

1069

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	For the President from Dean Rusk SECRET sanitized 3-26-84 NLS 83-1904 PF	open 4/14/99 04/14/65	A
#1b memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1c memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1d memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1e memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1f memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1g memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1h memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1i memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1j memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1k memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1l memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1m memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1n memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1o memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1p memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1q memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1r memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1s memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1t memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1u memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1v memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1w memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1x memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1y memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#1z memo	For the President from McG. B Top Secret	04/14/65	A
#3a memo	To President from Dean Rusk SECRET duplicate of #1a 4 pp	open 3/06 04/14/65	A
#6 memo	To President from McG. B SECRET sanitized 10-1-84 NLS 83-191 1 pp	open 4/14/99 04/14/65	A
#6d memo	To McGeorge Bundy from Ben Read Confidential 1 pp	open 4/14/99 04/12/65	A
#6e memo	Briefing memo Confidential 2 pp	undated 04/14/65	A
#6g memo	To the President from McG. B Secret duplicate of #6 1 p	open 3/06 04/14/65	A
#13 memo	To president from McGeorge Bundy Secret open 10/25/02 NLS 83-191 1 p	04/10/65	A
#13a memo	To Deputy Secretary Defense & Chairman AEC Secret open 2-27-03 NLS 83-191 2 pp	04/10/65	A
#15a memo	copy Saigon cable, capt. 3199 Confidential 2 pp	open 10/25/02 NLS 83-191 04/08/65	A
#16a message	To president from PM Wilson Secret open 6/27/00 NLS 96-300 3 pp	04/05/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, [REDACTED]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 9, Mar - April 14, 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17a cable	copy Dept. 3185 from Tokyo Confidential <i>Open 4.14.99</i>	undated	A
#18a cable	to President from Chester Bowles Top Secret <i>sanitized 12/13/01 NLS/RAC 00-154</i> 1 p	undated	A
#20a cable	To copy Moscow cable 2920 Confidential <i>open 8-8-97 NLS 96-301</i> 4 pp	04/06/65	A
#21 memo	To the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 10-1-84 NLS 83-191</i> 1 pp	04/08/65	A
#24a cable	copy of USUN 3966 <i>Exempt NLS 90-60</i> Top Secret <i>Confidential per NLS 90-60</i> 1 pp	04/07/65	A
#25a memo	to McGB from David XXXXX Klein Confidential 1 pp	04/07/65	A
#27 memo	To President from James Thomson & McG. Bundy Secret <i>open 5-5-93 NLS 96-805</i> 2 pp	04/08/65	A
#30 memo	to President from McG. B. <i>Open 9-29-81</i> Secret 1 p	04/07/65	A
#30a cable	copy Saigon 3246 <i>open 9-29-81</i> Secret 2 pp	04/07/65	A
#31a cable	copy Saigon 3248 Secret <i>sanitized 9-29-81</i> 2 pp <i>open 8/14/92 per NLS 86-263</i> <i>per 50 USC 6-23-78, 50 USC 8-30-78</i>	04/07/65	A
#32 memo	to President from McG. B Confidential 1 pp	04/07/65	A
#32a memo	To president from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 7-31-84 NLS 84-162</i> 1 pp	04/09/65	A
#33a message	Western reply to Soviets on Berlin meeting Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i> 1 pp	undated	A
#36d memo	memo to president from McG. B Secret <i>Open 2-10-88</i> 2 pp <i>NLS 86-70</i>	04/01/65	A

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National Security file, ~~XXXXXX~~
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36 list	persons invited to attend meeting 1 pp	undated	A
#37 memo	to the president from McG. Bundy SECRET open NLS 96-300 (5/98) 1 pp	04/02/65	A
#38 memo	to the president from R. W. Komer Secret open 4-14-99 1 pp	04/02/65	A
#39 memo	topic for discussion open 9-29-81 DCH Top Secret 5 pp	04/01/65	A
#40a memo	mark duplicate #39 open 9-29-81 DCH		
#42 memo	to the President from McG. B Secret duplicate of #36 2 pp	04/01/65	A
#46 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer SECRET open 10/25/02 NLS/RAL 99-45 1 pp	04/01/65	A
#47 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 4-15-91 NLS 90-221 Confidential 1 pp	3/30/65	A
#48 memo	to President from McG. B. open 4-15-91 NLS 90-221 Confidential 2 pp	03/31/65	A
#49 memo	to President from McG. B. open 4-15-91 NLS 90-221 Confidential 1 pp	03/31/65	A
#51 memo	To president from McG. B. Confidential 2 pp	03/31/65	A
#53 memo	open 6-17-87 NLS 86-94 to President from McGeorge Bundy 1 pp	undated	A
#54 memo	to President from McG. B. open 4-15-91 NLS 90-221 Confidential 1 pp	03/29/65	A
#55a cable	copy Saigon 3124 SECRET open 9-29-81 1 pp	03/28/---	A
#64 memo	to President from McG. B Secret 1 pp	03/29/65	A
#64a cable	copy Saigon 3070 Secret open 3-13-90 NLS 86-71 2 pp	03/24/65	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69 memo	To the President from JCT, Jr. & McG. B. Secret <i>pen NLT 96-300 (5/98)</i> 1 p	03/24/65	A
#71a report	re: Vietnam Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> 3 pp	03/24/65	A
#75 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 5-5-97 NLT 96-300</i> 1 p	03/23/65	A
#75d memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>[dup # 3, UK, m. Stewart visit 7/65, Box 214]</i> Secret <i>open 4-7-00 NLT 97-431</i> 2 pp	03/22/65	A
#77 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>duplicate of 75 b</i> 2 pp	03/22/65	A
#78 memo	to President from McG. B. <i>open 1-24-01</i> 1 pp Confidential	03/22/65	A
#84a cable	copy Saigon 2991 Secret <i>open 8-11-86 NLT 86-71</i> 2 pp	3/17/65	A
#84d cable	copy Saigon 2992 Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i> 1 p	03/16/71	A
#86 memo	to the president from R. W. Komer <i>open 8-17-12</i> Secret <i>Dept # 2-105 Komer File 6/31 (1st Security 12/63-3/66)</i> 1 pp	03/17/65	A
#86a telegram	draft telegram to Cairo SECRET 8 pp	undated	A
#87 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 5-5-97 NLT 96-300</i> 2 pp	03/17/65	A
#87b memo	NS Action Memorandum No. 325 Secret <i>open NLT 96-300 (5/98)</i> 2 pp	undated	A
#88 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 11-17-99</i> Secret <i>sanitized 9-28-81 per letter 5-21-76</i> 1 pp <i>NLT 99-142</i>	03/16/65	A

FILE LOCATION

M National Security File, ~~_____~~
 McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 9, Mar - April 14, 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#89 memo	To the President from McG. B. Secret <i>Open 6/13/2002</i> 1 pp	03/16/65	A
#89b cable	to President from Prime Minister <i>Open 6/13/2002</i> 1 pp Conf.	03/16/65	A
#89d cable	to Prime Minister from President Confidential <i>Open 6/13/2002</i> 1 pp	03/16/65	A
#89 f memo	To President from Prime Minister Secret <i>Open 6/13/2002</i> 2 pp	03/11/65	A
#89 h message	To Prime Minister Wilkinson Wilson from President Secret <i>Open 6/13/2002</i> 3 pp	03/16/65	A
#92 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential <i>opened 10-2-81</i> 1 pp	03/15/65	A
#93 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret 1 pp	03/15/65	A
#94 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret 1 pp	03/14/65	A
#96 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret <i>Open 10-1-84 NLS 83-191</i> 1 pp	03/14/65	A
#96a cable	cable from Dean Rusk Secret <i>Open 9-29-81</i> 3 pp	03/13/65	A
#101 memo	to President from Prime Minister Secret 2 pp	03/--/65	A
#104 memo	To President from McG. B. Top Secret 1 pp	03/11/65	A
#105 memo	to President from McG. Bundy <i>Exempt NLS 86-93</i> Top Secret <i>Downgraded per NLS 86-93</i> 1 pp	03/11/65	A
#107a cable	copy of EX-1641 Secret 3 pp	03/08/65	A
#110 memo	To President from McG. B. Confidential <i>Open per T45-3002</i> 1 pp	03/09/65	A + C

FILE LOCATION National Security File, [REDACTED]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the PRESIDENT, VOL. 9, Mar - April 14, 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#11a cable	copy of London 4345 to SecState Confidential 1 p	03/09/65	A
#113 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	03/07/65	A
#117 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 4 p <i>open 3-16-87 NLS 86-230</i>	03/06/65	A + C
#118 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	03/05/65	A <i>"C" closing lifted 7-31-86</i>
#118a MEMO cable	copy Telaviv 1122 cable Secret 1 p	03/05/65	A
#118b MEMO cable	copy Tel Aviv 1124 cable Secret 4 p	03/05/65	A
#118c cable	copy Tel Aviv 1125 cable Secret 2 p	03/05/65	A
#119 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential 1 p	03/05/65	A + C
#122 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	03/03/65	A
#123a cable	copy Saigon 2821 cable from Amb. Taylor Top Secret 1 p <i>open 9/29/81</i>	03/03/65	A
#123b cable	copy Saigon 2822 cable from Amb. Taylor Top Secret 1 p <i>open 9/24/81</i>	03/03/65	A
#124a cable	copy SecState 2569 cable Secret 2 p	03/03/65	A
#125 memo	draft memo of agreement Secret 3 p	03/03/65	A
#126 memo	re: Israel Secret 1 p	undated	A
#128 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential 1 p <i>open 6/13/2002</i>	03/02/65	A

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#129 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 6/13/2002</i> 1 p	03/02/65	A
#129a cable	to AmEmbassy London for Amb. Bruce from Secy Rusk Secret <i>open 6/13/2002</i> 2 p	03/02/65	A
#129b cable	to AmEmbassy Bonn from Amb. McGhee from Secy Rusk Secret 1 p	03/02/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter 19b	U Thant to the President 1 page possible classified information	open 2-10-88 NLS 86-70 4/8/65	A
letter 26a	the President to Sir Robert Menzies 1 page possible classified information	4/8/65	A
memo 26b	Mc George Bundy to the President 1 page possible classified information	4/8/65	A
MEM-----			
letter 26c	duplicate of 26a	4/8/65	A
letter 26d	the President to Sir Robert Menzies 1 page possible classified information	4/8/65	A
memo 65	McGeorge Bundy to the President 1 page possible classified information	3/26/65	A
letter 65a	the President to His Excellency Dr. Sukarno 1 page possible classified information	open 9-29-81 3/26/65	A
memo 67a	Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy 1 page Secret	1/6/65	A + C
memo 70	McGeorge Bundy to the President 1 page possible classified information	3/24/65	A
memo 70a	duplicate of 70	3/24/65	A
letter 70b	the President to Sir Robert Menzies 2 pages possible classified information	3/24/65	A
letter 79a	the President to His Excellency Levi Eshkol 1 page possible classified information	open 7-31-84 NLS-84-162 3/22/65	A
memo 98	McGeorge Bundy to the President 2 pages possible classified information	OPEN 10-2-81 3/12/65	A
memo 100	McGeorge Bundy to the President 2 pages possible classified information	3/12/65	A
memo 102a	to McGeorge Bundy from David Klein 2 pages possible classified information	3/6/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, volume 9

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
cable 103b	Embtel 1565 with message from the President to President Tito 3 pages possible classified information	open 4.14.00 no date	A
letter 116a	President to His Excellency Lal Bahadur Shastri 2 pages possible classified information	no date	A
memo 55	McGeorge Bundy to President 1 page open Per TH 5-30-02	3/29/65	C
letter 14	For Valenti for the President from Bundy 1 page possible classified information open 10-1-84 NLS 83-191	4/10/65	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is George Ball's excellent briefing memorandum for your talk with Harold Wilson. The memorandum speaks of the Prime Minister's call because it was wrongly assumed that he would both be calling on you and lunching with you. There is no need for both appointments, and I have tonight sent word around that a single appointment at lunch is the more effective way of proceeding in the light of your extremely crowded pre-Easter calendar. I doubt if we will get any kickback.

I have sent a number of separate messages to Wilson to emphasize the importance of avoiding the Pearson error, the Douglas-Home error, or the Michael Stewart error. I am informed by his private secretary that his object is to have this meeting occur without any such incident. What he wants most is to be on visibly close terms with you. That leaves you in the driver's seat-- but my fingers are crossed because I know whose fault it will be if something goes wrong.

McG. B.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

1511
1a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by the British Prime Minister

Background

Prime Minister Wilson will be spending two days in the United States, one in New York and one in Washington. His visit, originally scheduled for February, was intended to be a follow-up to his discussion with you of ANF/MLF matters in December. Lack of progress on allied nuclear matters and the development of other problems have changed the focus of his second trip.

The Labor Government is beginning to take hold after an uncertain start. Wilson has shown himself to be a bold and imaginative leader despite a paper-thin majority of three in the House of Commons. Public opinion polls indicate the British public is willing to give Wilson a chance to prove himself. Barring an economic recession, the chances are Wilson will have the time he needs.

The Prime Minister will be accompanied by Ambassador Dean and George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. I will also be available.

UK Objectives

Mr. Wilson publicly announced as he was leaving London that he was coming to the United States principally to talk about two subjects: the British economic situation and Viet-Nam.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-13-99

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In addition, Mr. Wilson may wish to tell you of his recent talk with deGaulle, the talk he had with U Thant on February 14 and, perhaps, certain African matters.

Talking Points

1. UK Economic Situation. The UK is enjoying something of an economic boom. The growth rate in 1964 was 5 1/2 percent and there is virtually full employment. The major immediate problem is the large deficit (2 billion dollars in 1964) in their balance of payments. This problem came to a head as soon as the Labor Government came to power. Massive international support has been necessary to support the pound. The British Government is attempting to correct the situation without getting into the "stop and go" cycle which has characterized the British economy since World War II. The recent budget has created cautious optimism in foreign circles but the pound will still need support. The Prime Minister will wish to discuss this situation including the fact that they will soon be making another drawing from the IMF. In this connection he will probably bring up the issue of world liquidity.

On these subjects you should indicate approbation for Wilson's effort to develop a stringent budget. We are pleased with the evident determination of Wilson to defend the pound without devaluation. We are hopeful that the measures taken in the new budget as well as longer-term initiatives being developed will prove to be effective in getting the British economy on a sounder basis.

You should indicate that we face a common interest in finding a solution to the international liquidity problem satisfactory to both our countries. We realize that, as the payments positions of the U.S. and the UK are strengthened, there may develop a shortage of the means to finance expanding world trade. We will be glad to continue close consultations with the UK on this question.

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2. Vietnam. British Government support for U.S. policy in Vietnam has been stronger than that of our other major allies. It has been skillfully conducted and stoutly maintained by the Prime Minister. Criticism of this close identification with U.S. policy was begun by the left wing of the Labor Party but has broadened to include other elements fearful of the possible consequences in Vietnam.

Your Johns Hopkins speech, which the British Government praised as being statesmanlike and imaginative, has relieved the pressure on the Prime Minister. His sending of Patrick Gordon Walker, former Foreign Secretary, on an exploratory mission to the Far East has served the same purpose as will his ability to meet with you directly.

You should indicate appreciation for the support the Prime Minister has given us on Vietnam. We have made known our willingness to discuss a peaceful solution but the first reactions from Hanoi and Peking are not encouraging.

Other Subjects

1. Malaysia-Indonesia. Ambassador Bunker, who has been meeting with Indonesian leaders since March 31, will wind up his talks and depart April 15. He has been stressing the point that our disagreements over Vietnam, Malaysia, and other world issues need not damage our bilateral relations and that we should "agree to disagree". Sukarno has insisted that U.S. support of Malaysia is the main issue and that no improvement in our relations is possible unless we demonstrate that we are not partial to Malaysia. Other Indonesian leaders, however, have conceded that internal developments in Indonesia are at the heart of the problem. Bunker has refused to debate the Malaysia issue, and thinks his approach is making some impression on the Indonesians. On specific problems, he has agreed on a quiet withdrawal of the Peace Corps and is now discussing what to do with our remaining programs: the

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-4-

university contract teams and participant training for Indonesians in the U.S.

2. France. The reports we have received indicate the Prime Minister succeeded in improving the climate of Anglo-French relations by his recent talks with President deGaulle. We have noted the statements of French officials that France is not attacking the pound and will endorse a new IMF drawing by the UK if one is considered necessary.

3. F-111. Following a close Cabinet vote, the British Government cancelled its expensive project to build the TSR-2, a plane comparable to the U.S. F-111. It has an option until April 1967 to purchase up to 110 F-111s, with an option for the first ten up to 1 January 1966. The final decision on whether to go ahead with the F-111s will depend largely on the results of a current UK review of defense policy. The British decision may also be influenced by our willingness to purchase some British-produced military items which we agreed to examine as part of the F-111 contract. This quid pro quo appears important as a matter of domestic British politics.

4. Africa -- Zambia and Southern Rhodesia. The U.S. shares UK concern for the adverse impact on Zambia and all of Southern Africa if the Southern Rhodesian Government declares independence unilaterally. We look to the British to lead the way in coping with this delicate and difficult situation. We hope the UK will make every effort to muster the cooperation and understanding of the Commonwealth for its policies and we assure the UK of our willingness to continue our support of its position in the area.


for Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

✓ 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara ^{may} ~~will~~ bring over a cable to Taylor this evening which will rack up a number of instructions to the field to carry out some of the things that were discussed at lunch yesterday. (The current draft is at Tab A.) My own judgment is that direct orders of this sort to Taylor would be very explosive right now because he will not agree with many of them and he will feel that he has not been consulted. He heard about the airborne brigade by a premature JCS message of yesterday and has already come in questioning it.

At Tab B is another cable from Taylor in which he gravely questions the usefulness of immediate additional ground deployments.

I am sure we can turn him around if we give him just a little time to come aboard, but I am not sure that you yourself currently wish to make a firm decision to put another 10,000-15,000 combat troops in Vietnam today. As Taylor says, we were planning when he left to use the Marines already on the scene in combat roles and see how that worked. It is not clear that we now need all these additional forces.

Your own desire for mixing our Marines with theirs is quite a different matter, and I think that should be pressed sharply.

The net of this is that I would strongly recommend that you hold up on Bob's telegram tonight and take time to talk it over with Rusk, McNamara and me either after the meeting with the Senators or tomorrow morning.

I have made an appointment for us ^{McG. B.} McG. B.
with you at 11:30 - subject to
your OK.


~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 6-21-78

By DCH, NARS, Date 5-16-81

2a



1512

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
2-b					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO
ACTION		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
INFO					
FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: AMEMB SAIGON CINCPAC COMUSMACV					
JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE					
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By DCH		NARS, Date 5-16-81			

~~TOP SECRET~~FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Vietnamese battalions used for this purpose are transferred from a general reserve assignment, it may be necessary to replace them.)

2. Introduction of a brigade force into the Bien Hoa - Vinh Tau area, both to act as a security force for our installations and also to participate in counter-insurgency combat operations.

Westmoreland will develop and submit to CINCPAC and the JCS a plan for the use of these troops in such operations.

3. Introduction of battalion or multi-battalion forces into 2 or 3 additional locations along the coast, e.g., Qui Nhon. Westmoreland will submit proposals as to number of troops required and location for assignment. The purpose of these deployments will be to experiment further with US forces in a counter-insurgency role.

Items 1, 2 and 3 above are designed as initial steps to increase the effectiveness of the counter-guerrilla campaign. If these moves are successful, they should be followed promptly by requests for additional US forces.

4. A substantial expansion of Vietnamese recruiting campaign utilizing US recruiting experts, techniques, and procedures. Westmoreland will work out with the South Vietnamese new recruiting goals and detailed plans for accomplishing them.

5. An experimental program providing expanded medical services to the countryside utilizing mobile dispensaries. The Surgeon General of the Army is being directed to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

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~~TOP SECRET~~FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

6. An experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army Civil Affairs personnel.

Initially teams should be introduced into 2 or 3 provinces. General X is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

7. An experimental plan for distribution of food directly to ARVN personnel and/or their families. General Y is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan for this purpose.

Ambassador Taylor should clear items 1, 2 and 3 with GVN, after which State and Defense will inform Congressional leaders of proposed actions before they are undertaken. Westmoreland should be prepared to discuss his plans for items 1, 2 and 3 with General Wheeler during their discussions in Honolulu next week.

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(Copy of SAIGON 3384, April 14, 1965)

Authority State 12-19-77, OSD 7-7-78
By DCH, NARS, Date 5-16-81

Recent actions relating to the introduction of US ground forces have tended to create an impression of eagerness in some quarters to deploy forces into South Vietnam which I find difficult to understand. I should think that for both military and political reasons we should all be most reluctant to tie down Army/Marine units in this country and would do so only after the presentation of the most convincing evidence of the necessity.

Before the Marines had been introduced in the Danang-Phu Bai area, there were at least four reasons for justifying the bringing in of US ground forces, among which was the need to assure the Government of Viet Nam and North Vietnam of our determination to stay in South Vietnam to the finish. Now that the Marines are ashore, that requirement is met and, in my opinion, no more US forces are needed to make that particular point.

There remain three arguments for further reinforcements: (1) the need to do essential military tasks which Government of Vietnam forces are unable to do; (2) the need to do essential military tasks faster than the Government of Vietnam forces, unassisted, are able to do; and (3) the desirability of making provision for possible future crises and contingencies. Singly or in combination, these arguments could be adduced to justify almost unlimited additional deployments of US forces if such deployments did not raise counter-arguments which sooner or later outweigh the three points for the affirmative. The mounting number of foreign troops may sap the Government of Vietnam initiative and turn a defense of the Government of Vietnam homeland into what appears a foreign war. The increasing presence of more Americans will give Peking grounds to press military reinforcements on Hanoi. Frictions will grow between the Vietnamese and their white allies; it will become increasingly difficult to steer US and Government of Vietnam policy on parallel lines. The net effect may be not an expediting of victory but its retardation.

I mention these countervailing factors to make the point that it is far from an unmitigated advantage to bring in more US forces. A consideration of the disadvantages convinces me that, while logistic preparations should be made now to be able to receive additional forces, the forces themselves should be held outside of South Vietnam just as long as possible and until their need is uncontroversial. From a purely military point of view, it is essentially wasteful of the specialized mobility of Marines and airborne troops to commit them prematurely to restricted land areas. Politically, it is undesirable to seek authority for their introduction until a clear and specific need exists which assures them an unreserved welcome from their Government of Vietnam hosts.

TAYLOR.

SECRET

(Copy of SAIGON 3384, April 14, 1965)

2c

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TAYLOR.

Authority State 12-19-77; OSD 7-7-78

By DCH, NARS, Date 5-16-81

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Bundy

Mac — Here is

Bob's wrap-up. Copy
to B² also.

JCS double
checking it this p.m.

Joan Fred —
4/14/65

1512

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: AMEMB SAIGON
CINCPAC
COMUSMACV

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

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~~TOP SECRET~~FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is George Ball's excellent briefing memorandum for your talk with Harold Wilson. The memorandum speaks of the Prime Minister's call because it was wrongly assumed that he would both be calling on you and lunching with you. There is no need for both appointments, and I have tonight sent word around that a single appointment at lunch is the more effective way of proceeding in the light of your extremely crowded pre-Easter calendar. I doubt if we will get any kickback.

I have sent a number of separate messages to Wilson to emphasize the importance of avoiding the Pearson error, the Douglas-Home error, or the Michael Stewart error. I am informed by his private secretary that his object is to have this meeting occur without any such incident. What he wants most is to be on visibly close terms with you. That leaves you in the driver's seat-- but my fingers are crossed because I know whose fault it will be if something goes wrong.

incl. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by the British Prime Minister

Background

Prime Minister Wilson will be spending two days in the United States, one in New York and one in Washington. His visit, originally scheduled for February, was intended to be a follow-up to his discussion with you of ANF/MLF matters in December. Lack of progress on allied nuclear matters and the development of other problems have changed the focus of his second trip.

The Labor Government is beginning to take hold after an uncertain start. Wilson has shown himself to be a bold and imaginative leader despite a paper-thin majority of three in the House of Commons. Public opinion polls indicate the British public is willing to give Wilson a chance to prove himself. Barring an economic recession, the chances are Wilson will have the time he needs.

The Prime Minister will be accompanied by Ambassador Dean and George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. I will also be available.

UK Objectives

Mr. Wilson publicly announced as he was leaving London that he was coming to the United States principally to talk about two subjects: the British economic situation and Viet-Nam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbj/gw NARA, Date 10/27/05

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In addition, Mr. Wilson may wish to tell you of his recent talk with deGaulle, the talk he had with U Thant on February 14 and, perhaps, certain African matters.

Talking Points

1. UK Economic Situation. The UK is enjoying something of an economic boom. The growth rate in 1964 was 5 1/2 percent and there is virtually full employment. The major immediate problem is the large deficit (2 billion dollars in 1964) in their balance of payments. This problem came to a head as soon as the Labor Government came to power. Massive international support has been necessary to support the pound. The British Government is attempting to correct the situation without getting into the "stop and go" cycle which has characterized the British economy since World War II. The recent budget has created cautious optimism in foreign circles but the pound will still need support. The Prime Minister will wish to discuss this situation including the fact that they will soon be making another drawing from the IMF. In this connection he will probably bring up the issue of world liquidity.

On these subjects you should indicate approbation for Wilson's effort to develop a stringent budget. We are pleased with the evident determination of Wilson to defend the pound without devaluation. We are hopeful that the measures taken in the new budget as well as longer-term initiatives being developed will prove to be effective in getting the British economy on a sounder basis.

You should indicate that we face a common interest in finding a solution to the international liquidity problem satisfactory to both our countries. We realize that, as the payments positions of the U.S. and the UK are strengthened, there may develop a shortage of the means to finance expanding world trade. We will be glad to continue close consultations with the UK on this question.

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2. Vietnam. British Government support for U.S. policy in Vietnam has been stronger than that of our other major allies. It has been skillfully conducted and stoutly maintained by the Prime Minister. Criticism of this close identification with U.S. policy was begun by the left wing of the Labor Party but has broadened to include other elements fearful of the possible consequences in Vietnam.

Your Johns Hopkins speech, which the British Government praised as being statesmanlike and imaginative, has relieved the pressure on the Prime Minister. His sending of Patrick Gordon Walker, former Foreign Secretary, on an exploratory mission to the Far East has served the same purpose as will his ability to meet with you directly.

You should indicate appreciation for the support the Prime Minister has given us on Vietnam. We have made known our willingness to discuss a peaceful solution but the first reactions from Hanoi and Peking are not encouraging.

Other Subjects

1. Malaysia-Indonesia. Ambassador Bunker, who has been meeting with Indonesian leaders since March 31, will wind up his talks and depart April 15. He has been stressing the point that our disagreements over Vietnam, Malaysia, and other world issues need not damage our bilateral relations and that we should "agree to disagree". Sukarno has insisted that U.S. support of Malaysia is the main issue and that no improvement in our relations is possible unless we demonstrate that we are not partial to Malaysia. Other Indonesian leaders, however, have conceded that internal developments in Indonesia are at the heart of the problem. Bunker has refused to debate the Malaysia issue, and thinks his approach is making some impression on the Indonesians. On specific problems, he has agreed on a quiet withdrawal of the Peace Corps and is now discussing what to do with our remaining programs: the

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-4-

university contract teams and participant training for Indonesians in the U.S.

2. France. The reports we have received indicate the Prime Minister succeeded in improving the climate of Anglo-French relations by his recent talks with President deGaulle. We have noted the statements of French officials that France is not attacking the pound and will endorse a new IMF drawing by the UK if one is considered necessary.

3. F-111. Following a close Cabinet vote, the British Government cancelled its expensive project to build the TSR-2, a plane comparable to the U.S. F-111. It has an option until April 1967 to purchase up to 110 F-111s, with an option for the first ten up to 1 January 1966. The final decision on whether to go ahead with the F-111s will depend largely on the results of a current UK review of defense policy. The British decision may also be influenced by our willingness to purchase some British-produced military items which we agreed to examine as part of the F-111 contract. This quid pro quo appears important as a matter of domestic British politics.

4. Africa -- Zambia and Southern Rhodesia. The U.S. shares UK concern for the adverse impact on Zambia and all of Southern Africa if the Southern Rhodesian Government declares independence unilaterally. We look to the British to lead the way in coping with this delicate and difficult situation. We hope the UK will make every effort to muster the cooperation and understanding of the Commonwealth for its policies and we assure the UK of our willingness to continue our support of its position in the area.

George Ball
for Dean Rusk

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4

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further Peace Steps in Vietnam

I have two suggestions here:

1. One is to announce that you are sending Hubert Humphrey to Saigon. I know you have been very reluctant to use him in foreign affairs, and for excellent reasons, but there is no doubt that such a mission would give us a great chance for public attention to the real problems; it would also help put zip and confidence into the Quat Government. (Quat has asked for him privately). He could emphasize the pacification program, the forgiveness for defectors, the search for peace, and other such noises, all within the framework of Johnsonian firmness. He would collect a number of brickbats, which would do him some good here at home. But do you want to use him this way?

2. You yourself could make a new statement which could sharpen the point that what is at stake is the future of South Vietnam and the hopes of its own people. Our Regional Development Plan is aimed at its attractions for Hanoi; I think we need to sharpen the idea that the people who really need Tender Loving Care are the victims of the struggle in South Vietnam. This would also allow us to concentrate attention on the fact that the real victims of this war are not a few bridges, but thousands and thousands of villagers. In such a comment, we could also make some sharp remarks about the refusal of all Communist capitals to engage in any kind of discussions of the way to peace.

A statement of this kind could also rehearse the good week's work done on regional development. Black and U Thant have had a good talk on this.

On Saturday we shall have a left-wing student protest rally here in Washington, with pickets also at the Ranch. A strong peaceloving statement tomorrow or Friday might help cool them off ahead of time.

I need your brief guidance on this tonight.

McGB

✓ 5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports the Aid Bill
with three interesting changes

1. The Committee recommends \$3.²⁸~~53~~ billion, which is only \$28 million below your request. 9 of the 28 million is money AID no longer wants. The other 19 million is support assistance that got cut when they cut the military assistance, and did not get restored. Bell would like to get it back if he can, but on balance is happy with the money.
2. Fulbright got his two-year authorization which gives him great pleasure.
3. But to get his two years, Fulbright accepted a Morse proposal to end the present program on July 1, 1967 and to appoint a Commission of 12 (4 from Senate Foreign Relations, 4 from House Foreign Affairs and 4 by the President) to make recommendations for a wholly new program which would give aid to not more than 50 countries. Dave Bell thinks this Commission is nonsense and would only produce an elaborate stalemate. He said House Foreign Affairs will strongly oppose it and that it can probably be killed in conference -- along with the two-year authorization.
4. Fulbright is extremely pleased with himself and will regard Bell's position as stupid and destructive. My own view is that it is Fulbright who has shown once again that he simply does not know how to run his own Committee.
5. Fulbright will be present with the Senators this evening and will be hoping for love and kisses from you. You will know better than I what to tell him -- but my own guess is that you may prefer to let the House handle the matter for you.

hcf. B.
McG. B.

4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Mayor Brandt and Fritz Erler

Mayor Brandt's visit to the U. S. is prompted as much by the German election campaign as any other consideration. It is traditional in post-war German politics for each candidate for the German Chancellorship to be photographed with the President. This clearly is Brandt's principal purpose at this time. But in fairness to Brandt and his party, they are the most consistently pro-American political force in Germany today. The Socialists have no prominent Gaullists in their ranks and therefore they do not suffer from the schizophrenia which plagues the Christian Democrats.

Brandt will be accompanied by Fritz Erler, (the Socialists' shadow Foreign Minister) and the German Ambassador. He has asked for a few minutes alone with you, either at the beginning or before the end of the meeting. According to his press secretary (who is also his political confidant) he wants to urge you not to press the MLF soon or hard lest it destroy any possibility for German unification, and ostensibly this is the major subject he wishes to discuss privately.

For public purposes, the principal subject of conversation is the recent Communist harassment of Berlin, and there might be some advantage in having an agreed statement on this subject released at the end of the meeting. The text of a possible statement which George could give the press as Brandt leaves is attached at Tab A. This is a free option.

Brandt probably will want a picture with you alone (just as the Chancellor will when he gets here) and I would urge that he be given one.

A State Department briefing memo, which touches upon the other issues likely to arise, is attached at Tab B.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ck, NARA, Date 4-13-99

6a



6-b

**Statement by George Reedy on the President's Talk
with Mayor Brandt and Bundestag Representative Fritz Erler**

The Mayor told the President of the recent Communist attempt to harass the people of Free Berlin and the reaction to it. The President expressed his admiration for the courage and resolution of the people of Berlin in the face of Communist pressure and provocation. He reaffirmed the determination of the United States to defend the rights and freedom of the people of Berlin and to continue to seek a just and lasting solution to the unresolved German problem.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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2- Ret. BKS

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
April 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Memorandum for the President's
Meeting with Mayor Brandt and Fritz Erler

Enclosed is a briefing memorandum for the President's meeting on Wednesday, April 14, at one o'clock with Mayor Brandt of Berlin. It is expected that Fritz Erler, who is Vice Chairman of the German Socialist Party, and Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein will accompany Brandt. Alfred Puhon, Director of the Office of German Affairs, will be present.

There is also enclosed a proposed press statement regarding the Communist interference with Allied and German access to Berlin which took place last week. It is suggested that this statement be issued to the press following the President's meeting with Mayor Brandt.

for 
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Briefing Memorandum
Press Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ck, NARA, Date 4-13-99

6e

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Subject: Call by Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin and Fritz Erler

Who They Are: You have met Brandt on many occasions. He is about to begin an active campaign as Social Democratic (SPD) candidate for Chancellor of the Federal Republic running against Erhard (CDU). The elections will take place on September 19. Fritz Erler is Vice Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and would be the Foreign Minister if the Socialists form a cabinet. You met him when you were Vice President. He is considered one of Germany's most skilled politicians as well as a foreign policy expert. Brandt and Erler are both good friends of the US. Both speak good English.

Why They Are Here: Brandt is building up his image in preparation for the election campaign. He and Erler also want to get the benefit of the latest US thinking on German and world problems. Both are interested in the Great Society.

What You Might Say:

(1) Berlin access. The United States is determined to stay in Berlin and to maintain its rights. We believe the British and French are equally determined. While we understand the desire of the Federal Republic for closer political association between Berlin and West Germany, we feel it is essential not to prejudice Allied rights in Berlin in any way. (The Federal Republic keeps pressing for parliamentary meetings in West Berlin and these invite Communist retaliation, as happened last week.) Tell Brandt you intend to issue a statement reaffirming US resolve to remain in Berlin (draft statement attached).

(2) German unity. This continues to be a major United States goal. We are now consulting with the British, the French and the Germans regarding a possible Allied step, perhaps in the form of an Allied declaration. Ask Brandt and Erler for their views on Soviet policy and developments.

(3) Ties between Europe and the United States. We believe it important to keep NATO healthy and strong. We intend to maintain our combat forces in Europe. We continue to urge that our European partners agree on the kind of nuclear role they want within the Alliance. Close cooperation between Europe and the United States is essential for us all. (Brandt and Erler are both firm believers in cooperation with the United States; both are concerned

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 4-13-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

about the role of de Gaulle and the nuclear question.)

(4) Viet-Nam. Brandt and Erler will want to hear your views on Viet-Nam.

Attachment:

Draft statement on Berlin

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DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

The President has just met with Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin. In their conversation the President told Mayor Brandt that the United States, in cooperation with its Allies, will continue to maintain its rights in Berlin and regards the Communist harassment of last week as both illegal and dangerous. The President emphasized that the status of Berlin, which is based on Four-Power agreements, must be preserved. He expressed admiration for the bravery and resolution of the people of Berlin in the face of Communist pressure and provocation.

~~SECRET~~

April 14, 1965

69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Mayor Brandt and Fritz Erler

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McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC memo; state guidelines
By ch/w, NARA, Date 10/27/05

6-h

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Rec'd
Pac 5
Apr 13 1965
5 pm

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reports on Vietnam

Here are two Vietnamese reports that are interesting:

At Tab A is an analysis of White House mail on Vietnam. The short of it is that your speech has totally reversed the situation prevailing before last Wednesday. Is this something you would like to have put out to a friendly correspondent?

*In against these surveys
they are
Very*

Yes _____ No ☒

dangerous

At Tab B is a report of a long backgrounder given by Max Taylor yesterday or the day before in Saigon. I have not seen many stories that relate back to it, but I have sidlined points at which you may feel that he was too explicit. Yet on balance it seems to me that he did a good job, and I do not myself think that we gain much by trying to pull a rein on him at this stage.

and some time ago I told

McG. B.
McG. B.

*staff and press not to
make them and we
didn't fire them out
A*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

April 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Analysis of White House Mail on Vietnam
- April 4 through April 12

President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins brought a sharp reversal in the heavy flow of critical mail. Volume of mail on Vietnam slowed after the speech and shifted from 5 to 1 against the President to better than 4 to 1 in his favor. Telegrams which had been running 5 to 1 against the President are now running better than 4 to 1 in support of his Vietnam policy as outlined at Johns Hopkins.

From April 4 through 7, the White House received approximately 2,000 letters, 304 telegrams and 208 postcards.

From April 8 through 12, the White House received approximately 789 letters and 559 telegrams.

Letters now express general approval of the President's policies with specific endorsement of his offer of unconditional negotiations and a program of economic aid for Southeast Asia. Significant numbers of writers note the pride they felt in the President and the country while listening to the address. Others mentioned a new feeling of optimism and relief -- of new hope for the future. Several commended the President's choice of Eugene Black, and offered their services to the economic development and assistance effort.

Before the speech, mail which opposed the President's Vietnam policies urged an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal and a negotiated settlement. There were repeated requests that the UN be involved in any settlement. Other significant themes were: references to the economic development of the Mekong Delta and other opportunities for the U. S. to demonstrate a more positive image in Southeast Asia; expressions of shame and horror at the brutality of the war and the suffering of civilians; references to Goldwater and the charge that the President was pursuing Goldwater-like policies; confusion over U. S. aims; expressions of distaste for the use of napalm, gas and the bombing of North Korea.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Before the speech, mail which supported the President's Vietnam policies stressed the need to halt the spread of communism and to stop Chinese expansionism.

After the speech, mail which opposes the President's Vietnam policies criticized the proposal for a \$1 billion aid program, arguing that the money be used for defense rather than "tribute" (the Dirksen term). Letters frequently called the speech a "disappointment". Some called for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations; some urged withdrawal; others demanded a firmer policy to stop communism with no extension of economic aid.

Telegrams now express strong approval of the President's policies, particularly the pursuit of a peaceful solution, the offer of economic aid, food surpluses, etc. There are expressions of gratitude and congratulation; support for the mention of a role for the United Nations; endorsement for the offer of unconditional negotiations.

Before the speech, telegrams which opposed the President's Vietnam policies urged the use of UN machinery and an immediate cease-fire. There were expressions of shock and anger, opposition to Goldwater-like policies, opposition to air attacks, gas and chemical warfare; support of economic development efforts.

Origins of mail - Where California and New York were clearly the principal sources of mail before the speech, there is more even distribution throughout the country now. There is also an almost even balance among men and women.

C
CLC

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B

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Cy of Saigon 3342, April 12, 1965)

In a background briefing for selected press representatives, Ambassador Taylor said he would give the high points of his recent Washington discussions.

His discussions mainly concerned three areas of difficulty, he said: manpower for Government of Vietnam, restraining of Viet Cong infiltration, and pacification.

In amplification, the Ambassador said General Westmoreland had recommended increases in strengths of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, paramilitary forces, and police. The goal of 160,000 new men for this year had already been announced, he said, and he felt this figure could be reached with maximum effort on the part of the Government of Vietnam. On the question of increased US military participation, the Ambassador noted the announcement on increases in US Marine strength which had been made yesterday. In addition, General Westmoreland had recommended certain increases in the numbers of individuals and units to enable US forces already here to function more effectively.

Three specific actions have been approved. First is the establishment of an Army Logistical Command here. This would draw together five or six current logistical operations under one head. It would mean an addition of several thousand US troops. Secondly, it was decided to increase programs of improvement to port facilities in the central region. This would serve both military and local economic needs, especially those arising from increased numbers of refugees in the central cities. The third measure is an increased use of US Seventh Fleet to assist in controlling infiltration by sea. All these were measures to offset Viet Cong strength, the Ambassador stressed.

In addition, he participated in Washington discussions on US air action against North Vietnam -- how better to orchestrate strikes and make the program more effective. It was generally felt that the current program is about right as to tempo. The Ambassador said that no change in behavior on the part of Hanoi had been noted so far as a result of the strikes, but it was still too early to expect one. There had been visible results in the North, he said: cumulative material aspects of the strikes were making communications more difficult in the southern part of North Vietnam, where road movement was hampered, and it was felt that the attacks were beginning to have a significant impact on the economic and national life of North Vietnam.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Ambassador said that the subject of pacification received the most attention in Washington. The US realizes, he said, that pressure on Hanoi from air alone is not enough. If the North Vietnamese think they are about to win the war on the ground in the South, they may decide to absorb punishment of US-GVN air strikes. We must prove to the North that they do not have a chance to win against forces in the South. The Ambassador continued that many programs were discussed in Washington and that no single spectacular plan was adopted.

As to the final topic discussed in Washington, the Ambassador said that the President's Johns Hopkins speech and the State Department's answer to the 17 non-aligned nations spoke for him.

In answer to a question about possible contacts with North Vietnam, or signals that North Vietnam might be responding to our bombing, the Ambassador said there are various points North Vietnam can use for contacts with Western countries -- the UN, or places where they have diplomatic representation, for example, but we do not know exactly how they would choose to contact us. In answer to this question, the Ambassador said that there has been no change in our preparedness to talk on the subject of Vietnam, but emphasized that the US will not accept cessation of its bombings as a pre-condition for discussions. In answer to a question as to whether there had been any lessening of Viet Cong activity which might be significant in this regard, the Ambassador replied there had not been anything to justify a reduction in bombing of the North.

The Ambassador said in answer to a question, that the President's statement that the US is ready to engage in discussions without pre-conditions was clear and stressed that discussions are not the same as negotiations; no statement had been made by the US Government about negotiations. In answer to a question, the Ambassador said we assume Hanoi is free to speak for itself with regard to the course of war, but we cannot be sure of the extent of possible pressure on Hanoi by other Communist countries. The question was asked whether the Ambassador would revise his earlier statement that he did not expect intervention by the Soviet Union or Red China; the Ambassador replied it was his personal view that there would be no massive Soviet or Chinese intervention at this time, but that shipments of arms or other secondary kinds of assistance might continue.

In answer to a question as to whether he would be leaving his Saigon post, he said no. A question was asked whether the figure for the 1965 increase in GVN forces was 100,000 or 160,000, the Ambassador replied that the former figure was mentioned by Secretary McNamara some time ago, but

since that time, a higher target of 160,000 had been adopted. In answer to a question as to whether the US was planning on an establishment of 350,000 US troops in Vietnam, the Ambassador replied he knew of no such plan. Asked if there had been thought given to attacking an important target in North Vietnam in reprisal for the Saigon Embassy bombing, the Ambassador replied that the air strike program was carefully planned and not tied to specific Viet Cong actions, so he had not considered any special measure necessary as a result of the Embassy bombing. Asked if the question of hot pursuit had come up as a result of the MIG dogfights, the Ambassador replied, not to his knowledge. The Ambassador also replied, "no" when asked whether US or GVN ground action was planned against North Vietnam. In answer to a question as to whether a naval blockade of North Vietnam was among the measures contemplated in the increase of Seventh Fleet support to the Vietnam war (mentioned above), the Ambassador replied that in his opinion, a blockade operation would not be profitable due to cost, international complications, and possible involvement with airfields on Hainan Island.

The Ambassador was asked whether attention was being given to the problem that US allies contribute to trade flowing through the Port of Haiphong. He replied he was not aware of anything being done at this time, but it was something he might not know in any case. In answer to a question about the disposition of Embassy-bombing terrorist Hai, the Ambassador said that Prime Minister Quat knows we have a problem (referring to the threatened execution of Gustav Hertz) and we know he has a problem; the Ambassador felt nothing hasty would be done.

The Ambassador was asked in connection with a previous question as to whether a coup was imminent, whether there were anything we could do to prevent a coup if we wanted to. The Ambassador replied we had not in the past been able to forestall coups; but that we would always try; what was really needed was more conviction among politically active Vietnamese that coups were harmful.

In answer to a question as to whether the stationing of US Marines in Hue was a change in policy, since Marines were not guarding a major US installation like the Danang Airbase, the Ambassador replied that there was no difference in the employment of Marines in his mind, and that the Hue/Phu Bai airfield area would become more important -- a satellite of the Danang Airbase. He was asked whether Phu Bai would be made into a jet airfield, and replied not at this time.

A question was asked whether, if the MIGs which intercepted the US planes yesterday were Chinese, an entirely new problem in the war would now face the US; the Ambassador replied he had no proof that the MIGs were Chinese, and Zorthian read a just-received Department of Defense statement on this incident.

Finally, the Ambassador was asked whether one of the US's major problems in Vietnam was not instability of political life here. The Ambassador replied, "yes," and in answer to a question as to what we were doing about it, went on to say that we were trying to make our advice and help available to the Government of Vietnam in support of political stability, and that we felt that under Prime Minister Quat, the Government of Vietnam was doing well.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



4/12/65

11

Mr. President:

Per our phone conversation.

McG. B.

New York Times, April 12, 1965

GAIN SEEN IN WAR AGAINST VIETCONG

New York Times
April 12, 1965
Peasants Help Intelligence,
Saigon's Troops Improve
and More Men Volunteer

By SEYMOUR TOPPING

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 11—Several signs are evident of a recent favorable trend in the war against the Vietcong.

United States officials view the change as modest and possibly ephemeral—not one that has turned the tide of the war or altered the prospect of a long, hard struggle. But they are publicly and privately and on all levels more optimistic than several months ago.

Senior United States officers have reported that Vietnamese peasants are bringing in more intelligence information about activities of Vietcong forces. This is considered one of the more significant indexes of change.

Others are the improvement in the fighting performance of the South Vietnamese Army, an increase in the number of volunteers for the armed forces, more defectors from the Vietcong and the resumption of some foreign investment in the country.

New Hope Cited

Officials in Saigon and the provinces attributed these encouraging signs to the decision of the United States to bomb North Vietnam and to commit its jet fighter planes in support of operations against the Vietcong.

"More people think we have a chance to win," a provincial official in an exposed town in the central highlands said in a typical comment.

A top aide of the South Vietnamese Premier, Phan Huy Quat, said there had been a general improvement in morale, which presented a unique opportunity. But he added that the population still remained skeptical of the Saigon Government after the succession of military coups that undermined confidence in the central administration.

The Government may have only a few months in which to carry out reforms and to get rural reconstruction programs started again, an official said.

Senior United States officers believe that the Vietcong may undertake a major offensive, possibly in central Vietnam, later this month to offset the improvement in morale resulting from United States air operations. The offensive would be aimed as a military and psychological blow that would renew political malaise in Saigon.



The New York Times April 12, 1965

Vietnamese forces drove back Vietcong troops in the vicinity of Bongson (1) and below Banmethuot (2).

similar to that which brought down a succession of Governments late last year.

Independent observers interpreted the increased flow of information from the population about the activities of the Vietcong as one of the most encouraging signs. In the successful campaign against Communist terrorist forces in Malaya, the availability of such information was the decisive factor in the victory of British security forces.

Senior United States officials have for a long time felt that the collection and correlation of intelligence information that is done largely through Vietnamese channels has been unsatisfactory. It is too early to

say that there has been any important change.

However, in the last few weeks, new sources of information have sprung up that have delighted United States officers and led to a number of successful operations.

Supply Depots Seized

A top-ranking officer said three military operations against the Vietcong were undertaken last week on the basis of such information. Within the last three days two big Vietcong supply depots in Phuocanh Province north of Saigon have been captured as a result of intelligence information.

The first cache uncovered in Phuocanh included 500 rounds of .57-mm. recoilless-rifle ammunition, 1,000 rounds of the .75-mm. type, rice, salt and clothing. In a second depot whose discovery was announced today, were found jeeps, trucks, a large quantity of rice and other stores.

Some of the intelligence information has come from defectors, who have responded in increased numbers recently to the Government's Open Arms rallying program. In the IV Corps area, which embraces the Mekong River delta, the number of men entering the Open Arms rehabilitation camps is averaging 100 to 150 a month. United States sources on the scene pointed out that some of the men surrendering could not be properly termed military defectors, but were peasants simply abandoning Vietcong-controlled areas for personal reasons. Some flee "bomb-free" zones in Vietcong areas where fighter planes and artillery forces may attack anything that moves.

Defector Rate Rises

These officials added that recently the number of actual defectors had increased and included more Vietcong squad leaders and other junior officers than in the past.

According to American sources, the number of volunteers entering the Vietnamese armed forces increased to 7,000 last month. The total number inducted, including those conscripted, was 10,000. Vietnamese officials had expected about 4,000 volunteers and had aimed at inducting a total of 8,000 men.

This improvement was offset somewhat by the apparent continued high rate of desertion in March among conscripted men and in regional forces.

In what appears to be a cautious renewal of confidence among businessmen, there has been an increase recently in applications for import licenses.

French businessmen, who had almost stopped investing in building construction have resumed their financial operations. The large Chinese community in Saigon's twin city of

Cholon, which is a sensitive indicator of trends, has expanded its financial investments in the last few weeks.

11a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Mansfield

The attached will put you even with Mike Mansfield -- the speech did most of the job, and this is correspondingly brief.

McG. B.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File
12a

April 12, 1965

Dear Mike:

I have been slow in answering your memorandum of March 18 and your letter of March 24. They arrived just at the time when I was getting my thoughts in order for the speech on Vietnam which I delivered on April 7. Your memoranda were helpful in that process, just as your eloquent statement of support on the day after the speech was a great help. I know how deeply troubled you have been about the situation in Vietnam, and for that reason your support is all the more welcome.

As I read your letter and memorandum, I think there is more agreement than difference between us. Let me comment on a few points where your letter seems to overstate any differences we may have.

We have no desire to exercise "a primacy" over what transpires in South Vietnam. Our purpose is rather to prevent the Communists from doing exactly that. Our present limited actions in North Vietnam are caused by the actions of the North Vietnamese and not by any aggressive purpose on our side, in any way, shape, or form.

I do not think that I have ever spoken of "unconditional capitulation" of anyone. The exact shape of a settlement that would allow the South Vietnamese to work out their own destiny is a matter which cannot be decided at this stage, but I do not think your second paragraph is a precisely accurate description of the terms and conditions set forth in my speech and in our answer to the 17-Nation declaration.

I think that the implied criticism of "targets of convenience" in your third paragraph is somewhat unfair. This military phrase is not a perfect one, but all that it means is that along certain carefully defined communication routes, pilots are authorized to attack whatever military targets they encounter.


Contrary to what is suggested in your fourth paragraph, we are not opposed to the kind of situation which exists in Burma and Cambodia. Our position is rather that the decision on alignment or non-alignment is one which individual countries should be free to make in the light of their own interests and needs.

Finally, I do not agree with the suggestion that the military authorities in Vietnam should have sought my personal approval before making the limited, specific use of riot-control gases which they authorized in an effort to save lives. These episodes have been blown up out of all proportion by critics who do not seem to be troubled by the killing of civilians in city streets by terrorist bombs.

You will agree that I should be careful in responding to your specific proposals for future action, simply because of my obligation to maintain freedom of choice as the situation develops. But I want you to know that I am fully alert to the importance of maintaining effective access to American troops in Vietnam, and that by my direction the terms and conditions for discussions leading toward an eventual settlement are under careful and continuous review.

For the rest, I will stand on what I said last Wednesday, and I thank you again for your prompt and effective support for that statement.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Mike Mansfield", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

12-18

March 18, 1963

It was noted in previous memorandums that if the United States air attacks were continued it would be necessary either to safeguard American forces already in Viet Nam by the addition of American combat forces on the ground or, alternatively, to draw into Saigon the Americans scattered elsewhere in Viet Nam. It was further noted that the Viet Cong reaction to the bombings would not be to pit their weakness against our strength (that is, send MIGs against Hawk Missiles) but their strength against our weakness (their land forces against "isolated pockets of Americans").

It is obvious, with the dispatch of Marines to Da Nang, that it has now been decided to guard American installations other than Saigon with our own troops. Within the context of that decision, I would most respectfully suggest the following:

1. That the number of installations to be defended with American combat ground forces be strictly limited to a minimum consistent with the requirements of United States policy, insofar as it may involve continued air and naval operations against the Communists.
2. That such American-guarded installations, preferably, be on the coast or otherwise readily accessible from the sea.
3. That Americans scattered elsewhere in Viet Nam be drawn into those American-defended installations.

The above recommendations are based on the following reasoning:

In installations on the coast or near Saigon, our strength (American air and sea power) can be brought to bear, effectively, both in terms of supply and actual defense capability. Such installations can be held, therefore, with the expenditure of relatively fewer lives than installations in the interior. In the interior, the Viet Cong, just as the

Viet Minh once did against the French Forts, can mass forces against our installation at a time. To hold them, we will be drawn into deploying progressively larger numbers of United States ground troops throughout the country.

Under present conditions Hanoi really has no effective way of retaliating against the air-attacks. But if we have large numbers of our troops in Viet Nam, the Communists would have meaningful United States targets against which to launch their principal strength. Hanoi could strike at us by sending main forces into the South.

Even if Giap did not strike south, the deployment of United States guards throughout the country would actually strengthen the hand of the Viet Cong. It allows them to apply military pressure directly at a choice of United States targets at times and places of their own choosing. To sum up, whatever future direction policy may assume, the fewer the potential American targets in Viet Nam the better, unless, of course, we mean to take over the entire conflict in South Viet Nam.

On a related matter, there have been rumors in the press and elsewhere about creating a United States-Vietnamese Joint Command. Whatever it is called, this arrangement is likely to become in short order, primarily an American command. A joint command may appear to have the military virtue of improving the performance of the Vietnamese; it is more likely to undermine Vietnamese initiative and increase hostility to us by giving the war a colonial color.

In any event, participation in a joint command would lock us fast into a rigid position of primary responsibility in Viet Nam. It would leave us no choice but an expanded and deepening involvement.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

12c

March 24, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Over the years, I have submitted both to your predecessor and to you a series of memorandums on the situation in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Sometimes suggestions have been requested of me and sometimes they have been volunteered. In either case, they have been motivated solely by a desire to give such help as I might in the burdens of the decisions of the Presidency.

The main lines of thought in these memorandums over the years, as you may recall, are the following:

1. That the United States does not have interests on the Southeast Asian mainland to justify the costs in American lives and resources which would be required if we were to attempt to exercise, in effect, primacy over what transpires in that region; and that, insofar as South Viet Nam is concerned, we are there, not to take primary responsibility, but to provide whatever assistance is wanted and can be used effectively by the Vietnamese themselves.
2. That our national interest lies in reducing, rather than in increasing, the unilateral role which we have played in recent years, through the foreign aid program and excessive involvement of various United States agencies in the internal affairs of the weak nations of that region.
3. That our national security interests are best served in Southeast Asia by severely limiting our military involvement and, confining ourselves at most, to a very judicious use of air and sea power.
4. That the best prospects for a tolerable long-range situation in Southeast Asia lie in encouraging, through astute diplomacy and limited and preferably multilateral economic assistance, the emergence of truly independent governments with firm roots in their own people, which are as free as possible from great power involvement in their internal affairs. This situation, as I have noted, time and again, has prevailed in Cambodia at least until very recently when, in my judgment, a combination of years of inept diplomacy and the events in Viet Nam finally conspired to push this small and ably-led nation sharply towards China. It has prevailed

The President

-2-

March 24, 1965

to some extent in Burma and at one time, there was hope for it in South Viet Nam under the late Ngo Dinh Diem.

I am aware that the principles of policy outlined in the four points above are subject to the charge of "a return to isolationism." It should be noted, however, that there is no automatic virtue in an ubiquitous and indiscriminate internationalism, particularly when it leads to the kind of isolated internationalism in which we presently find ourselves in Viet Nam.

I think it is correct to say that the trend of our policies over the past few years has been in a direction opposite to the main lines of thought which are contained in my memorandums over the past few years. I say this, as you know, without rancor or criticism. I know that my thoughts have received your careful attention. I know that your assistants and the bureaucracy have studied them and occasionally even have concurred in an idea expressed in them.

Nevertheless, it is still a fact that present policy is on a course which contains the following diametric opposites of the suggestions which I have advanced over the years. Present policy, so far as I can determine, requires:

(1) That we make whatever expenditure of American lives and resources, on an ascending scale, is necessary in order for us to exercise, in effect, a primacy over what transpires in South Viet Nam. If this involves going into North Viet Nam and beyond, that, too, will be done.

(2) That in the absence of unconditional capitulation of the Viet Cong, our military involvement, must continue and be increased as necessary (there is discussion even now of a Joint Command which can only be the prelude to United States command in fact if not in word).

(3) That our military involvement will not be restricted to a most judicious use of air and sea power, as evidenced by instructions to strike at "targets of convenience"; but rather that it be extended, even to the infusion of a steadily increasing number of American combat forces on the ground.

(4) That we will not try to encourage, through sustained diplomatic efforts, the emergence of the kind of situations which exist in Burma and Cambodia, but rather, so far as I can see, that we will stress those situations which can be maintained only by continuous infusions of American aid (i.e., Laos and Thailand, not to speak of South Viet Nam itself).

March 24, 1965

These are the facts of our policy as it is being carried out, as I see it. It is possible that this direction may not be precisely the one you seek, a possibility suggested by your calling to my attention this morning your unawareness in advance of the usage of gas in Viet Nam. It may be that you were also unaware in advance, understandably, of the usage of napalm and of the concept of "targets of convenience" which are likely to do at least as much damage to non-combatants as combatants in a situation such as Viet Nam or the countless other decisions which deepen our involvement and responsibility. May I say in connection with the gas that it is beyond my comprehension how any American in an office of responsibility would not realize the vast significance, beyond immediate military considerations, of this act and, therefore, seek the highest political authority before taking such a step.

It is this possibility, that actions of the bureaucracy may have taken us in more deeply than desired which leads me to write you once again, and most respectfully suggest certain changes at this time which may move us from the present direction of policy as it is expressed in action. In all frankness, I believe that the present direction is at variance with the extent and nature of our national interests on the Southeast Asian mainland and in the world. In the end, I fear that this course, at best, will win us only more widespread difficulties which will play havoc with the domestic program of the Administration, with the balance of payments situation, and with our interests and constructive influence elsewhere in the world.

I have no great hope that, at this late date, these suggestions will be useful to you. But for what they may be worth, I would suggest:

1. That we should concentrate any ground forces which are sent to Viet Nam to safeguard Americans already there in two or three key spots which either back up on the sea or are easily accessible from the sea (i.e., Saigon and Da Nang) and that all other Americans in Viet Nam should be drawn into these protected points as rapidly as possible. From the point of view of our diplomatic position, two or three accessible and more defensible bases will be of greater value than numerous installations in the interior, which can become, one by one, the targets of massed Viet Cong attacks;
2. That we should seek, indirectly but forcefully, through all possible sources, a reconvening of the 1961 Geneva Conference group;
3. That we should insist upon, as the sole precondition for such a meeting, a total cease-fire and stand-fast throughout all of Viet Nam, north and south.
4. That we should be prepared for consultations between the Saigon government, the North Vietnamese and the opposition in the south on the conditions for maintaining the "cease-fire" and "stand-fast," and on subsequent relationships once a conference has been convened and, further, that we accept, if circumstances indicate the desirability of it, United Nations participation in this connection.

The President

- 4 -

March 24, 1965

As you well know, it is very difficult to predict the evolution of a course of policy once it has been set in motion. There will be risks to our national interests in a conference, but certainly, in my opinion, risks which are far smaller than those which we now run. I think it should be pointed out that if there is a settlement it is possible that Chinese influence in Southeast Asia may increase, but that possibility is even greater if the present course is pursued further. A settlement would not necessarily mean, however, that China will automatically control the area in a military or even an economic sense. The historic counterforce to that domination is the general Southeast Asian fear and anxiety of the Chinese which is quite distinct and may be at least as strong as ideology. In present circumstances, this fear and anxiety would appear to be largely dormant but it could revive in the event of a Chinese attempt at subversion or subjugation, particularly after a settlement. The existing Sino-Soviet dispute is also likely to distract China from Southeast Asia to some degree, but not in the event of a deepening military confrontation in that area.

I have written frankly and at length out of a deep concern over the present trend of events in Viet Nam. We are in very deep already and in most unfavorable circumstances. In my judgment we were in too deep long before you assumed office. But you know the whole situation on a day-to-day basis and I most certainly respect the decisions which you have felt compelled to make in this connection.

I shall not trouble you further with memorandums on this situation and I do not expect an answer to this letter. Your responsibilities are great and, to what I have written, I know you must add the views of many others who see this situation in different terms. But I did want to put certain possibilities before you in the event you have not yet had an opportunity to explore them. And I want you to know that you have my support on a personal as well as an official basis. If there is anything I can do to help you in this as in any other matter you have only to ask and I will try to the best of my ability to do so.

Respectfully yours,

Mike Mansfield

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

12-8

March 18, 1965

It was noted in previous memorandums that if the United States air attacks were continued it would be necessary either to safeguard American forces already in Viet Nam by the addition of American combat forces on the ground or, alternatively, to draw into Saigon the Americans scattered elsewhere in Viet Nam. It was further noted that the Viet Cong reaction to the bombings would not be to pit their weakness against our strength (that is, send MIGS against Hawk Missiles) but their strength against our weakness (their land forces against "isolated pockets of Americans").

It is obvious, with the dispatch of Marines to Da Nang, that it has now been decided to guard American installations other than Saigon with our own troops. Within the context of that decision, I would most respectfully suggest the following:

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Under present conditions Hanoi really has no effective way of retaliating against the air-attacks. But if we have large numbers of our troops in Viet Nam, the Communists would have meaningful United States targets against which to launch their principal strength. Hanoi could strike back at us by sending main forces into the South.

Even if Giap did not strike south, the deployment of United States guards throughout the country would actually strengthen the hand of the Viet Cong. It allows them to apply military pressure directly at a choice of United States targets at times and places of their own choosing. To sum up, whatever future direction policy may assume, the fewer the potential American targets in Viet Nam the better, unless, of course, we mean to take over the entire conflict in South Viet Nam.

On a related matter, there have been rumors in the press and elsewhere about creating a United States-Vietnamese Joint Command. Whatever it is called, this arrangement is likely to become in short order, primarily an American command. A joint command may appear to have the military virtue of improving the performance of the Vietnamese; it is more likely to undermine Vietnamese initiative and increase hostility to us by giving the war a colonial color.

In any event, participation in a joint command would lock us fast into a rigid position of primary responsibility in Viet Nam. It would leave us no choice but an expanded and deepening involvement.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

12c

March 24, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Over the years, I have submitted both to your predecessor and to you a series of memorandums on the situation in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Sometimes suggestions have been requested of me and sometimes they have been volunteered. In either case, they have been motivated solely by a desire to give such help as I might in the burdens of the decisions of the Presidency.

The main lines of thought in these memorandums over the years, as you may recall, are the following:

1. That the United States does not have interests on the Southeast Asian mainland to justify the costs in American lives and resources which would be required if we were to attempt to exercise, in effect, primacy over what transpires in that region; and that, insofar as South Viet Nam is concerned, we are there, not to take primary responsibility, but to provide whatever assistance is wanted and can be used effectively by the Vietnamese themselves.
2. That our national interest lies in reducing, rather than in increasing, the unilateral role which we have played in recent years, through the foreign aid program and excessive involvement of various United States agencies in the internal affairs of the weak nations of that region.
3. That our national security interests are best served in Southeast Asia by severely limiting our military involvement and, confining ourselves at most, to a very judicious use of air and sea power.
4. That the best prospects for a tolerable long-range situation in Southeast Asia lie in encouraging, through astute diplomacy and limited and preferably multilateral economic assistance, the emergence of truly independent governments with firm roots in their own people, which are as free as possible from great power involvement in their internal affairs. This situation, as I have noted, time and again, has prevailed in Cambodia at least until very recently when, in my judgment, a combination of years of inept diplomacy and the events in Viet Nam finally conspired to push this small and ably-led nation sharply towards China. It has prevailed

March 24, 1965

to some extent in Burma and at one time, there was hope for it in South Viet Nam under the late Ngo Dinh Diem.

I am aware that the principles of policy outlined in the four points above are subject to the charge of "a return to isolationism." It should be noted, however, that there is no automatic virtue in an ubiquitous and indiscriminate internationalism, particularly when it leads to the kind of isolated internationalism in which we presently find ourselves in Viet Nam.

I think it is correct to say that the trend of our policies over the past few years has been in a direction opposite to the main lines of thought which are contained in my memorandums over the past few years. I say this, as you know, without rancor or criticism. I know that my thoughts have received your careful attention. I know that your assistants and the bureaucracy have studied them and occasionally even have concurred in an idea expressed in them.

Nevertheless, it is still a fact that present policy is on a course which contains the following diametric opposites of the suggestions which I have advanced over the years. Present policy, so far as I can determine, requires:

(1) That we make whatever expenditure of American lives and resources, on an ascending scale, is necessary in order for us to exercise, in effect, a primacy over what transpires in South Viet Nam. If this involves going into North Viet Nam and beyond, that, too, will be done.

(2) That in the absence of unconditional capitulation of the Viet Cong, our military involvement, must continue and be increased as necessary (there is discussion even now of a Joint Command which can only be the prelude to United States command in fact if not in word).

(3) That our military involvement will not be restricted to a most judicious use of air and sea power, as evidenced by instructions to strike at "targets of convenience"; but rather that it be extended, even to the infusion of a steadily increasing number of American combat forces on the ground.

(4) That we will not try to encourage, through sustained diplomatic efforts, the emergence of the kind of situations which exist in Burma and Cambodia, but rather, so far as I can see, that we will stress those situations which can be maintained only by continuous infusions of American aid (i.e., Laos and Thailand, not to speak of South Viet Nam itself).

March 24, 1965

Those are the facts of our policy as it is being carried out, as I see it. It is possible that this direction may not be precisely the one you seek, a possibility suggested by your calling to my attention this morning your unawareness in advance of the usage of gas in Viet Nam. It may be that you were also unaware in advance, understandably, of the usage of napalm and of the concept of "targets of convenience" which are likely to do at least as much damage to non-combatants as combatants in a situation such as Viet Nam or the countless other decisions which deepen our involvement and responsibility. May I say in connection with the gas that it is beyond my comprehension how any American in an office of responsibility would not realize the vast significance, beyond immediate military considerations, of this act and, therefore, seek the highest political authority before taking such a step.

It is this possibility, that actions of the bureaucracy may have taken us in more deeply than desired which leads me to write you once again, and most respectfully suggest certain changes at this time which may move us from the present direction of policy as it is expressed in action. In all frankness, I believe that the present direction is at variance with the extent and nature of our national interests on the Southeast Asian mainland and in the world. In the end, I fear that this course, at best, will win us only more widespread difficulties which will play havoc with the domestic program of the Administration, with the balance of payments situation, and with our interests and constructive influence elsewhere in the world.

I have no great hope that, at this late date, these suggestions will be useful to you. But for what they may be worth, I would suggest:

1. That we should concentrate any ground forces which are sent to Viet Nam to safeguard Americans already there in two or three key spots which either back up on the sea or are easily accessible from the sea (i.e., Saigon and Da Nang) and that all other Americans in Viet Nam should be drawn into these protected points as rapidly as possible. From the point of view of our diplomatic position, two or three accessible and more defensible bases will be of greater value than numerous installations in the interior which can become, one by one, the targets of massed Viet Cong attacks;
2. That we should seek, indirectly but forcefully, through all possible sources, a reconvening of the 1961 Geneva Conference group;
3. That we should insist upon, as the sole precondition for such a meeting, a total cease-fire and stand-fast throughout all of Viet Nam, north and south.
4. That we should be prepared for consultations between the Saigon government, the North Vietnamese and the opposition in the south on the conditions for maintaining the "cease-fire" and "stand-fast," and on subsequent relationships once a conference has been convened and, further, that we accept, if circumstances indicate the desirability of it, United Nations participation in this connection.

March 24, 1965

As you well know, it is very difficult to predict the evolution of a course of policy once it has been set in motion. There will be risks to our national interests in a conference, but certainly, in my opinion, risks which are far smaller than those which we now run. I think it should be pointed out that if there is a settlement it is possible that Chinese influence in Southeast Asia may increase, but that possibility is even greater if the present course is pursued further. A settlement would not necessarily mean, however, that China will automatically control the area in a military or even an economic sense. The historic counterforce to that domination is the general Southeast Asian fear and anxiety of the Chinese which is quite distinct and may be at least as strong as ideology. In present circumstances, this fear and anxiety would appear to be largely dormant but it could revive in the event of a Chinese attempt at subversion or subjugation, particularly after a settlement. The existing Sino-Soviet dispute is also likely to distract China from Southeast Asia to some degree, but not in the event of a deepening military confrontation in that area.

I have written frankly and at length out of a deep concern over the present trend of events in Viet Nam. We are in very deep already and in most unfavorable circumstances. In my judgment we were in too deep long before you assumed office. But you know the whole situation on a day-to-day basis and I most certainly respect the decisions which you have felt compelled to make in this connection.

I shall not trouble you further with memorandums on this situation and I do not expect an answer to this letter. Your responsibilities are great and, to what I have written, I know you must add the views of many others who see this situation in different terms. But I did want to put certain possibilities before you in the event you have not yet had an opportunity to explore them. And I want you to know that you have my support on a personal as well as an official basis. If there is anything I can do to help you in this as in any other matter you have only to ask and I will try to the best of my ability to do so.

Respectfully yours,

Mike Tran Freed

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The President has noted your letter of February 18, 1965, transmitting a document, "The National Nuclear Test Program," and has expressed his appreciation for your initiative in preparing it. He has also noted that the plan contained in the document is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This approach is sound; flexibility should continue to characterize our planning. In addition, we should continue to keep in mind the thought expressed in your letter that any test series which might eventually be conducted in any of the prohibited environments would be developed in response to the particular objectives considered most important at the time. Such tests might be somewhat different from those contemplated in "The National Nuclear Test Program" as presently drafted.

At several points in the document, there is expressed an expectation that underground testing would continue essentially unchanged and at approximately the same rate even after we resumed testing in the atmosphere. This assumption seems open to question. The need for and feasibility of continuing a full-blown underground testing program simultaneously with atmospheric testing would be a matter on which the President would have to decide. I suggest that those portions of the document that appear to establish such assumptions with respect to underground testing be revised to leave the question open.

I also request one other revision in the document, a change in the section on ultra-high yield weapons to make it explicit that the President has not yet made a decision as to how far the development of such weapons will be carried. Except as indicated above, it appears that "The National Nuclear Test Program" document is an excellent statement of the current plan for continuing to maintain the state of readiness which has already been achieved by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

~~SECRET~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-45
By Cbm, NARA, Date 1-15-03

~~SECRET~~

-2-

April 10, 1965

The President requests that the plan contained in the document be periodically reviewed to ensure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and by the other research and development work at the laboratories. In addition, he requests that the plan be reviewed in collaboration with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to ensure that the planning takes place with appropriate political guidance and in light of our best estimate of significant developing conditions. He further requests that you bring to his attention any significant changes that occur in the program and the reasons for them either on a periodic basis or whenever the program is formally revised.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~ (page 2 of 2 pages)

April 10, 1965

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FOR VALENTI FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

I suggest the following short, but friendly, answer to Pearson's letter. It can go by telegram to Butterworth if you approve. It does not need your signature. Proposed answer follows:

"Dear Mike:

I want to thank you for your warm and thoughtful letter of April 8. I am glad to have this full account of your thinking, and I won't go over my own views again because I stated them just as clearly as I could in our talk at Camp David. I think we understand each other's problems a lot better now.

I am glad you liked my speech, and your government's immediate support of it was a great help.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 83-191
By ics, NARS, Date 10-1-84

(2)
ME 4-8-65

15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

This is an extremely interesting account of the way the present South Vietnamese Chief of Staff -- Little Minh -- sees the war. It has a more rounded and thoughtful character than most of our own military reports.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Confidential Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(cy Saigon cable, Dept 3199, April 3, 1965)

April 9, 1965

In almost a two-hour long conversation last night with a small group of French jouranalists (Agence France Press, "Figaro") and correspondent of the German radio station in the Vietnamese Army Officer's Mess, General Tran Van Minh, Chief of the Armed Forces, gave an interesting and apparently frank account of his assessment of the present military situation as background only and not for quotation. The occasion was arranged by Major Demaison of the French Embassy who is a former classmate of General Minh. According to one correspondent present, Minh analyzed the current situation as follows:

1. The hard core Viet are quitting the South and moving to Central Vietnam either to wait there for new developments or to attempt to hold the territory for bargaining purposes in any future negotiations.
2. The Viet Cong are losing confidence in cadres from the south as a reflection of Viet Cong failure to keep the often repeated promise in the south that they will bring peace.
3. Increased terrorism in Saigon is most likely for political rather than military purposes.
4. Asked if in view of Paragraph 1 above, more US troops will be needed he said, "no." Additional US Air Force help is adequate.
5. The Vietnamese Army's best strategy would be to avoid big operations and mount instead a large number of "oil-spot" operations over extended territory for maximum psychological impact on population and prevention of the Viet Cong being cast in an underdog role.
6. In the last few weeks the Viet Cong has reached the zenith of their strength, not from manpower but from logistical point of view.
7. The Viet Cong are standardizing their arms. Use of arms other than the US made lately can be explained by the lack of ammunition for such arms.
8. Chinese intervention should be discounted. First, North Vietnam is not about to put itself at the mercy of Peking and, second, no matter what form possible the Chinese intervention might take, will mean large-scale escalation.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority RAC 23378
By is/bm NARA, Date 6-11-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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9. In response to the question, he said that he does not believe possible any negotiations within the next three months, but finds probably some kind of contact with North Vietnam. He added that North Vietnam is aware it failed in its effort to set up the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam as an interlocutor for the south and now must look to Saigon for such an interlocutor.

10. General Minh made an excellent impression on correspondents through his impersonal analysis of the situation, methodical reflection on given facts, and his ability to conceive of the wide range of possible courses of evolution of pertinent factors.

Comment: The Air Force Pouch sent a dispatch today attributing the foregoing to the "best informed military sources possible."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd
4/9/65
11:00 a.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been slow in sending you this copy of a long message from the Prime Minister which came over the private wire on Monday.

There is not much of substance in it, but he is obviously trying to keep in close touch.

I have sent an informal acknowledgment to his Private Secretary.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

File
A

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

16a

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

April 5, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested to have a brief account of my Paris trip. On the whole it went very well, and I found the General, although running true to form on the basic political issues, very friendly and forthcoming. I think that he was anxious to minimise the areas of disagreement and to concentrate on making progress on those topics where we can broadly see eye to eye.

The organization of NATO, including nuclear sharing, was not of course one of these topics, and you won't be surprised to have seen from the communique that we had to confine ourselves to discussing our respective points of view about the security of the West within the framework of the Alliance. I don't think that we can look for any significant shift in French policy in this field in the foreseeable future. As regards the Middle East and Africa, however, we found ourselves in more agreement on the need to try to reduce the Arab-Israel tension, to counter Sino-Soviet penetration of Africa and so forth. It may be significant that the French now seem ready to resume the periodical discussions at expert level which we used to have on these topics, and I hope that, if these talks start again, it may be possible to find out rather more clearly what the French intentions in these areas really are.

We discussed the Vietnam situation in some detail. But here again of course it was essentially a matter of examining differing points of view which showed no real signs of being nearer each other at the end of our meeting than at the beginning. Couve was particularly unyielding in his talks with the Foreign Secretary, but we made it no less clear that in our opinion there could be no question of merely pulling out of the area and that, as Co-Chairman of the 1954 Conference we had a definite part to play and were determined to do whatever we could (e.g. by Patrick Gordon-Walker's mission) to promote what the communique called a lasting and peaceful settlement.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-300

By CG, NARA Date 6-20-00

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-2-

We had several interesting discussions at various levels about economic affairs. I was very grateful to you for arranging for Kermit Gordon to be in London when we came back: and I have given him today a full account of our Paris talks which he will be able to pass on to you. Perhaps all I need say now therefore is that the main features of those talks were that on our part I emphasized our determination to strengthen the British economy without devaluing the pound and that on their side they gave us pretty categorical assurance that, when we go to the IMF in May, they will associate themselves with the raising of the necessary funds. This does not commit them of course as regards the amount, the conditions and so forth: but I took it as a good sign that they were prepared in principle to recognize our need for a breathing space and to commit themselves to support us. We also had some very interesting exchanges about possible ways of reforming the international monetary systems. Here again both sides stated their position on lines with which you will be familiar, and there was not much sign of any change of heart among the French. But they were clearly divided among themselves on the question of the gold standard, and I think that I managed to shake them a bit on this issue. Kermit Gordon will be able to tell you more about this. It will be interesting to see how the French will now behave both at the IMF meeting on the UK drawing and at the discussions (for which they hope to be ready soon after that meeting) about changes in the International Monetary System.

I think that in some ways the most valuable parts of our discussions were those which dealt with the possibilities of cooperation between Britain and France in various technological fields, including aircraft. I could not say too much to De Gaulle about our recent examination of the TSR 2 and the TFX, since our decisions here are technically a budget secret, which we cannot reveal until the Chancellor of the Exchequer opens his budget on Tuesday. But I was anxious that there must be no subsequent Nassau type misunderstanding between De Gaulle and ourselves, and I therefore let him know that we had it in mind to take an option on the TFX, but that we were anxious at the same time to explore the possibilities of future cooperation with France as regards aircraft. There are some signs that the press may get this wrong and may suppose that we have an Anglo-French aircraft in mind as a replacement for the TSR 2, but we will, of course, take the first opportunity after the budget to dispose of this misunderstanding and to make it clear that any new Anglo-French collaboration in this field made sense in terms of the enlargement of the market which is essential if these

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very specialized resources are to be deployed in the most economic way. And this is true, of course, not only of aircraft but also of such other technologies as computers, electronics and so forth. I think he also realized, although he was careful not to say so, that the argument in favour of Anglo-French cooperation in these fields is not merely economic and that, if this collaboration becomes a reality, it will represent a genuine beginning in the process of creating functional links between the two camps into which Europe is divided. If to this extent it contributes to a healing of that breach, I know that you will be no less pleased than ourselves.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Wilson

~~SECRET~~

Reid
4/8/65
4:00 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is Reischauer's report on Sato's
views of the speech.

BUNOY
GET AMBASSADOR'S M.C. B.
REPORT - TO SPEECH M.C. B.
THIS WEEK END
EVALUATION
OF YOUR BOY REPORT

V
⑧ 17a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2)
(Cy Dept 3185 from Tokyo)

SATO TELLS REISCHAUER HOW HAPPY HE IS

Prime Minister Sato phoned me the morning of the 8th to say he strongly welcomed the President's clear exposition in the April 7 speech of US aims in Vietnam fighting and the ultimate hopes and intentions with regard to Southeast Asia and would make clear at his noon press conference his hearty approval of the statements. He said he had been planning to have former Ambassador Asakai get together with me for a lengthy discussion of US objectives (since a direct talk between Sato and myself would attract too much attention), but the President's speech has now resolved his doubts and anxieties.

Comment: As Sato's reaction indicates, the speech will be extremely helpful in calming Japanese anxieties, blunting criticism, and winning a greater measure of public acceptance and even support for the US course of action in Vietnam. I and others in the Embassy have been holding long meetings with media and other leaders, attempting to get them to see the Vietnam situation in this perspective and we have felt we were having some success in this effort, but the clear statements of this speech made directly by the President should be immeasurably more effective.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-13-99

18
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is Chet Bowles sending his congratulations by CIA channels -- I have no idea why he doesn't dare send this through State.

mg
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
~~VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

18a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

C
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P
Y

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Following received from [REDACTED] New Delhi:

"For the President, White House.

Heartiest congratulations on your magnificent speech spelling out the immense opportunities open to Southeast Asia once Communist aggression ceases. It lays the foundation for an extraordinarily constructive effort in this critical part of the world.

We will do our best to see that its significance is fully appreciated here in India. Warmest Regards,

Chester Bowles"

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 00-154
By com, NARA, Date 12-7-01

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19

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U Thant's message on your speech

The attached is U Thant's letter to you, as read over the phone. A UN spokesman is putting out a statement which paraphrases this letter and may also quote from it. We are watching the tickers, ~~but have not seen it yet.~~ *I have it now.*

My inclination would be to write an immediate answer, and I attach a possible draft. If you like this, we could get the letter and the answer out, *in agreement with U Thant,*

McG. B.

McG. B.

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THANT

19a

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. (AP)-SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT TODAY SENT PRESIDENT JOHNSON A PERSONAL MESSAGE WELCOMING HIS VIET NAM SPEECH AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND STATESMANLIKE. THANT TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE BELIEVES THE STATEMENT WILL PROVE HELPFUL.

A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID THANT DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ON A VIET NAM SETTLEMENT AS IN LINE WITH HIS OWN POSITION.

THANT ASSURED JOHNSON THAT HE WILL CONTINUE HIS OWN EFFORTS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

LT1126AES 4/8

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Letter from U Thant to the President

4/8/65

"Dear Mr. President:

Permit me to say that I listened to your speech on the Vietnam situation last night with very great interest. I was particularly impressed by your appeal for "a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development" on behalf of the countries in the Mekong River area of Southeast Asia, including, of course, North Vietnam. I welcome this approach and I am grateful for your references to the UN and to me in connection with it. I find it positive, forward-looking, and generous. As you know, my recent thinking has been along similar lines.

Also, Mr. President, if I may say so, I regard your indication of a readiness to enter into "unconditional discussions" as both constructive and statesmanlike. I feel sure that it will prove to be very helpful.

It may well be, Mr. President, that your speech will mark a turning point in the long-standing Vietnam conflict. I certainly hope so. You may be sure that I will continue to contribute all that I can to the efforts toward a peaceful settlement.

With warm personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

(U Thant)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-70
By ig, NARA, Date 2-5-88

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a thoughtful and important cable from Kohler which I think you will want to read all the way through. I share the conclusions in his last paragraph and they are part of the reason why I think a private message, which Kohler could use less privately, is very much in our interest.

I hope to have a reasonably solid draft by Friday noon.

m.c.s.

McG. B.

Received: April 6, 1965 3:51 A.M.

Moscow Cable 2920

April 5, Noon

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-301
By ics, NARA Date 6-10-97

Vietnam and Soviet-American Relations

I. When new Soviet leadership decided, several months ago, that conduct their conflict with ChiComs required reversal Khrushchev line and reversion to active role in Southeast Asia, they must have realized this could entail deterioration their relationship.

With U.S. they apparently hoped damage could be limited both in scope and in duration, and assumed normal relationship could then be restored.

After Kosygin in Hanoi found Ho Chi Minh and company confident with respect outcome South Vietnam and negative with respect to negotiations, Soviet dilemma sharpened. It has since been aggravated by mounting American support of South Vietnam, on one side, and continuing ChiCom attacks on Soviets, on other. In circumstances, they have now clearly decided imperatives their commitment and influence in Communist world at this stage are incompatible with and predominate over interest in continued development relations with U.S.

II. More precise import this decision is now emerging, both in word and in deed. As regards deeds, it now seems clear that there will be no repeat no new initiatives on Soviet side or acceptance of initiatives from American side (with possible exception a few non-political matters of tangible interest or value to Soviets). Presently arranged exchanges will be allowed to continue but will not be extended or added to. Not only will direct negotiations at least be played down, if not avoided, but same will apply to international forums where U.S. and USSR are main protagonists.

Following are principal matters in which this decision has played major role to date:

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1. Bilaterals

A. Rejection of National War College visit and postponement of U.S. visit of Soviet military officers.

B. Inaction on leased line request.

C. Refusal of requested extensions to U.S. exchange students.

D. Stalling on other bilateral such as exchange of meteorological data. (Exception for king crab discussions and fishing inspections which Soviets must regard as of commercial advantage.)

2. Negative decision on resumption of ENDC.

3. Color TV deal with French.

Unless and until situation changes, this line of action (or inaction) will continue to be followed, with negative implications for resumption progress in bilateral field, and further aggravation already negative attitudes with respect such international problems as disarmament, UN finance and peace-keeping, and Germany.

III. As regards words, all stops are now being pulled out in major political and propaganda campaign designed to justify course adopted by Soviet leadership in eyes own people and to undermine U.S. position throughout world. This has gone through several stages:

1. Initial reaction to airstrikes against North Vietnam, while shrilly reflecting official anger at coincidence with Kosygin visit, was relatively controlled. Main feature this phase, demonstrations Feb 9 and March 4 against Embassy, boomeranged so violently they could only add to embarrassment and frustration leadership (and hopefully, may finally have persuaded them this not repeat not useful instrument of diplomacy).

2. After fiasco March 4 demonstration, campaign of more peaceful protest meetings launched in factories, institutes, universities, trade unions and other organizations throughout country and similar activities promoted abroad. These have produced shower of petitions to Embassy, telegrams to White House, and continuing flow of material

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"branding shameful aggression American imperialists" which now constitute substantial portion reading matter offered Soviet people in daily press.

3. World-wide interest in Voskhod II was exploited to initiate sharper phase of campaign, with Brezhnev on March 24 branding "American aggressors" as barbarians and bandits who should not think "time will wash off disgrace their crimes." Polemical style of professional party propagandists was apparent in subsequent note delivered to and returned by this Embassy March 26 stating as fact "confirmed by official U.S. spokesmen" that "poison gases are being used in South Vietnam by the US Armed Forces with approval US State and Defense Departments" and charging that "today United States has passed over from experiments to combat employment these inhuman weapons" which even "Hitler and his Generals did not dare to put into use." Particularly scurrilous cartoons have subsequently developed theme of rejected note, though this aspect may in time be inhibited by our setting record straight and paucity foreign reaction for local quotation. Campaign in general, however, continues and likely be sustained indefinitely, blending into anti-U.S. and anti-FRG themes being developed for 20th Anniversary World War II victory.

4. Top officials from government ministries were instructed not repeat not attend social functions U.S. Embassy February and March but lower ranks were allowed to come and no effort made cut off scientists, journalists, artists and other "intellectuals." In encounters at various ceremonies elsewhere, leaders and high officials have been personally cordial but have seemed almost studiously avoid substantive talk, particularly about Vietnam.

IV. Current period seems likely be much more protracted and harder live through without serious damage than Cuba crisis, especially in view relative weakness and sense of frustration of present Soviet leadership. However, some salutary forces are at work and may help so:

1. A knowledgeable Soviet source has told us that while "tough" sections top leadership want complete stoppage Soviet-American activities, including exchanges, "you have some influential friends who do not allow this to happen." This seems confirmed by continuing friendly attitude members Soviet elite, who while apprehensive about

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

possible escalation and confrontation, seem anxious to continue contacts and keep things going forward.

2. As nearly as we can judge, people generally are apathetic and skeptical. Somewhat disturbed by sense of increased war danger and by "poison gas" charges but with basically curious and friendly attitudes toward United States unchanged. Embassy travelers have been in North, in Central Asia and in South during past two weeks visiting any institutions where "protest meetings" had been staged by party agitators. Reception invariably friendly, practically no mention of Vietnam, some expressions regret damage to Embassy and hostility toward Chinese.

V. I see little that we can do which would bring about substantial change in current Soviet policy in the short run. However, I consider it essential for longer run to maintain posture on Vietnam reflected in President's statement of March 25 and to demonstrate in word and deed that we desire to continue course of sound improvement in Soviet-American relations of recent years. Indeed, while I recognize deteriorated atmosphere presents problems, I hope we will push forward such pending matters as ratification of Consular Convention, East-West trade legislation, and provision of suitable premises for new Soviet Embassy, all of which are in our net interest, and encourage private interests similarly to carry on as normally as possible, for example by participation in upcoming Soviet film festival and chemistry exhibition. In word, I think we should persistently reiterate themes that (a) US policy of helping in Vietnam has been unvarying in past ten years; (b) US policy of improved understanding with Soviet Union continues; and (c) if there is deterioration relations this result of changes in Soviet, not repeat not American policy. Soviet controlled media will not publish American side of story, but this becomes known here through VOA and other foreign media and local grapevine and will have salutary effect.

Dept. please pouch to interested posts.

Kohler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

YOUR APPOINTMENT WITH DREW PEARSON

Drew Pearson wants to talk to you about his impressions of the Soviet Union. He says that most of what he learned has been in his columns, but he does want to emphasize his feeling that events in Vietnam have produced a real frost in Soviet attitudes towards the United States.

Pearson of course believes that it is U. S. hawks that stand in the way of good relations with the Soviet Union. I tried to tell him that we were determined to do our part to improve relations but that we could not let Vietnam go under just for this purpose. My guess is that he will be cheered up by your speech yesterday.

I think nevertheless that it is well to leave Drew with the clear impression that you are not a hard liner and that you intend to find ways and means of making your point clear to the Soviets. He has always been curious about the pen pal correspondence and I would not repeat not give him too much of a hint of this possibility, but you could easily say that you plan to use Thompson and Kohler for this purpose and you might even say that Kohler has already advised us to do our best in this same direction. (I attach a cable and covering memorandum which I was just sending you on this subject.)

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-191
By ics NARS, Date 10-1-84

✓ 22

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your 5 o'clock meeting with Eugene Black

Present will be:

State: Ball, Mann and Cleveland (U Thant business)

AID: Bell, Poats (Southeast Asia expert)

Medical: Dr. Lee (Medical director of AID who is said to be a first-rate physician and a man who really understands what is needed in the area)

Budget: Kermit Gordon

Commerce: Jack Connor

Agriculture: Orville Freeman

White House: Bundy, Bator, Komer, Cooper (this seems like a lot but the coordinating process on this one is going to be very tough)

John Macy (to get a picture of the kind of people we are going to need to help Black)

I hope you may be able to lead off the discussion by saying how much emphasis you attach to this undertaking and how glad you are that Gene Black is going to take the lead in it. You might then wish to ask for a comment from State (overall policy); from Bell (status of economic planning in the area); from Connor (private investment possibilities); and from Freeman (on available agriculture supply).

This meeting can be treated as organizational and can be quite short.


The second problem is press treatment. I suggest that you may wish to have pictures of yourself meeting with Black and that you might wish to make a brief statement which might have the following content:

1. Your good message from U Thant and the fact that you are replying;
2. Your gratitude to Black and the fact that he will be going right to work;
3. Your long interest in this whole enterprise as shown in your report of 1961 to President Kennedy (the relevant paragraph is attached at Tab A and can be given to the press perfectly well.)
4. An introduction of Mr. Black to say just a few words himself.

M.G.B.

McG. B.

22a



Direct Quotation from Vice President Johnson's Report
to President Kennedy - May 6, 1961

Any help -- economic as well as military -- we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be -- and must be -- unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have -- for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations -- what we expect or require of them.

Reid
4/8/65
1:15 p.m.

23 (6)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The marked paragraph in the attached cable is one more example of Brandt's pro-Americanism.

It leads me to ask you once again if you are willing to let him come in for just a few minutes. Brandt is not Pearson; his whole political interest is to show how near he is to us.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Yes ☒

No ☐

7

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSOP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLIEN
KOWAL
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SYRE
THOMSON

23a

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49
Action
EUR
Info
SS
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USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
RMR

RR RUEHC
DE RUFKAH 538 05/1525Z
ZNR
R 051500Z APR 65
FM AMCONSUL DUESSELDORF
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUFKC/AMEMBASSY BONN
BT

03627

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 198 INFO BONN 234 BREMEN FRANKFURT STUTTGART
MUNICH HAMBURG BERLIN UNN FROM DUESSELDORF FIFTH

AT SPECIAL SPD LAND CONFERENCE, DUESSELDORF, APRIL 3, (APPARENTLY
CONVENED IN VARIOUS LAND CAPITALS TO COUNTER CDU FEDERAL
CONVENTION IN DUESSELDORF PRECEDING WEEKEND) PARTY CHAIRMAN
WILLI BRANDT MADE MAJOR SPEECH. HE REFERRED TO DUFHUES'S
"CHANGING OF THE GUARDS" STATEMENT AT CDU CONVENTION AND SAID
HE AGREED, BUT NOT IN MANNER INTENDED BY DUFHUES. INSTEAD, HE
CALLED FOR REPLACEMENT OF CDU BY SPD CABINET.

ON INTERNAL ISSUES BRANDT GENERALLY CHARGED CDU WITH IMITATION
OF SPD IN SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL POLICIES. HE REGRETTED REFUSAL
BY CDU OF GRAND COALITION, AND SAID SPD WOULD GO IT ALONE, IF
NECESSARY. HE STATED SPD STILL WILLING TO FORM COALITION
WITH ANY PARTY. TURNING TO LAND POLITICS, BRANDT ANNOUNCED
HEINZ KUEHN AS SPD CANDIDATE FOR NRW MINISTER PRESIDENT IN
1966 LAND ELECTION.

ON FOREIGN POLICY HE CALLED FOR AN AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM TO
ACHIEVE A PEACE TREATY. AFTER DESCRIBING THE DO-NOTHING
ATTITUDE OF THE CDU, BRANDT SAID: "THE GERMAN NATION IS SICK
AND TIRED OF SLOGANS INSTEAD OF ACTION." BRANDT GAVE SPD
CREDIT FOR A SUCCESSFUL BERLIN POLICY WHICH OPENED THE WALL
AND ALLEVIATED HUMAN SUFFERING. THIS POLICY OF SMALL STEPS
MUST BE INTENSIFIED. BRANDT ATTACKED ADENAUER'S STATEMENT
AT THE CDU CONVENTION WHICH HAD BLAMED THE US FOR THE BERLIN
WALL, STATING: "THE FIRST ONE TO GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE
PEOPLE OF BERLIN AFTER ERECTION OF THE WALL WAS NOT THE
CHANCELLOR BUT VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY HIS 1961 BERLIN VISIT."

LANDTAG FACTION CHAIRMAN KUEHN DESCRIBED THE SPD CONFERENCE
AS THE BEGINNING OF A DOUBLE-HEADER ELECTION CAMPAIGN BOTH
FOR THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN THE FALL AND THE NRW LAND
ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR.

COMMENT: BRANDT EXUDED SELF-CONFIDENCE DURING HIS THREE
HOUR SPEECH BEFORE AN AUDIENCE COMPOSED ONLY OF MEMBERS OR
DELEGATES OF THE PARTY. AUDIENCE REACTION WAS ENTHUSIASTIC,
ESPECIALLY WHEN HE ATTACKED STATEMENTS OF SPEAKERS AT CDU
CONVENTION. KELLOGG

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

Mr. President:

This is a very interesting account
of Peking's current line, as passed
to U Thant by the Algerians.

McG B
McG. B.

Raid
4/8/65
4:00 p.m.

(1)
XRE 4-9-65

⑦
25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached note from David Klein is worth your reading if you have not seen earlier reports on Brezhnev's apparently increasing ascendancy.

McG.

McG. B.