jenkins has told me of your quite proper concern over the Sunday Star story about Bob Sayre joining my staff. The story, which must have come from some State Department gossip, is a damaging distortion of a move which was made to deal with a real problem. That problem is that Ralph Dungan and Tom Mann really have not communicated easily together, so that Latin American business has kept coming through my desk. I was either doing things myself or playing liaison officer between the two of them. This I just did not have time enough to do without help, so about six weeks ago I told Ralph that I thought we ought to add to the NSC staff a relatively junior officer (like Dave Klein for European affairs) who would be available to us here, and who would be acceptable to Tom Mann, too. I should add in candor that both Ralph and I knew that this arrangement would in fact reduce his direct involvement in Latin American affairs, although I told him that I for one would be glad to have him continue to keep a hand in when he felt like it.

Sayre was recommended by Crockett and Mann for this job, and while I was wary at first, I found him very good in our interview, and I found that Ralph had a very high opinion of him. He has been over here for several weeks now, and he has already proved his value in a number of ways. The most conspicuous example is Tom Mann's speech on our recognition policy. Because of his friendly relations with Mann and his own sensitive eye for the politics of the matter, Sayre was able to get amendments made which made that speech entirely safe at home and successful in Latin America.

I have spoken to Ralph about this unsatisfactory story, and neither he nor I think it is something we should make an issue over, since it was way on the inside of a Sunday paper. Of course, Tom Mann himself is a Special Assistant to the President, but de facto he is now working with our staff in the same way that other Assistant Secretaries do.

Unfortunately, there does exist a real -- but manageable -- problem of Ralph's own state of mind. I have told Walter Jenkins that in my own judgment the best thing we can do for Ralph is to make it clear to him that he will be in line for one of the jobs he wants after the election, if all goes well. The two things which he has in mind are the Ambassadorship to Chile and a relatively senior U. S. appointment at the World Bank. He is highly qualified for either one, in my judgment. Meanwhile, I am doing all that I can to keep in good harness with him, given the difficult fact that as long as Tom Mann is No. 1 on Latin America, it simply will not be practicable for Ralph to play the role there which he had in the last administration.

M. B.
McG. B.

June 16, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached position paper on the cutoff of fissionable material production and the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses has been submitted by ACDA for your approval as guidance for the U. S. Delegation in Geneva. The paper has been agreed to by all interested agencies: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their comments are attached.

The basic proposals in this paper have already been approved and were included in summary form in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. This paper is essentially an elaboration of our present position particularly with regard to the requirements for verification.

In order to achieve agreement, the paper intentionally avoids facing the issue of whether or not aerial reconnaissance should be involved in the verification procedure. Although there is agreement among all other agencies that aerial reconnaissance is not necessary in connection with this agreement, the JCS recommends that a provision for aerial overflight be included. Secretary McNamara has informally advised Mr. Foster that he is prepared to overrule the JCS on this issue but would prefer not to do so unless the Soviets show some interest in the proposal. Mr. Foster agreed to fuzz the language on inspection so that it would not necessarily preclude subsequent consideration of aerial inspection. Although this is a touchy point since even the hint that we are considering aerial inspection as a condition for this proposal would completely discredit it abroad, ACDA believes they can live with this instruction for the time being by avoiding the issue in Geneva.

Subject to your approval, the paper will be submitted for information to NAC next Tuesday and will be presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva next Thursday.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ACDA ltr 5/13/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

SECRET

-2-

I recommend that you approve the paper. If you approve, I will inform the interested agencies of your action.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discuss _____

SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Robert Anderson's visit with de Gaulle

Robert Anderson called me to discuss what he should say if he got quizzed about Cy Sulzberger's article about our private contacts with de Gaulle. We agreed, subject to your comment, that he should say simply that General Bilpote and he are friends, and that he did know of General Bilpote's visit to you. He went to Europe on purely private business, but when General Bilpote indicated that he might be invited to meet General de Gaulle, he did receive from the President a cordial personal message to be delivered if he should meet General de Gaulle. As it turned out, he was invited to meet the General and they had a friendly and useful conversation.

Bob and I agreed that we ought to make it clear that he saw the General as a result of a French invitation, but without making too much of a point of it. My own hunch is that Bilpote will have put the matter to General de Gaulle in such a way that the General himself honestly believes that Anderson came at our initiative. It is not a matter which is worth fighting about at this stage, but our own view ought to be kept clear.

McG B.

McG. B.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. -16092
R-13/R-II
German

HIS EXCELLENCY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

THE WHITE HOUSE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE TO ME, MR. PRESIDENT, TO BE ABLE TO VISIT YOU IN WASHINGTON SO SOON AFTER MY UNFORGETTABLE STAY AT YOUR HOME IN TEXAS. I CONSIDER IT A FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE THAT I WAS ABLE TO BE WITH YOU DURING THOSE VERY DAYS WHEN AN EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO SET UP DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND TO SHOW MISTRUST. IT DID NOT SUCCEED; ON THE CONTRARY OUR CONVERSATIONS HAVE IMPRESSIVELY CONFIRMED HOW STRONG IS THE TRUST BETWEEN US, OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND OUR PEOPLES, HOW CLOSE THE COOPERATION, AND HOW UNSHAKABLE OUR UNANIMITY. I RETURN TO GERMANY WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP HAVE GROWN STILL CLOSER AND STRONGER. FOR THIS EXPRESS TO YOU MY HEARTFELT THANKS ON BEHALF OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE. PERMIT ME, MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, TO THANK YOU ALSO FOR THE VERY GENEROUS AND CHARMING RECEPTION AND FOR THE FRANK AND CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. WITH BEST WISHES AND VERY CORDIAL GREETINGS TO MRS. JOHNSON AND YOURSELF.

YOURS

LUDWIG ERHARD.

26

09133

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

33

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy BONN PRIORITY 3590

JUN 15 12 15 PM '64

EUR

Info:

INFO: USBER BERLIN 895

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USIA

NSC

Prior Chancellor Erhard's departure from Washington June 13, Secretary handed him following message from President:

QTE Dear Mr. Chancellor:

As you leave Washington, I want to tell you how much I have appreciated even this brief opportunity to renew our friendship. Our talks on the problems which confront us have been as always most helpful to me, and I am convinced that they have further strengthened the firm bonds of friendship and understanding between our two countries.

I am mindful of the fact that a few days from now, on June seventeenth, you will be commemorating in the Federal Republic the Day of German Unity. As I told you here, it is a fundamental objective of American foreign policy to help bring an end to the unjust division of the German people, because otherwise there can be no real and durable stability in Europe. The Day of German Unity--June seventeenth--has therefore come to assume a special significance as we look forward to the day when German unity will become a reality. I take pleasure in sending you special greetings on this occasion.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson UNQTE.

Federal

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:RCCreel:gw.6/15/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR:GER - Robert C. Creel

Clearances:

P - Mr. McCloskey
EUR/P - Mr. Parr

S/S - Mr. McKesson

EUR - Mr. Holloway LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Federal Press Chief von Hase was told there would be no objection to publication of letter, with timing to be left to Germans.

Request Embassy check with von Hase to ascertain when Germans plan publish letter in order similar release may be made here.

END.

GP 3

RUSK

RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congo

In the light of your question on the phone the other day, you may be interested in the attached two memos on the Congo. At Tab A is a short one prepared at my direction by Bill Brubeck which covers the situation briefly and describes what we are currently trying to do about it. The longer paper at Tab B is submitted by John McCone and it puts us on notice of his gloomy views. I myself do not think there is much more we can do right this minute, because it is only as the situation gets worse that people will be prepared for larger and more effective action. I am quite certain that a good and strong group in the Department of State is watching daily and so is Brubeck, with a full awareness of your own interest.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 9/23/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 11/10/77

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Robert Anderson's visit with de Gaulle

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McG. B.

June 16, 1964

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McG. B.

June 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: MLF and the Congressional Breakfast

In the attached short memorandum Dean Rusk recommends that you make a brief comment on the MLF to the Leadership, in the light of forthcoming briefings and consultations on the Hill.

I strongly concur. The MLF is now moving down a strong diplomatic track which may lead to definite agreement toward the end of the year, and we do not want the Congress to feel that the diplomats have stolen a march.

At Tab A is a brief statement of the Congressional situation as it now stands. What is eating Stu Symington, I do not know, but will find out the next time I see him.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM FOR MEETING on June 15, 1964, 6 PM

Subject: Elements of a Southeast Asian Policy that does not include a Congressional Resolution

The following outline is a sketch of the actions that would remain open to us in varying combinations in the event that we do not now decide on major military operations against North Vietnam and do not now decide to seek a Congressional Resolution. No effort has been made to design a precise scenario. Indeed, if a decision is made not to seek a resolution, what we should have instead is reasonably broad planning authority within which operating officers would be encouraged to work with a relatively free sense that specific recommendations which did not violate general guidelines could expect a sympathetic hearing over the next months.

1. Possible military actions.

a. Reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strike, and T-28 operations in all parts of Laos.

b. Small-scale reconnaissance strike operations, after appropriate provocation, in North Vietnam (initially VNAF?).

c. VNAF strike operations in Laotian corridors.

d. Limited air and sea deployments toward Southeast Asia, and still more limited ground troop movements. (Major ground force deployments seem more questionable, without a decision "to go north" in some form.)

The most interesting of these operations are those involving reconnaissance-strikes and VNAF attacks in the corridors. It is suggested that a detailed and precise roster of such attacks should be prepared, together with estimates of the situations to which they would be a good response, and the ways in which their tactical conduct could reinforce their political purpose.

2. Political actions

a. Internationally -- a continued and increased effort to maximize support for our diplomatic track in Laos and our political

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 1, item 215

By JW, NARA, Date 10-15-98

effort in South Vietnam. Higher authority particularly desires a maximum effort with our allies to increase their real and visible presence in support of Saigon.

b. Laos -- an intensive effort to sustain Souvanna and to restrain the right wing from any rash act against the French. Possible increase of direct support and assistance to Kong Le in appropriate ways.

c. South Vietnam -- rapid development of the critical province program and the information program, strengthening of country team, and shift of U. S. role from advice toward direction; emphatic and continued discouragement of all coup plots; energetic public support for Khanh Government.

d. In the U. S. -- continued reaffirmation and expanded explanation of the above lines of action, with opposition to both aggressive adventure and withdrawal, and a clear open door to selected action of the sort included in paragraph 1.

This outline does not preclude a shift to a higher level of action if actions of the other side should justify or require it. It does assume that in the absence of such drastic action, defense of U. S. interests is possible, within these limits, over the next six months.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

June 15, 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for FY 1964

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-39
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-13-01

The document submitted herewith is a request from the Department of Defense for approval of a Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for those weapons that will be dispersed or authorized for dispersal abroad by the end of the current fiscal year. This approval is required by law. The recommended dispersal plan has been concurred in by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

A substantial increase is being planned in the numbers of nuclear weapons to be placed in the hands of non-U.S. forces.



This form of nuclear spreading is the consequence of NATO plans developed over a long period, and though this trend may be open to question, this is not the occasion for a reversal, though I have entered a general warning at the end of my instruction.

Your approval of this document for planning purposes will not remove the requirement that the Department of Defense must request your specific authorization to deploy the weapons overseas. There will therefore be a further opportunity to review these matters when they are imminent. Tactical and strategic studies now in progress, as well as possible changes in external conditions, will undoubtedly produce modifications in dispersal plans and it is anticipated that the dispersal planning for FY 1965 may show a decrease in the overall planning figure shown in the FY 1964 Dispersal Plan.

With your concurrence, I shall send the attached NSAM to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

McGeorge Bundy

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~ **SANITIZED**

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-281
By sig, NARA, Date 5-29-92

June 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: FY 1965 Underground Nuclear Test Program

The Atomic Energy Commission has requested your approval in principle of the FY 1965 underground nuclear test program (both AEC and DOD tests), and specific approval for the tests planned for the first quarter of FY 1965. Attached are the formal request letter from the AEC and a written briefing on the test program that will be presented by Dr. Seaborg before the National Security Council.


It is not intended that final decisions on the proposed program will be taken at the NSC meeting. The meeting is for the purpose of identifying and discussing the important factors requiring consideration in acting upon AEC's request after the meeting. A list of certain of the major issues is included below to assist in focusing attention on the essential elements. You may want to draw on this list in quizzing Dr. Seaborg, et al. *Then afterward, with your guidance I can produce a revised program.*
The proposed program which will consist of between 65 and 78 tests consists of the following elements:

AEC weapons development tests
AEC Project Plowshare tests
DOD weapons effects and Vela tests
Tests for the U.K.

Total



1.3
(a)(5)(2)

This will compare with an estimated total  by the end of FY 1964.

The direct AEC and DOD costs of the test program in FY 1965 will be \$189.3 million as compared with \$171.3 million in FY 1964. The AEC budget item for weapons development tests for FY 1965 (\$117.2 million) is now \$13.5 million below the level required to finance the 45-55 tests now being proposed.



~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

-2-

Since the signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Union has conducted three underground tests which we have detected.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

- (1) Is a more than 50 per cent increase in the number of tests justified?

The pertinent considerations bearing on the size of the program are national security requirements, relative emphasis on nuclear weapons development versus other types of weapons development, international opinion as to size of the U.S. program, and Congressional opinion, particularly on the Kennedy commitment relating to "safeguards," which calls for a testing rate [REDACTED] shots per year. In regard to the Congressional attitude it should be borne in mind that the interested Committees and Members of Congress will become informed of your decisions almost immediately.

MY OWN VIEW IS THAT A MODEST CUTBACK FROM

- (2) Should we conduct tests in the megaton range?

RECOMMENDATION
IS JUSTIFIED,

Is the requirement for research and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50-100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects tests using these very high yield devices actually be conducted since DOD has made no provision to fund these very expensive tests?

MY GUESS IS WE COULD GO SLOWER ON THIS

- (3) Should additional funds be provided for the AEC development program?

An additional \$13.5 million are required to fund the full 45 AEC weapon development shots. AEC proposes to use certain anticipated savings in weapons production that would otherwise revert to the Treasury. Failing this additional sum, AEC weapon development program would be restricted to a maximum of 35 tests.

I THINK WE COULD BE MORE SAVING

- (4) How tightly should we interpret the Limited Test Ban Treaty?

One proposed Plowshare test and two DOD effects tests are questionable under the terms of the Treaty. Although they are very

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

low yield, they will produce radioactivity in the atmosphere that might be detected outside the borders of the U.S.

I think these are not worth the risk

(5) Should any tests be conducted outside the Nevada National Test Site?

The program includes one large test next Spring on Amchitka Island, Alaska, and one test in a salt dome near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Both tests are designed to improve our ability to detect, identify and locate clandestine underground nuclear explosions.

Mississippi is all right. I think, but Alaska has problem.

McG B

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

June 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 1965 Underground Nuclear Test Program


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The proposed program which will consist of between 65 and 78 tests consists of the following elements:

AEC weapons development tests
AEC Project Plowshare tests
DOD weapons effects and Vela tests
Tests for the U.K.

Total



6.1(a)

This will compare with an estimated total by the end of FY 1964.

The direct AEC and DOD costs of the test program in FY 1965 will be \$189.3 million as compared with \$171.3 million in FY 1964. The AEC budget item for weapons development tests for FY 1965 (\$117.2 million) is now \$13.5 million below the level required to finance the 45-55 tests now being proposed.

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

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ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

- (1) Is a more than 50 per cent increase in the number of tests justified?

The pertinent considerations bearing on the size of the program are national security requirements, relative emphasis on nuclear weapons development versus other types of weapons development, international opinion as to size of the U.S. program, and Congressional opinion, particularly on the Kennedy commitment relating to "safeguards," which calls for a testing rate 6.1 (a) shots per year. In regard to the Congressional attitude it should be borne in mind that the interested Committees and Members of Congress will become informed of your decisions almost immediately.

- (2) Should we conduct tests in the megaton range?

Is the requirement for research and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50-100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects tests using these very high yield devices actually be conducted since DOD has made no provision to fund these very expensive tests?

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- (4) How tightly should we interpret the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

One proposed Plowshare test and two DOD effects tests are questionable under the terms of the Treaty. Although they are very

low yield, they will produce radioactivity in the atmosphere that might be detected outside the borders of the U.S.

- (5) Should any tests be conducted outside the Nevada National Test Site?

The program includes one large test next Spring on Amchitka Island, Alaska, and one test in a salt dome near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Both tests are designed to improve our ability to detect, identify and locate clandestine underground nuclear explosions.

McGeorge Bundy

June 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Atomic Energy Commission, in compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has forwarded for your approval two draft amendments to agreements with the Republic of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. These agreements are similar in substance to the six amended agreements you approved on June 2, 1964.

A special consideration in connection with the agreement with France was the possibility that the proposed amendment might be in conflict with our policy prohibiting assistance that might help the French develop nuclear weapons capability. The Atomic Energy Commission is of the opinion that the new amendment would not authorize the transfer of any additional quantities of U-235 to France or otherwise broaden existing cooperation in any way. The quantities of material enriched to more than 90% U-235 pursuant to the new amendment will be limited to those involved in specific research projects. The data from such projects will be shared with the United States under the agreement for cooperation.

The draft agreements have been reviewed and endorsed by the Bureau of the Budget. The substance of the proposed amendments has been discussed informally with and has been concurred in by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Following formal execution of the revised agreements, they will be placed before the Joint Committee as required by law.

A letter to Dr. Seaborg giving blanket approval to both amendments is attached and I recommend your signature thereto.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Detailed analysis of the June ninth air strike in Laos reveals that half of our planes found and attacked the assigned target, which was a fort near Xieng Khouang, but other half dropped their bombs on a different fort about ten miles away near the town of Phong Savan, *as claims have charged.*

The planes flew together in two flights of four to the target area. The first four planes found and attacked Xieng Khouang. The second four planes ~~lost~~ sight of the first four, orbited twice, found what they thought was the target, and dropped their bombs. It is now clear that the second flight attacked a fortified area but not the assigned target.

A special U-2 flight will photograph the entire area today if weather permits. Results will be available in Washington over the week end.

The discovery that the second four planes had attacked a target different than the assigned target was made when the air photographs taken of Xieng Khouang after the strike failed to reveal where fourteen of the twenty-five 750-pound bombs had fallen. Confirmation was obtained by questioning the pilots.

m. f. B.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS 64-68, vol. 28, item 93

By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1964

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CHECK LIST FOR YOUR TALK WITH CHANCELLOR ERHARD

The 11:30 meeting should begin with you and him alone, but you can add Rusk or me or both if you want at any stage as long as a parallel addition is offered to Erhard. My own advice would be to stay with Erhard alone for about half an hour and then come into the Cabinet Room for 15 or 20 minutes.

The subjects you will want to deal with privately are (1) Southeast Asia and German help there; (2) the offset agreement, and (3) tanks for Israel.

Erhard may wish to talk privately about an allied initiative on Germany and about the Western posture toward the Soviet Union (the QUICK article). You will probably want to give him the same line you gave him in Texas on this general question, but the detailed problem of a Western initiative should be left to the larger meeting, because it is full of diplomatic niceties and Dean Rusk has been handling it very skillfully.

Following are short notes on the three problems I think you want to press privately.

1. Southeast Asia. (a) our ten-year commitment; (b) our determination to work for peace; (c) our need for friends; (d) the importance of warning off Hanoi and Peking. On (c) and (d) the Germans can help -- by technical and economic support in South Vietnam and by avoiding any new relations with Peking this year.

2. The offset agreement. Erhard does not want a formal bargain that offset payments are a condition of our 6-division presence, but he knows the connection exists. I think you will want to underline it firmly but always privately. Dean Rusk wishes you wouldn't, still -- and I said I'd report his view.

3. Tanks for Israel. Erhard is reluctant on this, and it is essential that he should know of your deep concern. The best point to make is that whatever troubles the Germans might have are small compared to the general damage to the West if the Arabs go into convulsions against the U.S., which is the main protector of Middle Eastern peace. At the minimum, Erhard can agree to keep this question open for further discussion on ways and means. We must not let him give us a flat no. The Israelis have played ball with us so far, and we owe them this much.

Good topics for the general meeting at the end of the morning or this afternoon are (1) East-West relations and an initiative on Germany; (2) Southeast Asia; (3) Cyprus; (4) Aid to the underdeveloped; (5) The Kennedy Round.

McG. B.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 60561/m, NSC 60 2/3/78
By mg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I hope very much that you will not have a press conference while the reconnaissance issue is still hot, and while Souvanna Phouma continues to object strongly to any suggestion of return fire on our side. But if on other grounds you decide to have a meeting, the best answer to a question that I have been able to devise is attached. This would not upset Souvanna, and it aims to give the best possible cloak to a refusal to discuss the question of firing.

McG. B.

McG. B.

CC: Mr. Valenti
Mr. Reedy

6/11/64

Draft response to question on Laos reconnaissance.

We have been in full consultation with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on this problem. We share the conviction of his government that the refusal of the Communists to allow any effective inspection by the International Control Commission, combined with their recent acts of aggression, has created an urgent need for reliable information on eastern Laos. It is for that reason that we have agreed to undertake reconnaissance flights. ~~Obviously,~~ These flights have taken place and will take place at the intervals necessary for the purpose of obtaining information. We have a good and clear understanding on this matter with the Government of Laos, and we are in agreement with that government also that it is not in the interest of the Government of Laos or of those who undertake these hazardous missions that any operational part of their work should be discussed.

June 11, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Erhard Briefing Papers

I will do a single sheet paper first thing in the morning summarizing the basic talking points. Meanwhile, the gray folder represents my thinking as worked out with David Klein of my staff, while the Department's short booklet is fully supported by the Secretary of State. The two do not have significant differences, with one exception.

At Tab E in the gray book are two memoranda you should read. One is from Dillon and McNamara and the other is signed by Rusk. I myself agree with Dillon and McNamara, who argue that we should closely link the offset agreements and our ability to maintain troop levels. The Secretary of State -- or his advisers -- say that this linkage would be "short-sighted and untrue." I doubt if he is right since our troop levels in Germany are justified finally more by the psychological needs of the Germans than by strategic necessity. If the Germans will not pay for psychological comfort, why should we?

I think Secretary Rusk is right and McNamara wrong on the question of German economic aid. I do not think we should let Erhard use the offset agreements as a shield to protect his own very low interest in a more serious foreign aid effort.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

6mg, NARS, Date

2/3/78

State 65271/m, nsc da

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✓
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(returned by
Pres 6/12/64)
39

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our current work on Southeast Asia

1. We spent the day in two rather indecisive meetings, but I think in fact a good deal was learned, and some underbrush cleared away.

2. Lodge's answer makes it clear that the basic next step in policy toward South Vietnam is the selection of his successor. I continue to believe unrepentantly that this is the most important single job you have to fill before the election, and that there is no one whom you should not take if you think he has the qualifications. You know my list, and I promise you there is not a name that I would remove from that list on any theory that the individual is more valuable to you where he is.

3. Moreover, I have not heard any additional names that strike me as good enough. It is perhaps immodest to speak this way about a list in which I have included myself, but I am trying to be honest.

4. Until we get a new Ambassador, we cannot really mount a sound program for crash action -- political, social, and economic -- in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, planning can begin and under your spur we have begun an intensive study of new and additional steps that could be taken on the basic theory that Americans can and should do more. This theory is shared by the men making the study.

5. On the situation in Laos, we have made a first cut at a diplomatic timetable which would be slower and less explosive than the one we started on three weeks ago. This paper is at Tab A, and it is the one which triggered a strong objection from the Secretary of State. He insists that our real objective is to force strict compliance with the '62 Accords. Most of us think that while we should press for such compliance, we should not expect it and should be ready to settle for less. The Memorandum at Tab A states the survival of Souvanna as the real objective, and I think it is right.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 8/31/77

By JK/umg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

June 10, 1964

6. The other subject on which we made progress today was whether or not to go for a Congressional resolution soon. The memo which we used for discussion on this subject is at TAB B, and the summary conclusion of the discussion was that we do not now recommend an attempt to get an early resolution. We think the risks outweigh the advantages, unless and until we have a firm decision to take more drastic action than we currently plan.

7. Finally, it was agreed that we will not be ready for a general meeting with you tomorrow, but that it will be very important to have Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and me to meet with you briefly at the 12:45 hour which is now scheduled by Jack Valenti.

8. If for any reason this program is not satisfactory, you can reach me anytime tonight or early in the morning.

McG. B.

39a



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B

~~TOP SECRET~~~~DRAFT~~

6/10/64

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION, JUNE 10, 5:30 P. M.

SUBJECT: Alternative public positions for U. S. on Southeast Asia
for the period July 1 - November 15

It is agreed that the U. S. will wish to make its position on Southeast Asia as clear and strong as possible in the next five months. The immediate watershed decision is whether or not the Administration should seek a Congressional resolution giving general authority for action which the President may judge necessary to defend the peace and security of the area. It is agreed that if such a resolution is sought, it should be general in tone. It is also agreed that the best available time for such a move is immediately after the Civil Rights bill clears the Senate floor. Finally, it is agreed that no such resolution should be sought unless careful Congressional soundings indicate rapid passage by a very substantial majority. The question that remains is whether on these assumptions such a resolution is or is not desirable, and the argument which follows is designed to explore the consequences of having and not having such a resolution.

A. Scenario for a Congressional resolution

The first necessity, if we are to have a resolution, is to prepare the case in favor. This requires that the Administration be ready to give answers to a whole series of disagreeable questions. Some of the more significant questions and possible answers follow:

1. Q. Does this resolution imply a blank check for the President to go to war over Southeast Asia?

A. The resolution will indeed permit selective use of force, but hostilities on a larger scale are not envisaged, and in any case any large escalation would require a call-up of Reserves and thus a further appeal to the Congress. More broadly, there is no intent to usurp the powers of the Congress, but rather a need for confirmation of the powers of the President as Commander in Chief in an election year. The basic precedents are the Formosa Resolution, the Middle East Resolution, and, in a sense, the Vandenberg Resolution.

2. Q. What kinds of force, if any, are possible under this authorization?

A. No force will be used if the President can avoid it. If the continued aggression of others should require a limited response,

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority

NSC 5/24/76

By

JB

NARS, Date

3/15/77

6/10/64

2. A. (cont'd)

that response will be carefully aimed at installations and activities which directly support covert aggression against the free people of Laos and South Vietnam. There is no intent or desire to enlarge the action beyond what is absolutely required, and specifically, there is no intent to overthrow existing governments in North Vietnam or in Red China, however much we dislike those regimes.

3. Q. What change in the situation requires such a resolution now?

A.1. This answer should include a candid account of the existing situation and hazard and the growing dangers both in Laos and in South Vietnam.

A.2. This part of the answer should refer to the need for international awareness that the U. S. is not immobilized by a political campaign.

4. Q. Isn't the situation in Southeast Asia one which really requires action (a) by the people on the spot, or (b) by allies, or (c) by the U. S. through other than military means?

A. All of these other kinds of action are needed, and all will be sought to the limit of U. S. ability. Specifically:

(a) The resolution is designed to give encouragement to those on the spot in their own effort at self-help.

(b) We will seek as much help as possible from allies, but in realistic terms we must recognize that our most reliable friends have their own commitments on other fronts.

(c) The political, economic, and social efforts of the U. S. in Southeast Asia, in support of the free governments there, are being intensified to the limit of our wit and resources.

5. Q. Does Southeast Asia matter all that much?

A. Yes -- because of the rights of the people there, because of our own commitment, because of the far-reaching effect of a failure, and because we can win if we stay with it.

A strong campaign in defense of this resolution will require a substantial increase in the commitment of U. S. prestige and power to success in Southeast Asia. The resolution would need to be preceded by a Presidential message. Such a message should not come as a bolt from the blue; it should itself be preceded by a clear indication of the increasing firmness of the Administration's position, and the reasons for that firmness. Such indications could be given only by public statements of high officials or by such devices as a White Paper.

In sum, a Congressional resolution would require a major public campaign by the Administration. A very important element in such a campaign would be early and outspoken support by leading members of Congress.

This is not a small undertaking, and it would have heavy implications.

The great advantages of an early Congressional resolution are international. It would give additional freedom to the Administration in choosing courses of action; still more important, it would give a signal of this new freedom of action and firmness of purpose in a number of important capitals, the most important of which are in Southeast Asia, on both sides of the line.

B. Without a Congressional Resolution

If we do not seek a Congressional Resolution, the international disadvantages are obvious, in that we may seem to have a relative lack of freedom of action and will not have built the major new base of commitment and of authority which in the best of cases such a resolution, with its attendant debate, might provide. On the other hand, if we do not have a resolution, we do not have the risks of a contest at home, nor do we pin ourselves to a level of concern and public notice which might be embarrassing if in fact we do not find it wise to take drastic action in the months immediately ahead. Thus we need to consider how much our course of action may be limited if we do not seek a Congressional Resolution.

First, it should be recognized that there are alternative forms of bipartisan support for action: consultation with Eisenhower and the Republican candidate; discussion with bipartisan leadership of Congress; direct Presidential appeal to the people; ample, if not always encouraging, precedent for Presidential action, as in Korea.

Second, there is a wide range of actions which are plainly permissible without a resolution. These include direct military action by South Vietnamese forces, and very substantial deployments of U. S. air, sea and ground forces. Within the framework of SEATO, and in defense of the agreements of 1962, we can plausibly move troops even into Vietnam, Thailand and Laos itself if the appropriate governments request it. Short of direct U. S. military action against North Vietnam, we could almost surely maintain adequate freedom of action even without a Congressional Resolution.

Third, the only time we can get a resolution, in the absence of acute emergency, is within the next three weeks. A strong case can be made that we do not now need to commit ourselves so heavily, and that if the situation changes drastically, we could readily respond by emergency session, certainly in November, and conceivably in September too.

On balance, it appears that we need a Congressional Resolution if and only if we decide that a substantial increase of national attention and international tension is a necessary part of the defense of Southeast Asia in the coming summer.

42 A

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 10, 1964

First Draft.

De-Fuzing Laos

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-40
By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00

The following are our objectives in Laos:

1. Preserve Souvanna Phouma as the Head of a Government of National Union, or at least as the Head of a government composed of the Neutralists and the Right Wing, leaving a door open to Communist participation.
2. Discourage further Pathet Lao grabs of territory.
3. Accomplish the above two objectives in such a way as to avoid dangerously demoralizing the South Vietnamese and the Thai.

Period of the Polish Conference

Our most immediate problem is probably not further Pathet Lao military grabs, but rather the preservation of Souvanna Phouma. Today he announced that he had asked the U. S. to cease reconnaissance activities over the Plain of Jars. This will probably further expose him to the risk of an overthrow by the Right Wing forces of Siho and Kouprasith.

Recommendation:

Unger should seek out Phoumi, Siho and Kouprasith immediately and leave them in no doubt that we still support Souvanna and would take the most drastic measures against the Right Wing in the event they attempted to overthrow him.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Souvanna's military and political position is probably now very weak and we therefore need to do what can be done, independently of any international negotiations, to shore it up.

Recommendation:

We try to re-establish Kong Le in some other territorial base, perhaps Luang Prabang, using air if necessary as part of a refugee operation.

We increase our economic, as well as military, aid to him and his supporters and encourage as intense cooperation as possible between Kong Le and the Meo under the leadership of Vang Pao.

Before the beginning of the Polish conference, either we bring the Canadians and the British here, or we send briefing teams to London and Ottawa in order to explain to them and persuade them that our primary objective is to reduce tension in Laos. To do this we need to have the Polish discussions go on as long as possible. During these discussions we would not expect to secure a withdrawal of the PL from the Plain of Jars, although this would be an initial demand. We should concentrate on using the Polish forum as a way of pressuring the PL and the Right Wing into an agreement to preserve the Government of National Union. During this period Souvanna will become even more vulnerable to Right Wing attack; so we must devise every means

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

of neutralizing Siho and Kouprasith, while at the same time bolstering Souvann.

Recommendation:

Explore the possibility of providing funds and goods directly to Souvanna and his allies in substantial quantities.

Reduce, if necessary, our support of the Right Wing in Vientiane, taking into account the risk of a violent reaction by Siho.

EO 12958 3.4(D)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

It must be expected that the Polish discussions will fail to achieve any of these objectives and will ~~result~~ result only in a call for a 14-nation Geneva conference. Souvanna might well be persuaded to attend, if the Right Wing did not assassinate him beforehand.

= We would then have two choices: we might tell the Right Wing that unless they cooperated with us, we would be forced ourselves to attend the Geneva conference; but that if they did cooperate, we would refuse to attend and continue our support to them. We might also agree with the Thais and the South Vietnamese that we would not attend a Geneva conference.

If the conference should then take place, without our participation, our objective would be, with the help of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to drag it on as long as possible. At the same time, or perhaps prior to this, we would take (or would have taken) certain

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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- 4 -

actions designed to discourage the Pathet Lao, at least temporarily, from further territorial encroachment. We should also consider high-level reconnaissance of the trail networks in Laos, both to keep track of PL-VM deployments and also for use by the British and Canadians at Geneva.

If the Geneva conference should fail to assemble because of our refusal to attend, we should consider reporting to some of the pre-Geneva 1962 measures, which we abandoned then. Among these would be heavily increased supply of money, weapons and goods to Souvanna and Kong Le; maintenance of our level of supplies to Phoumi's forces; possible re-introduction of some American advisory presence in the form of a small MAAG and/or White Star teams; U. S. -led GVN combat intelligence operations in the pakhhandle; and a beefing up of American operated air transport facilities within Laos.

The objective of the above would be to improve the bargaining position of Souvanna Phouma when and if the Geneva conference might occur. Ideally, we would at least go back to another Geneva conference in about the same position we were in May 1962. A second objective of these actions would be to reassure the Vietnamese and the Thai that we would not negotiate in Geneva from a position of complete impotence.

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Another alternative would be to agree to attend a Geneva conference, but only after we made it clear that we intended to return to the status quo anti-May 1962 in Laos. The only difference between this alternative and

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- 5 -

the previous one is that we would go to a Geneva conference before we had completed the actions described above. If we took this route, it would probably be essential to take somewhat stronger action in the form of military deployments and cross border activities in order to convince the South Vietnamese and the Thai that we were not throwing in the towel.

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If it is possible to keep the South Vietnamese, [REDACTED] and the Right Wing in Vientiane in hand, the actions described above might carry us through the early part of 1965, i. e. until the normal time for the Pathet Lao to attempt another bite.

If Souvanna Phouma gives up or is liquidated during the course of the above scenario, we should consider the formal partition of Laos. In any such partition all international restraints on our efforts to support the Right Wing would have to be eliminated. If Souvanna were lost during an international conference, we would press for formal recognition of a divided Laos, insisting, of course, on Right Wing control of the panhandle at least from Paksane south. The negotiation of any such solution would obviously be very long drawn out and involve many such thorny questions such as what to do about the Meo and the demarcation of the partition lines in the North.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

Here is a file for the President's attention containing two more draft amendments of ongoing bilateral agreements covering cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. The substance of these amendments is similar to the six previous ones. In addition, there is a finding with respect to the application of NSAM 294 to the French agreement.

A memorandum for your signature is included and also a draft letter for the President's signature covering both agreements.


Charles E. Johnson

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in review

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June 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our current work on Southeast Asia

1. We spent the day in two rather indecisive meetings, but I think in fact a good deal was learned, and some underbrush cleared away.

2. Lodge's answer makes it clear that the basic next step in policy toward South Vietnam is the selection of his successor. I continue to believe unrepentantly that this is the most important single job you have to fill before the election, and that there is no one whom you should not take if you think he has the qualifications. You know my list, and I promise you there is not a name that I would remove from that list on any theory that the individual is more valuable to you where he is.

3. Moreover, I have not heard any additional names that strike me as good enough. It is perhaps immodest to speak this way about a list in which I have included myself, but I am trying to be honest.

4. Until we get a new Ambassador, we cannot really mount a sound program for crash action -- political, social, and economic -- in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, planning can begin and under your spur we have begun an intensive study of new and additional steps that could be taken on the basic theory that Americans can and should do more. This theory is shared by the men making the study.

5. On the situation in Laos, we have made a first cut at a diplomatic timetable which would be slower and less explosive than the one we started on three weeks ago. This paper is at Tab A, and it is the one which triggered a strong objection from the Secretary of State. He insists that our real objective is to force strict compliance with the '62 Accords. Most of us think that while we should press for such compliance, we should not expect it and should be ready to settle for less. The Memorandum at Tab A states the survival of Souvanna as the real objective, and I think it is right.

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(page 1 of 2 pages)

Authority NSC Dec 8/31/77
By JK Lang, NARS, Date 9/14/77

June 10, 1964

6. The other subject on which we made progress today was whether or not to go for a Congressional resolution soon. The memo which we used for discussion on this subject is at TAB B, and the summary conclusion of the discussion was that we do not now recommend an attempt to get an early resolution. We think the risks outweigh the advantages, unless and until we have a firm decision to take more drastic action than we currently plan.

7. Finally, it was agreed that we will not be ready for a general meeting with you tomorrow, but that it will be very important to have Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and me to meet with you briefly at the 12:45 hour which is now scheduled by Jack Valenti.

8. If for any reason this program is not satisfactory, you can reach me anytime tonight or early in the morning.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

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(page 1 of 2 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68831/77
By JK/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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McG. B.

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46
J
June 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State is still pondering further action following your vigorous intervention Thursday night with Inonu. Meanwhile the Turks clearly expect us to show some signs of life.

But State, and Ball himself, question whether he should go off to Athens and Ankara, until we have sorted out matters with the British and thus have something to say. Ball returns to London Wednesday and then back here.

He and the British have unsurprisingly come up with enosis as the best solution, balanced by territorial and other concessions to Turkey (see attached at Tab A). The trick, of course, is how to get the Greeks to offer enough to satisfy the Turks. Ball clearly understands this (see his talk with Butler, Tab B), and argues that the most urgent question is "what leverage can we develop" on the Greeks.

However, the experts in State are very slow to face this issue, so a strong White House lead is still needed. Nor can we afford to wait until a neat US/UK plan is devised. We must start softening up the Greeks, both to condition them for giving and to show the Turks we're hard at work.

Labouisse's 1844 (Tab C) shows that the Greeks really think the Turks are bluffing; so Athens will be hard to move very far. This underscores the need to scare them a bit.

We might consider telling Athens there is sufficient danger of shooting in the Eastern Mediterranean to make us consider counselling U.S. tourists not to go. This would: (a) convince the Greeks we thought Turk move quite likely; (b) threaten Greeks where they hurt -- in breadbasket; (c) curb gold flow if we ever actually did it; and (d) be a move we could easily justify.

Warning note. Premature surfacing of fact US and UK were plumping for enosis might cause violent Turk reaction before ground had been prepared. Therefore, I question telling U Thant or anyone of such plans until we've got a better feel as to whether Greeks and Turks really prepared to strike a bargain.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-424

By is NARA Date 10-6-99

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McG. B.

R. W. Komer

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46a
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McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-424

By is, NARA Date 10-6-99

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R. W. Momer

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Successor to Lodge

Partly because I think you ought to have a person right from the center of the present management, and partly because these are the people I know, my own nominations for Lodge's successor are the following. I do not put these men in any particular order because they are good at different things.

1. Sargent Shriver - I think this is more important than poverty, and the right man harder to find. Shriver has energy, skill, a peaceful imagination and determination. He would have great standing in Vietnam and his reputation here is excellent. I do not think he speaks French and he has less experience in international politics and military matters than my other nominees. Nevertheless, I recommend him strongly.
2. Ros Gilpatric - I think Gilpatric has standing, style and judgment. I doubt just a little whether he has the energy and the political insight to take the call to the provinces and the case to the people. It would be hard to pry him loose from the Kravath firm, but I think he would come at your call.
3. Bob McNamara - You know everything I can tell you about him. My one reservation is that he has been trying to think of ways of dealing with this problem for so long that he has gone a little stale. Also, in a curious way, he has rather mechanized the problem so that he misses some of its real political flavor.
4. Robert F. Kennedy - I come back to this suggestion, although I know you have thought it wild in the past, for two reasons: the first is that the Attorney General has tremendous appeal to younger people and to non-Americans all around the world. He would give a picture of idealism and peace-seeking which our case will badly need, especially if we have to move to stronger measures. I have heard it said that he would take this challenge with some relish, but I have never talked to him about it myself.

5. William Gaud - Among people at the next level down in the Administration, he has the right combination of qualities to a greater degree than anyone else I know: energy, loyalty, skill, understanding of different kinds of action, and the trust of all services. He looks disarmingly young, but in fact he is a man of 56 with wide and deep experience in Southeast Asia, in the war, in the Pentagon, and in the jungle of New York law, and in AID.

6. Myself - I am no judge of my own skills, and it is certainly true that I have never run an embassy or a war. On the other hand, I think I do understand the issues. I know I care about them. I speak French and I have a heavy dose of the ways of thinking of all branches of the U. S. team in South Vietnam.

McG. B.

(Dictated by McGB
but not read)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is another excellent memorandum from Bob Komer, this time on the Shah of Iran, which you may wish to read tonight. He will follow it up tomorrow with a last-minute one-pager on talking points.

McG.B.

June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I see that you are meeting with the Attorney General at one o'clock. There is one relatively small matter which you might find it helpful to mention to him, and that is the willingness which you and Mrs. Johnson have expressed to take part in the Kennedy Oral History project. I still need to get your final judgment as to whether you prefer Bill White or Doug Cater, or possibly both. But the fact that you and Mrs. Johnson are willing to do this is something that will give the Attorney General real pleasure, and in line with your feeling that your relation with him is best handled directly, you may want to mention it yourself.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The nuclear-powered submarine H. M. S. DREADNOUGHT will visit Norfolk sometime during the week of June 19 - 25. In anticipation of the visit and the implementation of the Holy Loch Memorandum of Understanding, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Navy have developed a procedure described in the attached letter from Chairman Seaborg to Secretary Nitze covering the clearance of foreign nuclear-powered warships for entry to U. S. ports. The procedure has been reviewed as appropriate by the Departments of State and Justice and the office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Secretary of the Navy.

In my opinion, the procedure proposed for your approval is workable and consistent with the traditional Presidential prerogative to admit foreign warships to U. S. ports.

The Joint Committee was informed at the time of the execution of the Holy Loch Agreement that we intended to follow this approach with the UK in clearing their nuclear-powered warships and at that time the Committee made no objection.

If you approve, I will send the attached memorandum to the Department of Navy and the Atomic Energy Commission.

McGeorge Bundy

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Discuss _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jm, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1964

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Stikker
Tomorrow, June 4, at Noon

Dirk Stikker, the retiring Secretary General of NATO, will be making a farewell call on you tomorrow at noon.

Substantively, there is little business to conduct except to ask Stikker for his views on NATO's future.

But, given the nature of the call, you might want to have the press and cameras in when you present him with a farewell gift (a sterling silver tray is available), and deliver personal remarks along the following lines:

"These three years, during which you have been the Secretary General of NATO, have been years of challenge to the Alliance, and at times, of great danger to world peace.

"Throughout this period of test and trial, you have devoted your extraordinary ability and experience to the task of leading and inspiring the Allies to recognize, meet, and overcome the difficulties and dangers which have faced them.

"With tenacity and fortitude, with tact and unsparing self-sacrifice, you have persevered in your great task. And today as you prepare to lay down the burdens of office which you carried so magnificently, all of us stand deeply in your debt. You, sir, personify the spirit and the aims of the great organization, to which you have contributed so much, and with which your name will always be associated.

"We shall miss you, but we trust that you and your charming wife will come back often to see us. You have won a place in our hearts and our doors will always be open to you."

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


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June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You asked about recent Castro announcements of executions of alleged CIA agents.

There have been two such announcements in recent days. The first, a couple of days ago, related to four people who have no connection whatever with the Agency. The second one,  appears in this morning's papers.

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McG. B.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-106
By cb, NARA Date 2-11-00

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Honolulu Team Returns

1. I have now talked with Dean Rusk, Mike Forrestal, and my brother Bill, and I am on my way to see Bob McNamara, to whom I have talked briefly on the phone. The first reading is that no one is recommending any major decision today or, indeed, in the next few days.

2. Lodge and Westmoreland are marginally more optimistic than McNamara, McCone, Forrestal, and Bill Bundy, and they have moved Dean Rusk a little toward their view. Lodge thinks that we can "jog along" for some undefined period, and Westmoreland would probably be happy with a relatively low-key decision to take military action (imperfectly defined) in Southern Laos.

3. Rusk and McNamara, with different emphases, are also inclined to push military action ahead of them, at least for several weeks, and possibly for quite a lot longer. Lodge remains in favor of selective bombing of the North, but he has a much better understanding than before of the necessity for facing a large amount of noise and the possibility of serious escalation.

4. The plan for selective addition of American advisers, military and civil, in critical provinces is moving ahead and has general support. At the same time, you need to know that Lodge, and to a much less extent Westmoreland, are very wary of major U. S. "encadrement" or "interlarding" and are accepting this plan more because Washington urges it than because of deep belief in it.

5. Rusk reports that Lodge is very eager to have his Political Officer, Manfull, as Deputy Chief of Mission, and shows no desire for any more ambitious reinforcement. The Secretary obviously did not press the question with him, and reports his own conviction that since Lodge will probably be leaving in a few months, it is not worthwhile to make an issue of this. Forrestal and, I think, McNamara strongly disagree with this way of handling it, but I do not yet have any idea as to how you can get past the combined reluctance of Rusk and Lodge.

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(page 1 of 2 pages)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-247

By 118, NARA, Date 8-10-88

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6. The one major new agreement growing out of Honolulu is that we need to centralize authority for public information on Vietnam, both in Saigon and in Washington. Moreover, there is agreement on the names of the men to do this job: Zorthian of USIA in Saigon, and Bob Manning back here. Manning may need some White House standing in order to control Sylvester and his goons, and I am sure it will be in our interest to give it to him.

7. The political and diplomatic course of action with respect to Laos is probably still the most immediate possible trigger of larger decisions. For the moment, we are doing quite well in our negotiations with and on behalf of Souvanna, and our relatively affirmative position on the Polish proposal has been helpful, but it is agreed that we need to discuss possible further actions with respect to Laos, both among ourselves and with the Thais, the British, and the French.

8. Finally, I believe George Ball will bring a draft of a talking paper for his meeting with de Gaulle.

9. Unless I learn something more before the meeting, my personal recommendation is that the public statement after the meeting should be quite simply that you have received the report, that there will be further discussions in the coming days, and that no startling new statement need be expected in the immediate future.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Exile Raiders Picked Up By the British at Anguilla Cay

1. On Monday, the British seized a boat off Anguilla Cay, which is a British island about 150 miles from Miami and 45 miles from Cuba. On the boat were six armed Cuban exile raiders, including one woman and one prominent exile leader (Manolo Ray); there were also two Americans, including Andrew St. George, the Life photographer. The British are now holding the boat and people in Nassau, Bahamas.
2. We are in touch with the British on this matter. In accordance with customary practice, the British will probably fine the group, give them a suspended sentence, and let them go. The two Americans will probably return to the U.S. and the six Cubans will probably go to Puerto Rico or Venezuela.
3. One somewhat sticky point is that a U.S. Coast Guard plane participated, in a limited way, in the seizure of the boat -- i. e. at the request of a pursuing British destroyer, the Coast Guard plane passed communications to the fleeing boat to stop. The point is somewhat sticky because U.S. hard-liners are wont to howl whenever we seem to be interfering with exile raiders who want to attack Cuba.
4. Publicly, our posture is that the incident is a British/Cuban problem. When asked about U.S. Coast Guard participation, we are taking the factual line that "a Coast Guard plane on routine patrol came across a British destroyer pursuing the boat in question; at the request of the British, we passed communications to the boat to stop."

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-104
By wp, NARA Date 1-21-97

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1964

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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(page 1 of 2 pages)

Authority 86-247

By QA, NARA. Date 11-19-90

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6.3.64

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McG. B.

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(page 2 of 2 pages)

6/2/64

Possible statement on what was involved in the Rumanian talks.

We have a shopping list, but the list is confidential. The U. S. delegation (Mr. Harriman) agreed with the Rumanians that the list would not be published. It would be appropriate, however, to mention that the Rumanians were interested in purchasing equipment in the fields of petroleum, industry, chemicals, petrochemicals and power.

The Department of Commerce has not yet received applications for licenses for export to Rumania of these plants from U. S. firms.

When these licenses are issued, they are made public and the public will know specific plants which Rumania is interested in purchasing.

The Rumanian delegation is now discussing purchases of plants with various U. S. firms.

~~State is sending of the list.~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rumanian Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 5/29/77, NSC 67 2/3/78By rmg, NARS, Date 3/3/78

Our talks with the Rumanians are about over, and a communique (which the Rumanians are now checking with the Government in Bucharest, Tab A), announcing the results will be released Monday, June. 1. We have considered whether there is advantage in a specific White House statement when this communique is issued, but on balance we do not see much money in it. Will you let me know if you have a different view? Essentially we achieved what we set out to get. Agreement has been reached on the following:

1. To expand Rumanian trade with the United States. Rumania will be authorized to buy 11 major industrial installations (Tab B) (out of an original shopping list of 15). They will be licensed individually and negotiations with private suppliers will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For their part, the Rumanians have given us assurances that U. S. equipment will not be trans-shipped or re-exported, and technical data of U. S. origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted without explicit U. S. approval (Tab C). Estimated value of these sales, if consummated, is \$30 million a year.
2. To begin discussions on a consular agreement.
3. To expand cultural and information exchanges.
4. To work out plans for the establishment of tourist and commercial offices in Rumania and the U. S.
5. To raise diplomatic missions from legations to embassies.

The Rumanians accepted virtually every condition we levied, and this, despite the fact that we rejected their request for long-term credits and made clear that the most-favored-nation treatment would not be possible for some time, since this required a major legislative effort.

~~SECRET~~

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As a collateral matter, the Rumanians promised to talk with representatives of U.S. holders of Rumanian dollar bonds (some issued prior to World War I), to assure them that their interests would be protected. (The Rumanians, however, insist they cannot make specific commitments on claim settlements at this time.)

Perhaps the single most significant aspect of these talks was Rumania's determination to succeed in establishing a new and substantial relationship with the U.S. -- an important factor in Rumania's drive for independence from Moscow. However, for Rumania's own reasons and political considerations here, there is an awareness on both sides that the pace of these developments cannot be forced. To succeed, there must be a gradualness and a logic about them, as well as evidence of continued Rumanian independence in international affairs and greater freedom for the Rumanian people -- a point Averell Harriman intends to underscore before the talks are over.


McG. B.

Attachments:

Tabs A, B, C, as stated.

~~SECRET~~

57 b



JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Representatives of the Government of the Rumanian Peoples Republic and of the United States of America met in Washington from May 18 to _____, 1964, in order to review relations between the two countries and to discuss a number of matters of common interest, with particular emphasis on trade. The Rumanian Delegation was headed by M. Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The United States Delegation was headed by W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

The representatives of the two Governments agreed that further steps should be taken to carry forward the improvement in mutual relations which was initiated with the signing on March 30, 1960, of an agreement providing for the settlement of claims and other financial questions. The two Governments noted the positive development of relations between the United States and Rumania which has resulted from the exchange of visitors during the last four years, and from measures taken to expand the flow of information. Representatives of the two Governments reached the following understandings, designed to achieve progress in the relations between the United States and Rumania:

1. The United States and Rumania will raise the level of their diplomatic missions in Washington and Bucharest from legations to embassies. Ambassadors will be exchanged at an early date.
2. The two Governments took note of the forward steps that have been taken in consular matters, including progress in the reuniting of separated families and in permitting dual nationals to choose their places of residence. They agreed to take further measures to improve consular relations, and for this purpose, to undertake, in September 1964, the negotiations of a new consular convention.
3. The delegations stated the intention of the two Governments to expand the existing program of cultural and informational exchanges between the United States and Rumania.
4. In connection with trade relations, the United States agreed to establish a special Rumanian General License List for exports from the United States. In addition, the United States agreed to grant licenses,

upon receipt of fully documented applications, for a number of particular industrial facilities in which the Rumanian delegation expressed an interest. The two Governments agreed that products, designs, and technological data exported to Rumania from the United States would not be trans-shipped or re-exported without the prior consent of the United States Government. To this end, the two Governments agreed on arrangements for the verification of the use and disposition of United States products, designs, and technological data exported to Rumania.

5. The two Governments also agreed on arrangements for the mutual protection of industrial property and processes. It was agreed that commercial contracts between United States companies and Rumanian state enterprises could provide for the settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration in third countries or by appropriate international tribunals.

6. The two Governments further agreed to consult promptly, at the request of either party, about any other problems that might arise as trade between the two countries grows.

7. The Rumanian delegation discussed plans for the future operations of the Rumanian Commercial Office in New York. The United States delegation discussed plans for establishing facilities for trade promotion in Bucharest. It was also understood that tourist promotion offices could be established in the two countries.


8. Both Governments agreed to facilitate the entry, travel, and work of businessmen and commercial missions, the exchange of trade exhibits, and the publication of trade promotion materials.

9. The Rumanian delegation expressed its concern at the inability of Rumanian products to compete on an equal basis in the United States market, with particular reference to the tariff treatment accorded to Rumanian products. It stated that this factor could sharply limit the expansion of trade between the two countries. The United States delegation took note of this concern and explained the applicable provisions of United States law.

At the conclusion of the meetings, Under Secretary Harriman and Vice-Chairman Gaston-Marín expressed the hope on behalf of their Governments that progress in carrying out the understandings reached would furnish the basis for a further broadening and improvement in the relations between the United States and Rumania.

Washington, May ____, 1964

57 d




DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jm/mg, NARA, Date 10-22-98

List of complete plants which will be available to the
Rumanian People's Republic:

1. Polyisoprene rubber manufacturing plant, monomer included
2. Polybutadiene rubber manufacturing plant, monomer included
3. Synthetic glycerine manufacturing plant
4. Ammonia plant
5. Plant for making synthetic and artificial leather
6. Catalytic cracking plant
7. In-situ development design of a viscous crude oil reservoir
and delivery of the necessary equipment
8. Oil collecting, separating, treatment and transportation
unit in closed up system (LACT) and the manufacturing
license
9. Installation of turbines with combustion gases for electric
power stations and reserve
10. Plants for the manufacturing of: drawn sheet glass, polished
window-glasses, safety and enamelled glass
11. Nuclear electric power-station*

* With respect to a nuclear power plant, the Rumanians would
not send a technical mission to discuss this until such time
as we had agreed that the circumstances were propitious.

57-F



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 6/6/77By mmg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

Excellency:

As we conclude the discussions between representatives of the Rumanian Peoples Republic and the United States of America that have taken place in Washington over the past ten days, I should like to set down here the understandings we have reached on certain matters concerning trade between our two countries. My purpose is to spell out certain of our agreements in somewhat greater detail than is possible in a communique.

The U.S. Government has given the following assurances regarding exports to Rumania:

1. General License List

The U.S. Government is prepared to put into effect a special general licensing procedure for exports from the U.S. to Rumania. This procedure will make the great majority of items exported from the U.S. available to Rumania without the necessity of obtaining individual export licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Only certain selected items will continue to require individual licenses. The list of these items will be published on or about July 1, 1964, and may be amended from time to time.

2. Industrial License for Certain Items of Industrial Equipment

The U.S. Government is prepared to grant licenses for the export to Rumania of those items of industrial plant and equipment listed in the Annex to this letter. Your Government has expressed particular interest in these items. It is, of course, understood that the granting of such licenses must be on an individual basis and subject to appropriate documentation. Actual export contracts must be negotiated with private firms in the U.S. I believe that as a result of our discussions your delegation is familiar with our practices in these matters.

Mr. Gheorghe Gaston-Marin,
Chairman,
Rumanian Delegation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For its part, the Rumanian Government has given the following assurances regarding imports from the U.S.

1. Provisions Against Re-export

- a. Products of United States origin, whether exported to Rumania directly under general or individual license or indirectly via third countries, will not be trans-shipped or re-exported from Rumania, and technical data of United States origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted to third countries, except with prior consent of the United States Government.
- b. Upon the request of authorized officials of the Government of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Rumanian Peoples Republic will furnish specific information concerning the intended use of goods and technical data being ordered from the United States or the actual use of goods or technical data which have been exported from the United States.
- c. The Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Rumanian Peoples Republic will give instructions to all Rumanian State enterprises to carry out the above understandings. In the event United States officials develop the need for additional information in particular cases, the Ministry of Foreign Trade will, in consultation with United States officials, make arrangements for further verification.

2. Protection of Industrial Property

- a. Products of United States origin exported to Rumania will not be copied contrary to arrangements made with the supplier in the United States; and designs and technological data exported or licensed from the United States to Rumania directly or incident to the export of United States products will not be disclosed or used contrary to arrangements made with the supplier to the United States.
- b. The Rumanian Peoples Republic is prepared in negotiating for the purchase or licensing of products, designs, and technological data from United States suppliers to make provision for the protection of such products, designs, and technological data. Such provision may include arrangements for settlement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of disputes by arbitration in third countries or by appropriate international tribunals in the Rumanian Peoples Republic on the same basis as Rumanian nationals.

I should appreciate receiving confirmation of the understandings recorded in this letter. Let me repeat again the satisfaction with which my Government views these talks and the promise they carry of further progress in the relations between our two countries.

W. Averell Harriman
Chairman
United States Delegation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Helicopters in South Vietnam -- Report from Cy Vance

There are two kinds of helicopters in South Vietnam -- the H-21 has been the work horse of the Pacific theater for many years and has given good service but is now being replaced by the modern and up-to-date UH-1. It is the latter whose tail bolts have given some trouble. There has been only one accident, on April 11, and all the planes were promptly grounded for correction. Vance is confident that the difficulty is being rapidly overcome, and he characterizes this as a typical minor difficulty in a new machine. The Army and the DOD remain confident that the UH-1 will prove to be an effective and fully up-to-date machine for the job in Vietnam.

Vance thinks you should know that Congressman Oliver Bolton has been proposing the use of the Navy's Command helicopter instead of the UH-1, because of its greater speed (125 knots vs. 90 knots). Vance agrees with the Army judgment that this is not a useful suggestion, because speed in transit is not critical in Vietnam. It is when the planes are hovering that they are in danger, and no increase of speed en route can avoid this problem. Currently there are five companies of UH-1's and two companies of H-21's in South Vietnam (16 helicopters in a company), and by the end of June the whole force will be the more modern UH-1.

McG. B.

June 2, 1964

Log 2904 59

Mr. President:

This is a routine report on Battle Act determinations which requires your signature where the arrow is on page 2. You signed a similar document at the beginning of the year, and this document for the first quarter of '64 is actually a little overdue.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tab A

Attached is an important memorandum of conversation on Dean Rusk's talk with General Khanh in Saigon. Khanh makes it very clear in the opening paragraphs of Section 2 that he is strongly in favor of action outside South Vietnam on the basis of "a firm U. S. decision for such action."

He thinks the most urgent area for action is in southern Laos, where the Communists may be concentrating, and he shows the traditional South Vietnamese sensitivity to a possible Viet Cong effort to cut his country in two.

You may also be interested in the Secretary's summary of the things the U. S. had to bear in mind at the end of Section 3 and the beginning of Section 4. The Secretary's emphasis here, as in other conversations in Asia, is more military and strategic than diplomatic and political. In particular, he does not address the question of international justification for action, an omission noted in the closing comment of the cable (which was probably drafted by my brother Bill).

At Tab B is a summary of a deep backgrounder which the Secretary gave in New Delhi and which led George and me to send him a message suggesting that he take a somewhat less vigorous line.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Sec 6/15/77
By pmg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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7
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McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 6/15/77

By mmg, NAME, Date 7/18/77

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Atomic Energy Commission, in compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has forwarded for your approval six draft amendments to agreements with the Republic of China, the Kingdom of Greece, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Argentine Republic and Iran. These agreements cover cooperation in connection with the civil uses of atomic energy. All are amendments of agreements that are already in effect. The amendments are generally for the purpose of extending the agreements, providing authority for the possible sale of special nuclear material at some future date, for the reprocessing of special nuclear materials in facilities other than those owned by the Commission, and providing for the ultimate transfer of safeguards to the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with general United States policy.

The draft agreements have been reviewed and endorsed by the Bureau of the Budget. The substance of the proposed amendments have been discussed informally with and have been concurred in by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Following formal execution of the revised agreements, they will be placed before the Joint Committee as required by law.

A letter to Dr. Seaborg giving blanket approval to all six draft amendments is attached and I recommend your signature thereto.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: "No Invasion" comment on Cuba

We have had indications that the Soviets would find it easier to keep Castro under some control if you were to reaffirm our intent not to launch an invasion of Cuba unless the Cubans force it on us. We agreed, I think, that you could do this in an answer to a question, and the following language is the same in substance as the language used by President Kennedy, but enough different in detail so that it will not be a mere quotation.

X There is a good hook for a comment by you in a story today that Nixon wanted an invasion before the 1960 election. We can plant a question if you want.

Proposed Statement:

"I don't know who has advocated or is advocating any invasion of Cuba, but the U. S. Government does not consider it in our national interest or in the interest of the hemisphere to think in terms of a military invasion. If Cuba should again become an important military threat to us and to our neighbors, as it was during the dangerous adventure of the 1962 missile crisis, we would have a different problem. There is also real danger in the efforts of the Castro regime to export subversion and terror in this hemisphere. But we are not in favor of any invasion unless aggression by others should force us to change our policy."

McG. B.

June 2, 1964

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McG. B.

65
June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Helicopters in South Vietnam -- Report from Cy Vance

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McG. B.

66

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are the memos on the UAR loan. Ed Dale got this story started by saying that we had used pressure to get an IMF loan of \$40 million for Egypt. Komer has backed off Ed Dale, who has promised us a denial (which we have not yet seen). He is talking to Lisagor tonight, and with luck you will not get this question tomorrow. If you do get pressure, you can give a hot answer from the attached memorandum.

McG. B.

P.S. from Komer:

Dale's denial was printed the next day, but on the very last page of the Times, so no one saw it. (Attached) However, I have talked with Lisagor who says he has no intention of raising any such question and merely mentioned the matter very casually to Moyers last week end. In fact Lisagor said he hadn't even seen the Dale article.

CASUALTY LIST-VIET NAM
12¹
67

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Casualties in Vietnam

Since January 1, 1964

36 deaths from hostile forces
28 deaths not from hostile forces
405 non-fatal wounds or injuries
13 missing

Since January 1, 1961

140 deaths from hostile forces
87 deaths not from hostile forces.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Press Conference

As I look at your schedule for today and tomorrow, I am inclined to think we will do better to hold a press conference later in the week, and to make a definite plan that we will say something serious and sensible about Southeast Asia after McNamara and Rusk get back. (Their return is now tentatively scheduled for 9 A.M. on Wednesday morning.) You have a clear morning on Thursday until 11:30, and you are free except for brief meetings on Wednesday afternoon. Thus we could hear Rusk and McNamara Wednesday and you could make a basic reaffirmation of U. S. purposes on Thursday, and this would be a major news on the foreign front. I believe there are the makings of a strong statement in the drafts we have from Doug Cater and in other papers of recent days, and I think it is better to speak on Southeast Asia in a press conference than in a formal address right now.

A press conference today or tomorrow, by contrast, would be pretty much of a snap job and would not ~~really~~ let us off the hook of saying what we think about Southeast Asia later in the week anyway.

McG. B.

McG. B.

CC: Mr. Valenti

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bob Anderson's Call on General de Gaulle

Bob Anderson telephoned this morning to say that on Friday night, just as he was ready to leave Europe, he got a sudden invitation to call on General de Gaulle on Saturday at 10 A. M. He of course postponed his return and made the visit, which lasted about 45 minutes-one hour.

Anderson reports that General de Gaulle was most cordial. He said he knew there had been difficulty in communication between France and the United States, and would very much like to see this situation improved. There were only two great powers -- the US and the USSR-- but other countries had their own rights and interests, and he thought it important to have good communications. He said that he did not get on well with President Kennedy, who seemed to have a grand design of his own and was not in agreement with the views of General de Gaulle. On the other hand, while he had talked with you only 15 minutes in November, he had found it a most valuable conversation and hoped to have better understanding with you.

The General then asked Anderson whether you would value communication by letter or by telephone, and Anderson said he particularly emphasized the telephone. Anderson said that while he could not speak for you, he could think of no reason why such communications would not be welcome. Anderson asked de Gaulle if there was any particular substantive matter which he would like to discuss, but the General replied that in frankness he was too tired and was not yet caught up with immediate issues after his illness. Nevertheless he did value such connection, and while he expected to have differences with even the greatest of allies, France would always hope for good communication and understanding with her real friends like the United States.

After the meeting and before he left France, Anderson received a further message from de Gaulle's office giving him the General's telephone number -- Balzac 2000.

Bob's recommendation is that you should find a moment to make a personal phone call to the General in the next day or so. All that we need say is that we have had a report of this friendly talk, that we are grateful for the General's kindness to Mr. Anderson, that we certainly do welcome communication with him by letter and by telephone, and that this phone call is simply for the purpose of wishing him continued recovery and expressing the hope that we can indeed have such communications.

I support Bob's recommendation with one addition. George Ball is going to Paris this week end and has already asked if he may call on General de Gaulle, as he will be calling later on Prime Minister Home. I think you might wish to mention the Ball visit to General de Gaulle, and to say that if he is feeling ready for such communication, we would be very glad if he could have a frank talk with Secretary Ball about the great problems both our countries face in Southeast Asia.

McG. B.

McG. B.

June 1, 1964

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MR. PRESIDENT:

I have slightly rewritten the paragraph on Vietnam. I myself do not think we should try to hang this too hard on Eisenhower himself, but I have referred to his Administration briefly, and I attach a copy of his letter to Diem in case you still prefer to use it yourself.

McG. B.

719

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We should certainly say that the middle of the Honolulu meeting is not a time for the announcement of specific programs. Meanwhile it may be helpful to underline four basic themes that govern our policy in Southeast Asia.

1. America keeps her word.

We are steadfast in a policy which has been followed for ten years in three Administrations. Like a number of other nations, we are bound by solemn commitments of honor to help defend this area against Communist encroachment. We will keep this commitment. In the case of Vietnam, our commitment today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President Diem in 1954 -- a commitment to help these people help themselves.

2. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

We are concerned for a whole great geographic area, not simply for specific complex problems in specific countries.

3. Our purpose is peace.

We have one single central purpose in all that we do in Southeast Asia -- to help in building a stable peace for the area. It is others and not we who have brought terror to small countries and peaceful peasants. It is others, not we, who have preached and practiced the use of force to establish dictatorial control over their neighbors. It is others, not we, who have refused to honor international agreements that aim at reasonable settlement of deep-seated differences. The United States cannot fail to do its full share to meet the challenge which is posed by those who disturb the peace of Southeast Asia, but the purpose of America will not change. We stand for peace.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

Our soldiers are doing great work, but what they are doing is only part of the job. The issues are political as well as military, economic as well as strategic. Our recent request for additional assistance funds is more than half for economic help. The agenda in Honolulu covers plans for progress as well as programs against terror. It is others who make war, and we who seek peace.

McG. B.