

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT THREE-POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the Republic of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, together with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have recently undertaken a new examination of the German problem and of the prospects for resuming discussions on this subject with the Government of the Soviet Union. The three governments have done this by virtue of the obligations and responsibilities concerning Germany -- including Berlin and its access -- incumbent on them since the end of the Second World War, obligations and responsibilities which they share with the Government of the Soviet Union.

The initiatives to be taken toward the Soviet Union shall continue to be examined, with regard for the possible prospects of their culminating in useful results.

The three governments consider that, so long as a true solution of the German problem is not reached, that is, a solution based upon the application in the two parts of Germany of the right of self-determination, conforming to the principles of international law, the entire European situation will remain unsettled, and consequently peace will not be truly established on the continent. This solution is necessary not only in the interest of the German people, which asks for its reunification, but in the interest of all the peoples of Europe and therefore of the peace of the world.

/The three governments reaffirm their own continuing responsibility to work for the reunification of Germany -- a reunification which depends not only on their efforts, but on those of the Soviet Union. 7\*

It is clear that only peaceful means are possible in arriving at the necessary settlement, and under such conditions that it will serve as a general agreement assuring the security of all interested states. The three governments are certain that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has solemnly renounced the use of force, is in agreement with them on these points. They declare again that, in the interest of the peace of Europe and of the world, the necessary decisions cannot be postponed indefinitely.

\* This is the sentence we are insisting upon.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

J  
106

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Your Representative at the Runnymede Ceremony

As you know better than I, the British will be dedicating a memorial to President Kennedy at Runnymede on May 14. The ceremony is under the organization of the Kennedy Memorial Trust, which has Lord Harlech as its head. All the arrangements have been worked out by him in close consultation with the Kennedy family.

I know you have made most generous provision for transportation of Mrs. Kennedy and her party. I also know that this is very much appreciated by the Kennedys.

One question which remains open is that of someone to represent you and the U. S. Government. Lord Harlech and company have suggested that it would be appropriate for Secretary Rusk to conclude the brief ceremony by accepting the Runnymede site on behalf of the U. S. Government, which he is legally authorized to do. Dean will be in London for the NATO meeting and would like very much to participate in this matter. For reasons you will understand, I have checked this possibility privately with Bob Kennedy and he is entirely in favor. I therefore strongly recommend that you appoint Dean to do this job for you, and I know it would touch him very much if you were willing to call him and ask him yourself, or alternatively send him the attached note.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.



1062

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1965

Dear Dean:

As you know, a memorial to President Kennedy will be dedicated at Runnymede on May 14. You will be in London just before that for the NATO meeting. You were President Kennedy's Secretary of State, and you are my Secretary of State. I would be very grateful if you would stay on in England and be my personal representative on this occasion to accept the gift of land at Runnymede on behalf of the United States Government.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

107

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Copies of your Johns Hopkins Speech

I suggest copies of your Johns Hopkins speech  
for the following:

✓ Dr. Milton Eisenhower

Charles S. Garland (Chairman of the Board  
of Johns Hopkins)

✓ Gale McGee, who has been doing a great  
job on the campuses, and who was up here  
the afternoon before the speech

✓ Frank Church

✓  
4/28/65  
They could all be inscribed, "With warm regards  
and many thanks" -- except perhaps Church, for  
whom I suggest the same inscription you gave  
for McGovern: "With friendship."

h.f. B.

McG. B.

Rec'd Apr 26, 1965  
1103 a

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108

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Max Taylor

For information. Max Taylor has made one reservation to Bob McNamara's statement of his views in Bob's memorandum of April 21, and I think you ought to know about it. It is stated in his cable 3504 (at Tab A), and the McNamara text is at Tab B.

In essence, Max says that he thinks we can get a favorable settlement in a matter of months rather than in "perhaps a year or two" if we keep up our bombing and introduce substantial U. S. and third-country forces.

McG. B.

McG. B.



108a

A

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

(Copy of SAIGON 3504 April 24, 1965)  
(for Secretary McNamara)

I would like to amend the statement of my views expressed in the memo for the President dated April 21 in two respects.

A. II, paragraph 1. "This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from Viet Cong failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate Viet Cong failure in the South. "

Comment: This statement suggests that it may take a year or two to break the will of Hanoi to continue their present course even if we continue our bombing and introduce substantial U. S. forces. My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible from a combination of continued air attacks and by the introduction of sufficient U. S. and third country forces to demonstrate to Hanoi that the Viet Cong have no ultimate chance of success. This process will probably take months; how many is impossible to estimate.

B. II, paragraph 2. "All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or two, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. "

Comment: I subscribe to this statement less the phrase "perhaps a year or two. "

TAYLOR

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State letter 3-5-79  
By DC#, NARS, Date 8-27-81

108c

B



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

108d

21 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.
2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign -- both psychologically and physically -- but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.
3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for "victory", over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding -- for psychological and morale reasons -- a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.
4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority OSD letter 3/11/77  
By DCH, NARS, Date 8-27-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions		16,000	not yet approved
TOTAL: US 13 btns		82,000	
ROK & ANZAC 4 btns		7,250	

*August + October*

5. Possible later deployments, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns - 15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns - 14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns - 24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164 (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

- ✓ a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.
- ✓ b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.
- ✓ c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.
- ✓ d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II), relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.
- ✓ e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:
  - 1) The contemplated deployments.
  - 2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.
  - 3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.

Robert S. McNamara

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108 e

Appendix I  
Actions Relating to the 7 Points of Def 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership. These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was agreed that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker's meeting with you today

1. Ambassador Bunker is coming in primarily to report to you on his mission to Indonesia. I attach at Tab A the first two sections of a long report. These sections give his general conclusions and his recommendations.

2. He is pessimistic about the short-run prospects for improved U. S. relations with Indonesia. Bunker knows it takes two to have good relations, and he thinks Sukarno simply does not want them right now. Malaysia is the immediate cause of friction, but even if Malaysia were settled, the internal politics of Indonesia would bend Sukarno toward hostility to the U. S.

3. At the same time, Bunker believes strongly in a continued U. S. effort to play for the long-term stakes by keeping open quiet lines of contact to the Indonesian Government and people -- and especially to the Indonesian military. He recommends that we reduce our visibility, avoid punitive actions, remove vulnerable Americans from isolated regions, but maintain a skeleton AID staff with minor and popular AID projects as our University contract program. His one politically tricky recommendation is that we should keep our good relations with the Indonesian military by completing a firm but unfulfilled commitment to the Indonesian army to help in finishing a tele-communications project (Part 2, page 2, item 2). There is not yet an inter-agency position on this one.

4. There are two questions that may be more important than Bunker's report: (1) the succession in Indonesia, and (2) your own possible interest in appointing Bunker.

(1) On Indonesia, Bunker recommends Henry Byroade who has done a very good job as Ambassador in Burma. The State Department concurs, and so do we. Byroade's record is marred by some private indiscretions, but he has apparently behaved very well in Burma, and he has the temperament and style for Indonesia.

(2) On Bunker himself, I continue to think that if he were interested, he would give a stature and coherence to our European Bureau that it has never had in many years, even under Foy Kohler.

DECLASSIFIED

incl. B.

McG. B.

Authority NLS 83-225

By ics, NARS, Date 1-26-84

58

~~SECRET~~ attachment

✓ 110  
THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

Agenda for discussion with the President, April 25

1. Cambodia conference
  2. Possible pause in bombing
  3. Status of deployment discussions
  4. General political position
  5. Our position with Congress and the public  
in the coming weeks
- 7
- (a) Will the President receive professors
  - (b) Defenders - Press Conference.
  - (c)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCM NARS, Date 8-17-83



~~SECRET~~

111  
April 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We want to keep you informed about current aid decisions on India-Pakistan, in case you want to change the signals.

There are four small loans pending for signature in the next few days to two weeks. All of them are long since authorized and funded from existing appropriations:

- OK {
- (a) A Pak railway loan of \$7 million,
  - (b) A second Pak railway loan of \$8.5 million,
  - (c) \$10 million for the Indian development bank,
  - (d) \$3.8 million for Diesel engines for Indian railways.

None of the above are likely to get big publicity, but they do usually get a little squib in the papers.

NO ~~In addition we have for the past two years made a substantial advance out of next year's money to the Indian Consortium: (a) because India's fiscal year begins on 1 April; and (b) it is a way of cleaning out the cupboard before the end of our fiscal year. AID would like to make a \$100 million advance along these lines shortly. NO -~~  
It does not normally get publicity and is really a bookkeeping transaction, but the Indians might smell a rat if we suddenly switched signals.

*I suggest you tell Simlani here reason for no advance*

State and AID strongly recommend that we proceed with business as usual at this juncture, particularly with Shastri off to Moscow on 12 May in a mood of injured pride. However, we have a stop order in till you give a green light.

*because I'm afraid we may have no for at all - Q*

*R. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

*McF. B.*

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See Me ✓

100-100000-10 HANDWRITING FILE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

April 2 1965

J 112

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a fresh copy of the dispatch  
from Hanoi that you have been  
carrying in your pocket.

McG. B.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-158  
By is, NARA Date 2-21-00

Retyped

112a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - NOFORN

From Saigon, February 15, 1965

To External (Canadian Office of Foreign Affairs) 120 Immediate  
de Delhi

North Vietnamese Reaction to February 7 - 8 Air Strikes

Following is from Jackson in Hanoi. "Situation has become somewhat more tense following February 7 air strikes. Demonstrations have subsided a little but numerous indignant delegates petitioning International Control Commission are becoming awkward to handle. School has been suspended and trench digging intensified. No indications to support speculation that requested withdrawal of northern (ICC) teams might herald North Vietnamese or Chinese military movements.

"On February 12 Col. Mai Lam (the Deputy Chief of the North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC) said authorities fully expect further attacks. I asked him if North Vietnam had followed Kosygin's recent proposal to convene Geneva Conference for I had seen no references. He stressed North Vietnam would never negotiate under duress and could in any event absorb all attacks. Condition for Negotiations was United States withdrawal from South Vietnam.

"This inflexibility characterizes present position of regime and illustrates measure of its confidence. It considers it holds all trump cards. World opinion is sympathetic. Effectiveness of United States retaliation is limited. Order in South Vietnam is steadily crumbling and prospect of private deal between Hanoi and Saigon is growing."

\*The Canadian representative on ICC.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - NOFORN

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14

April 23, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

In case you need me this evening,  
I have taken a half-holiday as of  
7:00 pm, and have gone home to a  
family dinner with the children.  
I will be available on the phone,  
if wanted.

After the children go to bed, I will  
solve the problem of Vietnam.

*McG B*  
McG. B.



April 23, 1965

J 114

MR. PRESIDENT:

Galbraith is quicker than I am,  
and this time I think he has some  
good ideas.

McG. B.

## NOTICE

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114a

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

April 22, 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Herewith a list of names for your talent hunt. There is nothing in the world so difficult as finding people when you need them. I have put a day or two in on this and I think all are reasonably available and they are all responsible liberals.

This list bears on a political development which I believe to be of great importance. I am just back from a tour I take each spring of colleges and universities, and this year I covered a dozen or so in the Midwest, North Carolina, Georgia and last but not least, Austin, Texas. The university community, I am convinced, is rapidly replacing the unions as the foundation of liberal Democratic power. Since it is a development I strongly welcome, I could be biased. But even the mere numbers are impressive. In 1900 there were 24,000 college and university teachers in the United States; at the end of this decade there will be 480,000. They will have about 14,600,000 students. (It is interesting to reflect that you will probably be more responsible than any other man for the creation of this new political power.) Unlike the unions for which it was an afterthought, this new political community is enormously interested in foreign policy. It also has a strong feeling of exclusion. There is a strong feeling that no matter what happens, the same Club, the Department of State professionals and the respectable New Yorkers run things. I have a good personal test of this: for I have some standing as a non-member of the Club. I attribute my audiences, which are surprising even to a man of my vanity, overwhelmingly to this fact.

I know your feeling that there are a fair number of liberals in foreign policy positions. The trouble is that the best known ones--Bowles, Stevenson, Harriman--are regarded, not incorrectly, as being an older generation or away from the center of things. Those nearer the center like Carl Rowan are not well known.

All of this brings up the attached list, which includes men from outside the Club. Needless to say, this is one of the reasons why most of the names will be fiercely resisted. It is worth bearing in mind that Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson would all have been disqualified by the Club for being too liberal, too independent, too contentious, too outspoken, too opinionated or otherwise unmanageable.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith



1146

MEMO: PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

FROM: John Kenneth Galbraith

RE: Sound Liberal Talent for Foreign Affairs

Here is a list of talent. They are all top men who would add real distinction to your administration and with whom you would enjoy working.

I am assuming from what Mac Bundy told me that your particular needs are in the field of foreign policy--and I have indicated possible casting.

1) Frank Long. Long is Vice President of Cornell, a Democrat, scientist and strong supporter of yours. He has had a good deal of government experience on the scientific side. He has a great deal of background in the scientific aspects of international relations and a real aptitude in other areas. He wants to get along with the Russians. He is respected by them, but is clear-headed. He would make an ideal Ambassador to Russia and his appointment would be applauded by the whole scientific and academic community. He would also make a good Assistant Secretary for European Affairs although it would be an off-center appointment. Needless to say the whole State Department apparatus would object to having a brilliant scientist among its peacocks. Long is about 45 to 50.

2) Barry Bingham. I have spoken to you about Barry before. He is highly regarded by liberals and is one of the most influential figures in the border states. His father was Ambassador to London for F.D.R. Barry served there during the war. If David Bruce should be coming back, Barry would be an ideal candidate to succeed. It would be considered a distinguished appointment both here and in Britain. Four years ago he was somewhat reluctant to accept a government job for reasons involving the Courier Journal. I do not know what this situation has changed, but it would certainly be worth investigation.

3) While I am mentioning Barry Bingham, I would add somewhat hesitantly the name of Wilson Watt. He did a fine job two years ago of negotiating with Sukarno on Indonesia. I have heard that you have some reluctance as a result of Kentucky politics. I am not a master of these matters but if he is otherwise acceptable and could be persuaded, he would be a strong candidate for Indonesia and might make a difference there.

4) Richard V. Gilbert. Gilbert, who could be persuaded, would make a superb Ambassador to Pakistan. This is another appointment that would make a difference. He is an old New Dealer, a friend of Harry Hopkins, a brilliant economist and a successful businessman. For several years he has been the head of the Harvard Advisory Service in



Pakistan--an arrangement the University has for helping the Pakistan Planning Commission. He is the most influential American in Pakistan and is highly regarded by Ayub. This relationship is based on respect. Gilbert is a very tough cat. Gilbert has immediate access to Ayub, in contrast with our present Ambassador who doesn't see him for months at a time. I know of no appointment which would do so much to restore our position in that country. Gilbert is also the kind of tough figure whom the State Department would regard with some consternation. It is a choice between men of stature with ideas and the manageable ass-kissers.

5) Louis Lyons. Louis Lyons has just retired as head of the Nieman Foundation at Harvard. He is still exceedingly vigorous and is, I think, the most highly regarded newspaperman in the United States. Half the first-rate newspapermen have worked with him at one time or another and he is nearly immune to criticism. He is a man of enormous charm and honesty. He would make an admirable deputy head of U.S.I.A. He would also be a distinguished Ambassador in, say, Canada or Sweden.

6) Samuel Beer. Beer is a former National Chairman of A.D.A. and a popular figure in liberal circles. He has been very close to the Kennedys. Before his death, President Kennedy promised him an Ambassadorship in Latin America which Sam badly wants. Since then, he had a word from you (by way of Ted Kennedy, I think) that he was still in the running. But a few weeks ago he was told very flatly by the State Department that he had been washed out. Sam would do a good, disciplined and reliable job in one of the moderate sized countries. I wouldn't put him in a major snarl like Brazil--he has the tendency of many government professors of assuming a greater knowledge of politics than he has. It would be a popular appointment for the academic liberals.

7) Walter Reuther. Not long before his death, President Kennedy told me that he intended to appoint Reuther to a major Ambassadorial post. I learned about it because he was thinking of India. This again would be a non-establishment type appointment of the kind that the State Department resisted and which F.D.R. and Kennedy favored with great credit. Much depends on his availability and the existence of the right spot. I think he would be a highly imaginative choice to run African affairs. Victor Reuther would be another possibility. Once again, like all who have made their way in the contentious world of practical affairs, they would encounter great opposition from the cartel.

8) John A. Davis. Davis is a Negro professor of Political Science at City College, New York who did very good work with the Democratic Advisory Council. He is liberal, intelligent and effective. I do not know exactly where he stands in the New York political jungle. He would be a plausible choice for a smaller embassy and should at least be looked at for African affairs in the State Department.



10) Charles Kindleberger. He is a professor of good liberal sense at M.I.T. with an exceptional knowledge of European affairs and past State Department experience. He would bring a fresh and clear-headed view to European problems and would make a good Ambassador to the Common Market, to O.E.C.D., or to replace Tubby in Geneva.

11) Eunette Redford. This is rather a shot in the dark; he would seem to be a good man for a domestic regulatory commission. (His name comes up because I was in Austin the other day and heard his case that you had always been a better liberal than Ralph Yarborough.) You probably know him better than I do but it struck me that he would be a very good appointment for the Federal Trade Commission, the F.P.C. or the S.E.C.

JKG/adw

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tomorrow at 11:30, unless you manage to get away sooner, we have called a meeting of the Export Control Review Board (Secretaries of State, Commerce and Defense) plus the Secretaries of Interior and Treasury. This meeting is to review the problem of export sales of petroleum equipment and technology to Rumania. The essence of the argument is in the covering memoranda of Dean Rusk at Tab A and Jack Connor at Tab B, but there are supporting arguments in the papers behind these two memoranda.

There are only two points which I can add to the basic arguments presented in the covering memoranda.

1. One of the companies involved in this sale is in Albert Thomas' district, and Congressman Thomas has made a strong plea in its behalf. Another man interested in these sales is Charlie Engelhard.

2. The report of the Committee on East-West trade would almost certainly support the State-Defense-Interior position and not that of Commerce on this particular issue. ~~The~~ General propositions do not decide concrete cases, but it remains true that a decision against the State Department in this case will be read in the bureaucracy as a decision against expanding peaceful trade.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

115a

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1156

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Export Sales of Petroleum Equipment  
and Technology to Rumania

1. The Export Control Review Board (Secretary of Commerce, Chairman; Secretaries of State and Defense, members; Secretary of Interior and Director, CIA, invitees) met on April 1 to consider the licensing of certain petroleum equipment, technology and products to Rumania.
2. Agreement was reached on the approval of a license for catalysts having a value of \$320,000. Also considered by the Board were cases involving data concerned with catalyst technology and oil field equipment of a value in excess of \$750,000.
3. The Secretary of State with the support of the Secretaries of Defense and Interior favored approval of all these cases. The Secretary of Commerce, however, proposes to deny them, on the ground that they fall within the provisions of the Export Control Act requiring denial of exports that make "a significant contribution to the military or economic potential" of Soviet bloc countries "which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States."
4. The Secretary of State urged approval of the cases on foreign policy grounds. Petroleum is Rumania's principal national resource. If trade is to be used to "build bridges" to Rumania, the United States must be prepared to sell equipment and supplies for the development of the Rumanian petroleum industry.
5. Events in Rumania have moved favorably for us in the nine months since our trade discussions last June. There have been continued steps toward economic and cultural independence of the Soviet Union. We are beginning to reap the fruits of our policy line toward this dynamic Eastern European country. The most recent illustration of the trend was in March when Rumania was the only member of the Eastern European bloc to stay away from the Moscow meeting of Communist parties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-47  
By 8J, NARA, Date 12/2/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

6. Embassy Bucharest reports increasing restiveness on the part of the Rumanians about our trade policy. Ambassador Crawford thinks we may be putting the more outgoing and progressive Rumanian leaders, who personally have led the movement for better relations with the United States, in an increasingly awkward position through delays in action on commercial exports to Rumania.

7. The Secretary of Defense considered that the sale of the goods and technology in question would not present security problems. The Secretary of Interior observed that while many of the items were technically advanced beyond what would be available outside the United States, he was prepared to defer to the judgment of the Secretary of State on foreign policy needs.

8. The point has been made in connection with these cases that Rumania is selling gasoline and other petroleum products to North Viet Nam. The amounts are small - about 30,000 tons a year, or about one per cent of total Rumanian petroleum exports - and the main part of North Viet Nam's comparatively modest petroleum needs is met by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The purchase by Rumania of the equipment and supplies in question will have no effect on Rumania's ability to continue to send petroleum products to North Viet Nam. If we are ever to have any influence on matters of this kind, it can only be after we have re-established normal relationships with Rumania, which is an aim of our policy in Eastern Europe.

9. We urge that the Secretary of Commerce approve all the export licenses at issue.

10. Secretaries McNamara and Udall concur.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

115d  
APR 7 - 1965

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has brought to your attention by his memorandum of April 4 his view that we should at this time approve exports to Rumania of advanced equipment and technology which would be helpful to a buildup of its petroleum industry. As he indicated, a number of cases of this nature were discussed by him, Deputy Secretary Vance, Secretary Udall, Mr. Cline of CIA, and myself in a meeting last Thursday of the Export Control Review Board. I enclose a memorandum to you of my views, together with a summary of the discussion that took place at the Board meeting.

I feel strongly that these cases raise a substantial question under the Export Control Act because of the significant contributions which this kind of technology and equipment would make to the economic and military potential of Rumania, the USSR, and the other Communist countries. Furthermore, they would help Rumania in an industry providing petroleum to North Vietnam.

I urge that you read the attached four-page memorandum as well as the two-page memorandum by Secretary Rusk on the same subject and that the two of us be given an opportunity to discuss it with you personally.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Connor

Attachments - 2

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-47  
By Sj, NARA, Date 12-12-01

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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

115e

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Determination of Policy Regarding Proposed Exports of Petroleum Exploration and Refining Equipment and Technology to Rumania.

A meeting of the Export Control Review Board took place on April 1, 1965 to make a final determination with regard to fourteen export license applications for Rumania, all for technology and equipment for the petroleum industry. These applications had been reviewed at lower levels by the Departments of Commerce, State, Interior, and Defense, with intelligence advice from CIA. The Departments of Commerce, Interior and Defense had proposed denial of all the applications; the Department of State had urged approval of all. The April 1 meeting was called pursuant to an appeal by the Department of State for top level review.

Specifically these export license applications cover advanced technology relating to petroleum refining catalysts; catalyst material; advance types of equipment for petroleum exploration and drilling, containing extractable technology; and anti-knock compound for upgrading gasoline.

During the course of the ECRB meeting Secretary Rusk urged approval of all cases for foreign policy considerations. Deputy Secretary Vance (Defense) proposed approval of all items, excepting the catalyst technology on which he was uncertain. Secretary Udall (invited to participate) gave reasons for denying the catalyst technology and the exploration and drilling equipment, but concluded that, while his staff and the American petroleum industry continued to be opposed to such export licenses, he would defer to State.

I determined that the export license for the catalyst material should be approved, but that the applications for the exploration and drilling equipment, the catalyst technology, and anti-knock compound should be denied. Secretary Rusk maintained the position that all cases should be approved, and it was agreed to submit the matter to you for final decision.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-87

By ica, NARS, Date 10-26-82

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The grounds for my proposed denial are the following:

1. Rumania manufactures and supplies, according to CIA reports, substantial quantities of motor and diesel fuel to North Viet-Nam (about 20% of its requirements), and much larger quantities of these items, plus; lubricants, kerosene, and jet fuel to Communist China.

The anti-knock compound, though available from other free world sources, could enable Rumania to upgrade the octane rating of the gasoline it is supplying to those countries. This could subject us to strong public criticism at this time.

2. Rumania manufactures, and supplies, to Cuba, the USSR, Communist China, and other Communist countries, substantial quantities of oil well exploration and drilling equipment. That equipment is significantly inferior to the equipment Rumania is presently seeking from us.

3. Our catalyst technology, going well beyond normal operating and maintenance instructions, would improve Rumania's ability to reduce gasoline production costs. Commercially comparable technology is not available to Rumania from other sources.

4. Our oil field exploration and drilling equipment is needed by Rumania and the other East European Communist countries to discover and develop deep wells as their shallow wells are near depletion. Equipment comparable to ours is not available to Rumania from other sources.

5. The significantly advanced technology which makes our oil field and drilling equipment superior is extractable from the equipment by examination and analysis.

6. The USSR is known to have a strong need and desire for advanced U.S. technology and equipment in the petroleum exploration, drilling, production, and refining industries, which we have regularly denied to it.

7. Although Rumania, in our 1964 negotiations, promised not to re-export our products and technology, there are reasons to question whether Rumania will be able to live up to its commitments.

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Rumania is a member of CEMA, the Soviet Bloc economic organization, whose objectives include the exchange of technology among its members. By a 1964 agreement, Rumania has agreed to exchange with the USSR technology relating to the oil, chemical, and other industrial fields. Further, Rumania's 1965 trade agreement with Communist China provides that Rumania will supply petroleum equipment. Also, Rumania's 1965 trade agreement with North Viet-Nam includes sales of petroleum products.

These obligations could put Rumania in a difficult position to adhere to its 1964 promises to us.

Rumania's promise not to "copy" our equipment would not preclude it from adapting, for incorporation in its own equipment, the most desirable technological features of the U.S. equipment and supplying its own improved equipment to the USSR, Communist China and Cuba.

8. During the Board's meeting, Secretary Rusk expressed the view that, with a few exceptions, we should be prepared to license freely to Rumania everything not barred by the international (COCOM) controls. I appreciate the foreign policy considerations advanced by Secretary Rusk for that course of action.

9. The Export Control Act requires denial of equipment, materials and technology, that would contribute significantly to the military or economic potential of the Communist countries in ways that would be detrimental to our security and welfare. Few U.S. industries are more advanced and more important to our economic and military security and welfare than our petroleum industry. Few of our important industries could be more adversely affected by the objectives of Rumania, the USSR and the other Communist countries to expand their oil production and sales into the free world.

Approval of these cases, which embody advanced technology on sensitive, economic and potential military items, would be a significant departure from our existing East-West trade policies regarding the petroleum industry. Even our 1964 negotiations with Rumania, recognized the economic and military importance of the petroleum industry. We went a long way to accommodate Rumania (--for example, approving advanced synthetic rubber plant and technology --) to establish more friendly relations. However, we drew a line between petroleum technology and equipment which is available elsewhere in comparable quality and that which is not. We agreed to license some petroleum technology which was available from the free world in comparable quality. We also agreed to license advanced petroleum drilling equipment when the technology was found



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not to be extractable. We refused to license petroleum production technology not available elsewhere, and advanced equipment embodying extractable technology.

Further, it should be recognized that there is a substantial difference between our continuing to deny Rumania items that help it to export petroleum products to North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and the USSR and our instituting new denial policies to friendly countries that may be shipping non-military items to those countries.

10. The transactions which we approved in July 1964, as part of our negotiations with Rumania are, for a variety of commercial reasons, only now being finalized. This means it is too early to determine whether Rumania's assurances can be relied upon.

11. It is an established fact that the U.S. petroleum industry is strongly opposed to assisting the petroleum industry of the USSR and other East European Communist countries for strategic and economic reasons. This view was recently expressed by A. L. Nickerson, chairman of the board of Socony Mobil Oil Company, to the Fulbright Committee. In substance he told that group, the primary aim of Russia's foreign trade policy was to strengthen the power of the Soviet State. Behind the Soviet drive for expanded trade with the western world was its vital need for foreign exchange with which to buy modern petroleum producing and refining equipment and technology. Without this knowledge and specialized equipment, the Soviet could not quickly realize its vast reserves and disrupt free enterprise economies of the free world.

12. The value of the equipment, under discussion, is about one million dollars; the value of the technology is not known. These cases cannot, therefore, be regarded as commercially important, nor in light of the various circumstances as following a "normal trade" pattern.

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EXPORT CONTROL REVIEW BOARD

MINUTES OF MEETING

APRIL 1, 1965  
(4:15 p.m.)

Subject : Determination of Policy Regarding Proposed Exports of  
Petroleum Exploration and Refining Equipment and  
Technology to Rumania

Participants:

Members

Secretary Connor, Chairman  
Secretary Rusk  
Deputy Secretary Vance, for Secretary McNamara

Invitees

Secretary Udall  
Deputy CIA Director Cline

In Attendance

Assistant Secretary Wyman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Trezise  
OEC Director Hockersmith  
Executive Secretary, ECRB, T.L. Thau

Secretary Connor opened the meeting by summarizing the cases before the Board.\* They concern:

(a) Advanced catalyst material for use in making high octane gasoline. Formerly this catalyst was approved for export to bloc countries, but in 1964 technicians found that the U.S. catalyst is superior to foreign material, and since then it has been denied. In October 1964, State concurred in denying a quantity to the USSR.

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\*The cases are more specifically listed in the Executive Secretary's Summary of Facts and arguments, dated February 4, 1965.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-47  
By Sj, NARA, Date 2/2/01

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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(b) Advanced catalyst technology in written and oral form, to teach Rumania how to make most efficient use of the catalyst material. Commerce technicians find this technology goes well beyond normal operating and maintenance instructions; would contribute significantly to fund of technical knowledge of catalysts generally.

(c) Advanced petroleum exploration equipment - Nine cases involving various kinds, all containing extractable technology, and important to help Rumania conduct deep drilling operations. Vastly superior to anything available abroad, and would enable Rumania to deep drill for needed additional supplies of oil.

(d) Anti-knock compound. Available abroad in comparable quality and ample quantity. However, important to increase octane rating of gasoline. Rumania supplies North Viet Nam with 20% of its gasoline, and other petroleum products.

Secretary Connor noted that at the ACEP (Assistant-Secretary-Level committee), Defense, Interior, and Commerce had recommended denial. State had recommended approval and appealed to the ECRB. He, accordingly, asked Secretary Rusk to state his position.

Deputy Secretary Vance interjected at this point that he and Secretary McNamara do not necessarily agree with the position taken by the Defense representatives at the earlier meeting.

Secretary Rusk began by observing that none of these cases concern COCOM embargo items. Accordingly, the question is whether the U.S. should be more restrictive toward Rumania than the other COCOM countries.

He does not believe it is in our national interest to be so restrictive in trade matters. There have in the last year been many changes in Rumania's relations with the USSR and the West. They have gone to the edge of the cliff in showing their independence of Moscow. Evidences of this nature are as follows:

1. Rumania has undertaken an educational program to bring home to its people their 15 years of exploitation by the USSR.
2. The Russian language is no longer being taught in the schools.
3. Rumania has raised the issue of recovering Bessarabia from the USSR, a sensitive point to the latter.

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4. Rumania has granted a major amnesty to political prisoners.
5. Rumania has promised to respect a U.S. passport as assurance of safe exit for U.S. visitors, regardless of claims of dual nationality, old political crimes, etc.
6. Rumanian officials have made official visits to most major West European countries in pursuit of friendly trade and other relations.
7. Rumanian officials did not attend the recent Moscow conference.
8. On U.S. actions in Viet Nam, Rumania has been as quiet as any Communist State. No demonstrations have occurred; protests have been restrained.
9. The new Rumanian prime minister is anti-USSR and pro-Rumanian nationalism, apparently following the course of his recently deceased predecessor, Gheorghe Maurer.
10. In Secretary Rusk's own dealings with the Rumanian foreign minister, the latter has shown in outstanding ways his country's desire to be independent of the USSR - even to the point of wanting to have the same number of talks with Secretary Rusk as the USSR's representative.
11. Rumania is allowing an American hotel to be built.

This is the kind of trend that was very noticeable at one period in Yugoslavia, and in another period in Poland. We should be ready to respond favorably to that trend here as we did in the cases of Yugoslavia and Poland. On this basis, it is in our interest to take a forthcoming attitude on trade relations with Rumania.

If we seem to close the door to them in areas like this where we have discretion - even before any Congressional problems have to be faced on such necessarily legislative matters as MFN treatment - then we will be injecting an unrequired negative element. That would not be in our interest, especially as the same kinds of items, even though with less sophistication, are available. Thus it is our interest to license these cases as a means of keeping the doors open, of stimulating their favorable responses toward our policies, and of encouraging normal relations between our two countries.

Secretary Connor observed that foreign deep drilling equipment is not of the same kind as ours; that our technicians have found ours to be vastly superior.

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Secretary Udall said that the U.S. drilling equipment is substantially better in quality than that made in other countries. We would be giving Rumania here something not available to them elsewhere.

Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline to inform the members regarding Rumania's shipping of petroleum products to North Viet Nam, Communist China, and Cuba.

Mr. Cline replied, as follows:

In 1963, Rumania supplied somewhat less than 20% of North Viet Nam's petroleum products, with the USSR providing the balance. In 1964, the Rumanian share was 17%. For 1965, we have only one report to date, 500 tons of lubricants in one February shipment. The Rumanian shipments were primarily of motor and diesel fuels, but there is no evidence of kerosene or jet fuels. It was shipped by sea to North Viet Nam. There is no evidence the Rumanian shipments have ceased.

Some free world countries do supply North Viet Nam substantial amounts of other kinds of goods, but no free world country is known to be supplying petroleum products to North Viet Nam.

Rumania also shipped substantial amounts of petroleum products to Communist China, including 160,000 tons in 1964. This was primarily motor gas, kerosene, lubricants, and jet fuel.\* The only free world shipments of petroleum to Communist China were by Iran in 1964.

Rumania ships very little petroleum products to Cuba, but did send Cuba substantial amounts of oil drilling equipment, about \$2 million by the end of 1964. Oil exploration work is proceeding there, but not with much success. The Rumanian equipment is for drilling to about 3,500 meters.

Deputy Secretary Vance said the key issue to him is whether Rumania has promised not to copy or reexport our equipment.

Secretary Rusk replied that Rumania did so promise us in the negotiations last Summer.

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\*At the meeting Mr. Cline inadvertently said there was "a relatively small amount of jet fuel." This is now corrected as the amount was fairly substantial.

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Secretary Connor observed that the Rumanian promises do not appear to go all the way. Rumania has promised that U.S. products, designs and technology will not be transshipped or reexported, and that U.S. products will not be copied. However, Rumania's promise does not bar it from using our designs and technology to make products and sell them abroad. Also Rumania can incorporate into its own oil drilling equipment advanced features of U.S. equipment without actually copying same, and then sell their equipment anywhere.

Secretary Udall added that U.S. oil industry representatives believe that the USSR is very much in need of advanced deep drilling equipment and that Rumania could not hold our equipment and technology away from the USSR, even if Rumania desired to live up to its promise to us. The U.S. oil industry is very much concerned about the effects of increased free world sales of Rumanian and Soviet petroleum products and takes a hard line against our supplying them with our best technology and equipment. Accordingly, he could not support an approval decision in these cases against the objections of the U.S. oil industry unless he could tell them that the Rumanian assurances can safely be relied on.

The members at this point generally discussed the question of how long it would take Rumania to produce and export equipment based on copying or adopting ideas from our equipment. Deputy Secretary Vance thought it would take them 2 or 3 years, by which time we would have even better equipment in production. Mr. Hockersmith said that the length of time would vary, depending on the particular kind of equipment. Secretary Udall agreed.

Mr. Cline, in response to a question, said that the equipment the Rumanians are seeking from us is more advanced than anything the USSR and other bloc countries presently have. He also noted that in 1964 Rumania signed a new agreement with the USSR to exchange technical know-how in oil, chemical and other industrial fields. Rumania's 1965 Trade Agreement with Communist China includes exports of petroleum equipment.

Secretary Connor asked whether Rumania could or would attempt to hold U.S. technology and products against demands by the USSR, to the extent of resisting force.

Secretary Rusk replied that the Rumanians have been behaving toward the USSR generally as though they are sure the time is past in which a country like Hungary would be held by Russian force. We have good reason to believe the Rumanians consider it is in their national interest to adhere to their assurances to us. After all, they want from us much more than the items

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involved in these cases. However, it is, of course, possible that the USSR could go in openly or otherwise and try to get our technology and equipment, and it could not be guaranteed that Rumania would resist or be successful in such effort.

Secretary Rusk went on to say that Rumania is not taking an active role in carrying out CEMA agreements.

In response to a question from Secretary Connor, Secretary Rusk agreed that none of the items in question was on the Shopping List of last summer. However, he said, we expected they would be adding other things from time to time.

Secretary Udall asked how, if these cases were approved, we could describe to Rumania the meaning of our approval from a diplomatic standpoint. Could we say that you are on trial; that more will be approved, if you show you are trustworthy.

Secretary Rusk replied that we have reason to trust Rumania already. They are the most independent of all Communist countries relative to CEMA requirements, and they are most interested in increasing their trade with the West. However, he agreed that we could explain to Rumania that we consider these items important and are counting on their assurances being kept. He reiterated that Rumania has an interest in having much larger trade with us than in just these items.

Secretary Connor observed that it is hard to call Rumania's desire to buy these items, "trade". The variety of items is so small, and the quantities are limited to a few. This suggests they are only interested in samples to acquire our technology. If we approve these cases, we will be helping them to update their oil industry with the best U.S. technology, and at a cheap price.

In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Secretary Connor agreed that we license this same equipment for use in oil fields throughout the free world. However, he noted that in most of those areas the companies engaged in the exploration and drilling are affiliated with U.S. interests.

In response to Secretary Connor's request for his views, Secretary Udall said that the U.S. petroleum industry and officials of his department take a hard line on selling Rumania and other bloc countries our advanced technology and advanced equipment containing extractable technology. "Maybe I'm

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softer", he said, "but I tend, on the basis of the discussion so far, to defer to State, if State feels so strongly about these cases for foreign policy reasons."

Secretary Connor replied that this is not his attitude. He would, before favoring approval, wish to know what effects our approval would have on Rumania's oil industry, as well as its relations with both the Soviet bloc and the West. What course would our equipment enable Rumania to pursue? What avenues of independence would it open for Rumania that it presently does not have? "I see arguments on both sides", he said. "I would not vote yea with enthusiasm as I presently have reservations about Rumania's intentions."

Deputy Secretary Vance then expressed the views of his department. He said that Secretary McNamara and he generally favor sales unless there are strong reasons against. On the drilling equipment he saw no strong reason for denial and would vote yea. The same for the catalyst material and anti-knock compound. As to the catalyst technology he said he was still uncertain, believing that a few more questions needed to be answered.

Secretary Rusk then expressed his Department's views. He said that he would not have recommended approval of these cases two years ago, but so much has happened in Rumania in the last year regarding its relations with the USSR and the West. Therefore he would now "nudge the Rumanian development along" by approving these cases since they are among the several kinds of items Rumania is looking for from us.

Responding to a question about whether MFN is one of the items that Rumania wants from us, and whether we would ask Congress to allow MFN to be given to Rumania if she pays her debts to us, Secretary Rusk said he hoped the U.S. would be able to give MFN treatment to imports from particular countries after we settle with them whatever has to be settled.

Secretary Connor then said that he was opposed to approving the oil field equipment and the catalyst technology. He also did not like the implications regarding possible use by North Viet Nam of Rumanian gasoline that might be upgraded with the U.S. anti-knock compound, but he would approve it in a spirit of compromise, to give Rumania some of the items they have ordered. He would also approve the catalyst material.

Deputy Secretary Vance asked about the importance of the U.S. catalyst technology. Mr. Wyman explained that Mr. Englehart had admitted to him that

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the U.S. catalyst material is superior to that available from France and other countries, and that the U.S. technology regarding its use is the best. Mr. Englehart was really not interested in selling Rumania the technology, but only the material. He had filed the application for the technology only because his competitor had applied to sell the technology too.

At this point there was a general discussion of the catalyst use technology and the reason for its importance, and regarding the technology extractable from the petroleum drilling equipment.

Secretary Rusk asked Secretary Connor whether his indicated opposition to approval of the drilling equipment and the catalyst technology applied only to Rumania, or extended to any country that might be a competitor of the U.S.

Secretary Connor replied that he drew a distinction between free world and Soviet bloc competitors of the U.S., noting that this distinction is called for by Section 3(a) of the Export Control Act. Regarding Rumania, he asked Mr. Cline for pertinent figures and then emphasized that Rumania exports half the petroleum products it produces, and over half of that goes to other Soviet bloc countries. Next to the USSR, Rumania is the largest supplier of oil products to the bloc, with the USSR receiving most of Rumania's exports to the bloc.

Secretary Connor asked Secretary Rusk whether we would supply oil directly to North Viet Nam. Secretary Rusk replied that we have no trade with North Viet Nam, but that if we were to take sanctions against Rumania because she sells oil to North Viet Nam we would have to do the same regarding a number of free world countries that also ship to North Viet Nam.

Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline whether the free world countries are known to be shipping oil or other militarily important materials to North Viet Nam. Mr. Cline replied that there is no evidence of free world shipments of petroleum products or commodities which would make a direct contribution to the military.

Secretary Udall read from a report showing that Rumania's sales of oil to the free world are important to enable Rumania to earn the funds with which to buy machines and other items from the West. He suggested that from this standpoint helping Rumania increase its sales of oil to the West is beneficial to our interests.

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Secretary Rusk said that the U.S. has since 1945 been trying to get the Soviet bloc to learn to live peacefully with the West. The late Secretary Dulles in 1953-54 had dreamed of the day when we would have the kind of opportunity we have today to encourage a bloc country like Rumania to loosen its ties to the USSR and make friendly ties with us. If we give up the opportunity that approval of these cases gives us, we may lose the chance to help break the tight control of the USSR over the bloc countries, and may thus impair the prospects for long-term peaceful coexistence. He noted that other free world countries like West Germany are moving now to improve their relations with the various East European Communist countries.

Secretary Connor said he still did not believe that as the official charged with responsibility for administering the Export Control Act he could properly approve the catalyst technology and drilling equipment cases. However, he said, "I can, of course, be overruled by the President."

Secretary Rusk replied that he would ask the President to consider this matter.

Deputy Secretary Vance asked whether the French would be likely to sell their catalyst technology and catalyst to Rumania if we refuse to sell our technology along with the catalyst material. Secretary Connor replied that this would not necessarily occur.

The discussion then turned to the question of what limits, if any, Secretary Rusk would put on exports to Rumania. Secretary Rusk indicated that, with possibly some exceptions, he would approve everything not on the COCOM embargo list. Secretary Connor observed that he could not think of anything not on the COCOM list, but which we control, which could be more important than advanced equipment and technology for oil exploration and production.

Secretary Connor then concluded the discussion by saying he would approve the catalyst material case (Englehart) and the Ethyl anti-knock case, and would deny the catalyst technology and petroleum exploration equipment cases.

Mr. Thau asked if the cases to be approved could be acted on by BIC without waiting the Presidential review of the other cases. Secretary Connor approved and the other members concurred.

Mr. Hockersmith called attention to a recent application by Universal Oil Products Co. (Case No. 65378) to sell a quantity of catalyst material to Rumania. He asked if this could also be approved. Secretary Connor agreed and the others concurred.

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(The meeting adjourned at 5:10 p.m.)

The following day Secretary Connor determined to hold up approval of the anti-knock case for Presidential consideration along with the others because of the Viet Nam possibilities. This change was communicated informally to the interested departments.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a selection of Lodge's cables to date. There are so many that I have not tried to have them all copied, but I will if you wish tomorrow. You will see that he has had a friendly reception so far from Macapagal, from Holyoake and from the Australians. He has commitments of sorts from all three:

The Australian battalion (currently estimated at 1900 men);

A New Zealand agreement to consider sending "a small combat unit";

Macapagal's agreement to go ahead rapidly with his 2200 man Philippine force.

  
McG. B.

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4/22/65

*116a*

TO: AmEmbassy Saigon for Ambassador Taylor

FROM: Secretary Rusk

After Honolulu discussions McNamara has now recommended to the President the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U. S. troops already in-country:

1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions		16,000	not yet approved

Upon completion of these deployments, the U. S. forces would include 13 battalions and would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.

For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the President is inclined to favor McNamara's recommendations, but before making a decision on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:

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(page 1 of 3 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State letter 3-5-79  
By DCH, NARS, Date 8-27-81



## INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

"The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat Government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these

reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from U. S. and third country sources.

The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I am prepared to recommend to the President that:

(1) The U. S. assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time.

(2) As part of this effort, the US bring in additional U. S. ground forces. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. I would propose that the US provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents. "

You <sup>should</sup> ~~will~~ seek to obtain the support of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out <sup>after</sup> ~~subsequent~~ to Presidential review of your recommendations. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that if your recommendations are accepted the total U. S. in-country strength would approximate 80,000.

(page 3 of 3 pages)

117

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You asked me today for texts of the messages on the postponement of the Ayub and Shastri visits. I had already asked for these, and they are attached at Tab A with a covering note from Bob Komer to me. As Komer points out, we did not give Ayub much leeway to come if he insisted, and we gave Shastri none. I did not question these messages because they were prepared at the Secretary's instruction right after his private talk with you. In fairness to Rusk, he was caught in a dilemma, because if he had framed his instructions so that Ayub and Shastri had a real choice, they would both have said yes, and he knew very well that this was not what you wanted.

What really blew the Indian position, however, was the rapid leak here in Washington and the obvious Pakistani decision to hide in the shadow of the Indian problem and get their own announcement out very quickly with accompanying noises about the Indian change as well.

I read two morals from this:

1. Never schedule important but difficult beneficiaries during a legislative session;
2. When the execution of a policy is entrusted to people who really do not believe in it, it will be badly carried out.

At Tab B is a thoughtful review of this whole matter by Komer which may also be worth a look.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS



117a

A

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI

IMMEDIATE 1143

Info:

Rptd: Amembassy NEW DELHI

IMMEDIATE 2154

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

The President has given careful thought to the problems that would be raised by an Ayub visit at this time. He has definitely decided that you should seek a postponement. I hope you can talk to Ayub in such a manner that he will fully concur in delaying his trip for good Pakistani reasons. The mood of Congress is such at this moment that if he were to come here fresh from Peiping and Moscow he would not encounter a warm reception, and the continuance of substantial foreign assistance for Pakistan would be seriously jeopardized.

I appreciate that the Ayub situation will be made much easier if Shastri also is disinvited for the time being. I am, therefore, asking Ambassador Bowles to arrange an ~~approx~~ appointment to see Shastri ~~xxxx~~ tomorrow, and I hope that you

Drafted by:

U:GW 11:4/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Mills

White House - Mr. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

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By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

2  
and he can coordinate your appointments so that they can take place at approximately the same time. I think it very important that word from one capital does not leak to the other before the appropriate approach has been made.

If Ayub is badly upset by the suggestion of postponement and takes a very hard line, you should advise him that you will report his views to Washington. But you should give him no encouragement that Washington will be persuaded to reverse its position.

FYI Shoaib told me in Tehran that he thought Ayub might see the advantages of postponement if it were clear that the Shastri visit was also to be postponed. However, you should not indicate any knowledge that I discussed this matter with Shoaib unless Ayub mentions it, since it is possible that ~~XXX~~ Shoaib has not reported our conversation to Ayub. If Ayub suggests that we now fix a time for a fall visit, we are prepared to suggest a date in September. You can, of course, tell Ayub that a similar suggestion of postponement is ~~now~~ being made to Shastri.

You should also be aware that the continuing failure of India and Pakistan to resolve their differences has been picked up and referred to most critically in executive sessions of congressional committees.

END FYI

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

08165

W/D

112

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APR 14 10 35 PM '65

Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1145

Rptd: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2156  
NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR McCONAUGHY FROM SECRETARY

You should seek private appointment with Ayub soonest

and deliver following message from President:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I need not tell you of the importance which the Government and the people of the United States have steadfastly attached to relationships between our two countries. These relationships have been good for both of us and strong enough to allow the frankest of discussions on matters where we do not share the same views.

I

It was for this reason that I have been looking forward to your visit to Washington so that we might profit from our confidence in each other to discuss frankly our common problems and to chart our courses together for the troublesome months and years that lie ahead.

The fact that you and I have both recently received

Drafted by: U:GWBall/NEA:WJHandley:4/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Mills

White House - Mr. Bundy

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Authority NSC 68-8-80

By isp/ry, NARA, Date 8-25-92

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

unmistakably clear and strong mandates from our electorates & to pursue our national and international goals has made this meeting seem even more opportune and desirable.

What I now propose, therefore, comes only after the most serious reflection during the past few days and with our common interests foremost in mind. I have in fact reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington.

Our foreign aid legislation is now before the Congress, and my years of political experience in Congress, as Vice President and President, have led me to the conclusion that your visit at this time would ~~ge~~ focus public attention on the differences between Pakistani and United States policy toward Communist China. This I fear might gravely affect our ability to assist your Government~~x~~ in the economic and defense programs on which you are embarked and would work against the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan.

I cannot overstate the full depth of American feeling about ~~Commis~~ Communist China. The mounting number of ~~AMERICAN~~ American casualties in South Vietnam is having a profound effect upon American opinion. This is being felt in Congress just at the time when our foreign aid legislation is at the most sensitive point in the legislative

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification

cycle.

Under  
~~XXXXXX~~/these circumstances I think it would be in the interests  
of both our countries and contribute to the assurance of close and  
mutually helpful relations/ ~~XXXXXX~~ between us if we could postpone our meeting  
until later this year -- perhaps early in the fall.

Certainly there is much for us to talk about when we do meet.  
While some of our policies have caused concern to us, our mutual  
interests unquestionably outweigh our differences. For my part,  
I shall continue to seek the most friendly and constructive alliance  
~~relationship~~ relationship with you and your country.

I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly  
discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months  
than at the moment. I would appreciate your judgment on this matter  
and I would be guided by your thoughts as to how a postponement can  
best be worked out with a minimum of awkwardness on both sides.

UNQUOTE

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

W/d

08180

117d

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APR 14 10 02 PM '65

Origin  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2155

Rptd: Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1144

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Because of the delicate and pressing situation in Viet Nam the President feels strongly that both the Ayub and Shastri visits should be postponed. The President was ~~looking~~ looking forward to a fruitful talk with Shastri but he thinks it likely that early in June he will be preoccupied with Southeast Asia as well as with the legislative program that is likely to reach a crunch about that time. With these thoughts in mind he is reviewing his entire schedule to see how the load can be lightened. Thus he is planning to postpone a visit from Kenyatta as well as Ayub and Shastri.

In view of the fact that the Ayub visit is scheduled to take place in less than a fortnight the President is sending a letter to Ayub that is being repeated to you. If you feel a Presidential letter to Shastri should follow up your initial approach such a letter can be sent.

Drafted by:

U:GWBall:4/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved The Secretary

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Mills

White House - Mr. Bundy

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Authority State 11-8/11/76; NSC 11-4/11/77

By DC # , NARS, Date 9-28-81

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

I hope that you can approach Shastri in such a way as to lead him to feel that a postponement of his visit until fall is in the interests of India. In our view it would ~~be~~ not be useful for him to come while the aid bill is pending in spite of the fact that the Indian attitude regarding South Viet Nam has been generally ~~xxxx~~ helpful. There are still substantial differences of emphasis between us regarding sensitive issues, including Southeast Asia, and Shastri would almost certainly find it necessary to make statements that could lead to adverse comment in the press and in Congress.

You should also be aware that the continuing failure of India and Pakistan to resolve their differences has been picked up and referred to most critically in executive sessions of congressional committees.

I would appreciate it if you would coordinate your appointment with Shastri so that you and Ambassador McConaughy will be going in at approximately the same time. We are anxious to avoid having news of action in one ~~xxx~~ capital reach the other before the appropriate approach has been made. You are of course at liberty to tell Shastri that we are suggesting to Ayub that his visit also be postponed.

RUSK

END

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*W / d 117e*  
*2*

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 12935  
RECEIVED: APRIL 15, 5:21 AM  
FROM: NEW DELHI  
ACTION: SECSTATE 2920, IMMEDIATE  
INFORMATION: KARACHI 601, IMMEDIATE  
DATE: APRIL 15

NODIS

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE UNNUMBERED

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

DEPTELS 2154, 2155, 2156.

WHILE I UNDERSTAND REASONS TO DEFER AYUB KHAN VISIT AND DEGREE TO WHICH POSTPONEMENT OF SHASTRI VISIT WOULD EASE IMPACT IN PAK, I MUST EMPHASIZE PROFOUND SHOCK AND RESETMENT WHICH WILL BE FELT BY SHASTRI PERSONALLY AND WHICH WILL BE REFLECTED THROUGHOUT GOI AND IN PRESS IF HE IS DISINVITED UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

AS INDIANS SEE IT AYUB KHAN HAS BEEN BUSY IN PEKING AND ELSEWHERE WOOING COMMUNIST CHINA IN ATTEMPT TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE ITS SUPPORT FOR INDIA WHICH ITSELF HAS BECOME DEEPLY COMMITTED AGAINST CHINA. IN ADDITION GOI BELIEVES THAT AYUB KHAN HAS DELIBERATELY HEATED UP BORDER SITUATION AS FURTHER MOVE TO PREPARE GROUND FOR UNJUST ATTACK ON INDIA IN HIS SCHEDULED APRIL MTG WITH PRES.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By io NARA Date 10-30-99

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2920, April 15, 5:21 AM from New Delhi

IF OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO BE TOUGH WITH AYUB BECAUSE OF THESE OR OTHER ACTIONS CANCELLATION OF HIS TRIP WOULD APPEAR TO BE ALL MORE REASON FOR SHASTRI TO GO. SIMULTANEOUS CANCELLATION OF SHASTRI VISIT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WLD BE INTERPRETED AS APPEASEMENT OF AYUB NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALSO IN PAKISTAN.

MOREOVER SHOCK AND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER OUR ACTION HERE IN INDIA WOULD COME AT VERY MOMENT WHEN INDIA ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS IS VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING JOHNSON PLAN IN COUNCIL OF BELGRADE 17, COUNSELLING HANOI TO PROCEED WITH PEACE NEGOTS, AND WHEN GOI AND INDIAN PEOPLE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY COMMITTED TO OUR SOUTHEAST ASIA POSITION.

SHASTRI HAS NEVER VIEWED HIS VISIT TO US AS BALANCE TO THE VISIT OF AYUB. HE HAS HOWEVER CAREFULLY ESTABLISHED SENSE OF BALANCE ON HIS VISITS FIRST TO MOSCOW AND THEN TO WASHINGTON.

ISSUE OF WAR OR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA MAY BE RESOLVED BY DECISIONS ULTIMATELY TAKEN BY USSR. IF WE CAN KEEP GOI STEADY ON ITS PRESENT COURSE WE BELIEVE SHASTRI WILL TRY HARD IN MOSCOW TO PERSUADE SOVIETS TO MEET US HALFWAY ON BASIS OF JOHNSON PLAN.

IF WE NOW ABRUPTLY WITHDRAW INVITATION AS BALANCING ACTION TO OUR REBUFF TO AYUB KHAN THERE WILL BE LITTLE PROSPECT OF SUCH HELP FROM DEEPLY WOUNDED SHASTRI AND FROM EMBARRASSED AND RESENTFUL GOI. AT SAME TIME SOVIETS WILL BE PRESENTED WITH READY-MADE OPPORTUNITY TO CAPITALIZE ON INDIAN FRUSEGATIONS.

BELIEVE ME THERE IS NO EARTHLY WAY THAT I OR ANYONE ELSE CAN PLAUSIBLY EXPLAIN THIS ACTION IN INDIA AT THIS TIME AND UNDER THESE CONSITIONS.

I EARNESTLY REQUEST THEREFORE THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE DO ABOUT AYUB KHAN, DECISION TO WITHDRAW PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO SHASTRI TO VISIT US ON JUNE FIRST SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND REVERSED.

BOWLES

DDC/15

(NOT PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T)

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Classification

FLASH

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 2161

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

Info

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI

IMMEDIATE 1148

NODIS

Ambassador from Secretary

08950

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APR 15 3 23 PM '65

In coming to his decision to ask postponement of Shastri visit, President carefully weighed all considerations you mention and more. He nevertheless believes that postponement of visit is in best interests of US-India relations as seen from here. Under these circumstances, he considers it desirable to let Shastri know this in requesting postponement his visit. Knowing Shastri as you do I am sure you will be able gain his understanding of problems President faces and why another time would be better. While President well understands that postponement may create some awkward moments for both GOI and US, he believes our ~~convergent~~ ~~convergent~~ national interests will enable us to find ways to ride out any rough weather.

I think it is very important that you see Shastri without delay in view of Ambassador McConaughy's approach to ~~Russia~~ President Ayub and likelihood of early leak.

Presidential message to Shastri in immediately following telegram for ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ delivery in your discretion.

GP-1

END

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By CS, NARA, Date 4-14-99

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:eae 4/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary (per Mr. Handley)

Clearances:

Mr. Bundy *Bet*

White House - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

NEA - Mr. Handley *AB*

S/S - Mr. Tueller *Bet*

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~


~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

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1179





1174

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 21, 1965

Since the inevitable furor over postponing Ayub and Shastri now seems to be dying down, here's a post mortem on the exercise.

I may be a pollyanna, but I still see more smoke than fire here. It was inevitable that the simple fact of disinviting Ayub and Shastri simultaneously would cause a to-do, especially in India, because it necessarily bracketed the Indians with the misbehaving Paks.

But the real question is whether the exercise will leave lasting scars. We won't really know for months, perhaps. However, disinviting Ayub seems to have shaken him (though the Indian stink about disinviting Shastri too softens the blow and mutes the lesson). The Paks, who probably see the blow as directed mainly at them, are lying low and letting the Indians get themselves in trouble.

The Indians are showing their injured pride in many ways. Shastri is saying nice things about the Soviets (but partly because he's going to Moscow shortly). We've suffered a setback here, though I doubt it's as serious as Bowles thinks in his 2970 (attached). But there may also be longer term merit in letting the Indians know we can't be taken for granted either.

Could we have softened the blow by handling things a bit differently? Frankly, and with the wisdom of hindsight--yes but not much:

a. We could have dampened the Indian reaction by not disinviting both simultaneously. Because we worried mostly about Ayub, we ended up hitting Shastri harder and with, as Indians saw it, far less cause. This also muted the signal to Ayub, and obscured our case to the US press. Finally, Ayub got a day more notice than Shastri (and may even have been tipped off by Rusk's talk with Shoaib on 8 April). I honestly underestimated the Indian sense of bewilderment and hurt, and State and I should have argued harder for delaying a while (if we didn't tell Ayub we'd disinvite Shastri too, there would have been no risk of leak).

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-1079; NSC 9-98/

By cap/rg, NARA, Date 8-25-92

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

b. We didn't have time to work out a graceful joint pitch that would stick. The nine day delay deprived us of maneuver room. The President gave us the word on 5 April, but Rusk asked delay till he could get back from Tehran. He returned 10 April, but didn't hit the President till after the weekend. We didn't get the Ayub letter out till late 14 April; then waited on Shastri till we heard from Ayub. See Tab B for the bidding.

c. The leak on 15 April then forced our hand. We simply had to get agreed announcements cleared in three capitals before disaster hit. This added to the impression of haste and was extra hard on the Indians.

Given all the circumstances, however, I don't think we were more brusque than necessary. The letters were frank and friendly. Our Ambassadors said the right thing. It was really the timing which hurt, plus the fact that we couldn't publicize our worry lest their coming now could cost them plenty on the Hill. So everybody focussed on our sensitivity about Vietnam.

Now that we've taken our short term lumps, the best thing is to let the issue die and focus on the longer run impact. This affair can still end up a net plus if we play it right: (a) it reminds our friends that we too have feelings--especially about Vietnam; (b) Ayub got the signal, though we may need to remind him; and (c) the Indians too will end up a bit worried. But we do have a problem here. Unseemly haste or new aid gestures would be bad, but a friendly LBJ letter designed to smooth Shastri's ruffled feathers might be useful in a week or so (enough before he goes to Moscow on 12 May that we don't look forced).



R. W. Komer

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

1170

1. The final instructions disinviting Ayub and then Shastri are seriatim at Tab B. Of course, I don't know what the President finally told Rusk, but his 1143 told McConaughy we were going to approach Shastri along the same lines too, and that Ayub could be told. As to reconsideration Rusk said "if Ayub is badly upset. . . and takes a very hard line, you should advise him that you will report his views to Washington. But you should give him no encouragement that Washington will be persuaded to reverse its position."

2. Ayub's one big concern was whether Shastri was being postponed too. McConaughy naturally told him and commented that this was what saved the day.

3. Rusk's first cable, 2155, to Bowles did not give leeway for reconsideration if Shastri balked. Bowles urgently pled for a new brief in his 2920. Rusk held up a day till we saw whether Ayub balked, but when McConaughy reported Ayub's acceptance, the die was cast. Rusk told Bowles to go ahead without delay.

Relevant cables are attached.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority State Ex 9-20-79, NSC 9-981

By isp/hg, NARA, Date 8-25-92



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 3-Power Declaration

The attached 3-Power Declaration has been negotiated by Tommy Thompson in the Ambassadorial Group. It is written in diplomatic choctaw, but that is the consequence of compromise. The Germans want it very much. The one important thing for us is not to be the ones to hold it up. Secretary Rusk asks that it get your approval as promptly as possible, and I see no problem.

If you approve, we expect that it will be issued about May 1. We are still hoping to have a really good speech on the wider subject of Europe for you to give about a week later, and this does not get in its way.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

Yes ☒

No ☐

Speak to me ☐

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

✓ Recd 4/28  
7 PM-oh  
119

April 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With your approval, I would like to get this out to a friendly newspaper man or Senator tomorrow.

m-B  
McG. B.

OK ✓

Hold it up         

Suggested user?                         

Australian Culp, in VN

Rec'd  
4/21/65  
11:45 a.m.

(17) ✓  
120

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think you will be heartened by the enclosed letter which is one of the best that has come in on Vietnam. The only difficulty about using it widely is that the context shows that the boy is in CIA. It can be sanitized if you wish. I have acknowledged it, but you may wish to send an additional note yourself.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

Draft a note from me \_\_\_\_\_

Clean it up for publication \_\_\_\_\_

Thanks, but leave it be ✓



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1965

5/10/65 (4)  
Sheff 121  
my  
Mun

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Continued dickering with Nasser

In accordance with your oral instruction of Tuesday, April 20, the State Department is conducting extensive explorations with Congressmen on reactions to a possible agreement with Nasser to finish up the \$37 million worth of deliveries under the existing PL480 agreement. There will be no decision on this or on corn or wheat sales except with your approval. Meanwhile, it seems to me useful to keep on with the discussion which Battle and Talbot have begun with Nasser and which really is quite different in tone from what we were getting from him only a few months ago. The best man for this job is Komer, who is going on a short holiday in Sardinia next week (This is his first real vacation in many, many months.) With your approval, I would like to send Komer into Cairo informally at the end of his holiday with a very hard-hitting private message which will aim to get it across to Nasser that there just is not any real hope for our relations unless he pays proper attention to our political problems as well as his own. Komer's adventures in Israel show that he has much more stomach for this kind of straight talk than most of our friends in the State Department.

Unless you disapprove, I will seek State Department approval for this. I think Rusk and Ball will be keen about it because they both recognize Komer's skill and the value of a White House voice in such private diplomacy.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

OK if they agree ✓

Hold up on this

If such a first visit by Komer turned out well, he might easily be used again later if you should decide (as I think you may) that there ought not to be any deals with Nasser of any kind until after the Aid Bill is passed. A Komer whom Nasser had come to know would be the best possible man to explain such a tough decision.

121a

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 24, 1965

Cairo trip. If I'm to go, I need at least a tentative go-ahead Monday, since I leave c.o.b. Wednesday. Final decision can wait till last minute needed to alert me on Sardinia, and get me to Rome for instructions (deadline would be Monday, 10 May, since we return from Rome early 12 May).

Steps I suggest are: (a) Get tentative LBJ blessing first, to overcome usual State hesitations; (b) then you tell Rusk and I get Talbot on board; (c) advise Kamel that President OKs my coming around 12 May, if UAR (and Nasser specifically) still interested. We could always postpone later, if timing became unpropitious.

I. Purpose of Trip. If we can't go ahead yet on aid, there's a case for keeping the ball in play by continued dialogue. I'm a logical candidate since: (a) I'm known to Nasser personally as LBJ's Middle East man and a strong advocate of closer US/UAR ties; (b) I've been invited; and (c) I could probably slip in and out quietly, to avoid any repercussions here.

II. What to Say. The very fact of my being sent would be evidence to Nasser that LBJ desires to keep in close touch. Beyond this, however, a number of useful points need to be made. Talbot rang the changes on all our differences--Congo, Yemen, Cyprus, Aden, Jordan Waters--omitting only Libya. Rather than duplicate this well-worn record, I'd focus on the fundamental reasons why Nasser needs us and we need him: (a) unless the US is present as a countervailing force in the ME, Nasser will be gobbled up by the USSR; (b) let's get away from UAR suspicion of US--the billion in aid we've given Egypt is a pretty solid token that we want to be of help; (c) if he'd stop to think, he'd realize how much we protect him by restraining Israelis--not only Suez but right now on nuclear matters, etc.; (d) but by same token he ought to re-examine the Arab/Israeli problem, because Israelis are too tough a nut to crack and we wouldn't let them be cracked anyway. These are facts of life, so why can't we build on them.

III. What To Offer. Some in State (Harriman for example) think I shouldn't go unless LBJ will authorize some goody. Another round of talk with no visible response to Nasser's three recent gestures to us--silence on Israel arms, pulling back from Congo rebels, IAEA controls--might convince him there's no point in trying to come to terms. NEA

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CL, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

also hesitates over whether it's too soon after 11 April Talbot talk to send someone else, and (implicitly) whether WH man should get into act.

None of these caveats seem to me compelling, though some forthcoming US signal (preferably the \$37 million or at very least the CCC corn sale) would be helpful. Faute de mieux, I'd still see merit in telling Gamal that LBJ definitely wants to do business, but that Congressional problem is mighty real (I could speak from experience now). In short, Gamal should hang on a while longer.

It would be even better if I could tell him frankly that President is inclined to go ahead with the \$37 million, unless he thinks it will generate restrictive amendments in aid bill--thus blocking any new US initiatives. If LBJ holds off for this reason, he plans to go for new one-year PL 480 agreement later, provided of course Nasser behaves in the meantime. If LBJ won't go this far now, it would still be a good line in mid-June (assuming we weren't at war by then).

All in all, there are still so many issues on which Nasser could cause us real ME trouble this year (Jordan waters, arms to Israel, Cyprus, Congo, Yemen) that I see wisdom in buying him off to the extent US opinion will permit--or stringing him along as much as possible to the extent it won't. My dropping in on Cairo would be useful enough to this end that I suggest we try it out pronto on LBJ and then Rusk or Ball.

*RWK*  
RWK

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

*Mr. W. Bundy*

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

122

21 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.
2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign -- both psychologically and physically -- but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.
3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for "victory", over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding -- for psychological and morale reasons -- a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.
4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Letter 3/1/77

By OCH NARS, Date 8-27-81

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1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible			
3 divisions		16,000	not yet approved
TOTAL: US 13 btns		82,000	
ROK & ANZAC 4 btns		7,250	

*August + October*

5. Possible later deployments, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns - 15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns - 14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns - 24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164 (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

- ✓ a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.
- ✓ b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.
- ✓ c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.
- ✓ d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II), relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.
- e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:
  - 1) The contemplated deployments.
  - 2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.
  - 3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.

Robert S. McNamara

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Appendix I  
Actions Relating to the 7 Points of Def 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership. These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was agreed that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood.

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that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Chron*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

In response to your memorandum of April 12, 1965, relating to interagency committees, the committees chaired out of this office have been looked at in light of the President's wish to eliminate unnecessary or obsolete interagency committees and task forces.

At the present time there are six interagency committees and task forces for which I am responsible. Four of these groups are either actively carrying out continuing assignments or have not yet completed their principal task. Two groups have finished their work and may now be terminated.

In view of the fact that all of these committees were established by National Security Action Memoranda and without any public announcement thereof, it would be the preferred procedure to terminate these two groups at this time by a simple notice to the holders of the NSAM's in question. A similar procedure would be used in the future for any additional groups to be closed out. Accordingly, I am now issuing notices to the holders of NSAM No. 68 and No. 243 that the groups established thereby are formally terminated.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

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April 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Press Contacts April 12-18

1. I saw Karl Meyer of the Washington Post to say goodby. I took the occasion to chide him on one or two critical pieces which he had written for the New Statesman in London, and he protested his good will. He is certainly one of the ablest men on the Post, but I am just as glad he will be in London from now on.
2. I talked to Joe Alsop, mainly about Vietnam. He continues to be cheerful and I believe his column on April 21 will be an attack on those whom he regards as timid.
3. I talked to Roscoe Drummond about the CIA changes and found him receptive and friendly -- but I have not seen any noticeable result.
4. I talked to Phil Potter about Vietnam. He continues to be a strong supporter.
5. I saw Joe Kraft and mainly listened to him about his experiences in talking to Vietnamese Communists in Algeria. I upbraided him over his piece in the Nouvel Observateur, and he said he had only been trying to be helpful.
6. I also talked about Vietnam with Shaplen of the New Yorker. His main interest was to tell me what a good type Colonel Thao is (Thao is a Catholic who is constantly engaged in protests against whatever government is in power.)
7. I saw Henry Brandon and Jan Reitenberg briefly on Prime Minister Wilson's visit, and neither of them had much of interest to say. Brandon asked if the cancellation of the Ayub and Shastri meetings was because of your health, and I knocked that one down hard.
8. My most important discussion was with Teddy Weintal of Newsweek. They are engaged in a major dissection of U. S. foreign policy and policy makers, which I fear will be highly critical. Weintal spent most of his time with me attacking the State Department, but I had earlier heard that he



had spent a good deal of his time in the Department attacking the White House staff. I spent an hour and a half trying to hammer some sense into his head, but I do not think I was successful. His principal theme was that there is no clarity or direction to any part of our foreign policy. In talking to me he seemed to be trying to get me to put the blame on State Department, and I resisted the temptation just as hard as I could.

I also talked briefly on the phone to Bill White and to Max Frankel. My effort with White is partly reflected in his column today, and the conversation with Frankel was aimed at offsetting what persons unknown had said to him about the costs of the Shastri-Ayub cancellation.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a proposed statement for use after your meeting with Gene Black. It is deliberately couched in low key because of the continuing need to keep the UN and the Asians out in front.

At the same time, it makes a real move on the Asian Development Bank, and with a little background I think we can get a friendly notice from knowledgeable reporters.

This is not a big headline, but rather part of a continuing peace offensive. If we try to play it too heavy, we will get backfires from those who know that the real objective here is to sustain an atmosphere in which Prince Sihanouk will decide to play ball.

McG. B.

Attachment

4/20/65

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PROPOSED STATEMENT AFTER MEETING WITH

EUGENE BLACK - April 20, 3 PM

I have had a good talk with Mr. Eugene Black on our efforts to assist in the economic progress of Southeast Asia. He has given me an encouraging report on the discussions which he had in New York with the Secretary General and other leaders of the UN.

Mr. Black tells me that those discussions strongly support our view that this is centrally a matter for Asian leadership. Our hope is to act in cooperative support of the efforts of the Asian peoples themselves. Mr. Black tells me that this position is understood in the UN.

Mr. Black has reported that he is deeply impressed by the quality of the work which has been carried forward under the Lower Mekong Basin Coordinating Committee. He has expressed to the Secretary General our strong support for the work of this Committee, and for the pattern of cooperation among the Mekong states which it represents.

Mr. Black has discussed with me the project for an Asian Development Bank. He reports that after discussions both in New York and Washington, he finds agreement within this Government that under appropriate conditions and with sound management such a bank would be of considerable value in promoting regional development in Asia. I agree with this position and believe that the U. S. would wish to participate if such a bank can be established.

In addition to regional plans and programs, Mr. Black and I have discussed more immediate actions to increase the direct flow of food and medicine and other supplies from this country to the people of Southeast Asia. At my direction, plans for this purpose are being developed urgently in appropriate agencies of the government, and we should have actions to report within ten days.

I know that Mr. Black will be glad to respond to your questions.



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APR 4/20/65  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - I read you most of this.

The Demonologists look at the noise from Hanoi, Peking and Moscow

I have talked with Tommy Thompson and Ray Cline of CIA, and I have checked Foy Kohler's dispatches, and other internal comment. There is an astonishingly clear consensus as follows:

1. The threats of volunteers and the talk of increasing commitment still have many loopholes. As Kohler puts it, "Cautious formula on Soviet volunteers to North Vietnam seems to reflect continuing Soviet reluctance to move toward possible military confrontation with US." The Soviets put three conditions on these volunteers:

- a. If necessary;
- b. If North Vietnam requests it;
- c. If the US escalates the war.

The Chinese give essentially the same conditions, but in more violent language.

2. On negotiations and discussions, there are more interesting variations. The Chinese are violently opposed to "US imperialism's scheme about peace talks." Moscow and Hanoi regard our proposals as fraudulent, but they do not flatly reject discussions. Moscow is testing the possibility of a Cambodian conference, and Hanoi has an even more interesting formula: it lays down its terms of settlement (quite unacceptable to us, of course), and says that it would be glad to talk if its terms of settlement could be agreed upon as a basis for discussion. The State Department is not attaching any public importance to this way of stating it, but Thompson and Cline and I all agree that there is at least a hint of real interest from Hanoi in eventual discussions. I expect these "pre-discussion" statements to continue on both sides for a while and I think you are in a good position to manage the speed of the process.

3. Cline reports new U-2 pictures of the Hanoi area which show the same SAM site still under construction and not yet operational, together with markings elsewhere which may indicate additional SAM construction.

Authority NLS 78-592 - CIA letter 11-2-82  
By DCH for ICS, NARS, Date 8-17-83

Thompson continues to think that this will be a long, slow process and that Soviet operational crews are unlikely in the immediate future. Cline is a little more cautious. We all agree that if Soviet crews are installed, they will come under the guise of volunteers and will thus not engage Soviet prestige and pride as directly as if they were admittedly under orders from the USSR.

4. We all agree that the contest between Moscow and Peking remains the dominant quarrel for both of them, and that their statements are aimed as much at each other as at us -- although there can be no doubt that our air attacks and their lack of active response have been acutely embarrassing to both of them -- just as they have undoubtedly created increasing nervousness in Hanoi.

5. Finally, Thompson and Cline strongly agree that the Communist capitals greatly exaggerate the power of dissenting opinion in this country. They all agree that people like Lippmann, Morgenthau, Fulbright and marching students do great damage by creating false hopes in unfriendly breasts.

*h d n.*

McG. B.

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~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meetings with the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro

1. You have two meetings scheduled with the Italian Prime Minister. The first on Tuesday morning at 11:30 will come right after the welcoming ceremonies on the South Lawn. The second on Wednesday afternoon at 5:00 pm will be largely devoted to the issuance of a communique and picture-taking. (The Prime Minister speaks little English, so the services of an interpreter will be required.)

2. This will be the Prime Minister's first trip to the United States and his first meeting with an American President since taking office in the late fall of 1963.

3. Moro now leads his second left-of-center coalition; in a sense, he is trying to do for Italy what the New Deal did for the United States 30 years ago. Moro himself is politically and economically a conservative who hopes to put through a program of economic and social reform to strengthen Italy's political and economic structure. He too is trying to create a Great Society, although he has not begun to produce the kind of progress you have already achieved.

4. On the international side, Moro has proven a reliable ally. His support for our policies has been steady and helpful. In spite of real political problems within his coalition he has given our policies in Vietnam his full support. His support for us in Vietnam contrasts sharply with Italy's equivocal performance under Fanfani during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Fanfani is the present Foreign Minister and will be looking for crumbs he should not get during this visit.

5. For all the obvious reasons, Moro's coalition faces sharp and imposing obstacles. His government is not only under constant threat from the extreme left and right; Moro himself is under personal pressures from people like Fanfani who want his job. Any demonstration of your support for the Prime Minister personally and his policies generally would be most helpful for Moro and the government he leads. Ambassador Valenti has some good suggestions on this point.

6. The substantive points for your discussions with Moro, as well as useful biographic material on the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are covered in the State Department's briefing book, which is attached.

7. Buz is doing the welcoming speech and the toast for the dinner Tuesday night, and my staff has provided him with the substantive information he needs.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~



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April 17, 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The Mexican Ambassador sent to you on April 14, a letter from the President of Mexico expressing appreciation for your assistance on working out an agreement on the salinity problem and indicating his concern about a proposed ground water recovery program in the Yuma area involving the installation of a number of deep wells. This ground water recovery program is a part of the Colorado River Project bill which Senator Hayden had discussed with you.

The attached reply thanks the Mexican President for his letter and states that we will be consulting with Mexico once plans have been prepared on the ground water program.

I recommend that you sign the proposed reply.

McGeorge Bundy

(P)  
Rmnd  
4-19-65

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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April 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested in this account of the efforts that are being made to help Gustav Hertz. Everyone agrees that his chances are better without any direct public action by you, but you should know that a general and intense effort is being made in his behalf. The most important single thing has been Max Taylor's success in working out arrangements to prevent a hasty execution of the terrorist Hai.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Gustav Hertz

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-48  
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-01

1. Status of Hertz and condemned Viet Cong terrorist

AID official Gustav Hertz remains a hostage of the Viet Cong under threat of death should convicted VC terrorist Nguyen Hai be executed. The National Liberation Front, through Radio Hanoi, repeated on April 10 its threat of April 7 to shoot Hertz if Hai dies. Prime Minister Quat told Ambassador Taylor on April 13 that he anticipates no difficulty in delaying execution of Hai although he is unable to be specific as to the pretext or the precise length of time.

2. Whereabouts of Hertz

On April 10, [REDACTED] Saigon advised that Hertz was alive as of April 2 when he was moved from Mimot Viet Cong detention camp in Cambodia to another detention camp in the Tay Ninh Province of South Vietnam. It was further reported that members of the National Liberation Front were at that time discussing among themselves conditions for the possible release of Hertz at some future date. There is a possibility that these reports are inaccurate in that informants may be confusing Hertz with a captured Englishman reported as being held in the same area.

3. Death of Grainger

It was learned yesterday that Joseph W. Grainger, another U. S. AID official kidnapped by the Viet Cong on August 8, 1964, had been shot and killed by the Viet Cong on January 12, 1965. Information indicates that Grainger began a hunger strike in early January to protest his detention and on January 5 escaped into a swampy area. He was recaptured a week later and was shot when he refused to accompany his captors back into captivity.

An official U. S. statement on the Grainger murder has been released and is being given world-wide distribution by VOA without speculation as to how Grainger case ties in with Hertz case.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)



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-2-

4. World-wide public opinion campaign mounted in Hertz's behalf

A circular telegram was sent April 10 to USUN, New Delhi, Tokyo, London, Rome and Paris requesting that they make arrangements for public statements by well known national figures whose words might deter Viet Cong from carrying out the threat against Hertz should the Viet Cong terrorist Hai be executed or die. The addressee posts were furnished background information on Hertz and comment on the implications of reprisal killings against civilians. USUN was also asked to investigate the possibility of an appeal by U Thant and the transmittal of messages from UN delegates to their governments recommending public expressions of concern.

Response to date:

a. Finnish representative to the UN said he would report this suggestion to Helsinki immediately for transfer to the Finnish embassy in Moscow and contact with North Vietnamese representative.

b. Italian Vice President Nenni said he would make an appropriate statement.

c. London is seeking support of someone like Philip Noel Baker, Nobel Prize winner and Labor MP, to draft a letter or resolution for which he will seek signatures, including, at his discretion, Lord Russel. Embassy also proposes to enlist the support of church organizations and brief dependable key figures in the press so that they will be prepared to help. Also exploring with top Labor government leaders other means.

d. Embassy in Paris unable to contact either Mendes-France or Daniel Mayer, president of League of Rights of Man, but is exploring other possibilities, including the French Red Cross.

A second circular telegram was sent this afternoon asking posts to proceed at once to generate public statements condemning the murder of Grainger but not specifically calling attention to plight of Hertz. This request is predicated on the assumption that heavy publicity on the murder of Grainger may render the Viet Cong more cautious with Hertz.

5. Third country approaches

U. S. Embassy in Paris requested and received authorization to request that French diplomats in Hanoi and with FLN in Paris make representations in behalf of Hertz along lines suggested by middle-level Quai official.

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- 3 -

At the personal request of Senator Robert Kennedy, the Algerian Ambassador in Washington has agreed to telephone Ben Bella asking that he intercede for Hertz with the National Liberation Front representatives in Algeria. (As of 11:00 a. m., April 14, I learned from Kennedy's office that Ben Bella has agreed to do what he could.)

On the basis of reports that Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has been following the Hertz case closely, we are looking into the possibility of having an American citizen who is close to Sihanouk request intercession by Sihanouk. (There is some reason to believe that the Prince may have confused Gustav Hertz with a Marvin Herz, a USIS officer once stationed in Phnom Penh.)

6. Ambassador Lodge

Ambassador Lodge will follow up the push for public statements in Hertz's behalf during his forthcoming world tour.

7. Other Possibilities

An attempt to ransom Hertz from the Viet Cong with money, medicines or other quid pro quo on a quasi-official basis or, alternatively, by placing the Hertz family in contact with Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett. (An effort is now being made to locate Burchett and this will be explored further.)

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(G)

A personal appeal by Mrs. Hertz to Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. Ho is likely to react as he has previously by disavowing any control or influence over the Viet Cong and coming back with a propaganda attack on the U. S. calling for an end to the war and the withdrawal of U. S. forces as the quickest way to achieve freedom for the prisoners now held. (Mrs. Hertz is drafting a letter which she will discuss with me soon.)

An attempted prisoner exchange. This would cause serious difficulties if based on an exchange of prisoners now held by the South Vietnamese because they have people of their own they would like to get back from the Viet Cong. At the moment, the U. S. holds no prisoners, although some might be obtained for subsequent exchange.

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- 4 -

8. Contacts with the Hertzes

I am in daily telephone touch with Hertz's brother and wife. I have had two lengthy meetings with them, one with the son, and one with the Hertz family priest (attached is a memorandum on my first meeting with them). The Hertz's have given an interview to Life magazine (which I will see prior to publication), but otherwise have stayed away from the press. Both Mrs. and Mr. Hertz seem much more relaxed now about a personal meeting with the President.

*C. L. C.*  
Chester L. Cooper

~~SECRET~~



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April 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Agenda for your meeting with Prime Minister Wilson

1. The more you can tell him about Vietnam the better. Specifically:
  - a. Exactly how we think the situation in Vietnam now stands;
  - b. The care and restraint of our air action plans;
  - c. The concentration of our effort in South Vietnam;
  - d. Further troop deployments now under discussion and their carefully defined roles;
  - e. Your determination to keep the pressure on the communications in the political and diplomatic fields -- on this last one I would suggest that you show him the first draft of the planned statement for tomorrow, if you think it is in the ball park. It refers in a couple of places to the position of the British and we need his approval for those references.
2. The most important of other topics is money. Joe Fowler hopes ~~you~~ will take a very careful position on this, and the Prime Minister and Fowler will have talked before your meeting. There would be no harm in letting Wilson explain his views on liquidity, but our own position is that the pound and the dollar would do well to gain strength before we make loud noises on this subject.
3. We suggest no communique but a close personal agreement on the line both sides will take.
4. Similarly, we suggest no toast at the informal luncheon. At the right moment you could simply give a toast directly to the Queen. The Prime Minister would then reply to the President.

McG. B.