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26

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Sir Robert Menzies has been the best man of all on Vietnam in recent weeks. A good sample is his performance with some Australian Bishops which is attached at Tab A in a note from the Australian Ambassador. But you will have seen other statements in the press.

I thought you might want to send him something short and sweet like the letter at Tab B.

I have changed his title to "Dear Sir Robert" to make it a little more informal, and which I thought you might like, but it can be done the other way if you prefer, and there is also a "Dear Prime Minister" letter attached.

McG. B.

McG. B.

April 8, 1965

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McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1965

27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Bunker Mission at Mid-Point

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-300

By us, NARA Date 4-8-97

Ambassador Bunker has been in Indonesia for eight days now; he plans to depart for Washington a week from today. Here is a brief summary of his talks with Indonesian leaders:

1. Bunker has had two long sessions with Sukarno, will lunch with him tomorrow, and will see him once more before he leaves. He has also talked at length with Subandrio, Nasution, and other Indonesian leaders.

2. From Sukarno on down, the Indos are stressing one basic point: that U.S. support for Malaysia is the root cause of the break-down in Indo-U.S. relations. As a secondary cause they also cite U.S. actions in the "Afro-Asian world" (i. e., the Congo and Vietnam). While claiming to recognize certain objectives that we share, the Indos are pressing hard for U.S. "neutrality" on Malaysia in place of support for Malaysia.

3. In response, Bunker has emphasized repeatedly that our desire is to preserve our bilateral relations with Indonesia despite differences over foreign policy issues. He has tried to make clear our support for both Indonesia and Malaysia and our hope that Asians will work out their own solution to the dispute.

4. The general climate of the talks has been friendly and frank. Bunker clearly has good rapport with the Indo leaders. In Bunker's words: "My visit is not going to result in a dramatic change in Indo policies, but I think it important that by the time I leave the Indos have it clearly in mind that in our view the ball is in their court."

5. One key dissenter from the Sukarno-Subandrio view is General Nasution, who frankly and pessimistically told Bunker that the "contradictions" of Indo internal politics -- not the Malaysia dispute -- are the cause of our bad relations. Nasution advises that we prepare for one or two very difficult years while the Indo power struggle (Communists versus anti-Communists) runs its course.

~~SECRET~~

6. In a further step to remove American "targets", Bunker and Jones propose that we gradually close out our Peace Corps operations in Indonesia.

7. It is expected that the current lull in anti-American agitation will end with Bunker's departure and with the conclusion (April 28th) of the tenth anniversary celebration of the Bandung Conference.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

McGeorge Bundy

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a thoughtful and important cable from Kohler which I think you will want to read all the way through. I share the conclusions in his last paragraph and they are part of the reason why I think a private message which Kohler could use less privately is very much in our interest.

I hope to have a reasonably solid draft by Friday noon.

McG. B.

April 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the latest draft of the 17-nation declaration. The first two pages are familiar to you. The first half of the third page is a direct quotation from the Hopkins speech.

From the middle of page 3 to the middle of page 4 is language of my own that has been in and out of various drafts. I myself think it is extremely important and so do my friends in the Department and in Saigon. This language will not only help to keep our friends in Saigon on board for the phrase "unconditional discussions" (we have discussed this language with them, and they have agreed to it, but there will be some pressure on them just the same). These paragraphs also contain a vision of a future in which we can get our troops out and in which South Vietnam and North Vietnam can have peaceful relations together. Both of these are important and neither of them appear elsewhere in this reply or in the speech.

I have sent this to George Ball for his comments and I will be waiting for yours. We ought to send it to Alex Johnson right away for final coordination in Saigon before putting it out tomorrow.

McG. B.

Rec'd
4/7/65
3:00 P.M.

30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the weekly report from Taylor and Johnson to you personally. I think it is worth reading.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By DCH On 9-29-81

30a

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

(copy of Saigon 3246, April 7, 1965)

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

The bombing of the Embassy on March 30 was the dominating event of the week. The local press, and many Vietnamese privately, expressed indignation and outrage at this act of terrorism. While the bombing brought home once again that the Viet Cong can strike in the heart of Saigon, it did not seem to dampen the improved morale of the Vietnamese. American community is entirely unshaken.

In the meantime, Quat and his colleagues have continued to move ahead with concrete constructive measures in the political field. The week witnessed:

- a. An announcement by the National Legislative Council that a national congress should be convened to take up the urgent task of drawing up a permanent constitution, and that the congress should be based on direct universal suffrage organized in secure zones.
- b. The opening of a press congress to develop a statute governing the conduct of the local press.
- c. Indications from the government that it would hold elections early next month for city and municipal councils.
- d. An announcement by the government that it is 1) establishing an embassy in Addis Ababa, with an information center to serve all of Africa; 2) dispatching a delegation, headed by Vice Premier Tuyen, to visit key African capitals; and 3) opening competition to fill 20 vacancies in the Vietnamese diplomatic and consular service.
- e. An announcement that Quat will reserve Thursday afternoons to meet with members of the public.

Another interesting development, but one on which we still have only tentative and fragmentary information, has been the emergence of signs of Buddhist protests against Viet Cong depredations against Buddhist Monks and pagodas. We understand that the Buddhist Institute has instructed pagodas to pray for a Buddhist Monk in Binh Dinh Province who reportedly burned himself to death in protest against such Viet Cong actions. The Buddhist Institute also held a memorial service for the American and

~~SECRET~~ **DECLASSIFIED**

Authority State letter 10-6-78

~~SECRET~~

By DCH NARS, Date 9-29-81

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Vietnamese victims of the Embassy bombing. These are heartening if still isolated, signs of an improved attitude in Buddhist ranks.

In the military field, the Viet Cong continued to lie low, their activities reaching a level even lower than that recorded during the lunar festival period of early February. In spite of their inertia, they took heavy losses in engagement with the government forces in which the friendly total killed in action amounted to 189 against 795 Viet Cong dead. The enemy also lost 80 captured and over 200 weapons. While this is good news, we still have the uneasy feeling that the Viet Cong may be preparing unpleasant surprises for us. During the week, we acquired reasonably clear evidence that elements of the North Vietnamese 325th division have been in South Vietnam since February. The presence of one battalion is confirmed and it is possible all three regiments are operating in the Central Provinces. We are pressing all intelligence agencies to determine what the Viet Cong are up to.

Reports of improved morale are now coming in from the provinces, indicating that the rise in confidence noted in urban centers is beginning to spread to the countryside. While more indications will be needed to establish the extent of the trend, this is the first time in months we have had such encouraging reports on provincial morale.

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd
Apr 8 1965
Hamm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31

April 7, 1965

Mr. President:

For information.

McG. B.
McG. B.

This was before the
speech

(2)

312

~~SECRET~~

(Copy of SAIGON 3248 of April 7, 1965)

Together with Alex Johnson, I saw Quat alone the afternoon of April 6 and briefly reviewed with him matters arising out of my Washington visit. At the outset, I strongly stressed Washington view that no amount of bombardment of North Vietnam is going to convince Hanoi to call off its action down here without real progressⁱⁿ/South Vietnam against the Viet Cong. Hanoi must be convinced that the Viet Cong cannot win here. Thus our strategy in 1965 calls for a balanced program as between action against North Vietnam and in-country action. Quat entirely agreed. With respect to Rolling Thunder, I said that we planned to continue along presently projected lines without radical change either up or down. Quat agreed.

I then outlined our view of the manpower gap, showing Quat a chart indicating that, if Viet Cong strength maintains present upward trend and South Vietnam accomplished presently projected force goals, the ratio of strength will be even less favorable at the end of the year. I then outlined Washington discussions and decisions, including the 21-point General Johnson program to improve the effectiveness of existing programs, the proposed additional Marine battalions, and the RB-66 Task Force. I also mentioned the possibility of additional third-country contributions, such as from Australia, New Zealand and Korea. I tied proposed Marine deployments to Quat's previous remarks to Alex Johnson on desirability of enlarging Danang perimeter. I also referred to increased Navy surveillance program and the additional equipment for popular forces which has been approved.

With respect to the manpower gap, Quat said that he had asked Thieu urgently to study this problem with senior officers, particularly with respect to more effective "political mobilization" throughout the country. In passing, he said that he felt that the regional and popular force figures on those present for duty were padded, and he very much felt that this needed looking into. He also felt that a more aggressive spirit was much needed among many of the officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and that morale in the army could be improved by better administration of present provisions for troop welfare, veterans' benefits, etc. I gather that he has been discussing all these matters with Thieu.

He was entirely receptive to the addition of Marine deployments in the Danang area, but wanted to discuss the matter with Thieu and Minh before giving us a final answer or authorizing Westmoreland to undertake discussions at the military level. With respect to these forces, as well as possible

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 J 86-263

By Wip/rg, NARA, Date 8-24-92

addition of third-country forces, he said that he was receptive and entirely understood and accepted our rationale, but that he has a political problem of public presentation which required careful handling. He indicated that this involves what he termed a strongly nationalistic minority who could be expected to oppose the introduction of foreign combat forces.

In discussing naval surveillance in the Gulf of Siam, he said he was anxious to find some way of improving relations with Cambodia, and referred to a proposal that he had made, when Foreign Minister in Khanh's government, for the establishment of a "no man's land" or "free zone" some five kilometers in depth on the Vietnamese side of the border from which all friendly Vietnamese population would be removed. He said the numbers would not be very large. In the zone all civilians could be assumed to be hostile and subject to military or police action.

I also referred in broad terms to our plans for the construction of a new chancery, the "41 points" and the Rowan program on public information. On the "41 points," I sought to obtain from him the designation of a contact point within the government. After some "thinking aloud" on the role of Tuyen, he finally came around to say that at this stage he wanted to handle it himself and that Killen and I should bring the matter to him.

In referring to our needs for office space here, particularly that of MACV, he said that he was considering the formation of a government enterprise which would build (garbled) so that at such time as we no longer had need of the space, the government would be in possession of some better buildings. I indicated our willingness to explore this with him further. In response to my request, he agreed to look into the matter of trying to bring about a defector from the National Liberation Front who could be surfaced.

With respect to the Washington Embassy, he said they were considering Vu Van Thai as a replacement for Khiem and that they had a good man selected for Tokyo.

TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

SANITIZED

Bundy

31a

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

2
Action
5
Info
PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 331A 07/0250Z
P 070200Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

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1965 APR 7 AM 12 58
P R I O R I T Y

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3248 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1932
(070200Z) FROM SAIGON APRIL 7, 10AM

LIMDIS

TOGETHER WITH ALEX JOHNSON, I SAW | ALONE AFTERNOON APRIL 6
AND BRIEFLY REVIEWED WITH HIM MATTERS ARISING OUT OF MY WASHINGTON
VISIT. AT OUTSET, I STRONGLY STRESSED WASHINGTON VIEW THAT NO
AMOUNT OF BOMBARDMENT OF DRV IS GOING TO CONVINCE HANOI TO CALL OFF
ITS ACTION DOWN HERE WITHOUT REAL PROGRESS IN SVN AGAINST VC. HANOI
MUST BE CONVINCED THAT VC CANNOT WIN HERE. THUS OUR STRATEGY IN 1965
CALLS FOR A BALANCED PROGRAM AS BETWEEN ACTION AGAINST DRV AND IN-
COUNTRY ACTION. | ENTIRELY AGREED.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 331A ~~SECRET~~
WITH RESPECT ROLLING THUNDER, I SAID THAT WE PLANNED TO CONTINUE
ALONG PRESENTLY PROJECTED LINES WITHOUT RADICAL CHANGE EITHER UP OR
DOWN. | AGREED.

I THEN OUTLINED OUR VIEW OF THE MANPOWER GAP, SHOWING | A CHART
INDICATING THAT, IF VC STRENGTH MAINTAINS PRESENT UPWARD TREND AND GVN
ACCOMPLISHED PRESENTLY PROJECTED FORCE GOALS, RATIO OF STRENGTH WILL
BE EVEN LESS FAVORABLE AT END OF YEAR. I THEN OUTLINED WASHINGTON
DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS INCLUDING 21 POINT GENERAL JOHNSON PROGRAM
TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS, THE PROPOSED
ADDITIONAL MARINE BATTALIONS, AND THE RB-66 TASK FORCE. I ALSO MEN-
TIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL THIRD COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS, SUCH
AS FROM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND KOREA. I TIED PROPOSED MARINE
DEPLOYMENTS TO | PREVIOUS REMARKS TO ALEX JOHNSON ON DESIRA-
BILITY OF ENLARGING DANANG PERIMETER. I ALSO REFERRED TO INCREASED
NAVY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR POPULAR
FORCES WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED.

WITH RESPECT TO MANPOWER GAP, | SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED

(Note: The original document in the file is a
typescript of the same cable.)

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SANITIZED
Authority Site 6-23-78, OSD 8-30-78
By ing, NARS, Date 8-14-79

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3248, APRIL 7, 10 A.M., FROM SAIGON.

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 331A ~~SECRET~~

URGENTLY TO STUDY THIS PROBLEM WITH SENIOR OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO MORE EFFECTIVE "POLITICAL MOBILIZATION" THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. IN PASSING, HE SAID THAT HE FELT THAT THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCE FIGURES ON THOSE PRESENT FOR DUTY WERE PADDED AND HE VERY MUCH FELT THIS NEEDED LOOKING INTO. HE ALSO FELT THAT A MORE AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT WAS MUCH NEEDED AMONG MANY OF THE ARVN OFFICERS AND THAT MORALE IN THE ARMY COULD BE IMPROVED BY BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF PRESENT PROVISIONS FOR TROOP WELFARE, VETERANS' BENEFITS, ETC. I GATHER THAT HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING ALL THESE MATTERS WITH

HE WAS ENTIRELY RECEPTIVE TO THE ADDITION OF MARINE DEPLOYMENTS IN THE DANANG AREA BUT WANTED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH BEFORE GIVING US A FINAL ANSWER OR AUTHORIZING WESTMORELAND TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS AT MILITARY LEVEL. WITH RESPECT TO THESE FORCES, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ADDITION THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, HE SAID THAT HE WAS RECEPTIVE AND ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED OUR RATIONALE BUT THAT HE HAS A POLITICAL PROBLEM OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION WHICH REQUIRED CAREFUL HANDLING. HE INDICATED THAT THIS INVOLVES WHAT HE TERMED A STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC MINORITY WHO COULD BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN COMBAT FORCES.

IN DISCUSSING NAVAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE GULF OF SIAM, HE SAID HE WAS

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 331A ~~SECRET~~

ANXIOUS TO FIND SOME WAY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA AND REFERRED TO A PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD MADE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NO MAN'S LAND" OR "FREE ZONE" SOME FIVE KILOMETERS IN DEPTH ON THE VIETNAMESE SIDE OF THE BORDER FROM WHICH ALL FRIENDLY VIETNAMESE POPULATION WOULD BE REMOVED. HE SAID THE NUMBERS WOULD NOT BE VERY LARGE. IN THE ZONE ALL CIVILIANS COULD BE ASSUMED TO BE HOSTILE AND SUBJECT TO MILITARY OR POLICE ACTION.

I ALSO REFERRED IN BROAD TERMS TO OUR PLANS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW CHANCERY, THE "41 POINTS" AND THE ROWAN PROGRAM ON PUBLIC INFORMATION. ON THE "41 POINTS", I SOUGHT TO OBTAIN FROM HIM THE DESIGNATION OF A CONTACT POINT WITHIN THE GOVT. AFTER SOME "THINKING ALOUD" ON THE ROLE OF HE FINALLY CAME AROUND TO SAY THAT AT THIS STAGE HE WANTED TO HANDLE IT HIMSELF AND THAT KILLEN AND I SHOULD BRING THE MATTER TO HIM.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 3248, APRIL 7, 10 A.M., FROM SAIGON.

IN REFERRING TO OUR NEEDS FOR OFFICE SPACE HERE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF MACV, HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING THE FORMATION (#) A GOVT ENTERPRISE WHICH WOULD BUILD (#) SO THAT AT SUCH TIME AS WE NO LONGER HAD NEED OF THE SPACE, THE GOVT WOULD BE IN POSSESSION OF SOME BETTER BUILDINGS. I INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THIS WITH HIM FURTHER.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 331 ~~SECRET~~

IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST, HE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER OF TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A DEFECTOR FROM THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WHO COULD BE SURFACED.

WITH RESPECT TO THE WASHINGTON EMBASSY, HE SAID THEY WERE CONSIDERING AS A REPLACEMENT FOR KHIEM AND THAT THEY HAD A GOOD MAN SELECTED FOR TOKYO.

SEE SEPTTEL FOR REPORT ON SUBSEQUENT MEETING EVENING APRIL 6 WITH TAYLOR. *Attached*

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:04 A.M., 4/7/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:39 A.M., 4/7/65.

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

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32

~~SECRET~~

April 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My own soundings on the House side (Morgan, Zablocki, Fountain) indicate that a \$10-12 million CCC credit sale to the UAR for dollars on near commercial terms would be tolerable, though a few Congressmen might naturally speak up anyway if the matter came out. Bundy has checked with Fulbright, who's also on board.

The only real concern was over timing. Morgan and Zablocki would prefer to risk no publicity, especially during mark-up (they hope to finish next week), or even hopefully till the aid bill was passed (Morgan hopes before the end of April). However, they realize that if a signal to Nasser is essential we can't wait too long.

To both buy time and give a signal, we'd suggest splitting the difference by merely asking the UAR privately now whether it's still interested in a CCC corn sale. If so, we could then argue about terms for a few weeks before putting out for bids (which is what could trigger the publicity). We would also have to tell UAR, however, that this did not mean the \$37 million remainder of Title I wheat was out, but that we simply weren't ready to decide this yet, especially while the aid bill was in process; this was in the UAR's own interest as much as ours.

There's not much point in minor gestures to keep Nasser quiet if Congress is going to pass another restrictive amendment aimed directly at him. This would only convince Nasser that Congress wouldn't let you sell him wheat even if you wanted to. The Senate side is in tolerable shape, since Fulbright's committee settled on some innocuous working proposed by Hartke (attached). But the House leaders are worried about people like Farbstein insisting on much tougher wording and offering it from the floor. To short-circuit this, Zablocki proposed that we urge Farbstein to introduce the Senate language in the House. He'd get the credit for what he would call a restrictive amendment, and we'd head off the Nasser-haters with innocuous language. We're asking Zablocki and Morgan to try this out for size, but may need help in moving Farbstein. Mr. Weisler knows him well, I believe.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-162

By is, NARS, Date 7-31-84

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

New Amendment to the Hartke Amendment that the Senate Committee
Passed today (4 /8/65)

Add at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"It is the sense of the Congress that assistance under this or any other act to any foreign country which hereafter permits or fails to take adequate measures to prevent the damage or destruction by mob action of US property within such country should be terminated and should not be resumed until the President determines that appropriate measures have been taken by such country to prevent a recurrence thereof."

3.1
2

April 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Western reply to Soviets
on Berlin meeting

1. I attach for information the text of the Western reply to Soviet protests on the Berlin meeting of the Bundestag.

2. The language is not perfect, but that is the consequence of 4-Power coordination, and speed is more important than fighting over words in these matters.

3. Nitpicks aside, the message is clear, firm, and even-tempered, and I think the State Department has done a good job of coordinating. Since it meets your guidance at lunch yesterday, George Ball and I have signed off on it and it is being delivered today.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Text of Western replies to Soviet protests on Berlin Meeting of Bundestag

The Government of the United States cannot accept the views of the Soviet Government concerning the plenary meeting of the German Bundestag and the meetings of committees and fraktions which will take place in Berlin this week. These meetings do not affect the special status of Berlin, as defined in the Quadripartite Agreements, nor do they place in question the responsibility of the four powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole. Moreover, such meetings have taken place repeatedly in the past without provoking any incident.

On the other hand, the Soviet and East German authorities have for several days been taking a series of measures against access to Berlin, the illegal character of which is evident.

Since April 1 the East German authorities have repeatedly hindered movement on the ground routes to Berlin. Civil freight and passenger traffic between Berlin and Western Germany has been deliberately delayed or stopped by unreasonable searches and interrogations. Since April 5 the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn has been closed to traffic on several occasions and for several hours at a time. The waterways to Berlin have been similarly closed for periods of hours or days. These measures have amounted to a serious violation of the freedom of access to Berlin. In addition the East German authorities have again intensified interference with the free movement of persons between the Western and Soviet sectors of Berlin.

Simultaneously, on the pretext that Soviet and East German maneuvers were taking place in the Berlin area, allied personnel traveling between Berlin and Western Germany have been turned back by the Soviet authorities on entering the autobahn. The Soviet Controller in BASC has also refused to guarantee flight safety for allied aircraft using certain flight levels in the air corridors during the whole period of these maneuvers.

These measures taken by the Soviet and East German authorities are contrary to the Quadripartite Agreements which define the special status of Berlin and establish the conditions of access to the City. They can only provoke tension in Europe.

The Government of the United States looks to the Soviet Government to put an immediate end to the harassment of ground communications with Berlin and to take whatever steps may be necessary to prevent a recurrence. It will also hold the Soviet Government responsible for the safety of allied flights in the air corridors. These flights will continue in accordance with the Quadripartite rules on this subject.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By CB NARA, Date 4-18-99

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

April 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

John McCone sent me this memorandum in response to your general question about the background of Peter Arnett, the correspondent who launched the gas story from Saigon. I am sending a copy to George Reedy, and you may want George to raise this urgently with Gallagher. Arnett sounds like a predictable source of trouble.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

April 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement of your Speech for 4 p.m. this Afternoon

I suggest that George say something like the following. He has a copy of this memorandum and will be waiting for your OK.

"The President has accepted an invitation from President Milton Eisenhower to speak at Johns Hopkins University on Wednesday evening. The President plans to discuss the policy of the United States toward Southeast Asia."

George will also want to announce in whatever way he sees fit, that it will be on live TV, and the time which I think he will shoot for is 9 p.m.

I am sending a slightly amended version of Dick Goodwin's second draft through Jack Valenti to you. I resisted a lot of the State Department nitpicks and the changes I have proposed are only those which seemed to me genuinely important from the point of view of their international impact. There will be time tonight and tomorrow morning to get it in final form, just as you want.

McG.B.

*Copy h.c. to
H. Reedy
on*

36

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach at Tab A the NSC Agenda. The one thing I have not put on it which you may want to emphasize at the end is that everyone should stay strictly withing the guidance of your press conference yesterday.

At Tab B is a short memorandum on your Southeast Asia regional development initiative and the next steps which are suggested. In reviewing this to the NSC I shall not mention Harriman's name, so as to leave you a free hand.

At Tab C is the attendance list.

McG. B.
McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

36a

A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA

April 2, 1965 - 1 P. M.

Situation in South Vietnam

1. The diplomatic situation -- the Secretary of State
2. Current military situation -- Secretary of Defense
3. Additional non-military actions in Vietnam -- Secretary of State and
Ambassador Taylor
4. Initiatives for Southeast Asia Regional Development -- McGeorge Bundy

B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Economic Development Planning

I won't bore you with the long papers that have been worked up in staff sessions this week. Their essence is as follows:

1. There is great advantage in continuing US leadership to get a regional Southeast Asia development operation going.
2. For this purpose, we can well blow a second and somewhat louder blast enlarging the general proposition you set forth in your statement on Vietnam at the Cabinet meeting last week.
3. We should not at this stage give a precise description of the form of the development organization or a commitment in dollar terms. There are two disadvantages in such a course now:
 - a. A long forward pass would probably be incomplete, if we do not line up some receivers down-field. This could make us look silly.
 - b. Quite soon we will want to separate Southeast Asia development planning from the Vietnamese crisis, in operating terms. We want the real political effect of an effort for regional economic development, but we can get that effect better if we do not tie the two issues too tightly together. We do not want it thought that we are interested in economic development only because we are trying somehow to get out of our mess in Vietnam. The Marshall Plan was helpful in dealing with Soviet pressure on Europe, but it was not designed or presented to the Europeans in those terms.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-70

By inf, NARA, Date 2-5-88

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

These considerations lead us to suggest that we should use language like Goodwin's in your next statement on Vietnam. But right after that, we should separate the regional economic problem from the Vietnamese problem in day-to-day operations.

We think we should try to get U Thant to pick up the ball and organize some Asian responses. We also think the project should be given to Harriman to work on, both with U Thant and in relevant Asian capitals. This will give it visibility and standing because of his history as a Marshall Plan leader, his international prestige and his position as a liberal.

After we get some Asian responses and perhaps the skeleton of a new Southeast Asia development organization, we should expect to consider a contingent US commitment like our Alliance for Progress commitments of four years ago. A scenario of this kind will allow plenty of time for Congressional consultation in advance of any such US pledge.


These are the essential elements of a quite complex and difficult enterprise. This plan has been reviewed with Tex Goldschmidt, as well as the bureaucrats, and it has his warm support.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

36 e



THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND THE
551st NSC MEETING ON APRIL 2, 1965 AT 1:00 PM IN THE
CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President, Presiding

The Vice President of the United States (out of town)

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman

OEP

Buford Ellington, Director

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

TREASURY

Henry H. Fowler, Secretary

AID William Gaud

USIA

Carl T. Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

McGeorge Bundy

Bill Moyers

George Reedy

Jack Valenti

Douglass Cater

April 2, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach an interesting memorandum from Bob Kemer on Ayub Khan on which your reaction would be helpful.

I agree with Kemer that Ayub is trying to have his U. S. and his Chinese friendship and that we ought to begin to blow the whistle on him. I also think that the best time to do this is during his visit here.

Finally, I share Kemer's view that we ought to begin to get some signals back to Ayub beforehand, and I think the best way to do this is by a few discreet backgrounders which will suggest that there is growing disillusionment here with the current Pak position and a belief that what is essential is to re-establish clear understanding of the true interest of our two countries before Pakistan begins to do what Nasser and Sukarno have come so near doing -- killed the goose that lays the golden egg.

Ayub obviously intends to mobilize all his U. S. friends -- Lloyd Hand has been fighting off a Pak demand to keep him in Washington for four days -- and while we all believe that the real job will be in your hands, we would like to set the stage tactfully but firmly.

McG. B.

Agree in general _____

Disagree _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

April 2, 1965

38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wm Bundy

Post-mortem on Yameogo Visit. This exercise not only came off without a hitch but was most useful to our relations with Africa. Yameogo and his party were genuinely appreciative of your hospitality, and as Yameogo continues on across the country, he keeps publicly expressing his gratitude to you and the American people.

The visit strengthened the impression throughout Africa that the US is concerned at the highest level for African welfare. It also reinforced Yameogo's own determination to resist Communist penetration into Africa and to support the legal government in the Congo.

We're pleased to learn that Yameogo is scheduled to meet with the other Chiefs of State of the "Entente" nations shortly after his return in order to de-brief them on his US visit. What he has to say can't help but reflect favorably on the US image. The Yameogo group left Washington convinced of the USG's sincerity and progress in solving our own racial problems and with a greater appreciation of our policy objectives in the Congo and in Vietnam.

Given all the criticism of how we spread our aid too thinly over too many countries, Upper Volta is a good case of where a small investment (around \$1 million annually) has paid real political returns. Following up your request we looked at increasing our aid. We've told Yameogo we'll do a study of how Volta's manganese deposits can be developed. Japan is a logical market. If the World Bank won't finance, AID would consider favorably. Yameogo was most impressed with this speedy response to your expression of interest.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

cc: UHaynes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 173075, State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NANA, Date 4-13-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 1, 1965

KEY ELEMENTS FOR DISCUSSION, THURSDAY, APRIL 1, at 5:30 PM

1. The Situation

Morale has improved in South Vietnam. The government has not really settled down, but seems to be hopeful both in its capacity and in its sense of political forces. The armed forces continue in reasonably good shape, though top leadership is not really effective and the ratio of armed forces to the VC buildup is not good enough.

The situation in many areas of the countryside continues to go in favor of the VC, although there is now a temporary lull. The threat is particularly serious in the central provinces, and the VC forces may be regrouping for major efforts there in the near future.

Hanoi has shown no signs of give, and Peiping has stiffened its position within the last week. We still believe that attacks near Hanoi might substantially raise the odds of Peiping coming in with air. Meanwhile, we expect Hanoi to continue and step up its infiltration both by land through Laos and by sea. There are clear indications of different viewpoints in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow (and even in the so-called Liberation Front), and continued sharp friction between Moscow and Peiping. However, neither such frictions nor the pressure of our present slowly ascending pace of air attack on North Vietnam can be expected to produce a real change in Hanoi's position for some time, probably 2 - 3 months, at best.

A key question for Hanoi is whether they continue to make real headway in the south, or whether the conflict there starts to move against them or at least appear increasingly tough. If the former, even a major step-up in our air attacks would probably not cause them to become much more reasonable; if the latter, the situation might begin to move on a political track -- but again in not less than 2 - 3 months, in our present judgment.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority State 4-19-78; NSC 6-21-78
By OCH NARS Date 9-29-81

2. Immediate International Moves

There are two initiatives from third parties which require US decisions. U Thant has proposed a three-month period in which there would be "a temporary cessation of all hostile military activity, whether overt or covert, across the 17th parallel in Vietnam." The 17 "neutrals" which met in Belgrade have proposed negotiations "without pre-conditions."

We think the U Thant proposal should be turned off. (Bunche tells us U Thant will not float it publicly if we reject it privately). It is not clear that the trade-off would be to our advantage, even if it could be arranged, and in any case, we prefer to use U Thant for private feelers rather than public proposals. We can tell U Thant that we have no objection on his sounding out Hanoi on this same point, however, and that if he gets a response, we would be glad to comment on it.

The 17 nation proposal is more attractive. We are inclined to propose to Quat that both South Vietnam and the US should accept it with a covering statement of our good, firm, clear objectives in any such negotiation. The President has already made it clear that he will go anywhere to talk with anyone, and we think the 17 nation proposal is one to which we can make a pretty clear response. Tactically, it will probably not lead to any early conference, because the position of Hanoi and Peking will be that they will not attend any meeting until our bombings stop. The Secretary of State will elaborate on these propositions.

3. More General Political Posture

The more general political question, which still needs refinement, is the order and content of the eventual tradeoff. We have three cards of some value: our bombing of North Vietnam, our military presence in South Vietnam, and the political and economic carrots that can be offered to Hanoi. We want to trade these cards for just as much as possible of the following: an end to infiltration of men and supplies, an end of Hanoi's direction, control, and encouragement of the Viet Cong, a removal of cadres under direct Hanoi control, and a dissolution of the organized Viet Cong military and political forces. We do not need to decide today just how we wish to mesh our high cards against Communist concessions. But we will need to be in such a position soon, if only to exchange views with Quat. On this more general point, we believe more exploratory conversation with the President is needed today.

4. Actions within South Vietnam

It remains crucial that the South Vietnamese and we put every possible useful resource into the effort in the South. Specifically, the promising elements of the following programs should be carried out energetically in accordance with appropriate priorities:

- a. The 41-point program of non-military measures. (A separate first status report on these measures has been prepared.) The Mission, as well as all agencies in Washington, should develop additional points, and a major US program for the supply and distribution of food should be urgently considered. Mr. McCone's twelve suggestions for covert and other actions should be explored urgently.
- b. The Rowan recommendations, with USIA in charge.
- c. The 21-point Johnson program of military actions, expanded to include every possible measure and effective use of US resources against sea infiltration.
- d. An 18,000 - 20,000 man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.
- e. The GVN manpower increase programs, using increased pay scales or any other inducement regardless of monetary cost.

5. US and Third Country Combat Forces in South Vietnam

In view of the inadequate ratio of government forces to the likely pace of VC buildup during 1965, consideration has been given to (and the JCS would recommend) the addition of 2 or 3 division forces to take on limited missions, to release government forces for wider use, and to deter large scale DRV attacks on South Vietnam. Deployment of the forces would proceed in a series of steps, the first of which would require sixty days and would involve the deployment of 2 additional Marine battalions, one Marine air squadron, and the logistical forces referred to in d above.

Because the reaction of the GVN and the South Vietnamese people to any major US combat deployment is uncertain, as is the likely net effectiveness of US and third country combat forces in the Vietnamese environment, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that action at this time be limited to approval of the first step. The second and remaining steps could be reviewed approximately 60 days from now.

(4/1/65)

Major third country participation would be a big asset to the program. We may get some small Australian and New Zealand participation, with staff talks going on this week. However, major forces could come only from South Korea. The Secretary of Defense thinks we should seek deployment of Korean "offensive enclave/mobile combat reserve" forces (in the form of a 3500-man regimental combat team) concurrently with deployment of additional US Marines. The Secretary of State points out that the political situation in Korea is touchy, but he believes that we can quietly explore with the Korean Government the possibility of bringing in Korean combat troops on a quiet basis to reinforce and support the 2,000 Koreans now in South Vietnam.

We should defer any decision on any larger-scale program. However, detailed plans should be made for the logistics to support the possible later introduction of the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (30,000 additional Marines), a US Army Division (30,000 men, including logistics), a possible Korean force bringing their total to a division, and at least one Commonwealth Brigade.

6. Actions Against North Vietnam and in Laos

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC action slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks, to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations with warning and propaganda themes should be initiated to add to the psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and certain third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

(4/1/65)

7. A Regional Economic Initiative

If there is time, Mr. McGeorge Bundy will present briefly the current results of further steps on the President's Point 5 of last week.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd
4/1/65
4:40 pm

LD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If you have a chance to read this memorandum before our meeting today, I think it will save time. I have deliberately put the political problems up near the front because they are the harder ones. The military and non-military action programs summarized in later parts of the memo do not seem as controversial or difficult today.

McG. B.
McG. B.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

40a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 1, 1965

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 4-19-78: NSC 6-21-78
By DLA, NARS, Date 9-29-81

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

(4/1/65)

7. A Regional Economic Initiative

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~~TOP SECRET~~

41

McG. B.

(24) (41a ✓)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Appointment With the President -
Willy Brandt and Fritz Erler

1. Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that the President see Brandt and Erler together either on April 13 or 14. Among other things, Secretary Rusk notes (a) that Brandt, head of the SPD and Mayor of Berlin, is a candidate for Chancellor in the September elections, (b) that he is leading in the latest polls, and (c) that we wish to give Brandt a reception which recognizes his importance and assures that he is treated in the same fashion as CDU leaders of comparable stature.
2. I think it most important that the President see Brandt, especially since his opponent, Erhard, is almost certain to meet with the President in Washington sometime between now and German election time.
3. Seeing Brandt does not pin the President to seeing anyone else, like a French or Spanish Foreign Minister. There is only one Governing Mayor of ^{McG. B.} Berlin.
McGeorge Bundy

1 million
_____ Yes

_____ No

Mc Ask V.P. to see Brandt or Ball - I prefer not to L

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TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

1288
JWA

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointments with Willy Brandt
and Fritz Erler

Recommendation:

I recommend that you see Governing Mayor Willy Brandt and SPD Deputy Chairman Fritz Erler together either on April 13 or 14.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin, German Socialist Party (SPD) Chairman and Chancellor-candidate in the September 1965 elections will be in Washington April 13-15. He will be accompanied by Fritz Erler, SPD Deputy Chairman and SPD floor leader in the Bundestag. When Brandt was here one year ago, you saw him privately and hosted a lunch for him. You received Erler at the Capitol while you were Vice President.

This visit has special importance to Brandt because of the Bundestag elections scheduled for next September. Since this is a sensitive political year for Germany, we wish to give Brandt a reception which recognizes his importance and at the same time assures that he is treated in the same fashion as Christian Democratic (CDU) leaders of comparable stature.

In connection with the forthcoming elections the most recent polls in Germany, taken in February, show the SPD leading the CDU with 34% to 31%. This is a change from previous polls which showed the two parties even at about 34% each.

- 2 -

I plan to see both Brandt and Erler. Unfortunately previous plans preclude my giving Brandt a lunch during his visit, but I am thinking of asking Under Secretary Ball or the Vice President to host a lunch.


Dean Rusk

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Economic Development Planning

I won't bore you with the long papers that have been worked up in staff sessions this week. Their essence is as follows:

1. There is great advantage in continuing US leadership to get a regional Southeast Asia development operation going.
2. For this purpose, we can well blow a second and somewhat louder blast enlarging the general proposition you set forth in your statement on Vietnam at the Cabinet meeting last week.
3. We should not at this stage give a precise description of the form of the development organization or a commitment in dollar terms. There are two disadvantages in such a course now:
 - a. A long forward pass would probably be incomplete, if we do not line up some receivers down-field. This could make us look silly.
 - b. Quite soon we will want to separate Southeast Asia development planning from the Vietnamese crisis, in operating terms. We want the real political effect of an effort for regional economic development, but we can get that effect better if we do not tie the two issues too tightly together. We do not want it thought that we are interested in economic development only because we are trying somehow to get out of our mess in Vietnam. The Marshall Plan was helpful in dealing with Soviet pressure on Europe, but it was not designed or presented to the Europeans in those terms.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 86-70
By gfw NARA, Date 10/27/05

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

These considerations lead us to suggest that we should use language like Goodwin's in your next statement on Vietnam. But right after that, we should separate the regional economic problem from the Vietnamese problem in day-to-day operations.

We think we should try to get U Thant to pick up the ball and organize some Asian responses. We also think the project should be given to Harriman to work on, both with U Thant and in relevant Asian capitals. This will give it visibility and standing because of his history as a Marshall Plan leader, his international prestige and his position as a liberal.

After we get some Asian responses and perhaps the skeleton of a new Southeast Asia development organization, we should expect to consider a contingent US commitment like our Alliance for Progress commitments of four years ago. A scenario of this kind will allow plenty of time for Congressional consultation in advance of any such US pledge.

These are the essential elements of a quite complex and difficult enterprise. This plan has been reviewed with Tex Goldschmidt, as well as the bureaucrats, and it has his warm support.

McG. B.

McG. B.

SECRET

Rec'd
4/1/65
5:45 P.M.

43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A is a memorandum from Dean Acheson on European policy which grew out of his earlier letter to you and a luncheon between him and me. The memorandum is rather diffuse and really does not get to the hard questions.

Since you and I last talked, there have been further developments in the framing of our European policy. George Ball has set up a working group under John Ferguson, and I myself think this is a good step forward. I now plan to put Acheson in touch with the Ferguson group, and I believe that we will get some hard new thinking over the next weeks.

At Tab B is a short note to Acheson for your signature.

McG. B.

McG. B.

43a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


April 1, 1965

Dear Dean:

I have read your memorandum with the greatest interest, and I will be talking about it with Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara. I have also asked Mac Bundy to make sure that these thoughts are fully weighed in the interdepartmental study which George Ball is organizing.

This brings my warmest thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Dean Acheson
Union Trust Building
Washington, D. C.

March 31, 1965.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Study Needed of U.S. Policy Towards Europe

Part One: Analysis of the Facts;
Understanding of the Problems

Before tackling any problem, one must first understand it, and decide what one wants to do and can do about it. Then, and only then, is it useful to think about what to do, how to do it, and what to say about it. At the very beginning of everything comes getting the facts straight.

We need to get the facts straight about the political trends within individual European countries, and how they are affected by U.S. policy and other external events.

We also need to get the facts straight about Europe as a whole.

Everyone agrees that today Europe is different from Europe twenty years ago, or even fifteen years ago. But different in what way? Upon the answer depends whether and how we should change what we have been doing.

Has Europe changed, as some say, from postwar weakness and dependence upon the United States to strength and a position of independence of the United States?

Europe is certainly prosperous, even rich.

Equally certainly, it is not militarily strong or politically strong. Alone, it is weak, in the sense that it has neither a will nor the power to impose it. Strong evidence points, in most cases, to a recent decline in the coherence of the individual states; to the conclusion that reemerging nationalism is a disintegrating, not a strengthening, factor in each and in the whole; and to the fact that in all countries attachment to European unity and the American alliance remains very deep.

In short, there has been change; but the nature of the change requires critical analysis. Has the change been such as to cause an alteration of the psychological attitude of our friends towards their situation, themselves, and towards us? Or has there been an alteration in the underlying realities? Either conclusion may well call for changes in policy; but one may well call for very different changes from the other.

Analysis would also play its part in what we want to do and can do on specific problems. These would be treated in succeeding parts of the study, outlined below.

Part Two: The Central Political Problem,
Central Europe and Germany.

The problem left unresolved by the war, too tough for soldiers and statesmen alike, is that of the Eastern European countries and a divided Germany. No one in the West, including the Germans, has ever dealt with this frankly, seriously, or apart from oratory. In Germany the sham is recognized.

In developing agreement, logic would seem to counsel that we first get clear on what we think is desirable and possible.

An agenda of the topics for analysis and conclusion should include: the responsibility for decision and movement; the relation of various types of power, economic, military, and political, to the political question; the positions of East Germany, the Eastern countries, and the USSR to the problem, and means of affecting them; inter-allied problems; the need for decision and action.

Part Three: Financial and Economic Problems

The State Department and the Treasury Department are at last equipped to work and to work together on foreign economic policy -- particularly monetary and trade policy. In both cases political understanding should dominate policy, rather than technical or "expert" opinion.

Narrow and timid attitudes can and will destroy both the expansion, essential to the Great Society at home, and the hopes of shift from foreign aid to foreign trade in Western policies toward the developing countries. No amount of foreign aid could make up to these countries for the contraction in their economic opportunities which adoption of the wrong monetary and tariff policies would bring.

Secretary Fowler understands the imperatives of the time. Under Secretaries Ball and Mann are the most experienced and vigorous economic leaders the State Department has had since Will Clayton. The time has come -- in fact, has brought the last clear chance -- to act.

Action means measures to provide increased liquidity, to work toward expanded international monetary

reserves. It means to get on with drastic revision of industrial tariff schedules proposed in the Kennedy Round of negotiations. It means to move toward a common agricultural policy for industrialized, temperate zone countries.

This study of economic policy should focus both on what we want to accomplish over the longer term in these respects, and on the specific steps that can now be taken to these ends.

Part Four: Politico-Military Policy.

U.S. policy regarding the defense of Europe was reviewed in March, 1961. (See NSC Paper on "US Policy Toward NATO and the Atlantic Nations," dated April, 1961.)

The time is at hand for a review of some of the issues treated in this paper: the U.S. position regarding NATO strategy; the kinds of force required to carry out that strategy; and the means of inter-allied responsibility and participation in the planning, operation, and control of nuclear and other weapons.

This part of the study should be based upon a realistic appreciation that military measures grow out of political conflicts and are inseparable from

political policies of the allies and methods for agreeing upon or harmonizing them. Like the section on monetary policy, it should deal with both long-term and short-term steps to achieve our purposes.

This U.S. review is urgent. The existing stalemate in NATO should be broken and a way found to resume movement.

Part Five: Political Organization

The business before us is not only to accomplish specific tasks: in Central Europe, in the financial and economic field, and in politico-military policy.

It is also to shape political relations among the Atlantic countries in ways which will make it easier to address these tasks and others, as they arise. For instance, we will, in the long run, wish to see Europe play a larger role in the development of undeveloped areas.

Political consultation should be the means of achieving common action. What changes in present Atlantic practices and procedures would make consultation more effective?

The ultimate method lies in the European countries' developing common institutions, like Hallstein's Commission, with power to negotiate and eventually to decide. What can we do to encourage this? What changes in Atlantic institutions will then be needed?

In the meantime, how should a European entity which is moving toward unity, but not fully integrated, be fitted into the framework of Atlantic institutions? Should we look toward more powerful central institutions in NATO? Some suggestions toward this end were made in 1961 -- a Defense Minister, and a standing group of Wise Men. These suggestions should be reviewed. New ones should be canvassed.

How does France under de Gaulle fit into all of this? Can a place be found for her in new NATO arrangements, without retarding integrated action by other interested countries? If not, how can de Gaulle best be isolated and frustrated in his opposition to such action?

Part Six: Time Element

There should be an early start and energetic prosecution of the study, looking to completion this summer.

If the President is going to Europe this year, it would be well if he laid a foundation here for our policy toward Europe before bringing out ideas there. The German election will have an effect on the particularity of action and speech on some subjects; but it should not inhibit, but rather require, some earlier definition of policy in Washington.

Respectfully,

April 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Do you think this would be a good time to have George Reedy announce the membership of your Committee on East-West Trade? This Committee is a small but clear signal of your interest in the peaceful side of the road, and the riots at the Moscow Embassy are safely in the past. However, the Committee is a genuinely impressive and well rounded one, and I think its existence would give encouragement to some of our worried liberal friends.

A possible press release is attached.

McG. B.

Yes ✓

No

44a

PRESS RELEASE

D R A F T

The President announced today the membership of the
Special Presidential Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with
Eastern European Countries and the USSR. The members are:

Mr. J. Irwin Miller (Chairman)
Chairman of the Board
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
Trustee, Ford Foundation, and
Executive Committee, World Council of Churches

Honorable Eugene R. Black
Chairman, Brookings Institution
Past President, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development

Mr. William Blackie
President, Caterpillar Tractor Company
Director and Chairman of the Foreign Commerce
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Mr. George R. Brown
Chairman of the Board, Brown and Root, Inc.
Chairman, Board of Trustees, Rice University

Mr. Charles W. Engelhard, Jr.
Chairman of the Board, Engelhard Industries
Director, Foreign Policy Association

Dr. James B. Fisk
President, Bell Telephone Laboratories
Past Member, President's Science Advisory Committee

Mr. Nathaniel Goldfinger
Director of Research, AFL-CIO
Trustee, Joint Council on Economic Education

Mr. Crawford H. Greenewalt
Chairman of the Board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company
Chairman, Radio Free Europe Fund

Mr. William A. Hewitt
Chairman of the Board, Deere and Company
Director, National Industrial Conference Board

Dr. Max F. Millikan
Professor of Economics and Director, Center for
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
President, World Peace Foundation

Mr. Charles G. Mortimer
Chairman of the Board, General Foods Corporation
Trustee, Committee for Economic Development

Dr. Herman B. Wells
Chancellor, Indiana University
Former U.S. Delegate to UN General Assembly

This Committee of distinguished private citizens ~~has been~~ ^{is exploring}
~~meeting regularly over the past month to explore~~ the possibilities and
implications of expanding peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern
Europe and the USSR. On completion of its investigations, the
committee will report its findings and recommendations to the
President.

45

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are the papers on the new chancery in Saigon, rewritten as you requested.

The bill now contains an authorization of \$1 million.

The ^{first}~~second~~ paragraph of the letter of transmittal is worth your close attention. It is designed to be straightforward and specific without tying your hands too much. The adjectives describing the new building are designed to satisfy both Taylor's propaganda concern and the legislators' concern for efficiency and economy. This language is acceptable to Crockett and Taylor,

Taylor and Crockett asked me to make one small point to you -- namely that the land on which we plan to build is a 3 1/2 acre lot in Saigon. This will permit a secure wall compound, which in Taylor's opinion will be safe from anything but a mortar attack, and Max tells me that it would be easier to bring mortars to bear on an installation in the country than on such a compound, so he thinks this is the safest location we can get.

hpl. B.

McG. B.

P. S. I have talked to Rooney and Hayes, and both of them express their cordial agreement with this plan. Hayes says it is exactly what we should do, and Rooney says that while you could get the money in another way, he will be glad to handle it this way for the political impact. If you sign this now, Hayes says he can get it reported out of his Sub-committee this afternoon.

45a

Insert A

In this bill I am requesting authorization of \$1 million which will permit us to build a new chancery promptly. ~~In the light of experience.~~ This new building may be either complete in itself or the first stage of a larger chancery, In either case, it will be ^a efficient, ~~and~~ economical and permanent place of business for the United States in Saigon.

Secure

no opinion direct

dignified

*This insert is part of
the first paragraph*

45-b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith a bill to authorize the construction of a new building to replace our damaged chancery in Saigon, Viet-Nam.

(A) This new building will be one more symbol of our solidarity with the people of Viet-Nam. It will show them that the United States has no intention of abandoning them in the face of Communist terrorism and aggression. It will show them that we intend to live up to our commitments. ~~It will show them that we do not intend to fail the Vietnamese when we are forced to bear a share of the terror and ruin they have borne so bravely and so long.~~

This new building will also show the Communists in Hanoi and their tools in the Viet Cong that wanton murder of civilians and destruction of civilian property cannot deflect us from our stated purposes in Viet-Nam. ~~The Communists will be shown once again that the United States and other members of the Free World are determined to protect themselves and that aggression will have no more success in Viet-Nam than it had in Greece or Korea or Berlin.~~

(B) ~~This new building, then, along with our continued program of assistance to the Government and people of Viet-Nam, will help to show the world that America keeps her word and is determined to use her strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression.~~

To emphasize this determination and resolve, I request the Congress to act promptly on this bill.

Sincerely,

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
President of the Senate
Washington, D. C.

A BILL

To amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
section 4 of the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 295), is further amended by adding the
following new sub-section:

"(e). For the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of this Act in South Viet-Nam, there is hereby
authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts
previously authorized prior to the enactment of this
amendment, ^{One million dollars} ~~such sums as may be necessary~~ for this purpose,
to remain available until expended."

Mr Bundy

45d

Mac:

The President says
this bill would never make
it on the Hill. It authorizes
"such sums as may be
necessary". He is sure
a dollar amount must
be provided.

Harry McTherson

~~SECRET~~

April 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOR INFORMATION:

When I was in Israel our friends asked whether we would be willing to ship to Israel 110 of the 150 M48A2C tanks Bonn had bought from us to replace the M4A1s we had gotten Bonn to sell Israel. The idea was that this would compensate the Israelis for Bonn's cancellation; the Germans would pay us just the same.

Washington authorized telling Israelis we were willing if the Germans themselves made the request. Bonn has now done so, and we have OKed the deal. This makes both the Germans and Israelis happy and will facilitate the Bonn/Israel reconciliation which Erhard is now so pleased about.

Thus at no cost to us Israel gets a slightly better tank and Bonn gets out of a box. Instead of shipping Israel the M-48A1 tanks we promised, we ship them the M-48A2C, but Bonn or Israelis pay any additional costs involved.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Mcq. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLS-S 93001
By ju/cmr Date 6-11-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Termination of Interest-Equalization-Tax Exemption
for Five Countries.

The attached memorandum from Douglas Dillon recommends that five countries, whose securities are now exempt from the Interest Equalization Tax, be taken off the exemption list. This can be done by Executive Order.

The countries are: Bahamas, Bermuda, Ireland, Kuwait and Portugal. All five provide attractive channels for circumventing the tax on money which ends up in third countries. None of them is so strapped for funds as to justify a continuing exemption.

George Ball and Kermitt Gordon support the Treasury recommendation. Regarding Ireland, State has talked to the Speaker and the two Kennedys, and anticipates no trouble. Mike Manatos and Henry Wilson agree.

The Interest Equalization law requires that you give the Congress 30 days advance notice. The lawyers' draft letters of notice to the Vice President and the Speaker are at Tab A, for your approval and signature.

McG. B.

FMB:djw:3/30/65

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

90-221

By

JP

, NARA, Date

4-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Personnel

You asked me last week for additional names for CIA. My views are as follows:

1. My first choice would still be Dick Helms. He has 20 years of genuine professional experience. The professionalsthemselves rate him as their best man, and their opinion is shared by Allen Dulles and John McCone, as well as their two military deputies, Cabell and Carter. He has force and good sense, and he would put the Agency out of the limelight. I believe he is now Clark Clifford's preferred choice. I believe you would get favorable editorials from my wicked friends at the Times and the Post for having put Intelligence in the professional corner where it belongs. That would be the State Department view, and I think it is now McNamara's opinion, too.

2. If for some reason Helms does not seem right, then my second choice would be Lloyd Cutler. Cutler is currently under consideration for Under Secretary of Commerce, but CIA is a more important job and he has many of the qualities for it -- experience in Washington, experience in intelligence, a subtle and balanced legal mind, and a proven habit of loyalty to his clients. You would be his client. He is a first-rate human being.

3. After these two I would put Bill Gaud. He has the trust of all related departments and he has four years of growing experience with international affairs. He is dedicated, careful, shrewd, and energetic. But there are two other very important jobs for which he is more needed.

4. I do not know Gus Long, but I have made what I hope are leak-proof inquiries. I get the picture of a remarkably tough and effective executive who has made a tremendous success of Texaco and would be a great asset to the Government in the right job. I do not find the kind of experience of international politics or the proven achievement in Washington which I think are very important for this particular job, and I find some question about the subtlety and detachment of his mind. I would think him a much better choice as a service secretary and then perhaps a Defense deputy if you should move Vance or McNamara at any time.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-221

By ip, NARA, Date 4-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 31, 1965

5. These matters of personnel are beginning to be locked in with one another, so that if we can make one or two key decisions, the rest may fall into place. For example, if you should settle on Helms then I think Dean Rusk would at once make you the excellent nomination of Gaud to be Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. This is the key interdepartmental coordinating job on daily policy, and a first-rate man there would give a lift throughout the part of the Government that I see daily. Cutler could then go to Connor with no interference, and that would give Commerce a flexible and tempered agent that I think Jack will need as a balance to his own extraordinary but different skills.

6. I have a similar problem of interlocking with Bob Komer. If you don't want him for Africa, then we have to decide whether he should go to Defense, where McNamara is still holding an important slot for him. But I am beginning to wonder whether he has not shown enough quality to be my own deputy (I need one, and so do you, so that there will be someone you can jump on with confidence while I am away). I hear very good things about Korrry -- from both Rusk and McNamara -- and if he went to Africa, we might promote Komer here.

7. One advantage of the names on this particular memo is that, whatever their files may show (with the exception of Long, who sounds awfully strong), they have been appointed and reappointed after repeated investigations.

mcf. B.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 31, 1965

849

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A confession and request

1. I have been talking to two members of your family about possible travels, and I think it is time I admitted it to you. The foreign policy of the United States would be advanced if we could get the right overseas trips this year for Mrs. Johnson and for Lynda Bird (this is probably true about Luci, too, but I have not had a chance to conspire with her). You are pinned down here both by a truly major program of legislation and by Vietnam. Even if you get free to go to Latin America and Western Europe, major areas will not have received the Johnson touch.

2. I have particularly hoped that Mrs. Johnson might be persuaded to make a brief tour of selected friendly countries in Africa. I feel confident that she would produce a really major effect on our reputation there. Her sympathy and quality would speak for you and for the United States as no other emissary could. She could visit constructive U. S. projects and give them more publicity than they have ever had before. She could meet with Peace Corps volunteers and make them your program as well as a Kennedy program. She could show that the truly modern American South is becoming as color-blind as the Constitution (your discussion with the Mayors last night, both on your side and on theirs, was one of the most moving hours I have ever witnessed).

3. What Mrs. Johnson could do in Africa, I think Lynda could do in India, Pakistan, and Iran. I am having a check made on the ways of funding such a trip so that there would be no balance-of-payments lash-back, but I have no doubt at all that a fresh and sensible girl of 21 would put you on the map in this part of the world with great positive results. In Lynda's case, it could be half pleasure and only half business, and I'm sure we could find the right company to go with her.

4. Lynda I think is interested, but Mrs. Johnson has sent me word that she thinks she ^{has to} ought really to stay at home. Would you be willing to intercede with one or both? Or should I stop trying to steal your family away from the hot Washington summer?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-221

By ip, NARA, Date 4-8-91

McG. B.

Reidy
3/31/65
12:15 p.m.

50

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

Although I see by the ticker that George Reedy has knocked the story down, I think you will still be interested in what John Hightower told Bromley Smith this morning.

McG. B.
McG. B.

file

L

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

50a
LJ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

John Hightower (AP) telephoned to tell me of the rumors circulating among reporters about Ambassador Taylor.

1. The President has lost confidence in Taylor and is thinking of relieving him as Ambassador and replacing him with Lodge.
2. In support of the rumors, reporters cite the fact that the President has not seen Taylor since his return on Sunday and was not called to the White House to talk about what should be done following the destruction of his Embassy.



Bromley Smith

UPI-70

(TAYLOR)

WASHINGTON.--BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY EMPHATICALLY DENIED A REPORT THAT GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR WILL RESIGN AS U. S. AMBASSADOR TO VIET NAM BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

THE WHITE HOUSE DESCRIBED THE REPORT AS "COMPLETELY UNTRUE." STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY SAID "THERE IS NOT A SHRED OF TRUTH IN THIS REPORT."

ROBERT GORALSKI, STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTER FOR THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO., SAID TODAY THAT TAYLOR WOULD QUIT AND BE REPLACED BY U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, NOW DEPUTY AMBASSADOR TO SAIGON.

THE NBC CORRESPONDENT SAID THAT TAYLOR WOULD LEAVE THE POST IN LINE WITH AN UNDERSTANDING HE REACHED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON LAST SUMMER, AND NO POLICY DISPUTE WAS INVOLVED IN THE DECISION.

TAYLOR RETURNED TO WASHINGTON LAST SUNDAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR SOUTH VIET NAM LATE THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT WEEK.

WHEN THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CAME OUT OF RETIREMENT TO TAKE THE SAIGON POST LAST SUMMER, IT WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD NOT REMAIN IN SOUTH VIET NAM FOR MORE THAN ABOUT ONE YEAR.

THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED REPORTS THAT TAYLOR PLANS TO QUIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. SOME OF THESE VERSIONS HAVE BEEN FED BY THE FACT THAT JOHNSON HAS NEITHER SEEN NOR TALKED WITH TAYLOR SINCE THE ENVOY'S RETURN.

HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT TOLD REPORTERS YESTERDAY THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE TAYLOR TODAY OR TOMORROW AND THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN HIM EARLIER BECAUSE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER OFFICIALS.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY GEORGE E. REEDY CALLED TODAY'S REPORT "COMPLETELY UNTRUE."

"BUT I DON'T WANT OBVIOUSLY TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IS GOING TO STAY OUT THERE FOREVER," REEDY ADDED.

REEDY SAID TAYLOR HAD NOT SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION, NOR WAS THE SUBJECT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT FOR CONSIDERATION. HE SAID ALSO THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT CONSIDERING A SUCCESSOR BECAUSE THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE SAIGON POST.

"THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE STORY," REEDY SAID IN COMMENTING ON THE RECURRENT SPECULATION THAT TAYLOR EITHER HAS SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION OR IS ABOUT TO DO SO.

ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TAYLOR AND WASHINGTON, REEDY SAID HE KNEW OF NOTHING TO SUPPORT THESE STORIES.

ASKED IF TAYLOR'S VIEWS WERE "COMPLETELY" IN LINE WITH THOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, REEDY SAID, "I KNOW OF NO DIVERGENCIES."

AS FOR WHETHER TAYLOR WOULD MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT TODAY OR TOMORROW, REEDY SAID THAT WHEN THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE "SEES HIM IS ENTIRELY UP TO THE AMBASSADOR'S CONVENIENCE."

REEDY EXPLAINED THAT TAYLOR HAD A NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS TODAY AT THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS AND WANTED TO GET THESE OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE SEEING THE PRESIDENT.

3/31--JD1150AES

2 51

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Max Taylor at 5:15 this afternoon

1. Max Taylor's visit this afternoon is the first of two. Today he comes privately. Tomorrow all the recommendations growing out of his visit will be available for formal presentation to you in the presence of the heads of the departments concerned. This will be quite a substantial meeting in numbers, but it is being kept off the record -- and if it leaks it will be billed simply as one more effort to make sure that we are doing everything we can to make our program more efficient and effective.

2. The three problems on Max's mind are these:

(1) The timing and direction of attack on the North

(2) The timing, size, and mission of any U. S. combat deployments to Vietnam; and

(3) The terms and conditions of a political resolution of the problem.

He has done more thinking on (1) and (2) than on (3) -- and so have we.

3. I think that on (1) he is in reasonable agreement with our outline plans for the next 2 or 3 weeks. But he is prepared to go toward Hanoi faster than McNamara. You may wish to probe him on this because I sense that you are leaning a little ahead of Bob on this one.

4. On U. S. deployments, I think Taylor and McNamara are very close together in the notion of a coastal deployment of the remaining battalions of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the effort to get a Korean Battle Group (Ambassador Brown warns from Seoul that he is very wary of this proposal and that the ground would have to be very carefully laid).

5. Max's work is still continuing on the proposed actions to beef up our work inside South Vietnam. Max is somewhat resistant to our pressures on this since he feels that his own time and energy should go into the absolutely top priority problems. What he puts at the head of the list is *overall* troop strength in South Vietnam -- and I think he is probably right, at that.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 11-9-78; NSC 9-4-79

By DCH, NARS, Date 5-16-81

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

March 31, 1965

But The other matters also count, and that is one more reason for my conviction that in the long pull we need a McNaughton-type in Saigon. John does see this point.

6. Finally, you and Taylor will certainly wish to talk over the guidelines for his meetings with Congressional Committees tomorrow and any backgrounding he may do with the press.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Raid
3/30/65
12:20 p.m.

52

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have reported through Ritchie to Pearson that you will probably be away this week end, and they have not come back with any further request for a meeting. This has all taken place in very good humor.

Now we have a request from the President of Temple University for a message of greeting to the Prime Minister, and in the circumstances I think it would make sense to send one. A brief draft is attached for your approval. (Tab A).

McG. B.

McG. B.

Yes ☒ _____

No _____

Rec'd
Pres's of
Mar 20 1963
11 am

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-94
By inf, NARA, Date 6-17-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with Israel for Cooperation in the Civil
Uses of Atomic Energy

The Department of State, with the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission, recommends that you approve an amendment to the Agreement with Israel for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.

The new draft agreement does not mean any policy shift on our part. The option the Israeli now prefer was offered to them at the time of the original negotiations. At that time they felt that they would like to buy the entire multilateral package, even though we had a slight preference for shifting only the safeguards to the IAEA and keeping the supply arrangements on a bilateral basis.

The largest number of bilaterals that have been converted have used the form of agreement being recommended for Israel. Twelve countries have now adopted it. The countries that have opted for the complete multilateral approach are Finland, Yugoslavia, the Congo and Pakistan. These four countries have deliberately emphasized their support of the multilateral approach in preference to any bilateral arrangements with the U. S. as far as supply is concerned.

Your approval of this draft amendment is urgently needed because the current agreement expires on April 11 and the agreement must lie before the Joint Committee for thirty days before it can be executed.

If you approve this draft amendment there is presented a letter for your signature (TAB A)

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

McG. B.
McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Carl Rowan on South Vietnam

1. This memorandum from Carl Rowan may be worth looking at before you talk to Max Taylor. In essence, Rowan makes two points: (1) Top U. S. officers in Vietnam should make more effort than they do to get really close to their Vietnamese counterparts; (2) we want to be very careful here about announcing actions that may take Vietnamese leaders in Saigon off guard.

2. I think Rowan is essentially right on both points. We can do better on coordination here -- and indeed have done better recently -- but I doubt if the situation in the field can be changed very much until there is a change of Ambassadors.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-221
By ip, NARA, Date 4-8-91

Reid
3/29/65
4:10 P.M.

(2) 114

3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will find interesting the attached telegram from Zorthian to Greenfield on Arnett. Defense and the CIA are still following up on your request for a full examination of this episode, but Zorthian's judgment seems sound to me. I myself am inclined to believe it more likely that Arnett is a vindictive cheapskate than a Communist agent. On the other hand, he may be a little of both.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

55a

SECRET

(Saigon 3124)

Telegram from Saigon to State Department for Greenfield from
Zorthian, March 28, 11 a.m.

Our post-mortem of press handling of US use of gas points inevitably to the conclusion that the major damage was done by an initial AP story which used the emotional lead stating that the US was experimenting with gas warfare. While our handling after this initial story could have been better, the fact is we were never able to catch up with the impact of worldwide response to the initial AP lead. The author of this story, as you know, was Peter Arnett. This is not the first time Arnett has written a deliberately negative story about US involvement here. AP, of course, claims journalistic responsibility and yet it is notable that on a story of this type, which even a neophyte journalist would have known, would have worldwide anti-US impact, AP did not consider it appropriate to first call the Mission and ask for comment. In the event of such a call, we certainly would have tried to get Mission denial of gas warfare into the story which AP finally ran. Without this opportunity, we were unaware of the story until it was played back to Saigon, which meant the story had clear sailing for several hours. I would think there is a very valid argument that part of AP's responsibility calls for an effort to get both sides of a story before running material of this type and that failure to do so in this case can properly be described as journalistic irresponsibility, if not deliberate effort to damage the US. Arnett in other negative stories has confessed that he has written them in order to "get even" with US authorities. It may well be that he considers this story appropriate retribution for recent restrictions on the Danang Airbase and air strike information.

I raise the question with you whether continued treatment of the US effort here along these lines might not be discussed with Wes Gallagher. You may want to discuss this with Ambassador Taylor during his visit and take informal steps accordingly.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State letter 3-17-80
By DCH NARS, Date 9-29-91

SECRET

56

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harriman reports

Averell Harriman has sent in for you a couple of reports of his conversation with Harold Wilson last week, but I think this very short memo from Bob Komer gives Harriman's point of view better than his own reports.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Contacts: March 21-27

1. I had a couple of talks with John Hightower in the early stages of the gas problem and found him very responsive to my insistence that this was not gas warfare. As a result, the AP story carried our essential position even before Secretary Rusk's good press conference.

2. I had a purely social dinner with Joe Alsop and Jack Connor after Douglas Dillon's farewell party. I also had one business phone call from Joe, and while I did not say the things he says in his column today, I did not flatly deny them when he said them, which, of course, is his standard technique.

3. I saw Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times and he gave me quite an account of Harold Wilson's thinking. Wilson had apparently told him about the telephone talk with you but forbade him to print it. I took the occasion to say to Brandon that there is nothing that we cannot discuss with our British friends, but the only thing we dislike is their use of Washington as a place for public criticism of the US in order to please their own political backbenchers. I think he got the point, and I daresay it will have been in his Sunday article yesterday. This should have some salutary effect.

4. Brandon is very eager to see you. I gave him no encouragement, but if you ever do want to talk to a British correspondent, he is probably the best.

5. I talked to a number of people on the meaning of paragraph 5 of your statement on economic development in Southeast Asia. I had calls that day from Potter, Mohr, Rogers, Kiker, and John Chancellor. Since you talked to some of them yourself, I am sure you are familiar with their interest and, on the whole, their affirmative reaction.

6. Walter Lippmann called me to send thanks for your courtesy in having a copy of the Vietnam statement sent to him. He also asked whether in our view the essentials of the Geneva Accords included reunification. I told him we did not see it that way, but I am quite sure he himself will press this notion in an early column. I am alerting the Department to this possibility so that they will be ready with their own views.

7. I had a call from Lew Gulick on the Taylor mission and I told him what we are telling everybody--that this will be a routine consultation.

McG. B.

March 29, 1965

58

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is now down to about
2500 words, and Rusk and I
hope we can discuss it with
you tomorrow at lunch.

McG. B

10 pm

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At the dinner tonight for President Yameogo, you will meet Mr. and Mrs. Ulric Haynes. Rick Haynes has recently joined the NSC staff as an assistant to Komer on Africa. He is a Negro Foreign Service Officer of unusual ability and energy and good sense, and you may wish to show that you know who he is.

Haynes is the man who brought my attention to the fact that the junior members of Yameogo's party were worth some real attention. He has made a number of equally sensible suggestions on African affairs in the short time he has been with us.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Les Carpenter on the gas episode

Les Carpenter has asked me if it would be helpful for him to do a careful chronology of the gas episode. I have told him that we are still putting the pieces together ourselves, and that I would have to give him an answer later. My own hunch is that he is not the best outlet for this story, simply because he is so close to us that it will look defensive, but if you have a different view I would like to know about it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Give the background to Carpenter _____

Hold up on it ✓

Speak to me _____

✓ J
60

psm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

61

Mr. President:

Would you like to see

Karl E. Meyer?

Yes _____ No _____

see Brundy at length

by you a / min

Marvin

With me to say Hello

AL

61a

The Washington Post

1515 L STREET, N.W. REPUBLIC 7-1234

WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

*Morison
JER*

29 March 1965

Mr. George Reedy
Press Secretary
The White House
Washington, DC


Dear George:

In two weeks -- on April 12 -- I leave these shores to undertake a new assignment for The Post. For around two years, I will be our bureau chief in London (Flora Lewis is returning in May; Estabrook in August).

Before I go, I would be extremely grateful if you could arrange a short background interview with the President. I will be writing extensively on Anglo-American and Alliance problems, and it would be enormously useful to leave Washington with a first-hand understanding of the President's own views. Naturally, I would suit any meeting to the President's convenience in terms of time.

I will call your office on Tuesday to see if anything can be worked out. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,



Karl E. Meyer.

J 62

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Spock

On Saturday I mentioned a long letter from Dr. Spock. You said at the time that you thought Spock was the sort of man who deserved a long and careful answer. *no central files 3/30*
Unfortunately, his letter (Tab A) could be used as propaganda against us, and therefore I doubt if a long public answer from you would be wise. So I have designed an answer in the following form: a brief acknowledgement from you (Tab B), enclosing a memorandum from me to you (Tab C), with attached quotations showing that it is really unfair for him to suggest that your foreign policy has changed sharply since the election.

incl. B.

McG. B.

62a

BENJAMIN SPOCK, M. D.
2040 ABINGTON ROAD
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO

March 23, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing as one who campaigned publicly for your election. I expressed on television, radio and in advertisements my faith - based on my interpretation of your statements - that your administration would actively seek peaceful solutions to the world's enormous problems. Now that our foreign policy has turned out to be different from what I expected, I feel I owe it to any people I may have influenced to keep trying to get my views to you directly. (On three occasions I and delegates from eight organizations have requested an opportunity to speak to you personally, without success.)

I am particularly dismayed that the State and Defense Departments base our South Vietnam policy on two assumptions which are denied in large part by history and impartial observers: that we are there to preserve the freedom of the people and that our lack of success is due primarily to interference from North Vietnam.

I and many other people - in America and in friendly nations - would summarize the situation as follows:

Secretary Dulles in 1956 encouraged Diem to refuse to allow the election specified by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, in which it was expected by everyone that the South Vietnamese would vote by a large majority in favor of joining North Vietnam. (In my opinion Mr. Dulles was not defending freedom.)

It was Diem's increasingly tyrannical actions - particularly the abolition of village elections and the dismissal of the village chiefs - which provoked the Viet Cong revolt in 1957, a rebellion of the people of South Vietnam.

Appreciable aid from North Vietnam did not begin until two years later.

Our side has been losing the war because many South Vietnamese heartily dislike the war, the Saigon regime and us; very few support us.

The Viet Cong, according to non-governmental observers, is still getting plenty of reinforcements and arms from Saigon deserters and could continue the war indefinitely if aid from the North were cut off.

There is little likelihood that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, who believe their cause is the just one and who defeated a large French army, will desist because of the demand of a foreign country.

I believe that our present policy is militarily foolhardy, morally wrong, and detrimental to our country's cause in its rivalry with Communism.

Before ending my letter I would like to add that I have not only agreed with all the domestic proposals you have made to Congress and the nation but have greatly admired the forthrightness and courage with which you have advanced them.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Spock

nln

March 30, 1965

to Pres
3/29/65
12
tab B
626

Dear Dr. Spock:

I have read your letter of March 23. I remain grateful for all the support you have given me, and I can assure you that my Administration will actively seek a peaceful solution for the world's enormous problem.

It is evident that your view of the situation in Vietnam is not that of the Administration, but I do not think it is right to suggest that I left any doubt as to my own basic view of that problem in 1964. I have referred your letter to my assistant, Mr. Bundy, and I think you may be interested in his memorandum on the subject.

I fully understand the sincerity and depth of your concern in this matter, and I want you to know that while we clearly have differences as to the real nature of the situation in Vietnam, there is no difference whatever between us in the depth of our interest in serving the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. You can be assured that every decision I take in this area is governed by this single central concern.

Sincerely,

15/

Dr. Benjamin Spock
2040 Abington Road
Cleveland 6, Ohio

LBJ:McG B:mz

~~Feb 2~~ 2
March 29, 1965
Tab C 62c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Spock's letter obviously expresses his own honest convictions about Vietnam. It is equally obvious that the assessment of our Administration is different. You yourself have stated this different view clearly and repeatedly, and I am sure Dr. Spock is familiar with your position.

His letter seems to me a little unfair in one respect -- its implication that your policy now is basically different from the one you put forward last year. Our file of correspondence with Dr. Spock shows that he questioned our Vietnamese policy a year ago. When he supported you last year and voted for you in November, you were already on record with a view of Vietnam which he clearly does not share. Perhaps it would be appropriate, in answering Dr. Spock, to call his attention to your remarks to the Associated Press on April 20 of last year (Tab 1) and still more, your Message to the Congress of August 5 (Tab 2).

Throughout the last 16 months you have emphasized that "we seek no wider war." Dr. Spock obviously does not agree with the actions you have found it necessary to take in recent months; he probably does not agree with our conclusion that increased Communist infiltration and increased aggression have made these actions necessary. It is of course his right to hold to his own view.

But I do not think he should suggest that there has been any change in your basic position. When he supported you in 1964, he certainly had every reason to know that the view of Vietnam which he sets forth in his letter of March 23 is not at all your view. His support, which was helpful and generous, was given in spite of this difference.

15/
McGeorge Bundy

"In Vietnam the Communists today try the more insidious, but equally dangerous, methods of subversion, terror and guerrilla warfare. They conduct a campaign organized, directed, supplied and supported from Hanoi. This, too, we will prove futile. Armed Communist attack on Vietnam is a reality. The fighting spirit of South Vietnam is a reality, as Secretary Rusk told us from there yesterday. The request of a friend for our help in this terrible moment is a reality.

"The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is 'essential' is a reality. To fail to respond to these realities would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine world-wide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.

"The situation in Vietnam is difficult. But there is an old American saying that 'when the going gets tough the tough get going.'"

Associated Press
Luncheon, Waldorf
Astoria, NY
April 20, 1964

"Our commitments in that area are well-known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

"Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

"1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

"2. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

"3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political or territorial ambitions in the area.

"4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

"The threat to the free nations of Southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory.

"As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

"As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again at Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

"I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the Independence of the nations of the area.

"It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our armed forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in Southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty."

Message to Congress
August 5, 1964

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: MAC

FROM: LIZ

HERE's the "try" and the "result."
Such a venture would have to originate with
the President's desire for her to go, I
believe. Sell him and ~~maybe~~ you can sell
her.

✓
63-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM

TO: MRS. JOHNSON

FROM: LIZ CARPENTER

MacGeorge Bundy asked me to explore with you the possibility of your taking on two foreign visits in view of the President being tied here with other matters:

- 1) To four or five African countries which would reap "terrific benefits," he said, "for the U.S.";
- 2) To Latin America
- 3) To Asia

Mac said they would be purposeful state visits, with dedication of dams, opening of schools, etc.

He doesn't want to begin exploring it unless you feel you could undertake them but he feels strongly it would help the USA position in these strategic areas.

I asked him if the Administration's position on travel would preclude them. He said of course you couldn't go to Western Europe, but these would be foreign missions in other parts of the world.

Mac would like to get one on the drawing board if you can give him any green light.

*ooze! I'm delighted Mac thinks
I would be a credit to our
country on such a trip but believe
my trip should be in the U.S.
this year. CJS*

TRANSFERRED TO FILE 12-1-65 FILE