

## **ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE**

**You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.**

**The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.**

**DATE**

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
014	memo	Bundy to the President re Ball and MLF (Sanitized 11/5/79)	S	1	12/17/64	A
016	memo	Bundy to the President re Mansfield's memo on SEA (Sanitized 1979)	S	3	12/16/64	A
018	memo	Bundy to the President re EEC agricultural deal (Exempted 1979) (near duplicate #18a, this file)	C	3	12/16/64	A
018a	memo	draft of #18 (near duplicate of #18, this file)	PCI	4	12/16/64	A
047	memo	Bundy to the President re UK and wool textiles (Exempted 1979)	C	1	12/9/64	A
053n	paper	Possible US/Allied Countermoves (Sanitized 4/1/97 NLJ 97-26) (dup. #7a, NSF, CF, VN, SEAsia Mtg. on 11/30/64, box 201)	S	1	11/30/64	A
088a	letter	Tristram Coffin to Bundy re Sen. Margaret Chase Smith & Goldwater's defense views		1	11/4/64	C
095	memo	Bundy to the President re White House staff		2	11/8/64	C

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**Collection Title** National Security File, Memos to the President**Folder Title** "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 7, 10/1 - 12/31/64"**Box Number** 2

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
102	memo	Bundy to the President re meeting with Walker (Sanitized 1/8/02 NLJ/RAC 01-52; same sani as previous verion) (dup. #5a, NSF, CF, UK, Walker Talks with Pres. and others, box 213)	S	2	10/26/64	A
104	memo	Bundy to the President (Sanitized 6/30/00, NLJ 99-43)	TS-	1	10/24/64	A
104a	memo	attached to #104, above (Sanitized 12/2/94, NLJ 94-291)	TS-	1	undated	A
121	memo	Bundy re dispersal of projectiles (Exempted 1984)	TS-	1	10/5/64	A
121a	memo	Bundy re dispersal of projectiles (Exempted 1984)	TS-	1	10/6/64	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence.		
#40 Memo	Bundy/Keeny re papers on FY '66 DOD budget <i>osd ltr 7/20/77</i>		
	<del>TS 2 p</del>	<del>12/10/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#1 Memo	<del>Bundy to the President re holidays for Bundy and Rusk</del> <i>opened 8/24/92 per TH</i>	<del>1 p</del>	<del>12/31/64</del>
#63 Memo	<del>Bundy to the President re appointment for Chet Bowles</del> <i>opened 8/24/92 per TH</i>	<del>1 p</del>	<del>12/4/64</del>
#88a Letter	<del>Tristram Coffin to Bundy re Senator Margaret Chase Smith and Goldwater's defense views</del> <i>open per TH 5-30-02</i>	<del>1 p</del>	<del>11/4/64</del>
#95 Memo	<del>Bundy to the President re White House staff</del> <i>open per TH 5-30-02</i>	<del>2 p</del>	<del>11/8/64</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ McGeorge Bundy,  
Memos for the President, Vol.7, 10/1 to 12/31, 1964

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>all decisions per OSD ltr 8/9/77</i> Agency: Department of Defense		
<del>#53j Paper</del>	<del><i>open 5-11-84 NLS 84-78</i> Graduated military pressure and related actions <i>Exempt NLS 81-03</i></del>	<del><i>Exempt</i></del>	<del>A</del>
	TS 1 p	11/30/64	A
<del>#53L Paper</del>	<del>US/GVN reprisals to VC provocations <i>(Sup. of #6h, NSF CF, UN, Mtg of Principals BK Box 208)</i></del>	<del><i>Exempt</i></del>	<del>A</del>
	<i>open 10-1-96 NLS 86-108</i>	11/30/64	A
#53n Paper	Possible US/Allied countermoves	<i>sanitized</i> TS 1 p	A
<del>#53p Paper</del>	<del><i>open 5-11-84 NLS 84-78</i> Enemy order of battle</del>	<del><i>Exempt</i></del>	<del>A</del>
	TS 1 p	11/30/64	A
<del>#53r Paper</del>	<del><i>open 5-11-84 NLS 84-78</i> US order of battle</del>	<del><i>Exempt</i></del>	<del>A</del>
	TS 1 p	11/30/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>audicass for NSC 8/31/77</i>	Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
<del>#3 Paper</del>	<del>Bundy re pros/cons of reprisal raid TS 3 p</del>	<del>12/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53 Memo</del>	<del>Pres. to SecState, SecDef, DCI TS 1 p</del>	<del>12/7/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53b Paper</del>	<del>position paper on SEA TS 6 p</del>	<del>12/2/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53d Memo</del>	<del>Pres. instructions to Taylor TS 4 p</del>	<del>12/3/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#74 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re courses of action in SEA TS 1 p</del>	<del>11/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#117 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy, minutes of 10/5/64 meeting TS 1 p</del> <i>Sanitized</i> <i>OPEN 10.16.98</i>	<del>10/6/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: NSC		
#87 Memo	<i>NSC let. 11/177</i> NSAM No. 318 S 2 p	11/14/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for ERDA concurrence.		
<del>#101 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy to Pres. re UK and Polaris S-RD 1 p</del>	<del>10/26/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#121 Memo	Bundy re dispersal of projectiles TS-RD 1 p <i>Exempt per NLS 84-80</i>	10/5/64	A
#121a Memo	Bundy re dispersal of projectiles TS-RD 1 p <i>Exempt per NLS 84-80</i>	10/6/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#120 Memo	Agency: White House, for NAVY concurrence. <i>NAVY ltr 6/3/77</i> <del>Bundy to Pres. re report on 9/18/64 Tonkin incident</del>	<del>TS 1 p 10/6/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for AID concurrence.		
<del>#77 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy/Bator re Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy</del>	<del>11/25/64</del>	<del>A</del>

~~S 3 p~~

~~11/25/64~~

~~A~~

open 9-4-79 ing

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State Department		
<del>#32a Cable</del>	<del>2821 fm London</del>	<del>12/14/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53h Report</del>	<del>"Third Country Assistance..."</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#57b Memo</del>	<del>Ball to Pres. re Wilson visit</del>	<del>12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#57h Memo</del>	<del>Neustadt from Bruce re Wilson</del>	<del>12/6/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#60b Memo</del>	<del>Ball to Pres. (dup. #57b above)</del>	<del>12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 Memo	Agency: USIA <i>Sanitized, USA doc 5/19/77</i> Rowan to Pres. re USIA ops. in Congo S 2 p	12/21/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence.		
#41a Memo	Cooper to Bundy re SVN govt. <i>S. 2 p</i> <i>OPEN 10.15.98</i>	12/10/64	A
#84 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re meeting w/McCone <i>C 1 p</i> <i>Open 6-21-79 ing per NSC 10-3-78 State 7-17-78</i>	11/17/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#104 Memo	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence. <del>Exempt, CIA Dec 9/19/77</del> <i>Sanitized 7/15/00 NLS 99-43</i> Bundy to Pres. <del>sanitized 5-16-95</del> <i>NLS 94-280</i> TS-Codeword 1 p	10/24/64	A
#104a Memo	<del>Exempt, CIA Dec 9/19/77</del> att. to #104 above Codeword 1 p	undated	A
	<del>Exempt per NLS 84-81</del> <i>sanitized 12-2-94 NLS 94-291</i> <i>Sanitized 7/24/00 NLS 99-45</i>		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
<del>#25 Memo</del>	<i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-44</i> <del>Bundy re talk w/Amb. Ritchie</del> <i>nsclcc 8/11/77</i> <i>(Dup of #23, Canada Vol 1)</i>	<del>12/16/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#28 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re UK proposal for ANF</del> <i>nsclcc 8/11/77</i>	<del>12/15/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#78 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re MLF</del> <i>nsclcc 8/11/77</i>	<del>11/25/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#80 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Congo situation</del> <i>State ltr 11/2/77</i>	<del>11/20/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#86 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Congo situation</del> <i>State ltr 11/2/77</i>	<del>11/16/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#8 Memo	Bundy re SVN politics <i>open 6-19-79 inf</i> S 1 p	12/21/64	A
#14 Memo	Bundy re Ball and MLF <i>sanitized 11-5-79 inf</i> S 1 p	12/17/64	A
#16 Memo	Bundy re Mansfield's memo on SEA S <i>sanitized</i> 3 p	12/16/64	A
#18 Memo	Bundy re EEC agricultural deal C 3 p	12/16/64	A
#18a Memo	draft of #18 above 4 p	12/16/64	C
<del>#23 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy [REDACTED] <i>sanitized 11-5-79 inf</i></del> <i>OPEN 10-16-98</i>	<del>12/16/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#26 Memo	Bundy re presentation of credentials C 3 p <i>open 6-19-79 inf</i>	12/15/64	A
<del>#29 Memo</del> <i>open 3/06</i>	<del>Bundy re Rusk/de Gaulle talk S 1 p</del> <del>(dup. #159, NSF Country File, France Vol 5)</del>	<del>12/15/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#31 Memo	Bundy re 3rd. country assistance in SVN <i>sanitized</i> S 2 p <i>open 4-15-91 NLJ 90-221</i>	12/15/64	A
<del>#32 Memo</del> <i>open 3-3-98</i>	<del>Bundy re report fm. Bruce <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p</del>	<del>12/14/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32b Memo</del>	<del>Bundy to Bruce <i>Exempt</i> S 2 p</del> <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-364</i>	<del>12/9/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#33 Memo	Bundy re SVN politics <i>open 6-19-79 inf</i> S 2 p	12/14/64	A
<del>#44 Memo</del> <i>open 3-3-98</i>	<del>Bundy re Meeting w/Wilson <i>Exempt</i> S 2 p</del> <i>Exempt NLJ 86-92</i>	<del>12/10/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#47 Memo	Bundy re UK and wool textiles <i>Exempt</i> C 1 p	12/9/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	White House/State continued.		
#50 Memo	Bundy re Taylor reports <i>open 6-19-79</i> S 1 p	12/9/64	A
#52a Memo	Bundy (dup. #32b above) <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i> S 2 p	12/9/64	A
#54 Memo <i>open 3-3-98</i>	Bundy for record on LBJ/Wilson talk <i>Exempt</i> S 3 p <del>Exempt NLJ 86-92 sanitized 11-26-91 NLJ 90-245</del>	12/7/64	A
#57 Memo	Bundy re Wilson visit <i>Exempt</i> S 2 p <i>Exempt NLJ 86-92 open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/6/64	A
#57d Memo	Bundy, answers to Wilson's arguments <i>Exempt</i> S 3 p <i>Exempt NLJ 86-92 open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/5/64	A
#57f Memo	Bundy re Wilson visit <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/5/64	A
#57g Memo <i>open 3-3-98</i>	excerpts fm. Neustadt memcon w/Wilson <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p	undated	A
#57j Memo	Bundy re Wilson visit <i>Exempt</i> S 2 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/6/64	A
#57k Memo	Bundy re UK and Vietnam <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/5/64	A
#57m Memo <i>Exemption upheld NL 8-11-82 letter re NLJ 81-04 open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	Bundy re Germany/France and MLF <i>Exempt</i> S 2 p <i>Exempt NSC Hr 3-23-82</i>	12/5/64	A
#58 Memo <i>Exemption upheld NL 8-11-82 letter re NLJ 81-04 150 1-18-84 letter sanitized per NLJ 81-04 appeal</i>	Bundy re alternative view to MLF <i>Exempt</i> S 4 p <i>Exempt NSC Hr 3-23-82</i> <i>Exempt State Ltr. 4/9/01 NLJ 81-04</i>	12/6/64	A
#58a Memo	Bundy re MLF and European Tour <i>Exempt</i> S 5 p <i>Sanitized per NL 8-11-82 re: NLJ 81-04</i> <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i> <i>Exempt State Ltr. 4/9/01 NLJ 81-04</i>	6/15/63	A
#59 Memo	Bundy (dup. #57j above) S 2 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i>	12/6/64	A
#60 Memo	Bundy re Wilson visit & MLF <i>Exempt</i> S 1 p <i>Exemption upheld NL 8-11-82 letter re: NLJ 81-04</i> <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</i> <i>NSC letter 3-23-82 4/9/01 NLJ 81-04</i>	12/5/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	White House/State continued.		
<del>#60d Memo</del>	<del>Bundy ( dup. #57d above ) open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</del>	<del>S 3 p 12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#60f Memo</del>	<del>Bundy ( dup. #57f above ) open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</del>	<del>S 1 p 12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#60g Memo</del> open 3/06	<del>excerpts ( dup. #57g above )</del>	<del>S 1 p undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#60i Memo</del>	<del>Bundy ( dup. #57m above ) open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</del>	<del>S 2 p 12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#61 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy ( dup. #57k above ) open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</del>	<del>S 1 p 12/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#62 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy, "what Wilson wants." Exempt NLJ 86-92</del>	<del>S 6 p 12/4/64 OPEN NLJ 98-159 4-28-99</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#64 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re position paper for Wilson visit open 5-24-95 NLJ 93-304</del>	<del>S 1 p 12/4/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#75 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Canadian auto parts open 2-5-93 NLJ 92-18</del>	<del>C 2 p 11/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re European policy</del>	<del>C 3 p 11/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Israel and Dimona inspection exempt NLJ 91-108</del>	<del>S 1 p 11/18/64 OPEN 11-17-99 NLJ 99-44</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#83 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Stevenson visit open 6-19-79 iib</del>	<del>C 1 p 11/18/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94a Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re NATO nuclear policy Exempt open 11-17-99 NLJ 99-44 NSC letter 3-23-92</del>	<del>S 4 p 11/8/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#96 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re Wilson visit open 3-3-98</del>	<del>S 1 p 11/6/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#98 Memo</del>	<del>Bundy re HHH trip to Europe</del>	<del>S 1 p 11/5/64</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,  
Memos for the President, Vol. 7, 10/1 to 12/31, 1964

RESTRICTION CODES

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16 of 16

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	White House/State continued.		
#99 Memo	Bundy re LBJ meeting w/Walker <i>Exempt</i> OPEN NLJ 11-157 8-28-91	10/27/64	A
#102 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Walker <i>Exempt</i> [dup #5a, UK, Walker Talks with President..., Box 213] Sanitized 9-8-99 NLJ 98-160 Same designation 1/17/02 NLJ/KAC 01-52 open 11-5-99	10/26/64	A
#112 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Leadership <i>Exempt</i>	10/19/64	A
#116 Memo	Bundy on Israeli tanks <i>Exempt</i> open 11-12-92 NLJ 91-108	10/13/64	A
#118 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Macapagal <i>Exempt</i> open 11-17-99 NLJ 99-44	10/6/64	A
#122 Memo	Bundy re Japanese & French <i>Exempt</i> open 12-5-90 NLJ 90-148	10/4/64	A

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✓ 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two holidays

1. Mary has now issued her ultimatum about a winter holiday for the Bundys, and at the same time I have learned from Dean Rusk that at last he is ready to admit his own need for a real rest. I am therefore able to double your troubles by recommending leave for both of us in the same memorandum -- but at two different times.

2. Dean wants to go away right after the Inauguration for a period of 10 days to 2 weeks. I think it is a matter of first importance that you should not only let him go, but authorize me to tell him firmly that you insist on his going. Everyone who has worked with him in the last three months has found him bone tired, and he told me the other day that he feels near the end of his rope, physically. This is not surprising, because he is a man of extraordinary conscientiousness, and he has not been two days out of harness consecutively in the last 4 years. It would really be better if he took 3 weeks, not 2, but it will be hard enough to make him stay still for 2 weeks as it is.

3. My own case is different. I am feeling fine and I have not had to carry the kind of load that Dean has. But just the same I know that I can do better work for you if I take a complete break once a year, and I know even better that the same rest is essential for Mary. She spent the best part of the winter in bed in the one year in which we did not get away.

4. We have a chance to go and stay with friends in Antigua between February 12 and February 23. This is a time when both Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara will be here, and when my own staff will be at full strength, with Brom Smith in the lead. There is never a good time for a holiday, but this seems as safe as any, and all fooling aside, there is no correlation whatever between my absence and the presence of crisis. We have had just as much trouble in the last 12 months when I was here as we did in the weeks I was away last winter.

OK \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

*Give letter to Mary,  
keep him informed*

*h. q. B.*

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12/31/64

TO: The President

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

For information. Here is Max's telegram, and the  
answer which I have sent in your name after our  
conversation this morning:

[quote attached telegram A and telegram B]

Declassified upon removal of  
Security-Classified attachment

By MJE On 3/7/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

*this package went  
w/ Mr. B to Texas 12/29/64*  
3

TOP SECRET

(12/28/64) (McG B)

Pros and Cons of a reprisal raid against North Vietnamese  
barracks at Vit Thu Lu (Target 36)

I. Considerations against the operation

1. Six days will have elapsed since the Christmas Eve raid and the reprisal element will be blurred.
2. The political confusion in Saigon will give this signal a very mixed meaning both to Vietnamese and to the world.
3. A confusing response which may lead to escalation by the other side is not in our interest at this time.
4. It seems unwise to escalate merely because security control in a U.S. BOQ is bad.
5. The central problem is and remains the establishment of political stability in South Vietnam, and a major decision of this sort should await progress toward stability. At the least it should not be taken while the situation is more unstable than ever.

II. Considerations in favor of the operation

1. Target 36 is a military barracks, and the fact that this is a reprisal will be evident to Hanoi and to others. Six days of delay in this reprisal is not significant, since the close parallel of one barracks against another will be apparent to all.
2. The delay was justified by the need to pinpoint Viet Cong responsibility, which is now clear, on the basis of Hanoi radio broadcasts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 1 of 3 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8/31/77  
By JK/umg, NARS, Date 9/4/77



3. We decided in December that we would execute reprisals from now on, and this decision was not tied, as other possibilities were, to increased political stability in Saigon. We have communicated this decision to those Allies who are closest to us on Vietnam -- the Lao, the Thai, the British, the Australians, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders. We have said the same thing to the senior military and civilian officials of Saigon. They are now waiting to see whether we mean what we say.

4. The operation is rated as a very low risk by General Wheeler, and because its character as a reprisal will be clear, it should not lead to escalation (but see separate intelligence estimate).

5. Seaborn's report from Hanoi suggests that the Communists very much need a reminder of our will and determination.

6. While a reprisal will not produce political stability in Saigon, it does seem likely that specific, firm action now will be somewhat helpful in assisting us to continue to make progress in resolving the impasse of last week.

7. A firm reprisal will do wonders for the morale of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.

8. The theory of our policy of reprisal is that it can help to prevent gradual Viet Cong escalation in South Vietnam. This theory seems as sound now as it was when we decided to follow it.

9. Ambassador Taylor and his entire country team are unanimous, and they are the people on the spot.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

(12/28/64)

One more consideration against:

It was Winston Churchill who said that you should never trust the judgment of the man on the spot.

Or, to put it another way, it is easy for advisers to be brave, but it is the President who must live with the decision.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 3 of 3 pages)



4

December 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Visitors in the First Half of 1965

Dean Rusk hopes very much that you will agree to an average of two visitors a month from heads of governments or heads of state in the future. These are the men who usually rate a formal greeting, an office visit, and a meal (sometimes with a return meal at their place, also). This memo does not deal with the occasional important foreign minister and other special cases.

I have had a check made of visitors in the last ten years and I find that this number of visitors would be a little bit less than the Kennedy average but significantly more than Eisenhower's. In some periods Eisenhower saw as few as three visitors in a six month period, and of course when he was ill, in the last half of 1955, he saw nobody.

Your own record in 1964 included twenty-three visitors, so that what Dean is recommending is almost exactly what you did last year.

This recommendation seems reasonable, with one proviso. That is that we should all do our very best to ensure that these visits are used constructively in the national interest. That is not always possible. Occasionally these dignitaries will get to the United States in spite of all our own desires, and in such cases it may be necessary to have a short visit with you simply to avoid badly hurt feelings or other damage. But most of the time a little skill will allow us to schedule visits in ways that are helpful to our own interests and purposes.

With that preface, here is the proposal in which Dean and I join:

I. Visits already agreed:

(1) Prime Minister Sato of Japan on January/2. This visit will follow the new precedent which we established with Wilson wherein that you give him a dinner but he does not give you a return meal. There will be a reception the following day at the Japanese Embassy but you are not committed to go if you don't want to.



(2) Prime Minister Pearson of Canada on January 15. There is no definite plan on this yet, but my suggestion is that he call on you in the afternoon for an informal talk. Mrs. Johnson may wish to give Mrs. Pearson a tea at about the same time, but she has an entirely free choice.

II. Visits which are possible and desirable but on which no specific time is yet recommended:

(1) Chancellor Erhard of Germany. The Germans are beginning to get it clear in their heads that you are not coming to Europe in the next few months, and informal soundings in the German Embassy suggest that Erhard will probably want to come over here in March or April. There is every reason why he should from our point of view. Such a meeting might well be the best time for floating a painless alternative to the MLF (closer consultation and some form of nuclear directorate in which Germany could have a seat, with four or five others).

(2) President Pak of Korea. He has not been here as Chief of State except for the Kennedy funeral, and he wants to come. But we ought to use the carrot of such a visit to draw him toward the Japanese-Korean settlement which means so much to us both politically and financially. We propose therefore to keep this one indefinite in the hopes of progress of this sort.

(3) President Azikiwe of Nigeria. This is an important and dignified figure, and the head of the leading moderate African state. He is expected in the United States in the June commencement season, and we would recommend that he be given an office interview and dinner. Nigeria is one of the few African countries where our hopes and the realities are consistent with each other.

(4) Prime Minister Moro of Italy. If Moro survives the current Presidential elections, he is likely to want to come late in January or early in February, and since this visit has been twice postponed we will have almost no way of avoiding him. Moro can be helpful in the continued defusing of the MLF, and an Italian visit always helps the moderator in Italy.

III. Visitors for whom we recommend specific times:

(1) Ayub Khan of Pakistan for April. We assume that Ayub will win his election by one means or another. If he does it will be highly useful for him to have a chance to meet and talk with you. He has a number of illusions



about our real policy, not the least of which is that if he could talk with you he could straighten you out. He needs to find out directly from you

(a) that we are friendly with India because that is our national interest, and not just because Chester Bowles has captured the liberal bureaucracy

(b) that our desire for friendship for Pakistan is equally firm and as real as ever and

(c) that we do not expect Ayub to settle his problems by taking our aid and kicking us in the shins at the same time.

Ayub is of course a very impressive and attractive human being. He is one of the few heads of government that you would have a really good time with.

(2) Shastri of India for May. If you have Ayub you will probably wish to invite Shastri at the same time and we think it will be more convenient for him and just as good for us to have the meeting come later -- perhaps in May. Our interests with India are obvious. A meeting of minds between you and Shastri would strengthen both India and the United States internationally; we need to be each others' friends right now.

(3) President Yameogo of the Upper Volta for February or March. Yameogo is proposed not simply for himself but because he is an excellent example of the moderate French-speaking African leadership. He has been sensible and helpful on the Congo issue and on the Chinese Communist problem. I initially questioned this recommendation but Dean Rusk thinks it is very important, and well worth the time, as a signal to the Africans. This is probably true, because we also recommend that you receive a less moderate but even more important figure:

(4) President Kenyatta of Kenya in March. Kenyatta is a man of great ability and prestige who has been much more moderate in office than the British feared. And Kenya is very important. He will be greatly flattered by a chance to talk with you, and it is important for him to know at first hand how preposterous it is for African leaders to base their policy on the assumption that we are either "colonialists" or soft.



IV. Persons who may propose themselves but about whom we think no decision can be made yet:

(1) Prime Minister Wilson of England. Wilson has wanted to return to address the General Assembly (the UN is a great political favorite in Liberal and Labour circles in England). It is not clear just when he will do this, and it is even less clear there will be anything important for you and him to discuss. So we may wish to discourage this one -- or keep it very brief. If we are to keep moving away from the MLF, it is probably best not to do it in Wilson's company.

(2) Chiang or Madame Chiang. We continue to get rumors about this possibility, though they now center around the Lady and not the Generalissimo. We may have to cross this bridge when she comes to it, but not before.

(3) Prime Minister Pompidou of France. This may be a future way of having -- or seeming to have -- a little sensible talk with France, but right now we have no assurance that there is much to talk about -- or any urgent reason for seeming to talk.

(4) President Nasser of the UAR. This is not the perfect moment for this suggestion (in which Dean Rusk does not join), but my own view is that it will help, in the long run, to have him and that we should keep the possibility in mind. Bob Komer has sent you a separate memo on this.

(5) Sukarno of Indonesia. He may come to the World's Fair in the spring, and it may be in our interest to see him then. We have some control on this.

V. A meeting of Latin American Presidents

You will notice that this list contains no Latin Americans. This is because we have a separate proposal: that you should make your first overseas trip to Brazil, to a meeting in Brasilia of South American heads of state. On balance they are a more appetizing group right now than they have been any time in recent years. An informal meeting to talk things over with them over a two or three day period would be a fitting first expedition and a very good way of establishing a number of personal relations which would take more time and energy if you had to do them one by one. The current government of



Brazil, while military, is also progressive, and Brasilia as a relatively small government city is a good place from a security standpoint. This could be in April or May.

I will try to collect your reactions by a phone call after you have had a chance to look this over.

McGeorge Bundy

December 24, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT

This is a better summary of Nasser's speech than the papers are likely to have. Our probable response will be simply to stop talking with him about aid for a while, but not to engage in a public row. Most of us feel that there is no gain in pushing him still further into a public frenzy. The history of Aswan and Suez is clear in everyone's minds. On the other hand, no one is particularly interested in ostentatious feeding of the hand that bites.

McG. B.



6

23  
December 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is what the French really think. But the last paragraph shows again how timely was your decision to put on the brakes.

McG. B.



December 23, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the Canadian Seaborn's account of his visit to Hanoi last week. It suggests that the people in Hanoi have a fairly accurate appreciation of our current policy, and that they are confident that time is on their side. On the other hand, there is no evidence here that Hanoi thinks there is going to be an early or sudden shift in its favor.

This is, in other words, one more piece of evidence in favor of the general conclusion that the situation is going steadily but slowly against us there.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 5-12-78; NSC 2-5-79

~~SECRET~~

By if, NARS, Date 6-19-79 December 21, 1964

Sent by wire <sup>8</sup>  
12/22/64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Political Developments in South Vietnam  
(Fifth Report)

1. The various principals in Saigon are still trying to sort out the confusion wreaked by the military's dissolution of the High National Council. Since yesterday's meetings between the Ambassador and four of the Young Turk commanders, and with Premier Huong, there have been further U.S. meetings with General Khanh and Huong. Taylor is trying to get Huong to stand firm and is urging him to use the threat of resigning to extract concessions from the military. Taylor hopes to get a retraction of the decree dissolving the HNC; to arrange a reconstituted HNC acceptable to the military; to obtain the release of all persons arrested yesterday; and to get a specific promise of support for Huong's government by the military commanders. Huong now says that Khanh has agreed to all these points except the first, which obviously is the basic one.

2. Huong appears far more reluctant to stand up to the military than to the Buddhists. He and Suu will probably stay on and accept the military's terms, provided only that they get a promise that the generals will not again "intervene". Huong evidently feels that he has little leverage against the military, and he fears an open break which would leave him without military support against the Buddhists.

3. Huong is still obsessed with the Buddhist threat, although Chief Buddhist Quang told the Embassy that he is suspending his antigovernment campaign. Quang did say, however, that the Buddhist campaign would be resumed if Huong persisted in anti-Buddhist policies, if the Catholics regained power, or if General Khanh emerged in real control.

Chester L. Cooper

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority USIA Ltr. 8/4/76 (\*143)By rmg/jc NARA. Date 11-20-09Sent to ranch  
12/22/64~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: USIA Policy and Operations in Congo Airdrop

In view of the widespread African hostility to the Stanleyville rescue mission, I thought you might be interested in USIA's efforts to generate understanding and sympathy for the operation.

USIA policy from the start was to rely heavily on rebel brutality as a means of influencing world opinion in support of the humanitarian aspects of the rescue mission. Before the paratroop drop, the USIA mission in Leopoldville had instructions on the press, motion picture, still picture, and radio coverage required to document this brutality. At the time of the drop, the Agency instructed its posts throughout the world to establish the essential facts and to "play up evidence of rebel atrocities, callous disregard for lives of Congolese and other noncombatants, defiance of worldwide condemnation."

Radio: From November 24 to December 11, the Voice of America broadcast 360 newscasts in 38 languages describing the rescue operation and rebel brutality. Additionally, there were more than a dozen commentaries on all major language services. USIA correspondents flew to the Congo for first-hand reports and interviews.

Press: USIA teletype servicing to all areas was heavy. The Africa File carried 98 stories on the Congo crisis, of which 27 dealt directly with rebel outrages. The other files carried a total of 60 atrocity stories.

Pictures: The Agency was able to obtain 23 good photographs of the rescue operation and the results of rebel brutality. Five thousand prints of these pictures were distributed to posts in all countries.

Publications: USIA Leopoldville helped the Congolese produce a 40-page booklet, attributed to the Congolese Ministry of Information, describing the atrocities and carrying pictures of many of the victims and some of the escapees. Twelve thousand copies of the booklet are being distributed in the Congo and, if our plans succeed, it will be distributed in other countries through non-American means. (A copy of the pamphlet is attached.)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

Other media output: The Agency produced a 15-minute television program based on the rescue mission and highlighting rebel atrocities. A rescue sequence with pictures of rebel brutality was included in the most recent issue of an unattributed newsreel distributed in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Carl T. Rowan

IOP:BAAnderson  
I:LEdmond:jw

10 ✓

*DeMunn*  
November 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your talk with Walter Lippmann

At Tab A is the outline you asked for yesterday of the 25-year record and the achievement of 1964. It is still very thin, but I think it shows real promise. If you like it, you may want to hold on to it as an outline for the State of the Union, but bits and pieces of it would also fit into what you have to say to Lippmann.

Lippmann is full of his European trip and will be just as glad to talk as to listen. The thing he admires most is the way you have defuzed the MLF crisis, at least from the point of view of the U. S. (The Franco-German trouble is growing more and more acute.) He will be delighted to hear anything you want to tell him along the lines of your recent backgrounders. There is no harm in telling him that you are issuing Presidential orders on this matter. A copy of the NSAM which will be coming to you for signature on this subject is attached at Tab B, and it is ok to use it with Walter. He is the one truly discreet reporter I know.

McG. B.

12/19/64

## AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

### The twenty-five year record and the achievement of 1964

#### INTRODUCTION

American foreign policy as a permanent and active enterprise dates from the second world war -- more precisely, from the fall of France in 1940. Since that time our policy has rested on four fundamentals:

1. Purpose.
2. Military strength.
3. The strength of the American society and economy.
4. Our understanding of adversaries, allies, and others.

There has seldom been a year of more solid progress on all fronts than 1964. The outline that follows indicates the nature of each of these four problems and the shape of the progress of 1964. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the special problem of Vietnam.

#### ONE. PURPOSE

The United States has made the most sudden transition in history from continental isolation to world-wide engagement. The last of our neutrality acts was passed in 1939. In 1964 we have active relations with nearly all nations, and alliances with more than 40. We are the citadel of human hope against the inhumanity of communism.

In making this transition we have had to steer between two great dangers -- isolationism and overcommitment. In the first ten years isolationism was the greater danger.

Since then the graver risk has been overcommitment. Too many Americans still think that the United States can and must solve every problem. Too many believe that American strength can produce righteousness in far countries. This illusion was a major cause of trouble in the 1950's and it contributed to the rigidities of John Foster Dulles.



1964 was a year of progress in this matter of American purpose. The greatest achievement was the national election itself. In that election a moderate, resilient, firm and peaceful policy was challenged by one of slogans and militarism and was decisively reaffirmed. President Johnson campaigned openly and clearly on a policy of prudence and patience and peace. He reaffirmed the American commitment to active world-wide effort within the range of our resources and our abilities, but he warned against illusion and he painted the world as it really is. His overwhelming victory is the most important achievement of American foreign policy in 1964.

## TWO. MILITARY STRENGTH

From June 1940 until today the military strength of America has been absolutely indispensable to peace, and American weakness has repeatedly brought danger to the world. American conventional disarmament and apparent American disengagement brought the challenge of 1948 in Berlin and 1950 in Korea. American overcommitment to a single form of defense in the 1950's brought the challenge of subversion in Southeast Asia and contributed to the crises in Berlin in 1960-62. 1964 marked a continuation and an electoral vindication of a policy of balanced strength which allows us to say now that the American defense establishment is not only the best run but the best understood that any country can boast of in the nuclear age. This is the managerial achievement of a great Secretary of Defense. It is the political achievement of the first two Presidents who have understood the real nature of military power in the age of the atom.

At the same time, 1964 marked a continuation and enlargement of a policy of restraint in defense planning. President Johnson's new disarmament proposals, his policy of mutual example in pruning the defense budget, and his success in achieving agreement to keep nuclear weapons out of space are all examples of a policy which once again was successfully explained and defended in the forum of a national election.

## THREE. THE STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

The entire enterprise of American foreign affairs rests upon the strength and stability of our own society. Repeatedly in the last 25 years the recessions have threatened the whole undertaking. The prospect

of real peace was shattered by the great depression of 1929-1932, which is a deeper cause of the second world war than Adolph Hitler himself.

The economic and social record of the United States in the last twenty years is highly successful. But there has seldom been a better year than 1964. The continuing surge of prosperity, the increase of general confidence, both among businessmen and throughout the society, and the extraordinary stability of wages and prices were a triumphant achievement. At the same time, the most important civil rights act in 100 years was not only enacted but put in force more peacefully and more effectively than even its strongest supporters had dared to hope. It is too soon to be sure, but it may well turn out that 1964 was the turning point toward a new order of peace and mutual respect among Americans of all colors. Nothing could be more important than these achievements for the face of America abroad and the strength of our society in meeting its foreign responsibilities.

#### FOUR. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ADVERSARIES, ALLIES, AND OTHERS

The hardest problem that any world power faces is to establish and sustain an accurate understanding of the rest of the world. Our beginnings on this problem in the second world war were quite primitive. We saw the world in black and white terms.

The black were the Nazi and Japanese enemy. The white were our allies, including such very different and imperfect partners as the communists and the Nationalist Chinese. The post-war period gave us the gravest kind of shock as to the nature, strength and purpose of both Stalinism and Chinese Nationalism.

We adjusted rapidly and effectively to the Soviet challenge in the West. This is the triumph of our European policy. We were less successful in Asia, but even there the record at least since 1950 is better than might have been feared.

Our relations with allies and neutrals have been equally spotty. We have not always understood what we can and cannot do with either one. Yet, on balance, again the record of the last quarter century is one of growing maturity on our part, and growing understanding of

what we can and cannot expect of others.

1964, again, has been a year of important accomplishment in understanding. After dealing firmly with an explosion in Panama, caused by years of neglect, we have come forward at the end of the year with the boldest and most magnanimous proposal in decades. We have made the year a bad one for Castro and a good one for the hemisphere. We have shown understanding of the intractable de Gaulle, while maintaining and strengthening our necessary relations of intimacy with the Germans and the British. In the Congo, we have shown both the necessary courage in rescuing hostages and a purpose of conciliation which will be more clearly understood as feelings cool. Above all, we have shown our continuing and increasing understanding of the changing nature of communism. We have shown discrimination between Moscow and Peking. We have made clear our purpose of building bridges to Eastern Europe.

All this has been achieved in a year of necessary preoccupation with domestic affairs. All of it has been added to the first and great task of preventing panic and keeping an even course after the terrible tragedy of November 22, 1963.

Foreign policy is not essentially a matter of rhetoric or protocol or personality, or even style. It was not so with President Kennedy and it is not so with President Johnson. The real tests of policy are deeper and more serious. They have been met by the United States for a quarter of a century, and they were met outstandingly in 1964.

#### THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF VIETNAM

The toughest single problem of U. S. policy in the mid-60's is in Vietnam. 1964 was not a year of success there, but it was a year in which deterioration was slowed down and a basis laid for continuing determined effort. This problem was not created by President Johnson or by President Kennedy, or even by President Eisenhower. It was created by generations of French mismanagement and by the thrust of expanding communism from the north. The American response in 1964 has been determined but prudent, and at the end of the year we have both a better country team and a better Vietnamese government than we had at the beginning. There is just no reason at all for despair, and every reason to carry forward the complex but indispensable effort on which we are engaged there.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is as revised after our last meeting and is ready for signature. We plan to give it relatively wide distribution in order to make sure that all the people with ideas of their own get your policy clear in their heads. There is nothing in it that will do any harm if it leaks a little.

mp.s.  
McG. B.

~~Secret~~ Attachment

(NSA on MCF)

December 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Congressional opinions re Panama

I attach reports on Congressional opinion obtained by others who were in the telephoning process. I myself talked to:

Senator Mansfield:

Unqualified approval.

Senator Dirksen:

Strong approval.

Speaker McCormack:

Unqualified approval. Said he thought even last January that we might need to be more forthcoming.

Mr. Halleck:

Reserved his position, but expressed no opposition. Seemed to be more wary about the sea level canal than about the proposal of a new treaty. Feels sea level canal may be an expensive boondoggle.

McG. B.

12a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1964

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McG. B.





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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 17, 1964

Yance's List

Notes re calls on Presidential statement on Panama:

Senator Saltonstall indicated approval.

Congressman Rivers indicated lukewarm approval.

Congressman Tollefson indicated hearty approval.

Senator Russell indicated deep dissatisfaction but stated that he guessed it was all right. Stated he felt we must have concluded that there was something wrong in being a strong and firm world power. Further stated that he felt we were giving Panamanians everything they had previously asked for before the negotiations started. After I spoke to each of these issues, Senator Russell stated he guessed it was all right but he was not happy with our proposed action.

CRD

Steve Ailes' list.

12c

Senator Prouty (Senior Minority Member, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries)

Appreciated being informed very much. Thought it made a lot of sense to take the initiative in this matter. Had no problem with the general nature of the announcement. Attitude can be described as favorable.

Senator Ellender (Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Works, Senate Appropriations Committee)

Was in a friendly and pleasant mood. Thought we certainly should take the initiative, but wanted the President to know that he thought we should make a strong statement to indicate that we do not propose to give up anything important - a tough line in his words rather than a tiptoe approach to the problem. He thought the President should refer to what the Canal has meant to Panama, what they would have been without it, and what they will be if we dig one somewhere else. In this last connection, he hoped the President would emphasize that other routes would be looked at.

Congressman Arends (Senior Minority Member, House Armed Services Committee)

Was hurrying to catch a plane to Florida, but said of course he would support the President. He said it will scare people when we say we will negotiate. He asked, what will we give up? Upon being assured that we plan to hold on to all rights necessary to the operation in Panama and to hold as firm a line as possible in the course of negotiations, he was satisfied.

Congressman Rhodes (Senior Minority Member, Public Works Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee)

He, as a practicing lawyer, thought it might be a mistake to make an offer on the theory that some times you can trade more effectively if the other side offers first. He immediately said, however, he did not wish to second guess anyone on the strategy and would support the program.



December 18, 1964

Tom Mann's List

1. The following expressed initial opposition:

Senator Hickenlooper. On ground US should show strength. After an hour's discussion I had feeling he could be brought around. Seemed to be impressed with idea that (a) sea level canal treaty, new Panama Canal Zone treaty and base rights agreement could be negotiated simultaneously and as a package and (b) Congress would be consulted on texts of two treaties in advance of presentation of drafts to any Latin American country. I stressed all that was up for consideration now was Presidential statement and not final texts of treaties and agreements.

2. The following expressed approval in principle of the plan but we need to bear in mind that if strong opposition develops some of these could shift. I made no attempt on basis of short telephone conversations to extract unconditional promises of support.

Senator Hayden. Unqualified support.

Senator Morse. Unqualified support.

Senator Kuchel. Unqualified support.

Senator Aiken. Somewhat cautious but my impression is he went along.

Senator Magnuson. Seemed to be in agreement. Talked principally about sea level canal and expressed opinion that the Senate Commerce Committee would want a hearing soon to go into details. Expressed interest in term of proposed base rights agreement.

Senator Cooper. Unqualified support. "I like what you are doing".

Senator Cotton. Expressed interest and seemed to be in agreement.

Representative Ford. Appeared to be in agreement but predicted strong opposition by some elements in the House which he did not identify.

Representative Morgan. Seemed to be in agreement. Said he would like to look into treaty drafts.

Representative Sullivan. Seemed to be in agreement but interested in treaty drafts.

Representative Bolton. Expressed agreement in principle.

Representative Fascell. Expressed agreement in principle.

Representative Selden. Expressed agreement in principle and said he wanted to go into treaty drafts after his return to Washington.

Representative Bonner. Expressed no objections but stated House Commerce Committee would like to have hearings. He said he would like to see the President personally before these hearings commenced and asked that Mann arrange this.

Representative Mahon. Travelling and unavailable.



Mr. Ball tells me that Senator Fulbright and Representative Boggs expressed approval and that Senator Fulbright only hoped that the President's statement would not preclude the possible idea of the formation of a private corporation composed of users to administer the canal. Mr. Ball assured him that it would not.

TCW

December 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is another new effort by CIA. This time they are trying to give you the highlights of their weekly summary. I myself think it is rather spotty and less successful than their new daily brief, but it is your opinion that counts.

Any adjective you want to put on this note will be helpful.

McG. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14

✓  
SANITIZED

December 17, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your backgrounders and your comments in small sessions over here have created a pretty good sense of your position on the MLF and Atlantic nuclear defense, but I think the Government will carry on better in the weeks ahead if it has a piece of paper signed by you. |

I attach a draft of such an instruction, and unless you have objection I suggest we discuss it with Rusk, Ball and McNamara this afternoon.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority State 8-22-77; NISC 10-4-79  
By ind, NARS, Date 11-5-79

C O L  
L B J L

December 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Interview with Maggie Higgins -- and Axel Springer

Maggie Higgins has been after everyone over here to get you to do a statement or an on-the-record interview for the German paper, Die Welt am Sonntag, which is run by a remarkable man named Axel Springer. George Reedy and I join in thinking this would be a real mistake. George will attach his own reasons, so let me give you mine.

Axel Springer is an enormously gifted man, but he is a strong and emotional nationalist and he is currently taking his strategic pills straight from Dr. Franz-Josef Strauss. I attach an intelligence report of a letter he recently sent to Erhard on this point. In these circumstances, any comment by you in an exclusive interview for Springer would have disadvantages:

first, it would seem to do a favor for a man who is leaning toward the notion of nuclear weapons for the Germans and has repeatedly expressed suspicion of your basic policies. This would be discouraging to other more friendly publishers, and would lead to a series of additional German requests for interviews.

second, Springer himself would be highly tempted to go after any clauses or phrases which he did not like, and you might therefore find that he had bitten the hand that fed him.

It seems to me much better to keep out of this one. I do not think we have an obligation to help Maggie Higgins earn her salary by a special favor of this sort. I even think it might be wise to signal quietly to Springer that it is impossible to give this kind of interview to a paper which is spreading suspicion about the United States. That might lead to a dialogue in which we could bring him round. Germans like to be bullied.

George's comments are attached.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT



SANITIZED

Authority Att. 5-12-78, NSC 2-5-79  
By if NARS, Date 6-19-79

December 16, 1964

16  
J  
**SANITIZED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senator Mansfield's memorandum of December 9

1. Senator Mansfield's memorandum is characteristically thoughtful. There is a difference in emphasis between him and us, but certainly no difference in fundamental purpose. I think he agrees with us that the most important task is to try to help in getting a more effective and better supported government in Saigon; of course this is a point that you have hammered on in every meeting in recent months. And we certainly agree with him "that American and Western interests are best served by the frugal use of American resources to forestall Chinese political and military domination of the area and to keep open an opportunity for the development of native institutions of national independence, regional cooperation and popularly responsible government." What seems frugal to us may seem too much to him, but this is not a difference in principle.

2. Senator Mansfield's memorandum makes seven policy suggestions and I comment on them in order:

(1) We think it would be a mistake to make a commitment against any U. S. action of any kind beyond the borders of South Vietnam. On the other hand, you have repeatedly said that we seek no wider war and intend no reckless action. I myself do not see the grounds for the flatness of the Senator's recommendation, given the facts of infiltration and of North Vietnamese control over the Communists in the South.

(2) There is a lot of force in the Senator's recommendation that we avoid entanglement on the Cambodian border. But Communist infiltration across this border is a fact, and it is hard to see how we can impose the stringent restrictions on the Vietnamese which the Senator suggests. As a practical matter, we do agree that there are other areas of higher priority, and this position is being urged on the Vietnamese authorities by the country team. [ ]

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(3) We agree on the importance of supporting Souvanna Phouma; this has been our position for two years. We do not quite agree that the initiative in these relations should be "his totally" because that seems to us not a good way of conducting relations which involve U. S. commitments and responsibilities. Souvanna himself has given repeated indications of his satisfaction with our current policy in Laos. Souvanna, indeed, is considerably more favorable to U. S. action outside South Vietnam than the Senator's memorandum, so that if we followed all his advice we could not follow all of Senator Mansfield's.

(4) We do not currently share the view that we should stand aside entirely from those who are trying to increase their contacts with Hanoi. We do recognize the advantages of detaching Hanoi from China, but at the moment we have also the quite tangible problem of what Hanoi is doing in South Vietnam. This seems to us to argue against a present policy of Free World friendliness to North Vietnam.

(5) We agree with the general purpose of this recommendation, but it is not clear to us that peaceful unification of all Vietnam is the best slogan for a government which has all it can do to deal with its own immediate problems. Nevertheless, this suggestion is worth further consideration and it is being reviewed with the State Department.

(6) No matter what course is taken, it seems likely to us that we face years of involvement in South Vietnam, though not necessarily "a vast increase in the commitment." The Administration has regularly insisted that this problem is not one which will be solved tomorrow, but it may well be important to make this point still more clear to the American people. In general, the Administration's policy seems to correspond to the view of most thoughtful Americans: We do not want a big war out there, and neither do we intend to back out on a 10-year-long commitment.

(7) Right now we do not see how we can have useful exploratory talks with the Chinese, in the light of the extraordinary virulence of their public and private comments about the U. S. It takes two to conduct a conversation, and everything we currently know about Peking suggests that there is no interest there in a serious conversation on

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any terms that are remotely acceptable to us. Recent reports from leaders of the British Labour Party, who have been in touch with the Chinese and who might be expected to sympathize with suggestion No. 7, only confirm our current pessimistic assessment of this possibility.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~  
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December 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your backgrounder this afternoon and foreign affairs

First, you may want to clarify a couple of points which Wicker confused:

a. You have asked Bruce to stay on, but have not had a chance to review the situation of your Ambassadors on the European continent.

b. You have not taken the view that the mixed-manned fleet may be hard to sell to Congress. It is a matter in which you are letting the British and the Germans argue it out, and meanwhile the U. S. Government has not changed its position of interest in and support for a mixed-manned fleet if that can be agreed on generally (the Germans are watching like hawks to see whether we are letting them down on this).

Second, I think you might want to give some attention to Latin America. You know the words and music here very well, so these are just items to remind:

- firmness but patience and understanding toward Panama
- a year of weakening for Castro in the face of our effective economic campaign and OAS firmness, and our steady handling of water crisis at Guantanamo (as a result, Cuba not an issue in '64 campaign)
- major change for the better in Brazil
- new speed and efficiency in Alliance administration (rate of commitments double that of '63)
- Chilean election right in the spirit of the Alliance for Progress (and without complaint of any kind you have sent your good right arm, Ralph Dungan, to be Ambassador there)
- new level of good will with Mexico after Chamizal settlement, with progress on salinity problem
- firm and single-minded management under Mann in Washington.



12/16/64

Third, I think you might expand on the different kinds of Communists. (This is a thesis which you preached in the campaign and which was accepted, I think, as against Goldwater's concept of a single monolithic, omnipresent, hydra-headed Communist horror.)

- our policy toward the Soviets is as you described it the other day, firm on essentials, but always friendly and always seeking ways toward peace
- you mean it about bridges to Eastern Europe and you are increasingly impressed by the fact that business and commercial leaders want peaceful trade in this part of the world
- Communist China is quite a different problem, and both her nuclear explosion and her aggressive attitudes toward her neighbors make her a major problem for all peaceful people. This is not the time to give her increased prestige or to reward her belligerence -- at the UN or elsewhere.

Fourth, I think you may wish to repeat the basic outline of what you have said on Vietnam and on Europe.

Fifth, you may wish to emphasize that you have an order out for your Government to use every bit of its imagination to find new steps and new initiatives of any sort in the field of arms control and disarmament, and stopping nuclear spread, and generally turning down the level of danger in the world. (I think we will have at least a modest package in this field for the State of the Union message if I can get past some barriers in the State Department.)

\* \* \*

Finally, and more generally still, I think you might usefully give the impression that you are not in a great rush about any of these international problems. Foreign affairs is a slow and gradual business. We are only one among many, though we are the most powerful. We have our problems, but those of the people in Moscow and Peking are worse. We have the patience and steadiness and strength that has been tested over 20 years, and our basic course of prudence, strength, and cooperation with all friendly nations has been given a resounding endorsement by the voters. We expect to go on in the same direction, and except for the brave Americans who carry the burden in Vietnam, we are proud to be at peace and proud that the world is perhaps a little less dangerous than it was just a year ago.

McG. B.

(page 2 of 2 pages)

9  
December 16, 1964

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**This one-page report gives you some feeling of the way the French are acting. I am more and more persuaded that this is not the winter for a cheery trip to Paris.**

**McG. B.**

**~~SECRET~~ attachment Fm AmEmb Paris 3572 Dec 15**



Dec. 12 1964

16

20

Mr. President:

Jack Valenti asked me to do a comment on Mansfield's memorandum and a possible letter for you. Here they are. Both the memorandum and the letter are designed to treat him gently. We could get into a stronger debate, but I doubt if it is worth it.

McG. B.

21  
December 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is Max Taylor's first extended comment on the group problem. He refers in his last sentence to another telegram which has not yet come in, but I think you will want this as it stands.

McG. B.

SAIGON NODIS Embtel 1764.

December 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

If you have time before you go, you might find it helpful to have a short talk with Walter Lippmann. He does not batter us all with angry telegrams like the virago you saw today, but he has some very interesting things to say about Europe. On the other hand, if you are short of time I will simply give him your warm regards and tell him that I have reported on your opinions -- which I can do in another memo.

McG. B.



December 16, 1964

2 23  
referred  
12/16  
but not  
sent as of  
that evening

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Your backgrounders and your comments in small sessions over here have created a pretty good sense of your position on the MLF and Atlantic nuclear defense, but I think the Government will carry on better in the weeks ahead if it has a piece of paper signed by you. I say this because I have indirect reports of what George Ball has been saying which make it fairly clear to me that he still has not quite got the message. Since he is the most energetic man in the Department of State and since this problem is his absolute No. 1 favorite, I think there is virtue in a formal instruction.

I attach a draft of such an instruction, and after you have commented on it we might brush it up for approval when you next meet Rusk, Ball, and McNamara, I hope on Friday.

McG. B.

SECRET attachment

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By   jw  , NARA, Date 10-16-98

Decemb 16, 1964

24

MR. PRESIDENT:

Klein is the staff officer who more  
than anyone has helped to keep  
our eyes open over here to both sides  
of the MLF.

McG. B.

24a

December 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROBERTS

Re: Requests for photographs, and suggested inscriptions

1. David Klein (departing from my staff in January)

For David Klein, with thanks for helping to keep Mac Bundy on the straight and narrow path.

2. William Brubeck (departing from my staff this month)

For Bill Brubeck, with thanks for his coolness in the Congo rescue operation.

3. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer (Japan)

For Ambassador Reischauer -- scholar, diplomat and patriot, with warm regards.

4. Ambassador Winthrop Brown (Korea)

For Ambassador Winthrop Brown, an outstanding professional, with warm regards.

5. Assistant Secretary of State William M. Bundy

I leave this to someone else to suggest.

McG. B.



~~TOP SECRET~~

December 16, 1964

25

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report of talk with Ambassador Ritchie

1. You asked me to talk to Mike Pearson about more Canadian help in Vietnam and about Canadian views on the MLF. I decided to do this by giving Ambassador Ritchie an oral message from you to the Prime Minister. A direct call from me to the PM would be a little tricky even in a good season, and at the moment he is badly beleaguered by scandal in his official family, so it seemed to me better to go at him this way.

2. I told Ritchie just how very important more Canadian help in Vietnam would be, and why. He took the point and promised to get us an answer. I also told him that you were troubled by newspaper stories of Canadian opposition to the MLF. He said the stories were inaccurate, but he admitted that the French Canadian problem makes it important for the Canadians to avoid any appearance of hostility to France. He reminded me, however, that the Prime Minister had promised President Kennedy that he would in no way oppose our efforts in favor of integrated nuclear defense in the Alliance, and I think that he will probably bring a rather reassuring reply on this score. The net effect should be to cool Martin off a little bit, which is just what we want.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-44  
By is, NARA Date 10-24-99



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26

December 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 5-12-78, 7-19-78  
By if, NARS, Date 6-19-79

1. At your request, State has studied the possibility of delegating to the Vice President the chore of receiving credentials from the roughly 30 foreign ambassadors who are assigned to Washington each year (1963 and 1964 lists of ambassadors presenting credentials are at Tab 1).
2. State's Legal Advisor thinks that it is constitutional for you to delegate the credentials-receiving job to the Vice President (Tab 2, Page 1). Angie Duke also thinks the Vice President could do the job, especially if you announced that the status of the Vice Presidency is being raised and that the receipt of credentials (along with other new duties) is in accordance with this new status.
3. At the same time, State and others (including Angie Duke) advise against giving this job to the Vice President. The arguments which are made against such a delegation and which you will want to weigh against the time-saving factor, are these:
  - (a) Many countries send their very best people to the U. S. as ambassadors, some of whom return to head governments or foreign ministries. Even a brief meeting gives you an opportunity to make an impact on these men.
  - (b) Generally speaking, meetings with ambassadors help to build your image as a man with a deep interest in foreign affairs. Conversely, a delegation of credentials-receiving could be misinterpreted.
  - (c) It is important for the President to maintain a relationship with some ambassadors and the traditional presentation of credentials affords a ready and appropriate occasion for an initial meeting. In this regard, we asked State what de Gaulle does (also a chief of state/government who has to cope with a horde of ambassadors); we were told that he sees each ambassador formally for 15 minutes (Tab 3).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



- (d) It has long been the norm for a chief of state to receive credentials personally and exceptions have been the result of such things as illness, absence, or of special political circumstances (historical study at Tab 4). A delegation to the Vice President will lead to substantial ill-will in the Diplomatic Corps. It is pertinent to note that when Eisenhower had to delegate this authority during his heart attack and then tried to continue the practice afterwards, strong pressures built up which forced him to resume the receiving of credentials.
- (e) A change in practice might cause some foreign governments to react negatively vis-a-vis their relations with our ambassadors. For example, the State Department expresses fear that its access to foreign heads of state/government would be much impeded (Tab 5, Page 2).
- (f) A meeting on arrival probably reduces the pressure for unnecessary appointments at a later date by ambassadors who feel that they have failed as personal emissaries to the President if they have not met him once individually.
- (g) There are practical difficulties in that the 1961 Vienna Convention (now in the Senate for ratification) requires that all ambassadors be treated equally. Presumably, there would be times when you would want to receive a new ambassador (e.g., British, Soviet). If you received credentials personally in such cases, but declined in others, the U. S. would be subject to charges of violating the Vienna Convention

4. While all of the above is not persuasive, on balance, there seems to me to be some substance in the argument against delegation. This, added to the important and highly relevant fact that credentials-presenting need not be seriously time-consuming, persuades me that, instead of using the Vice President for this chore, we should continue to concentrate on making the job for you as painless and as brief as possible.

One way to do this might be to instruct State that you will receive credentials no more frequently than once a month (e.g., the first Tuesday); as appropriate, State could delicately pass this word to foreign governments so that no umbrage will be taken. You would then receive the ambassadors (average of 2 - 4 a month) at coffee, or in your office, individually and consecutively, as you have occasionally done in the past. In either case, the process should take no more than 30 to 40 minutes a month; since the flow is uneven, there may even be months when you

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



December 15, 1964

won't be bothered at all. One advantage of such a set procedure for credentials is that there should be few if any exceptions; State, itself, insists that all ambassadors be treated equally in the presentation process (Tab 5, Para. #2).

McGeorge Bundy

\_\_\_\_\_ Set up system with State that will insure that I will spend no more than 30 to 40 minutes each month receiving credentials.

\_\_\_\_\_ Set up system so that Vice President will receive credentials.

\_\_\_\_\_ Speak to me.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

December 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

We don't get an awful lot of good news from Saigon, and this one is of real interest. Unfortunately, it is quite sensitive and no one yet thinks it would be wise to publicize it. But I am having this question looked at again by Chet Cooper to see if there is a real need for security or whether we are simply dealing with sensitive agency types.

McG. B.

EXDIS - 1817 - 12/15

28  
dy

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BEN READ,  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUBJECT: US-UK exchange regarding US comments on UK proposal for an ANF, Tuesday afternoon, December 8, 1964.

I enclose for your information and for very selective distribution at your discretion a copy of the paper entitled "US Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for an Atlantic Nuclear Force" which was approved word for word by the President and tabled Tuesday afternoon, December 8, 1964 in response to the British proposal which they tabled the day before.

I also include a copy of Dick Neustadt's summary of the 20 points the Prime Minister presented with regard to our paper and the responses made in the President's presence by members of the American delegation.

These two documents should be read together for details on our responses. One should of course refer back to the Memorandum of Conversation for that afternoon.

I am passing these two documents along at Dick Neustadt's suggestion to complete the debriefing he gave you the other day.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment

Identical memo sent to Mr. John McNaughton,  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA.

cc: Mr. David Klein  
Mr. Spurgeon Keeney

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 8/11/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 8/19/77



~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1964

29

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report of Secretary Rusk's talk  
with General de Gaulle

1. The attached cable is an account of Dean Rusk's talk with General de Gaulle. It is a stately minuet in which, as far as I can see, nothing new was said on either side, except that de Gaulle has now set a time at which he thinks he will be ready to talk about "coordination of nuclear defense" -- 1967 or 68.

2. De Gaulle's hostility to MLF is strongly expressed -- he says it will destroy NATO as we know it. As this position is drilled into the Germans in the next two months, I think we can expect the sentiment for delay in Bonn to increase.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (EXDIS Secto 12

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State ltr 4/21/77  
By sg/jm, NARA, Date 10/28/05

December 15, 1964

30

8

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Paul Popple

I do not think the President ought to be asked for additional letters about the JFK Library fund drive. You might instead suggest that they use the letter which the President made available at the time of the effort among Federal employees last spring. I am sure the Kennedy Library people have that one at hand somewhere.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Third Country Assistance in Vietnam

/ This is the second in our series of periodic reports on efforts and progress in obtaining Third Country participation in Vietnam. /

1. The Department of State has obtained the services of an energetic and experienced man to deal exclusively with the Third Country problem. (James Rafferty, recently associated with Corcoran-Rowe.) He and Cooper will meet daily for planning-progress-needling sessions.
2. State is also appointing a Third Country Action Officer in each Geographic Bureau who will ride herd on the problem in his area and will answer to Bill Bundy, Rafferty and/or Cooper.
3. The JCS has sent out a message today to all U.S. non-bloc Embassies requesting an urgent survey of military units that could be usefully put to work in Vietnam. Returns are due on 22 December. Emphasis will be placed on military service or engineering units complete with their own security elements. Once these units have been identified State will make the specific requests. In most cases it will probably be necessary to pay (either through MAP or AID) the operational costs of sending a Third Country unit to Vietnam. It may also be necessary to replenish those items of equipment which these units will take to Vietnam.
4. The recent floods in Vietnam provide a good rationale for the early dispatch of a Chinese Nationalist construction battalion. Cabled requests are being prepared for both Chinat and South Korean military-service elements. The target date for the initial units of Chinat and Korean forces is early January.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 90-221

By ip, NARA, Date 4-8-91~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. Preliminary negotiations are underway in Nicaragua for the organization of a Regional Civic Action Team.

6. Cooper has discussed with Bill Bundy and McNamara's Office the need for reception/processing facilities and a Third Country command structure in Vietnam. Defense is now working on this problem on an urgent basis.

7. Cooper has also discussed with USIA the need for pressing forward on the publicity front as we begin to get solid Third Country commitments.

Chester L. Cooper

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

32 7

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report from Ambassador Bruce

1. This is Bruce's report of a conversation today with the Prime Minister. The next to the last paragraph raises a question in my mind. It might be smart for us to suggest to Wilson that he would gain a little leeway if he could reduce his dislike of the MLF in this next debate, on the basis of what he and his experts have learned in the clarifying discussions with us and with the Germans.

2. I think this is in fact the case in Wilson's own mind, and it might be an advantage to him to say so.

3. When we get his suggested language, I will ask for your judgment on this point.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2

CONTROL: 10411 ~~SECRET~~  
Action REC'D: DECEMBER 14, 1964, 3:54 P.M.

Brady

FROM: LONDON

Info ACTION: SECSTATE (2821) PRIORITY

DATE: DECEMBER 14, 7 P.M.

~~SECRET~~NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY. PASS MACGEORGE BUNDY.

I SAW PM THIS AFTERNOON IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECEMBER 9 MEMORANDUM FROM BUNDY TO BRUCE.

PM HAD RECEIVED, AND REFLECTED ON, HARLECH'S REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH BUNDY.

I COVERED ORALLY ALL POINTS MENTIONED IN MEMO. PM SEEMS THOROUGHLY TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION ON NUCLEAR PROBLEM, AND OUR CONCERN OVERHOW HE WILL HANDLE HIS END OF IT IN DEBATE, AND ELSEWHERE.

HE READ ME DRAFT NOTES OF MAJOR SPEECH HE WILL MAKE DURING FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE DECEMBER 16, AND OUTLINED WHAT HE EXPECTS TO SAY IN CLOSING ON EVENING OF 17TH. HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE PERTINACIOUSLY ATTACKED. IF HE STICKS, AS HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTS TO DO, TO HIS INTENTIONS AS STATED TODAY, IT SHOULD NOT INVOLVE USG IN DIFFICULTIES.

HE WILL SHORTLY SEND USG FOR COMMENT, AS HE PROMISED IN WASHINGTON, SUGGESTED PHRASING ON ONE PHASE OF SUBJECT, CONCERNING A STATEMENT TO EFFECT: "USG STILL BACKS SURFACE FLEET--HMG HAS RESERVED ITS POSITION."

HE THINKS HE MAY, IN DEBATE, HAVE TO REPEAT HIS DISLIKE OF MIXED MANNED SURFACE FLEET PARTICIPATION BY BRITISH, BUT SAID HE WOULD NOT CLOSE DOOR TO JOINING EVENTUALLY BY USING WORD "NEVER".

THE OTHER PHRASEOLOGY HE MAY CONSULT US ABOUT IS ON POSSIBLE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR MILITARY CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA.

GP-1.  
CFN 9 16 17 GP-1LE

BRUCE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By gml/g, NARA, Date 2-11-98



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE:

The President has asked me to make his position very clear to Lord Harlech, in order that there be no misunderstanding of the forbearance and restraint with which he conducted his discussions of the Atlantic nuclear problem with Mr. Wilson. I am doing this, and I shall explain to Lord Harlech that I am doing it at the direct request of the President. As I said on the telephone, I believe it would be helpful for you to say these things to the Prime Minister, although not on the basis of a direct Presidential instruction. I think you are right in worrying about the temptations Mr. Wilson may feel in the heat of debate, and you are the one in the best position to give him a personal warning on this specific point.

What I shall say to Lord Harlech at the President's direction is the following:

1. The President wants to be very sure that the Prime Minister does not misunderstand his position on the nuclear force problem. The President and Senator Humphrey are both political men and the President in particular knows what a close election is like. It seemed to them that it would be unfair to force an immediate decision, against his previous record, on a man who has been in power less than two months, with a four-seat majority and a very grave economic and financial crisis on his hands. The President therefore decided not to force the pace with the Prime Minister, but rather to allow his advisers to explain American thinking as clearly as they could within a framework which the President deliberately set as one of discussion and not of decision.
2. The President also recognized and understood the importance of giving the British a free hand in finding out for themselves the real position and convictions of the Government in Bonn. The Laborites have been telling us for a long time that we do not properly understand the Germans. There is every reason for the Prime Minister to satisfy himself directly on this point, and if we have been wrong in our estimate of the Germans, no one is more interested than we in finding out.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-304  
By CB, NARA, Date 5-15-95

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. But by the same token, we hope that the British Government will take very seriously whatever they do find out in their discussions with the Germans, and our own first impression, after a very frank and entirely open-ended discussion with Schroeder, is that the British will find the Germans at least as firm on a number of basic questions as we have thought.

4. Meanwhile the President is gravely concerned by the risk that the Prime Minister may give others the impression that the U. S. has in any way backed off from its basic assessment of the situation as outlined in the paper of comments which was given to Her Majesty's Government on December 8. The fact that the President himself did not press the argument was merely an indication of his desire not to force the judgment on the Prime Minister now. The President noted that the Prime Minister himself did not pursue the argument on specific points, and his assumption is that the two governments will eventually have to bring the matter to a decision after due allowance for the discussions which are in prospect with others.

5. The President has asked me to emphasize particularly to the Ambassador the very great damage which could be done if the Prime Minister should take a line next week in the House of Commons that would make those eventual decisions more difficult. The President knows the temptations of debate, and he has already had one painful experience with a speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons.

If the impression should be created in the United States that the Prime Minister was trying to strengthen his position by seeming to have "won a victory" over Washington, the President would find it necessary to take a very different attitude toward this whole series of discussions.

I will tell the Ambassador, as my personal judgment, that a man in the Prime Minister's position would be extremely ill-advised to run any risks of this sort with a sensitive and determined man like President Johnson, since the President has plenty of cards to play if this becomes a public contest. I shall tell Lord Harlech that the President has shown great restraint in these last days because of his concern to avoid any appearance of running a power play against a weak opponent. But if his generosity is misunderstood, I doubt if it is likely to last.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Political Developments in South Vietnam

[This is the second in our series of periodic reports on the activities of the Buddhists and other political groups in Vietnam]

Buddhist leaders moved to confront Premier Huong openly over the weekend, reducing the room for maneuver on both sides. Although they still seek to remove Huong constitutionally, they have indicated a willingness to resort eventually to direct means if necessary. As part of their stepped up campaign in the past few days, the Buddhist leaders publicized notes stating their case to Chief of State Suu, Ambassador Taylor, and the Buddhist following; privately lectured their supporters on the need for tight discipline; and staged a 48-hour hunger strike of three top bonzes to try to dramatize their case against the government. Today in Saigon, a Buddhist newspaper launched a direct attack on U.S. policy, charging the U.S. with bringing about a series of unpopular governments in Saigon.

Huong shows no sign of weakening. He has publicly accused Buddhist leaders of seeking U.S. intervention in Vietnamese politics, and implied that he would not hesitate to arrest "plotters". At the same time, he has offered a carrot by signing a decree giving the Buddhists long-sought legal rights, and noted that he would resign any time he lost the confidence of the High National Council. His firm stand, and Buddhist pressure tactics, seem to be solidifying Council support behind him.

Ambassador Taylor is ignoring the Buddhist note holding the U.S. responsible for the Huong government. Two lay Buddhists, however, have asked the U.S. to use them as intermediaries in mediating the Buddhist-government quarrel. (We have decided against this.) Washington has also asked the Embassy to investigate ways in which the Buddhists might be directly approached.

*(became we don't trust this pair).*

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Authority State 5-12-78; NSC 2-5-79  
By if, NARS, Date 6-19-79



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- 2 -

(These include a possible letter from Lodge to the chief Buddhist trouble-maker.) We have also suggested that the U.S. might provide Buddhists with a stake in stability by funneling unofficial aid to the Buddhist leadership for their adherents at the village and hamlet level in conjunction with the pacification effort.

  
Chester L. Cooper

*M. B.*

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

December 12, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The attached report from my brother and Mike Forrestal brings you up to date on our efforts with third countries in Vietnam. It is a companion piece to the letters you signed today.

In the light of what you said to Bowles, our efforts with the Indians are being stepped up beyond the level indicated in this memo. They will never give us any combattants, but we might well get them engaged more strongly on the economic side.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Rec'd  
9am: Dec 12

✓ 35

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked me today whether my staff was larger or smaller than a year ago. The answer is that it is one man smaller. In a sense the saving is even greater, because we are handling a part of what Ralph Dungan's office used to do in the field of Latin American affairs and AID. There is also one further departure scheduled at the end of the year, and no replacement is expected. There may be one or two additional savings to be made in the coming year.

The White House itself pays a very small part of the cost of my office since only my salary and the salary of two secretaries are charged there. The NSC covers most of the remainder, but there are a number of people on detail, and in fact in the last year we have shifted a net of two people to the detail, and a net of two off the NSC staff. But the totals, as I say, come out one less than in President Kennedy's time, and all this is much lower than the Eisenhower totals for comparable services.

There is one further change which I have tried to get John Macy to approve as he works over your White House budget. My own work load has increased in your administration, and I now need a third secretary. It will be a great deal better for her and for my own immediate office if she is a White House person, and I am going to ask John for this concession. It does not have to be done right away, but in the long run it would make for a pleasanter ship all around.

On another subject; I think the press have been silly about White House salaries, but I think you are right in your decision to put them out in an orderly way. In this connection, it seems to me more important than ever that all Special Assistants be at the same level. I know that Bill Moyers feels the same way. Those who are really happy with what they are doing do not need the extra pay or status, and those who are not would be shaken at seeing other people put above them.

McG. B.

McG. B.



December 11, 1964

36  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will be interested in this dispatch telling of George McGhee's conversation with Chancellor Erhard today. The Chancellor seems to have reacted well to the special account of the Wilson talks which we got to Schroeder through an able and nonzealous State officer named Spiers.

But what will interest you is that the Chancellor feels that his own political problem with the MLF requires that before there is any agreement you should have made a big pitch personally with General de Gaulle. It is far from clear to me that this is what you will most want to do in February, and it may be important to think up some good excuses in the next week or two. I also read into this telegram the growing possibility that the Germans themselves may prefer to hold this matter over past their election.

We will know more when Dean Rusk comes back from Europe. In the meantime, our order to everyone is to keep things just where you left them with Wilson and not to harden any plans until you have a chance to review them.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

37 2

Determined to be an  
administrative marking

By MTE On 4/5/77

December 11, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Anderson

1. Senator Anderson's letter is not an easy one to answer. I am sure you don't want to get into an argument with him, but I doubt if you would want to seem to accept his criticism of people who are doing their very best to serve you as you would wish. So I have written a soft answer which nevertheless includes just a few words on behalf of your own people.

2. Let me say in passing that if there is a more loyal and responsible staff officer in these fields than Spurgeon Keeny, I do not know where to find him. Keeny now works half-time for me, and it is a tribute to him that Bob McNamara wanted to take him away from me last year. If Senator Anderson's worry about him is what prevents him from having a high post in the Defense Department, then I can only say that McNamara's loss is my gain. Moreover, Keeny himself is in no sense a contentious fellow, and it is Anderson's people who are going after him, and not the other way around. I will try to find an occasion to defend him to Senator Anderson, for whom I have very great personal regard.

McG. B.

December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cabot Lodge for Secretary of the Army

Bob Komer has heard from a friend in the Army General Staff that Cabot Lodge would dearly love to be Secretary of the Army. This has a truthful ring about it because Lodge has always been very proud of his own Army service. As you probably know, McNamara is not a Lodge enthusiast, but Bob used to have his doubts about Paul Nitze, and Nitze has been an admirable Secretary of the Navy. I think Lodge would have the same kind of style and success in the Army job and he might also be helpful in the Guard and Reserve war as a man with plenty of Reserve experience of his own.

In any event, I am sure you will be interested in the rumor.

McG. B.



December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wilson's reply to farewell telegram

I think you may want to see Wilson's answer to your quite routine farewell telegram which I cleared on December 9. His is a little more substantive and seeks to suggest a trifle more agreement than there actually was. But on the whole I think it is better for him to err in this direction, and there is no real harm in it.

. McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 10, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Papers on the FY '66 DOD Budget

1. Secretary McNamara has submitted the attached memorandum (tab 1) on the FY '66 DOD budget for consideration at the meeting with you tomorrow at 12:45 p.m. This is the only vital paper for tomorrow, and the most important stuff is in the first 2 pages. The views of the Chiefs on all aspects of the budget are summarized in Tab B to this memo, and Bob hopes you will read them.
2. The Defense budget is in extremely good shape and there are really no major items seriously at issue. The four items in the memorandum are by their nature difficult problems that by common agreement are being called to your attention. I understand, however, that Mr. Gordon and Dr. Hornig are in general satisfied with the solutions suggested in the memorandum and there should not be a very extended discussion on these items.
3. There are a number of major actions involved in the current budget that are not reflected in the attached memorandum since they are not in dispute. These issues include the following: the reduction in the MINUTEMAN force, the decision not to go ahead with an advanced manned bomber, the decision not to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, the decision not to proceed with an advanced manned interceptor, the decision to eliminate the "shelter incentive" plan from the civil defense program, the decision to eliminate the MMRBM, and the decision to go ahead with a deep underground command and control center for the Pentagon and the White House. I am attaching for your information at Tab 2 a background paper on recommended strategic offensive and defensive forces that covers these and other issues. This is not essential reading for tomorrow, but it is a most important basic paper on our overall strategic posture, and I think you will want to read it when you have time.
4. I am also attaching at Tab 3 a very interesting draft memorandum on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy that was prepared as background for the FY '66 budget submission. Although this paper is preliminary in nature, it has been recognized by the State Department and the BOB as an important policy statement that will affect future budget decisions; it may be referred to in tomorrow's discussion

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Authority OSD/LA 7-20-77By MBH, NARS, Date 7-27-77

12/10/64

(see page 2 for the Summary of McNamara's preliminary conclusions).

5. Finally, I attach at Tab 4 a copy of a memorandum on nuclear materials production schedules through FY 73. In view of the conflict between declining DOD weapons requirements and AEC production aspirations, this subject will present problems in the AEC budget this year and may also be discussed at tomorrow's meeting.

McG. B.

Spurgeon Keeny

~~TOP SECRET~~



41 8

December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a first report on one of the matters of interest to you in Vietnam by Chet Cooper, who is going to be my senior man on this problem. He has concentrated on the stability of the government and the Buddhist threat in this paper, and I am suggesting to him that he try to concentrate more directly on the problem of group politics in future reports, more in the fashion of the last 2 paragraphs of this one. But I think this one will be of real interest to you. Both he and I would value any suggestions and comments you have on whether this is the sort of thing you need.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 1, item 444

By ju, NARA, Date 10-15-98

~~SECRET~~

10 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Stability of South Vietnam's Government Report No. 1

This is my initial report covering one of the two matters of current interest to the President regarding Vietnam--the problem of the government's stability. A report on third country participation will be submitted tomorrow. Unless unusual developments dictate more frequent reporting, or unless instructed otherwise, I plan to prepare these reports on an every-other-day basis. Subsequent memoranda obviously will tend to be more brief than these initial efforts.

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1. Premier Tran Van Huong's five-week old government appears momentarily strengthened by his own exertions and by the firm support of US officials and VN military leaders. Nevertheless, a concerted Buddhist effort to overthrow Huong still seems likely. The Buddhists have been moving cautiously, however, and ten days of quiet in Saigon have permitted an easing of martial law restrictions. Huong's firmness against recent demonstrators, largely schoolboys and hoodlums, has been publicly endorsed by the High National Council and key Catholic leaders and privately by responsible labor leaders. Huong's administrative performance is still spotty, partly through unfamiliarity, but he seems willing to learn. Privately, he has said he is willing eventually to change some of his less able or more controversial ministers, but he will not do this while under fire.

2. External threats to the stability of the government arise from the activities of the Cambodians and the Viet Cong. There have been some hints that Cambodia will recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the legitimate government (this in turn would probably result in the Government of Vietnam's recognizing the dissident Cambodian Khmer Serei movement and closing the Mekong River to Cambodian shipping). The Viet Cong have been stepping up their political agitation and have been sending cadres into Saigon to stimulate and intensify anti-government demonstrations.

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3. Buddhist leaders have been holding strategy talks in Saigon and gearing up their followers for possible anti-government action. Their foremost strategist, monk Tri Quang, says they have set up a "Struggle Committee" and plan to apply quiet pressure on Chief of State Suu and the US to get Huong replaced constitutionally. Today, however, the Buddhist leadership issued a communique announcing opposition to the government and refusal to cooperate with the present cabinet. Huong privately threatens to stage hunger strikes by monks and mass demonstrations if necessary; these, he says, would prove decisive. The Buddhists imply that they are reluctant to oppose the US and they probably fear army reprisals; they have set no firm deadlines and say there may yet be time for a "quiet solution." What Buddhist leaders really want is still unclear--perhaps even to themselves. And though we continue to watch and investigate, we have no evidence to tie them to the Viet Cong or even to indicate that they sympathize with Viet Cong aims.

4. Ambassador Taylor has been meeting with Chief of State Suu; Huong, and his cabinet; the High National Council; military leaders; and the local press. He has made it clear that, while it is US policy to help South Vietnam, an expanded US commitment cannot be justified to the US government and public unless Vietnamese groups unite behind their legitimate government. Other Embassy officers are discreetly getting this message to the Buddhists and other political oppositionists. Taylor, in addition, has provided Huong and his top lieutenants (including Khanh) a list of measures designed to strengthen the government's image domestically and abroad. These suggestions seem to have been well received.

5. Complementing the efforts of the Ambassador to urge unity on the disparate elements of the Vietnamese official community, the CIA Station in Saigon is covertly putting pressure on elements close to Tri Quang to moderate Buddhist opposition to the government. Buddhists in the United States and abroad are being urged to bring their influence to bear, and the possibility of getting the Dalai Lama's brother to visit Saigon with this message is being explored. Covert efforts to generate support for Huong are also being made among the Saigon students, in senior military circles, and among old guard politicians.

CHESTER L. COOPER

~~SECRET~~



42

December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Clearances for Vice President-elect

1. As I understand it you would like us to clear all actions relating to Senator Humphrey with you, hence this memo. In the attached letter Hubert asked me to initiate necessary clearances for himself and two members of his staff. My own sense of the matter is that Hubert should be automatically cleared as Vice President-elect, and that we should have full field investigations on the other two. If this coincides with your judgment, I will ask Bill Moyers to get them moving.

2. The question of the exact materials that Connell and Rielly will need is for decision as we go along, but I do believe that Senator Humphrey is right and that at least these two people will need up-to-date investigations so that they can have access as needed.

3. Shall I go ahead with Bill Moyers and inform Hubert accordingly?

McG. B.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

All of Hubert's people should be investigated \_\_\_\_\_

Investigate only those who need classified material \_\_\_\_\_



December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a memorandum from Dave Bell in which he asks permission to leave the country from the end of December to the end of January. This is the one time he has been able to find which will permit an extended trip of the kind which he initially proposed during the campaign and which you rightly delayed. As Dave points out, the one immediate issue is the issue of AID organization that Fulbright has precipitated. He hopes this can be ironed out between now and Christmas, but if it isn't settled by then it will inevitably become your problem, and Bill Gaud can act for him in that situation.

There is no perfect time for an important official to be out of town, but I must say that I very strongly support Bill's request. It is very bad administrative practice for a man in his position to lack personal familiarity with his operations in the field. Headquarters generals are a bad thing in operational efforts.

I know your own feeling that your principal people should be where you need them, but I do very strongly urge that you let David go on this particular trip at this particular time. Of all our administrators, he has the most wholly reliable deputy, and he has been the one who is tied closest to his desk by the legislative calendar.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1964

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Value of your Meeting with Wilson

1. A couple of times in the last few days you have strongly expressed to me your doubts about the value of having Harold Wilson here. Since I think that this was without doubt the most productive and useful two days that we have had in foreign affairs since President Kennedy went to Berlin, I would like to urge the opposite view for a minute.

2. Let me begin with the obvious negative fact that there is just no way in the world that a President of the United States can avoid reasonably regular visits from the Prime Minister of Great Britain. If you had said to Wilson that you were unwilling to see him in December, the reaction everywhere would have been strongly critical. You may feel that this is outrageous, given the difference between his position and yours, but it is a fact. Winston Churchill made it so.

3. There can be real inconvenience in these meetings, because there is no certain way of predicting what issues will come up. The Nassau meeting was not set up to deal with SKYBOLT, which broke over its head because of the timing of our DOD budget. There was no such difficulty this time, because we knew that the Atlantic nuclear problem would be at center stage, but the handling of the matter was certainly very difficult.

4. In this situation the first achievement was to avoid a failure. You received a very strong recommendation to force Wilson to a decision, and you carefully walked around that and took a different and better course. This was a major achievement and it had several consequences:

(1) We have had a very straight and honest talk with the British back and forth on the hard elements of the problem, and they have gone off to talk on their own with the Germans. This puts the ball back in the European court, and places you as the firm but patient leader of the Alliance.

(2) You have laid a basis for political education and political leadership with Congress as the progress of the enterprise justifies it. We have a major problem of communication with the Leadership and the relevant committees, but we have won time in which to go about it.

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Authority FRUS, vol. XIII, item 63  
By ju/mg, NARA, Date 2-11-98

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(page 1 of 2 pages)



12/10/64

(3) Perhaps most important of all, this meeting has forced discussions between you and your advisers which has for the first time given both you and them a clear understanding of the problem and the way you want it treated.

(4) As a consequence, George Ball himself has reached the decision to reorganize the Department of State in this area, and no more important or constructive administrative decision has been made in the last 18 months in that Department. It is true that that decision should have been made a year ago, but it wasn't. It may seem strange that an internal administrative decision should have to wait upon a meeting between you and the British Prime Minister, but that is how this Government has worked for a generation. The President signals his real beliefs at his convenience, and this is the time that was convenient and right for you. If I had sent you a memorandum on the way to handle the MLF last August or September, you would quite properly have ignored it, and without clear proof of your own personal view, George Ball simply would not have acted.

5. From now on, it seems to me, the progress of this Atlantic negotiation will need your own continued personal command, and I will make it my business to make sure that the state of the play is before you at every stage and that every significant decision is signaled as far ahead of time as possible.

6. So, in sum, the Wilson meeting has not only been a modest success in its own right, but a turning point in the process by which you take effective command of a major issue of foreign policy. This is quite a lot for two days -- and I am omitting the fringe benefit that at least a hundred of your warmest political supporters were given a thank-you dinner of the most fashionable possible sort, because glamour is one thing the British still bring with them.

Unrepentantly,

*h.v.B.*  
McG. B.

P.S. I am doing a separate memo on the exact negotiating position on this issue as I now understand it. This is simply an informal defense of the fact that we had a meeting at all.

P.P.S. I am also doing a memo on what you might say about this on Saturday if you have a press conference; I think there is quite a lot.

Rec'd  
12-10-64  
5:30 PM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*L*

December 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think this ticker will interest you. This goes much further than we have gone, and there are dangers in it because it may lead de Gaulle to talk of another British surrender. But at least it shows that the British are not currently talking of any Johnson surrender.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

UPI-66

(MLF)

LONDON--FIRST BRITISH ASSESSMENTS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WASHINGTON SUMMIT TODAY SAID PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON IS "STUCK" WITH THE AMERICAN PROJECTED MIXED MANNED NUCLEAR FLEET (MLF)

PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID NOT HAVE TO BUDGE FROM HIS INSISTENCE ON THE MLF, AND HE DID NOT, THE APPRAISALS SAID.

GOVERNMENT SOURCES MAINTAINED SILENCE ON THE DETAILS OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND WILSON EARLIER THIS WEEK.

BUT DIPLOMATIC AND PRESS COMMENT CLAIMED THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT WILSON IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT AT LEAST A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION TO SOME MODIFIED FORM OF MIXED MANNED NUCLEAR FORCE.

WILSON'S PROBLEM WAS TO SELL THE COMPROMISE PROJECT TO THE ALLIES; BUT A BIGGER PROBLEM WAS TO APPEASE HIS OWN LEFT WING.

THE WASHINGTON REVIEW AND ITS RESULTS WERE SUMMED UP BROADLY IN THESE TERMS:

THE INFLUENTIAL TIMES SAW THE WASHINGTON MEETING AS THE START OF THE DISPOSAL OF BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND TERMED IT AN "ACT OF NATIONAL ABNEGATION, SURELY UNPRECEDENTED."

THE POINT OF NO RETURN HAS YET TO BE REACHED, BUT THE PROCESS OF RELINQUISHING THE INDEPENDENT DETERRENT HAS BEEN SET IN TRAIN, IT SAID.

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WAS HELD TO HAVE SKETCHED THE BROAD OUTLINES OF A NEW PATTERN OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION.

BRITAIN, IN THE VIEW OF SOME COMMENTATORS, CONSEQUENTLY CAN EXPECT ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. IN REDUCING THE BURDEN OF ITS GLOBAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. CAN EXPECT BRITAIN TO TAKE PART IN THE JOINT NUCLEAR FORCE AND HAND OVER TO THE ALLIANCE THE ULTIMATE CONTROL OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WILSON'S TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT WERE SAID TO BE TANTAMOUNT TO A BRITISH COMMITMENT TO JOIN MORE CLOSELY THAN EVER IN THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF THE U.S.

HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE U.S. RETAIN AN ABSOLUTE VETO ON THE USE OF THE DETERRENT IN ANY PROJECTED ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE WOULD TEND TO SURRENDER BRITAIN'S INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR ROLE, THE ASSESSMENTS SAID.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS SAID TO HAVE ASSURED THE BRITISH THAT THE U.S. HAS NO INTENTION OF EVER RELINQUISHING ITS VETO RIGHT, EVEN IN FAVOR OF A SYSTEM OF MAJORITY VOTE WITHIN THE PROJECTED MLF OR ITS SUBSTITUTE.

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS ASSURANCE, WILSON APPARENTLY CONSIDERS THAT THE DANGERS INVOLVED IN MIXED MANNING HAVE RECEDED.

WILSON, ONE ASSESSMENT INSISTED, WILL NOW BE SATISFIED WITH NATO ALLIES, INCLUDING BRITAIN, BEING GIVEN MERELY AN EFFECTIVE VOICE IN POLITICAL CONTROL OF WESTERN NUCLEAR POWER.

12/10--MJ1133A25

*Bund  
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(9)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

46  
Personal  
File

December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A few weeks ago in New York, I trespassed on your territory in talking to some old friends from the academic and philanthropic worlds. It occurs to me that you might be amused to see what an amateur does in your field.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Revision of Remarks by McGeorge Bundy  
at the annual dinner of the  
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching  
November 17, 1964

Some Speculations on Presidential Elections

Let me begin by telling you some things that this is not. First, it is not a Republican post-mortem. The papers are full of such discussions, but I doubt if most members of the Republican Party would be pleased to have the help of a member of the White House staff even if he still claims membership in their company -- and anyway, my own judgment is that it is too soon for such analysis. It is better, after such a great defeat, that those who have been beaten should take time to reflect. Little is gained by the immediate attacks and counterattacks, amounting almost to civil war, which filled the papers just after November 3.

Second, I do not offer these remarks in a temper of celebration by a member of the winning side. The feelings of winners are not usually interesting to others, and in any event my own hope is that we may come to see this election as one in which it was not merely the immediate supporters of President Johnson who won. I think it may well be that as time passes we shall see this election as we now see the election that took place a hundred years ago, in 1864. None of us, as we look back, spends much time in hope for McClellan, and as we follow the course of the campaign of 1864 through the summer and autumn of that terrible year, we all have the kind of persistent hope for Lincoln, and for his victory, that makes the final result a satisfaction to us all.

Finally, I do not offer my remarks in the spirit of speculation as to what the President will do next. Of this, too, we have already had more than enough, especially as the President himself has reached no final decisions on most of what the speculators write about.

My object is different: It is to offer some more general -- and I hope less partisan -- suggestions about what Presidential elections now mean as a part of our process of government.

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The first great point to be made about the Presidential election is that it is a fact. It is rare, and it works. It provides a process of choice which is orderly, civil, peaceful, and accepted. We take this process so much for granted that we are tempted to comment more upon its weaknesses, its length, its tedium, its frequent violence of language,

its freakishness and its uncertainty, as an instrument of choice. It would be good for us to pay more attention to the reaction of foreigners. Such reactions are carefully read and chronicled by your government in Washington, and over and over again the comments of broadcasters and newspapers after November 3 began with a tribute to our election simply as a working process of democratic decision. It remains a fair question whether this process leads to good choices, but the first great point, I repeat, is that the system works. Just the other day Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Thompson were talking to each other about our process of elections as against the quite different means by which a change of government can be brought about in the Soviet Union. Ambassador Dobrynin quite seriously advanced the claim that the Soviet method was somehow better. One need not rehearse the arguments on his side or on ours. The fact that such a claim can be made suggests starkly the depth of the difference between their values and ours, their estimate of men and ours.

Elections are commonly supposed to be about two things -- issues and men. And I think the common supposition is right. Let us talk first about issues.

A Presidential election is one of the few forces in American life which can give a decision on great issues. Such a decision is not usual, even in a Presidential election, but it can happen, and this year it did. At least three great issues were presented, and I believe that they were settled, at least for a time, by the result.

But let me interject at once that great issues and a great debate are two quite different things. If great issues are rare in an election, great debates are non-existent. I am not sure why this should be so -- I think it may have to do with the ways in which men are tested and attention is focused. It may have to do also with the fact that elections necessarily simplify, while really great debates are necessarily complex. It may also be an accidental result of the fact that no very great debater, in all our history, has also been ready to use his art to the full in a Presidential election. One thinks, for example, of Lincoln, one of the greatest of all Americans in political argument -- and a man who very carefully held his tongue in the campaign of 1960.

Whatever may be the explanation, it will be agreed, I think, that there were no great debates in 1964. But there were great issues -- three of them.

The first was the issue of peace. Senator Goldwater appears to think it genuinely outrageous that he should have been forced onto the defensive



on this issue, and I do not propose to defend everything that every Democratic speaker said or that every Democratic commercial insinuated. Yet I think there can be little doubt that the Senator in the end had only himself to blame. His convictions on the nature and meaning of nuclear weapons, his assertion that the one real enemy was international Communism, his suspicious hostility toward foreign aid, his coolness to the United Nations, his early dismissal of our alliances as defensive ~~+~~ doomed to failure -- all these set him against the pattern of American policy as it has developed for 25 years. Moreover, until he found himself beleaguered and beset, he rejoiced in this opposition and was the first to assert it. So there was an issue here, and at least for now the election helped to decide it.

Let me emphasize, in passing, that the issue raised by Senator Goldwater -- and its decisive rejection -- should in no way suggest the conclusion that foreign policy does not belong in political campaigns. Questions of foreign policy are inevitably a part of the choice of a President. It has been so in every election since 1940. Issues of war and peace, issues of strength and weakness, issues of success and failure in the world beyond our shores, are now of overriding importance to our people, and they know it. We should not only expect but insist that candidates be judged in due relation to their qualities and their positions on such matters. Such judgments have been made in other years.

But they can be made most wisely ~~an~~ when there is not the kind of sharp and deep division that occurred this year. In the end, it was not Senator Goldwater's qualifications but his convictions that worked against him on this issue. So the qualifications of his rival were not tested by a true competitor. *(not that they needed it)*

The second great issue of this election was whether or not we should now turn our backs upon the great revolution in our domestic affairs which began in 1932 and has continued without a break for more than 30 years. The particular symbol of this issue was the question of friendliness or hostility to the Social Security program. Senator Goldwater has complained about this issue too, but again the proper target of his complaints is himself. For it is a fact that his public record amply proved that in his heart he did indeed resent, resist, and oppose the main lines of social and political action through the Federal Government which have developed since 1932. He had made it clear, early and often, that he would prefer a world in which there is no

compulsory social security, no TVA, no progressive income tax, and a most radical cutback of every branch of the Federal Government except those concerned with the national defense. It is a position which a candidate has a right to take, but there can be no doubt that it posed an issue -- and this issue also was decided.

If one wants to be clear about the intensity of these first two issues, in this campaign, one has only to recall the very different temper of the campaign of 1960. There too the candidates exchanged at very great length their rival views of international affairs, and their rival visions of the domestic future. But their argument in foreign affairs was about ways and means and about estimates of the situation, and as the debates continued, their differences became so narrow as to be irrelevant to the process of democratic choice. And on the domestic scene, while the Republican candidate charged Senator Kennedy with extravagance, he did not accuse him of socialism, and while the Democratic candidate asserted that Mr. Nixon was a man of limited vision with no true conviction of the need for getting the country moving again, Mr. Nixon did not reply by an attack upon traditions then 28 years old; he offered himself instead as their wise and careful and prudent custodian.

But it is the third great issue of the campaign of 1964 which is perhaps the most surprising of all. The Republican candidate this year mounted a general attack upon a premise which has united political candidates of both parties as far back as I can remember -- he mounted an attack upon the premise of political consensus as the basis of political success. And in so doing he posed an issue of the widest and deepest significance. He argued that the Presidency of the United States belongs to an embattled and determined group with settled convictions and a clear and declared hostility to major segments of the population. He thus set himself directly athwart the conviction of his opponent and the convictions of his predecessors in both parties.

For the standard position of the American candidate for the office of President is that what he recommends and asserts is what all good Americans want. We had this year an extraordinary example of the practice of the politics of consensus. Some of you may believe that President Johnson carried his conviction to extremes, in his obvious belief that it made sense for every citizen to vote for him, and in his obvious determination to do his full part to achieve that result.

Yet I think you will agree that it was only in the strength of his feeling, the energy of his action, and the success of his effort that he is unusual. For we all can remember the voices of Kennedy and Nixon, of Eisenhower and Stevenson, of Truman and Dewey, and of Roosevelt and Willkie, speaking to Americans in all parts of the country and in all classes, with the confident claim that the candidate deserved the support of all.

But this year Senator Goldwater deliberately and energetically offered a choice -- not an echo -- and in offering that choice he plainly rejected any thought that he should try to appeal to all Americans. His most notable departure from tradition may have been his speech of acceptance, in which he categorically rejected the notion of reconciliation with rival tendencies and traditions even in his own party. He left entirely untended the overwhelming opposition of such increasingly important minorities as the Negroes and the Jews. He accepted without contest the total hostility of the labor unions. He made no serious overtures to those along the Eastern seaboard whom he had threatened to saw off. Ostentatiously, instead, he went hunting "where the ducks were." And so he traded millions of votes throughout the country for a bare handful of Southern states. Meanwhile President Johnson, by contrast, made his effort everywhere. He knew that he was in trouble in the deep South, but he went there, and what was still more important he encouraged Mrs. Johnson in her determination to show the family flag in the family country. Knowing the traditional wariness of big business toward the Democratic Party, the President made a special effort with businessmen -- and there may be some of you in this room who have taken to tearing up your invitations to the White House because you had so many! The President did not win the deep South, and he did not win all of big business, though he made a very good stab at it. But what he did do was to present to the country, in clear and energetic strokes, the picture of a man who offered himself as President not of one group or another, but of all Americans. When he went into the deep South he gained strength in the North, and when he went to speak for John F. Kennedy's memory in Boston, he gained strength throughout the country among those who have a special feeling for an American hero. He rejected no one, and he drew no issue of division.

The importance of this third issue is hard to exaggerate; I believe it heavily affected the result. It can happen of course that there will be an overriding question which requires sharp national division, but the campaign of Senator Goldwater sought to make a virtue of a conflict which did not in fact exist. It was properly rebuked.

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It is almost a relief to turn from issues to men. It is men, not issues, that are the usual objects of measurement in a Presidential campaign, and it is for its performance in this essential task that the campaign process should be measured. Our Presidential campaigns test the candidates on three levels, each of them relevant to the tasks of an American President:

First, political campaigns test the human being. We Americans prefer that our Presidents should be able to prove that they are good humored, cheerful, friendly, and easy in their relations to their fellow citizens. In running for the Presidency, it is not the rule that nice guys finish last. It is quite easy, indeed, to win a debate and to lose an election whenever it is more the man than the argument that is being judged. The demands of campaigning are severe: they require strength and good humor and self-control. So does the White House.

A second set of tests examines the candidate as a political animal. In the crudest and simplest sense the whole process measures the strength of his determination. Political campaigns place the heaviest demands upon the men who enter them, and it is good, I would say, that a special ambition and determination are required for this kind of contest. They are needed in the White House.

More subtly, an election campaign is a myriad of political decisions. A man chooses what he will say, whose help he will seek, how he will respond to the charges of his opponent, what he will emphasize, and how he will shape his presentation of himself and of his purpose. He will do this in literally thousands of separate acts. The public will seldom judge him explicitly on his political skills, for the American people tend still to believe that it is not good, in itself, to be a skillful politician. But the results of his political decisions will show in the election, and if he makes too many mistakes, he will not succeed. Few political boners will become as famous as the one in which Governor Hughes is said to have snubbed Senator Hiram Johnson in California in 1916, but tactical skill or clumsiness are major factors. This year the simple stupidity of the Goldwater campaign was impressive.

President Johnson, by contrast, showed his political skill at every stage. His most striking effort was also one of the least understood -- his success in preventing any significant split in Democratic ranks at the convention in Atlantic City. When the Freedom Democratic Party of Mississippi claimed the convention seats of that state, it posed an issue which could have been extraordinarily costly to Democratic harmony.

Here was a case in which the deepest convictions and aspirations of great sections of the party were pitted against each other. The Northern liberals, with Negro and labor leaders in the van, had numbers and a certain elemental sense of right on their side, but conservatives and Southerners had much the better of the argument on due process of law and tradition. The arguments of the opposing sides rolled to their conclusions without touching each other, like trains on separate tracks. There could be no reconciliation in logic -- only in politics. A formula was needed which would preserve the legal rights of one delegation while recognizing the human aspirations of the other. Such a formula was found and applied, and the indispensable spur to this effort was the President's own political leadership.

Third, and most important, a Presidential campaign tests a candidate as a leader. The voter asks himself at every stage whether this man has what it takes to be President. This is not at all the same question as whether he is an agreeable human being, and still less is it a question whether he has specific political skills. It is a question of magnitude. The candidate who has had it most notably in recent years was perhaps General Eisenhower in 1952. General Eisenhower was also an outstanding human being (though not at the time an outstanding political animal). He had both a warm and engaging personality, and the reputation of a victorious soldier-statesman who loved peace.

It is in this category of leadership that there is importance in what a candidate says. There may not be great debates in a campaign, but there can be masterful exposition of public policy, and a candidate who shows such mastery is a candidate who has made progress in persuading the voters that he is fit to lead. It was by showing such mastery, fully equal to that of an experienced Vice President, that Senator Kennedy overcame one of the great questions about his candidacy in 1960. At the height of a campaign, the details of a program will seldom get through clearly to the voters, but if a program exists and is understood at least by leaders of opinion and writers of comments, it will strengthen the candidate. Conversely a candidate who seems to have no such command of such complex matters will be damaged. Denis Brogan has reported the engaging and revealing remark of a working man who refused to vote for Goldwater this year because "that guy sounds just like me."

It is in this category also, for 1964, that one can find importance in the choice of candidates for the Vice Presidency. It seems doubtful that Congressman Miller's weakness and Senator Humphrey's strength,

in and of themselves, added or subtracted much to their respective tickets. Polls taken on behalf of President Johnson before the Democratic Convention suggested that no candidate could add or subtract more than one or two percent to his strength throughout the country. Yet I think the President did gain substantially, if indirectly, by the very widespread feeling, in all parts of the country, that in his selection of Senator Humphrey he had shown judgment and leadership of a high order. The President also showed great political skill in seeing to it that his running mate effectively emphasized those parts of his record and of his policy which would be appealing to others than orthodox liberals. And like President Johnson, Senator Humphrey showed himself no mean master of the politics of consensus. Senator Goldwater, by contrast, even in the eyes of many of his own supporters, showed an astonishingly frivolous view of the office of the Vice Presidency, when he chose as his running mate a man so evidently lacking in quality and beset by handicaps of narrowness and cynicism as Congressman Miller.

So I would claim that the election of 1964 did serve to test the candidates as men. I will not say that one candidate proved himself overwhelmingly better in every one of the three categories I have suggested; I am prepared to accept what I think is the general American judgment that, as a human being, Senator Goldwater is attractive. But I would claim that, as a man, even without the great issues which were working in his favor, the President was fairly tested and that he fairly won, across the board.

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I have talked long enough, but I would like to add one more general comment -- and I do it with the more enthusiasm because it is time that I found a point on which I could agree with Senator Goldwater. I think he is quite right when he says that, as things are today, the incumbent has a great advantage in our Presidential elections. The Presidency has become so much the center of our political life that the man who holds that office has advantages in public attention, in public familiarity, and in public recognition which no rival can easily match. The White House itself, the best loved and best known of American buildings, lends its splendor to its tenant. The presence of crisis makes the President the spokesman for a country which knows its need for the Presidency in the age of nuclear weapons.



The election of 1964 gave a powerful illustration of this modern fact in the events of the middle of October. In sudden succession the White House was shadowed by a personal tragedy, and then restored as the focus of the Nation's hopes by foreign crisis. When the President spoke to the country about the fall of Khrushchev and the Chinese bomb, on the evening of Sunday, October 18, he spoke with a most meticulous avoidance of any tone of partisanship. But he was President and he spoke to more than 60 million Americans. Since he spoke well and made sense, his speech inevitably had an important effect on the campaign itself.

There is no escaping this advantage. The Presidency cannot be sterilized by the processes of politics, and a President who did not take reasonable advantage of his office would not be a politician. I therefore propose no remedy for this fact; I propose rather that we should accept it. A President who has openly and greatly failed will not be helped by these marginal advantages, and the election of 1960 suggests that the advantages of the incumbent are not easily passed to any colleague or subordinate (although many observers would argue that Nixon could have used Eisenhower better, and that Eisenhower himself could have helped more than he did).

This advantage to the incumbent, together with the long range tendencies of the last 20 years, incline me to the suggestion that we are more likely to have Democrats than Republicans in the White House in the immediate future. In recent months it has been fashionable in some quarters to argue that the 2-party system is threatened by this prospective ascendancy of one of the two. I do not share this fear. We have had a lopsided party system through most of our history. I do not recall that Republicans were distressed when their party dominated the Presidency for 44 out of 52 years after 1860. If our period is like that one, but Democratic instead of Republican, the exceptional eight years of Grover Cleveland might be matched by the exceptional eight years of Dwight Eisenhower. And if we date the beginning of our 52-year period from the rise of Franklin Roosevelt, then we may assume that we shall have Democrats in the White House from now until 1984. This prospect does not make me turn in terror to George Orwell. For our parties always have contests within them. Failure will still bring punishment. Those who succeed will watch with care the feelings of our people as a whole. And the fundamental testing process of our Presidential elections will continue.

We may not have great issues to be sharply settled, as we had this year, but the absence of such issues need be no cause for pain. The candidates will always be tested as men, and the historical record suggests that the survivor will usually be fit to handle the still greater tests which he has won the right to face.

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December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach a memorandum from Fred Dutton which urges you to make some calls on the MLF to the Congressional leaders. I think you have already anticipated him and probably you have as clear a sense of the current state of Congressional opinions as he does.

Dean Rusk leaves for New York tomorrow and then to Paris, and will not be back until about the 18th. That leaves George Ball in charge of the Department, and with all his qualities, I do not think George is the best briefing officer for Congressional leaders. Yet I agree with Dutton that the longer we let this go, the more risk we run that resentment will pile up where it may hurt us later.

In this situation I wonder what you would think of having an informal meeting at the White House over which you might preside, with McNamara, Ball and me with you. You could lay out the basic framework as you did to Wilson, and let the rest of us field questions on our proposals, the British proposals, and the current state of the ball game. It seems altogether clear that whatever the timetable may be, and whatever the result, there is a real lag between the Hill and the Administration which can only give us trouble if we do not try to bridge it pretty soon and at a pretty high level.

As an aside, Carl Marcy called me this morning to say that Fulbright is in a rather difficult mood at the moment because he fears war in Vietnam and is at odds with us also on the organization of the AID program. Finally, his nose is out of joint over the Cultural Center, where he thinks Eisenhower has been given too much credit and he too little. Marcy told me this entirely personally and I relate it not to add to your troubles, but simply to mark it down as an objective report in case you happen to want to give Fulbright a coat of butter. Marcy has always been straight with me.

McG. B.



December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Senator Ellender's Visit

Mike Manatos tells me Senator Ellender is coming in at 11:30 and wants to talk about NATO. I have tried to reach Ellender to find out what is on his mind, but he has not called me back.

NATO is an enormous subject, but my own guess is that what he may be worried about is de Gaulle and the MLF, and perhaps the size of our commitment to Europe.

My own advice would be to tell him what you just told me on the phone -- namely that you have taken charge yourself of the timing and direction of the NATO-MLF discussion, that you have made it clear to the British that while we understand their interests, it is important for them to find out directly with the Germans how to put the best possible arrangement together, and that our own interest is exactly what we said in the communique -- to hold the alliance together and to prevent further nuclear proliferation in Europe.

It may be that Ellender shares the illusions of many Americans about de Gaulle, and you may want to say to him that we have no desire for a quarrel with the French and are doing our best to keep civilized discussions going as Ball did with Couve last week and as Rusk will do with de Gaulle next week.

As for our own commitments in Europe, our basic policy is to keep the Germans tied in peacefully -- and we have two wars as the best possible reason for that policy. Our force levels in Germany are governed by this consideration -- and it is worth noting that we have been able to offset the balance of payments costs completely in recent years. You yourself have renewed the offset agreement with Chancellor Erhard.

You can make it clear to him that you are not letting the MLF run our policy, but that it is one proposal put forward as a means to an end, and that you mean to work this thing out by careful reasoning together -- with everyone who is willing to reason with you.

McG. B.



December 9, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These are Max's first reports to you on his return to Saigon. If you want to see the longer telegrams, you can just check below. I think the essence of the situation is in this personal weekly message to you.

I am still working on getting you a proper reporting system on our efforts with third countries and political groups. I know it has not been satisfactory in the last week. One reason is my own engagement in the Wilson talks and the other is that I am making a staff switch on Vietnam.

McG. B.

Send me more \_\_\_\_\_

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Authority State 5-12-78, NSC 2-5-79

By ij, NARS, Date 6-19-79