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3/29/65
3:15 p.m.

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64

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I apologize for having delayed in sending you this weekly report. The initial cable was garbled, and then when there was a correction I was slow in getting it up to you. I think you will want at least to skim it before Max Taylor comes in. I marked the more interesting paragraphs, although I think you have already learned of them from other sources.

McG. B.

McG. B.

SECRET-NODIS

March 24, 1965

GENERAL TAYLOR'S WEEKLY REPORT

FOR THE PRESIDENT

This has been a pleasantly quiet week both in a military and in a political sense. Viet Cong units country-wide appeared to be avoiding contact with government forces as their activity dropped to the lowest level since the lunar New Year (early February). There were no large-scale Viet Cong attacks and only two district towns were fired on during the week.

For the first time in my memory, during the last week all three of the principal indicators of military activity -- killed in action, prisoners captured, and weapons lost to the enemy -- have been favorable to the government.

Evidence of arms infiltration from Hanoi increased in this period. Thanks in one case to information given by a Viet Cong defector and in another case to timely intelligence, arms caches were uncovered in the Vung Ro area near the bay where the arms ship was found last month, and in a motorized wooden vessel carrying quantities of arms sunk by government forces at a point off Quang Tri.

Government operations were maintained at a high level, although contacts with the enemy were fewer than the week before. USAF B-57's attacked Viet Cong targets every day of the week with evidence of favorable results.

The pacification indicators also took a favorable turn. In II Corps area, there was a marked decrease in the number of Viet Cong incidents, attributable in part to U. S. and Vietnamese air operations. In Binh Dinh province, visible progress was made in caring for the refugees. Work has started on eleven new refugee centers and the province chief has recruited several hundred refugees for the regional and popular forces. The units formed from these recruits will accompany the refugees when they are able to return to their villages or are resettled in new locations. Pacification progress elsewhere in South Vietnam was as uneven as usual.

In the political sphere, Quat continued to exhibit understanding of the importance of building up his public image. During the early part of the week, he spent a good deal of time meeting with and entertaining the provincial officials convened in Saigon for a "National Administrative Congress." While it is too early to assess the results of the Congress, it provided a unique

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-71

By 4-9 NARA. Date 3-12-90

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DIS~~

opportunity for each province to air its problems and hopes before responsible Saigon authorities and thus to reestablish badly needed communication between Saigon and the provincial administrations. Also, Quat is spending two days in central Vietnam this week on a personal inspection of the refugee situation there and establishing political contact in Hue and Danang, the traditional center of political turbulence in South Vietnam. I expect to join him in Danang Wednesday for a visit to the aircraft carrier Coral Sea off the coast and to our Marines in Danang.

The Armed Forces Council met over the week end to consider changes in the high command. Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as Commander-in-Chief (he holds this post now on an "Acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief of the Joint General Staff and is about to recommend several other changes. If these appointments materialize, they place Catholic generals in the three top military positions (the third being General Thieu, Deputy Prime Minister and Armed Forces Minister). This could stimulate a reaction from the Buddhist Institute, and we have reports that the Armed Forces Council have sent representatives to discuss the matter with Institute leaders. Except for Cao whose ability to fill the job of Chief of Staff is questionable, we would take no issue with the reported changes.

Despite the apparently improved Catholic position within the military establishment, we have begun to receive some indications that the militant northern refugee Catholics are becoming more and more restless at what they consider to be the growing alliance between the Buddhist Institute and Generals Thi and Ky, I Corps and Air Force Commanders respectively. We will take more soundings among these Catholic Groups in order to monitor their feelings and intentions as closely as we can.

If the Catholics are getting increasingly restless, it is perhaps understandable that the Buddhist Institute continues to be relatively tranquil. The Institute had a national conference last week and, as far as we can determine from talking to key leaders, they agreed that Quang Lien should cease his involvement in the peace movement he initiated (although Quang Lien reportedly believes the conference did not take such a hard and fast decision). Institute leaders also decided that they should concentrate on internal Buddhist organizational and program matters, avoiding politics unless "directly threatened." They seem reasonably satisfied with Quat for the time being and may be willing to stick to propagating the Dharma. Time will tell.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

65

March 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is designed to be as friendly as possible without actually saying anything that can bite us later. All the experts on Sukarno say that this kind of butter is worth it, and I have been over it with a fine tooth comb to make sure that there is nothing in it that we could not defend as routine diplomatic chatter.

McG. B.

McG. B.

*James Thomas
to deliver to
Amb. Bunker*

65a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

It is most kind of you to receive Ambassador Bunker on such short notice. He is one of my most trusted advisers on international relations, and you can rely on him as a man of great judgment and discretion.

I hope that in the course of his visit to Indonesia he will have a chance to have frank talks with you and with members of your Government. I further trust that through such conversations, as well as with the help and guidance of our good friend Ambassador Jones, we will be able to gain better insights into the problems before our two countries. Such talks can help both of us in the search for the best possible basis for future friendly relations between our countries. I shall look forward with the greatest interest to Ambassador Bunker's report of your views and his advice on future policy.

Let me take this opportunity, Mr. President, to extend my best wishes for your health and happiness.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Dr. Sukarno
President of the Republic of Indonesia
Djakarta

March 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think the NSC meeting today should be devoted centrally to Vietnam, and that it would be helpful at this point for all present to take a deep breath and listen to each other for about a half hour in a review of the situation as it now stands. Accordingly, I have asked John McCone to discuss the situation in South Vietnam and the attitudes of the major Communist powers. I have asked Dean Rusk to follow on with a discussion of the political and diplomatic situation, and I have asked Bob McNamara to wind up with a comment from the military side.

The group, although carefully selected, will be quite large, and I doubt if in this group you will wish to go beyond the line you have taken with the Governors and in your Cabinet statement yesterday. (The fact of a possible longer statement or speech is being as tightly held as we know how.)

This meeting is the first for Governor Ellington and the last for Douglas Dillon, and you may wish to say a word about each of them.

McG. B.

66a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA

March 26, 1965 - 1:15

VIETNAM

1. Intelligence review - Director of Central Intelligence
 - a. The situation in South Vietnam
 - b. Estimates of Communist reaction and intent --
Hanoi, Peking and Moscow
2. The political and diplomatic situation - The Secretary of State
3. The military situation - Secretary of Defense

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If this is none of my business, you can ignore this whole paper, but I ~~do know~~ that you saw Korry today, and I think you may be interested in the attached memorandum from Bob Komer which was the product of discussions about the African bureau at the turn of the year. I do not know Korry myself, but I do know that Komer's has much better judgment on African matters than ~~anyone~~ ^{most of the} on the 7th Floor of the Department of State, George & my

State Department friends.

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McG. B.

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African
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John Stamps
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cy Vance and the Republicans' Gas Warfare Letter

1. Bob McNamara being swamped, he had Cy Vance go and deal with the six young Republicans today. Vance and I coordinated fully on his attack, and he has just reported that ~~he thinks that~~ after a 50-minute session, he has gotten four of them to agree that they have nothing more to say about it -- Lindsay, Morse, Broomfield, and Horton. Tupper and Mathias did not commit themselves.
2. Vance was armed with evidence that police units in most of their states have these riot-control gases in hand for possible use, including the so-called nausea gas. He told them flatly that in his judgment, the use of the term "gas warfare" by supposedly responsible members of Congress was damaging to the national interest. He reports that they were defensive in tone in their replies. Their main argument was simply that decisions with such political overtones should have been reviewed by political authorities. Vance said there was never a war that had closer political supervision, and that these were riot-control agents which no one in his right mind should call gas warfare. Vance went armed with copies of British editorials defending our position and says that these were effective.
3. Vance learned that Morse had been given "unshirted hell" by Bates of Massachusetts, and that the others had been similarly treated by Les Arends.
4. Our plan now is that a formal answer to their letter to you will be made by the Department of Defense in a short and straight-forward way, and without publicity. If you prefer a different handling, you have only to say so.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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about handling
of reply.

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TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

March 23, 1965

RECEIVED
MAR 23 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The introduction of gas warfare in Vietnam is deplorable even though the chemicals used are non-lethal. We urgently request that you order an immediate halt to the practice.

The use of gas in Vietnam is directly counter to the purpose of U.S. policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia:

1) Gas warfare, regardless of its intensity, is so abhorrent to all peoples that its introduction inevitably will help turn world public opinion against the United States. The valid and important reasons for the United States commitment to the integrity of South Vietnam and the fact of North Vietnamese aggression may become of less importance to world opinion than the fact that gas has been used. World public opinion is particularly important in Vietnam now because it may play a large role in convincing North Vietnam to end its aggression and to seek a negotiated settlement which maintains the integrity of South Vietnam.

2) The United States introduction of gas warfare in Vietnam makes it less likely that North Vietnam will end its aggression and seek a negotiated settlement. The Administration has repeatedly stated that its policy goal was to induce North Vietnam to end its support to the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South. Obviously, the air strikes against the North have been designed to convince Hanoi that it would pay a heavy price if it chose to continue. Obviously also, the Administration policy requires the government to determine clearly which potential U.S. military actions can serve as a psychological inducement to end the war and which can become a psychological incentive to continue it. Nothing in warfare is as emotionally charged as the introduction of gas, and Hanoi's psychological reaction will no doubt be an increased desire to fight.

3) The introduction of gas warfare by the United States in Vietnam will intensify anti-American feelings throughout Asia. Americans, it must be remembered, are not native to Asia -- and the war in Vietnam, according to Communist propaganda, is a war against the white man. We have thought that

March 23, 1965

because the United States has no long record of colonial rule in Asia that we might escape the anti-white man problem which beset the French. But by the introduction of gas warfare, the United States may have united all the peoples of Asia against us as cruel and inhumane oppressors.

4) The use of gas warfare in Vietnam will make more difficult cooperation from other governments to share with the United States the burdens of Vietnam. If a government in the past has not been willing to share our burdens, it surely would be less likely to do so now that by our actions chemical warfare has been introduced.


5) Because of the introduction of gas in Vietnam, other governments which may in the future need help to thwart Communist guerrilla warfare will fear to ask for American involvement. No government is likely to view the use of gas on its own population as a desirable means of preserving its independence. The fact that the gas is non-lethal is technically important, but it is psychologically insignificant.

6) The use of gas in Vietnam does not serve important military ends -- in fact, it thwarts one of our most basic military purposes. We have been told time and again that the key to military success in Vietnam was the allegiance of the village peasant -- that if the peasant felt secure in the protection of the Saigon government and the U.S. forces he would turn the Viet Cong infiltrator away and victory for the government would be imminent. But if gas is used against an entire village, exposing innocent civilians as well as Viet Cong, how can the village peasant develop any sense of allegiance to, or feeling of security in, forces which use gas against him? It is patently obvious that the result would be the opposite.

7) The use of non-lethal gas in Vietnam under United States supervision invites retaliation in the use of lethal gas against American troops. The onus in gas warfare rests with those who begin it, and retaliation, in public opinion, may seem reasonably justifiable. Furthermore, the distinction between lethal and non-lethal gases, while of the highest importance, is not liable to be appreciated by the public. They are likely to think only that the United States used gas and now it is getting it in return. Finally, it is obvious that any retaliation will probably come against American forces, in order to emphasize the "war against the white man" theme and to help unite all Vietnamese against the "foreign oppressor".

8) The use of gas in Vietnam comes at the very moment when there are new reports of Nasser's experimentation with gas warfare in the Yemen, thus denying the West the power of moral suasion to prevent inhumane practices by others.

We urge you to call an immediate halt to the use of gas in Vietnam.



William Broomfield, M.C.



Frank J. Horton, M.C.


John V. Lindsay, M.C.

Very sincerely,


Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., M.C.


F. Bradford Morse, M.C.


Stanley R. Tupper, M.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Bunker, today at 1 p.m.

1. Ambassador Bunker is seeing you at 1 p.m. today in connection with his mission to Indonesia. He is seeking general guidelines from you on the purpose of his trip. He will be leaving for Djakarta this weekend and will probably stay for a week or ten days.
2. As you know, Bunker was deeply involved in the Indonesian problem when he served successfully as United Nations Mediator for the West Irian (West New Guinea) dispute between the Indonesians and the Dutch in 1962. He is devoting this week to an intensive updating on the current state of U. S. -Indonesia relations.
3. We would suggest that you stress the following points in your talk with the Ambassador:

(1) It is clearly in our interest to do what we can to arrest Indonesia's apparent drift into the Communist camp under the auspices of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). At stake are 100 million people, vast potential resources, and a strategically important chain of islands.

(2) There is disagreement both in our Djakarta Embassy and in Washington as to (a) Sukarno's real intentions; (b) the Indo power balance between Communists and non-Communists; and (c) what the U. S. can and should do -- some recommend a "deep freeze" for Sukarno & Co.; others believe in a continued effort to win back their interest and friendship. You want his best judgment on these points.

(3) You would therefore like him to consult in depth with Ambassador Jones, with other members of the Country Team, with Sukarno, and with a broad spectrum of top Indonesian officials.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By us, NARA Date 5-5-98

J.C.T.
J. C. T., Jr.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1965

71

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Non-Military Actions in South Vietnam

1. This is a summary version of the non-military actions currently under discussion for Vietnam. The whole package is now being reviewed by Embassy Saigon, as was done with the Johnson recommendations. An agreed package should be a by-product of Taylor's visit, and might even be achieved before then.

2. My personal view is that with truly executive leadership and a strong effort throughout the country team, we really could make substantial progress over a 12-month period. I also believe that our current policies can win us that much time, if they are skillfully and carefully applied. The one thing we have never had out there is a fully coordinated U. S. effort under the leadership of an Ambassador who understood the essentially political nature of the problem and applied himself to decentralized action with U. S. advice, assistance, and support at every level.

3. I have thought about practically nothing except the name you mentioned to me this afternoon, and I have a feeling that if this man could be given an operational Chief of Staff like John McNaughton (whom he is said to like and respect very highly), with Alexis Johnson as his political deputy, we just might have the right team. If McNaughton went in this capacity, moreover, we might easily convert Bob McNamara.

McG. B.

Non-Military Actions in South Vietnam (Summary Version)Rationale

The war in South Vietnam can be won only if military actions are supplemented by those which will give the people a stake in the promise and fruits of an effective, stable, non-Communist government. The following actions in the political-economic-social sphere are the major present visible elements of such a supplementary program. But a few initial words of caution are necessary:

- a. Even if implemented immediately, most of the programs and actions listed below will take many months to be effective (months which, hopefully, can be bought with current US and GVN military programs).
- b. None of the programs has been costed in terms of either money or manpower (it is understood that there is no restriction on U. S. dollars, but local currency and manpower costs may prove troublesome).
- c. Some of the programs will involve a redefinition of Departmental responsibilities and a few may require additional legislation.

US Actions (Many of Which Require GVN Acquiescence if not Cooperation)

1. Establish US Interagency Action Group, under a civilian Chief-of-Staff type, in Saigon to guide, coordinate and, where necessary, follow-up pacification operations. / This may be the key to effective implementation of virtually all programs and actions below ./
2. Assign US action officers full-time to Viet political and religious groups and to key GVN officials and ministries. / The best possible candidates for these assignments should be found, whether they are already assigned to Vietnam or not ./
3. Improve monetary and career benefits to US personnel serving in Vietnam to assure that the best possible officers are recruited and will serve for extended tours. / This will probably require additional legislation. ./
4. Adopt essentials of the Rowan Report on information and psychological warfare, but without additional USIA appropriations.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95; State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-13-99

3/24/65

5. Less important programs:

- a. Establish teaching hospital in Saigon.
- b. Increase International Voluntary Service activity and Free World (especially Asian) Peace Corps-type activity at village level.
- c. Organize US-GVN Disaster Teams to cope on quick-fix basis with war damage, floods, emergency refugee problems, etc.

GVN Actions (Most of Which Require US Pressure on or Assistance to the GVN):

6. Delegation of greater power to the Province Chiefs -- transfer substantial political, economic and paramilitary responsibilities from Saigon to the Provinces -- develop popular security forces and civic action programs based on the village and district -- provide Province Chiefs with command and control over a necessary minimum of regular military forces (in most instances amounting to 1 or 2 battalions). [This will also require US administrative and jurisdictional modifications].
7. Establish a national rationale or credo-positive, dynamic, "revolutionary" -- develop a mass political base and indoctrination programs to channel all elements of the population, civilian as well as military. [Easier said than done -- US agencies can help but impetus and ideas must be genuinely Vietnamese].
8. Institute economic warfare programs against VC-held areas. [We and the GVN may be financing much of the insurgency].
9. Revitalize Chu Hoi (defector) program. [This program has lacked insistent U. S. pressure and support].
10. Launch large-scale high priority program of political and social action in connection with refugees. [The war could be lost if the refugee problem is flubbed].
11. Somewhat less critical:
 - a. Reduce draft age from 20 to 17 years -- post-service vocational and educational benefits.
 - b. Redress legitimate Montagnard political and economic grievances.

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3/24/65

c. Expand rural and urban economic/social programs (e. g. , land reform, low-cost housing).

d. Improved pay, recruitment procedures and training for local officials and teachers.

e. Expand police (from 33,000 to 53,000) -- improve training and organization of Special Branch -- create national counterespionage organization -- revise existing legal arrangements which hamper retention of VC suspects.

March 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Since the ticker account of what Wilson said about Max Taylor's alleged statement was misleading, I think you may wish to read the attached sheet which was what he actually said. His language was not flawless, but I do not think that in this case he was setting himself up as Max's governess. The statement attributed to Taylor did sound as if he was talking of unlimited escalation -- which of course he was not.

McG. B.

Joe Mr Andy - From David Cucc.

72a

Sorry I forgot to leave these. Many thanks for lunch.

British Prime Minister's remarks in the House of Commons, March 23,
about Ambassador Taylor's statement

In response to a question by a left-wing Labor MP, the Prime Minister said:

"My Honorable Friend referred in the last few words of his question, to a statement, reported in certain newspapers this morning which is attributed to General Taylor. This is, of course, a matter of which we must seek further elucidation, and we are so doing, because it uses phrases about carrying on the war without limit, which, I think, goes considerably further than anything which I have told the House, after establishing the fact before I did so.

I think that one must be concerned to find what the facts are. I will not say here and now that this has been said by General Maxwell Taylor. We must investigate these statements and get a proper account. Only ten days ago the (London) TIMES carried a scare story on its main page about the American attitude, which turned out to be completely false and which was denied, with reference to the TIMES' story, the following day in Washington."

73

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What we now know on gas (leaving aside the loose end on nausea gas)

1. The riot-control gases used in Vietnam are standard issue for all U. S. troops with riot-control missions, and authority to use them has been delegated to subordinate commanders for many years.
2. These gases are also standard issue under Military Assistance Programs to friendly troops with riot-control missions.
3. These gases are non-lethal and their effects are temporary. They are totally different from the poison gases against which international conventions and humanitarian feeling are directed.
4. There are three known uses of these riot-control gases in Vietnam (two cases were in efforts by Vietnamese troops to rescue U.S. advisors -- this is a good point at home, but not abroad).
5. There has been absolutely no NSC discussion of this problem precisely because riot-control gases are standard equipment. There has been no proposal at any time for the use of poison gas in this theater or elsewhere.
6. Finally, these gases are precisely analogous to those used by police forces all over the world.

McG. B.

74
March 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tear Gas

1. The two uses of tear gas in an effort to rescue American prisoners were on 23 and 25 December 1964. In neither case was there any effective contact with the enemy or success in the rescue of the prisoners. It sounds to me as if no one even cried.

2. The third known use of tear gas in Vietnam was in an effort to dislodge the Viet Cong from a village without jeopardizing the lives of civilians, on January 28. The effect is reported to have been very slight.

McG. B.

75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart

1. Dean Rusk says that Stewart may raise the subject of gas with you, and I attach another copy of my earlier memorandum. (TAB A)
The ticker says that Wilson is instructing the Foreign Secretary to raise the point over here.

2. Dean Rusk says that the dangling point on the diplomatic track is that the British still wish to take some political step of their own, such as a message to the members of the Geneva Conference. Rusk is opposing this and suggesting that we might well make a statement of our own views to the British or to a wider group. This point remains open, and he thinks that you may wish to stay out of it with Stewart and talk it over with him (Rusk) at lunch. The rest of the case is as set forth in my memorandum of last night, a copy of which is at Tab B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

75a

A

March 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What we now know on gas (leaving aside the loose end on nausea gas)

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6. Finally, these gases are precisely analogous to those used by police forces all over the world.

McG. B.

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~~SECRET~~

March 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
of Great Britain, Tuesday, March 23, 11:30 a.m.

1. Stewart's conversations with Dean Rusk so far have produced only one serious question -- the political problem of the Wilson Government in holding to its present support for us in Vietnam. Dean is planning to talk some more with the British before Stewart comes in, and this memo may be outdated by tomorrow, though I doubt it.

2. The British tell us -- and David Bruce agrees -- that their present position is not tenable without some slight help from us. As David Bruce puts it, the Prime Minister is being strongly criticized, not only by his Left but by his Center. He is accused of uncritical support for a U. S. position about which he is uninformed. It is asserted that he has deserted his principles to curry favor with the President, who in return has allowed it to be known that the Prime Minister will be an unwelcome visitor in April. The cooler men in the Labor Party, as distinct from the Left Wing wild men, are said to be losing their patience.

3. All this of course is a wild misstatement of the existing situation. None of it takes account of the very great damage which Wilson did to himself by his outrageous phone call to you -- a phone call which has never been publicized. But Bruce impresses it on me that the existing situation in the Labor Party is real.

4. In this situation one course might be to let the wretched Labor Party struggle with its own political problems, on the ground that Wilson's troubles are of his own making, not ours. The difficulty with this course is that since Wilson prefers his own survival to solidarity with us, he would be mortally tempted to begin to make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and to the natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen. This would not be helpful to Wilson in the long run, but it would not be helpful to us either, as the history of Diefenbaker proves. (Wilson and Diefenbaker have about the same amount of internal sweetness.) When we fall out with Prime Ministers, it's usually painted as our fault.

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5. The alternative is to see what is the least we can offer the British in return for continued solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy in Vietnam. David Bruce thinks this necessary minimum is simply that we should join them in saying publicly that there is a full and continuous exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two Governments on this important issue. Then we can put on some parsley about how glad we are to have Mr. Stewart and how much we look forward to the Prime Minister's visit. In return, the British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their existing announced approval of our present course of action. They should limit themselves to expressions of hope that a path to a peaceful settlement will come, plus expressions of alertness, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to any opportunities for peaceful settlement which may develop in the future. Bruce thinks that this position will not be easy for Wilson, but that he will find it distinctly preferable to a split with us at this time.

6. David and I have been up and down this problem for an hour this afternoon, and this is our joint recommendation. I will telephone and ask for your views in the morning, and on the basis of what you tell me, I will then do a one-page paper for your use with Stewart. Bruce and I believe that you can be most candid and effective with him if you see him entirely alone, but the meeting can be of any size that you choose. It need not take more than 20 minutes, and the smaller it is the shorter it can be. Our talking paper will cover the stupid fuss over gas, which should not have occurred, as well as press reports of a far-out statement on "escalation without limit" by Max Taylor.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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PRESENATION COPY

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76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Investment Bankers Association of America has asked me to address its spring meeting at the Greenbrier on May 6 and 7. I am inclined not to do this because I have already accepted too many Spring speaking engagements -- at Johns Hopkins, Cal Tech, Notre Dame, and Harvard. But if you think I ought to balance the ticket and talk to some non-students -- or if you wish to show a little White House attention to this crowd, I will be glad to add this one. These are the money-men, more so than straight bankers on one side or straight business men on the other.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Yes

No ✓

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-431

By is, NARA Date 10-6-98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

77

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March 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of Great Britain, Tuesday, March 23, 11:30 a.m.

1. Stewart's conversations with Dean Rusk so far have produced only one serious question -- the political problem of the Wilson Government in holding to its present support for us in Vietnam. Dean is planning to talk some more with the British before Stewart comes in, and this memo may be outdated by tomorrow, though I doubt it.

2. The British tell us -- and David Bruce agrees -- that their present position is not tenable without some slight help from us. As David Bruce puts it, the Prime Minister is being strongly criticized, not only by his Left but by his Center. He is accused of uncritical support for a U. S. position about which he is uninformed. It is asserted that he has deserted his principles to curry favor with the President, who in return has allowed it to be known that the Prime Minister will be an unwelcome visitor in April. The cooler men in the Labor Party, as distinct from the Left Wing wild men, are said to be losing their patience.

3. All this of course is a wild misstatement of the existing situation. None of it takes account of the very great damage which Wilson did to himself by his outrageous phone call to you -- a phone call which has never been publicized. But Bruce impresses it on me that the existing situation in the Labor Party is real.

4. In this situation one course might be to let the wretched Labor Party struggle with its own political problems, on the ground that Wilson's troubles are of his own making, not ours. The difficulty with this course is that since Wilson prefers his own survival to solidarity with us, he would be mortally tempted to begin to make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and to the natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen. This would not be helpful to Wilson in the long run, but it would not be helpful to us either, as the history of Diefenbaker proves. (Wilson and Diefenbaker have about the same amount of internal sweetness.) When we fall out with Prime Ministers, it's usually painted as our fault.

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-2-

3/22/65

5. The alternative is to see what is the least we can offer the British in return for continued solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy in Vietnam. David Bruce thinks this necessary minimum is simply that we should join them in saying publicly that there is a full and continuous exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two Governments on this important issue. Then we can put on some parsley about how glad we are to have Mr. Stewart and how much we look forward to the Prime Minister's visit. In return, the British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their existing announced approval of our present course of action. They should limit themselves to expressions of hope that a path to a peaceful settlement will come, plus expressions of alertness, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to any opportunities for peaceful settlement which may develop in the future. Bruce thinks that this position will not be easy for Wilson, but that he will find it distinctly preferable to a split with us at this time.

6. David and I have been up and down this problem for an hour this afternoon, and this is our joint recommendation. I will telephone and ask for your views in the morning, and on the basis of what you tell me, I will then do a one-page paper for your use with Stewart. Bruce and I believe that you can be most candid and effective with him if you see him entirely alone, but the meeting can be of any size that you choose. It need not take more than 20 minutes, and the smaller it is the shorter it can be. Our talking paper will cover the stupid fuss over gas, which should not have occurred, as well as press reports of a far-out statement on "escalation without limit" by Max Taylor.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

78

(4)
MC 3/22

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nominee for African Bureau

March 22, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 99-46

By cb, NARA Date 1-19-01

1. You asked me last week for a nominee to run the African Bureau. After hard and careful thought I have one nominee. It is Bob Komer.

2. Komer is by far the ablest man who has touched the African problem in recent years. He has energy and brains and judgment. He understands both the realities of power and those of African nationalism. He works well not only with the State Department but also with Defense and CIA. He has and deserves a reputation for effective loyalty to two Presidents. He would be recognized in the Department of State as a Johnson man.

3. The only hitch is that we would lose him here. But I honestly believe that in a decently organized world an Assistant Secretary can do a lot more, day in and out, than an NSC staff officer. The proof of this fact is in the revolution in Latin American affairs since you put them in order under Tom Mann. Komer could do the same thing in Africa, and there is literally no one in the Career Foreign Service who would have his abilities right away on this front.

4. I think you would find a warm response to this suggestion from George Ball and, to a slightly lesser degree, from Dean Rusk. I know it would be welcomed by McNamara and around the town generally. McNamara has indeed been trying to get Komer as John McNaughton's deputy, but the African Bureau is a much more important assignment. Indeed, if you don't want Bob for the African job, then I would hope that we could keep him here and not let him go to McNaughton.

5. I will leave this one in your hands for discussion with Dean Rusk if you think it worth pursuing. But if for some reason you do not approve of it, I would be grateful if you check the box below because then I will want to come back at you about the problem of keeping Komer here, as against the possibility in the Pentagon.

McG. B.

McG. B.

This doesn't interest me _____

2 79
March 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Eshkol

I attach at Tab A a letter from Prime Minister Eshkol, together with a draft answer at Tab B. I think the Eshkol letter is an unusually understanding one, and I have tried to answer it in the same spirit, while avoiding any direct reference to the agreement since the existing documents should be allowed to stand on their own feet.

McG. B.

79a

3/22/65

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of March 12. I followed very closely your discussions with Governor Harriman and Mr. Komer, and I think your own summary is just right. And I agree with you entirely that our confidence in each other's understanding, goodwill, and friendship is more important than words -- though words are important, too.

I also understand fully the responsibility which you carry for the safety of your land and people, and it helps me to have your generous recognition of the responsibilities that fall to me. I believe that in the future, as in the past, it will be possible for our two Governments to meet their responsibilities for peace and security in the Middle East by policies built on trust and respect for each other. In this task we are fortunate in our traditional friendship for each other -- a friendship which is clear once more in your generous letter.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our warmest good wishes to Mrs. Eshkol and to you.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel
Tel Aviv

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-162

By is, NARS, Date 7-31-84

LBJ:McG. B. :mz

() ()
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

(L) / MK 3-22
Last week you rejected a draft letter to Mayor Yorty on Middle Eastern problems because you didn't want to do anything that might hurt Jimmy Roosevelt. I have now written a much briefer letter of acknowledgment for my own signature, and unless you see objection I will handle it that way.

I did not think about the Roosevelt matter because the initial request from another office was for a draft acknowledgment for your signature. But of course you are right.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Send your letter ✓ as modified 

Speak to me 1

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

80a

March 22, 1965

Dear Mayor Yorty:

The President has asked me to thank you for your note of February 24 on ~~Middle Eastern problems~~, and to say that he appreciates both ~~your thoughtful comments~~ and your expression of support.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Samuel W. Yorty
Mayor of Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90012

(1) ✓ 81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Press Contacts, Week of March 15

On March 15, Crosby Noyes brought in one of his foreign reporters, Mr. Richard Critchfield. Most of the talk was about Crosby's views of Vietnam, which seemed to me a shade less firm than those of his paper, but not really troublesome.

I had dinner that same day with Joe Alsop in honor of Isiah Berlin. The political talk was dominated by your speech to the Joint Session of Congress, which made a deep impression. I also saw Joe for a private lunch on Friday and found him in a good mood on Vietnam, and in a bad mood on the decreasing availability of some of his old friends. He believes that John McCone has ordered a crackdown among CIA people, whom Joe used "for facts" and not for policy comment. He and Reston have discussed a joint demarche to you on this subject. I told him I saw little profit in that kind of pressure, and got him to admit that whatever his difficulties in individual cases, he really has no shortage of access to responsible officials. This is an old battle with Joe. He had one round with President Kennedy and of course had an unending contest with President Eisenhower. He plans to raise this question again with Bill Moyers on Monday.

On March 17 I had lunch with Walter Lippmann and listened to his views on the need for a Wilsonian 14 points on Southeast Asia. Since he envisions a single Titoist Vietnam as the best available outcome, he would like us to come out in favor of the unification of Vietnam. This particular proposal seems foolish to me, certainly at this stage, but much of the rest of what he proposes is in the draft opening statement which I have sent down for your consideration before the press conference today.

I also had very brief phone conversations with Frankel and Hightower from which nothing interesting developed.

*Man
I think all of you
give entirely
too much attention to Joe when the
world is on fire -*

McG. B.
McG. B.

Q

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE

March 18, 1965

782

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telephone service at the Ranch

1. You have previously indicated both to Ted Clifton and to me that you believe that improved telephone service would be arranged at your ranch if the civilian women White House telephone operators were used there rather than the military personnel of the White House Communications Agency Signal Board.

2. We have made a careful analysis of the possibilities of taking girl operators to the ranch, and there seem to be a large number of difficulties. It is felt that in order for you to get continuous similar service, you would need 2 or 3 girls on a shift, and the technical advice of the Bell people themselves is against it.

3. So for this visit we propose a trial arrangement of a compromise solution. When you go to the ranch today, you will find on every call director in the house and office two lines marked "White House Special." These two lines are so arranged that when you pick up the phone a regular White House girl operator in Washington will answer and handle your call. You may wish to use these lines for all your calls except those in the Texas area. We believe the Texas calls can be completed faster on the regular Signal Corps lines.

4. Clifton tells me there is no additional expense in this arrangement. The lines are already available.

5. If at any point during the weekend you do not like this arrangement, it can be discontinued by a call to the Military Aide.

McG. B.

✓ 83

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Dean Acheson's Letter

I share Dean Acheson's view that we need to focus some attention on our European policy, but I am sorry to say that I do not at all share his view that he should be the man to do it. He has extremely firm and well developed ideas which do not really fit the current state of Europe and which you have already had to overcome. If we were to set up a panel report, we would have some of the same problems of containing the results that we have had with the Gilpatric Panel.

What I would suggest instead is that we should agree to plan a statement on European policy sometime in the next couple of months. With plans for a trip to Europe in suspense, this would be a good way of filling a gap. There is every reason to ask Acheson to make suggestions for such a speech and to pull together suggestions of any other members of the panel that we may wish to ask. An informal process of this sort would have all the value and very little of the danger of a more formal consultation. On the other hand, you may feel that I am unnecessarily wary about my old friend Acheson, and I shall be glad to arrange for an Acheson panel on Europe if you really want one.

Thus there seem to be about three choices:

(1) Ask Acheson for informal suggestions for a European speech, together with a memorandum on the substantive issues such a speech should meet.

(2) Ask him in this process to consult with such other members of the panel as he chooses.

(3) Appoint a committee from the panel to give you a private report on European policy.

My suggestion is that we do (1) and (2) but not (3). But if you will check your preference, I will carry it out.

McG. B.

(1)
(1) and (2)
(3)

March 18, 1965

J 84

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cables from Saigon

Attached are copies of 4 interesting Saigon cables.

At Tab 1 is Max's weekly summary
(Saigon 2991)

At Tab 2 is his complaint about excessive
visitors, short but stirring (Saigon 3005)

At Tab 3 is his thoughtful discussion of the
pros and cons of bringing in a U. S. division
(Saigon 3003). This one is being reviewed by
State and Defense as well as in Saigon, but
there is no clear recommendation in sight
in the next few days.

At Tab 4 is an interesting report on morale,
from the Consul in Hue (Saigon 2992).

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1-9-78; NSC 10-31-78
By DCH, NARS, Date 5-22-81

~~SECRET~~

(cy of Saigon 2991, March 17, 65)

84a

The past week was relatively quiet on the internal political front. Quat announced his government's short-term program on March 12, covering the five problem areas of security, foreign affairs, "building democracy", economic and social development, and education and youth. Shrewdly enough, Quat has included some items in his program on which he can already show progress, such as the abolition of certain miscellaneous taxes affecting the lower income groups and the convening in Saigon of a conference of Vietnamese Diplomatic Mission Chiefs.

During the week, the Government also announced that it was investigating one of the peace groups which appeared a week or so ago and that three of the leaders would be turned over to General Thi for "deportation beyond the 17th parallel." Shortly thereafter, Thi announced that he proposed to strap parachutes on them and drop them beyond the 17th parallel, but Quat quickly put a hold order on this proceeding. Indications now are that the culprits will be expelled by more prosaic means on the ground.

It is worth noting that Quat is deliberately keeping himself in the public view. In the period of a few days he has held a well-publicized reception for "out" politicians, met both with the National Legislative Council and the press on his Government's program, has appeared with his diplomatic Mission Chiefs now convened in Saigon, has given a television interview to the three major US networks, and has presided over the inauguration of a conference of Province Chiefs and other representatives. This is all to the good.

The Buddhist institute continues to twist, turn and exhibit signs of uncertain direction. Shortly after Thich Quang Lien issued his peace proclamation last week, the Buddhist Institute issued a communique which seemed directed at pressuring Quang Lien into abandoning his peace movement. At about the same time, Quang Lien handed us his letter to you on which we have reported separately, an action indicating that he is not yet prepared to drop his peace plans. Clearly, the Buddhist Institute is not wholly together on the issue of peace activities and the serious Institute leaders are wrangling over them. Hence, we are withholding comment for the moment on how to respond to Lien--if at all.

I spent Tuesday, March 16 visiting key points in the II Corps where we have been particularly concerned over the declining military situation and the growing refugee problem. I would say that the military situation is looking

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 86-71

By ing, NARS, Date 8-11-86

~~SECRET~~

up somewhat but that the refugee problem is very serious. General Co, commanding II Corps and his Division Commanders are regaining confidence after a week which included a number of local military successes over the Viet Cong. However, the Viet Cong pressure on the civil population of the I and II Corps over recent months has caused some 160,000 men, women and children to leave their homes in the hills and the Piedmont to take refuge in the towns of the coastal plain. They are living huddled in temporary camps, not hungry but unhappy in the squalid dullness of their lives and the uncertainty of their future. The US Mission and the Government are fully alive to the problem and are formulating specific actions and recommendations.

With the growing pressure on North Vietnam, the psychological atmosphere continues to be favorable. What is still missing in this new atmosphere is the image of a Vietnamese Government giving direction and purpose to its people. As noted above, Quat is beginning to pick up speed, but he can not yet be said to have established communication with the Vietnamese people. However, it is too early to say that he may not with time. We will keep pressing.

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This Mission is being overwhelmed by visitors to the detriment of our work. You will recall an understanding which I had upon taking this assignment that, as a matter of practice, I would return to Washington periodically with appropriate Mission representatives to present our problems to senior officials and to respond to their questions. It was also understood that the concurrence of the Ambassador would be sought before visiting Washington officials would be authorized to visit Saigon. This policy was adopted to protect the mission from a crushing load of visitors which had built up over the preceding months (and to which I had frequently contributed) and to assist in holding back Congressional visitations, always just over the horizon.

Thanks to your cooperation and that of other heads of Departments and agencies, this new arrangement was respected for some time and we of the US Mission were most appreciative. However, since I missed my return trip around the first of February, the breaches of the understanding have been so numerous as to constitute the rule rather than the exception and while some of these visits have no doubt been useful, our work has often suffered as a consequence. Every agency of this Mission has been visited by a senior representative of his parent agency (or has attended high-level conferences of his agency in Washington or elsewhere) within the past month so that there should be no present lack of rapport between the field and the home offices. From February 1 through March 15 we have had 407 military visitors and 45 civilian.

In summary, I respectfully request a return of the good old days when my visits were used as the principal occasion for senior discussions and when visits from Washington were rare and the Ambassador's concurrence for them was obtained before the fact.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(Cy of Saigon 3003, Ma h 16, 65)

84c

General Westmoreland has just sought my concurrence in his recommendation for the landing of the third battalion of the 9th Marine Embarked Battalion at Phu Bai for the purpose of protecting the 8th Radio Relay Unit and the air strip there. He intends to move helicopters from Danang to the strip and thereby reduce field congestion at Danang.

Because of the military advantages of thus rounding out the Marine Embarked Battalion, I have no reluctance in agreeing to the merit of his recommendation which, of course, should receive the concurrence of the Government of Vietnam after that of Washington.

This proposal for introducing the Battalion is a reminder of the strong likelihood of additional requests for increases in US Ground Combat Forces in South Vietnam. Such requests may come from the US side, from the Vietnam side, or from both. All of us here are keenly aware of the Government of Vietnam trained military manpower shortage which will exist throughout 1965 and which probably can be rectified only in part by an accelerated mobilization. We will soon have to decide whether to try to get by with inadequate indigenous forces or to supplement them with third country troops, largely if not exclusively US. This matter was discussed with General Johnson during his recent visit who no doubt has raised it following his return to Washington. This message examines the pros and cons of such an action--specifically defined as the introduction of a US division (appropriately modified) into South Vietnam.

The purpose of introducing a division would be primarily to relieve the present shortage of the Army of Vietnam units either by replacing the Army of Vietnam in the defense of key installations or by engaging in active operations against the Viet Cong in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Such a reinforcement would allow a strengthening of military efforts in the I and II Corps areas where the situation is deteriorating and would give a boost to the Government of Vietnam morale, military and civilian. Likewise, it should end any talk of a possible US withdrawal and convince Hanoi of the depth of our resolve to see this thing through to a successful conclusion.

This statement of the purpose of introducing a US division is, in effect, a tabulation of the arguments in favor of so doing. However, there are counter-arguments on the other side of the case. The introduction of a US division, obviously increases US involvement in the counterinsurgency,

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Authority State 7-17-78; OSD 10-4-78

By DCH, NARS, Date 5-22-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

exposes greater forces and invites greater losses. It will raise sensitive command questions with our Government of Vietnam allies and may encourage them to an attitude of "let the United States do it." It will increase our vulnerability to Communist propaganda and third country criticism as we appear to assume the old French role of alien colonizer and conquerer. Finally, there is considerable doubt that the number of Government of Vietnam forces which our action would relieve would have any great significance in reducing the manpower gap.

It is impossible to reach a conclusion with regard to the overall merit of this action without first examining in some detail the possible missions which could be assigned a US Division. There are two obvious possibilities; the first, the assignment of the division to one or more of the Provinces of the high plateau where the climate is good, the terrain relatively open, and the Montagnard population more readily distinguishable from the alien Viet Cong. Here, our forces could utilize their mobility and firepower effectively and make an important contribution in cutting off the growing infiltration into and through this area. For the most part, the Montagnards are friendly to the US and our forces would thus be operating in a relatively friendly environment.

On the other hand, such a mission in the highlands would place our forces in an area with highly exposed lines of communication leading to the coast. Their location in this area would create serious logistic problems because of the difficulty of the movement of land transport through areas infested by the Viet Cong. There would be problems both of reinforcement and of withdrawal because of this precariousness of land communications. Finally, the Government of Vietnam may question the introduction of sizeable US forces into the Montagnard area where we have often been accused of favoring the Montagnards over the Vietnamese and of encouraging Montagnard separatism.

The other role which has been suggested for US Ground Forces is the occupation of defense of key enclaves along the coast such as Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Such a disposition would have the advantage of placing our forces in areas of easy access and egress with minimum logistic problems associated with supply and maintenance. The presence of our troops would assure the defense of these important key areas and would relieve some Government of Vietnam forces for employment elsewhere. The troops would not be called upon to engage in counterinsurgency operations except in their own local defense and hence would be exposed to minimum losses.

TOP SECRET

On the other hand, they would be engaged in a rather inglorious static defensive mission unappealing to them and unimpressive in the eyes of the Vietnamese. Operating in major population areas would maximize the points of contact with the Vietnamese and hence maximize the possible points of friction. The Division would be badly fragmented to the extent that its command, control and supervision would be awkward.

The foregoing analysis leads me to the following tentative conclusions. First, it is not desirable to introduce a US division into South Vietnam unless there are clear and tangible advantages outweighing the numerous disadvantages, many of which have been noted above. One must make a definite determination of the numbers and types of Government of Vietnam forces relieved by the introduction of the US unit and thus the effect of the increased US presence in closing the manpower gap of 1965. Obviously, our division would make some contribution but it remains to be proved that it will be sufficient to reverse the downward trend and give such a lift to the Government of Vietnam forces that they would perform better by the stimulation of the US presence rather than worse in a mood of relaxation at passing the Viet Cong burden to the US.

If the evidence of the probable effectiveness of this US contribution is convincing, then the matter of mission becomes the primary question. The inland mission in the highlands is clearly the more ambitious and, if well done, will make a greater contribution during the present critical period; on the other hand, it is the more exposed and even permits one to entertain the possibility of a kind of Dien Bien Phu if the coastal provinces should collapse and our forces were cut off from the coast except by air.

The coastal enclave Mission is safer, simpler, but less impressive and less productive than the inland Mission. The contrast of the pros and cons of the two suggests the desirability of reexamining the question to see whether the advantages of the inland disposition could not be combined in some way with the retention of a base coastal area, linked with a position inland. In any case, considerable additional study is required before we are prepared to make a recommendation either for the introduction of a division or for the assignment of its mission. In the meantime, we should be giving much thought both in South Vietnam and in Washington as to the right course of action if and when this issue becomes pressing--as it shortly will.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Cy of Saigon 2992, Mar(17)

84 d

Air strikes against North Vietnam, arrival of US Marine battalions, and US jet air strikes from South Vietnam has not produced a strong reaction in Hue. However, all elements of the population seem to welcome them. Buddhist, Catholic, student, university, labor and business leaders whom we have spoken with agree with each other for once in voicing support for these actions. Most do not specify whether they foresee their producing an eventual Viet Cong defeat or a strengthened Government of Vietnam position for negotiations. Few leaders, either Catholic or Buddhist, foresee their producing the downfall of the Hanoi regime. Evidence of support for a "peace movement," has not yet surfaced in Hue. Air strikes against the North have received most attention, initial strikes seemed to have produced a sort of "crisis psychology" in which the people are nervous, but hopeful that strikes would produce an end of the war on favorable terms. Lack of Viet Cong reaction to continued strikes has lessened the fears of Viet Cong reprisals.

General Thi reports that villagers and militia in the area surrounding recent US jet airstrikes against the Viet Cong in Quang Nam Province literally jumped for joy and excitement while observing the jets overhead. The reaction in Hue to the use of US jets in South Vietnam and the arrival of US Marines at Danang appears uniformly favorable.

These actions, together with strikes against North Vietnam, are taken as evidence of US determination to continue aid to South Vietnam.

No evidence is available that the more extreme students are putting the presence of US Marines into the context of "imperialism," although the possibility of their doing so in any future political crisis cannot be ruled out.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-13-99

March 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a good package from Bob Komer on the next steps on the urgent business of dealing with Nasser in the wake of our Jordan and Israeli bargains. I will call and ask your judgment on this in the morning.

We all join in recommending the relatively long form to Nasser (Tab A), but if you prefer a more general letter the substance of this can be re-framed as part of Battle's instructions. The reason for the long letter is simply that Nasser sets great store by communications from the President of the United States, and this letter, a straightforward but solid statement from you, is probably the best insurance we have against an explosion from Cairo.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

March 17, 1965

✓
Hawley

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Now that we're over the hump with Israel and Jordan is expected to sign up on the 18th, it is urgent we bring Nasser into the picture. We did so on the HAWK sale to Israel in 1962, and it helped forestall a violent reaction. Nasser may still blow up, but a high level approach to him will at least reduce this risk and at any rate prevent him from claiming that we're acting behind his back.

An additional reason for moving fast is that the Israeli arms matter is leaking steadily.

The method we propose is a friendly but not apologetic letter from you, which avoids details, and an oral fill-in by Ambassador Battle. This protects you, though we strongly doubt Nasser would violate your confidence lest he close up a useful channel. He never has before.

The letter has been carefully drafted to give Nasser the minimum number of handles for response. Its length is both to make the best case for arms to Israel and to avoid highlighting this too starkly. It gently tells him that sales to Jordan and Israel are exceptions to our continuing policy, and that we won't go overboard in arming Israel if he will show restraint in getting Soviet arms. It also renews our offer to explore mutual arms controls as a better road, and ends up by saying we hope to continue economic cooperation if he'll let us do so. The letter is on green for signature, so you don't have to approve it twice.

Also attached for info are Battle's talking points, which expand on the same themes.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *Guidelines*
By *plg* NARA, Date *8-13-12*

(19) 87

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Carl Rowan's report to you of his mission (Tab 2) is a good document and it is possible that you will want to read it all the way through. But here is a summary:

1. We need unified control and direction of psychological warfare under USIA.
2. We need a substantially increased effort which can be supported largely by other agencies, but will need additional money within USIA.
3. There will be a difficult and continuing problem of getting the Vietnamese to do their minimum necessary part of the job.

Within this general framework Rowan makes a number of sensible administrative recommendations and proposes increased personnel and equipment for propaganda in the field.

He also asks for:

- a high priority on loud-speaker-equipped aircraft and helicopters;
- an increased administrative role for his people in the field (there is doubt in other departments about his particular solution, but none about the need to improve matters);
- increased broadcasting, both radio and television;
- increased training of Vietnamese broadcasters;
- increased GVN propaganda abroad;
- a greatly improved program to encourage and use defectors from the Viet Cong;
- increased Pentagon efforts in training psychological warfare officers;

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

and a start on a new Embassy building to prove that we are in Saigon to stay (this is really not a USIA matter, but Taylor agrees with Rowan).

Rowan is going to send you a separate memorandum reporting on the stiffness of existing relations between the United States and Vietnamese Governments at the top level. This is a problem which I think you already recognize.

I have checked with State and Defense and I find general support for Rowan's approach and a readiness to encourage USIA in going forward. Kermit Gordon agrees that these things will need more money, but he is not yet prepared to accept Rowan's suggestion of a FY-66 supplemental, since he thinks you may wish to have Rowan find the money elsewhere in his own budget. (That of course always dampens a man's enthusiasm.)

I have drafted a memorandum from you to Rowan at Tab 1 which gives him a general order to get cracking on his program, while reserving the necessary rights and interests of yourself and others. In particular, I have reserved the question of control of the program for Viet Cong defectors because this extremely important and neglected matter may well be too big to go under Zorthian, good as he is.

This is a first step in response to your general instruction at luncheon yesterday. It is designed to be consistent with additional recommendations that will come next week, and I think you may not want to lose seven days in capitalizing on Rowan's good report and his readiness to act.

McG. B.

McG. B.


Memo to Rowan approved and signed _____

Memo not approved and not signed _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

87a



87b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 325

TO: THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

1. I have reviewed your memorandum of March 16 on the informational and psychological warfare programs in South Vietnam. With the exception noted in paragraph 5, I hereby give my general approval to the rapid and effective execution of the improvements you propose. This approval is subject to review and concurrence by Ambassador Taylor. I am sending the Ambassador a private message to indicate my own interest in the strongest possible information and psychological warfare program, but I shall also inform him that I do not wish to override his judgment on the effectiveness of particular programs and particular patterns of administration.

2. By copy of this memorandum I request the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development to give all possible support to an intensified information and psychological warfare program along the lines developed in your report.

3. By copy of this memorandum I request the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to review with you and as necessary with other agencies the financial implications of such an intensified program and to make his recommendation to me as to the best way of meeting any additional costs.

4. Meanwhile, you are directed to proceed with all necessary actions on the firm understanding that it is my fixed policy that no worthwhile undertaking shall be inhibited or delayed in any way by financial restrictions. We can and will find the resources we need for all good programs in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By jis, NARA Date 5-5-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. This memorandum does not cover the problem of Viet Cong defectors discussed in paragraphs 11 and 13 of your memorandum. I agree that this problem is of high importance, but I do not at present wish to make a judgment on the best arrangements for U. S. action to deal with it.

Copies to:

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator of the Agency for International
Development

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

87c



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for B. K. Nehru

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-142

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

1. The attached request for an appointment for B. K. Nehru was obviously signed by Dean Rusk before our luncheon party today. Still, it presents a question which I think you may want to decide yourself.

2. More than most Ambassadors, Nehru is a man of vanity whose reporting is much affected by whether he feels well treated. He feels you are not much interested in India or him, and hints of his feelings have gone back to India, where our Embassy has picked them up. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that you could turn him around in ten minutes. The question is whether it is worth it.

3. My feeling about it is that it makes sense to do it simply because the future of India is the most important open question in Asia. We are trying hard to get a major set of good new Johnson ideas for your meeting with Shastri, and it would help to send Nehru home with a feeling that you are looking forward to that visit. The man who can do this best is yourself.

4. Like Senators, Ambassadors respond best to the President, not to anyone else.

5. If you do see Nehru, we would give you a single sheet with about four talking points -- on Indian economic progress, on Indian defense, on the Shastri visit, and on Vietnam.

6. If you don't want to do it, I would of course be glad to do my best as a substitute.

M.C.B.

McG. B.

I will see him _____

You see him _____

Leave him to the State Department _____

No use of my
seeing him if the
feels this way
A

(51) (16)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two messages to Prime Minister Wilson

Here are draft answers to two messages from Wilson -- a short one this morning on your address to the Congress, and the longer one of last week on his visit with Erhard.

The answer to this morning's message is very brief. The other is longer and is designed to be straightforward without being effusive. By separate channels (Harlech and Galbraith) I have sent the Prime Minister all sorts of warnings about his April visit and Vietnam, and I think it is better not to raise ~~the~~ topics in these messages.

This morning's message is at Tab 1 -- the draft answer is at Tab 2. The Prime Minister's message about his meeting with Erhard is at Tab 3 -- the draft answer is at Tab 4.

m.c.s.
McG. B.

Messages approved ✓ *With Changes*

Not approved _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

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FROM PRIME MINISTER

11862

TO PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1100/65

MESSAGE BEGINS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY I ADD MY WARM THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS TO THE
COUNTLESS OTHERS YOU MUST BE RECEIVING FOR YOUR COURAGEOUS
STAND BEFORE CONGRESS OVER SELMA.

THOUGH THIS IS IN ONE SENSE A DOMESTIC AMERICAN MATTER,
THE PROBLEM OF RACE IS ONE THAT FACES ALL OF US WHO CARE
FOR THE FUTURE OF MANKIND, SINCE IT IS ONE THAT COULD DIVIDE
THE WORLD MORE BITTERLY THAN IDEOLOGY. WHAT YOU HAVE SAID
AND DONE WILL ENCOURAGE MEN AND WOMEN FAR BEYOND THE BORDERS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILL GIVE THE FREE WORLD THE
INSPIRATION IT NEEDS TO TACKLE THIS, PERHAPS THE TOUGHEST
AND MOST TRAGIC OF ALL THE WORLDS PROBLEMS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE ENDS

03.25 ZULU

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 16, 1965

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

Thanks very much for your generous message about my address to the Congress. You are certainly right when you say that this is only part of a world-wide problem, and while of course we must deal with it here as an American matter, I am struck myself by the degree to which our people recognize more and more that our progress on this front is a matter of more than national importance.

###

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

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~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1965

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

When we last spoke on the telephone, I said that I would let you know how I got on during my visit to Berlin and Bonn which has just taken place.

As it turned out, it was a very good thing that my trip should have started with the visit to Berlin. This enabled me to make an act of presence in the city and to make a speech re-affirming British determination, together with our allies, to safeguard the freedom of the city. The demonstration and the speech acted as a useful curtain raiser and set the tone for my subsequent talks in Bonn with the Federal Chancellor.

My talks with Erhard covered four main points:

- (1) The nuclear organization of the Alliance
- (2) Reunification
- (3) European problems including measures to improve the cohesion of the continent and bring EFTA and EEC closer together and
- (4) The offset agreement

In addition I had a private session with him, as between two retired or reformed economists, on the British economic situation. This gave a chance for me to say what I thought about Rueff and all his works and for Erhard to say that he totally disagreed with de Gaulle about the gold standard. Erhard indicated clearly, without actually committing himself, that we could expect German support when we apply for our fund drawing later in the year.

As to nuclear matters, it soon became very clear that whatever Shroeder's views might be, Erhard was not going to have anything to do with nuclear matters this side of the German elections. It is clear that the only way that Erhard can preserve his relationship with de Gaulle and the unity of his party is by putting nuclear matters on ice for the time being. When I told Erhard that I assumed he wanted the MLF and ANF to be a sort of sleeping beauty he did not disagree. The wording in the communique represents the compromise between the British desire not to lose momentum and the German wish to forget about it for the time being. I would judge that there is no progress to be made on this until after the German elections.

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 13, #76

By jc, NARA, Date 6/6/02

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- 2 -

The one thing that the Germans were really interested in, again for electoral reasons, was some demonstration of public activity to which they could point on the re-unification front. I made it quite clear that, in practical terms, re-unification can only come as a result of a period of detente with the Soviet Union and could not be made a condition for detente: and in agreeing to remit the matter to the Ambassadorial Group, I was careful not to commit myself to any specific project. Although the Germans would like progress in time for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in May, they may be able to live with a minimum of demonstrable activity on the subject with their Western allies.

On the economic organization of Europe, I found Erhard equally concerned as I was myself to prevent the further division of Europe by allowing the gulf between the Common Market and EFTA to widen. He is a strong proponent of liberal outward-looking policies, and, privately, indicated that as an economist, he did not think much of the present agricultural arrangements of the Common Market. It was however a price that had to be paid. I am myself instituting a study here of ways and means of mitigating the effect of present divisions and hope to come up with some useful ideas.

We had some very tough sessions on the offset agreement but since you have yourselves virtually equipped the German armed forces, there does not seem to be much for us in that line. However Erhard undertook to issue a directive to his people to try harder and the fact of the directive was written into the communique. We shall give them a couple of months and then if necessary send the chief secretary, who is a very tough character, back to Bonn to re-negotiate the whole process. We left the Germans in no doubt that if we did not get satisfaction on this point, we should be forced to agonizing re-appraisals.

All in all the talks were tough but constructive. The visit was well worth while and has, I hope, generated the right sort of atmosphere for the Queen's state visit in May.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

3/16/65

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MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

I am slow in sending a proper acknowledgement to your helpful message of ^{Monday 11} ~~last week~~ about your visit to Chancellor Erhard. I am very glad to have your account of this meeting, and we agree with your assessment that the visit was a real success. The Germans clearly liked what you said and did in Bonn and Berlin, and the atmosphere created by the meeting should help in the growth of ^{the} close and effective relations between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic which are so important to the future both of Europe and of the Atlantic world.

On nuclear matters, I share your view that the Germans do not want to do anything serious between now and their election. I think it is wise, however, to use these intervening months for a very careful review of this whole problem, so that we can be ready to move ahead in whatever way seems most likely to be effective after September. You can be sure that we will be interested in taking a strong and active part in such discussions, just as we shall be ready to carry our full share of responsibility in working out the best possible means of concrete progress after September.

Eliminate
~~I have seen a number of reports suggesting that somehow we have given up on this problem or abandoned our interest in an effective solution. That is simply not true, and you can be sure that we will continue to play our full part in working for a solution that meets the real interests of those allies who share our desire to find a common answer.~~

~~SECRET~~

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3/16/65

Your understanding with the Chancellor on procedural arrangements for reunification is clearly a useful step. There now seems to be general agreement for consideration of the German proposals in the Ambassadorial group. I have myself assured the German Ambassador that we will deal sympathetically and constructively with any suggestions that can advance a sound German settlement. I think that with care we can find a way of meeting their legitimate interest without the disadvantages of seeming to advance wholly unrealistic proposals.

On the economic organization of Europe, we of course share your concern over protectionist and inward-looking tendencies.

We will be very much interested in any ideas and suggestions that you and your people may come up with for dealing with these tendencies and for narrowing the gap between the Common Market and EFTA.

have talked with *last week* *told*
I ~~will be seeing~~ Hallstein ~~later this week~~ and I ~~expect to tell~~ him directly of the importance which we attach to progress in the Kennedy Round in agriculture as well as in industry. This ~~effort~~ is not a matter merely of narrow economic interest -- it is near the center of our effort to expand the sense of partnership of the Atlantic community.

I am not surprised that you had tough sessions on ~~the~~ *offset* *offset* ~~agreement~~. *pay ment* We have had some of those ourselves. On the other hand, it is good to know that the German Government does not share the monetary notions of the French, and I was glad to learn of Erhard's preliminary

~~SECRET~~

-3-

3/16/65

attitude toward your coming fund-drawing. As you know, we are acting energetically to improve our own balance of payments, and we know how important a topic this will be for you too in the coming weeks.

I look forward to ~~meeting your new Foreign Secretary next week~~
~~and to~~ your visit in April, which I understand will follow the talks you will be having with General de Gaulle. ~~We will then have a good chance to take a look at all the urgent issues before us.~~

###

~~SECRET~~

File
do not send 90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bob Komer's Future

1. I told you some weeks ago that Bob McNamara would like to get Bob Komer over to the Pentagon as John McNaughton's deputy. Your first reaction was that we ought to keep Komer here, and I have asked Bob to hold the matter up until we could get it settled. Now Komer is back from his outstandingly skillful mission to Israel, and we need to make a decision.

2. My own first reaction was that it would be reasonable and good for Komer to move along. He has been in his present job for four years, and I believe that men should move around from time to time. Service on my staff has been a quiet and anonymous business, and Komer is a man of great energy and proper ambition who has naturally wanted to move up when he could.

3. But after his adventures in Tel Aviv, Komer has begun to change his mind. He feels closer to you, and he has felt with renewed force the fascination of serving as a White House staff man. My own judgment has also been altered, both by the quality of his work in Tel Aviv and by his renewed willingness to stay.

4. So I now think that it would be best to keep Komer, but in order to make his change of mind durable, and in order to give him some well-earned recognition, I would like your permission to make a change which is long overdue. I would like to make him a member of the White House Staff, while keeping his pay and administration in the National Security Council. This would end an anomaly which has troubled him and two or three of my other senior people ever since 1961 -- they work directly for me and at least indirectly for you, but their official standing is that of staff officers of the National Security Council, and unfortunately the term "NSC Staff" has no real weight in the government. Actually, knowledgeable people already think of them as members of the White House Staff, or at least the "Bundy staff," and that is what I would now like to make official.

5. The way to do this, I think, is to give to Bob first, and presently to a few others, the title of "Assistant to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs." This requires no Presidential appointment, and it would

March 15, 1965

put these people on the same basis as Larry O'Brien's staff, which is the nearest analogy we have.

6. I know Presidents prefer to keep White House titles from multiplying, and that is why I left the present situation alone for four years. But if you share my view that a man of Komer's caliber is really of more value here than he would be as John McNaughton's deputy, then I think this small form of recognition is worth it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Pres 2

*Rec'd
3/15/65
12:45 p.m.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Hold for
0830
mudon, 91
my 13*

March 15, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

These daily memoranda may be helpful to you, or they may tell you more than you want to know. If you will check your preference, we will follow it.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Keep sending this ✓

Do it more briefly

I could use even more ✓

*check
you up*

CONFIDENTIAL

March 15, 1965

92

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Walter Lippmann and Foreign Policy

1. You have handled Walter so well in the past that all I really have to suggest is that you give him "more of the same."
2. Vietnam is of course the center of his concern. He has supported the policy of limited air strikes so far because he hopes you will negotiate just as soon as you can. He does not think there is any real hope in South Vietnam, and on this he accepts the smug pessimism of Couve and U Thant. He probably fears that you are in danger of being taken in by McNamara and me; I think he likes us both, but I think he remembers our connection with the Bay of Pigs.
3. Like the rest of us, Walter is always flattered when he is asked for his own opinion, and he is genuinely discreet. It might therefore be useful to ask him what kind of settlement he would work for in Southeast Asia and how he would hope to get there. I doubt if he will be very concrete or persuasive on the subject -- any more than his French friends.
4. The one issue on which Walter has been critical is on what he thinks is your effort to smother debate in a general consensus (I attach his NEWSWEEK column of last week). I would deal with this by explaining exactly what you have and have not done. You have done your best to explain your view of the matter to the public and to political colleagues. They are quite free to oppose you if they choose, but they are not free to make statements that you regard as damaging and pretend that they are speaking as your friends and supporters. (This is exactly what Frank Church has tried to do.)
5. Finally, I hope you might want to have a word with Walter about the practical ways and means of building up our efforts for peace and good works in the world while we are necessarily engaged in meeting a crisis in Vietnam. I myself think this is a gap in our current policy, and I think he might well have some good ideas about it.

McG. B.

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By DCH On 9-29-81

92a

WALTER LIPPMANN

ON

CAN THE QUESTION OF WAR BE DEBATED?



On March 1 at a meeting concerned with the education of scientists, the President interpolated a few remarks about Americans here at home who are debating his policy in Vietnam. The President showed himself so much annoyed at the "folks who don't understand" that he just barely stopped short of denying their right to disagree with him. He did go as far as to say that the wars of this century were "brought about" because the non-interventionists led the Kaiser, Hitler, and the Japanese to believe that they could move without American interference. If the President's version of history is correct, it follows that when there is an issue of war and peace, the only safe and patriotic course is to suspend all debate and rally around the President.

On a number of counts, I find this attitude very disturbing. For one thing, it amounts to saying that debate on the vital issues of war and peace gives aid and comfort to the enemy. Under such a rule, the American people would have had no right to debate the momentous question of whether in 1917 and in 1939 they should emerge from the isolationism which they had practiced since Washington's Farewell Address and the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine.

This is an impossible rule of conduct for a free people. Today there is an issue in Indochina which cannot be left undebated, and it cannot be entrusted blindly to the President and Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. In Indochina for the first time in our history we are waging a unilateral war against Asians on the mainland of Asia. In the Korean War, let us remember, we were the agents of the United Nations and were supported on the battlefields by contingents drawn from Europe and Asia. But what is going on now is a radical innovation in United States foreign policy.

How else but by debate are the great questions of war and peace—of isolation and intervention, and of military expansion onto the Asian continent—to be decided?

A Major Fallacy. There is an even more seriously disturbing aspect of the President's remarks. There is a major fallacy in the notion that conformity and silence will convince our adversaries that the United States will prevail and that they must yield. The fallacy is that the issues of war

and peace are determined by the state of American opinion at home rather than by the balance of forces abroad. I realize perfectly well that in Hanoi or Peking they may like to read Senator Church's speeches or even the dissents of an occasional journalist. But it is a great delusion to think that this has any decisive effect on what they do in Hanoi or Peking. What they do will be determined by the realities as they see them in Asia, and not by how they read the Gallup poll in the United States.

The state of American opinion at home, and the balance of dissent and consent within it, is very important. But assessing opinion must not be mistaken for the conduct of foreign policy. I sometimes wonder whether this mistake is not now being made, and if the reports of the polls are not being treated as more important than the hard intelligence we may have about Southeast Asia.

A Dangerous Self-Delusion. There is a difference not only of degree, but a difference in kind, between the conduct of domestic American affairs and the conduct of foreign affairs. In domestic affairs, when a consensus of Americans has been worked out, the legislation will pass and the country will accept it. But in foreign affairs, a consensus of Americans does not settle anything. The adversary, the reluctant allies, the neutrals, do not participate in the American consensus, and it is, therefore, a dangerous self-delusion to suppose that because we at home are all agreed, we can compel all the others to agree with us.

At the bottom of this self-delusion, if we search deeply enough, we shall find a visceral feeling that, as compared with foreigners, we are always right and never wrong. If therefore we are agreed among ourselves, none can withstand us because none should withstand us, and we shall and must prevail. This same visceral feeling has engendered the demand, which made a botch of the settlement of both world wars, for unconditional surrender as the only victory which Americans can accept.

In expecting conformity and silence at this stage—when the great decisions of war or peace in Asia are still in the making—the President may evoke those visceral feelings which, if they are sufficiently excited, will make the whole business before him unmanageable.

March 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press contacts, week of March 8 - 14

1. I saw Scotty Reston at length last Tuesday. He was selling, not buying -- and what he was selling was the notion of allied peace-keeping forces outside the UN, and U. S. nuclear help to a united Europe. I told him I thought the first of these ideas was better than the second, but he has since put them forward with equal zeal in a couple of rather sophomoric columns.

2. I did a background lunch for the Overseas Press Writers on Wednesday, and the stories written by those who were there were thoughtful and untroublesome. The one poor result was a story written second-hand by Heren of the London Times, who wholly misinterpreted a hearsay account of my remarks and asserted that we were now planning on a permanent presence in Southeast Asia. Since no reporter who actually attended the meeting reached any such conclusion, the State Department knock-down of Heren's story has been effective.

3. I spoke to Doug Cornell of AP at your suggestion, and got them to rewrite their initial wire story on Lord Harlech's appointment with you so as to make it clear that he was not kept waiting for an hour, but simply used the time for a last meeting on a number of substantive matters with me.

4. I sat next to Kay Graham at dinner this week and heard a very lively account of her trip around the world, which she enjoyed enormously. She reported that she had run into a good deal of criticism of our "image" overseas, and I think there is a good deal in what she says. For a number of reasons we have lost ground in the sympathies of the underdeveloped world outside this hemisphere, and it might be wise for us to put some time on this problem at lunch on Tuesday.

But on topic A -- Vietnam -- Kay Graham told me she was all for firmness, and she expressed some distress at the "softness" of Adlai Stevenson, who was her house guest at the time.

McG. B.

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March 14, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dean Rusk's message to British
Foreign Secretary

1. Dean Rusk has asked me to send you the attached draft message from himself to the British Foreign Secretary.

2. I told Dean that on the basis of our discussions last week, I thought this draft was more friendly to British "soundings" than you might want. He said he would like to discuss the matter with you tomorrow, and asked that I send this draft over for you to read beforehand.

3. I have marked with question marks where it seems that the message may go further than we now want.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 83-191
By ics, NARS, Date 10-1-84

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~~SECRET~~

INFO: Amembassy LONDON ~~IMMEDIATE~~ IMMEDIATE
Amembassy VIENTIANE
Amembassy SAIGON
Amembassy BANGKOK
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS

EXDIS

Please deliver following message to Foreign Secretary from Secretary.

? In connection with Mr. Gromyko's visit to London next week, it may be helpful for me to review our thinking with regard to the two useful initiatives you have taken with the Russians on Vietnam and Laos. As I understand it, there has been no substantive Soviet reaction to either of these initiatives, but Gromyko may well have something to say when you see him.

With regard to the Co-Chairman action on Vietnam we continue to see advantage in using this machinery for sounding out the positions of the countries most directly concerned and keeping channels open for indications which we hope will appear that the Communists are getting ready to talk meaningfully. We would not, however, urge to you to press this proposal on the Russians any harder than you would wish to for your own reasons, since we are satisfied that there are other channels of contact through

RE: MCTrueheart: LUnger: gm 3/13/65

The Secretary

White House
EUR Duty Officer (subs.)

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
Authority State Ltr 11-8-76
By DC H, NARS, Date 9-29-81

SECRET

which indications could reach us. We would have no objection, incidentally, to your telling the Russians, if they inquire or if you feel ^{it} ~~this~~ would be useful to volunteer, that you had discussed the idea of soundings by the Co-Chairmen with us and that we support it.

With regard to action under Article 19 of the Protocol to the 1962 Laos Accords, our interest is twofold, aside from the obligation the Article itself places on the Co-Chairmen. ~~Secondly, we wish to keep a negotiating track~~ ^{First,} open because of its possible usefulness in pressing for full compliance with the 1962 Accords, which remains our basic objective in Laos. While the situation in Laos in many ways has improved, I am sure you would agree it is far from stable and I think we should keep up pressure to make of the ICC and the 1962 Accords in general as effective instruments as possible. At the same time I realize that fundamental improvements may be out of the question until the North Vietnamese are ready to abandon their infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and therefore I would not press for any talks or actions growing out of Article 19 which could upset the present equilibrium in Laos, however precarious ^{as it is.} ~~the situation~~

We also ~~on the other hand, we~~ see the possibility that Co-Chairman action under Article 19 might at some stage be of use also in the Vietnamese situation. There is a clear interrelation between the Laos and Vietnam questions to be found in the problem of infiltration. Depending on how the Vietnamese situation develops in coming weeks and months I can see the possibility of our wishing to suggest inserting it for discussion (formally or quite informally, in the corridors or

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

around the table, in talks between the Co-Chairmen themselves; ~~in the situation~~
~~where the Co-Chairmen, three IGC countries and Laos perhaps with the addition~~
~~of the US and Communist China~~ or into a larger-scale ~~conference~~ talks.

In connection with the possible Article 19 discussions I note that we are in full agreement that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is the representative of the Royal Laotian Government and that it would be up to him to convey to the Co-Chairmen, in the manner he saw fit, the views of any of the three factions in Laos.

Finally,
there remains always the possibility that it might eventually be deemed useful to have the Article 19 consultations lead into a full conference of the Geneva signatories. This, however, is in my view for later decision in the light of developments in the consultations themselves and, perhaps, of developments in Vietnam.

I believe you will find little that is new in the above, but I hope it will, for your own information of course, be of some help to you to have an up-to-date statement of our views on these topics. I should be very glad to hear how your talks go with Mr. Gromyko and will be looking forward to our own talks in Washington later in the month.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

FORRESTAL

97

March 13, 1965

Dear Mike:

I have just learned that your resignation from the National Security Council staff takes effect at the end of next week. I have known and understood the reasons which have led to your decision that you must return in due course to your firm in New York, but I cannot let you leave without expressing my warm appreciation for all that you have done here in Washington.

I know of no field of service more demanding than that of staff assistance to the President in national security affairs. You have served in the high tradition of your family, and your service has been marked by outstanding ability, insight, and understanding. You will be greatly missed in this Administration, and I hope that as the years pass the time may come when you will feel able to return to Government service.

With renewed thanks and warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Mr. Michael V. Forrestal
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:McGB:ab

Raid
3/12/65
5:15 p.m.

97a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mike Forrestal is leaving at the end of next week, and I know he would greatly value a farewell letter from you. I attach a possible letter at Tab A. Forrestal has been making up his mind to go back to New York for many months, and the decision crystallized shortly after the election. I am not sure I fully understand the reasons for it, but I think they are compounded of family problems (his mother is not well), professional problems (it is unwise to leave the law very long at his age unless one wishes to leave it for good), and problems here in Washington (I think he has wanted a substantial promotion which the rest of us have not quite thought him ready for.) But he has done very good work and he deserves at least a gentle pat on the back as he leaves. If you were willing to see him for a minute to say good-by, I know that he would appreciate that too.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Letter approved
Yes ☒
No ☐

Make an appointment
Yes ☒
No ☐

11:15 Thursday, 18 March

Rec'd
3/12/65
2:45 p.m.

98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Salinity Problem with Mexico

We agreed in late January on the text of a proposed five-year agreement with Mexico in an effort to reach a practical solution to the salinity problem. We have been checking it out since then with domestic interests to make certain it is acceptable before signature. The text of the agreement, in the form of a Boundary Commission Minute, is attached.

We have also worked out a five-year truce under which both countries agree to negotiate remaining differences instead of going to the World Court. The chief remaining difference is Mexico's claim for damages which State is thinking of disposing of in a loan to help rehabilitate the Mexicali Valley.

State and Interior are working on a memorandum of understanding between them to define the responsibility of each agency for carrying out the proposed agreement.

Udall and Mann consider the proposed settlement as better than generally thought possible and recommend we accept it.

The seven Colorado Basin States were consulted at a meeting at Phoenix on January 26-27. The seven Governors have now written you accepting the agreement with some reservation, expressing their appreciation for the close consultation with them, and commending the negotiators. Interior believes it has satisfied the Governors on their reservations. It is recommended you reply in general terms to the Governors and leave the technical points for Secretary Udall to handle.

Senators Hayden and Anderson and Congressman Aspinall have accepted the agreement. However, Senator Hayden made his approval subject to the condition that you would send up a budget amendment for FY 1966 requesting the \$2.2 million needed to complete the \$5 million in works called for in the agreement (Interior has \$2.8 million), and \$3 million to start a \$7 million 17-well ground water recovery project in the Yuma area.

Interior recommends that you accept Hayden's conditions. Budget concurs, but recommends that Hayden be informed that the 94-well ground water recovery program in the Yuma area, of which the 17-well project is a part, poses difficult problems in our relations with Mexico, which must be studied thoroughly. The Administration's commitment is, therefore, limited to the 17 wells. Mexico has protested the 94-well ground water recovery program, but State interposes no objections to the 17 wells. Budget will send separately the proposed budget amendment for your signature and transmission to the Congress.

We considered the possibility of a ceremony in connection with the signing of the agreement. Mexico is opposed. They regard the agreement as a hard bargain, and thus difficult to sell politically in Mexico. Simultaneous Presidential announcements of the settlement are planned at the time of signing. I will recommend the draft of such a statement after it has been worked out with Mexico.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached letters to the Governors of the Basin States.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____


2. That you approve the Budget amendment.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

3. That you authorize the signature of the proposed agreement with Mexico.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

McG. B.
McGeorge Bundy



The settlement requires construction of a dirt canal at a cost to us of about \$5 million along the left bank of the Colorado River beginning at the end of the present Wellton-Mohawk drainage canal in Arizona and extending downstream to a point below Morelos Dam, the point at which Mexico diverts its Colorado River water. During most of the winter and possibly for some periods in the summer, the salty water from Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District will be bypassed through this extension channel and wasted to the Gulf of California. The rest of the water in the river is of fairly good quality, and Mexico will accept it.

DRAFT 1/13/65 p.m.

MINUTE NO. 218RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY PROBLEM

The Commission met in the office of the Mexican Section in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, at 10:00 a.m. on January ____, 1965, to comply with instructions it has received from the two Governments, to consider measures "to reach a permanent and effective solution" of the problem of the salinity of the waters of the Colorado River which reach Mexico, as contemplated in the Presidential Communiques of March 16 and June 30, 1962 and February 22, 1964.

The Commission reviewed the measures which the two Governments have taken to date to alleviate temporarily the problem of salinity of waters of the lower Colorado River, and noted the reduction which has occurred in the salinity of drainage waters from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District and that continued improvement is anticipated.

The Commission, with the scientific and engineering studies made by both Governments as a basis, thereupon adopted the following Resolution, subject to the approval of the two Governments, embodying the following

Recommendations:

1. That the United States construct at its expense an extension to the present Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage conveyance channel, with capacity of 353 cubic feet (10 cubic meters) per second, along the left bank of the Colorado River to a point below Morelos Dam, and a control structure in that extension of the channel in the reach between Morelos Dam and the mouth of the Araz Drain, which structure would permit the

discharge of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters to the bed of the river at a point either above or below Morelos Dam.

2. That the Commission permit execution of the works which may be required for the extension channel to pass through Morelos Dam.

3. That the extension channel and control structure proposed in Recommendation 1 be operated and maintained by the United States at its expense to discharge all of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters below Morelos Dam, except those which are discharged above the Dam on the days and at such rates as Mexico may request in writing.

4. That during the life of the present Minute and subject to the reservations of Recommendation 11, the Commission account for Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters as a part of those described in the provisions of Article 10 of the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944, with the understanding a) that on the days for which Mexico requests water at the minimum winter rate of deliveries of 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second, the United States control waters reaching the limitrophe section of the Colorado River so that without including Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters, their flows be not less than 800 cubic feet (22.7 cubic meters) per second, their average flow be not less than 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second for the total of such days during each winter period for which the minimum rate is requested, and that the computation of that average flow not take into account flows in excess of 1000 cubic feet (28.3 cubic meters) per second; and b) that

the winter periods in reference extend from October 1 of each year through February of the next following year.

5. That throughout the life of this Minute, Mexico schedule water at the minimum rate of deliveries of 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second, for the maximum practical number of days during each winter period, and for not less than 90 days.

6. That the pumping of Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters which are to be delivered to Mexico above Morelos Dam be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with Mexico's scheduled deliveries of water at the northerly boundary in order to minimize the salinity of these deliveries; with the understanding that during the period October 1 to February 10 the United States pump insofar as practicable from the more saline wells in the District, and also during other periods when the total quantity of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters is discharged below Morelos Dam.

7. That the United States endeavor to conclude arrangements to permit discontinuance of discharge of waters from the canal wasteways of the Yuma County Water Users' Association to the bed of the Colorado River below Morelos Dam, and if necessary for this purpose, construct and operate, at the expense of the United States, works needed so that such waters be delivered near San Luis, Arizona, and San Luis, Sonora; that Mexico pay for the increased cost of pumping which may be required to discharge these waters to Mexico at the delivery point near San Luis, Arizona, and San Luis, Sonora.

8. That this Minute be in effect during a period of five years, beginning on the date on which the extension to the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage conveyance channel is placed in operation; and that during this period the Commission review conditions which gave rise to the problem and in due time determine whether, in keeping with the purpose expressed by both Governments of achieving a permanent and effective solution, a new Minute ~~(should)~~ be adopted to become effective upon termination of this period.

9. That construction by the United States of works contemplated in this Minute be completed and the works be placed in operation by October 1, 1965, subject to the appropriation of funds by the United States Congress to implement this Minute.

10. That this Minute be specifically approved by both Governments.

11. That the provisions of this Minute not constitute any precedent, recognition, or acceptance affecting the rights of either country, with respect to the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944, and the general principles of law.

The meeting then adjourned.

Rec'd
3/11/65
6:40pm

21
99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Max Taylor's weekly report received today. The attachment at Tab A is one you have seen before, but I thought you might want it because it is referred to in the body of the telegram.

There is nothing sharply new here. Max continues to believe that a "sustained program of air action" is the best immediate remedy. In the light of our discussions at Camp David, such a program is now being prepared by McNamara for your prompt consideration.

McG. B.

McG. B.

1:00 PM
3-11-65

12
102

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Fulbright's letter on
his talk with Tito

I attach a draft answer (Tab A) to a letter which Bill Fulbright sent you last week (Tab B) on his long talk with Tito last November. At Tab C is a summary which I have had prepared, and at Tab D is a long memorandum of conversation.

David L. O'Brien

McG. B.

McG. B.

Reid
3/11/65
3:00 P.M.

(17)
103

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Tito

Attached is a sharply revised version of the State Department proposed answer to President Tito. At Tab A is Tito's original message to you. The thought is that the answer should be made public after delivery. I have tried to reframe it so that it concentrates attention on aggression from the North and gives no hand-hold whatever for "negotiation."

McG. B.

McG. B.

Approved  _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

March 12, 1965

103a

To: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

The President has approved the
attached revised message for
transmittal.

McGeorge Bundy

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Contains Verbatim text)

1036

Amembassy BELGRADE IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy CAIRO
NEWDELHI
MOSCOW
SAIGON
VIENTIANE

Embtel 1565

You should deliver following message from President Johnson
to President Tito soonest:

QUOTE Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of March 2 on the current situation
in Vietnam. Your interest in this difficult situation is appreciated.
I share your desire that the outcome be peaceful.

For many years, North Vietnam has been providing essential
arms, supplies, trained manpower, and direction to the Viet Cong.
Indeed, Hanoi's aggression against South Vietnam is the fundamental
cause of the present dangerous situation. It is this aggression
by Hanoi that has required defensive measures on the part of the
Vietnamese government and people as well as on the part of those who
have responded to their request for assistance. To ignore this
aggression is to encourage it. We must not lead lawless and expansionist
elements on the world scene today to believe that aggression is an
acceptable and effective means of conducting international relations.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-13-99

The peace and security of nations, large and small, would thereby be jeopardized.

The actions the United States is taking in Vietnam are at the request of and in support of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. They are directed at countering the externally instigated and supported insurgency in South Vietnam. Our military operations north of the 17th parallel, in cooperation with those of the Vietnamese armed forces, are directed against those bases and those routes by which this external support is sent into South Vietnam. Our actions will continue to be such and only such as are made necessary by continuing aggression by North Vietnam against the government and people of South Vietnam. ~~We are not expanding the conflict in Southeast Asia, but are continuing our efforts to help defend the freedom and independence of South Vietnam.~~

Looking toward the future, when Hanoi stops its aggression against South Vietnam, the United States will withdraw the military presence it is maintaining in Vietnam. Should Hanoi show itself willing to leave its neighbors alone, there would be no need for our defensive actions against military targets in North Vietnam, and there would be no bar to the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese question.

I hope, therefore, Mr. President, that you will understand clearly the motives of my government and of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and that, in your conversations and communications with the leaders of other countries, you will reflect this understanding. We desire a peaceful outcome to this troubled situation, but it must be an outcome that will promote the freedom, not the subjugation, of the South Vietnamese people.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson END QUOTE

White House plans to release text of message after delivery.

Notify Department by IMMEDIATE cable or phone when message delivered.

-end-

104a

March 11, 1965

Dear General Johnson:

I accept your resignation with regret.

On the occasion of your second retirement from active duty, I join with many others in acknowledging your important contribution over the years to the security of the United States. When called back to the service of your country by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, you had already earned our highest military rank and the nation's highest recognition for military valor, the Congressional Medal of Honor.

For the past three years you have served the President and the National Security Council as the leader of a group dealing with the foremost problems of national security. In this role you have added to your previous military contributions the important service of providing the President with a clear-sighted, objective, and penetrating analysis of the status of our national defenses.

Your lifetime of service to your country during a critical period in history has been outstanding. On behalf of your countrymen, I express deep appreciation for all you have done.

With best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,



General Leon W. Johnson, USAF
Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee
Washington, D.C., 20301

LBJ:McGB:du

March 11, 1965

105

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of Nuclear Weapons to Air Defense
National Guard Units

1. In the attached memorandum Secretary McNamara last year requested authority for emergency release of nuclear air defense weapons to National Guard units. Under present arrangements, National Guard air defense units would be slow to act in an emergency due to administrative requirements for federalization. The requested authority would permit release of weapons and operational employment in accordance with emergency action procedures approved for regular forces.

I held up this action last year because of the risk of misunderstanding, in the light of the controversy over control of nuclear weapons. This is in fact a quite routine adjustment of emergency procedures, but it might not have seemed so in 1964. Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff now feel that it should be approved, and I agree.

McGeorge Bundy

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-37

By CG, NARA, Date 5-26-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here is a paper on relations with Eisenhower prepared by Clifton. If you agree, I think we should accept the suggestion that Goodpaster go and see General Eisenhower sometime next week. If you agree, I will arrange it.

McG. B.

Goodpaster should go _____

Let's wait _____

(3)
MR 3/10

(19)

107

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is a telegram from Harriman on India which he asks to have shown to you. I think it is good and accurate. We all feel that between now and the Shastri visit we shall have to look hard at our policy toward India, and there will be more papers on this subject before then.

McG. B.

McG. B.

E. B. McG.
108

March 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On Saturday you gave me back the attached Panama Commission papers suggesting that the list showed typical Harvard blindness in its lack of Southern and Western members.

I am quite willing to give this back to John Macy if you want me to, but my own thought is that your initial approval is wiser.

I am led to this conclusion because the record shows that we tried very hard to get Westerners. We wanted York from California and we wanted Brown from Texas, but they had different kinds of conflicts of interest.

However, as it is, when you take their birthplaces, these five men are not mere Yankees. Anderson and Eisenhower were born in Texas, Fields was born in Indiana, Brooks in Ohio, and only Merchant is a New Yorker.

Finally, those who are making the recommendations to you are also not mere Yankees. Anderson and Mann were born in Texas, Ailes in West Virginia, and Macy in Chicago. It is true that most of them now work in the East, but nobody ever called Mr. Rayburn an Easterner and he was here a long time.

To put it another way, Macy and I will get your message, but I do wonder if this package needs to be re-made at this late date.

McG. B.

Damn it, get me a Westerner _____

Oh hell, do this one Macy's way _____

Attachment

March 9, 1965

6" 2
109

MR. PRESIDENT:

I suggest the following answer to Galbraith. If you sign it, I would expect to telephone him and put it on the line that Wilson's April visit will be sharply counterproductive if he should use it to put heat on us for negotiations.

McG. B.

109a

March 9, 1965

Dear Ken:

I want to thank you for your letter of March 3 reporting your talk with Harold Wilson. We are trying to keep in close touch with the Prime Minister, and we recognize his problems. What is just as important is that he should recognize ours, and I am asking Mac Bundy to give you a ring on this point because it may well be that a private word from you would be helpful.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John Kenneth Galbraith
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

LBJ:McGB:du

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Two requests for appointments

1. David Harlech asks to come in and say good-bye any time Thursday, or Friday morning. He will need only a few minutes, and will be glad to come at any time that is convenient for you. He will come on or off the record, as you choose.

Yes ✓ 12:00 Friday 3/17 No

On the record Off the record

12:30
3/9/65 miss
(Told gaylard
(said didn't
know yet if on or
off the record)

2. Tom Finletter will be in Washington Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, and asks for 5 or 10 minutes alone. My guess is that he wishes to discuss his own future, and while you can turn him back to Dean Rusk if you choose, his place on the North Atlantic Council is so important that you may wish to handle it yourself. My own strong feeling is that he should be encouraged to retire. I am very fond of him, but he has always been rigid, and it is a trait which increases with age.

Yes No

McG. B.
McG. B.

OFF
RECORD
12:30
Friday
3/17

cancelled
to David Klein

3/10/65 Harlech appt changed to 12:30 on March 12
Finletter appt cancelled

110a

Will you please so inform.

7

✓
1.1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from London

This is Embassy London's report of Wilson's performance in debate on Vietnam today. Given his own problems, he handled it very well, and if you thought well of the idea, I would propose to express our appreciation to Harlech tomorrow.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

Leave it to me when I see
Harlech on Friday _____ ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

112

March 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA: Mr. Valenti

SUBJECT: A Quiet Talk at Camp David

When I called Dean Rusk to suggest a meeting Tuesday, he reminded me there was a Congressional Reception that night. So I checked with Jack Valenti and he tells me that he assumes you must mean Wednesday, since that is your first free evening.

Wednesday is free for both Rusk and McNamara and McNamara particularly thinks it a very good idea to have a quiet talk this way. Bob's view is that the meeting should be strictly limited to you and Rusk and himself and me, unless you yourself want to add George Ball or McNaughton.

I misinformed you about General Johnson. He is staying eight days, but McNaughton has come back after four. McNaughton arrived this morning and he will join us at lunch tomorrow.

You may wish to wait until after the luncheon tomorrow before making a decision about the Wednesday evening matter, but I would add my own warm support to Bob's. I think a quiet talk in the mountains would be very good for all of us.

The one disadvantage with Wednesday is that it is Mike Feldman's farewell reception at the State Department, but I think a phone call to Mike and a message via Lee White would deal with that reasonably well.

McG. B.

March 7, 1965

114

MR. PRESIDENT:

This intelligence memorandum is the latest that we have on Communist attitudes toward a conference over Vietnam.

McG. B.

CIA Staff Memo No 10-65 - 3/5/65

March 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My press appointments March 2-6

1. Phil Potter came in on March 3 at his request to talk about South-east Asia. He said he had some ideas and I said I would listen to him but not talk back. Most of his ideas had to do with the desirability of putting the monkey on the back of Peking, not Hanoi. I think this is not a particularly good idea, but I listened to it.
2. Jim Deakin of the St. Louis Post Dispatch came in on March 4 at his request. He is doing a story on my brother and me. I found him pressing hard on the notion that the President is advised only by hawks. I think he got some of this from Marquis Childs. I gave him quite a lecture on the fact that the government just does not work that way and that you insist on having all sides of the problems examined by all of your advisers. Since Potter had given me something of the same line, I infer that there is gossip in the press corps to the effect that you are lonely in Hawkville with no beautiful doves like Roger Hillsman to keep you straight.
3. I also Al Otten of the Wall Street Journal on March 4 at his request. I originally let him come in because he said he was doing a story on the Cabinet and had talked with other staff officers. I found him pretty solid on the Cabinet -- he had it straight in his mind that you transact your main business with Cabinet officers and use the White House staff to support your own work but not to replace the Cabinet. But in the course of the meeting he took off on the Administration's press policy, and I heard a line of argument which must be parallel to what he said on TV and which I will not bother to repeat to you.
4. Hugh Sidey came in at his request for a talk after a phone conversation in which he made it clear that he was coming to praise and not to criticize. He began by asking if I did not think that Time had greatly improved in the last two months, and when I asked him what he meant, he went on to tell me how Luce himself had complained violently about the article on the White House staff a while back. He also gave me to

understand that Donovan is very much in charge and that he likes it that way, and by implication I got the impression that Otto Fuerbringer's prejudices are now under some control. Sidey was interested mainly in the President as Commander-in-Chief. He seemed to feel that you were making your decisions without a lot of crisis flap and long Cadillacs. I agreed and told him that nevertheless you were in touch with the whole situation and watched with particular care when orders ~~relating to~~ ^{being} ~~the~~ ^{win} ~~operation~~ involved the lives of Americans -- as George Reedy's briefings would show him. I also pointed out that you were coordinating the U. S. policy operations not simply as Commander-in-Chief but as the chief policy maker with American public opinion and with foreign governments. I also took the occasion to note the continuing importance of our work in South Vietnam itself, and emphasized your awareness of all of these aspects of the problem. Being in a good mood, he seemed to be responsive. We will know more about it on Monday when Time comes out.

Finally, I saw Joe Alsop for lunch today. This is the one meeting which I undertook because of friendship and not because of a feeling that it would be helpful to our work. It turned out to be the easiest of the lot. Joe thinks that you have handled the Vietnamese situation with magnificent courage and wisdom, and he thinks the first reactions both abroad and at home are highly encouraging. He asked me no embarrassing questions at all of any description, and about one-half of our time was actually spent on things like the Vikings, the bad habits of modern professors, and the peculiarities of Gaullist France. Early on I made it clear to Joe that I would not discuss the problem of our press policy in any way, shape or form, and he stayed entirely away from the subject. I doubt very much that anything from this lunch is likely to appear in anybody's column, but if I do see a trace of it in his work or anyone else's, I will flag it.

Joe made it very clear that while he had been worried and troubled about the question whether we were really ready to stay with it in Vietnam, and had written columns out of this worry, he is now full of respect and admiration for what you have done. I have seldom seen him in a more reasonable and grown-up frame of mind. He clearly wants to come back on board.

McG. B.

March 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached at Tab A is a sharply revised version of a long draft letter to Shastri prepared in the Department of State. I have revised it so that it protects your position and would do no damage if published. At the same time it is polite to Shastri and will, I think, give him no offense.

It has taken the Department some three weeks to prepare this letter, so that it is now time to get the answer out. I can assure you that we have been pressing on every front, but this is one of those diplomatic communications which falls between stools in State.

Shastri's letter is at Tab B.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1965

117

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE

Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and I spent 2 1/2 hours together last night on Vietnam. The following general conclusions emerged:

1. On the evidence so far our air actions in North Vietnam and Laos have caused somewhat less international reaction than we expected. The propaganda and the demonstrations are inevitable, and so are the reactions of the would-be negotiators, here and abroad. Your own effective work has brought the American reaction under control, at least for the present. We got an inadvertent assist from U Thant on this because his outrageous comments solidified a lot of Congressional opinion. We have not driven the Chinese and the Soviets together, as the demonstrations and Chinese complaints show. We have certainly not persuaded Hanoi to leave its neighbors alone, but we may have made a beginning. Most important of all, we may be moving, with less friction than we anticipated, toward a situation in which international opinion may regard our actions against the North as a natural reply against Viet Cong operations in the South. If this can be done by continuing our measured and fitting actions over the coming weeks, it will be a new and important change; it will be most helpful to us against guerrilla infiltration over the long run, whatever the eventual result in Vietnam.

My own view is that if this result is achieved -- and Dean says that Ambassador Thompson, who has been skeptical, is now quite hopeful about it -- it will be your personal achievement. You alone -- against your noisiest advisers -- made the basic decision to present these actions within the framework of a continuing policy and a continuing purpose and not as major new departures. The best and simplest documentary evidence of this is in the amendments which you made to the speech which was never given. I am holding that document for your memoirs.

2. Two of the three of us think that the chances of a turn-around in South Vietnam remain less than even; the brutal fact is that we have

PERSONAL-SENSITIVE-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-230

By ig, NARA, Date 3-16-87

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE

been losing ground at an increasing rate in the countryside in January and February. The air actions have lifted morale, but it is not clear now much, and there is no evidence yet that the new government has the necessary will, skill and human resources which a turn-around will require.

Moreover, our own basic framework for the support of the pacification program leaves a great deal to be desired. (Last night Bob McNamara said for the first time what many others have thought for a long time -- that the Pentagon and the military have been going at this thing the wrong way round from the very beginning; they have been concentrating on military results against guerrillas in the field, when they should have been concentrating on intense police control from the individual villager on up. This is a point which Lodge will make in a report which is to be delivered to you Monday afternoon before your meeting with him on Tuesday.)

We all nevertheless agree that whatever the odds and whatever the difficulties, we must continue to make every conceivable effort in the pacification area. This is the purpose of the Johnson mission, and the results of that mission should be available for discussion with you early next week.

3. There is one particularly tough issue on which we will get comment next week, both from the Johnson mission and the Lodge report. That is the question of the organization and management of the U. S. team in Saigon. McNamara and I, if the decision were ours to make, would bring Taylor back and put Alex Johnson in charge, with a younger man (conceivably John McNaughton) as Chief of Staff. Rusk, McNamara, and I have all learned from separate channels that within the country team it is in fact Alexis who is looked to for leadership and for coordination. Max has been gallant, determined, and honorable to a fault, but he has also been rigid, remote and sometimes abrupt. We all recognize that Taylor has served an enormously important purpose in keeping American opinion from division and criticism, but our inclination would be to bring him back not later than the first of June for a final round of consultation and discussion, and release from his duties at the end of the year for which he originally contracted. (He took the oath on July 2.)

PERSONAL - SENSITIVE - SECRET

PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE

4. We talked also about our international political position. We all agree that so far we have followed the right course, but we continue to believe that it is important to defend and to insist on our policy in every forum. That is why Dean has agreed with enthusiasm to your proposal for briefings of Ambassadors, and that is also why he has taken on this heavy schedule of public appearances in the immediate future.

5. There remains a real question in our minds as to how much we should open the door to a readiness for "talks." This is a point on which both Dean, and Bob especially, are quite concerned. They both feel, for somewhat different reasons, that it is important to show that we are ready to talk about Vietnam -- always on our own terms -- in all appropriate international channels. They point out that in one sense that is exactly what we are doing now in our briefings of Ambassadors, and in our tough talk with Dobrynin, and in public statements which constitute diplomatic actions. But Bob goes a lot further. He believes that we should find a way to have real talks in an international meeting. (I think his motivation is that we will need a conference table if things go worse, as he expects.) Dean and Bob both feel that to hold some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about "talks" than we have in the last ten days. The particular pressure which is visible today is from the British, who have been made nervous by one sub-Cabinet resignation and a lot of yammering from their own Churches and McGoverns. What the British want is to make some explorations toward the possibility of talks, and to say that they have been in consultation with us. This is not an urgent matter over the week end, if only because Wilson is safely in Bonn. It will be up for judgment early next week.

My own opinion on the general diplomatic front is that we can always get to the conference table when we need to, and that there is no great hurry about it right now. (Dean Rusk agrees, though he wants to keep the British just happy enough to hold them aboard.) I think there is a lot to be said for detailed and careful study of the bargaining problem in all the various forms which it may develop. But for the moment it seems to me that we are exactly right to stick on the line which you have set. The one thing we might add is that of course we are willing to talk about ending the North Vietnamese aggression and that talks on that subject in any forum would always be welcome. Dean's backgrounder yesterday went a little way in this direction, and I think we would all be helped by knowing your own reaction to the resulting stories by Roberts, Frankel, et al.

PERSONAL-~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

6. Bob and I pressed upon Dean our own feelings that it is important to have contingency planning on what we should do if in spite of our best efforts there is either escalation by the enemy or continued sharp deterioration in South Vietnam. The military planning for reactions to escalation is mostly done, but we do not feel confident that we know just what our actual decisions should be and would be if there were North Vietnamese ground movements over the demarcation line or large movements of Chinese forces into North Vietnam, or both. We estimate both of these as unlikely for the moment, but we have to be ready for them. The crucial question is, in a sense, whether and when you would authorize landings of a number of U. S. divisions in South Vietnam.

A closely related question on escalation is whether it would be useful right now to get a substantial allied ground force in place in the central and northern part of Vietnam. Max Taylor is doubtful about this, but in the heat of discussion last night Rusk, McNamara and I all thought it worth serious further exploration. A force which had Australians, Filipinos, Thais, Koreans and conceivably even Pakistanis would give real international color to the defense of South Vietnam and would also have a substantial braking effect on any possible Communist escalation. We will be asking for your thoughts on this one too.

7. Finally, on the subject of contingency thinking for sharp deterioration, we agreed, in spite of Dean Rusk's reservations, that such thinking should be done -- but very, very privately. Rusk points out that when men even look as if they were planning for defeat, they make defeat more likely, and he is right. So our current plan is that there should be no paper work on this subject at all, but simply some intensive discussion limited completely to the three of us and one subordinate each. There will be no papers, and this mission will not exist anywhere except in this memorandum.

8. I need not tell you how helpful it will be to have your reactions to this discussion. There is nothing in it that makes it urgent for you to respond today or tomorrow, but I will be right here if you want to comment.

McG. B.

PERSONAL- SENSITIVE -~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

A Random Thought

In reviewing our public statements on Vietnam, I found myself re-reading your TV conversation with Lawrence, Sevarid and Brinkley on March 14 last year. It reads even better after a year, and it does suggest to me that you might do the same thing at about the time of the anniversary.

The format of this conversation is one which puts the control ~~■~~ fully in your hands, and at the same time puts you immediately in touch with a large number of Americans. This has the effect of undercutting the press middle-man who complains that there is not enough news. It also has the effect of giving the country a direct feeling of having a President who is a man of peace at the same time as a responsible Commander-in-Chief.

At the same time, it would give you a chance to make it clear that the Great Society and the meeting of our world responsibilities are not inconsistent with each other, but are part and parcel of one program and leader.

McG. B.

McG. B.

FOR RELEASE AT 6:00 P.M., EST

March 15, 1964

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT
CONDUCTED BY WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE OF THE
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY; ERIC SEVAREID
OF THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM; AND
DAVID BRINKLEY OF THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING
COMPANY, AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MARCH 14, 1964.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, considering the violent and abrupt manner of your succession to the Presidency, I think everyone agrees that the transition has gone remarkably smoothly. Did this just happen, or did you start to plan these things, say, in those few hours in Air Force One as you flew back from Dallas?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had a lot of help in the planning, Mr. Lawrence, a lot of thoughts that went through my mind, as I left the hospital, and on the way to Air Force One, and while we were waiting for Judge Hughes and Mrs. Kennedy to come aboard, I wasn't sure whether this was an international conspiracy or just what it was, or what might happen next. I was sure that the whole Nation had been shaken and the world would be in doubt.

As I rode back, I recognized that our first great problem was to assure the world that there would be continuity in transition, that our constitutional system would work. I realized the importance of uniting our people at home and asking them to carry forward with the program, so I immediately planned to have the bipartisan leaders come to the White House upon my arrival.

I asked the members of the Cabinet who were then in town, the Director of the National Security Council and Mr. McNamara and others to meet me at Andrews, and I appealed to all of those men to work with me on the transition and to try to so conduct ourselves as to assure the rest of the world that we did have continuity and assure the people of this country that we expected them to unite.

Very shortly thereafter, President Eisenhower came down and spent some time with me exploring the problems that he expected to arise confronting a new President. President Truman came in and gave me his counsel, and we started off with the help and plans of a good many people and substantially well organized.

I don't know how well the Government did its part of the transition, but the people's part was well done.

MR. LAWRENCE: What were your first priorities, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: The first priority was to try to display to the world that we could have continuity and transition, that the program of President Kennedy would be carried on, that there was no need for them to be disturbed and fearful that our constitutional system had been endangered.

(OVER)

To demonstrate to the people of this country that although their leader had fallen, and we had a new President, that we must have unity and we must close ranks, and we must work together for the good of all America and the world.

MR. LAWRENCE: Well, did you have any concern about the international posture that you must adopt so that: one, all of our allies would be reassured; and our potential enemies wouldn't get any wrong ideas?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes; and I spent the first full week meeting with more than 90 representatives from the nations of the world, and trying to explain to them our constitutional system, and what they could expect under it and how we carry on the program that we had begun, and that I had been a part of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket that won the election in 1960; that we had a Kennedy-Johnson program, that I had been a participant in the formulation of that program and that we would carry it on, maybe not as well as the late President could have, had he lived, but as best we could, and they need have no fear or no doubt.

MR. LAWRENCE: What was the image that you wanted the potential enemy to get?

THE PRESIDENT: That we were sure and we were confident that we were united, that we had closed ranks, and not to tread on us.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, on November 24th both the President and you, the Vice President, were in the same city, and six Cabinet officers were in the same airplane, going to Tokyo.

Has there been any dispositions or regulations since to avoid such concentration?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I don't think that we realized at that time that so many Cabinet officers were on this trip to Tokyo. And of course in retrospect we can see a good many things that took place that we wish we had made better plans for.

But immediately upon returning to Washington, I made it clear to the Cabinet that we didn't want any goodly number like that leaving town at the same time, and that when the President and the next in line of succession were out of town, that we wanted most of the Cabinet here. And the President since that time has not been out of town with any appreciable number of Cabinet officers absent.

MR. SEVAREID: Is there anything that Kennedy had done, sir, that affords better physical protection for the President?

THE PRESIDENT: Not that I know of. I am not an expert on security, but we have a very dedicated and faithful number of men in it, FBI and in the Secret Service. They work together.

MR. LAWRENCE: Do you always follow their instructions, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, with rare exceptions now and then, like marching in the funeral procession and occasionally, they prefer to have two or three policemen between me and the crowds, and I ask them to move out so I can see some of the people. I want to be a people's President, and in order to do so, you have to see the people and talk to them and know something about them and not be too secluded.

I think they would feel better if the President kept 100 yards distance from every human being, but that is not practical.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, when you got back here, one of your -- obviously one of your immediate jobs was to keep the government going as a matter of effective politics and leadership. How, specifically, did you think you would go about that? How did you let it be known in Washington that there was a new man here, that things are going to continue more or less as they had been, and how did you think was the best way to make it as smooth as possible?

THE PRESIDENT: First, to ask the very unusually talented individuals that had associated themselves with the Kennedy Administration to stay at their posts of duty during this critical period and without exception, they answered the call.

Second, I called the Governors together and made an appeal to them to help me in every way they could in establishing this confidence and letting the people in the country know that their Government was going on and will function and was strong, that it would work.

And hour after hour, day after day, that first week, I -- while I was preparing my message to Congress, preparing to go on television to the people, and the Thanksgiving message, I was spending my days and nights, and way into the mornings, talking to the leaders out in the States and trying to instill confidence in them and to ask them to help me with the awesome responsibilities that were mine.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. President, is there any one particular memory that is more vivid than the others for you, from those four horrible days?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I have rarely been in the presence of greatness, but as I went through that period, I observed Mrs. Kennedy, Jackie Kennedy, I saw her greatness, her gallantry, her graciousness, her courage, and it will always be a vivid memory, and I will always appreciate the strength that came to me from knowing her and from associating with her.

MR. SEVAREID: Did you send any kind of private messages to Chairman Khrushchev soon after you became President?

THE PRESIDENT: No. We had representatives from all the nations here. I spent two or three days speaking to those representatives.

Mr. Mikoyan was here, and I had a long visit with him, and I talked to him about the visit that Premier Khrushchev had made me when I was leader in the Senate, and we exchanged views for a period of time here in the office, just about the time of the funeral.

MR. LAWRENCE: Did the subject come up of a possible exploratory, get-acquainted session with Mr. Khrushchev?

THE PRESIDENT: No. We both expressed desire in our discussion that we understand each other better and that we would be glad to meet at some time when we felt that the agenda was such that would give promise of reaching some solution to the many problems that confront the two countries. But no definite plans were made for a meeting. None were proposed, but it was accepted as a possibility.

MR. BRINKLEY: You mentioned, Mr. President, part of the reason for the transition being so smooth was that your predecessor's Cabinet staff stayed on. In fact, they are still here almost intact.

Would you expect it to continue that way? Would you --

THE PRESIDENT: I would certainly hope so. Each Cabinet member stayed, most of the Under Secretaries are here, most of the Assistant Secretaries.

We have brought in about three young men who have been associated with me through the years, and we have lost Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Sorensen. But basically the staff is the same, the duties are the same. The work goes on each day just as it did when Mr. Kennedy was here.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, I wonder if you could talk a moment about this problem of Presidential succession. I think you have not endorsed any of the specific proposals that are up for discussion now. But oughtn't there be some mechanism so that there would always be a Vice President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; and I think the Congress is giving attention to that, and I think it is quite proper that they do, and I have no doubt that in the next few months when we select the Vice President -- but what is very likely is that the Congress will take some action, -- I don't know just what kind of action -- to make it possible to replace the Vice President if he becomes President.

I think it is important that we do that. I don't have any deep-set views on just how that should be done. I participated in passing the measure that establishes the line of succession now, and I think that that's very good.

President Kennedy sat down with me in the early days of his Administration and discussed the possibilities of take-over, transition, if the President became disabled.

We had an oral agreement what should be done under those circumstances. The first -- one of the first things I did was to ask the distinguished Speaker of the House to come to my office, and I made an agreement with him exactly as President Eisenhower had made with Vice President Nixon, and as President Kennedy had made with me, and that is now in writing and in existence if I should become disabled.

But the Congress should consider replacing the Vice President when they have one no more. They are doing that now.

I rather doubt that they will explore all the angles of it and make any realistic progress toward constitutional amendments or the necessary statutes this year, but I am sure once we have a Vice President that they will face up to it and take prompt action.

MR. SEVAREID: Haven't we really reached a point in the history of this country where the selection of a vice presidential candidate must be nothing but his competence for the highest office?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I would hope that the only thing that would appeal to any delegate would be this question: Is this the best equipped and best trained and best fitted man to serve as President should he be called on to do so?

MR. LAWRENCE: Yet it is a choice which is peculiarly that of the presidential candidate, is it not, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the delegates are always interested in getting the recommendations of the President, and in most instances, not all instances, but most instances, the presidential nominee makes his recommendation.

I don't -- I recall one or two instances where the President chose not to make any recommendation. But the Vice President is very close to the President. They have to agree on the same platform, and they have to run on the same ticket; and in order to be prepared for what might happen, the President must have great confidence in the Vice President, and make known to him his thoughts, his views, and all of his secrets, so that he can have the background for taking over if it becomes necessary, so the President's recommendation should not be treated lightly.

MR. LAWRENCE: There have been reports, Mr. President, that you have become displeased with Attorney General Kennedy because efforts have been made in his behalf to have him nominated for Vice President. There even have been published reports that you are not even speaking.

Is there any truth in those reports?

(OVER)

THE PRESIDENT: No. The Attorney General's statement, I think, was a very good one, two or three days ago. I think most of that is newspaper talk.

I would be less than frank if I said that I thought that it was wise at this stage of the game for either the President or the Vice President to be carrying on a campaign for the office.

The Attorney General and I have talked about that, and I think he understands my viewpoint, and I take his word that he has done nothing to encourage those efforts, and all of this stuff that you read about is newspaper talk.

MR. SEVAREID: Well, speaking of newspaper talk, Mr. President, it is widely believed among reports around town that you object rather strongly to being criticized in papers and on the air.

Would you give us what your true feelings on that subject are? How do you feel about it?

THE PRESIDENT: I assume that almost anyone is human and would rather have approval than disapproval.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, Kennedy once said in a similar conversation about a year ago or more that he thought the press ought to be as tough as it could be on any administration, so long as it was after truth and not merely a political operation.

Is that a good definition of your views?

THE PRESIDENT: I would have no objection to that. I would agree to it, and I don't think -- it is not the toughness that any President objects to.

I think it is sometimes their inaccuracies and -- I frequently see stories from 10 or 15 papers that I think are quite accurate, very well done. On occasion, you will see something that is reported as a truth that you never heard of, where you are the principal participant. And if you call attention to it, then you become sensitive.

MR. SEVAREID: How many papers do you read a day, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I guess about 10 or 15.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, during these 100 days there has been on persistent political issue, which is the investigation of Bobby Baker in the Senate, aimed at you because he was your protege and your friend.

As a political animal, sir, what is your estimate of this as a campaign issue in 1964?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, without agreeing with your assumptions about why the investigation or who it is aimed at, I would say that one of the finest committees

in the Senate made up of both parties have been conducting this investigation of an employee of theirs, no protege of anyone, he was there before I came to the Senate for 10 years, doing a job substantially the same as he is doing now, he was elected by all the Senators, appointed by no one, including the Republican Senators, and I think that their investigation will be a just one, and a fair one, and that they will make recommendations to the Senate that will be proper, and whatever they recommend I am sure the Senate will carry out.

MR. LAWRENCE: Well, quite apart from what the Senate Committee may recommend, sir, have you formed a personal judgment, a judgment for yourself? You and Mr. Baker used to be friends. Do you continue to be friends?

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't seen him since he resigned from the Senate or haven't talked to him since he resigned from the Senate, and I think every man is entitled to a fair trial and I would like to see what conclusion is reached and what the evidence shows with which I am not familiar before I would make a judgment.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, if I could make you a self-critic for a moment, what, if anything, that has happened in these last 120 days would you do differently were you to do it again?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know about that. I am sure that we have made a good many mistakes, but I don't know of any recommendation that I have made that I would change.

I would favor the same measures that I have recommended to the Congress. I would handle the developments and the foreign policy fields such as Panama and Guantanamo and Zanzibar, Cyprus, as we have handled them.

So while I am sure that we could improve on them if we had more time, in the light of what developed I wouldn't change any.

MR. LAWRENCE: I believe the first big problem you had to tackle was the budget, the time for making final decisions, and you devoted nearly all of the first month to this.

Why was the budget so terribly important?

THE PRESIDENT: Because I think it told the people of the country and the people of Congress what you are willing to pay for.

And if I had it to do over again, I would much prefer to have 68 days than to have 38 days to make a budget of \$98 billion. We have been adding to our budget about \$5 billion a year. We had about \$3 billion in built-in increases. Our last budget was \$98.8 billion.

So my big problem was to find ways and means of cutting money out of the budget that we did not need, and

(OVER)

we did not need to appropriate, and we could save in order to have some money available to meet the many unfilled needs we had. Particularly in the welfare field, in the poverty field, in the training of manpower field.

MR. LAWRENCE: During the budget cutting, Mr. President, you made one little talk which caused some controversy in which you said that to meet the unfilled needs of the people, you would take from the haves and give to the have-nots. Now, just how did you mean that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have a budget of \$52 billion in the Defense Department. We have those installations set up, and those needs have been planned for. We no longer find they are necessary. They have the money.

We say to them that we are going to take from this picture 69 bases, that you now have, we are going to close those bases, we are going to take some of these overseas employees and cut them 15 percent, and have some people double up on our jobs, and squeeze out additional productivity, and out of that money that we save, money that we have, and have used for these purposes, we are going to take it over here and take the young boys that have dropped out of school and have nothing to do, and no job and no work, and unemployed, and we are going to try to train them to be good citizens.

MR. LAWRENCE: You meant, Mr. President, to re-divide the money amongst the Government agencies, not some kind of a new soak-the-rich scheme as some interpreted this "take from the haves and give to the have-nots"?

THE PRESIDENT: No, we made no recommendations on soaking anybody. We are reducing taxes, not increasing them. Our tax reduction is in excess of \$11 billion, \$9 billion plus for individuals, everyone is the beneficiary of that, already, and corporation taxes have been reduced some \$2-1/2 billion, so we weren't soaking anyone. But we were taking money that was being used for things that we did not need, or that we could avoid, and taking that money and applying it to meet the unfilled needs of our poverty stricken people.

President Roosevelt talked about the third that were ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-housed. Thirty years we have worked on it but there is still one-fifth of the people that earn less than \$3,000 a year.

So out of the billion three that we cut from the Defense Department budget we will add almost a billion in the new budget for a poverty program. So it will come from those who have it, to those who don't have it.

MR. SEVAREID: Have you had any second thoughts, Mr. President, about erecting another agency to deal with root causes of poverty, health is one, education and other things, on top of the agencies and departments that already exist that have been dealing with these things?

THE PRESIDENT: No, we are going to have a very small staff to coordinate the poverty program. We realize it is a beginning, it is not an extremely comprehensive program. We are going to have Sargent Shriver in charge of coordinating the program between the agencies who already are working in that field. The Agriculture Department. The Justice Department, in the dealings with the juvenile delinquency, the Health, Education and Welfare Department, and Health and Education. The Labor Department in training manpower. And we don't want to create more agencies, we want to use the ones we have.

So the President is going to have as his chief of staff, a poverty director, administrator, and through him his orders will be carried out through existing agencies.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, the hundred days are over now, and the transition is over. This is now the Johnson Administration.

Could you give us an idea -- not necessarily specific, unless you care to -- what direction you would say your Administration would take hereafter? What new approaches or ideas or philosophies we might see?

MORE

(OVER)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think a message going to the Congress on Monday will indicate one approach. We are determined, and we have a group of dedicated men that are going to try to get at the roots and the causes of poverty that cause 20 percent of our people to live off of less than \$3000 a year.

We are going to try to get at the roots and the causes and find the solution to doing something about half a million men that are rejected each year because of mental or physical reasons for service.

We are going to try to recognize and proceed on the basis that illiteracy and ignorance and disease cost this Government billions of dollars per year, and make for much unhappiness.

And the program of poverty this year is one example of what I would like to think will be carried on, and grow in the years to come. I want this Government first of all to be dedicated to peace in our time, and do everything that we can conceivably do, any place, any time, with anyone, to resolve some of the differences that exist among mankind.

In order to do that, this Government must be prepared and we must maintain strength and power that would insure our safety if attacked. In order to have peace, and to be prepared, we must be solvent and fiscally responsible. So for that reason, we have tried to eliminate waste at every corner. I don't believe that we are going to make the Treasury over by cutting out a few automobiles or turning out a few lights. But I do think it is a good example when you walk through the corridor and you see the closets where lights burn all day and all night just because someone didn't turn them off.

So we have tried to set that example and we want a Government that is seeking peace, that is prepared for any eventuality, that is fiscally solvent and that is compassionate, that meets the needs of the people for health and for education, and for physical and mental and spiritual strength. And our Government -- that is the kind of a Johnson Administration I would like to have and that is the kind that we are working towards.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, Administrations come to have rather handy labels, New Deal, or Fair Deal, or Crusade, or New Frontier. Has any ever come to your mind for the Johnson Administration?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. I have had a lot of things to deal with the first 100 days, and I haven't thought of any slogan, but I suppose all of us want a better deal, don't we?

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, I don't want to overdo the business of labels, but many of us have long been a little baffled watching your career in the Senate and out here as to whether to call you a conservative or liberal, or Southerner or Westerner. How do you think of yourself if you apply those labels at all to yourself?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't believe in labels. I want to do the best I can, all the time. I want to be progressive without getting both feet off the ground at the same time. I want to be prudent without having my mind closed to anything that is new or different. I have often said that I was proud that I was a free man first and an American second, and a public servant third and a Democrat fourth, in that order, and I guess as a Democrat, if I had to take -- place a label on myself, I would want to be a progressive who is prudent.

MR. LAWRENCE: While we are talking about Democrats, Mr. President, what is your timing on your election year effort?

THE PRESIDENT: I would hope that we would not have to -- we would not have to begin an active campaign -- the Democratic Party -- until around convention time, after the Congress disposed of its business. I am going to carry out some commitments that President Kennedy made for fund-raising dinners from time to time, but I think after the convention we will have ample time to give our views to the people. In the meantime, I would like to have the cooperation of the members of both parties in carrying out a program that is best for America. I am the only President this country has, and I would like to be as free from partisanship as possible, at least until convention.

MR. LAWRENCE: Well, Mr. President, in this interim between now and the convention, do you think we might see a few old-fashioned, non-political conservation tours or inspection tours of that kind?

THE PRESIDENT: We will see them before and after the convention. They are part of the work of the President. I think part of the President's job is to get out and see the people and talk to them about what the Government is doing and make reports. That is why I am on this -- having this little visit with you fellows this afternoon, so that the people may know something about my views and how I feel and my approaches, and may know how much I need them and need their help in the job that I am trying so hard to do.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, some people have thought that you put in too long and hard a day, that you might endanger your own health that way. How do you protect your health from day to day?

THE PRESIDENT: We do have long days and the problems are -- that require attention require time. And you never have as much time as you want to spend before making these decisions, but you must make decisions.

The first 100 days were filled to almost the breaking point. But I have adjusted myself to the schedule and with the help of the most competent people that President Kennedy surrounded himself with, I am now able -- I wake up in the morning and read my papers and read the documents that were left over from the night before that I need to pass upon and have my briefings, and my breakfast, and come to the office between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock.

Then I work at a rather feverish rate until 1:30 or 2:00. And I have a swim and take out 15 or 20 minutes. Then I go and have a lunch or -- usually a business lunch, working lunch, and about 3:00 I take a little nap of 20 or 30 minutes, and that breaks the day for me, and then I am good until 8:00 or 9:00 that night, and have my dinner.

After dinner I see TV news, and then I engage in my night reading, and I usually read until about 1:00. I don't require too much sleep. But I am never in better health. I enjoy the work that I am doing, and the people with whom I am working. I never felt better in my life.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, you did manage to quit cigarette smoking some years ago. Have you any advice for those of us who haven't managed?

THE PRESIDENT: I gave up cigarette smoking because the doctor recommended that I do so, and I have missed it every day, but I haven't gone back to it, and I am glad that I haven't.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. President, I gather from what you say that we need not expect any kind of political announcements from you until very close to the convention. Is that so?

THE PRESIDENT: I would not want to preclude one. Unless I -- there is substantial consideration involved -- I see no reason to make any now, and I don't anticipate it, but if the circumstances indicated that one would be fruitful or necessary, I wouldn't hesitate to face up to it.

MR. BRINKLEY: While we are on politics, I wonder -- we have heard everybody else's analysis of what happened in New Hampshire. Would you give us yours?

THE PRESIDENT: I really don't know. I think that we always incline to put too much emphasis on the actions of one primary. But it seemed to me that the people of the State heard all the candidates and decided to select one of their neighbors that apparently they knew and approved. I have very high regard for Ambassador Lodge myself, as I do for some of the other candidates.

MR. BRINKLEY: Has his serving in Viet Nam during a political campaign been at all awkward or embarrassing for the Administration?

THE PRESIDENT: Not to the President. So far as I have been able to detect from his actions, he has been doing nothing but the job as Ambassador, and doing it as best he could, and I have seen nothing that has interfered with that work.

MR. LAWRENCE: Did Secretary McNamara bring you any new word from Mr. Lodge just recently when he returned, about Mr. Lodge's future plans, how long he might stay on the job, and so forth?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. I have had no indication that he plans to leave the job at all, and if he did, I am sure he would let me know.

Secretary McNamara brought me some recommendations concerning the situation out in Viet Nam, in which Ambassador Lodge expressed his views, and in which they were in general agreement with Mr. McNamara and other members of the team, but nothing political.

MR. LAWRENCE: Is it your opinion that Mr. Lodge has behaved properly and within the scope of his role as an Ambassador, considering that he has been injected into the political arena?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: You have had reports in the last day or two from the Ambassador to France and from Secretary McNamara. Can you tell us anything of what he reported to you from Viet Nam?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he made a very lengthy report and I think a responsible and constructive one. We are going to consider it in the Security Council further the early part of the week. We have problems in Viet Nam as we have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara has been out there, this is his fourth trip. We are very anxious to do what we can to help those people preserve their own freedom. We cherish ours and we would like to see them preserve theirs. We have furnished them with counsel and advice, and men and materiel to help them in their attempts to defend themselves. If people quit attacking them, we'd have no problem but for ten years this problem has been going on.

I was reading a letter only today that General Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem ten years ago, and it is a letter that I could have well written to President Khanh and sent out by Mr. McNamara.

Now, we have had that problem for a long time. We are going to have it for some time in the future, we can see, but we are patient people, and we love freedom, and we want to help others preserve it, and we are going to try to evolve the most effective and efficient plans we can to continue to help them.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Kennedy said, on the subject of Viet Nam, I think, that he did believe in the falling domino theory, that if Viet Nam were lost that other countries in the area would soon be lost.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a very dangerous thing, and I share President Kennedy's view, and I think the whole of Southeast Asia would be involved and that would involve hundreds of millions of people, and I think it's -- it cannot be ignored, we must do everything that we can, we must be responsible, we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, during the New Hampshire primary campaign, Governor Rockefeller criticized what he called "divided counsel" that was going out from Washington to the leaders of Viet Nam. He said that while you and Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara were committed to winning the war and defeating the Viet Cong, the Senate Majority

Leader, Senator Mansfield, seemed to find favor with the idea of neutralization advanced by President de Gaulle of France. What is your reaction to Governor Rockefeller's criticism?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Governor should know that Senator Mansfield is very experienced in the field of foreign relations, and served as a distinguished member of that committee, and when he made his speech in the Senate, he spoke for himself, and so stated. He was not speaking the Administration viewpoint and he did not leave any such impression. From time to time he has given me his counsel over the years in this general area of Southeast Asia, but when he made this speech he spoke for himself entirely, and there is no division in the Administration between Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara and myself. We all feel alike on the matter.

I think that there could even be some division between Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Lodge, judging from what you have said. Mr. Lodge sees things pretty much as we do, and we are going to continue with our program, and it is going to be a responsible one, and we think a fruitful one.

MR. LAWRENCE: Do the recommendations that Secretary McNamara brought back from his last trip envisage a continuing role for Mr. Lodge in handling policies in South Viet Nam?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes, he has a very important role. He met with me in my office two days after I became President, and I said to him at that time that "You are my top man there, and I want you to have the kind of people you want, and I want you to carry out the program you recommend and you will have our support here." He has worked very hard at that job and we have sent him some new people from time to time, and we will be sending more. He has command of the full resources that we have out there, and he works very well with our people.

MR. LAWRENCE: One of your speeches at the University of California in Los Angeles indicated a kind of hint to me that we might carry the war to the North Vietnamese if they didn't quit meddling in what you call a "dangerous game". Are there any such plans that you can talk about at this time, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: No, and I made no such hint. I said it was a dangerous game to try to supply arms and become an aggressor and deprive people of their freedom, and that is true, whether it is in Viet Nam or whether it is in this Hemisphere, wherever it is.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, do we face the decision on Viet Nam of the order of magnitude of Korea, for example?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. I think that we have problems there. We have difficulties there. We have had for ten years, and as I told you, a good many things have come and gone during that period of time; as long as there are people trying to preserve their freedom, we want to help them.

MR BRINKLEY: Well, Mr. President, not only do we have a new Administration in this country, but we also have what might be described as a new world, since it is said now that the postwar world is over, and the American leadership is challenged and questioned both by friends and enemy alike in many places now. So it is an entirely different world, very different world, from what it was a few years ago. What is your view and assessment of it? How do you see the American role from here on, now that we are no longer the unquestioned leader of the entire West?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that as long as we are living in a world with 120 nations, that we have got to realize that we have got 120 foreign policies. And we are living in a world where we recognize 114 other nations, and some that we don't recognize, and so I think at this time that our nation is held in high esteem and respect and affection generally among the peoples of the world, the free world. I realize that we have discouraging incidents from time to time, and we have problems, and because we try to help with those problems, sometimes the role of the peacemaker is not a very happy one. And so, for that reason, we have to do things that we don't want to do sometimes, and are rather irritating -- and sometimes we are abused because we do them, and sometimes we are misunderstood. But if the final result is good, then our action is justified.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, about ten years ago an American Secretary of State termed neutrality as something immoral. Not long ago President Kennedy talked about making the world safe for diversity. Is a more and more diverse world, with the diminishing of the importance of great alliances, a trend toward a safer world?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. And you must remember this: that we are having all the new nations that are emerging, and they are coming in without experience, and they have their pride. A good many of them have the feeling that -- pent-up feelings, that they have nurtured for years and years. And they have an opportunity to express themselves, and sometimes it looks a little odd for the Prime Minister of a new country to come in with a pistol in his hand and arrest an American charge d'affaires.

But that does happen, and we have to be prepared for those developments and try to understand them and try to provide leadership that will keep us from getting in deeper water or more trouble, and that is what we are doing. Sometimes our people become very impatient. They cut the water off on us in Cuba, and I have got a good many recommendations from all over the country as to how to act very quickly. Some of them have said -- some of the men have even wanted me to run in the Marines, send them in immediately.

Well, upon reflection, evaluation and study, realizing not many people want more war, and none of them really want more appeasement, you have to find a course that you can chart that will preserve your dignity and self-respect, and still bring about the action that is necessary. So instead of sending in the Marines to turn the water on, we sent one Admiral in to cut it off and arrange to make our own water, and we think things worked out the best they could under those circumstances.

(OVER)

But there are going to be these demands from time to time, people who feel that all we need to do is mash a button and determine everybody's foreign policy. But we are not living in that kind of a world any more. They are going to determine it for themselves, and that is the way it should be. And we are going to have to come and reason with them and try to lead them instead of force them. And I think, I have no doubt but what for centuries to come that we will be a leading force in molding opinion of the world, and I think the better they know us the more they will like us.

MR. LAWRENCE: Is there any progress, Mr. President, in the deadlock over Panama and the absence of diplomatic relations with that country?

THE PRESIDENT: We have been very close to agreement several times. I have no doubt but what agreement will be reached, that will, in effect, provide for sitting down with Panamanian authorities and discussing the problems that exist between us and being guided only by what is fair and what is right and what is just, and trying to resolve those problems. Now, when that will come about, I don't know. We are anxious and willing and eager to do it any time it suits their convenience.

MR. LAWRENCE: What is the hitch right now, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I think first, they have an election on, and I think translating our language into their language, that some of the agreements that we have to discuss these matters, they perhaps feel that they would want stronger language than we are willing to agree to, and we want a different expression from what they want. It is largely a matter of trying to agree on the kind of language that will meet their problems, and that we can honestly, sincerely agree to. We are not going to agree to any pre-conditions to negotiate a new treaty without knowing what it is going to be in that treaty and without sitting down and working it out on the basis of equity. We think that that language can be resolved and will be resolved in due time.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. President, what is your assessment now of General de Gaulle's behavior in the last year or two? What do you think about it?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is not for me to pass judgment on.

MR. BRINKLEY: In relation to us, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: On General de Gaulle's conduct. My conversations with him have been very pleasant, and I would like to see him more in agreement on matters with us than he is, such as recognizing Red China. We did not think that was wise for France or for others or for the free world. But that is France's foreign policy. That is not ours, and in his wisdom he decided he would follow that course, and that is a matter for him to determine.

MR. LAWRENCE: What do you hear from the people at the United Nations, Mr. President? Has the fact of French recognition now increased the prospect that the Red Chinese may be voted into membership at the UN?

THE PRESIDENT: The situation changes from time to time, but we don't think that they will be voted into membership and we hope not. I don't believe they will.

MR. LAWRENCE: What would be our reaction vis-a-vis the UN if they were admitted?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will have to cross that bridge. I don't want to admit that they are going to be admitted and don't think they will.

MR. LAWRENCE: Senator Goldwater, for example, has argued that we should withdraw at once if the Red Chinese are admitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is Senator Goldwater's view, and I don't think they're going to be admitted, and I don't think we will have to face that question.

MR. BRINKLEY: One you do have to face soon, Mr. President, is to say something to Congress about foreign aid. That seems to have reached a peak of opposition. It seems to have reached some kind of peak last year. What do you think the future of it is?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is going to be very tough to get a good foreign aid measure through the Congress this year. Last year President Kennedy asked for \$4 billion 900 million. He later had that request carefully studied and reduced it to \$4 billion 500 million. He got a \$3 billion appropriation after I came to office. I signed the bill, and there was reappropriated about \$400 million unexpended balances, \$3 billion 400 million. Now, I have conferred with the leaders in the House and Senate on that matter, and they all admit it is going to be more difficult this year than it ever has been before, although I don't think that is justified. Nevertheless, I request -- we are not going to pad our request. We got \$3 billion 4 this year, and we will ask for something in the neighborhood of that for next year, and we will ask only what we need, and we hope we get what we ask, but it will be appreciably under what was asked last year, and approximately the same that we got this year.

We think that we are justified in spending three or four cents of our tax dollar to protect the million men who are in uniform, our men, scattered throughout the world, and to keep them from going into combat, and this is the best weapon that I have.

MORE

)VER)

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, is there any one root cause for the apparent slowness of the Alliance for Progress?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It is very difficult to get 21 nations to all agree and get their systems changed and their reforms effected and to blend into their governmental philosophy the modernization that is going to be required to make the Alliance for Progress a success.

We are distressed that it hasn't been more successful, but we haven't lost faith.

We are having a meeting Monday with all of the Ambassadors from the Organization of American States. We are having a meeting Monday with all the Ambassadors from the Western Hemisphere.

We are calling in all of our own Ambassadors, and the three groups are going to meet, and we are going to point out the weaknesses and the slowness of certain reforms that are required and the cooperation that we must have from their countries because there is no use of making big investments and taking our taxpayers funds unless these reforms are effective.

And we are going to make an appeal for a united attack that will give new life to the Alliance for Progress, and we have hopes that it will be successful.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, are you terribly disturbed about the resort to street protests and demonstrations on Civil Rights and other things that is taking place now almost all over the country?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that when the Senate acts upon the Civil Rights Bill, that we will have the best Civil Rights law that has been enacted in a hundred years, and I think it will be a substantial and effective answer to our racial problems.

The Negro was freed of his chains 100 years ago, but he has not been freed of the problems brought about by his color and the bigotry that exists.

And this bill goes a long way to taking the battle from the streets into the legislative halls and into the courthouses, and into where these differences should be settled.

Of course, we have a right to petition, and we should petition when we have grievances, but I think the most effective thing that can be done and I think great progress has been made under leadership of President Kennedy and the Attorney General and others in the last year, in getting all the people of the Nation to accept their moral responsibility and take some leadership in this field where there has been so much discrimination.

And I know of nothing more important for this Congress to do than to pass the Civil Rights Act as the House passed it. And I hope that can be done after due deliberation.

I think it will be a great step forward for the Nation, and I think it will make us much more united, and I can't think of any single thing we can do to strengthen American foreign policies more than to pass the House Civil Rights Bill in the Senate.

MR. LAWRENCE: You are confident that you can get a Civil Rights Bill substantially like the House bill without major modification?

THE PRESIDENT: We want to very much, and we are going -- the Senate will have to work its will and we believe that a substantial majority favors the House bill, and we believe in due time it will be able to work its will.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, are you concerned, Mr. President, at what might happen if this filibuster is still going in the late spring when the schools are out and the kids are out and idle time on their hands?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to predict that the Senate will be -- how long it will be discussing this bill. I am hopeful and I am an optimist and I believe they can pass it and I believe they will pass it and I believe it is their duty to pass it, and I am going to do everything I can to get it passed.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, you have now been President for something over 100 days. You have been around Washington for more than 30 years.

How is the view from the inside as compared with the view from the outside?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is a much tougher job from the inside than I thought it was from the outside.

I have watched it since Mr. Hoover's days, and I realize the responsibilities it carried and the obligations of leadership that were there, and the decisions that had to be made, and the awesome responsibilities of the office.

But I must say that when I started having to make those decisions and started hearing from the Congress, that the Presidency looked a little different when you are in the Presidency than it did when you are in the Congress, and vice-versa.

MR. LAWRENCE: Mr. President, Thomas Jefferson referred to the office as a splendid misery.

Harry Truman used to talk about it as if it were a prison cell.

Do you like it?

THE PRESIDENT: I am doing the best I can in it, and I am enjoying what I am doing.

Thomas Jefferson said the second office of the land was an honorable and easy one. The Presidency was a splendid misery.

But I found great interest in serving in both offices, and it carries terrific and tremendous and awesome responsibilities but I am proud of this Nation, and I am so grateful that I could have an opportunity that I have had in America that I want to give my life seeing that the opportunity is perpetuated for others.

I am so proud of our system of government, of our free enterprise, where our incentive system and our men who head our big industries are willing to get up at daylight and get to bed at midnight to offer employment and create new jobs for people where our men working there will try to get decent wages but will sit across the table and not act like cannibals, but will negotiate and reason things out together.

I am so happy to be a part of a system where the average per capita income is in excess of \$200 per month, when there are only six nations in the entire world that have as much as \$80 per month, and while the Soviet Union has three times as many tillable acres of land as we have and a population that's in excess of ours and a great many resources that we don't have, that if properly developed would exceed our potential in water and oil and so forth, nevertheless we have one thing they don't have, and that is our system of private enterprise, free enterprise, where the employer, hoping to make a little profit, the laborer hoping to justify his wages, can get together and make a better mousetrap.

They have developed this into the most powerful and leading nation in the world, and I want to see it preserved. And I have an opportunity to do something about it as President.

And I may not be a great President, but as long as I am here, I am going to try to be a good President, and do my dead level best to see this system preserved because when the final chips are down, it is not going to be the number of people we have or the number of acres or the number of resources that win, the thing that is going to make us win is our system of government.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

121
rec'd to P
at 3:45 PM

March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I spoke to the Secretary of State about your belief that it would be good to do some strong briefing of diplomats. He agreed, and has undertaken to organize a program of such briefings in which he, George Ball and Tom Mann will share the load.

I also spoke to the Secretary about the importance of louder and stronger public statements. He agreed on this point, and told me that his own program includes a speech tonight, a backgrounder tomorrow, a press conference on Saturday, and a TV program on Sunday. I agreed that this seemed to be par for the course.

Bob McNamara is spending the day on the Hill, but when he gets back I will speak to him about having a whack at the New York Times people.

I also mentioned to Secretary Rusk your thought that it would be useful to have higher level discussions in NATO. He thought we should wait for the report of Unger's presentation.

DR
If we are going to send someone over, I myself think we might consider Acheson. He has enormous personal prestige; he is the symbol of our determination to stand by Europe when Europe is in trouble; he takes a good strong view on the current situation in Vietnam. But I have not mentioned this to anyone else, pending your comment.

McG. B.

I attach a copy of a memorandum I sent to Secretary Rusk confirming this understanding.

Rec'd
3/3/65
1:15 p.m.

123

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two interesting cables from Max Taylor
received this morning

The question of introducing an international combat
force will presumably await General Johnson's
visit and report. The coup rumors, on the other
hand, are obviously a hardy perennial.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

123a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy of cable from Ambassador Taylor, March 3 (Saigon 2821)

I am concerned that if we intend to move ahead with plans for some sort of an international combat force in northern South Vietnam, we keep the South Vietnamese in step with us. In particular it would not be good if South Vietnam first learns of such discussions from press or from others.

I have no idea what South Vietnamese attitude on this subject might be. As you know, there was no great enthusiasm on part of South Vietnam, especially military, for Korean unit. While I am satisfied this attitude will change as Koreans demonstrate their worth, many Vietnamese will be highly sensitive to criticism that the country is being "taken over" and the military will be very sensitive to inevitable problem of command and control that will arise from the introduction of combat units, particularly if multinational in character. While command problems are minimal for US force engaged in essentially static defense of Danang base, they will be very complex for any force, especially multinational, with security mission in northern South Vietnam. This is not to argue against force if it otherwise seems desirable, but simply to point out importance of bringing South Vietnamese into our thinking at early stage.

Westmoreland is also concerned with inadequacy of present logistics system to accommodate a substantial international force. If we intend to move ahead, I would therefore hope that I could shortly have instructions to explore matter on very restricted and tentative basis with the Government of South Vietnam.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Letter 6-26-79
By DCH, NARS, Date 9-29-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Copy of cable from Ambassador Taylor, March 3 (Saigon 2822)

In a meeting with Prime Minister Quat this morning, I first congratulated him on the success of his airmen yesterday and then raised the less pleasant subject of the premature announcement of the strike by Radio Saigon. Quat agreed that this latter event was most disturbing and plainly suspects that General Ky is responsible. He said that he directed an investigation last night and has not yet heard the results. I told him that I would be most interested to know the outcome of the investigation as this incident could have serious consequences for our joint military planning and operations.

I then adverted to our discussions of March 1 with regard to strengthening the security of Danang by the introduction of U. S. ground forces. I told him that the discussions yesterday between his officers and General Westmoreland had been quite satisfactory and had produced no obstacles. I had now filed my recommendations to Washington and was awaiting a decision which might take a little time. I mentioned the impending visit of General Johnson and Mr. Rowan and suggested the possibility that a decision on Danang might await their visit. Quat seemed quite satisfied with this explanation.

Quat then passed to the subject of rumors of which there is never a dearth in Saigon. He commented on the continued tale of the report that the Americans were behind the February 19 coup. He added that the most recent rumor is that a new coup is scheduled for March 12, allegedly for the purpose of achieving greater governmental stability. He concedes that the use of a coup to achieve greater stability is hard to understand but suggests that French agents may be behind some of these reports. He seems to take the sinister French influence as a real and serious thing.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Letter 6/26/79
By DC/H, NARS, Date 9-29-81

Rec'd
3/3/65
1:15 P.M.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

124

March 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Ambassador Kohler

Here is a very interesting cable from Kohler. I think paragraph 4 may be worth using with members of Congress and others who may be tempted to undercut our position. If you approve, I will get the word out -- or you may prefer to do this job yourself -- no one can do it better.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Get it out _____
Leave it to me _____
Leave it alone _____

~~SECRET~~ attachment

mc
Please return
A

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE

March 3, 1965

127

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your talk with George Meany about East-West trade,
this afternoon at 6:15

1. The point you might wish to make to Meany is that if we follow his current line, his constituents will be hurt. (You might wish to leave him with a sense that he should worry more about his job to help labor, and let you worry about the Berlin Wall, which is your job. Some of his people tell him that we can get political concessions as part of commercial bargains; this is nonsense, in the light of the other markets that are open to Bloc countries -- and on the historical record it is not the way Commies trade, in any case.)

2. Here are some specifics:

In 1963 we sold \$150 million worth to Eastern Europe and the USSR. The West Europeans sold about twenty times as much. The machinery, the steel, the construction equipment which the Bloc countries bought from Europe could have easily been bought here, and created jobs here.

In terms of jobs the \$150 million we sold was worth about 11,000 jobs directly, and some 25-30,000 jobs altogether. For each \$100 million of orders we lose, we give up close to 20,000 jobs in total.

--Thus when we decided in 1961 against shipping the Russians \$43 million of machine tools to make auto transmissions, we gave up on some 8-9,000 jobs.

--On the other hand, the \$300 million of grain we sold last year, almost all for gold, involved the production of some 50,000 American farmers.

--And if we now sell the \$100 million of machinery to the Rumanians which they want, it will mean some 20,000 man-years of work for Americans.

This trade is expanding. Russia and Eastern Europe will play an increasing role in the world economy. They will also become more dependent upon the Free World. If we decide to share in this trade, our sales will soon reach some \$800 million a year. This would be worth some 150,000 jobs. We see no reason to let Europeans get them instead of Americans.

3. So we would like labor to take part in a fair-minded and impartial study, and we agree with George's suggestion that Nathan Goldfinger of his staff would be a good man to have.

4. I'll be standing by if you want me, by my phone.

McG. B.

2 128

March 2, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Appointment for Foreign Minister of Korea

In the attached memorandum Secretary Rusk recommends a 10-15 minute appointment for the Korean Foreign Minister, Tong Won Lee. I strongly concur in this recommendation. This is a man who has done very good work on rebuilding relations between Korea and Japan, and if he can show a picture of himself with the President it will be good for the right forces in both Korea and Tokyo.

McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

~~SECRET~~

March 2, 1965

129

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Erhard/Wilson meeting

1. The long delayed meeting between Chancellor Erhard and Prime Minister Wilson is now scheduled to take place in Bonn March 6 - 9. One of the major topics will be the MLF/ANF discussion.

2. There continues to be some talk in Europe that we have lost interest in this problem. So Dean Rusk's MLF department has suggested formal letters from you to the heads of government of Germany, England, Italy, and The Netherlands, reaffirming our position and calling for multilateral talks shortly after the Erhard/Wilson meeting. I have reviewed the bidding with Dean himself and ~~think~~ he concurs in my feeling that we do not now want to crank up a formal U. S. -sponsored multilateral exercise.

3. Nevertheless there is a continuing problem of keeping the balance between pressure and negligence, and Dean and I believe that it would be useful to send a message to Wilson via David Bruce, and to let Erhard know that such a message has gone, before this meeting. You expressed yourself forcibly on the MLF to Wilson when he telephoned about Vietnam, but what we would now like is a document of record which will send the British and the Germans into this next round of discussions with a feeling that we are hoping for progress and will always be ready to move on with them when they begin to make progress on their own.

4. Accordingly, at Tab A is a short private message to Wilson, and at Tab B is an instruction to McGhee to give an oral message to the Chancellor reaffirming your basic position.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

(3/2/65)

129a

To: AmEmbassy London for Amb. Bruce from Secy Rusk

Request you deliver to Prime Minister most expeditious way following personal message from the President. You are also authorized communicate contents of this message to Foreign Secretary and to other high officials as you think appropriate.

"Dear Prime Minister:

As you prepare for your important conversations with Chancellor Erhard, I wish to take a moment to reemphasize what I said last month on the telephone, namely, that we continue to believe that nothing is more important for the long-run strength and health of the Alliance than to find sound and progressive ways of organizing our collective nuclear defense. As you know from our long conversations in December, I have wanted to give full time for deliberation and consultation among those who have major interests in this matter, and in particular I felt that it was most important that there should be direct and candid conversations between your Government and the Government in Bonn. I find that in some quarters this patience has been mistaken for slackening of U. S. interest in the problem, and as you leave for Bonn I want to tell you again how important I believe it is that we should find an effective answer to this problem for the long run. While it is clear that no final agreements are likely in the months between now and the German elections, it is equally clear that the problem will not be solved by neglect.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 6-6-02

~~SECRET~~

"I still believe, as I have for many months, that the key to a solution is to be found in a reconciliation of the interests and concerns of Great Britain and Germany. In the first instance, that is a task for the statesmanship of your two governments, but I am fully aware of the important responsibilities which necessarily fall to us in the U. S. as well. So I send you this message to reaffirm my hope that your conversations with Chancellor Erhard may be productive, and to reassert a readiness of the U. S. to join in further efforts in whatever way may seem most useful after your meeting.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

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~~SECRET~~