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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Question & Answer Booklet on Vietnam

The attached question & answer booklet on Vietnam was just about ready to go last week when Khanh began to have his troubles. It has been extensively reviewed within the government and it seems pretty sensible to most of us, but Khanh's troubles do call in question one or two passages like those marked at the bottom of page 4. We still think it would be better to go ahead, with revision if it can be quickly done, but it is agreed that you ought to have a chance to pass on this decision if you want.

McG. B.

Let it go \_\_\_\_\_

Let it go, only with revision \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Mac - Please read very  
carefully - make sure all  
words are correct - and  
then your imprimatur  
on it will be appreciated.  
WBS/JV  
9/1/64

"TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING-FILE"

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cuban Commuters at Guantanamo

I reviewed with Bob McNamara the problem of the Cuban commuters at Guantanamo, and he tells me that while he himself would like to get the commuters down to zero, he advises against any further action before the election. The Navy has strenuously resisted the reductions we have made so far, and it is quite possible that there would be unfriendly leaks to the press if we go further in the next two months. These leaks could be tied together by the Kurzmans and the Szulces of the world in a critical way. On the other hand, we are getting no criticism for the situation we have now, and our position is, if anything, stronger than the responsible military officers themselves would have recommended.

So Bob believes that the matter can well be left where it is for now. I agree with him.

McG. B.

All right \_\_\_\_\_

Leave it alone for now \_\_\_\_\_

I am still not persuaded, and we should discuss it at our next luncheon \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Navy Ltr. 4/27/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

47

September 1, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 12:30, September 1**

This is a briefing meeting only and should not lead to any major decisions. I have asked John McCone to be ready to lead off with a general intelligence briefing of 5 to 10 minutes (he has not had a chance to do this for sometime, and it will be useful for members of the Council to get caught up on some basic Agency assessments).

Dean Rusk will follow with a general comment on the current major issues.

The whole meeting should not take more than 15 or 20 minutes unless you wish to pursue discussion on any particular subject.

After that, John McCone hopes to meet privately with you in your study. He quite understands that problems arising out of the Convention may come up at the lunch and is happy not to be present there.

McCone's own agenda includes the question of briefing for Humphrey and Miller, and permission for a tour of NATO capitals in the last ten days of September. He may also raise his usual question of contact with Eisenhower.

McG. B.

August 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pending Protectionist Legislation

The attached memorandum from Ball and Herter asks for your help in enlisting the Leadership against a number of minor but irritating protectionist moves in Congress.

At Tab A is the short, clear, Ball/Herter memo.

At Tab B is a summary of the items to which they raise reasonable objection.

At Tab C is a summary of arguments on each bill.

I join with them in hoping that you will be willing to spend 5 or 10 minutes with the Leadership to get attention to beating these proposals. They are typical protectionist measures and they will involve the usual danger of retaliation -- and of course there are quite understandable pressures behind each of them which can only be countered by arguments of the over-all national interest.

McG. B.

cc: Mr. O'Brien

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Welcome back!

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC 68 8/31/77

By

JK King

NARS, Date

9/14/77

Our only really serious international problem is South Vietnam, but that could hardly be more serious. The immediate situation is that we just do not know whether Khanh still has it in him to resume full control. Taylor and Johnson saw him today and urged him once more to do so, and he indicated that he probably would go back to Saigon later this week and see what he could do. We here all agree that we ought to stay with him solidly, so that if he falls it will in no sense be our doing. A draft letter of encouragement from you to him is being considered by Max Taylor overnight, and we should have his advice on whether to use it in the morning. Meanwhile, Taylor's return home has been rescheduled tentatively for September 7, and if things have not improved by then, our current inclination is to have Alexis Johnson come instead and keep Max on the job out there.

The larger question is whether there is any course of action that can improve the chances in this weakening situation. A number of contingency plans for limited escalation are in preparation. They involve three kinds of activities -- naval harassments, air interdiction in the Laos panhandle, and possible U.S. fleet movements resuming a presence on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin. The object of any of these would be more to heighten morale and to show our strength of purpose than to accomplish anything very specific in a military sense -- unless and until we move toward a naval quarantine.

One other possibility which we are discussing is the increase of a U.S. military presence in South Vietnam, perhaps by a naval base, or perhaps by landing a limited number of Marines to guard specific installations. Bob McNamara is very strongly against the latter course, for reasons that are not clear to me, and you may wish to question him on it if we have a luncheon meeting tomorrow.

A still more drastic possibility which no one is discussing is the use of substantial U. S. armed forces in operations against the Viet Cong. I myself believe that before we let this country go we should have a hard look at this grim alternative, and I do not at all think that it is a repetition of Korea. It seems to me at least possible that a couple of brigade-size units put in to do specific jobs about six weeks from now might be good medicine everywhere.

~~TOP SECRET~~

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68/31/77

By JK/VMG, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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Our only really serious international problem is South Vietnam, but that could hardly be more serious. The immediate situation is that we just do not know whether Khanh still has it in him to resume full control. Taylor and Johnson saw him today and urged him once more to do so, and he indicated that he probably would go back to Saigon later this week and see what he could do. We here all agree that we ought to stay with him solidly, so that if he falls it will in no sense be our doing. A draft letter of encouragement from you to him is being considered by Max Taylor overnight, and we should have his advice on whether to use it in the morning. Meanwhile, Taylor's return home has been rescheduled tentatively for September 7, and if things have not improved by then, our current inclination is to have Alexis Johnson come instead and keep Max on the job out there.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

McG, B.

August 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I would give it just as it is, but knowing your hatred of length, I have marked with brackets some places where it can safely be cut.

The principal additions since you last saw it are two: a discussion of the Convention's work as you requested, and some sentences on page 2 and 4 which emphasize the fact that this is not merely your personal choice, but a choice based on wide consultation and commanding general approval.

McG. B.

My fellow Americans. My fellow Democrats. Sensation-seeking columnists and commentators:

I thank the Convention for the honor it has done me.

I will be with you tomorrow to begin the march toward an overwhelming victory for our Party and our Nation.

In the last three days you have made a great start toward that victory. You have built a platform on which I am proud to stand -- a platform built on solid performance and framed for a future of prosperity and peace.]

In your settlement of the problem of credentials, you have found a fair answer to honest differences among honorable men.

On the one hand, you have done what law and order required in seating those who were duly elected and who mean to stay with our Party.

On the other hand, you have made new room for new voices which deserve to be heard in our nation at large.]

You have struck a magnificent keynote through the eloquence of the outstanding Senator from Rhode Island, John Pastore. You have reaffirmed our enduring values through your beloved permanent chairman, Mr. Rayburn's friend and his worthy successor, John McCormack of Massachusetts.

I too, have been working -- to carry out my obligation,  
under a very old American tradition.

For it is the traditional task of your Presidential nominee  
to recommend -- for your deliberation -- a candidate for Vice  
President of the United States.

I have such a recommendation.

I have reached it after consultations with leaders of the  
Democratic Party in every section of the country, and at every  
level of government.

I have reached it after discussion with outstanding Americans  
in every area of our national life.

I have reached it after long and prayerful private thought --  
[consulting my own experience of that office and the burdens it  
can bring.]

All of this has had a single guide: To find a man best qualified  
to assume the office of President of the United States should that  
day come.

I have found such a man.

He has been tested and proven in our democratic process of  
political campaign and election.

He has had long [and distinguished] experience in public life  
as a legislator and as an executive. [And every step has been marked by  
excellence and achievement.]

He knows every part of this nation /and the problems of our people.7

He also knows the world and its problems, and has shown understanding and a deep concern for the strength of our nation and the peace of the world.

He matches energy in the fight with compassion of the needs of others. He matches strong convictions with understanding of the convictions of others.

If you select him, you can proudly say to the American people: This is not a sectional choice. This is not merely a way to balance the ticket. This is, simply, the best man for the job.

The qualities he brings to office will help make the Vice Presidency an important instrument of the Executive branch.

From that office he can help connect Congress to the White House -- and help carry America to the world.

And I will feel strengthened knowing he is at my side in the great work of the government.7

Nothing has given me greater support in the past nine months than my knowledge of President Kennedy's confidence that I could continue the task he began.

I have found a man I can trust in the same way.

This confidence and this recommendation are not mine alone. They represent the enthusiastic conviction of the great majority of our Party.

They will, I am sure, receive the overwhelming support of the American people.

I hope that you will choose -- as the next Vice President of the United States -- my close and trusted colleague -- Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota.

Remarks of the President

August 26, 1964

12:10 pm

5:10 Wm. F. Buckley

My fellow Americans. My fellow Democrats. Sensation seeking columnists and commentators:

[For these three days I have followed your Convention closely.]

You can be proud of what you have achieved and the way you have conducted the affairs of a great party. Although I haven't understood why you need to keep on all those lights.

I deeply appreciate the high honor you have done me.

And I will be with you tomorrow, to begin the march toward an overwhelming victory for our party and our nation.

We have a very old tradition.

It is the duty of your Presidential nominee to recommend --  
for your deliberation -- a candidate for Vice President of the United States.

I have such a recommendation.

I have reached it after consultations with leaders of the Democratic Party in every section of the country, and at every level of government.

I have reached it after discussion with outstanding Americans in every area of our national life.

I have reached it after long and prayerful private thought -- consulting my own experience of that office and the burdens it can bring.

All of this has had a single guide: To find a man best qualified to assume the office of President of the United States should that day come.

I have found such a man.

He has been tested and proven in our democratic process of political campaign and election.

He has had long experience in public life as<sup>a</sup> legislator and as an executive. And every step has been marked by excellence and achievement.

He knows every part of this nation and the problems of our people.

He also knows the world and its problems, and has shown understanding and a deep concern for the strength of our freedom and the peace of the world.

He matches energy in the right with compassion for the needs and weaknesses of others. He matches strong convictions with understanding of the convictions of others.

If you select him, you can proudly say to the American people: This is not a sectional choice. This is not merely a way to balance the ticket. This is, simply, the best man for the job.

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From that office ~~he~~ he can help connect Congress to the White House -- and help carry America to the world.

And I will feel strengthened knowing he is at my side in the great work of government.

Nothing has given me greater support in the past nine months than my knowledge of President Kennedy's confidence that I could continue the task he began.

*I have found a man ~~whom~~ I can trust in the same way.*  
~~I, too, am confident that, should he be called, he too~~

~~can continue.~~

This confidence and this recommendation <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ not mine alone. <sup>They</sup> ~~It~~ represents the enthusiastic conviction of the great majority of our party.

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Remarks of the President  
August 26, 1964

My fellow Americans. My fellow Democrats. Sensation-seeking columnists and commentators:

I thank the Convention for the honor it has done me.

I will be with you tomorrow to begin the march toward overwhelming victory ~~we~~ for our Party and our Nation.

Already in the last three days you have made a great start toward that victory. You have built a platform on which I am proud to stand -- a platform built on solid performance and framed for a future of prosperity and peace.

In your settlement of the problem of credentials, you have found a fair answer to honest differences among honorable men. On the one hand, you have done what law and order required in seating those who were duly elected and who mean to stay with our Party. On the other hand, you have made new room for new voices which deserve to be heard in our nation at large. <sup>If</sup> You have struck a keynote of rare eloquence through <sup>the outstanding</sup> ~~my old friend, the great~~ Senator from Rhode Island, John Pastore, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> you have reaffirmed enduring values through your beloved permanent chairman, Mr. Rayburn's friend and his worthy successor, John McCormack of Massachusetts. <sup>If</sup> I, too, have been working while you have worked

to carry out my <sup>obligation,</sup> ~~duty~~ under a very old American tradition.

For it is the <sup>traditional task</sup> ~~duty~~ of your Presidential nominee to recommend --  
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####

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached at Tab A is a request from Ball and Herter that, at your next meeting, you ask the leadership to help defeat six protectionist special-interest bills now pending (list below), and to hold the line against other similar cats and dogs during the last few weeks of the session. Specifically, you might wish to

- Give them copies of the attached list (Tab B) which describes the present status of each bill.
- Emphasize that your objections go beyond the specifics -- that you are concerned about the over-all trade policy image of the Administration, both at home and abroad. (Coming on top of beef, the Saylor Buy-American Amendment, and the wool and shoe missions, if several of these bills go through, and are not vetoed, we shall certainly be charged with a wholesale retreat on trade policy, and be faced with wholesale retaliation.)
- Tell them that you have instructed the heads of all appropriate departments, and O'Brien et al, to give the leadership full support in holding the line.

On the list below, the first five bills stand by themselves. The first three have passed the House (steel containers, brooms, electron microscopes). Numbers 4 and 5 are awaiting action on the House floor (woven labels, seed screenings). Item 6, the extra long-staple cotton rider to the Senate version of the PL 480 bill, has passed the Senate and may be tacked on to the House bill on the floor next week.

The list is as follows:

1. Steel Shipping Container Bill (H.R. 5673) would require U.S. producers of containers using imported steel to mark on their containers the country where the steel was produced. It would impose a record-keeping chore on U.S. producers, discriminate in favor of firms producing containers made of other materials, set a precedent for marking regulations in other industries, and is likely to trigger retaliation. (The bill was introduced by Rep. Roberts, D-Ala., has passed the House, and is now in the Senate Commerce Committee.)

2. Duty Increase on Brooms (H.R. 5986), from the present 25% ad val. to 50-100% ad val. Domestic production has risen from \$22 million in 1958 to \$28 million in 1962; imports, at their peak in 1962, amounted to only \$867,000, about 3% of consumption. The increase would damage Mexico and would be regarded in Latin America as contrary to our expressed interest in helping them expand their export earnings under the Alliance. In 1963, President Kennedy ruled against a tariff increase on brooms. (Introduced by Rep. Collier, R-Ill., the bill passed the House and is now in the Senate Finance Committee.)

3. Electron Microscope Bill (H.R. 2874), would remove from the "free list" microscopes imported on behalf of certain non-profit organizations. The duty would be 22% ad val. and would impinge on universities, hospitals, and government research institutions. It would invite retaliation by countries (e.g., UK, Germany, France) which now permit duty-free import of U.S. produced scientific instruments. (Introduced by the late Rep. Green, D-Pa., and strongly supported by RCA, the bill passed the House and is now in the Finance Committee.)

4. Woven Labels Marking Bill (H.R. 4994), requiring that all imported woven textile labels have woven in them the country of origin. It would place a burden on U.S. importers, set a precedent, and trigger retaliation. (Introduced by Rep. McDonald, D-Mass., the bill has been given a rule by the Rules Committee and is awaiting action on the House floor.)

5. Seed Screenings Bill (H.R. 3607) would prohibit all imports of screenings, on the ground that they contain noxious weed seeds. There is no restriction on domestic screenings of similar composition. The domestic industry does not need protection; imports of mixed-feeds have declined and represent less than 1% of domestic production. The bill would violate GATT, impair a tariff concession to Canada, and would probably induce retaliation. (Introduced by Rep. Short, R-N.Dak., the bill was reported favorably by the Agriculture Committee and is slated for the Consent Calendar for September 7.)

6. Extra Long-Staple Cotton Amendment to PL 480 (S. 2687), would direct the President to dispose of CCC stock of domestically produced ELS cotton at the world price (i.e., at less than the domestic support price). Such subsidized sale would violate our explicit commitment of last spring to Peru, would cause trouble with the UAR and the Sudan, might be judged in violation of the GATT, and would tend to lead to a larger domestic marketing quota and hence aggravate the surplus problem. (The ELS provision is in the Senate bill which passed last week. Supporters will try to tack it on to the House bill which is on the floor under an open rule.)

McG. B.

August 25, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Your meeting with General LeMay

1. We understand that General LeMay plans to discuss two Air Force projects:
  - (a) the IMI -- improved manned interceptor;
  - (b) The AMSA -- advanced manned strategic aircraft (big bomber).
2. General LeMay's understanding is that you invited this conversation in Texas in December, and I think your proposed comment is excellent: It has taken him eight months to make his proposal, and it is not unreasonable for you to ask for four months before a final decision is made on matters of this magnitude.
3. LeMay's proposal is still before the Joint Chiefs and no paper has come from the Chiefs to the DOD. In the normal course, a program of this sort should be reviewed by the Chiefs, by DOD, and by your own staff -- Budget, Science Advisor, and my office -- before the matter comes to you for final decision.
4. You may wish to tell General LeMay of your surprise and disappointment that the WASHINGTON STAR should have a full account of the bomber project.
5. Ted Clifton tells me that by his scuttlebutt the top Air Force is not in fact in contact with Senator Goldwater. From the internal evidence of recent Goldwater speeches, I am inclined to accept this report -- no serious Air Force officer could have made the kind of errors of fact that Goldwater has repeatedly made on one technical matter after another. The temperamental and sentimental type knocloubt exist, but some of Clifton's good Air Force friends tell him that Goldwater strikes them as too dangerous to deal with, at least at present.

These reports, and the really kooky quality of Goldwater's continuing public statements on nuclear weapons, raise the question whether we should not at some stage draw a sharp line between responsible Air Force thinking and Goldwater's chatter. I doubt if you will want to explore this problem with LeMay, but you may want to listen to him with this question in mind.

LeMay is acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be joining you in the NSC meeting which follows directly after your conference with him.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

August 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 13:30 P. M.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8/31/77

By JK/KMG, NARS, Date 9/14/77

This is a short meeting designed only for information briefing on two subjects: South Vietnam and Cyprus. Rusk will lead on Vietnam, and Ball on Cyprus.

The situation in Vietnam is edgy; Khanh is having real trouble with the Buddhists, and his position is threatened -- though so far he has kept the real power. There may be further discussion, still of a preliminary sort, at luncheon.

On Cyprus, one act is ended and the next has not yet begun. Acheson's Geneva effort has broken down, for the moment, but George Ball & Company have not yet settled on the next course.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

567  
August 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC meeting, 12:30 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC/Sec 8/31/77

By

JK/mg

NARS, Date

9/14/77

This is a short meeting designed only for information briefing on two subjects: South Vietnam and Cyprus. On South Vietnam there may be further discussion, still of a preliminary sort, at luncheon.

On Cyprus, one act is ended and the next has not yet begun. Acheson's Geneva effort has broken down, for the moment, but George Ball & Company have not yet settled on the next course.

McG. B.

August 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Backing from the Establishment

1. I know that you are hard at work on this one already, but I hear mutterings around the edges which suggest that we may not be doing as well as we should with the very first team of businessmen, bankers, et al. Bob Anderson has a much bigger reputation here than in New York, and he is somewhat discounted in any event as an old friend governed by personal affection.

2. I think the key to these people is McCloy. He is for us, but he is under very heavy pressure from Eisenhower and others to keep quiet. I have told him that this is no posture for a man trained by Stimson, and I think he agrees in his heart, but I also think that in the end the person to whom he will want to say "yes" is you. He belongs to the class of people who take their orders from Presidents and nobody else.

3. My suggestion is that you should call him and ask him down for a frankly political discussion next week. I think he would come with pleasure (his trip to Nasser is off), and I think that if you put it to him straight he will give you a straight answer -- and an affirmative one -- within a few days. I think with McCloy on your side, a remarkable bunch of people can be gathered; ~~and~~ this is something he does extremely well.

4. McCloy is personally very much in favor of Hubert Humphrey, and if in fact that is your decision, you might make a lot of money by telling McCloy just before you tell the country. He is a man who could keep a secret, but, like the rest of us, he would like to know ahead of time.

McG. B.

*Suspense*  
*returned*  
*8/24*  
*58*

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 22, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Halleck's remarks on the Gulf of Tonkin timing

On August 11, in the House, Charlie Halleck made the following statement:

"As I remember it -- and I have checked with some others who were there -- we were told that nothing should be said about this proposed retaliatory move and no one, not even the President, would say anything about it until our planes were over the targets. Only then, it was said, would the President explain the matter to the people over television and radio."

I have checked this against my own notes, against those of Walter Jenkins, which are much more complete, and against the recollection of the Speaker, Secretary Rusk, Senators Humphrey, Mansfield and Russell, and General Wheeler. Both the notes and the recollections of all of those named refute Mr. Halleck's statement. None of us heard any such statement; all of us are convinced that no such statement was made. All of us recall, and our notes show, that you gave explicit warning to the Leadership not to discuss this matter because of possible danger to our forces, and that you made it clear that your own statement would be carefully timed in this connection. But you also read the statement word for word, and therefore the Leadership heard you say exactly what the statement says about timing, namely, that (at the time of the statement) "air action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities of North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations." This language was most carefully chosen; it was precisely accurate.

The evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Halleck's memory has failed him, and if he should return to the charge, I believe that his error should be nailed at once. I also believe the Congressional Record should be set straight when Congress returns, perhaps by Carl Albert -- but I think we should wait till then. I have not gone after Albert yet (he's in Atlantic City), but I'm sure he'll do it for us if you want.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Halleck's remarks on the Gulf of Tonkin timing

On August 11, in the House, Charlie Halleck made the following statement:

"As I remember it -- and I have checked with some others who were there -- we were told that nothing should be said about this proposed retaliatory move and no one, not even the President, would say anything about it until our planes were over the targets. Only then, it was said, would the President explain the matter to the people over television and radio."

I have checked this against my own notes, against those of Walter Jenkins, which are much more complete, and against the recollection of the Speaker, Secretary Rusk, Senator Humphrey, Senator Mansfield, Senator Russell and General Wheeler. ~~and neither the notes nor the recollection of any one of those named supports Mr. Halleck's statement.~~ <sup>all</sup> All of us recall, and our notes show, that you gave explicit warning to the Leadership not to discuss this matter because of possible danger to our forces, and that you made it clear that your own statement would be carefully timed in this connection. But you also read the statement word for word, and therefore the Leadership heard you say exactly what the statement says about timing, namely, that <sup>at the time of your</sup> ~~your~~ <sup>statement</sup> ~~statement~~ "air action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities of North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations." *This language was most carefully chosen; it was precisely accurate.*

The evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Halleck's memory has failed him, and if he should return to the charge, I believe that his error should be nailed. ~~But I would wait for such a renewed accusation because I believe that at the moment we are far ahead of the game on this particular matter. I have discussed the question of an immediate answer with Secretary Vance, and he joins in this recommendation.~~

~~In any event I believe the Congressional Record should be set straight~~  
when Congress returns, ~~but~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> by McG. B.

Carl Albert -- but I think we ~~can~~ <sup>should</sup> wait till then. I have not gone after Albert yet (he's in Atlantic City), but I'm sure he'll do it for us if you want.

None of <sup>heard</sup> ~~in~~ ~~remember~~  
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~~Get Albert's name~~

60 Y  
Gator dead

August 21, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

Attached are memoranda from Ball and Herter recommending that there be no Presidential message or ceremony in connection with the signing of the beef bill tomorrow. I am inclined to think they are right.

McG. B.

Attachments:

61  
August 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Walter Lippmann called in today to ask about South Vietnam. He had noticed that in Europe, Lodge said that the solution must be political, and asked if this meant a change of policy. I told him no -- that we had always believed that in the end this was a political problem. He seemed content.

I then asked him if he had any message for you, and he said that the one thing that was on his mind was the Vice Presidency. He himself believes that the basic quality of the man you choose is what counts, and he asked me to say that on this score he thought most thoughtful observers would be most impressed by a choice of Hubert Humphrey. I said that our impression was that very few votes would be moved one way or another by any of the presently possible choices, and Walter at once said he thought the polls might well be misleading on this point. He thinks that the Vice Presidency will inevitably be very much in people's minds as we move on toward the moment of election, and that the Republicans have made themselves extraordinarily vulnerable by picking Miller. Lippmann said that Humphrey both has and deserves a reputation among informed men as a man of outstanding ability, experience, and quality, to serve as your running mate.

I asked Lippmann if there was anyone whom he would particularly oppose on these grounds, and he said that the one name that really bothered him was Mike Mansfield. He thought Mansfield was a man of great integrity and fine personal character, but not at all fitted for the task of Presidential leadership (this comment interested me because I agree with it but would not have expected that Walter would).

I asked Walter about McCarthy and he said that while he thought very highly of him, he did not believe that it would be wise or well understood if you went past the senior Senator in this case.

I told Walter that I was sure you were getting lots of free advice on this topic, and that I doubted very much if the published advice of friends like Scotty Reston was likely to strike you as helpful. He agreed warmly and reminded me that I had started by asking him if he had any message for you.

I pass this in, even at the risk of intrusion, because as a matter of fact it represents my own strong conviction too. I very much believe that Hubert is the right choice both in politics and in national policy. I barely know

Gene McCarthy, and what I know about him I like very much, but friends whom I deeply respect feel very strongly the other way, and I do agree with Walter that in spite of Scotty's snotty advice, a Johnson-Humphrey ticket would be the strongest -- and would help the most to make clear your high concept of both jobs.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

62  
August 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination for increased military assistance to Laos

Attached is a recommendation from the Bureau of the Budget and AID (with the concurrence of State and Defense) that you sign an Amendment of Determination No. 65-2 to permit increased military assistance to Laos.

This determination will raise the ceiling for defense articles to Laos in FY 65 from \$8.9 million (out of a total program of \$15.9 million) to \$31.5 million (out of a new total of \$44.5 million).

You signed an initial determination for a FY 65 increase in aid to Laos on July 9th. Since that time, however, we have undertaken major new commitments, particularly in support of Operation Triangle, which, as you know, has been surprisingly successful.

The new estimates assume a continuation of present high rates of ammunition use and air support activity through November. (The shape of future air action in Laos is now under policy review and will be before you next week, but the present determination is needed in any case to cover past actions.)

I should add that although the Bureau of the Budget queried Defense as to the adequacy of the \$31.5 million figure in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, Defense has chosen to stick with this estimate. At this figure we remain comfortably below the \$50 million P. D. limit set by Congress.

Given the fluidity of the Laos situation, this package strikes me as reasonable.

McG. B.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Hold till we talk \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSCltt 8/31/77  
By JK/mcg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

Tanner  
8/21 63 (ja)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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-2-

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m.j. B.  
McG. B.

64  
1

August 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Hubert Humphrey did a long but excellent speech on Vietnam in California on Sunday. We gave him a lot of help on it, and it got a good play out there, although not here. Since this was done pursuant to a request of yours some time back (but delayed by the Gulf of Tonkin affair), we think you may want to have a glance at it. The Senator was very responsive to all our suggestions and comments.

McG. B.

65

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Alvin*

August 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message from you to Haile Selassie is designed to support a move by the Emperor to organize the Africans to help in the Congo. It is generally agreed that, given the Emperor's standing and pride, such a message is the best, and indeed the only, way of showing him U. S. support. The language has been checked up and down, and while it is a little longer than you would like, the Emperor's tastes are different.

The help involved here is primarily a matter of African political support for a restoration of order, but there may also be some Ethiopian and Nigerian troops, to which we would give logistic support.

McG. B.

McG. B.

*approved:*  
*JPB/M.B./my dr*  
*aug 20*  
*11:25 am*

*Called approval*  
*to Mr. Bush*  
*immediately*  
*my dr*

65a

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy LEOPOLDVILLE IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State let 6/6/77

By

rmg

, NARS, Date

7/18/77

LIMDIS

Please deliver following message from President to Emperor:

QUOTE

Your Majesty:

Ambassador Korry has reported to me your deep concern over events in the Congo. We share that concern.

I was personally gratified to learn that Your Majesty was considering a possible initiative in this problem. I believe that an initiative by Your Majesty would be particularly effective at this time. I recall the dramatic results of your most helpful assistance in the Algerian-Moroccan crisis last fall. Ambassador Korry has, perhaps, already informed you that we would consider most favorably any move which Your Majesty might feel appropriate to strengthen the authority of the central government of the Congo under President Kasavubu and to help establish peace and order under that government.

The events in the Congo are moving rapidly and posing a most serious problem to President Kasavubu and his government. The sacking of Baudouinville by the rebels who destroyed hundreds of dwellings and news of rebel entry into Bukavu highlight the threat of anarchy in the Congo and increase the need for quick and effective action.

AF/AFN:DDNewsom:ch:8/20/64

/ M - Governor Harriman

White House/Mr. Brubeck

S/S -

AF - Mr. Fredericks

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The United States has, from the beginning, sought to preserve the unity of the Congo under the central government. To this end, we joined with the African nations, as Your Majesty well knows, in the massive effort of the United Nations. The preservation of the unity of the Congo and the restoration of peace and order remain our basic objectives. We have strongly supported a solution within an African framework and the principal reliance on African security forces. I can assure you that our own recent efforts in response to requests for assistance from the Government of the Congo are part of our continuing effort to support the unity of this important nation and are designed only to undergird and supplement efforts in the same direction by the nations of Africa.

I wish Your Majesty every success as you deal with this, as well as other, critical problems in the great continent of Africa.

Lyndon B. Johnson

UNQUOTE

END

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NLJ 96-302  
By us, NARA Date 6-27-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: T-28/Helicopter incident in Laos

At 3 AM today Cy Vance informed me that a T-28 with a Thai pilot was down in eastern Laos. The pilot had been seen to parachute, and air cover for a rescue operation was requested. Vance and I agreed that in the light of your judgment last week, this should be authorized, and a limited four-plane cover was approved for the remaining daylight hours (up to about 7 or 8 this morning, our time.)

Meanwhile, Ambassador Unger, on his own initiative, authorized a T-28 napalm strike in support of the rescue, with civilian American pilots aboard for control and management.

In executing the attempted rescue, a U. S. helicopter with an American pilot was shot down. Fortunately the pilot and crew of this helicopter were rescued by another helicopter. One of the fighter pilots covering the operation flamed out over Thailand, but the pilot ejected and has been rescued in good condition.

Finally, one of the T-28s covering the attempted rescue appears to have hit heavy weather in quite another sector of Laos. The plane is down but the pilot is believed to have parachuted safely. (The nationality of this pilot is ~~not fully determined~~, but is believed to be ~~Lao or Thai~~.)

Meanwhile, it is believed that the two Thais in the original T-28 have escaped into the brush and may be in the hands of friendly Mao tribesmen.

The net of this somewhat messy operation is that no Americans are lost, as far as we know, although the one helicopter pilot has been severely wounded.

Vance and I agree that T-28 operations and attendant contingency rescue planning need intense and immediate review, and that review is beginning. A particular problem is that Ambassador Unger authorized American civilian pilots in the T-28s against explicit Washington orders to the contrary. He was acting in an emergency situation, and it may well be that we have held him on too tight a guideline here, but a direct issue of action without authority does exist. Dean Rusk and I will try to bring you a more complete report on this aspect at lunch Wednesday.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

- (1) There is now some doubt whether napalm was in fact used.
- (2) Both Unger and Washington will try to keep this whole episode under maximum security, because of the unusually high degree of U. S. involvement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

65

67

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1964

Mr. President:

The attached brief statement seems to me to demolish Senator Goldwater's 90% charge, and a first reading with AEC and Defense suggests that it raises no question whatever with respect to declassification. I believe that we have not yet dealt with this charge and that it is important for us to do so. With Bob McNamara away, I would prefer this statement to be either a White House declaration or a comment by you at a press conference. In any event, I will go on getting clearances, and in the meantime I would be glad of any guidance you wish to give.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Hold for press conference \_\_\_\_\_

Prepare White House statement \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8/18/64

✓

Senator Goldwater said last week that sometime in the next ten years our deliverable nuclear capacity may go down by 90%. This is a statement totally without foundation in fact. It is false, and if the Senator would trouble to inform himself he would agree that it is false. People around him are saying that it is a simple matter of using unclassified data to multiply <sup>warhead</sup> ~~bomb~~ yields by delivery vehicles and then subtracting all the bombers. Quite aside from the fact that this is a most casual method of dealing with a very complex problem, it is a method which has led to a false conclusion, on at least four grounds.

First, raw megatonnage assigned to strategic forces is a poor measure of military effectiveness, as all informed persons know. A very big bomb that cannot be delivered has no military value. Thus a reduction in our megatonnage would not of itself say anything at all about our real nuclear power. Four years ago, for example, the Esienhower Administration decided -- quite rightly -- to phase out hundreds of very large bombs with a total yield of thousands of megatons, and to replace them with weapons of much lower yield and much greater effectiveness. That decision, which had the unanimous support of the JCS and Secretary Gates, led to a sharp reduction in the total yield of the stockpile. Yet our deliverable nuclear capacity continued to grow.

Second, the idea that all manned bombers are to be phased out is wholly unjustified. Our forward plans now go through fiscal 1972. Those plans include large numbers of strategic bombers at every stage. They

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority CSO 62-510199  
By pmg, NARS, Date 7/18/97

also include a deliverable megatonnage which is highly classified, but many times greater than the Senator's statement implies. No decision has yet been made about our needs beyond 1972, but we are making ample advance provision (1) for possible extension of the life of the B-52, (2) for research and development on new manned systems, and (3) for possible strategic uses of manned systems now in production. We will have manned bombers, and plenty of them, just as long as they are needed.

Third, the real deterrent strength of our strategic forces has steadily grown, in the terms that really count, for the last three years, and this growth in real strength will continue. Real strength must be measured by a whole set of tests: (1) Are the weapons hardened and dispersed, for protection against surprise attack? (2) Are there enough of them? (3) Are they accurate? (4) Are they the right size and design for the targets assigned? (5) Can they get through? (6) Can the strategic forces as a whole destroy their targets in all possible circumstances, with an ample margin of safety? Our strategic forces meet these tests, and will continue to meet them.

Fourth and finally, even on its own misleading terms the Goldwater statement is false. Even if all bombers were phased out entirely, and even if megatonnage were the one and only measure of deliverable nuclear capacity, the Senator's claim that our strength might be reduced by 90%

would be false. Bomber-delivered weapons will not constitute anything like 90% of our strategic force, by any measure, at any time in the next decade.

This unworthy accusation shows plainly the danger of jumping to hasty conclusions on the basis of bad information. Accurate information on this subject remains open to Senator Goldwater whenever he asks for it.

August 18, 1964

68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Atomic Energy Commission, in compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has forwarded for your approval a draft amendment to an agreement with the Government of Brazil. This draft amendment provides for an extension for a one-year period beyond the present expiration date of August 2, 1964. At the conclusion of this extension, responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities will be transferred to the International Atomic Energy Agency in keeping with U. S. policy.

The draft agreement has been reviewed and endorsed by the Bureau of the Budget. The substance of the proposed amendment has been concurred in by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Following formal execution of the revised agreement, it will be placed before the Joint Committee as required by law.

There is an element of urgency in obtaining your approval to permit the Atomic Energy Commission to present this draft amendment to the JCAE in order to obtain their approval and waiver of the standard thirty-day waiting period hopefully this week.

A letter for Dr. Seaborg is attached at Tab A, and I recommend your signature thereto.

This is routine, but it is inescapably Presidential.

McG. B.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Elmo Roper

I have read and discussed with Dean Rusk the letter and memorandum which you received last week from Elmo Roper (returned at Tab A).

Essentially Roper proposes a high-level U. S. Government commission to be appointed by you with a mandate to work with commissions appointed by other NATO governments. The compelling objection to this proposal is that there is just no evidence at all to support any notion that governmentally appointed commissions could now accomplish any of the things Roper has in mind. The brutal fact is that governmental discussions will involve the President of France in the first instance, and the President of France does not believe in proceeding in international matters through commissions of distinguished citizens. Nor does it serve any good purpose to give our differences with the General additional publicity right now.

The proposal has the additional disadvantage that the approach of our own election and the British election make this a poor time for serious work on the future organization of the alliance.

Secretary Rusk has repeatedly proposed to General Norstad and others in the Atlantic Council (of which Elmo Roper is a member) that the right thing for interested private citizens to do is to organize with like-minded private citizens abroad and produce non-governmental proposals for strengthening the Atlantic community. This is what Jean Monnet does continuously with his group of distinguished Europeans, and it is a much better instrument than the governmental commissions Roper proposes, at this stage.

Having received a number of Mr. Roper's letters in the past, we doubt very much that he is open to conversion on this point, and it is probably better for you to put the responsibility off on the rest of us, so I have drafted a letter to Roper (Tab B) which avoids details and refers him to Secretary Rusk and me.

McG. B.

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McG B

70  
August 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.

1 - 71  
DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

Authority NLS 96-302

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

By ju/ico, NARA, Date 10-15-98

August 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: T-28/Helicopter incident in Laos

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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August 18, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Authority NSC 8/31/77  
By JK/ung, NARS, Date 9/14/77

SUBJECT: Cyprus

This is the main topic for the NSC meeting tomorrow; it is moving rapidly toward the point of decision. The Turk air attacks and now Soviet threats have brought the issue to a boil.

Whether or not the Soviets are serious, the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks all seem to think so. The mood on the island has become violently anti-US and pro-Soviet, which makes the Acheson plan all the harder to achieve by agreement. Makarios may be playing with fire, but once again he has moved faster than Athens -- or ourselves.

The one saving grace may be that Moscow's move is scaring Greece and Turkey into seeing reason. They may at last find a common interest in preventing Makarios and Moscow from coming out on top. But speed seems imperative if we are to push through a settlement by fiat before the Makarios-Moscow axis is firmed up.

I. State seems to favor one more try at Geneva, in hopes that Athens and Ankara may at last stop haggling and strike a bargain. In fact, their positions are not too far apart. The gut issue is how large a base the Turks get and whether it should be sovereign or on a long term lease. It's not clear that we have yet said everything we should to press Greeks and Turks once more, and we'll push this with Ball tomorrow.

II. Should this fail, Acheson and Ball are thinking of a NATO pressure play to force a solution. In essence Acheson himself would split the remaining difference between Greeks and Turks. We would then ask all the NATO powers to join us in: (a) telling Greeks and Turks to buy; (b) calling on Greece on behalf of Guarantor Powers to restrain Makarios; and (c) if this fails to maintain order, declaring that whatever violence may occur must be confined to the island.

To latter end, NATO would declare that: (a) No NATO-supplied arms could be used by Greece and Turkey against each other -- if so, NATO will take measures to take back the arms and penalize the offender by denying him any more military aid; (b) the NATO powers would act under Article V to prevent Turk action against Greece or vice versa; and (c) if the Soviets intervened, NATO would move. This complex and

~~SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

ingenious plan raises several key questions:

A. Granted that a NATO umbrella is desirable, can we get enough members to play? Only a majority is technically needed, but if the Scandinavians or Low Countries balked, it would look thin. Would de Gaulle cause trouble? Would many insist on full explanation of the "Acheson award" or offer amendments?

B. What are the consequences of taking the play away from the UN and giving it to NATO? U Thant might be privately relieved, but can he publicly acquiesce? What about the SC resolutions?

C. Do we want in effect to put the Sixth Fleet between Greeks and Turks if they seem to be going for each other? This is what is called for, since we have the only power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

D. Could Greece really enforce the terms on the Cypriots? If Makarios smells a rat he'll appeal to the UN and to Moscow.

III. An alternative to bringing in NATO is Papandreou's scheme for instant enosis. He pleads that the only way to short-circuit the burgeoning Nicosia/Moscow axis is to impose enosis now. Then the Greeks would make a deal with the Turks. We feel the Turks would never buy unless the terms are worked out beforehand. But if they can be, Papandreou's plan may be simpler and more direct than the NATO scheme -- or perhaps the two can be combined so as to reinforce each other. If Greeks and Turks turned to NATO (knowing already what they'd get) we'd be home.

IV. The ultimate question is whether a Greek-Turk deal, assuming we could get one, can be imposed on the island. The evidence is quite inconclusive. Makarios has outmaneuvered the Greeks every time so far, and now he thinks he has Soviet backing. I think you will want to press George on this; the rest of us have not made much progress.

Finally, whatever road we take, we have all the ingredients of major crisis shortly. Makarios will try every trick he has, and the Soviets are now committed to make at least some trouble. Ball and Acheson must still carry the main load, but I think you'll want at least a daily report.

This is a brief summary, and I think it gives you what you need for tomorrow, but if you have time, the relevant cables are attached.

R. W. Komer

McG. B.

SECRET

(page 2 of 2 pages)

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403  
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~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cyprus

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 8/31/77  
By JK/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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The one saving grace may be that Moscow's move is scaring Greece and Turkey into seeing reason. They may at last find a common interest in preventing Makarios and Moscow from coming out on top. But speed seems imperative if we are to push through a settlement by fiat before the Makarios-Moscow axis is firmed up.

I. State seems to favor one more try at Geneva, in hopes that Athens and Ankara may at last stop haggling and strike a bargain. In fact, their positions are not too far apart. The gut issue is how large a base the Turks get and whether it should be sovereign or on a long term lease. It's not clear that we have yet said everything we should to press Greeks and Turks once more, and we'll push this with Ball tomorrow.

II. Should this fail, Acheson and Ball are thinking of a NATO pressure play to force a solution. In essence Acheson himself would split the remaining difference between Greeks and Turks. We would then ask all the NATO powers to join us in: (a) telling Greeks and Turks to buy; (b) calling on Greece on behalf of Guarantor Powers to restrain Makarios; and (c) if this fails to maintain order, declaring that whatever violence may occur must be confined to the island.

To latter end, NATO would declare that: (a) No NATO-supplied arms would be used by Greece and Turkey against each other -- if so, NATO will take measures to take back the arms and penalize the offender by denying him any more military aid; (b) the NATO powers would act under Article V to prevent Turk action against Greece or vice versa; and (c) if the Soviets intervened, NATO would move. This complex and

~~SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

ingenious plan sees several key questions:

A. Granted that a NATO umbrella is desirable, can we get enough members to play? Only a majority is technically needed, but if the Scandinavians or Low Countries balked, it would look thin. Would de Gaulle cause trouble? Would many insist on full explanation of the "Acheson award" or offer amendments?

B. What are the consequences of taking the play away from the UN and giving it to NATO? U Thant might be privately relieved, but can he publicly acquiesce? What about the SC resolutions?

C. Do we want in effect to put the Sixth Fleet between Greeks and Turks if they seem to be going for each other? This is what is called for, since we have the only power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

D. Could Greece really enforce the terms on the Cypriots? If Makarios smells a rat he'll appeal to the UN and to Moscow.

III. An alternative to bringing in NATO is Papandreou's scheme for instant enosis. He pleads that the only way to short-circuit the burgeoning Nicosia/Moscow axis is to impose enosis now. Then the Greeks would make a deal with the Turks. We feel the Turks would never buy unless the terms are worked out beforehand. But if they can be, Papandreou's plan may be simpler and more direct than the NATO scheme -- or perhaps the two can be combined so as to reinforce each other. If Greeks and Turks turned to NATO (knowing already what they'd get) we'd be home.

IV. The ultimate question is whether a Greek-Turk deal, assuming we could get one, can be imposed on the island. The evidence is quite inconclusive. Makarios has outmaneuvered the Greeks every time so far, and now he thinks he has Soviet backing. I think you will want to press George on this; the rest of us have not made much progress.

Finally, whatever road we take, we have all the ingredients of major crisis shortly. Makarios will try every trick he has, and the Soviets are now committed to make at least some trouble. Ball and Acheson must still carry the main load, but I think you'll want at least a daily report.

This is a brief summary, and I think it gives you what you need for tomorrow, but if you have time, the relevant cables are attached.

R. W. Komer

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

(page 2 of 2 pages)

of papers  
403  
letter 3x7  
letter 3x7  
letter 3x7

August 15, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sevilla Sacasa asked that you see this statement of his on the Gulf of Tonkin decision. I have acknowledged it and sent your thanks.

McG. B.

August 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dave Bell asks permission to leave town between mid-September and late October to make a trip through Asia and Africa. He has not inspected overseas operations in a serious way since he took on the AID job, and he feels as Dean Rusk does that this is a "very poor way to administer an organization which does most of its work overseas."

The only question is whether he might be needed in the campaign, and I have told him that in my judgment it is better for him to go and do this job of inspection. But if you have a different view, I can change this advice.

In any event, he will not go abroad until final passage of the Foreign Aid bills.

McG. B.

Bell should go \_\_\_\_\_

Bell should stay here until after election \_\_\_\_\_

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

As I said, I am going to Manchester tonight to see Mary and the children. Bromley Smith will be on duty for the rest of the day, and tonight and tomorrow Bob Komer will have the duty here. Both of them can be reached by the White House operators at any time, and each of them has my firm instruction to let you know of any important news in the national security field. I will be back on Monday, but if a check Sunday night shows that there is no particular crisis, I will probably not come the first thing in the morning.

The air service from Manchester is excellent, and if there is any serious crisis at any time, I will come right back.

McG. B.

CC: Mr. Valenti  
Mr. Moyers  
Mr. Reedy  
Mrs. Roberts

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sevilla Sacasa asked that you see this statement of his on the Gulf of Tonkin decision. I have acknowledged it and sent your thanks.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Thank him

L

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

EMBAJADA DE NICARAGUA  
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.


STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SEVILLA SACASA  
BEFORE THE VOICE OF AMERICA

The decision of President Johnson, in the face of the acts of hostility and aggression perpetrated against the armed forces of the United States, on the high seas, in the Gulf of Tonkin, has had significant echo in all the countries of the Free World.

The glorious North American nation has categorically stated, through the authorized voice of its leader, its firm determination to defend liberty and peace.

This decision of President Johnson's - solemn and characterized - elevates to an even higher plane the hierarchy of respect enjoyed by the United States of America in the world, as the nation wherein generosity and power are equally balanced. I salute President Johnson with the reiterated expressions of my highest esteem and admiration.

Washington, D. C.  
August 5, 1964.



August 14, 1964

78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SANITIZED

RE: 12 o'clock meeting on Southeast Asia

The immediate Southeast Asia situation has not changed since last night. If you have had time to read the paper, you can say so and reduce discussion by turning attention to specific questions. John McCone would like to open with a few minutes of intelligence briefing and I think this is helpful. The only significant new piece of intelligence is that we have some new

and no direct estimate is available today, but McCone may mention this new evidence on a most important problem.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

EO 12958 6.1(c)-25Yrs

(S)

You will want to ask Rusk for a brief discussion. The specific questions which I suggest are these:

1. You assume we plan to put these matters succinctly to CINCPAC and to Max Taylor for comment.
2. You understand there is difference of opinion about means of attacking the infiltration routes and especially on the question of U.S. aircraft. You would like to hear argument on this point.
3. Is there any consensus on the timing of the next DESOTO patrol and on its combat instructions.
4. You may wish to repeat to others what you have said to me about following upon Goldwater's assertion that you gave an admonition to commanders to use any weapons, including nuclear weapons. I have been pressing this with many newspaper men and find a surprising reaction -- which is that everyone knows Barry is this kind of fool and there is not much news in it any more! My own conclusion is that if you wish to put more light on this folly, you may have to do it yourself in a press conference, and I am working on possible language.
5. You may wish to ask Wheeler if the Army is using all its best -- and also its most experienced -- men in South Vietnam.

The general result of this meeting should be agreement on further study and refinement of a program in which we are free to take appropriate initiatives, together with an instruction to consult further in the Pacific. McNamara will be away all next week, and if the situation does not change sharply, we will probably not wish to make big decisions until his return on Monday, the 24th.

McG. B.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-304

By Cb, NARA Date 1-17-01

*Rec'd  
6:20 pm  
aug 13*

*29*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Senate added to the AID Bill a flat prohibition against aid to Indonesia today, by a lop-sided vote of about 68 to 25. The Secretary of State would like to make the attached statement, and Bill Fulbright tells him it gives him no problem in terms of impact on the prospects in conference. I believe the statement to be an accurate one, but we all agree that your political judgment is needed before it is made.

I will be waiting for a phone call.

McG. B.

*McG. B.  
I am - 7:15 - 7:30  
I am - 7:30 - 7:45*

*ans'd by phone  
mtds to Mr. Bundy  
w msg fr Pres.*

## PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The action of the Senate in adopting an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act terminating U. S. assistance to Indonesia is, in my judgment, an unwise limitation on the President's authority and discretion in the conduct of our foreign policy. Final adoption of such a provision by the Congress would be contrary to the best interests of the United States. Our present AID program consists of malaria eradication, certain technical assistance, and training of selected groups of Indonesians in the United States and through U. S. university and other American specialists in Indonesia.

I hope and believe that a full presentation of all the facts involved in this matter to the Conference Committee of the House and Senate will cause it to reconsider and to modify or eliminate this provision prior to final passage of the act.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is merely an extra note of insurance, but you may want to know that we have been asked by our friends in Santiago not to make any public recognition of Chile's break with Cuba. In response to this request, we are making no public statement at all, and when pressed by reporters we will say simply "This is a decision taken by a democratic government in the light of its own assessment of its international obligations, and that is all we need to say about it."

If we look as if we are interfering in any way, it will be bad for our friend Frei and good for the Communist-supported Allende.

The election prognosis continues favorable at the moment.

hcl. B.

McG. B.

OK  
L

CC: George Reedy

TOP SECRET

August 13, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum will be the main topic of discussion at the meeting scheduled for noon tomorrow, Friday. In the main, the paper speaks for itself, but you should know of a couple of important issues which it does not state directly.

The most important section of the paper begins on page 7 and deals with possible limited pressures forward in the direction you indicated in the Monday meeting. Within this section, on page 8, there is a discussion of cross-border operations into the Panhandle, and you should know that General Taylor and many others would now like to move toward U. S. air operations against the infiltration routes. Bob McNamara is strongly opposed. I think you may want to hear argument on both sides on this issue. Max Taylor's cable giving his view is attached at Tab A.

On page 9 there is a discussion of the de Soto patrol. There is difference of opinion on when this patrol should go back. Most of us here in Washington think it can wait ten days to two weeks (as the memo says on page 1). Max Taylor would like it to go almost right now, on grounds of signal to the Communists and encouragement to our friends. On this one also you may wish to hear argument.

More broadly, it occurs to me that this meeting may be a good time for you to emphasize again the priority we put on Saigon. At Tab B is a very private letter from Mike Forrestal to John McNaughton which shows that the Army is using rather routine assignment and reassignment methods there. A bit of questioning from you to Wheeler might do a lot of good on this point.

Finally, I will give you a one-sheet wrap-up on this before the noon meeting.

McG. B.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 8/31/77  
By JLK/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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~~TOP SECRET~~

August 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

August 10, 1964, 12:35 PM - Meeting in Cabinet Room

Present: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,  
Vance, Messrs. McCone, Wheeler, Reedy, McG. Bundy  
For second item: William Bundy, John McNaughton

1. Cyprus

Secretary Ball reported briefly on the events of recent days and concluded with a report that a cease-fire appeared now to be accepted, although fragile and precarious. In this situation, he felt that the prospects for successful negotiations were somewhat less gloomy than they have been. He reported that Mr. Acheson in Geneva was encouraged, that the Greeks have adopted a serious negotiating position and had added a serious negotiator, Sossides, to the Geneva operation. In summary, Mr. Ball believed that we should press to make the cease-fire stick, and move forward with Mr. Acheson's negotiations. The President agreed with this position.

2. Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone began with a brief report on the intelligence situation. He mentioned the report of a U-2 pilot over North Vietnam to the effect that missile bursts had been sighted and indicated his own inclination to discount the pilot's report. He reported existing intelligence on air and ground movements and mentioned the possibility that we might now face increased Communist air activity over Laos or intensified infiltration.

It was also reported that there might be a meeting of the three Laotian factions in Paris in August.

The Secretary of State indicated his own view that we should hold up on such actions as 34-A DeSoto patrol, or any other additions to our current course at least until we see what the other side does. He emphasized, as he has repeatedly before and since, the importance from his point of view of keeping the responsibility for escalation on the other side.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 68 8/31/77  
By Jkl/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

The Secretary of Defense indicated that our side was well prepared for a response to any likely form of escalation.

The President expressed his basic satisfaction with what had been accomplished in the last week. He said the reaction from Congress was good, and also from the people, judging by the polls. He said this response was quite a tribute to the Secretaries of State and Defense. He warned, however, that if we should fail in the second challenge, or if we should do nothing further, we could find ourselves even worse off than before this last set of events. The President did not wish to escalate just because the public liked what happened last week. We would have to pick our own ground, nonetheless, instead of letting the other side have the ball, we should be prepared to take it. He asked for prompt study and recommendations as to ways this might be done with maximum results and minimum danger. He did not believe that the existing situation would last very long.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 13, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

This is merely an extra note of insurance, but you may want to know that we have been asked by our friends in Santiago not to make any public recognition of Chile's break with Cuba. In response to this request, we are making no public statement at all, and when pressed by reporters we will say simply "This is a decision taken by a democratic government in the light of its own assessment of its international obligations, and that is all we need to say about it."

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The election prognosis continues favorable at the moment.

McG. B.

CC: George Reedy

August 13, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Senate added to the AID Bill a flat prohibition against aid to Indonesia today, by a lop-sided vote of about 68 to 25. The Secretary of State would like to make the attached statement, and Bill Fulbright tells him it gives him no problem in terms of impact on the prospects in conference. I believe the statement to be an accurate one, but we all agree that your political judgment is needed before it is made.

I will be waiting for a phone call.

McG. B.

## PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

84a

The action of the Senate in adopting an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act terminating U. S. assistance to Indonesia is, in my judgment, an unwise limitation on the President's authority and discretion in the conduct of our foreign policy. Final adoption of such a provision by the Congress would be contrary to the best interests of the United States. Our present AID program consists of malaria eradication, certain technical assistance, and training of selected groups of Indonesians in the United States and through U. S. university and other American specialists in Indonesia.

I hope and believe that a full presentation of all the facts involved in this matter to the Conference Committee of the House and Senate will cause it to reconsider and to modify or eliminate this provision prior to final passage of the act.

August 12, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Beef Legislation**

The attached memorandum from Chris Herter sets out his reasons for opposing any of the compromise proposals which are being suggested. However, he understands the Administration's and Wilbur Mills' problem and has not wanted personally to press his views on you.

Ball and Freeman will draft a compromise tomorrow morning, and will meet with the Conference tomorrow afternoon. Ball will let us know what if any help Mills might need on the floor.

McG. B.

August 11, 1964

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

I was about to send this acknowledgment in my name to the Mexican Ambassador, but it occurs to me that you might prefer to answer it yourself, or to hold up in the light of your concern about our relations with Mexico.

My own opinion, for what it is worth, is that meetings with Mexicans are a plus even after differences on an issue like the OAS Resolution.

**McG. B.**

Send your letter \_\_\_\_\_

Redraft for my signature \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

August 11, 1964

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The President has asked me to acknowledge with thanks yours of August 10 and to say how much he looks forward to meeting with President Diaz Ordaz at his ranch in October. The President agrees that the invitation should be extended promptly after your Congress has acted.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

His Excellency  
Antonio Carrillo Flores  
The Ambassador of Mexico  
2829 16th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

August 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I do think we should send a message to U Thant in reply to his telegram, and the paper I sent you over the week end may have got lost in the shuffle on the way back. Perhaps you will be willing to check the attached draft and see whether it comes somewhere near what you want.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

August 11, 1964

AGENDA FOR LUNCHEON

1. Next steps in Southeast Asia.
2. Appearances before the Platform Committee.
3. John McCloy's mission.
4. SAC airborne alert indoctrination.
5. Secretary of State's business.
6. Secretary of Defense's business.

August 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum to me from Bill Brubeck gives the up-to-date situation in the Congo as we now see it.

What is very unclear is how deep the Chinese hand is in the rebel efforts. Harriman thinks it is pretty deep; most of the intelligence community thinks it is more marginal.

Brubeck raises hard questions at the end of his memorandum, and I think that the dominant judgment at the moment is that we ought not go beyond the steps currently in train, and that particularly we should not now plan on sending a Special Forces battalion of U. S. forces -- that could only come if a lot of other people were willing to act, which is not currently the case. The CINC Strike C-130 force is another matter because of its relation to a possible need for evacuation of Americans.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

90  
L

August 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here, as promised, is Max Taylor's country team report. I know he would greatly value your own judgment as to whether it meets your personal needs. I am asking Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk to read it carefully before lunch tomorrow and perhaps we can have a word about it then. On that basis I would draft an acknowledgment for you.

McG. B.

August 10, 1964

*Approved*  
*8/10*

91

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a message to General de Gaulle which I have considerably rewritten and which I think is both polite and safe. It is designed to keep you firmly on the side of unity with France, without kowtowing to him in any way. I doubt if there is much news in it.

McG. B

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

8/10/64

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

*approved 8/10 9/1a*

On this, the 20th anniversary of the Allied landings in Southern France, I join you in honoring the memory of those heroic soldiers -- of France, the United States, and the Allied nations -- who gave their lives on these battlefields in the struggle against tyranny and in the defense of freedom.

Their sacrifice was not in vain, for out of our alliance in adversity has grown a great common effort for peace and prosperity. All of us can take justifiable pride in the enormous accomplishments since those first days of the war when you, Mr. President, so clearly expressed the indomitable spirit of your people.

The histories of our two countries are rich and varied. But at critical moments they have also been very closely intertwined. In times of greatest need each has come to the other's assistance, and for two centuries our greatest triumphs have been won together.

Today we mark just such an occasion. Looking back to the dark days of the war, and forward to a durable peace, I join in tribute to that spirit of unity which made victory possible, and which still makes it possible today for us all to look confidently to the future, with its promise of peace and freedom for all.

August 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Group of Ten Monetary Negotiations

Attached is a complicated memorandum from Douglas Dillon on the monetary report of the Group of Ten Finance Ministers and Central Bankers. At Tab A, there is an important little memorandum from Kermit Gordon dealing with the budgetary implications. These involve mainly bookkeeping, not real spending, and in any case should not surface until December or January.

In summary terms, Dillon's memorandum reports the following:

The principal result is a confidential agreement among the ten governments to propose an across the board 25% increase in all members' IMF quotas, and additional increases for countries such as Germany which are now out of line. Dillon estimates that the combined increase will come to 30-35%. (The 25% figure is to be kept under wraps; the Ministerial Statement refers only to a "moderate increase". In September, at the Tokyo Bank-Fund meeting, the Governors of the IMF will instruct the Executive Directors to study the adequacy of present quotas. In due course, the latter will recommend 25% plus some selective increases.)

The U. S. share of the increase will be a little over \$1 billion (\$1,031.25 million), one quarter payable in gold and the rest in interest-free notes. Gordon's preliminary estimate is that only the \$250 million gold share need be in the budget.

Dillon has briefed Foreign Relations and Banking and Currency. He reports the briefings as "uneventful". Roosa did a backgrounder on Friday.

\* \* \* \* \*

The overall outcome of this year-long exercise, though we should put a good face on it, is more mouse than elephant. With some support from

the British, Japanese, Canadians and Swedes, we pressed for an across the board quota increase of 50%. The more prescient of the economists have felt that even 50% wouldn't do except as a stopgap. They advocate institutional reforms which would assure the continuing long-term expansion of the international credit-base, in step with the growth in potential output and world trade. However, the other Europeans, especially the French and Dutch, held to the classic central bankers' line that governments are not to be trusted with a more flexible system, and also that the "U.S. dominated" IMF cannot be trusted to be tough enough with the underdeveloped countries. The French and Dutch took particular relish in playing governess to the "profligate U.S."

We shall give thought to the reforms we might attempt in two or three years, by when, more likely than not, the Europeans will be plagued by balance of payments troubles and we'll have the whip hand. We must not then be as myopic as the Europeans have been. The Foreign Economic Policy Task Force will be taking a hard look at the problem.

F. M. B.

McG. B.

August 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here, as promised, is Max Taylor's country team report. I know he would greatly value your own judgment as to whether it meets your personal needs. I am asking Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk to read it carefully before lunch tomorrow and perhaps we can have a word about it then. On that basis I would draft an acknowledgment for you.

McG. B.

August 9, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a draft of remarks which might be made at the signing ceremonies for the Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia.

Jack Valenti and Bill Moyers have copies.

My understanding is that the meeting will be Monday afternoon in the Treaty Room, but I do not have the exact time.

McG: B.

**DRAFT OF REMARKS  
FOR RESOLUTION SIGNING CEREMONY**

Last Tuesday I decided to ask the Congress to consider a Resolution supporting our determination as a nation to repel aggression in Southeast Asia. Within twenty-four hours leaders of Congress and officers of the Department of State together drafted that Resolution.

In each House the Resolution was promptly examined in committee and reported to the floor. In each House there followed a free and serious debate. In each House, on Friday, the Resolution was passed, with only 2 opposed, and a total of 502 in favor.

Seldom have we had a more dramatic example of effective cooperation by both parties, both Houses of Congress, and both the Executive and Legislative Branches. The united determination thus demonstrated by our government rests in turn upon the united determination of all Americans.

This Resolution is short and straightforward, and I hope that it will be carefully read all around the world. It states plainly the position of the United States. We are determined to reply to any armed attack on our forces, and to help those in Southeast Asia who seek our help in defending their freedom.

This Resolution makes it clear, once more, that the United States has no territorial, military or political ambition in Southeast Asia. We desire

only that the people of the area should be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way.

This Resolution stands squarely within the four corners of two great documents -- the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations.

The Eighty-eighth Congress has added a proud page to an already outstanding record of achievement.

I pledge to all Americans that the Presidential powers which are confirmed and reinforced by this Resolution will be used by me with all the wisdom and judgment that I possess. It is everlastingly right that we should be resolute in reply to aggression and steadfast in support of our friends. But it is everlastingly necessary that our actions should be careful and measured. As we are the most powerful of all the nations, we must also be the most responsible.

In this spirit, and with this pledge, I now sign this Resolution.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. GEORGE REEDY

Subject: A brief chronology of events - August 3-7

By Monday morning, when I returned to Washington, the President had already issued instructions -- on Sunday -- along the line of the announcement which he read Monday morning. On Monday morning he decided to make this order public. On Monday <sup>afternoon</sup> there was a private meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler, and it was agreed that no further immediate action was needed. On Tuesday (mid-morning) the President was informed by Secretary McNamara of the first reports of the second attack on the Maddox and C. Turner Joy. He was kept fully and promptly informed from that point forward on all action reports. Secretary McNamara gave a brief description of the existing situation at the scheduled NSC meeting at noon, and the matter was then discussed in detail at lunch by the President with the two Secretaries, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance and myself. All of us except the President had earlier engaged in a detailed discussion of the choices of reply at the Pentagon, where the necessary military information was most readily available. This meeting at the Pentagon preceded the NSC meeting.

During the luncheon meeting with the President the entire situation was reviewed and a consensus was swiftly reached on the course of action on which the President decided. This discussion lasted for about two hours and was marked by thoroughness, clarity, and an absence of significant disagreement. The members of the meeting separated then for the purpose of preparing the necessary orders. The President ordered the scheduling of a full NSC meeting for 6:15 to review his decision, and a meeting of the Leadership at 6:45 so that he might inform them. At the 6:15 meeting it was clear that all members of the NSC were in accord with the President's decision, and in the meeting of the Leadership a similar consensus readily developed.

Meanwhile in the State Department and in the Defense Department all the necessary orders and cables were put swiftly in motion on a coordinated basis. The nature of the military orders has since been made clear by Secretary McNamara's press conferences. The diplomatic track included a number of personal messages from the President, immediate

plans for a meeting of the NAC, SEATO and the Security Council (UN), and arrangements for the initial drafting of a Congressional Resolution.

The first draft of the Congressional Resolution was discussed with the Leadership, and in the light of their comments redrafts continued in the evening, and at a breakfast meeting in the Department of State the Secretary and his associates hammered out a short, basic, agreed version with the bipartisan leaders. This version was reviewed by the President and approved by him immediately upon his return from Syracuse. He had already directed the preparation of an accompanying message which he approved at this same meeting and which went promptly to the Congress that afternoon. Meanwhile at the White House the President's statement to the people was prepared under his immediate direction, and the President, in addition to his other meetings, communicated with Senator Goldwater.

The timing of the President's address to the nation was complex. The address must be so timed as not to give any battle advantage to the North Vietnamese but at the same time must precede any announcement of the operation from the other side. The time which was eventually agreed met this requirement and at 11:40 the President made his statement to the nation.

The President also decided in the course of Tuesday evening that the speech at Syracuse should be related to this set of events, and he issued instructions and guidelines for the preparation of the speech which he delivered on Wednesday morning. On Wednesday the President was briefed by Bundy and ~~Clifton~~ <sup>Clifton</sup> before he departed for Syracuse <sup>in the plane</sup>. On his return he reviewed and approved the Congressional Resolution and the message to accompany it, as previously stated. In the course of the afternoon he received repeated telephone reports on the situation and through the evening he kept close watch on events. On Thursday and on Friday the President continued to receive full diplomatic and intelligence reports. The American people were kept continuously informed by the appropriate officers of the State and Defense Departments. The Congressional hearings on the Resolution proceeded, and the Resolution was voted Friday noon. The President then issued his statement hailing this event.

Thursday  
was also  
a Thant  
Day.

In this same period the President personally directed and wound up with the necessary votes to pass his Poverty bill in the House of Representatives. He also kept a close eye upon the work of Under Secretary

- 3 -

Ball on the crisis in Cyprus, and <sup>of</sup> with Governor Harriman on the Congo, and while these situations are both still very tense and full of danger, they have at no time been beyond the range of attention of the President and Commander in Chief.

McG. B.

August 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: JACK VALENTI

Our soundings with Bill Blair, as revealed in the attached telegram, make it clear that Macapagal would love to come in October if we want him. The crucial question now is whether in fact you want to ask him.

This is a straight question of your own preference, and the only issue that I can see is political. If it would help to have Macapagal at the White House in October, we can have him. The current guess is that there will be no roaring crisis in his part of the world, and of course the Filipinos are known to most Americans as real friends. On the other hand, if you once agree to a date with a sensitive man like Macapagal, any break in it might have some negative repercussions.

If we are going to ask Macapagal, we probably should do it within the next week or so.

If you will tell me your preference, I will work out the dates and the details with Jack Valenti. It would have to be a visit involving a meal at the White House one day and a visit to the Philippine Embassy the next.

McG. B.

Approved in principle - work out details \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

P. S. This is the only reliable friend that we have been able to find for a formal visit in October. We might get an informal visit from the President-elect of Chile if he is the non-Communist and if he is elected by a strong enough vote.

*Put on the desk*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: JACK VALENTI

Our soundings with Bill Blair, as revealed in the attached telegram, make it clear that Macapagal would love to come in October if we want him. The crucial question now is whether in fact you want to ask him.

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*h. J. B.*  
McG. B.

Approved in principle - work out details ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

P. S. This is the only reliable friend that we have been able to find for a formal visit in October. We might get an informal visit from the President-elect of Chile if he is the non-Communist and if he is elected by a strong enough vote.

97a

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41  
Action

55  
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 3874  
Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1964  
12:43 AM

FROM: MANILA  
ACTION: SECSTATE 245 PRIORITY  
DATE: AUGUST 6, NOON

009

EXDIS.

DEPTTEL 206.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Sec 6/6/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

WE BELIEVE OCTOBER VISIT WOULD BE VERY ACCEPTABLE TO PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM YESTERDAY AT CONCLUSION CREDENTIALS CEREMONY I MENTIONED TO HIM THAT I KNEW PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING HIM SOME TIME IN WASHINGTON; MACAPAGAL IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED "MY BAGS ARE PACKED AND I AM READY TO GO!"

I UNDERSTAND MRS. MACAPAGAL WILL ATTEND WEDDING GREEK KING IN SEPTEMBER. SHE TOLD MRS. BLAIR YESTERDAY THAT HER DAUGHTER'S ENTRY INTO COLLEGE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL DECEMBER 1964. WE FEEL SURE THAT MRS. MACAPAGAL WOULD WISH TO ACCOMPANY THE PRESIDENT ON HIS AMERICAN TRIP, AND OCTOBER WOULD APPEAR TO OFFER NO PROBLEMS WHICH WE CAN IDENTIFY AT THIS TIME.

AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR MACAPAGAL TO ABSENT HIMSELF FROM THIS COUNTRY WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. AS THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT CONGRESS WILL BE IN SESSION IN OCTOBER, THIS ALSO MAKES A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN THAT MONTH PROPITIOUS.

IN CONCLUSION I BELIEVE INVITATION LIMITED TO OCTOBER ONLY WILL BE WELL RECEIVED BY MACAPAGAL. WHEN AUTHORIZED TO DO SO, I CAN EXPLORE THIS MATTER INFORMALLY WITH PRESIDENT TO PAVE THE WAY FOR EXTENSION OF OFFICIAL INVITATION. IN VIEW PAST HISTORY OF THIS SUBJECT, I RECOMMEND PRELIMINARY INFORMAL APPROACH. GP-3

LM

BLAIR

~~SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Augu 6, 1964

98

MR. PRESIDENT:

It would give Mike Forrestal the greatest pleasure if the President were willing to inscribe this picture. A possible inscription might be:

To Mike Forrestal, who has found an even hotter spot than the White House -- with thanks.

McG. B.

August 6, 1964

99

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Central Intelligence Bulletin is of unusual interest, and gives a very good and comprehensive account of where we are. I think you may want to see it at once.

McG. B.

August 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached background memorandum covers the routine matters for your meeting with U Thant. Obviously, the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin will take priority. My suggestion is that you should simply give him the essence of your basic position on this matter:

1. Ships of the U. S. Navy were wantonly attacked on two occasions on the high seas. (No one in his right senses can accept the Soviet notion that the Gulf of Tonkin is not in international waters.)
2. These attacks have required what you call "a positive reply." That reply is limited, for the present, and your actions will always be measured.
3. You know that U Thant himself does not believe in a military solution, but you have to point out to him that this new action by Hanoi shows pretty clearly who it is that is really disturbing the peace of the area.
4. You will want him to carry away a clear impression of the confident determination of the United States.
5. Finally, of course, you will want to treat him politely as Secretary General of the UN. Our complaint there has been put forth by Stevenson (who will be present) and we understand the position of the Secretary General. At the same time, he is entitled to a frank discussion of your real views, and the fact of the matter is that U Thant acts more like a neutralist Burmese than like a spokesman of the world in this particular matter.

McG. B.

August 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: S. K. Patil, Indian Minister of Railways

I will bring Mr. Patil in simply to shake your hand and have a picture taken. He understands clearly that this is purely a handshake, and I will get him out very promptly.

One thing you might want to do is to send your very best personal wishes to P. M. Shastri. Patil may say that Shastri wants to see you after our election, and that one you can put off with a smile, on the ground that our constitutional processes do not let you make commitments for 1968 at this time.

I repeat that I will get him out quickly.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1964

101a

Bundy

me

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

S. K. Patil is just in to shake your hand. Though nominally Minister of Railways, he actually runs very potent Bombay political machine. He's India's most pre-US leader too.

Patil will talk as long as you'll let him, but he realizes you're very busy. I'd suggest you only ask about:

1. Indian food crisis. How bad is it (we hear it's as much hoarding and poor distribution as a real shortage). We drastically stepped up shipments when problem began in January and are sending wheat faster than Indians can unload it. We'll deliver a massive 4-500,000 tons a month up to next February. We're also shipping corn, and have promised 300,000 tons of rice from next crop.

2. How is Shastri doing? Will his health hold up? Patil may put in a plug for a Shastri visit here next Spring.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 10-25-98

August 4, 1964

102  
with  
FS

**AGENDA FOR NSC MEETING - 6:15 PM - 8/4/64**

1. Situation report on second attack on Maddox - Secretary of Defense
2. Basic policy and immediate diplomatic action - Secretary of State
3. Planned immediate military action - Secretary of Defense
4. Possible enemy reaction - Director of Central Intelligence
5. Possible Congressional Resolution - Secretary of State
6. General discussion led by the President.
7. Discussion of the President's public statement.

**AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH THE  
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS**

**August 4, 1964**

- 1. Report on Maddox action by the Secretary of Defense.**
- 2. Political situation report by the Secretary of State, to include both meaning of the present situation and diplomatic steps being taken.**
- 3. Immediate military plan of action - Secretary of Defense**
- 4. Discussion led by the President aimed toward the question of Congressional resolution -- text to be presented and explained by the Secretary of State.**
- 5. Discussion of what leadership will say about this meeting.**

104-<sup>ACF</sup>

**Congressional delegation at August 4 Meeting with President**

**Speaker McCormack**  
**Senator Mansfield**  
**Senator Humphrey**  
**Senator Fulbright**  
**Senator Russell**  
**Senator Dirksen**  
**Senator Kuchel**  
**Senator Hickenlooper**  
**Senator Saltonstall**  
**Senator Aiken**  
**Congressman Albert**  
**Congressman Vinson**  
**Congressman Thomas Morgan**  
**Congressman Halleck**  
**Congressman Arends**  
**Congressman Bolton**

August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Through: Mr. Valenti

Ambassador Kamel of the UAR is back from Egypt and brings with him a letter from Nasser to you. Attached is an advance copy of this letter which we obtained from Kamel in order to make sure that there were no nasty surprises in it. There are none. The letter is about the Arabs and nuclear weapons; it answers your letter of May 21 (Tab B). Nasser says that the UAR "does not think of bringing that terrifying danger (nuclear terror) to the region she lives in," and he points of course to Israel as the real threat to peace in the area.

The message, in sum, gives a good peg for Jack McCloy's next effort on this subject, due for the third week of August. So Rusk, Komer and I recommend that you receive Kamel for a very few minutes, to allow him to transmit the letter. The meeting will be off the record (Kamel agrees) and I will be on hand to remove him after the very briefest discussion. I would then plan to express some discouragement on UAR policy in Libya, Cyprus, Jordan, the Yemen, and Aden, in an effort to suggest to Nasser that the next few months are not a good time for stirring up American disapproval.

McG. B.

Short visit approved \_\_\_\_\_

disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

6<sup>0</sup> clock July 30~

106 2.00  
diary

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Lewis Douglas

Lewis Douglas wants to talk to you briefly on South Africa and also to offer his assistance in the campaign. As an Arizona Democrat who has supported more Republicans than Democrats since he broke with FDR, he may have some value. On the other hand, my own experience with him in the last three years is that he talks a better game than he plays. He is getting on. He also loves the importance of visiting the White House.

On Africa, I attach a memorandum from Bill Brubeck which may tell you more than you want to know about South Africa. The last paragraph on page 1 and the talking points on page 2 may be worth attention.

Douglas' name would be helpful on a Committee of Citizens for Johnson, but I myself would not ask him to do any major executive job. There is almost nothing he can do that his brother-in-law, John McCloy, cannot do very much better -- except that Douglas has a Western address.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

July 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Lewis Douglas wants to talk to you briefly on South Africa and also to offer his assistance in the campaign. As an Arizona Democrat who has supported more Republicans than Democrats since he broke with FRR, he may have some value. On the other hand, my own experience with him in the last three years is that he talks a better game than he plays. He is getting on. He also loves the importance of visiting the White House.

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McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1964

108

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA MR. VALENTI

A five-minute pep talk to our new ambassador to Korea (a top man) would be well worth the time. He should hear personally from you that (1) you are dead serious about wanting an early ROK/Jap settlement so that Japs can help carry the aid load for South Korea (still running over \$300 million a year); (2) you favor in principle withdrawal of some U. S. forces, once doing so wouldn't look like retreat in face of Red China.

We expect to propose you send an oral message through Brown urging President Pak to press ahead on ROK/Jap settlement.

If you don't have time to talk to him, you can have a picture with him, and I'll give him the pep talk.

McG. B.

Approved for: 5-minute talk \_\_\_\_\_  
picture only \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fn, NARA, Date 10-16-98

July 30, 1964

109 2

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

I attach a set of papers, the sum of which is a proposal that you should publicly sign a memorandum on August 10 encouraging better staffing of international organizations. <sup>u.s.</sup>

The memorandum itself is full of virtue in a mild way and has been approved by every interested agency.

The operational question is whether you would like to make a gentle noise for international organizations in the way that is suggested. I am myself in favor because I think it is good to remind the public that most Americans favor international cooperation and that the Republicans have nominated someone who does not. The disadvantage is that it will take you five minutes.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

110  
July 29, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have rewritten the last part of this message to make the Congo operation as inconspicuous as possible. I do not think we can omit it without arousing comment from one side, and we certainly cannot praise it without comment from the other. This is the only touchy part in what is otherwise a well constructed letter which will please the experts and get a good deal of second bounce attention. Any act of yours in favor of the UN of course is news now in the light of Goldwater's position. If you approve this draft, it will be printed promptly and we can decide whether to give it special publicity when the report is formally submitted.

McG. B.

111

July 29, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

These are the only two items I can dredge up that are ripe today. I do think the test ban one is good, although it can be tightened up a little.

My own preference is still for an announced conference with television coverage, because I think what you say on this subject would be picked up by the network commentators and get very wide coverage.

McG. B.

July 28, 1964

AGENDA FOR LUNCHEON 7/28/64

1. Japan air agreement?
2. Possible additional discussion of Vietnam
3. Soviet withdrawals from Cuba (Report by Mr. McCone)
4. Platform and Convention appearances of the two Secretaries?
5. The MLF and Britain
6. The Germans and Europe
7. The test ban anniversary
8. Chinese nuclear danger
9. Other business by either Secretary.

July 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Topics for a Possible Press Conference

The staff work is still going on, but the following topics have been proposed as elements in a voluntary statement on Wednesday, and any comment you would have would be most helpful.

1. The test ban treaty anniversary. The test ban was initialled on July 25 and signed on August 5 last year. We are preparing a very short voluntary statement which would make three or four simple points:

- a. We have had a year without testing and the world's air is clearer;
- b. The U. S., even if the treaty were violated tomorrow, is safer and stronger than ever because of our comprehensive safeguards program;
- c. Over 100 nations have joined in a new spirit of hope for progress towards peace;
- d. This course of action has had the support of 4/5ths of the Democrats and 3/4ths of the Republicans in the Senate;
- e. Without the leadership of a dedicated believer in peace like President Kennedy, this step forward would have been impossible.

2. The Food for Peace Program. This one goes great down on the farm, and now that the Republicans have adopted the title as their own, we think that there is real political money in the combination of American farm wealth and the needs of human beings everywhere. We will try to bunch statistics on this in a constructive way.

3. The OAS Meeting. This is the smoothest and strongest Latin American operation in the last five years, and we think there is money in a brief summary of the achievement and a word of praise for the diplomats who brought it off -- Rusk, Mann and Bunker. This again is a matter for bipartisan satisfaction.

4. We reached an international agreement on COMSAT last Friday, and it got lost entirely in the headlines made by your press conference the same day. We will suggest a restatement of this diplomatic achievement together with an announcement of the Defense Department's plan for a separate National Communications Satellite System of our own.

There is also an admirable answer available to Goldwater's gaffe. He has told the Germans in another interview that brinkmanship is what Germany has practiced successfully for a thousand years. When you get a question -- as you surely will -- a remark on the two wars of the last fifty years should answer anyone who thinks German brinkmanship is a good example for humanity. (Goldwater denies he said it, but at the moment the denial does not look very good, and in any event he said much the same thing in Der Spiegel earlier this month and has not denied that.)

McG. B.

Kay Graham

Jan 27 Luncheon for  
Accepted Queen Frederika

June 9 Dinner for P. O.  
Accepted Krag of Denmark

June 16 Luncheon for  
Regatta "Women-Boat"

In June Luncheon for Kay  
(3 bellini) & several newspaper  
publishers  
(stag)

1142

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: A message from Kay Graham

Mary and I had a delightful week end at Kay Graham's, in the course of which I told her that it would be a great help if the Post would endorse us openly. I told her that this seemed only a reasonable request in the light of her violent comments on the Republican Convention and on Goldwater himself. She asked me with a smile whether I was acting for you, and I said of course; I asked her whom else she thought I would be acting for. She then told me that if I were a Washingtonian I would know that the Washington Post has never given its formal endorsement to anyone, and she told me that if any of us at the White House can't tell whom the Post is for, then it must be because we can't read. I told her in reply that just because the Post had never endorsed someone, it ought to begin now, when the stakes are so high and the issues so clear, but I got no commitment.

My very strong impression is that Kay Graham needs a little personal attention from you. Not from her but from other people in the Post-Newsweek establishment, I have heard snippy remarks to the effect that Harry Luce, the arch Republican, seems to be more welcome around the White House than people who have supported the Kennedy-Johnson Administration 90% of the time. I find that the parable of the laborers in the vineyard does not do much good with such people (it is not the most persuasive of the parables for most <sup>of us</sup> people).

My suggestion is that you might ask Kay to come for lunch or an informal dinner some day, on the same basis that Harry Luce came the last time. If you ask her and then ask her to bring any three or four of her people from either the magazine or the newspaper, I think a lot of good can be done. I know that a lot of these individuals are not your favorites, but I cannot help thinking that if we can swing the Chamber of Commerce, we ought to be able to handle the busy liberals -- especially as Kay herself is very sensible when she hears both sides. If you would like to have such a gathering, I will work it out with Jack Valenti.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Work out a lunch \_\_\_\_\_

Work out an informal dinner \_\_\_\_\_

Let it wait awhile ✓

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

I believe McG. B. has  
many times Kay has  
been invited within  
last six months. C.J.G.  
Again later

10  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been planning to change my registration from Republican to Independent this year, simply because ~~that is the way~~ I now feel about it. It occurs to me, however, that it may be just a touch better from the overall point of view if a man in my position does nothing whatever about his political affiliations at this time. Since I have no intention of voting in either primary this year, the matter has no operational effect, and I would like to be guided by your judgment, if you have one.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Jayne

Go ahead \_\_\_\_\_

Please wait ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

Suit yourself \_\_\_\_\_

L

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

116  
July 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with John Cowles

1. Cowles has asked for this meeting in order to tell you privately that his Minneapolis paper will endorse us at the most effective time. I think this is the first time he has ever supported a Democrat at an election time. His paper has a monopoly in Minneapolis, and he also has a major television station. Cowles said nothing about his brother Mike, who controls the Des Moines Register and Tribune, and Look. My hunch is that Mike will be friendly, but I see no reason at all why you should not raise this question with John Cowles directly.
2. Cowles also wants to make a pitch for Hubert Humphrey. He believes that Hubert is the most powerful reinforcement you can get in the Middle West, and he professes a very high regard for him. This is most interesting because John Cowles used to be one of the people who thought Hubert was too much of an orthodox liberal and a smart aleck as well.
3. Cowles is here for a periodic meeting of the General Advisory Council of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mainly because I gave you a bad briefing memorandum for your last meeting with this group, the meeting was rather perfunctory and some of them went away wondering whether we really care about disarmament. I am going to have dinner with them tonight to emphasize your commitment to every sober effort toward arms control, but an informal word from you to Cowles in this same sense would have twice as much impact as any comment from me.
4. John Cowles is quite good at keeping his own secrets, but not so good with other peoples, so you will not want to tell him anything you do not want repeated in the liberal Republican establishment.

McG. B.

July 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Japanese Aviation Negotiations

The attached contain the Secretary of State's recommendation that we offer the Japanese access to New York via the Central Pacific in exchange for rights to Osaka and miscellaneous other concessions.

Rusk feels strongly about this.

My own recommendation would be that you authorize him to go ahead.

Feldman would prefer that we suspend negotiations until after November.

Rusk would like to discuss this with you in person-- unless you authorize him to go ahead on the basis of the attached.

McG. B.

Authorize State to go ahead \_\_\_\_\_.

Discuss at lunch tomorrow \_\_\_\_\_.

July 25, 1964

118

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been planning to change my registration from Republican to Independent this year, simply because that is the way I now feel about it. It occurs to me, however, that it may be just a touch better from the overall point of view if a man in my position does nothing whatever about his political affiliations at this time. Since I have no intention of voting in either primary this year, the matter has no operational effect, and I would like to be guided by your judgment, if you have one.

McG. B.

Go ahead \_\_\_\_\_

Please wait \_\_\_\_\_

Suit yourself \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET

July 24, 1964

119

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air drops in North Vietnam

I apologize energetically for my stupid error in passing you bum information on this subject in the last two days. I misunderstood a telephone comment from an innocent officer, and did not check the documents myself.

The facts as I now have them are that we have made a total of 8 drops since April 1964 as a part of our overall covert plan 34A. This makes Bob McNamara's statement of weekly drops a 100% exaggeration, but that is much better than being wrong on the basic fact as I was. These efforts have been only very moderately successful, and the casualty rates are high, but we still have radio contact with about half of these people.

I will have a more complete report tomorrow.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 6/1/76  
By TB, NARS, Date 3/16/77

120 2 

July 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Canal Zone Policies

I attach a memorandum from Steve Ailes which asks your approval for a couple of reforms in the Canal Zone. I think it is a good and sensible proposal, but it does run the risk of attracting criticism from Flood, and we do not want it to go through without your comment.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

128 a  
23 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Canal Zone Policies

As your representative for the management of Canal Zone affairs, I propose to take two actions which may provoke some opposition in Congress, but which are in my opinion overdue. First, for new hires, I propose to reduce the tropical differential allowance paid to U. S. citizen employees in the Canal Zone from 25% to 15% and to freeze the differential paid to current employees at the current dollar level. Second, I propose to name two consultants to the Panama Canal Company Board of Directors, one a Panamanian and the other a U. S. citizen resident of Panama.

Tropical Differential Allowance

U. S. citizen employees of federal agencies in the Canal Zone (as distinguished from the Republic of Panama) receive a tropical differential allowance equal to 25% of their basic rates of pay. This has been in effect since 1912. Originally it was and through the years it has been justified as a recruitment incentive for the U. S. workers needed to operate the Canal.

In the early days of the Canal, hardship conditions undoubtedly made such an incentive necessary. Today, however, living conditions in the Zone are in most respects similar to those in a U. S. community. No longer is there a practical justification for a substantial hardship allowance. The State Department gives its post in Panama City a "zero" hardship rating - that is, no hardship allowance is granted.

The effect of continuing the differential has been to create a second and third generation of U. S. workers in the Zone, who quite naturally resist any move designed to increase Panamanian employment in better paying jobs. It is our policy to provide such opportunities for Panamanians. More importantly, the attrition rate among U. S. employees is the lowest in the Federal service. This has had a corresponding effect on the number of jobs available to Panamanians. The existence of the 25%

bonus - which is, incidentally, the only one in the U. S. Government that is included in computing retirement pay - has served to entrench opposition to U. S. policies among U. S. workers, who regard jobs in the Zone as matters of right.

So long as we continue to operate a lock-type canal, we will probably need a substantial American complement in the Zone. Present employees will incur no pay reduction by this action. I am confident that the prospective reduction of the tropical differential will not deprive us of the ability to hire the new U. S. workers we need. The imposition of Federal income tax on Zone employees in 1951, and increased commissary and rental prices, has had no such effect.

If action is not taken at this time, present employees will receive not only whatever pay raise Congress votes but an additional 25% increment on the raise.

I propose to reduce the differential in this way:

(1) New hires would receive a 15% allowance. This corresponds to the housing allowance normally paid U. S. Government employees overseas, such as those employed by the State Department in Panama City.

(2) Present employees would continue to receive the same dollar differential, i. e., a differential equivalent to 25% of their present rates, but would not receive a differential on pay or grade increases in the future. If future pay raises or grade increases result in a situation in which the dollar differential is less than 15% of the employee's base pay, he will receive 15%.

(3) Dependents, who today receive the differential, would, after two years, receive none and no new dependent hires would receive the differential. There is no justification for a dependent's allowance, since the differential incentive is not responsible for her presence in the Zone.

This proposal is sound and necessary. There is no longer any reason to single out the Canal Zone workers for the exceptionally favored treatment they receive today. While I would expect opposition from Representative Flood and a few other Congressmen who are responsive

to the Zone employees, and possibly from the AFL-CIO, speaking for its constituent unions in the Zone, the impending pay act should soften some of this opposition, and the fact that the existing differential is preserved should allay fears of the future on the part of present employees.

It is important that the change be understood as purely a managerial and domestic policy matter, completely divorced from our negotiations with Panama. The Panamanian government has never actively opposed the differential in the past.

The projected ultimate savings from this proposal are over \$4 million annually.

#### Consultants to the Board

Ambassador Vaughn and Governor Fleming have urged the Panama Canal Company Board of Directors to designate a Panamanian consultant and to invite him to sit with the Board from time to time. The Board adopted such a proposal at its July 18 meeting. A U. S. businessman resident in Panama, and a prominent and well regarded Panamanian, perhaps an ex-President, would be designated as consultants to the Board of Directors. They would be invited to sit with us when security considerations permit.

Because our meetings deal with business questions, we anticipate no foreign policy difficulties in taking this step. It follows ordinary business practice in securing the assistance of local businessmen when they can help a non-resident board cope with local problems.

The consultants would not be members of the Board, so that no legal problems are raised. Thus any charge that we are turning over the management of the Company to Panamanians would be without foundation. Over a period of time, it should improve attitudes in Panama City toward the Panama Canal Company.

We considered it desirable for you to be apprised of these two steps before action is taken.

Stephen Ailes  
Secretary of the Army

121

~~SECRET~~

July 23, 1964

Mac -

Fine! Note the few minor add-ons I suggest.  
In fact LBJ may not be fully aware that as result of tough bargaining we got Indians to cut their 5-year defense plan by \$600 million without in fact committing any more than same level of aid (\$50 million) previously given.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 10-16-98

*RWK*  
RWK

121a

July 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach an answer from Prime Minister Home to your message of July 4 about India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister reports that he didn't make much progress, and at the bottom of page 1 he makes a suggestion that is likely to strike a sympathetic chord in your mind: that we should review the scale of our aid to India's defense effort. I have asked Bob Komer to have another hard look at this, and he asked me in turn to tell you that we already intend to make such a review as a result of your instructions. Meanwhile, however, we do not want to encourage the British to any leak that would suggest a major change in our policy toward India. So our reply to Home should be careful, and I attach a draft answer at Tab A for your approval.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 23 1964

~~SECRET~~

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter of July 22. It is a great help to have this full and clear account of your discussions with Ayub. And it is also very good to hear that the Commonwealth Conference went so well.

I am not surprised that you found the Pakistani position so stiff, and it is clear that we will simply have to keep working on them. Meanwhile, I do agree that it is important to keep the level of our assistance to India <sup>(as well as Pakistan)</sup> under careful review, and I have asked my people to take a further hard look.

Our experience over the last year and a half suggests that the more closely

we work with the Indians, the more their own sense of need can be moderated. *As a matter of fact, we believe that in our recent military aid talks we managed to get,* and I see every advantage in trying to make further progress in this direc-

tion if possible.

*The Indians to moderate their appetites to a significantly large extent,*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-290  
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

JUL 23 1964

July 23, 1964

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File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach an answer from Prime Minister Home to your message of July 4 about India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister reports that he didn't make much progress, and at the bottom of page 1 he makes a suggestion that is likely to strike a sympathetic chord in your mind: that we should review the scale of our aid to India's defense effort. I have asked Bob Komer to have another hard look at this, and he asked me in turn to tell you that we already intend to make such a review as a result of your instructions. Meanwhile, however, we do not want to encourage the British to any leak that would suggest a major change in our policy toward India. So our reply to Home should be careful, and I attach a draft answer at Tab A for your approval.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: C. P. Sulzberger

I didn't keep up on the change of the timing of your appointment with Cy Sulzberger and so I did not get you the information on your appointment of Ambassadors in time. I have telephoned the information to him directly, but I think you may want to look it over yourself.

Bill Crockett tells me that they use a three-way classification over there: Career, Professional, and Political. Career men are Foreign Service Officers. Professional men are people picked because in the combined judgment of the White House and State Department they are the best men for the job. Political means what it says. On this breakdown, you have appointed 22 career people, 6 professionals and you have made only one political appointment -- that of Mrs. White to Denmark. There may conceivably be argument about one or two of the Professionals, but in the cases of the ones I know -- Attwood, Vaughn, Blair and Taylor -- I strongly support the Department's judgment.

Cy Sulzberger seemed to accept this classification. He also said that he was surprised at the amount of attention his poor innocent column had received!

McG. B.

McG. B.

<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Post</u>	<u>Date of Appt.</u>	<u>Category</u>
Benson E. L. Timmons	Haiti	12/5/63	Career
C. Burke Elbrick	Yugoslavia	1/30/64	Career
Andrew V. Corry	Sierra Leone	2/7/64	Career
William Attwood	Kenya	2/24/64	Professional
G. McMurtrie Godley	Congo (Lpdlle)	2/24/64	Career
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.	Dom. Republic	3/6/64	Career
James D. Bell	Malaysia	3/7/64	Career
Edwin M. Martin	Argentina	3/64	Career
Robert G. Barnes	Jordan	3/64	Career
Elbert G. Mathews	Nigeria	3/64	Career
Fulton Freeman	Mexico	3/64	Career
Henry L. T. Koren	Congo (Brazz)	4/22/64	Career
Katherine Elkus White	Denmark	4/13/64	Political
Jack H. Vaughan	Panama	4/13/64	Professional
Taylor G. Belcher	Cyprus	5/1/64	Career
William McCormick Blair, Jr.	Philippines	4/10/64	Professional
Covey T. Oliver	Colombia	5/19/64	Professional
William Whitman II	Togo	6/9/64	Career
Mercer Cook	Senegal	7/16/64	Professional
Robert G. Ryan	Niger	7/16/64	Career
Randolph A. Kidder	Cambodia	7/17/64	Career

Tyler Thompson	Finland	Nominated *	Career
Sam P. Gilstrap	Malawi	July 5, 64	Career
Winthrop G. Brown	Korea	Nominated *	Career
Margaret J. Tibbetts	Norway	Nominated *	Career
Clinton E. Knox	Dahomey	7/23/64	Career
Maxwell Taylor	Vietnam	7/64	Professional
Lucius D. Battle	UAR	Nominated *	Career
Cecil B. Lyon	Ceylon	Nominated	Career

\*Hearings set for July 28

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with C. P. Sulzberger, Thursday, at 12:30

Cy Sulzberger is a man of wide experience and even wider vanity. He tries to be a "hard news" columnist, and he will certainly make it clear in his column that he has had the advantage of a personal interview with you. This public demonstration of his importance is his main interest in meeting you.

Our own interest is different. It is that Sulzberger is widely read by diplomats here and abroad. My own guess is that what he should get is a clear impression of your confidence and determination in meeting Communists abroad and right wing radicals at home.

On meeting the Communist threat, you can cite: the radical improvement of our defenses under McNamara; the evident pull-back of the Soviet Union in Europe since the end of the Cuban crisis; the alertness of your Administration in recognizing the new situation in Eastern Europe; your firmness (and restraint) in Vietnam; your alert concern with Zanzibar (a topic of special interest to Sulzberger); and your belief that the Administration can safely accept a fundamental judgment as to whether the free nations or the Communists have done better in the last 3-1/2 years.

Sulzberger has two hobbyhorses that may come into the conversation. One is de Gaulle. He has had good French sources for a long time (de Gaulle and Couve de Murville are two), and he tends to be an apologist for the French. It would be helpful for him to know that you bear no personal grudges and that we are happy to cooperate with France wherever and whenever France is ready to cooperate with us -- while at the same time you cannot be expected to support or approve French activities which cut across our purposes, as in South Vietnam, or in de Gaulle's effort to cut away the ties between Germany and the U. S.

Sulzberger's other hobbyhorse is the value of Ambassadors and the dangers of personal diplomacy. He had a column on it today. Sometime ago General Billotte apparently leaked to him a garbled account of the Billotte/Anderson visit to you and the return visit of Anderson to de Gaulle. Sulzberger almost surely got a dose of Bohlen's disapproval of this small venture, and there is barely veiled criticism of it in his column, which

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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July 22, 1964

I attach (Tab A). My own suggestion is that you should laugh this one off as purely a matter of courtesy to a man who represented himself as a personal emissary of de Gaulle, and that if Sulzberger presses on it, you should refer him to me. Given his prejudice, I doubt if you will want to give this the appearance of being more than a very minor episode -- which indeed is all it was.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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A

Y, JULY 22, 1964.

## Foreign Affairs

### Sound Advice From the Senate

By C. L. SULZBERGER

WASHINGTON — Senator Jackson's subcommittee recently performed a useful service by stressing Congressional recognition that "there is no substitute for the broadly experienced Ambassador." The White House might well read this sensible study. When the authority of his envoys is undermined, it is frequently by the President.

Too often there seems to be a slapdash relationship between Washington and its diplomats. President Roosevelt liked to deal behind the back of Secretary Hull. Once when Lord Halifax, British Ambassador, protested a certain action, Hull embarrassedly confessed he knew nothing about the matter.

President Kennedy was deeply interested in foreign policy and placed much reliance on his envoys. Nevertheless, at the moment he was writing General Gavin, his Ambassador in Paris, that he was "the greatest diplomat since Benjamin Franklin," the White House was pulling the rug from under Gavin's feet.

Jackson's subcommittee complained of the overworked habit of dispatching amateur emissaries abroad. It added: "The practice of commuter-trips by special emissaries is now clearly overdone. . . . Ordinarily—visits of the President or the Secretary of State and a handful of other officials apart—an Ambassador, not a troupe of visiting firemen, should be the spokesman for the American Government."

Too frequently a President designates some political leader or friend to call upon a foreign Chief of State with whom our regular Ambassador has carefully cultivated a particular relationship. This, on occasion, can erode the prestige of the regular Ambassador.

It is occasionally useful to assign a special envoy to a special problem. Thus it is admirable to ask former Secretary Acheson to try and bring some order to the complex Cyprus question which involves four separate capitals. But even in this realm we sometimes tend to bypass regular Ambassadors.

### Duplicated Mission

While NATO Ambassador Finletter was negotiating and travelling to muster allied support for the project of a multilateral nuclear force, Washington named Livingston Merchant to the same task. Then, when Merchant ended his mission, there was a plan (since discarded) to give it to Frederick Nolting, former envoy to Saigon. Merchant and Nolting are able men, but so is Finletter; and Finletter's position with those we sought to cultivate was hardly improved.

The Jackson subcommittee comments: "If the Ambassador is to play the supervisory and coordinating role which postwar President have verbally assigned him, the time has arrived to strengthen his hand." This theory has not often enough been practiced.

It would be desirable, as the Senators suggest, for our Government to bring its diplomats home more frequently for consultation. But there is less sense in sending abroad temporary special envoys or amateurs armed with Presidential letters.

The Jackson subcommittee re-emphasizes that career diplomats should be favored for ambassadorial posts. Nevertheless, Presidents have a tendency to appoint political backers to embassies; and Congress has a tendency to be so stingy with representational allowances that we have never been able to find a career ambassador for London because none could afford it.

Despite this, we have been well represented there; the brilliantly competent David Bruce, now Ambassador to Britain, is a gleaming case in point.

For the first time in our history, we have career ambassadors in Paris and Rome, two posts generally given non-career amateurs. The State Department, by juggling its limited budgetary funds, was able to employ there two of its most experienced servants, Messrs. Bohlen and Reinhardt.

Notwithstanding, if one examines our huge list of embassies around the world one still discovers numerous non-career envoys whose diplomatic potential was enhanced principally by the fact they supported the party now in power.

None of this is novel. However, it is commendable that the demand for improving the system should come from a Congressional voice. One may hope the Chief Executive will heed the Jackson report both in selecting future envoys and supporting them.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Warren Commission Report

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-22-76  
By JB, NARS, Date 3/7/77

It is more and more apparent that the Warren Commission Report will be one of the most important news stories of the next two months, and I think we now have a good plan for your approval.

The report will consist of one summary volume and 18 supplemental volumes of hearings and evidence. The preparation of the report and the decision as to its contents is entirely a matter for the Commission. What happens after it is reported to you is entirely a matter for you. This distinction is being fully sustained in discussions between Lee Rankin and myself.

Our initial plan had been that the report would be ready for submission to you on August 8, in the thought that you could then authorize its immediate publication about August 10 so as to get it out comfortably before the Democratic Convention. It now appears that this schedule is too tight, both for the final drafting of the report itself and for our own purpose of insuring widespread, dignified and effective publication of the report and its principal findings. An August publication runs the serious risk of slipshod work by the Commission, by the printers, or by the Press, and it is now my strong recommendation that we should defer the report until after the Democratic Convention.

The schedule we now propose is as follows:

That the Chief Justice and his Commission should present their report to you on August 31, the Monday after the Convention.

You would receive the report in page proof.

You would review it at once, and we are assuming that you would order its publication in full. You might also wish to write a brief introductory statement.

At the same time you could instruct your staff to arrange not only for dignified publication through the Government Printing Office, and distribution through the Superintendent of Documents, but also for the

CONFIDENTIAL

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most sensible and careful arrangements to make the findings available fairly and efficiently to the American people and the world press. In this undertaking you might wish to establish an informal advisory group of outstanding people like Frank Stanton, Walter Lippmann, John Cowles, etc., to insure that there is fairness to all concerned, in these arrangements. (This is important because of the problem of giving reporters a chance to digest the findings before they file their stories, and also because we may need to make special technical arrangements to permit the New York Times and others to publish the entire 650-page summary volume.)

Our expectation is that the elapsed time between the Commission's report to you and the publication date of the summary volume should be two weeks, which brings us to Monday, September 14; we would thus avoid clouding Labor Day weekend with a somber subject. At the same time, September 14 is safely before the climactic weeks of the campaign.

The USIA hopes to be authorized to make careful preliminary distribution of the summary report so that it can be available on publication day everywhere in the world. This is a sensitive and difficult matter, because of the danger of leaks, but a good operation here by USIA could have favorable impact all around the world, in the light of the importance of convincing skeptics abroad that President Kennedy was not the victim of an enormous conspiracy.

The Government Printing Office, which is approaching this whole matter with a great sense of responsibility and discretion, plans to make the summary volume a model of a public document both in type face and in format. The Superintendent of Documents expects to be able to put copies on public sale at \$2 in paper cover and \$3 in hard cover. The 18 volumes of supporting evidence would sell at about \$30 in paper covers and \$45 in hard covers. No one can guess what the final sales may be. I am convinced that if this matter is properly handled, the report and the way of handling it can become both a reminder of the essential sobriety and strength of our system and a proof of your own mastery of its principles and practices. It is also obvious that renewed attention to the tragedy itself will provide a telling comment on the issue of extremism.

One item on which I do not yet have adequate information is the recommendations of the Commission on guarding the President in the future. I am talking to Rankin about that later this week and will report what I learn. These recommendations may require immediate action at the time of the Commission's report.

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What is currently needed is your approval or disapproval of the following proposals:

1. That we aim at presentation of the report on August 31 and its publication on September 14.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize us to plan for wide and dignified publication -- always subject to your own personal decision when the report is in fact presented to you.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

3. That you authorize the preparation of contingency plans for the process of release both to the press and through USIA, for your later review.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

4. That you authorize me to discuss these plans informally with the Attorney General in order to insure effective liaison with the Kennedy family.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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July 21, 1964

AGENDA FOR LUNCHEON

1. South Vietnam reinforcements.
2. The Laotian situation.
3. Japanese aviation agreement?
4. The round-the-world cruise of the nuclear-powered task force.
5. The coffee agreement.
6. Senate Internal/Subcommittee hearings.  
Security
7. The Kennedy Round.
8. Relations with Tshombe.
9. The meeting with the Latin American Foreign Ministers.
10. The multilateral force.

15-67 M

74-67 MM

55-545

74-22

74-67  
74-67

127 J

7/20/64

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Kennedy Round is deadlocked over agriculture. The EEC Commission, with support from Paris, has refused to budge prior to German agreement on a common grain price for the Community. Erhard, in turn, has refused to agree on a grain price before his elections--he is worried about the farm vote.

The deadlock is reinforced by two contradictory misconceptions about the U.S. position, both widely held:

- The U.S. Government has lost interest in the Kennedy Round, and only Herter still cares;
- The U.S. will throw in the towel on agriculture rather than allow the industrial negotiations to founder. (Erhard, in particular, may not be convinced that the U.S. will refuse to table industrial exceptions on November 16, as scheduled, if there is no agreement on ground rules for agriculture.)

To counter these notions, Herter and Ball are agreed that it would be useful if you would reaffirm, at your next press conference, the U.S. interest in a successful negotiation involving both industry and agriculture. A proposed question and answer are attached (Tab A).

Further, if you approve, Herter will write to Erhard and Hallstein confirming your commitment to the Kennedy Round but making it clear that unless we make substantial progress this summer and autumn on the negotiating rules to govern agriculture, November 16 will have to go by the board. Herter's draft letters to Erhard and Hallstein are attached (Tab B).

Sometime during October we shall face a tough decision about all this. There is a fair chance that the Europeans will give some ground on agricultural rules by November, but not as much as we demand. The question will be whether we should shift once again the target date for exchanging offers and exceptions, thereby risking a further loss of momentum, or go ahead with industry while postponing agriculture, or go ahead with both despite the less than satisfactory agricultural rules.

Francis M. Bator

McGeorge Bundy

**Press Conference Question and Answer**

**Approved** \_\_\_\_\_

**Disapproved** \_\_\_\_\_

**Herter Letter to Erhard (and Hallstein)**

**Approved** \_\_\_\_\_

**Disapproved** \_\_\_\_\_

127a

Tab A

127a

**PROPOSED PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTION AND ANSWER  
ABOUT THE KENNEDY ROUND**

**Question:** Mr. President, there have been some stories out of Europe that the United States has lost its enthusiasm for the Kennedy Round. Would you care to comment?

**Answer:** I want to make our position quite clear. A successful Kennedy Round--one which is a good bargain for all concerned--is a major economic and political objective of our foreign policy. The Kennedy Round is important for us--for our agriculture as well as for our industry. It is important for the other developed countries. And it is important to the developing nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. We have certainly not lost our enthusiasm and intend to push ahead, full steam.

1276

Tab B

July 20, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 6/6/77By mg, NARS, Date 7/18/77

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

In the light of our recent conversations in Washington, I am taking the liberty of writing to you personally about a matter of grave concern to my Government and to all of us, I think, who believe in the importance of the Kennedy Round.

At the present time, the negotiations appear to be in severe danger because of the continued failure to make progress in establishing negotiating rules for the various categories of agricultural products. If the negotiations are to go forward on schedule, substantial progress must be made on these rules and procedures well before November 16. The Executive Secretary of the GATT pointed out to the Trade Negotiations Committee on July 13 that unless we have made significant progress on agriculture by early autumn, it will be impossible to exchange offers and exceptions lists on November 16. Postponement would seriously risk the success of the entire negotiation.

In the past, the Community's negotiators have taken the position that their mandate from the EEC Council will not permit them to move beyond the stand they have so far taken on agriculture in Geneva. I strongly hope that in facing the urgent test that now confronts us, the Community's negotiators will be enabled to act more flexibly so as to permit a satisfactory solution to be reached.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

For our part, let me reiterate, on behalf of President Johnson, our Government's firm commitment to spare no effort to bring the Kennedy Round to a successful conclusion.

Most sincerely yours,

Christian A. Herter

His Excellency  
Dr. Ludwig Erhard  
Chancellor of the Federal  
Republic of Germany  
Bonn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

127c

July 20, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 6/6/77

By BMG, NARS, Date 7/18/77

Dear President Hallstein:

I am taking the liberty of writing to you personally about a matter of grave concern to my Government and to all of us, I think, who believe in the importance of the Kennedy Round.

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In the past, your negotiators have taken the position that their mandate from the EEC Council will not permit them to move beyond the stand they have so far taken on agriculture in Geneva. I strongly hope that in facing the urgent test that now confronts us, your negotiators will be enabled to act more flexibly so as to permit a satisfactory solution to be reached.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

2.

For our part, let me reiterate, on behalf of President Johnson, our Government's firm commitment to spare no effort to bring the Kennedy Round to a successful conclusion.

Most sincerely yours,

Christian A. Herter

Honorable Walter Hallstein  
President  
European Economic Community  
23-27 Avenue de la Joyeuse Entree  
Brussels 4, Belgium

**CONFIDENTIAL**

KAuchincloss:DAC

128 2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked the other day about a story in JET that Theodore Berry's name had been withdrawn as Ambassador to the Netherlands because officials of that country were opposed to the presence of a Negro Ambassador.

What actually happened was a little different. During the NATO meeting Dean Rusk was told by our Ambassador Rice at The Hague that Negroes are very coldly treated by the Dutch. Rice said the Dutch have concealed but strong race prejudice and that Berry would be both uncomfortable and ineffective at The Hague. This led the Secretary to change his position on this matter, and by his decision the Department withdrew its earlier recommendation to you. No proposal was ever made to the Dutch themselves.

While we have not double-checked Rice's judgment on this matter, neither Ralph Dungan nor I think we should try to overrule the Secretary on a touchy issue of this kind, especially as Berry's own record suggests a certain vulnerability to criticism and raises some doubts about his effectiveness in what may be a very important diplomatic post in the next six months. For this reason, an alternative post (perhaps Jamaica) is being sought for Berry.

In the circumstances, we are probably lucky that JET has focused its criticism on the Dutch. Crockett and Dungan continue to believe -- as I do very strongly -- that sooner or later we can and should find a place for a Negro somewhere in Europe outside Scandinavia.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-123

NARA, Date 02-09-2015

by 448

July 15, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Here are three interesting dispatches from Max Taylor.**

**The first explains where the bad UPI story out of Saigon came from.**

**The second gives the view of the experienced Chinese Nationalist Ambassador on the general situation.**

**The third gives perhaps in more detail than you want an account of the effort which has been made to get the Saigon Government to do something serious about help from other countries. I concur in the last paragraph which says that they are doing all they can.**

**There is just no comparison between the reporting we get from the Taylor-Johnson team and what we used to get from Ambassador Lodge. These are good examples.**

**McG. B.**

July 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a short Presidential message it is proposed that we authorize for delivery to Nasser as the host of the Chiefs of State Conference of the Organization of African Unity.

The message is straightforward and sensible, and I do not see any backlash in it. It will get very little attention here and will be received with favor by the Africans.

McG. B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

131

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Drew Pearson and Khrushchev

I reached Drew Pearson in San Francisco and he readily agreed not to do a story on his interview with Khrushchev. He says he had almost reached the same conclusion. He sends you warm greetings and says that the atmosphere in San Francisco is terrible.

With your permission, I would propose to repay this favor and serve our own interests as well by giving Pearson the break on the story of your most recent message to Erhard. This is a story which has to be played carefully because it involves Erhard's own feelings and position, but I think Pearson will understand it, and a story which is exclusive to him will get very wide attention around the country. It would be more "statesmanlike" to do it with Joe Alsop, but Joe does not have the readership among the voters. In either case I will work out the details closely with the State Department experts.

McG. B.

Give it to Pearson ✓

Give it to Alsop \_\_\_\_\_

remind me to  
call Pearson

Monahan

July 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Drew Pearson and Khrushchev

I reached Drew Pearson in San Francisco and he readily agreed not to do a story on his interview with Khrushchev. He says he had almost reached the same conclusion. He sends you warm greetings and says that the atmosphere in San Francisco is terrible.

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McG. B.

Give it to Pearson \_\_\_\_\_

Give it to Alsop \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

133

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter of July 22. It is a great help to have this full and clear account of your discussions with Ayub. And it is also good to hear that the Commonwealth Conference went so well.

I am not surprised that you found the Pakistani position so stiff, and it is clear that we will simply have to keep working on them. Meanwhile, I do agree that it is important to keep the level of our assistance to India as well as Pakistan under careful review, and I have asked my people to take a further hard look. Our experience over the last year and a half suggests that the more closely we work with the Indians, the more their own sense of need can be moderated. As a matter of fact, we believe that in our recent military aid talks we managed to get the Indians to moderate their appetites to a large extent, and I see every advantage in trying to make further progress in this direction if possible.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-290  
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

August 12, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

The letter from General Doolittle is self-explanatory. In the circumstances, it seems to me that a straightforward and friendly acceptance is all you can offer.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News in morning papers on troops to Vietnam

The stories on additional troops to Vietnam which are in this morning's papers come from a backgrounder given by Buz Wheeler yesterday. Bob McNamara says that Wheeler was caught by questions which he could not easily side-step, as a result of stories from Saigon the day before. I incline to think he could have hedged long enough to give us a crack at it, but whether or not that is so, the real error here was in not perceiving ahead of time that this piece of information was bound to come out and deciding for ourselves how to handle it. (These small numbers of people are connected with the critical provinces program and other elements of our May and June decisions).

I have talked to Bob Manning and emphasized to him that this is a good example of the kind of news that the White House needs to pass on and which it may wish to use itself. He agrees and is already in touch with Sylvester on this point.

While it is entirely accidental, I think myself that the news of this small reinforcement is in fact consistent with our policy for pacification within South Vietnam and is not the sort of thing that we would gain much from by announcing at the White House. That does not excuse the failure to arrange the matter so that you had a choice.

*m.f.b.*

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

*5/10/77*

By

*mmg*

NARS, Date

*7/18/77*

July 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked the other day about a story in JET that Theodore Berry's name had been withdrawn as Ambassador to the Netherlands because officials of that country were opposed to the presence of a Negro Ambassador.

What actually happened was a little different. During the NATO meeting Dean Rusk was told by our Ambassador Rice at The Hague that Negroes are very coldly treated by the Dutch. Rice said the Dutch have concealed but strong race prejudice and that Berry would be both uncomfortable and ineffective at The Hague. This led the Secretary to change his position on this matter, and by his decision the Department withdrew its earlier recommendation to you. No proposal was ever made to the Dutch themselves.

While we have not double-checked Rice's judgment on this matter, neither Ralph Dungan nor I think we should try to overrule the Secretary on a touchy issue of this kind, especially as Berry's own record suggests a certain vulnerability to criticism and raises some doubts about his effectiveness in what may be a very important diplomatic post in the next six months. For this reason, an alternative post (perhaps Jamaica) is being sought for Berry.

In the circumstances, we are probably lucky that JET has focused its criticism on the Dutch. Crockett and Dungan continue to believe -- as I do very strongly -- that sooner or later we can and should find a place for a Negro somewhere in Europe outside Scandinavia.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-123

By ULH NARA, Date 02-09-2015

July 15, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Galbraith and his opinions

I haven't seen Ken in some weeks, so I am flying blind, but on past form my guess is that he will be full of opinions on the following:

1. Politics. Galbraith fancies himself as a great political analyst. His instinct is aggressive. He is a great friend of the Attorney General. He will be in favor of an aggressive and strongly liberal campaign with overtones of economic nationalism. (He is very cool to the Kennedy Round.) He almost surely favors the Attorney General for Vice President and will have a number of ingenious reasons for this view. His relatively early support of President Kennedy (many Eggheads were very slow) represents the only first-rate political judgment I know of in his past. His record is almost as bad as my own.

2. Economics. I suspect that Galbraith will have broadly the same views as Walter Heller, but I cannot prove it.

3. Foreign Policy. Galbraith is of course a strong pro-Indian, like so many of your giresome advisors. He is rather blindly anti-Pak, which is a mistake.

On Vietnam, his views are like Mike Mansfield's, with perhaps a shade more understanding of the need for some firm position on the scene before we seek a political solution.

On Europe. I seem to remember Galbraith as a mistruster of the Germans, and a follower of Harriman.

Galbraith has been carrying forward one specific matter for us, namely, the adjustment of difficulties between the US and Canada on civil air routes. You may wish to ask him how this is going. He undertook it by agreement between JFK and Mike Pearson (Galbraith is an American of Canadian birth) and my understanding is that he did a classy job, which is now being worked over by both bureaucracies with reasonable prospects of a good result.

McG.B.

July 15, 1964

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McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-123

By UUS NARA, Date 02-09-2015

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1964

*done  
word to  
Roh*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA: Mr. Valenti

The UN General Assembly convenes in November just after the election (unless there is an emergency session sooner). Within the next week or so we have to decide which date we want for the opening American address. The Department of State would like to pick a date that would maximize the chance that you might be willing to make the opening address. They understand of course that you will not wish to decide the matter now.

The American date can be almost anywhere between November 11 and November 20. Do you have any current idea as to what point along this period might be most likely to attract you?

No opinion ✓

Approximately Nov. \_\_\_\_\_

*McG. B.*

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July 10, 1964

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Approximately Nov. \_\_\_\_\_

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

July 9, 1964

142 Q

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination on Laos

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 8/31/77  
By JKL/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

This Presidential determination on Laos is routine. The \$9 million authorization is relatively small, and it is probable that we will be back to you again in about six months, but it is just as well to keep this program on a relatively short rein.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lynda Bird

Mrs. Johnson and Lynda Bird have just reported to me your view that she ought not to come and work with us for a spell this summer because people who don't know typing and shorthand only get in the way. I myself think that smart girls should learn typing and shorthand, but I do want you to know that in this particular case there really is a useful job she could do, and Bromley Smith and I would like very much to have her.

In addition to her natural intelligence and energy, Lynda Bird has two qualities that are very hard to get on short notice: complete loyalty to the President, and immediate clearability. She could join with us at once in the daily business of sorting incoming information from cables, from CIA, and from other sources -- and while this sort of work gets boring after a while, it is good fun and instructive if done for a limited period. So I can assure you that we would genuinely like to have her, although of course I know better than to try to overrule a President and a father at one and the same time.

McG. B.

144

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-41**  
**By CL, NARA Date 6-30-00**

*C. Shuman*

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Survey Poll on Chilean Presidential Candidates

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

██████████ a poll in April and May of the three candidates for President in the Chilean election. The poll showed that Frei (Christian Democrat) would receive 52% of the vote; Allende (Socialist-Communist) 36%; Duran (Radical) 7% and 5% undecided.

██████████ a poll in March before a by-election in which the Radicals lost badly. In that poll, Frei was also ahead. The second poll showed Duran lost badly and that Frei picked up slightly more of the voters who switched from Duran than did Allende.

The poll was taken by an experienced American firm which had previously conducted polls in Chile. Nevertheless, the poll was a small sample -- only 2000. State regards it only as an indicator of how the situation lined up in May and not what it might be now or how it might end up on September 4.

Chilean President Alessandri thinks Frei is ahead but he also went to great lengths in a recent conversation with our Ambassador to urge that the United States keep an open mind on Allende and not cut off financial assistance should Allende win.

The Chilean President race is a hard one. The Christian Democrats are coming from behind. They now have a good organization but they have to guard against over-confidence and fight all the way to the finish line if they hope to win.

I see no need now for any action on our part other than that we have already taken.

McG.B.

~~SECRET~~

146 2  
July 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I want to repeat in writing the very warm thanks of a bunch of Bundys for our weekend at Camp David. The place is wonderfully restful and it has established a pattern of quiet hospitality to your guests and their children which makes it a splendid retreat -- perhaps most of all for busy wives.

It is absurd, of course, to think of keeping Camp David open simply for the convenience of an occasional staff officer, and if you are sure you are not going to use it in the immediate future there can be no argument against a temporary closing. But for the longer pull I do think this is a place we ought not to give up without some thought. It has unusual facilities for servicing a President while giving him privacy, and it is so organized as to be very rapidly and easily accessible on short notice. I do not think the shelter arrangements which the Eisenhower administration established are as important as I am told that Ike did, but in a more general way the Naval efficiency of the place is important in that a lot of work can be done there, and done well.

There is one other point to be made -- and that is that with just a little loosening of the current rules we could get a very much higher usage of Camp David. I feel confident that there are many conferences and meetings which could properly and wisely be held there with just a little encouragement.

But most of all, I have a feeling that the Johnsons would like the place if they gave it another try at some auspicious moment. That is its real justification and the excuse for combining advocacy with gratitude in this memorandum.

McG. B.

July 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral Claude Ricketts, who died Monday, was one of the most admired men in the Armed Services, and made himself particularly respected by his combination of professional quality and respect for civilian authority. I think a great many military men, as well as a large number of people who knew him well from other departments and agencies, would take it as a very handsome gesture if you were able to attend his funeral on Thursday at 2 PM (Navy Chapel, U. S. Naval Security Station, Nebraska Avenue).

Such attendance would have a modest political value internationally also because Ricketts was the symbol of professional belief in the effectiveness of the MLF -- but this is an entirely secondary point.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

147  
July 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 8/31/77  
By JL/mg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

At the NSC meeting, State and Defense will explain where we are and describe contingency plans in case the Turks invade. Only the last two pages of their paper (attached) deal with what we do next. You might want to concentrate on two points:

1. We can't let Geneva talks fail. State's paper (pp. 5-6, para. c) notes what they'll do this week to support Acheson, but a pep talk from you will increase their sense of urgency. The Greeks know time is on their side. Grivas is already campaigning for enosis. They figure the worst they can come out with is a UN debate ending in a blessing for self-determination, which would result in enosis. So the big problem is to get something for the Turks out of the Geneva talks. Our failure (1) could trigger a Turk invasion and (2) would ruin our position in Ankara.

2. Spur efforts to keep peace on Cyprus. State-Defense planning focuses on how to minimize the consequences of a Turk invasion. However, we ought to be thinking, too, about what more we might do, if anything, to keep violence from breaking out on Cyprus itself. Belcher got assurance from Makarios last week that the Greeks wouldn't attack the Turks. But we can't trust Makarios, and besides he could make political moves that would provoke a Turk rebellion.

McGeorge Bundy

Attach. Memo for President from  
Ball dtd , subj. Cyprus

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 7, 1964

Subject: Prime Minister Douglas-Home's Second Message on  
U.S. Shipping Regulations

Home has sent you a second message (Tab A) concerning U.S. regulation of shipping. Besides thanking you for your "prompt and sympathetic reply" (Tab B), and for the postponement by the Maritime Commission of the application of the new contracts until September 1, the message makes two points:

-- The Cabinet will ask Parliament sometime later this month for "specific powers to secure the jurisdiction of the UK" -- enabling powers which Home proposes not to use if an "accommodation" can be reached. The message contains not a clue about what kind of powers they have in mind. We have London working on this. (Chadwick, their commercial man here, appears not to know.)

-- They want a conference on the legal issue of jurisdiction and not, as proposed in your letter, on the much broader question of regulation. However, Home is content to have the question explored through diplomatic channels.

The message -- which, in contrast to the first, is positively genial -- does not require an answer from you. We shall carry it from here.

Francis M. Bator

McGeorge Bundy

July , 1964

149

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think you will want to read  
this letter from Papandreou,  
although as you will see it tells  
us nothing that you have not  
heard before and gives very  
little ground.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 8/31/77By JKW/mq, NARS, Date 9/14/77


MEMORANDUM FOR

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McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

✓

July 6, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

Juanita asked me to draft an answer to this letter from Justice Frankfurter, and a draft is attached.

You also asked to be reminded from time to time that you want to call on him occasionally. Mrs. Frankfurter has been unusually unwell lately, and if you have a spare moment in the next 10 days I think it would be a particularly good time -- the Justice himself has been better than usual lately, and would get that much more out of a short call from you.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

July 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum came in to my office just before the holiday, and I have been slow in getting it to your desk. Bob's plan is to go mountain climbing in the week of the 17th of August, and I am sure you will want him to have a week off. But you may find the timing inconvenient -- it is the week before the Democratic Convention. You may want to mention this matter to him at lunch tomorrow.

McG. B.

July 3, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

Attached are two memorandum for information, one on the situation in the Congo (Tab A), and the other on the OAS Resolution on Venezuela (Tab B). The Congo is in bad shape and the OAS's resolution is in good shape, but there is nothing much to do about either one right now.

McG. B.

July 2, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

I have taken it on myself to give approval for travel outside the United States where there is just no question at all, but I think that important cases should come to you, and in order to test your reaction here are a couple of cases. I am sure we will have more in the summer months.

Alan Boyd of the CAB wants to go to Latin America from July 13 to August 6. There is an OAS conference on Civil Aviation in Santiago from July 20 to 24, and before and after he wants to go to Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia. Between the lines it appears that this trip includes both business and pleasure, but the business is legitimate enough. During his absence Vice Chairman Murphy will act for him.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Chairman Seaborg wants to go to Europe between August 28 and September 17. His primary purpose is to attend the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva from August 31 through September 9, and the opening of the Eighth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna on September 14. It has been customary for the Chairman of the AEC to head the U. S. delegation at both of these meetings. In the five-day interval between the two meetings, Chairman Seaborg plans to go to a new other European centers of atomic energy and to make a speech to the European atomic industry group. There will be other Commissioners attending portions of these European meetings, but it is planned that at least one Commissioner and the General Manager or his deputy will be in Washington throughout the period involved.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

The Department of State concurs in both of these travel plans.

McG. B.

155

July 2, 1964

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McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



July 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Papandreou is still very resistant, and is backing away a little bit every day from the agreement of last week. George Ball thinks it essential that he should get one more stern reminder from you of the dangers created by his resistance to real negotiation. The attached draft letter is designed to do this job.

In large part, our purpose here is to get a very clear warning on the written record. The prospects of real trouble over Cyprus are better than even, and both George Ball and I think it essential to complete the record of your effort to warn the Greeks before it is too late.

Papandreou will not like this letter, any more than Inonu liked your letter of June 5. But that is not the point now.

*McG.B.*  
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July 1, 1964

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