

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1066

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a memo	to President from Dean Rusk Secret	1 p	05/29/65	A
#2b List	Commodity Breakdown Confidential	1 p	undated	A
#2d memo	to President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p	open 4.14.99 05/31/65	A
#8 memo	to President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p	open 4.14.99 05/25/65	A
#8b memo	To President from R. W. Komer Secret	3 p	open 4.14.99 06/08/65	A
#8c chart	Aid to Pakistan Confidential	1 p	open 4.14.99 04/23/65	A
#8d chart	Aid to India Confidential	1 p	open 4.14.99 04/06/65	A
#9 cable	copy to cable to AmEmbassy Santo Domingo from President Secret	2 p	open 2-3-93 NLJ 91-232 05/25/65	A
#11 memo	to President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p	open 4.14.99 05/19/65	A
#16a cable	copy cable 1861 Vientiane Top Secret	1 p	Exempt per NLJ 84-30 05/13/65	A
#17 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p	05/14/65	A
#20a cable	Embtel 1227 from Madrid Confidential	1 p	05/13/65	A
#24a memo	to President from McG. B. Secret	2 p	Exemption upheld per NLJ 83-50 open 11-17-99 NLJ 99-125 05/13/65	A
#25a memo	to President from McG. B. Secret	2 p	open 11-17-99 NLJ 99-125 05/13/65	A
#33 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret	1 p	open 6-12-84 NLJ 83-96 05/12/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~McGeorge Bundy~~  
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 10, April 15 - May 31, 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 10-19-83 NLS 83-90</i> 1 p	05/12/65	A
#37 memo	To Sec. Rusk, Sec McNamara, Admiral Raborn, Wm. <i>open 10-29-84 NLS 83-192</i> Bundy from Mc. George Bundy <i>sanitized per NLS 83-90 - 10-19-83</i> <del>Top Secret</del> <i>downgraded to SECRET</i> 2 p	05/11/65	A
#39 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>Confidential</del> <i>open 8-15-84 NLS 84-32</i> 1 p	05/11/65	A
#39a memo	to President from Eugene R. Black <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-210</i> <del>Confidential</del> <i>sanitized 8-15-84 NLS 84-32</i> 2 p	05/11/65	A
#43 cable	Draft cable to Amb. Taylor from President <del>Top Secret</del> 2 p	05/10/65	A
#44a cable	Cable Pakistan, Rawalpindi Confidential <i>Excp 11/6/00 NLS 99-157</i> 1 p	04/24/65	A
#50 memo	to President from McGeorge Bundy <i>Open 4.14.99</i> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	05/10/65	A
#51 memo	to President from McGeorge Bundy <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> <del>Secret</del> 2 p	05/10/65	A
#52 memo	to President from McG. B. <i>open 1.14.99</i> <del>Confidential</del> 1 p	05/09/65	A
#54 Memo	to President from McG. B. <i>more info released 3-22-93 NLS 91-231</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-90</i> 1 p	05/08/65	A
#61 cable	<del>Embtl 6237 Paris</del> <i>sanitized 1-24-01 NLS 99-48</i>		
#62a	<del>Secret</del> 1 p	05/04/65	A
#62b cable	<del>Embtl Paris</del> <del>Secret</del> 2 p	05/04/65	A
#62c cable	<del>Embtl 6236 paris</del> <del>Secret</del> 2 p	05/04/65	A
#64a memo	To McGeorge Bundy from James L. Greenfield <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 11-13-84 NLS 84-30</i> 3 pp	undated	A
#65 memo	To SecState & SecDef <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 8-15-84 NLS 84-32</i> 1 p	04/10/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#66 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 3-16-87 NLS 86-230</i>	1 p	05/04/65	A + C "C" closing lifted 7-31-86
#67 cable	copy Saigon 3645 <del>Secret</del>	2 p	05/04/65	A
#73a cable	#23929 Secret <i>sanitized 5-19-92 NLS 91-234</i> <i>Ran 12/1/01 NLS 09-003-2-2</i>	2 p	undated	A
#74 memo	To President from McG. B. <i>same sanitization 1-22-92 NLS 91-232</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 10-23-84 NLS 183-204</i> <i>open-2-5-96 NLS 91-232 appeal</i>	2 p	05/01/65	A
#76a cable	Cable NBR Four from AmEmbassy Santo Domingo Confidential	2 p	04/28/65	A
#76b cable	1149 from AmEmbassy Santo Domingo Confidential	2 p	04/28/65	A
#77a cable	Embtel 3606 from Saigon Top Secret <i>sanitized 9-29-81 per letter 12/18/80</i>	2 p	05/01/65	A
#78b report	re: Vietnam Top Secret	2 p	04/25/65	A
#78c report	re: Vietnam Top Secret	6 p	04/25/65	A
#78d report	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX			
#80 memo	to President from McG. B. <i>open 4.14.99</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	04/30/65	A
#80b memo	To McGeorge Bundy from Benjamin Read Confidential	1 p	04/27/65	A
#81a cable	copy of Saigon cable Secret <i>sanitized 6-7-84 NLS 84-30</i>	1 p	04/29/65	A
#84 memo	to President from McGeorge Bundy <i>open 4.14.99</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	04/29/65	A
#87a cable	copy of Paris 6107 Confidential	3 p	04/28/65	A

**FILE LOCATION**

National Security File, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 10  
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. April 15 - May 31, 1965

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<del>#88a cable</del>	<del>copy of Saigon 3559</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 11-13-84 NLS 84-30</i>	<del>2 pp</del> 04/28/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#89 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <i>open 1-24-01</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/28/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#92 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> <del>Confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/28/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#93 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> " <del>Confidential</del>	<del>2 pp</del> 04/27/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#99b cable</del>	<del>copy of Saigon 3552</del> <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 11-13-84 NLS 84-30</i>	<del>2 pp</del> 04/27/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#99d cable</del>	<del>copy of Vientiane 1712</del> <del>Top Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/27/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#101a memo</del>	<del>to President from McGeorge Bundy</del> <del>Confidential</del> <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/26/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#105 memo</del>	<del>to President from McG. B.</del> <i>open 4.14.99</i> <del>Confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/26/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#105a report</del>	<del>draft three power declaration</del> <i>open 4.14.99</i> <del>Confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
<del>#108b cable</del>	<del>copy Saigon 3504</del> <del>Top Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/24/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#108d memo</del>	<del>to the President from Robert McNamara</del> <del>Top Secret</del>	<del>2 p</del> 04/21/65	<del>A</del>
<del>#108e report</del>	<del>Actions Relating to the 7 points of Def 9164</del> <del>Top Secret</del>	<del>2 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
<del>#109 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <i>declassified per NLS 83-225 on 1-26-84</i> <del>Confidential</del> <i>sanitized per [unclear] [unclear] of gift</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/26/65	<del>A</del> <i>X "C"</i>
<del>#110 agenda</del>	<del>agenda for discussion with President</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 8-17-83</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/25/--	<del>A</del>
<del>#111 memo</del>	<del>to the President from R. W. Komer</del> <i>open 4.14.99</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/23/65	<del>A</del>

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National Security File, ~~xxxxxx~~  
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 10, April 15 - May 31, 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#112a cable	re: North Vietnam <i>open 2-24-80 NLS 99-158</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p 02/15/65	A
#115b memo	to President from Dean Rusk <i>open 1/8/02 NLS/RAC 99-47</i> <del>Confidential</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-193</i> <i>11-15-83 inc</i>	2 p 04/04/65	A
#115d letter	To President from John T. Connor <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt 12/01- NLS 04-003-2</i> <i>open 1/8/02 NLS/RAC 99-47</i>	1 p 04/07/65	A
#115e memo	re: petroleum exports <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-26-82 inc NLS 82-87</i>	4 p undated	A
#115f minutes	Export Control Review Board Minutes of Meeting <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt 12/01- NLS 04-003-2</i> <i>open 1/8/02 NLS/RAC 99-47</i>	10 p 04/01/65	A
#116a memo	To AmEmbassy Saigon from Sec Rusk <del>Top Secret</del>	3 p 04/22/65	A
#117b cable	Deptel 1143 to Karachi <del>Secret</del> <i>open 4/14/99</i>	2 p 04/14/65	A
#117c cable	Deptel 1145 to Karachi <del>Secret</del> <i>open 8/25/92</i>	3 p 04/14/65	A
#117d cable	Deptel 2155 to New Delhi <del>Secret</del>	2 p 04/14/65	A
#117e cable	Embtel 2920 from New Delhi <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-126</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>SAINT 250 9-24-81 per letter 8-11-76</i>	2 p 04/15/65	A
#117f cable	Deptel 2161 to New Delhi <del>Secret</del> <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 04/15/65	A
#117h memo	to Mac from R. W. Komer <del>Secret</del> <i>open 8/25/92</i>	2 p 04/21/65	A
#117i report	Tab A <del>Secret</del> <i>open 8/25/92</i>	1 p undated	A
#121a memo	to Mac from RWK <i>open 4/14/99</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p 04/24/65	A
#122 memo	to President from Robert McNamara <del>Top Secret</del>	2 p 04/21/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~SECRET~~  
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 10, April 15 - May 31, 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#122a report	Appendix I <del>Top Secret</del>	2 p undated	<del>A</del>
#126 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> open 8-17-83	2 p 04/20/65	A
#127 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> open 4/14/99	1 p 04/19/65	A
#130a memo	for Mr. Bundy from Chester L. Cooper <del>Secret</del> sanitized 1-24-01 NLJ/RAC 99-48	4 p 04/13/65	A
#6 cable	to Santo Domingo for Vance and Bennett <del>Secret</del> Exempt per NLJ 83-89 Exemption upheld per NLJ 83-89 appeal	2 pp. 05/28/65	A
#10 memo	to the President from Bromley Smith <del>Possible classified information</del> open 4.14.99	1 p. 05/24/65	A
#57a letter	to Sir Robert Gordon Menzies from the President Possible classified information	1 p n.d.	A
#120a letter	to the president Possible classified information	1 p 4/2/65	A
#128 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Possible classified information</del> open 8-17-83	1 p. 4/17/65	A
#129 memo	to the President from Mc. B. <del>Possible classified information</del> CONFIDENTIAL Exempt per NLJ 83-192	1 p. 4/17/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, [REDACTED]  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I told you briefly about my talk with Joe Alsop at noon today, but I think you may want to know more.

Joe is full of concern on two points: he thinks we have underestimated Communist strength on the ground in the northern part of South Vietnam, and he thinks our bombing in the North is limited and timid. He does not appear to know about some of the new developments around Hanoi, and his positive recommendations were limited to two: we should put the Marines in combat pretty soon; and two, we should go after the oil supplies in North Vietnam. He has been told by someone that these oil supplies are highly vulnerable and if we can get them, we can bring the DRV war machine to a halt.

I told Joe that we would certainly check and recheck our intelligence reporting, and that we shared his view that the coming contests in the northern part of South Vietnam were of high importance. I told him also that any difference between us on bombing was a matter of pace and judgment -- that he could be quite confident of your firmness. I did not tell him about the problem of keeping our liberal friends on board because he has no sympathy with that part of your job and would simply denounce us for neglecting a fire while seeking an unreal consensus. He obviously believes we can never keep the Times with us and might as well ignore it.

I think Joe is reflecting his exposure to some of the fighting troops and his own natural belligerence. But there is just a sniff of Embassy Saigon in what he says, and I think it is clearly important that we get General Taylor back for serious discussion just as soon as his own sense of the political crisis permits.

I have thought a little about whether Joe is likely to convert Mike Mansfield, and I must say I doubt it. He has no talent for persuasion and if he batters Mansfield, it will only make the Senator more determined in his own somewhat mousy stubbornness. I will keep looking for a better advocate to convert Mansfield.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, May 31, 1965  
12:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$37 Million PL 480 Wheat for Egypt

Secretary Rusk has now asked formally for a determination on the completion of shipment under the existing PL 480 agreement. I attach his memorandum at Tab B and a good one-page from Bob Komer at Tab A. The Secretary and Bob Komer are both ready to go ahead on this and I am sure they are right from every point of view but that of Congressional reaction. The Department (Rusk and McArthur especially) has done a comprehensive consultation with the top Leadership, but it is a fact that the Senate authorization on aid will be up in the next ten days.

If you want to go ahead with the wheat sale, but keep it out of the Senate debate, we could probably make some money by telling Nasser informally that we expect to be able to go ahead in the next couple of weeks. He keeps his mouth shut on this sort of thing because it is in his interest to do so. I will put this on the agenda for our next Tuesday lunch-type meeting with Rusk and McNamara. So this particular paper is for information and not for decision.

mfb  
McG. B.

Enc: Tabs A & B

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURES

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

May 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resumption of Wheat Shipments to the U.A.R.

Recommendation:

That you determine that issuance of Purchase Authorizations under the U.S.-U.A.R. PL-480 agreement would be in the national interest.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Last January Congress adopted an amendment to the CCC Supplemental Appropriations Act stipulating that no further aid could be provided the U.A.R. under the act unless you determined such aid was in the national interest. Since that amendment was adopted, the U.A.R. Government has shown an understanding of the need for a satisfactory climate in its relations with the U.S.; in particular, it has terminated its military assistance to the Congo rebels, thereby meeting our number one priority requirement. Informal consultations with all the top leadership in the Congress has produced an understanding on their part of the reasons for completing PL-480 shipments under our current commitment. Furthermore, passage of the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill by the House has removed one of the major problems that worried the Leadership. I believe we are clear with the Congress at this point.

The urgency of the Egyptian supply situation requires the U.S. Government to act on this matter within the next few weeks. Otherwise the U.A.R. will be forced to turn elsewhere, to the advantage of the Soviet Bloc and the detriment of the U.S. position in the Near East.

There is attached a statement of the commodities and values involved in the proposed sale to the U.A.R.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Statement.

SECRET/LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 8-19-76

By DCH, NARS, Date 9-28-81

6/1/65



Commodity Breakdown of Remaining \$37 Million 1/  
Title I PL-480 Agreement with UAR  
(In millions of dollars)

Wheat/Wheat Flour	\$ 22.4
Tobacco	8.9
Vegetable Oil	5.6
Non-Fat Dried Milk	<u>0.1</u>
	\$ 37.0

1/ Not including ocean transportation cost.



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~~SECRET~~

May 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Rusk's proposal to finally release the remaining \$37 million PL 480 wheat in our three-year agreement with Egypt. He personally checked with the leadership and found no dissenters (though no enthusiasts either).

This bribe is probably essential to avoid a major ruckus in the Middle East. Nasser has made clear that he sees our suspension of shipments since December as an act of economic pressure. But Egypt's pressing food needs and foreign exchange shortage have so far deterred him from doing more than warning us. In fact, his hope that we'd resume shipments helped lead him to pull back in the Congo and, far more important, to keep quiet about our arms deal with Israel. So our pressures have worked to date.

However, once Nasser decides there's no chance of further surplus wheat, he loses his chief incentive to play ball. Past experience amply shows that in such a case (e.g. the Aswan Dam), his response is to show that he too has teeth. The sad fact of the matter is that Nasser can hurt us more than we can hurt him. Our oil and bases are too vulnerable. Nasser can always whip up the other Arabs on the Israeli issue, where we're highly exposed because we bailed out Erhard. And Nasser has another obvious issue in the Jordan Waters. Last but not least, if we cut Nasser off he has nowhere to go but Moscow, which can then force him to cause trouble as the price of its support.

Luckily the Arabs have kept reasonably quiet so far about the Jordan Waters and US arms to Israel. To buy more time and avoid a crisis, it makes sense to keep Nasser on the hook by offering him a carrot at long last. He knows the PL 480 agreement expires 30 June, so this carrot won't be available long. Moreover, the \$37 million will only carry him a few months. What he'd really like is another PL 480 agreement. So we can keep this dangling for as long as we like to exert leverage on him.

To help head off any Hill reaction, we could point out that: (a) we are only fulfilling a prior contract; (b) Nasser's recent behavior has been pretty good; and (c) any new agreement will depend on continued good behavior.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~



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B

3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: June Buying

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Cabinet and Heads of  
Agencies, dated May 18, 1965

The National Security Council staff will keep its June expenditures to a minimum by purchasing only those supplies and materials needed to carry on essential work, and we will not add to inventories or make any contracts.

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith  
Executive Secretary



Rec'd  
5/28/65  
6:00 P.M.

~~65~~  
7

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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May 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Johns Hopkins professors

The attached letter from Baltimore, mostly from Johns Hopkins professors, is sent across your desk because Milton Eisenhower undertook an obligation to these people to see that their views were made available to you. He did this in order to keep an offensive advertisement out of the newspapers, and I am sure you will agree that it is best to close the circuit by having the letter come under your eye. I have acknowledged the letter from Eisenhower and the one from the professors, and there is no need for a further answer.

mq. B.

McG. B.

4a

May 14, 1965  
4910 Wilmslow Road  
Baltimore, Maryland 21210

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Johnson,

On May 5 eighty college and university teachers and researchers of Baltimore published an open letter to you in the Washington Post. The letter welcomed the concern for peace expressed in your Baltimore speech and reflected our anxieties about certain aspects of our policy in Vietnam. A copy of that letter is enclosed.

I know I speak for the other signers of that letter, Mr. President, in welcoming your speech yesterday which again emphasized your determination to be second to none in the search for peace and which provided hopeful and concrete ways of approaching peace in that unhappy corner of the world. I feel certain that, pursuing the wise and moderate course of your Baltimore speech and of your speech yesterday, you will find ever-stronger support among us.

Sincerely yours,

*Waldo H. Heinrichs*

Waldo H. Heinrichs

Enclosure



Mr. President:

As college and university teachers and researchers in Baltimore we welcomed your speech at The Johns Hopkins University and applaud you:

For your determination never to "be second in the search for . . . a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam" and for your awareness that "armed hostility is futile."

For your call for "an independent South Viet-Nam . . . free from outside interference," and free to determine its own destiny.

For your readiness to participate in "unconditional discussions."

For your recognition of the human tragedy arising out of the war in Viet-Nam.

For your imaginative proposals "to replace despair with hope and terror with progress" through development of the Mekong Valley.

And for your determination "to choose life" and to "prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind."

But, Mr. President, you asked us whether we have "all done enough . . . to bring peace to this world." We have asked ourselves and we are troubled. Have we indeed "done enough"?

Is it enough to call for negotiations while continuing to bomb North Viet-Nam? Can we expect the North Vietnamese to join fruitful negotiations under such conditions? Shouldn't we consider a moratorium on such raids? Shouldn't we attempt to clear the way for negotiations, as we did in Korea, by effecting a cease-fire first?

Is it enough, Mr. President, to call for "unconditional discussions" that do not include the Viet Cong? Can we deny that they have a vital interest in such talks?

What provisions have been made, or are planned, to ascertain the wishes of the Vietnamese people?

Doesn't the continuing destruction of lives and property make it more difficult to attract popular support in Vietnam and elsewhere? And what of the moral implications of our actions?

Are we taking full advantage of the differences that divide the Communist world; or are our policies perhaps forcing them to resolve these differences?

In short, Mr. President, we hope your speech was a beginning not an end to efforts for a peaceful solution to the problem of Viet Nam and that it will provoke rather than forestall a thorough public debate of our overall policies in Southeast Asia.

The signers below, who are teachers and researchers at The Johns Hopkins University, Goucher College, and Morgan State College, are expressing their opinions as individuals and not as representatives of their institutions.

P. Achinstein, Maurice Bessman, Barbara Bradshaw, D.F. Bramhall, Allan Brick, B. Bromberger-Barnas, Maxwell R. Brooks, Richard Chase, Bernice Cohen, William Coleman, Guido Crocetti, H.Z. Cummins, Marsha Cummins, J.E. Deese, Sara deFord, Clinton DeSoto, Eugenio Donato, J.D.H. Donnay, Gunter von Ehrenstein, Leon Eisenberg, Jerome Frank, Frank Furstenberg, Palmer Futch, J.B. Gillooly, Rene Girard, Cecille Gold, J.L. Gossman, E.K. Haviland, William Hedges, W.H. Heinrichs, Jr., Roger Herriott, Neil Holtzman, Evelyn Howard, Florance Howe, Peter Houts, Charles Hunt, Andre Jagendorf, Sarah Jones, Donald Kerr, H.F. Klinefelter, Jr., R.K. Lancaster, F.C. Lane, Victor Laties, Sam Legg, A. Lilienfeld, Victor Lowe, H.J. Mark, Clement Markert, John Menkes, Jean-Pierre Meyer, Mary Monk, Joseph Morton, Earl Nash, Neal Nathanson, W.L. Neumann, G.K. von Noorden, John Owen, Solbert Permutt, Alvah Phillips, Kingsley Price, Olive Quinn, Harry Raulet, Frederick Reuss, Richard Riley, Donald Risley, Harold Rosen, E.V. Schneier, Barbara Starfield, Helen Taussig, W.E. Thormann, Bernard Vannier, Eli Velder, John Wallace, E.H. White, Kerr White, J.C. Williams, Eleanor Wilner, Wilson Wing, F.C. Wood, Jr., James Woods.



✓ 5

May 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Alarm bell from Tom Wicker

Wicker called me this afternoon to tell me of a story filed by Szulc from San Juan which had a quite twisted version of my talk with Caamano. It was obvious that he had got his stuff from Benitez, and so I called Benitez and raised hell. He in turn called Szulc and the story has been killed overnight. Now that Szulc knows a number of facts and has made a number of inferences, the thing will probably not sit still for long. I made an agreement to talk to Wicker again before they print anything.

What Benitez told Szulc in essence was that I had just about completed an agreement with the rebels when I got impossible instructions on Sunday. The tenor of the story is given by Szulc's lead: "Bundy told Caamano on Tuesday that he was dealing with a divided U. S. Government." I hope I do not need to tell you that this is the opposite of what I said.

Benitez told me in so many words this afternoon that he thinks "the cause" can only be won in the press. I told him he could not make a worse mistake, and I am getting on to Abe Fortas to ask him to say the same thing.

My guess right now is that what we will need to do is to develop a line which will make it clear that we never did have any "agreement" but a series of discussions on the subject of a possible understanding which never came to full shape because of important differences on a number of matters. I think we need to be awfully careful in what we say, simply because it would be so easy to torpedo the rebels entirely in American public opinion. This is the exact point which you have taught me and which Benitez wholly misses.

Benitez also confessed to me that he has been talking to Collier, and he has tried to turn off the Collier story, but probably with less success. Fortunately, Collier has already established a reputation for inaccuracy on all sides, and because I have no good friends at the Tribune I have not tried to affect that story.

McG. B.



FLASH

May 28, 1965

TO SANTO DOMINGO

FOR VANCE AND BENNETT

1. In our view essential that Imbert and Ministry of Finance turn over to OAS all checks, especially those for rebel side, before Federal Reserve cable on \$3 1/2 million transfer goes to central bank. We cannot trust a promise that rebel checks will be subsequently delivered by him or Ministry of Finance.

2. Further essential that OAS establish control over official check-writing machines or check-writing department of Ministry of Finance.

Otherwise anti-inflationary and psychologically important impact of U. S. contribution of dollar funds vitiated by Imbert's ability to continue writing checks <sup>without funds</sup> for payroll and other purposes. One possible way of achieving OAS control over check-writing of Ministry of Finance is to place OAS representatives in check-writing department to control the writing of such checks as are needed for all government payrolls and other essential and justified expenditures. If OAS does not have sufficient people perhaps they can swear in as temporary OAS representatives knowledgeable officials of local banks. In addition, a guard to prevent physical transfer of check-writing machines from Ministry of Finance building essential.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-232  
By inf, NARA, Date 1-7-93

3. In our view guard should be established without prior notice to Imbert but then his cooperation with this OAS move should be sought on grounds that protection of the Dominican peso and normal functioning of Dominican economy require issuance of checks ~~not~~ only against actual funds. It should further be pointed out to him that even though issuance of checks without receiving new dollar resources will not have important inflationary effect for the time being (if he is smart enough to realize this point) that it is inevitable that word of this government check-writing without funds would spread widely and would shake business community confidence in banks, would provoke economic disorder, and thus jeopardize his de facto control in rest of country.



7  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1965

Mr. President:

For Signature

The attached draft letter would give support to Prime Minister Holyoake whose Government has decided to send an artillery unit to South Vietnam.

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

May 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cls, NARA, Date 4-14-99

Aid decisions on India/Pakistan. Since Dave Bell and I missed our previous chance to talk with you, I want to lay before you my growing concern over the possible repercussions of the current White House hold order:

1. Because it has been on for over a month now, decisions are backing up to the point where the fact that the US is holding up will shortly become apparent to Indians and Paks. Once this happens, it will then soon become public. My concern is that this will change the whole atmosphere we've tried to build up around the Ayub/Shastri postponements, i.e. that they were not to be misinterpreted as any change in US policy.
2. The hold order is also creating special problems for AID, either in forcing it to seem to obligate a lot of money in the last month of the fiscal year or (in the worst case) leaving AID with around \$250 million in FY'65 funds unobligated.

All but \$30-70 million of the money Bell requests you unfreeze is aid already pledged to the Pak and Indian consortiums. All of it is from already appropriated FY'65 funds. Up to \$245 million of it represents loans already approved, authorized, and announced. So if we go ahead, there will be only minimal routine publicity. But if we continue holding off we will begin getting political comment soon. Since by far the greater amount happens to go to India, we'll get most of the flak from India instead of Pakistan.

If you would give me an idea of what approach you want me to take on the hold order, I can help keep the town in line. Should you have in mind exerting pressure on India and Pakistan, I'd like to suggest a number of ways. But I'd urge doing it with FY 1966 programs, where the issue of our retracting on our pledges does not arise.

Bell and I are most anxious to clarify any points you may desire. I hear that Rusk wants to raise the problem with you too.

*Bob - Don't press me  
or pressure me - I'll get  
to this when I can, I hope today - R*

R. W. Komer  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 8, 1965  
7 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Komer's background paper on the Pak/Indian Aid Decision. I think he makes a very good case for authorizing the immediate public decisions, while insisting on a hard new look at our Indian/Pak policy. We can turn this around much better in private than in public in the first stages.

m.f. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*Jim Not for allocation of  
Appropriation \$1 now unless I have  
already signed & agreed - If I  
have shown me when & where,  
OK*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



~~SECRET~~

June 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on Pak/Indian Aid Decisions, Noon 9 June 1965

86  
~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

Rusk, McNamara, Mann and Bell have been asked to attend.

This memo summarizes the current situation. Much of it is familiar ground but Bundy and I thought you'd like a recap.

US aid an incentive to other donors. The precedents on economic aid to India/Pakistan go back almost to the end of World War II, basically as part of our effort to shore up the threatened nations on the borders of the Communist Bloc. Then in 1958, we organized a World Bank consortium for India as a device to get other Western countries to bear more of the aid burden. Each year since we've used a US pledge as a lever on them. This has proven quite successful--in FY 1965 for example we got total pledges of over \$1 billion, of which our share was around 40%.

In 1961 we did the same thing for Pakistan; here our share has run somewhat higher (around 50% in the last two years), but we've gotten other donors and the Bank heavily involved. So Bell is naturally concerned lest, if we begin to backtrack, our UK, Japanese, German and other friends will too.

Administration clearance of FY'65 India/Pak aid. After being worked out among the agencies, the FY'65 figures went through the regular vetting procedure; (a) BOB reviewed the forward projections provided by AID for consistency with Administration guidelines; (b) the regular budget submission was reviewed by BOB, and then discussed with you; (c) the annual foreign aid message was cleared; and (d) the Congressional presentation was then checked with BOB. The Bundy shop participated throughout. I think it fair to say that all AID decisions and authorizations during FY'65, including consortium pledges, have been within these Administration guidelines.

In late April, following your call to Tom Mann about our pending FY'66 pledge to the Indian consortium, we put out a special White House request that all pending Pak/Indian aid decisions be cleared here first. We've been operating on this basis to the present.

Issues for Decision. Mostly because of circumstance, but partly because of our hold order, we have an end of fiscal year logjam. Since we've already disbursed most of Pakistan's FY'65 aid, the logjam mostly affects India:

~~SECRET~~

A. Some \$227 million in loans to India and \$18.5 million to Pakistan which have already been approved, authorized and announced. Only the actual signing of the loan agreements remains. The biggest item is a \$190 million program loan to India under last year's consortium pledge. For Passman purposes this money is regarded as already committed (it will not show up as an end-FY 65 shortfall); of course, it is also regarded as committed by the Indians and Paks.

B. Some \$76 million in loan applications for India and \$61 million for Pakistan. AID would like to authorize those which are ready before 30 June to utilize FY'65 funds, but not all will be ready.

C. For the last two years we have given India an advance program loan for a fraction of our new consortium pledge, to keep aid flowing since the Indian fiscal year begins two months earlier than ours. This year State and AID want to give up to \$100 million to India and start the same procedure for Pakistan with up to \$70 million. Aside from being good economics, this is essential to commit FY'65 funds which otherwise would be haggled about by Passman on specious grounds. It does not deprive us of much FY'66 leverage, since it covers only a fifth to a third of what we'd normally give. Nor does this money flow till we actually sign the loan; *it would only be authorized now.*

D. The Indian PL 480 agreement also expires 30 June, and the pipeline will begin running out this July. To forestall hoarding and then hunger in India, we need approval to make a new one-year agreement.

The case for going ahead with the above items is threefold:

A. It forestalls a sterile debate with Passman over why we couldn't even commit the allegedly minimum amount requested for FY 1965. If we hold up all new commitments beyond 30 June, we'll run \$250-300 million short.

B. It avoids the risk of a major to-do with Paks and Indians over whether we are backing away from pledges and commitments already made. Both now strongly suspect we're holding out on them, but haven't been able to pin it on us yet. If we hold up past 30 June, however, this will be impossible to conceal.

C. The story will inevitably be played up in the US press. Among other things, it will revive speculation about the real purpose of the Ayub and Shastri postponements.



~~SECRET~~

Page Three

D. The backlash might affect current aid appropriations, if Congress gets a sense that the Administration is backing off on India/Pak aid.

Recommendations. You can use tomorrow's meeting both to forestall the above kind of unnecessary trouble and to put State, AID and Defense on notice that you're highly sceptical about our current Pak/Indian policies and (a) want a hard new look at them before we spend a lot more money; (b) want to keep the Paks and Indians worried lest Uncle Sam become a lot less generous. Essentially, the trick would be to do the necessary to limit the risk to our FY 66 aid appropriation, but simultaneously instruct State and AID that we want to play a lot harder to get with the Indians and Paks. The following scenario would serve this purpose:

1. You'll go ahead reluctantly on using up FY 65 money only because we're too far down the pike to pull back gracefully without (a) accusations that we're backing off on pledges; or (b) giving Passman a handle to cut FY 66 money.

2. But you seriously question whether we're getting our money's worth from this huge investment, and intend to continue personally vetting all major new commitments until we've done a basic policy review which satisfies you and which you can use persuasively on the Congress. Rusk should take leadership on this.

3. You don't want to have Ayub or Shastri here till we've worked out our new policy line, and have softened both up to the point where they want to come for help rather than come tell you how to run Vietnam, etc. So you want much clearer signals to both Paks and Indians first (perhaps via special emissaries).

4. Despite Pakistan's fine economic performance, let's get across quietly but clearly to Ayub that he can't play China's game while being banked by the US.

5. Let's tell the Indians we're not very happy with them either, especially their tendency to take our aid for granted without doing enough to help themselves or to recognize that we're fighting their war in Vietnam.

6. In effect you fully recognize the central importance of India/Pakistan, but when we're investing as much AID money there as in the Alianza, you see a need for tighter control and greater emphasis on results.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

*mf. S.*

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By CE NSA/ISA Date 4-14-99

AID TO PAKISTAN  
(\$ Millions)

	<u>FY46-FY61</u>	<u>FY 62</u>	<u>FY 63</u>	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 65 Estimated</u>	<u>TOTAL FY46 - FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66 Congressional Presentation</u>
AID & Prede-							
cessor Agencies--							
<u>Total</u>	<u>919.3</u>	<u>240.1</u>	<u>174.3</u>	<u>213.9</u>	<u>198.4</u>	<u>1746.0</u>	<u>210.0</u>
Loans	334.0	207.1	169.4	206.0	190.0	1106.5	
Grants	585.3	33.0	4.9	7.9	8.4	639.5	
<u>Food for Peace-Total</u>	<u>449.6</u>	<u>159.5</u>	<u>185.4</u>	<u>163.8</u>	<u>180.0</u>	<u>1138.3</u>	<u>170.0</u>
Title I (for grants							
& loans)	367.7	156.9	146.1	146.1			
Title II	48.6	--	35.5	10.7			
Title III	33.3	2.6	3.8	7.0			
<u>Ex-Im Bank</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>37.9</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>76.0</u>	<u>85.0</u>
<u>Other Economic</u>	<u>67.9</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>73.2</u>	<u>--</u>
TOTAL ECONOMIC	1449.9	438.6	362.0	379.6	403.4	3033.5	465.0
TOTAL MILITARY	<u>492.0</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>68.9</u>	<u>45.5</u>	<u>40.0</u>	<u>675.5</u>	<u>40.0</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1941.9	467.7	430.9	425.1	443.4	3709.0	505.0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (MAP figures only)

April 6, 1965

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ck NARA, Date 4-14-97

	<u>FY46-FY61</u>	<u>FY 62</u>	<u>AID TO INDIA</u> (\$ Millions)		<u>FY 65</u> <u>Estimated</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>FY46-FY65</u>	<u>FY 66</u> <u>Congressional</u> <u>Presentation</u>
			<u>FY 63</u>	<u>FY 64</u>			
AID & Pre-							
decessor							
Agencies--Total	<u>1022.0</u>	<u>465.5</u>	<u>397.2</u>	<u>336.5</u>	<u>343.2</u>	<u>2564.4</u>	<u>358.5</u>
Loans	<u>676.4</u>	<u>445.9</u>	<u>392.3</u>	<u>330.6</u>	<u>335.0</u>	<u>2180.2</u>	<u>350.0</u>
Grants	<u>345.6</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>384.2</u>	<u>8.5</u>
Food for Peace							
Total	<u>1522.8</u>	<u>275.2</u>	<u>276.1</u>	<u>294.4</u>	<u>300.0</u>	<u>2668.5</u>	<u>325.0</u>
Title I (for							
grants & loans	<u>1368.0</u>	<u>249.0</u>	<u>262.5</u>	<u>262.1</u>			<u>300.0</u>
Title II	<u>5.2</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>7.8</u>			
Title III	<u>143.5</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>24.5</u>			
Ex-Im Bank	<u>244.9</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>40.3</u>	<u>57.2</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>418.1</u>	
Other Economic	<u>230.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>233.8</u>	<u>--</u>
TOTAL ECONOMIC	<u>3020.4</u>	<u>766.8</u>	<u>714.6</u>	<u>689.8</u>	<u>693.2</u>	<u>5884.8</u>	
TOTAL MILITARY	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>37.1</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>79.9</u>	<u>49.0</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>3020.4</u>	<u>766.8</u>	<u>751.7</u>	<u>708.1</u>	<u>717.7</u>	<u>5964.7</u>	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 91-232**  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS FLASH

May 25, 1965

To: AmEmbassy Santo Domingo

From: The President

**FOR BUNDY AND VANCE**

1. After Bundy's telecon with Moyers this a.m., it was decided in full review here to approve your recommendation to return, Bundy to come back to Washington Wednesday morning and Vance to remain, pending arrival of OAS Foreign Ministers Committee. We hope that this Committee will be constituted at the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting which begins Thursday.

2. It desirable for Bundy, Vance and Mora review situation with Caamano this afternoon outlining what U. S. has successfully done to date and pointing out that we will continue to cooperate with OAS in all undertakings. We hope the OAS will continue the effort to establish a government of moderate, progressively oriented, anti-Communist elements representing a broad spectrum of the Dominican operation and all our info available to them together with any information they may desire.

3. Desirable Bundy, Vance and Mora have talk with Guzman and Imbert in order also to impress them with the need for restraint pending arrival of OAS representatives.

4. Bundy is to brief Benitez so that Benitez can return to San Juan to advise Bosch as to U. S. efforts and intentions, emphasizing need for restraint during very critical next few days.

5. Press treatment could be as follows: in order coordinate with our briefings here

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-6-

have to come from the FBI -- unquote. You should simply reply back to the White House statement if queried about this.

On Guzman role the agreed-upon statement by State at noon today was -- quote -- We do not have full information about Mr. Guzman's role at the bank or his activities while Director and we suggest you ascertain this from him directly -- unquote. Stonewall anxious avoid direct or indirect endorsement Guzman by USG officials.

One final note from Stonewall: Your effort should provide clear, sharp note of confidence that from the Sunday morning when we first moved ships to horizon until now, we have met with success in our program. Specific objectives (evacuation, averting Commie takeover, cease-fire, OAS participation, etc.) achieved. Present step only continuation of that program. Turning now to OAS not admission of defeat but logical consequence previous developments.

###

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ok'd by President  
Mr. Smith  
called Miss Whitcomb  
5/5 10  
gave message  
7:23 p.m.  
5/24/65

May 24, 1965 4:40 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Despite Tito's recent outbursts which have been critical of U.S. policy but not of you personally, there is a strong case for sending the following birthday greeting from you:

"On the occasion of your seventy-third birthday, I send you greetings and congratulations. Also on behalf of the American people, I wish to extend best wishes to the people of Yugoslavia."

1. The greeting is much cooler than the one sent last year. (Copy attached)
2. To send no greeting would be considered by the Yugoslavs as a snub and misinterpreted as a change in the policy of trying to build bridges to Eastern Europe.

The above greeting is by comparison cool enough to convey our attitude toward Tito but does show that we value our relations with Yugoslavia.

☒ Message approved

☐ Do not send

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cks, NARA, Date 4-14-99

Bromley Smith  
Bromley Smith

Revised draft of message to Tito

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1965

11  
return to Brown Smith

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I telephoned Bundy to ask him to rush his promised telegram so that it would be available during your 2 p.m. meeting.

Bundy asked that the following two comments be relayed to you:

1. The Cabinet slate proposed in the telegram this morning has been very carefully checked for Communists. The clean bill of health given those on the list is based on extensive information available in Santo Domingo. This information may be more current and more detailed than that available in Washington.

2. The solution proposed in the morning telegram is a package which, if it is to work, has to be taken as a whole. Changes in it will create a new negotiating situation.

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith



This is the statement  
to be made by the  
President of the U.S.  
as agreed to on,  
I think, 13 May 65.

— The word "I" is in  
~~Davidson~~ handwriting —

The bulk of text is  
Jimmie Beutels. The  
words at the bottom  
are in Bosch's  
handwriting.

(May 20, 1965)

Document No.

12

This is the statement to be made by the President of the U. S. as agreed to on, I think, 13 May 65. The word "I" is in Davidson's handwriting -- the bulk of text is Jaime Benitez' -- the words at the bottom are in Bosch's handwriting.

I hope that the OAS mission presently in the Dominican Republic will rapidly find a solution that will at the same time assure for the Dominican people the principles of a Democratic Constitution and a government of national unity able to maintain economic and political stability. If the good offices of OAS succeed in achieving this solution the U. S. Government will offer all necessary assistance towards rapid economic development.



The govt of the U.S.A hopes  
that the OAS mission presently  
in the Dominican Republic will  
rapidly find a solution that will  
at the same time assure for the  
Dominican people the principles  
of Democratic Constitution and a  
govt of national unity able  
to maintain economic and  
political stability.

~~To such~~  
~~a Govt with a Constitutional~~  
~~base~~ <sup>once achieved</sup> the U.S. offers as ~~as~~ / now  
all necessary assistance towards  
rapid economic development.

If the good offices of OAS succeed  
in achieving this solution, the U.S. Gov.  
~~will~~ ~~will be able to~~ offer ~~and~~



5/15/65

13

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I continue to hope that the OAS mission presently in the Dominican Republic will rapidly find a solution that will at the same time assure for the Dominican people the principles of a democratic constitution and a government of national unity able to maintain economic and political stability. If the good offices of the OAS succeed in achieving this solution, the United States Government will offer all available assistance toward rapid economic development.

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British are still trying manfully to settle the Rann of Kutch dispute. But the de facto cease fire they achieved is so fragile that Harold Wilson wants to tape it down soonest. The reconnaissance flights of each side over the other may trigger a new incident at any time.

Because a major Pak/Indian fracas is the last thing we want just now, and because Ayub just wrote you a long self-justifying letter (Tab B), we urge you seize the chance to back up our cousins by sending Ayub attached brief private reply. It avoids arguing with Ayub about the merits, but tells him that if he really wants peace all he has to do is buy Wilson's proposals. Pak stickiness on procedural details is the chief obstacle at this point.

We've checked with the British, who are eager to have you reinforce their pitch--"the sooner the better." This can't hurt and may do a lot of good, because Ayub is becoming nervous about US aid.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Att. Rusk Memo to President 5/19/65, subj.  
BritEfforts to work out Cease-Fire w/Pak and  
India on Rann of Kutch

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

Rec'd  
5/14/65  
Fri.  
1:20 p.m.

15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, May 14, 1965  
12:55 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Waiver of security clearance requirements  
for US citizens at Robert College in Istanbul

1. I attach a memorandum from Dave Bell on a matter which comes up annually -- the waiver of security clearance requirements for U. S. citizens at Robert College in Istanbul, Turkey. You signed one of these last year, and it has been an almost annual affair while I have been here.

2. This year there is a minor complication in that the issue of security clearance requirements under the Foreign Assistance Act has become public in Turkey for a number of accidental reasons. In my judgment, this makes it the more important that we should grant the waiver, and I so recommend.

McG. B.

McG. B.



Rec'd  
1252  
May 14, 1965  
Jvi

(2)

19  
16

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday  
May 14, 1965  
12:50 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Very few people in the Foreign Service write as well as the average journalist. Bill Sullivan in Laos is an exception. Quite aside from the merits of his argument, I think you will be interested in his reply to an effort by my brother Bill to open another diplomatic track toward Vietnam negotiations by way of a conference on Laos.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Rec'd  
5/14/65  
1:20 P.M.  
Fri.

4

(2)  
NR 5/14

17

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, May 14, 1965  
10:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Don Wilson's plans

1. I think you should know -- if you do not already -- that Don Wilson of USIA has now definitely decided to leave the Government. I first heard this when he came in a week or so ago to ask if I would write him a general letter of recommendation for discreet use. Last night Kay Graham told me that she was talking to him today about a possible job in the Post/Newsweek organization.

2. When I get my desk dug off I will write Wilson a warm letter of recommendation, because he has done an honorable and effective job under two very different Directors of USIA. While I cannot quarrel with his view that he has a right to look around for a new job after 4-1/2 years on this one, I have emphasized to him that it would be most unfortunate if there should be a lot of leaks and rumors about his desire to leave the Government, both because it would complicate life for you and because it would make him a lame duck. He agrees and has undertaken to be as quiet as possible.

3. I continue to believe that Wilson would be an active and effective Ambassador to a smaller country, but my impression is that you want no more argument on this point.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Determined to be an  
administrative marking

By DCH On 9-28-81

European Speech

18

Twenty years ago the guns fell silent in Europe.

Today we know those who gave their lives in that conflict did not die in vain.

We still live in an uncertain world. Men have not yet stopped war or put an end to poverty. Freedom, as always, demands courage and unyielding vigilance and, occasionally, the life of man. And the alliance of the West is marked by arguments among its members.

But on the whole, this twenty years has been a time of shining achievement, of promises realized, of hopes fulfilled.

Nowhere does this emerge more clearly than in the dramatic contrast between this twenty years, and the twenty years which followed World War I.

On November 11, 1938 -- the twentieth anniversary of the Armistice -- Munich was just six weeks old, and ~~the~~ war less than a year away. Depression scarred the face of Europe and the Americas.

The League of Nations, hopeful herald of a new era, ~~among the nations~~, had dissolved in bitter nationalism, unchangeable suspicion, and endless, useless debate. And



when new aggression threatened, Western leaders yielded, to find that weakness only increased the appetite of tyrants.

In all of this America shared; by failing to support the League and by standing apart from the troubles of Europe.

"And war came." Again the lights went out.

When the dawn arrived, twenty years ago today, it was a grey dawn. Tens of millions were dead and nations were shattered. Almost before the ashes had cooled, the shadow of Soviet ambition fell across the face of Europe.

It was, perhaps, fortunate that new danger came when past failure was fresh.

For we learned from the folly of the past.

First, instead of revenge we sought reconciliation. The result is that Western Germany, Italy and Japan are today trusted and flourishing members of the community of free nations.

Second, the narrow nationalism of rival states was replaced by a drive toward a unified Europe, growing in intimacy and partnership with the United States. The Marshall Plan -- history's most generous act by one country toward others -- provided the foundation for this unity.

Third, we found policies that replaced the fear of depression with the reality of prosperity. The Common Market, and closer economic ties between all the nations of the Atlantic, have been the catalysts of abundance. Compared with 1938, America's production has almost tripled. Free Europe's production has doubled. The flow of goods between us has tripled. And, together, we have opened the door to a world without poverty.

Fourth, the Atlantic nations replaced appeasement with firmness. We made it clear, in Greece and Turkey and

in Berlin, that we would not yield one inch of European soil to aggression. As a consequence Europe is safer from attack and closer to enduring peace than at any time since VE-Day.

These then are the achievements of two decades:

In place of depression, abundance; in place of division, unity; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of weakness, strength; in place of retreat, firmness; in place of war, peace.

We must not now forget in success and abundance the lessons we learned in danger and isolation.

None of us has sought -- or will seek -- domination over others. We have resisted the temptation to serve only our own interests. We have been successful because we have acted in a wider interest than our own alone. Thus, the European nations have found strength and prosperity in building communities that stretch beyond old frontiers. The United States has committed its resources to European reconstruction, and its military strength to European defense. America has steadily sought the strength of European unity rather than to exploit the weakness of European

division. Our policy has had a single aim -- to restore the vitality, the safety and the integrity of free Europe. And, with our help, Europe is better able to resist domination - - from within or without -- than ever before.

*Some efforts today to*  
There are ~~some today who would~~ replace partnership with suspicion, and the drive toward unity with a policy of division.



The peoples of the Atlantic will not return to that narrow nationalism which has torn and bloodied the fabric of our society for generations. Every accomplishment of the past has been built on common action and increasing unity.


Are our people more prosperous? Is peace nearer? Is the future brighter? If so, it is because we have drawn together the strands of union. And there is no problem we now face which will not yield more easily to common and united action. The kind of nationalism which would blight the hopes and destroy the dream of European unity and Atlantic partnership is in the true interest of no free nation on earth. It is the way back toward the anguish from which we came.


Of course there will be differences among us. But they can be resolved through reason founded on respect.

Of course there will be difficulties. But they can be overcome by determination founded on belief.

Of course there will be dangers. But they can be faced by unity founded on experience.

Let us therefore continue the task we have begun, attentive to counsel but unmoved by any who seek to turn us aside. We will go all together if we can.



 But if one of us cannot join in a common venture, it will not stand in the way of the rest. Each of our nations will, of course, respect and honor the achievements, and the culture, and the dignity of its neighbors. But we do this better joined in common trust than divided by suspicion. For we have a civilization to build.

Here is some of our unfinished and urgent business.

First, we must hasten the slow erosion of the iron curtain. By building bridges between the nations of Eastern Europe and the West we bring closer the day when Europe can be reconstituted within its wide historic boundaries. For our part, after taking counsel with our European allies, I intend to recommend measures to the United States Congress to increase the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the United States.

Second, ~~We~~ we must work for the reunification of Germany. The people of Germany, east and west, must be allowed ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> freely choose their own future. The four powers have special responsibilities for Germany and Berlin. The shame of the Eastern Zone must be ended. It serves the real interest of none. We must set the Germans free, while still meeting the history-

laden concerns that all understand. The United States is ready to play its full part in such arrangements.

Third, we have a wide range of economic problems to resolve. Despite obstacles we will continue to press for greater European integration and a freer flow of trade across the Atlantic. We will also devise new proposals to expand world monetary reserves, and modernize the system of international payments.

Fourth, we must begin a new effort to find common instruments for helping the developing world. We are the rich nations in a world of misery. We are the white nations in a colored world. The treasured values of our civilization tell us it is right -- morally right -- that we should help others. The lessons of experience and wisdom tell us that if we fail to help now, then some day the tides of unrest will be surging along our own coasts. In fact, they already are there.

Fifth, we must work out more effective forms of common defense, ~~and ways to halt the spread of nuclear weapons~~. All

Atlantic nations who wish to do so have a right to share in collective nuclear defense, <sup>halting the spread of nuclear weapons,</sup> ~~while avoiding the dangers of nuclear spread.~~

And just as long as they are needed and wanted, strong U. S. Forces -- backed by strong nuclear power -- will remain in Europe.

Sixth, we must work toward agreement with the Soviet Union. Our firmness in danger has shown that the door to conquest in the West is forever closed. Thus, the door to peaceful settlement is now open. It is in the interest of the Soviet Union, and in our own, to seek an end to tensions.

I am sure all the nations of the West share our own desire to <sup>together</sup> work toward any agreement that can hasten lasting peace.

These are a few, and only a few, of the great issues which face us as we move toward the third decade of increasing European unity -- and stronger Atlantic partnership.

My country is engaged in towering and troubling enterprises around this struggling globe. American troops fight to hold back communist aggression in Vietnam. Others try to protect the freedom of the Western hemisphere. In Africa and the Middle East our energies are engaged with the responsibility that great power brings. Everywhere we seek to serve the common interests of the free.

But the heartbeat of our policy and our expectations is with the nations of the Atlantic.

We must all-- American and Europeans -- vow never to repeat the errors which have led to disaster: for America to stand proud in isolation, or Europe to fall apart in rancor.



But it is not enough to keep from past mistakes. We must build the new achievements of our future: A Europe, one in purpose, hope and temper - - reaching across the Atlantic to the civilization which it bred and taught, and which Europe now welcomes in common trust.

In 1778 The French Government said of the struggling, new United States of America: "...the glory, the dignity and essential interest of France demands that she should stretch out her hand to those states..."

The Atlantic tides have risen many times since then. Her waters have seen many a great captain, many good, s and dozens of armies make the passage. Yet the old dream <sup>stays</sup> ~~lingers~~ -- a great civilization touching both Atlantic shores.

How much grander is that dream than any hope to which a single nation can reach. How much more filled with the prospect of ~~peace~~ <sup>peace</sup> and the increasing welfare of man.

The glory, the dignity, and the essential interest of all our states command us to the majesty of that Atlantic civilization.

It shall be ours.


19

Friday, May 14, 1965  
4:30 PM

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

I am acknowledging this warmly in your name and I am sending copies to all who are concerned with public information on the Dominican situation. The fourth paragraph is most valuable.

McG. B.



19a  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

14 May, 1965.

Dear Mr Bundy,

You will remember a conversation we had last week about a British report about the situation in the Dominican Republic. You told me that the President would welcome publication of the substance of this report.

--- I now enclose a copy of the statement made by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, in the House of Commons on May the 11th, the fourth paragraph of which does, in fact, contain the substance of the information contained in the report which we discussed. I would be grateful, if you see no objection, if you would draw Mr. Stewart's statement to the attention of the President.

Yours Sincerely  
Pav Dean.

---

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

196

COPY OF STATEMENT MADE BY FOREIGN SECRETARY  
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MAY 11, 1965

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In December, 1962, free elections in the Dominican Republic resulted in victory for Mr. Juan Bosch, who as President, received sympathy and support from many quarters, including the United States Government. He was overthrown in September, 1963, by a military coup; it was alleged at the time that his Government had been infiltrated by Communists, and of this there was, indeed, some evidence.

The civilian triumvirate which succeeded him was, in turn, overthrown on 24th April last by another military coup, engineered by elements of the Dominican armed forces with the declared object of restoring Mr. Bosch and the constitution of 1963. The revolt having met with determined and effective resistance from other elements of the Dominican armed forces, the rebels distributed large numbers of automatic weapons to civilian sympathisers.

At this point, a small force of United States marines landed to evacuate those of their own and other nationals who wished to leave. The House had already been informed of the assistance generously given by the United States authorities in the evacuation of British subjects.

Events then took a different turn. Reports from our own sources leave us in no doubt that, in the second phase of the revolt, the leadership was provided at least in part by persons who had received high-grade instructions in the technique of armed revolt. Had it not been for the skilled intervention of these relatively few activists, it is questionable whether the originators of the revolt would have been able to pursue the struggle.

In these circumstances, the United States troops who had landed to protect American and other nationals remained and were reinforced; and the Organisation of American States sent a mission which, after consultation with both the combatant groups, recommended the despatch to the Dominican Republic of an inter-American peace force. That recommendation was accepted by the O.A.S. Council on 6th May, and the United States Government have made it clear that they will withdraw such troops as are not required by the Organisation.

The immediate task of the O.A.S. is to create the conditions in which the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic can be resumed. A speedy and successful conclusion to their efforts will be the general wish of the House.



May 14, 1965

19c

TO: Mr. George Reedy

From McGeorge Bundy

I send you the attached for  
appropriate use with the  
press.

May 14, 1965

19d

To: Mr. Jim Greenfield

From: McGeorge Bundy

I send you the attached for  
appropriate use with the  
press.

*Rec'd  
Shirley  
May 13, 1965  
3:50 p  
(2)*

20

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 13, 1965  
*signed at 3:45 P. M.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is all too true, but Cy Vance tells me to tell you that the book is being thrown at these Marines. General Palmer reports that the problem of maintaining discipline along the line of communication is extraordinarily difficult -- there are hundreds of bars and all sorts of other temptations, and while he has MPs stretched to the limit, he thinks more such episodes have to be expected.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

*Reid  
5/13/65  
Thurs. - 12:30 p.m.*

*21 POKS*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 13, 1965  
12:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Unless you object, we plan to try to get James Donovan to be an observer on behalf of Baptist organizations in the forthcoming trial of two American missionaries along with 30 Cuban Baptist ministers and laymen, which begins tomorrow in Cuba.

2. We have been up and down this very carefully, and it makes sense to us and to the American Baptist organizations. So I am telling them to go ahead, but I think you should know about it. It can be stopped if you tell me to do so this afternoon.



*McG. B.*

McG. B.

*cc: Mr. Moyers*



Rec'd  
Shaw  
May 13, 1965  
4:15

POK  
22

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 13, 1965  
4:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Erhard Visit

1. The dam has broken on Erhard's visit to Columbia University. We have managed to damp this down, in spite of well-informed rumors, for about two weeks, in order to get it as far away from the Shastri postponement as possible. But the Chancellor has a press conference tomorrow in which he cannot escape the question, and I have told the Germans that, subject to your veto, it is all right for him to confirm that he has an invitation to Columbia University, and that you have asked him to have an informal talk at the White House during his visit to the U. S. This will put the visit in as low a key as possible in order to minimize invidious comparisons with Ayub and Shastri.

2. Will you let me know right away if you have different feelings on this?

McG. B.

McG. B.

W  
23

Thursday, May 13, 1965  
12:55 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached cable from Kohler gives an interesting account of his talk with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin on the pause.

Kohler had a tough time getting his message to the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The North Vietnamese Embassy refused to receive the message on the ground that we did not have diplomatic relations and suggested that Kohler deliver it through the Soviet Government, as a Co-Chairman. The Soviets refused to play this role, and Kohler eventually got the message delivered by having it handed to an employee at the North Vietnamese Embassy who accepted it.

Kohler also gave a copy to the Soviets who refused to pass it on, but did not pass it back.

This cable makes it obvious that the whole Soviet Government is embarrassed by the notion of admitting that it has any middle-man's role with respect to Hanoi.

Yet there is evidence on other channels of real Soviet interest in a pro-Russian and anti-Chinese settlement in Vietnam (See Tab B).

All this is very preliminary evidence of the impact of the pause. We are reviewing all our ~~bombing~~ <sup>POLITICAL</sup> plans and should have comment for you by the end of the day on Saturday. Meanwhile, everyone's orders are to avoid comment on the absence of bombing. So far we have gotten through one day more than I expected, but I expect the noise to begin very soon.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

From Moscow to Dept 3391, May 12, 1965  
Tab B: CSDB 312/01196-65, 12 May 1965

Thursday, May 13, 1965  
12:25 p.m.

24

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is what we have relayed to  
Davidson for the discussions which  
are now continuing.

McG. B.



24a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Harry Shlaudeman, 11:35 a.m.  
Thursday, May 13, 1965

1. With the President's approval, I described to Shlaudeman for relay to Mr. Davidson the position of the U. S. on the discussions Davidson was having with Juan Bosch. First, the arrangements, being discussed between the U. S. Government and Bosch must be extended to include the agreement and support of Balaguer before we can expect success. Both Bosch and the U. S. Government will have to work together to get Balaguer's support. These three forces, in turn, will have to be joined and supported by the OAS Committee. All four forces will be necessary to get effective consent and support both now and in the process of getting a new government to work.
2. I reported that the two names which Davidson had received from Bosch yesterday as possible Presidents were both acceptable to us -- but that we considerably preferred Guzman to Jimenez because we knew much more about him and because he appeared to have larger stature.
3. I told Shlaudeman that Crockett would be discussing a number of additional names which Davidson could use as examples of neutrals who might be added to the slate which Bosch had suggested in order to make it more generally acceptable. These names would be for illustration, but they do not yet carry official U. S. support.
4. I told Harry to ask Davidson to point out that both the U. S. Government and Bosch would have to accept responsibility for ensuring consent and compliance of the military forces with which each of them was in friendly contact. There should be no military state within a state on either side. I reported our current estimate that if we could get a general agreement with Bosch and Balaguer and the OAS, we would probably not be faced by such pockets of military resistance -- but we must be ready for them.
5. Before talking to Shlaudeman, I had received from Mr. Davidson the following language reporting an agreement between him and Bosch on the problem of controlling extremists:

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 59-125**

**By is, NARA Date 10-30-99**

~~SECRET~~



5/13/65

"Concerning active Communists and Trujillistas, it is agreed that they present the problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. They may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island, identification of such persons to be effective promptly by mutual consultation, and prompt action will follow as aforesaid. "

6. I told Shlaudeman that this language was acceptable to us but that it would be well to make it clear that we would have to interpret the phrase "mutual consultation" to mean much the same thing as "mutual responsibility. " I told Shlaudeman that part of our interest here was to avoid a lot of vengeance against so-called Trujillistas. He said that he thought this was not a major problem and that the Trujillistas were included as a face-saving balance to the inclusion of the Communists.

7. I then turned the telephone over to Mr. Crockett for his further discussion of individual Dominican names with Mr. Shlaudeman.

m. J. B.

McG. B.

Thursday May 13, 1965  
12:25 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is what we have relayed to  
Davidson for the discussions which  
are now continuing.

McG. B.

25



~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1965

252

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Harry Shlaudeman, 11:35 a.m.  
Thursday, May 13, 1965

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**NLJ 99-125**

**By id, NARA Date 10-30-99**

~~SECRET~~



5/13/65

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McG. B.

~~SECRET~~



May 13, 1965

242 PM

26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed White House reception for  
foreign students

I attach a memorandum from Dean Rusk recommending that we continue the custom by which you receive foreign students at the White House each year.

I think this is one of the really good and easy ways of having a friendly personal impact on the foreign students and of sending home a number of possible future leaders with a friendly feeling about the United States.

The time could be any afternoon between now and May 21.

McG. B.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

5/13/65

Dictated by Mr. Davidson

27

Concerning active Communists and Trujillistas, it is agreed that they present the problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. They may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island, identification of such persons to be effective promptly by mutual consultation, and prompt action will follow as aforesaid.

Davidson memo.

5/13/65 4:20 pm

28

The President of the United States:

<sup>continue to</sup>  
I hope that the OAS mission presently in the Dominican  
Republic will rapidly find a solution that will at the same time assure  
for the Dominican people the principles of a democratic constitution  
and a government of national unity able to maintain economic and  
political stability. If the good offices of <sup>the</sup> OAS succeed in achieving  
this solution, the United States Government will offer all <sup>AVAILABLE</sup> ~~necessary~~  
assistance toward rapid economic development.

---

OAS up front

Mr. President:

Here is an updated report from your  
diary on your Dominican Republic  
activities.

mjdr/mf  
5-12-65  
1:25p



APRIL 25, 1965 - MAY 11, 1965

MEETINGS WITH:

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McGeo Bundy	7
Abe Fortas	3
Admiral Raborn	1
Group (Rusk, et al)	18
Munoz-Marin	1
Betancourt	1
Figueres	<del>41</del> 42

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Secretary Mann	28
McGeo Bundy	86
Abe Fortas	40
Sacy Ball	3
Admiral Raborn	10
Mr. Helms	3
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~~228~~ 225

MAY 10, 1965

6:10p-7:08p

Secy Rusk, Secy McNamara, Secy Mann,  
McGeo Bundy, Wm Bundy

MAY 11, 1965

1:20-3:00p

Lunch with Secy Rusk, Secy McNamara, Mr. Fortas,  
Admiral Raborn, McGea Bundy

9:15 p  
5 12-65

✓  
30  
—

33

(2)  
ME 5/12

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 12, 1965  
7:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conversation with John Hightower

John Hightower came in to follow up on your conversation with the AP people at lunch. I gave him for background use a pretty clear account of your view of the constitutional and political position with respect to the Southeast Asia Resolution and the recent appropriations and the Korean War. We agreed to make it clear that you were in no sense predicting any such enlargement as a "Korean" war, and that in fact you were opposed to speculations about what might come next week there.

Hightower and I were both somewhat surprised that Gallagher thought the Southeast Asia Resolution was a fresh story, but it was clear that John had instructions to write something substantial about it.

At the end of our cordial talk -- we treat each other pretty candidly -- I told him that we had deliberately stayed away from our one problem with AP reporting -- namely, Arnett. Hightower at once said that he thought this was very wise indeed because he thought Gallagher would almost surely become both protective and resentful if the White House attacked one of his reporters. I asked Hightower if he would have written the gas story the way Arnett did. He answered that he has as many years' experience as Arnett has years of life. He said that it was hard to get experienced and senior men to stay put in Saigon.

I told him that the AP problem sounded very much like our problem in Saigon, but that you had insisted on putting the first team there. I said that I could not judge the daily merits of Arnett's reporting, but that I respected Zorthian, and Zorthian was troubled. Hightower agreed that Zorthian was a very good man.

Although somewhat puzzled by his mission, Hightower obviously felt the luncheon has been highly successful.

m. s.  
McG. B.

Rec'd  
Wednesday  
May 12, 1965  
6:05 pm

31

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Intelligence on the Dominican Republic

After your comment on the CIA at lunch, I had a talk with Ray Cline, who was over here under his own steam to find ways of speeding up CIA communications to you.

I showed him the memorandum that you found unhelpful, and he observed that it was a compound <sup>of</sup> general summary and a few small pieces of new information which you might already have seen. He had come over to discuss a faster method of ticker transmission, and we have agreed to try out the following system for the next few days and see how you like it.

1. All really good new bits of intelligence will be sent forward by ticker and walked right into you via Juanita Roberts' office.

2. Twice a day there will be a more general assessment-- once in your evening check-list and again in a morning summary which will be ready for you in the Situation Room at 7:30 each morning.

In this way you will get the fresh information as it comes, and a brief but more comprehensive run-down twice a day. After we have tried this for a day or two, I will see whether you feel that you are getting your \$3 billion worth.

I have also emphasized to Ray the high desirability of getting closer to the rebel command if it can possibly be done. He is carrying this message back to Helms and Fitzgerald and the operators..

h. f. B.  
McG. B.



32

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1965

Wednesday, 8:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach herewith a possible statement on the Dominican Republic which Tom Mann has drafted and which I will not have seen when you get this. (He is sending it later to the Situation Room and I will be getting it the first thing in the morning). The reason for sending it to you is that Bus told me you might want to have a statement on this subject at the Cabinet Meeting. Tom thinks a statement by you is not desirable right now, but this is really a matter which we will be able to judge better if we get word from Abe Fortas in the morning. I myself think it is quite possible that a forward-looking statement aimed at peace and the constitution would be helpful, and I will check with you early tomorrow.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Attachment

36

33

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 12, 1965  
8:15 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following actions are being taken in follow-up on  
CIA Situation Report No. 3 of 6:15 p.m.:

1. At Admiral Raborn's request, I have authorized questioning, photographing and finger-printing on Luis Genao Espallat, the Communist leader said to be held at San Isidro.
2. On the Costa Rican troop offer in Paragraph 6, we are pressing State and Defense to accept it at once without waiting for the so-called Central American Force, and we hope to have results by morning.

mcB

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-96  
By is, NARS, Date 6-12-84

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 12, 1965  
8:10 p.m.

*Handwritten:*  
4/20  
34

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This Intelligence Summary is worth reading. I think it gives a fair and quick account of the current situation. I will speak to Bob McNamara in the morning about our naval effort against infiltration by sea. This is an area of obviously increasing importance.

*19/*  
McG. B.

IM SC 04481/65  
Cy 93, TSD

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 12, 1965

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your conversation with Governor Stevenson

1. You are considering a decision to suspend air attacks on North Vietnam for several days. You would not announce this decision in any way, but you would call attention to this pause privately with Moscow and Hanoi. While this pause would not be a long one, it would indicate our own ability to move either way, depending upon the actions of the enemy. This pause would not be extended or repeated merely in return for a conference, but only if there were major reductions in the level of armed action in South Vietnam.
2. You would like to have this decision known to U Thant, but only if he could be told in a way that would protect us entirely against leaks. Does Governor Stevenson think he could tell U Thant on an entirely personal basis, so that Governor Stevenson and U Thant would be the only two people in the whole United Nations to know about this matter until the President was ready to discuss it publicly?
3. If Governor Stevenson can give you this kind of assurance, you are strongly inclined to go ahead with this pause. If he cannot give you this assurance, you may have to reconsider the whole matter.

Stevenson sees U Thant around noon and this phone call should be placed as quickly as possible.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-90By js, NARS, Date 10-19-83



May 12, 1965

35 PM

36

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Your Meeting on May 13 at 5:45 p.m. with the National Review Board for the East-West Center**

You have agreed to meet with eight members of the East-West Center's National Review Board at 5:45 p.m. on May 13th. (Their names are attached.)

The Board members will be accompanied by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Irving Lewis of the Bureau of the Budget, will also attend.

The Center's National Review Board was appointed by the Secretary of State in February 1965 in order to give advice and guidance to the Department of State on operations of the Center. The need for such a group was stressed in a report made to you a year ago by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Under the chairmanship of Governor Burns of Hawaii, the Board is now holding its first meeting.

State suggests that you express your specific interest in the National Review Board, since you (a) sponsored the authorizing legislation for the East-West Center in 1959 and 1960; (b) gave the dedication address for the Center in Honolulu on May 9, 1961; and (c) concurred with the U.S. Advisory Commission's recommendation for the establishment of the National Review Board and the designation of the Governor of Hawaii as its first Chairman. I attach a copy of draft remarks prepared by Mr. Cater.

**James C. Thomson, Jr.**

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

May 11, 1965

PERSONAL FOR

Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
Admiral Raborn  
Assistant Secretary William Bundy

Up to this moment, the knowledge of the President's plan for a trial pause has been restricted to the President himself and to those addressed in this memorandum.

The President now approves the extension of this circle to include in the State Department Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Unger; in the Defense Department Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and in the White House Mr. Bromley Smith. The President has further approved most private transmission of the existence of his plan to Prime Minister Wilson, Prime Minister Pearson, and Prime Minister Menzies, with explicit caution to each of these Heads of Government against revealing the substance of the President's plan at this time to anyone but his Foreign Minister. The President has himself informed Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Johnson in Saigon, and he now authorizes a message to Ambassador Taylor instructing him to inform General Westmoreland.

The President has consulted fully with Prime Minister Quat, who has expressed his understanding of the President's plan.

The President has authorized the Secretary of State to convey appropriate messages with respect to this plan to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of North Vietnam.

The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense to carry out the military aspects of this plan.

Beyond this point, the President has given no authorization whatever for any discussion or disclosure of this plan by anyone at any time with anyone inside or outside the Government. The President has directed me to

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-192

By ics, NARS, Date 10-29-84



emphasize the importance of complete discretion among those who are authorized to be informed, and he asks me to impress upon the Secretary of Defense and upon Mr. William Bundy, in Secretary Rusk's absence, the importance of insuring complete discretion in the State and Defense Departments. Needless to say, he has given me a similar caution with respect to the White House, and he omits this warning in the case of Admiral Raborn simply because he expects that no other office of the CIA will be informed at this time.

This operation needs a code word and the best that I can think of is HOLIDAY.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/11/65

Agenda for lunch with the President, May 11

1. Dominican Republic
  - a. Mr. Solomon's report
  - b. Our next political moves --  
with Bosch, with Wise Men, with the OAS,  
and on the scene
  - c. The coordination of public information
2. Southeast Asia
  - a. Exchange of cables with Taylor  
and further planning problems
  - b. Plans for a speech on peaceful programs
3. Secretary of State's travel plan



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 11, 1965

7  
39

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gene Black and Mekong Development

1. Gene Black came in to report this morning and submitted the attached memorandum showing where his efforts now stand. I have removed the enormous attachment (TAB A), which is a thick black book that is being staffed out. Since he drafted this memorandum, Gene has had a telegram from Tex Goldschmidt reporting that the Mekong Valley Development meeting in Bangkok is going very well. He has also heard that the Asian Development Bank has scheduled a definite meeting for June 28/29 in Bangkok and he will plan to go to that.

2. This program is going well, and I am sending a copy of these papers to Dick Goodwin with a suggestion that he include a sentence or two, as appropriate, in the speech now set for Thursday.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-32  
By ics, NARS, Date 8-15-84

39a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Initiatives in Southeast Asian Development

Since your April 7 address in Baltimore, the Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development has taken a series of measures to implement your proposal for an expanded cooperative effort for development in Southeast Asia. In keeping with your expressed desire, we are encouraging the Asians and other interested countries and institutions to take the initiative. At the same time, however, the Task Force has taken the necessary steps (a) to assure that the U. S. can respond quickly and effectively to specific Asian proposals, (b) to encourage the Asians to make acceptable proposals, and (c) to initiate programs ourselves where desirable. These steps include:

1. At the request of the UN/ECAFE I have sent an observer to the Special Mekong Committee meeting on May 10-11. He will:

(a) Encourage building of a regional development agency on the framework of the Mekong Committee and offer tangible support for the Committee's present prime interest, the Nam Ngum multi-purpose dam in Laos; he will state that the U. S. is prepared to contribute half the cost of this project, provided certain economic and political problems are resolved and other donors together match with grants our grant contribution; and

(b) Attempt to reconcile differing approaches suggested by the Japanese and the U. N. as to the scope and organization of the new program. (The Cambodian break with the United States has complicated the problem).

2. I have discussed your offer of assistance with U Thant, who is very enthusiastic. Since then the U. N. has been considering various institutional devices to implement the program. In addition, Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Reischauer have discussed your proposal with the Japanese who have shown an active interest and are in the process of developing their own proposals.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-210  
By lip, NARA, Date 5-10-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-


3. We have asked the Japanese, during their on-going conversations with the Soviets, to exchange views with them on your proposal for Southeast Asian development. This would serve as a means of bringing the Soviets into a dialogue on this subject. Hopefully, this exchange would also impress upon the Soviets that your offer is not directed against them and that not all the initiative comes from the U. S.

4. I discussed the Asian Development Bank with U. N. officials, expressing the U. S. interest in participating in the Bank, provided it is properly organized. Subsequently, I have informed the U. N. that I would be glad to attend an Asian Bank Consultative Committee meeting in June if the dates coincide with my tentative plans to visit the Far East late next month. Meantime, an U. S. inter-departmental group is preparing a detailed position in connection with the Asian Development Bank's formation.

5. Since the cooperation of Western European countries is so important, I hope also to be able to travel there to ascertain their attitudes. Prime Minister Wilson has told Secretary Rusk that he would like to have discussions on the Mekong River project.

6. Meanwhile A.I.D. and the Department of Agriculture are devising additional assistance projects to reach the needy people of friendly countries in which we have bilateral aid programs. They are taking care to avoid undermining the effort to establish a regional scheme for basic economic (and hopefully) political cooperation.

7. A tentative, preliminary assessment of the possible size and shape of a multilateral assistance program for Southeast Asian regional development under varying conditions, has been prepared by A.I.D. See TAB A, Illustrative Program for Accelerated Economic and Social Development in Southeast Asia. An earlier draft was an annex to the Task Force's preliminary report.

  
Eugene R. Black

Enclosure: TAB A  
Illustrative Program for  
Accelerated Economic and  
Social Development in SEA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M 11, 1965

40 7

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached telegram from  
Jean Monnet and his Action  
Committee is encouraging.  
I suggest the attached letter  
of reply.

McG. B.



40a

May 12, 1965

Dear Mr. Monnet:

I want to thank you warmly for your telegram of May 10 about my speech in honor of VE Day.

I have followed the proceedings of your Committee in Berlin with the greatest interest, and I look forward to a chance to study closely the positions which you have announced on that occasion. It is a great source of strength to know that the policy of the United States and the purposes of yourself and your Committee remain in such close agreement.

Sincerely,



Mr. Jean Monnet  
83, Avenue Foch  
Paris XVI<sup>e</sup>, France

LBJ:McGB:mz



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1965

S/S 7167

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with the  
Members of the National Review  
Board for the East-West Center

The President has agreed to meet with the members of the National Review Board for the East-West Center at 5:45 p.m. on May 13. Suggested talking points are enclosed. The members of the National Review Board were appointed by the Secretary of State on February 24, 1965, and are holding their first meeting at the Department of State on May 13 and 14.

Mr. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, will accompany the National Review Board members to the White House. Mr. Irving Lewis of the Bureau of the Budget will also attend.

You may wish to consider inviting Congressman John J. Rooney who had a guiding hand in the House at the time the legislation for the Center was being considered, and Senator John J. McClellan of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee concerned with the East-West Center budget.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested Talking Points.
2. Press Release.
3. List of Members to be Present.
4. Agenda.
5. East-West Center Report.

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1 - ~~Shannon~~  
2 - ~~RT~~  
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NATIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE EAST-WEST CENTER

Following is the list of members of the National Review Board who will be at the White House at ~~11:30 a.m., May 13~~ to meet the President.

5:45 p.m., May 13

The Honorable John A. Burns (Chairman), Governor of Hawaii

Hugh Borton, Ph.D., President, Haverford College, Pennsylvania

Hung Wo Ching, Ph.D., President, Aloha Airline, Honolulu

The Honorable Francis E. Keppel, Commissioner of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Mrs. Mary W. Lasker, Trustee, Museum of Modern Art, New York City

The Very Reverend Laurence J. McGinley, Church of St. Ignatius Loyola, New York City

Otto N. Miller, Ph.D., President, Standard Oil Company of California, San Francisco

Logan Wilson, Ph.D., President, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.

### Suggested Talking Points

1. The President may wish to express his specific interest in the National Review Board since he:

- (1) {
- a) Sponsored the authorizing legislation for the East-West Center in 1959 and 1960.
  - b) Gave the dedication address for the Center in Honolulu on May 9, 1961.
  - c) Concurred with the U.S. Advisory Commission's recommendation of the establishment of the National Review Board and the designation of the Governor of Hawaii as its first Chairman.

(2) 2. In addition the President may wish to express the hope that the Board will assist the East-West Center to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through cooperative study, training and research.



# NATIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE EAST-WEST CENTER

Following is the list of members of the National Review Board who will be at the White House at 5:45 p.m. May 13 to meet the President:

The Honorable John A. Burns (Chairman), Governor of Hawaii

Hugh Borton, Ph.D., President, Haverford College, Pennsylvania

Hung Wo Ching, Ph.D., President, Aloha Airline, Honolulu

The Honorable Francis E. Keppel, Commissioner of Education,  
Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Mrs. Mary W. Lasker, Trustee, Museum of Modern Art, New York City

The Very Reverend Laurence J. McGinley, Church of St. Ignatius  
Loyola, New York City

Otto N. Miller, Ph.D., President, Standard Oil Company of  
California, San Francisco

Logan Wilson, Ph.D., President, American Council on Education,  
Washington, D.C.

May 10, 1965

43

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

DRAFT CABLE TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have just learned from Bob McNamara that nearly all ROLLING THUNDER operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, Washington time. If we avoid bombing between Wednesday noon and the end of the days of Buddha's birthday, we would have a four-day pause which I could use to great effect with opinion here and with the Soviets.

My plan would be not to announce this brief pause but simply to call it to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi tomorrow, and tell them that we shall be watching closely to see whether they respond in any way. I would plan to report publicly after the pause ends on what we have done. You should see Quat on Tuesday morning and see if you can persuade him to concur in this plan. I would like to associate him with me in this decision if possible, but I would accept a simple concurrence or even a willingness not to oppose my decision. In general, I think it important that he and I should act together in such matters, but I have no desire to embarrass him if it is politically embarrassing for him to join actively in a pause over Buddha's birthday.

You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward a restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. We have amply

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State 3-21791 NSC 7-11-79  
By DCH NARS, Date 9-28-81

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOD

- 2 -

demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.

I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off better.

April 30, 1965

44

MR. PRESIDENT:

An interesting report of  
Ayub's real thinking. (This  
is after postponement of visit.)

McG. B.



4/29/63

45

The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger, that the authorities are unable to guarantee their safety, and that the assistance of United States military personnel is needed for that purpose.

Accordingly, I have issued instructions to the Secretary of Defense to take necessary steps to proceed immediately with the evacuation of the several hundred Americans still in the Dominican Republic. Our assistance will also be available to nationals of other countries residing in the Dominican Republic, some of whom have already requested assistance.

I am sure that the Dominican people, in this hour of their tribulation, will understand that we continue to hope and to work for a cessation of hostilities, the restoration of law and order, and the speedy return to the normal processes of government.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

46  
To: Mr. Brandt

April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will be interested in this letter from Arthur Dean. I have already acknowledged it informally and urged him to do a public answer to Hans Morgenthau. He says he will.

His experience in handling the Korean armistice makes his testimony on these matters significant.

hjs  
McG. B.

46a

48 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK 5

April 19, 1965

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

In view of the various ideas being expressed to you that the calling off of the bombings of North Vietnam would make that government and possibly the USSR and the so-called People's Republic of China more amenable to negotiation, I would suggest you have reviewed for you the result on the military conduct of the war in Korea after truce negotiations started in 1951 and after we vetoed the proposed bombing north of the Yalu River.

Before our negotiators under Admiral Turner Joy went to Panmunjom, the Communists insisted that all jeeps have white sheets over their tonneaus and that they approach from a certain direction. The Communists used photographs of these white sheets and approach as symbolic proof we had surrendered and widely circulated these photographs all over Indochina. Just before the final signing of the Armistice on July 27, 1953, the Chinese Communists and North Koreans mounted an extraordinary attack on our forces during that Spring. I did not go to Korea until after the signing of the Armistice but I believe that experienced people in the State and Defense Departments could trace for you the rise and fall in the character of Communist negotiations, depending upon the launching of Sputnik and of their own military preparations following the launching of the Marshall Plan, the beginning of NATO, and the presentation of our military budgets.

I believe cessation of the bombings would be widely interpreted in Communist circles as surrender and would be used by them in Indochina, the Philippines, Japan and India as proof positive that we had been defeated and were

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

-2-

withdrawing from Asia. Indeed, if orders to stop the bombing were to be given, the Communists may give you a slight inkling of their willingness to negotiate -- which neutralist leaders and those of our allies who prefer to see us withdraw without an appropriate solution will interpret as hopeful -- and will therefore renew pressure on you at the end of the original stated period of bomb cessation to continue the orders not to bomb.


Therefore, there is every likelihood that we will not recommence bombing once the order to cease has been given. Any ability to negotiate will deteriorate thereafter and the effect on South Vietnam government and the morale of its forces will be disastrous.

I call your attention to an article in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, at page 25.

I believe his attempt to compare Titoism in Yugoslavia with the situation which would exist on our rights to send shipping through the straits and rights to overfly if all of Indochina were in the hands of the Communists or Neutralists is hardly comparable and there is no assurance that Ho Chi Minh would be Titoist in character, except for vaguely defined ideas that historically the North Vietnamese do not like the Chinese.

True, the USSR may install the equivalent of Sam II's north of Hanoi but I assume diplomatic approaches to the USSR will make our intentions clear to them while we are trying to work the situation out.

Sincerely yours,



Arthur H. Dean



Rec'd  
May 10, 1965  
49

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Lunch with Walter Lippmann

I opened the lunch by telling Walter that you had made me late by calling me twice to tell me to complain of his report that he was out of favor at the White House. I told him you wanted him to know that your respect for him and your respect for Mrs. Lippmann were absolutely unaffected by any difference on a specific issue, and that he could count on your friendship. He acted like a man who had just received a two-quart transfusion at a moment of desperate need. I have seldom seen anyone change his mood so fast. He then went on to say that he did not know what to think because he had heard of your comments to newspapermen about how every time you caught up with him, he seemed to have moved like Martin Luther King. I said that this was indeed your feeling, but that it had nothing to do with your high regard for him and your friendly feelings toward him. I shall be enormously surprised if this does not lead to a better tone in his comments -- in fact, my guess is that the next time he hits us, he will take the line that you are a very good and wise man who is getting bad advice -- and this is of course what advisors are for.

We went up and down a number of issues, but the two comments he made which might interest you are these:

1. He says he does agree with Scotty Reston that there is too much commotion and too much talk coming out of the White House. I think he is referring to the particularly strenuous period between April 30 and May 5 in which you were speaking to the country and to the Congress and to the press. I told him in all solemnity that I had never seen an important decision hastily or incautiously made in the White House, but he stuck to the view that appearances count almost as much as reality in this field.

2. He said that he and others continued to feel that at the decisive moments you got more ~~forceful~~ advice from the hardliners than from the peace-makers. I said I wished I could show him all the hawklike things you had turned aside. I also tried to show him, in our discussions of Vietnam, that the political track and the negotiating stance were very much on our minds, and he listened with care, but I did not persuade him. In terms of immediate decisions, I think his attitudes weigh urgently on the side of finding the way to a pause over Buddha's birthday if we can. This will be the <sup>first</sup> ~~preliminary~~ order of business in the Vietnamese section of our 6 PM meeting.

McG. B.

Rec'd  
May 10, 1965  
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48

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Chief Justice and Runnymede

I tried to reach the Chief Justice on Saturday and failed. He was in Cincinnati but he had left no forwarding numbers. Yesterday I did not speak to him and Dean Rusk did. As a result, he and Rusk have now agreed that he should not go to Runnymede.

I found this out when I finally reached the Chief Justice this morning to press on him your message of Saturday -- that you very much wanted him to go and thought of him as your man at the ceremony, although the Secretary of State had the formal responsibility of accepting title to the ground. It soon developed that the Chief Justice, <sup>thought he</sup> was gently but firmly disinclined by the Secretary of State. I told him that I was sure this could not possibly have been Dean Rusk's intention and that I was under the strictest orders to emphasize your own personal desire that he should go. We went back and forth for several minutes. I am sure I got it across to him that you yourself had been counting on him to go, and he repeatedly said that he fully understood your desires. But he was equally firm in asking to be excused and in asserting that it would be very embarrassing for him to change his plans again (he has rescheduled a Court conference for Saturday afternoon after having moved it in order to be able to go.)

I fear that in this particular case the Secretary of State has got the Chief Justice's back up, and I think we have to leave it where it is. At least the Chief Justice strongly urged me to tell you that this was his own opinion. I reminded him that the last time he told me he could not do something, you had him over to the White House and the result was the Warren Commission report. He laughed and said that was a case where one could be of some service, and he would always be at your command for any job of any sort -- but he would rather, honestly, not do this job now.

In sum, I do not think the Chief Justice's feelings about the Secretary of State can be improved by asking him to go now, and I am sure he has no hard feelings toward you whatever. So I think we had better leave it where it is. I am only sorry I did not attend to it sooner.

M. B.  
McG. B.

Rec'd  
May 10, 1965  
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

Agreement has been reached by Tom Mann, Jack Vaughn, Steve Ailes and Bob Anderson on a new and forthcoming approach to the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. On the basis of the new instructions, Anderson hopes to be able to hold rapid and fruitful discussions with the Panamanians.

The core of the new approach is to tell the Panamanians that:

- (1) Our aim is to negotiate with them promptly a sea level canal treaty acceptable to both countries;
- (2) U.S. base rights and a status of forces agreement will be negotiated along with but separate from the canal treaty;
- (3) if agreement on a sea level canal is reached and U.S. base rights are obtained, we will alter our existing rights under the 1903 treaty and work out an interim treaty or a transitional agreement covering the period from the present to the coming into effect of the sea level canal treaty; and
- (4) we will attempt to finish our negotiations with the Panamanians before talking further about site surveys or a sea level canal with Colombia, Costa Rica or Nicaragua.

Bob Anderson will be talking with Congressmen tomorrow about the new approach in keeping with our commitment to tell certain Congressmen informally about any new proposals before informing the Panamanians.

If all goes well, the new approach will be explained to the Panamanians at a meeting in the State Department this Wednesday.

OK

Speak to me

*McG. B.*

McGeorge Bundy



~~SECRET~~

May 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk asks your approval of the attached guidelines for talks with the Israelis next week on the arms sales agreement Komer worked out in March. The Israelis have asked us for 210 tanks (as we agreed), 75 combat aircraft (private understanding with Eshkol was 24), and 60 self-propelled guns (a new element).

State recommends we (1) make up the shortfall in German deliveries with 110 M-48A2c tanks; (2) offset tank sales to Jordan with 100 M-48A1's (we don't have enough M-48A2c's to spare for this shipment too); (3) treat self-propelled guns as armor and sell them only if we subtract a commensurate number of tanks; (4) sell planes only as a last resort, and then not bombers. The guidelines recommend no deliveries before 1966, though if the Israelis continue to press hard we might agree to send 15-25 tanks in late summer for training and study.

I recommend we allow ourselves a little flexibility in timing the tank deliveries. I think we'll have to give in and send a few this summer, so it might improve the atmosphere to grant this request without too much haggling. It may be false economy to dicker over a couple of months at the risk of a strong Israeli reaction. The Israelis are pledged to full secrecy to minimize Arab reaction. (Nasser broke the news of our plans to send arms to Israel in his May Day speech, but he handled it in a very restrained way.)

We might also want to maintain greater flexibility than State's guidelines suggest on the type of plane we might sell. While we will do everything we can to persuade them to buy European planes, we are committed to sell if that effort doesn't work out. State's guidelines foreclose on selling any type of bomber, but that is clearly what the Israelis want. We can reserve final decision for you and might put ourselves in an unrealistic position by shutting the door now.

If you agree, I will tell State you generally approve the guidelines but would like to maintain flexibility on these two points.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

McGeorge Bundy

See Me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

Attach. Rusk Memo to LBJ 5/7/65 ~~SECRET~~ NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
subj. Military Talks w/Israel By CG, NARA, Date 4-14-99



Rec'd  
5-10-65  
9:45a

51

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-232  
By Wig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A possible trip to Rio de Janeiro, May 19-22

1. The basic argument for this trip is simply that it would be the highly visible act of a brave and generous man who was ready to step out and defend and explain his policy not only to his own people but to the whole hemisphere.

2. The centerpiece of the trip would be a speech to the Inter-American Conference. I see such a speech as having three components:

(1) A full and frank exposition of the reasons for the decision of April 28 and the purposes of the U. S. toward the Dominican Republic. Such a speech could include a full account of our opposition to Trujillo, our generous efforts with Bosch, our deep reluctance to intervene, the sudden chaos of April 28, the danger from Communists, the work of reconstruction, and especially our effort to engage the OAS.

(2) A reasoned appeal for a new OAS framework in which the Communist danger can be handled -- here again there have been strong beginnings over the last four years, but the time has come now for further steps, and the OAS resolutions already passed since April 28 suggest the road ahead.

(3) A broad and generous reaffirmation of the Alliance for Progress, with special emphasis on better arrangements for trade and credit, as distinct from gifts and grants. The LBJ image of self-respect, progress, and mutually helpful bargaining should be added to the hemispheric war on ignorance and poverty.

Such a speech should recognize that not all of these things can be achieved in a day, and it might suggest that the Inter-American Conference make a beginning in this May session and be ready to meet again in another six months -- on the model of the Vatican Council, which is very popular with the Christian Democratic Left in Latin America.

3. The meeting should also be used for private talks with any other Latin American Presidents who agree to come after they learn of your intention. The value of these private talks needs no elaboration.

4. The machinery of such a trip is important. If we want to do it,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

May 10, 1965

we should ask Gordon to speak to Castello Branco privately right away. And we should also send an invisible advance man at once. In order to avoid charges of hasty or ill-considered action, we should announce the trip within the next few days, but we should have consulted with Latin American heads of state beforehand, as appropriate.

5. The composition of your party would be important. The most important person to go with you would be Mrs. Johnson, followed closely by either or both of the girls. In addition, I think it would help to have the visible company of people like Rostow, for economic planning; John Bartlow Martin, for a quiet talk about the real situation in the Dominican Republic; Averell Harriman, for general prestige; Dick Goodwin, for speeches and for the intellectual liberals; and myself for staff work. In addition, you would obviously want Tom Mann and Jack Vaughn for self-evident reasons. It will do no harm to move with a substantial team in this case.

6. The pace and style of this whole trip, if you take it, might well be governed by the sense of calmness and sober purpose and confidence which Sulzberger so correctly observed and reported yesterday.

*h c. B.*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd  
5-10-65  
9:45a

52

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Miller Committee Report

1. Now that the Miller report is out and has had a good reception, I think you will want to move on and get a Johnson Administration position on its recommendations and on this whole subject. (Let me say in passing that when I talked to about 10 Congressmen and 3 Senators I found a very encouraging response. I also enjoyed this job and learned from their responses why you think advance consultation is so important in these matters. I used to do it with the Harvard faculty, but I have simply not had this kind of experience down here.)

2. The inter-governmental group to do this job should be the White House, State, Defense, and Commerce. The key question is whether you want it run in the State Department or over here. I think it should be here, but you may prefer to put it with Tom Mann.

3. If you put it here, you will get recommendations which are very close to the Miller report and lean toward an effort for greater peaceful trade. If you put it with Tom Mann, I think you will not get that kind of report -- Tom wants to do what you want to, but his own instincts are very conservative -- he tends to think that if Communists want a particular bargain, we should be opposed to it. Moreover, he has other big jobs on his hands, and his Assistant Secretary for Economics, Tony Solomon, is in Santo Domingo.

4. On the other hand, as you know, I am not an economist and my economic right-hand is Francis Bator, who is probably a shade more adventurous than you will want, in the long run. Still, it is easier to tone recommendations down than to jazz them up. So I think it is objectively right for the White House to chair this study. But needless to say, we will follow your judgment.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

You do it \_\_\_\_\_

Have Tom Mann do it \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99



May 8, 1965

F  
53

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. I gave you some bum information on Len Meeker's legal memorandum this afternoon.

2. Meeker has just persuaded me that there is no way to prevent the filing of a paper which will be aimed specifically at the legal situation. We have had requests for it from many Congressmen, and since we are meeting those requests, we are also going to have to meet the requests, when we get them, from the press. The paper will not be labeled specifically as an opinion of the Legal Adviser, but rather as an authorized State Department view of the legal position. This will make it somewhat more anonymous and may meet just a little of Abe Fortas' point.

3. But we really cannot have it both ways. Either we think we have a legal case or we do not, and it seems to me better for us to have one than not to have one. This is the strong opinion of Acheson, Fisher, and Meeker himself. So with great respect to Abe, I think we have no choice on this one, and have told Meeker to go ahead. I have also asked for a final copy of the document, and it should be in your night reading.

McG. B.



Rec'd  
5-8-65  
1:45P

(1)

54

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for meeting at 2 o'clock

Since I am running the Task Force, I will be glad to open the meeting with a rundown of the existing situation if you wish me to. If you feel fully informed, you may wish to proceed to the action items below.

1. Our first problem is to establish a public posture with respect to the contending forces and the OAS. Attached at Tab A is a statement drafted by Tom Mann and me after a Task Force discussion this morning. Dean Rusk thinks that it would be better to handle it as a background statement by State Department forces. Abe Fortas likes it all except the third paragraph. He thinks this paragraph would trouble Munoz Marin, who wants to keep the door open to a possible deal with Caamano. Whether or not we wish to follow that course, we do want to keep Munoz happy until we get the Wise Men organized. In these circumstances, Mann and I rather like Rusk's proposal.

2. The only other decision item for today is on the rather ticklish point of fingerprinting of suspected Communists as they cross the line of communication.

3.3  
(b)(1)

to produce a plan <sup>at the meeting</sup> which would meet his purposes with absolute minimum visibility, and this matter is one which you will have to adjudicate because there are differences on it at the top levels of the different agencies.

3. We expect to have by the end of the day a solid statement on the exact reasons for our treating the OAS as we did between April 24 and the present. Our inclination is to have Ellsworth Bunker put this out in a formal on-the-record interview just as soon as he is able to find the time. His top priority job is to lobby for the Wise Men's resolution and for inter-American troop contingents, and he will be absent from our meeting today because he is going full speed on this central job.

M. B.  
McG. B.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-43  
By isl, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

54a

A

5/8/65

In the troubled situation which now prevails in the Dominican Republic and at a time when the Organization of American States has only begun its work, it would be premature to give diplomatic recognition to any group in the Dominican Republic.

The United States considers that such a decision should come only after the OAS has made further progress in restoring order and preparing the way for the functioning of democratic processes.

The present situation is that there are two announced groups. One of them, headed by Colonel Imbert, is in control of part of the city of Santo Domingo and apparently of the rest of the country. The other, headed by Colonel Caamano, is in control of only a part of the city of Santo Domingo.

While the OAS is preparing its next steps, life in the Dominican Republic must go on. The United States pledges its continued cooperation in relief, sanitation, and other appropriate programs designed to bring life throughout the country back to normal as soon as possible.

###

5/15/65  
✓ Staff mfg 55  
man  
May 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Gene Black would like to see the President on Tuesday morning to report on Southeast Asian economic matters. Apparently he can only make it Tuesday morning: he can't get here until late on Monday, has a COMSAT meeting at 1:00 p.m. and a dinner in New York on Tuesday, and is leaving for a week or so in Europe on Wednesday.

If the President is harried, this is hardly high priority business. There is nothing of substance which could not be put in a short memo, and there is nothing new to report to the Press.

On the other hand, an on-the-record progress report will convey some sense of movement. Also, the President seems to enjoy seeing Black.

I just spoke to Black on the telephone. He would be quite relaxed if the appointment were held over until he is back from Europe. He expects to be in town again on May 21. Alternatively -- and this is Black's suggestion -- we could make the appointment and cancel if Tuesday begins to look bad.

I promised to let Black know as soon as we have an answer.

In any case, we will have a short written report from Black to the President, hopefully for night reading on Monday.

FMB

FMB

Tuesday morning impossible: wait till after European trip\_\_\_\_\_

McG.B. will explore\_\_\_\_\_

FMB to explore with Valenti ✓



May 7, 1965

J 56

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: The Communist Role in the  
Dominican Revolt**

I haven't read this yet, but it looks as if it  
may be a very important document, and I  
think you will want to have it right away.

McG. B.

**SECRET** attachment  
Cy 91 of 1120/65

Rec'd  
5/6/65  
S:W

(6)

57

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sir Robert Menzies and his bishops

I think you will be amused by the continued effectiveness of Sir Robert Menzies in dealing with his Bishops. In any case, he asked to have this brought to your attention.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Mae  
Write PM Menzies  
our thanks  
A

RECORDING FILE

Reid  
5/5/65  
4:00 PM

58

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Talk with Senator Joseph S. Clark

I finally had breakfast with Clark this morning and he is clearly in tough shape. He simply does not like the notion of contest and conflict with any Communists, and yet he does not want to break with you publicly. We went up and down Santo Domingo and Vietnam and Disarmament, but it all comes back to the fact that he believes the Cold War is more our fault than that of the Communists. He believes we are fighting unnecessary wars when we should be making a basic settlement with Moscow against Peking -- and if necessary, against the Germans, whom he dislikes intensely. He thinks that you are getting too much hard-nosed advice from Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy, and not enough soft advice from Humphrey, Moyers, and Fulbright (this is his way of stating it, not mine, and I cooled him off a lot by telling him that Humphrey was absolutely firm and clear-cut on the need to go into Santo Domingo last week).

Clark is furious at our supplemental for Vietnam, but he thinks he will probably have to vote for it. I asked him point-blank whether he would have let the Dominican Republic go Communist. He said, "No," but he obviously prefers to believe that there was no such danger and that we were deluded by McCarthyite-CIA reports (this again is his imagery, not mine).

Clark is in the very uncomfortable position of a man who has plenty of convictions, but not quite enough courage to give them full expression. I see no chance whatever of changing his mind on any of these issues, but I think he can be kept moderately quiet by the simple fact that he is not ready to break with you -- though emotionally, he would certainly like to.

The one thing he wants us to do for him is to give some sympathy to his resolution on disarmament, Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. I am inclined to think that with some reservation this may be a good thing to do in its own right, and I am having our position checked. This resolution had been held up at our request last year, but Clark says you have allowed him to go ahead with it this year.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Rec'd  
Power 5/11/65  
may 5 11 1965  
4 13p

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

L

59

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. On the radio station, the Army is going to jam it and they think they can jam it effectively. The Army could also take it at very little initial cost, but the Ambassador believes this would break the cease-fire just signed and have a very damaging local impact. Vance and I concur for now, but we will watch the matter sharply to make sure the jamming works. Power will be restored for our own stations within a matter of hours at most.

2. The OAS has postponed its meeting until 9 P.M. This means that the Ambassadors will be coming to shake your hand before they go into the meeting. If Bunker can come himself, he will be here a little ahead of time to brief you on where they stand and which ones need what kind of word from you. If he is still negotiating, he will send his assistant, Ward Allen, to be prepared to do the same job.

McG. B.



Reid  
5/5/65  
4:00 p.m.

Spivak

60

(7)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lawrence Spivak supports  
policy

Larry Spivak of "Meet the Press" called and asked me to tell you that he thinks you are 101% right both on Vietnam and on the Dominican Republic -- and that the professors who are critical today would be the first to jump on you if things went sour in either place because of U.S. inaction.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Raid  
5/5/65  
4:00 p.m.

61

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Anthony Eden's approval of  
Vietnam policy

I think you will be interested in the support which our Vietnamese policy has received from Lord Avon (Anthony Eden). Unfortunately Lord Avon is "the man of Suez" to most liberals, otherwise his support would be more helpful. But I will pass a copy of his comment to Bill White anyway.

M. F. B.  
McG. B.

Lord Avon's address

- 8 -

As it seemed to me, your President's recent offer to negotiate over Viet Nam without, in the meanwhile, reducing the joint effort to defend that country, was right in its terms and its timing. In truth, this blend of firmness and reasonableness, of generous offer but refusal to abdicate, is probably the only way. Tough as it is, I can see no present alternative to the policies which your President and government are pursuing, nor would I accept the immediate reactions of the Communists as their last word. The important new factor is that the President's initiative has made a peaceful settlement possible. In this sense the negotiation has been opened, however long it takes to conclude. This is no mean achievement for one speech.

Eventually, of course, a negotiated solution will have to be found. Probably the 1954 arrangements will then prove to be the best basis. I don't know. But this would only become practicable if the Communist powers accept that the three countries - Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam - are to be a protective pad between both worlds and understand that to seek to undermine or dominate makes all settlement impossible. I believe that an agreement is negotiable, but a condition must be that the Communist governments should accept that it cannot be dictated only on their terms. In this the interests of the United States and the rest of the free world are one.

Internationally the world will go through strained periods in the next few years; at times these will bring dangers. The competition for leadership between the principal Communist states is evident for all to see. It is likely to grow sharper, which will carry its risks for us all. This is one of the reasons why I much want to see a more coherent sense of purpose among the free nations.

- more -

Rec'd  
5/5/65  
1:00 p.m.

62

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Three Important Cables from Bohlen

Bohlen had a long talk with De Gaulle yesterday and the results are attached in three separate messages. They are interesting.

1. On NATO, De Gaulle says that after 1969 there will be no installations on French soil except those of French command. This is the first flat statement of a notion which has been floating in the air for some weeks. We have time to turn around in dealing with this challenge. I suspect that our judgment will be that we should undertake to move a somewhat streamlined NATO Headquarters to England, Holland, or Germany, because I think De Gaulle means just what he says.
2. On Germany and Europe, General De Gaulle tells Bohlen that of course we must be involved in any final settlement of Germany. But this is exactly what he is not willing to say publicly in the Tripartite Declaration which is still being debated.
3. On the Gromyko visit, De Gaulle seems to be quite straightforward in admitting it did not amount to much. This is not what his propagandists are saying, but De Gaulle is a man who can have contempt even for his own propaganda.

Att: 3 ~~SECRET~~ cables

McG. B.  
McG. B.



## INCOMING TELEGRAM. Department of State

Bundy

6-1

~~SECRET~~

84  
Action VV FHE148VV HPA753  
RR RUEHCR RU  
DE RUFHPA 117 04/2025Z MAY 4 PM 6 09  
SS R 042020Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 6237  
INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1122  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 712  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
SECRET MAY 4

DECLASSIFIED

03279

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 8/83/77

GERMANY AND EUROPE:

By mg, N.H., Date 9/8/77

I TOLD GENERAL DE GAULLE THAT I THOUGHT SOME CLARIFICATION FROM HIM AS TO WHAT PARTICULAR DIFFERENCES HE SAW BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO EUROPE MIGHT BE USEFUL IF HE WOULD GIVE THEM TO ME. HE IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT OUR DIFFERENCES WERE REALLY VERY MUCH A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE; HE THOUGHT MORE A MATTER OF TIME AND HE EMPHASIZED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WHEN HE SAID REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY WOULD RESULT FROM THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPE HE DID NOT IN ANY SENSE ENVISAGE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AND BE A PARTY TO ANY FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. HE DID THINK HOWEVER THAT ANY UNIFICATION WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE NEIGHBORING STATES AS TO FRONTIERS, WHICH WAS OBVIOUS, AND ALSO, HE FELT, A PRIOR AGREEMENT SOMEWHAT LIKE THE PARIS AGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAID IN THIS CONNECTION GERMANY LOST THE WAR AND SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO PAY FOR IT.

ON THE SUBJECT OF EUROPE HE MADE THE INTERESTING COMMENT OR CHARGE THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX, GERMANY, ITALY, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, WERE NOT IN FAVOR OF THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE BECAUSE IT WAS VERY CONVENIENT FOR THEM TO HAVE AMERICA ASSURE THEIR SECURITY AND CONDUCT THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. I TOLD DE GAULLE THAT I HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR WERE PRESSING FOR ACTION IN REGARD TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, WHICH HE DISMISSED WITH A WAVE OF HIS HAND ON THE GROUND THAT ERHARD WAS IN AN ELECTION YEAR AND WOULD MAKE THESE GESTURES BUT REALLY DIDN'T MEAN THEM VERY MUCH.

DE GAULLE HOWEVER DID NOT SEEM WILLING TO PURSUE THE SUBJECT OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION.

THE CONVERSATION THEN LEAD INTO THE SUBJECT OF NATO WHICH WILL BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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GP-3. BOMLEN

DECLASSIFIED

80

Action

SS

Info

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUEHFA 113 04/2030Z  
R 042015Z ZEA  
(FM AMEMBASSY PARIS)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 3238  
INFO RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 713  
RUEHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1123  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ MAY 4

EXDIS

NATO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 645123/77By mmg NARS, Date 9/8/77

WHEN I ASKED GENERAL DE GAULLE IF HIS THINKING ON NATO HAD REMAINED THE SAME, AS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO THE SECRETARY AND ME LAST DECEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO TIMING, DE GAULLE ANSWERED THAT HIS VIEWS HAD NOT CHANGED; THAT HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN 1969 TO REEXAMINE THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF AN ALLIANCE WITH THE US, WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND WITH GERMANY, (HE DID NOT MENTION OTHER NATO MEMBERS) BUT WHETHER IN THE SAME FORM AS THE PRESENT TREATY HE COULD NOT BE SURE AT THIS TIME. HE SAID FOR EXAMPLE HE WOULD HAVE TO "LOOK AT" THE QUESTION OF A COUNCIL AS HE WAS NOT QUITE SURE WHAT A COUNCIL WOULD DO. HE THEN STATED VERY CLEARLY AND DEFINITELY THAT ANY FORM OF INTEGRATION WOULD HAVE TO GO WHEN THE TIME CAME TO REVIEW THE TREATY. HE SAID THAT IN FRANCE THERE WOULD BE NO LONGER ANY TROOPS OR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS NOT UNDER FRENCH COMMAND, BUT THAT OF COURSE IF GERMANY WISHED TO HAVE AMERICAN AND BRITISH TROOPS THIS WAS THEIR RIGHT. HE MENTIONED THAT FOR OTHER REASONS FRANCE WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO MAINTAIN SOME FORCES IN GERMANY. HE EMPHASIZED HOWEVER AGAIN THAT ALL FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF FRANCE WOULD BE UNDER FRENCH COMMAND AND FRENCH COMMAND ALONE, WITH THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THERE WOULD NO LONGER BE ANY FOREIGN TROOPS ON FRENCH SOIL. HE SAID THESE CHANGES IN THE NATO STRUCTURE WOULD NOT CERTAINLY BE MADE THIS YEAR AND IN ANY EVENT, WHILE NOT COMMITTING HIMSELF TO ANY SPECIFIC TIME EXCEPT BEFORE 1969, THAT OTHER ALLIES INCLUDING THE US WOULD BE GIVEN PLENTY OF WARNING AND TIME TO CONSIDER THE FRENCH SUGGESTIONS.

I ASKED THE GENERAL, SINCE HE HAD FOUGHT IN TWO WORLD WARS, IF HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IN WORLD WAR I, HAD NOT SUFFERED A GREAT DEAL FROM THE ABSENCE OF UNITY OF COMMAND. HE SAID POSSIBLY, BUT POINTED OUT THAT IN WORLD WAR I THE BRITISH AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMERICAN TROOPS HAD FOUGHT IN FRANCE BUT, AS HE PUT IT, HAD BEEN UNDER FRENCH LAW, I.E., THAT FRANCE HAD BEEN IN CONTROL OF ALL ACTIONS ON HER SOIL. HE SAID THERE

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DECLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

-2- 6238, May 4, from Paris

WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO VARIOUS PLANS DRAWN UP BY HEADQUARTERS TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT WHEN HOSTILITIES START, ASSIGNING ONE SECTOR OR ANOTHER TO DIFFERENT COMMANDERS, BUT HE SAID THAT INTEGRATION WOULD BE FINISHED.

I TOLD HIM MY IMPRESSION OF THE NATO SET UP WAS THAT MOST STAFF PLANNING WAS FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES, AND HE WAVED THIS ASIDE AND SAID NO, AND UNDER US CONTROL.

COMMENT: WHILE DE GAULLE SAID NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW HE WAS MUCH MORE EXPLICIT IN REGARD TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ANY INTEGRATED STRUCTURE IN FRANCE. I HAD NEVER HEARD HIM BEFORE STATE SO FLATLY THAT ALL FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WOULD LEAVE THE SOIL OF FRANCE OR ELSE BE UNDER TOTAL FRENCH CONTROL.

GP-3 BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

## INCOMING TELEGRAM (Department of State)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

03200

1965 MAY 4 PM 4 39

038

RR RUEHCR R  
DE RUFHPA 116 04/2020Z  
R 042005Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (PARIS)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (6236)  
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 386  
RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1121  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 711  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ MAY 4

LIMDIS

GROMYKO VISIT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARS, Date

PAGE 2 RUFHPA 116 ~~SECRET~~

UP A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. DE GAULLE MENTIONED THAT GROMYKO HAD NOT BEEN AT ALL VIOLENT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE U.S. AND HAD SPOKEN QUITE DISPASSIONATELY IN REGARD TO VIETNAM. HE SAID HE HAD HAD ABOUT AN HOUR'S TALK WITH GROMYKO AND HAD DISCUSSED GERMAN REUNIFICATION ALONG THE LINES OF HIS MARCH 4 PRESS CONFERENCE. HE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST A GENERATION BEFORE THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPE CREATED THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE GERMAN UNIFICATION POSSIBLE BUT HE HAD SAID FRANCE FELT THAT THERE COULD BE NO REAL TRANQUILLITY OR ASSURANCE OF PEACE IN EUROPE AS LONG AS GERMANY WAS DIVIDED. DE GAULLE SAID THAT HE HAD HOWEVER EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE WAS IN NO GREAT HURRY FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT. HE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD ACCEPT THE SITUATION PHILOSOPHICALLY AND SHOULD CEASE TO "EMBETER" THE WESTERN POWERS WITH THEIR EPISODES OF THE CORRIDOR. BERLIN, ETC.

IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID HE HAD NOTED THE "STUPID" TRICK OF THE RUSSIANS IN TRYING TO GET BACK IN A PRESS CONFERENCE SOMETHING THEY COULDN'T GET INTO THE COMMUNIQUE BUT DISMISSED THIS AS OF NO IMPORTANCE.

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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DECLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

-2- 6236, MAY 4, FROM PARIS

I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD HAD ANY INDICATIONS OF GERMAN REACTION TO THE MEETING, AT WHICH TIME DE GAULLE RATHER CONTEMPTUOUSLY

PAGE 3 RUFHPA 116 ~~SECRET~~

SAID "OH, THE GERMANS ARE ALWAYS UPSET ABOUT SOMETHING" AND THAT THIS WAS AN ELECTION YEAR WHICH MADE THEM SOMEWHAT MORE NERVOUS THAN USUAL.

GP-3 BOHLEN  
BT

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1965

63

Mr. President:

Attached is Ambassador  
Taylor's weekly report.

McG. B.

64

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Send to Bundy

May 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been trying to cut down the flow of military information about bombs and bombers from Saigon and I am running into strong opposition to any major change in the present rules. I asked Jim Greenfield to prepare a statement of the case for keeping to our present rules, and I enclose his memorandum to me. I think on the whole, he makes an annoyingly good case.

hcb

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

64a

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-30

By isa, NARS, Date 11-13-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House.

This memorandum is in response to yours of April 10 to the Secretary regarding press coverage in Viet-Nam.

All of us who deal with this matter share the President's concern regarding the effects of detailed accounts of air operations against North Viet-Nam. However, I believe certain facts bearing on this matter merit consideration.

First, there has been a marked improvement in press relations in Saigon over the past year. This has been a direct result of increased candor on our part which has improved our credibility and also permitted us to win the reporters' agreement not to publish material that would adversely affect our security interests.

Last month, efforts to restrict the flow of news and the activities of reporters at Da Nang produced sharply negative and destructive effects. It disrupted the briefing process in Saigon, generated a flood of critical letters, comments and stories from the news agencies and other media, and sparked an investigation by the Moss Committee in Congress.

At the recent Honolulu conference on Viet-Nam information problems, we dealt with this and other matters in detail. A new set of ground rules on military information was worked out and it has been working fairly smoothly. We agreed to give out the number of planes involved in attacks but only in round numbers or approximations. This was done for two reasons -- first, because the enemy obviously knew the approximate numbers involved and, second, with reporters able to get near the air bases, they could easily observe the facts themselves, though without official guidance the numbers could easily have been exaggerated.

It is

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

It is important to note the other side of the bargain. In return for our help in getting the above material, the reporters have agreed not to report far more sensitive information, such as (1) takeoffs from Da Nang and other bases, (2) attack tactics by aircraft, (3) information about postponed raids, (4) rules of engagement, (5) detailed damage reports to our aircraft, (6) radar sightings of enemy aircraft, etc.

Refusal now to provide round figures for strike aircraft would mean backing off from a mutually advantageous arrangement which we have just concluded with the reporters in Saigon, with their home offices here and with the Moss Committee. If we withdraw from our part of the bargain, we can be sure the reporters will do the same, and with considerable bitterness. The loss of goodwill and confidence in Saigon and here would be a major one. And we could expect the correspondents to use much of the information they have been withholding, which would provide an ever more significant setback.

The present arrangement and ground rules have been explained to the Moss Committee, to the Presidents of both AP and UPI, to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, and to reporters in Saigon and Washington. This has produced a decided improvement in relations and in cooperation which I strongly believe should not be jeopardized. In this connection, the Board of Directors of UPI at its recent meeting noted approvingly the improvement in the press situation in Viet-Nam and praised the President for the actions which have been taken to make this possible. The AP, however, is maintaining the pressure on us for an even freer flow of military information, as you know (see attachment A).

As regards the rapidity of release of information on such things as troop reinforcements, we can and do try to keep such announcements in perspective. But they are news and there is simply no way to control the length of stories filed or the play such stories get once they arrive in newspaper offices around the country. Moreover, efforts to hold back on disclosing this kind of information would immediately open up the Administration to the charge of withholding or

"managing"


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"managing" the news. I believe you will agree that there has been more than enough of such allegations and that they do us probably more harm over-all than the news stories themselves. We must do everything possible to avoid lending support to allegations that we are "hiding the truth" or "suppressing news" on Viet-Nam, even when disclosure produces some temporary embarrassment.

We have these matters under constant review and are determined to deal with them in a way that will minimize the concern you expressed in your memorandum. I hope that you will agree, however, that the above considerations are valid elements in judging what can and should be done. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters in more detail with you at any time.

  
James L. Greenfield

Enclosure:

As stated.

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# EDITORS CRITICIZE U.S.I.A. IN VIETNAM

## A.P. Coup Says Reporters Get 'Half Truths' on War

MIAMI, April 20 (AP) — George F. Beebe, managing editor of The Miami Herald and president of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, said today that editors felt that the American public was not getting "the full story nor the true story" of the war in Vietnam.

He issued this statement: "It would be of deep concern to the people of the United States that military briefings in the Vietnam conflict have been placed in control of U.S.I.A. (the United States Information Agency)."

"We do not object to safeguards to protect the security of our nation and our fighting men, but editors of this country do object to the contradictions, the double talk and half truths that the press is getting, both in Washington and Saigon."

"In an undeclared war, the United States press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime."

"With rare exceptions, the press always has felt the military should be spokesman for military matters. It resents U.S.I.A. requiring escorts when reporters talk to the men in our armed forces. I speak for the A.P. [The Associated Press Managing Editors] board in protesting the present United States policy of providing information on developments in Vietnam which is inadequate and too unreliable."

"The people of the United States deserve to be well informed in this crisis no matter how selective the news might be. We fear it is not getting the full story nor the true story at this time."

### Up in Saigon Described

SAIGON, South Vietnam (AP) — Information given to reporters about the United States military role in Vietnam is under supervision of the United States Information Service, a field office of the Information Agency.

United States military briefing officers are subordinate to Barry Zorthian, head of the Information Service here. The U.S.I.A. is an independent agency under the policy direction of the White House and the State Department. Its job is to present the United States in the most favorable possible light.

In World War II and in Korea regulations for coverage of battles involving United States servicemen came from the military. Mr. Zorthian has criticized

reporters' private for articles he considered unfavorable to the United States, although they did not violate security.

The press information officer here for the Military Assistance Command is Col. Ben Lagare. However, when 20 regulations for coverage of air strikes were issued a week ago, the memorandum was signed, not by Colonel Lagare, but Mr. Zorthian as "Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs."

The Zorthian memorandum states that the rules "must be observed by official briefers and other American and Vietnamese official personnel."

### Held and Withheld Data

Mr. Zorthian's memorandum says that information that will "normally be released as soon as available" includes the target hit, nationality of the striking force, whether the planes were landbased or not, a general characterization of the success of the mission, tonnage or ordnance used, the numbers of strike aircraft, enemy antiaircraft ground fire and pilot sightings of unfriendly aircraft.

The memorandum prohibits disclosure of information on aircraft taking off on strikes, identification of land bases, or location of bases from which the aircraft were launched, number of aircraft damaged, or enemy air reaction other than that actually seen by strike personnel.

The total aircraft lost may be released when recovery operations are completed, the memorandum says.

Correspondents have not objected to regulations issued for reasons of security, but have objected strongly to the policy of not allowing free access to military personnel without being accompanied by an "escort officer." This policy, they believe, inhibits military personnel during interviews.

### Guides Are Called For

The Zorthian memorandum says "entry and movement within air base areas controlled by the Vietnamese Air Force will be in the company of a guide." Journalists passing through a Vietnamese Air Force area to reach an American installation will be escorted to and from the American installation by a Vietnamese Air Force guide.

### Barred From Danang

United States newsmen have been barred from the big Danang Air Base since late March. Despite an announcement by Mr. Zorthian that accreditation would begin April 12, no cards have been issued.

American billets, messes and servicemen's clubs are closed to newsmen. Interviews with pilots have been generally forbidden, although some have been arranged off the base under the stipulation that the pilots dis-

cuss their missions in general terms.

Few helicopters have been made available to newsmen to go to battle areas.

The daily briefings are at the United States Information Service headquarters in Saigon. The briefing officer is Lieut. Col. L. A. Breault, who held a similar post in Korea. In Korea, Colonel Breault's information came from Army intelligence and did not have to be cleared by the U.S.I.S.