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December 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-304  
By cb, NARA, Date 5-15-95

SUBJECT: The British and Vietnam

1. I think you should know that the British will find it very, very difficult indeed to increase their commitment in Vietnam right now. That does not necessarily mean that we should not hit them hard while Wilson is here, but I think it does mean that we cannot expect a definite and affirmative answer.

2. There is no political base whatever in England, in any party, for an increased British commitment in Vietnam now. For 10 years we have accepted a situation in which the British give political support, but avoid any major commitment on the ground of their other interests and their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The most that Wilson could possibly do at this stage would be a slight enlargement of the Thompson advisory mission and of their police training effort, with perhaps a green light to a few bold British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men do. All this he would have to do quietly. There is no workable basis for a public change in British policy at a time when there is no public change in ours. You might press him to go from the current level of 7 Britishers to about a hundred, but we would be lucky to get 50 in this first phase.

3. When and if we open a second phase and need to land a mixed force of U. S. and other troops, we might conceivably get a small British contingent along with larger ones from Australia and New Zealand. Our own commitment would have gone up and there would be a better case for asking the British to join in. On the other hand, Tommy Thompson points out that if the British Co-Chairman send troops in, that might be the trigger, or at least the excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi.

4. The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno. This kind of bargain in this part of the world makes a good deal of sense, and Rusk and McNamara will be ready to go forward with the British in detailed discussions on this basis.

5. The point of this memorandum is simply to make sure that you know how very hard it will be for Wilson to do as much for us in South Vietnam as we need him to. It is hard to treat a thing as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share of it, just because it is getting worse (though we choose not to say so).

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Wilson Visit

December 4, 1964

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 98-159**

**By ins, NARA Date 4-28-99**

I. What Wilson Wants on the Atlantic Nuclear Issue

We think the Prime Minister hopes to obtain the following:

A. Agreement in principle from us on the outlines of his proposal for modifying MLF, as follows:

1. A change in name of the force from "MLF" to something like "Atlantic Nuclear Force," (what we have been calling AMF).
2. A top control board as in our present MLF proposal.
3. A permanent U. S. veto on the understanding that this could be changed only if all members agreed (including the mother of parliaments). In addition, he may seek a British veto even if this means a veto for every member.
4. A British contribution of roughly half the V-bombers with their nuclear weapons. The other half would be outside the force (with conventional capability for use or threat in Asia).
5. A British contribution of three or four POLARIS submarines to be matched by an equal number of American POLARIS subs (or, as second best, by an equivalent American contribution of MINUTEMEN).
6. A multilaterally-owned and financed mixed-manned MINUTEMAN force in the U. S. or Canada, as a total substitution for surface-ships.
7. All these forces, national and multilateral, would be under common command and control, including PAL, and irrevocably committed for the life of the Alliance. Wilson probably would accept two other symbols of community -- common uniforms and flag -- to the extent the Germans think this symbolism important. But he probably would want us to do the same with respect to our POLARIS or MINUTEMAN contribution.
8. He wants British costs for this whole force not to exceed those presently programmed for 5 POLARIS submarines plus V-bombers. Really, he'd rather pay less.

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9. AMF should exist side-by-side with SAC and consult with it, separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR.

B. Wilson wants agreement that non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings be part of the AMF treaty.

C. He wants public support from us for British divestiture of their "independent" nuclear deterrent. We will be asked to play up their action as a contribution toward non-proliferation, thus countering Tory opposition.

D. He also will want slogans for improved inter-allied "consultation" about "crisis management" on a global scale, beyond the NATO area. Wilson's intentions are not clear, but he wants something.

## II. What We Cannot Do for Him.

Several aspects of these proposals seem unacceptable to us. They are as follows:

A. We should stand out against a substitution of mixed-manned surface ships by mixed-manned MINUTEMEN. We think it exceedingly difficult to get Congressional acceptance for mixed-manning MINUTEMEN. Moreover, we think Erhard government sees mixed-manned surface ships as its imperative, politically, and the symbol of a successful outcome on "MLF". We also think that weapons close to European territory are bound to be valued far above weapons in Nebraska (or Alberta).

B. Wilson has been told by Ball and Neustadt that agreement in principle on British participation in surface ships is a sine qua non for the successful outcome of these talks and for a success in negotiations with the Germans. This should remain our American position.

C. We cannot promise Wilson either POLARIS contribution or a MINUTEMAN contribution from our side on terms we are sure will satisfy the Germans. We cannot take our boys out of uniform or haul down the American flag. The Germans may feel that these symbols are important for all elements of the force, including ours.

D. We cannot promise to support a status for this new force outside SACEUR's jurisdiction. At the present time, the Germans strongly want the force under SACEUR.

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E. Even though national contributions to AMF would let us reduce the number of surface ships, we cannot accept so small a number that Germans or Italians think the surface force is meaningless.

F. We cannot now agree to including PERSHINGs or tactical aircraft in AMF since Germans deeply suspect this is an entering wedge to giving London a veto over all tactical nuclear weapons.

### III. What Might Make a Deal?

We see the following as possible elements of agreement in principle:

1. Wilson could accept enough British participation in a mixed-manned surface force to satisfy the Germans that this whole arrangement is non-discriminatory. This means a significant number of British sailors on some number of ships. There can be fewer ships than 25 because a lot of weapons would be provided by national contributions, but there cannot be just a token number. The British will argue that the Germans really don't set as much store by the surface force as we think and would be satisfied with a seat in the control board at the top. We don't buy this and don't think the Germans would either. Wilson may also argue manpower difficulties in manning surface ships as well as submarines. Bob McNamara can dispose of this very quickly.

2. We could match the British submarine contribution with an equal number of our own subs, if the terms and conditions of our participation (flag and uniform) are satisfactory to the Germans. Alternatively, we could fall back on a MINUTEMAN contribution, which would have to have different trappings from the British submarines.

3. We could agree to non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings as part of a treaty.

4. We could say that we'd hail the British decision to commit their forces irrevocably as an important step back from nuclear proliferation.

5. We could leave in abeyance for later multilateral negotiations the relationship of AMF to SACEUR.

6. We could agree to tell the Germans now, and the world later, that we would keep our veto for the life of the force. However, when we do so, we should not suggest that we won't take a new look at the situation even in the remote and unlikely event that Europe were politically unified under an elected Chief Executive.



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Dec. 4, 1964

7. We could make clear publicly that if AMF comes into being, we will reduce our own programmed strategic forces proportionately. This is important since one of the great problems Wilson faces at home is strong revulsion against creating additional nuclear weapons above the number McNamara says are needed to cover Soviet targets.

8. We can show interest in better consultation between our governments -- and other governments, too -- on matters outside the NATO area. We can suggest that staff work be done to sort out just what, if any, new mechanisms are needed.

But we might also suggest that consultation is meaningful only when there are joint ventures, joint risks, and joint responsibilities. This could lead delicately into a discussion of "jointness" in Southeast Asia (see below).

9. We can graciously accept and support the British contribution of part of their V-bomber force.

10. We can work out financial arrangements which will assure Wilson that participation in the surface fleet is on a no-extra-cost basis to him. Bob McNamara can spell this out to their heart's content.

11. We can certainly acquiesce in abolishing the initials "MLF," but we should leave final choice<sup>of</sup> a new name to multilateral negotiation.

#### IV. Intangibles for Wilson

If Wilson were to accept this deal in principle, he would be taking a very considerable political risk at home since he and his party have long opposed British participation in surface ships and the Tories now also oppose it, while no segment of public opinion supports it. On the other hand, you can encourage him to the view that by taking this risk, he opens the way to enormous opportunities. Great politicians take big risks for great causes. Those opportunities include:

1. A real prospect of German agreements and progress in the Atlantic nuclear field.

2. The beginnings of a new relationship between Britain and Europe, particularly Germany, with all that may mean for Britain, financially and otherwise.

3. Clearing the decks for new endeavors to negotiate seriously with the Russians.

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4. A positive act of solidarity with the U. S. and with Germany, bringing into being a joint venture which will deepen good relations, and give Britain a leading voice in Europe.

5. A great British initiative breaking log jams in the Alliance for which the British would receive great credit and would deserve it in your eyes.

If a deal of this sort seems to be coming off, we will recommend to you a schedule for talks by the British and ourselves with the other allies involved, especially the Germans. It will be essential to have full agreement with Wilson on who says what to whom and when.

#### V. If Wilson Doesn't Deal

We don't know whether Wilson can give the assurance which we seek regarding his participation on surface ships. He has said he'll negotiate seriously. But he has also said that he wants to come back here in January and he is in so delicate a situation with his Cabinet that he may not feel he can afford to give that assurance now, even to you. Or he may feel that we aren't willing to do enough in return. If so, he'll want to talk to the Germans about his proposals as they stand. And he'll want us to encourage Bonn to listen seriously. But we must not let Bonn think that we are trying to help force them off surface ships.

The question of who then says what to whom becomes very difficult. We would need a very explicit understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town.

#### VI. Wilson's Interests East of Suez

Britishers, particularly Defense Secretary Healy, say that agreements in principle for support of joint ventures east of Suez will be an important element in your talks. We do not know how far Wilson means to press this with you, although Healy says he means to expose it to McNamara later. If Wilson opens this with you, you could raise with him the prospect of "joint venture" in Vietnam and Malaysia. Regarding Viet-Nam he might be asked to increase his participation in guerrilla training, or to provide an air squadron, or maybe special forces in advisory roles. In return we would underwrite the independence of Malaysia.

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Dec. 4, 1964

When you get into this you will startle the Prime Minister -- though his people have been warned. There is no support in the United Kingdom for involvement in our Vietnamese commitment, which looks to most people in London like a hopeless venture. The Labor Government (or at least its Ministry of Defense) is eager for joint ventures "east of Suez," but they have visions of ships steaming around the Indian Ocean, not of men getting killed in Vietnamese jungles. Yet British sacrifice is just what we need most.

#### VII. Wilson's Interests in Financial Stability

We understand that he may well propose to you joint staff work on measures for long-term support of the pound while his government tries the hard, slow task of modernizing the economy and righting the balance of trade (without unemployment). Wilson is enormously appreciative of what you've done already to bail him out for the short-run. He probably won't ask you now to go beyond agreement for more staff work, after which there would be further consultations on means to evolve long-term multilateral funding.

We think you can be forthcoming. He desperately needs the technical and economic advice available to our government. It would be as much to our benefit as theirs to provide this assistance.

We also think this indication of your interest in working toward a long-term solution for their problem might enhance the prospects of agreement on the AMF.

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December 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Appointment for Chet Bowles

Dean Rusk telephoned to re-emphasize his strong recommendation that you really should spend a few minutes with Bowles. I have done my best with Bowles and with the Department to explain how busy you are, but we are dealing here with a former Under Secretary of State and an Ambassador to a major country, and I am afraid my own heart is not in the argument against a short call.

Moreover, if you invest this ten minutes in Bowles, you can have an Ambassador to India for the next four years. He will be glad to stay for the duration if you want him, and I think there is general agreement that he has done a first-class job. Moreover, he has shown loyalty and self-discipline after being eased out of a job he had coveted and in which his failure was only partly his fault.

So I am sending this up on appeal.

If you agree, I will set it up for Monday.

McG. B.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum drafted by Dick Neustadt gives the essence of the position we worked out this morning with Bob McNamara and George Ball. It is still subject to comments by both of them, and George Ball may well produce a version of his own, but we all think you ought to have a chance to look at it tonight before our important meeting tomorrow at 12:30.

This is the most important negotiation we have had since 1962, and it represents our chance to do a better job than was done at Nassau. The staff and second level have learned from that experience and we share the view of the British that it is not our champion that has anything to fear, but we do have an obligation to make sure that all the elements of the problem are in front of you.

This memorandum does not mention some of Wilson's special problems which we already know about, but its recommendations are consistent with the fact that you are strong and he is weak in the immediate political situation.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-304

~~SECRET~~ By cb, NARA, Date 5-5-95

December 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

1. Here is the third installment of the new intelligence check list. The annex on the MLF is a little bit more bearish than is justified, I think. We will know more about it when Ball and Neustadt get back tonight, and we now plan a discussion with you on Saturday at 12:30 before Wilson gets here.
2. I also asked the intelligence people for the first foreign reactions to your speech today, (TAB A) and they seem to have caught the conciliatory tone we intended. I have also had a very warm and grateful phone call from the German Ambassador, and one or two favorable comments from European correspondents who called for background interpretation.
3. On the boner I made about Agriculture and the Kennedy Round, I think the damage control has been fairly good. Charlie Murphy was most understanding and says that Agriculture will cheerfully make it clear that nothing has changed. Charles Bailey, who follows farm matters closely, told me that the phrase gave him no trouble, and at the moment it looks as if my carelessness has done less harm than I feared.

McG. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Lawrence Spivack is after me to go on Meet the Press sometime after Christmas. I admit that I enjoy this kind of thing, but I would not want to get anywhere near it if you prefer that I should not. It is of course not easy to tell right now what may be the hot issues next month, but I think that in principle one should always be able to stonewall on the tough ones and use the rest of the time to convey a picture of the President at work for peace.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Please do \_\_\_\_\_

Please don't \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Not now

December 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Scott and Hetherington of the Manchester Guardian

By reputation, these are two very perceptive journalists. Since Europe has got all its earphones on and will multiply anything that is attributed directly to you, my first suggestion is that you may want to keep the interview very much off the record, and say that it is entirely for their instruction and not to be referred to or hinted at in any way in the columns of the Guardian. In particular, I would warn them off the kind of language in which it is said: "The President is known to think." That sort of thing in the hands of a very reputable paper like the Guardian will mean that there has been an interview with you, and nothing else.

Of course, if you have some particular message that you want printed in this particular sheet, all these warnings should be ignored.

The three topics they are likely to pursue with you are: (1) The MLF and NATO nuclear defense; (2) South Vietnam and China behind it; (3) Possibilities for progress in negotiation with the Soviet Union. I am seeing them a half hour before you, and if I get a sharply different impression, I will telephone you.

1. MLF and NATO nuclear defense. Our position is as you stated it last Saturday. Our overriding interest is in the coherence and mutual confidence of the alliance. We believe that new and better arrangements are needed to take care of the interests of non-nuclear powers in a nuclear age, and we do not believe in multiplying small national deterrent forces, although of course we cannot and do not try to substitute our judgment for that of states like France and England.

We see the MLF as a means not an end. We believe that some responsible participation is necessary for Germany in the long run, and the mixed manned surface fleet is the best system we have found for this purpose. But we are not rigid or doctrinaire, and we shall listen with great interest to any modifications or enlargements which Prime Minister Wilson may wish to suggest next week.

The Johnson-Wilson meeting will not be an attempt to make a binding Anglo-Saxon deal behind the backs of our friends. Both sides are agreed that the discussions will not be final and that they should be followed by intensive



consultation with all those who have important interests in this subject. This includes especially Germany, Italy, Holland, and France, although of course we recognize the present French position is one of objection.

I think we should resist any notion of a fixed timetable, while at the same time warning of the dangers of indefinite delay.

In sum, our position is firm and constructive but not rigid, and our objective is what it has always been -- to find a means of moving ahead that meets the real needs of our European partners.

2. South Vietnam and China . You know at least as well as I exactly what you want to say. I attach a copy of yesterday's statement, which is worth referring back to. Off the record you can leave these men in no doubt of *your* the awareness of the real difficulties, but you will probably want to leave no doubt also of the conviction of the U. S. that this really is a place where the interests of all free nations are the same, and where the defense of freedom would be enormously assisted in every way by a substantial increase of the contributions of others besides Americans. (This will give Guardian liberals something of a shock, but I think it should be helpful if done with care.)

On China, you may want to make it clear that the U. S. policy toward China results from what the Chinese actually say and do, and not upon any imprisonment in reactionary blindness. The same practical considerations make us think that those who talk of bringing China into the family of nations are in fact giving diplomatic ~~policy~~ support to a calculated and aggressive expansionism in which Chinese agents are a threat to domestic peace in every continent and a threat to the security of their neighbors on every border.

3. Possibilities for progress in negotiation with the Soviet Union. At the moment of course this is focussed on rather narrow issues like Article 19 in the UN and some of our pending bilateral problems like the consular convention. Moreover, in the immediate future we think the prospect is that the new Soviet regime will not be ready for major negotiation with non-Communist states for some time. At the same time we do think it is important not to give them any wrong signals that would lower the chance of progress toward useful agreements. Our policy of guard up and hand out has been made extremely clear in the last year and occasional foreign newspaper rumors that we are somehow hardening our position as a result of the election are nonsense. The only places where we have tough problems of confrontation with Communists are places like South Vietnam and the UN, where it is the Communists and not the United States Government that have forced the issue.

McG. B.



Rec'd  
12/3/64  
2:35 pm

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As I think you know, Ben Bradlee is an old personal acquaintance of mine. Our parents have been friends for forty years, and Ben and I have known each other all our lives. I used to find him a bit slick and cynical, but in the last year or two Mary and I have thought he was maturing remarkably, and my personal experience with him has been that he is honorable professionally, although he is a very energetic and independent-minded reporter. Knowing your own reservations, I have been extraordinarily careful about discussing your business with him, but I do see him both professionally and socially from time to time. (The Bradlees have had a tough year, and Mary has seen to it that we tried to help.)

When I heard from a couple of press people last night that the FBI was putting it about that the source of the story that J. Edgar Hoover was leaving was Bob Kennedy, I felt free to speak directly to Bradlee this morning and say that this rumor was around and that it would obviously do damage. He told me in the most categorical terms that the NEWSWEEK people made a deliberate point of not talking with Bob Kennedy in the preparation of the cover story. They did talk to some of his associates, but their editorial direction was to avoid taking their lead from persons known to be at odds with Mr. Hoover.

Bradlee tells me flatly that the story that a search was on for Hoover's successor came from within the White House, from what he calls "a high source." He said that this source was in no sense hostile to Mr. Hoover and simply took the position that he was coming toward the end of the road and that it would be very difficult to find the necessary successor. He says the same source told them of "White House regret at Hoover's explosive press conference." I do not know who their source was, but I believe they had one.

I believe that Bradlee is representing his own position honestly, and my conclusion is that he or his people must have taken some relatively speculative but very incautious comments by someone over here and turned them into hard news. This is something which NEWSWEEK has done before, and Bradlee himself occasionally stretches his inferences. But I believe him fully when he says that this particular item did not come from Bob Kennedy. I doubt very much that the FBI has good evidence to the contrary -- but of course they share with the press the bad habit of protecting their sources, so that their charges are hard to judge.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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December 1, 1964

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Ray Cline of CIA and I have worked out this new form of a daily intelligence briefing on the premise that it is more useful to you if it comes in your evening reading. Our thought is that this may run parallel to Dean Rusk's daily report and be more nearly responsive to your own interests than the papers we have been sending heretofore. We will send this model for three or four days and then I will ask for your reactions.

McG. B.

**~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT**

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1964

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to UNICEF

Maurice Pate, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) sent you a letter back in October asking for help on milk supplies. Dick Reuter now recommends that you sign the attached answer. I understand that he has been in touch with Pate in the meantime, but the answer will be helpful for the public record.

M.G. B.

McG. B.



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November 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I think the attached papers are self-explanatory. They are designed to show not only the basic policy but the initial probable posture, which is very quiet and which would not become noisy unless you made new and additional decisions.

I continue to think that it would be helpful to have a short and very private session with Rusk and McNamara and me before the 11 o'clock meeting, and I will call you in the morning to see if 10:15 is still workable.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Pacem in Terris Convocation

You may recall that Justice Douglas spoke to you last winter about the international convocation which is being planned by Bob Hutchins' Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to discuss Pope John's final encyclical, Pacem in Terris. The convocation is to be held in 1965 between February 18-20. As I recall it, you did not give Justice Douglas any definite assurances, but the zealous staff people of the Hutchins Center have been putting it out that you plan to come, and they have been using your attendance as bait for people like Nasser, U Thant, and whatever Soviet leader they can get.

I myself think it would be a mistake for you to encourage this particular enterprise by your personal attendance. Hutchins and Company are not the most sensible observers of the world scene, and I am strongly put off by their efforts to use the President of the United States as a drawing card for a rather mixed bag of foreigners.

On the other hand, I may be turning into a stuffy bureaucrat, and it may be also that you feel some personal commitment to Justice Douglas. In that case my recommendation would be that you condition your attendance upon a review of the plans for the meeting and a very firm undertaking by Justice Douglas himself that your name will not be used in efforts to bring people like Nasser and Nkrumah, or even the Soviet leadership, to the meeting.

My preferred version of a letter to Justice Douglas (attached) is designed to give him encouragement in what is, after all, a useful work of international communication, while taking you off the hook. It conforms closely to a recommendation which we have from the Justice's associates, except that it makes it explicit that you yourself will not come and removes your approval from their effort to bring major political leaders. These forms of insurance seem to me necessary -- unless, as I say, you feel committed to go.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1964


Dear Mr. Justice:

I appreciate your keeping me informed on the planning for the convocation of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions scheduled for February 18-20, 1965, in New York City.

I regret that I myself will be unable to attend the convocation, but I have no doubt that such discussion, under private auspices, of the problems of peace will provide a major contribution to the greatest single problem of our time. The symposium that the Center proposes can, I think, be an important event in the International Cooperation Year which I proclaimed on October 2.

The idea of assembling in this country outstanding spiritual and intellectual leaders should provide a welcome new dimension to the discussion of these fundamental problems, and help make the International Cooperation Year count in the search for practical programs for peace.

Sincerely,



The Honorable William O. Douglas  
Associate Justice  
Supreme Court of the United States  
Washington, D. C.



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November 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. VALENTI

Jack --

The attached memorandum to the President explains my current thinking and is strongly supported by Harlan Cleveland and the Department's experts on International Cooperation.

This is a pretty woolly outfit, but Justice Douglas is a good friend of the President and the draft letter is designed to go as far as we can without getting the President in trouble.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

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*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

*Mr. President -  
I suggest you read  
The attached  
JL*

10 J 73

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Averell Harriman

Averell Harriman sent this memorandum to you through me. I think it is a thoughtful statement of some, but not all, of the themes that we will need to sound in coming weeks.

I have passed to the Secretary your feeling that it makes sense to have Harriman move over from a major administrative and bureaucratic assignment to the somewhat more fitting role of Ambassador at Large. There are particular assignments which he can carry out with great distinction, and he certainly deserves the most dignified treatment. I am watching for the right occasion to tell him both of your regard for him and of the very great importance of avoiding even the appearance of criticism of his colleagues and the Administration as a whole.

McG. B.

McG. B.



UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Supplementing my previous memorandum, I recommend that prompt and urgent attention be given to the ways in which you can project most effectively the image of your own policies and United States objectives in the world. My observations are based on three factors:

that the early days of any Administration are the time to set the stage for what is to follow;

that in foreign affairs, approach and attitudes are as important as policies and programs themselves;

that the personality and approach of the President are the most important single means of molding world opinion toward the United States.

There is a wealth of material in your statements made in the past year, particularly during the campaign. The State of the Union and other early messages provide the opportunity to bring the main elements together and to highlight them into a clear and appealing image. In doing so, you could usefully relate some of the principal elements of your domestic program to the larger world scene.

Among the key elements of such an approach, the following come first to mind:

1) Your appeal for unity in this country has become a major objective. This could readily be expanded into a call for unity among free peoples everywhere. President Roosevelt's proclamation of the Four Freedoms had world-wide appeal during the

war period.

war period. A new statement of the basic ideals of free men in the present ideological conflict could have as strong an appeal today. This would permit you to stand above the differences among the free countries. Your position would stand out in sharp contrast with the smallness and divisiveness of de Gaulle and others.

2) Here at home, you have declared war on poverty. This provides a good basis for a new approach to foreign aid and technical assistance. You could call for a unified effort by the more advanced and prosperous nations to combat the poverty, disease and ignorance that threaten our fellow men -- an international war on poverty, as a call to arms for the only war you want to wage.

3) The "building bridges" concept could be emphasized to encourage those now living under communism to look to the United States with even greater hope. This is a much sounder approach than the dangerous promises of "liberation."

4) Of prime importance is the manner in which you reaffirm your determination to exert every effort to promote the achievement of peace. No single subject has greater appeal to all mankind. You can now seize the initiative, for you are in a unique position to restate with unquestioned sincerity your determination to work to this end, at the same time recognizing the practical problems that face us. "Our guard is up, but our hand is out," is a theme that can be universally understood.

As a footnote, your close personal relationship with a number of leaders of other countries is a valuable asset and will, of course, be expanded.

The kind of hospitality recently accorded President Diaz of Mexico at your ranch has conveyed an image of a warm and hospitable United States to all of Latin America. This is truly the "Good Neighbor."

  
W. Averell Harriman

Mac:

*Bundy*

73 b

Please talk to me about this the first thing  
when I get back.

LBJ/mf

11-10-64

9:30p

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am keen to talk to you at your convenience about our foreign policies.

With a new Administration, a President has an unusual opportunity for a few months at least, even though he intends to follow the same basic policies -- to establish a fresh image, to get out of certain rigidities and dead ends, to take new tacks, and give new inspiration to United States world leadership.

I would like to play a part, if you care to have me. Fortunately, I chose my ancestors well, and I am still able to outpace some of the younger men.

During the past year, I have had a seven-day-a-week job, much of it doing details which I think others could handle as well, while I have not been consulted on many of the major issues. Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy used me as a pinch-hitter for special negotiations, in addition to my regular duties. By luck or good fortune, my batting average has been surprisingly good.

In recent years, it is perhaps because I have been around a long time and people associate me with Roosevelt and other historic periods. I am continually struck by my personal acceptance on the part of the leading personalities wherever I go.

In Russia, Khrushchev treated me with respect, because I sat next to Stalin when he was at the lower end of the table. Kosygin met me first when he was an assistant to Mikoyan at a time when I was negotiating with Stalin. I know Harold Wilson from his days as a rising civil servant when I was dealing with Churchill and the British War Cabinet as President

Roosevelt's



Roosevelt's personal representative. Erhard knows me from 1948 when we brought the Germans into the Organization for European Economic Cooperation against the opposition of Clay and others who wanted Germany to be represented by the Military Government. The Latinos seem to associate me with Roosevelt. To mention a few.

As a result of my experiences over the years, I feel that I can be of value to you in some of the tough negotiations ahead and also in advice on some of the difficult problems we face.

I think that my work for you during the past year has shown that I am not looking for honors and am ready to take on any work. I would like, however, to be in a position to come to you on matters where I feel my past experience has a contribution to make. I had this relationship with Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, and never misused it.

  
W. Averell Harriman

*I am enclosing an election post mortem  
of New York State which may interest you.*

73d

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

For the first time in history, you carried all of the 62 counties in New York State, and all by a comfortable majority. In 1936, FDR failed to carry most of the upState counties, not even his own -- Dutchess County.

You carried the State as a whole by over two and a half million, as against Roosevelt's 1,112,000 in 1936, and Eisenhower's one and a half million in 1956. Your percentage of the total vote was 68.5%, and Roosevelt's was 58.8%.

Bob Kennedy won by 800,000, or about 55%.

*(Thanks to the left  
you gave him)*

Your landslide victory has swept the Democrats into control of the State Legislature for only the second time in fifty years. Without a Democratic Governor, this makes a problem of leadership in Albany, although we have Arthur Levitt as Comptroller. As the increase in membership comes from upState, Bob Wagner should not try to run the Legislature from City Hall if we are to maintain our majority next year.

W. Averell Harriman



74  
TOP SECRET

November 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Courses of Action on Southeast Asia

I am attaching a book of draft papers on possible courses of action in Southeast Asia. These papers reflect the basic concerns of the inter-agency working group. In revised form, they will be the focus of your meeting with Ambassador Taylor on Tuesday, December 1.

I particularly urge your attention to the two papers that now stand at the front of the book: a) the brief opening paper which summarizes the materials that follow (Tab A); and, b) Ambassador Taylor's analysis entitled "The Current Situation in South Vietnam -- November, 1964" (Tab B). I would also suggest that you review the intelligence assessment at the beginning of Section I.

Ambassador Taylor's analysis and proposed scenario correspond roughly to the immediate action program suggested in the working group papers (Section VII of the draft Summary). However, you should know that the Ambassador does believe that after a period of weeks we should be prepared -- if the Vietnamese Government holds together, but Hanoi is still tough -- to move clearly into Option C. Many of the working group feel that a decision to carry out the immediate program should be accompanied by a decision -- in principle -- to adopt Option C unless circumstances change, with the date of initiation left open.

Option C is analyzed at some length in Section VII of the draft papers. Of special importance is the intelligence paper on probable Communist and non-Communist reactions to Options B and C; these papers are located at the end of Section VII (Tab C).

McG. B.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSA Ltr 8/31/77

By

JL/mg

NARS, Date

9/14/77



CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1964

8 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Progress on Canadian Auto Parts and the Need for a Bargain with Wilbur Mills

As you may remember, the Canadian auto parts row has been one of the most troublesome issues between us and Pearson's Government for about a year. The Canadians put on a tariff scheme designed to stimulate production in Canada which sharply penalized independent American auto suppliers. In response to their spurs, Doug Dillon has been urging us to apply a countervailing duty against Canada; this is what the letter of the law seems to him to require, but the trouble is that it would start a major trade fracas with the Canadians and do no one any good.

Common sense has now prevailed, and a possible bargain is shaping up which has the support of all departments of your Government, most of the auto industry, and -- we are confident -- the Canadians. It is as follows:

- Both Canada and the United States would eliminate tariffs on automobiles and most automobile parts originating in the other country.
- The Canadian Government would make a side deal with the major automobile producers who operate on both sides of the border; the producers would commit themselves to increase somewhat the fraction of their output originating in Canada. The shift is to take place over four years and would be made easy by the rising market for automobiles both here and there; it should cause us very little trouble. (Justice has some anti-trust worries about this, but nothing very serious.)

The big companies are all in line (Ford and Chrysler with gusto). The only negative reaction has come from some independent parts producers. One company, Modine, with parts-plants employing a total of about 1,250 workers in Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and California, is openly hostile. The bulk of the parts industry, however, is either in favor or neutral.

The UAW would be prepared to support the proposal if they can be assured that there will be adequate provision for dislocated workers.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-18

By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-93

CONFIDENTIAL



Nov. 27, 1964

Labor believes we can work this out with Reuther and his people.

The immediate problem is to get Wilbur Mills to agree to push the necessary implementing legislation. You do not now have authority to reduce U. S. tariffs to zero on goods from a particular country. The plan is to tack an appropriate amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930.

From a preliminary check by the Ford people, it appears that Mills would be receptive to pushing this through quickly, right after Medicare. If you instruct us to proceed, Dillon will talk with Mills and try to get a clear commitment on this point. This particular matter should take only 3 - 4 days of hearings. So it will delay other items very little. Henry Wilson in O'Brien's office concurs in this tactic.

The matter is fairly urgent. Doug claims that if the Canadians do not rescind their current tariff scheme he must impose countervailing tariffs by January 1 or face jail. The Canadians would be prepared to rescind in return for an agreement which would commit us to go to the Congress for the necessary legislation during the winter. If you agree, and if Mills is agreeable, we can probably close the deal with Pearson's people well before January 1. This will be a major achievement, and one with some news value too.

McG. B.

Tell Dillon to work on Mills \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1964

76

TO VALENTI FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY  
TO REEDY FOR POSSIBLE PRESS CONFERENCE USE

Precisely because I admire Acheson's powers of exposition, I must warn against drawing heavily on his memorandum in your press conference tomorrow. In my experience he has more than once sought to commit Presidents to his own policy without fair warning of all the problems involved. In particular, Rusk and I agree that there is a serious problem of the timing and content of any MLF agreement, and that you should not tie yourself to any particular mast until you have a chance to weigh all the evidence.

Nevertheless there is every reason to reaffirm a few basic principles of our European policy. This can be done briefly tomorrow but Rusk and I join again in recommending that you hold your main fire for the speech at Georgetown on Wednesday. We leave to your judgment whether it is wise to foreshadow this speech tomorrow. From our standpoint the risks of describing a speech ahead of time somewhat outweigh the immediate Saturday news value of such a comment, but your judgment will of course govern.

Possible press conference comments follow (subject to possible later comments by Dean Rusk):

The present discussion of disarray in the Atlantic Alliance is grossly exaggerated and is partly the result of a neglect of first principles. Some of these principles are worth new attention:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA 8-22-77, 715C 10-4-79  
By ing, NARS, Date 11-5-79



1. The ultimate essentials of the defense of the Atlantic Community are the firmness and mutual trust of the U. S. and Europe. U. S. position is clear: the safety of the U. S. depends upon the freedom of Europe, and the freedom of Europe depends upon the strength and will of the U. S. That strength and will have never been clearer or more necessary than today.

2. The U. S. is committed to the increasing strength and cooperation of the Atlantic Community in every field of action -- <sup>political, military</sup> /economic, commercial and monetary. There are no problems which we cannot solve together, and very few which any one of us can settle by himself alone.

3. The US sees no safe future for itself, and none for any other Atlantic nation, in a policy of narrow national self-interest.

4. One of the great aspirations within the Atlantic Community is the aspiration toward growing unity among the free peoples of Europe. No nation on either side of the Atlantic has done more to support this purpose than the U. S. This support will continue.

5. Since 1945 the U. S. has borne a special responsibility for the nuclear defense of the free world. The costs and complexities of modern nuclear weapons systems make it inevitable that this American responsibility will continue far into the future. While we cannot divest ourselves of this awesome obligation, we can and will work earnestly with all our friends to find new and better ways by which all interested members of the alliance can increase their own sense of safety, by sharing responsibly in the unified defense of the alliance as a whole. This is the meaning of our present

interest in the multilateral force. This is the meaning of our continued readiness to discuss these problems with every interested ally.

6. The President believes that the Atlantic alliance is only at the beginning of its time of greatest achievement. Its success has been proved in 15 years of Atlantic peace. Its differences are differences among peoples who have learned in the torment of war that the freedom of each requires the freedom of all. The President looks forward with confidence to the resolution of present differences and the reassertion of the unity which is so deeply in the common interest of us all.



November 25, 1964

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID letter APR 12 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

By isg, NARS, Date 9-4-79

SUBJECT: Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy

1. The report of your Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy is attached. We believe you would find it worthwhile to read the "Introduction and Summary" (pp 1-37) which contains

- a brief introduction;
- a section on aid (p. 6);
- a section on trade in manufactured goods which covers also East-West trade (p. 16);
- a section on agricultural trade and food aid (p. 25): this is more complicated and less central than the rest and you might wish to skip it;
- a section on money (p. 28), some of which is directly relevant to the current sterling crisis. (The money section in your copy contains some suggestions which are extremely sensitive. The relevant pages are marked "Presidential copy only.")

2. The most dramatic recommendations of the Task Force concern aid, and these 10 pages are as near must reading as you'll get in these reports. They argue that

a. To make good on the current aid strategy, there will have to be a substantial, if gradual, increase in U.S. development aid between now and 1970.

b. There is a strong case for upping our sights and shifting during the next four years to a much larger program, involving much more money and much more food. Their reasons, briefly:

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- Shifting to a larger program might well make a dramatic difference to the shape of the world we shall face during the 1970s. One cannot be certain, but playing a bold hand appears less risky than doing too little or opting out.
- Doing the aid job faster, on a larger scale, is likely in the end to be a good deal cheaper.
- The leverage we could exert on the internal policies of the recipient countries would be far greater. In some key countries, such as India, we would have a fair chance really to get things moving.
- The domestic political cost of the program, large enough now, may be no larger if it is expanded and may even be less. With a much larger program, it would be both necessary and possible to engage private U.S. business on a much larger scale, not in providing money but in providing their services for a fair profit. As in defense programs, their support should follow.

3. The Task Force, at some risk to Dave Bell's patience and your own faith in its good sense, has followed your instruction to ignore political feasibility. Nevertheless, it recognized the seriousness of the problem and asks us to make it clear that there is no need for alarm bells in 1965, even if you now decide that the Government should give serious study during the next year to converting, over the next 2 - 3 years, to a much larger program. Specifically:

- The issue does not have to be raised directly with the Congress or the public during the next few months;
- You do not need to ask for a substantial increase in the 1966 AID appropriation;
- AID need not change its operating procedures this year.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. But such a decision would involve you in asking for some hard thought, on an organized basis, on the dual problem of gearing up to a larger aid effort and of creating, during the next year or two, the political climate that would make it possible. The Task Force has some interesting suggestions on both points, but, if a "war on poverty--worldwide" is to be a major Presidential initiative, a comprehensive planning effort will be needed, as a major order of business, during 1965.

5. We believe you may want to talk about this report in a small group, and Bundy will ask you for such a meeting soon.

Francis M. Bator

McGeorge Bundy

FMB:mst

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 8/11/77  
By JK, NARS, Date 8/19/77

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1964

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - PERSONAL - LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM TO:

Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
Under Secretary Ball

SUBJECT:

The Future of the MLF

Against my own expectations of two weeks ago, I am reaching the conclusion that the U. S. should now arrange to let the MLF sink out of sight. Whether this should be done quickly or slowly is an important tactical question, but the overriding point which I wish to suggest in this tightly limited group is that we should now ask the President for authority to work toward a future in which the MLF does not come into existence.

I reach this conclusion because it seems increasingly clear that the costs of success would be prohibitive. They would include at least the following:

1. A deeply reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain.
2. A Germany whose governing party was divided on this issue and whose participation was ambiguous in meaning.
3. ~~Heavy~~ Additional strains on an Italian government which is weaker and not stronger as a result of its last elections.
4. At least a temporary setback in efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by international agreement (those who believe strongly in such agreements, in all countries, are skeptical of the MLF).
5. A protracted and difficult Congressional struggle in which we would be largely deprived of the one decisive argument -- that this arrangement is what our major European partners really want.
6. A constitutional debate in NATO which, even if successful, would provide justification for further Gaullist outrages against the organization.
7. A genuine and enduring blow to Franco-German relations, which the Germans will blame on us.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - PERSONAL - LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)



TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - PERSONAL - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

-2-

11/25/64

This is not an attractive prospect, and the MLF is not worth it.

From my own conversations with the President, I am sure that he does not feel the kind of personal Presidential engagement in the MLF itself which would make it difficult for him to strike out on a new course if we can find one which seems better. I believe we can.

The fundamental requirement is that we should work in harmony with the Germans, and my own judgment is that our first course should be to engage in a most intimate and careful discussion with Erhard himself. When he chooses to be, both his popularity and his position make him the undisputed political leader of Germany. I myself believe that he would be glad to join with the President of the United States in a radical defusing of the MLF and a proposal for a completely fresh look at the nuclear defenses of the Alliance, with an ostentatious inclusion of France in this process of discussion.

As long as the German Chancellor is treated with care and dignity by the American President, I believe we can meet the main purposes of the MLF, at least in the short run, without paying its heavy costs.

And even if a fresh look should lead nowhere over the next year or two, we would still be free to take new steps with the Germans if the situation then demands it. I do not believe that any such steps need be worse than the MLF is today.

Since this question is fundamental to the Johnson/Wilson talks, and since the President counts very heavily upon the advice of the four of us, I hope very much that we may be able to talk this matter out among ourselves over the weekend. I am calling Dean Rusk separately to ask if he will propose times at his convenience for a meeting under his chairmanship.

*McG.*

McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - PERSONAL - EYES ONLY (page 2 of 2 pages)

79

*Small  
reply*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Advisory Board of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Lectures Fund of the University of Texas has asked me to give the inaugural lecture sometime this winter. Aside from the pleasure of going to Austin and receiving a modest honorarium which I could use for charitable contributions, I would ordinarily not accept such an invitation, because I work for a man who notices every absence. But it occurs to me that you might think it appropriate and helpful for me to do this job in a part of the world which is so much your own.

If I do this, it would probably be in March.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

*Send to Bundy*

Please do \_\_\_\_\_

Please don't ✓ \_\_\_\_\_

Suit yourself \_\_\_\_\_

November 20, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

Our only very hot spot at the moment is the Congo. Here is where we are:

1. Vanderwelle<sup>A</sup> mercenary column is on its way with <sup>little</sup> ~~no~~ opposition so far and <sup>C</sup> ~~should~~ reach Stanleyville in two or three days with luck.
2. Rebels have broadcast another threat to American hostages using the name of U. S. Consul Hoyt <sup>who is held in Stanleyville.</sup>
3. At the same time rebels have agreed to discuss with a U. S. representative in Nairobi and <sup>we</sup> are publicly accepting this offer and proposing talks at noon tomorrow <sup>(3 a.m. Washington time)</sup> with Ambassador Attwood speaking for us.
4. The Belgians are resistant to any concessions that Tshombe and Co. might find unacceptable, and accordingly Attwood's instructions will be quite general and directed at maintaining the palaver while warning strongly of consequences of any hostile act. Attwood is a skillful negotiator and we hope very much that these talks will help protect hostages while the Vanderwelle<sup>A</sup> column advances.
5. Very weak security has now forced the Belgian Government to announce that the troops with air support are at Ascension Island as a precautionary measure. We have confirmed this announcement.
6. Tomorrow, Saturday, we shall need to consider whether it is wise to advance paratroopers to Kamina or to execute against Stanleyville. ~~they~~  
George Ball and I are both very cautious at this point and would probably

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State ltr 11/2/77

By

J. L. M. G.

NARS,

Date

12/30/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

recommend against action when what we face is threat, not open act of violence. ~~Rusk~~ and Harriman may be marginally more activist. All of us will be much affected by Spaak's judgment at the time. *Belgium Government alarm appears to be increasing.*  
Bromley Smith and George Ball are here and fully informed, and can tell you more by telephone if you wish.

I will also be fully informed and participate by telephone in discussions tomorrow and Sunday as needed.

The talks in Nairobi, and the unobstructed course of the Vanderwelle<sup>A</sup> column so far give me considerable hope that we can avoid the hazards of actual execution of paratroop drop, but this situation is subject to change at very short notice.

~~TOP SECRET~~



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7

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your talk with Walter Lippmann

At Tab A is the outline you asked for yesterday of the 25-year record and the achievement of 1964. It is still very thin, but I think it shows real promise. If you like it, you may want to hold on to it as an outline for the State of the Union, but bits and pieces of it would also fit into what you have to say to Lippmann.

Lippmann is full of his European trip and will be just as glad to talk as to listen. The thing he admires most is the way you have defuzed the MLF crisis, at least from the point of view of the U. S. (The Franco-German trouble is growing more and more acute.) He will be delighted to hear anything you want to tell him along the lines of your recent backgrounders. There is no harm in telling him that you are issuing Presidential orders on this matter. A copy of the NSAM which will be coming to you for signature on this subject is attached at Tab B, and it is ok to use it with Walter. He is the one truly discreet reporter I know.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

November 18, 1964

82

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel's Request to Defer Inspection of the Dimona Reactor

1. Eshkol has sent you a private plea, via Mike Feldman, to hold off further inspection of Israel's Dimona reactor until after their November 1965 elections.

2. State and our intelligence people feel that this would be quite dangerous.

3. Israel is still making a number of suspicious moves in the nuclear field (see attached). We estimate that between our last inspection in January 1964 and November 1965 it could accumulate enough plutonium for one or two test devices. Thus the deterrent posed by our inspections is more important than ever. Also, just now we're doubly worried about new proliferation; it is no time to let the Israelis think we don't care.

4. Though Eshkol is having some trouble with the "hard line" proteges of Ben Gurion in his Cabinet, we doubt that they could use the inspection issue against him because Ben Gurion himself allowed the first inspections (and accepted the principle of periodic ones).

5. Even so, we propose a friendly compromise:

(1) We have to insist that the Israelis keep their bargain for a prompt inspection.

(2) However, to ease Eshkol's problems we won't ask for another one before November 1965 (we've previously insisted on semi-annual inspections but Israelis have evaded this).

(3) As an added sweetener, we won't pass the results to Nasser before Israel's elections. You'll recall that cluing Nasser was what really worried Eshkol when you saw him last June.

We'd handle this by sending Ambassador Barber to see Eshkol "to deliver a private message from President Johnson."

Mike Feldman agrees this is reasonable.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

McG. B.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-44

By is, NARA Date 10-24-99



83  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Governor Stevenson's visit

1. Stevenson is coming in at 12:45 to see you alone before a 1 o'clock meeting on UN problems (Sam Belk and I will be there for your staff, and we have sent in a separate memo which covers the Article 19 problem as it now stands).

2. I do not know what Stevenson himself wants to discuss, but I have talked a little with Dean Rusk about his thoughts on Stevenson's future. Everyone expects that the Governor will stay on through the coming session of the General Assembly, but it is not so clear what he will want to do afterwards. Rusk has thought that he might wish to go as Ambassador in London (he is very popular in the United Kingdom, in both parties). On the other hand, he may wish to go on where he is, and I do not think Dean would wish to propose a change against Stevenson's preference. He has been a very effective Ambassador at New York, and of course he still has an important following here at home.

3. If Stevenson did wish to leave, Rusk's candidate for the appointment in New York would be Harlan Cleveland, and while Cleveland is a little bit stuffy in manner, I would think him an excellent choice. He is a real master of the work of the United Nations and of United States policy in that forum. His firmness and good judgment here in the Department have been the anchor for Stevenson's own performance. Moreover, his Deputy, Joseph Sisco, is admirably qualified to be Assistant Secretary if Cleveland leaves. The appointment in New York is a glamorous one and widely coveted, but I think the judgment of informed critics and commentators would be that Cleveland's appointment was first-rate.

4. All this assumes, I repeat, that Adlai may wish to move on, and neither Rusk nor I have any direct evidence on this point. Whatever his plans, he will probably want to tell them to you first.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter JUL 19 1978

By if, NARS, Date 6-19-79



84  
November 17, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with John McCone today at 1:15

Mr. Bundy asked that the following information be brought to your attention prior to your meeting with CIA Director McCone this afternoon:

1. Mr. McCone has repeated to Mr. Bundy his desire to be relieved as Director of CIA in due course. His reasons include the necessity of attending to family business, as well as his and his wife's West Coast responsibilities.
2. Mr. McCone has given no clear indication as to the time of his leaving his post, and a question as to his intentions would be appropriate.
3. Mr. McCone has said it would be highly useful if his successor were named far enough in advance so that McCone could introduce his successor to his intelligence colleagues during the course of a familiarization trip of some two months to the Far East and Europe.
4. McCone has thought about who should succeed him. His preferred candidate is apparently Roswell Gilpatric, who is also strongly supported by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
5. Mr. Bundy recalls the special knowledge which Clark Clifford has in this area, and suggests you may wish to telephone him prior to your discussion with Mr. McCone.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ~~7-17-78~~ NSC 10-3-78

By JP, NARS, Date 6-21-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 16, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**THE HONORABLE CARL ROWAN**

The President now approves of your releasing the report on foreign media reaction to the U. S. election. He wants it very clear, however, that when you do release it it is in response to insistent press inquiry and not as a USIA initiative or a USIA puff for the President.

**f**

**McGeorge Bundy**

85a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Media Reaction to the U. S. Election

1. I got word from Buz that you would like us to spread to appropriate press people the contents of the November 5 report of USIA on foreign media reaction to the U. S. election. There is a problem about this.
2. I talked to Carl Rowan and find that it has been routine practice for some years to provide these summaries to the press on demand. As I understand it, this procedure is the result of the Moss Committee fuss about concealing relevant information on U. S. prestige in 1960. There is nothing classified about this material, and since the USIA people do not push it, no one has ever complained that in making it available USIA is moving into the domestic field.
3. Rowan's belief is that the most we can get out of this by private peddling to newspapers is possibly a single column by one of the more easily fed writers. He has had requests for the material from the wire services and thinks we would get more news that way. However, we both think this course should have your explicit approval.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me ☒ \_\_\_\_\_



Mac:

The President would like for you to obtain the November 5 Foreign Media Reaction to the U.S. Election Report from Carl Rowan and to give the contents of the press wide circulation through your appropriate friends in the Press. The President wants to be careful not to identify the material as having been compiled by USIA. . . .and wants no press release of it.

Busby

11-10-64

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 16, 1964

*Diff*  
86

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congo Situation

1. The question: Do we concur in the Belgians' desire to pre-position Belgian paratroopers at British Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, 22 hours from Stanleyville?
2. Recommendation: State, Defense, and Bundy recommend concurrence.
3. The situation: Mercenary advance on Stanleyville begins tomorrow and should drive rebels out within 3 or 4 days. In this period the safety of 30 Americans and 800 other foreigners, mostly Belgian, will be endangered. Spaak and Prime Minister LeFebvre wish to reduce our reaction time from three days to one.
4. As we agreed at the Ranch, it seems best to let Belgians take the lead on this and to be guided by their judgment. They know the Congolese better, and their nationals outnumber ours by 30 to 1. Nevertheless, it is our officials who have been directly threatened, and all the transport will be U. S. Air Force. So it is an important decision.
5. We can still hope that the rescue operation will not be necessary, because any action of this kind will have real political costs in the Congo and may involve the death of innocent Americans by panicky rebel reaction. Nevertheless, the possible cost of opposing the Belgian recommendation seems clearly greater than the cost of concurrence.
6. The requirement for your consent to further movement of this force will remain. It is probable that the next recommendation will be to move the paratroops to Kamina in the Katanga Province of the Congo. This will put them only 4 hours from Stanleyville, and while it increases risk of rebel panic, it will also increase the warning signal that we are ready to act if necessary. This decision may come tomorrow, and Secretary Rusk will bring it to you directly if necessary.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc: BKS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 11/2/77  
By JK/umg, NARS, Date 12/30/77

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1964

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 318

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: The Future of the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

1. In the next months we face highly important negotiations and decisions on this subject. These decisions relate not only to the MLF proposals now under discussion in Paris, but to the interests and concerns of the new British Government. It is also obvious that we shall have to take careful account of the interests and purposes of France.
2. Our own interest is, as it has been, to find the most effective means of advancing the partnership of the Atlantic Community in nuclear defense as in other matters, and to do this without giving encouragement to the spread of nuclear weapons.
3. To carry out these purposes effectively, it is essential that this Government should be united, and accordingly it is my desire that all of the activities of this Government relating to the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance should be fully coordinated among the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department.
4. More specifically, I desire that all officers of this Government who travel overseas to discuss this matter should have written instructions cleared in the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. Such instructions, where appropriate, should also be used by other officers of this Government as guidance.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC la 7/1/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 7/22/77




~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. I also desire that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should make an explicit designation of those officers who are authorized to discuss these problems with the press, and that other officers should be instructed to refrain from such discussion during this period of critical negotiation. A parallel arrangement will be instituted in the White House. It is critically important that this Government should speak with one voice on this subject in the future.

6. Finally, I request that detailed recommendations and proposals should be worked out for my consideration by the end of this month so that there may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8.



~~SECRET~~

Dispatched 11/16/64 (Rcpts nos. 657-658)

1 xerox cy David Klein

November 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I think the attached letter from Tris Coffin will interest you, although it's far from clear to me what, if anything, we can do about it. I have sent a copy to Bob McNamara, for his information.

McG. E.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

TRISTRAM COFFIN

November 4, 1964

Dear Mr. Bundy:

I thought you would like to know of a future stratagem of the Goldwater opposition on the defense issue.

An effort will be made to have Senator Margaret Chase Smith as the spokesman for this extreme point of view on the Armed Services Committee and in the Senate. The instrument of this conversion is Brig. Gen. William Lewis Jr., her administrative assistant, and a member of Goldwater's 9999th Air Force Reserve. Lewis is a reservist.

Lewis is responsible for Mrs. Smith's vote against the test ban treaty. He is responsible for her appearing on a TV program upholding Goldwater's views on defense. ( She had been so cool to Goldwater after the GOP convention I had some hope that, would abandon him and had, in fact, written a statement for her. )

But Lewis has become very anxious to add another star, and to succeed Goldwater as head of the 9999th, and apparently the Arizona Senator said he would recommend him on both scores.

A strange personal factor is involved. Lewis is, for all intents and purposes, the senior Senator from Maine. He dictates Mrs. Smith's views, her friends, and her social schedule, and is extremely jealous of anyone who might have any influence over her. He became terribly upset when, a short time after Mr. Johnson became President, he called Mrs. Smith for advice two or three times. They had been together on the old House Naval Affairs Committee, as well as the Senate Armed Services Committee. So, for this added reason, Lewis is ready to do anything he can to hurt the President.

The President may wish to re-examine the question of the reserve status of members of Congress and their aides. The best legal judgement I have heard is that being an active reservist is a plain violation of the Constitution, that is for a member of Congress.

Sincerely,





November 12, 1964

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Bundy Plays Hockey**

I have two out-of-town engagements next week which I propose to stretch a little (unless you complain very loudly) in the light of my noble and devoted service in Washington while most of the staff has been on holiday in the days since the election, to wit:

1. A visit to New York on Monday p. m. and Tuesday for a speech to a lot of educational tycoons Tuesday evening, and a couple of dinners with Mary at a restful distance from the children.

2. A visit to Boston from Friday evening to Sunday afternoon for the purpose of watching the Harvards play the Yales, in the company of our oldest son (who is now at Groton School) and his grandmother, who remains your devoted admirer.

I expect to do a little bit of work in New York and Boston in scouting for fresh talent, but I would not want you to think that I will be working full time on either expedition. My office will be covered by Bromley Smith at both times.

Mary says that you are on no account to construe these two expeditions as a vacation. She is making separate plans and will issue a later ultimatum on this point.

McG. B.

November 11, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The first paragraph of the enclosed letter is a message from Chip Bohlen which is worth reading because he is a very shrewd judge of the way Europeans judge us. I am sure he is right about your prestige there after the election.

McG. B.

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November 11, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

This is Taylor's latest, which is very slightly encouraging as against the description that we gave your yesterday. We are now going ahead with plans for his return, which will probably be set for early in the week after next rather than next week.

McG. B.

**NODIS 1385**



November 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A, for your approval, are Chris Herter's recommendations concerning the U.S. "Exceptions List" for the Kennedy Round -- the list of items on which we would not offer a 50% tariff cut. The recommendations are the outcome of the elaborate inter-agency procedure called for in the Trade Expansion Act. They were approved last week by a Cabinet-level committee of all interested agencies.

At Tab B are memoranda from Hodges and Feldman reflecting anxiety about the Herter recommendations regarding cotton and wool textiles. I am inclined to think that they are wrong and Herter right. A note to that effect is also at Tab B.

The tabling of exceptions lists is scheduled for next Monday, November 16. In order to meet that schedule, Herter will need your approval by approximately Thursday noon.

McG. B.

FMB:djw

November 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are the Hodges and Feldman comments on Chris Herter's recommendations concerning cotton and wool textiles.

Regarding cotton textiles, imports of which are limited by the Long-Term Arrangement (LTA), both Feldman and Hodges concur in the Herter recommendation not to put cotton on the exceptions list--to offer a full 50% tariff cut. Their purpose is only to record some misgiving, and, in Luther's case, to make clear that his concurrence is subject to the continued operation of the LTA.

Regarding wool textiles, too, Hodges does not wish his letter to be regarded as an appeal from Herter's recommendation. He has misgivings, however, on two counts:

1. All agencies agree that we should offer a full 50% reduction in the tariff on raw wool. Under a 17-year GATT obligation, such a reduction must be matched by an equivalent cut in that part of the tariff on wool manufactures which compensates U.S. mills for the extra cost of raw wool due to the tariff on wool. Herter recommends--and has the support of all agencies other than Commerce--that we abide by our GATT obligation. Hodges would prefer otherwise. Unless we follow Herter, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. will certainly invoke their rights under the GATT. We would be threatened by retaliation and would end up having to make substantial tariff concessions by way of compensation. (Hodges' economic case is weak. Whereas a full 50% cut in the compensatory duty on wool manufactures--matched by a 50% cut in the tariff on raw wool--will tend to reduce, if only very slightly, the protection enjoyed by integrated woolen producers, it will improve the competitive position of the smaller independents).

2. The other point raised by Hodges concerns the non-compensatory part of the tariff on wool manufactures. Harter recommends that as regards the non-compensatory component of the present tariff, items which now make up about 95% of all wool textile imports be placed on the exceptions list. Hodges would like to add the other 5% worth of import items (\$10 million). His case is none too clear. As the comments on the attached page suggest, these are not items which warrant the protection they now receive. (Some of the tariffs at issue are at Smoot-Hawley levels.)

I would recommend that you back Harter. He and his people have done a remarkable job over the past several months in hammering out an agreed list. He has the full support of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Interior, Labor, and the Council of Economic Advisors--even Commerce is loath to appeal.

McG. B.

Attachments

FBator:jcm



Mac:

94 ✓

Prepare a letter carrying out these  
recommendations to appropriate  
people.

LBJ/mf  
11-10-64  
9:30p

(Mr. Bundy, he was pointing to page  
4 when he said the above.)

*mf*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Policy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-44  
By is, NARA Date 10-24-99

This subject will be high on the agenda for our talks on Tuesday, and the following memorandum is designed to indicate (1) where the problem is now; (2) how the various parts of your Government see it; (3) what the solution may be; and (4) the guidance that you might wish to give at this stage.

1. Where the problem is now

When you last saw it, the multilateral force was proceeding through technical discussions in Paris, with a proposed target of agreement among participants by December. This was always optimistic, but the Germans and our MLF advocates both wanted a target to keep the work going. In the last six weeks three things have happened:

(1) The Germans rather clumsily gave too strong an impression that we and they might go ahead bilaterally. We gently cooled this idea. But it is still in the background. Our official position is one of supporting this force on a multilateral basis and believing that there will be a number of European participants when the time comes.

(2) The British Labour Government has adopted a much more flexible and interested posture than it had taken in opposition. Gordon Walker advanced unofficial proposals by which the United Kingdom would become a member of a new NATO nuclear group, using its Polaris submarines as its major contribution, with possible add-ons from aircraft and perhaps even a reluctant token contribution to the MLF itself. These proposals are carefully unofficial. Our response has been to show interest and to emphasize the importance of finding a system which meets the interests of the Germans. But we recognize and respect the British desire not to buy a whole new weapons system just two years after Nassau (to specialists in this subject, what is fascinating is the very close relation between Labour's current attitude and that of the Home Government -- the only important differences are those of political imagery, and on the whole those differences may make it a little easier for Labour than for the Conservatives to join in a new package deal).

(3) Meanwhile, back from South America, and ready for bear, General de Gaulle has been informed that this damnable thing may happen if he doesn't do something about it. From his point of view that would be a disaster, because it would tie the Germans and the British, and probably

~~SECRET~~

11/8/64

the Italians and the Dutch, to an Atlantic nuclear defense policy. The General honestly believes in what he calls a European policy. Moreover, both he and his devoted French followers honestly believe that only what is French is European and vice versa. So the French Government, by public statements, background briefings, and diplomatic *démarche*, has declared that the MLF is hostile to France and incompatible with a proper European policy.

2. How the various parts of your Government see it

In broad outline, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and I have very similar fundamental views. We believe that the MLF is the least unsatisfactory means of keeping the Germans well tied into the alliance, but we see it as a means, and not an end in itself. We are strongly opposed to a bilateral German-American bargain, although we are willing to make others just a little bit nervous by refusing to be categorical on this subject in public. We want the British in the game, just as we did at Nassau, and we are not disposed to make their task more difficult by sticking to a rigid formula -- or timetable. Guidance has already gone out to the field making it clear that we no longer expect final agreements in December -- or even in January.

Behind this basic agreement there are divergences. Dean Rusk rightly finds the French behavior outrageous, and I think he believes we are required to engage in a public debate against them. To a considerable extent he is surely right, but I feel -- and I think Bob does too -- that it is important for us to be more polite and more forthcoming than the French deserve, at every stage, in order to weaken their claim that we are deliberately encircling them and trying to prevent a European Europe.

Bob McNamara is sometimes torn between his very sound political assessments and his obligations as a salesman of dollar-earning hardware. For example, one significant element in the British position may be their need to keep in the business of producing useable and saleable aircraft. The best way of doing this politically is probably to license the TFX for production under a British name and paint-job, but that might cut into our own TFX market, and so Bob may be resistant. One of our jobs is to introduce McNamara the statesman to McNamara the merchant and make sure they do not get in each other's way (I am trying to make a beginning on this, but while the statesman always listens to Dean and sometimes to me, the merchant will listen only to you).

Potentially more dangerous than these marginal differences among your senior advisers is the fact that for at least two years the MLF has been handled at lower levels of the Government by men who have a passionate



11/8/64

commitment to their own view of Europe, of Germany, of the MLF, and of wise U. S. policy. These men are determined to make the Europeans do what is good for them, and at the moment their one and only medicine is the MLF as it stands. I think George Ball has softened these men a little in the last two weeks; some of them are now prepared to give a little to the new British Government. But they are still governed by an attitude of rigid hostility to the French, paternalistic domination of the Germans, and a serene conviction that if only Presidents will say what they tell them to, all will be well. They also tend to believe, against all experience, that if Uncle Sam plays the firm nanny, the British can be forced out of the independent nuclear business for their own good. These men drive the French and the British up the wall.

In addition to these troubles within the Executive Branch there is a major Congressional hurdle down the road. A curious collection of liberals, Joint Committee atom-guarders, and neo-isolationists would probably beat the MLF today if there were a totally free, silent, secret vote in the Senate. All of this can be turned around if we get a bargain that has wide European support, and it is not an immediate problem, but we should have it in the back of our minds.

### 3. Outlines of a solution

I strongly believe that this complex and challenging problem can and should be resolved over the next 6 to 9 months. The outlines of an answer are already visible, and they would include:

(1) A new name for the enterprise -- the one which looks best right now is "Atlantic missile force."

(2) A process of control which gives us a veto over any firing and gives to major European participants a veto over any element to which they themselves have made a major contribution.

(3) An ostentatiously open attitude to the French, with repeated invitations to membership and repeated offers of "cooperation" if they choose to stay outside.

(4) An interlocking set of financial and political bargains on details in which the dominant object is to make the British and the Germans see their common interest in agreement.

11/8/64

4. What you now need to do about it.

All this will take time, and much careful thought and action. I believe what it requires from the Presidency right now is:

(1) A clear signal to all departments that this problem is Presidential business and that all activities in support of U. S. policy in this field must be reported to the White House and have such clearance as the White House requires.

(2) An order that all negotiators and travellers working on this problem have written instructions cleared by State, Defense, and the White House (this is important because emissaries of State below Dean Rusk and George Ball often take a rather hard and dogmatic line, while emissaries of Defense tend often to be either merchandisers or military skeptics).

(3) An order that a detailed U. S. position be developed for discussion and decision by you in advance of Harold Wilson's visit, which could and should lead to a private understanding between you and him that would then be widened through the Germans and Italians to lay the necessary base for the whole enterprise.

After you have heard Rusk and McNamara on Tuesday, you may wish to confirm instructions of this sort, revised as you then decide.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EYES ONLY

November 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Determined to be an  
administrative marking

SUBJECT: Staffing the White House

By MIE On 4/5/77

1. I have now talked to Clark Clifford, Bob McNamara, and Ralph Dungan about this problem, and I think you ought to have a talk yourself with all three of them while you are making up your mind.

2. With some give and take and marginal differences of opinion, I find general agreement with the broad outline that Bill Moyers and I discussed with you on the phone. It is agreed that we need about a half a dozen senior men who work directly for you, and it is agreed also that in different ways Abe Chayes, Tom Finney and Joe Califano all have high qualifications. I think Clark may be somewhat less convinced than the rest of us that you need someone new as your chief lawyer, and he is also more doubtful than the rest of us that we ought to try to get Tom Finney (who is obviously a linchpin in his own office).

3. In two other offices I have personal views:

(1) I wonder if Larry O'Brien really wants to quit right away. I should think he might enjoy working with the new Congress, which is so much more hopeful than the old one. Gossip has it that he has not yet made a choice as to what he will do next, and I think you might well keep him for a year or so if you ask him yourself.

(2) I do think George Reedy is miscast in the Press Office. He can and should do very good work as a thoughtful adviser with no 24-hour-a-day responsibilities, but I doubt if he can survive the pressures of that office. One very interesting possibility for the Press Office would be Jack Valenti. There is no more important job in the White House, and I believe Jack could and would set a wholly new standard of performance. One of the absolutely central requirements is that the Press Secretary should be known to have full access to the President. Jack has it. He also has administrative skill and strong news sense, and with the right deputies he could be Press Secretary and also do a lot of your other business. Moreover, the Press Secretary has to be with the President wherever he goes, and at the same time he has status and rank which would make people stop speaking of Jack as your courier.



11/8/64

4. On balance, my candidate for Ralph Dungan's job is Tom Finney, in part because this is Ralph's own strong feeling, and his judgment on this matter is very good. Probably Tom would not wish to be the man merely in charge of recruiting -- important as that job is -- but he could also take on a good deal of your political work, because he has judgment and flair in this field too, as his work in Atlantic City shows. What Tom would have to have is a clear standing as one of your senior aides. I am sure he would not come as deputy or assistant to any of the rest of us. This is also true of Abe Chayes, and it is really quite understandable.

5. On a somewhat separate subject, I want you to know that I fully understand the force of your comment that you do not want to see people being fired in the newspapers. The Celebrezze case is a very good sample of how unhelpful gossip can be. At the same time, I think you may want to be careful yourself in what you say to members of the Administration and to the press about your current team. Bob McNamara and I both feel, for example, that it is very important that John McCone should be allowed to carry out his often-expressed desire to go back to private life, and I think in the current post-election mood of exhilaration he would change his mind if you told him to.

There is every reason to be as gentle and sympathetic as possible with people and to prevent the press from eating them all alive (if we can), but you do not want to tie your hands out of kindness.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's visit to you

1. David Harlech has called and informed me that the Prime Minister still wants very much to accept your invitation to Washington, but finds that December is getting crowded. He thinks the space between the rising of Parliament about the 11th of December and the meeting of the NATO Ministers on the 14th is too narrow (Rusk, Ball, and I also think so). ~~Then at~~ The time after NATO and before Christmas he slides over and suggests that it might be best to come here early in January.

2. Early January will be terribly crowded for you with the State of the Union and preparations for the Inauguration -- and George Ball points out that it is also just before a probable de Gaulle press conference and that it would not be a good time for a meeting of the Anglo-Saxons. To put the meeting off until late January, on the other hand, would undoubtedly create a feeling in Germany that we were falling into a British plan of indefinite delay.

3. So it is our feeling here that it would be very much better to get Wilson in and out of Washington before Christmas, and I would like to have your permission to propose to David Harlech that the meeting occur on or about the 21st or 22nd of December (a Monday and Tuesday).

4. I would like at the same time to suggest to David that such a meeting should be advertised as a consultation and not a time of binding decisions. It is essential that the Germans and Italians be in on the ground floor of any basic Atlantic decision, and that the French be invited to join as well. Moreover, we do not need final decisions of the kind that were forced upon us at the Nassau meeting of 1962.

5. When David Harlech called me, I sounded him out as to what Wilson really wanted and whether he was definitely excluding a meeting before Christmas, and I got the clear impression from David that if we press for a December meeting we can get one -- and that Harlech himself thinks it would be wise to do so.

6. When I next speak to you on the phone, I will ask for your reaction to this memorandum.

h. q. B.  
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

November 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation Report Thursday Morning

1. There is still no reason to speed your return here.
2. Soundings with Henry Wilson and indirectly with Larry O'Brien suggest that the most important thing to keep a hand on is the organization of the House. The Speaker is the sort of man who talks to the press easily, and his ideas may not be yours. It may be useful for you to talk with O'Brien and perhaps with the Speaker himself to keep him from conclusions or commitments that might complicate your problem. Wilson's own feeling is that it is possible and important to change the traditional 15-10 Ways and Means Committee and the Speaker may take some talking to. Wilson also feels that the liberals in the House need a little more recognition than the Speaker is likely to give them unassisted.
3. I had a first talk with Abe Chayes and while there are problems to be dealt with, he would I think be very much interested in coming to the White House as your Counsel. This would mean a choice, however, between him and Mike Feldman, because Mike would not stay with another man holding the Counsel's job. I am talking to Clark Clifford about this at lunch today and will have a further report later. I also mean to talk it over with Bob McNamara because he knows both the people and the problems involved.
4. Ralph Dungan is sending you a recommendation on Executive salaries in the White House. Moyers and I have passed this job to him because he is a departing hero and can give a more objective opinion. The one thing I would suggest is that without reference to what you may do about the rest of the staff, you can hurt no one else's feelings if you give Ralph the highest possible pay level for the period between the date of the pay raise and his departure. The Dungans have a large family and no independent resources.

I will send cables later in the day on Southeast Asia and on Atlantic policy.

McG. B.



November 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

1. Energetic inquiries up and down give no good evidence as to where Szulc got his story on a Humphrey trip to Europe in this morning's Times. I have even traced through and demolished four or five possible explanations, including a report that I myself was the source -- which I was not. My current guess is that widespread knowledge dating way back of possible Humphrey visit to Parliamentarians was parlayed by Szulc in typical irresponsible fashion. I find no repeat no evidence that Humphrey's own office was involved, and I am equally persuaded that the State Department is not repeat not guilty in this case, if only because the Department itself has been preoccupied with plans for George Ball's own perfectly legitimate trips. Sorry not to be more helpful.
2. Southeast Asia planning continues with real progress in departmental staff work and prospect of serious proposals ready for Cabinet level discussion Monday. Any day after that Rusk, McNamara and I could come to the Ranch, and I think there would be value in such a meeting. Dominant present views is carefully graduated increase of pressure with careful political preparation and maximum effort to obtain advance and continuing support of as many other governments as possible.
3. Current thinking on European problem is that we should do more listening than talking on MLF nuclear front while British and friendly continentals explore each other's thinking. A more immediate question may be possibly posed with respect to German grains price decision, and we will send you a week end memorandum on that one. But no repeat no immediate decision is required.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 10-16-98



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Patrick Gordon Walker

1. Last-minute reports say that Gordon Walker has given very good assurances on British Guiana and that the preliminary discussions of the MLF problem are to be continued by agreement below your level at this time. That leaves no major substantive problem that needs your affirmative comment to him, but you might briefly mention our interest in economic isolation of Cuba, and our necessary firmness on Article 19 at the UN. Both Tyler and I can pick up on these questions if you want us to.

2. Gordon Walker will probably be happy to do his own talking and would respond at Oxfordian length to any questions you want to put to him on the basic foreign policy purposes of the shiny new Labor Government. I have seldom seen a man more obviously satisfied with the seals of office.

*hfb,*  
McG. B.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 98-159**  
**By iss, NARA Date 4-28-99**

~~SECRET~~

J 100

October 27, 1964

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

What you could say about Kosygin's message -- if it is too long, you could simply use the last paragraphs about the Kohler/Kosygin talk.

"Some people think that it is a bad thing for us to have communication with the leaders of Russia. They even talk of breaking off relations. You and I know better. We know that in a dangerous world it is vital for the two greatest powers to try to know each other better -- however different they are and however opposite their beliefs. One of the first things I did as President was to talk with Mr. Mikoyan and tell him plainly that the tragic death of President Kennedy would not change American policy or weaken our determination to seek peace. That message was heard and in this last year we have taken small but useful steps toward better understanding.

"Now in the last two weeks there has been a sudden change in the Government of the Soviet Union. The new Government sent its Ambassador in to see me right away, and once again I told him of our steady purpose of peace. I told him that our guard was up but our hand out.

(Kah-see-gan)

"I also sent a message of greeting to Mr. Kosygin, the new head of the Soviet Government, and I can tell you tonight that I have had a very cordial answer from him with a renewed assurance that the Soviet Government on its side is determined to seek for better understanding. Mr. Kosygin had a very good talk with our Ambassador there.. Many differences remain, and each side will stick to its own beliefs, but I can promise you that while I am President we will keep our lines open for honest talk with the leaders of the Soviet Government. We know how to take care of ourselves, and we think it is much better to talk with these men than to rattle our rockets at them."

McG. B.

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10/26/64

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Initially the State Department proposed that we defer approving this purchase program until after the British elections and until we could better gauge what the U. K. might wish to do in regard to the Polaris program. However, the Secretary and I now feel that we should proceed with this program for the sale of non-nuclear hardware as though it were strictly routine and I, therefore, recommend your approval of the program as proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

If you concur in this proposed action, I shall sign the attached memorandum to Defense and AEC.

You will note that I have inserted a paragraph expressing your interest in completing this program by December 31, 1969, at which time the existing Agreement for Cooperation with the U. K. will expire. This was done on the recommendation of the State Department as a prudent thought reserving to us maximum freedom in renegotiating an extension of the cooperation agreement.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED *nscl 7/11/77*  
Authority *ERDA ltr 5/16/77, State ltr 6/19/77*  
By *rmg*, NARS, Date *8/8/77*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Patrick Gordon Walker

1. I attach Dean Rusk's preliminary memorandum for your talk with Patrick Gordon Walker. Gordon Walker will have Lord Harlech with him, and I will be there on our side.

2. The talks with Gordon Walker have been friendly and quite constructive so far. We have reached pretty good understanding on balance of payments, on Article 19, on Cyprus, and on Middle Eastern questions. We had our usual disagreement on Chinese representation in the UN.

3. The most interesting development is that Gordon Walker has indicated a considerable British interest in finding a way across the differences which have divided us heretofore on the MLF. There is still a distance to go and much complex work to be done, but the first signs are better than we feared before the election.

4. In this situation the following basic points are all that you need to cover, unless something additional comes up overnight:

(1) You meant everything you said about our basic friendliness for the Labor Government, in your television speech of October 18.

3.4(b)(1),(6) (2) You do want to speak to him about British Guiana and about our belief that it is of fundamental importance not to have an independent British Guiana dominated by Jagan. All our intelligence estimates --   -- agree in seeing Jagan as a real danger, and therefore we hope very much that the present schedule for elections in December will be kept firm. (The prospect is that Jagan will lose in these proportional representation elections, and he is trying to get the new government to put them off).

(3) In connection with British Guiana you may also want to tell Gordon Walker face to face of the understanding which President Kennedy and you had with Prime Minister Home -- that there would be no independent British Guiana before November 3. That undertaking runs out now, but there is still a deep common interest in avoiding

SANITIZED

SECRET

(page 1 of 2 pages)

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 01-52

By Sj, NARA, Date 1-10-02

REPRODUCTION COPY



~~SECRET~~

a Communist British Guiana.

(4) The MLF -- the main point to get across is our determination to proceed with this force, and our fundamental reason -- that the Germans cannot be treated forever as a second-class member of the Alliance. Gordon Walker understands this point, though he does not like it very much. If you have time, you might want to ask him to spell out the beginnings of Labor thinking. I will be able to comment on technicalities if you want.

(5) Finally, the Department would like you to speak of Article 19 and the Soviet UN payments problem, and they also suggest that you give him two sentences on Cuba. I myself think there is no urgency on either point in this particular meeting, but Dean Rusk's memo has good comments if you want to use them.

I will give you a last-minute memorandum in the morning.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

(page 2 of 2 pages)

10/24/64

103

To: Juanita Roberts

From: McGeorge Bundy

The stuff in this envelope is quite sensitive and should be shown to the President, but not left around where other people might see it (I don't mean you, of course).

McG. B.

104

October 24, 1944

**SANITIZED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 99-43**

**By CG, NARA Date 6-30-00**

~~TOP SECRET~~

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Chicom Test Site**

The attached sheet shows a remarkable intelligence feat. Our satellites have already photographed the Lop Nor test site and confirm our other intelligence reports on the Chinese shot. I have asked John McCane to do his best to see how much of this could be quietly put out, but he and I agree that we should be very careful about the degree of our skill here, because we really do not want the Russians to know how good our cameras are.

McG. B.

**Enclosure**

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Communist China: Keyhole Mission [REDACTED]  
17-20 October, produced excellent photography of the Chinese Communist nuclear test site at Lop Nor on 20 October, four days after the nuclear test.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

It shows a darkened, charred area [REDACTED] feet in radius around the former location of the shot tower. A lighter, somewhat circular area extends out to about [REDACTED] from the center.

This ground scarring is about what would be expected from a device with the 18 KT yield now indicated by other analysis.

The tent camp, vehicle park, and temporary buildings seen in the operations area prior to the test appear to have been totally removed. This suggests that as of 20 October there were no immediate preparations for further testing.

Tents at the probable control bunker 12.5 miles southwest of the shot area provide the only evidence of any current activity at the test site proper. However, many tents remain at the support area about 30 miles to the west.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-45  
By cb, NARA Date 7-19-00

~~HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT CONTROLS JOINTLY~~

SERVICE

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



105

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AP ticker on visit to Europe

I have raised hell up and down the State Department over these two ticker items. I find Dean Rusk is just as annoyed as I am. Neither he nor anyone I have yet talked to knows who the "authoritative sources" are, and Rusk himself is making it clear in a backgrounder this afternoon that there is no change whatever from the situation as it stood after you came back from Omaha -- namely, that you are not making any decisions now, but that you will feel free to go anywhere you want after November 3 if you think it useful to the national interest.

I am ~~very~~ annoyed about this because we had a perfect stance after your backgrounder in Air Force One, and it left you quite free -- as it should -- to do exactly as you want when you survey the world on November 4. But with luck, I think we can put this particular Humpty-Dumpty back together again.

hcl n.

McG. B.

7  
N

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE

## JOHNSON-EUROPE

WASHINGTON, (AP)-PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS REPORTED TO HAVE GIVEN UP TENTATIVE PLANS TO VISIT WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION, AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES REPORTED TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT WAS REPORTED EARLIER THIS MONTH TO BE CONSIDERING A POST-ELECTION TOUR OF ALLIED CAPITALS--ASSUMING HE WAS ELECTED NOV. 3.

THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN CHANGED MEANWHILE AND AS THINGS STAND TODAY JOHNSON WILL NOT GO TO EUROPE BEFORE THE INAUGURATION, THE SOURCES SAID.

THE WHITE HOUSE CHANGE IN PLANS WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE ADVICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. AS ONE RESULT OF THE CHANGED TIMETABLE HAROLD WILSON, BRITAIN'S NEW PRIME MINISTER, IS NOW EXPECTED TO COME TO WASHINGTON EITHER IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER, INSTEAD OF RECEIVING JOHNSON IN LONDON.

THERE WERE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ADVICE, OFFICIALS SAID. THEY STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT PLANS FOR A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE BEFORE THE INAUGURATION WERE TENTATIVE ANYWAY.

FIRST AMONG THE REASONS IS A QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. SOME GOVERNMENT LEGAL EXPERTS SAY THE ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT DOES NOT BECOME THE AUTOMATIC SUCCESSOR OF THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER ELECTION DAY, ONLY AFTER THE INAUGURATION.

IN ADDITION TO THIS MECHANICAL, BUT VERY IMPORTANT REASON, THERE ARE ALSO VARIOUS POLITICAL REASONS, THE SOURCES SAID.

PE1055AED 10/23

56

## WASHINGTON--ADD JOHNSON (54)

BECAUSE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO PREPARATION MADE FOR A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO EUROPE. IN ADDITION THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN MOSCOW AND THE LABOR PARTY TAKEOVER IN ENGLAND REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION OF SUCH A TOUR.

JOHNSON, PROVIDED HE IS ELECTED, DEFINITELY WANTS TO VISIT SOME OF THE MAJOR ALLIED NATIONS, PROBABLY IN THE SPRING OF 1965. THIS WOULD INCLUDE A RETURN VISIT TO WILSON, AND LIKELY A VISIT WITH CHANCELLOR LUDWIG ERHARD OF WEST GERMANY.

THERE ALSO IS THE QUESTION OF A VISIT TO FRANCE WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE. UNDER ONE EARLIER PROPOSAL JOHNSON WAS EXPECTED TO GO TO PARIS TO ATTEND A MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION COUNTRIES IN NOVEMBER. A SECOND SUGGESTION WAS THAT HE ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE NATO COUNCIL IN PARIS IN DECEMBER.

IT WAS LEARNED THAT PARIS SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST IN RECEIVING JOHNSON IF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S PRESENCE IN PARIS WAS TO ATTEND ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE NATO CONFERENCES.

LT1104AED 10/23

106  
7  
October 23, 1964

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Report from Cabot Lodge**

1. Cabot Lodge called this morning to report on his trip to Dallas and San Francisco. He said that the meetings there were excellent, and that the response to careful explanation of the real situation in Vietnam was equally good. He thinks we should do more of this sort of thing and that the country as a whole simply does not understand the complexities of the Vietnamese problem. I agreed with him, but we also agreed that this is not something we can deal with in the next two weeks except by such special efforts as his. He is going to make two more in other good cities (unnamed) before Election Day.

2. As a separate matter, Lodge asked me to report that in talking around in political circles in Massachusetts, he detects no measurable damage from the Jenkins affair. He thinks that at least in that part of the country, people are inclined to take a very charitable view of a man who stands by a friend in trouble as you have done.

McG. B.

Oct. 22, 1964

107

MR. PRESIDENT:

I attach two cables that are for your information rather than for action. One is Chou En-Lai's letter, which is being handled in the Department and which, for the moment at least, needs no answer; and the other is David Bruce's interesting estimate of Wilson's current plans.

McG. B.

Warsaw 885 10/19/64

London 1776 10/16/64



10/21/64

✓  
108

Mr. President:

This is your latest personal weekly report from Max Taylor. It has nothing startling in it but reports somewhat more progress on the political front than we have expected.

McG. B.

109

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Your Meeting with the Foreign Policy Panel

The people who are coming are:

Dean Acheson	Robert Lovett
General Bradley	James Perkins
John Cowles	
Allen Dulles	Secretary McNamara
Paul Hoffman	Secretary Ball
George Kistiakowsky	Ambassador Thompson
Arthur Larson	William Foster
Morris Leibman	John McCone
John McCloy	

Dean Rusk is sick at home, guarding his strength for a trip to Atlanta. George Ball will speak for State. In addition, we have McNamara, McCone, Thompson and Foster for specific subjects.

I suggest the following agenda:

1. Your words of welcome      You could say that you have assembled the experts to tell them all we know about the Chinese bomb and the Soviet change of Government. But your main purpose is to start the process of thinking about what we do after the election, whoever wins. You are going to have to leave after about half an hour but you hope the discussion through the morning can deal with three big subjects:.

1. Our relations with the Communists
2. The next steps in the Atlantic Community, and
3. Limiting the spread of nuclear weapons

Other subjects like Vietnam, Cyprus and the Congo may become very urgent after the election, but it is these three that seem to you and your advisers to be the ones on which consultation with the panel can be particularly helpful now.

2. A short briefing by John McCone on the Chinese bomb. Not all of these people are fully cleared yet for sensitive intelligence, so he will handle this quite generally.
3. Comment by Bob McNamara on the military balance of power in the Pacific.
4. Briefing on the Soviet change by Thompson. Many of the panel are acquainted with various Soviet leaders and this could be quite a lively discussion.
5. Political comment by George Ball, both on these events and on the British election.
6. Summary remarks by the President before leaving on the three subjects that will be discussed during the morning.

A. Relations with the Communists: We do not think all Communists are identical, and we do not think the fall of Khrushchev will end the various splits in that world. Our problem is what to do and what not to do in this situation.

B. The Atlantic Community. We are coming to a moment of truth on the future of the MLF and also on the future of the Kennedy Round, and we need to be very clear both about strategy and tactics. You might say that you have already told the British Ambassador that we are firm about the principle of the MLF but flexible about the process by which it comes to pass, as long as flexibility does not become an excuse for abandonment. - Also George Ball paper (attached).

C. Limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. You have already announced a four-point program in your Sunday speech and the most immediate problem is to make sure that the Chinese bomb does not tempt other nations into a similar course.

McG. B.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

George Ball has sent this over as a personal memorandum. I am not quite sure that Dean Rusk is signed on to it, and I have some reservations about it myself, especially as a proposal in the height of the campaign. But I have an obligation to George to make sure that you get it. This is something you might wish to toss back at your panel of consultants tomorrow. George is quite sure to raise it with them himself, however, if you want to leave it alone for now.

M.G.B.

McG. B.

OK  
Toss to  
Panel

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



IVY  
Seahong says he is signing

+ has always been a

Democrat. - So both

Rowe + I gave you

bum dope

inf. K.

L

111a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

L

I talked to Jim Rowe and he and I agree that it is probably just as well if Seaborg's name is left off because he is a Government employee (although exempt from the Hatch Act). Jim is going to go back through his contact and say that they ought to press hard to get around 40 signers some other way. He thinks this can be done.

He asked me to caution you against mentioning this to anyone, because it is supposed to be very much a self-starting enterprise of the Nobel Prize winners themselves.

M. J. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1964

112

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Items for your meeting with the Leadership

I attach 3 or 4 documents that you might conceivably want to refer to in the meeting with the Leadership, to give them some feel of what we have been up to in recent days.

*At Red Tab is agenda.*

At Tab A is your interview with Ambassador Dobrynin, on which I agree with Dean Rusk that your performance was superb.

At Tab B is a friendly confidential message from Harold Wilson, together with your message to him.

At Tab C is an unusually thoughtful telegram of assessment from Kohler, in which the first and last sentences may be worth quoting.

At Tab D is the text of the Pravda editorial (already published) with the fascinating paragraph which denounces Khrushchev, marked by arrows.

At Tab E is a report from Taylor which shows that, in addition to Americans, the Free World personnel in Vietnam has now reached the 1,000 mark representing 11 countries.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-22-77; NSC 10-4-79  
By inf, NARS, Date 11-5-79

Declassified upon removal of  
Security-Classified attachment

By NIE On 3/8/77

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

These are the two messages from Taylor which we discussed this morning and which I think you will want to read at your leisure. No immediate decisions are required, and not all of his factual estimates are accepted by everyone here, but the problem is certainly a big one. It has intense staff attention now and will be ready for your consideration early in November.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET CODE~~

*RTU 10/21*

*10116 NO 25*

*JPS 303 16 7-T*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1964

Talking points for President's conversation with Prime Minister Wilson

1. Wilson is definitely Prime Minister. Home resigned. The Queen sent for Wilson and he has agreed to form a government.

2. His majority is exceedingly narrow -- not more than five and perhaps as few as two over the Conservatives and Labourites combined.

3. He is giving a broadcast to his own countrymen at 3:00 (8 p.m. ~~on~~ <sup>their</sup> time) so your conversation **should** be brief and cheerful.

4. You can well indicate, if you wish, that if all goes well in November, you would be glad to have him come to Washington as soon as it makes sense for both sides (this is what he is pining to do, and even before the election I had a quite formal hint to this effect from Lord Harlech).

5. You could tell him that you have issued firm and calm <sup>the Chinese bomb,</sup> statements in the interest of peace on both the Soviet change and ~~this~~ <sup>one</sup>, and you could say that if he agrees, you plan to put out the telegram you have sent him (copy attached).

McG. B.

McG. B.

October 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara and I have authorized the sending of the attached cable, because we think it is very important to keep up the pace of these operations from the point of view of the Khanh government's morale and for some more sensitive reasons within the Pentagon. We both believe from your earlier attitude that this particular operation will not be bothersome to you, but if you have a question on it, it can be stopped by flash action anytime before 8 this evening.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

116  
J  
October 13, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible end-runs on financing the  
Israeli tank deal

You are about to go to New York, and experience suggests to me that sometimes on New York trips in October people talk about the needs of Israel. This is just a line to urge that if you meet any talk of this type you should be very friendly but avoid any specific commitments.

We have been both energetic and effective in swinging the German tank deal for the Israelis, and in their hearts they know we are right. If there is any pressure still, it is simply because of the ineradicable habit of believing that the U. S. Government is vulnerable in election years in October. This Administration is genuinely pro-Israeli, but we should not now make additional commitments of funds which AID may very well not have next year, and which Israel, on a fair reading, does not currently need.

This may be a false alarm, but I think we owe you this much warning.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-108  
By lip, NARA, Date 11-3-92

117 2  
October 6, 1964

Minutes of a meeting of October 5, 1964, 4:15 p. m., Cabinet Room

Present were: The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, McGeorge Bundy and, for the last two items, John McCone

1. It was agreed that no decision would be taken at present on sending the Secretary of State to South Vietnam. The Secretary argued that at present such a visit would be misunderstood, lead to criticism, and have no positive results. It might be wise to reconsider the question later. Specifically, the Secretary suggested that after the British election it might be useful for him to go to the UK and then come home by way of the Far East.

2. It was agreed that we would not at present respond affirmatively to Souvanna Phouma's request for interdiction operations along Route 7. We should point out to him that such operations now would put the onus of escalation upon us. We should not, however, foreclose the possibility of a different decision in the event of renewed hostile activity by the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh.

3. The President approved the next scheduled marine operation under the 34-A program, a patrol proceeding to a distance of three miles from the North Vietnamese coast line.

4. The President agreed to a program of Laotian bombing in the communications corridors of Southern Laos, using the T-28 force now available. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that there was implied in this program a limited use of U. S. fighters, at some stage, for suppressive strikes, but Presidential approval for this part of the program was neither asked nor given.

5. The Secretary of State proposed the formation of a national committee for the Alliance for Progress, and the President agreed.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 1, item 369

By gw, NARA, Date 10-16-98



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-44

~~SECRET~~

By is, NARA Date 10-24-99

October 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chief Macapagal business this afternoon is attached communique, now approved by Macapagal. At Fil request, it's long and meaty, with many details befitting our "special relationship": (1) reaffirmation of SEATO commitments and defense in SEA; (2) study of mutual security needs; (3) joint commission on veterans' claims; (4) our support of land reform; (5) we'll plan together on using joint fund for education; (6) our interest in rural electrification; (7) new PL 480 rice; (8) our stand on new Fil retail trade law, etc. We're happy with it.

Macapagal told McNamara that he thought it worthwhile to gamble on keeping Sukarno from going East--but Sukarno needed some kind of "golden bridge" (i. e. aid) to justify his climbing down on Malaysia issue. For Vietnam he mentioned a battalion of troops (1200), but a lot of staff work is needed yet. We don't see much meaningful short term input. Bob said we'd find some way to help the Fils re-orient their defenses to the south, and beef up their military budget. Any increases in our MAP would depend on their increasing too.

Most of Macapagal-Rusk talk was on Malaysia and Sukarno. This time our friend stressed his disillusionment with the Bung, so Rusk suggested that restoring Fil-Malay relations would be a good signal.

Macapagal's noon Press Club talk (attached) was helpful on Vietnam.

Talking points. You might hit the following for emphasis:

1. Visit most helpful from your viewpoint. We rely on our Fil friends to advise us on Southeast Asia.
2. We're delighted that Fils want to help out more in Vietnam. We'll be in touch on staff level as soon as possible.
3. Since Malaysia-Indonesia wasn't highlighted in your talk yesterday (it was with Rusk and McNamara), you might ask for any final words of advice.
4. We'll keep trying to forestall an Indo-Malaysia blow-up, but hope Fils will patch things up with Malays, as a warning to Sukarno.
5. Wish him pleasant US trip (his path crosses yours 11 October in Frisco).

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten mark]*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I want to thank you for letting me go to New York this afternoon. I am sorry to spring it on you at the last minute, but it did not come up until yesterday, and I did not know until this morning that Jackie was personally interested. This is a matter of the Kennedy Library, and I have become the hyphen between the Kennedys and Harvard, so I feel that I must do it.

I can assure you that we will be fully staffed here, and that I will be on the job myself every day that you are away between now and Election day. We are also making arrangements to send Jack Valenti each afternoon a short but up-to-date report on world problems. He will not bother you with it unless you ask for it or unless there is a crisis. But it will be on hand every day. We will of course also come through at once by urgent message or by telephone when we have anything hot.

McG. B.

120

L7

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The enclosed document is the original of the Navy's report on the 18 September Gulf of Tonkin incident. I think you may want to read the summary conclusions at the paper clip, and also the Division Commander's report at enclosure 6.

The Navy concludes at this stage that the only reliable evidence of contact is by radar, and that the only reliable contacts, even on radar, are those relatively early in the engagement. On this basis they reach the firm conclusion that there was one boat in the area, and quite possibly a second. The strongest single argument for a firm radar contact is at enclosure 1, and I doubt if you will find it conclusive.

The Division Commander's report is worth reading, if only to show the attitude of the man on the spot. He was obviously inundated by flash questions from all his superiors, and he does not seem to have understood fully how important it was for him to tell us exactly what happened. He does recognize that he made a most serious mistake in using the word "attacked" in his very first message. If he had not done that, the pressures which developed here would probably never have been generated.

The Navy is taking corrective action to provide much more powerful communications in future patrols of this sort, and I suspect that the next Captain in this position will understand better the need for keeping his superiors fully and accurately informed.

I see no need for further action on your part, but I think this document will make an interesting footnote for this chapter of your memoirs.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Navy for 6/3/77

By MB4, NALM, date 7-20-77



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*L*

~~SECRET~~

October 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Doug Dillon asked me a couple of weeks ago to report on his conversations at the finance meetings in Tokyo. The following are the leading items distilled from these conversations:

1. The Japanese Minister of Finance, Tanaka, presented the Japanese case for exemption from the interest equalization tax in such a way as to indicate that the problem is more political than economic. As a result, Dillon concludes that the political need can be met in other ways, perhaps by settling the air route discussions which have been put over until after the election. I myself think Dillon's glasses may be somewhat rose-tinted because of his great interest in avoiding any further concessions on interest equalization.

On the other hand, it is a matter on which we can stand firmly if we wish to.

2. The French Finance Minister, Giscard d'Estaing, said that the French Government and President de Gaulle were very hopeful that after our election it would be possible to take some steps that would lead to an improvement in French-American relations. Dillon expressed his agreement and said he was sure that you would be pleased if such a better understanding could be reached between yourself and President de Gaulle.

I see nothing novel here. The second-level Frenchmen are always in favor of better top-level contacts -- and the heart of the matter is always what the General himself thinks and does.

*h.f.B.*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 90-148  
By ing NARA, Date 12-3-90



123  
October 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: How to be a Statesman in the last month

I am working on the foreign policy speech you asked for, and I will have a draft when you get back from your trip. But my first guess is that you will not like it very much. The fact is that in 800-1200 words, no man can be an international statesman unless he has a fancy new proposal -- and we don't and shouldn't have before Nov. 3. One can be eloquent, but one cannot be very solid. And it is solidity, not fancy phrases, that people are looking for.

A see two possible answers to this problem. The one I like less is a longer speech. At Manchester and again at Johns Hopkins you went about 4000 words, mainly off the cuff. This is about the same length as JFK's American University speech and Eisenhower's most successful peace speech on April 16, 1953. In that length a man can spread himself and give depth to his arguments. In an intimate and informal way this is the direct impact of your Manchester and Hopkins speeches. A prepared text could of course be somewhat tighter and therefore cover more ground.

But I believe this is not the best way of doing it. My own suggestion is that you ought to have a TV conversation on foreign policy with Walter Lippmann, on a half hour of paid political time about ten days before the election. Lippmann himself is extremely good at this sort of thing, and so are you. With proper forethought you could informally cover 4 or 5 great issues like Peace, Relations with Communism, the Atlantic Alliance, the progress of the Hemisphere, and the role of the President. This could be done quietly and informally, and the format would I thin, draw a large audience.

It is true that Lippmann is regarded by some as a soft-liner. But to most people he is simply the wisest publicist in the country. You could easily set yourself off a little bit from him on Vietnam or on national defense, and anyway the risk of contamination is low.

Moreover, there is a deeper advantage here. The one place where Goldwater may have scored a little is on the Bobby Baker tack. The readiness of a man of Lippmann's standing to talk respectfully and freely with you in a campaign broadcast would work directly against this kind of propaganda.

Moreover, this general format could be used in other shorter discussions of specific topics -- education with someone like John Gardner, civil rights with someone like Ralph McGill, farm and poverty problems with someone like Hubert Humphrey, and business and labor problems with Henry Ford and George Meany -- although they may be hard to bring into the same room.

None of this is intended as an excuse for not producing a draft speech, and I repeat that you shall have it, but these interim ideas seem just good enough to pass on.

McG. B.



October 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Macapagal Visit

You are seeing Macapagal in a ceremonial greeting and a parade tomorrow morning. Your business talk is now set for 5, and your dinner is at 8.

The arrival greeting and the toast are being worked on by Busby.

The most important real subject for this meeting is Vietnam, and a summary of possibilities is at Tab B. My own suggestion is that you may wish to let Macapagal lead by telling him that you have heard of his very interesting proposal to our CIA man in Manila, that you are very much interested, and that you would like to know just how he envisions Filipino support in operation. The way the Pentagon and State see it is at Tab B, and my own slightly more optimistic view is in a handwritten footnote at the end of that memo.

The more general issues of the meeting are covered briefly by Bob Komer at Tab A, and at somewhat greater length by Dean Rusk at Tab C.

McG. B.

125

October 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached short memorandum was provided to me by John Gardner, who knows more about education and the ordinary citizen than anyone I know. He makes the point that "the usual high government pronouncement on education is abstract, official in tone, and full of statistics." His memorandum is designed to suggest the kind of warm, personal, informal tone which he thinks would get across to parents.

This is the sort of thing that might be done in five or ten minutes on TV, and if you wanted to give it a very high tone, you might simply do it as an interview with John Gardner. He is one of the few educational eggheads with a strong face and a down-to-earth manner. He has an enormous reputation throughout the educational world and deserves it.

McG. B.

126

October 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked for a set of authenticated Goldwater quotes that might be used in an advertisement to show his trigger-happy nature.

The attached page shows a set of seven that look pretty good to me, especially when they are taken together. There could be more or less, according to your choice.

My own hunch is that this ought to be a matter for major full page advertisements in the last ten days or two weeks, and I have not heard of a better format than the one which you suggested. If you approve, I will take up with Ken O'Donnell the best way of getting this out.

McG. B.

OK - handle with O'Donnell \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



127 2  
October 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your ad lib speeches to different groups in the last week have made a tremendous impression. Don Wilson tells me, for example, that the television tape of the Manchester speech is politically one of the most powerful performances he has ever seen. He thinks it will have great impact wherever it can be used.

There is one very small matter on which I get negative reports -- the little story about Mr. Kleberg and his Cuban ranch does not seem to get across to most listeners -- or at least so I am told. You quite rightly decided a couple of weeks ago that there was no money in a general discussion of Cuba in Florida, and it may be that the difficulty people are having with this story confirms your general judgment on that point. In any event, I pass the puzzlement along for your own judgment.

McG. B.

128  
October 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cabot Lodge

1. I talked to Cabot Lodge and in accordance with what Jack Valenti suggested I told him that you want to see him for a few minutes at the end of the ceremony on the International Cooperation Year tomorrow noon. I told Lodge of your suggestion that he make some speeches on Vietnam to World Affairs Councils, and he said he is doing just that. He has three dates already (one of them in San Francisco), and wants to talk with you a minute about where else he might go. He particularly wonders whether Texas might be helpful.

2. I also spoke to Lodge about joining the panel on peace, and making a trip to Africa. He thinks the former is unnecessary and might be a little conspicuous at this stage. As for Africa, he would be glad to go, but thinks the trip would be more useful in November because it relates not to our election but to stiffening the Africans on the Chinese representation issue in the United States General Assembly.

3. I think Lodge is right on all counts. He said that anyone with any sense would know that he was making these speeches because of his basic confidence in the Administration's foreign policy, and he said he thought that his relations with us reminded him of the man who had three whiskies and was feeling fine -- there was no need of anything more.

McG. B.



October 1, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy and your Backgrounder with the Bureau Chiefs

1. On your possible NATO trip, the publicity has been good, with the exception of a slight backlash from "French official sources" in Paris. I suggest you keep precisely to the line you laid down the other day and protect your freedom to decide after the election whether you will go before January or not. I begin to see a lot of business here in November and December, and there is also a rather tricky problem of protocol with General de Gaulle. As it stands the story is good.

2. On the Chinese nuclear test, October 1st went by without incident out there, and the attached Reuters ticker (Tab A) suggests that Peking is downgrading its own nuclear position for the moment. So I remain unrepentant about proposing that our warning come from Rusk and not from you. You may want to say simply that we have very good evidence of advanced preparations for testing, and think it proper to notify the world of this development. You might add that it is always possible that the Chinese may still be missing some essential element, and that our indicators are in no sense conclusive.

3. On Vietnam, I think you may wish to give a hint of firmness. It is a better than even chance that we will be undertaking some aid and land action in the Laotian corridor and even in North Vietnam within the next two months, and we do not want the record to suggest even remotely that we campaigned on peace in order to start a war in November. The middle course we are on could well require pressure against those who are making war against South Vietnam, but the timing and techniques of such pressure are a very delicate business, as you have said several times before.

4. More generally, I would go after these people pretty strongly on the difference between the real world and the Goldwater world. Two simple examples:

(1) Brazil, Chile, Panama and Cuba all show that Castro has lost ground while freedom has gained.

(2) Barry may think we may have lost ground in Europe, but the Europeans know better. I attach at Tab B a German poll (public) which shows what the Germans think of the balance of power. In 1960 only 32% thought the Americans and the West were stronger, while 22% thought it was the Russians and the East. Today 54% says it is the Americans and the West, and only 7% think it is the Russians and the East. Each year since we came in, there has been a gain for our side. Moreover, if you want to throw in a joke, you might point out that the more education people have, the better they understand this basic ~~fact~~ fact.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Cables from Max Taylor

Attached is Max Taylor's first response to your request for a weekly assessment and an earlier telegram to which he refers at the end of this one. There is not much comfort here, and Bill Sullivan, who is in town this week, confirms the particularly serious point made at the end of Max's telegram to you -- namely that there are increasing signs that the Vietnamese are blaming us for their troubles. We shall be ready to ask you for certain decisions on corridor air and land operations in the next few days, and at the same time we will want to work on the question of the exact language we use about Vietnam in the next month. Unfriendly critics have found a gap between what you said in Manchester, N. H., and what my brother said in Tokyo, although in strict logic both speeches were within the framework of existing policy.

McG. B.

McG. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Leak on the Gulf of Tonkin

I talked to Cy Vance on the attached leak from the Navy on the Gulf of Tonkin, and he asked me to tell you that he is even more annoyed than you will be. He adds that there is no final report from this survey team, but that the AP story is pretty near right, as far as it goes. We can expect this to add to the confusion on this subject.

This makes two leaks today for the Pentagon, because I think the Fryklund story on our estimates of Soviet missiles must have come from there too. The Fryklund story does us no harm politically but is a very serious security breach on a ~~quietly~~ held set of estimates.

highly

McG. B.

McG. B.

164

131 a Bundy

TONKIN (TOPS 93)

WASHINGTON (AP)-A NAVY SURVEY TEAM HAS RETURNED FROM THE SCENE OF THE LATEST GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT WITH A CONCLUSION THAT TWO HIGH-SPEED CRAFT THREATENED PATROLLING U.S. DESTROYERS, IT WAS LEARNED TODAY.

ORIGINAL REPORTS AFTER THE INCIDENT ON SEPT. 18 SPOKE OF VARYING NUMBERS OF HOSTILE SHIPS, PRESUMABLY COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE PT BOATS, AND A STATEMENT BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA MENTIONED FOUR UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS AS MENACING THE DESTROYERS.

INFORMED SOURCES TOLD THE ASSOCIATED PRESS THE SURVEY TEAM FOUND THAT RADAR CONTACTS SUGGESTED FIVE ONCOMING CRAFT BUT THAT IT WAS DETERMINED THERE WERE ONLY TWO "HARD TARGETS."

THE RADAR BLIPS THOUGHT AT THE TIME TO BE THREE ADDITIONAL HOSTILE VESSELS ACTUALLY WERE "DUPLICATE IMAGES" ON THE SCREENS OF THE TWO RACING U.S. DESTROYERS, SOURCES SAID.

THE TEAM, MADE UP OF BOTH NAVAL OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS, REPORTEDLY CAME UP WITH NO HARD EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT ANY OF THE DESTROYER GUNS HIT THE APPROACHING CRAFT, ALTHOUGH SOURCES SAID RADAR DID PICK UP SIGNS OF SHELL FLASHES IN THE WATER AROUND THE TARGETS.

WE349PED 10/1

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WASHINGTON--ADD TONKIN (164)

SOURCES SAID WARNING SHOTS WERE FIRED AT THE ONCOMING SHAPES AT ABOUT 11,000 YARDS RANGE AND AGAIN AT ABOUT 10,000 YARDS BEFORE THE DESTROYERS TOOK DEAD AIM AT ABOUT 8,000 YARDS.

THE BLIPS DISAPPEARED FROM THE RADARSCOPES AND NO WRECKAGE, BODIES OR DEBRIS HAVE BEEN FOUND.

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