

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

DATE

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 2

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
012	memo	Bundy to the President re Martin cable from Bangkok (Exempted 1977)	S	2	2/17/65	A
048a	cables	compilation of Sullivan cables (Sanitized per RAC 3/10/02)	S	17	2/1/65	A
050c	cable	1165 from Vientiane	S	1	1/31/65	A
059	memo	Bundy to the President re leaks on Latin America trip <i>open 1-12-10 NLJ/RAC 09-4</i> (dup. #24, NSF, IMTF, Pres. Trip, South America, May 1965)	C	1	1/27/65	A
090	memo	Bundy to the President re PM Pearson's visit (Exempted 1977)	C	1	1/16/65	A
105	memo	Bundy to the President re McNamara check-up (re-reviewed 12/8/83)	C	1	1/11/65	C, A
108	memo	Bundy & Komer to President re Rowan trip to Africa (Sanitized 1977)	S	1	1/9/65	A
121	memo	Bundy to the President re talk with Dobrynin (Exempted 1977)	C	2	1/5/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President**Folder Title** "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 8, 1/1 - 2/28/65"**Box Number** 2**Restriction Codes**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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11/20/2009

jc
Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 2 of 2

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130	memo	Bundy to the President re Pearson visit (Sanitized 1977)	C	1	1/4/65	A

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Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>State 3-27-78 + NSC 9-15-78</i> Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#13 Memo	Bundy re Taylor reports <i>Exempt</i> TS 2 p 4-14-87 NLS 86-72 <i>OPEN 10-22-98</i>	2/17/65	A
#14a Memo	Bundy re cable to Taylor <i>open 6-15-79 in 8</i> TS 1 p	2/16/65	A
#14b Draft	<i>open 8-12-88 NLS 86-231</i> draft cable to Taylor <i>Exempt</i> TS 3 p	2/16/65	A
#14c Cable/draft	cable to Bruce TS 3 p [near & duplicates #14b]	2/16/65	A
#41 Memo	Bundy re situation in SVN <i>Exempt</i> TS 8 p	2/7/65	A <i>Open 8-1-84</i>
#41a Paper	Bundy re policy of reprisal <i>Exempt</i> TS 5 p	undated	A <i>Open 8-1-84</i>
#51 Memo	Bundy re Wilson reply on Indonesia TS 1 p <i>Open NLT 98-177 4-28-99</i>	1/30/65	A
#55 Memo	Bundy re cable to Taylor <i>open 6-15-79 in 8</i> TS 1 p	1/27/65	A
#91 Memo	<i>open 4-14-87 NLS 86-72</i> Bundy re cable to Taylor <i>Exempt</i> TS 2 p	1/14/65	A
#95 Memo	Bundy re message to Soviets <i>NSC 8/15/77</i> TS 1 p	1/12/65	A
#107 Memo	Bundy re Soviets <i>Exempt, State la 6/23/97</i> TS 1 p <i>open 2-17-98</i>	1/10/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy,
Memos for the President, Vol. 8, 1/1 to 2/28, 1965

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2 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for State concurrence.		
#2 Memo	Bundy to Pres re meeting w/de Murville <i>sanitized</i> <i>OPEN 8/1/96 NLS 95-208</i>	2/19/65	A
#6 Memo	Bundy re Vietnam & UN <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i>	2/19/65	A
#9e Ltr.	Bundy to Miller re foreign trade	2/2/65	A
#12 Memo	Bundy re Martin cable fm Bangkok <i>Exempt State Ltr 8/29/77</i>	2/17/65	A
#15 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Bohlen <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i>	2/16/65	A
#18a Memo	Bundy re LBJ/Wilson phone conversation <i>Exempt State Ltr 8/29/77</i> <i>OPEN 10-22-98</i>	2/15/65	A
#20a Memo <i>Open 3/04</i>	Bundy (dup. #18a above)	2/15/65	A
#23 Memo	Bundy re Max Taylor <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-47</i>	2/14/65	A <i>corrected record 2/24/92</i>
#26 Memo	Bundy re meetings w/Williams, Counter-insurgency school <i>open 5-28-92 NLS 91-5</i>	2/12/65	A + C
#29 Memo	Bundy re message to Soviets <i>Exempt State Ltr 8/29/77</i>	2/11/65	A
#33 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Bruce <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i>	2/10/65	A
#34 Memo	Bundy re Dodd, Tshombe, Congo <i>open 1-12-89 NLS 87-30</i>	2/10/65	A + <i>C</i>
#35 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/German ambassador <i>sanitized</i> <i>OPEN 10-16-98</i>	2/9/65	A

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3 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH, State concurrence continued.		
#37 Memo	Bundy re meeting w/Bruce <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i> C 1 p	2/9/65	A
#42 Memo	Bundy re Ball MLF speech " C 1 p	2/2/65	A
#45 Memo	Bundy re Kosygin reply " S 1 p	2/2/65	A
#46 Memo	Komer/Bundy re Dodd, Tshombe <i>open 9-25-79 ing</i> S 1 p	2/2/65	A
#50 Memo	Bundy re Sullivan cables <i>open NCSO 19-002-4-4; 12/19/01</i> S 1 p	1/31/65	A
#51 Memo	Bundy re Wilson reply <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i>		
#53b Memo	Bundy re European trip C 1 p	1/28/65	A
#59 Memo	Bundy re leaks on LA trip C 1 p (duplicates #24 in NSF, IM&T, President's Trip, South America (May, 1965))	1/27/65	A
#79 Memo	Bundy re State organization <i>OPEN 10-22-98</i> C 6 p	1/21/65	A + C
#82 Memo	Bundy re Ball memo <i>open 9-25-79 ing</i> C 1 p	1/19/65	A
#89 Memo	Bundy re McGhee/Erhard meeting <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i> S 1 p	1/17/65	A
#90 Memo	Bundy re PM Pearson's visit <i>Exempt State Sec 8/9/77</i> C 1 p	1/16/65	A
#101 Memo	Bundy re foreign heads visits <i>open 6-20-79 ing</i> C 2 p	1/11/65	A
#102 Memo	Bundy re press contacts " C 1 p	1/11/65	A

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4 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH, State concurrence continued.		
#108 Memo	Bundy re Rowan trip to Africa <i>sanitized</i> S 1 p	1/9/65	A
#121 Memo	<i>Exempt. State Sec 8/29/77</i> Bundy re talk w/Dobrynin C 2 p	1/5/65	A
#123 Memo	Bundy re German visitors <i>open 6-20-79 sig</i> C 2 p	1/5/65	A
#128 Memo	Bundy re Harriman " C 1 p	1/4/65	A
#130 Memo	Bundy re Pearson visit <i>sanitized</i> C 1 p	1/4/65	A
#131 Memo	Bundy re State of Union message <i>open 6-20-79 sig</i> C 2 p	1/3/65	A
#133 Memo	Bundy re Alsop column " S 1 p	1/2/65	A
#134 Cable	Busby to Bundy re Pres. meetings w/foreign heads of state " C 1 p	1/1/65	A
#70 Memo	Bundy to the President re Churchill funeral, balance of payments, and Vietnam C 2 p	1/25/65	A
#64 Memo	Bundy to the President re Vietnam 1 p	1/26/65	C <i>"C" removed 7-31-86</i>

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5 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for NSC concurrence.		
#17 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Vietnam S 3 p	2/16/65	A
#54 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re Vietnam S 2 p	1/27/65	A
#56 Memo	Bundy (dup. #54 above) S 2 p	1/27/65	A
#60 Memo	Komer/Bundy to Pres. re aid to Guinea C 1 p	1/26/65	A
#71 Memo	Bundy to Pres. S 3 p	1/24/65	A
#72 Memo	Bundy to Pres. S 1 p	1/23/65	A
#109b Memo	McCafferty to Bundy re communications C 1 p	1/7/65	A

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6 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Defense concurrence. <i>Sanitized, OAS 5/10/77</i>	<i>Open 5/31/01 MS 73-46</i>	
#28 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re damage reporting S 1 p <i>same sanitization 10-15-87 per NLS 86-232</i>	2/11/65	A
#105 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re McNamara check-up C 1 p <i>re-reviewed 8/01/83</i> <i>11 12/08/83</i>	1/11/65	A + C

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7 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for Treasury concurrence. <i>Treasury ltr 6/30/67</i>		
#39 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re balance of payments meeting <i>S 1 p</i>	2/8/65	A
#75 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re BOP Committee work <i>C 2 p</i> <i>Treasury ltr 6/30/67</i>	1/22/65	A

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8 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: White House, for ERDA concurrence. <i>4/25/77, 10/18/77, ERDA 5/24/77</i>		
#68 Memo	Bundy to Pres. re UK cooperation S-RD 1 p	1/25/65	A
#68a Memo	LBJ to SecDef, et al re proposed transfer of materials to UK S-RD 1 p	1/26/65	A

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9 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE			DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: Department of State				
#48a Cable	compilation of Sullivan cables	S	17 p	2/1/65	A + C
	<i>State ltr 2/14/78</i>				
#50b Cable	1164 fm Vientiane	S	1 p	1/31/65	A
#50c Cable	1165 fm Vientiane	S	1 p	1/31/65	A + C
	<i>State ltr 2/14/78</i>				
#50d Cable	1166 fm Vientiane	S	1 p	1/31/65	A
#50e Cable	1167 fm Vientiane	S	1 p	1/31/65	A + C
	<i>State ltr 2/14/78</i>				
#89a Cable	2651 fm Bonn	S	2 p	1/16/65	A

FILE LOCATION

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10 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: Department of State		
#31a Cable	2445 fm Saigon <i>State ltr. 3/2/78</i>	TS 4 p	2/9/65 A
#31b Cable	1653 to Saigon	TS 2 p	2/8/65 <i>X epw 8-1-86</i>
#31c Cable	2466 fm Saigon <i>State ltr 3/2/78</i>	TS 2 p	2/10/65 A

FILE LOCATION

NSF [REDACTED], McGeorge Bundy, Bundy,
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11 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10-15-87 same designation #106 Memo Sanitized More released 1-16-03 #99 Memo 100 open 9-18-07	Agency: White House, for CIA concurrence. NLJ 86-232 Sanitized 5/31/01 NWS 99-46 Sanitized NSC lu 2/1/78, CIA lu 8/4/77 Bundy to Pres. "Secret" XS 1 p Bundy to Pres. G 1 p per NLJ 86-232	1/10/65 1/11/65	A A

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1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mary and I put off our vacation last week, and for good reason. This has been a week in which it was quite crucial to get your policy clearly understood, and I think that has now been done.

Now I'd like to get her away for a week and two weekends. She needs it -- and to be honest, so do I.

There's never a good time to go -- but I do not think the next week will be very startling. If the Saigon situation takes a week or so to sort out (as I rather expect), there will be very little to do here. If it gets settled quickly, we'll presumably go ahead as we decided yesterday, but very carefully and quietly and without speeches. Your policy is clear. Rusk and McNamara will both be here. So will Brom Smith and my very good Vietnam expert, Chet Cooper.

Our plan is to go to Eleuthera, to Juan Trippe's house, with the Brewsters of Yale. I'll be able to get back on 6 hours notice at any time. We would leave Saturday noon, February 20, and get back Monday, March 1.

May I have not only your permission but your blessing? Mary wants to go (and needs to) but she'll do much better if you tell her she can.

McG. B.

McG. B.

P. S. This trip will not become public if the ingenuity of my secretaries and my staff can prevent it. We'll take our cue from McCone, who is away right now and no one knows it. (He gets back tonight)

Yes ☒

No ☐

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-208

~~SECRET~~

By ing, NARA, Date 7-1-96

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Couve de Murville at 11:30 this morning

1. Obviously the dominant topic is Southeast Asia and especially South Vietnam. Couve takes the immediate military disturbance calmly, although he obviously feels that it reinforces his own conviction that there is not, and cannot be, any workable government in a situation of "American occupation." He professes to think there is a possibility of such a government after a political settlement and an American withdrawal, but he produces no evidence whatever to support the notion that such a government would be anything but Communist.
2. Couve told me that he thought we had decided on "escalation" and that he was very fearful of the results. This is what he has told others and I think it is what he honestly believes. I pointed out that no one had more experience of negotiation and of the settlement of political differences than you, and that our current lack of interest in negotiation should not be construed as willful insistence upon a violent solution. Couve readily admitted -- and indeed volunteered -- the opinion that you are a very prudent man and that you have made no mistakes since November 1963 -- "a remarkable achievement."
3. I pointed out to Couve that just a year ago today he had suggested to Bohlen in a private talk that we might have to take further military action before we would be in a position to negotiate. He did not deny that he had said this (the cable is at Tab A). He simply said that he thought it was now too late for such measures. In his own view the dangers of action beyond the 17th Parallel outweighed any possible return, and he thought we would do better to limit our attention to the South. I told him that you more than any other man in the government were insistent upon a maximum effort in the South, but that we also had to take account of the very heavy role and responsibility of Hanoi and of the problem of morale which is created when there is increasing violence against our people and the Vietnamese, and no visible response.

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- 2 -

All this was standard back and forth. I then tried to make a more important and less obvious point -- without much success. I told him that we did not think it was helpful for the French to make public calls for a conference. He said that this was no more than a restatement of their own well-known position. I said that any restatement was a political act, especially at a moment of tension. I told him that I thought the French might have to choose between having a real private diplomatic role in these matters and taking the posture of public disapproval of what an ally was doing. I did not see how they could do both. Couve said that France aspired to no private role and that we could not object if the French stated their honest opinion. This was the only sign of heat which he displayed in the whole meeting.

My conclusion is that Couve honestly does not think we can avoid defeat in South Vietnam. This is of course a comforting conclusion for a Frenchman for obvious reasons. He is not troubled by the shifting of the power balance in Southeast Asia because France has no ambitions there, and he is a Frenchman through and through. He does think there is real danger in any "escalation", and since this danger might affect Europe and France, his worry is not pretense. He will be reassured by anything you choose to tell him about your own care and watchfulness. I think he will also see the value of the argument that anything we do now will be designed to be essentially continuous with our policy of insistent support for action in the South and very careful and moderate and measured naval action, air patrol, and so on in other areas.

McG. B.

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J 3

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comments on Vietnam for your newspaper visitor

1. The situation today in Saigon

Our reports are still fragmentary and the matter is not yet sorted out, but appearances are that this was an effort by Catholics and conservatives to get rid of Khanh by taking control of his person and of several other strategic points in Saigon. Since they failed to capture Khanh, my own guess is that the whole effort will fail and that the Armed Forces Council will keep Khanh and gradually reassert authority with little, if any, bloodshed. But of course there could be more explosive results. The intended victor in this enterprise was General Khiem, the Ambassador here, and he has now made public statements which will obviously cost him his job if Khanh wins.

It is of course always possible that the armed forces will somehow bargain this out and that Khanh might lose his job without Khiem winning it. It may take some days to tell just how this one is going to come out. It could make the armed forces more or less unified depending on the skill and firmness of the individuals concerned.

2. Negotiations

The pressure for negotiations is coming mostly from people who simply do not understand what that word means in Asian ears right now. If the U. S. proposes negotiations or even indicates a desire for them, the word in Saigon will be that we are getting out. And the consequences of that rumor would be very severe for our whole position.

So we are planning to act quietly and firmly, and to stick to a policy: that we are helping these people to help themselves and that we are acting appropriately against a sustained and dangerous aggression of a very complex and difficult sort.

At the same time, when the appropriate occasion comes, we will be more than ready to state our position, and our cases, and our purposes

-2-

and our objectives. There is no secret and will be no secret about our policy. And nobody wants a peaceful settlement more than we do.

McG. B.

4
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Intelligence estimates

The attached intelligence estimates are important enough for you to read in full. They are both studies of Communist reactions to possible U.S. actions in Vietnam, and the U.S. actions in question are those which you have been considering in recent weeks. The document at Tab A deals mainly with the Soviets, and the one at Tab B deals mainly with Hanoi and Peking. They seem careful and sober to me, and they suggest the wisdom of your determination to act in a measured and fitting way.

McG. B.

McG. B.

TOP SECRET attachments

SNIE 10-3-65 Communist Reactions to Possible US Actions
SNIE 10-3/1-65 Communist Reactions to Possible US
Courses of Action Against North Vietnam.

3/2/65

February 19, 1965

85

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comment on the attached proposal

1. You have reached your own clear conclusions about the timing of any proposals for a political settlement, and that decision really decides the issue on this memorandum too. Our existing decisions make it unwise to take a big initiative of this sort.

2. In addition there is a technical objection to the use of the General Assembly, which I think is most important right now. The General Assembly would not adopt the kind of resolution that is proposed in this memorandum. It would instead come back with a direct proposal for peace negotiations among the parties concerned. So we have no prospect of getting a positive vote on our own package proposal -- even one which is in abstract terms as attractive as the one attached.

McG. B.

1. The President has an enormous opportunity to break out into a new field of policy. The world is frightened and therefore ready for new initiative. The following suggestions are in line with the possibility of the President's seizing a great new initiative.

2. He might ask the United Nations General Assembly not to adjourn and go himself early next week and make the following statements.

3. Peace is more important than any immediate agreement over Article 19. The issue should be postponed and at this moment of extreme tension, the General Assembly should remain in session.

4. As President, I have said I would do anything to insure peace. I will talk to anyone. Peace is more important than protocol, my willingness to talk includes Peking.

5. Our aim in Southeast Asia - as anywhere else - is to secure people's right to self-determination and to settle their own future without violent intervention from outside.

Unless this kind of violence ceases, ultimately escalation to nuclear war will come. It is therefore in the interests of the whole world community to prevent it and the United Nations must take cognizance of it.

6. In the first place, the issue concerns Southeast Asia. We therefore propose (a) A temporary cease-fire. (b) Plebiscites under United

2.

United Nations control in North and South Vietnam to ask 1. Do they want reunion and 2. Are they prepared for an independent neutral Southeast Asia under international guarantee?

7. If they vote for a union, the United Nations would arrange the conditions. If they vote for Southeast Asian independence, a neutrality, the United Nations should handle the guarantee. If South Vietnam votes for separate nationhood its frontiers should be given a United States guarantee and seal.

8. The United States does not believe that internal policies can be controlled or frozen from outside. But it also insists that they must not be violently disrupted by outside intervention. This issue transcends Southeast Asia.

9. The United States therefore proposes that the United Nations accept a general obligation to provide frontier guards and seal off frontiers on the complaint of a member government. (This could apply at once to Thailand and Congo.)

10. Such procedures will increase peace-keeping costs but friendly powers will be ready to shoulder them since they are infinitely cheaper than war. The United States will not only play its part but is ready in Southeast Asia to consider joining in the joint financing of the

Mekong River scheme.

11. If this initiative is rejected, there can be no alternative but the continuance of United States assistance with all its risks of escalation. But the world cannot hope for peace if guerrilla war becomes an acceptable form of violence.

12. Behind all the differences of race and creed stand the endangered family of man. If the human dialogue cannot be taken up and the pressures toward deepening violence set aside we may be moving steadily toward the end of the human experiment. Any effort for peace is more vital at this time than the differences which divide us. Let us speak for the city of man.

It seems to me that in addition to striking out on a new line such an approach could incidentally check the growing rapprochement between Russia and China and create and also promote new possibilities of closer diplomatic action with Western Europe.

#####

~~SECRET~~

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Answer to Adlai Stevenson's memo

I asked George Ball to answer Adlai's memorandum of February 17 (Tab A) and here is my own suggestion as to what you might say to him if you wish to telephone him. In the current situation, I do not think such a phone call is urgent.

1. Stevenson suggests an early Presidential statement. Your answer is that you believe in all necessary statements of our policy and objectives -- that you have stated them repeatedly -- and that you have told the Secretary of State to hold a press conference or issue a statement at any time in the next days or weeks that he may think it necessary. You yourself do not wish to heat up the national or international atmosphere by making a very loud noise right now, although you are free to change your mind if the situation requires it.

2. You do not wish to indicate our "readiness for exploratory talks" at this time. Our position is not one in which we should now look as if we were hunting negotiations. Both the Communists and our friends in Saigon would interpret such a proposal as a sign of weakness and readiness to withdraw.

3. You share his view that we do not wish to get into the Security Council right now.

4. You do not think that we would now wish to organize a meeting of the US, UK, France, China, the Soviet Union, and North and South Vietnam. Such a committee would be weighted against us, and there is no reason today to offer the French the mediator role in this conspicuous way.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-29-77; NSC 11-30-78
By ig, NARS, Date 6-20-79

7

February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested in Alec Home's strong minded views. He has always been a downright man when Communists are concerned, and of course now he doesn't have the cares of office.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

TDCS DB-315/00562/65

Feb. 18, 1965

8
J

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Couve de Murville

These are the notes that have come over from State for your meeting with Couve de Murville. I have delayed sending you a memo of my own thoughts until I could talk to Couve and get a feel of what is on his mind; this I am doing at 9:30 Friday morning, and I will have a memo of talking points in your hands before your meeting with him.

McG. B.

attached P's ltrfy bk.

9
—

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting this Afternoon with Irwin Miller about
the President's Committee on East-West Trade

Your East-West Trade Committee is about ready for launching. Miller is ready to go to work. He has talked to Rusk, Connor, McNamara, Harriman, and Linder, and will be seeing Ball, Freeman, and if we can work it, Mann, tomorrow. We have provided him with office space in the Executive Office Building. His clearance is all set.

Miller and I have put together a list of suggestions for the other members (Tab A). The one serious problem is with George Meany. As you know, Meany has painted himself into a very tight corner on this issue. He will give us trouble whether he is on or off. My own vote would be for including him, unless he himself turns us down. If we don't ask him first, it will be very difficult to find someone else from labor who will risk Meany's wrath.

If you approve, we propose that:

1. After your meeting with Miller, George Reedy release the attached short statement (Tab B) , announcing Miller's appointment, and indicating that the other members will be announced when appointed. (Because of the danger of leaks, it would be unwise to wait until we have lined up the full committee.)
2. The other members be announced, after everyone is signed on, hopefully by early next week.
3. The Committee be instructed to report to the President in two months. We can leave open, for now, whether or not part or all of the report would be released.

We will need to discuss with you who is to say what and when up on the Hill.

At Tab C is a tentative list of topics the Committee will look into. We have not tried to work out rigid terms of reference. It makes better sense to let them pick and choose once they get to work. We have a good Executive Secretary from State (Edward Fried), who knows where the bodies are buried.

McG. B.
McG. B.

9a



Irwin Miller

Albert L. Nickerson (Socony Mobil)

William Blackie (Caterpillar Tractor)

Eugene Black

Herman Wells (Chancellor, Indiana University)

William A. Hewitt (President, Deere & Co., Moline, Ill.)

James B. Fisk (President, Bell Telephone Labs.)

Crawford H. Greenewalt

Max F. Millikan (Director, MIT Center for International
Studies and Professor of Economics)

Charles Mortimer (Chairman, General Foods)

George Meany

9c

8

9-d

C

9e

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1965

Personal and Confidential

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-29-77, NSC 11-30-78

By ib, Date 6-20-79

Dear Mr. Miller:

It occurs to me that it might be helpful to you to have a further indication of our thinking about the kinds of issues which need to be explored. Needless to say, you should not think of the following list of questions as in any sense prejudging the committee's terms of reference.

Export Licensing Do our present practices impose a serious handicap on U.S. businessmen, in favor of their European and Japanese competitors? If so, at what gain in terms of legitimate security purposes? What changes in administrative practice and legislation would facilitate U.S. exports without impairing security?

Trade and Technology Are special rules necessary to control -- and to ensure adequate payment for -- the sale of non-strategic but technically advanced machinery and information? Or should we rely on the judgment of the seller, and be satisfied with his making a commercially satisfactory profit on the transaction?

Export Credit Subject to a determination by the President that trade with a particular Communist country is in the U.S. interest, U.S. exporters can generally obtain Export-Import Bank guarantees to cover ordinary commercial credit. Should the Government do more? Do we need greater statutory flexibility in this area than the Johnson Act permits?

Access to U.S. Markets This is likely to be a critical issue. Except for Poland and Yugoslavia, goods from Communist countries are now subject to tariffs at 1930, Smoot-Hawley rates. To be in a position to buy, Communist countries must be able to sell; should we therefore be prepared to grant individual Bloc countries most-favored-nation tariff treatment? Under what circumstances? Would dumping impose a serious problem in this connection? What kind of legislation would provide the President with the necessary flexibility?

What kind of arrangements should we bargain for? Almost all other free world countries conduct their trade with the Communists through bilateral agreements involving quotas. Is that the pattern we should follow, or should we try to work out arrangements which would lead

increasingly to multilateral trade involving both Communists and non-Communists? What arrangements would ensure fair treatment of our exporters in commercial disputes with state enterprises? Should related matters -- consular relations, tourist facilities, cultural exchange -- be thrown on the table?

As you are aware, on many of the above questions a great deal of work has been done both inside and outside the Government. What the President needs is a hard judgment -- based on the large volume of available information supplemented by whatever additional information the committee might wish to have collected -- about what practical steps the Government might prudently take to move matters forward.

As you know, the President places great weight on this enterprise. I know he will be delighted if you can see your way to taking it on.

If I can be of further help in answering questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

J. Irwin Miller, Esq.
Cummins Engine Company
Columbus, Indiana

10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: A conversation with Walter Lippmann

I went ahead with Lippmann this afternoon because he was running up against his deadline, and I did not want to bother you at the Mansion.

The meeting went very well. He wanted to know whether anything very startling was likely to happen between his taping tomorrow morning and his broadcast on Monday. I told him that I could not predict events precisely, but I asked him what he meant by anything spectacular, and it very shortly emerged that he would not be startled by a continuation of air action across the 17th Parallel even if it did not result from some new spectacular attack on Americans in the South. I then gave him reassurance that we were not planning any immediate all-out bombardment of Hanoi, and that this was one part of the meaning of your statement to the National Industrial Conference Board, which seemed to him to be a reasonable restatement of what he took to be your present policy.

Walter is not really happy about our present posture, but just the same he is doing his best to support it. I gave him a lecture to the effect that calling a conference now was no way to get to an honorable settlement, and he professed to see my point. He said that all he meant was that we must use the tools of diplomacy. I said that I fully agreed, as long as it was understood that one of the major tools of diplomacy was the 7th Fleet. He said he not only agreed but had repeatedly made this point.

He pressed me on the situation inside South Vietnam, which he clearly believes to be hopeless. I said that it was difficult but in no sense hopeless, and that the very center of our purpose was to find ways and means of helping to turn the tide there. I said that while you were not the man to miss any real chance for a decent settlement, I myself did not believe there was any piece of paper that had any chance of being signed by both us and the Communists. He agreed, and said that he supposed that in any negotiation we would begin very far apart. I said that one of the

difficulties was that the very word "conference" sounded suspiciously like surrender in Southeast Asia right now. He repeated that he was not calling for a conference.

The conversation was not a long one because all Walter wanted was reassurance against what he would regard as a sharp new turn between taping and broadcast. As I say, I gave him that assurance. I think he went away feeling that my judgment needs watching, but that you are just the man to watch it. He may even be right.

McG. B.

McG. B.

62 11

February 17, 1865

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wilson's Talk with Bruce Today

Last night Marvin Watson gave me your amendments to a draft telegram to Taylor and Bruce. I sent the cable as amended to Bruce, but not to Taylor because it seems better to send him your actual decision after the NSC.

Bruce has now presented our thinking to Wilson. (Our telegram is attached at Tab A). Wilson said he would solidly support our policy, but he has also expressed deep concern over the statement that "we do not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time." He said that he thought continuance of air action without the prospect of parallel talks or negotiations would have disturbing repercussions in Britain and in many other countries. (Bruce's report of this talk is at Tab B, but I have given you the essence of it).

Bruce says Wilson may send you a personal message on this subject.

/s/
Mc.G.B.

Attachments

2 TS cables

AmEmb Lond 5147 (DepTel) Feb 16
Embtel 3961, Feb 17, 65

611's 2
13
February 17, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are two reports from Taylor on his first meeting with Prime Minister Quat:

"In making our first call on Prime Minister Quat this morning, reported by separate telegram, we also took up the program /of continuing action/ which we discussed on February 15 with Oanh, Khanh and Thieu. Quat said Khanh had mentioned the matter to him but asked us to cover same ground which we did.

"Quat was in entire agreement but expressed concern on our co-ordination at New York and the problem of his communications with New York. He asked whether Yost had or could discuss question of tactics at New York with Duc and we said we did not know but would inquire.

"Would appreciate Department's guidance for reply and Department's thoughts on coordination at New York. This will require concerted and delicate coordination between New York, Saigon and Washington. Suggest we offer our communications channels using US United Nations for GVN communications both directions."

"Alex Johnson and I paid call on Prime Minister Quat this morning. Following is summary of principal points in one and one-half hour conversation (brevity is not Quat's strongest point). Quat seems confident that he has built his fences and established liaison with those groups that can cause him trouble.

"He said that he called on Archbishop Binh yesterday who expressed himself as satisfied with Cabinet and Quat expected that Vinh, Minister of Economic Affairs, would maintain contact with Catholic groups including Father Quynh. Quat said he had also talked with Thich Thien Minh yesterday and that Tran Quang Thuan would be his liaison with Buddhists. He would seek to keep political parties

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *10-22-96*

~~TOP SECRET~~

(which Quat said were not very important) happy. Quat himself intends to try to establish closer personal relations with principal generals. He said problem of handling generals was in large part "human" problem. He said that he was urging on all to bring their complaints immediately to him rather than letting them fester. He said Tran Van Tuyen's planning job was directed toward rationalizing governmental organization.

"Quat expressed interest in and we had some general discussion of need for greater degree of national mobilization.

"Quat expressed interest in continuing our US Mission Council/GVN internal security council meetings and we agreed that we would meet this next Friday to get acquainted and for general discussion without seeking to bring up any specific items. He said that three Vice Prime Ministers and the Minister of Information will be members from his side and that Bui Diem will serve as chief point of contact at working level for these meetings. He also said that we could consider Bui Diem as his "confidant" for most other matters and could use Diem as contact when he, Quat, was not available.

"In reply to our query, Quat also expressed his intent to move ahead as quickly as possible with appointment of competent ambassadors. He expressed his intention of trying to establish good press relations including small meetings with foreign correspondents here. He talked about wanting to get Dong Duc Khoi back from New York to help on press relations. He said Khoi had been falsely accused of being whole-hearted Diemist when in fact at time he was working for Diem he was also in close liaison with opposition.

"While expressing desire to carry out some reforms of second level officials, particularly those in interior dealing with public, Quat expressed full agreement with importance of continuity of province chief and said he had no intention making any sweeping changes in those key posts.

"Quat expressed his desire for closest relations with us and said that while he would be carrying out some maneuvers to help heal old sores and close ranks, we should be clear that his single objective is more vigorous prosecution of war in close concert with us. He asked that we judge him on results. We said we would do so."

15/
McG.B.

from Embtel Secstate 2632
and Embtel 2635

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14

2/16/65

To: Marvin Watson

From: McGeorge Bundy

per our conversation.

14a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram to Ambassador Taylor

1. The attached draft is based on your comments at our 1:30 meeting. It would be desirable to get it out to Taylor tonight, and also to get the same thing out to Bruce for his discussions with Wilson. As you will remember, you promised Wilson a memo on our exact position, and Wilson has been after Bruce to find out in more detail just what our thinking is. This telegram does not tell when the next military action would be, and I believe it is quite safe to let Bruce have it.

2. I call your attention to the alternative language in brackets at the bottom of page 2. You said "prompt and adequate and measured." I believe that for a policy of continuing action the words "adequate and measured and fitting" are better. "Fitting" is the word we used at the time of Tonkin Gulf, and if we are going to continue actions in a situation in which there is no spectacular outrage like Pleiku, I think "fitting" is a better word than "prompt." It may sound like mere semantics, but I think it is quite near the center of the problem of stating your desires precisely. Will you strike out whichever adjective you do not want?

McG. B.
McG. B.

OK for Taylor as revised ✓

OK for Bruce as revised ✓

Speak to me ✓

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-27-78, NSC 9-15-78
By if, NARS, Date 6-15-79

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-231

By inf, NARA, Date 8-70-88 2/16/65

146

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO; ~~AmEmbassy Saigon for Ambassador Taylor~~

In order to make sure that your understanding of current policy is

~~precisely the same as ours, we are sending you the following~~

~~guidance which is being distributed to State and Defense to control~~

~~all actions and all public comments in the next two weeks. This~~

~~guidance supersedes all previous discussions of our thinking.~~

1. We have recommended, and the President ~~has~~ concurred in, continuing air and naval action against North Vietnam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Vietnam directed in Hanoi.

2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. Current plan is that this statement would come from Secretary of State, but decision is not final. This statement of policy ~~will be consistent with three points you have stated to Khanh, but~~ for your guidance, following language more accurately states President's ~~will~~ will reflect following elements of our thinking: current thinking:

a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Vietnam. FYI. ~~The~~ President has directed that every possible step be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within South Vietnam by any

~~TOP SECRET~~ TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

2/16/65

every conventional means available to GVN and U.S. End FYI.

b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes

under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.

this program to our next Security Council tomorrow.

promptly we plan to present

c. We plan detailed presentation to the UN Security Council

of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not repeat not

touch upon
~~currently~~ expect to ~~indicate~~ readiness for talks or negotiations at

this time.

In execution of item c. above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.

3. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action ~~against the North~~ will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be ~~prompt and~~ adequate and measured *and* fitting *to* aggression. Each new military action

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-3-

2/16/65

will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.

4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as well as the Soviet government of our views as outlined above.

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Feb. 16, 1965

To: AmEmbassy London for Ambassador Bruce

NODIS

For your guidance in talking with Wilson, our current thinking is as follows:

1. We have recommended, and we think the President will concur in, continuing air and naval action against North Vietnam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Vietnam directed in Hanoi.

2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. Current plan is that this statement would come from Secretary of State, but decision is not final. This statement of policy will reflect following elements of our thinking:

a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Vietnam. ~~Every~~ Every possible step will be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within South Vietnam by any and every conventional means available to GVN and US. ~~Every~~

b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (PLJ 86-231, +146)
By jc, NARA, Date 11-19-09

2/16/65

under this program will be jointly planned and agreed. We presently plan to present this program to our National Security Council tomorrow.

c. We plan detailed presentation to the UN Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time.

In execution of item c., above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.

3. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. Each new military action will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.

4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as well as the Soviet government of our views as outlined above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

-3-

2/16/65

In presenting this position you should emphasize to the Prime Minister the very high degree of secrecy attaching to this plan of action until final Presidential decision and orders have put it into operation.

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TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1965 ¹⁵ J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Bohlen
Wednesday, Feb. 17, at 11:30 a.m.

1. Chip Bohlen, who is in Washington for the Couve de Murville visit, told me he would like to discuss with you recent French developments and, specifically, the impact of Vietnam on our relations with France and on the international situation generally. He also has some ideas about your trip to Europe which he would like to raise for your consideration.

2. Bohlen has read in the papers that you want him to stay on -- I believe George McGhee made this point on background at your direction. But of course he'd rather hear it from you.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Stat 8-29-77, NSC 11-30-78

By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

16

February 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach three cables of interest.

The first is Max Taylor's Weekly Report. He is unenthusiastic about Quat, happy about air attacks and dependent removal, and accurate about the bad week on the military front.

The second is a cable sent to hold up David Bruce yesterday. I told my brother to handle it this way feeling that if Bruce were to report on the basis of our discussion Saturday, he might not state your position exactly as it now stands. We are sending him a cable after today's meeting with you.

The third message is a warm acknowledgment from Pope Paul for your message of reassurance last week.

McG.B.

TOP SECRET AND SECRET ATTACHMENTS

LOND 5120 (TS)

SecState 2145, 15 Feb 65 from Rome (S)

SecState 2617, 16 Feb 65 from Saigon (S)

11:22 PM
Feb 16, 1965

17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Vietnam decisions

Authority 76C Ltr 10/3/77
By mg, NARS, Date 11/14/77

I have been brooding about our discussion of yesterday, and I think I am beginning to understand where the problem is.

1. I think that some of us -- perhaps mostly me -- have been confusing two questions. One is the firmness of your own decision to order continuing action; the other is the wisdom of a public declaration of that policy by you. Let me give you a little background and a recommendation.
2. Rightly or wrongly, those of us who favor continuing military action against the North do see it as a major watershed decision. However much it is based on continuing aggression in the South (as it should be), it amounts to a U. S. decision to mount continuing pressure against Hanoi by use of our air and naval superiority. This is not the same, in operational terms, as what we did last August. And it is not the same as a policy of episodic retaliation for particular attacks against large numbers of Americans. It is very different indeed, and the difference is just what we are counting on as the one possible means of turning around a desperate situation which has been heading toward a disastrous U. S. defeat.
3. Precisely because this program represents a major operational change and because we have waited many months to put it into effect, there is a deep-seated need for assurance that the decision has in fact been taken. When you were out of the room yesterday, Bob McNamara repeatedly stated that he simply has to know what the policy is so that he can make his military plans and give his military orders. This certainty is equally essential if we are to get the necessary political effects in Saigon. If we limit ourselves to reprisals for spectaculars like Pleiku and Qui Nhon, we leave the initiative in the hands of the Communists, and we can expect no good result.
4. Thus it seems essential to McNamara -- and to me too -- that there be an absolutely firm and clear internal decision of the U. S. Government and that this decision be known and understood by enough people to permit its orderly execution. That is one side of the problem.

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Feb. 16, 1965

5. The other side of the problem, as I understand it, is that you do not want to give a loud public signal of a major change in policy right now. This is a position which makes a lot of sense on a lot of grounds. When I talked to Cabot Lodge yesterday, he told me that he had taped a statement for Dave Garroway's "Today" show in which he stoutly and firmly supported your decision not to make loud public statements. Lodge believes, as you know, that action speaks louder than words in this field. Russ Wiggins of the Post has just called me to try to make a luncheon date (I refused), and in the course of listening to him I learned that he too thinks it is right to act against the North and equally right not to boast about it, because such boasting only makes life harder for the Communists. Tommy Thompson also argues the virtue of not rubbing the Communist nose in this mess, at least at your level.

6. So in terms of public statement, I fully understand the forces which were leading you yesterday to suggest that any public comments might best be handled by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Stevenson. Most of the need for public utterance which led Bill Moyers and me to urge a Presidential speech last week can be met just as well by the Secretary, and there is real gain in keeping you out of the immediate military aspect of the matter at this stage.

7. Thus I think it is possible to reconcile the need for a clear decision within the Government with a need to avoid excessive public noise -- by a policy of Presidential decision and Secretarial exposition.

8. That leaves us only one problem: which is communication with our Allies. What we tell them is not likely to stay tightly secret, and yet I think it is crucial that they not feel left out or uninformed. In different ways this is as important for London as for Saigon, for Ottawa as for New Delhi, for Bonn as for Tokyo, for Paris as for Bangkok.

9. My solution to this problem would be to give a clear account of our private thinking, with appropriate emphasis for each capital, but without any indication of the size and frequency of planned actions, other than to say that they will be limited and fitting, and that any further escalation will be the fault of the enemy.

10. For this purpose, Taylor's phrasing of the new policy which he gave to General Khanh is just about right. He described it in the following language:

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-3-

Feb. 16, 1965

"A. Intensification by all available means of the program of pacification within SVN.

We will respond to and deter aggression by the

"B. Execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets ~~in the southern part of DRV.~~ Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.

"C. Announcement of this policy of measured action in general terms and presentation to the United Nations Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor, accompanied by an indication of readiness to discuss ways of bringing the DRV aggression to an end."

11. In summary, what I think we need is internal clarity about the importance and scope of the decisions you are taking, and as much public calm and coolness as possible. For these purposes, Rusk is the ideal spokesman for policy, and Stevenson the ideal defender and explainer (which means, incidentally, that McNamara probably should not undertake a TV program proving that Hanoi is the aggressor -- this should be Adlai's job, though that is very unfair because it is Bob who has had all the necessary spade-work done).

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

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Rec'd
2/15/65
4:15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18

Feb. 15, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

Subj: Record of phone conversation
with Prime Minister Wilson

This is the best I can do from my notes.
If there is anything you feel like adding
or subtracting, give me a ring and tell me
so that I can make the record more
accurate.

Next time I will try to think ahead and
get a really accurate record of such a
conversation. I'm afraid that on this
particular occasion I was too busy trying
to prevent the talk to put my mind on
getting a record of it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

It was a great old talk, though - on
your side.

18a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 15, 1965

Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Prime Minister Wilson, Wednesday, February 10, 1965, 10:15 p.m.

1. The Prime Minister placed the call to the President to propose that he should visit Washington immediately for discussion of the crisis in Viet Nam. I had already informed the British Ambassador, first on my own and then later at the President's direct insistence, that such a visit would be untimely and unhelpful. Lord Harlech obviously agreed, but his replies made it clear that the Prime Minister was insistent. I tried a further delay by suggesting that the call be deferred until Thursday a.m., but the Prime Minister continued to insist that he needed to have a position before he faced his own Cabinet Thursday noon London time. The President agreed to receive the call and, after considerable delay in a vain effort to get the classified circuit going, I completed an open circuit with the Prime Minister, and the President went on the line about 10:15 p.m. My notes cover only the President's side of the conversation.

2. The Prime Minister evidently opened with his proposal, and apparently indicated that there was a high level of concern in London, and that he would like to come to Washington to put himself in a better position to deal with that concern.

3. The President said he thought it would be a very serious mistake for the Prime Minister to come over; that he thought there was nothing to get upset about, any more than it would be right from him to get upset about Malaysia; and that any visit would be misunderstood here. The President said that our response had been very measured and very reasonable, and that it was not going to be very different whether the Prime Minister came here or not -- that it would be a great mistake for us to jump up and down and fly the Atlantic every time there was an issue of this sort. Next week we might be arguing about Sukarno, and another week there might be a threat or two from some Communist. We have telephones and we can always talk.

4. The President went on to make the point that he had tried to be helpful to the Prime Minister on monetary matters and on Malaysia, and that he would be glad to send the Prime Minister an account of the exact situation by classified cable so that he could tell his colleagues just what the U. S. position was.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED + FRVS, vol. 2403
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 10-22-98

5. The Prime Minister then evidently said something about his problems in the House of Commons. The President said he had plenty of problems with his own Congress, and he thought it would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to try to use the President as an instrument in the House of Commons, just as he would not wish to use the Prime Minister as an instrument with the Congress. He had to deal with the Congress every day, but he did not pull the Prime Minister into it. He thought the Prime Minister would have to decide what side he was on. The Prime Minister evidently said something about the hazards of escalation, and the President replied that he was afraid of escalation, too, but he did not see what was to be gained by flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out. He thought that such activity would make everybody even more concerned and, instead, he proposed again that he should send the Prime Minister an exact account of the situation and he would be glad to have the Prime Minister's comments as a true ally.

6. The President reminded the Prime Minister that the U. S. did not have the company of many allies in Vietnam. He had spoken to the Prime Minister about the need for British support there and the Prime Minister had told him about his troubles in other areas. The President told the Prime Minister that he was with him in Malaysia with men, money, marbles, and chalk, all the way. Now in Vietnam it looks a little dark and he didn't see what help would come from talk. If the Prime Minister had any men to spare, he would be glad to have them. The Prime Minister apparently returned to the charge, and the President asked him bluntly, "Why don't you run Malaysia and let me run Vietnam?" Would the Prime Minister think it would be good for the President to announce to the American press tomorrow that he was going over to London to try to stop the British in Malaysia? The Prime Minister apparently answered back in some fashion, and the President repeated his comments about the British in Malaysia and our own role in Vietnam.

7. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave way and reassured the President of his own basic support for our policy in Vietnam. The President replied that that was all right and fine -- that we would stand on that -- that we understood the British problem -- the monetary problem, and the MLF problem, too. There followed an exchange on the MLF in which the President said that he was still waiting for the Prime Minister to carry out his agreement to go and talk with the Germans about it. The President had been very careful not to be domineering, and ~~but~~ he had wanted to give the British time to talk with the Germans on this matter, although he had not changed his own strong views on the matter.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Feb. 15, 1965

He thought that if the Prime Minister had time on his hands and if people were bothering him in London, he ought to go on over to Bonn and talk to the Germans about the MLF. The President had seen the German Ambassador only the day before, and the Germans were looking forward to an early visit. The President had wanted all his European friends to have time on this issue, and he recalled that the Prime Minister had told him when he was in Washington that he was going right back home to talk to Erhard, and the President had been waiting for the results of that visit. Now the Germans felt we had somewhat let them down because we had shown such willingness to wait. The Germans did not understand why we were so courteous and so willing to postpone the matter.

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9. The President reaffirmed his basic position: Wherever they murder our people, we are going to react promptly, adequately, and measuredly. The President knew the Prime Minister was going to do the same thing -- in Malaysia or anywhere else.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

Feb. 15, 1965

and all that he would have to talk about was a call in the middle of the night. The President replied with some sharpness that it was the Prime Minister and not he who placed the call in the middle of the night. The President was just answering it. The President then repeated that the U. S. position was not provocative, not belligerent, not domineering, and that we were not throwing our weight around. But if people came in and killed our men -- 20 or 30 or 40 of them -- our response would be prompt, adequate, and measured. And that's what the President would expect the Prime Minister to do in similar circumstances, and he would have our full support.

13. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave new assurances of his support and friendship, and the President said that that was fine, and he appreciated it, and that was friendship, and that was the way it ought to be -- and he reciprocated.

14. There was then some further talk about what could be said about being in communication, and the President said he surely would keep in touch. The conversation then came to an end, and the President instructed me to send off a message summarizing the current situation to the Prime Minister's office. This I later did.

h.d.s.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

19
February 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These are the crucial exchanges with Max over the week end. The only place where there is an issue between him and us is about the exact noise to be made in the first round in the Security Council. As I understand it, this is a question in your mind too, and we have plenty of freedom of action to decide this the way we want.

You may feel that it was a mistake to send him even a few paragraphs of a possible statement, but I could think of no other way of getting it clear to him where our thinking was heading, and whoever else may have talked to Tad Szulc, I am sure that Taylor did not.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS (5)

Feb 15, 1965

20 2

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the best I can do from my notes. If there is anything you feel like adding or subtracting, give me a ring and tell me so that I can make the record more accurate.

Next time I will try to think ahead and get a really accurate record of such a conversation. I'm afraid that on this particular occasion I was too busy trying to prevent the talk to put my mind on getting a record of it.

McG. B.

(Handwritten P. S.) It was a great old talk, though -- on your side.

~~SECRET~~

20 a
February 15, 1965

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 d FRUS v2, #103

NSC Memo, 1/30/95 State Guidelines

By Ng/jm NARS, Date 10/27/05

Feb. 15, 1965

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Feb. 15, 1965

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Feb. 15, 1965

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McG. B.

February 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Attached Memorandum from Sargent Shriver

I talked to Shriver about this at your request as relayed by Marvin Watson. I told Shriver that my own one doubt with Williams was whether he would be able and willing to make the occasional decision on African affairs that American Negroes would not like. I gave Shriver the example of the Congo paratroop drop and he told me that he was sure Williams would have strongly opposed this operation and that he could not honestly say whether he would or would not have supported the decision once made. He said that what we ought to do was to put that question directly to Frank Williams himself. He told me that Williams has political ambitions in New York, and he recognized the force of my question.

I have not seen much of Williams, but I like what I know of him. If you want us to, either John Macy or I can pursue this matter further.

McG.B.

Have Macy look into _____

Feel Williams out yourself _____

Ask Dean Rusk to look into it _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two press queries

1. Walter Lippmann called to say that he is taping his annual CBS round-up on Thursday for broadcast next Monday. He would like not to be caught by any sudden developments in between. I told him that I would mention his concern to you.

2. Lippmann is trying hard to stay aboard, and I think we ought to help him out, within limits. The course we are now going on is one that will need missionary work with him, and that in turn involves trusting him. He is the one man in Washington who does not betray confidences, and my suggestion is that we should check the situation again on Wednesday and tell him what we can then, under your direct guidance.

OK, check with me on Wednesday ✓

No, don't let's talk, even to Lippmann

3. Max Frankel has called to say that he is doing a profile of me for the Sunday Times Magazine, and he asks for an interview sometime in the next week. I told him flatly that I would much prefer not to be profiled, but he said that I had no choice. I can easily block off all sources around here, but I did that once before with the Times and got a very unfriendly profile as a result.

4. This is a real dilemma. The best I can suggest is to see him under ground rules which flatly exclude Southeast Asia.

See him on that basis *my basis +*

Don't see him

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

McG. B.
McG. B.

23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY~~

February 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Max Taylor

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-47

By is, NARA Date 10-24-99

1. There is one aspect of my trip to Vietnam that I have not yet reported to you. It is my strong sense that Max Taylor in fact does not have the political sensitivity needed to provide continuing and constructive advice to the struggling factions in Saigon. Moreover, his personal bridges with General Khanh are damaged beyond repair. He does not trust Khanh and makes no bones of the fact that he believes Khanh must be removed from power before any really constructive work can be done. As I said in my report last week, there are all sorts of reasons for disliking Khanh and mistrusting him, but the fact is that he is the most impressive potential leader anywhere in sight. I feel confident that we can do better by backing him and advising him than by trying to get him thrown out. This was the unanimous view of my colleagues, including Andy Goodpaster, who is Max Taylor's own boy. It was also the view of a number of members of the country team -- though not of Alexis Johnson, who stoutly asserted that he agreed with Max on every point.

2. There is a more subtle difficulty between Taylor and the Buddhists. He is almost surely right in believing that their irresponsible use of street scenes has to be curbed at some point, but I think he is wrong in letting it be known to all of political Saigon that this is the view of the American Embassy.

3. In short, Max runs the risk with both Khanh and the Buddhists that his opposition to them will merely stir them into anti-Americanism.

4. I mention this now because once we get fairly squared away on a course of military action, which includes air attack against the North, it would be possible for you to withdraw Taylor to CIA with only limited public fuss. Taylor wants to come out in any event by July (his understanding is that he was being asked to serve for no longer than a year, and he told me that his personal and family reasons for wanting to come back then are as strong as ever -- though of course he is a soldier and will stay if a continuing crisis requires it, in your judgment).

5. This is not a matter which should be decided in the next week or two, but it is perhaps a reason for keeping the option open until you are sure what you want.

h. d. B.
McG. B.

24
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Feb. 14, 1965

Mr. President:

You probably saw Rowland Evans, but you may not have seen Paul Scott, so I send you both of them in order to indicate that reports of my activities cover a very wide spectrum. There is as much truth in one as in the other.

McG. B.
McG. B.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely "McG. B.", written in dark ink. The signature is composed of a single continuous line, starting with a tall, thin vertical stroke that curves into a large loop at the bottom, and then extends into a horizontal line that curves back up towards the loop.

Allen-Scott Report

W.C. J. S. Will
Va.
Sun Withdraw

By ROBERT S. ALLEN
AND PAUL SCOTT



Mr. Allen

WASHINGTON — President Johnson's policy — makers have begun preparing the "escape hatch" for the slow and tortuous withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in South Viet Nam.

This strange disengagement, from which public attention will be diverted by high-level negotiations with the Russians and increased U.S. emphasis on Thailand, is the inside reason behind McGeorge Bundy's presidential mission to Saigon.

The White House assistant, who is in touch with top Soviet leaders through private channels, contends that a U.S.-Soviet regional settlement in Southeast Asia can be reached if U.S. military advisers are withdrawn from South Viet Nam.

As a first step toward this risky objective, Bundy has begun pressuring South Vietnamese officials to bring into their government Buddhists and young military officers who can negotiate a local peace with the Communist Viet Cong.

Once such a coalition government is firmly established in Saigon, Bundy believes Russia will agree to restrain the North Vietnamese from taking over South Viet Nam in exchange for a phased withdrawal of U.S. military advisers.

In pressing this controversial peace — settlement plan, Bundy has succeeded in blocking all serious opposition within the administration by stressing it is the only alternative left under the President's edict that the war not be expanded to North Viet Nam.

He has shocked more than one member of the National Security Council by arguing that it never has been U.S. policy to keep Communists out of the Saigon government, still less to keep U.S. forces on the ground.

According to Bundy, present U.S. policy is to provide a barrier against the extension of Chinese power, and the collapse of other regimes in Southeast Asia that would follow a Chinese take-over.

Within the context of his proposed regional peace settlement, Bundy contends that objective can still be attained if the U.S. can make a deal with Russia.

To balance off the increased Soviet influence in North Viet Nam, Bundy is advocating that the U.S. temporarily beef up its air and ground forces in Thailand.

This military maneuvering in Thailand, according to the President's chief foreign policy

adviser, also could be used as a negotiating weapon during the high-level U.S.-Soviet talks.

It is not clear from Bundy's arguments exactly who will come out on top in South Viet Nam, or whether he really cares.

In one meeting, Bundy contended the Viet Cong would not necessarily dominate a coalition government, arguing that with peace the Buddhists and army officers could draw support away from the Communists and contain them within the government.

At a later session, when this view was challenged by another NSC member, Bundy took the position that, even if the Viet Cong should dominate the Saigon government, the U.S. could neutralize Ho Chi Minh's influence by continuing its economic aid.

Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman either isn't reading the Central Intelligence reports from Africa or he is deliberately misleading Congress.

That's the opinion of one legislator briefed on the Congo by Harriman during a closed-door meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

When Harriman failed to mention anything about Soviet or Chinese Communist activities in the strife-torn Congo, Representative Frances Bolton, Ohio, ranking Republican on the committee, asked the former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union if he had overlooked this.

"There is no Chinese or Soviet intervention in the Congo," replied Harriman. "We have no evidence that Peking or Moscow has sent either arms or men there."

"You must be mistaken," challenged the soft-spoken Mrs. Bolton. "Pictures have been sent me from Africa showing both Chinese and Soviet arms captured from the Congolese rebels. I am told this information has also been gathered by the CIA. Haven't you been advised?"

When Harriman persisted he had no data on either Moscow or Peking arms shipments to the Congo, Mrs. Bolton suggested:

"Maybe we should arrange for CIA Director John McCone to brief you. If you are going to make policy for Africa, you ought to know what is going on."

With that, the aging Harriman excused himself.

24a

N. Y. Herald Tribune
Feb. 14, 1965

INSIDE REPORT: *Bundy's Role*

By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

SAIGON.

The most astonishing fact about the new and dramatic American policy of air attacks on the privileged sanctuary of North Viet Nam was the role of McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's assistant for national security.

Had it not been for Bundy's wholly coincidental visit to Saigon at the insistence of Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, retaliatory air strikes might still be in the "discussion" stage.

Taylor requested Bundy's presence as an on-the-spot observer in the deteriorating Vietnamese war months ago. Taylor knew the value of Bundy's advice to President Johnson. He knew, too, that a true understanding of what has been happening out here required a good deal more than the study of endless documentary reports in the arid atmosphere of a Washington office.

It required, in short, the eyes of Bundy to see and the ears of Bundy to hear for both himself and the President. Bundy's coming coincided with the savage Viet Cong attack on the U. S. air base at Pleiku. His reaction was immediate and insistent—neither the South Vietnamese government nor the U. S. could risk inaction in the face of such a bold and open insult.

At the MACV (Military Assistance Command Viet Nam) command post in Saigon during the Viet Cong raid on Pleiku, Bundy sat with earphones and maps and personally heard the reports from Pleiku crackle over the wires to headquarters. He and Taylor decided to recommend an immediate counter-strike north of the 17th Parallel (as Taylor had repeatedly recommended before). Now Bundy was here to make the recommendation himself.

As the proposal was being framed for Washington, Bundy permitted himself a sardonic smile and an audible hope that "those so-and-so's in Washington" would grasp the situation as he had grasped it in Saigon.

Washington reacted promptly. The war entered a new stage, long overdue. Accordingly, despite the corrosive instability of the Vietnamese government so tragically out of touch with the mass of its citizens in hamlet and village, the action of the past few days has lifted spirits here to their highest point since the raids in the Gulf of Tonkin last August. But much must be decided before it can be safely said that the new spirit is here to stay.

For example, it quickly became apparent last August that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a one-shot reaction. The quick thrust of hope that spread through the government and the American mission here ("We're all hawks" one ranking diplomat told us) gave way

to disappointment, then to disillusion. The psychological result left the "hawks" more despondent than before the Gulf of Tonkin.

A similar reaction is quite predictable today if the forward strategy is not continued and intensified. No one here knows whether it will be. There is also the vital point of whether the tit-for-tat strategy of Pleiku and Qui Nhon is to be limited strictly to Viet Cong actions aimed only at the Americans or whether it will be broadened to cover actions against the Vietnamese forces.

If limited to the former, the U. S. will soon be accused of putting a higher value on the life of a white man than on a Vietnamese, endangering the healthy relationship between our men in the field and the people we came here to defend. But this much may be said, the invasion of the privileged sanctuary north of the 17th Parallel carried the war for the first time since August to the source of aggression. This war is directed, financed and exported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Cutting this link with the Viet Cong Communist forces in the south would by no means guarantee an honorable end of the war.

But so long as the chain between Hanoi and the Viet Cong is not broken, there will be no chance whatever for an honorable solution.

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25
2
February 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My recent press contacts

1. I have spent most of the week refusing to talk to the press. I had no appointments in my office and I had no social engagements at which press were present.
2. My most important talks were two with Joseph Alsop. I tried very hard to prevent him from jumping to conclusions either way, believing that he could only do harm. This is obviously a tricky exercise, and I cannot be sure that I did more good than harm. I gave him no hint as to when or whether there might be more to say on our side, but I did counsel him against going out on any limbs. My conversations with him on Vietnam are simplified by the fact that I have deliberately made any substantive discussion of this subject off limits for two months.
3. I took a call from Ben Bradlee in the hope that I could say something nice about Bill Moyers, but by then his cover story had changed to Vietnam so I stonewalled. I did tell him that NEWSWEEK was particularly difficult to deal with on this subject because it has a vested interest in defeat. He did not deny the charge.
4. I had a phone call from Reston, and later one from Wicker and Frankel about Vietnam. Scotty was afraid we might be turning into jingoes, and Wicker and Frankel were trying to find out just how far north we mean to go. The Frankel call was on Thursday and I of course said nothing about weekend meetings or about the opinions of any of your advisers -- or even of my own. I have also checked my own staff and am sure that his story of today did not come from the White House.
5. I also took a call from Henry Brandon but found him hopelessly inquisitive and had to hang up on him.
6. These calls persuade me that there is nothing any of us can really say or do with the press until you decide what additional comment, if any, you yourself wish to make on the record.

McG. B.

(dictated but not signed)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Two requests for brief meetings

1. Mennen Williams is off to Africa on Tuesday, and asks for a 2-minute call sometime on Monday so that he can say in Africa that he comes with your backing. I know the problem he represents, but I think it is important that while he is Assistant Secretary he be seen as your Assistant Secretary from the point of view of our relations with Africa. So I hope you will be able to do this.

Yes _____ No _____

2. The Counterinsurgency School has a class of about 60 people which graduates in a week or two, and Walt Rostow has called me suggesting that it would be a good signal at this stage if you were to receive them next Friday or Saturday and say a few words about their work. In this case I think he is right, although you can certainly skip it if you wish. The advantage is simply that counterinsurgency is what we are trying to get more of in South Vietnam, and that any signal of your interest would stir the bureaucrats. This is a relatively easy way of doing it, and of course we would provide the draft statement for polishing by Bus.

officers of
state,
Defense,
CIA etc.

Yes _____ No _____

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-5

By jw, NARA, Date 5-22-92

Rec'd
2/11/65
3:15 P.m.

27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach three cables that will interest you. The first is a message from Pope Paul; the second is a report of the German press treatment on your meeting with the German Ambassador Knappstein; the third is a message I sent to Prime Minister Wilson's office last night after your talk with him.

Only the message from Pope Paul requires action and I suggest that we send back through Reinhardt a message of this sort:

"The President understands the concern expressed by His Holiness in his message to the President. The President is sure that His Holiness understands that the root cause of the trouble in Southeast Asia is the persistent and ferocious aggression of Communists directed from North Vietnam. The President wishes His Holiness to be assured that the actions of the US Government are being carefully controlled by the President himself and that all such actions will be measured and temperate and governed by the President's determination to do all in his power to avoid any wider war."

This leaves out the words "prompt and adequate" which we have used with other troubled spirits, but I think in the case of Pope Paul, a slightly different language is justified.

Send this answer ✓

Speak to me _____

McG.B.

McG.B.

Message to Paul - good
Thank you for.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS (2)

Q

✓ 28

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Damage reporting on our strikes in North Vietnam

1. You mentioned last night your dissatisfaction with our information on these matters, and I have just talked with Bob McNamara about it.

2. Bob reports that the only really good way of getting post-strike information is by photography, and that he personally has resisted requests from military commands for authorization of low-level photographic missions. Such missions require flak repression aircraft, and the one such mission which has been executed involved expenditure of such a large amount of ordnance as to amount to an additional strike. So Bob has felt that we should not order such missions, and limit ourselves to U-2 reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the weather has been bad and we have no good U-2 photography of our missions thus far.

3. Bob says that in his own judgment the assessment of damage is a relatively minor question, since the impact of these strikes is intended to be primarily political and since there is a general presumption that they have been reasonably effective.

4. If you do not share this judgment, he will be quite willing to order prompt and thorough post-strike reconnaissance at low levels if necessary, but he points out again that such missions will imply additional attacks on North Vietnamese defenses.

5. My own judgment runs with Bob's on this. I do not think it is urgent to have immediate and detailed information on the results of our strikes, and I would settle for what we can get from U-2 photography.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Leave it alone ✓

Tell McNamara to lay on low-level photography at lowest safe noise level, and make this ~~SOP~~ standard procedure.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-46

By abm, NARA Date 5-14-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1965

29

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A further message to the Soviets on their nuclear test that vented

1. As you know, we picked up radioactive debris from a Soviet test that vented on January 15, 1965. We reported this fact to the Soviet Union and asked for an explanation.

2. Ambassador Dobrynin came back with an oral statement in which the Soviet Government agreed that there had been venting, but denied the possibility of fallout outside the limits of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we got pictures of the crater, and we have been refining our analysis of the Soviet test. It is now reasonably certain that the test was intended as a Plowshare excavation experiment. The explosion was very clean, with a yield of 300 to 400 kilotons. We believe that the venting was not accidental but was inherent in the cratering design of the experiment. On the other hand, the weather conditions at the time may well have led the Soviets to believe that there would be no fallout beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

3. The test clearly raises a question of its legitimacy under the test ban treaty, and we face something of a dilemma. On the one hand, if we do not keep pressing the Soviets for a fuller explanation, we may seem to be giving our tacit approval to a violation. On the other hand, if we take a prosecutor's attitude we may only succeed in pinning ourselves to a position of rigidity, on very small amounts of venting, that will work against our own interest at some later stage when we may wish to make similar tests of very clean devices of our own.

4. The conclusion that we have reached is that we should register our dissatisfaction with the existing Soviet position and ask for more information. This will protect us from seeming to accept an explanation that is simply not in accordance with the facts, while at the same time we avoid the position of a prosecutor under the treaty. Moreover, if by any chance the Soviets do provide additional information, it will help to strengthen the precedents for full disclosure of the facts surrounding any cases of venting in the future.

5. The Committee of Principals (State, Defense, AEC, JCS, CIA, Hornig, and Bundy) agree upon the Aide Memoire attached at Tab A, for presentation by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Speak to me _____

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. XI 470

By JC. NARA. Date 11-20-09

(14)

30 ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Proposed Luncheon with the Elder Statesmen
on Saturday

1. McCloy is in India. Lovett is in Jamaica. Black is in Florida. Of the three, I have talked only with Gene Black, who says he will be glad to come back here if you want him. From the tenor of a telegram I have since received, I think he is worrying about Vietnam and not about the problem I described of getting outstanding people to manage the State Department and to be your Ambassadors.

2. Bruce will still be in town. Another man of experience and judgment is Allen Dulles. ~~Still another, it occurs to me, is Douglas Dillon. He served four years in the State Department and four as Ambassador, all with distinction. He also knows the present situation at close hand.~~ out of town.

3. The only trouble with this list is that most of them are Republicans. That determined old Democrat, Dean Acheson, is also in the Caribbean, but will be back next week.

4. I have not spoken to the Secretary of State about this, but I have with George Ball, and he sees no difficulty whatever in your having a relaxed talk with these veterans in any way you choose.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Invite those checked for Saturday lunch:

Bruce _____
~~Dillon~~ _____
Dulles _____
Clifford _____
Humphrey _____

Skip it for now ✓

February 11, 1965

2 31

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cables from Max Taylor

I attach two cables from Max Taylor which have been referred to in our discussions but which you will wish to read yourself. They are the basic recommendation for a reprisal program (Tab A), and his weekly report (Tab B), which includes his acknowledgment of our outgoing cable (Tab C) reporting your basic decision of Monday to reaffirm your December plan on the basis of the evacuation of dependents and the best government we can get in Saigon. These documents are the fundamental basis on which we are now making plans for your further review. The only more important document will be your speech, of which I expect to have a first draft by Saturday morning.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*3/a

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Control:

7133

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 9, 1965

SS

4:49 AM

Info

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2445 PRIORITY

INFO: WHITE HOUSE 343 PRIORITY
DOD 425 PRIORITY
CINCPAC 1446 PRIORITY
BANGKOK 448 PRIORITY
VIENTIANE 366 PRIORITY

DATE: FEBRUARY 9, NOON

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Lu 3/2/78

By

rmq, NARS, Date 3/28/78

WE APPRECIATE PROMPT DECISIONS FROM WASHINGTON FOR REPRISAL ATTACKS YESTERDAY AND TODAY AGAINST SELECTED MILITARY TARGETS IN THE DRV. I CONSIDER THIS A SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN DEMONSTRATING US DETERMINATION NOT TO CONTINUE TO SUBMIT TO VC OFFENSES AGAINST US AND VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS WITHOUT A SUITABLE RESPONSE ON OUR PART. THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 7 EMPHASIZES THAT WE SEEK NO WIDER WAR, IN PINNING THE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE DRV, AND IN CAREFULLY POINTING OUT THAT OUR RESPONSE WAS AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS SUPPORTING DRV AGGRESSION AND NOT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION. THIS STATEMENT AND OUR ACTIONS YESTERDAY AND TODAY PROVIDE IN MY VIEW A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR EMBARKING ON A GRADUATED REPRISAL PROGRAM TO BRING INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE DRV TO CEASE ITS INTERVENTION IN SVN, AS DISCUSSED HERE AT SOME LENGTH WITH BUNDY AND HIS PARTY.

THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF SUCH A PROGRAM IS THAT THROUGH A MEASURED, CONTROLLED SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS AGAINST THE DRV TAKEN IN REPRISAL FOR DRV INSPIRED ACTIONS IN SVN, SIGNIFICANT PRESSURES CAN BE

/BROUGHT TO BEAR

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2445, FEBRUARY 9, NOON, FROM SAIGON

BROUGHT TO BEAR ON DRV TO PERSUADE IT TO STOP ITS INTERVENTION IN SVN. THE PROGRAM WOULD BE CARRIED OUT JOINTLY WITH GVN AND WOULD BE DIRECTED SOLELY AGAINST DRV MILITARY TARGETS AND INFILTRATION ROUTES, NOT AGAINST DRV POPULATION. WHILE FEBRUARY 7 AND 8 MILITARY ACTIONS WERE SPECIFICALLY TIED TO VC ATTACKS IN PLEIKU AND TUY HOA, IN THE FUTURE WE COULD LOOK TO A SITUATION IN WHICH US/GVN REPRISALS COULD BE INITIATED BASED ON A GENERAL CATALOG OR PACKAGE OF VC OUTRAGES, NO ONE PARTICULARLY GRAVE ITSELF, NOT NECESSARILY TO A SPECIFIC VC ACT IN EACH CASE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE MIGHT ANNOUNCE THAT VC ACTS AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS (SUCH AS THE RAILROAD IN SVN) WILL RESULT IN RETALIATION AGAINST SIMILAR TARGETS IN THE DRV. OUR GRADUATED REPRISALS WITH THE GENERAL LEVEL OF VC OUTRAGES IN SVN, OR IF WE SO DESIRED PROGRESSIVELY RAISE THE LEVEL OF PRESSURE ON THE DRV.* THUS, IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO THE SO-CALLED PHASE II ESCALATION BUT JUSTIFIED ON BASIS OF RETALIATION.

IN CARRYING OUT SUCH A PROGRAM, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD LIMIT US/GVN PUBLICITY TO THE BARE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO BALANCE COMMUNIST OUTPUT. WE WOULD CONFIRM OUR REPRISAL ACTIONS ONLY WHEN NECESSARY AND THEN AS BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ESTABLISHED POLICY OF REPRISALS.

OUR CURRENT 34A OPERATIONS (EXCEPT ANY 34-A AIR STRIKES IN THE DRV) AND THE YANKEE TEAM/BARREL ROLL OPERATIONS IN THE LAOS CORRIDOR WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE. ADDITIONALLY, WE WOULD PROGRESSIVELY EXTEND THESE OPERATIONS INTO THE DRV ALONG INFILTRATION ROUTES.

THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF GRADUATED REPRISALS WE WOULD CONVEY CLEARLY THROUGH APPROPRIATE INTERMEDIARIES OR OTHER MEANS TO PEKING, MOSCOW, AND HANOI THE LIMITED NATURE OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME OUR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. SIMILARLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO EXPAND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THAILAND AND INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RLG AND OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO BRING THEM INTO THE PICTURE TO THE EXTENT DESIRED.

/WITH REGARD TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2445, FEBRUARY 9, NOON, FROM SAIGON

WITH REGARD TO OT THE GVN I WOULD ENVISAGE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AT AN EARLY DATE TO DEVELOP FIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT (#) GVN ACTIONS AND TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF EDUCATION BY WHICH GVN WOULD BEGIN TO FORMULATE ITS WAR OBJECTIVES AND ULTIMATELY REACH AGREEMENT WITH US ON THE FRAMEWORK OF DEMANDS TO BE MADE ON THE DRV AS WELL AS THE GENERAL NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES. BOTH GENERAL KHANH AND ACTING PRIME MINISTER OANH HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR EXPANDED DISCUSSIONS AND OF INTEGRATING THE VIETNAMESE INTO A PROGRAM AGAINST DRV. I FEEL IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE DO THIS AND THAT WE MAINTAIN A SENSE OF MOMENTUM IF WE ARE TO CAPITALIZE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS WHICH IF EXPLOITED EARLY COULD LEAD TO A GREATER SENSE OF PURPOSE AND DIRECTION BOTH IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY AND AWAKEN NEW HOPE FOR EVENTUAL VICTORY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID IN THE PRESENT SITUATION A GENERAL LETDOWN IN MORALE AND SPIRIT WHICH FOLLOWED OUR ACTION IN THE TONKIN GULF.

IF THE GRADUATED REPRISAL PROGRAM SUCCEEDS IN MOUNTING SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON THE DRV TO THE POINT WHERE THE DRV LEADERS HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR CHANCES FOR ULTIMATE SUCCESS, WE SHOULD HAVE A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO COME OUT. I BELIEVE RATIONALE OF SIMPLY RETURNING TO OBSERVANCE OF THE SPIRIT OF THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS WITH RESPECT TO SVN AND THE 1962 ACCORDS RE LAOS AS SET FORTH IN EMBTEL 235 (NOTAL) IS STILL VALID. THIS FORMULA HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF SIMPLICITY, OF AVOIDING PITFALLS OF NEW CONFERENCES, AND AVOIDING NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT CESSATION OF DRV DIRECTION AND SUPPORT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTH COULD BE ACHIEVED MORE OR LESS TACITLY IN FIRST INSTANCE AND THEN CONFIRMED THROUGH GVN/DRV NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MILITARY LEVEL. AN ADDED ADVANTAGE IS THAT IT KEEPS US REMOVED FROM DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH DRV. A SEPARATE TELEGRAM FOLLOWS ON HOW US/GVN TERMS FOR CESSATION OF DRV SUPPORT AND DIRECTION OF AGGRESSION IN SVN MIGHT BE STATED.

/IN SUM, I BELIEVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 2445, FEBRUARY 9, NOON FROM SAIGON

IN SUM, I BELIEVE A PHASE II PROGRAM BASED LARGELY ON GRADUATED REPRISALS OFFERS THE BEST AVAILABLE MEANS OF EXERTING INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE DRV LEADERS TO INDUCE THEM TO CEASE THEIR INTERVENTION IN SVN WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING MORE MANAGEABLE IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND WITH OUR FRIENDS. I RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED ALONG THIS TRACK.

TAYLOR

LM

*SENTENCE AS RECEIVED. VERIFICATION REQUESTED.

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:55 AM, FEBRUARY 9

PASSED CIA AT 5:22 AM, FEBRUARY 9

~~TOP SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE IN COLLECT
CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

316 Bundy
04/09
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Feb 8 20 1965

Origin
Info
ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 1653 IMMEDIATE
FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FROM THE PRESIDENT
NODIS LOR

1. Mac Bundy has given me a full report of his discussions with you and of the outstanding work which you and all your team are doing.
2. In our discussions in December we agreed upon the importance of undertaking appropriate action against North Vietnam. We then felt it important to establish as strong a government as possible, and you have been doing your level best to that end. It also seemed to me essential to get women and children out of the area, and now we have taken that decision. I am now prepared to go forward with the best government we can get, and accordingly I wish you to know that I have today decided that we will carry out our December plan for continuing action against North Vietnam with modifications up and down in tempo and scale in the light of your recommendations as Bundy reports them, and our own continuing review of the ~~situation~~ situation.
3. It is most important that this decision not be publicized until we have determined precise opening moves, and until Kosygin is safely

Drafted by:

2/8/65

Telegram - translation and
classification required by:

White House: McG Bundy/bmm

W. P. Bundy

Cleanances:

White House: McGeorge Bundy

S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

DECLASSIFIED
NSC 7-25-80
NARS, Date 8-4-84

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

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isp

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

out of Hanoi. Moreover, we wish to **make our own plans after** assessing Soviet reaction to recent events which should **be more** clear by time Kosygin leaves.

4. Evacuation of dependents **should proceed as you** determine. I hope you can meet the 7 - 10 days suggested in your **last message**.

5. I am impressed by **argument that the** building of a minimum government will benefit by some private assurances from us to the highest levels that we do now intend to take continuing **action**. Therefore, you are **authorized** to convey this in general terms to **key leaders** and political figures as **you see fit**. **At** the same time you **should say that we want** to work with **a unified and** going government, and **that the sooner they can** work out such a government, the better we can plan **and execute the continuing** actions we have in mind.

6. This brings my warmest **good wishes to you and** Mrs. Taylor, and my renewed thanks for all that you are **doing for your country**.

GP-1.

END

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**W H* 002~~TOP SECRET~~

31c

Action

CONTROL: 8080
RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 9, 1965, 9:50 P.M. CORRECTION ISSUED:
2/10/65, 2:15 A.M.,
RNL

Info

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY
ACTION: SECSTATE 2466 IMMEDIATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 10, 10 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Authority

State Sec 3/2/78

NODIS - LOR

By

mmg, NARS, Date *3/28/78*

REF: A. DEPTTEL 1653. B. EMBTEL 2462.

THIS CABLE IS MY WEEKLY REPORT ON THE LOCAL SITUATION AND A
REPLY TO DEPTTEL 1653.

WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, WE ARE MOST HAPPY OVER YOUR DECISION
TO MOVE FORWARD INTO THE SO-CALLED PHASE II OF OUR DECEMBER PLAN.
OUR EMBTEL 2455 REPORTS OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PASSING TO
PHASE II VIA THE REPRISAL ROUTE, BASED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
MAC BUNDY AND HIS GROUP. WE WILL FORWARD SHORTLY SUGGESTIONS OF
SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROGRAM. SUCH ACTIONS WILL
BE FOR THE PERIOD FOLLOWING KOSYGIN'S DEPARTURE FROM HANOI AND
OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET REACTION TO RECENT EVENTS.

WITH REGARD TO THE AUTHORITY IN PARA 5, REF A, ALEX JOHNSON AND
I USED IT AFTERNOON FEB 9 IN ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE VIEN TO
ACCEPT THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP WHICH HAD BEEN OFFERED HIM AND
WHICH HE HAD DECLINED. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE HIM DIS-
CREDITED IN A GOVT CONTROLLED FROM THE WINGS BY KHANH AND
THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE, WE DO THINK HE SHOULD ACCEPT THE
RISKS INHERENT IN THE JOB IF HE CAN GET THE ARMED FORCES
COUNCIL (NOT JUST KHANH) TO GIVE HIM GUARANTEES ON THE CARDINAL
POINTS MENTIONED IN REF B. WE HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN KHANH'S
WORD BUT WE DOUBT THAT THE GENERALS AS A BODY WOULD RENEGE ON
A FORMAL COMMITMENT. AS I SIGN THIS CABLE, WE DO NOT KNOW THE
OUTCOME OF THE PREMIERSHIP QUESTION.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2466, FEBRUARY 10, 10 A.M., FROM SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY SITUATION DURING THE LAST WEEK, CELEBRATION OF THE OPENING OF THE LUNAR NEW YEAR LED TO A SHARP DECLINE IN BOTH VIET CONG AND GOVT MILITARY ACTIVITY. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE HOLIDAY PERIOD AND AS A RESULT PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES WERE DOWN CONSIDERABLY FROM NORMAL LEVELS. AS YOU KNOW, THIS LULL, HOWEVER, WAS BROKEN DRAMATICALLY BY THE VIET CONG ATTACK AGAINST THE US MILITARY COMPOUND AND AIRSTRIP AT PLEIKU DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS LAST SUNDAY, CAUSING AMERICAN CASUALTIES OF 8 DEATHS AND 108 WOUNDED AS WELL AS THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE AIRCRAFT AND DAMAGE TO 13 OTHERS. THE PLEIKU INCIDENT, OUR JOINT PROMPT REPRISALS AGAINST SELECTED NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS HAVE BROUGHT NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE PICTURE WHICH IT IS PREMATURE TO ASSESS.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE FOREGOING EVENTS IS LIKELY TO BE GREAT BUT CAN NOT YET BE MEASURED. FORMER PRIME MINISTER HUONG, FEARING FOR HIS LIFE FROM THE BUDDHISTS AND SUSPICIOUS OF BETRAYAL TO THEM BY KHANH, WENT INTO HIDING ON FEB 3 IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, TO THE ANGUISH OF HIS HOST. YESTERDAY, BRIGHTENED BY THE ATTACKS OF FEBRUARY 7 AND 8 ON THE DRV, HE DECIDED TO GO TO VUNG TAU AND ACCEPT THE PROTECTION OF GENERAL KHANH AND THE ARMED FORCES WHOM HE HAD NOT TRUSTED UP TO THEN. I CAN NOT EXPLAIN HIS REASONING BUT THERE IT IS. VIEN STATES THAT HE WOULD NEVER HAVE ENTERTAINED THE THOUGHT OF ACCEPTING THE PREMIERSHIP AFTER HUONG'S DOWNFALL BUT FOR THIS NEW TURN OF EVENTS IN THE NORTH. SOMETHING TONIC HAS BEEN ADDED BUT HOW FAR IT WILL CARRY US REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

IN ANY CASE, THANK YOU FOR RECENT DECISIONS AND FOR LETTING BUNDY AND COMPANY COME OUR WAY. THEY WERE A STIMULANT TO US AND WE HOPE IT WAS RECIPROCAL.

CFN LOR A 1653 B 2462 1653 II 2445 II BUDNY KOSYGIN 5 A
JOHNSON 9 VIEN NOT KHANH KHANH B KHANH NOT NO PLEIKU 8 108
13 PLEIKU NOT HUONG KHANH 3 7 8 DRV VUNG TAU KHANH NOT NOT VIEN
HUONG BUNDY

TAYLOR

RNL/AE

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 10, 1965

8
32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Chip Bohlen

1. I think you will want to see Chip Bohlen at least briefly, as George Ball suggests.
2. I think you know that Bohlen is an old friend of mine, so that perhaps my judgment should be discounted. I also recall that I may have made him look as if he were poaching on your territory by taking him into the Rose Garden a little early for a short walk before a ceremony last spring.
3. It is true that in 1963 and early 1964 Bohlen was in a quite edgy mood because of his inability to get anywhere with the French. But in recent months he has become more philosophical. He has conducted the affairs of the Embassy in exactly the same spirit that you have shown in your own wise restraint toward de Gaulle, and I think the things that were said about him a year ago are no longer true. But the point is that you will want to judge this for yourself and that there is no substitute for face-to-face conversation.
4. Bohlen loves his job and has great professional skill. At the same time, he has a force and toughness which are unusual in the Foreign Service. I believe that if you and he should hit it off, it would make a great combination for the long pull in our relations with France.

McG. B.

33
February 10, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Bruce
at 11:30 this morning

1. I attach a short State Department memorandum (Tab A) on your meeting with Bruce this morning. It gives his subjects of interest as (1) British economic problems, (2) British political problems, and (3) general Atlantic Alliance problems.

2. The Department's suggested statement (Tab B) seems to me so thin that it might be better to have no statement at all, and simply to let Reedy say that Ambassador Bruce is back for routine consultation. I myself think this would be enough. In the light of the latest news from Vietnam, there will be no coverage on this event anyway.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-29-77, NSC 11-30-78

By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79

34

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

About ten days ago you called my attention to a bad story in the Herald Tribune about the White House and Tshombe. We traced this sharply and clearly to Senator Dodd, and still more to his assistant, David Martin. (Martin admits that both Dodd and he spoke to Freidin in London.)

Nevertheless, I think you will want to know that in fact Dodd's meeting with Tshombe worked out very much to our advantage. We have our own transcript from Dodd, and the Senator said all the things we asked him to say about how Tshombe should widen his circle of friends, play ball with the OAU, broaden his Cabinet, and be responsive to the Belgians. Dodd even told Tshombe that the State Department -- and of course the White House -- were his friends.

At least partly as a result, Tshombe has paid some real attention to these matters in recent days, and the mess in the Congo looks less discouraging than at any time during recent months. (Cross your fingers.)

Nevertheless, Bob Komer has had a good time beating up Dodd's assistant, who has made all sorts of apologetic noises. As a result I think we got some considerable net help from Dodd, and at the same time have left his people feeling that they owe us something.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-30

By ig, NARA, Date 1-12-89

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the German Ambassador at
11:30 this morning.

1. The German Ambassador asked for this appointment. His ostensible purpose is to elaborate upon the contents of Chancellor Erhard's letter (delivered last Friday), particularly in the context of General de Gaulle's press conference remarks, which to some extent overtook the letter. The Germans do not agree with de Gaulle's view that reunification is a European matter. They need and want U. S. support.
2. Except for its introductory portion on your inauguration and its final sections on your trip to Europe, the letter dwells mainly on the substance of the Chancellor's recent talks with General de Gaulle on the subjects of (1) European unity, (2) the defense of the Alliance, and (3) German reunification.
3. The Chancellor's tone is generally more optimistic than the facts warrant. This optimism is necessary for the Chancellor's own domestic political purposes.
4. Most of the items raised in the Chancellor's letter require no specific comment. It would be safer not to discuss specific European plans with the German Ambassador; and this matter is already being handled through other channels. But it may be useful to tell the Ambassador once again of our strong support for the cause of German unity and our readiness to deal constructively with any proposal which would facilitate reunification. The unification issue has become confused over the last weeks and it is time for one more reassurance.
5. Since the press obviously will be interested in the reasons for this meeting, and since the German Government leaks like a sieve, it would be good to have Knappstein talk with the press in George Reedy's office after he leaves you. At that time, he could confirm the delivery of a message, describe its general contents, and repeat for the correspondents your strong and continuing commitment to reunification and the readiness of the U. S. to work with its allies for a solution to this problem.
6. At Tab A is a short State memo; at Tab B is a translation of the Chancellor's letter.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 10-16-98

McG. B.

February 9, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

This little statement would do nicely. It does have the effect of striking down one element in General de Gaulle's press conference. But if you say it you will get support in Germany. The General's position that reunification can only be handled by the Europeans is such obvious nonsense that you should win this particular trick without much backfire. If you say anything at all, I recommend something like this, because there is no point in issuing a non-statement.

McG. B.

2/9/65

36 a

Draft Statement by the President on the Visit of the German Ambassador

Ambassador Knappstein and I have had a good talk this morning. He delivered a message from Chancellor Erhard which reaffirmed the deep community of interest between the Federal Republic and the United States. I told the Ambassador of the full and continuing support of the United States for serious progress toward the reunification of Germany, and I expressed my clear agreement with Chancellor Erhard that the struggle for the reunification of Germany requires the interest and active participation of all of the responsible powers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting tomorrow with
Ambassador Bruce

David Bruce told me he would like to discuss with you tomorrow the British political, economic and financial situations. He also has some ideas about handling the NATO nuclear problem -- ANF/MLF which he would like to raise.

(He mentioned, too, that as a conservationist, he wanted to congratulate you on your conservation message. I suggested that he tell you this in his own inimitable way.)

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-29-77, NISC 11-30-78By if, NARS, Date 6-20-79~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your call to Prime Minister Pearson on Balance of Payments

1. The object of this call is to get Pearson's consent to a re-affirmation of the existing Canadian commitment to avoid excessive borrowing from the U. S. What Dillon would like is for you to read to Pearson the paragraph which we want to put into the message on this subject. It reads as follows:

"To stop the excessive flow of funds to Canada under its special exemption from the Equalization Tax, I have sought and received firm assurance that the Canadian government will take the steps needed to hold these outflows to levels consistent with that special exemption."

2. You can point out to Pearson that this language merely reaffirms existing clear Canadian undertakings, and that it is of great importance to be able to use it in your message if you are to avoid heavy pressure from many quarters to set a strict dollar limit for Canadian borrowings.

3. The fact is that we will have to impose such a limit

- if Canadian reserves continue to grow
- if Canadian interest rates rise sharply
- or, if Canadian banks start pulling back to Canada money which they now hold in the United States.

4. You will probably also want to tell Pearson that you are about to invoke the Gore amendment and impose the Interest Equalization Tax on bank loans of one year or longer, with no exemption for Canada, Pearson is probably expecting this news, but he is entitled to hear it from you. The Canadians will not be very much hurt by it because they have been raising their money by selling bonds instead of by borrowing from our banks.

5. Pearson may argue that the Canadians are already doing all they can to limit their long-term borrowing in New York. You will probably not want to get into the details of the long argument in Douglas' memorandum (Tab A). You can simply say that your experts (Dillon and Martin) strongly disagree -- and that in any case you have no real

Feb. 9, 1965

alternative but to ask for performance on the existing Canadian undertaking.

6. On a separate subject, Dillon tells me that if the Canadians agree to this language, the Japanese would like a sentence or two about what has been happily agreed with them. No one sees any objection to these sentences, but Douglas wants to be sure that you were informed of their existence.

h. f. s.

McG. B.

P.S. On the Canadian air agreement, you probably will not wish to raise the subject yourself, but if Pearson mentions it, it would be worthwhile to say that you have been reviewing it yourself and that the plan which you have now approved (very slightly different in language from the last Canadian proposal) goes just as far as we can possibly go. This may help him get past any lingering doubts in his Cabinet over a bargain which is clearly better for Canada than what now exists.

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February 8, 1965

39

21

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Balance of Payments meeting

1. As I understand it, all outstanding issues have been brought within range of agreement, except for the issue of domestic monetary policy, which is highly controversial (see para. 3 below).

2. Dillon will handle the presentation and will discuss, among other things: (1) a possible call from you to Pearson; (2) the question of need for legislation freeing the bankers and businessmen from anti-trust fears.

3. Dillon will specifically exclude from the discussion in this meeting reference to domestic interest rates on page 13 of the message. This is to avoid a wrangle in the meeting and a possible question of Martin's prerogatives. He and Martin and Gordon and Ackley will try to settle this question of language and substance out of court and only if there is continuing argument will the matter come to you directly. Your interest in maintaining easy credit will of course be defended throughout by your people.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Treasury Doc 4/30/77
By PMG, NARS, Date 7/19/77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you may be interested to know that we have in the White House currently a film of the NBC White Paper on the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb, which was broadcast about a month ago. My own interest in it was first stirred by the fact that I have a bit part, but with all allowance for an amateur actor's pride, I do think this is one of the most remarkable television shows ever put together, and I think you might find it interesting as a record of the one decision the American Government has ever made to use atomic weapons. You would also see quite a few of your own team on stage -- Don Hornig, Glenn Seaborg, and George Kistiakowsky, as well as Byrnes, McCloy, Oppenheimer and General Groves. The film is on loan from NBC, and before sending it back I want to check your possible interest.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Send it up to Mrs. Roberts because
I may want to see it _____

Send it on back ☒ _____

*film to be picked up by
Mr. Prince 2/9/65*

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TOP SECRET

February 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Situation in Vietnam

This memorandum attempts to describe the situation, the stakes and the measures which I think should now be taken.

I. Summary Conclusions

The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U. S. action defeat appears inevitable -- probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much.

The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral non-Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leadership, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated U. S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the installment plan.

The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared by all who accompanied me from Washington, and I think by all members of the country team.

The events of the last twenty-four hours have produced a practicable point of departure for this policy of reprisal, and for the removal of U. S. dependents. They may also have catalyzed the formation of a new Vietnamese government. If so, the situation may be at a turning point.

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NSC 11-10-74	
By <u>WJper</u>	NAAS, Date <u>8-1-86</u>
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- 2 -

There is much that can and should be done to support and to supplement our present effort, while adding sustained reprisals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion which again is shared by all members of my party: the U. S. mission is composed of outstanding men, and U. S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. No man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but when you described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right.

II. The General Situation

For the last year -- and perhaps for longer -- the overall situation in Vietnam has been deteriorating. The Communists have been gaining and the anti-Communist forces have been losing. As a result there is now great uncertainty among Vietnamese as well as Americans as to whether Communist victory can be prevented. There is nervousness about the determination of the U. S. Government. There is recrimination and fear among Vietnamese political leaders. There is an appearance of wariness among some military leaders. There is a worrisome lassitude among the Vietnamese generally. There is a distressing absence of positive commitment to any serious social or political purpose. Outside observers are ready to write the patient off. All of this tends to bring latent anti-Americanism dangerously near to the surface.

To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing feeling that time is against us. Junior officers in all services are able, zealous and effective within the limits of their means. Their morale is sustained by the fact that they know that they are doing their jobs well and that they will not have to accept the responsibility for defeat. But near the top, where responsibility is heavy and accountability real, one can sense the inner doubts of men whose outward behavior remains determined.

The situation is not all black. The overall military effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces in open combat continues to grow. The month of January was one of outstanding and genuine success in offensive military action, showing the highest gross count of Viet Cong dead of any month of the war, and a very high ratio also of enemy to friendly losses. We

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believe that General Westmoreland is right (and General Alsop wrong) when he says that the Viet Cong do not now plan to expose themselves to large-scale military engagements in which their losses on the average would be high and their gains low. (The operation at Binh Gia is analyzed as a special case, representing the taking of a friendly Catholic village as bait rather than a decision to force pitched battle -- more such cases are expected and the particular military problem posed is difficult.)

Moreover, the Vietnamese people, although war weary, are also remarkably tough and resilient, and they do not find the prospect of Communist domination attractive. Their readiness to quit is much lower than the discouraging events of recent months might lead one to expect. It is probable that most Vietnamese think American withdrawal is more likely than an early switch to neutralism or surrender by major elements within Vietnam.

Nevertheless the social and political fabric is stretched thin, and extremely unpleasant surprises are increasingly possible -- both political and military.

And it remains a stubborn fact that the percentage of the countryside which is dominated or threatened by the Viet Cong continues to grow. Even in areas which are "cleared," the follow-on pacification is stalled because of widespread belief that the Viet Cong are going to win in the long run. The areas which can be regarded as truly cleared and pacified and safe are few and shrinking. (An important exception to this is the area of Saigon and its immediate surroundings. The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling siege of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. That is the current policy of the mission.)

III. The Political Situation

Next only to the overall state of the struggle against the Viet Cong, the shape and structure of the government is the most important element of the Saigon situation. We made it our particular business to examine the question whether and to what degree a stable government is a necessity for the successful prosecution of our policy in Vietnam. We reached a mixed conclusion.

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- 4 -

For immediate purposes -- and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe that the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US/GVN policy. That is about all it can do.

In the longer run, it is necessary that a government be established which will in one way or another be able to maintain its political authority against all challenges over a longer time than the governments of the last year and a half.

The composition and direction of such a government is a most difficult problem, and we do not wholly agree with the mission in our estimate of its nature.

The mood of the mission with respect to the prospect of obtaining such a government is one of pessimism and frustration. This is only natural in terms of the events of the past many weeks. Two dominant themes predominate: a government headed by Khanh will be difficult if not impossible to deal with and, in any case, would be short lived; the Buddhists (or, more specifically, the few politically activist Bonzes) must be confronted and faced down (by military means if necessary) lest they maintain their power to unseat any government that does not bow to their every demand. We tend to differ with the mission on both counts.

Specifically, we believe that General Khanh, with all his faults, is by long odds the outstanding military man currently in sight -- and the most impressive personality generally. We do not share the conclusion of Ambassador Taylor that he must somehow be removed from the military and political scene.

There are strong reasons for the Ambassador's total lack of confidence in Khanh. At least twice Khanh has acted in ways that directly spoiled Ambassador Taylor's high hopes for December. When he abolished the High National Council he undercut the prospect of the stable government needed for Phase II action against the North. In January he overthrew Huong just when the latter, in the Embassy's view, was about to succeed in putting the bonzes in their place.

Khanh is not an easy man to deal with. It is clear that he takes a highly tactical view of truth, although General Westmoreland asserts that Khanh has never deceived him. He is intensely ambitious and intent above all else on maintaining and advancing his own power. He gravely lacks the

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confidence of many of his colleagues -- military and civilian -- and he seems not to be personally popular with the public. He is correctly assessed as tricky. He remains able, energetic, perceptive and resilient, and in our judgment he will pursue the fight against the Communists as long as he can count on U. S. help. (If he should conclude that the U. S. was violently against him personally, he might well seek a way to power by some anti-American path, a path which would lead to disaster for both Vietnam and the United States.)

But our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is that we see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics.

We also differ from the Embassy in our estimate of the Buddhist leaders. The dominant Embassy view is that "the Buddhists" are really just a handful of irresponsible and designing clerics and that they must be curbed by firmness. We agree that they may well have to be limited at some point, especially in their use of mobs, but we also think they must be offered some accommodation.

We feel that the operative concept should be incorporation into the affairs of government rather than confrontation. This is easier said than done, because the Buddhists have many of the bad habits of men who have prospered by irresponsible opposition. Still there are signs that both Buddhist laymen and bonzes are now taking a more positive stance. We feel that the mission might do more in attempting to direct or channel the Buddhists into a more useful and positive role -- and active rather than a passive approach. The Buddhists now play a key role in the balance of political forces, so that something more than "confrontation" must be achieved if there is to be any active government at all.

Having registered these two immediate and important differences of emphasis, we should add that in our judgment the mission has acted at about the right level of general involvement in the problem of Vietnamese government-making. American advice is sought by all elements, and all try to bend it to their own ends. The mission attempts to keep before all elements the importance of stable government, and it quietly presses the value of those who are known to be good, solid, able ministerial timber.

In a situation in which confidence is low and uncertainty great, strongly ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists might react very vigorously against an overt American attempt to form or actively support a government against their liking. Anti-Americanism is a theme that is potentially explosive, and therefore tempting to those who feel that we are blocking their ambitions. This is one lesson, to us, of the outburst in Hue last month.

On the other hand, no power whose stake is as great and whose presence as clear as those of the United States in Vietnam can afford to stand aside entirely, and such a passive posture would not be understood or approved by the Vietnamese themselves.

It is important, therefore, that the mission maintain a constant and active concern with the politics of government-making. This it is doing. While it is very difficult to second-guess this effort, we do recommend a telegram of guidance which might take into account the marginal differences from mission thinking which are suggested above. In the light of further discussion, a message of this sort will be drafted for consideration.

IV. Strengthening the Pacification Program

If we suppose that new hopes are raised -- at least temporarily -- by a reprisal program, and if we suppose further that a government somewhat better than the bare minimum is established, the most urgent order of business will then be the improvement and broadening of the pacification program, especially in its non-military elements.

The mission fully concurs in the importance of this effort. We believe, however, that consideration should be given to important modifications in its organization for this purpose. In particular we believe that there should be intensive effort to strengthen our program at the margin between military advice and economic development -- in the area which implies civil government for the soldiers and police action for the aid mission. These efforts, important as they are understood to be, are somehow at the edge of vision for both parties. General Westmoreland and his people inevitably think first of military programs, though they have been imaginative and understanding about the importance of other aspects. Mr. Killen and the USOM people are centrally concerned with problems of aid and of economic improvement, although they talk with conviction and energy about their increasing police effort. It remains a fact that its own

organization for helping to provide real security for an area which has been "cleared" in crude military terms is unfinished business for the U. S. mission. What is true of our side is doubly true of the Vietnamese.

We do not offer a definite solution to this problem. We are inclined to suggest, however, that one important and unemployed asset is the Special Forces of the Defense Department. Because of the predominant role of the U. S. military, and because of the generous spirit and broad mind of General Westmoreland himself, we are inclined to believe that the easiest growing edge for this work may be through the use of some of these versatile and flexible units.

We would think it important, however, that an effort of this kind be coordinated at a high level between the Defense Department and AID, and we believe that a joint mission which would include either Director Bell or Mr. Gaud from AID is urgently needed for the purpose of building this missing link into our program.

V. A Sense of Positive Hope

Vietnamese talk in full of the need for "revolution." Vietnamese practice is empty of action to match the talk -- so much so that the word "revolution" sometimes seems to have no real meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a deep and strong yearning among the young and the unprivileged for a new and better social order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are groping toward; this is what the students and young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning does not find an adequate response in American policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause of latent anti-American feeling. We only perceived this problem toward the end of our visit. We think it needs urgent further attention. We make no present recommendations. We do believe that over the long pull our military and political firmness must be matched by our political and economic support for the hopes that are embodied to Vietnamese in the word "revolution."

VI. The Basic U. S. Commitment

The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persistence of the Viet Cong are astonishing. They can appear anywhere -- and at almost any time. They have accepted extraordinary losses and they come back for

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- 8 -

for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win.

There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to help them. The place where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. There is one grave weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix -- and that is a widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to take the necessary action and stay the course.

This is the overriding reason for our present recommendation of a policy of sustained reprisal. Once such a policy is put in force, we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness.

One final word. At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be long. It seems to us important that this fundamental fact be made clear and our understanding of it be made clear to our own people and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the past we have conveyed the impression that we expect an early solution when those who live with this war know that no early solution is possible. It is our own belief that the people of the United States have the necessary will to accept and to execute a policy that rests upon the reality that there is no short cut to success in South Vietnam.

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ANNEX A

A POLICY OF SUSTAINED REPRISALI. Introductory

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam -- a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher -- and more visible to American feelings -- than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide -- as it may -- the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost.

II. Outline of the Policy

1. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property.

2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired into a small shop in the countryside.

3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world,

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NSC 11-10-76

By LW per MIE NARS, Date 8-1-86

that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped -- and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.

4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.

5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our reprisal policy with as low a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen -- but we do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the cause of our continuing reprisals.

6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be increased only gradually -- and as indicated above it should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the course of the struggle in the South.

7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an "air war" may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions should not be difficult to develop.

8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peking, if there is Communist counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism, especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed -- but we believe them to be acceptable.

9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists

to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort.

III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy

1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South -- in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.

2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes -- and our own conversations confirm -- that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable.

3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective government -- at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts -- and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields.

4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.

5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence.

6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we our-

selves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects.

7. While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of the force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.

8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy -- they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy -- to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency -- will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.

IV. Present Action Recommendations

1. This general recommendation was developed in intensive discussions in the days just before the attacks on Pleiku. These attacks and our reaction to them have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development and execution of sustained reprisals. Conversely, if no such policy is now developed, we face the grave danger that Pleiku, like the Gulf of Tonkin, may be a short-run stimulant and a long-term depressant. We therefore recommend that the necessary preparations be made for continuing reprisals. The major necessary steps to be taken appear to us to be the following:

- (1) We should complete the evacuation of dependents.
- (2) We should quietly start the necessary westward deployments of back-up contingency forces.
- (3) We should develop and refine a running catalogue of Viet Cong offenses which can be published regularly and related clearly to our own reprisals. Such a catalogue should perhaps build on the foundation of an Initial White Paper.

(4) We should initiate joint planning with the GVN on both the civil and military level. Specifically, we should give a clear and strong signal to those now forming a government that we will be ready for this policy when they are.

(5) We should develop the necessary public and diplomatic statements to accompany the initiation and continuation of this program.

(6) We should insure that a reprisal program is matched by renewed public commitment to our family of programs in the South, so that the central importance of the southern struggle may never be neglected.

(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communication of the precise meaning of what we are and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow.

(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating attention in every forum upon its cause -- the aggression in the South.

(9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong violence. A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.

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February 2, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-29-77, NSC 11-30-78

By ig, NARS, Date 6-20-79

Subject: A Possible George Ball MLF Speech

This is a matter which may come up in my absence and on which I want to register a warning.

George Ball, as you know, continues to be a very strong believer in the MLF and in U. S. leadership to bring it about. He has now written a speech which he claims has the approval of Dean Rusk, Bill Tyler and Tommy Thompson. I know from my own conversations with Thompson and Tyler that they really do not think it wise, and after a careful reading of my own I told George I could not clear it unless the matter were referred to you and that I would have to advise against it. George has referred the matter to Secretary Rusk, who may or may not raise it with you.; George's speech is scheduled for Saturday, Feb. 6, in New Orleans.

I am sorry to say that I can imagine nothing less constructive than a long speech by a known American partisan arguing the case for the MLF in the first week of February. This will be ten days before Couve de Murville's visit to Washington, and it will come at a time when everyone in Europe has gladly dropped the subject until after the German elections. Chancellor Erhard's truce with de Gaulle turns precisely on an MLF pause, and your Administration is getting the credit that we predicted from the quarters we predicted. It is true that we are also getting worried noises from the devout "Atlanticists" like McCloy at home and a few Germans who are somewhat out on a limb. But this is emphatically not the time for a change of signal.

Still less is it the time for a sound of divided trumpets within the Administration. If anyone is to restate our Atlantic nuclear policy, it ought not to be someone who is a devout partisan of a particular solution like George. It ought to be the Secretary of State or the President himself.

George and I have agreed to disagree on this, and I do not know whether the matter will come to you, but if it does, I think you should have this much background. If the Secretary recommends the other way and you find his views persuasive, you will certainly get no complaint from your temporary Saigon branch.

McG. B.

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February 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Deputy or Potential Successor in my Office

Some weeks ago you asked me who should take over if, for any reason, I were no longer on this job, and I told you I had thought some about it. Since then I have thought some more, and I think I have some good suggestions.

1. The ideal man for this job is Bill Moyers. I do not know what his plans and yours may be, but I do know that he has an abiding interest and talent for foreign affairs. I believe that he would be extremely good at this job, and I think he would like it. Obviously he could not be spared at once from where he is, but if an assignment in this job were to keep him at your side longer than he might otherwise be willing to stay, it would be well worth considering.

2. Another possibility is Abram Chayes. He performed with great brilliance as Legal Adviser in the Department of State, and in the process he won the unreserved confidence of Dean Rusk, who had little or nothing to do with his initial appointment.

3. A third possibility is Tom Hughes, whom I have mentioned before. He is currently the head of Intelligence in the State Department, and I continue to be deeply impressed by the range and fairness of his mind. Like Moyers and Chayes, he would have an instinctive understanding for the requirement that the man in this job must protect the President's right to hear both sides of the hard cases. If and when you get the State Department organized to your satisfaction, the main function of this office should be just such careful review, rather than the initiation or monitoring of operational policy.

If you were to think well of the possibility that Moyers might move in here sometime, that would be my first preference. If not, I would like to think in terms of persuading Chayes or Hughes -- or some third party that would suit you -- to come in as Deputy in this office with a prospect of succession as and when a vacancy occurs. I have no present intention of quitting, but I doubt very much that it would be in your interest for me to go on here until 1973.

McG. B.

Rec'd
2/2/65
6:00 p.m.

(1)

44

Determined to be an
administrative marking

By MIE On 4/11/77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Deputy or Potential Successor in my Office

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h.l.B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1965

45 8

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply from Kosygin

1. The Soviets have now answered your private message of January 14. The message (Tab A) is cordial in tone, and none of the positions taken is surprising. The tone is perhaps a shade harder on Southeast Asia. Tommy Thompson is analyzing this and will be generating a recommendation as to how we should carry on the discourse. I will look into this again the moment I get back, and we will not let it fall between the cracks as we did in November.

2. At Tab B is a memo from Thompson about the state of the play on visits between you and the Soviet leaders. His own first suggestion is that you might now say privately that you had hoped to be able to visit the Soviet Union sometime in 1965. I doubt if we should decide this until we know a little more clearly how many trumpets we may be blowing in Southeast Asia. But I am sure you will want to have this first look at the lines along which Thompson himself is thinking.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 8-29-77, NSC 11-30-78

By ig, NARS, Date 6-20-79

46
J
DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 11-30-78; State 8-29-77

By ing, NARS, Date 9-25-79

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The Freidin article on page 2 of today's Herald Tribune looks to me like straight Dave Martin, Dodd's assistant, who has done this sort of thing at least once before. It rehashes many of the same complaints as in Senator Dodd's latest 6 January letter to you, especially the one about the State Department opposing Tshombe and the White House backing him. When I went up to see the Senator, I specifically and vigorously laid that old chestnut to rest. My distinct impression was that Martin was writing most of these diatribes, because Dodd didn't even seem familiar with some allegations.

2. When Dodd's last letter ended with an offer to help, we decided to see if we couldn't turn Dodd around by enlisting him to help us urge Tshombe to be more conciliatory toward his African colleagues. Dodd, who has a special entree with Tshombe, seemed eager to help. Soapy Williams and I wanted him to write Tshombe a letter, but he wanted (the idea was probably Irving Brown's of AFL/CIO) to go see Tshombe in Leopoldville. We demurred that this would be too public, but Dodd countered by suggesting he see Tshombe in London, using the Churchill funeral as a cover. We thought this worth riding with, but Soapy and I personally swore Dodd to secrecy. In fact, the trip has stayed secret, and we think Dodd did a good job.

3. I hope the Trib article will be a one-day wonder; we'll make sure no one else believes it. State recommends that if we get questions Reedy simply say that the WH and State are in complete agreement on Congo policy.

R. W. Komer

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

2

February 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: UN in San Francisco June 26

1. My own guess is that the President ought to plan to go to the 20th Anniversary Commemorative Session of the United Nations in San Francisco on June 26. This will be a highly significant anniversary, and there is every reason for the President to help to celebrate it. Whatever the result of our Article 19 fight, the President is clear in his own mind that we will continue as best we can to support the UN, and the 26th of June in San Francisco would be a good time to say so.

2. So my suggestion would be that you ask the President to agree in principle to attend this meeting and, if he agrees, tell the Governor that this is our current plan. Obviously, if the situation should change or if some other obligation should arise, the President can always change his mind. But as of now, it seems to me to make sense for him to plan to go to San Francisco and to say so to Stevenson.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Returned
from LAS
2/3/65
48*

February 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Since you enjoyed the first of Sullivan's reports on the non-coup in Vientiane yesterday, you may want to have the whole series as we have it. It comes out as he predicted it would, but there are some amusing ups and downs and some good touches at the end, including resumption of the tennis tournament, a Canadian black tie dinner for Souvanna, and a swim (after victory) for Sullivan.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

48a

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN IN VIENTIANE

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CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY OF CONFUSED ORIGIN SHAKING CITY TO-NIGHT. SEVERAL ROADBLOCKS HAVE MUSHROOMED AROUND CITY AND TROOP MOVEMENTS ARE REPORTED. ONE SHORT BURST OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE ABOUT 2015 HOURS.

MOST RUMORS SUGGEST THAT YOUNG COLONELS MAY BE TAKING ACTION THAT THEY HAVE LONG DISCUSSED. IF SO, ACTION LIKELY BE DIFFUSED AND DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST GRIEVANCES

WHICH ARE MORE PERSONAL THAN INSTITUTIONAL.

WE HAVE OFFICERS WITH GENERAL KOUFRASITH AND COL. TTOGLITH AT CHINAMAO. WE ARE SENDING OTHERS TO BE WITH GENERAL SIHO AT HIS HEADQUARTERS. OUR PURPOSE IS TO NEUTRALIZE MAIN SOURCES OF LOCAL POWER IN ORDER AVOID ESCALATION.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WHO HAS CALLED SOUVANNA, HAS BEEN ASSURED BY LATTER THAT SITUATION BEING BROUGHT UNDER HIS CONTROL BUT WE, AT CURRENT MOMENT, HAVE NO RPT NO ASSURANCE THAT HE KNOWS ANY MORE THAN WE DO JUST WHAT IS AFOOT.

~~OP-2~~
SULLIVAN

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.019.002.004/3

By jc NARA, Date 11-20-09

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

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ANZUS TASK FORCE HAS CUT WIRES, PUTTING RADIO OFF AIR. I HAVE SENT TWO OFFICERS FROM MILITARY ATTACHE'S OFFICE TO ROADBLOCK CONTROLLED BY BOUNLEUT'S TROOPS TO TELL THEM COUP HAS FAILED AND TO ADVISE THEM HEAD FOR THE HILLS. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE, ONLY CASUALTIES ARE TWO SOLDIERS FROM CHINAIMO WHO WERE KILLED WHILE ATTEMPTING RUN BOUNLEUT ROADBLOCK. I AM OFF TO SEE SOUVANNA AT PALACE IF I CAN GET THROUGH.

SULLIVAN

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~~CINCPAC 037 FROM VIENTIANE~~ FEBRUARY 1, 2 AM

I HAVE JUST COME FROM SEEING SOUVANNA, WHO IS HOLD UP IN KING'S COMPOUND WITH MOST OF GENERAL STAFF AND WITH THOSE CABINET OFFICERS WHO NOT AT MY HOUSE. HE WAS DELIGHTED KNOW WE HAD CUT RADIO HVI*SEEMS TO FEEL THAT EFFORT WILL FIZZLE.

ACCORDING HIS INFORMATION THERE ARE TWO COLONELS INVOLVED: BOUNLEUT SAYCOCIE AND KHAMCHAN SOUVOUJONG. THEY DISPOSE AT MOST OF TWO COMPANIES OF MEN. THEIR CHANCES FOR SUCCESS SEEM NIL. HE ASKED IF WE COULD ASSIST IN DISPOSING THIER MEN.
~~CFN 1167 000 547 037 1 0AM~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJPS 440A 5 2 0 1 2 1~~
WE SENT ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE TO CAMP WHICH BOUNLEUT ALLEGEDLY WAS USING AS COMMAND POST BUT HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE FIND HIM. WE ARE NOW SENDING SAME OFFICER TO SEEK HIM OUT AT ROADBLOCK ENROUTE CAMP CHINAIMO.

IN MEANTIME, I AM SENDING GENERAL SANG (PSYWAR CHIEF) WHO STILL DRINKING MY BRANDY AT MY RESIDENCE, IN COMPANY WITH EMBOFF TO GET MESSAGE FROM SOUVANNA TO BROADCAST ON HIS ARMED FORCES RADIO STATION. SANG SEEMS SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT, BUT HE BEING TRANSPORTED BODILY TO PALACE AT THIS MOMENT. ASSUMING BROADCAST CALMS POPULATION AND TROOPS DISPERS, I THINK WE MAY BE OUT OF WOODS BY MORNING.

SULLIVAN
~~DE~~

~~0100P40 030 FM VIENTIANE FEB 1, 9 AM~~

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE FINALLY TRACKED DOWN COLONEL BOUNLEUT APPROXIMATELY 0400 AND BY 0430 HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT HIS EFFORT HAD FAILED. BOUNLEUT THEN ASKED TO BE TAKEN TO SOUVANNA TO "EXPLAIN HIS POSITION" BEFORE HE WOULD AGREE DISPERSE HIS TROOPS. BECAUSE I DOUBTED SOUVANNA WANTED PERSONALLY TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS, I ASKED ARMY ATTACHE TO CHECK FIRST WITH PRINCE BEFORE TRANSPORTING BOUNLEUT.

~~OPN 1100 020 040 000 1 JAN 0400 0400~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJPS 4404 020 0400 0400~~

SOUVANNA CHOSE (WISELY) TO WAIT UNTIL MORNING BEFORE HAVING ANY OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH BOUNLEUT. HE DESIGNATED GENERAL SINGH AS HIS SPOKESMAN AND AGREED WITH BOUNLEUT TO USE ARMY ATTACHE RESIDENCE AS MEETING PLANCE. MEETING BEGAN THERE 0800 THIS MORNING AND IS CONTINUING. COLONEL LAW IS PRESENT AND PARTICIPATING IN MEETING.

BOUNLEUT'S FORCES STILL CONSISTS, AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE OF TWO COMPANIES. ONE COMPANY, WITH MORTARS, IS DRAWN UP AT ROADBLOCK EN ROUTE CHINAIMO. OTHER COMPANY STILL RECKLESSLY HOLDS RADIO STATION. THEY APPARENTLY HAVE NOT YET FIGURED OUT WHERE WE CUT THE LINE AND I HAVE NO INTENTION REPAIRING LINE UNTIL RADIO BACK IN GOVERNMENT HANDS.

OVER

SECRET

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Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

~~SECRET~~

~~2-1100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 AM FROM VIENTIANE~~

KOUPRASITH HAS SENT GROUP WITH ARMORED CARS DOWN CHINAIMO ROAD TO TAKE UP POSITION FACING ROADBLOCK. HE HAS ASSURED US THEY WILL MAKE NO MOVES AND THAT THEIR PURPOSE IS MERELY SHOW OF STRENGTH. OTHERWISE, TOWN IS MORE OR LESS NORMAL. SOUVANNA AND SEVERAL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS STILL IN KING'S COMPOUND. LAST OF CABINET OFFICERS (BOUAVAN NORASING) LEFT MY HOUSE AT 0330. I HAVE DELIBERATELY ORDERED FULL RESUMPTION ALL NORMAL ACTIVITIES BY U.S. ELEMENTS HERE IN ORDER GIVE GENERAL
~~CFN 0000 010 000~~

~~PAGE THREE RUMJTS 4408 SECRET~~

POPULATION SOME SENSE OF REASSURANCE. OUR ONLY PROBLEM TO DATE IS THAT AIR OPERATIONS ARE STOOD DOWN BECAUSE WATTAY AIRFIELD COMMANDER REMAINS SOMEWHAT NERVOUS. AIR ATTACHE HAS OBTAINED GENERAL OUANE'S PERMISSION BEGIN OPERATIONS AND HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL MA WHO CONCURS. WE HOPE HAVE T-28 STRIKES ROLLING IN ABOUT ONE HOUR.

~~0000~~

SULLIVAN Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

~~BT~~

~~CFN HA T-28 0103~~

G FM VIENTIANE
SP FEB 1, 11 AM
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USLABOUNLEUT MEETING WITH GENERAL SINGH TRANSPIRED PEACEFULLY,
NSC WITH BOUNLEUT FINALLY BEING ACCORDED HIS REQUEST TO HAVE INTER-
INR VIEW WITH SOUVANNA. HE HAS ASKED COLONEL LAW TO ACCOMPANY HIM
RMR AT THIS MEETING AS A SAFETY MEASURE AND I HAVE AUTHORIZED THIS.

MEETING, WHICH STARTED IN KING'S COMPOUND, HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS
ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR, AND HAS NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PRESIDENCY.

IM MEANTIME, LAO TECHNICIANS SEEM TO HAVE FOUND WAY TO REROUTE
THEIR COMMUNICATIONS FROM LAO NATIONAL RADIO TO TRANSMITTER
AND RADIO IS ONCE AGAIN BROADCASTING LAST NIGHT'S COMMUNIQUE.
WE HAVE ROUTED OUT OUR AUSTRALIAN TECHNICIAN AGAIN AND HE IS
EXAMINING POSSIBILITIES OF OUR MAKING A NEW CUT IN WIRE SHOULD
THAT PROVE NECESSARY. ALTHOUGH ARMY AND POLICE RADIOS ARE BOTH
BROADCASTING THEY ARE PLAYING MUSIC RATHER THAN COMMUNIQUE
WE HAD REQUESTED OF GENERAL SANG.

ALTHOUGH COLONEL LAW HAS NOT YET REPORTED BACK FROM SOUVANNA-
BOUNLEUT MEETING, I HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM SOURCES IN PRESIDENCY
THAT SOUVANNA IS PLANNING BROADCAST AT 1000, PRESUMABLY ANNOUN-
CING THAT AFFAIR IS SETTLED. THEREFORE, WE ARE HOLDING OFF ON
RADIO SABOTAGE UNTIL WE HEAR WHETHER NATIONAL RADIO PERMITS
SOUVANNA STATEMENT TO BE BROADCAST.

AT SAME TIME I AM ATTEMPTING PEEL OFF SOME OF BOUNLEUT'S
TROOPS WHO ARE GETTING TIRED AND HUNGRY. THEY WERE BROUGHT INTO
TOWN FROM GM 17 BY A RUSE AND SEEM CONFUSED. THEY HAVE NO
REPEAT NO PARTICULAR ALLEGIANCE TO BOUNLEUT, WHO IS A STAFF
OFFICER WITH NO REPEAT NO COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES. ASSISTANT
ARMY ATTACHE IS THEREFORE SEEKING GM 17 BATTALION COMMANDER IN
ORDER TRY PERSUADE HIM ORDER TROOPS BACK TO THEIR CAMPS.

~~SECRET~~

SULLIVAN

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ACTION PEARL BEPT 1170 INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK 825 SAIGON 998
CINCPAC 842 FM VIENTIANE FEB 1, 11 AM

SOUVANNA BROADCAST WHICH SCHEDULED 1000 HAS NOT YET REPEAT
NOT YET TAKEN PLACE. LAO NATIONAL RADIO HAS CEASED BROAD-
CASTING, PRESUMABLY UNDER ORDERS FROM BOUNLEUT. SOUVANNA
HAS JUST SENT FOR ME AND I AM NOW ENROUTE TO HIS RESIDENCE.

BT

SULLIVAN
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OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2 11:2, February 1, 1 p.m., From Vientiane~~

SOUVANNA THANKED ME WARMLY FOR ROLE WHICH U.S. OFFICERS
PLAYED IN HELPING ABORT THIS COUP EFFORT.. WHEN I ASKED IF
THERE WAS ANYTHING FURTHER WE COULD DO, HE SUGGESTED USING OUR
~~OWN~~

CONTACTS TO CALL LA MILITARY OFFICERS ANYWHERE WHO MIGHT BE
EXCITED BY THESE EVENTS. COLONEL LAW IS ACCOMPANYING GENERAL LA
TO PARAGUAY TO BE CERTAIN THAT PHOLMI-ORIENTED TROOPS OF SECOND
MILITARY REGION MAINTAIN THEIR EQUANIMITY.

BELIEVE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES ADEQUATE BASIS FOR HANDLING PRESS QUERIES WASHINGTON. EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FACT THIS WAS MINOR BARRACKS ROOM FLARE-UP ESSENTIALLY LED BY SINGLE COLONEL WITH HANDFUL BORROWED TROOPS. STABILITY NOW REIGNS AND SOUVANNA IS DEFINITELY INTACT AS PRIME MINISTER.

SULLIVAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 1:07 a.m., February 1.

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 1:29 a.m., February 1.

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FM VIENTIANE FEB 1, 1 PM

I HAVE ~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2002/03/10 : ALJ-019-00243-5~~ SINCE OSTENSIBLY TO INQUIRE AFTER HIS WELFARE AND TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT STATE OF PLAY. I KNEW FROM SOUVANNA THAT LATTER HAD SENT BOUAVAN NORASING TO PHOUMI TO BRING HIM ABREAST OF EVENTS.

RMR

PHOUMI, WITH CONSIDERABLE PANACHE, DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD SPENT THE NIGHT CALMING DOWN ALL ELEMENTS CONCERNED AND ALWAYS HOLDING HIMSELF READY SMOTHER ANY FIGHTING THAT FLARED UP. HE THEN CONCEDED THAT BOUNLEUT HAD TOSSED IN TOWEL AND SAID ~~ON 1175 007-000-118~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMORS WERE CONSIDERED~~

THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING REACH BOUNLEUT TO BE SURE HE BEHAVED. SAID HE HAD TELEPHONED SOUVANNA TO ASSURE LATTER THAT EVERYTHING WAS NOW RESOLVED.

PHOUMI THEN WENT ON TO STATE THAT THERE WERE MANY RUMORS SUGGESTING HE HAD BEEN BEHIND COUP AND HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THESE WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. WITHOUT SUGGESTING ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WHAT MY OWN SUSPICIONS WERE, I TOLD PHOUMI SUCH ACCUSATIONS WERE PRICE HE PAID FOR HIS PREVIOUS SUCCESSES IN GENERAL FIELD OF COUP PLOTTING.

COMMENT: IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE, ESPECIALLY ON BASIS OF A COUPLE OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, WHETHER PHOUMI HAD A DIRECT HAND IN LAST NIGHT'S EVENTS. MY OWN ESTIMATE IS THAT WHEN I SPOKE TO HIM LAST NIGHT, HE SEEMED PRETTY GENUINELY

OVER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2- 1173, FEBRUARY 1, 1 P.M. FROM VIENTIANE~~

IN THE DARK. BOUAVAN, WHO TALKED WITH HIM FROM MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT, SWEARS PHOUMI KNEW NOTHING AT THAT TIME. HE WAS PATENTLY MUCH BETTER IN THE PICTURE THIS MORNING AND TOOK SOME PLEASURE IN DEMONSTRATING THIS. HOWEVER, HE'S SUCH AN ARTFUL DODGER THAT ONE NEVER REALLY CAN BE SURE.

~~SECRET~~

SULLIVAN

~~BT~~

~~CEN GR 4~~

~~NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-6, 2-1-65, 2:15 AM.~~

~~NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 2-1-65, 2:30 AM.~~

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~~SAIGON 007 0100Z 026~~ FROM VIENTIANE FEB 1, 7 PM

L I N D I S

COLONEL LAW AND GENERAL LA HAVE RETURNED FROM PAKSANE WHERE THEY MET WITH GENERAL KHAMKHONG AND REGION II STAFF. THEY WERE ASSURED BY KHAMKHONG THAT HE AND HIS TROOPS WERE IN NO WAY INVOLVED IN BOUNLEUT'S ACTIONS LAST EVENING AND HAVE NO REPEAT NO INTENTION MOVING INTO CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

THERE IS NO DOUBT PHOUMI WOULD LIKE TO ENGAGE REGION II FORCES IN CONFRONTATION WITH KOUPRASITH, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT CURRENT

~~GRN 1170 011 000 000 000~~

~~PAGE TWO PHOUMI 000 000 000 000~~

SITUATION GIVES PHOUMI VERY LITTLE CHANGE TO EXPLOIT ON THIS SCORE. UNLESS SOMETHING SLIPS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, I WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT EXPECT REGION II INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL SCENE.

HOWEVER, THERE SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING A GENUINE POSSIBILITY THAT PHOUMI HAS BEEN ABLE TO ENGAGE SIHO'S CONCERN. WE HAVE REPORTS, FAIRLY WELL SUBSTANTIATED, THAT THREE COMPANIES OF LAO NATIONAL POLICE ARE BEING MOVED INTO VIENTIANE REGION. THIS ACTION IS ALLEGEDLY BEING TAKEN TO REDRESS BALANCE BETWEEN POLICE AND FIFTH MILITARY REGION. I AM SENDING ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHES TO BOTH SIHO AND KOUPRASITH HEADQUARTERS TO TRY TO KEEP THEM CALM.

~~GR 1~~

SULLIVAN

L I M D I S

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5
WHILE MILITARY RIVALRIES HAVE BEEN OCCUPYING ATTENTION VIENTIANE,
VIET MINH MAY BE UNROLLING THEIR SUNDAY PUNCH IN SOUTH.
GROUND ACTION WHICH BEGAN YESTERDAY EAST OF THAKEK HAS PUSHED
FAR OFF SEVERAL HILL POSITIONS IN THAT AREA.

IT APPEARS TO BE ACTION BY ABOUT FIVE RPT FIVE ENEMY COMPANIES
AND, ALTHOUGH IT HAS REACHED ACROSS ROUTE 13 AT ONE POINT
SOUTH OF THAKEK, FAR MILITARY OFFICERS IN VICINITY ARE NOT RPT

~~OPN-448-888-888-888-888~~

~~PAGE TWO KUNST 45TH T O P O D C R E T~~

NOT INCLINED TAKE IT TOO SERIOUSLY.

FROM OTHER INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY GENERAL MA, THERE EXISTS
REAL LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS FIRST ACTION MAY BE A FEINT, WITH
SERIOUS TROUBLE BREWING IN REGION NEAR MUONG PHINE. IF THIS
IS TRUE, WE MAY BE SEEING INITIAL PHASES OF LONG AVAIED VIET
MINK REACTION TO FAR OFFENSIVES EAST OF SAVANNAKHET AND KONG
KOK. GENERAL MA'S INFORMATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH LOSS OF T-28
PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. THIS PLANE, AS WELL AS OTHERS IN THAT FLIGHT,
ENCOUNTERED EXTREMELY HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE WHICH INDICATES
NEW CONCENTRATION IN AREA NORTHEAST OF MUONG PHINE. THIS
CONCENTRATION MAY BE POISED FOR ATTACK TO AGSOVAND OR BE LOCATION

Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-019-002-4-3-5
OF INFILTRATED UNITS WHICH HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN PREVIOUS
WEEKS.

OVER

GENERAL MA WILL FLY MORE MISSIONS AT FIRST LIGHT TOMORROW.
IF HE DEVELOPS REALLY SERIOUS OFFENSIVE IN PROGRESS, HE WISHES
SOME EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. THEREFORE, THERE IS REAL POSSIBILITY
I MAY ASK FOR A CRASH BARREL ROLL MISSION TOMORROW AGAINST THIS
AREA IF I DO, I HOPE COMPLIANCE WILL BE ASSURED.

SULLIVAN
~~BT~~

~~Note: Advance copy to S/S-C at 9:07 a.m. 2/1/85~~
~~Passed to White House, OOB & CIA at 9:29 a.m. 2/1/85~~

49

February 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cabinet Committee Meeting on Tuesday

1. Douglas Dillon now agrees to a balance of payments meeting on Tuesday, and I enclose the almost final draft of an agreed paper from the Cabinet Committee to you, for your reading this evening.
2. As you will see the principal divided issue that remains is the travel tax.
3. In the background there are also latent differences about the effectiveness that "moral suasion" has on those who control short-term capital controls and overseas equity investments, but I myself see no way around a trial period on this, in the light of Jack Connor's determination to make them work. If he fails, your position is going for legislation will be that much stronger. If he succeeds, even for a year or so, we have done something important.
4. Still one major aspect of the "moral suasion" problem is whether we are really ready to act if it fails. You may remember that Don Cook emphasized this point to me very hard. It may be worth your while to press Connor and Dillon on this point. They will assure you of their readiness to recommend stronger measures if, against their expectations, moral suasion does not work. It may be important for you to have those assurances in hand.
5. Douglas Dillon wants you to know that he talked to Don Cook for 45 minutes this afternoon, and he thinks that Cook is on board on this program. He admits that Cook does not like the travel tax but says that Cook emphasized the necessity of doing "enough." Douglas thinks that this constitutes a tacit acceptance of the travel tax. I myself doubt this very much in the light of my own talks with Cook, so I plan to have an informal chat with him tomorrow morning and will pass the results on to you.
6. The overall descriptive tone of this memorandum is gloomier than your Economic Advisers and your Budget Bureau would wish, but we have agreed not to fight over the mood music. I have not yet heard final

January figures (and one thing certain is that monthly figures do not prove much), but it remains interesting that the heavy December outflow was overbalanced by the inflow of the first three weeks of January.

7. Let me offer one final, more general point: the immediate balance-of-payments problem is troublesome and can even become dangerous, but the underlying position of the dollar is as strong as the economy of the United States. It is only in the world of central bankers that the U. S. monetary position is "weak." It is much better to defend the dollar, as we are now doing, than to have to show the bankers who is boss, but it is always worth remembering that Franklin Roosevelt did not weaken his eventual place in history by his refusal to let gold be his master.

8. I believe Don Cook shares the basic conviction in the paragraph last above. That is one reason I was so greatly impressed by him.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News of the day

1. The newspapers have more to tell than the cables this morning, as usual. The stories on the balance of payments are thumb-sucking of a particularly sloppy sort and do not, in my judgment, represent recent leaks from anyone really well informed. Only the travel tax story in the Tribune looks as if it had come from someone who should have known better. Significantly, it is the travel tax which is the one big disagreed question in the package you will be getting this week.

2. At Tab A is a splendid set of cables from Bill Sullivan in Vientiane showing the rise and probable fall of an unusually foolish coup earlier today. It is worth your reading because of the flavor it gives of life in Laos, and still more because it shows what a resourceful man Sullivan is -- in essence he blocked this coup by getting a tipsy Australian technician to cut some wires.

3. At Tab B is the other interesting news not yet in the papers -- namely, the shift of tone by Tass on your suggestion of a meeting with Soviet leaders. We still do not have an answer to your last private message on this point, but the Soviets have now put themselves publicly in a position about the same as ours. It is conceivable that they intend this friendly noise to balance the fact of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi.

4. My own plans are well set now for a Tuesday evening departure and return late Saturday night or early Sunday. We have agreed with Max on a small and unobtrusive team, and the week of the Vietnamese New Year should give us a quiet time for talks.

5. I will be after you tomorrow to get your last instructions, and George Ball and I will be after you also to get a decision on the very tricky question of arms for Jordan. Meanwhile, George continues to work ahead on the Senate's Nasser vote.

6. Finally, I have no direct report from your ailing Secretaries of State and Defense, but indirect medical reports suggest that both of them must be kept in bed for another few days.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 019-002-4-4
By OP, NARA, Date 12/7/01

McG. B.
McG. B.

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INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR SUNDYZ

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FM AMEMB Y VIENTIANE

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC CAMP HSMITH HAWAII

RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 1164 INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK 819
SAIGON 544 CINCPAC 934 FM VIENTIANE JAN 31, 11PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Br 2/14/78

By my, NARS, Date 2/21/78

CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY OF CONFUSED ORIGIN SHAKING CITY TO-NIGHT. SEVERAL ROADBLOCKS HAVE MUSHROOMED AROUND CITY AND TROOP MOVEMENTS ARE REPORTED. ONE SHORT BURST OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE ABOUT 2015 HOURS.

MOST RUMORS SUGGEST THAT YOUNG COLONELS MAY BE TAKING ACTION THAT THEY HAVE LONG DISCUSSED. IF SO, ACTION LIKELY BE DIFFUSED AND DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST G

RIEVANCES

WHICH ARE MORE PERSONAL THAN INSTITUTIONAL.

WE HAVE OFFICERS WITH GENERAL KOUPRASITH AND COL. TTOGLITH AT CHINAMAO. WE ARE SENDING OTHERS TO BE WITH GENERAL SIHO AT HIS HEADQUARTERS. OUR PURPOSE IS TO NEUTRALIZE MAIN SOURCES OF LOCAL POWER IN ORDER AVOID ESCALATION.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WHO HAS CALLED SOUVANNA, HAS BEEN ASSURED BY LATTER THAT SITUATION BEING BROUGHT UNDER HIS CONTROL BUT WE, AT CURRENT MOMENT, HAVE NO RPT NO ASSURANCE THAT HE KNOWS ANY MORE THAN WE DO JUST WHAT IS AFOOT.

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SULLIVAN

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DE RUEHGR 24277 31/1830Z
Z 311831Z ZEA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR. BUNDY
Z 311800Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WAHDC
STATE GRNC
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 2/14/78
By mmj, NARS, Date 2/21/78

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 1168 INFO PRIORITY SAIGON 546
BANGKOK 321 CINCPAC 936 FROM VIENTIANE FEBRUARY 1 1230 AM

ANZUS TASK FORCE HAS CUT WIRES, PUTTING RADIO OFF AIR. I HAVE
SENT TWO OFFICERS FROM MILITARY ATTACHE'S OFFICE TO ROADBLOCK
CONTROLLED BY BOUNLEUT'S TROOPS TO TELL THEM COUP HAS FAILED
AND TO ADVISE THEM HEAD FOR THE HILLS. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE,
ONLY CASUALTIES ARE TWO SOLDIERS FROM CHINAIMO WHO WERE KILLED
WHILE ATTEMPTING RUN BOUNLEUT ROADBLOCK. I AM OFF TO SEE
SOUVANNA AT PALACE IF I CAN GET THROUGH.

SULLIVAN
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CFN JQYY TRY IWQ OEY Q QWEPAM ANZUS

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INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

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FOL FROM VIENTIANE SIGNED SULLIVAN JAN 31 19 37
~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 1167 INFO BANGKOK 822 SAIGON 547
CINCPAC 937 FROM VIENTIANE FEBRUARY 1, 2 AM

I HAVE JUST COME FROM SEEING SOUVANNA, WHO IS HOLD UP IN KING'S COMPOUND WITH MOST OF GENERAL STAFF AND WITH THOSE CABINET OFFICERS WHO NOT AT MY HOUSE. HE WAS DELIGHTED KNOW WE HAD CUT RADIO ~~AND~~ SEEMS TO FEEL THAT EFFORT WILL FIZZLE.

AND
ACCORDING HIS INFORMATION THERE ARE TWO COLONELS INVOLVED: BOUNLEUT SAYCOCIE AND KHAMCHAN SOUVOUOVONG. THEY DISPOSE AT MOST OF TWO COMPANIES OF MEN. THEIR CHANCES FOR SUCCESS SEEM NIL. HE ASKED IF WE COULD ASSIST IN DISPOSING THEIR MEN.
~~GFN 1167 822 547 937 1 2AM~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJFS 443A SECRET~~

WE SENT ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE TO CAMP WHICH BOUNLEUT ALLEGEDLY WAS USING AS COMMAND POST BUT HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE FIND HIM. WE ARE NOW SENDING SAME OFFICER TO SEEK HIM OUT AT ROADBLOCK ENROUTE CAMP CHINAIMO.

IN MEANTIME, I AM SENDING GENERAL SANG (PSYWAR CHIEF) WHO STILL DRINKING MY BRANDY AT MY RESIDENCE, IN COMPANY WITH EMBOFF TO GET MESSAGE FROM SOUVANNA TO BROADCAST ON HIS ARMED FORCES RADIO STATION. SANG SEEMS SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT, BUT HE IS BEING TRANSPORTED BODILY TO PALACE AT THIS MOMENT. ASSUMING BROADCAST CALMS POPULATION AND TROOPS DISPERS, I THINK WE MAY BE OUT OF WOODS BY MORNING.

SULLIVAN
BT

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Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 28 #162

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By pe, NARA. Date 11-20-09

GROUP COPY

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(MOSCOW)--THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENDORSED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INFORMAL SUGGESTION FOR A MEETING OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN LEADERS.

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THE ENDORSEMENT WAS ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING IN MOSCOW BY THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER--PRAVDA. IT SAID:

"SUCH CONTACTS BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN STATESMEN MIGHT PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE KEY PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME."

MOSCOW VIRTUALLY HAD IGNORED FOR THREE WEEKS JOHNSON'S INFORMAL INVITATION FOR THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND FOR EXCHANGE OF TELEVISION BROADCASTS BY LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT PRAVDA RESURRECTED THE SUBJECT.

IN AN ARTICLE BY A COMMENTATOR--WHICH MEANS A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED STATEMENT OF SOVIET POSITION--PRAVDA SAID:

"THESE STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, INCLUDING HIS STATEMENT CONCERNING EXPANSION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTACTS, WERE FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY THE SOVIET UNION."

IN SOVIET TERMINOLOGY, "FAVORABLY RECEIVED" MEANS OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE IDEA.

IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE ON JANUARY FOURTH, JOHNSON TOLD THE CONGRESS: "WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE SEEK PEACEFUL UNDERSTANDING THAT CAN LESSEN THE DANGER TO FREEDOM."

HE ADDED THAT THIS REQUIRES KNOWING EACH OTHER BETTER. JOHNSON STATED:

"I HOPE THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS CAN VISIT AMERICA SO THEY CAN LEARN ABOUT THIS COUNTRY AT FIRST HAND."

JOHNSON SAID HE WAS SURE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD WELCOME A CHANCE TO LISTEN TO THE SOVIET LEADERS ON TELEVISION, AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO HEAR AMERICAN LEADERS.

THE INITIAL SOVIET REACTION TO THE SPEECH HAD BEEN MOSTLY HOSTILE.

THE INFORMAL INVITATION WAS REPORTED WITHOUT COMMENT AND THEN IGNORED IN FAVOR OF ATTACKS ON OTHER PARTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

ON JANUARY SIXTH, PRAVDA CHARGED JOHNSON WITH TRYING TO MEET DEMANDS OF WHAT IT CALLED "WILD MEN"--A TERM APPLIED BY THE SOVIET PRESS TO DEFEATED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BARRY GOLDWATER--BY APPROVING IN HIS SPEECH OF MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE CONGO AND VIET NAM.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA ALSO ON JANUARY SIXTH, CALLED THE SPEECH SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY BECAUSE IT CALLED FOR BETTER SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS BUT WAS WHAT IT LABELLED "UNDISTINGUISHED BY CONCRETE PROPOSALS."

TODAY THE APPROACH WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.

BJ355AES 31

FBIS 17

OBSERVER ON JOHNSON MESSAGE

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0400Z 31 JAN 65 L

(PRAVDA ARTICLE BY "OBSERVER" "AROUND THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE")

(TEXT) JOHNSON'S MESSAGE ON THE "STATE OF THE UNION" HAS EVOKED WIDE RESPONSE BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND OUTSIDE, THE AUTHOR WRITES. (IT MAY BE TO THE POINT) TO NOTE THAT THIS MESSAGE IS THE FIRST PROGRAMMATIC STATEMENT BY THE JOHNSON GOVERNMENT ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DURING WHICH THERE WAS AN ACUTE STRUGGLE REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS.

PRESS COMMENTARIES DEVOTE AN IMPORTANT PLACE TO THAT PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH SPEAKS ABOUT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. IT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THIS QUESTION IS OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC. THE MESSAGE STATES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS STRIVING FOR A PEACEFUL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, FOR WHICH JOHNSON SAID, HE HAS A KIND OF MANDATE FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO APPROVED THIS COURSE DURING THE PAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. "I HOPE," PRESIDENT JOHNSON STATED IN HIS MESSAGE "THAT THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND SEE OUR COUNTRY WITH THEIR OWN EYES." THE MESSAGE ALSO STATES THAT "THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR ADDRESSES BY SOVIET LEADERS ON OUR TELEVISION" AND THAT JOHNSON "WOULD WISH THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE, TOO, WOULD HEAR OUR LEADERS."

JOHNSON STATED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME IS STUDYING WAYS TO INCREASE PEACEFUL TRADE WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES AS WITH OTHER STATES, BIG AND SMALL, IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND THE RELAXATION OF TENSION, BECAUSE IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT CORRESPONDS TO THE CHERISHED WISHES OF THE PEOPLE, THE OBSERVER POINTS OUT. THE SOVIET UNION UNFAILINGLY FAVORS CONTACTS WITH OTHER STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLVING IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE NAME OF PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT IS PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON THAT THE QUOTED STATEMENTS BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT, INCLUDING THE ONE CONCERNING THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTACTS, ARE FINDING A FAVORABLE RECEPTION.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE AUTHOR STRESSES, IS A POLICY OF PEACE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND NORMAL RELATIONS AMONG COUNTRIES, ANY STEPS BY OTHER STATES IN THE SAME DIRECTION WILL ALWAYS MEET WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

31 JAN 820Z HWM/BG

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-177
By is, NARA Date 4-28-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

January 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply from Prime Minister Wilson on Indonesia

1. Harold Wilson's long answer to your letter about a Sukarno visit has just arrived. As we rather expected, he takes a very dim view of it, and my brother and I believe that Dean Rusk will share our view that you would not wish to go ahead in these circumstances.

2. Wilson's argument is that a Sukarno visit to Washington would be regarded as a triumph for his confrontation policy in Malaysia, and in the UK, and in Indonesia. The British obviously doubt that we could turn him around in any serious way, and they point out -- certainly correctly -- that in the current state of British opinion and deployment, there would be very harsh criticism of us from the UK.

3. Wilson's letter also takes a very different view from ours of the future inside Indonesia. They obviously think the army will prove stronger than the P. K. I. when Sukarno leaves the scene. If this is true, it is most encouraging, and it is worth a second look here.

4. This message ties in quite neatly with the problem of getting Lodge to the Far East. Our thought now is that you might invite him to go as an informal representative to Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta and that from those points he could easily be invited by Max Taylor for an informal visit in Saigon. The whole expedition could be purely a matter of "having a look," and could be compared quite smoothly to his earlier visit to third countries on behalf of Vietnam. This does not call for a decision until I get back from Saigon, but I think it is quite a good idea for the latter part of February. Lodge is alert and ready to go whenever you want him.

5. All this of course is separate from the proposed Bunker appointment, which will take a little longer and which would be neatly balanced, in a sense, by having Lodge taken an informal travelling look-see that could include reassurances to the Malaysians.

McG. B.

Ccc Wm Bundy

Rec'd
1/30/65
9:00 a.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further cutback in enriched uranium production

The Atomic Energy Commission has recommended a further substantial reduction in the production of enriched uranium on the basis of Department of Defense projected requirements for nuclear weapons and a new analysis of future needs for non-military purposes. This recommendation has been analyzed in the Department of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, Office of Science and Technology, and by my staff. All are agreed that a formal recommendation should be submitted for your approval in the near future.

Meanwhile, Congressman Holifield, on behalf of the Joint Committee, has requested an opportunity to consult with the AEC on its recommendation before it is formally submitted to you. Dr. Seaborg will brief the Joint Committee next week but will make it clear to the Committee that the recommendation has been made to you and is now awaiting final action.

During the next week, the Department of State and ACDA will review the situation and evaluate the potential of the cut in production for its possible value in dealing with the Soviets. They will develop a specific action proposal if such is indicated. By the end of the week it is expected that a formal proposal can be presented to you together with a short report from Dr. Seaborg covering his talks with the Joint Committee, and the State-ACDA suggestions.

Assuming that you approve the AEC recommendation, it is planned to release the AEC letter and a covering White House release in time to catch the week end editions, next week.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

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Mac:

As you can see by the attached, June is
busting out all over.

Jack Valenti

1/29/65

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a memo from Mac Bundy about an European trip.

I list for you tentative commitments for foreign visits both here and abroad:

February 10	Prime Minister Wilson Here in Washington
April 26-27	Ayub Khan Here in Washington
May 6, 7, 8	Tentative trip for you to Brazil

Based on this line up, my judgment is that it would be better for Bundy to seek out a June date as the most practical time. You would have met Ayub in late April, gone to Brazil in early May, and thus would have over a month to prepare for the European trip.

Jack Valenti

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Valenti

SUBJECT: European trip

1. Now that our South American planning is in train, I think it is time to choose some dates for your European trip, at least tentatively. If we are going in the spring, we ought to begin to make soundings in Europe, because there are four other governments involved (the trip will have to include at least London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome).

2. The current guessing is that any time in April, May, or June would be good. Probably early June would be the best. The German election season does not get really hot until July (although it simmers from time to time even now), and the gossip is that if there is a British election this year it will be either in March or April, or in the fall.

JUNE ✓
APRIL — 3. Accordingly, my own suggestion is that we should ask our Ambassadors to make tentative inquiries on a most confidential basis at levels not less than that of the Foreign Minister, with early June as one possibility and early April as another.

4. There is of course a NATO Council meeting in London May 11, 12 and 13, but I myself do not think that your trip to Europe should be tied that tightly to NATO -- it would lead to a vast amount of irrelevant grumbling from Paris. I am sending this memo through Jack so that he can get your reactions and put in his own comments on the basis of other plans you may have.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-29-77; NSC 11-30-78
By ip [signature] 6-20-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Basic Policy in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSA 1013/14

By

1009

, NAIC

Date

11/14/77

1. Bob McNamara and I have asked for the meeting with you at 11:30 in order to have a very private discussion of the basic situation in Vietnam. In a way it is unfortunate that we are meeting the morning after a minor coup, because that is not the present point. All of us agree with Alexis Johnson that nothing should be done on that until we have particular recommendations from Saigon (though at that point we may well want to urge Taylor and Johnson to make the best of the matter and not try to undo it).
2. What we want to say to you is that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to wait and hope for a stable government. Our December directives make it very plain that wider action against the Communists will not take place unless we can get such a government. In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful, and Bob and I are persuaded that there is no real hope of success in this area unless and until our own policy and priorities change.
3. The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction there that the future is without hope for anti-Communists. More and more the good men are covering their flanks and avoiding executive responsibility for firm anti-Communist policy. Our best friends have been somewhat discouraged by our own inactivity in the face of major attacks on our own installations. The Vietnamese know just as well as we do that the Viet Cong are gaining in the countryside. Meanwhile, they see the enormous power of the United States withheld, and they get little sense of firm and active U. S. policy. They feel that we are unwilling to take serious risks. In one sense, all of this is outrageous, in the light of all that we have done and all that we are ready to do if they will only pull up their socks. But it is a fact -- or at least so McNamara and I now think.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

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4. The uncertainty and lack of direction which pervade the Vietnamese authorities are also increasingly visible among our own people, even the most loyal and determined. Overtones of this sentiment appear in our cables from Saigon, and one can feel them also among our most loyal staff officers here in Washington. The basic directive says that we will not go further until there is a stable government, and no one has much hope that there is going to be a stable government while we sit still. The result is that we are pinned into a policy of first aid to squabbling politicians and passive reaction to events we do not try to control. Or so it seems.

5. Bob and I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role which can only lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating circumstances.

6. We see two alternatives. The first is to use our military power in the Far East and to force a change of Communist policy. The second is to deploy all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major addition to our present military risks. Bob and I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both should be carefully studied and that alternative programs should be argued out before you.

7. Both of us understand the very grave questions presented by any decision of this sort. We both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours. Both of us have fully supported your unwillingness, in earlier months, to move out of the middle course. We both agree that every effort should still be made to improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the authorities in South Vietnam as best we can. But we are both convinced that none of this is enough, and that the time has come for harder choices.

8. You should know that Dean Rusk does not agree with us. He does not quarrel with our assertion that things are going very badly and that the situation is unraveling. He does not assert that this deterioration can be stopped. What he does say is that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work. This would be good if it was possible. Bob and I do not think it is.

9. A topic of this magnitude can only be opened for initial discussion this morning, but McNamara and I have reached the point where our obligations to you simply do not permit us to administer our present directives in silence and let you think we see real hope in them.

nd. S.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~