

65.  
April 10, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.

The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting further troop reinforcements to (S) Vietnam and does not understand why there should have been an announcement on this subject from Saigon. This announcement seems to him inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National Security Action Memorandum No. 329 dated April 6.

The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects.

McGeorge Bundy

(cc Pres)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-32  
By ics, NARS, Date 8-15-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 4, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Lodge's Reports

Here are Lodge's reports. The one on Saigon is better than the one on the other countries. It is just like Lodge himself -- full of strong points and weak ones -- but well worth having. I think you will want to read it yourself.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-230  
By hig, NARA, Date 3-16-87



**FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The situation was comparatively quiet both on the political and military fronts during the past week. Quat is proceeding with plans for a re-organization of his cabinet, a desirable action provided that he does not go too far and recreate the image of governmental instability which we are trying to dispel. In eliminating the incompetent, he hopes to strengthen himself politically by bringing in more southerners and thus placating the most important group which is showing dissatisfaction with his government.

Quat also hopes that he is about to get agreement from his generals to dissolve the Armed Forces Council. This, also, is a good thing particularly if it can be done without reopening dissension among the generals. I have the impression that Quat probably could go faster in straightening out the military but is restrained by his instinctive fear of confrontations and tests of strength. Perhaps in the long run this caution will pay.

Although Quat has displayed considerable adroitness in handling his opponents, he is not escaping growing criticism in the local press. Some critics complain of corruption and weak officials; some of the need for national elections; others comment on an alleged over-eagerness of the Quat government to consider negotiations with the Communists. Also, there is the chronic impatience over a government which does not show quick and dramatic successes in a short period of time. One hears all of these rumblings at the moment but we are not inclined to attach too much importance to them yet.

I was deeply vexed by the unfortunate border violation in which U.S. Air Force planes bombed a Cambodian village and thus gave Sihanouk his excuse to break off relations with US and perhaps later grounds for scuttling the Cambodian conference. While the breach with Sihanouk was probably inevitable, it is most regrettable that it came about as it did. General Westmoreland is having a thorough investigation made of the violation and we will see that appropriate disciplinary action is taken.

The major events of the military week were the arrival of the advance party of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the announcement that Australia will send a battalion of combat troops to Vietnam. Both announcements were received with enthusiasm and, for the moment,

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority State Letter 10-6-78  
By DCH, NARS, Date 9-28-81



~~SECRET NO DIS~~

constitute a lift to the local morale. What the eventual effect will be of the presence of so many foreign troops is still unpredictable.

There are many sensitivities in this country of which we foreigners are imperfectly aware. Recently, the local press picked up a report that a joint US/Government of Vietnam command was being considered which has triggered many adverse comments both in public and in private. A joint command to the Vietnamese means one dominated by the US and such a subordination would be offensive to most Vietnamese. General Westmoreland is thoroughly aware of this sensitivity and will proceed cautiously in suggesting such changes of relationship as may be required by the presence of US ground forces in action.

I hope that your attention has been called to the highly successful anti-Viet Cong operation in Kien Hoa Province where the Seventh Division has just executed an extremely well planned operation. It resulted in the discovery of a large arms and supply cache and the capture of important documents giving considerable information on seaborne infiltration. It may well be that this discovery will be more valuable than the ship we sank at Vung Ro Bay in early March.

We enjoyed very much Cabot Lodge's visit last Wednesday and Thursday. He said the right thing to the right people and left much good feeling behind him. Many thanks for having him call on us.

TAYLOR

May 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may have seen in the morning news that the Cambodians have broken diplomatic relations with us. Our people are not surprised. The initial recommendation for a prompt apology on the accidental air attack was based on a hope that it might marginally affect this Cambodian decision, but my own judgment is that relations were about to break anyway. Moreover, it is good that the Cambodians have put the burden equally on NEWSWEEK and on the air attacks.

This Cambodian decision makes a proposed apology irrelevant. We will deal with the air matter by saying that it is still under investigation. We will further say that this break of relations does not affect our position on a Cambodian conference (we have no relations at all with North Vietnam and China, who would also be in such a conference). Finally, we will say that we are still reviewing the question whether we wish to keep a consulate in Phnom Penh, which the Cambodians have apparently suggested.

More generally, if we get any flak on this air accident, now or later, we will point out in reply that Cambodia has provided a variety of facilities for the Viet Cong over a long period of time and is therefore in a poor position to criticize a single Air Force error, however tragic it is for those who were hit.

McG. B.



May 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum has been done by Butch Fisher over the last 24 hours and is a great improvement over what you saw yesterday. It is not quite final. I have told him to check very closely the statements about our pressure for an OAS meeting at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3. But in general I think you will agree that it is a strong paper.

Our current intent is to use most of these arguments in the United Nations Security Council tomorrow in a Stevenson speech.

Is this ok with you?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

McG. B.



May 4, 1965

Authority of the United States to Take  
Action in the Dominican Republic

The United States' action in the Dominican Republic was emergency action taken to protect lives and to give the InterAmerican System a chance to deal with a situation within its competence.

The United States initially landed troops in the Dominican Republic under emergency conditions in which immediate action was essential to preserve the lives of foreign nationals -- nationals of the United States and of many other countries. Such action is justified both on humanitarian and legal grounds. The United States continues its presence in the Dominican Republic for the additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by its Charter -- to achieve peace and justice by securing a cease-fire and the reestablishment of processes within which Dominicans can choose their own government, free from outside interference.

The primary purposes for which the American States established the OAS, as set forth in Article I of its Charter,

were "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." The OAS thus exists to assist the American states to maintain their rights to defend their integrity and to provide for their preservation and prosperity. In realization of these purposes and rights, meetings of organs of the OAS have already taken place. The propriety of a regional agency "dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action" is expressly recognized by Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The initial landing of U. S. Marine forces during the night of April 28-29 was ordered by the President of the United States to protect the lives of U. S. nationals and those of other countries. The action was taken after the United States had been officially notified by the Dominican authorities that they were no longer able to preserve law and order. The possibility that this action might be necessary had been discussed on April 27 at the initiative of the U. S. at a meeting of an OAS body, the OAS Peace Committee. Despite attempts of the U. S. to do so, it had

not been possible to arrange a meeting of the OAS Council before April 29th. The factual circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republic were such that the landing could not have been delayed beyond the time it actually took place without the needless sacrifice of many more lives -- both foreign nationals and Dominican citizens -- with the consequent danger to the peace and security of the Hemisphere.

After United States forces arrived in the Dominican Republic it became apparent that the structure of Government had broken down to a point where there was not only no authority capable of preserving law and order but there was no mechanism by which the Dominican people could freely choose their own government.

Had the United States been interested in merely the form of legalistic procedures rather than the substance of fundamental rights of a nation under the OAS Charter, it could, of course, have "recognized" a group claiming to be the government. It could then have responded to a request from the newly recognized group to send in armed forces. In fact on April 28, this military junta addressed just such a request to the United States. The United States did not

follow such a course of action because such a "recognition" would have amounted to taking sides in the internal struggle and would, therefore, have resulted in actual interference with the freedom of the Dominican people to choose their own government. Clearly, such a course of action would have been inconsistent with the high principles that govern the Inter-American system.

The obligations of non-intervention contained in Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter did not preclude the United States placing armed forces in the Dominican Republic for the humanitarian purpose of saving lives. Nor did those obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces in the days immediately after their landing, when it was entirely apparent that there was no local means of keeping order and providing a government in Santo Domingo. In fact, it would have been irresponsible for the United States to withdraw its forces when such a course would have endangered seriously the lives of foreign nationals not yet evacuated and would have led to a full-scale resumption of bloody civil war among the contending Dominican factions.

The United States, in maintaining elements of its armed forces in the Dominican Republic, has acted to preserve the



situation so that the organs of the Inter-American system may carry out their intended responsibilities under Inter-American treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in re-establishing democratic government under conditions of public order.

The actions of the United States have been designed to help give effect to the resolutions adopted by the OAS, ~~Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers~~. These resolutions have (1) called for a cease-fire; (2) appealed for the establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge; and (3) dispatched a five-member commission to the Dominican Republic. Without continued <sup>by</sup> action/the United States, the OAS machinery could not become effective.

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers is now debating the creation of an Inter-American force. The Meeting will also be considering reports and recommendations from the five-member commission on such questions as the preservation of public order and the formation of a new Dominican government. All of these efforts would be frustrated if the United States withdrew its forces and thus invited a renewal of anarchy.

There is a further consideration which supports the action taken by the United States. Available information has suggested that what began as a democratic revolution moved into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. If a rebel movement under such control had succeeded in establishing itself as the government of the Dominican Republic, the events would doubtless have been irreversible. The OAS would have been deprived of any realistic possibility of assisting the Dominican people to determine freely their own political future. Rather than let such a risk materialize, the United States acted to preserve the situation pending consideration by the OAS and the taking of such steps as the OAS might recommend.

Participation in the Inter-American System, to be meaningful, must take into account the modern day reality that an attempt by a conspiratorial group inspired from the outside to seize control by force can be an assault upon the independence and integrity of a state. The rights and obligations of all members of the OAS must be viewed in light of this reality.

The action of the United States was not for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of the Dominican Republic or for the purpose of occupying that country. The U. S. forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic. They are not taking sides in the conflict.

The United States is in no sense acting against the Dominican Republic. Rather, its action is for the purpose of helping to preserve for the people of that nation their right to choose their government free of outside interference.

. . . . .

The United States continues to support its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course, without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

The United States continues to support the OAS as the institution through which this right can be realized when outside interference makes collective assistance to a sister republic necessary.

Experience has shown that if a group led by Communist conspirators and inspired by an outside power is permitted to seize control of a country by force, any further consideration of the right of the peoples of that country to choose their own course is an empty gesture.

United States forces continue to be present in the Dominican Republic only to give the OAS time to organize effective measures to prevent such a denial of freedom and further loss of life. As President Johnson has stated: "The moment that the Organization of American States can present a plan that will bring peace on the island and give us the opportunity to evacuate our people and give some hope of stability of government, we'll be the first to come back home."



*Rec'd  
May 3, 1965  
1 pm  
(1)*

70

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Negotiation with Bosch

Abe Fortes called at 11:40 to say that he talked with both Jaime Benitez and John Bartlow Martin, who were talking with Bosch when he called. He made the basic proposal to them that he made to you and me, namely that Bosch should make a statement which would cover the following points:

1. Recognition of the danger of the Castro Communist group and belief in routing them out.
2. An end to the killing and a restoration of peace and order.
3. A call on US forces to remain while they are needed.
4. A call on OAS forces to share in this responsibility and help relieve US forces.
5. A pledge to do all in his power to restore civilian government in Santo Domingo for the purpose of working toward early free elections.

Abe also emphasized to Benitez and Martin as his own opinion that Bosch would be well advised to withdraw from present political ambition and let an interim government be formed without him. Abe urged that this was in his own long-range political interests.

Abe will report back what the results are as he gets them.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

Recd  
8:40 pm  
5-3-65

18  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed statement by Betancourt

Attached is a statement which we expect Betancourt to put out tomorrow morning. We talked him out of including a sentence in which he endorsed the views of Leoni and of the Venezuelan Congress, both of whom have made relatively sharp statements at different times in recent days.

The language is clumsy and Latin, but the sentiments are mildly helpful. It is a triumph of your own persuasion that they are not strongly against us.

McG. B.

(phoned by Mr. Mann's office)

May 3, 1965

Proposed statement by Betancourt

The former President of Venezuela, Mr. Romulo Betancourt, was invited to confer with the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, and with the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk. The two interviews lasted for more than three hours.

Various political and economic problems in the hemisphere were discussed in these conversations, and in particular the grave situation in the Dominican Republic. It was agreed in these interviews that with respect to Santo Domingo the decision of the commission which the Organization of American States sent to that country should be awaited; also in these conversations confidence in the regional system to find formulas which will permit Santo Domingo to live in the future in full exercise of its sovereignty and based on free elections and democratic philosophy was ratified.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Agenda for Legislative Leaders Meeting, 6:30, May 2

I I think you will want to open the meeting yourself with a brief account of the Dominican situation as it has developed in the last eight days. The highlights are:

1. Immediate alertness and repositioning of forces.
2. Initial non-Communist leadership rapidly overtaken by more dangerous elements.
3. Disintegration of Reid government and increasing danger to Americans and other foreigners.
4. OAS Peace Committee meeting on Tuesday which determined ~~on~~ watchful waiting.
5. Requests for help on Wednesday by military and police.
6. Bennett's two cables (copy of my sanitized memorandum attached at Tab A)
7. Decision Wednesday afternoon between 5:30 and 6 PM.
8. OAS meeting Thursday morning, Friday afternoon and all day Saturday producing Mora's decision to go on Friday and decision to send a Committee on Saturday.
9. ~~2,000~~ 3,000 American and foreign nationals now given safety.
10. Present situation: we are placing adequate strength. We have ~~placed~~ international committee in place. The political and military initiative is ours.

II You might next call on Admiral R<sub>a</sub> born to describe very briefly the nature of the Dominican crisis and the role of Communists.

III. Secretary Rusk will be ready to speak with equal brevity (I said three or four minutes) on legal and political justification for our position. He will also have Ambassador Bunker at hand to speak on OAS side. (Bunker will not mention fact of a specific Venezuelan decision to contribute forces, but he will say that outlook for inter-American contribution is good.)

IV. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler will be ready to comment very briefly on present military situation. They will not discuss the line-of-communication decision and will simply emphasize that adequate forces are on hand and in reserve.

V. Carl Rowan will be available to describe our informational and psychological warfare effort.

VI I think you will also wish to speak very briefly on Vietnam before adjourning the meeting.

M.C.B.

McG. B



May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been terribly slow in getting sorted out the basic telegrams which came in to you in our meeting on Wednesday afternoon. At last I have got copies. I have underlined the two decisive paragraphs and repeat them for your convenience as follows:

Bennett's 1149 said that Col. Benoit had requested a landing of Marines but reported "I do not believe situation justifies such action at this time." But he added that the outcome was still in doubt and that he might need Marines in a hurry if the situation should break apart.

Just two hours later he sent a critic message in which he said that in view of the further deterioration and recent intelligence messages the "country team is unanimously of opinion that... time has come to land the Marines. American lives are in danger." His message concluded "I recommend immediate landing."

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

The CIA is making these longer reports three times a day. We can get them to you faster by leaving them on the yellow sheet like this. Alternatively, we could take the additional time to retype them.

CIA and other agencies have been instructed to avoid unfamiliar abbreviations and to use Eastern Daylight Time.

The shorter hourly CIA reports come by telephone and we type those regularly.

*McG. B*

McG. B

Send them like this ✓

Retype \_\_\_\_\_

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CIA/OCI 19945  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM  
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT 7: SUMMARY OF SITUATION  
FROM 6 AM TO 1 PM EDT

1. THE CEASEFIRE SEEMS GENERALLY TO HAVE BEEN RESPECTED DURING THE MORNING HOURS, THOUGH SPORADIC FIRING IS STILL BEING HEARD IN THE DISTANCE BY PERSONNEL IN THE EMBASSY. A US MILITARY HELICOPTER WAS FIRED ON SEVERAL TIMES BY SMALL ARMS AS IT WAS MAKING A RECONNAISSANCE RUN OVER THE CITY EARLY THIS MORNING.

2. IN AN APPRAISAL OF THE OVERALL SITUATION EARLY THIS MORNING, AMBASSADOR BENNETT SAYS THAT, WITH THE OAS COMMISSION TO ARRIVE SHORTLY, THERE IS NO REAL CHOICE BUT TO TEST THE CEASEFIRE CONCEPT. IF THE CEASEFIRE DOES NOT COLLAPSE--WHICH IT COULD WELL DO--THE AMBASSADOR SEES THE NEXT STEP AS ONE OF DISCREETLY HELPING THE LOYALIST MILITARY JUNTA TO START FUNCTIONING AS SOME KIND OF A GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE DISARMING OF THE REBELS, AN OPERATION WHICH THE AMBASSADOR VIEWS AS DEFINITELY REQUIRING US MILITARY ACTION, HOPEFULLY WITH OAS PARTICIPATION.

3. THERE ARE A FEW MORE SCATTERED REPORTS FROM THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY, SUGGESTING THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REBEL ACTIVITY AT THE POINTS IN THE INTERIOR OF WHICH WE HAVE OBTAINED INFORMATION. A US DESTROYER SURVEILLANCE PATROL WHICH CALLED AT THE NORTHERN PORT CITY OF PUERTO PLATA YESTERDAY REPORTS THAT THE SITUATION THERE IS TENSE AND ANXIOUS, BUT QUIET. THE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS, ABOUT 100 MILES NORTH OF THE CAPITAL, IS ALSO REPORTED TO BE QUIET BY A TRAVELER WHO CAME FROM THERE TO SANTO DOMINGO YESTERDAY WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING ANY INCIDENT. ANOTHER TRAVELER WHO ARRIVED YESTERDAY FROM SANTO DOMINGO REPORTED THE CITY TO BE SHUTTERED UP AND QUIET.

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-0032-2  
By sp, NARA, Date 12-7-01

4. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT REGULAR MILITARY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE REBEL MOVEMENT ARE BECOMING SOMEWHAT DEMORALIZED. SOME OF THEM ARE REPORTED BY THE CIA STATION TO BE TURNING OVER THEIR WEAPONS TO CIVILIANS AND MAKING THEIR WAY OUT OF REBEL AREAS OF THE CITY, AND CIVILIAN REBEL LEADERS ARE EXPRESSING CONCERN ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN REBELS STILL REPORTED TO BE HIGH, HOWEVER, AND REBEL AREAS OF THE CITY HAVE WATER, TELEPHONES, AND "A GOOD SUPPLY OF FOOD."

5. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL DAYS, A REBEL RADIO STATION HAS BEEN HEARD BROADCASTING EARLY TODAY. CALLING ITSELF RADIO CONSTITUTION, "THE PEOPLE'S RADIO STATION," IT IS TRANSMITTING APPEALS TO NATIONALIST DOMINICANS TO "TAKE TO THE STREETS TO EXPEL THE FOREIGNERS." THE STATION DECLARES THAT THE WATCHWORD IS TO STRUGGLE EVERYWHERE. IN EVERY STREET, EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO PINPOINT THE LOCATION OF THIS BROADCASTING STATION.

1.3  
(a)(4)

6. BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO HAS INFORMED THE US EMBASSY IN RIO THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE REASONS FOR THE US ACTIONS IN THE DOMINION REPUBLIC AND AGREES WITH OUR POSITION.

LATE ITEMS

7.

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(a)(4)

8.

GP-1  
525





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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The General Situation at My Desk at 6:30 PM

1. I talked to Fortas, and he talked to Bosch. His general conclusion is that Bosch is essentially out of control and probably that Colonel Camano is also out of control. Bosch is bitter and lays all of the responsibility to our failure to communicate, to Ambassador Bennett's vindictiveness, our failure to respond to Colonel Camano's complaints of firing by our troops, and to Ambassador Martin's failure to communicate effectively between the Commanding General and Colonel Camano.

Abe told him that all this was irrelevant and that the essential point now is that the rebels are still firing in a time of cease-fire and that no one could answer for the consequences if this firing did not stop. Abe does not think we can expect much from this and suggested a desperate effort by John Martin to re-establish contact in the city and press for observance of the cease-fire. Earlier in the day we sent Martin a flash message to this purpose. Tom Mann is now sending him another.

Meanwhile, both State and Defense have asked their men on the spot for their immediate recommendations on action this evening, but my own belief is that we must stick with the cease-fire, unless all hell breaks loose in a quite literal sense, until after we get the OAS Commission on the spot.

2. We have sent strong personal messages using your name to Gordon in Brazil, to Harriman in Colombia, and to Bernbaum in Venezuela. (Moscoso had his talk with Leoni and went right back to Puerto Rico, to my great astonishment.) We have no answer back but we should know more by morning. Mann has done a similar job in other countries and is sending you a separate report.

3. I talked to Kilpatrick of the POST and Frankel of the TIMES, and Bromley talked to Gluck of the AP, to brief on our intelligence that Communists are more and more active and Bosch's own party more and more scattered to asylum and hiding. This was all "Government sources," not White House. Bromley gave Gulick the figure of 58 -- Gulick had tried 53 on him first.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 91-232 appeal  
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-96



We spend much of the day trying to find the right Costa Ricans for the right Liberal to speak to, and Tom Mann and I finally settled on John Reilly of Hubert Humphrey's office. Reilly is to go to Costa Rica at once. He is friendly with the men who are said to have most influence with Orlich, and he is to make the strongest possible pitch for token troops -- Costa Rica has no Army but a few police would be a great help.

4. The task force you ordered is set up and at work. It met at 3 this afternoon and meets again at 9:30 in the morning. Its members are Bundy, Mann, Vance, Wilson, Helms, with one expert each. This afternoon we settled a number of odds and ends like gas and the draft statement. We also ordered contingent military planning for both a tight cordon inside the city and a wider cordon outside the heavily built-up area. On the political side we cleared the revised instructions to Bunker and reinforced existing efforts for longer-range planning. But after considerable discussion we agreed with Mann that the situation on the ground is decisive and we will have to play the political moves by ear, and day-by-day. Mann went off to see Betancourt, and I strongly urged him to give Betancourt encouragement and keep the Betancourt plan in the air. Tom himself is very skeptical on this but he agreed not to throw cold water on the plan.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

Rec  
5-1-65  
11:52 AM

75

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

57

May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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6 PM EDT

Just two hours later he sent a critic message in which he said that in view of the further deterioration and recent intelligence messages the "country team is unanimously of opinion that... time has come to land the Marines. American lives are in danger." His message concluded "I recommend immediate landing."

h4B

McG. B.

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McG. B.



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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1965 APR 28 PM 5 16

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ALCRITIC NBR FOUR

BUNDY SMITH  
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SKATRE  
THOMSON

## JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REGRET REPORT SITUATION DETERIORATING RAPIDLY. SAN ISIDRO PILOTS WHO HAVE BEEN PRINCIPAL ELEMENT IN JUNTA FORCES TIRED AND DISCOURAGED. ARMY LEADERSHIP DISORGANIZED ALTHOUGH MONTAS JUST NAMED COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMED FORCES, IN EFFORT MOBILIZE ARMY EFFORT, POLCCE CHIEF DESPRADEL INFORMS HIS MOPPING UP OPERATIONS HAVE MET SUCH VIOLENT RESISTANCE HE CAN NO LONGER CONTINUE AND THAT HIS MAXIMUM CAPABILITY NOW IS DEFENSE OF FEW KEY INSTALLATIONS. WESSIN STILL EXPRESSES CONFIDENCE, BUT OBVIOUSLY WEARY AND SPEAKING OF NEED FOR MORE MEN. RIVERA CAMINERO WORRIED AND DISCOURAGED. DE LOS SANTOS AND MONTAS STILL FULL OF FIGHT.

CHIEF MAAG JUST RETURNED FROM SAN ISIDRO WHERE MOST ABOVE OFFICERS NOW GATHERED FOUND GENERAL ATMOSPHERE DEJECTED AND EMOTIONAL, WITH NUMBER OF OFFICER WEEPING. BELISARIO PEGUERO THERE ALSO IN HYSTERICAL MOOD URGIN "RETREAT."

BENOIT OF JUNTA SENT FORMAL REQUEST U.S. SUPPLY TROOPS, TOLD MAAG CHIEF THAT WITHOUT HELP THEY WOULD "HAVE TO QUIT." IN VIEW THIS REPORT AND RECENT MESSAGES THROUGH CAS, COUNTRY TEAM UNANIMOUSLY OF OPINION THAT, NOW THAT WE HAVE REQUEST FROM MILITARY JUNTA FOR ASSISTANCE, TIME HAS COME TO LAND THE MARINE

AMERICAN LIVES ARE IN DANGER. WE SUGGEST, SUBJECT CONDITIONS AT MOMENT. MARINES ESTABLISH BEACH HEAD IN HOTEL EMBAJADOR.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State Ltr 19-17-79 re N23 79-57

By DCH NAHS Date 1-28-81



CONFIDENTIAL

-2- CRITIC NBR FOUR, 282040Z APRIL, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

VICINITY CENTERING ON POLO FIELD WHICH CAN BE USED BY HELICOPTERS FOR LANDING. WE WOULD ALSO BE GLAD HAVE DETACHMENT TAKE POSSESSION EMBASSY GROUNDS. IF WASHINGTON WISHES, THEY CAN BE LANDED FOR PURPOSE PROTECT EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS. WE HAVE JUST BEEN TOLD BY POLICE CHIEF, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE CANNOT PROVIDE PROTECTION ROUTE HAINA NAVAL BASE WHICH HAS BEEN USED UNTIL NOW FOR EVACUATIONS.

I RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE LANDING. BENNETT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 4/28/65, 5:16 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL



87-81-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76b

Action

NNN. 945 SDA 209  
.... ZZ RUEHCRJ  
ARA DE RUESSD 209 23/1900Z  
Info Z 281850Z ZEA  
SS FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO  
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1149  
SP INFO RUCK CL/  
CINCLANT  
SAH RULPAL/CINCSO  
L RULLHJPCOMCARIBSEAFRON  
H RUEKDA/DOD  
NSC RULGRAJ/CTG FOUR FOUR PT NINE  
INR BT  
NSA STATE GRNC  
OPR BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ APRIL 28

RMR CINCSO AND CINCLANT FOR POLADS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

COL. BENOIT, MEMBER OF JUNTA, JUST TELEPHONED EMBASSY TO ASK THAT U.S. LAND 1200 MARINES "TO HELP RESTORE PEACE TO THIS COUNTRY." BENOIT DID NOT ELABORATE SIMPLE REQUEST AND HE WAS GIVEN NO ENCOURAGEMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE SITUATION JUSTIFIES SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME AND AGREE WITH NAVY ATTACHE THAT MARINES SHOULD NOT BE USED IN ANY EVENT FOR STREET CLEARING OPERATIONS. PREPONDERANT MILITARY FORCES ARE ON SIDE OF JOINT  
CFN 1149 1200

PAGE TWO RUESSD 209 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CHIEFS OF OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE SEPARATED GEOGRAPHICALLY AND, I REPEAT, WITHOUT ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE STILL RESTS WITH REBELS. LOGICALLY THE JUNTAS FORCES SHOULD BRING SITUATION UNDER CONTROL, BUT SITUATION NOT REALLY VERY LOGICAL AND SEVERE TEST OF NERVES NOW IN PROCESS. IN VIEW CONDITIONS DESCRIBED MY TALK WITH VAUGHN THIS MORNING, DEPT'S 657 IS PERHAPS DRAWING UNDULY OPTIMISTIC CONCLUSION. FURTHER, WE LEARNED WESSIN HAS NOT ADVANCED THIS MORNING BEYOND BRIDGE HEAD THIS SIDE OZAMA RIVER AND ALL IN ALL NOT MAKING VERY AGGRESSIVE SHOWING. JUNTA ARMY ORGANIZATION CONFUSED AND AIR FORCE CARRYING BURDEN. IN SHORT, ATTACHES AT THIS STAGE CONSIDER OUTCOME STILL IN DOUBT.

BUNDY-SMITH  
DATOR  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
HAYNES  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KLIEN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAVRE  
THOMSON

24229  
1965 APR 28 PM. 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1149, APRIL 28, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

DEPARTMENT MAY WISH DO SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CASE  
SITUATION SHOULD BREAK APART AND DETERIORATE RAPIDLY TO EXTENT  
WE SHOULD NEED MARINES IN A HURRY TO PROTECT AMERICAN CITIZENS.

BENNETT

GP-3

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:19 PM, 4/28/65.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA AT 3:30 PM, 4/28/65.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

77

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached cable Max Taylor reports that he has relayed to Quat our basic decisions on the May deployments to Vietnam. His current plan is that there will be a joint announcement from Saigon on Monday, very early in the morning, our time. This timing may slip somewhat if the planned schedule is not met. The text of the announcement is at the second page in the marked paragraph.

*mfr*

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

SANITIZED

77a  
EAC

46  
Action 00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 46A/1 01/1152Z

00340

1955 MAY 1 AM 8 38

SS  
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (3636)  
INFO RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 69  
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 790  
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 383  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 233  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 51  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 27  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 27  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 27  
RUMKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2105  
STATE GRNC

SANITIZED  
Authority: STATE letter NOV 24 198

By: [Signature] MARS, Date 12-18-80

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 1

EXDIS

REF. DEPTTEL 2463 AND DEF 001097, DTG 301329Z APRIL (NOTAL).

ED 12055  
1-301 (b)  
ACCOMPANIED BY MANFULL, I CALLED ON [REDACTED] ON 1 MAY TO INFORM HIM OF PERTINENT USG DECISIONS CONTAINED IN REFTELS. I TOLD HIM THAT THE MAY DEPLOYMENTS; THAT GENERAL THROCKMORTON WAS TRYING TO CONTACT [REDACTED] TO WORK OUT WITH HIM THE TIMING OF ARRIVAL OF UNITS. I EXPLAINED THAT THROCKMORTON WOULD PROPOSE THAT AN ADVANCE PARTY OF ABOUT 70 MEN OF THE BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU FORCE (173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE) ARRIVE BY AIR ON 3 MAY, TO BE CFN 3636 59 790 383 233 51 51 27 171 2105 1 2463 001097 301329Z [REDACTED] USG U.S. [REDACTED] 70 BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU 173RD 3

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 46A/1-~~TOP SECRET~~  
FOLLOWED BY THE MAIN BODY ARRIVING AND CLOSING IN THE PERIOD 5 MAY - 7 MAY. TOTAL STRENGTH ABOUT 3,500 MEN. I ADDED THAT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE AT A LATER DATE TO REPLACE THESE AIRBORNE TROOPS BY A THREE BATTALION INFANTRY FORCE IN WHICH CASE THE TOTAL STRENGTH WILL BE ABOUT 4,000.

ED 12055  
1-301 (b)  
WE NEXT TOOK UP THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES TO CHU LAI. I TOLD [REDACTED] THAT CONSIDERABLY MORE PREPARATION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE LANDING OF THIS FORCE OF 6,200 MARINES AND SEABEES (I REMINDED HIM THAT THREE AIR SQUADRONS ADDITIONAL TO THIS FIGURE WOULD FOLLOW) THAN FOR THE AIRBORNE TROOPS. ALTHOUGH THE MARINES WERE, OF COURSE, CAPABLE OF COMING ASHORE UNASSISTED, THERE WERE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR HAVING [REDACTED] CONDUCT A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 1/13/80  
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

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Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3606, MAY 1, FROM SAIGON  
CLEARING OPERATION OF THE AREA IN ADVANCE OF THE LANDING TO PREVENT ANY VIET CONG INTERFERENCE WITH IT. MACV ESTIMATES THAT THESE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE 7 MAY AT THE EARLIEST. HENCE, WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS BEFORE FIXING THE LANDING DATE. WE WILL LOOK TO OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK OUT THESE PLANS.

WE THEN DISCUSSED PRESS RELEASES AND AGREED THAT, PROVIDING THE SCHEDULE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE CAN BE MET, THE ONE FOR THE CFN 5 7 3,500 4,000 CHU LAI ~~██████████~~ 6,200 ~~██████████~~ VIET CONG. MACV NOT 7 1

ED 12065  
1-301(b)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 46A/1 ~~██████████~~  
AIRBORNE FORCES WOULD BE MADE AT 1700, MAY 3 (SAIGON TIME), SINCE THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE PARTY ON THAT DATE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO GIVE AWAY THE MOVEMENT. WE GAVE ~~██████████~~ THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH HE SAID SEEMED SATISFACTORY BUT RESERVED PRIVILEGE OF SUGGESTING CHANGES OR ADDITIONS LATER.

~~1-301(b)~~

QUOTE AS A CONTINUATION OF THE GVN'S EFFORTS TO ASSURE SECURITY OF KEY INSTALLATIONS AND TO PRESS THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST THE VIET CONG MORE VIGOROUSLY, THE GVN HAS REQUESTED AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO FURNISH THREE BATTALIONS OF UNITED STATES AIRBORNE FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THIS CONTINGENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES WILL AUGMENT THE SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE VITAL BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU MILITARY BASE COMPLEX. AN ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVED ON 3 MAY AND THE MOVEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. UNQUOTE

WE AGREED THAT A SEPARATE BUT SIMILAR RELEASE COVERING THE CHU LAI MARINES SHOULD BE MADE SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF LANDING. WE WILL WORK THIS OUT AT THE PROPER TIME.

ED 12065  
1-301(b)

FOLLOWING THIS MEETING WITH ~~██████████~~ I RECEIVED WORD FROM GENERAL THROCKMORTON THAT ~~██████████~~ CONCURRED IN THE SCHEDULE FOR THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE. HENCE, SO FAR AS THE SAIGON END IS CONCERNED, THE OPERATION IS APPROVED ON THE INDICATED SCHEDULE. TEXT AND TIME OF PRESS RELEASE MAY BE CONSIDERED FINAL UNLESS OTHERWISE INFORMED.  
TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5/1/65 8:44 A.M.

PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 5/1/65 9:10 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

03115007030

COPY

Lyndon Baines Johnson Li



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

78

4/30/65

Mac:

He agrees. He asks that you  
let Secretaries Rusk and  
McNamara see this also.

Marvin

*Rec'd  
Pres's office  
May 1, 1965  
11:55 am*

✓ 78a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Douglas Dillon's views on Vietnam

I talked with Douglas frankly about a possible pause. His comments follow:

1. He thinks that by our air strikes we have got out of a very bad box -- the gravely weakening situation of January. But he thinks we may be building ourselves another box, in that we will eventually run out of these carefully chosen military targets and have not yet laid a good base for larger air action.
2. In this situation Douglas thinks that a carefully managed pause may be very useful -- not now but later -- in proving our good faith and laying a basis for stronger action if the pause produces no response from the other side.
3. Douglas thinks that the pause should not come in the next few weeks. When it does come, he thinks it should be somewhat longer than we have been saying. He thinks that about three weeks would be needed in order to make it clear that the other side has had a chance to respond.
4. Dillon also thinks that the pause should come after any currently planned troop movements and not before them. Otherwise he thinks the troop movements would spoil the political effect of the pause.
5. Douglas would inform the Russians the moment that a pause was begun and tell them of its purpose. He would also make it clear to them that if the pause produced no such response by the other side, the bombings would be resumed and intensified. He discounts the possibility, which Tommy has raised, that they might issue alarming threats in such a situation.
6. Dillon is not worried about morale in Saigon during a pause. He thinks we have proved our determination and that we ought to be able to keep them with us in a pause designed along the lines described above.
7. On balance, Dillon likes the pause idea. I repeat that he sees it as a way out of a position which he thinks will be hard to sustain for very

long. He noted that the Kiplinger letter is already talking about a "deal" by which we have limited our bombing to relatively cheap targets, while the Soviets limit their defense operation to the Hainan area. He also noted that General Ky was already talking of the need to do more in the north.

My own summary judgment is that Dillon made a great deal of sense in a short space of time and that we should keep in touch with him constantly. He flies to Europe on May 5, but he will be where we can reach him by diplomatic channels right through May.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/25/65 (2d draft)  
McNaughton

*Pub in 780*  
*Pam Folley*

CRITICISM OF THE INITIATIVE BY "THE UNSYMPATHETIC"

1. The US is trying to get concession from the VC by turning on and off bombing of the DRV, an innocent party. There is no more basis for this new US objective than there was for starting bombing in the first place. The fundamental point is that the VC are independent of the DRV, that the war is a civil war, that the DRV cannot compel the VC to stop the war in SVN in exchange for the US halt in bombing.

2. The US proposal contemplates that the GVN will continue military operations in SVN. This means that the US is asking "a horse for a rabbit" -- the US is expecting the DRV/VC to halt all of their activities in exchange for a cessation of only one-half of the US/GVN activities. Why should the VC give up land and people they hold in SVN (some for 25 years) in exchange for cessation of bombings in the DRV? This request is patently unfair. What would be fair is a total cessation of all hostilities in both the DRV and SVN, a recognition of the existing power relationships of the contending parties and the immediate start of "unconditional discussions" (quoting President) on that basis between the GVN and the NLF/VC. These are the two parties that truly represent the South Vietnamese people's interests, and they should reach an accommodation among themselves.

3. The real reason the US is stopping the bombings is that the bombing policy is bankrupt and always has been. It has not succeeded in compelling discussions; it has not broken the DRV/VC will (it has really strengthened their will); it has united the Soviets and Chicom; it has alienated world opinion. The bombing pause is a patent confession of failure of a bad idea.

4. The US/GVN gave too short a period of time before resuming bombing for the initiative to work. They did not give DRV/VC a reasonable chance

~~TOP SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority OSD letter 10-18-78  
By DCH, NARS, Date 8-27-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

to respond, for cooler heads to prevail, or for discussions to begin.

5. The conclusion is inescapable that this is a grandstand play -- a piece of "crisis management" for the world audience -- intended to demonstrate Johnson's statesmanlike magnanimity and reasonableness, intended to fail, and intended to be followed, "regretfully, but unavoidably" with air strikes against DRV that are less justifiable and put greater pressure on the Chinese and the Soviets to enter the war than anything we have seen so far.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

✓  
4/25/65 (2d draft)  
McNaughton

78c

POSSIBLE "PAUSE" SCENARIO

1. P-7 -- Introduce 1- and 2-day pauses in the weekly ROLLING THUNDER program (without reducing the weekly sortie level).
2. P-3 -- Perhaps announce certain US ground/air/sea deployments to South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
3. P-2 -- Taylor lays out the program to GVN and obtains GVN concurrence. To assuage any GVN fears, he emphasizes (a) that, while the chances of DRV/VC compliance are slight, the basic aim is to marshal world opinion in support of GVN/US position for peace and for an independent South Vietnam, that the main purpose this time is to demonstrate US/GVN good faith and to lay a groundwork for possible later uses of the same technique with better chances of success in abating the DRV/VC aggression, (b) that, to prevent resumption of the bombings, the DRV/VC must stop the aggression in the South\* and that the US firmly intends to resume the bombings after a pause of approximately a week if there is no halt by then to DRV/VC aggression in the South, (c) that the US is undertaking significant further ground/sea/air deployments to the area, showing US commitment and determination and adding to the US/GVN deterrent and fighting capability, and (d) that there is to be no stand-down of US/GVN civil or military activities in the South during the pause.\*\*

Start a  
fold in Pause  
with this +  
Dilemma  
included  
my 13

too quick

too short

?  
3A P-1 -- Discuss with leadership in Hanoi.

\* "Aggression in the South" is intended to be broader than infiltration of men and material and broader than control of the war from the North. It is intended also to include VC attacks, terrorism and sabotage in the South.

\*\* Such a stand-down in the South may be the principal bone of contention. The critics will say that we are offering a "half ceasefire" (stop bombing) in exchange for a "whole ceasefire" (infiltration plus VC activity) -- that it is

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

4. P-Day\* -- US/GVN suspend air strikes against North Vietnam. Also suspended are 34A operations, medium- and low-level reconnaissance operations and any leaflet drops against the North; not suspended are U-2 operations over North Vietnam, operations in Laos, or normal GVN military and civil operations in the South.

5. P-Day -- US/GVN begin energetic private efforts to induce the DRV/VC to stop the aggression against the South in response to the cessation of US/GVN air strikes against the North. Specifically:

Why not Chicom ? (a) US informs Soviets and DRV (but not Chicom) that bombings have been halted "to see what happens in the South"; stresses that this is a major US/GVN attempt to bring about a reduction in tensions; urges the Soviets to urge the DRV/VC to respond by stopping the aggression against the South; explains that the GVN, as the lawful government of South Vietnam, intends to and will carry out normal civil and military functions in the South; and makes clear that the US/GVN will be compelled to resume the bombing, whether or not talks are offered or begin, if DRV/VC aggression in the South continues.

(b) Privately communicate the US/GVN action to certain allies (Canada and SEATO less the Philippines and France), to certain

?x

unreasonable to expect the VC to allow the ARVN to mow them down and take over VC areas. The scenario recommends (Item 3(d) above) that there "be no stand-down of US/GVN civil or military activities in the South during the pause" and (Item 11) that GVN carry on "typical" and "demonstrably normal" civil and military governmental activities during the bombing pause. An alternative approach during the pause would be for the GVN to lay on a full and representative program of "probes" (tax collection, AID distribution, medical activities, battalion movements along highways, etc.) in all "safe" and "contested" areas, but to avoid search-and-clear and saturation bombing attacks on VC base areas. The important point is to ensure that the DRV/VC are on notice of US/GVN intention not to accept a "cease-fire" which turns over a large part of the country to the VC.

\* ~~Events~~ Events relevant to the choice of P-Day include (1) Buddha's birthday on May 14-15, (2) the Cambodian conference, (3) the SEATO meetings in London, (4) US deployments to South Vietnam (and their announcement), (5) any strong steps taken by the USSR or the Chicom.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

neutrals (India, Yugoslavia, Japan), and to selected Communist nations (Rumania, Poland).

? 6. P+1-7 -- Publicly and privately urge that "unconditional discussions" begin.

7. P+3-7 -- The DRV/VC may (a) ignore our overture, or may reply (b) negatively (either flatly or in an unacceptable counter-offer), (c) ambiguously, or (d) affirmatively. (The most likely response is a negative one. The most difficult one to handle would be one which offered to talk "provided the pause continues.")

8. P+3-6 -- News leaks out, either from the above sources, from US sources, or because reporters observe a longer-than-usual gap in the ROLLING THUNDER program. US/GVN say "no comment on military operations." (Speculation should be postponed a few days by the pauses in the prior week's program, per Item 1 above.)

9. P+5-7 -- Rumors increase and suspense builds. US/GVN continue "no comment" policy.

10. P+1-7 -- US/GVN observe VC operations in the South and sea and land infiltration from the North; immediately and continuously report privately to the Soviets/DRV/allies/neutrals/etc., the specific acts of VC aggression and/or DRV infiltration that have occurred and that must stop if the bombing pause is to continue. DRV/VC aggression against the South may:

(a) Increase. If so, the US/GVN might resume bombing even before the end of the one-week period.

(b) Continue at the prior pace. If so, the US/GVN should report the aggressions as indicated above, and should resume the bombing at the end of the one week.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

4

(c) Abate substantially but not entirely. If so, the US/GVN should report the aggressions as indicated above, and should imply throughout the week that bombing would be resumed at the end of the one week; but in fact resumption of the bombing might be postponed beyond the one-week period if the abatement of VC activity is sufficient either (i) to show promise of further abatement or (ii) to constitute a manageable level for the GVN.

(d) Stop almost entirely. This is very unlikely. But if so, this fact would be noted by the US/GVN, and resumption of bombing would of course be suspended even longer.

11. P+1-7 -- GVN carries on normal civil and military governmental activities in the South. (Care should be taken to ensure that GVN activities during the pause are "typical" and demonstrably at the normal level -- this, to avoid allegations that the GVN went out of its way to "bait" the VC and "incite" incidents.)

12. P+7 -- US/GVN, in private contacts with other nations, with leadership on the Hill, and with knowledgeable press on a background basis, explain the efforts we had made to de-fuze the war, the lack of success achieved, and the unfortunate necessity to resume the bombing of the North soon.

13. P+8 -- Resume the ROLLING THUNDER program at the same level and according to the same plan as now pertains.

14. P+8\* -- Presidential statement on all networks, Syncom (if possible), etc.:

(a) Review the nature of the war in South Vietnam, emphasizing

\* An alternate approach would have the President make his statement before resumption of the bombing, offering to delay resumption a few more days to see if the DRV/VC could not be brought to end their aggression in South Vietnam. Resumption of the ROLLING THUNDER program would follow that "last mile."

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

5

details of the VC terrorism and the evidence of DRV support and direction of VC activity.

- (b) Emphasize that we have a very limited objective: Our bombing has been and is intended only to lead to a cessation of the aggression and infiltration.
- (c) Review prior US statements on US willingness to talk -- "unconditional discussions."
- (d) State that he has noted and studied carefully the views of those who have recommended a temporary cessation of bombing as a US/GVN move in the direction of a peaceful outcome.
- (e) State that the US/GVN reviewed the bombing policy, believed that continuation was fully justified in view of the continuing level of DRV/VC aggression, but nevertheless in good faith made a major concession on bombing in the hope of producing an end to the DRV/VC aggression against the South.
- (f) Continue that, accordingly, US/GVN a week ago directed that the bombing of the North cease so that the US/GVN and the world could see if such action would lead to an ending in the DRV/VC aggression against the South.
- (g) Reveal that at that time -- a week ago -- the suspension of bombing was communicated to the DRV and to a number of other nations which have an interest in the matter and which might bring their good offices to bear.
- (h) Indicate that the US/GVN watched carefully what course DRV/VC chose to follow -- continuation of the aggression or reduction of tensions by ceasing hostilities.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6

- (i) Describe in detail the DRV/VC behavior during the week --
    - (i) aggression in the South (attacks, terrorism, sabotage),
    - (ii) infiltration from the North (men and materiel by land and sea), and (iii) negative responses to our verbal initiatives.
  - (j) State that the US/GVN have been compelled to order the air strikes against North Vietnam resumed. Those orders have been given and the first of the new series of strikes has already taken place.
  - (k) Emphasize that the US will not be pushed out of SVN by DRV/VC, will keep up its guard in SEA to deter continued aggression (this is the reason for the additional deployments), and will not settle for meaningless agreement that does not assure the independence of SVN from DRV/Chicom domination.
  - (l) Repeat statement on limited US objectives in SEA, on desire to have unconditional discussions, and possibly on US willingness to join in a SEA economic/social development,
15. P+8 -- GVN confirms resumption of bombing with own announcement.
16. P+8-10 -- Conduct USIA broadcasts and leaflet drops into the DRV and broadcasts elsewhere to inform the people everywhere of the President's speech and of the points made on it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pub in Pam  
4/25/65  
McNaughton  
Pell  
78d

RISKS IN "POSSIBLE PAUSE SCENARIO"

(Enemy moves not all consistent)

1. USSR, Chicom, DRV and VC may use the pause as "proof" of US recognition that the bombing policy was wrong from the start -- i.e., the suspension is a US "admission of error."

2. USSR and Chicom may deliver the equivalent of an ultimatum that resumption of bombing will produce "grave consequences" (or perhaps specific forms of intervention). This risk is greater if resumption is announced in advance.

3. USSR or the Chicom may use the period of pause to rush new Soviet or Chicom-manned AA or MIGs into the southern part of the DRV. They could inform us of this, facing us with the prospect of knowingly striking Soviet or Chicom nationals.

4. USSR, Chicom, DRV and VC may respond (ultimately publicly) that they are willing to talk but only if the US agrees not to resume the bombing. I.e., they may push for a "half ceasefire" on our part in exchange for "no ceasefire" on their part.

5. The U Thants and "war weary" of the world will probably urge "full ceasefire," meaning not only continuation of the pause, but also stand-downs by both sides in the South (equivalent to writing off vast areas of SVN to the VC).

6. DRV/VC may reduce but not stop their aggression in the South. This could lead to a debate as to whether they have or have not fulfilled the stated US/GVN requirements for continuation of the pause, making it difficult to resume.

NOTE: Domestic opposition may muster forces during the week, after the news has leaked, to impose obstacles to resumption of the bombing.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Douglas Dillon's views on Vietnam

I talked with Douglas ~~very~~ <sup>ponder</sup> frankly about the ~~possibility~~ of a pause. His comments ~~are as follows~~:

1. He thinks that by our air strikes we have got out of a very bad box -- the gravely weakening situation of January. But he thinks we may be building ourselves another box, in that we will eventually run out of these carefully chosen military targets and have not yet laid a ~~basis of argument or longer support~~ <sup>good</sup> for air action. <sup>larger</sup>
2. In this situation Douglas thinks that a carefully managed pause ~~in the bombing~~ may be very useful -- not now but later -- in proving our good faith and laying a basis for stronger action if the pause produces no response from the other side. ~~He sees it, in other words, as a pause far out of the date and which may be ahead of us.~~
3. ~~On timing~~. Douglas thinks that the pause should not come in the next few weeks. When it does come, he thinks it should be somewhat longer than we have been saying. He thinks that about three weeks would be needed in order to make <sup>it</sup> clear that the other side has had a chance to respond.
4. <sup>Dillon</sup> ~~Douglas~~ also thinks that the pause should come after any currently planned troop movements and not before them. Otherwise he thinks the troop movements would spoil the political effect of the pause.
5. Douglas would inform the Russians ~~at~~ the moment that a pause was begun and tell them of its purpose. He would also make it ~~very~~ clear to them that if the pause produced no such response by the other side, the bombings would be resumed and intensified. He discounts the possibility, which Tommy has raised, that they might issue alarming threats in such a situation.
6. Dillon is not worried about morale in Saigon during a pause. He thinks we have proved our determination and that we ought to be able to ~~quit and~~ keep them with us in a pause ~~which is~~ designed along the lines described above. 7. On balance, Dillon likes the pause idea. I repeat that he sees it as a way out of a position which he thinks will be hard to sustain for very long. He noted that the Kiplinger letter is already talking about a "deal".



by which we <sup>have</sup> limited our bombing to relatively cheap targets, while the Soviets limited their defense operation to the Hainan area. He also noted that General Ky was already talking of the need to do ~~much~~ more in the north.

My own summary judgment is that Dillon made a great deal of sense in a short space of time and that we should keep in touch with him constantly. He flies to Europe on May 5, but he will be where we can reach him ~~at least through~~ <sup>by</sup> diplomatic channels right through May

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1965

80  
Staff mtg  
man

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Chancellor Erhard to Washington

The State Department has asked about arrangements for Chancellor Erhard's visit to Washington.

The Chancellor has engagements in New York on June 1 and 2, and would like to come to Washington afterward. Since June 2 and 3 were originally reserved for Prime Minister Shastri's visit here, I would recommend that the German Chancellor be received the day after -- June 4.

As for arrangements, the Wilson format -- a short business meeting followed by a lunch -- might be best. It would, I am sure, satisfy the Chancellor's needs and, in the end, might burden your time least.

McG. B.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Let's discuss ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Returned - for your 80a  
files -

---



S/S 6192

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard  
to Washington

The Department understands that, on the basis of Ambassador McGhee's discussions this week with the President, we may begin to plan for the visit of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to Washington on June 3-4, in connection with his trip to New York on June 1. For planning purposes, it would be helpful to know what time the President wishes to set aside for his meeting with Erhard and whether the President wishes to host a lunch for him.

*DR*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP-4 -- Downgraded at 3-year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)  
By DCH, NARS, Date 8-27-81



April 30, 1965

W.D.  
81

Mr. President:

An interesting message on  
Lodge's visit to Vietnam.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

(Cy of Saigon 7 1, April 29, 1965)

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 84-30

Document # 81a

FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR ON LODGE VISIT

EXCISE

Ambassador Lodge departed Saigon after a very worthwhile 27-hour visit. While in Saigon, Lodge had detailed discussions and a working luncheon with Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson and all members of the Country Team. Ambassadors Taylor and Lodge called on Premier Quat and spoke with him and Deputy Prime Minister Do and Secretary of State Bui Diem almost two hours. Ambassador Taylor offered a reception for Premier Quat, Deputy Prime Minister Do, Secretary of State Bui Diem, the diplomatic corps and eight key Government of Vietnam officials. Premier Quat hosted a small dinner for Ambassador and Mrs. Lodge.

On Thursday morning, Lodge has a most fruitful one-hour conversation with [redacted] at the Residence. Later, Lodge received a call from General Don and called on the Apostolic Delegate. As Archbishop Binh was out of town for a week, it was impossible for Lodge to see him, but interested circles know he made every effort to do so.

In addition to enabling Lodge to explain current American policies and growing Free World support for the defense of Vietnam to key Vietnamese and diplomatic corps personalities, the fact that Ambassador and Mrs. Lodge returned to Saigon as old friends of Vietnam already appears to have had a very favorable effect on Vietnamese morale and is interpreted as one more proof of the strength and extent of American commitment to a favorable outcome in South Vietnam.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACD/CMR

REVIEWED BY T. Kobayashi DATE 3/11/84

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TO AUTH. \_\_\_\_\_ REASON(S) A-5

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SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 84-30

By [redacted], NARS, Date 6-7-84

COPY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

April 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here's a message from Dungan (Tab A) in answer to a private wire which I sent him (Tab B) after one of our talks this morning. I think it gives an interesting and believable account of Frei's thinking.

McG. B.

April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A is a quick, strong two-page summary of your activities on disarmament since November 1963, and at Tab B is a still longer paper which the State Department has put in the record of the Foreign Relations Committee. I will fold both of these documents around a stick and beat Joe Clark over the head with it tomorrow at breakfast.

McG. B.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Habib Bourguiba, Jr., now Tunisia's foreign minister, is coming in briefly to deliver a letter from his father.

Simply knowing that you appreciate Tunisia's stance will give Bourguiba, Sr. a big boost. He has gone way out on a limb in recommending that Arabs and Israelis negotiate a Palestine settlement. Even though this is unworkable now, it took courage to be the only Arab leader to recognize that Israel is here to stay. Other Arabs have criticized him bitterly. Bourguiba has also publicly supported our position on negotiation without preconditions in Vietnam.

To be honest, Tunisia's forthright stand is partly designed to generate maximum US backing for its next development plan. It wants (1) a pledge of specific support--we're giving a general assurance but don't want to make another multi-year commitment; (2) a \$30-40 million foreign exchange cushion to start the next plan. We'll help meet the need but, again, don't want to talk amounts until we figure out how much is required.

In sum, we want to be as re-assuring as possible, both to show it pays to be friendly and because Tunisia is using our aid well (Tunisia is one of the seven countries AID is concentrating on). Possible Talking Points are: (1) You hope his father's courageous stand on the Palestine issue will win followers among the sensible Arab leaders when the initial shock wears off; (2) you're aware of Tunisia's effective development effort and can assure him that, even though we don't want to commit ourselves to a specific amount of aid now, we will support Tunisia's development during its next 4-year plan; (3) it's important to get the Western Europeans more heavily involved in Tunisian development, not to get ourselves off the hook but because Tunisia's most profitable natural economic relationship is with Europe; (4) your best wishes to his father.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

McGeorge Bundy

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Talk with George Meany on the Miller Report, 4/29, 12:30

George Meany and I reached agreement on the Miller Report which I hope will still be firm when you meet him at 12:30.

The agreement is that Meany's man, Goldfinger, will sign the Report, but make an additional 300-word "comment." The essence of this comment is that while he signs the report as a whole, he himself would take a somewhat harder line against the dangers of casual trade, especially in the sale of technology. I have seen it, and it seems to me an acceptable settlement.

It is always possible that Jay Lovestone will have stirred Meany up again. Lovestone is a former Trotskyite and a wild man against all trade with Communists. If this should happen, you may want to emphasize about three points to George:

(1) There is nothing soft about the Miller Report. In particular, it is very tough against credits to Communists, which George Meany has always told us is the most important point of all.

(2) The Miller Report also shares Meany's views that this is basically a problem of politics, not one of profits.

(3) You and George have a firm agreement that there would be no need for a minority report, and our current plan for a brief Goldfinger comment is a very fair compromise.

McG. B.

April 29, 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Agenda for your Meeting with Irwin Miller's  
Committee at 11:00 A.M. Today**

The purpose of the meeting is for you to thank Miller and his people for working hard on a tough problem; to assure them that you will give their Report careful study, and to tell them that you are reserving decision on the release.

At Tab A is a list of the members of the Committee.

After welcoming them, you might wish to ask: (1) Miller briefly to summarize his recommendations; (2) McNamara and Mann to comment. (Rusk and Connor have conflicting appointments very difficult to shift. As you know, I will have to be in New York. Francis Bator will sit in for me.)

You will want to single out Irwin Miller for special thanks. He did an extraordinary job. You might also mention Edward Fried of the State Department, who did a first-class job as Executive Secretary and will also be at the meeting.

On the question of release, there is not yet agreement in the Government. Connor has not yet had a chance to study the Report himself, but his people are against letting it out. I believe Rusk and McNamara are in favor of release, as are we.

At Tab B is a copy of the draft report.

At Tab C is a copy of the memorandum I sent you for your conversation with George Meany.

McG. B.

April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bohlen's cable is the best summary and analysis of de Gaulle's speech I have seen. It may be useful to you.

McG. B.



CONFIDENTIAL

87a

(Cy of Paris 6107, April 28, 1965)

The De Gaulle speech of April 28 represents an annual springtime exercise and coincides with the Gromyko visit. It does not introduce any really new elements, but serves once again to orchestrate the theme of total French national independence, this time with even greater emphasis and with considerable weight on anti-American aspects of this policy.

From a domestic angle, the speech sounds familiar notes (French recovery from a long eclipse and international respect for an independent France) which may be expected to continue in Gaullist propaganda as the campaign gets underway next fall and France moves towards the December Presidential election. It is addressed to critics in certain "milieux" which allegedly advocate subservience to the US and cannot adjust to the new order and which are described in most pejorative fashion.

It is quite true that the Soviet Union will find no cause for rejoicing in the references to "totalitarian empire" and to the need for Eastern Europe to throw off their "crushing constraints" before they can rejoin the European family. De Gaulle's object here seems to have been (a) to reassure French public opinion, and to some extent, German, re French policy toward the Soviet Union in the midst of the Gromyko visit, and (b) to demonstrate the limits of Franco-Russian collaboration while indicating that independent France is an interesting business partner for the Soviets. As such, France intends to act like a European and "to effect from one end of our continent to the other an equilibrium based on understanding and cooperation of all peoples who like us inhabit it."

There are also references to alliances with the US and others, and to "friendly country" which seems unjustifiably "distressed" by resurrected France. However, each of these references is accompanied by allusions to US hegemonic policy, to US material and political domination and to subjection (rejected by resurgent France) of integrated Europe to a trans-Atlantic protector. New France also described as modifying a system of double hegemony established at Yalta, the latter being a constant obsession with De Gaulle. Thus, the overall tone of the speech is hostile to US policy, which is described in distorted terms, and with many untruths and half truths.

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Authority State Hc 8/23/77  
By DLH, NARS, Date 9-29-81



On specific issues, corollaries of the above viewpoint are (1) reprobation of the expanding war in IndoChina. De Gaulle does not step over the chalkline to blame the US exclusively, but makes no mention of US steps toward a negotiated settlement. (2) Approval of Latin American efforts toward "human liberation and national organization," (3) French aid to Africa, (4) developing relations with China, (5) reconciliation with Germany, (6) solidarity (strictly bilateral) among the six, and (7) independent non-Atlantic defense arrangements. Several of these obviously diverge from US objectives and many will no doubt be greeted with enthusiasm in the "third world" at the expense of the US.

On Europe, De Gaulle rejects any dissolution of France in "a so-called integrated Europe," which he explicitly equates with US domination. French participation in Europe is to be restricted to "an organized cooperation of the free nations of the old continent." In his only reference to the European Economic Community, he reduces it to its most limited expression: "A common industrial and agricultural market" which France has joined with five other countries to organize, and apparently gives it no more importance than tunneling Mont Blanc, making Moselle navigable, and the development of the Concord Jet Transport. He further reduces the importance of the community by failing to see in it any means of defense against US economic power. French business must, in the main, continue under French direction and management. Competitiveness of rapidly developing sectors of French industry must be maintained "at all costs." For joint industrial efforts, France must generally choose as partners countries to which we are closest and whose weight we can assume will not crush us." The foregoing seems to confirm other indications that the French have fixed certain limits to the extent of European economic integration, and that in the economic field as in the political, no concessions will be made to supra-nationality.

In the list of bilateral enterprises the US, ironically, figures as the author of payments deficits which obliges France to convert her excess dollars into gold. The UK was singled out for cooperation on aviation, and the USSR on television.

Key sentences in our view are (a) "no hegemony exercised by anyone whatever, no foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any state, no prohibition on any country to maintain peaceful relations with any other, can be justified," and (b) "there is now a French policy and it is made in Paris."

CONFIDENTIAL

Out of context, these slogans are not objectionable, but their formulation and deductions drawn from them in the speech are clearly and deliberately disobliging toward us. It is quite natural that "total independence" is going to strike first at relationships which, unlike those with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have been closest in the past. However, we cannot escape the conclusion that in moving further and further away from these relationships in each pronouncement, De Gaulle is continuing on a dangerous course and setting dangerous trends in motion. In the words of Paul Reynaud, "French nationalism is in the process of reviving American isolationism and now to top it off, it is reawakening the greated German nationalism."

CONFIDENTIAL



67 h d  
88

April 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is Max Taylor's weekly report. There is little in it you do not already know. In the last paragraph, he speaks of the new Chancery, and as you know, Dean Rusk has the action on that one and is talking to Fulbright about it this week.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT



~~SECRET NODIS~~

(Cy of Saigon 3559 April 28, 65)

88a

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

Upon returning from my visit to Honolulu last week, I found the most active political issue in Saigon was related to the conference on Cambodia and the need to obtain the Vietnamese support for participation. We had anticipated considerable difficulty in presenting this matter and obtaining the support of Quat's government. However, the Government of Vietnam made matters easier for us by a premature interview given by Foreign Minister Do expressing Vietnamese willingness to participate in the conference. However, the interview was not fully cleared with Prime Minister Quat, who showed an understandable reluctance to appear too eager for a conference which might lead to discussions on Vietnam. Thus, Patrick Gordon Walker had a busy time, though he eventually accomplished his mission of securing Government of Vietnam agreement. Whether Prince Sihanouk will now succeed in his apparent efforts to block attendance at the conference by the US, Government of Vietnam, and Thais remain to be seen.

Although the internal political scene was quite <sup>et</sup> on the surface, there are continuing indications of unrest among various political groupings who do not find themselves entirely satisfied by the Quat Government. There has so far been little to unite these disparate groups of militant Catholics, some unhappy military leaders, southern regionalists, and the usual "out" politicians. Quat is well aware of the danger of these malcontents and is trying to placate those of any real importance. He told us April 27 that insofar as the southern regionalists were concerned, he expected to give them additional ministerial seats in his next overhaul of the Cabinet.

On last Friday, I received authority from Washington to sound out Quat with regard to the introduction of the additional forces recommended by the conference in Honolulu. Alex Johnson and I presented the matter to him the following day under somewhat disadvantageous conditions as he was being pressed at the time by the need to develop a government position on the Cambodian conference. In spite of earlier indications of reluctance to request additional foreign forces, Quat received our presentation quite calmly and indicated almost at once his personal concurrence in principle. Our understanding when we broke up was that he would discuss this matter cautiously with his principal military advisors and call us back for a second conference earlier this week.

Having failed to receive this call, Alex Johnson and I sought an appointment the afternoon of April 27 in which Quat gave his complete concurrence to the introduction of the US and third country forces recommended in Honolulu.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET NODIS~~

Authority NLJ 84-30  
By isa, NARS, Date 11-13-84



We agreed that Generals Westmoreland, Thieu and Minh would initiate planning at once and I have requested Washington for final approval for the phased introduction of the US troops.

Insofar as Viet Cong activity during the week was concerned, the lull in activity which has lasted for several weeks continued. The Viet Cong main force units are still avoiding contact with ARVN units and react only when the ARVN proceed against their controlled areas. While we always try to push the ARVN to take advantage of such a lull to harass and destroy the Viet Cong in their own bases, results in terms of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong during the week have not been impressive.

You may have noticed from previous reports that the term "pacification" has fallen into disrepute as being negative and ill-descriptive of the liberation of the country from the Viet Cong and that "rural reconstruction" has been substituted for it. Regardless of the change of name, progress in this field remains as undramatic as in the past. However, a great deal of work is being expended on the numerous actions programs which were discussed with you during my consultations in Washington earlier this month. Whenever security conditions permit, most of these programs are moving quite well but, unfortunately, reconstruction is hampered by security considerations in many provinces.

We may have to seek your help in the matter of the new Chancery project which has run into trouble before Congress. You will recall your quick reaction to the bombing of the Embassy in urging and obtaining House authorization for the construction of a new Chancery which would be both "permanent" and "dignified." It has been almost a month since the public announcement of the intention to initiate this construction but the legislation has, I understand, encountered obstacles in the Senate. Because of the political and psychological effect here in South Vietnam (apart from our urgent need for an efficient and reasonably secure Embassy), it will be most unfortunate if Congressional delays are allowed to blur the impact of your prompt reaction to the bombing of the Embassy.



~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Egypt, the Congo, and Corn

1. You may remember that Nasser told Talbot on April 11 that the UAR was going to give no more aid to the Congo rebels. Our own intelligence now reports that we know of no deliveries since April 7, and our assessment is that Nasser has in fact probably stopped helping the rebels. Moreover, the UAR itself has leaked out a story that such aid has stopped, and the story itself is of course a propaganda plus for our side.

2. In these circumstances, Bob Komer asks if you would let him go ahead with his corn sale. Since this is a dollar sale with credit for only 12 months, and since it is only a \$10 million item anyway (as distinct from the \$37 million of PL 480), he says that he "still sees this as a free ride."

3. I have reminded Komer that this is not the bargain we had only a week ago, when we agreed to explore the PL480 and hold up the corn, but his answer is that a week ago we did not have solid evidence on the Congo matter, which is a real victory for Dean Rusk. So I have agreed to ask you.

4. My own view is that the corn sale is a minor matter both ways, and I think we could well have done it last week. But it looks like a better gesture this week, and it may be better yet at some future point -- as, for example, during a Komer visit to Nasser.

McG. B.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

Not yet \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-48  
By cb, NARA Date 1-9-01

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90

April 28, 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Miller Committee**

1. Jack Valenti called me to say that you feel we are pushing you a little on this one.
2. I understand your feeling: the problem of Vietnam is obvious, and so is the problem of George Meany. George has now agreed not to ask to see you today, on the understanding that there will be no decision before he talks with you.
3. On the other hand, this is a Committee of genuinely first-rate people from all over the country and all parts of the business and professional community. They have worked extremely hard at your request on a problem in which you have a direct interest that I have repeatedly emphasized to them. They have worked without seeking publicity and without making fuss. They deserve a very few minutes to present their conclusion and hear your noncommittal but warm thanks.
4. Two weeks ago, I asked for an appointment for them through Jack Valenti's office on the occasion of their <sup>last</sup> scheduled two-day session here which comes tomorrow and Friday. The appointment was set for Thursday at 5:30, and they have made their plans accordingly.
5. There is nothing sacred about the time of day however, and I can see real advantages in your meeting with this Committee earlier on Thursday. Moreover, the meeting can be very brief, and it can be off-the-record. You can reserve your own position completely.
6. So, as I said to you just after the Raborn swearing-in, I suggest a morning meeting -- before Meany, but without decision. I have talked to Jack Valenti on this and subject to your veto, we are rescheduling the Miller group for 11 o'clock, for a session that should cause no problems.

McG. B.



Reid  
4/28/65  
3:55 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I got word from Juanita that you would like to have a message sent to Ike about his statement. He is on his way by train, and I think a telegram is better than a letter, so I suggest the attached.

McG. B.

McG. B.

OK  
sent 4/28/65  
7:05 p

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. At your direction, I spoke last week to Ambassador Ritchie of Canada to bring him up to date on your thinking about the Prime Minister's idea of a pause. I told him that we had considered the matter very carefully and that the compelling argument against it was simply that the signal would be misunderstood both by our friends and by our enemies. I repeated our interest in knowing if any of our friends got any different evidence that would weigh against this conclusion.
2. Ritchie has just called me to say that the Prime Minister is most grateful for being so fully and frankly in touch with your thinking, and that it helps him a great deal to have this kind of information. The expressions of sentiment are very warm, though there is no statement of agreement with our view.
3. The Prime Minister also wants you to know that he is speaking in Vermont on April 30 (Friday) in fulfillment of an engagement which was fixed six months ago. He will not say anything about the situation in Vietnam but will speak rather on the general topic of American and Canadian neighborhood. He is doing this largely because of George Aiken. The Prime Minister obviously wants you to know that this will not be a repetition of his Philadelphia performance.
4. We shall see.

McG

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation Report

As of 8:30 this morning the situation in the Dominican Republic was as follows:

1. The evacuation of Americans from the Santo Domingo area was successfully carried out by 4:45 p.m. yesterday. The Task Force, after discharging the evacuees in San Juan, will return to station off Santo Domingo (over the horizon) in case of further trouble.
2. There has been no government formed yet. Wessin, de los Santos and Rivera Caminero issued a decree last night declaring martial law. We have no information about possible negotiations between the rebels and the loyalists, despite urgings to both sides by Ambassador Bennett yesterday afternoon.
3. The Embassy reported sporadic firing in the city during the night and still continuing as of 7:52 this morning. Ambassador Bennett reports a rumor -- as yet unconfirmed -- that Wessin after crossing the bridge yesterday evening only established a beachhead, waiting until today to initiate mopping up operations. Some of the soldiers of General Monagas' 1000-man column were observed in parts of the city last night.
4. Ambassador Bennett this morning relayed an unconfirmed report that communist elements still have control of the palace. If true, there may be some heavy fighting in taking this objective.
5. Former Triumvirate members Reid and Caceres called the Embassy yesterday from the home of a friend. They were well and seemingly in good spirits. "Provisional President" Molina Urena has taken asylum in the Colombian Embassy.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-232  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Dominican Situation

As of 9 AM this morning, the Dominican situation looks as follows:

During the course of the night, there were no major developments either on the military side or on the negotiation front. The Embassy reports that it finds no real signs of willingness to negotiate on either side.

From the Embassy's report, it seems that both sides are rapidly coming to the end of their rope. The outcome of the stand-down depends upon which one can hold out the longest. At this stage, it is still hard to predict. The rebels reportedly picked up the support of the Santiago Garrison, but there are also indications that rebel nerve is flagging.

Permission for evacuation of Americans has been obtained from rebel forces, but approval from the royalists has not been nalled down. The Navy Chief of Staff gave his okay last night, but the Embassy has not been able to contact Wessin or de los Santos. This is due to communication difficulties with San Isidro Base, where they are located. The Embassy has been instructed to take steps to correct this deficiency.

The evacuation plan has been complicated by the reported intention of Wessin and de los Santos to issue a ultimatum to the rebels calling upon them to agree to a military junta and free elections with all candidates participating by September 1, or face a maximum bombardment effort of the capital. We do not know whether the ultimatum has actually been delivered. The Navy Chief of Staff has agreed to draw the line around the evacuation points and spare these areas from bombardment.

Ambassador Bennett hopefully will arrive in the Dominican Republic this morning. The exact time and place has not been decided because of the uncertainty over the ultimatum.

Bosch is still in San Juan. Radio Santo Domingo carried a broadcast by him (presumably tape telephone) calling upon the rebel forces to fight on.

State is drafting a message to Connitt instructing him to contact Wessin and de Los Santos to remind them of the Navy Chief of Staff's

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- 2 -

commitment on evacuation and to inform the leaders on both sides that we intend to proceed with the evacuation. Timing on the evacuation will depend on the results of the contacts. State sent Connett a message last night setting the tentative target for starting the evacuation at 12 noon Washington time. Evacuation operations are not to be initiated until a go-ahead authorization is given.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last week you asked me for information on aid to India and Pakistan. At Tab A is a summary chart with table on Pakistan, and at Tab B the same on India. These papers are slow in coming because Bob Komer misunderstood my original request and prepared detailed memoranda on the substance of our policies in both countries. These are well worth reading if you have time, and I attach them because Bob did so much work on them. The misunderstanding was my fault, not his. (Tab C, Pakistan statement; Tab D, India statement.)

McG. B.

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Notes on your party for John McCone

I will have a citation and a National Security medal for you to award to McCone whenever you think the time is ripe. There is no need for formal remarks, but you might want to note that John has served as Under Secretary of the Air Force -- one year; as Chairman of the AEC -- 2-1/2 years; and as head of Central Intelligence, - 3-1/2 years.

He has won the confidence of 3 Presidents and of 3 great agencies of government in the National Security field.

He has won the right to go back to California, but he has no right to expect to stay there.

*McG B*

McG. B.

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your repeated questions, I have finally had a good study done on the location of the habitual isolationists in the United States. I attach a memorandum prepared by my assistant, Gordon Chase, but I think the charts at the various tabs will be more interesting to you than the memorandum itself. Beginning at Tab 10, we have listed about half a dozen of the most important votes in the last generation. Tab 10 shows Wilson's little group of willful men, and the following tabs show later critical votes, including the Lend Lease Act and the North Atlantic Treaty ratification.

There is no doubt that isolationism has centered in the Great Plains and the Mountain States, and probably more in the Northern States in this section than in the Southern ones. I'm not sure that any sharper definition is possible.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT :

I think you will be interested in  
Ne Win's real feelings about the  
Chinese. This casts an interesting  
light on the Lippmann thesis that  
Asians do not want us in their  
continent.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment  
(Rangoon 562)



(2)  
204-27-65

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Max Taylor

1. I attach Max Taylor's message on his conversation with Quat today (Tab A). Max now recommends a 9-battalion decision. My own view is that we ought to decide something more limited -- perhaps the items (a) and (b) in his third paragraph (6 battalions).

2. The more gradual that we can keep this process of decision and action, the better. I attach at Tab B a telegram from Sullivan which shows the wary reaction of one of our wisest diplomats in the field.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

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~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

(Cy of Saigon 3552, April 27, 1965)

FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

Although Quat had not summoned us to resume the discussions reported in reference telegram, Alex Johnson and I went to see him this afternoon to find out the current status of his thinking on the introduction of international forces. We found that he was full of the subject, having discussed many aspects of the military manpower shortage with Generals Thieu and Minh over the weekend.

He is particularly impressed with the need and possibility of increasing the national effort beyond the present program of 31 additional ARVN battalions between July 1965 and March 1966 (the so-called second alternative). He sees numerous possibilities of utilizing certain specially trained regional force soldiers, ex-non-coms dismissed by Diem in the late 1950's, and officers presently assigned to civilian ministries. He also considers that the Nungs and Hao Hoa are capable of producing many more soldiers and units than at present. He has charged General Minh with looking into these possibilities and of formulating a new program to superimpose on the second alternative. Knowing something of the problem of raising additional forces, I have doubts as to the feasibility of most of Quat's ideas, but his enthusiasm is certainly laudable.

With regard to additional US forces, we agreed that General Westmoreland should contact Generals Thieu and Minh and work out plans for the following movements: (a) three battalion equivalents to move into Bien Hoa-Vung Tau in early May; (b) three battalion equivalents, followed by three air squadrons, to move into Chu Lai early May; (c) three battalion equivalents to move into Qui Nhon-Nhatrang in mid-June. It is understood that in addition to these US combat forces, there will be substantial numbers of logistic troops brought in to add to the logistic support presently in-country, to provide support for the additional combat forces, and to improve the logistic facilities in the three areas mentioned above.

With regard to publicity, it was agreed that, as combat units are about to enter the country, as in the case of the Marines, there will be a simple announcement made, indicating that the additional forces come at the invitation of the Government of Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-30  
By iss, NARS, Date 11-13-84

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

We then passed to a discussion of third country forces. Quat made a fuzzy introduction which led me to believe for a moment that he was going to raise obstacles to non-US foreign troops. However, in a circumlocution which was difficult to follow, he concluded that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really the cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country units. He noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the presence of other flags would be of assistance to us.

I told him that I felt sure the Australians were prepared to offer a battalion and that Ambassador Anderson would no doubt be seeking an appointment with him shortly. He replied that Anderson was already on his list for callers for tomorrow. He showed some interest in the possibility of a Korean reinforcement but was markedly cool to the thought of additional Philippine forces. We left both matters open with the agreement to obtain Ambassador Lodge's impressions of his visits to Seoul and Manila when Lodge calls tomorrow. Also, Quat authorized Alex Johnson to discuss the matter of these foreign contingents with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do who we ~~found~~<sup>find</sup> is abreast of these matters.

General Westmoreland is undertaking planning at once with Thieu and Minh on the approved subjects. As these matters were presented to Quat as being what I would recommend to Washington if he concurred, I now request approval of the introduction of the US Combat and Logistic Forces on the general schedule indicated above.

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

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~~TOP SECRET EXDIS~~

4/27/65

(copy of Vientiane 1712) April 21, 1965

During Southeast Asia Coordinating meeting, participants were briefed by MACV on JCS proposals for extensive new U. S. troop deployments in Southeast Asia. Since I believe execution of these proposals would have widespread reactions in all countries of this region, you may find it of some use to have my judgment re probable Lao reactions to these deployments.

First, as I have reported, Lao believe our methodical bombardment of North Vietnam is correct and will produce results. They are perhaps more optimistic than we that in reasonable period of time North Vietnam and Viet Cong morale will collapse and they will sue for peace on terms acceptable to us. They have taken great heart from our actions and have gained a new confidence in their own future.

If we, by proposed deployments, indicate we, on the other hand, have lost confidence in prospect that bombardment will produce results, Lao will rethink their own estimates. They will probably interpret our deployments as evidence of panic and this atmosphere can be very infectious.

Second, despite many earlier misgivings and in the face of Communist and French propaganda to the contrary, Lao accept the idea that we have no, repeat no, colonial or neo-colonial ambitions here. A massive occupation of South Vietnam by U. S. forces except in extremis would also cause this assumption to be re-examined.

The net result of these two factors would, in my judgment, be considerable diminution in Lao confidence re U. S. objectives and capabilities. The practical consequences would probably include much less active cooperation with us in our current military operations and a rather headlong rush to embrace French policy of "negotiated neutrality" for Southeast Asia.

SULLIVAN

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority State letter 10-10-78  
By DCB, NARS, Date 8-27-81

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April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Questions and Answers  
other than Vietnam

1. Q. Will you explain the decision to cancel the Ayub and Shastri visits?

A. We did not cancel these visits. We simply proposed a postponement which we thought was in the interest of all concerned. We have many important relations with both of these countries, and much to talk about. In recent weeks it has become clear that we will have a very heavy legislative calendar from now at least until the end of June. So we thought it would be better to postpone these visits for just a few months so that we could have more time for real talks and know better where we were. That is all there is to it, and I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding anywhere. I think the record shows that the U. S. has been a constant and firm friend of both India and Pakistan. I hope and believe that our understanding and respect for each other's needs and interests will ensure that this friendship continues.

2. Q. Will you explain why you did not postpone the visit of President Park of Korea?

A. President Park's visit had already been postponed for other reasons before, and we thought there were important reasons against any postponement now in that particular case.

3. Q. Does this mean that no other foreigners will be received in May and June?

A. We have no plans for additional State or official visits in that period. (The important thing is to keep a hole open in case you should want to receive an important Head of State who might turn up in this country with other business, as Wilson did.)

4. Q. Can you explain what has happened to the Japanese Government's offer of additional cherry trees for Washington?

A. We warmly welcome this generous Japanese offer. There are technical problems to be settled and Secretary Freeman and Secretary Udall are working on those. I feel sure that a solution will be found, and Mrs. Johnson and I remain deeply grateful for this gracious gesture of friendship.



April 27, 1965


5. Q. Would you comment on Gromyko's visit to de Gaulle?

A. No. (If we get something solid on de Gaulle's speech before 4 o'clock, we may need a Q & A on that. The diplomatic fallback position, of course, is that "we need time to study full text").

6. Q. Will you comment on the situation in the Dominican Republic?

A. We are always disappointed by outbreaks of violence in any neighboring country. Our first responsibility is to ensure the safety of Americans, and we are taking action for that purpose. We hope very much that there can be prompt restoration of order and an early opportunity for free elections in the Dominican Republic.

McG. B.



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on call to Mr. Bundy's  
of the time of  
receipt of this  
memo

hope not  
dispute it to  
the Pres. mtd  
4-27-65

Reid  
4/27/65  
9:00 a.m.

10/a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status Report on Dominican Republic Situation

As of 5:30 PM there has been no dramatic change in the internal picture. There continues to be maneuverings between factions to see if a basis for a junta can be found, but nothing decisive has resulted yet.

The Embassy has received our instruction to approach the highest Dominican authorities on a cease-fire and permission for immediate evacuation of Americans. They are in the process of making the approach. We have no report yet on the outcome.

Efforts to reach Munoz Marin to ask him to speak to Bosch about (1) a cease-fire, (2) institution of a provisional government, (3) pledge to block the communists and, (4) both sides to eschew purges are continuing. He apparently is not in Puerto Rico.

Ambassador Bennett has left for Ramey AF Base, where arrangements will be made locally to fly him to Santo Domingo.

Bosch is still in San Juan; Balaguer in New York.

State has just learned that as of noon today, the Dominican Navy was moving away from association with the rebels and back with the Wessin-de los Santos forces.

h49

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-232  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Draft Report of the Committee on East-West Trade

I attach at Tab A the Miller Committee's preliminary report. At Tab B is the list of the members, which may be worth a quick look. You couldn't buy this group for \$3 billion, and it is not going to be very easy for anyone to say that they are soft -- on anything.

The report is a very unusual document in that it recommends a bold policy in language which is carefully designed to protect both you and the committee from charges of softness of any sort.

The six introductory pages make a solid case for the sound views of the Committee. Then they go on to say that peaceful trade is in fact good for the United States and good for peace. They present sharp, and I think persuasive, arguments against the basic position of the Commerce Department over the years at pages 24-30 -- on export licensing and technology. Then they make a set of quite specific and common-sense recommendations (pages 37-41).

Irwin Miller, who is a diplomat as well as a business genius, has had conversations with Rusk and McNamara, and a long talk with Connor, and reports them all in general agreement. I know this to be a fact from Rusk and McNamara, and I think you may want to check Jack Connor yourself.

There remain two problems:

1. George Meany. With your permission, I will call George tomorrow and try to keep him from having his agent Goldfinger file a strong dissent or from making other attacks, public or private, on the report. He still opposes trade with the Communists but is aware of his bargain with us.

2. The question of publication. I do not think you should decide this until after your meeting with Miller's Committee and the appropriate



Cabinet officers on Thursday. My own guess is that it is best to publish now rather than to pocket the report. You do not have to endorse it at this stage, and I think it will win general public approval from those who believe in peace, while attracting only very limited criticism from the other side. This makes it a useful gesture, in the context of Vietnam, whatever you may eventually decide, and I do not see how it could do anything but enlarge your freedom of choice over it.

McG. B.

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
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1965

Dear Dean:

As you know, a memorial to President Kennedy will be dedicated at Runnymede on May 14. You will be in London just before that for the NATO meeting. You were President Kennedy's Secretary of State, and you are my Secretary of State. I would be very grateful if you would stay on in England and be my personal representative on this occasion to accept the gift of land at Runnymede on behalf of the United States Government.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached list has been prepared by John McCone after I invited him, in your name and that of Mrs. Johnson, to the party (Tuesday evening at 6 P. M.) He is absolutely delighted.

There are three things that you should decide:

One is whether you want the other Cabinet Members beyond the four whom John knows well. We all agree that your choice should govern.

The second is about representatives from the Hill. If you have them, he suggests the eight couples listed.

Finally, McCone says that it would be hard to choose among private friends, but if you do wish to include them, he would include only Mrs. Longworth and Mrs. Bliss.

If you would check at the three points indicated, we will then get the list to Bess Abel for instant invitations.

McG. B.

The President & Mrs. Johnson  
Vice President & Mrs. Humphrey

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Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.  
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Helms  
General and Mrs. Marshall S. Carter

Secretary and Mrs. Dean Rusk  
Secretary and Mrs. George Ball  
Secretary and Mrs. Averell Harriman

Secretary and Mrs. Robert S. McNamara  
Secretary and Mrs. Cyrus R. Vance  
General and Mrs. Earle G. Wheeler

Secretary and Mrs. John Connor  
Secretary and Mrs. Henry H. Fowler

Other Cabinet members as desired by the President

Mr. and Mrs. McGeorge Bundy  
*Mr. & Mrs. Clark Clifford*

If representatives from the Hill are to be included, it should be:

Senator and Mrs. Stennis  
Senator and Mrs. Saltonstall  
? Senator and Mrs. Fulbright (?)  
? Senator and Mrs. Hickenlooper (?)

Chairman and Mrs. Rivers  
Chairman and Mrs. Mahon  
? Mr. and Mrs. Gerald Ford  
? Mr. and Mrs. Leslie Arends

Mr. Longworth  
Mr. Blair



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Three-Power Declaration

1. I sent you the other day a draft Three-Power Declaration on Germany, and you gave it an O. K. But on a closer reading we found a Gaullist trap in it, and we have proposed an important additional sentence which is now being debated with the British, French, and Germans. You should know about it because Dean Rusk may bring it to you direct for decision.

2. Our additional sentence is the one in brackets at Tab A. What it does is to reaffirm the U. S. role in Germany, so as to balance the preceding sentence which sounds as if this were a problem for Europeans -- de Gaulle's position. The additional sentence has the great virtue of being nothing but a restatement of a long agreed position. The British and Germans are strongly with us. The French will probably resist and we will have a choice between compromise and separate statements.

3. I have insisted on this pretty hard with Dean Rusk because of your instruction to us last week that we hold our end up against de Gaulle in all appropriate places. In this case we have Erhard and Wilson strongly with us, and we should be alright.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~