

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

DATE

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
020	memo	Bundy re Chinese weapons (Sanitized 5/00, NLJ 97-72 appeal) (duplicate #21, this file)	S	1	9/15/64	A
021	memo	Bundy re Chinese weapons (duplicate #20, this file)	S	1	9/15/64	A
078	memo	Bundy to the President re meeting on SE Asia (Sanitized 1/17/01)	PCI	1	8/14/64	A
124	memo	Bundy to the President re meeting with C.P. Sulzberger <i>open 5-22-12</i>	PCI	2	7/22/64	C, A
128	memo	Bundy to the President re Jet article (duplicate #136, 138 this file)		1	7/15/64	C
136	memo	carbon duplicate of #128 (duplicate #128, 138 this file)		1	7/15/64	C
138	memo	carbon duplicate of #128 (duplicate #128, 136 this file)		1	7/15/64	C
144	memo	Bundy to President re Chilean poll (sanitized 6/30/00, NLJ 99-41)	S	1	7/8/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President**Folder Title** "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 6, 7/1 - 9/30/64"**Box Number** 2**Restriction Codes**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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11/20/2009

jc
Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	all decisions per NSC ltr 8/31/64 Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
#23 Memo	Bundy re meeting on SVN S 6 p	9/14/64	A
#35 Memo	Bundy re Cyprus meeting S 2 p	9/8/64	A
#49 Memo	Bundy re South Vietnam S 1 p	8/31/64	A
#50 Memo	Bundy (dup. #49 above) S 1 p	8/31/64	A
#55 Memo	Bundy re SVN & Cyprus S 1 p	8/25/64	A
#56 Memo	Bundy re SVN & Cyprus S 1 p	8/25/64	A
#62 Memo	Bundy re aid to Laos S 1 p	8/21/64	A
#72 Memo	Bundy re Cyprus S 2 p	8/18/64	A
#73 Memo	Bundy (dup. #72 above) S 2 p	8/18/64	A
#142 Memo	Bundy re aid to Laos S 1 p	7/9/64	A
#147 Memo	Bundy re Cyprus S 1 p	7/7/64	A
#150 Memo	Bundy (dup. #147 above) S 1 p	7/7/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 6, 7/1 to 9/30, 1964

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	all decisions per NSC letter 8/31/77 Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
#1b Memo	Bundy re Gulf of Tonkin Incident TS 4 p	9/20/64	A
#20 Memo	sanitized 3-2-97 NLJ 95-468 Bundy re Chinese weapons TS 1 p	9/15/64	A
sanitized 5-17-80 NL 897-72 and NL 893-468 appeal	same sanitization NL 89-468-06		
#21 Memo	Bundy (dup. #20 above) TS 1 p	9/15/64	A
	sanitized		
#81 Memo	Bundy re Vietnam operations TS 1 p	8/13/64	A
#82 Memo	Bundy re 8/10/64 meeting TS 2 p	8/13/64	A
	same sanitization NL 89-468-06 appeal		
	same sanitization NLJ 93-468 8-12-94		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#144 Memo	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence. Bundy re Chilean poll <i>paritized 6-14-79 in B</i> <i>Serialized 7/5/60 MS 99-41</i> S 1 p	7/8/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence.		
#39 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Gulf of Tonkin 2 p Sanitized 6-4-92 NLS 89-210 Sanitized 11/10/00 NLS 89-41 TS <i>open 7/25/06</i>	Exempt per NSC 8-1-78 9/4/64	A & C
#39a, 39b Memos	Bundy (dup. #39 above) TS 2 p <i>open 7/25/06</i>	9/4/64	A & C

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NSF ~~McGeorge Bundy~~
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence. <i>All decisions - OS D Ltr 5/10/77</i>		
#40a Memo	Bundy to Dodd re Lansdale C 1 p	9/3/64	A
#67a Memo	re Goldwater claim on nuclear capacity C 3 p	8/18/64	A
#135 Memo	Bundy re troops to Vietnam C 1 p	7/15/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence.		
#7 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re trip <i>Exempt ASD 11/15/77</i>	TS 2 p 9/23/64	A OPEN 10.22.98
#8 Memo	Bundy re plans for emergency use of nuclear weapons <i>Sanitized 3-2-97 NLS 93-468</i> <i>Exempt per NLS 84-77</i> <i>Exempt per NLS 93-468 8-12-94</i> <i>OSD 11/15/77</i>	TS 1 p 9/23/64	A
#42 Memo	Bundy re letter to LeMay	TS 1 p 9/2/64	A
#66 Memo	Bundy re Laos incident <i>Sanitized 1987, dup of #1471, Laos, V9</i> <i>(downgraded per NLS 86-210)</i> <i>Exempt per NSC 9-16-77</i>	TS 1 p 8/18/64	A OPEN 6-26-98 NLS 96-302
#71 Memo	Bundy (dup. #66 above)	TS 1 p OPEN 10.15.98	A
<div style="background-color: black; height: 15px; width: 100%;"></div>			

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Navy concurrence. <i>Naughton 4/27/77</i>		
#46 Memo	Bundy re Cuban commuters at Guantanamo		
#12 Memo	Bundy to the President re Presidential control of nuclear weapons <i>sanitized 8-1-85 per NLS 84-77</i> <i>sanitized per NLS 83-240 appeal 8-5-85</i>	9/1/64	A
open 11-30-92 NLS 83-240 ISSD appeal	1 p "S"	9/22/64	CA closing 8/31/83
#13 Draft Statement	re control of nuclear weapons <i>open 6-7-82</i>	9/22/64	C
#15 Memo	Bundy to the President re <u>Time</u> cover story on Goldwater <i>open 7-10-96 J.D./ip</i>	9/21/64	CA
#18 Memo	Bundy to the President re panel of consultants on international problems <i>open 8/31/83</i>	9/18/64	C
#19 Memo	duplicates #18 <i>open 8-24-92</i>	9/18/64	C
#78 Memo	Bundy to the President re meeting on Southeast Asia <i>sanitized 9-13-85 NLS 83-243</i>	8/14/64	CA closing 8/31/83
#124 Memo	Bundy to the President re meeting with C. P. Sulzberger	7/22/64	ATC
#128 Memo	Bundy to the President re <u>Het</u> article	7/15/64	C
#136 Memo	carbon duplicate of #128	7/15/64	C
#138 Memo	carbon duplicate of #128	7/15/64	C

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#2 Memo	Bundy re Brosio & NATO <i>open 6-14-79 ing</i> S 1 p	9/29/64	A
#4 Memo	Bundy re Chazimal ceremony " C 1 p	9/24/64	A
#27 Memo	Bundy re Middle East tension " S 1 p	9/12/64	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#38 Memo	Bundy re Taylor visit <i>open 6-14-79 ing</i> C 1 p	9/5/64	A
#101a Memo	Bundy re Patil and India <i>OPEN 10.15.98</i> S 1 p	8/4/64	A
	(dup. #40, NSF Country File, India Vol. 3) <i>SANITIZED NSS 7/28/76</i>		
#108 Memo	Bundy re Korea <i>Exempt</i> C 1 p	7/29/64	A
	<i>OPEN 10.15.98</i>		
#121 Memo	Komer re India aid level <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p	7/23/64	A
	<i>OPEN 10.15.98</i>		
#121b Memo	<i>OPEN 11/21/96 NLT 94-298</i> draft message to Brit. PM <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p	undated	A
#133 Memo	draft message (dup. #121b above) S 1 p	undated	A

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#3 Memo

State 6/20/77

IS 1 p

9/24/64

A

NSF [REDACTED] x [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 6, 7/1 to 9/30, 1964

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State Department <i>all decisions - State in 6/6/77</i>		
#65a Cable	draft of message fm LBJ to Haile Selassie S 2 p	8/20/64	A
#97a Cable	245 fm Manila S 1 p	8/6/64	A
#127b Ltr.	Herter to Erhard C 2 p	7/20/64	A
#127c Ltr.	Herter to Hallstein C 2 p	7/20/64	A

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DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have now reviewed with my senior advisers all the reports and evidence so far available with respect to an incident which occurred twenty-four hours ago in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Commanding Officer of a two destroyer patrol operating on the high seas in that area has reported that during the hours of darkness his force encountered unidentified surface contacts which closed on his force at considerable speed. After warning shots of our force were ignored, the Commanding Officer ordered direct engagement of these contacts by surface fire. Electronic evidence indicates that the surface contacts were successfully hit, and were either destroyed or forced to withdraw.

These unidentified forces were not allowed to press home any attack. Our forces sustained no damage. The unidentified forces have been entirely dispersed. Our Commanding Officer and his force have acted with firmness, dispatch and good judgment. Their patrol on the high seas continues.

At this time the only evidence of the approach and withdrawal of these unidentified forces is electronic. In the light of this fact and the action already taken by our forces, no further action is justified at present.

Last month repeated and premeditated attacks, clearly and fully substantiated by interlocking evidence, required a positive reply. Today, unless further acts occur or additional evidence is obtained, the reply already given is the right one.

9/19/64

1a

A review of all reports and evidence so far available with respect to the incident which occurred yesterday in the Gulf of Tonkin allows the following conclusions:

The Commanding Officer of a two destroyer patrol operating on the high seas in that area has reported that during the hours of darkness of September 18 his destroyers made clear and continuous electronic contact with unidentified surface targets which closed on the destroyers at considerable speed. Our forces fired warning shots, and when the surface targets continued to approach, the Commanding Officer ordered direct engagement of them by surface fire. Electronic evidence indicates that the targets were successfully hit, and were either destroyed or forced to withdraw.

These unidentified targets were not allowed to press home any attack. Our forces sustained no damage. The unidentified targets have been entirely dispersed. Our Commanding Officer and his force have acted with firmness and dispatch. Their patrol on the high seas continues.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-6

September 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Subject: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, September 18.

Our first information on this episode came at about 9:15 Friday morning, Washington time. Subsequent messages during the morning made it clear that the episode was not comparable to those of August, in that the reporting was more cautious and the evidence of actual hostile attack thin to non-existent.

At noon on Friday we reviewed in Bob McNamara's office the possibilities for additional reply. The initial proposal of the Joint Chiefs was that we should attack the major POL installations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, that in order to conduct these attacks we must first attack and neutralize the MIGs in the same area. Dean Rusk opposed so large an action right from the beginning, urging instead that if the episode proved to be confirmed attack on our forces, we should execute a strike but at a lower level of force. Bob McNamara elicited from General LeMay the information that strikes in the southern part of North Vietnam would not require neutralizing attacks on the MIGs. McNamara then instructed the Joint Staff to work on three alternative orders: (1) to attack the air and oil installation in the north in and around Hanoi; (2) to attack selected targets in the south; and (3) to continue patrolling, perhaps closer to the 12-mile line or even inside it.

At about 2:30 we met with the President in the Mansion -- Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, Mr. McNaughton, Tommy Thompson and myself. (Dean Rusk had a luncheon meeting which he could not break.) The President proved very skeptical about the evidence to date, and he was deeply annoyed that leaks apparently from the Pentagon were producing pressure for a public statement before we knew what he wanted to say. He pressed his own skeptical views and made it clear that he was not interested in rapid escalation on so frail evidence and with a very fragile government in South Vietnam. He authorized a brief interim statement as drafted by McNamara during the meeting, and he authorized preparatory orders for the strike against

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 475C Dec 8/31/77

By JK/mmg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

southern targets not defended by MIGs.

Through the afternoon, further reports made it more and more clear that there was no proof of a premeditated torpedo boat attack. The opinion hardened against any further immediate military reply. The President continued skeptical. He resisted any suggestion of a further statement. The preparatory orders were cancelled. By Friday evening, at the top of the Government, it was believed that the matter should be ended, and that we should take overnight to see what else could be learned -- especially from air and sea search by daylight.

By Saturday morning it was clear that the search had proven negative. Summary reports from CINCPAC and others somewhat hardened the evidence that vessels had been in the area, but the general conclusion was that these vessels had not attempted an aggressive attack. In these circumstances, the President reviewed and authorized a statement by Secretary McNamara (attached at Tab A), and himself agreed to conduct a backgrounder with the White House press (attached at Tab B).

In this meeting in the Cabinet Room between 11 and 1, the following were present: The President, Rusk, Hall, McNamara, Thompson, McNaughton, Vance, Wheeler, Rowan, Carter, Roedy, B. Smith, McG. Bundy. In this meeting the President continued to make clear his very grave doubt that there had been any hostile vessels, let alone an intent to attack. McNamara summarized the evidence, adducing not only the continuous radar contacts, both search and fire control, but two seamen's eyewitness reports, a pilot's report of sighting wakes from covering aircraft, and an intercept which appeared to indicate DBBB report that DRB ships were under attack. The President found only the intercept persuasive (and it is significant that even this evidence was countered by a later analytical report.)

The President pressed his doubts with General Carter, who asserted his own belief that it was probable that there were vessels. Secretary Rusk put the probability at 99%. Secretary Rusk also pressed on the President the importance of not seeming to doubt our naval officers on the spot. These officers were convinced that they had been facing

the enemy, and an expression of doubt from Washington would be damaging. The President replied somewhat sharply that he was not planning to make a radio broadcast on the matter but that he did think it important to find out exactly what happened. He also repeated his irritation at having his hand forced by an AP report obtained from some junior military officer.

Secretary McNamara raised with the President the question of renewing de Soto patrols at an early date. George Ball raised sharply the question whether an early resumption of these patrols was wise. He pointed out that before the August patrol there had been a lapse of six months in these patrols, and that their military value was limited. He believed that if we should now lose a destroyer in such patrols there would be a very grave questioning both here and abroad as to the justification for our having taken such risks for a limited return. The President again found consideration for this argument.

The President asked General Wheeler to explain the military value of de Soto patrols. General Wheeler said that the patrols were desirable but not essential. They obtained electronic evidence on the defensive dispositions of the North Vietnamese. Much of this information could be obtained by aerial patrols, but surface patrol was a useful supplement. More important to General Wheeler was the general proposition that we should not allow ourselves to be denied free movement on the high seas. Secretary Rusk supported this argument strongly by saying that the "Bandits" in North Vietnam should be made to know that we were in the area and had no intention of being driven out. The President said he found force in these arguments and was himself quite ready to continue the patrols, with all their dangers, provided there were solid and persuasive reasons for doing so. He pointed out that at some time in the future a brutal prosecutor like Tom Dewey might be asking how we got into these troubles, and he wanted to be sure that the answers would be good. He reminded the group of the Pearl Harbor hearings, and said that he did not wish to have his people playing tennis or riding horseback when they should be available for crucial decisions. The President then instructed Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler to prepare a general argument showing the justification for further de Soto patrols, and including both military arguments and political arguments like those of Secretary Rusk. He asked that Secretary Ball serve as critic of the argument thus developed so that he could make a judgment on the matter.

The President also directed that full contingency planning be developed so that if anything should happen to the de Soto patrol, the Government would be ready for immediate and appropriate reply. The President wanted to be quite sure that we had a full and proper response ready that would make the enemy "swallow his teeth," if he tried to start anything.

The President further directed the preparation of a message to General Taylor asking for his weekly assessment of the military situation in South Vietnam. The President pointed out that nothing would be more useful in the next six weeks than a real success on the ground, for both domestic and international reasons. (This cable was later prepared, and reviewed and approved by the President, and is attached at Tab C.)

The President's summary view of this episode, as reported to me in a telephone conversation Sunday noon, is that it is still very unclear that there were any hostile vessels there, that it was highly destructive to have leaks before we were ready to determine what we wished to do about the matter, that we must all control our tongues and arrange for tighter discipline at every level. (I told the President that I myself had not been as alert as I should have been to the need for discretion, and it turned out that he had heard me tell Jack Valenti at a time when he did not think I needed to. The President obviously has the problem of privacy in his own immediate decision-making very much on his mind. But his main concern in this episode is with looseness in military channels, and he indicated that he had been aiming his comment mainly at Secretary McNamara for action in DOD.)

McG. B.

File
2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brosio and Omaha

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-12-77 + 75c 8-3-78

By WJ, NARS, Date 6-14-79

1. We have cancelled your 12:30 office meeting with Brosio because there will be plenty of time for talk in the plane. Dean Rusk will bring him over just before 1:00, and Clifton will bring them to the second floor.
2. Attached at Tab A is a rather ordinary toast which nevertheless reaffirms our commitment to NATO and should make a gentle headline showing our firmness and confidence in the Alliance and our expectation that the Alliance in turn will have confidence in us. It is clear in its commitment, but several shades less pointed against the French than the sort of thing we felt we had to say in '63 when de Gaulle was at his most belligerent.
3. In the airplane you will have McNamara, Ball, Vance, Wheeler, and myself to help out in any talks you wish to have with Brosio. His conversations here have gone well so far. The one shade of difference between us is that he is more cautious about the MLF than we are, and you may want to listen to him and George Ball on this topic.
4. You may wish to talk quite privately with Brosio about the possibility of your coming to NATO in December. It is at least possible that a trip to Paris at that time would be useful in breaking the log jam over talks with General de Gaulle. It would also let you off a general tour of Europe which will probably not be productive in '65 with the German elections ahead of us. In any event, a wholly informal exploration with Brosio might be useful. Any such talk should be in a very small group.
5. At Offutt we have drafted suggested non-political arrival and departure remarks and scheduled time for you to meet with the Governor for 15 or 20 minutes before the briefing. The arrival and departure remarks are at Tabs B and C.
6. Bob McNamara has checked and re-checked the Omaha briefing, and we think that General Power's personal convictions of Soviet strength and Western weakness will be safely hidden. But because of this hidden conviction, it may be unwise to press too hard for Power's estimates of Soviet strength.
7. I have had all these remarks put on cards, but if you don't like them, they can be revised on request.

M.G.B.
McG. B.

2a
TAB A

President's Remarks at Luncheon for Secretary General
H. E Manlio Brosio

Mr. Secretary General, Gentlemen:

I am very pleased to welcome Secretary General Brosio here today. He has come, as the chief officer of the NATO Alliance and as the representative of half a billion people united in the defense of freedom under the North Atlantic Treaty.

He comes also as a friend. He has served with great distinction in our capital as the Ambassador of the Italian Republic. His Country's readiness to let such a talented public servant go to work for NATO is evidence of the deep interest and vital role of Italy in the Alliance.

NATO owes much to the distinguished line of men who have served in the high office of Secretary General -- Lord Ismay of Great Britain, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and Dirk Stikker of The Netherlands. We can all be glad that in our guest today these men have found a worthy successor.

NATO is a vast organization, but it is also a most intimate alliance. In fifteen years, it has grown impressively in confidence, strength and stature. It is the most successful -- and most peaceful -- alliance in history.

For us in the United States NATO is a tested and recognized cornerstone of foreign policy. It has and it will continue to have -- the strongest bipartisan support.

After fifteen years, the Atlantic area is more secure than ever. Aggression and threats to freedom in Europe have been turned back. All

our peoples can be proud of what we have achieved.

But the task of defending liberty is never done. The security of our Alliance is only assured so long as we remain strong and determined to protect our people and our values.

Our own American commitment to the Alliance is real and substantial. It was not given lightly. The considered American decision in 1949 to participate in NATO represented an historic break from isolationism. Now and in the future this commitment remains as firm as facts and strength and will can make it.

Allied defense is indivisible. American security depends on the security of the Alliance as a whole -- and the Alliance in turn depends on the strategic strength of the United States. We believe our adversaries understand this -- and so do the free peoples of the Alliance.

This nation does not seek to dominate anyone. Within our Alliance there is room for the efforts of all -- and for new patterns of shared responsibility. We are ready to work together with all our friends to make sure that our strength will be as clear tomorrow as it is today. We seek a growing partnership of freedom -- a partnership based on shared respect of reality and shared responsibility for effective defense.

Mr. Secretary General, the U. S. believes in NATO. That is why we are honored by your presence here today. Ours is a vital role in a

vital organization. We are confident that the affairs of the Alliance are in good hands. While you are Secretary General, we look forward to a long period of the closest possible cooperation.

And so I ask you all to join me now in a toast to Secretary General Manlio Brosio, who serves a dynamic alliance, and through it, the great cause of peace and freedom and justice.

DRAFT

ARRIVAL STATEMENT AT OFFUTT AIR BASE

9/29-2

TAB B
2-6

Secretary General Brosio, Governor Morrison, ~~Mr. [REDACTED]~~

General Power, my friends of Nebraska and of Offutt Air Force Base:

The Secretary General and I are delighted to be here in Nebraska and we thank you for this warm welcome. We have come here in the work of the great alliance for peace which is NATO. The Secretary General has been an old friend of our country, and a distinguished servant of his own Italy. Today he comes to us as the civilian spokesman for our alliance as a whole, and it is altogether fitting that we should come together to Nebraska.

Mr. Secretary General, you are a son of Italy and your headquarters now is in Paris. More than 150 years ago another son of Italy with headquarters in Paris sold this part of the world to the United States. Nebraska has come a long way since Napoleon and Jefferson made their trade. You are now in the center of the part of America which grows food for peace and food for free men. The history of Nebraska is a history of hard work and steady growth by liberty-loving men from every part of Europe -- and men of Nebraska have gone back to Europe more than once, within our lifetime, for this same cause of liberty.

Today Nebraska is a headquarters of the military strength of freedom, and that is what you and I have come to see together. I have been here before, and I am confident of what we shall find. So let me say simply, as we begin our visit, that this enormous strength has only one purpose: to keep the peace for free men everywhere.

DRAFT

DEPARTURE STATEMENT - OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE

(9/29/64)

2c TAB C

The Secretary General and I have now completed two hours of hard work with General Power and his brilliant and dedicated staff. Both of us have gained fresh understanding of the intimate relation between the strategic strength of the United States and the defense of the North Atlantic Alliance. We have seen in detail the military facts and figures which support the great and simple political reality set forth in our Treaty -- that the defense of one is the defense of all. We have learned again what we already knew -- that the strength and skill of this command are absolutely vital to the peace of the Atlantic world.

This day has thus brought new encouragement to me and I hope also to my friend, the Secretary General. So we are grateful to you and to the State of Nebraska for all that we have seen.

We also thank you for your distance from Washington. On the plane ride out and back, Mr. Brosio and I are finding a chance for quiet talk together about the future needs and hopes of our great alliance. The success of NATO is evident in every member country -- in peace and prosperity and confidence for the future. Yet our very success creates new problems for tomorrow. The work of freedom is never done.

As we go back to these discussions, let me thank you again for our afternoon in Omaha.

Now perhaps my friend Mr. Brosio would be willing to say a word.

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 24, 1964

3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I attach at Tab A a pretty gloomy exchange of messages with Max Taylor. The fabric of the Khanh Government is wearing thin, and yet it does seem to remain true that the military balance can be held at least for the present.
2. At Tab B is Max's answer to your own private message of last week end, which contained nothing very urgent but which I am sure you will want to have seen.
3. We will be having Cabinet level talks this week end to get firm recommendations for the next steps on all aspects of this problem. They should be ready for you to review when you get back from New England.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 6/20/77
By NBA, Ref. No., Date 7-11-77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting with Mexican President at El Paso

1. Chamizal Ceremony: The Mexicans regard the Chamizal settlement as probably the greatest single achievement of Mexican diplomacy. Lopez Mateos wants credit in Mexican history for returning the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. His draft speech is very friendly. The English text is attached. Your speech is even better, I think.

2. Colorado River Salinity: This is the major pending problem with Mexico. Lopez Mateos may raise it privately, but he is not expected to make any public comment. There may be demonstrations in Ciudad Juarez on this issue, but if they occur they are not expected to be serious because the Mexican Communist Party has put out orders that nothing be done to embarrass Lopez Mateos. Negotiations on salinity are continuing in the Boundary Commission. Both the Bureau of Reclamation and the Mexicans favor a by-pass canal solution, but we have no agreement yet on how it would be operated. If the question comes up, you might say that we are pressing hard for a solution and hope we can reach agreement soon.

3. Chamizal Complementary Projects: Mayor Williams, of El Paso, may seek assurances from you that the Federal Government will finance a limited-access river highway, a Federal Chamizal Memorial Park, and removal of Franklin Canal from downtown El Paso. Ralph Dungan is discussing these projects with Williams. We have suggested a highway which the Bureau of Public Roads considers justified (Mayor Williams wants more); we have agreed to talk about a small federally financed park (costing less than \$1 million); we have asked El Paso to work out a canal proposal with the water users and interested federal agencies. We are pointing out that Congress has to approve these projects. We want to cooperate with El Paso, but we cannot agree to something we know Congress will not buy.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-12-77, NSC 8-3-78
By ip, NARS, Date 6-14-79

2-5

September 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the Warren Commission, 11:00 a.m.

1. The Warren Commission will present you with ^{either} a page proof or a first final printed copy of their report. There should be pictures, and you might wish to make a very brief statement along the lines attached at Tab A.

2. George Reedy has made really excellent arrangements for fair and comprehensive press coverage. I have had very good back-play from men like Lippmann and Hightower, and even the demanding Reston is happy.

3. The Commission recommends that the question of guarding the President be reviewed by a Cabinet-level committee or by the National Security Council. I do not think you want to comment on this matter today, or indeed before Tuesday, because we do not want to jump the gun on the report itself, which will be published Monday.

4. For Tuesday papers I would recommend that you announce that you are planning to follow this basic recommendation and that you have asked the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General, and one member of your White House staff to serve as a committee of three. From the public appearance point of view, I might be the logical White House member, but from the point of the real understanding of your needs and requirements my own recommendation would be Jack Valenti.

5. If you wanted to give a bipartisan cast to this arrangement you could ask that in its initial plans and operations the committee be enlarged to include Bob Anderson, Bill Rogers, and Gordon Gray. I do not think this latter course is necessary, because this is in no sense a partisan matter, but it might be useful in preventing misunderstanding in a campaign season.

6. You should understand that in proposing a Cabinet committee, the Warren Commission is engaged in a benevolent conspiracy against all Presidents. They believe that the Secret Service is always handicapped by the understandable impatience of the President and that their position

(9/24/64)

as members of the informal White House family can lead to a certain laxness. So the object is to set up a committee that can stand up to the President a little bit.

McG. B.

Suggested remarks to the Warren Commission

Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Commission:

I congratulate you gentlemen on the completion of what I know has been a most demanding task, especially as it has been added to the heavy duties and responsibilities which you gentlemen already carry.

I know that you have been guided throughout by a determination to find and to tell the whole truth of this terrible event. This is our obligation -- to the memory of John F. Kennedy -- to the good name of the United States of America -- and to all men everywhere who honored President Kennedy and who respect our nation.

I have given instructions for the prompt publication of this report to the American people and to the world. I shall myself give it the prompt and careful reading which the importance of the subject and the quality of the Commission require. I commend it to the attention of all Americans and all our friends everywhere.

I thank you gentlemen again for all that you have done. You have earned the gratitude of your countrymen.

September 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 12:30 Meeting with the Bi-partisan
Leaders

The grape-vine tells me that those gentlemen are worried that they may be merely campaign window dressing. So at the end of any remarks you make, I think you may want to emphasize that we want to get a lot of hard work out of them in the days ahead. You may want to ask me to outline the plans for exploiting them.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wheeler's and Goodpaster's Trip

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *julra*, NARA, Date 10-22-98

1. Bob McNamara says that we cannot possibly ask Wheeler and Goodpaster to go to Gettysburg on their own initiative. They have to go at your command, but we can draw^a distinction between the things they say on your behalf, and the things they say on their own.

2. Bob and I think they should tell Eisenhower that they are both very strongly opposed to any public disclosure of the special procedures which he instituted and which you have continued. Their opposition is based on the need to hold the Alliance together and the need to respect public statements previously made by Eisenhower himself and by a number of military commanders, all of whom acted in accordance with their understanding of the high classification of these instructions. Wheeler and Goodpaster would go on to say that their recommendation has been put to you very strongly. You have indicated your sympathy with it, but it has been pointed out to you that this position can only be held as long as it is respected by those who know the real situation, chief of whom is General Eisenhower himself. Thus you have asked them to raise the matter with the General and to get his opinion. If General Eisenhower shares the judgment of General Wheeler and General Goodpaster, then you as President will do your best to make sure that no one within your authority violates the security of the existing instructions. Obviously if Ike takes this position with Wheeler and Goodpaster, he himself will be bound.

3. This far, Wheeler and Goodpaster would be acting on your instructions. On their own they could add that political gossip in Washington says that General Eisenhower himself is going to reveal the nature of the contingency instructions, that one Republican has predicted such revelations in the Congressional Record, that you as President are obviously receiving advice from the political sector that you should pre-empt, and that in their judgment the only way to damp this thing down is for the two most important men involved to agree not to discuss it.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

(page 1 of 2 pages)

4. My impression is that Wheeler and Goodpaster are optimistic as to the results of such a mission. Bob and I are non-committal but do not see what harm it can do.

5. If you approve this pattern, they can be on their way early in the morning.

McG. B.

8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Summary of the existing plans for emergency use of nuclear weapons

On March 26 you approved recommendations from McNamara and the Joint Chiefs to put into effect updated instructions for expenditure of nuclear weapons in emergency conditions.

This instruction covers four emergency situations. Two of them are essentially defensive and would allow the use of nuclear weapons only against military targets in the air or at sea. These are: 1) active defense against air and space nuclear attack on the U. S., and 2) naval and air action against an imminent seaborne missile attack on the U. S.

In these two cases the commanders could act without contacting the President if the necessary delay would make it impossible for them to prevent the imminent attack.

The other two cases are 1) retaliation to a nuclear attack on the U. S., and 2) reply to a major assault on major U. S. forces at sea or in foreign territory. In these two cases every effort to contact the President must be made (with the qualifying phrase in the second case: "every effort consistent with the preservation of his command"). The authorized retaliation for an attack on the U. S. is a strategic attack on the Soviet Union. The authorized retaliation in the other case is against hostile forces but not repeat not against the Soviet Union itself.

The instructions reveal an interesting difference between situations in which nuclear weapons would do enormous civilian and industrial damage and situations in which they would be used in the upper atmosphere or on the high seas. In the latter cases commanders have latitude to decide that the delay in contacting the President would be excessive. This is in line with a belief which Eisenhower had that when the destructive force of nuclear weapons would hit only military forces, the decision on their use was a very much less serious matter. It is possible that we ought to take account of this distinction in anything we say in the next few days.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 93-468 ISCAP Appeal

~~TOP SECRET~~

By ics, NARA Date 9-10-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

8
September 23, 1964

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McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-468 ISCAP Appeal
By ics, NARA Date 9-10-98

September 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: 12:30 Wednesday Meeting with panel of consultants
on major international problems.

In an effort to get a good story out of your meeting with this group tomorrow, I suggest the following plan:

You meet with them at 12:30, and my suggestion is that you might open the meeting with brief remarks along the lines of the paper attached at Tab A. We might have a stenographer taking notes. After the meeting, we might simply decide to make this text available on the record as a summary of what you said. The object would be to get a headline on Johnson, bipartisanship, and peace, together with a picture of you meeting with these men. It is not a very newsy story, but it is a good one.

McG. B.

September 22, 1964

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After your opening remarks you might turn to me for a brief procedural comment. I will briefly describe the way we hope the panel will work and then ask if any member wants to comment on any problem to you now. Then we will plan to get out of your hair and go over to State for lunch with Dean and Bob.

McG. B.

9/22/64

11
OUTLINE OF REMARKS

I am delighted to have a chance to meet briefly with you gentlemen and to thank you for undertaking to serve as members of a panel of private citizens to work with us in the quest for peace. You gentlemen symbolize a tradition which goes back for a quarter of a century -- the tradition of nonpartisan service on matters of war and peace. I see Democrats who have served in Republican Administrations, Republicans who have served in Democratic Administrations, and a number of men who have held office under both parties. And these party affiliations really don't matter very much compared to the common concern and the great operating principles of our American foreign policy. There are four of these principles, and you gentlemen have worked for all four of them.

The first is that the United States must be strong in her arms and strong in her will. When I look at General Bradley and Dr. Kistiakowsky and Mr. Dulles, when I think of Mr. Lovett, who can't be with us today, I am looking at men who played a great role in building the strength we now have. We have kept on in this same tradition in the last four years, and we believe the balanced strength of the United States has never been greater than it is today.

But there is always work to be done to keep our defenses strong and up to date, and we look forward to the advice and counsel which you gentlemen will bring in coming discussions of defense planning for the future.

Second, the United States yields to no one in her loyalty to friends and allies. With us today we have Mr. Acheson, Mr. McCloy, and Mr. Hoffman, architects of the recovery of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Western Europe has never been more secure, and the future of Atlantic freedom never more bright than it is today. The leaders of that continent rightly seek a growing role in the common cause of freedom. The differences and difficulties which lie ahead of us are the product of success, not failure. As we go on in this great work, our friends in Europe will be encouraged in the knowledge that we shall have advice like yours to guide us.

I am particularly glad to have the help of such men as Mr. Acheson and Mr. McCloy as our minds turn to the future of central Europe, and as we renew our determination to work for the freedom and reunion of the people of divided Germany. One of the great achievements of the last generation is that we have built mutual trust between democratic Germany and the United States, while never forgetting the proper interests of other allies or even the legitimate concerns of adversaries. In that tradition we shall continue, with your help.

And we shall show equal good faith to other friends and allies in other continents as well. Today this determination finds its hardest test in the difficult and demanding task of helping a young nation to grow and defend itself against Communist terror and domestic disorder -- the Republic of Vietnam. We are not discouraged by difficulty, nor will we let ourselves

be deflected by partisan critics. In Vietnam today, the best of Americans, from private to Ambassador, are making their sacrifice in this hard cause on the spot. They too will be encouraged to know that the Government in Washington can call on men like you for help and counsel as this ten-year-long commitment of three administrations is continued.

Third, the United States has been not merely the strongest of all nations, and the most reliable of allies, but the leader in proving that we accept the responsibilities of the rich and strong. In the Marshall Plan, which Mr. Hoffman ran, and the World Bank, where Mr. Black and Mr. McCloy achieved so much, and later still in the Alliance for Progress, where Mr. Moscoso will always be remembered, we have been willing and ready to help free men to help themselves.

And I agree with what General Eisenhower used to say year after year -- that these programs are a great bargain for our own national security. Year after year, as the Democratic Majority Leader, I worked to support the Republican President in defending these programs, which have no constituency of their own. The freedom of Europe, the great hopes of India and Pakistan, the new glow of confidence in South America, are the product of this national, bipartisan effort.

Fourth, and finally, the policy of the United States is not simply peace through strength, but peace through positive, persistent, active effort.

For twenty years, in five administrations we have been first in our support for the United Nations -- and many of you like Mr. Cowles, Mr. Leibman, Mr. Larson and Mr. Wadsworth, have been among its most determined friends.

For twenty years, in the age of the atom, we have been first in the search for effective disarmament. Mr. Acheson, Mr. Dean and Mr. McCloy have played great roles in that continuing effort.

For twenty years, in crisis after crisis, we have sought the way of reason and restraint. No great power in all history has a better record of respect for the rights of others.

* * *

So we are strong in our defenses, loyal in our alliances, responsive to the needs of others, and passionate in the positive search for peace. This is the kind of people we are -- this is the kind of service you have given. This is the foreign policy which will continue, with your help, in the years ahead.

September 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have spent the afternoon working on the subject of the control of nuclear weapons, and as I now see it, we have two choices. The first is to keep on with our present basic position as stated in your Seattle speech, which is at Tab A, with its critical paragraph marked on page 2. If this is what we do, I would suggest that the questions which are being asked this week should be dealt with by Bob McNamara. This position is open to attack by Eisenhower, and since it is open to the charge of deception, I believe you yourself should stand on existing statements and say nothing further.

Cy Vance believes this is the preferable course, and he is drafting a possible statement for McNamara along these lines.

My own preference is different -- it is that you should make a statement in which you make clear that there are indeed very specialized contingencies for which certain Presidential instructions already exist. This would straighten the record before Eisenhower speaks, and it would deal with the principal danger, which is that you yourself might come under personal attack on this issue.

I attach a statement which I think would do this job. We have a little time to turn around, and my suggestion is that we review this matter with Rusk and McNamara at noon tomorrow when they come in for a short business meeting before you meet with the peace panel.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 83-240 appeal -ISSO

By sig, NARA, Date 12-17-92

9/22/64

Draft Statement on Nuclear Weapons

This week there has been some inaccurate and misleading talk on the important issue of the President's responsibility for the control of nuclear weapons. Nothing is more important in this campaign than to keep the record on this subject absolutely straight. My own basic view of this matter has been stated repeatedly -- most recently in my speech in Seattle, and I call your attention again to that address.

The two issues which have been confused this week are these: first, whether it is sound to make a basic distinction between so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons and "strategic" weapons; second, whether there is or should be any grant of discretion to subordinate commanders to make their own decision when to use these weapons.

My position on these matters is the same as the position of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy.

First, I agree with President Eisenhower's statement of 1955 that "you can draw no sharp line between tactical use of atomic weapons and strategic use." I agree with that statement because I know that the so-called "tactical" weapons, now deployed in Europe, have a total explosive power which is many thousands of times greater than the power of the two "small" weapons which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki 19 years ago. I have said before, and I now say again, that there is no such thing as a "conventional" nuclear weapon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 5/8/81 re NLJ81-14
By shw, NARS, Date 8/6/81

Second, I believe, as President Kennedy and President Eisenhower believed, that the responsibility for control of the use of nuclear weapons must rest with the President alone. President Eisenhower was asked about this matter on December 2, 1959, and what he said then was: "There is no arrangement that puts the President's authority in anybody else." That was a sound description then, and it is a sound description now.

Therefore it is false to assert that there is any delegation of this Presidential authority to any other person, civilian or military. On the contrary, like all Presidents before me, I have ordered the most careful and continuous efforts to maintain immediate communication between the President and all senior commanders. It is the clear understanding of all these commanders -- as it has been for nineteen years -- that any question of a possible use of nuclear weapons is a question requiring Presidential authority.

Like my predecessors, I have had to take account of those remote contingencies in which the President himself might be unable to function effectively, either through incapacity or through a failure of all our arrangements for immediate communication. For exceptional circumstances of this sort, appropriate and carefully limited Presidential instructions exist. This is a totally different matter from the grant of discretionary authority which Senator Goldwater advocates.

There is a deep-seated and decisive difference between Senator

Goldwater and myself on the control of nuclear weapons. I believe, as the Presidents before me have believed, that these weapons represent a wholly new order of power and danger. Senator Goldwater believes that many of them are merely conventional weapons to be handled in a conventional way.

I believe that responsibility should be centralized in the President, and I believe that is what the people of this country want. The Senator believes that major discretionary authority should be granted to a subordinate military commander.

These differences are clear and important, and they should not be obscured by misunderstanding or misstatement in any quarter.

September 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Help for Mrs. Johnson

I have talked only to Mary about this, and I have no doubt that a slightly wider canvass would produce additional names, but I know you want it kept quiet until Mrs. Johnson decides what she really wants.

Tony Chayes is pretty fully employed at the Naval Hospital in Bethesda, but it is conceivable that she could take leave. She is extraordinarily intelligent and has experience in both research and writing.

Elsbeth Rostow (Mrs. Walt) has a teaching job at American University, but I know she cares passionately about this campaign, and she is a woman of great energy who I think would pitch in very effectively. She knows her way around the Government, and she is both an experienced economist and a good writer and speaker in her own right.

Mary Russell (Mrs. Ned) is a woman of great intelligence who, according to my Mary, has a lot of free time. The particular job which we have seen her do is the organization and control of answering of letters for Mrs. Kennedy after the assassination, but Mary thinks she would be good at research and writing too.

Katy Miller (Mrs. Clement) used to work on her husband's campaigns and is an ardent Democrat with a good, quick mind and a lot of energy.

Dorothy Fosdick, who is the Staff Director of Scoop Jackson's committee, is a very thoughtful and effective woman who is devoted to her particular assignment, but she should have a lot of free time in the coming six weeks.

Nan McAvoy, probably better known to you than to me, is another woman of great energy and intelligence who I should think would jump at a chance to help Mrs. Johnson.

Finally, if there is still a problem on the letter-answering side, Mary suggests that Libby Rowe might get a lot of help from Mrs. Roy Atherton. Mrs. Atherton is an older woman of great intelligence and experience, whose husband was one of the first and best of the new career diplomats. She is probably a Republican of about the same depth as my Mother, but again she cares passionately about this particular campaign. No letter that she composed would ever give trouble.

McG. B.

September 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TIME cover story

TIME cover story, on balance, is not as tough as I feared. It is critical of Goldwater for consistently confusing his own stand and for wrongly calling any nuclear weapons "conventional." It states flatly that the nuclear issue "is killing Barry Goldwater."

Characteristically, however, the story balances its saddlebags by saying that we have not been accurate or precise, and it does plainly charge that we are misleading the American people on the question whether you have delegated any authority to use nuclear weapons. The story states flatly that you have done just that, like Eisenhower and Kennedy before you, by giving contingent authority to the NATO and NORAD commanders.

I believe we should continue to refuse to discuss the ways and means in which you exercise your basic responsibility, and should stick hard to the language worked out last week, which is entirely correct as far as it goes. The language we used then and which everyone is instructed to keep on using is as follows:

"The responsibility for the control of U. S. nuclear weapons rests solely with the President, who exercises the control of their use in all foreseeable circumstances. This has been the case since 1945, under four Presidents. It will continue to be the case as long as I am President of the United States."

If further comment makes it seem necessary, we can readily develop further comment on this issue by such wise men as Lippmann and Reston. I think we could easily get across to such critics the difference between careful planning against desperate contingencies and unlimited delegation of discretionary authority to field commanders. I do not recommend that we take this course now, until we see how much of a flap is created by the TIME story and others like it.

McG. B.

Rec'd
9am
Sep 21, 1964

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ralph Dungan and Chile

I have talked to both Dungan and Dean Rusk about this, and Rusk plans to talk to Tom Mann. You may want to speak to Mann about it yourself on the El Paso trip.

Everyone agrees that the job of Ambassador in Chile is now highly important. Frei plans to embark on a course of anti-Communist reform which will involve important negotiations with major American copper interests. We need an Ambassador who is fundamentally sympathetic to the cause of democratic reform, but realistic on the need to meet the fair interests of our businessmen.

Tom Mann will do a very good job on protecting our interests, but he is a little insensitive to the Chilean need for reform. So Dean Rusk and I both believe that a progressive and imaginative Ambassador will be needed as a counter-weight, and that Dungan would be an excellent choice. This situation is much like that in Panama, where Vaughn is doing an excellent job of producing new ideas, while Tom Mann keeps an eye on the brakes.

Ralph Dungan is a liberal Catholic with strong convictions on the need for progressive policies. He is also a realist. He is a good friend of Frei, with whom he has been in close touch for years. I am convinced that he wants to do this job because it engages all his own convictions, and not because he wants the empty pleasure of being called Ambassador.

Ralph is not absolutely ideal for this job -- it would be better if he had some business reputation, and better also if he spoke Spanish (although he is prepared to work on that passionately). But against any presently available businessman, Ralph has the great advantages of prestige in your Administration, proven sympathy for the progressive anti-Communist effort in Latin America, and a close personal relationship with Frei. He has the confidence of the Secretary of State, and he will be an energetic and loyal ambassador for you personally.

Dean Rusk thinks we should send Cole's successor to Santiago very promptly. I myself do not believe that is very important. If you now make clear your intention to send Dungan at the right time, he could readily stay here until Thanksgiving or even New Year's. An able Chargé can easily keep house between now and then.

What is needed is a decision. It will not be good for the Frei administration to believe that we are unable to pick a man for this crucial job during the next six weeks. We have twice delayed Cole's resignation, and we have now run out of spare time.

If you do designate Dungan, I think we can get cordial and responsive notices from the Times and the Post, and also from other less doctrinaire observers of the Latin American scene.

M. C. B.
McG. B.

17
September 20, 1964

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Tom Mann will do a very good job on protecting our interests, but he is a little insensitive to the Chilean need for reform. So Dean Rusk and I both believe that a progressive and imaginative Ambassador will be needed as a counterweight, and that Dungan would be an excellent choice. This situation is much like that in Panama, where Vaughn is doing an excellent job of producing new ideas, while Tom Mann keeps an eye on the brakes.

Ralph Dungan is a liberal Catholic with strong convictions on the need for progressive policies. He is also a realist. He is a good friend of Frei, with whom he has been in close touch for years. I am convinced that he wants to do this job because it engages all his own convictions, and not because he wants the empty pleasure of being called Ambassador.

Ralph is not absolutely ideal for this job -- it would be better if he had some business reputation, and better also if he spoke Spanish (although he is prepared to work on that passionately). But against any presently available businessman, Ralph has the great advantages of prestige in your Administration, proven sympathy for the progressive anti-Communist effort in Latin America, and a close personal relationship with Frei. He has the confidence of the Secretary of State, and he will be an energetic and loyal ambassador for you personally.

Dean Rusk thinks we should send Cole's successor to Santiago very promptly. I myself do not believe that is very important. If you now make clear your intention to send Dungan at the right time, he could readily stay here until Thanksgiving or even New Year's. An able Charge can easily keep house between now and then.

What is needed is a decision. It will not be good for the Frei administration to believe that we are unable to pick a man for this crucial job during the next six weeks. We have twice delayed Cole's resignation, and we have now run out of spare time.

If you do designate Dungan, I think we can get cordial and responsive notices from the Times and the Post, and also from other less doctrinaire observers of the Latin American scene.

McG. B.

18 ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While we were in the Northwest, you called my attention to Victor Reisel's statement that we had made a boner in not putting George Meany on our panel of consultants on international problems. This morning I talked with Ralph Dungan, who in turn talked with George Meany. Meany said in the most forceful terms that he was not the least bit bothered that he was not on the panel, and that Reisel was talking nonsense. (Meany dislikes Reisel.)

In these circumstances, my own hunch is that we ought not now to add names to this group. If we put George Meany and Mary Lord and some leading Negro on the panel now, it will look like an afterthought for special groups. The panel as it stands makes good sense on the big issues. If we later set up special task forces for particular problems, we will certainly need many additional representatives. ~~But~~ Both Ralph and I think it is best to leave it as it stands for now.

But if you still want additions, we should propose a list immediately, because you meet this group next Wednesday. In that case, I would think we might make as many as ten or twelve additions so as not to have a woman and a Negro and a labor leader stick out like sore thumbs. But this in turn runs the risk of annoying those who have been chosen, and all of them naturally tend to prefer a smaller group.

Enlarge the list substantially _____

Leave it alone ✓ _____

huf. B.
McG. B.

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Enlarge the list substantially _____

Leave it alone _____

McG. B.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-72 and 418 93-468
By is , NARA Date 5-4-00
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1964

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

We discussed the question of Chinese nuclear weapons today, first in a lunch at the State Department given by Secretary Rusk for McNamara, McCone, and myself, and later at a meeting with the President in which Rusk, McNamara and I were with him in the Cabinet Room (McCone having left at a time when we thought the President would not be able to join us).

At the luncheon we developed the following position:

(1) We are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U. S. military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time. We would prefer to have a Chinese test take place than to initiate such action now. If for other reasons we should find ourselves in military hostilities at any level with the Chinese Communists, we would expect to give very close attention to the possibility of an appropriate military action against Chinese nuclear facilities.

(2) We believe that there are many possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government if that Government is interested. Such possibilities include a warning to the Chinese against tests, a possible undertaking to give up underground testing and to hold the Chinese accountable if they test in any way, and even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action. We therefore agreed that it would be most desirable for the Secretary of State to explore this matter very privately with Ambassador Dobrynin as soon as possible.

(3) We agreed that it would be much preferable to conduct any overflight of Chinese nuclear test facilities in a plane with Chinat markings and a Chinat pilot. In the course of the afternoon, Director McCone produced a proposal that such a flight be staged

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These preliminary decisions were reported to the President in the Cabinet Room, and he indicated his approval. The Secretary of State now intends to consult promptly with the Soviet Ambassador.

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McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

22

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background comment on Vietnam for
coffee-hour with the Press.

It is fundamental in all Vietnamese problems, to keep our basic policy in mind.

1. For ten years under three Presidents we have been committed to support the freedom of South Vietnam against increasing pressure from Communist terrorists and subversives. This is a ~~simple, straight~~, basic policy which you have described many times, but which must never be forgotten.

2. Now, as for ten years, there are three basic choices in Vietnam: (1) to move ~~out~~ to a full-scale war like Korea; (2) to pull out; (3) to keep on, as we are going, with ~~generous~~ ^{extensive} but measured support for the Vietnamese in fighting their own battles.

3. You are fully committed to the third course, as Eisenhower was and as Kennedy was. You believe that is what the people of this country want. This course is long and hard and slow. It involves changes in the level of our assistance. It involves the acceptance of hardship and sacrifice by many Americans. It involves events like the Gulf of Tonkin, and it requires patience and fortitude.

4. By strenuous and continuous effort you have succeeded in placing in Saigon a team of first-rate Americans. You are proud of Ambassador Taylor, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Alexis Johnson, and indeed of the whole team of men that has been put together to support them. These Americans have your full support and they deserve the backing of all their countrymen. You have made sure that the government in Washington is meeting every request they make, and you hope there will be no sniping from the rear.

5. The events of the last few days reflect the fact that the people and government of Vietnam have a big political problem in addition to the threat of the Viet Cong. This is a country with an old civilization, but politically it is only ten years old. There are differences of religion and of politics which would test a much more experienced nation -- Buddhists and Catholics -- soldiers and civilians -- city and country -- labor and capital. As we understand it, the short-lived movement of

a small number of troops into Saigon reflected these political differences, and not a full-scale uprising against the government.

6. The triumvirate of General Khanh, General Minh, and General Khiem, with the support of most of the rest of the military leadership, has successfully and peacefully dealt with this particular episode. The troops have been taken out of Saigon, and the whole affair has for the ~~present~~^{present} been resolved with no violence or bloodshed. The U. S. has maintained its full support for the triumvirate before, during, and after this episode.

7. We also supported the continuing effort of this government to broaden the base for political support for the government and for the national effort against the Communist terrorists.

8. So our policy remains as it has been for a decade, and we will not be discouraged by temporary difficulties. We will not be drawn into reckless military adventures, and we will not give up in Southeast Asia.



23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on South Vietnam, 9 September, 1964,
11:00 a.m., Cabinet Room

Present were: The President, Secretary Rusk (after the first half-hour), Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler, Ambassador Taylor, William Bundy, John McNaughton, Robert Manning, and McGeorge Bundy

The meeting began with the President's review of a memorandum, "Courses of Action for South Vietnam," dated September 8, 1964 (attached). Initial attention was concentrated on the four specific recommendations in this paper. The Secretary of Defense reported that these recommendations, with minor adjustments, had the approval of the Joint Chiefs, but he reported also that there was an important division among the Chiefs, in that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believed that it was now necessary in addition to execute extensive U. S. air strikes against North Vietnam. General Wheeler explained that these two officers now felt that the situation would continue to deteriorate unless such drastic action was taken now. He said that he and the other two colleagues were persuaded by the argument of Ambassador Taylor -- the man on the spot -- that it was important not to overstrain the currently weakened GVN by drastic action in the immediate future. General Taylor repeated that this was indeed his view, but he emphasized that he also believed that in the long run the current in-country program would not be sufficient. He had held this view for many months, but it had been reinforced by recent events in the field.

The President pressed General Taylor as to the reasons for his current unreadiness to recommend larger action. Under this questioning General Taylor made it clear that he and General Westmoreland were in agreement on this question of timing. The President indicated that he had gained the impression in an earlier talk with Ambassador Taylor that the Government now might in fact be somewhat strengthened by recent events, in that General Khanh had eliminated some people who were good riddance. Ambassador Taylor agreed that this was a real possibility, at the more optimistic end of the spectrum, and that perhaps also General Khanh would now have more true support in the country as a whole. But he could not be sure of this, and on balance

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By JK/amy NARS, Date 9/14/77

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he thought the government was in a more uncertain condition than before.

The President asked whether the U. S. had given any encouragement to General Khanh in his August 16 effort to concentrate power in his own hands, and the Ambassador replied in the negative. We had tried to encourage Khanh to include a bill of rights and to lay a careful groundwork for any actions he might take. He had accepted the first point, but had not had time to carry out the second before his plans were overtaken by protest.

The President asked Director McCone for his opinion and the Director replied that in the judgment of his Agency the four recommended actions were appropriate, and that a sustained air attack at present would be dangerous because of the weakness of the GVN. Such an attack might also trigger major increases in Chinese Communist participation. The Agency remained very gravely concerned by the internal situation in South Vietnam, which the Director estimated a shade more pessimistically than Ambassador Taylor.

The President asked the Ambassador whether we could stop internal feuding. The Ambassador replied that it was very difficult with a group of men who turned off their hearing aids in the face of appeals to the public weal. These people simply did not have the sense of responsibility for the public interest to which we were accustomed, and regularly estimated matters in terms of their own personal gains and losses. The President then asked the Secretary of State for his judgment. Mr. Rusk said that a major decision to go North could be taken at any time -- "at 5-minutes' notice." He did not recommend such decision now. He thought we should take the four recommended actions and play for the breaks. The split in the Communist bloc was deepening and would probably be sharpened by the forthcoming December meeting. As that split grew more severe, there might be real inhibitions upon adventures by Peking and Hanoi in Southeast Asia.

The President asked what could be done to strengthen the Government in South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor replied that this was very difficult, but that one thing he would try to do would be to discourage Khanh from excluding all military men. I said that this was the common judgment of all of us, and that the Government needed what talent it could get, whether military or civilian.

The President said that in his judgment the proper answer to those advocating immediate and extensive action against the North was that we should not do this until our side could defend itself in the streets of Saigon.

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We obviously wanted to strengthen the GVN. We believed it could be strengthened. But what specifically were we going to do in this direction?

Ambassador Taylor replied that we needed to move on in meshing our team with the GVN. This had been well started before the unrest of August. The problem was not in planning but in execution, and in the quality of the individuals in the GVN. Nevertheless we should continue to seek better individuals and continue to strengthen our cooperative effort with them.

The President accepted this as a first purpose and then asked whether we needed additional equipment as well. Ambassador Taylor said that while the additional U. S. advisers would be helpful, there was currently no equipment need beyond that which was being supplied.

Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of politico-economic action in the urban areas, along the lines of the recent Rand report, to lower the level of student and Buddhist pressure and increase the political base of support for the GVN. Mr. McCone endorsed this judgment. He further expressed his opinion that Hanoi and Peking now believed that they were doing very well and that they were not having second thoughts about their basic policy (an implied disagreement with the Secretary of State). The Agency was also disturbed by the prospect that internal movement toward negotiations might be increasing, and that there was some sign also of anti-American feeling in South Vietnam. It could happen that the President would find that the purposes originally set forth in Eisenhower's 1954 letter were no longer supported by the people of Vietnam themselves.

Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Taylor if it could be said that the key leaders had looked at the dangers of recent weeks and might be sobered toward responsibility. Ambassador Taylor said there were some such factors at work. The recent events had proven that for the present, at least, General Khanh is indispensable, and on paper, at least, he now had a broader backing than before.

The President asked what would happen if our ~~proposed efforts~~ did not strengthen the government and if instead it got weaker and weaker. Ambassador Taylor replied that as long as the armed forces are solid, the real power is secure. It was vital to be sure of the armed forces. And he believed that these forces would be reliable as long as they had confidence that we were with them.

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The President asked who might come in if Khanh went out. He said that he hoped that it would not be "Mac's friend Mr. Oanh of Harvard," and was pleased to hear that this assumption was right. Ambassador Taylor indicated that it might be such a man as Quat, or General Khiem, or perhaps Vu Van Mau. But he emphasized that this was a very uncertain game of prediction.

Ambassador Taylor further recommended that we should make every effort to execute the sound Hop-Tac plan. This plan for clearance around Saigon would make ministers work, but work was good for the ministers.

The President asked whether the situation was better or worse than when Ambassador Taylor went out. Ambassador Taylor said he thought it was somewhat worse, but made it clear in response to a further question that this weakening was political, not military. Ambassador Taylor also emphasized his belief that sooner or later we would indeed have to act more forcefully against the North. He simply did not think now was the best time.

The President asked if anyone doubted whether it was worth all this effort. Ambassador Taylor replied that we could not afford to let Hanoi win, in terms of our overall position in the area and in the world. General Wheeler supported him most forcefully, reporting the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs that if we should lose in South Vietnam, we would lose Southeast Asia. Country after country on the periphery would give way and look toward Communist China as the rising power of the area. Mr. McCone expressed his concurrence and so did the Secretary of State, with considerable force.

The President indicated that the reason for waiting, then, must be simply that with a weak and wobbly situation it would be unwise to attack until we could stabilize our base. Secretary McNamara added that the price of waiting was low, and the promise of gain substantial. Ambassador Taylor pointed out that General Khanh himself wants two months simply to organize his own government. The Secretary of State asked what the situation was in the countryside. Ambassador Taylor replied it was not too bad. He had constantly asked Khanh if he was keeping things quiet in the provinces and had regularly been assured of Khanh's concern on just this point.

The President asked Ambassador Taylor to compare Khanh and Diem in the people's affections. The Ambassador replied the people did not care for either one.

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The Secretary of State asked if television could be used to give Khanh more contact with the people. Ambassador Taylor said the matter needed further study.

Secretary McNamara asked if it were clear that money was no object, and returned to the importance of carrying out the kind of program recommended in the Rand report. Ambassador Taylor replied that recommendations from Saigon were likely to be more conservative than the Rand report. Mr. Killen felt that our program had been too much a U. S. program, and too little a matter of real intent and planning by GVN officials. Mr. Killen felt that to make a government you had to make it do its own work.

Secretary Rusk said he very much hoped money would not be regarded as the ceiling, and felt that it would be worth any amount to win. He adduced the example of the costs of the anti-Communist struggle in Greece, which worked out at \$50,000 a guerrilla. Secretary McNamara repeated that the Rand report said we had been penny-pinching and that we should make sure that our people in the field understood that these were not normal circumstances and that normal attitudes would not be helpful. Ambassador Taylor replied that the country team would ask for any money it needed. The President emphasized his own continuing conviction that it was necessary not to spare the horses. He pointed out that this had been his constant view and that he wondered what the Rand report was talking about. Secretary McNamara and I said in reply that the report was talking of the attitudes of second- and third-level officials in the field, and not about the efforts of people in Washington to get everybody to do whatever would be helpful.

The President reemphasized his own position and asked Ambassador Taylor directly if he felt pinched. The Ambassador replied "no."

The President said that what disheartened him was that we had our best team out there for 60 days and had lost ground. Ambassador Taylor replied that the President might have a wrong impression. The Ambassador believed that in the field we were indeed doing better -- that General Westmoreland, if present, would report real strengthening of the pacification effort, that tactics and performance were improving -- that at least in half the provinces the over-all program was going well. The Ambassador believed that progress was being made at the grass roots, and that our current problem was political.

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The President asked Mr. McCone why things were quiet on the enemy side after the Gulf of Tonkin. Mr. McCone replied that the enemy was waiting and watching and probably felt that the current political unrest was working in his interest.

The President asked if anyone present had a different view from the basic recommendation of the attached paper. No differing view was expressed. Secretary McNamara said that we could try other things later on. Secretary Rusk concurred. General Wheeler said that of course a clear-cut incident might require appropriate action at any time, and there was general agreement with this thought.

The President then turned to what would be said, and Mr. Manning made brief suggestions emphasizing our concern for security and stability in South Vietnam, as well as for the pacification effort. The President discussed briefly the plan for a meeting with the Leadership, saying that we should take every occasion we could to bring them in normally in these matters. Mr. Bundy pointed out the problem of Congressional delegations going to South Vietnam, and the President and Ambassador Taylor agreed that it would be useful for Ambassador Taylor to point out that one reason for his regular return to this country was to avoid the advantage given to enemies of the GVN government by U. S. types coming out all the time. We would emphasize to the Leadership our hope that Congress would let the government get stabilized, and that at this delicate moment when the government is fragile we should have only one spokesman on the scene -- the Ambassador.

The President then approved the four courses in the attached memorandum, reemphasized that money was no object, and asked General Wheeler to explain to his colleagues in the JCS that we would be ready to do more, when we had a base. The President did not wish to enter the patient in a 10-round bout, when he was in no shape to hold out for one round. We should get him ready to face 3 or 4 rounds at least.

There was a brief discussion of a draft letter to General Khanh, and the President directed that a revision be prepared for his consideration.

McG. B.

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Sep 14, 1964

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Mr. President:

I attach the best story on the Berlin rescue, and a covering memorandum from David Klein. If this stands up under inquiry, would you like to get him back here for an appropriate medal?

Tommy Thompson may be skeptical, but this is the kind of simple, personal courage that you like and the country likes.

McG. B.

GI In Berlin Saves Wounded Refugee

German-Born Soldier Pulls Escaper Over Wall In 40-Minute Gunfire Battle

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
[Bonn Bureau of The Sun]

Berlin, Set. 13—A daring American soldier dragged a wounded refugee to safety across the Communist wall early today while West and East Berlin police exchanged fire in the longest battle since the wall was built three years ago.

For forty minutes West Berlin police and East German border guards fired across the wall in the dawn light between 4 A.M. and 5 A.M. For most of that time Spec. 4C. Hans Puhl exposed himself while directing the rescue.

The refugee, Michael Meyer, 21, was reported recovering in a West Berlin hospital although he was wounded five times, twice seriously, by Communist bullets.

Border Guards Fire

The fight developed after border guards had shot Meyer about 30 feet on the eastern side of the wall as he attempted to escape to the West.

Both sides later praised the restraint of their forces. Maj. Gen. John F. Franklin, United States commandant in West Berlin, said the "resolute, disciplined and carefully controlled actions of the Berlin police forces in the United States sector" brought under control "a dangerous situation



SPEC. 4. C. HANS PUHL

threatening peace and order in Berlin."

He said he was unable to find words strong enough to condemn the action of the Red Border guards in shooting Meyer. West Berlin police "cannot and will not remain passive" when fire from the East enters West Berlin he added.

Weapons Checked

Although eyewitnesses said American military police joined the West Berliners in returning the fire, United States authorities reported that a check later showed that none of the Americans had used his weapons.

The Communist news agency ADN later asserted that both West

Windows Splintered

At that point, Red guards opened fire. West Berlin police, under their standing orders, returned fire from windows overlooking the wall only after Communist bullets began splintering glass and stone from buildings in the West.

Two more guards approached Meyer, who occasionally moved. Witnesses said Puhl, speaking German, waved them off with his pistol. He said he "didn't actually point" his pistol at them, however.

An American source suggested that Puhl "may have let them think he was going to fire."

Puhl, who had removed his helmet, shouted encouragement to Meyer as bullets dusted him with fragments of stone. West Berlin police, civilians and firemen, who also had arrived, produced a rope, stepladder and wirecutters.

Barbed Wire Cut

As firing continued sporadically, Puhl and several West Berliners cut through the barbed wire atop the wall. Then Puhl threw the rope, with a loop in the end, to the refugee.

Meyer, unable to walk, had crawled to the base of the wall. He fixed the rope under his arms.

Other American soldiers, who also had reached the scene, and several West Berliners helped in pulling the wounded man to safety.

West Berlin police said Meyer had been shot twice in one leg and once in the shoulder, and had received two minor wounds. He was rushed to a hospital in an ambulance that had been waiting.

By clambering onto the wall itself, Puhl was in Communist territory. The relatively mild Communist reaction seemed to indicate that the East Germans were inclined to make little of the event, however.

(Continued from Page 1)

Berlin police and American soldiers fired across the wall. Without mentioning Meyer, the agency blamed for a "serious provocation" for which they "must carry the full responsibility."

Puhl, who immigrated to the United States from Germany eight years ago, was the undisputed hero of the incident. The precise orders for American soldiers in such incidents never have been made clearly public, but no one was splitting hairs today.

Fechter Case Recalled

His heroism seemed certain to remove some of the illwill generated when Peter Fechter, an 18-year-old East German, bled to death from bullet wounds at the base of the wall on the East's side two years ago. Although that incident occurred within 100 yards of an American checkpoint, American troops did nothing to aid him.

Today gunfire broke out shortly after 4 A.M. Puhl, who was on patrol with a West German policeman, said he arrived to see two Communist guards trying to drag Meyer away from the wall.

He raced into a building a few feet from the wall, he explained at press conference, and, waving his rifle, ordered the Red guards away. When they failed to move, he said, he tossed a tear gas grenade across the wall.

As the guards fled, Puhl ran back outside and, supported by West Germans, got his head and shoulders above the wall.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Your own Activities on Vietnam since Saturday:

You got the first AP reports probably on the 11 o'clock news, because when I called you at 11:30 with the first diplomatic and military reports, you already knew that something was up. Through the night both State and Defense were in touch with the field, but there was nothing that required you to be awakened. About six o'clock you called the Secretary of State and were fully briefed on the situation as it was then. You and the Secretary agreed that we should continue our full support of the legitimate government, and that restoring order in a situation of this kind was ^{that} the Government's own responsibility. Our activity was confined to making our position of support clear to all concerned. During Sunday morning you talked also to Secretary McNamara and me, and when you got back from church you had a brief meeting at the White House, which began about quarter of one and lasted for about half an hour. Those present were the two Secretaries, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler and myself. You approved the draft statement which the Department of State put out shortly thereafter. (You also approved an instruction to Ambassador Johnson, but I do not think that should be mentioned) ~~in any way~~
~~anyway~~

You received further reports through the afternoon from the Situation Room, and on the basis of these reports and further discussions with your advisers, you made the decision about 6:30 to have another statement issued by the State Department. This statement was a timely reinforcement of the triumvirate.

During the evening you received further reports which confirmed the wisdom of our backing of the triumvirate and showed that the so-called coup was beginning to fade out. You therefore gave instructions not to be disturbed during the night unless there was some startling new development.

No such development occurred, and when you checked the Situation Room this morning (about 8:30) you found that the reports in the morning papers were fully confirmed by our own evidence and that to all intents and purposes

the coup was over.

You have been in touch with the Secretary of State and you and he have agreed that he will make a general statement on the matter during his speech in Detroit and that he will have a press conference to review the whole matter on his return, probably at about 5:30 this evening.

McG. B.

26
September 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background comment on Vietnam for
coffee-hour with the Press.

It is fundamental in all Vietnamese problems to keep our basic policy in mind.

1. For ten years under three Presidents we have been committed to support the freedom of South Vietnam against increasing pressure from Communist terrorists and subversives. This is a simple, straight, basic policy which you have described many times, but which must never be forgotten.

2. Now, as for ten years, there are three basic choices in Vietnam: (1) to move ~~out~~ to a full-scale war like Korea; (2) to pull out; (3) to keep on as we are going with generous but measured support for the Vietnamese in fighting their own battles.

3. You are fully committed to the third course, as Eisenhower was and as Kennedy was. You believe that is what the people of this country want. This course is long and hard and slow. It involves changes in the level of our assistance. It involves the acceptance of hardship and sacrifice by many Americans. It involves events like the Gulf of Tonkin, and it requires patience and fortitude.

4. By strenuous and continuous effort you have succeeded in placing in Saigon a team of first-rate Americans. You are proud of Ambassador Taylor, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Alexis Johnson, and indeed of the whole team of men that has been put together to support them. These Americans have your full support and they deserve the backing of all their countrymen. You have made sure that the government in Washington is meeting every request they make and you hope there will be no sniping from the rear.

5. The events of the last few days ^{reflect the} ~~reflect the~~ fact that the people and government of Vietnam have a big political problem in addition to the threat of the Viet Cong. This is a country with an old civilisation, but politically it is only ten years old. There are differences of religion and of politics which would test a much more experienced nation -- Buddhists and Catholics -- soldiers and civilians -- city and country -- labor and capital. As we understand it, the short-lived movement of

a small number of troops into Saigon reflected these political differences, and not a full-scale uprising against the government.

6. The triumvirate of General Khanh, General Minh, and General Khiem, with the support of most of the rest of the military leadership, has successfully and peacefully dealt with this particular episode. The troops have been taken out of Saigon, and the whole affair has for the moment been resolved with no violence or bloodshed. The U. S. has maintained its full support for the triumvirate before, during, and after this episode.

7. We also supported the continuing effort of this government to broaden the base for political support for the government and for the national effort against the Communist terrorists.

8. So our policy remains as it has been for a decade, and we will not be discouraged by temporary difficulties. We will not be drawn into reckless military adventures, and we will not give up in Southeast Asia.

McG. B.

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MEMORANDUM FOR

September 12, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

You may be hearing from Rusk shortly about growing tension in the Middle East, particularly a new flare-up in the Yemen civil war. This is no Cyprus crisis, but could have still painful repercussions during our election campaign. If the Saudis resume aid to the Yemeni royalists, Nasser will no doubt resume bombing Saudi supply bases, in which case Faysal will scream for help. The British, who strongly disagree with our policy of pouring oil on troubled waters, have been at us hard to unleash Faysal, even at the expense of our relations with most other Arabs.

Though the Arab Summit seems at first glance to have been a dud, we also may have renewed muscle flexing toward Israel or a Jordan crisis. Either of these could bring new Israeli aid pleas just before the election, and new attacks on our Arab policy.

We assume that your own feeling about the Middle East is the same as your view on the Malaysia issue last week, i. e. we certainly don't want another war on our hands for at least two months. This word from you was very helpful in getting State to calm down the British. A few similar cautionary words about the Middle East on Tuesday would encourage State to weigh in with Arabs, Israelis and Englishmen as well. In our judgment, this would be a quite useful noise. *I'll bring it up Tuesday + give you a chance to comment if you want.*

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

McG. B.
McGeorge Bundy

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Authority State 10-12-77, NSC 8-3-78
By ip, Name, Date 6-14-79

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Sept 12, 1964

28

Mr. President:

Here are two backgrounders that may interest you if you have nothing better to read! One is Acheson on Cyprus, and the other is Taylor on Vietnam, and in their different ways they are unusually good.

McG. B.

Sept. 1 1964

29

Mr. President:

I have redrafted the letter to LeMay so that I think it is safe and sound and on one page. Unless you have real objections, I would advise that we get this out in the next few days because we have had his letter for a fortnight now -- more my fault than yours.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: David Rockefeller's call at 11:30 this morning

1. David Rockefeller's visit is mainly concerned with his interview with Khrushchev, as I understand it. He has already reported to us fully on this, and you may want to thank him for his prompt debriefing to Kohler and the memorandum made available to you and your staff. You may want to say that his daughter Neva is obviously an extremely good note-taker (she did a memcon and it is a good one).

2. Rockefeller conveyed to Khrushchev one important message which I had given on a totally off-the-record basis to Norman Cousins, and which Cousins gave to Rockefeller for Khrushchev -- namely, that it is important for the Chairman to keep out of the election. Khrushchev indicated to Rockefeller that he understood this point and would behave himself. Rockefeller of course did not bring the White House into his comment.

3. Rockefeller and Khrushchev had the usual discussion of Cuba and of South Vietnam, and nothing very startling came out of this. Khrushchev as usual said that both Castro and the Viet Cong were straightforward anti-Colonialist phenomena, and denied the importance of external interference.

4. Somewhat more interesting is Rockefeller's discussion with Khrushchev on trade. Khrushchev clearly showed an interest in trade with the U.S., but when David spoke of the need of a lend-lease settlement, he made his standard rejoinder that a lend-lease settlement was possible only if we would undertake to give long-term credits as we had to our other allies (in the Marshall Plan). From this and all other evidence I conclude that Nikita simply does not understand the politics of East-West trade in this country.

5. The one tactical question you might wish to discuss with Rockefeller is whether a short, informal note to the Chairman, saying that you have heard Rockefeller's report of his conversation, would be useful. I would be in favor of it, but my bet is that the State Department experts would be cool. This is exactly the sort of thing which created a sense of personal communication between Khrushchev and Kennedy, and I believe that such a sense of connection can be useful to us as time goes on. I will ask you for your judgment on this after you see Rockefeller.

6. Rockefeller's bank is also having some trouble with the Arabs, but the State Dept. has been helping him all the way, and I am urging him not to raise this with you.

McG. B.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Latin American Ambassadors, Sept. 11

1. The Ambassadors will meet you in the Blue Room at noon. Additional guests will be the OAS Secretary General, Jose Mora; CIAP Chairman Carlos Sanz; President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Felipe Herrera; Secretary Rusk; Ambassador Bunker; Tom Mann; Walt Rostow; Angier Biddle Duke; William Rogers and Anthony Solomon, Tom Mann's AID and Economic deputies; Bob Sayre, and I. We hope you will lead off with a brief statement. You will be followed by Carlos Sanz of CIAP, and there will be a brief comment by Walt Rostow, and the discussion can pick up from there.

2. Our hope is that this meeting will concentrate on the Alliance for Progress, but your own talking points at the beginning can be a little more general, as follows:

(1) This is another in the series of meetings which you have had and hope to have with the Ambassadors of the hemisphere. One of your very first meetings with them was in November. You met them again in May. You met them in smaller groups in July. And now you meet them again in September.

(2) The last year has been a good one for the American Republics, and a bad one for the opponents of freedom. In one country after another the Communists and their supporters have been set back, and the devotion of free peoples to freedom has been demonstrated.

(3) At the same time the conspiratorial aggressions of Castro have been exposed and understood more widely than ever, and we have been able to take increasingly effective action together in the Organization of American States (the score is now 19 to 1 in the execution of that resolution, but you will want to avoid rudeness to Mexico).

(4) Cuba itself shows plainly the failure of Communism in action. Brutal repression of political opposition, the flight of more than 350,000 exiles, the growing economic confusion inside Cuba, all prove the falsity of Communist promises. The people of the hemisphere recognize Castroism more and more as the shabby failure that it is.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC 12-2-76

By

JB

, NARS, Date 3-16-77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

9/10/64

(5) The Alliance for Progress is moving steadily forward. 16 countries have taken steps to improve their collection of taxes. Latin American countries are spending 25% more on public education than they did before the Alliance. 12 countries have introduced or passed agrarian reform laws. 12 have created new land reform institutions.

(6) American commitments under the Alliance are moving rapidly forward. We committed more in the first six months of 1964 than in the whole 12 months of 1963. The figures (if you want to use them) are:

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u> (Jan. -Jul.)
AID	464.4	528.7
Eximbank	114.8	123.8
Food for Peace	217.8	192.1
Trust Fund	48.6	19.4
Peace Corps	<u>17.7</u>	<u>12.5</u>
	858.3	876.5

(7) In our private sector too there is renewed confidence in the future of Latin America. We have reversed a trend away from investment by Americans in the growth of the hemisphere so that in the first quarter of this year, for the first time since 1961, there was an increase in direct net investment of private American funds in the future of Latin America.

(8) Most important of all, we understand more and more our common commitment to progress and freedom, and our mutual obligation of loyalty and cooperation. The Alliance is on its way.

(9) But we all know that very large tasks remain, and your hope is that in frequent informal meetings like this we can work together to build the spirit which will sustain us in moving toward the necessary actions in all our countries.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/10/64

(10) At this point you might refer to the recent meeting of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance -- CIAP -- in Mexico, and ask Chairman Sanz if he would like to comment on the work of this meeting and on the plans for the next meeting in Washington, October 18-28.

My second thought on this set of talking points is that we might usefully have it stenotyped and put it out informally afterwards. This will be against Tom Mann's own preference, but the more I think about it the more I believe that these sentiments are sound and popular and would be well received everywhere.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of background on some current Alliance problems to give you a flavor of what may come up.

Attached at Tab B is a rough draft of a possible toast which Busby is going to work over in the morning.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31a

TAB A

The following points may arise in the discussions with the Ambassadors:

1. Latin America needs additional dollar capital.

Comment: This is not the most serious problem of the Alliance. The U.S. and international banks have provided about \$1.3 billion on the first six months of 1964. More could be done to attract foreign capital from the United States and Europe. This is up to the Latins. A greater effort could be made to get governmental assistance from European countries.

2. There is too much "red tape" connected with U.S. loans.

Comment: This complaint has some merit. Much of the red tape is imposed by law, e.g., the paperwork connected with the 50-50 shipping provisions. Another problem is our own policy decision to require U.S. procurement to protect our balance of payments. We impose some controls to avoid misuse of funds. We are making every effort to cut the "red tape."

A large problem is the poor performance of the Latins:

(a) Inadequate development of plans and projects. Except for the Mexicans, and maybe one or two others, the Latins tend to prepare only broad general proposals, and do a poor job on the engineering and feasibility studies for specific projects. The Central Americans, for example, are beginning their CIAP review today, without providing any plans at all to CIAP.

(b) The level of unused funds, which we have committed, is too high. We are continually criticized in Congress for asking for additional funds when loans go unutilized for one or two years.

(c) We have to work harder on developing and utilizing economic development institutions. The Latins have been slow in organizing farm credit and other institutions, because of resistance of existing institutions, but also because of a lack of good administrators.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

(d) Facilities constructed with loans are not adequately maintained and utilized. This extends from poorly maintained roads to unstaffed schools and hospitals.

3. The United States has not completed action on the International Coffee Agreement.

Comment: We are working hard on this and hope to get enabling legislation approved.

4. United States trade policy is hurting Latin America and is contrary to the Alliance. The Latins are particularly upset about quotas on meat, sugar, oil, and textiles.

Comment: We understand the close relationship between the Alliance and trade. We are conscious of Latin American interest and worked hard for, and believe we have achieved reasonably acceptable compromises on all of these commodities. We will continue to work for trade policies that will take into account Latin America interests.

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-2-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED TOAST

TAB B

316

Four months ago I met with you on a similar occasion to talk about the Alliance -- both its successes and its shortcomings. At that time we signed agreements for projects worth \$40 million with 14 countries. We said we would attempt to double the pace of our efforts. In the first six months of 1964, loan commitments by the United States exceeded all commitments in 1963. So we have done much to double our effort, and I know your countries are doing the same.

When we started the Alliance in 1961, there were many doubters -- those of faint heart who thought we could not succeed. There were others who deliberately tried to make us fail. But we have left the doubters and obstructionists behind as we have surged forward in our constructive efforts. I sense a feeling of optimism among all of you that we will achieve our goals. Throughout this Hemisphere over the last year we have seen a peaceful revolution at work which has not only promised but delivered on social and economic progress within a framework of freedom.

We have begun. The task ahead is difficult, but not impossible if we continue to pull together, to remain steadfast to our objectives and our ideals.

So I propose a toast to the solidarity of our Republics; to the steadfastness of our purpose and to the success of our Alliance for Progress.

September 10, 1964

J 32

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

Here are some recommendations which Paul Nitze and Ted Clifton have worked up as possibility for Presidential visits to naval installations. I understand the proposed timing of the San Diego visit is not workable, but conceivably you could go there at a later time. My own recommendation would be that any one of the three of these would be good as a means of showing the Commander-in-Chief in action, and that the decision should be made in terms of other values of the travel.

One additional proposal is that you might combine the keel-laying of the JOHN F. KENNEDY with the return of the ENTERPRISE nuclear-powered round-the-world squadron around October 3 to 5. In some ways this is the most attractive of the lot, although there is of course the question whether you prefer to have a member of the Kennedy family do the Kennedy keel-laying.

McG. B.

September 9, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have gone to Boston on the 5 o'clock plane to join my mother at a party she sets great store by. I will be back before 10 tomorrow (Thursday) morning -- and this is the last time I will be absent without leave between now and November.

McG. B.

Draft statement for the President

I am inviting the Latin American Ambassadors to the White House on Friday for a luncheon and a review of the Alliance for Progress. I met with the Ambassadors in May and again in July, and had very frank and friendly discussions of the problems in Latin America. The meeting on Friday will be a continuation of these discussions. I am very optimistic about the progress we are making in Latin America through the OAS and CIAP. Events throughout the hemisphere in the last eight months indicate we are having increasing success. But we must keep pressing forward if we are to achieve our goals of economic and social progress in a framework of individual freedom. I want to review the Alliance with the Ambassadors and discuss with them ways in which we may strengthen and improve our effort.

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35
September 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The principal subject for discussion at the President's luncheon today was Cyprus. Those present with the President were: Secretary Rush, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Dean Acheson, and myself.

Acheson and Ball revealed their agreement on the conviction that the only solution now would be a fait accompli in which the Turks would move to occupy the Karpas peninsula, triggering an instant enosis under Greek leadership, with a consequent supercession of Makarios. Acheson in particular emphasized that no negotiated solution was possible because of the weakness of Papandreu and the strength and intractability of Makarios. On the other hand, a program of indefinite delay could only strengthen the hand of Makarios and increase the danger that an eventual Turkish explosion would be both violent and undirected.

A number of questions were raised by the President. What would happen to the Turks on the island? Mr. Ball answered that he would expect most of them to stay and that, with luck, bloodshed would be limited. The President asked whether the Greeks would follow this scenario and whether they could control the Greek Cypriots. Ball and Acheson pointed out that there already exists between Athens and Nicosia agreement to move to instant enosis if the Turks move against the island. They expected that this agreement would probably be carried out.

The Secretary of State asked whether Makarios would appeal to Moscow instead of to Athens. Mr. Ball thought he would not, and he said the appeal would not be answered in any serious way. I asked what would trigger the Turkish action, and Acheson answered that nearly anything would serve. The most immediate possibility was the refusal of troop rotation.

The President summarized by saying that Mr. Acheson's argument appeared to be that we must expect a resort to action in one way or another, and that the choice was whether it should be messy and destructive or controlled and eventually productive, in accordance

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Authority

NSC let 8/31/77

By

JK/umg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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9/8/64

with a plan. Mr. Acheson agreed with this definition of the problem. He indicated that in his discussions with a Turkish military leader the Turks had shown that there was great Turkish interest in such a plan and that the Turks would do their best to execute it with a minimum use of American weapons and a minimum report to those kinds of force -- like air bombing -- which were internationally unpopular.

Mr. Ball pointed out that it would be impossible to warn the Greeks of any planned Turkish action because of the danger of leaks to Nicosia. He also noted that the British would be troubled about this plan because of the status of Cyprus as a Commonwealth state. Mr. Acheson remarked that this might be true for Butler, but that Mountbatten would be friendly and that the British bases would be protected under this plan.

The President indicated his own doubt that the plan as put forward could in fact be neatly and tightly controlled, without risk of escalation. He thought that in particular the Greeks would be very likely to move with all their strength on the island against a Turkish lodgment, and he asked McNamara for a careful Joint Staff study of the problem. The President also noted that the next two months were not a good season for another war, and the question was raised whether it was essential to press along this road before November. No definite answer was given, and it was agreed that Mr. Ball would prepare a more detailed staff study of the entire plan, to include both its military and political elements.

McG. B.

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9/8/64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is an information memorandum from Dillon about World Bank matters which are on the agenda at Tokyo. Three of the four items (those numbered 2, 3, and 4 in the margin), will eventually require Congressional action, but no U.S. money or appropriations are involved. (Item 2 concerns revision of the Bank's charter to permit it to lend money through its "private enterprise" subsidiary, the IFC; Item 3, U.S. adherence to a convention which would establish, under Bank auspices, machinery for arbitrating investment disputes between governments and foreign private owners of assets; Item 4, an increase in the maximum authorized capital of the Bank to enable it to accept some additional subscriptions from other countries. Item 1, which involves no legislative action, concerns the transfer of a fraction of the Bank's annual earnings to IDA.)

McG. B.

FMB:djw
9/8/64

September 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Greek demonstration in Detroit

We have about 350 telegrams today from the Detroit area urging you to support the Greek Cypriots in one way or another and to oppose the Turks; I attach a sampling. This is part of a more general move by Greek groups to put pressure on you. If there is such a demonstration and you have an opportunity to say a word or two about it, something like the following might be helpful:

"I fully understand that feelings on this issue are intense. The United States is helping all it can to find a way to a fair and peaceful settlement. Our most experienced diplomat has just spent two months in Europe, and his efforts have been received with understanding and sympathy by the government of Greece and the government of Turkey. It remains true that America has been criticized in Turkey, in Greece, and on Cyprus. But all Americans, whatever their individual sympathies, can be assured that their government is on the side of peace and justice for all in Cyprus."

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 5, 1964

38

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Taylor's visit

Here is a letter from Prime Minister Khanh to you which I am sure you will want to read.

Our current plan on Taylor's return is that he should spend Monday in briefings and discussions with the rest of us, and be available in his turn to brief the NSC on Tuesday. We expect his first meeting with you to come on Tuesday afternoon, if that fits your schedule. A paper on future alternatives has been worked up between Rusk, McNamara, my brother, and myself, and will be available after the weekend, or earlier if you call for it.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-12-77; NSC 8-3-78

By ig, NARS, Date 6-14-79

37
September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Gulf of Tonkin

I attach the chronology of the Gulf of Tonkin affair which you asked for from McNamara. I had sent it back for correction on a couple of small points, and I have read it myself to see if I could save you any time, but my conclusion is that you will probably want to read it all the way through yourself when you have time.

There is still no evidence whatever that the timing of your announcement adversely affected the success of the operation in any way. All the evidence, indeed, runs the other way. The appendix to this report shows that North Vietnamese did have the aircraft in their screens before you spoke. The post-strike estimates show that there was no significant alert in the ports struck by the first attack from TICONDEROGA. The planes we lost were lost in the second strike several hours later, long after a complete alert had been given by the first attack. Moreover, it is clear that you yourself never gave any assurance of the kind Halleck claimed. Finally, the record of public discussion suggests that Goldwater's charges and Halleck's have been rejected by sober commentators and by the American people. Nevertheless this record does make it clear that we narrowly escaped a dangerously early announcement of the attacks. The reasons for this are four:

(1) Admiral Sharp and other military officers repeatedly assured McNamara that it would be a simple matter to mount an air strike in the early morning in the Gulf of Tonkin. This assurance led to initial planning built around a 7 p.m. announcement here, and when these estimates proved gravely optimistic, McNamara himself became increasingly impatient and eager to get the matter announced.

(2) Communications in this around-the-world operation were slower than McNamara and Sharp expected them to be. Thus, there are repeated delays in getting the final orders to execute from Washington to the carriers. There was also confusion about time zones which cost us an hour of planned time.

(3) This same time lag, in reverse, made us slow to understand the difference between the real operation and the one which Sharp and McNamara had in their mind's eye. Neither of them knew until late in the evening, our time, that there would be a time interval of 2-1/2 hours

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 89-210; NSA 214.06
By JOW, NARA, Date 7.25.06

9/4/64

between the first launch and the actual strike in the case of TICONDEROGA. They assumed 40 minutes to one hour.

(4) Finally, we were a little casual in Washington about acting on this accurate information of TICONDEROGA's strike plan when it did arrive. It was known to McNamara in the Pentagon and to officers in the Situation Room ^{just} before you went on the air, but no one told me -- or you -- as far as I know. Indeed, Bob McNamara does not seem to have got this fact clearly in his own mind, because in his own press conference just after midnight he wrongly said that the carriers "have already conducted air strikes against the North Vietnamese bases."

The net of this is that we were saved from real trouble by your own stern and repeated insistence on positive assurance that the planes were in the air well before you spoke, and by the other facts cited earlier.

Bob McNamara is the ablest man in the government, but when he makes a basic decision and gets up a head of steam, he does not always keep the sharpest eye out for new evidence. Others of us could have been more alert than we were to help guard against this one weakness of an extraordinary man.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET DINA~~

September 4, 1964

39a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 89-210; NSA 2-14-06
By JDW, NARA, Date 7-25-06

9/4/64

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McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

396
September 4, 1964**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT****SUBJECT: Chronology of the Gulf of Tonkin**

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TOP SECRET-DINAR**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NLJ 89-210; NSA 2-14-66
By JDL, NARA, Date 7-25-06

9/4/64

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McG. B.

TOP SECRET DINAR

September 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Dodd

Tom Dodd has sent you a 2-page puff for General Lansdale as the solution to all problems in Vietnam. I have drafted an answer for my signature which says simply that this is a matter for General Taylor to decide, but says it rather more politely and carefully. I attach both papers in case they are of interest to you.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Don't bother me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

40a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Hon. Thomas J. Dodd
United States Senate

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Ltr 5/10/77

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

By smg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

The President has asked me to reply to your thoughtful memorandum about the possible assignment of General Lansdale to Vietnam.

General Lansdale's unusual abilities and, still more, his fervent desire to be helpful in the difficult situation in Vietnam are both well known to us. His name has been discussed on more than one occasion with Ambassador Taylor, and in accordance with our general sense of priorities with respect to Vietnam we have made it clear to Ambassador Taylor that we will be only too glad to send General Lansdale if the Ambassador feels he can be helpful. On the other hand, the President has taken the position in every case that all officers holding senior assignments in Vietnam must be desired for this assignment by Ambassador Taylor.

Ambassador Taylor has a full knowledge of General Lansdale's special abilities, and he has so far not asked for General Lansdale's assignment. In this situation, the President does not think it appropriate to overrule the man on-the-spot.

As you know, we expect Ambassador Taylor to come back here at the earliest appropriate time for consultation and to pick up Mrs. Taylor. His visit will give us an opportunity to review the general question of the caliber of his country team. In this connection, your thoughtful memorandum will be helpful.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED
SEP 3 1964

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J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIR
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA.
BOURKE B. H. NLOOPER, IOWA
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President
FROM: Thomas J. Dodd

Tom Dodd

RE: The Growing Crisis in Vietnam and the Need for Assigning to General Taylor's Staff the Personnel with the Greatest Experience in Asian Problems and in Psychological and Political Warfare

The situation in Vietnam has by common consent now reached the point where a complete disintegration may occur virtually overnight. The gravity of the Vietnamese crisis makes it necessary to consider what measures can be taken, quite literally within the coming days, to strengthen the hand of Ambassador Taylor and of the very impressive team that now supports him.

As you know, I have the greatest admiration for Ambassador Taylor. He is, in my opinion, one of the few men who combines military ability with superior political understanding and diplomatic skill. However, in a crisis situation such as now exists in Vietnam, military ability, political understanding, and native intelligence may prove inadequate. It seems to me that what is required above all is an American team who command an immediate understanding of the Asian people and of political and psychological warfare problems in Asia, and who, by virtue of their past activities, enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese military and political leaders and can get them to do things that they might otherwise not do.

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that despite certain personal differences which I know exist, you consider the immediate assignment of General Edward G. Lansdale to Vietnam as an assistant to Ambassador Taylor, with sufficient authority under his overall leadership, to direct U. S. political and psychological warfare efforts.

I make this recommendation because I have been tremendously impressed by General Lansdale personally, and even more impressed by the many accounts I have heard of his accomplishments in the Far East and by some of his writings on the problems of political and psychological warfare.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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General Lansdale, as you know, enjoys a near legendary reputation in the Far East as a result of his collaboration with President Magsaysay in putting down the Huk insurrection and as a result of his later exploits in Vietnam.

In 1950, when the Communist Huks seemed about to take over the Philippines, General Lansdale (at that time a Lt. Col.) was assigned as liaison officer to Ramon Magsaysay, then recently named Philippine Secretary of Defense. Although technically assigned to JUSMAG, Lansdale actually worked under the U. S. Ambassador and acted as a friend and advisor to Magsaysay during his successful campaign against the Huks and afterwards through the 1953 elections, when he became President of the Philippines. For this service, Lansdale received the National Security Medal from our National Security Council.

In 1954 after the Geneva Accords, General Lansdale (then a Colonel) was sent to Vietnam in a special effort by the United States to keep it from falling into Communist hands. Attached to MAAG and operating under General O'Daniel and the Ambassador, Lansdale acted as a close personal advisor to President Diem, to Vietnamese Army leaders and to many other Vietnamese leaders and officials in political, internal security, psychological warfare and counterinsurgency matters. His effective assistance in their hour of need, when few thought South Vietnam would survive, won him the friendship and high respect of many Vietnamese.

According to all accounts, Lansdale possesses an almost unique ability to get the Vietnamese and other Asians to do what they ought to do, without feeling that they are being pushed around by foreigners. Indeed, I have heard it said of him that he is one of the few Americans who could get an Asian army to fight to the death behind him.

I am impressed not only by what I have heard about Lansdale but by his burning desire to get back to Vietnam and by his confidence that the situation can still be saved. Men who possess such absolute confidence frequently turn out to be right; and in Lansdale's case, his past record of accomplishment certainly suggests that his self-confidence may once again be justified. To me it seems a terrible tragedy that a man with Lansdale's rare qualifications should have been retired from the Army while still in the prime of life and should be stuck away in the "Food for Peace" program where his essential talents are completely wasted. I hope that some means can be found of returning him to active duty in Vietnam.

Tom Dodd

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September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Booklet on Vietnam

I have further reviewed the Vietnamese question & answer booklet which I showed you the other night, and by agreement with Bob Manning in the State Department we have put it on ice. While today's errors of emphasis could be corrected, there is just no way of knowing what else might get out of whack in the next two months, and history suggests that "white papers" of this sort attract more criticism than they prevent.

We do not think the news that a number of copies were printed will leak, but if it does, we will simply say that our position is being stated in another way in the light of the steadily developing situation. There will, of course, be speeches on South Vietnam as time goes on by appropriate spokesmen.

This memo is for information only, unless you have further guidance.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 2, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to General LeMay

General LeMay left behind a 4-page single-spaced letter to you after his visit last week. Bob McNamara and I have both studied this letter and we both think it ought to have an answer for the record. I attach a draft which he and I concur in recommending. LeMay's letter argues generally for the two systems he discussed with you -- the Advanced Interceptor and the Advanced Bomber. More specifically, he asks for an authorization to reprogram \$33 million of FY 65 money for the Interceptor, and authorization to spend the \$32 million of FY 65 funds that Congress appropriated for the Advanced Bomber. McNamara is strongly opposed to making either of these decisions now. I assume that you do not want to overrule him.

The draft answer puts these questions in a framework for budgetary decision in November and December, and I myself doubt very much if LeMay's letter provides the basis for any serious political trouble between now and then. On the other hand, it is always possible that the Goldwater forces will be given a sniff of this issue and make a fuss about it. In one sense, therefore, a different and affirmative answer to LeMay might have some insurance in it.

So while I think it is safe to send this letter, it may be even safer to have one more talk with Bob McNamara face to face. I simply am not sure how far you may have gone with him in conversation already.

McG. B.

Letter approved and signed _____

Ask McNamara to call me on this _____

Put it on the docket for next Tuesday _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSL/lt. 7-15-77

By MBA, NARS, Date 7-27-77

Sept. , 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is a letter from Inoué which arrived during the convention and which I do not think you saw. There is nothing urgent about it, but I believe you like to be informed of the existence of such messages. The essence of it is covered in Bob Komer's short memo.

McG. B.

September 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Valenti

**SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador
Howard Jones**

Dean Rusk and I join in urging that you receive Ambassador Howard Jones -- our man in Indonesia -- for just a few moments and a picture before he goes back to Djakarta, preferably Thursday, but this afternoon if you prefer.

Sukarno is as unreliable and dangerous as he can be, but he is susceptible to personal Presidential influence, and Jones will be able to do a stronger job for U. S. interests if Sukarno has clear evidence that he comes from you and speaks for you. This is the more true because, especially since President Kennedy's death, Sukarno has persuaded himself that he had a close personal relationship with JFK.

This is worth three minutes of your time on many grounds.

McG. B.