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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Bob McNamara tells me that there is nothing he can add to what he said after meeting with you in Texas on November 10. He thinks that ~~the~~ pay and retirement allowances are the only things we can safely use to show that our savings are really bigger than the figures show. He does not want to use military housing. The statement he made is attached.

2. The essence of this statement is what Rusk passed to the Russians and is the basis of Kosygin's statement today. My own strong recommendation is that you authorize George Reedy to call people's attention to this full page of McNamara's testimony, which not only emphasizes our savings but speaks of your order to him to keep on improving our basic military effectiveness. This is the balanced position we have held with success for over a year, and I think there is every reason to be proud of it even if Senator Russell is momentarily troubled by the Soviet announcement. Indeed it is precisely to prevent foolish rumors as a result of what Kosygin said that I think we have to get the record straight today.

3. McNamara also recommends that you put out the fact that he now expects his NOA request for '66 to be less than the NOA appropriated in fiscal '65, but he does not insist on it, and if I understood you correctly on the phone, the quieter way would be simply to refer to the Texas press conference.

McG.

McG. B.

PRESS CONFERENCE

of

HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- - -

November 10, 1964

Tuesday

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2:05 P.M. CST

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Building 110
Bergstrom Air Force Base
Austin, Texas

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SECRETARY McNAMARA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Perhaps I can start by telling you very briefly some of the subjects that Mr. Vance and I discussed with the President, and after that respond to your questions.

As you know, we met with him both yesterday afternoon and also this morning. We reviewed certain preliminary estimates of the fiscal 1966 Defense budget. We considered new programs that are under discussion in the Department, particularly research and development programs, as well as new weapons systems.

We reviewed the actions that we are taking to economize in every way possible, but to do so without reducing, as a matter of fact while continuing to increase, the military force of our country. We discussed the agenda for Thursday and Friday meetings with the German Minister of Defense, Minister Von Hassel. We reviewed certain of the topics that will be discussed next month in the meetings with Prime Minister Wilson.

Finally, this morning we considered the personnel appointments within the Department of Defense to cover the four-year period that lies ahead.

Now I will be very happy to take your questions and endeavor to answer them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is your estimate of next year's Defense budget?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: It is too early to give you an accurate estimate of the expenditures for fiscal 1966 for Defense, but I can tell you this: A number of the major force issues remain under discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I haven't yet received their final recommendations, nor have I completed my own studies that will lead to final decisions on force structure. But the President this morning emphasized again, as he has to each of the Cabinet officers, the absolute necessity for economy in all departments of Government,

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but particularly in Defense, where we spend, as you know, over 50 percent of each tax dollar.

But he pointed out that not only in Defense, but in other departments as well, we must achieve this goal of economy while continuing necessary and desirable services, and in the case of Defense it means that we must continue to provide the forces that we need as a foundation for our foreign policy. There have been very substantial increases in military forces during the past four years. These must be continued. We plan to continue them, and adequate provision for those increases will be made in the fiscal 1966 budget.

He emphasized that the economy he is speaking of must come about not through force reductions, but, rather, through increases in efficiency, increases in efficiency of operation, elimination of waste, duplication, unnecessary, obsolete facilities, and that will be our guideline in preparing the budget.

Now, following that principle, I can give you a very rough estimate of the fiscal '66 expenditures. Following this principle, I think we can hold the Defense expenditures, including the military assistance program, to under \$50 billion in 1966. You may recall that in fiscal 1964 we spent \$51.2 billion, and, therefore, the estimate I have just given you for fiscal '66 means that the expenditures in '66 will be at least \$1-1/4 billion below the level of '64, and this is after absorbing increases in salaries and increases in pensions to retired personnel of about \$1 billion, between those two years.

So on a comparable scale, and a comparable pension payment basis, the reduction would be on the order of \$2-1/4 billion between fiscal '64 and fiscal '66, offset by a \$1 billion increase in salaries and payments to retired personnel, for a net reduction of about \$1-1/4 billion between fiscal '64 and fiscal '66.

QUESTION: How about fiscal '65?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The question on '64, let me answer that first. The expenditures in fiscal '66, if they are under \$50 billion, as I have just forecast, will be roughly the same level as in fiscal '65, where we estimated a few weeks ago that they would approximate \$49.9 billion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does this mean that there are going to be extensive base closings and personnel reductions as a part of this? That is what everybody wonders.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: One of the subjects that we discussed with the President was the progress we are making on the subject of our bases and installations. These studies are timed to be completed at a date such that their results and conclusions can be incorporated in the fiscal '66 budget, which means they must be completed very soon. They include the study of the Naval shipyards. They also include studies of our air bases, our air depot system, our Army arsenal system, our Army terminal system, for example, and certain other bases and installations.

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I can't tell you at the moment the extent to which we will be able to determine that certain of the facilities are obsolete, are excess; but we hope to complete the studies very shortly.

QUESTION: Will this be all services -- Army, Navy, Air Force?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: All services; that is right. Army, Navy and Air Force have all been carrying on studies of their base systems during the past 10 months at my direction and I asked them 10 months ago to complete them in mid-November in order that I may utilize the results as a foundation for our fiscal '66 budget, so I anticipate that in a very short time we will complete the base studies and act upon them.

I want to emphasize that the action we take will be to eliminate unnecessary, obsolete, surplus installations, and that in no way will it affect our military strength, or military capabilities or military force structure.

QUESTION: Could it include some SAC bases, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: SAC bases are one of the systems of bases which we have under study.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, just as a point of clarification, these figures that you mentioned for the military budget, is that purely military or overall Defense budget, including atomic energy?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Atomic energy is not part of the Defense budget. It is budgeted separately by the Atomic Energy Commission. But the figures I gave you are the expenditures for which the Defense Department is responsible and for which I, as Secretary of Defense, am responsible, all the expenditures I am responsible for, including our military assistance program.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Congress this year gave you a large sum of money to carry on strategic manned aircraft. Can you tell us how that has progressed and if there is a chance in '66 that you might go ahead and fulfill it?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think the important point to emphasize with respect to the manned bomber that you are speaking about is the intention of Congress or the hope of Congress that the Executive Branch would act in such a way as to hold open the possibility of continuing bomber operations indefinitely, and that is exactly what we propose to do, but I say that without indicating to you that we have made any decision or will make any decision to produce another manned bomber to follow the B-52's.

What we are doing, what I have stated repeatedly we will do, is to provide the option for maintaining bombers in the force indefinitely. We have scheduled, as you know, our strategic forces up through fiscal '69 on our five-year program that covers fiscal years '65, '66, '67, '68, and '69, and we will be adding another fiscal year, 1970, in connection with the preparation of the fiscal '66 budget. But on that five-year

program covering the years '65 through '69, we have provided for bomber operations in every year. As a matter of fact, the fiscal '69 plan calls for B-52 and B-58 bombers in the force to a total of something on the order of 700 aircraft. The research and development programs that we have underway will permit us to retain bombers in the force indefinitely. When I say "definitely", I mean as far ahead as anyone can foresee, say into the mid-1970's.

QUESTION: Can you tell us more about the new weapons systems you have discussed?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, these are highly classified and I can only tell you that they were among the subjects that we discussed with the President.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you don't interpret the intent of Congress as to build a new manned strategic bomber rather than keeping the 52's in service indefinitely?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I do not interpret the appropriation by Congress as a decision by Congress that a new manned bomber should be produced.

QUESTION: Why not?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: For the very good reason that neither the Air Force recommended that nor did the Congress appropriate funds for that purpose. The Air Force recommended and the Congress appropriated funds only for what is called the project definition phase which is a very early phase in the development of the bombers and nobody in the Department of Defense that I know of has to date recommended that we produce and deploy a successor to the B-52, this for the very good reason that missiles are coming in in larger numbers and have major advantages over the bomber. But certainly no one in a responsible position in the Department of Defense is yet ready to state that we should stop all research and development on bombers with the thought we would never again face the need for one.

QUESTION: Then, in other words, Mr. Secretary, you don't plan to do it, then?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I have stated very clearly what I plan to do, which is to retain the option for including bombers in our operational force indefinitely, and I say as far ahead as one can see, into the 70's or late 70's, and we will do this both by continuing the operation of our present major bombers, the 52 and 58, indefinitely and beyond that by carrying on research and development programs which will permit us to follow those 52's and 58's with another manned bomber should that appear desirable.

The research and development programs will permit us to follow any one of three designs into deployment and production in time to replace the 52's and 58's, but I want to emphasize to you as citizens, not reporters, that a follow-on bomber will cost \$9 billion, and whether we, as citizens, should decide to spend \$9 billion of this Nation's resources to develop and produce a follow-on bomber is a question that we neither are required to face in terms of time, lead times, nor prepared to face in terms of clear understanding of the threats and the responses that we should make to those threats.

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QUESTION: Sir, can you tell us where there have been the biggest increases in expenditures since last year in defenses?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Where there have been the biggest increases?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Meaning what -- in tactical aircraft versus strategic missiles?

QUESTION: Just overall expenditures.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I am not clear. Do you mean geographically, company by company, or weapon by weapon? What is the point of your question?

QUESTION: Weapon by weapon.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think there has been a gradual shift in expenditures over the past four or five years from huge investments, massive investments, in strategic nuclear weapons on the one hand to a larger expenditure on surface fleets, tactical fighter aircraft, and transport aircraft, this because one of the first actions of President Kennedy was to very substantially increase the capital investment -- if you will -- budget for strategic missiles. You may remember he increased the POLARIS program very substantially, and doubled the production capacity for MINUTEMEN, all designed to build our strategic force up more rapidly than previously had been planned upon.

Since that time, additional emphasis has been placed upon the capabilities of our forces to respond very quickly. I think that all of us recognize that the way to reduce fatalities and casualties in any future conflict is to get to the scene of that conflict quickly with forces that can go into operation promptly, and in order to do that we need much greater mobility than we have had, a much higher level of combat readiness in all arms, particularly in combat-ready divisions and in tactical aircraft. Therefore, the expenditures on combat-ready divisions, tactical air and sea mobility, have risen very rapidly in the last three or four years.

Now, in percentage terms, the largest increase, I am sure, has come in what we call our counter-insurgency forces, the type of forces operating in Viet Nam today. But while this is the largest in terms of percentage, it is very small in terms of absolute figures.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, was your discussion entirely about budget matters, or did you also go into the effort in Viet Nam and what might be done in the future?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No. As I mentioned to you, we discussed personnel matters, budget matters, force structures, the agenda for the meeting with Minister Van Hassel and Prime Minister Wilson, and this morning, upon the arrival of Secretary Rusk and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, we discussed a number of foreign policy matters, including South Viet Nam.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some months ago, the President was asked if he had arrived at a decision concerning the developments of a new manned bomber, and he said he had not yet. Now you tell us today that the Defense Department has decided to go ahead with research and development which will give you an option to develop a new manned bomber.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes.

QUESTION: Does this represent a Presidential decision on this?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No. I said to you that our policy for the future will be as I believe it has been for the past: that we will retain this option. No one that I know of is proposing that we proceed today to decide or in the course of fiscal '66 budget to decide, that we will complete the development of a new manned bomber. The proposals are for varying degrees of commitment to that project. The problem is a highly technical one, how rapidly you should develop new engines, how rapidly you should develop air frames, how rapidly you should develop avionics. But we have such developments underway. I propose to recommend that we continue them. I have every reason to believe that those recommendations will be incorporated in fiscal '66 budget.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, about personnel, do you expect to remain in the new Administration?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Well, this is subject to being discussed further. The President should answer it. I would say if he should ask me, I would.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will you, sir, give us your latest assessment of the chances of winning the war in Viet Nam, and also whether this morning you discussed any new American moves that might be needed to win that war?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think that it is important to recognize what our objectives are in Viet Nam. Our objectives are not to align Viet Nam to the West as an ally of the West. Our objectives are not to utilize the soil of Viet Nam as a military base of the West. Our objectives are to insure the continued independence of that Nation and to insure that it remains free from Communist domination. That has been our objective; that is our objective. I believe we will achieve it.

I think some progress has been made recently. During the past year, we have had a series of problems out there, largely political in character, as you are well aware. In 12-1/2 months, we have had four governments, and in a society that is under as intense pressure as that society is, political, economic, military pressure, you can imagine the instability in all of those fields brought about by the series of changes in government. At last we have a civilian government, a government that gives some indication of being able to develop a consensus among the hard groups in the nation and move the nation ahead to a more effective response to the Viet Cong guerrillas that are attacking and harassing the people. So I think that today, compared to a month or two ago, we can look ahead with greater confidence.

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I don't want to overstate the case, because during the past 12 months the Communist guerrillas, recognizing that they did not have the power to confront in open conflict the established military forces of that country, have greatly accelerated and expanded the terror attacks upon the political infrastructure of that country. When I say the political infrastructure, I mean their attacks upon the political authorities at every echelon, starting at the lowest level, the hamlet, and proceeding up through the village, the district, the province, and even the national government in Saigon.

These attacks, these terror attacks, have been very successful. I have forgotten the exact figures, but I think these are rough approximations, that in the past 12 months, the Viet Cong have killed about 500 government officials at all echelons of government, and kidnapped an additional 500. To put that in perspective, you have to recognize that the total population of South Viet Nam is on the order of 12 million or 14 million, and that a portion of that is already under the Viet Cong control, so if you take the remaining portion and multiply it maybe by 15 to make it comparable to this country, and then think of 15,000 government officials in this country being murdered or kidnapped in a period of 12 months, it will give you some idea of the very intense pressure that that society is under.

The fact that those people have been willing to continue to fight, to absorb fatalities at the very high rate at which they are absorbing them, and still to retain sufficient capability as a fighting unit to force the Viet Cong into covert as opposed to overt operations, I think is a tremendous accomplishment, and I think sometimes we become weary ourselves,, psychologically weary, spiritually weary, when we look at what we have done. I have been associated with this now for four years, the Nation has been associated with it for ten. We are going to be associated with it for many years in the future, I am sure, before we eventually achieve this objective I mentioned, but I personally believe we can achieve it.

QUESTION: In connection with the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Wilson, did you and the President discuss the differing views of the Labor Government of Britain and the United States on the multilateral nuclear force?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The multilateral force was one of the subjects we discussed, not only in connection with the visit of the Prime Minister, but also in connection with my discussions which are scheduled to be held with Minister Von Hassel on Thursday and Friday of this week. This will be one of the subjects that the German Defense Minister and I will discuss and will also be one of the subjects that will be discussed, no doubt, in December with Prime Minister Wilson.

I think all of you know our position on this. We believe that we should seek every possible means of drawing our NATO allies into further participation in our nuclear strategy. We are quite willing to join with them if they choose to develop and participate in and finance a multilateral force. What form that should take is, of course, still under discussion. There are working groups in London and Paris that are working on draft treaties. We hope to have the drafts completed by the end of

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this year, ready for further thought and discussion by the leaders of the several nations of NATO, and no doubt will discuss them at a series of meetings that will be held both in Washington and elsewhere in the capitals of NATO between now and then. I personally believe it is in our interest as a nation to join with the Western European nations if they show interest in this, as many of them have, Germany being the outstanding example of that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are new reports of the possible sale of new British aircraft to the Chinese Communists. Can we assume that in the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister that the U. S. position will be to discourage the sale of additional aircraft?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: These are commercial aircraft you are speaking of, I believe. There are no discussions that I know of relating to the sale of military aircraft by the UK, and since it is a commercial problem, I don't feel qualified to discuss it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said that our objectives in South Viet Nam are not to ally South Viet Nam with the West. Is this to be interpreted as a willingness or readiness to accept the neutralization?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I believe I used the word "ally". Our objectives are not to associate South Viet Nam with the United States in the form of a military alliance. Perhaps I wasn't specific enough. We are not seeking to engage in a relationship between South Viet Nam and the U.S. such as we have, for example, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U. S. We are not seeking military bases in South Viet Nam. We have a very limited objective, which is to preserve the independence of that country, to insure that it retains its freedom, to insure that it remains outside the sphere of dominance and domination by the Communist powers.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the Chinese nuclear bomb and what it means to us and, if so, could you tell us anything about it?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No. This was not one of our subjects. But I want to emphasize what I have said before and what I know Secretary Rusk and the President have also referred to, the very serious danger to all the nations of the world from further spread of nuclear weapons. I think we have reported to the press and to the public that the increases in technology have greatly reduced the cost of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon development, reduced the cost both in terms of numbers of skilled technicians required and reduced the cost required in terms of dollars required and reduced the cost in terms of time required. As those costs in terms of men, dollars and time drop, we can expect more and more nations to develop the capability for producing nuclear weapons and as more and more nations obtain nuclear weapons, the danger to the rest of the world increases geometrically.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you plan to send combat units to Viet Nam to protect the airfields there?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We have no plans at present to send combat units to South Viet Nam.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said the time has not arrived for the decision on the follow-on bomber. When would that arrive -- 1970 or sometime like that?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No. I think the decision would have to be made before 1970. In the latter part of this decade, I think, assuming we continue the type of research and development work that we have underway at the present time. If that were to stop, the time for decision would be earlier because the lead time associated with it would be longer.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, besides the Vietnamese political affairs, did you discuss the course of the war itself in purely military terms and how it could be made more effective, and that subject?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We discussed all aspects of the operations in South Viet Nam -- political, economic, and military -- but I have nothing further to add to what I have already said about those discussions.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(At 2:27 P.M. CST)

December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I attach a memorandum which I have sent to David Bruce asking him to communicate the substance of it orally, with his own ruffles and flourishes, to Wilson before the Prime Minister makes his speech.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE:

The President has asked me to make his position very clear to Lord Harlech, in order that there be no misunderstanding of the forbearance and restraint with which he conducted his discussions of the Atlantic nuclear problem with Mr. Wilson. I am doing this, and I shall explain to Lord Harlech that I am doing it at the direct request of the President. As I said on the telephone, I believe it would be helpful for you to say these things to the Prime Minister, although not on the basis of a direct Presidential instruction. I think you are right in worrying about the temptations Mr. Wilson may feel in the heat of debate, and you are the one in the best position to give him a personal warning on this specific point.

What I shall say to Lord Harlech at the President's direction is the following:

1. The President wants to be very sure that the Prime Minister does not misunderstand his position on the nuclear force problem. The President and Senator Humphrey are both political men and the President in particular knows what a close election is like. It seemed to them that it would be unfair to force an immediate decision, against his previous record, on a man who has been in power less than two months, with a four-seat majority and a very grave economic and financial crisis on his hands. The President therefore decided not to force the pace with the Prime Minister, but rather to allow his advisers to explain American thinking as clearly as they could within a framework which the President deliberately set as one of discussion and not of decision.
2. The President also recognized and understood the importance of giving the British a free hand in finding out for themselves the real position and convictions of the Government in Bonn. The Laborites have been telling us for a long time that we do not properly understand the Germans. There is every reason for the Prime Minister to satisfy himself directly on this point, and if we have been wrong in our estimate of the Germans, no one is more interested than we in finding out.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-304
By CG, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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3. But by the same token, we hope that the British Government will take very seriously whatever they do find out in their discussions with the Germans, and our own first impression, after a very frank and entirely open-ended discussion with Schroeder, is that the British will find the Germans at least as firm on a number of basic questions as we have thought.

4. Meanwhile the President is gravely concerned by the risk that the Prime Minister may give others the impression that the U. S. has in any way backed off from its basic assessment of the situation as outlined in the paper of comments which was given to Her Majesty's Government on December 8. The fact that the President himself did not press the argument was merely an indication of his desire not to force the judgment on the Prime Minister now. The President noted that the Prime Minister himself did not pursue the argument on specific points, and his assumption is that the two governments will eventually have to bring the matter to a decision after due allowance for the discussions which are in prospect with others.

5. The President has asked me to emphasize particularly to the Ambassador the very great damage which could be done if the Prime Minister should take a line next week in the House of Commons that would make those eventual decisions more difficult. The President knows the temptations of debate, and he has already had one painful experience with a speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons.

If the impression should be created in the United States that the Prime Minister was trying to strengthen his position by seeming to have "won a victory" over Washington, the President would find it necessary to take a very different attitude toward this whole series of discussions.

I will tell the Ambassador, as my personal judgment, that a man in the Prime Minister's position would be extremely ill-advised to run any risks of this sort with a sensitive and determined man like President Johnson, since the President has plenty of cards to play if this becomes a public contest. I shall tell Lord Harlech that the President has shown great restraint in these last days because of his concern to avoid any appearance of running a power play against a weak opponent. But if his generosity is misunderstood, I doubt if it is likely to last.

McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1964

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
MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

I have approved the attached paper (Tab 1) on policy toward Southeast Asia as guidance for our work in this field in coming months, subject to such amendment and further development as I may approve from time to time. I have also approved the attached instructions (Tab 2) to Ambassador Taylor for his use on his return to South Vietnam. Taken together, these documents state my present position.

I consider it a matter of the highest importance that the substance of this position should not become public except as I specifically direct.

In discussions of relevant parts of these matters with foreign governments, I expect that every effort will be made to impress upon our foreign friends the importance of discretion, but I recognize that we cannot control what foreign governments say.

In the case of American officials the matter is different. The officers to whom this memorandum is directed are requested to take personal responsibility for the supervision of the execution of this policy and for insuring that knowledge of all parts of it within the Executive Branch is confined as narrowly as possible to those who have an immediate working need to know.



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Authority NSC 68 8/31/77
By JK/mmg, NARS, Date 9/14/77

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 2, 1964

POSITION PAPER ON SOUTHEAST ASIAI. Concept

A. US objectives in South Vietnam (SVN) are unchanged. They are to:

1. Get Hanoi and North Vietnam (DRV) support and direction removed from South Vietnam, and, to the extent possible, obtain DRV cooperation in ending Viet Cong (VC) operations in SVN.

2. Re-establish an independent and secure South Vietnam with appropriate international safeguards, including the freedom to accept US and other external assistance as required.

3. Maintain the security of other non-Communist nations in Southeast Asia including specifically the maintenance and observance of the Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.

B. We will continue to press the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) in every possible way to make the government itself more effective and to push forward with the pacification program. We will also press upon leaders and members of all groups in that country the overriding need for national unity.

C. We will join at once with the South Vietnamese and Lao Governments in a determined action program aimed at DRV activities in both countries and designed to help GVN morale and to increase the costs and strain on Hanoi, foreshadowing still greater pressures to come. Under this program the first phase actions within the next thirty days will be intensified forms of action already under way, plus possibly US air protection of Lao aircraft making strikes in the Corridor, US armed air reconnaissance and air strikes against infiltration routes in Laos, and GVN and possibly US air strikes against the DRV as reprisals against any major or spectacular Viet Cong action in the south, whether against US personnel and installations or not. We would be prepared to stop the flow of dependents to Vietnam at the same time as US strikes in Laos were conducted.

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(page 1 of 6 pages)

Authority

By JUL 1979, NARS, Date 8/13/79

D. Beyond the thirty-day period, first phase actions may be continued without change. Alternatively, additional military measures may be taken, including deployment of a large number of US aircraft to the area, low-level reconnaissance of infiltration targets in the DRV near the borders, and the possible initiation of strikes a short distance across the border against the infiltration routes from the DRV. At this time, we would be prepared to remove US dependents. In the alternative case these actions would become a transitional phase.

E. Thereafter, if the GVN improves its effectiveness to an acceptable degree and Hanoi does not yield on acceptable terms, the US is prepared -- at a time to be determined -- to enter into a second phase program, in support of the GVN and RLG, of graduated military pressures directed systematically against the DRV. Such a program would consist principally of progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation as it develops (possibly running from two to six months) and of appropriate US deployments to handle any contingency. Targets in the DRV would start with infiltration targets south of the 19th parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related targets, aerial mining of DRV ports, and a US naval blockade of the DRV. The whole sequence of military actions would be designed to give the impression of a steady, deliberate approach, and to give the US the option at any time (subject to enemy reaction) to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. Concurrently, the US would be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain US objectives in an acceptable manner.

* * * *

Tabs D - H to this paper contain a more detailed presentation of the precise actions contemplated under this concept. Tab D gives the actions proposed in the first, transitional, and second stages. Tab E spells out illustrative occasions that might be used for reprisals and reprisal targets. Tab F deals with possible major Communist actions and the US/allied counter moves that would then be indicated. Tab G is the Communist order of battle in Southeast Asia, and Tab H is the US order of battle and reinforcement capabilities.

II. Thirty-Day Action Program

A. A White House statement will be issued following the meeting with Ambassador Taylor, with the text as in Tab A, attached.

B. Ambassador Taylor will consult with the GVN promptly on his return, making a general presentation and pressing for the adoption of specific measures in accordance with the instructions in Tab ~~8~~,
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attached.

C. Laos and Thailand

The US Ambassadors in these countries will inform the government leaders in general terms of the concept we propose to follow and of specific actions requiring their concurrence or participation. In the case of Laos, we will obtain RLG approval of an intensified program of US armed reconnaissance and air strikes both in the Panhandle area of Laos and along the key infiltration routes in central Laos. These actions will not be publicized except to the degree approved by the RLG. It is important, however, for purposes of morale in SVN, that their existence be generally known.

Thailand will be asked to support our program fully, to intensify its own efforts in the north and northeast, and to give further support to operations in Laos, such as additional pilots and possibly artillery teams.

D. Key Allies

We will consult immediately with the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

1. UK. The President will explain the concept and proposed actions fully to Prime Minister Wilson, seeking full British support.

2. Australia and New Zealand will be told the concept and will be pressed not only for support but for additional contributions in South Vietnam. We will also discuss the possibility of small military unit contributions if and when E of the concept is carried out.

3. The Philippines will not be told the concept but will be pressed for additional contributions along the lines of the program for approximately 1800 men already submitted to President Macapagal.

E. We will press generally and strongly for more third country aid, stressing the gravity of the situation and our deepening concern. A summary of existing third country aid is in Tab C, attached.

F. Communist Countries

1. We will convey to Hanoi our unchanged determination and objectives, and that we have a growing concern at the DRV role, to see if there is any sign of change in Hanoi's position.

2. We will make no special approaches to Communist China in this period.

3. We will convey our determination and grave concern to the Soviets, not in the expectation of any change in their position but in effect to warn them to stay out, and with some hope they will pass on the message to Hanoi and Peiping.

G. Other Countries

1. We will convey our grave concern to key interested governments such as Canada, India, and France, but avoid spelling out the concept.

2. In the event of a reprisal action, we will explain and defend our action in the UN as at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. We do not plan to raise the issue otherwise in the UN. (The Lao Government may stress the DRV infiltration in Laos in its speech, and we should support this and spread the information.)

H. Intensified Military Actions (See Tab D)

1. GVN maritime operations (MAROPS) will be intensified.

2. Lao air operations will be intensified, especially in the corridor areas and close to the DRV border. US air cover and flak suppression may be supplied where needed.

3. US high-level reconnaissance over the DRV will be stepped up.

4. US armed air reconnaissance and air strikes will be carried out in Laos, first against the corridor area and within a short time against Route 7 and other infiltration routes. (These actions will be subject to RLG concurrence and publicized only to the degree agreed with Souvanna.)

I. Reprisal Actions (See Tab E)

For any VC provocation similar to the following, a reprisal will be undertaken, preferably within 24 hours, against one or more selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces will be used to the maximum extent, supplemented as necessary by US forces. The exact reprisal will be decided at the time, in accordance with a quick-reaction procedure which will be worked out.

The following may be appropriate occasions for reprisals, but we should be alert for any appropriate occasion:

1. Attacks on airfields.
2. Attack on Saigon.
3. Attacks on provincial or district capitals.
4. Major attacks on US citizens.
5. Attacks on major POL facilities.
6. Attacks on bridges and railroad lines after the presently damaged facilities have been restored and warning given.
7. Other "spectaculars" such as earlier attack on a US transport carrier at a pier in Saigon.

In these or similar cases, the reprisal action would be linked as directly as possible to DRV infiltration, so that we have a common thread of justification. VC attacks on transportation facilities, in addition to being related to DRV infiltration, would provide the occasion for attacks on DRV communications on a parallel basis.

A flexible list of reprisal targets has been prepared running from infiltration targets in the southern part of the DRV up to airfields, ports, and naval bases also located south of the 19th parallel.

J. US/GVN joint planning will be initiated immediately both for reprisal actions and for possible later air strikes across the border into the DRV.

K. Dependents. We would be prepared to stop the flow of dependents concurrently with the initiation of intensified US air operations in Laos under paragraph H. 4. above.

(page 5 of 6 pages)

L. Deferred Actions (See Tab D)

The following actions will not be taken within the thirty-day period, but will be considered for adoption in the transitional phase of the program:

1. Major air deployments to the area.
2. Furnishing US air cover for GVN MAROPS.
3. Resuming destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. If attacked, these would be an alternative basis for reprisals, and should be considered primarily in this light.
4. US low-level reconnaissance into the DRV.
5. GVN/Lao air strikes across the border, initially against the infiltration routes and installations and then against targets south of the 19th parallel.
6. Evacuation of US dependents. We would be prepared to carry this out concurrently with 4 and 5 above.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~

December 3, 1964

Instructions from the President to Ambassador Taylor
as approved by the President, December 3, 1964

I have now approved the following instructions for your personal guidance on your return to South Vietnam. I hereby authorize and request that from these instructions you prepare a full statement of the present position of the United States Government for appropriate use with the senior officials of the Government of Vietnam. I recognize that for written presentation you may wish to recast in somewhat less specific form the detailed improvements which we seek in the conduct of affairs by the Government of South Vietnam, but I expect you to communicate the essence of these instructions in whatever way you find most effective.

During the recent review in Washington of the situation in SVN, it was clearly established that the unsatisfactory progress being made in the pacification of the Viet Cong was the result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stemmed: first, the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second, the continued reinforcement and direction of the VC by the North Vietnamese Government. To change the downward trend of events, it will be necessary to deal adequately with both of these factors.

It is clear, however, that these factors are not of equal importance. There must be a stable, effective government to conduct a successful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the aid of North Vietnam for the VC should end. While the elimination of North Vietnamese intervention will raise morale on our side and make it easier for the government to function, it will not in itself end the war against the Viet Cong. It is rather an important contributory factor to the creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign against the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. Since action against North Vietnam is contributory, not central, we should not incur the risks which are inherent in such an expansion of hostilities until there is a government in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems involved in such an expansion and of exploiting the favorable effects which may be anticipated from an end of support and direction by North Vietnam.

It is this consideration which has borne heavily on the recent deliberations in Washington and has conditioned the conclusions reached. There have been many expressions of admiration for the courage being shown by the

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(page 1 of 4 pages)

Authority

By

NARS, Date

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December 3, 1964

Huong government, which has the complete support of the USG in its resistance to the minority pressure groups which are attempting to drag it down. However, the difficulties which it is facing raise inevitable questions as to its capacity and readiness to discharge the responsibilities which it would incur if some of the new measures under consideration were taken.

There are certain minimum criteria of performance in South Vietnam which must be met before new measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At a minimum, the government should be able to speak for and to its people who will need guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period. It should be capable of maintaining law and order in its principal centers of population, make plans for the conduct of operations and assure their effective execution by military and police forces completely responsive to its authority. It must have the means to cope with the enemy reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations.

I particularly request that you and your colleagues in the American country team develop and execute a concerted effort to bring home to all groups in South Vietnam the paramount importance of national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time. It is a matter of the greatest difficulty for the United States Government to require great sacrifice of American citizens when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of heedless self-interest and shortsightedness among nearly all major groups in South Vietnam. I know of your own great interest and concern for this problem and you can be assured that in your efforts to deal with it you will have the energetic support of the government in Washington.

While effectiveness is largely a subjective judgment, progress in certain specific areas such as those listed below provides some tangible measure. The U. S. Mission should urge upon the GVN particular effort in these fields, not only because of their intrinsic importance to successful pacification, but also because of the indication of governmental effectiveness which progress, or the lack thereof, will provide:

1. Improve the use of manpower for military and pacification purposes.
2. Bring the armed forces and police to authorized strength and maximize their effectiveness.

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December 3, 1964

3. Replace incompetent officials and commanders. Freeze the competent in place for extended periods of service.
4. Clarify and strengthen the police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation of VC suspects.
5. Clarify and strengthen the authority of provincial chiefs.
6. Make demonstrable progress in the Hop Tac operation around Saigon.
7. Broaden and intensify the civic action program using both military and civilian resources to produce tangible evidence of the desire of the government to help the hamlets and villages.
8. Carry out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon.

Throughout, it will be essential that the GVN and the USG cooperate closely and effectively as loyal allies dedicated to the attainment of the same objectives. These objectives in the broadest terms are to cause the DRV to respect the rights of its neighbors and to terminate the Viet Cong insurgency.

While progress is being made toward these goals by a government of growing effectiveness, the USG is willing to strike harder at the infiltration routes in Laos and at sea. In conjunction with the RLG, it is prepared to add US air power as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. At sea, it favors an intensified continuation of the MAROPS which have proved their usefulness in harassing the enemy. In combinations, these operations in Laos and at sea constitute the first phase of military pressures to reduce infiltration and to warn the DRV of the risks it is running.

While these intensified operations are going on, the armed forces of the GVN and the USG must be ready to execute prompt reprisals for any unusual hostile action. The U. S. Mission is authorized to work out with the GVN appropriate plans and procedures to this end.

As a second phase, the United States is also prepared to consider a program of direct military pressure on the DRV, to be executed after

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December 3, 1964

the GVN has shown itself firmly in control. The actions undertaken in the first phase should provide encouragement and enlist popular support for the government and thus facilitate its task. The time provided by this phase would be used to advantage in the military, political, and economic efforts outlined earlier, as well as in preparing for the next phase -- direct pressure on North Vietnam.

This second phase, in general terms, would constitute a series of air attacks on the DRV progressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the leaders of DRV that it is to their interest to cease to aid the Viet Cong and to respect the independence and security of South Vietnam, properly assured by appropriate international safeguards.

The participants in the attacks of the second phase, as we now plan it, would be the air forces of the US, South Vietnam, and Laos. The U.S. would participate (as at present) in support of the Vietnamese Air Force and at the request of the Government of Vietnam. We would expect to work out joint plans, and before their execution we would agree on our purposes, our public position, and the manner of conducting operations against North Vietnam. The U. S. mission is authorized to initiate such planning now with the Government of Vietnam with the understanding that the USG does not commit itself now to any form of execution of such plans. You are authorized to make it clear, as appropriate, that the execution of such plans would be preceded by deterrent deployments by the U. S. as well as security precautions by the Government of South Vietnam against possible escalation of hostilities.

You are also authorized to explain that we propose to discuss with our major allies both our present plans of action against the infiltration routes and our preparations for possible later action against North Vietnam. In particular, we propose to seek the military and political cooperation of the governments of Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Finally, I request that you give your personal and continuing attention to our effort to multiply the effective participation of other allies in our effort in South Vietnam. I have already requested your assessment of the maximum usable contribution both in present circumstances and in the event of increased efforts along the lines for which planning is authorized in this instruction. This assessment will be the basis of a major further effort by this Government.

I shall be glad to have your prompt report of the reaction of the Government of Vietnam to the policy outlined in these instructions.

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(page 4 of 4 pages)

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

December 1, 1964

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today reviewed the situation in South Viet-Nam with Ambassador Taylor, and with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Ambassador Taylor reported that the political situation in Saigon was still difficult, but that the new government under Prime Minister Huong was making a determined effort to strengthen national unity, to maintain law and order, and to press forward with the security program, involving a combination of political, economic and military actions to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. The Ambassador also reported that, although the security problems have increased over the past few months in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, with uneven progress elsewhere, the strength of the armed forces of the government was being increased by improved recruiting and conscription, and by the nearly 100% increase in the combat strength of the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, the government forces continue to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Cong.

On the economic front, Ambassador Taylor noted that agricultural output was continuing to increase, with U. S. assistance in fertilizers and pesticides playing an important role. He also noted that the prices of goods and the value of the piaster have remained remarkably stable. On the other hand, the Ambassador reported that increased interdiction of the communication routes by the Viet Cong is interfering to some extent with commerce within the country, and the recent typhoons and floods in central Viet-Nam have destroyed a large percentage of the crops and livestock in that region. The Vietnamese Government, with U. S. assistance, has moved promptly to organize a program which is bringing relief and rehabilitation to the stricken areas.

The meeting reviewed the accumulating evidence of continuing and increased North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and of North Vietnamese forces in, and passing through, the territory of Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962.

The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects.

The President reaffirmed the basic U. S. policy of providing all possible and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them. It was noted that this policy accords with the terms of the Congressional Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964, which remains in full force and effect.

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TAB C

THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

Fifteen countries, including the U.S., are now providing aid to the Republic of Vietnam. Over 500 non-U.S. foreigners are now in Vietnam assisting the Vietnamese Government. (This does not include 482 French nationals engaged primarily in education and medicine.) Ten more countries have agreed to provide aid, and we and the GVN are now engaged in efforts to implement these agreements. We are trying to increase still further the number of aid-contributing nations.

A summary of current third-country contributions follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Nature of Aid</u>	<u>Persons in RVN</u>
Australia	Combat advisors, aircraft and crews, medical aid, technical aid, civic action aid, radio station	167
New Zealand	Army engineers, surgical team, educational aid	32
Philippines	Medical aid, psywar assistance	34
Korea	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, karate instructors	140
Thailand	Aircraft crews, jet training, cement and roofing	17
U.K.	Police aid, professor, educational and technical equipment	7
Canada	Medical aid, scholarships, wheat	1
China	Agricultural aid, psywar assistance, electric power aid	85

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By if, NARS, Date 6-12-79

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Nature of Aid</u>	<u>Persons in RVN</u>
Germany	Professors, technical experts, credits	12 ..
Italy	Surgical team	9
Japan	Electric power aid, medical aid	80
Malaysia	Counterinsurgency training (outside Vietnam) and equipment	0
Switzerland	Microscopes	0
	Total	<u>584</u>

The following is a summary of expected additional contributions:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Nature of Aid</u>
Austria	Medical supplies, blankets, tents
Brazil	Surgical equipment, pharmaceuticals, coffee
Denmark	Medical supplies for flood relief, technical aid
India	Unspecified social and economic aid
Iran	1,000 tons of petroleum products
Israel	Pharmaceutical supplies
Netherlands	Scholarships, technical aid
Spain	Medical aid
Tunisia	Medical aid
Turkey	Medical aid

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We are currently engaged in talks with the Philippine Government which we expect to result in the sending of an 1,800-man Philippine tri-service task force to Vietnam. The task force would consist of a C-47 squadron, an LST, and a ground element composed of engineer, medical, civic action and supporting security troops. We also expect the Philippines to provide increased civilian technical, educational, and civic action aid.

In the immediate future, we propose to ask the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand to play a larger combat advisory role (both air and ground). The point is to persuade these countries to expose their personnel to the same risks as ours.

We also propose to ask the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand to plan for a contribution of combat units to accompany U.S. combat units when and if it should become necessary that outside forces be deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. We also plan to talk to the Thais in the same vein with respect to a potential Thai contribution of combat units for use in Laos.

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- 1st 30 DAYS:
1. Intensify GVN sea harassment of DRV, including US air protection.
 2. Intensify Lao air strikes in Corridor; perhaps US CAP & flak suppression.
 3. Expand high-level (U-2) reconnaissance of North Vietnam.
 4. Conduct US armed air recce and air strikes against infiltration routes in Laos, and be prepared to stop flow of US dependents to Vietnam.

- TRANSITION:
5. Deploy 150± US aircraft to SEA; alert US ground forces for movement.
 6. Conduct low-level recce of infiltration targets in DRV near to border.
 7. Conduct US/RLAF/GVN air attacks in DRV on infiltration routes near Laos: e.g., Barthelemy Pass area (14 sorties) & Mu Gia Pass area (8 sorties).
 8. Be prepared to evacuate US dependents, depending on reaction to Action 7.

- NEXT 2-6 MONTHS:
9. Expand high- and low-level reconnaissance coverage of the DRV.
 10. Conduct, first, US/GVN air strikes in the DRV south of the 19th Parallel against targets on the following list (GVN could hit the first four):

	<u>Sorties</u>		<u>Sorties</u>
#36 Vit Thu Lu barracks	4	#41 Phu Van ammo depot E	22
#39 Chap Le barracks	10	#42 Phu Van ammo depot NE	24
#33 Dong Hoi barracks, WNW	32	#53 Phu Van supply depot SE	16
#24 Chanh Hoa barracks, HQ	115	#55 Vinh Son supply depot SE	8
#64 Xom Bang ammo depot	39	#4 Dong Hoi airfield	15
#91 Route 12 armed recce	36	#5 Vinh airfield armed recce	14
#90 Route 8 armed recce	38	#71 Ban Thuy Port (also mine)	28
#38 Vinh barracks, HQ	89	#74 Quang Khe Naval Base (mine)	11
#52 Vinh supply depot E	13		

11. Deploy additional US (and Allied) forces as necessary (see Tab H).
12. Conduct, next, US/GVN air strikes against the above targets and, in addition, US strikes against the following targets north of the 19th Parallel:

	<u>Sorties</u>		<u>Sorties</u>
#40 Phu Qui ammo depot	52	#22 Xuan Mai barracks, SSW	87
#89 Route 7 armed recce	40	#23 Xuan Mai barracks, NNW	20
#94 Alt. to Rt 6 armed recce	34	#56 Son La supply depot	71
#43 Qui Hau W ammo storage	97	#46 Ban Phiang Hay ammo depot	16
#93 Route 6 armed recce	28	#25 Son La Army barracks	48
#28 Ban Xom Lom barracks	42	#26 Dien Bien Phu barracks	27
#37 Moc Chau Army barracks	18	#92 Route 19 armed recce	14

13. Conduct US aerial mining of DRV ports and US naval blockade of the DRV.
14. Conduct, next, US/GVN air strikes with increasing severity on the above targets and, in addition, US strikes on those on the following list:

	<u>Sorties</u>		<u>Sorties</u>
#6 Phuc Yen airfield	40	#87/88 Rt 5 & RR (Hanoi-Haiphong)	2
#3 Hanoi Gia Lam airfield	8	#89 Rt 7 (Laos/NVN border)	2
#49 Hanoi POL storage	9	#90 Rt 8 (Nape to Roa Qua)	2
#51 Thach Loi POL storage	14	#91 Rt 12 (border to Xom Ma Na)	2
#8 Haiphong Cat Bi airfield	20	#15 Viet Tri bridge	24
#30 Hanoi air defense HQ	13	#12 Hanoi Red River bridge	42
#48 Haiphong POL storage	10	#23 Xuan Mai barracks, HQ	12
#10 Ninh Binh bridge	13	#16 Dap Cau bridge	48
#64 Xom Bang ammo depot	13	#10 Ninh Binh bridge	14
#83/84 Rt 1 & RR (Hamrong-Hanoi)	4	#64 Xom Bang ammo depot	26
#85/86 Rt 1 & RR (Vinh-Hamrong)	4	#89 Rt 7 (Laos/NVN border)	4

15. Conduct, next, US/GVN air strikes with further increased severity on the above targets and, in addition, US/GVN strikes against the remaining 38 (including all industrial) targets on the "94 target list." (See map at Tab I.)

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Authority NLS 84-78

By us, NARS, Date 5-11-84

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TAB E. US/GVN REPRISALS TO VC PROVOCATIONS

11/30/64

[NOTE: Attacks by the DRV -- e.g., on US recce in Laos or deSoto patrols, or by organized land, sea or air units against SVN -- are of a different order of magnitude and are excluded from this Tab.]

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A. Decisions re VC provocations: (1) For any VC provocation similar to those in paragraph B below, a reprisal will be carried out, preferably within 24 hours, against one or more of the targets in paragraph C below. (2) GVN forces will be used to the maximum extent, supplemented as necessary by US forces. (3) The exact reprisal will be decided at the time. And (4) joint US-GVN planning for reprisals should begin immediately.

B. Illustrative provocations:

1. Attacks on airfields, such as the Bien Hoa attack on Nov. 1, 1964.
2. Attack on Saigon.
3. Attacks on provincial capitals or district capitals, as in the Sept. 1964 attack in Chuong Thien province.
4. "Gross" attacks on US citizens -- greater than the Nov. 18, 1964, Ton Son Nhut "snack bar" incident or the Feb. 9, 1964, "baseball bleacher" attack.
5. Major attacks on POL, as in the March 8, 1964, attack in Phuung Dinh province.
6. Attacks on transportation -- e.g., on bridges and railroad lines -- after the presently damaged facilities have been restored and warning given to the VC.
7. Other "spectaculars," as in the May 2, 1964, attack on the USS Card in Saigon.

C. Reprisal targets, all south of the 19th Parallel:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Barracks:	#24 Chanh Hoa	115	Also Div headquarters
	#33 Dong Hoi (West NW)	32	Probable Div headquarters
	#36 Vit Thu Lu	4	Guerrilla staging area
	#38 Vinh	89	Headquarters military region IV
	#39 Chap Le	10	
Ammo Depots:	#41 Phu Van (East)	22	Major depot
	#42 Phu Van (Northeast)	24	
	#64 Xom Bang	39	Supports Pathet Lao forces in "panhandle"
Army Supply Depots:	#52 Vinh	13	
	#53 Phu Van (Southeast)	16	
	#55 Vinh Son (Southeast)	8	
Armed Recce:	#90 Route 8	38	Main supply route into central Laos
	#91 Route 12	36	Main supply route into southern Laos and SVN
Airfields:	# 4 Dong Hoi	15	Closest airfield to SVN, jet fighter capable
	# 5 Vinh (armed recce)	14	Capable of recovering jet fighters
Port:	#71 Ben Thuy (bomb and mine)	28	Vinh's port, probable naval base
Naval Base:	#74 Quang Khe (mine)	11	Can repair SWATOWs

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-108

By gwp/asp, NARA, Date 10-1-96

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Communist Action*Possible US/Allied Countermoves**

Comment 53-n

1. Stepped up VC operations. VC might attack US/GVN bases, terrorize US citizens, try to disrupt SVN govt and economy with increased terror, sabotage, attacks in Saigon, provincial capitals, and rural areas.

- a. Take additional security measures, including dispersal outside SVN of some US air and adding US/GVN ground forces for base security and for protection of key cities or installations.
- b. Step up attack on infiltration targets.
- c. Evacuate unessential non-combatants.
- d. Carry out reprisals in dramatic cases.

We cannot prevent stepped up VC operations, but, unless the SVN Government topples, the VC could harass but not stop US/GVN strike programs (which could be conducted entirely from outside SVN).

2. DRV or Chicom air attacks on SVN or US carriers. The DRV Air Force (if not crippled by US strikes) can conduct fighter-bomber attacks against northern SVN and close-in carriers. From Hainan, Chicom fighter-bombers can reach northern half of SVN, and bombers can reach all of SVN and carriers in So. China Sea.

- a. If Communist attack small, consider a limited reprisal.
- b. If large and only DRV involved: (1) US/GVN airstrike DRV airfields, POL and support facilities to kill the DRV Air Force; (2) reinforce air defenses in SVN as insurance against Chicom air strikes; (3) Alert US ground forces for deployment to SEA.
- c. If large and Chicoms involved: (1) US air intercept, engage and "hot pursue" Chicom aircraft; (2) US air strike air bases and related facilities in South China; (3) to forestall Chicom ground action, US air strike interdiction-type targets in South China; (4) Consider hitting Chicom nuclear production facilities; (5) Begin major deployments to SEA and West Pac to provide against the contingency of Chicom ground intervention.

Air superiority over DRV should be achievable in 2 days, over South China in 5 days. If Chicoms openly intervene and US conducts strikes on the Chinese homeland, the risk of further escalation would be great.

3. DRV ground attack against SVN or Laos. The DRV, for reasons of rear area security and coast defense, has only 5 deployable divisions. It can, depending on weather, put and support 2 (in 48 hrs) to 5 divisions across the DMZ and/or up to 3 in--to Laos.

- a. Defense: GVN ground defense, augmented quickly by US ground forces.
- b. Offense: (1) US/GVN interdiction, attrition and punitive air attacks on NVN; (2) US harbor mining and naval blockade; (3) early US/GVN ground offensive (consider seizing and occupying some or all of NVN).
- c. Major deployments: Begin major US deployments to SEA and West Pac to provide against the contingency of Chicom intervention.

SVN's army would be outnumbered 2 or more to 1. It can resist initially with 1 div, plus an airborne brigade as lift became available. The ARVN's counter-VC role would slow further reinforcement.

4. Chicom/DRV ground attack into SE Asia. If not interdicted, the Chicom/DRV, depending on weather, can put and support 7-24 divisions into SEA. First Chicom forces could enter South Vietnam in 10 days.

- In addition to actions in para 3 above:
- d. Extend air strikes and blockade to So. China, increase US ground forces in SEA to 5-2/3 divisions, and employ US naval and air forces on a large scale against China.
 - e. Consider attacking Chicom nuclear production facilities.
 - f. Stress either a ground offensive to seize North Vietnam (per OPLAN 32-64) or air and naval action designed to drive Red China out of the war (per OPLAN 39-65). Nuclear strikes if necessary.

US air countermoves could be brought to bear on short notice. US ground forces, if not deployed in advance, would be arriving in the area slower than Chinese forces, unless the latter were successfully interdicted.

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Authority NLS 14-89

By UUCD, NARA, Date 08-25-2015

- * See attached sheet on Enemy Order of Battle for Communist capabilities
- ** See attached sheet on US Order of Battle and Reinforcement Capability

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November 23, 1964
(re-issued 11/30/64)

TAB G -- ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND CAPABILITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COMMUNIST GROUND FORCES

Major Combat Units, Excluding Border Divisions. (Note that Red China has 48 of the following divisions tied down -- 9 opposite Taiwan, 34 in Manchuria opposite the USSR and Korea, and 5 in the west opposite the USSR.)

	<u>Divisions</u>				<u>Separate Units</u>	<u>Strength</u>
	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Armd</u>	<u>Cav</u>	<u>Airborne</u>		
Red China	106	5	3	3	20 div. equiv.	2,160,000
(S&SW China)	(22)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(404,000)
DRV	5				3+ div. equiv.	225,000
Pathet Lao					52 inf. batts.	20,000
DRV in Laos					16 inf. batts.	10,000
Viet Cong					47 main-force batts.	31,000

Uninterdicted Support Limits of Chicom/DRV Divisions Against Moderate Ground Opposition (10,000-14,000 men per division).

	<u>Feb-Mar</u>	<u>Apr-Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct-Jan</u>
Via DMZ (to SVN)	5	5	2	2
To Laos (or via Laos to SVN/Thai)	11+	3+	3+	11+
Via Burma (to Thai)	8	2	2	8
TOTAL	24+	10+	7+	21+

COMMUNIST AIR FORCES

(see attached map for relevant distances.)

<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Available</u>	<u>Now in South China & DRV</u>	<u>Field Limits in So. China & DRV</u>	<u>Bomb Load</u>	<u>Radius Miles</u>
MIG-15/17 (jet)	1758 (36 DRV)	291 (36 DRV)	540 (120 DRV)	2 x 550#	100/180
MIG-19 (jet)	80			2 x 550#	290
MIG-21 (jet)	22			2 x 550#	300±
All MIGs				Guns only	590±
IL-28 (jet)	290	23	120 (25 DRV)	6,600#	590
IL-10 (prop)	60 (15 DRV)	15 (All DRV)	Not a lim.	4 x 220#	165
TU-16 (jet)	2	0	Not a lim.	6,600#	1650
				13,000#	1260
TU-4 (prop)	13	0	Not a lim.	10,000#	1100

NAVAL FORCES

Red China's naval power rests primarily in 28 submarines. None is now in the South China Sea, but 4-6 submarines could be deployed there. The Chicom South Sea Fleet's major combat units are 45 PT boats. There is also enough amphibious lift, excluding junks, for two infantry regiments. North Vietnam's navy consists of 31 PT and gunboat types.

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NLS 84-78

By

NARS, Date

5-11-84

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11/30/64

TAB H -- US* ORDER OF TITLE A REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY (SOUT EAST ASIA)
 (deployments other than per OPLANS may cause bottlenecks)

53r

<u>DAYS TO ACTION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>MEANS</u>	<u>FROM/TO</u>
+0	1 Spec Landg Fce of 3d MarDiv	1900 (24 Helcptrs)		afloat off SVN
	2 Interceptor Sqns	33 F-102s		SVN-Phil-Thai
	5 Fighter Sqns	78 F-100/105		2 SVN-1 Phil-2 Thai
	2 Attack Carrier Gps	2 CVA: 126 aircraft		So. China Sea
	1 Recce Sqn	12 RF-101s; 2 RB-57s		SVN
	5 Troop Carrier Sqns	76 C-130s		4 Okin-1 Phil
	1 ASW Carrier Gp	ASW Car: 44 aircraft		West Pacific
	2 Patrol Sqns	19 aircraft		Phil
	1 Submarine	1 Submarine		So. China Sea
	2 Cruisers, 30-32 DDs, 14 minesweepers, 10-14 subs ready for action			in West Pacific
	(1 Light AA Missile Battn) (18 Launchers)		(Sea)	(En rt SVN since 11/18)
+1	1 Air Gp of 1st MarAir Wg	44 aircraft	Air	Okin/SVN
	3 B-47 Sqns (closes +2)	45 B-47s	Air	CONUS/Okin
+2	4 Fighter Sqns	71 F-100/105s	Air	Japan/SEA
	4 Fighter Sqns	74 F-105s	Air	Okin/SEA
	2 Interceptor Sqns	29 F-102s	Air	Okin/SEA
	2 B-57 Sqns	38 B-57s(+5 damaged)	Air	Phil/SVN
	1 Recce Sqn	11 RF-101s	Air	Okin/SEA
	7 Fighter Sqns (closes +6)	126 aircraft	Air	CONUS/SEA
	1st MarAirWg (-) (cl +32)	104 aircraft	Air-Sea	W.Pac/SVN & Haw/Phil
	3d MarDiv (-) (closes +35)	17,000	Air-Sea	Okin-Haw/SVN
+3	1 BattnLandgTm of 3d MarDiv	1300	Sea	Offshore/SVN
	1 B-52 Sqn	30 aircraft	Air	CONUS/Guam
+4	2 Interceptor Sqns (cl +6)	36 F-104s	Air	CONUS/SEA
	8 Recce Sqns	66 aircraft	Air	CONUS/Asia
+5	1 Attack Carrier Gp	CVA: 75 aircraft	Sea	West Pac/So. China Sea
	2 Troop Carrier Sqns	32 C-123s	Air	CONUS/Thai
	1 Patrol Sqn	12 aircraft	Air	MidPac/Phil
+6	1 Attack Carrier Gp	57 aircraft	Sea	West Pac/So. China Sea
	6 Trp Carrier Sqns (cl +8)	96 C-130s	Air	CONUS/Jap-Phil-Okin-Thai
+8	82d AirbnDiv (cl +35)	13,000	Air-Sea	CONUS/Thai
+9	173d AirbnBrgde (cl +20)	3400	Air	Okin/SVN
+10	23 Fighter Sqns (cl +30)	414 aircraft	Air	CONUS/Asia
+11	2 Patrol Sqns	24 aircraft	Air	Mid Pac/West Pac
+15	25th InfDiv (closes +30)	14,300	Air-Sea	Haw/Thai
+17±5	6-7 Submarines	6-7 Submarines	Sea	East Pac/West Pac
+20	1 ASW Carrier Gp	ASW Car: 45 aircraft	Sea	East Pac/West Pac
+23±5	2 Attack Carrier Gps	2 CVA: 140 aircraft	Sea	East Pac/West Pac
+25±5	2 Cruisers	2 Cruisers	Sea	East Pac/West Pac
	20-28 Destroyers	20-28 Destroyers	Sea	East Pac/West Pac
+30	1st MarDiv (closes +50)	21,400	Air-Sea	CONUS/Okin
	2d MarDiv/Wg (closes +45)**	21,500&106 aircraft	Sea	CONUS/SEA
	4th InfDiv (closes +45)**	15,000	Sea	CONUS/SEA
	5th MechDiv (closes +45)**	16,000	Sea	CONUS/SEA
	2 AA Battns (Hawk) (cl +90)	32 launchers	Sea	CONUS/SVN
+45	1 MarAirWg	106 aircraft	Sea	CONUS/Japan
	1 Mech Brgde(+)	5,400	Sea	CONUS/Thai
	2d Inf Div	14,000	Sea	CONUS/Thai
	101st Airbn Div (Thtr Res)	13,500	Sea	CONUS/Haw
+60	1st Inf Div	15,000	Sea	CONUS/SVN

*GVN has 9+ divisions and 107 tac/aircraft; Thailand has 4+ divisions and 47 tac/aircraft.

**Deployment to Asia of these divisions cuts into US NATO 5-division M+30 commitment, requiring mobilization of Army and Marine ready reserves (7 divisions available).

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Authority NLS 84-78

By vis, NARS, Date 5-11-84

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I talked to the President on the telephone from my office to his at 1:30, and he gave me the following debriefing of his conversation with Harold Wilson between 11:30 and 1:00 today.

The President said that the conversation began with a discussion of the British and American elections. The President pointed out to the Prime Minister that there were a lot of problems which did not show in the U. S. returns, especially with respect to international affairs. He said that our folks were damned tired of being told that it was their business to solve all the world's problems and do so mainly alone, and that he was very wary of taking any tall dives that might get him into the situation Roosevelt got into in 1937.

Against this background, the President spoke frankly but kindly to the Prime Minister about the troubles which the latter had already given the President. He pointed out that the impression which had been created by the British budget, with its heavy emphasis on social security, and the pressures created against the pound had combined to make the President's own budgeting process very difficult. He had originally planned on a budget of \$107 or \$108 billion and now he was forced to think in terms of \$101 or \$102, which would make it very difficult to carry out the programs he wanted. This British decision had shaken us up some.

The President said the second thing which had given him trouble was the monetary action of the British Government. The British had made trouble for themselves and for others by sounding as if they did not believe in the instrument of the bank rate and then using it very heavily and suddenly.

The third point the President made was that the British economic problem was in no sense over, and we might well expect a good deal of trouble in the next 60 to 90 days and that problems for the pound would also be problems for the dollar.

Finally, the President talked to the Prime Minister about the difficulties created by his speech on Atlantic nuclear defense in the House of Commons.

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(page 1 of 3 pages)

Authority FRUS, vol. XII, item 58 & NLJ 90-345

By ju/rq, NARA, Date 2-11-98

12/7/64

By that time, the President said, the Prime Minister was almost on the ropes. The Prime Minister said that on the Atlantic nuclear force he laid the blame on Flora Lewis. (Later on in the day the President described this episode to Rusk and McNamara by saying, "He chased Flora Lewis all around the toom.")

The Prime Minister knew that this episode had created a serious episode and he wanted us to know that he had not said no to the MLF but only to a force without a US veto. On the MLF, he had said maybe. (Later the President told us this reminded him of the girl who, when she said maybe, really meant yes, and the President said he was not in a position now to accept the bargain.) The President reminded the Prime Minister of the difficulties Sir Alec Douglas-Home had given him on commenting on Cuban busses from the White House steps. This time the Prime Minister had given him trouble ten days before the visit. The Prime Minister said he felt very sorry -- that he had meant to give a very preliminary and general discussion as the President did at Georgetown.

The President returned to the Atlantic nuclear problem and said he himself would not take any adamant position and had no intention of forcing the matter now. But his overwhelming interest was to make sure that the Germans did not get us into World War III. We had been over there twice now in his lifetime and we did not want to have to do it again. He said that the best people in his government had worked on this, both under President Kennedy and under him, and they just did not see any other way of doing it than the way that was now before us. The President told the Prime Minister that a stitch in time saves nine, and that if we couldn't solve this problem and tie the Germans in, there was some 17-year-old right now in Germany who would be a 20-year-old little Hitler in another three years. The Germans had made rockets for the U.S. and the British, which proved they had brains, and they lent a lot of money to the UK, which showed that they had money. All they needed now was will, and that was what we had to prevent, so that we should all get together and work this thing out.

Bob McNamara would show the Prime Minister how to reduce his force from 5 submarines to 3, and take the money and men he had saved, and put the men on the surface ships. The President knew the Prime Minister wanted to keep our finger on the trigger, and we want exactly

12/7/64

the same thing; the object was to keep the Germans with us and keep their hand off the trigger. The President repeated that McNamara and the other Americans could show the British how to join in on this without any real trouble, and with no cost.

* * *

Earlier, in the presence of the Prime Minister and Sir Burke Trend, the President had debriefed to Trend and me by saying many of the same things. He pointed out in that meeting that he had spoken of Erhard's problems. (He later told Rusk and McNamara that the Prime Minister had been low on Erhard and high on Willy Brandt.)

The two had agreed that Adenauer was no help. Mr. Wilson remarked that while he had agreed on the fact that the Germans presented a real problem, he had not got to specifics. The President said that he had described all his best advisers as men with the temperament of Rhodes Scholars, dangerously sympathetic to the UK, and had made it clear that while he was "not going to put his feet in concrete" or get the Prime Minister's feet in concrete, he did very much hope that we could reason it out together. In this meeting he put his point about the Germans by saying that he had just won an election by preaching against discrimination in the United States, and he could not now preach in favor of discrimination in international affairs.

The President said that he and the Prime Minister had agreed to have a private talk on monetary matters with experts from both sides, and he asked me to arrange a meeting at which Secretary Dillon, Chairman Martin and Chairman Ackley would be present at 4:45. This I later did.

McGeorge Bundy

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Words: 598

Suggested Remarks
Prime Minister Wilson Dinner, Toast
Monday, December 7, 1964

Prime Minister, Distinguished Guests:

This House is honored by the presence tonight of a most welcome -- and most distinguished -- visitor and his party.

In years long past, other of the Prime Minister's countrymen left their mark on this House -- rather indelibly. If I may say so, the Prime Minister has carried on in that tradition today. With his pipe, our guest has started ^{as many} ~~more~~ fires in the White House this afternoon ^{as} ~~than~~ any Britisher in the last 150 years.

Seriously, I can say that this has been a day of warmth in this House -- as we have talked together, worked together and sought understandings together. Our deliberations have been warmed by fires of common purpose lighted long ago by the greatest men of both our histories.

One of the first Presidents to live in this House, Thomas Jefferson, once said of Great Britain and the United States that:

"No two nations on earth can be so helpful to each other as friends, nor so hurtful as enemies."

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In the Prime Minister's country, in this country, in free countries around the world, there is recognition now that this is a time of test and a time of trial. But there is also recognition that this is a time when we must tend our societies and our values as plants that grow.

We may be grateful that the condition of the world tonight -- unlike this same night 23 years ago -- permits us to devote our time to strengthening the roots of our societies so that richer fruit may be borne in the years to come.

Between Britain and the United States, there have been differences -- as there are among all sovereign nations. Such differences concern questions of approach, not questions of fundamental aims.

We agree without reserve on the indivisibility of the security of the West. Likewise, we agree on the imperative need to undertake new efforts to secure a just peace, no matter how difficult the task. Only if the world achieves peace and security can any of us properly tend the societies which nurture and fulfill the human values of our heritages.

I am confident that the understandings we have sought today -- and shall continue to seek -- will serve well this great and growing opportunity for all free men.

##

Others before us learned -- and proved -- the truth of that vision. Today -- and, I am sure, in all the days to come -- the Prime Minister and I have worked and will continue to work only in that tradition of friendship. Our purpose is not merely helpfulness to each other -- on the part of the great peoples we each are privileged to serve -- but helpfulness to the cause of all mankind.

We are each conscious of the meaning of this moment in the history of this decisive century. As our Administrations² are new, this moment itself is new for the world. We shall continue to bear the trust of old obligations -- to the values to the needs of our alliances, and of our allies. of our civilization, to the purposes of our people, But we shall also look outward to identify and to assume the challenge of this era's new opportunities.

At the mid-point of this century, one of the Prime Minister's most illustrious predecessors -- a man much beloved in this land and around the world -- spoke in Boston. Winston Churchill said then:

"Human beings and human societies are not structures that are built or machines that are forged. They are plants that grow and must be tended as ~~any~~ such. Life is a test and this world a place of trial."

Suggested Remarks
Prime Minister Wilson, On Arrival
Monday, December 7, 1964

DRAFT: HB
Words: 334

(minor editing: REN)

Prime Minister, Distinguished Guests:

It is a pleasure to welcome you today -- to this country and to this House.

For you and me, as individuals, positions and responsibilities have changed somewhat since last you were a visitor in this city. But the relations between our countries -- and the common purposes of our peoples -- remain unchanged.

Your visit underscores the certainty there will be no change.

Under Democratic and Republican Administrations in this country, and under Labor and Conservative Governments in your country, the collaboration between Great Britain and the United States has meant much of enduring value to all of mankind -- not only to our two peoples, but also to our friends and allies everywhere.

Today we realize -- as surely all nations must realize -- that the world has come to the beginning of a new era of change.

It is opportune that at this formative period -- early in each of our respective Administrations -- we can meet together to seek the basis of continuing responsible understandings.

The problems of our nations -- the problems of all nations -- are many today. Yet we can and do justifiably believe that this is a hopeful time for man -- the most hopeful since time began. In all of history, never has man had so great a capacity for ending war and assuring peace, overcoming poverty and providing plenty, mastering the causes of human misery and enjoying the fullness of human happiness.

In confidence that our countries and our peoples, with our allies, have great contributions to make to -- and great gains to realize from -- the progress of the years ahead, we meet now for a series of working sessions, where we can begin, together, to explore the complex and important problems facing us and our allies.

As we welcome you to our country, we welcome you and your countrymen to the continuation of this great work. May our labors help to strengthen the hope for peace and the cause of freedom -- as have the labors of our predecessors on both sides of the Atlantic.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1964
8:00 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Last-minute papers for the Wilson visit

As I understand your decision this afternoon, our basic plan for this meeting is as follows:

1. You meet privately with Wilson to discuss your basic positions as political leaders. This meeting should include a warning to him about the destructive effects of painting the meeting his way and undertaking on our side to avoid the same mistake. The basic principle of this meeting on every issue should be that it is a matter of exploration and discussion without decisions, and that in particular we are not attempting to settle basic issues of Atlantic nuclear defense until both of us can talk with the Germans and other friends. This position should be reached in your first private meeting and announced by the two of you to your Cabinet colleagues when you join them.
2. When we get to Atlantic nuclear defense which does not have to be the first topic if a world review is preferable, you will say to the Prime Minister that our position is very well known and that we look forward to a statement of the proposals of the new British Government. You may then wish to let Rusk, Ball and McNamara carry the ball on specifics, confining yourself to the continuous repetition of the requirement that any eventual arrangement be acceptable on the European continent and especially among the Germans.
3. It should be our position not to press for a definite British decision now on the sailors in the surface ships, but simply to say that we believe this to be indispensable, and that both of us should test this matter with the Germans.
4. We can also agree to test with the Germans some of Wilson's building blocks, and there is no harm in indicating where we can and cannot be forthcoming, as the existing briefing papers suggest, but without so much precision.
5. The enclosed papers are not fully modified in the light of tonight's suggestions, but they still give you what you basically need for tomorrow:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-304
By CL NARA Date 5-15-95

~~SECRET~~

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12/6/64 8:00 p. m.

At Tab A is the statement of Wilson's basic position on nuclear defense matters and our answers as initially recommended. You should ignore the first two pages, and our own position should be modified in the sense which we agreed today: that we are simply examining building blocks for later discussions with the Germans, and that the British proposals certainly do not look to us as if they would work on that score. The stuff you may want to look at specifically is the list of Wilson's desires on pages 3 and 4. We do not really know much more about this than this page suggests -- partly because Wilson himself probably does not know what he means by slick phrases like "crisis management." The elements of our response on pages 5, 6 and 7 should probably not be spelled out as sharply as these pages suggest, in the light of our new tack.

At Tab B are the arguments we were going to use, and they are almost too good for unveiling in the new situation.

Tab C is still valid, and I have added a personal assessment of Wilson by David Bruce, which is well worth reading.

Tab D talks about the Germans. If anything, it is an understatement in the light of today's cable.

Tab E summarizes briefly some of the other major topics.

I also attach separately the current drafts of arrival statements and toasts. They do not say very much, but I really believe that this is not an occasion for saying anything major.

m. J. B.
McG. B.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

57-8

December 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Wilson Visit

I. What the U. S. Wishes to Achieve

Whatever is worked out with the British must fall within the framework of the objectives that prompted the MLF proposal. These are principally:

A. To tie Germany irrevocably to the Western world by giving the Germans the feeling that they are respected, first-class members of the Atlantic Alliance and are not being excluded from responsible participation in the management of their own nuclear defense.

B. To set a pattern for the management of atomic weapons by collective action rather than by the proliferation of individual national deterrent systems. This applies particularly to Germany where participation in a collective effort is the safest counter to the pressures for a national system that will otherwise inevitably develop over the years.

To achieve these purposes we need not stick rigidly to all of the details of the original MLF plan but certain fundamental conditions must be met:

1. The European powers participating - particularly Germany and Italy - must be given a sense that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-233

By CB, NARA Date 7-24-97

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they are in on an equal basis with the United Kingdom-- and that the United Kingdom has no special position.

2. We must avoid any impression that the Anglo-Saxons are doing a deal that the continental European nations will be pressed to accept. The Germans, Italians and Dutch are all watching with great interest, much anxiety and some suspicion the outcome of the Wilson visit.

We must take care to make clear at all times that this is a multilateral proposal which can be negotiated only on a multilateral basis. We are merely exchanging views with the British regarding the scope of possible solutions. No commitments will be made until there has been a multilateral discussion among the other members.

In dealing with the British we must impress upon them that the final scheme must be so arranged that their participation is on a parity with the Germans and other Europeans rather than with the United States. And whatever views we may hold as to the necessity for British participation we must present a solid front to the British that the principle of a mixed-man surface force is a first objective of American foreign policy which we intend to pursue.

Finally, we must view this discussion not merely as a technical exercise but as part of a major effort to meet the very large objectives spelled out above. For that reason we cannot succeed merely by making a deal with the British that the Germans reluctantly accept if over the long run the result does not achieve the kind of equality of treatment that would fulfill the political and psychological needs of the Germans.

And if--because of British stickiness--the present effort should break down we want to make clear--not merely in the eyes of our own people but of the Europeans--that the blame falls squarely on the British and not on the United States.

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II. What Wilson Wants on the Atlantic Nuclear Issue

We think the Prime Minister hopes to obtain the following:

A. Agreement in principle from us on the outlines of his proposal for modifying MLF, as follows:

1. A change in name of the force from "MLF" to something like "Atlantic Nuclear Force", (what we have been calling AMF).

2. A top control board as in our present MLF proposal.

3. A permanent U.S. veto on the understanding that this could be changed only if all members agreed (including the U.K.). In addition, he may seek a British veto if this means a veto for every member.

4. A British contribution of roughly half the V-bombers with their nuclear weapons. The other half would be outside the force (with conventional capability for use or threat in Asia).

5. A British contribution of three or four POLARIS submarines to be matched by an equal number of American POLARIS subs (or, as a second best, by an equivalent American contribution of MINUTEMEN).

6. A multilaterally-owned and financed mixed-manned MINUTEMAN force in the U.S. or Canada, as a total substitution for surface-ships.

7. All these forces, national and multilateral, would be under common command and control, including PAL, and irrevocably committed for the life of the force. Wilson would probably accept the other evidences of multilateralization--common ownership, common uniforms and

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-4-

common flag. These are clearly important not only to the Germans but to the other Europeans. At the same time, Wilson will probably insist that we accept the same arrangements with respect to our POLARIS or MINUTEMAN contribution.

8. He wants British costs for this whole force not to exceed those presently programmed for 5 POLARIS submarines plus V-bombers. Really, he'd rather pay less.

9. AMF should exist side-by-side with SAC and consult with it, separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR.

B. Wilson wants agreement that non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings be part of the AMF treaty.

C. He wants public support from us for British divestiture of their "independent" nuclear deterrent. We will be asked to play up their action as a contribution toward non-proliferation, thus countering Tory opposition.

D. He also will want slogans for improved inter-allied "consultation" about "crisis management" on a global scale, beyond the NATO area. Wilson's intentions are not clear, but he wants something.

III. What we Cannot Do for Him.

Several aspects of these proposals seem unacceptable to us. They are as follows:

A. We should stand firm against the British effort to substitute mixed-manned MINUTEMEN for mixed-manned surface ships. We have been working on the mixed-manned surface ship proposal for two years and the British are johnny-come-latelies. Mixed-manned MINUTEMEN are just not on. They would undoubtedly run into heavy weather in Congress. They are likely to have little appeal to the Germans, Italians or Dutch. They would certainly be subject

*Depends
on Congress
as well
as Germans*

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to the Gaullist argument that Europe cannot rely on being defended by weapons on U.S. soil and on the opposite side of the Atlantic and hence more visibly under U.S. control.

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mind
what
we said!*

B. Wilson has been told by Ball and Neustadt that agreement in principle on British participation in surface ships is a sine qua non for the successful outcome of these talks and for a success in negotiations with the Germans. This should remain our American position. (as revised in ink!)

C. We cannot promise to support a status for this new force outside SACEUR's jurisdiction. At the present time, the Germans strongly want the force under SACEUR.

D. Even though national contributions to AMF would let us reduce the number of surface ships, we cannot accept so small a number that Germans or Italians think the surface force is meaningless.

E. We cannot now agree to including PERSHINGs or tactical aircraft in AMF. The Germans deeply suspect this is an entering wedge to giving London a veto over all tactical nuclear weapons, and furthermore we do not want to prejudice progress toward conventional use of tactical air.

IV. What Might Make a Deal?

We see the following as possible elements of agreement in principle:

A. Enough British participation in a mixed-manned surface force to satisfy the Germans that this whole arrangement is non-discriminatory. This means a significant number of British sailors on some number of ships. There can be fewer ships than 25 because a lot of weapons would be provided by national contributions, but there cannot be just a token number of ships. The British will argue that the Germans really don't set as much store by the surface

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force as we think and would be satisfied with a seat in the control board at the top. We don't buy this and don't think the Germans would either. Wilson may also argue manpower difficulties in manning both surface ships and submarines. Bob McNamara can dispose of this very quickly. (Reduction of subs from 5 to 3 would release 500 men.)

As a fall-back only:

B. We are ready to consider how a portion of our own strategic strength can be made a part of the new Atlantic force -- ~~perhaps by contributing some MINUTEMEN.~~ We don't want to decide how this should be done or what our contribution should consist of until we reach the stage of multilateral discussions and find out whether others than the British are interested in having us do this. Wilson could be told that we are willing to consider the matter seriously but not to make specific comments in advance of multilateral discussion. ~~At the same time he could be told that we definitely do not wish to be put in the position of directly "matching" his POLARIS submarine contribution.]~~

C. We could agree to non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings as part of a treaty.

D. We could say that we'd hail the British decision to commit their forces irrevocably as an important step back from nuclear proliferation.

E. We could leave in abeyance for later multilateral negotiations the relationship of AMF to SACEUR.

F. We could tell Wilson that we have every intention of insisting on our veto in the force as it is launched. Moreover we could draft the treaty so that any change in voting arrangements would be subject to the concurrence of all -- which would effectively give the British a veto on any relinquishment of our veto. However, we must avoid falling into the Gaullist trap of appearing to oppose European unification. Thus we should indicate that if Europe some day achieves political unity under a chief executive -- which is clearly a long way off -- that will create

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For talk
with
Extraneous,
not
decision
now.

~~SECRET~~

-7-

a new situation which will require all parties to reexamine all the provisions of the treaty.

G. We can agree to make clear publicly that if AMF comes into being, we will reduce our own programmed strategic forces proportionately. This is important since one of the great problems Wilson faces at home is strong revulsion against creating additional nuclear weapons above the number McNamara says are needed to cover Soviet targets.

H. We can show interest in better consultation between our governments--and other governments, too--on matters outside the NATO area. We can suggest that staff work be done to sort out just what, if any, new mechanisms are needed.

But we might also suggest that consultation is meaningful only when there are joint ventures, joint risks, and joint responsibilities. This could lead delicately into a discussion of "jointness" in Southeast Asia (see below).

I. We can graciously accept and support the British contribution of part of their V-bomber force.

J. We can work out financial arrangements which will assure Wilson that participation in the surface fleet is on a no-extra-cost basis to him. Bob McNamara can spell this out to their heart's content. (The U.K. submarines could be their capital contribution to the force.)

K. We can certainly acquiesce in abolishing the initials "MLF", but we should leave final choice of a new name to multilateral negotiation.

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V. Intangibles for Wilson

If Wilson were to accept this deal in principle, he would be taking a very considerable political risk at home since he and his party have long opposed British participation in surface ships and the Tories now also oppose it, while no segment of public opinion supports it. On the other hand, you can encourage him to the view that by taking this risk, he opens the way to enormous opportunities. Great politicians take big risks for great causes. Those opportunities include:

1. A major contribution to the prevention of atomic proliferation and specifically to forestalling German pressures over the years for an independent or Franco-German nuclear system. A real prospect of German agreement and progress in the Atlantic nuclear field.

2. The beginnings of a new relationship between Britain and Europe, particularly Germany, with all that may mean for Britain, financially and otherwise.

3. Clearing the decks for new endeavors to negotiate seriously with the Russians.

4. A positive act of solidarity with the U.S. and with Germany, bringing into being a joint venture which will deepen good relations, and give Britain a leading voice in Europe.

5. A great British initiative breaking log jams in the Alliance for which the British would receive great credit and would deserve it in your eyes.

If a deal of this sort seems to be coming off, we will recommend to you a schedule for talks by the British and ourselves with the other allies involved--at least the Germans, Italians and Dutch. It will be essential to have full agreement with Wilson on who says what to whom and when.

VI. If Wilson

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VI. If Wilson Doesn't Deal

We don't know whether Wilson can give the assurance which we seek regarding his participation on surface ships. He has said he'll negotiate seriously. But he has also said that he wants to come back here in January and he is in so delicate a situation with his Cabinet that he may not feel he can afford to give that assurance now, even to you. Or he may feel that we aren't willing to do enough in return. If so, he'll want to talk to the Germans about his proposals as they stand. And he'll want us to encourage Bonn to listen seriously. But we must not let Bonn think that we are trying to help force them off surface ships.

The question of who then says what to whom becomes very difficult. We would need a very explicit understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town.

VII. Wilson's Interests East of Suez

Britishers, particularly Defense Secretary Healy, say that agreements in principle for support of joint ventures east of Suez will be an important element in your talks. We do not know how far Wilson means to press this with you, although Healy says he means to expose it to McNamara later. If Wilson opens this with you, you could raise with him the prospect of "joint venture" in Vietnam and Malaysia. Regarding Vietnam he might be asked to make a substantial contribution. In return we would participate more actively with the UK in Malaysia.

VIII. Wilson's Interest in Financial Stability

We understand that he may well propose to you joint staff work on measures for long-term support of the pound while his government tries the hard, slow task of modernizing the economy

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and righting the balance of trade. Wilson is enormously appreciative of what you've done already to bail him out for the short-run. He probably won't ask you now to go beyond agreement for more staff work.

If this is all he asks we think you should be forthcoming. He desperately needs the technical and economic advice available to our government. It would be as much to our benefit as theirs to provide this assistance.

This indication of your interest in working toward a long-term solution for their problem might enhance the prospects of agreement on the nuclear force.

George W. Ball

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 5, 1964

Suggested Answers to
Wilson's Likely Arguments Against Englishmen on
Surface Ships

A. Arguments Against Any Surface Force

1. Doesn't Add to Western Strength

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-304
By CB, NARA, Date 5-15-95

He told House "surface fleet adds nothing to Western strength." His argument is that McNamara already has the targets covered by MINUTEMEN from here. He hates adding more nuclears than needed.

You can tell him we will cut back our own planned missile strength as surface force comes into being (~~we plan to do this anyway~~), so the surface force weapons will be needed. McNamara himself has said this, and will say it again. This is a certified real force.

2. Disruptive Effects on Alliance

He told House that the surface fleet "is likely to cause a dissipation of effort within the Alliance." Note future tense and qualification "likely."

You can tell him that British participation is best possible guarantee of strengthening Alliance and aiding its coherence. DeGaulle may well still make trouble but we can leave several well-padded empty chairs for him for France and we can be patient. The real danger of "dissipation of effort" is that the Germans will come unstuck. We believe that to prevent this, an Anglo-German tie is crucial.

3. Complications for East-West Agreement

He told House the fleet "may add to the difficulties of East-West agreement. There is the question whether the surface fleet... involves the German finger on the trigger." The phrases are carefully "iffy."

He also said "as long as the American veto remains absolute it does not mean in our view additional fingers on the trigger. I suspect... that the Soviet fear relates not so much to the present proposal but... to the possibility... that the American veto might be replaced by a system capable of overriding American opposition..."

You can tell him we won't give up the veto without unanimous consent from all governments concerned, including our own, which would mean

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12/5/64

going back to Congress. And we won't even think of doing that unless some day the European governments concerned are unified under a single political executive. That won't be while you are President and probably not while he's Prime Minister even if he stays in as long as MacKenzie King of Canada (24 years, I think).

This assurance is important to Wilson and it will be a real plus for him to have it from you.

It is also important, however, to sign him on to some form of eventual possible review in honor of a really unified Europe.

4. Military Doubts About the Military Value of the Force.

He'll probably say his admirals think surface ships are very second rate weapons carriers.

You can give him the Acheson treatment on this: our admirals tell us differently. All our military studies have shown that surface ships in European coastal waters are a good weapons system for the decade of the '70's.

B. Arguments Against British Participation in a Surface Force (Men and Money)

1. Extra Cost to the U. K.

He may say they can't afford to spend a dime on surface ships.

You can tell him they won't have to. McNamara has figured out how they can spend much less for all their contributions to AMF (including surface ships) than they now have programmed for 5 POLARIS subs.

2. Shortage of Skilled Naval Manpower

He will tell you that they can't find the technicians (especially electricians) to man their present fleet and programmed submarines, if they also contribute to the surface force.

You can tell him his present 5-sub program will take 1,000 officers and men. Three subs, plus a share in the surface force will only take 1,100 and that assumes a force of the full 25 ships. We probably could do with somewhat fewer ships in the light of the broader force they are proposing. Besides, there are several years ahead in which to train the needed specialists. The country of the Battle of Britain can find 200 of anything in 4 months -- let alone 4 years.

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3. His Own and His Party's Past Opposition

He may argue that he's caught by his own past record.

You can tell him you congratulate him on his careful use of tenses and "iffy" qualifications in the House. He isn't caught; this is a new situation to which he contributed: surface ships as part of a larger, grander, safer, more peaceful force.

4. Cabinet Opposition

He may argue that he'll have a helluva time with his own Cabinet. The Left is anti-surface-ships and so is George Brown on the Right (so is Mountbatten and the British press).

Tell him you think he is a big enough politician to take big risks for great causes -- and this is a very great cause for the future of the Alliance and of Anglo-American relations. He could tell that to his Cabinet from you. He could also tell them that this is a very small price indeed for all that they need from U. S. -- to wit:

- (1) A respectable home for a "national deterrent" they are pledged to get rid of.
- (2) Non-proliferation efforts including a fresh and stronger German pledge.
- (3) New efforts for East-West agreement (a thin but pleasant hope).
- (4) U.S. support against wicked Central Bankers.
- (5) The prestige of being true friends of the Johnson Administration

5. Tory Party Opposition

He'll tell you that if he holds his whole party in Parliament he'll only have a 22-vote majority at most (counting the Liberals). The Tories plan to oppose him on any deal he makes with us, including surface ships.

Tell him that Macmillan promised us a "fair wind" for the mixed-manned surface ships at Nassau. The Tory Government never delivered on that promise. He can drive this point home against Tories.

Tell him also that you are prepared to say publicly you welcome Labor's plan to give up its "independent" term as a fine step back from proliferation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's personal commitment to this visit

1. It is extremely clear on all the evidence that Wilson has staked a great deal on having a "successful" visit with you. The habit of American Presidents for 10 years has been to portray all visits of Prime Ministers as "successful," and if Wilson does not have a success with you, it will be extremely damaging for him. This is the more true because both he and his Cabinet are great admirers of your Administration, as exemplified at the Cabinet level by McNamara, and at the political level by your own massive achievement and victory. They need your approval.

2. At the same time Wilson is a man whose background has made him genuinely hostile to conservatives and to many of the values which Socialists normally attach to our own great industrial society. When you joke about Ivy League types -- at least nowadays -- you are playing a game. When Wilson gets angry at Tories and bankers, he is not. You are strong and he is weak, and you have a much longer experience of real power. If Wilson should feel that there was no way for him to get a success, he might choose to exploit failure and to move in an emotionally anti-American way. I regard this as a low probability, and one which can be prevented entirely by your own personal dealings with him, but you may want to have it in mind.

3. In spite of his strong prejudices, Wilson is an extremely cool and determined man, and the absolute heart of his purpose will be to make a solid political bargain with you. My own belief is that the odds are about 4 to 1 that he will agree to put British sailors in the surface fleet and that what he will ask in return is mainly window-dressing, from our standpoint.

Inc. B.
McG. B.

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NJ 93-304
By cls, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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Excerpts from Neustadt MemCon with Wilson
(November 25)

The PM began his response by saying he and Pres. are politicians. He felt the two of them could deal with one another as such. For two politicians my term "collision course" represented a starting point of negotiations. For his part he intended to negotiate. He would have his position and the President would have a contrary one. He said he had no intention of "tearing up my papers and going home," *if the President should respond with a "no".*

He continued by remarking he did not expect the Pres. to tear up what American Govt. had said before in past two years. He told the House Monday night that while desirable to go right back to first base, he recognized no chance "ignoring all that has happened since, all the momentum that some of the post-Nassau ideas have gained, we cannot ignore the fact that these proposals for the mixed-manned surface fleet have gained some momentum" (Hansard Nov. 23, page 936.)

He then observed that it was important his Cabinet knows he not a supporter of the surface fleet. He added that of course there were two questions here: first, whether there should be a surface force at all, and second, whether the Brits. should be in it if there were one. These were separable questions. He had started with a negative attitude about the first and would present alternatives which he really felt were better, closer to Ann Arbor and capable of achieving surface force objectives, that Negotiations would then follow. He expects that.

PM added with some stress that it would make a great deal of difference to him if the Americans said publicly that we intend to retain our veto for the life of the Alliance. Then his position Cabinet and Party easier. This would be essential requisite for agreement. He then said "Don't worry; I am not going to allow Denis to take his artillery to Washington to sink the surface ships." (Some metaphor especially since Mountbatten's presumably reference.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jm, NARA, Date 2-6-98

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~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

December 6, 1964

To: Mr. Neustadt
From: David Bruce
Subject: Prime Minister Wilson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-174
By is, NARA Date 4-28-99

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Great Britain, aged 48, son of an industrial chemist of salty character, was educated in secondary schools before proceeding on a scholarship to Jesus College Oxford, where he established a brilliant academic record.

He was elected to the House of Commons in 1945; from 1947 to 1951, as President of the Board of Trade, he was the youngest member of the Cabinet.

Married, he has an attractive wife and two sons.

The Prime Minister is possibly the most effective debater in the House of Commons. Witty, though not humorous, encyclopaedic on knowledge, extraordinary in memory, cold in manner, skilled in logic, masterful in temperament, he is a man of unusual distinction.

Many persons, including some of his party associates, consider him evasive, opportunistic, lacking in true convictions, inordinately ambitious, untrustworthy. His great rival, Hugh Gaitskill, heartily disliked him.

In the three years I have known him, I have found him frank, open, discursive, intelligent, agreeable, friendly. Without any question, he is intellectually interesting and gifted. His instinct for domestic political manipulations is strong, his judgments reached only after exhaustive rumination. He is the Master of his Party, preeminent in dominating the disparate elements that compose it.

He is by choice a lone wolf. He discourages intimacies by aloofness from social conviviality, though when occasion requires it, he is a stimulating and congenial companion.

I would suspect that this complex, persuasive, formidable, adroit, secretive individual is not, as often depicted, one with ice-water in his veins; on the contrary, he is subject to deep passions

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and prejudices. In the last respect, he may be exceptionally vulnerable.

At present, he seems to me overprone to ascribe failings in the British system in almost every category, economic, financial or otherwise, to the malevolence, stupidity, selfishness of his opponents. He may be too steeped in the early fifties, too devoted to outmoded dogmas, too suspicious of the motives of others. It may well be that he believes in the necessity for class warfare to extirpate residual privileges. Certainly, he detests the Conservative Establishment, and regards bankers, financiers, industrialists and large landowners as leagued in desire to oppress the commonalty.

Wilson considers himself an expert economist. Theoretically, he probably is. But neither his ideas, nor his speeches are conducive to engendering the confidence, either at home or abroad, of those who, in the last analysis, determine the movements of money and goods in global trade.

It will be fascinating to watch how this superior person will adapt himself to the world of fact as contrasted with that of theory.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subjects for Discussion with Wilson other than MLF

1. Southeast Asia

Before leaving London for Washington, Wilson told newsmen he intended to discuss with you Britain's place in helping Vietnam. He coupled this remark with the observation that (1) the UK had "a very important role East of Suez...in a peace-keeping way," and (2) Britain remained fully committed to support the Malaysian Federation in the face of intervention and aggression. This opening should give you the opportunity to raise with him the prospect of joint ventures in Vietnam and Malaysia. An assessment of what we might get here is at Tab 3/

2. British Guiana

Wilson evidently plans to raise this with you. He should be told as clearly as Douglas Home was that the US cannot accept the emergence of another Communist state in this hemisphere. He expects to hear this, and has said he will be able to meet us pretty well.

3. Cuba

You mentioned our Cuban concern to Wilson when you last talked with him. To avoid any misunderstanding of this Government's continuing position on this issue, we think he should be told again you expect the British Government not to encourage additional trade.

4. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

You may wish to reassure Wilson that, despite the lack of clarity of the present political situation in the Soviet Union, you will continue to try to find measures of peaceful settlement with the Soviet Government, and a basis for agreement on non-dissemination and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

You might also want to repeat for his benefit your bridge-building hopes for Eastern Europe and invite the British to work with us and the other Allies in establishing closer ties with Eastern Europe.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-304

By CG, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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5. Economic Problems

These are discussed in the basic Ball-Neustadt memorandum.

6. There are also a number of NATO military problems you can leave to Bob and a number of diplomatic problems (UN, China, and the Congo) you can leave to Dean Rusk.

McG. B.

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(page 2 of 2 pages)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-304

SUBJECT: The British and Vietnam

By CB, NARA, Date 5-15-95

1. I think you should know that the British will find it very, very difficult indeed to increase their commitment in Vietnam right now. That does not necessarily mean that we should not hit them hard while Wilson is here, but I think it does mean that we cannot expect a definite and affirmative answer.

2. There is no political base whatever in England, in any party, for an increased British commitment in Vietnam now. For 10 years we have accepted a situation in which the British give political support, but avoid any major commitment on the ground of their other interests and their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The most that Wilson could possibly do at this stage would be a slight enlargement of the Thompson advisory mission and of their police training effort, with perhaps a green light to a few bold British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men do. All this he would have to do quietly. There is no workable basis for a public change in British policy at a time when there is no public change in ours. You might press him to go from the current level of 7 Britishers to about a hundred, but we would be lucky to get 50 in this first phase.

3. When and if we open a second phase and need to land a mixed force of U. S. and other troops, we might conceivably get a small British contingent along with larger ones from Australia and New Zealand. Our own commitment would have gone up and there would be a better case for asking the British to join in. On the other hand, Tommy Thompson points out that if the British Co-Chairman send troops in, that might be the trigger, or at least the excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi.

4. The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno. This kind of bargain in this part of the world makes a good deal of sense, and Rusk and McNamara will be ready to go forward with the British in detailed discussions on this basis.

5. The point of this memorandum is simply to make sure that you know how very hard it will be for Wilson to do as much for us in South Vietnam as we need him to. It is hard to treat a thing as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share of it, just because it is getting worse (though we choose not to say so).

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What happens when the German Government gets the full treatment from the French on MLF.

In light of what you heard today in our meeting, I'd like to add one refinement.

On Thursday I talked at length with Martin Hillenbrand, our best man in Bonn, about what happens if DeGaulle really turns the heat on the Germans by threatening to wreck NATO, EEC, Franco-German relations, etc.

Hillenbrand says these threats will come in January or later, whenever De Gaulle senses that MLF may really be "in danger" of succeeding.

Then, Hillenbrand says there'll be a "moment of truth" in Bonn. The practical politicians in the CDU who are scared of showing the electorate a deeply split party (pro-French versus pro-Americans) will urge Erhard to slow the negotiations down and stall until after the elections (September). On the other hand, Schroeder, von Hassell and Westrick, Government Ministers whose policies and personal fortunes are tied to MLF, will urge Erhard to "be a man", kick Adenauer in the teeth, risk a party split and go full steam ahead.

Today's
cable.
Westrick
unstuck
and he's
important
to Erhard.

Hillenbrand thinks Erhard probably will do what his Ministers urge provided he is convinced there's a great chance of early success for MLF -- a success he can present both to his party dissidents and to the voters. But the chance of prompt success will be seen in Bonn to depend on the British. Are they firm and forthcoming? Can Erhard count on ~~Erhard's~~ Wilson? If he isn't pretty sure of Wilson, Erhard may crack under the pressures of delay.

And Hillenbrand adds, Erhard's a "nice guy", who hates to play tough and likes to be liked, and no one can say with certainty how he'll react under the cross-pressure.

If by chance he buckles and decides to stall, we'll have to help him do it gracefully, without blaming either us or the British, and without letting DeGaulle chortle in triumph. Hard to do.

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By cb, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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But the best chance of doing it is the same as the best chance of stiffening Erhard's spine: Get Wilson moving, and convince Bonn that he's serious.

Whatever happens later, our course for now is to press Wilson to comment himself in principle on surface ships.

Dea.

Richard E. Neustadt

M.B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MLF — AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

1. You asked yesterday why President Kennedy was tentative and careful about the MLF. It was rightly pointed out that there were different reasons at different times, but in the last half of 1963 the reasons were, I think, dominated by his feeling that if he could only get the MLF by major and intense U. S. pressure, it was not worth it. His exact reasoning I do not know, but I do know that he reacted very strongly and affirmatively to a memorandum which I sent him on June 15, 1963 (Tab A). While parts of it are outdated, I think it may be worth your attention, and I attach it.

2. I do this partly because I feel that we have not given you a full and fair statement of the case against pressing hard now for the MLF. I myself do come out on the side of going ahead very hard with Wilson himself, but you are entitled to know that there is another side of the case, and it would go something like this:

(1) The MLF or AMF will make very heavy demands on direct Presidential leadership, and there are better things for the President to do. It is all very well to talk of Bob McNamara converting the Senate, but the man who will really have to do it is the President.

(2) The new force, even though wider and better than the old MLF, will have many opponents, and their voices will be heard, whatever specific leaders of governments may say. The most important of them are as follows:

A. France.

General de Gaulle's hostility is fixed and strongly supported by all French Gaullists. Tactically, the violence of French feeling can probably be somewhat moderated if you visit Paris and reason with him, but the underlying hostility of France will remain. It is true that the French propaganda now is preventive in purpose, but it will continue at least until ratification in all countries. The French will charge us with dividing the Alliance and blocking the future of Europe, and many who do not support de Gaulle will believe them. The Germans will be split by this French pressure and they, too, will show some tendency to blame us.

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By CL, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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B. The Soviet Union.

The Soviets already charge that the MLF is a reopening of cold war hostility. Most of their opposition I consider tactical, but it is built on their genuine fear of Germany, and it strikes a lot of resonance among peace lovers and liberals in all countries.

C. Most professional military men are cool at best, and many are openly opposed. Lemnitzer is warning against this enterprise as divisive within the Alliance. Norstad is publicly against it. The JCS will be loyal but probably not enthusiastic. General Eisenhower may not be any better than neutral and could be opposed.

D. American commentators like Lippmann and George Kennan are violently opposed. Lippmann believes that there is no serious support for this force anywhere except among a few faddists in the State Department. He will shortly come back from Europe saying that his travels have confirmed this impression. (Walter, more than most, sees only what he wishes to see in nuclear matters.)

E. The Joint Committee and the Armed Services Committee are very wary of any treaty which seems to affect U. S. nuclear power and still more wary of any amendment of the McMahon Act. Holifield has publicly stated his opposition, but this is of course less important than what Russell and Anderson decide.

F. Hubert Humphrey summarizes Senatorial sentiment as strongly opposed and on many grounds. While we have never made a major Administration effort with the Senators, there are a large number who have informed themselves reasonably well, and I think it is fair to say that right now I know of not one hardened supporter, while there are many skeptics and many outright opponents. Hubert says that when Livingston Merchant gave informal MLF briefings on the Hill last year the surface response was polite, but the real reaction was negative.

3. All this means that we will have a great effort of political education ahead of us even after we have gone past Wilson and worked out a genuine multilateral agreement, perhaps in January or February. President Kennedy used to say that we would do this only if the Europeans really wanted it. Given the level of European skepticism, we will have to make an entirely different case based on our own judgment that this is what the whole Atlantic Community now requires if it is not to break apart and if Germany

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is not to be tempted into another disastrous national rearmament. (Incidentally, all those in America who fear the Germans will be hostile -- as many of them are already.)

* * *

4. The devil's advocate might continue by saying that the choice this week is not at all as black and white as men like Acheson say. Even if Wilson says "yes" there will be further problems of timing and tactics which may give you later moments of choice. And if he refuses to say "yes" at this stage, there is still quite a political charade to be played out.

5. The devil's advocate would argue that even on this basis we can save most of our real interests -- though not the MLF itself.

6. The Germans will still need us as friends and we will need them. This basic common interest is exemplified in the enormous U. S. nuclear and conventional forces now in Germany, and most of those forces will still be there, MLF or no MLF, in the coming years.

7. We can continue to prevent de Gaulle from dominating Europe even without an MLF -- the Europeans themselves have no desire to follow him. His nuclear force is not a big magnet. The number of Germans who would really tie their fate to France as against the U. S. is ridiculously small. The German politicians who favor France today would be the first to come to Washington if they ever came to power.

8. We can enlarge political and nuclear consultation even without an MLF. It is true that this is an inferior way of doing it, but if the MLF is not destroyed by us but by circumstances, new consultative procedures could usefully show our good will.

9. We can leave the British POLARIS problem unsettled and let London stew in its own juice and thus show that we are true to our doctrine that any new arrangement must take full account of the needs of the Germans.

10. We can also say clearly that we will go right back to the MLF -- and perhaps even to more drastic measures -- if the Cold War heats up again (it is worth remembering that the MLF was generated in 1960-62, a period of heavy and active Soviet pressure on Berlin; the absence of that pressure is a major part of our present tactical problem).

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11. In sum, the devil's advocate would state your choices this way:

(1) If you go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight, a major confrontation with de Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or delay which would gravely damage the prestige of the President.

(2) If you go half steam ahead, there will probably be no MLF, but it will not be your fault alone. You will have kept the letter and spirit of the Kennedy readiness to move if the Europeans wanted it. There will be trouble with the Germans, but nothing unmanageable. There will be plenty of opportunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for gradual and ceremonial burial. Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will have the praise of liberals, of military men, of the British, of the French, and of many Germans -- and you will have freedom to make a different choice later if you wish.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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June 15, 1963

58a

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The MLF and the European Tour

I think we now need a sharp change in planning for the political discussions of the MLF in Europe. In Bonn, Rome, and London this will be a major topic, and I think it is important to switch from pressure to inquiry. I also think that quite possibly this shift should be signaled before we leave Washington. I reach this conclusion because a close look at the most favorable result of the opposite course is not encouraging.

Assume that we can swing Macmillan on board; David Bruce thinks we can. It will be slower, in the wake of Profumo, simply because the government will take a while to pull itself together; but I do not quarrel with David -- though one could.

Assume further that the Italians follow suit at some point (in August or September at the earliest). There is reason to doubt this result, because of Nenni's difficult and focal position, and more deeply because of the lack of real enthusiasm for the MLF anywhere in Italy outside of a few pro-American diplomats. But the Italians have tended to do what we wanted if we wanted it loud enough, and the assumption is not wild.

Assume further that there is enough agreement, soon enough, for a drafting group to complete its work in '63. This involves more speed than anyone really wants, outside the U. S. Department of State, but again it is conceivable.

Assume finally that in 1964, early in the session, we muster support for an amendment of the McMahon Act and a new MLF treaty. We have a very long road to go in educating the Senate to this point, and we should have to do it in the face of reluctance and even opposition on the part of some of those who are normally our friends. Moreover, the problem of coordinating a really effective exposition of the case for the force would be formidable. Still, if it is worth it, it may be that it can be done.

On all these four assumptions, do we want it? My present conclusion is that on the evidence in Europe, in the Soviet Union, and here, we do not.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-304
By C6, NARA, Date 5-5-95

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In Europe the successful pressure for an MLF decision would have these clear consequences:

In France, there would be increased hostility; this does not mean de Gaulle, who is probably fixed in his anti-Americanism for sometime to come, but rather other Frenchmen who are clearly with him in their conviction that an MLF, subject to U. S. consent, is an attack on the French nuclear effort, which has support that goes far beyond de Gaulle.

In Great Britain, where almost no one with any political standing is personally favorable to the MLF, the decision would be regarded as an extraordinary case of subservience to U. S. pressure. We should not believe those who tell us that the Foreign Office is favorable; in unguarded remarks to others, Home and other Englishmen have indicated their doubts, and the few who are for it are for it because we are, and they wish to be loyal Allies.

In Germany, the justification most frequently given for German approval would be -- as it is now -- that the Germans must do what is necessary to keep the Americans happy; that will make a poor impression here. There is no strong affirmative German sentiment for the MLF as something the Germans themselves want.

In Italy, the issue will be divisive, and it will not make us friends. Among Italians there is no enthusiasm for the MLF as such; at best, there is a willingness by some who are strongly pro-Western in personal orientation to walk with American leadership and to keep up with the Germans.

In the rest of NATO, except for Turkey and Greece, political support for the MLF would be scanty at best. In Turkey and Greece the concept is approved, but on the clear assumption that we would pay the Greek and Turkish bills.

Only among the passionate pro-Europeans like Monnet is there real sentiment for the MLF, and this sentiment itself is conditional upon a clear offer to abandon the veto at an early stage if a genuinely European force becomes practicable. While I believe in making this offer, I am more and more clear that it is a debating trick, for the present.

If we press the MLF through in the next 12 months, we shall have only grudging support among the very people in whose interest the force has been designed.

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Underlying all this European reluctance is an increasing realization that the MLF is not merely a concept but a cost. The cost is so moderate in comparison with our own budget for nuclear weapons systems that we have tended to discount it in thinking about what Europeans themselves would want. But it is striking now that such support as the MLF has is almost always in Foreign Offices and very seldom in Treasuries or Ministries of Defense, where the resources must be found.

In the U. S. - Here in the U. S. the political cost of amending the McMahon Act for the purpose of arming people who are themselves uncertain and divided on the need would be very great and it would draw deeply on the kind of personal leadership you may well need to limit testing, or to get ratification of a test ban agreement, or to press forward with the "Kennedy round," or to continue the defense of foreign aid. The drain will be directly upon the Presidential account, since the State Department has no leverage and the Defense Department will not be able to make the case on straight military grounds. Indeed it will be necessary to admit that on straight military grounds this force is not necessary; we have said this too often -- and it is too plainly the fact -- for us to change our tune now.

In the Soviet Union -- and this, I think, is a new factor of real importance -- the MLF will be increasingly held up as a militaristic maneuver which prevents serious progress toward peace in Europe. If we press it through, I think it is predictable that we will not get many of the things we now hope Harriman can talk about. We may not get them anyway, but with the MLF moving into action, we should be vulnerable -- rightly or wrongly -- as the nuclear rearmlers of Germany. Moreover, this charge will add to the disenchantment of many Europeans with what we are pressing upon them.

* * * *

If this is an accurate picture of the troubles that lie ahead with the MLF, you may well ask how we got as far in as we have. The answer, I think, is a double one: one turns on people and the other on policy. It happened that the people with the direct responsibility here (Ball, Merchant, Rostow, Schachtel and Owen) were and are passionate believers in the MLF as a means of blocking national deterrents, General de Gaulle, and all other obstacles to European unity.

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They have pressed the case more sharply and against a tighter timetable, at every stage, than either you or the Secretary would have chosen. I myself have not watched them as closely as I should have, and more than once I have let them persuade me to support them where I might well have been more skeptical.

But the more important answer, I think, is that in fact it was necessary after Nassau to take a direct initiative in favor of the MLF and to find out by making it a U. S. proposal whether in fact there was real support for it. The MLF is in trouble now, and we have a real problem in framing our next steps with it, but I think we would be in worse trouble if we had made no proposal designed to meet the nuclear ambitions of Europe. Then indeed we would have left General de Gaulle a free field. And the charges of American monopoly and insensitive domination would have been redoubled in strength.

There is much more that could be learned hereby a close review of our past policy, but the real problem now is what we do next.

* * * *

It is essential that we not back away too sharply from the MLF. A hasty reversal would not only be wrong on the merits but very damaging to our prestige. We can and should continue to make clear our own conviction that this force will work, it can carry its share of the military load, and it represents a serious forward step toward NATO nuclear partnership. We can and should urge continuing study of this proposal, by an international planning staff in Paris; we should not at all abandon our readiness to bear a full share if adequate European participation is developed; we should welcome and even encourage comparative studies of the MLF as against alternative ways of dealing with the needs of our Allies.

But at the same time we should take off any sense of a deadline, and I think we should try to widen the discussion to include other elements in the nuclear problem, such as consultation, control, alternative weapons systems, coordination of existing nuclear forces in the West, and non-proliferation. We should, if possible, seek a framework of discussion in which the French would be willing to participate, and we should capitalize on one of the great facts which underlies European reluctance to pay for the MLF: namely, serene confidence in our own present strategic superiority and our will to use it in defense of Europe.

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In other words, instead of pressing in a somewhat nervous and narrow way for a single specific solution, I think we should seek to widen the discourse to include more people and more problems -- in Monnet's phrase, we should line the people up on one side of the desk and the problems on the other, and spend a long time looking at them together. Monnet's phrase is aimed at the MLF alone, but I think it makes more sense in a wider framework.

If this course makes sense, the place to decide on it is Bonn, and the man to back it is Adenauer. If the German Government is firmly favorable to this course, no one else will criticize it in any major way, and we shall be able to change the course of negotiations with very modest damage to the U. S. or her President. There would be a certain loss of face for the passionate MLF salesmen, but they are not the U. S. Government.

If this is to be done, then I think we need to decide whether or not there should be some public hint of it before we go to Germany. I began thinking that there should be, but on reflection my belief is that it may be better to discuss this problem with the Chancellor personally. The real question then is whether we should give him a hint of it before you arrive and, if so, by what kind of messenger.

Can we talk about this on Monday?

McG. B.

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December 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subjects for Discussion with Wilson other than MLF

1. Southeast Asia

Before leaving London for Washington, Wilson told newsmen he intended to discuss with you Britain's place in helping Vietnam. He coupled this remark with the observation that (1) the UK had "a very important role East of Suez... in a peace-keeping way," and (2) Britain remained fully committed to support the Malaysian Federation in the face of intervention and aggression. This opening should give you the opportunity to raise with him the prospect of joint ventures in Vietnam and Malaysia. An assessment of what we might get here is at Tab A.

2. British Guiana

Wilson evidently plans to raise this with you. He should be told as clearly as Douglas Home was that the US cannot accept the emergence of another Communist state in this hemisphere. He expects to hear this, and has said he will be able to meet us pretty well.

3. Cuba

You mentioned our Cuban concern to Wilson when you last talked with him. To avoid any misunderstanding of this Government's continuing position on this issue, we think he should be told again you expect the British Government not to encourage additional trade.

4. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

You may wish to reassure Wilson that, despite the lack of clarity of the present political situation in the Soviet Union, you will continue to try to find measures of peaceful settlement with the Soviet Government, and a basis for agreement on non-dissemination and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

You might also want to repeat for his benefit your bridge-building hopes for Eastern Europe and invite the British to work with us and the other Allies in establishing closer ties with Eastern Europe.

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5. Economic Problems

These are discussed in the basic Ball-Neustadt memorandum.

6. There are also a number of NATO military problems you can leave to Bob, and a number of diplomatic problems (UN, China, and the Congo) you can leave to Dean Rusk.

McG. B.

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(page 2 of 2 pages)

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December 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Wilson Visit and the MLF (continued)

1. I attach several items which I hope are responsive to your questions today.

Tab A is the paper from which we were working, which has some of your own notes on it.

At Tab B are suggested answers to Wilson's likely arguments against putting Englishmen on mixed-manned surface ships.

Tab C is a note on Wilson's probable psychological state of mind about this visit, together with excerpts from what he said to Dick Neustadt.

Tab D is a comment on the difficulties the Germans may have even if Wilson comes aboard.

2. I continue to believe strongly that our basic decision should be to go all out to get Wilson to say "yes" to English sailors on surface ships as part of a new force, larger and better than the MLF.

3. But if he does not say "yes" then I think we should have a very careful look on Wednesday, and my own current view is that we might wish to take a wholly new attitude toward this enterprise.

4. I'll be expecting your call in the morning when you know what time you'd like to meet.

McG. B.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Wilson Visit

I. What the U. S. Wishes to Achieve

Whatever is worked out with the British must fall within the framework of the objectives that prompted the MLF proposal. These are principally:

A. To tie Germany irrevocably to the Western world by giving the Germans the feeling that they are respected, first-class members of the Atlantic Alliance and are not being excluded from responsible participation in the management of their own nuclear defense.

B. To set a pattern for the management of atomic weapons by collective action rather than by the proliferation of individual national deterrent systems. This applies particularly to Germany where participation in a collective effort is the safest counter to the pressures for a national system that will otherwise inevitably develop over the years.

To achieve these purposes we need not stick rigidly to all of the details of the original MLF plan but certain fundamental conditions must be met:

1. The European powers participating - particularly Germany and Italy - must be given a sense that

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they are in on an equal basis with the United Kingdom-- and that the United Kingdom has no special position.

2. We must avoid any impression that the Anglo-Saxons are doing a deal that the continental European nations will be pressed to accept. The Germans, Italians and Dutch are all watching with great interest, much anxiety and some suspicion the outcome of the Wilson visit.

We must take care to make clear at all times that this is a multilateral proposal which can be negotiated only on a multilateral basis. We are merely exchanging views with the British regarding the scope of possible solutions. No commitments will be made until there has been a multilateral discussion among the other members.

In dealing with the British we must impress upon them that the final scheme must be so arranged that their participation is on a parity with the Germans and other Europeans rather than with the United States. And whatever views we may hold as to the necessity for British participation we must present a solid front to the British that the principle of a mixed-man surface force is a first objective of American foreign policy which we intend to pursue.

Finally, we must view this discussion not merely as a technical exercise but as part of a major effort to meet the very large objectives spelled out above. For that reason we cannot succeed merely by making a deal with the British that the Germans reluctantly accept if over the long run the result does not achieve the kind of equality of treatment that would fulfill the political and psychological needs of the Germans.

And if--because of British stickiness--the present effort should break down we want to make clear--not merely in the eyes of our own people but of the Europeans--that the blame falls squarely on the British and not on the United States.

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II. What Wilson Wants on the Atlantic Nuclear Issue

We think the Prime Minister hopes to obtain the following:

A. Agreement in principle from us on the outlines of his proposal for modifying MLF, as follows:

1. A change in name of the force from "MLF" to something like "Atlantic Nuclear Force", (what we have been calling AMF).
2. A top control board as in our present MLF proposal.
3. A permanent U.S. veto on the understanding that this could be changed only if all members agreed (including the U.K.). In addition, he may seek a British veto if this means a veto for every member.
4. A British contribution of roughly half the V-bombers with their nuclear weapons. The other half would be outside the force (with conventional capability for use or threat in Asia).
5. A British contribution of three or four POLARIS submarines to be matched by an equal number of American POLARIS subs (or, as a second best, by an equivalent American contribution of MINUTEMEN).
6. A multilaterally-owned and financed mixed-manned MINUTEMAN force in the U.S. or Canada, as a total substitution for surface-ships.
7. All these forces, national and multilateral, would be under common command and control, including PAL, and irrevocably committed for the life of the force. Wilson would probably accept the other evidences of multilateralization--common ownership, common uniforms and

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common flag. These are clearly important not only to the Germans but to the other Europeans. At the same time, Wilson will probably insist that we accept the same arrangements with respect to our POLARIS or MINUTEMAN contribution.

8. He wants British costs for this whole force not to exceed those presently programmed for 5 POLARIS submarines plus V-bombers. Really, he'd rather pay less.

9. AMF should exist side-by-side with SAC and consult with it, separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR.

B. Wilson wants agreement that non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings be part of the AMF treaty.

C. He wants public support from us for British divestiture of their "independent" nuclear deterrent. We will be asked to play up their action as a contribution toward non-proliferation, thus countering Tory opposition.

D. He also will want slogans for improved inter-allied "consultation" about "crisis management" on a global scale, beyond the NATO area. Wilson's intentions are not clear, but he wants something.

III. What we Cannot Do for Him.

Several aspects of these proposals seem unacceptable to us. They are as follows:

A. We should stand firm against the British effort to substitute mixed-manned MINUTEMEN for mixed-manned surface ships. We have been working on the mixed-manned surface ship proposal for two years and the British are johnny-come-latelies. Mixed-manned MINUTEMEN are just not on. They would undoubtedly run into heavy weather in Congress. They are likely to have little appeal to the Germans, Italians or Dutch. They would certainly be subject

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to the Gaullist argument that Europe cannot rely on being defended by weapons on U.S. soil and on the opposite side of the Atlantic and hence more visibly under U.S. control.

Very Imp
B. Wilson has been told by Ball and Neustadt that agreement in principle on British participation in surface ships is a sine qua non for the successful outcome of these talks and for a success in negotiations with the Germans. This should remain our American position.

C. We cannot promise to support a status for this new force outside SACEUR's jurisdiction. At the present time, the Germans strongly want the force under SACEUR.

D. Even though national contributions to AMF would let us reduce the number of surface ships, we cannot accept so small a number that Germans or Italians think the surface force is meaningless.

E. We cannot now agree to including PERSHINGs or tactical aircraft in AMF. The Germans deeply suspect this is an entering wedge to giving London a veto over all tactical nuclear weapons, and furthermore we do not want to prejudice progress toward conventional use of tactical air.

IV. What Might Make a Deal?

We see the following as possible elements of agreement in principle:

A. Enough British participation in a mixed-manned surface force to satisfy the Germans that this whole arrangement is non-discriminatory. This means a significant number of British sailors on some number of ships. There can be fewer ships than 25 because a lot of weapons would be provided by national contributions, but there cannot be just a token number of ships. The British will argue that the Germans really don't set as much store by the surface

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force as we think and would be satisfied with a seat in the control board at the top. We don't buy this and don't think the Germans would either. Wilson may also argue manpower difficulties in manning both surface ships and submarines. Bob McNamara can dispose of this very quickly. (Reduction of subs from 5 to 3 would release 500 men.)

B. We are ready to consider how a portion of our own strategic strength can be made a part of the new Atlantic force -- perhaps by contributing some MINUTEMEN. We don't want to decide how this should be done or what our contribution should consist of until we reach the stage of multilateral discussions and find out whether others than the British are interested in having us do this. Wilson could be told that we are willing to consider the matter seriously but not to make specific comments in advance of multilateral discussion. At the same time he could be told that we definitely do not wish to be put in the position of directly "matching" his POLARIS submarine contribution.

C. We could agree to non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings as part of a treaty.

D. We could say that we'd hail the British decision to commit their forces irrevocably as an important step back from nuclear proliferation.

E. We could leave in abeyance for later multilateral negotiations the relationship of AMF to SACEUR.

F. We could tell Wilson that we have every intention of insisting on our veto in the force as it is launched. Moreover we could draft the treaty so that any change in voting arrangements would be subject to the concurrence of all -- which would effectively give the British a veto on any relinquishment of our veto. However, we must avoid falling into the Gaullist trap of appearing to oppose European unification. Thus we should indicate that if Europe some day achieves political unity under a chief executive -- which is clearly a long way off -- that will create

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a new situation which will require all parties to reexamine all the provisions of the treaty.

G. We can agree to make clear publicly that if AMF comes into being, we will reduce our own programmed strategic forces proportionately. This is important since one of the great problems Wilson faces at home is strong revulsion against creating additional nuclear weapons above the number McNamara says are needed to cover Soviet targets.

H. We can show interest in better consultation between our governments--and other governments, too--on matters outside the NATO area. We can suggest that staff work be done to sort out just what, if any, new mechanisms are needed.

But we might also suggest that consultation is meaningful only when there are joint ventures, joint risks, and joint responsibilities. This could lead delicately into a discussion of "jointness" in Southeast Asia (see below).

I. We can graciously accept and support the British contribution of part of their V-bomber force.

J. We can work out financial arrangements which will assure Wilson that participation in the surface fleet is on a no-extra-cost basis to him. Bob McNamara can spell this out to their heart's content. (The U.K. submarines could be their capital contribution to the force.)

K. We can certainly acquiesce in abolishing the initials "MLF", but we should leave final choice of a new name to multilateral negotiation.

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V. Intangibles for Wilson

If Wilson were to accept this deal in principle, he would be taking a very considerable political risk at home since he and his party have long opposed British participation in surface ships and the Tories now also oppose it, while no segment of public opinion supports it. On the other hand, you can encourage him to the view that by taking this risk, he opens the way to enormous opportunities. Great politicians take big risks for great causes. Those opportunities include:

1. A major contribution to the prevention of atomic proliferation and specifically to forestalling German pressures over the years for an independent or Franco-German nuclear system. A real prospect of German agreement and progress in the Atlantic nuclear field.

2. The beginnings of a new relationship between Britain and Europe, particularly Germany, with all that may mean for Britain, financially and otherwise.

3. Clearing the decks for new endeavors to negotiate seriously with the Russians.

4. A positive act of solidarity with the U.S. and with Germany, bringing into being a joint venture which will deepen good relations, and give Britain a leading voice in Europe.

5. A great British initiative breaking log jams in the Alliance for which the British would receive great credit and would deserve it in your eyes.

If a deal of this sort seems to be coming off, we will recommend to you a schedule for talks by the British and ourselves with the other allies involved--at least the Germans, Italians and Dutch. It will be essential to have full agreement with Wilson on who says what to whom and when.

VI. If Wilson

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VI. If Wilson Doesn't Deal

We don't know whether Wilson can give the assurance which we seek regarding his participation on surface ships. He has said he'll negotiate seriously. But he has also said that he wants to come back here in January and he is in so delicate a situation with his Cabinet that he may not feel he can afford to give that assurance now, even to you. Or he may feel that we aren't willing to do enough in return. If so, he'll want to talk to the Germans about his proposals as they stand. And he'll want us to encourage Bonn to listen seriously. But we must not let Bonn think that we are trying to help force them off surface ships.

The question of who then says what to whom becomes very difficult. We would need a very explicit understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town.

VII. Wilson's Interests East of Suez

Britishers, particularly Defense Secretary Healy, say that agreements in principle for support of joint ventures east of Suez will be an important element in your talks. We do not know how far Wilson means to press this with you, although Healy says he means to expose it to McNamara later. If Wilson opens this with you, you could raise with him the prospect of "joint venture" in Vietnam and Malaysia. Regarding Vietnam he might be asked to make a substantial contribution. In return we would participate more actively with the UK in Malaysia.

VIII. Wilson's Interest in Financial Stability

We understand that he may well propose to you joint staff work on measures for long-term support of the pound while his government tries the hard, slow task of modernizing the economy

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and righting the balance of trade. Wilson is enormously appreciative of what you've done already to bail him out for the short-run. He probably won't ask you now to go beyond agreement for more staff work.

If this is all he asks we think you should be forthcoming. He desperately needs the technical and economic advice available to our government. It would be as much to our benefit as theirs to provide this assistance.

This indication of your interest in working toward a long-term solution for their problem might enhance the prospects of agreement on the nuclear force.

George W. Ball

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 5, 1964

Suggested Answers to
Wilson's Likely Arguments Against Englishmen on
Surface Ships

A. Arguments Against Any Surface Force

1. Doesn't Add to Western Strength

He told House "surface fleet adds nothing to Western strength." His argument is that McNamara already has the targets covered by MINUTEMEN from here. He hates adding more nuclears than needed.

You can tell him we will cut back our own planned missile strength as surface force comes into being (~~we plan to do this anyway~~), so the surface force weapons will be needed. McNamara himself has said this, and will say it again. This is a certified real force.

2. Disruptive Effects on Alliance

He told House that the surface fleet "is likely to cause a dissipation of effort within the Alliance." Note future tense and qualification "likely."

You can tell him that British participation is best possible guarantee of strengthening Alliance and aiding its coherence. DeGaulle may well still make trouble but we can leave several well-padded empty chairs for him for France and we can be patient. The real danger of "dissipation of effort" is that the Germans will come unstuck. We believe that to prevent this, an Anglo-German tie is crucial.

3. Complications for East-West Agreement

He told House the fleet "may add to the difficulties of East-West agreement. There is the question whether the surface fleet... involves the German finger on the trigger." The phrases are carefully "iffy."

He also said "as long as the American veto remains absolute it does not mean in our view additional fingers on the trigger. I suspect... that the Soviet fear relates not so much to the present proposal but... to the possibility... that the American veto might be replaced by a system capable of overriding American opposition..."

You can tell him we won't give up the veto without unanimous consent from all governments concerned, including our own, which would mean

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going back to Congress. And we won't even think of doing that unless some day the European governments concerned are unified under a single political executive. That won't be while you are President and probably not while he's Prime Minister even if he stays in as long as MacKenzie King of Canada (24 years, I think).

This assurance is important to Wilson and it will be a real plus for him to have it from you.

It is also important, however, to sign him on to some form of eventual possible review in honor of a really unified Europe.

4. Military Doubts About the Military Value of the Force.

He'll probably say his admirals think surface ships are very second rate weapons carriers.

You can give him the Acheson treatment on this: our admirals tell us differently. All our military studies have shown that surface ships in European coastal waters are a good weapons system for the decade of the '70's.

B. Arguments Against British Participation in a Surface Force (Men and Money)

1. Extra Cost to the U. K.

He may say they can't afford to spend a dime on surface ships.

You can tell him they won't have to. McNamara has figured out how they can spend much less for all their contributions to AMF (including surface ships) than they now have programmed for 5 POLARIS subs.

2. Shortage of Skilled Naval Manpower

He will tell you that they can't find the technicians (especially electricians) to man their present fleet and programmed submarines, if they also contribute to the surface force.

You can tell him his present 5-sub program will take 1,000 officers and men. Three subs, plus a share in the surface force will only take 1,100 and that assumes a force of the full 25 ships. We probably could do with somewhat fewer ships in the light of the broader force they are proposing. Besides, there are several years ahead in which to train the needed specialists. The country of the Battle of Britain can find 200 of anything in 4 months -- let alone 4 years.

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3. His Own and His Party's Past Opposition

He may argue that he's caught by his own past record.

You can tell him you congratulate him on his careful use of tenses and "iffy" qualifications in the House. He isn't caught; this is a new situation to which he contributed: surface ships as part of a larger, grander, safer, more peaceful force.

4. Cabinet Opposition

He may argue that he'll have a helluva time with his own Cabinet. The Left is anti-surface-ships and so is George Brown on the Right (so is Mountbatten and the British press).

Tell him you think he is a big enough politician to take big risks for great causes -- and this is a very great cause for the future of the Alliance and of Anglo-American relations. He could tell that to his Cabinet from you. He could also tell them that this is a very small price indeed for all that they need from U. S. -- to wit:

(1) A respectable home for a "national deterrent" they are pledged to get rid of.

(2) Non-proliferation efforts including a fresh and stronger German pledge.

(3) New efforts for East-West agreement (a thin but pleasant hope).

(4) U.S. support against wicked Central Bankers.

(5) The prestige of being true friends of the Johnson Administration.

5. Tory Party Opposition

He'll tell you that if he holds his whole party in Parliament he'll only have a 22-vote majority at most (counting the Liberals). The Tories plan to oppose him on any deal he makes with us, including surface ships.

Tell him that Macmillan promised us a "fair wind" for the mixed-manned surface ships at Nassau. The Tory Government never delivered on that promise. He can drive this point home against Tories.

Tell him also that you are prepared to say publicly you welcome Labor's plan to give up its "independent" term as a fine step back from proliferation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's personal commitment to this visit

1. It is extremely clear on all the evidence that Wilson has staked a great deal on having a "successful" visit with you. The habit of American Presidents for 10 years has been to portray all visits of Prime Ministers as "successful," and if Wilson does not have a success with you, it will be extremely damaging for him. This is the more true because both he and his Cabinet are great admirers of your Administration, as exemplified at the Cabinet level by McNamara, and at the political level by your own massive achievement and victory. They need your approval.

2. At the same time Wilson is a man whose background has made him genuinely hostile to conservatives and to many of the values which Socialists normally attach to our own great industrial society. When you joke about Ivy League types -- at least nowadays -- you are playing a game. When Wilson gets angry at Tories and bankers, he is not. You are strong and he is weak, and you have a much longer experience of real power. If Wilson should feel that there was no way for him to get a success, he might choose to exploit failure and to move in an emotionally anti-American way. I regard this as a low probability, and one which can be prevented entirely by your own personal dealings with him, but you may want to have it in mind.

3. In spite of his strong prejudices, Wilson is an extremely cool and determined man, and the absolute heart of his purpose will be to make a solid political bargain with you. My own belief is that the odds are about 4 to 1 that he will agree to put British sailors in the surface fleet and that what he will ask in return is mainly window-dressing, from our standpoint.

hcl. B.
McG. B.

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By CL, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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Excerpts from Neustadt MemCon with Wilson
(November 25)

The PM began his response by saying he and Pres. are politicians. He felt the two of them could deal with one another as such. For two politicians my term "collision course" represented a starting point of negotiations. For his part he intended to negotiate. He would have his position and the President would have a contrary one. He said he had no intention of "tearing up my papers and going home."

He continued by remarking he did not expect the Pres. to tear up what American Govt. had said before in past two years. He told the House Monday night that while desirable to go right back to first base, he recognized no chance "ignoring all that has happened since, all the momentum that some of the post-Nassau ideas have gained, we cannot ignore the fact that these proposals for the mixed-manned surface fleet have gained some momentum" (Hansard Nov. 23, page 936.)


He then observed that it was important his Cabinet knows he not a supporter of the surface fleet. He added that of course there were two questions here: first, whether there should be a surface force at all, and second, whether the Brits. should be in it if there were one. These were separable questions. He had started with a negative attitude about the first and would present alternatives which he really felt were better, closer to Ann Arbor and capable of achieving surface force objectives, that Negotiations would then follow. He expects that.

PM added with some stress that it would make a great deal of difference to him if the Americans said publicly that we intend to retain our veto for the life of the Alliance. Then his position Cabinet and Party easier. This would be essential requisite for agreement. He then said "Don't worry; I am not going to allow Denis to take his artillery to Washington to sink the surface ships." (Some metaphor especially since Mountbatten's presumably reference.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What happens when the German Government gets the full treatment from the French on MLF.

In light of what you heard today in our meeting, I'd like to add one refinement.

On Thursday I talked at length with Martin Hillenbrand, our best man in Bonn, about what happens if DeGaulle really turns the heat on the Germans by threatening to wreck NATO, EEC, Franco-German relations, etc.

Hillenbrand says these threats will come in January or later, whenever De Gaulle senses that MLF may really be "in danger" of succeeding.

Then, Hillenbrand says there'll be a "moment of truth" in Bonn. The practical politicians in the CDU who are scared of showing the electorate a deeply split party (pro-French versus pro-Americans) will urge Erhard to slow the negotiations down and stall until after the elections (September). On the other hand, Schroeder, von Hassell and Westrick, Government Ministers whose policies and personal fortunes are tied to MLF, will urge Erhard to "be a man", kick Adenauer in the teeth, risk a party split and go full steam ahead.

Hillenbrand thinks Erhard probably will do what his Ministers urge provided he is convinced there's a great chance of early success for MLF -- a success he can present both to his party dissidents and to the voters. But the chance of prompt success will be seen in Bonn to depend on the British. Are they firm and forthcoming? Can Erhard count on ~~Erhard~~ Wilson? If he isn't pretty sure of Wilson, Erhard may crack under the pressures of delay.

And Hillenbrand adds, Erhard's a "nice guy", who hates to play tough and likes to be liked, and no one can say with certainty how he'll react under the cross-pressure.

If by chance he buckles and decides to stall, we'll have to help him do it gracefully, without blaming either us or the British, and without letting DeGaulle chortle in triumph. Hard to do.

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By CB, NARA, Date 5-15-95

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But the best chance of doing it is the same as the best chance of stiffening Erhard's spine: Get Wilson moving, and convince Bonn that he's serious.

Whatever happens later, our course for now is to press Wilson to commit himself in principle on surface ships.

Dur.

Richard E. Neustadt

M.B.

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