

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

10/7

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>sanitized 3-23-84 per NLS 83-194</i> 2 pp	06/30/65	A
#1a report	re: Colombia Secret <i>sanitized 5-26-95 NLS 93-377 memo released</i> <i>open 7-28-94 NLS 93-375</i> 4 pp	6/23/65	A
#2 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 1-3-97 NLS 96-302</i> 1 p	06/30/65	A
#4 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	06/30/65	A
#6 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>Open NLS 96-300(5/98)</i> 2 pp	06/30/65	A
#10 memo	to the President fx from McGeorge Bundy Confidential 9 pp	06/30/65	A
#15 agenda	Supplementary agenda for Tuesday lunch Secret <i>sanitized 3-23-84 NLS 83-194</i> <i>open 8-17-12</i> 1 p	06/29/65	A
#15a memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 3-22-93 NLS 91-231</i> 3 pp	06/28/65	A
#15c memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 4.11.99</i> 3 pp	06/28/65	A
#16 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 3-22-93 NLS 91-231</i> Secret <i>sanitized 3-24-88 NLS 86-168</i> 3 pp	06/28/65	A
#16b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Confidential <i>open 8-8-97 NLS 96-301</i> 3 pp	06/28/65	A
#18 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 5-5-97 NLS 96-300</i> 1 p	06/28/65	A
#19 memo	to the President Top Secret 1 p	06/28/65	A
#20 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 6-19-84 NLS 83-252</i> 4 p	06/28/65	A
#21 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy & James Thomson, Jr. Confidential <i>open 5-5-97 NLS 96-300</i> 1 p	06/28/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~Adm. [redacted]~~,
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo #22	To Mac from RWK Secret	1 p 06/28/65	A
Memo #22a	To President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Sanitized NLS 8905 (Op. #295, NSI NSD Meeting, South Africa)</i>	2 p 06/28/65	A
Memo #23	to President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/27/65	A
Memo #23a	to President from George W. Ball Secret	6 p 06/23/65	A
Memo #24	to President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/27/65	A
Memo #25	to President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/26/65	A
Memo #26e	to President from McGeorge Bundy Secret	3 p 06/26/65	A
Memo #27	to President from McG. Bundy Confidential	4 p 06/26/65	A
Memo #28	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/26/65	A
Memo #28a	to Bundy from Gordon Chase Secret	1 p 06/25/65	A
Memo #28c	to Bundy from Peter Jessup Secret	1 p 06/23/65	A
report #28a	excerpt from Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting Secret	1 p 06/10/65	A
memo #28g	to McG. Bundy from Grant G. Hilliker Secret	1 p 06/18/65	A
#28h memo	summary statement of US Policy toward Cuba Secret	3 p undated	A
#29 memo	to President from McGeorge B. Secret	1 p 06/25/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#30 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential open 6-17-87 NLS 86-171	1 p 06/25/65	A
#36 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential open 6-19-84 NLS 83-252	1 p 06/24/65	A
#38a report	Meeting with the President Secret	1 p 06/23/65	A
#37 memo	President from McG		
#37a cable	copy of Paris 7274 Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 06/23/65	A
#38e report	re: Vietnam Secret open 6-19-84 NLS 83-252 sanitized 10/1/19	1 p undated	A
#38e report	re: Berlin Secret	1 p undated	A
#38g Memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Llewellyn E. Thompson Secret open 4.14.99	2 p 6/23/65	A
#38i report	re: Dominican Republic Secret	1 p undated	A
#41a memo	to Mr. Bundy from Spurgeon Keeny Confidential open 6-17-87 NLS 86-171	3 p 06/22/65	A
#42a report	re: Vietnam Secret] Exempt NLS 86-124 sanitized 1-24-01 NLS 99-54 (more info. released)	3 p 06/22/65	A
#47 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McG. B. Top Secret Sanit: 2/7/2011 WS/RAC99-65	1 p 06/21/65	A
#49a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open 4.14.99	2 p 06/19/65	A
#51 cable	copy of Vientiane 2054 Top Secret open 2-17-84 NLS 83-253	2 p 06/21/65	A
#55a cable	copy of London 6060 Confidential	1 p 06/18/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, [REDACTED]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55 cable	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		
#55 c cable	from Foreign Sec. Michael Stewart to Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge Confidential	1 p undated	A
#56 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p 06/18/65	A
#60 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy Confidential <i>Polcom, "Re President - Activities, June 1965"</i> <i>(dup in NLS, Special Needs State Correspondence)</i>	1 p 06/17/65	A
#63 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p 06/03/65	A
#64 memo	to His Excellency Juan E. Bosch from McG. Bundy Confidential	1 p 06/17/65	A
#68 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McG. Bundy Confidential	1 p 06/16/65	A
#69 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p 06/16/65	A
#70 memo	to the President from James C. Thomson, Jr. & MCGeorge Bundy Confidential	1 p 06/16/65	A
#71 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/16/65	A
#72 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p 06/16/65	A
#76 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McG. Bundy Secret	1 p 06/12/65	A
#75b cable	Embtelet 2292 from Santo Domingo Confidential	1 p 06/08/65	A
#76 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McG. Bundy Secret	1 p 06/12/65	A
#79 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/11/65	A
#79a cable	Amembassy Santo Domingo Immediate Secret	5 p 06/11/65	A

FILE LOCATION *open 2-5-96 NLS 91-232 appeal*
NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#81 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>Open NLJ 99-276 2-18-00</i>	1 p 06/11/65	A+C
#81a memo	to Bundy from Gordon Chase Confidential	1 p 06/09/65	A
#82 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p 06/11/65	A
#83 agenda	NSC meeting agenda confidential <i>open 8-17-83</i>	1 p 06/11/65	A
#85 memo	to the President from Rick Haynes & McG. B. Secret	1 p 06/10/65	A
#85a biosketch	Harry Frederick Oppenheimer Confidential <i>Exempt 1201-NLS 019-003-3</i>	2 p 02/24/64	A
#86 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President SECRET <i>open 6-19-84 NLJ 83-253</i>	1 p 06/10/65	A
#86a agenda	agenda for meeting on Vietnam Secret	1 p 06/10/65	A
#91 memo	to President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-205</i>	1 p 06/07/65	A
#91a memo	re: Dr. Joaquin Balaguer paritized 5-28-92 NLJ 92-53 Secret <i>Exempt NLJ 89-144</i>	3 p 06/04/65	A
#94a cable	Embtel 4100 from Saigon Confidential <i>open 2-14-84 NLJ 83-253</i>	2 p 06/07/65	A
#98a memo	to the President from Robert S. McNamara Top Secret <i>Exempt per NLJ 83-195 OPEN 3/1/98 FRCS VOL 11 ITEM 325</i>	2 p 06/02/65	A
#100 memo	to the President from McG. B. Top Secret	1 p 06/05/65	A
#101 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 10/20/97</i>	1 p 06/05/65	A
#101a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 8/25/92</i>	2 p 06/05/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#102a memo cable	Copy of cable to USUN NY from McG. Bundy Confidential	open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232 2 p	06/05/65 A
#102b cable	From USUN New York #4872 Confidential	open 11-15-91 NLJ 91-230 4 p	06/05/65 A
#105 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p	06/04/65 A
#105a cable	from Saigon #4056 Secret	2 p	06/04/65 A
#106 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	Sanitized NLJ 97-405 5-7-99 1 p	06/04/65 A
#107 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential	Sanitized NLJ 97-405 5-7-99 1 p	06/04/65 A
#107a cable	from Peking to Foreign Office Confidential	Open NLJ 97-406 8.20.98 2 p	05/31/65 A
#107b cable	from Peking to Foreign Office Confidential	Open NLJ 97-406 8.20.98 6 p	06/01/65 A
#109 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232 2 p	06/03/65 A
#114 memo	to President from McG. B. Confidential	open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232 1 p	06/03/65 A
#13a Letter	President Johnson to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa possible classified information	1p	06/30/65 A
#59a Letter	President Johnson to Eisaku Sato possible classified information	1p	06/18/65 A
#63a Letter	Juan Bosch to President Johnson possible classified information	exempt NLJ 91-232 3p	05/31/65 A
#67a Letter	President Johnson to Dr. Ludwig Erhard possible classified information	open 4.14.99 1p	06/17/65 A
#77a Memo	Horace Busby to the President possible classified information	open 4.14.99 2p	06/10/65 A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED],
 McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#110 Memo	<p>McGeorge Bundy to the President 1p possible classified information declassified per NW 83-252 copy OPEN "C" closing restriction added 6-22-84 sanitized + moved to open 6-22-84 declassified per NW 83-252 and Donor's Deed of Gift 6-17-94</p>	06/3/65	SECRET

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~SECRET~~, McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 11, June 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

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- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 30, 1965, 6:25 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Colombia

93-377

cb

5-195

Since one of the stickiest areas in Latin America these days is Colombia, I thought you might be interested in having a brief report on the more immediate and major problems in that country [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5)

1. The most serious immediate problems appear to be economic. Lack of political and economic confidence has caused the free rate of exchange to depreciate from 10 pesos to the dollar in October 1964 to 19 pesos to the dollar now. The official import rate is over-valued at 9 pesos to the dollar and is increasingly under pressure. Liquid reserves are dangerously low and business activity threatens to be curtailed by the lack of essential imports and of credit. There is a substantial inflationary potential because of the gap between budget expenditures planned for 1965 and anticipated revenues.

2. There is a difference of view on how to meet these problems. On the one hand, the Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U. S., along with a number of high-level Colombians (e. g. the recently resigned Finance Minister), believe that Colombia must institute a comprehensive economic program, which should probably include such measures as budget balancing, wage-price restraint, an increase in imports and a de facto devaluation of about 50%; we would be prepared to support such a program with up to \$90 million of new commitments.

On the other hand, President Valencia holds a different view. While, in May, he appeared ready to go along with the above comprehensive economic program, he has more recently said that such a program would be politically too risky, particularly the de facto devaluation (we don't agree).

What Valencia seems to prefer is that we provide substantial assistance (estimates vary from \$200 million to \$400 million), without taking the necessary self-help measures, on the grounds that this would enable him to avoid a revolution or at least an electoral defeat for the National Front in Colombia. We are not anxious to meet Valencia's desire, among other

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things, because it will cost us a lot more money and because we believe that a large loan to Colombia without adequate self-help measures, would severely undercut the credibility of an important Alliance for Progress dimension.

1.3(a)(5)

3. The situation, however, is not without hope. [redacted] there are indications that a number of influential Colombians are becoming more and more convinced of the need for a positive economic program. State's present estimate is that the odds are slightly in favor of Colombia attempting a comprehensive economic program of the type outlined above, although probably with some changes. State also estimates that the odds are somewhat better than even that the program, if attempted, will be reasonably successful.

4. If, in the last analysis, President Valencia refuses to undertake a comprehensive economic program a number of contingencies could develop. These are analyzed in the attached contingency plan, which notes that the most likely contingency is continued drift and deterioration under the National Front and that the next most likely contingencies are (a) the withdrawal of Valencia (b) a military takeover, and (c) a general uprising. State does not foresee the danger of a Communist take-over in Colombia in the short term, in view of the fact that the extreme left in Colombia is badly fractured, poorly led and not very popular.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

You may have seen

Charles Bartlett's praise

of this policy yesterday.

~~SECRET~~

COLOMBIA

Mr. Sayre

1a

SHORT-TERM CONTINGENCY PLANS

These plans should be considered in conjunction with the paper entitled "Report on Colombia" dated June 18, 1965. If the policy outlined in that paper does not succeed, one of the following contingencies could occur.

A. Further Drift and Deterioration under the National Front: If the National Front government continues to drift, either under President Valencia or under a replacement, without a positive, comprehensive economic program, including the needed devaluation, it may survive for a while longer, perhaps even through next year's elections, when there might be a new opportunity for a positive economic program under new leadership. Meanwhile, however, the Colombian economy would experience a recession, probably accompanied by price rises, due to the need to limit imports and general economic activity to the low level permitted by reduced foreign exchange availabilities under this alternative, coupled with probably inability to avoid substantial monetary expansion. As a result, support for the National Front would decrease even further and opposition groups such as the followers of ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla could be expected to gain new strength.

Comment: If the National Front thus demonstrated that it was unable to take the positive action necessary to resolve its economic problems, the best course for moderate Colombia leadership might be to seek ways of restructuring the political system to provide for more effective government through the elimination of such provisions in the present system as presidential alternation, parity of Liberal and Conservative representation in all elective and appointive offices, and the two-thirds congressional majority rule.

U.S. Action:

1. Under these circumstances, we would not make available new large program loans to Colombia, but would limit aid instead to technical assistance, some project lending, PL 480 commodities, disbursement of a considerable part of aid funds already obligated, and possibly some debt re-scheduling. So doing would keep the pressure on the Colombian Government for a comprehensive positive economic program.

2. As soon as it is apparent that the government will not take action on a comprehensive economic program, we should explore discreetly with responsible political, business, and military leadership ways in which the present disadvantages of the National Front system could be eliminated to provide for more effective government capable of taking action on Colombia's economic problems.

~~SECRET~~**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4****NJ 93-375****By JW, NARA, Date 7-18-94**

B. Withdrawal of Valencia: Valencia's resignation is a possibility during the coming year in view of economic and political pressures. The possibility of his assassination should also be considered.

Valencia could be replaced through constitutional means by (a) the present designado (legal successor), which is unlikely, by (b) a newly-selected designado, or by (c) the Foreign Minister, who is next in line to succeed, if the term of the present designado is found by the Council of State to have expired and no new one is appointed, as is possible.

Comment: U.S. interests would best be served by Valencia's continuance in office and his execution of a sound economic program, with broad-based support. The replacement of the President either by a designado or by the present or a new Foreign Minister would be the least undesirable of the alternatives to Valencia, especially if such a replacement were approved by all the National Front elements and if the new President were capable of providing stronger leadership with broader-based support than Valencia has. There are no clear heirs-apparent now, though. Fernando Londono Londono, a respected former Foreign Minister and Minister of Government, and an Ospinista Conservative, is a possibility. Another is Admiral (ret.) Ruben Piedrahita Arango, who was a member of the junta which governed between the ouster of Rojas Pinilla and the inception of the National Front. A third might be ex-President Ospina himself. A new president would still be faced with the need for action on the economic front and for financial aid from the U.S.

U.S. Action

1. If President Valencia does resign, we should make clear to all Colombian groups U.S. preference for his replacement by constitutional means.
2. We should also be ready to support a new constitutionally chosen head of state, while insisting on a sound economic program similar to that described in the June 18 paper, to the extent feasible.
3. In anticipation of Valencia's possible withdrawal, we should consider the advisability of influencing the selection of a new designado and whether there are means for taking such action without generating counter-productive results.

C. Military Take-over: If the economic and political situation were to deteriorate badly and if a constitutional procedure for replacing President Valencia could not be agreed upon, then there would be a possibility that the responsible leadership, despite its ^{current} reluctance, might take over the government, probably with political and business backing.

Comment: Such a take-over would provide an opportunity to restructure the political system in order to permit it to function more effectively. However, it would open up other internal political possibilities of uncertain consequences, and would have unfortunate repercussions in Venezuela and elsewhere in our Hemisphere relations. Moreover, the U.S. would probably be faced with an immediate request for assistance difficult to answer,

U.S. Action

1. We should step up our soundings in Bogota concerning the possibility of military intervention and try to ascertain what military and civilian leadership might be brought to the fore as a result, in order to strengthen our ability to exercise a moderating influence over such events.

2. If there is a military take-over, we should make clear our preference for an interim government composed of moderate civilian elements in addition to military representatives. This is particularly important since present Colombian military leaders are not thought capable of effective government administration by themselves.

3. We should consult with appropriate Latin American countries, especially Colombia's neighbors (Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil), concerning developments in Colombia, our position, and the advisability and manner of official recognition of any new government there.

4. We should seek an early return to some form of constitutional government designed to function better than the present one.

5. We should also encourage the necessary economic measures to qualify for A.I.D. assistance permitting economic growth and development under the concepts of the Alliance for Progress.

D. General Uprising: A more extreme possibility than Contingency C is that conditions could worsen to the extent that they would lead to public disorders perhaps developing from a general strike and amounting to a popular uprising, which the military and police would control, although with some difficulty. This situation might lead the military to take independent initiative to take over the government. It is unlikely that the Communists would be able to take sufficient advantage of such a situation to assume power themselves.

Comment: Once such an uprising were contained, it would probably be necessary either to exercise tight political control over dissident groups, probably through some form of government in which the military exercised continued significant control, or else to broaden the political system to include more representative political groups. To the extent that this broadened representation was responsible and responsive to basic needs for social and economic progress in an open political system it would not be bad. To the extent that it was irresponsible or extremist it should be avoided.

U.S. Action

1. In the case of a general uprising, we should stand by to help responsible military and police elements by providing equipment and supplies as necessary to maintain order and to prevent an increase in extremist influence.

2. If necessary, we should provide technical and economic assistance in support of emergency measures for restoring economic order.

3. We should try to persuade the responsible political and military leadership to continue to exclude irresponsible and extremist groups from governing positions.

4. When the situation has stabilized sufficiently, we should take the actions listed under Contingency C in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5.

5. We should consult with Colombia's neighbors as in Contingency 3. In addition, we should consider urging the OAS to look into the Colombian situation and, if appropriate, to send representatives to Colombia to observe developments, particularly Communist involvement, and perhaps to mediate.

Note: We do not foresee danger of a Communist take-over in Colombia in this period. The extreme left in Colombia is badly fractured, poorly led, and not very popular.

ARA/CV/PPLord:mjf
6/23/65

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Wednesday, June 30, 7:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers show at Tab A a long letter from Glenn Seaborg to you with proposals for the underground test program for 1966, and at Tab B a memorandum from me to Seaborg giving general approval to this program, and specific approval to the tests planned for the first quarter.

This program corresponds closely to the program for the current fiscal year, and has been reviewed and approved by representatives of State, Defense, ACDA, and Don Hornig's office. It falls within the guidelines that surround the Test Ban Treaty, and I see no problem with it.

There will be in each quarter a few tests which require special review to check against the danger of venting, and by general agreement Don Hornig is going to take the lead in keeping our procedures tight and clear on this.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-302
By vig, NARA Date 9-11-96

~~SECRET~~

21 26 3 ✓
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 30, 1965 - 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation Reports from Santo Domingo

Ambassador Mann and Jack Vaughn have been reviewing the reporting from Santo Domingo, and it is their strong recommendation that we ought to go to a one-a-day wrap-up cable. I have approved this proposal, to begin July 1, with the proviso that if you are in any way dissatisfied, we can go back to the two-a-day reports which we had at the height of the crisis.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Of course all such news is separately reported

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Wednesday, June 30, 1965 - 7:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Contingency Planning on Vietnam

We have had two long meetings on the planning of the political and military alternatives that grew out of our meeting with you last week. Jack Valenti has given us time at 11:30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have the papers for Friday's discussion. Meanwhile, I have one further thought that you may wish to be turning over in your mind between now and then.

During this week I have had a review made of the economic and informational situation in Vietnam and around the world. It is extraordinarily clear that any further action turns on what we can get the Ky government to do.

In this situation, the quality and energy of our team in Saigon becomes decisive. Max Taylor is heavily preoccupied with the military situation, and the rest of his team is not geared to a full-steam operation with the new cabinet.

So I begin to wonder if it would not be wise to settle hard on the plan for a Lodge-Sullivan team, and plan to get them out there together as soon as Lodge is briefed and Sullivan's successor is chosen. I have already told my brother Bill that Sullivan is the generally preferred choice for this job, and that he should accordingly find the right man quickly for Vientiane. But the decision on the timing of the Taylor-Lodge change is obviously one which only you can make. The more I think about it, the more I think the time of Lodge's take-over should be nearer 1 August than 1 September.

M.B.
McG. B.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
NSC 6-18-80	
By DCH	NARS, Date 8-23-82

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 30, 1965
2:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting of Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs,
July 8

Below is a list of the members of the President's panel of consultants on foreign affairs. As I said yesterday, they will be here next Thursday, July 8. We will follow your suggestion and break them apart into smaller groups for more secure discussion.

What we particularly need to know now is which of them you would like to have in a meeting with you. If you will check the names of those with whom you feel you would be able to deal frankly, we could put them in a special group which could meet in the White House and which you could join if you chose. This would avoid giving needless offense to the others.

Panel members:

6:15 July 8

Dean Acheson

George Kistiakowsky _____

(would be back
'tip 7:45
July)

Eugene Black

Arthur Larson _____

Omar Bradley

Morris Leibman _____

John Cowles

Robert Lovett

Arthur Dean

John J. McCloy

(in Europe)

Allen Dulles

Teodoro Moscoso _____

Roswell Gilpatric _____

~~James Perkins~~ _____

Paul G. Hoffman _____

McG. B.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-300

By iss, NARA Date 5-5-98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 30, 1965

1:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Progress on the Pak-Indian front

1. I have talked with Tom Mann this morning, and I think, as a result of your talk with him, the State Department for the first time has really got the signal. As Tom said to me, there has been great reluctance to believe over there that the White House meant what it said, but Tom himself has now taken hold, and I think the results will be very constructive.

2. Three major steps are being taken now:

A. The first is definite notice to George Woods that we want the July consortium on Pakistan postponed. This will clear the decks for serious talk with the Pakistani representative who is likely to turn up here quite soon.

B. Tom Mann is talking to B. K. Nehru and will make it very clear to him that we think the time is ripe for a very serious talk with the Indians about the whole range of our relationships, which are a very great expense to us. Tom's conversations will be careful and courteous, but thorough, and he will suggest to B. K. that he himself go back to India and get Shastri to designate a really high-level visitor to come over here for very serious talks.

C. Bob McNamara is having a full review of the MAP pipeline and will have alternatives for the handling of that for discussion next Tuesday. Meanwhile there will be technical delays on all deliveries in that field. This has been the hardest spigot to get turned off, and Bob thinks there are some tough choices in the handling of it, pending the serious talks that are now in prospect with both countries. But he will have suggestions on that next week.

3. My own conversations with State, AID and Defense make it clear to me that the message is now getting across and that Mann, McNamara and Bell all mean to conduct their business in accordance with your basic desire. This is an important change for the good.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. There does remain one special case which may require special treatment before we really finish talking turkey with these two governments -- that is the question of food for India. I don't see how we can reach any general agreement with the Indians in the next week or two. Yet if we do not make some interim arrangement for shipments of wheat within that time-frame, there may well be a real problem of food shortage in India which the Indians could successfully blame on us. That could bring us a lot of violent and quite unnecessary criticism, and might even give the Soviets a chance to make emergency deliveries and make us look foolish. This is what we just avoided in Egypt a couple of weeks ago.

I have told Bob Komer to prepare a contingency plan for interim wheat deliveries on a very limited basis. This plan will not be marketed around the city, but it will be available for a prompt decision in the light of what Tom Mann learns from his first hard talk with Nehru.

M. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

Wed., June 30 1965
11:20 a. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

This piece of paper was prepared by Red Raborn at Bob McNamara's request. I think the conclusions will interest you and perhaps also the first 10 pages. I myself have an uncomfortable feeling that both on the economic and on the military side the position of our Vietnamese is weaker than we have been admitting to ourselves.

McG. B.

(encl. SC 07353/65 TS Developments in SVnam during past year

cy 110.9

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Wednesday
June 30, 1965
11:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach Ambassador Taylor's weekly report to you. At the end of the second paragraph, he says that we have not yet explained our decision against reprisal for the Bennett and restaurant atrocities. He has had an interim explanation, and State tells me that further comment will be going out today.

What is more important over the long range are the hard military and economic questions covered in the latter part of the telegram.

McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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Wednesday, June 30, 1965
8:35 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Jones and Green (Indonesia)
at 11:30 a. m. Wednesday, June 30

Green leaves for Indonesia July 8. Jones becomes Chancellor of the East-West Center later in July.

The purpose of this meeting is to give Jones a word of deserved thanks and to give Djakarta a signal of your confidence in Green. The Indonesians and Sukarno in particular, had a particularly high regard for Jones.

As you know, our policy toward Indonesia is cool and correct at the moment. We are keeping the door open to friendly relations, but we have removed the Peace Corp and other targets of Communist agitation. We are really playing for the breaks in a situation in which the Communists are gaining in influence, but the prospects of a reaction by the military is strong.

I attach a letter (Tab 1) for Green to deliver to Sukarno. Sukarno being the highly personalistic type he is, a message of this kind will increase Green's standing and give some additional weight to whatever he may have to say as our relations develop. I have redrafted the State Department version to make it cool, but courteous, and I think it will be a help to Green. On the other hand, we have not made any promise of such a letter and you can give it a pocket veto if you prefer.

McG. B.

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[Handwritten initials]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: France in Vietnam, 1954, and the U.S. in Vietnam, 1965
-- A Useful Analogy?

It has been suggested in some quarters that the United States today finds itself in a position in Vietnam similar to that of the French in 1954. One implication is that we must expect an outcome to our present policy similar to that which befell the French in their defeat and withdrawal of that year.

The actual content and applicability of this analogy are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

1. Vietnam in 1954

A. The Political Scene

The central fact of French involvement in Vietnam was the persistent seven-year effort to re-establish French colonial rule. French forces were pitted against a Communist-led revolution for national independence; at no point did France offer Vietnam the alternative of non-Communist independence.

The former Emperor Bao Dai served as the political facade for France's effort to maintain control through a Mandarin elite. Saigon cabinets came and went, while vested interests among Vietnamese and Frenchmen jockeyed for power; but little progress was made toward forming a government capable of rallying Vietnamese nationalist allegiance.

B. The Military Scene

By early 1953, Viet Minh forces comprised seven regular infantry divisions, with independent regiments equal in strength to two additional divisions -- a total of nine divisions. In numbers, the Viet Minh had about 125,000 regulars, 75,000 full-time regional and provincial troops, and 150,000 part-time guerrillas -- a total of 350,000 men.

DECLASSIFIED
NSC 6-18-80 letter
By DCH NARS, Date 8-23-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To combat these forces, the French had committed 175,000 regulars (54,000 of whom were native Frenchmen, the rest Legionnaires, Africans, etc.) and 55,000 auxiliaries, plus a naval contingent of 5,000, an Air Force contingent of 10,000 and 225,000 local forces of the three Indo-China states -- a total of 470,000 men.

By 1952, eight percent of France's national budget was annually allocated to the Indochina war; in 1952-53 nearly 6,000 French and Legionnaire troops were killed, as well as 7,730 of their Vietnamese allies.

These impressive statistics imply heavy conventional engagements. In early 1950 the Viet Minh had shifted from guerrilla to conventional warfare, and for the next four years large-scale assaults -- ranging upward to 14-battalion strikes -- were not uncommon. In 1952 a three-division assault in one province forced the withdrawal of over 20,000 French troops.

By 1953 the French were generally engaged in a holding action; the brunt of their forces were tied to defensive duties, and the prospects for a military victory were nil. They had largely retreated to the Red River Delta in the North, some key towns in the Center, and the region around Saigon in the South. Only the equivalent of three divisions were actually available for offensive operations.

By 1954 the war's unpopularity at home had brought mounting pressure for negotiation. The Geneva Conference was already under way by the time of France's spectacular tactical defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954.

2. Vietnam in 1965

A. The Political Scene

The two central facts of the South Vietnam situation today are the Viet Cong/Viet Minh struggle for control and the process of non-Communist social and political revolution. U. S. forces are present in rapidly growing numbers to help resist the Communists at the request of successive Saigon governments.

Since Diem's fall, power in the urban South has been passing from the predominantly Catholic and French-educated elite to a more "Vietnamese",

militantly nationalistic and potentially xenophobic group of which the political bonzes, students, and certain young generals are prime examples. While the Communists are seeking to exploit this revolutionary ferment, it remains something quite apart from the Viet Cong insurgency. Those who aspire to lead the revolution claim that unless it is successful, the Viet Cong insurgency cannot be defeated.

This shift in the alignment of fundamental forces is responsible for much of the political turbulence of the urban scene. It is a process that involves the striking of new power balances in the midst of a war and in the absence of parliamentary traditions or institutions for the channeling of political conflict. Despite their deep antagonisms, neither the Buddhists nor Catholics have acquired political dominance, with the result that each can check but not cancel the power of the other. The same is true of the myriad of other political factions pressing their own interests.

While frequent changes in governments have had a debilitating effect on political and administrative stability, as well as on government efforts to create a national consciousness for support of the war effort, there remains an impressive resiliency among the Vietnamese people and their traditional way of life which is little affected by the cabinet changes in Saigon.

Nevertheless, the most significant element of stability and strength, insofar as the struggle against Communist insurgency is concerned, remains the external factor of U.S. military, economic and political support. Without it, the country would quickly succumb to Communist domination.

B. The Military Scene

The Viet Cong probably controls somewhat more than 3 million Vietnamese in half the total rural area of the country. The GVN continues to control rural areas inhabited by an estimated 4.4 million. The remaining rural inhabitants, some 5.4 million, are subject to various stages of governmental pacification, or else not controlled by either side.

Viet Cong regulars, now estimated at 64,600, are full-time, professional soldiers organized in identified units of up to regimental

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strength. They are for the most part well trained and equipped. The regulars are distinct from an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 irregular Viet Cong who operate as guerrillas and self-defense militia troops. Another 30,000 armed political personnel staff the Viet Cong's party and administrative apparatus. The military activist figure may therefore be as high as 194,000.

The Viet Cong regular force has the capability of mounting large-scale actions well above present levels of activity. Such actions could theoretically involve as many as nine simultaneous attacks in regimental strength; even a series of coordinated, widespread attacks of lesser magnitude could seriously tax South Vietnamese ability to respond with the limited general reserve battalions available.

But the Viet Cong regular battalions vary widely in their combat effectiveness. Some are battle-tested veterans, while others are known to include relatively poorly trained young recruits or recently infiltrated North Vietnamese draftees with minimal training and little or no combat experience.

It is not clear whether the Viet Cong will sustain their currently stepped-up pace, whether present activity is the forerunner of a major offensive, or whether Viet Cong plans have been set back by increased U.S. air activity and troop support. The concentration of Viet Cong forces in northern South Vietnam suggests Kontum, Pleiku or other GVN interior strongholds as their likely targets for a major victory, possibly accompanied by an attempt to drive to the coast from their own inland strongholds, thereby cutting South Vietnam in two.

Arrayed against the Viet Cong is the South Vietnamese Army, numbering approximately 220,000 out of the total armed forces of roughly 250,000 men.

The ARVN is capable of maintaining internal security in the major population centers, in some outlying areas, and along selected lines of communications. While its combat capabilities are affected by frequent command changes at top echelons, insufficient numbers of aggressive leaders and poor but improving logistics, the ARVN is well supplied with U.S. arms and equipment and has become gradually more effective in guerrilla operations. The ARVN, with continuing U.S. military

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

support, has the capacity to prevent a Viet Cong military victory.

In alliance with the ARVN are the U. S. forces in Vietnam which now approach 70,000 -- a combined US/GVN total of 320,000.

Remaining in the background throughout the present conflict is the seasoned regular army of North Vietnam, numbering over 300,000 men.

3. France in 1954

Two key aspects of France's relation to the Indochina war in 1954 were the war's acute unpopularity and French political instability.

France was never united or consistent in her prosecution of the war in Indochina. The war was not popular in France itself, was actively opposed by many on the left, and was cynically used by others for domestic political ends.

The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh's political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period, in fact, were heavily influenced by his belief that the Communists would soon come to power in France.)

For a long time, Paris tried to pretend that the war was not a war but a "police action." Not until July 1952 was the legal status of "veteran" given to Frenchmen who had served in Indochina, and the National Assembly never did permit conscripts to be posted to the Indochina theater.

The ambiguous legal status of the conflict enabled French Communists to carry their opposition to the point of sabotage without incurring the legal charge of treason. Successive French governments had to contend with concerted and organized domestic opposition; resolutions favoring negotiation and early withdrawal were frequently proposed and occasionally passed by non-Communist parties. Leak and counter leak was an accepted domestic political tactic, and, as a result, even highly classified reports or orders pertaining to the war were often published verbatim in the pages of political journals.

Pressures for negotiation and settlement mounted steadily in 1953, with a number of prominent politicians -- especially Pierre Mendes-France -- pushing such themes with vigor. The January 1954 Berlin conference gave new impetus to this pressure, and by February 18 it was decided that a conference should be held in Geneva in April to consider both Korea and Indochina.

Dien Bien Phu fell on the day before the opening of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. Had Paris had the will to continue the fight, replacements for that battle's losses could have been sent from France, and the Indochina war might have continued for months if not years.

Paris lacked the will, however, and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu made the French Government anxious to disengage as soon as possible. The fall of the Laniel cabinet on June 12 and the advent of Mendes-France as Premier on June 18 hastened the conclusion of a settlement.

4. The United States in 1965

The central themes of U. S. opinion regarding Vietnam appear to be considerable concern (over U. S. casualties, U. S. involvement, Saigon's political instability, the risks of general war, the use of air strikes and napalm, etc.) but general support for the Administration.

In general, the public appears unenthusiastic but reconciled to our role in this conflict. While there is widespread questioning and uneasiness about the way in which we may be playing that role, the public as a whole seems to realize that the role must be played. Furthermore, open skepticism as to our tactics subsides at times of sharp crisis in the situation.

The most articulate critics of our present policy in Vietnam have been elements within the academic community and church organizations. Although usually a minority within their own groups, they have stimulated extensive worry and inquiry in the nation as a whole. With the end of the academic year, this protest movement has temporarily subsided.

Meanwhile, the Government's negotiatory posture since April 7th, and the apparent intransigence of the Communists, has made it more difficult to advocate persuasive alternatives to Washington's current

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track. Criticism continues to be focused on the air strikes, however, and on the U.S. Government's apparent refusal to consider negotiations with the NLF.

The latest Harris Poll (June 28) shows that 62% of the public expresses overall approval of the President's handling of the Vietnam crisis. Well over 70% of the people believe that Southeast Asia will go Communist if we do not stand firm in Vietnam, and they approve the President's call for unconditional negotiations. Twenty-three percent are not sure about bombings in the North or the sending of more troops during the monsoon season. However, of those with an opinion, almost 80 percent approve of the bombing and over 60 percent believe we should send more troops. Skepticism as to the future of the conflict and our right to be involved in it are expressed by the fact that 35 percent of the people believe that China has the right to ask us out of an area so close to her borders and 32 percent believe we might get involved in a land war we can't win.

The latest Gallup Poll (June 9) showed that the percentage of people who believed that we should continue our present course of action climbed from 13 to 20 percent in the last month. Those who believe that we should increase military action dropped from 23 to 21 percent and those who believed we should stop military action stayed virtually the same with only a one point rise to 26 percent. The number of those expressing no opinion dropped from 35 to 28 percent.

With some exceptions, most editorialists and columnists support the President in his determination to keep Vietnam independent. This support for the broad objective is tempered by a noticeable strain of criticism over a "lack of frankness" on the part of the Administration in discussing the depth of our commitment. Such criticism was most discernible after the seeming contradiction between the Department of State and the White House over the combat role of U.S. troops and after the Government's handling of the B-52 affair.

Those who oppose the Government in the press also seem to be presently concentrating on the demand that the U.S. negotiate directly with the Viet Cong and, to a lesser extent, that the bombings should be stopped again. In general, however, most newspapers appear convinced

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

that the Administration is sincere in its desire to settle the conflict by negotiations and that the intransigence is on the Communists' side.

The most vocal current comment on the Vietnam situation is coming from the Congress. Senators Morse and Gruening remain convinced that we must pull out. There is another group, somewhat larger, which could be termed "reluctant realists" whose viscera says get out but whose heads tell them the present policy is unavoidable. Senators Mansfield, Church and Fulbright seem to fall in this category. Once again, the problem is one of offering a plausible alternative that would assure the existence of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

The most recent Congressional development is the attack spear-headed by Representative Melvin Laird who states that unless we go for total victory we shouldn't commit U.S. ground troops. He threatens withdrawal of Republican support in the House. It is too early to judge the appeal of this maneuver.

Despite obvious Congressional disquiet, Congressional support has been demonstrated in the 512 - 2 vote last August on the Southeast Asia Resolution and in the votes approving the President's request for a supplemental Vietnam appropriation (408-7 and 88 - 3).

5. Conclusion

It would seem clear from the foregoing analysis that despite superficial similarities, the situation faced by France in Vietnam in 1954 is not fundamentally analagous to that faced by the U.S. in Vietnam in 1965.

France in 1954 was a colonial power seeking to reimpose its overseas rule, out of tune with Vietnamese nationalism, deeply divided in terms of French domestic opinion, politically unstable at home, the victim of seven years of warfare -- the last four of them marked by military engagements on a scale far greater than anything yet encountered by the U.S. and the GVN.

The U.S. in 1965 is responding to the call of a people under Communist assault, a people undergoing a non-Communist national revolution;

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neither our power nor that of our adversaries has been fully engaged as yet. At home we remain politically strong and, in general, politically united. Options, both military and political, remain to us that were no longer available to the French.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 29, 1965
10:15 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached intelligence report is the most interesting paper from the collection of papers that Red Raborn left with you last week end, and is one which you may wish to look at closely. It suggests that there are real pressures in our bombing program. A sanitized version was put out by McNamara ten days ago, but this classified account has more impact.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD ATTACHMENT~~

KKX

DIA Summary 26 June 1965 - "Impact of Air Strikes on North Vietnam"

Rec'd
June 29
10:52a

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12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 29, 1965
10:00 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Fred Friendly of CBS is coming to town tomorrow, and I have agreed to see him briefly. I owe him this because of his help in getting me safely (?) out of the teach-in business.

What is on his mind is his desire to talk about some new formats for a possible Johnson TV program. Of course, what he would like most of all is a few words with you. I have told him that you would do this only when you felt like it, and that one thing you got more than enough of is advice that this or that moment or subject was perfect for a fireside chat. But he persisted, and I have to admit that I am interested in his ideas because I think he is the most skillful and imaginative producer in the news business.

Have you any advice? And will you see him?

McG. B.

Let me know what he says _____

Talk to Jack Valenti and fit him in for a few minutes _____

Talk to him about the weather and nothing else _____

TACK TO BILL MEYERS

Williston
called
Purdy
6/29
5:15 PM

June 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Responding to your desire to correspond more with foreign leaders, here is a friendly note to Balewa of Nigeria.

He responded warmly (Tab A) when you sent him your civil rights speech. Since he runs the most important, and one of the most pro-Western states in Africa, he rates a written reply.

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R. W. Komer

C E Johnson

14

Jun 29 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Amendment to Agreement with Brazil for
Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy**

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve the proposed amendment to the existing agreement with the United States of Brazil relating to cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy.

The amendment has been reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget, particularly from the standpoint of the budgetary and fiscal aspects, and it recommends that you approve this amendment.

The amended agreement which has been negotiated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, shall replace the present agreement that was last amended on September 1, 1964, and would last for ten years. The new agreement presented herewith maintains all of the provisions of the present agreement and adds several standard modifications that have been developed as a matter of policy to be appropriate to most of the countries with which we have agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy.

If you approve, the proposed agreement will be formally executed and will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

If you concur in this recommendation, there is presented herewith an approval letter for your signature.

McGeorge Bundy

- Approved
- Disapproved
- See me

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 29, 1965

Supplementary Agenda for Tuesday lunch, June 29

- A. Covert assistance to an African leader
(this is very sensitive and I will brief on it orally)
- B. The report of the Republican Task Force on France
(Secretary Rusk has an advance copy of this and will wish to comment on the problem it presents.)
- C. Preliminary plans for meeting of panel of consultants on foreign affairs, Thursday, July 8.
(I will report on this briefly)
- D. The timing of the report of the Canadian-American Committee on principles of US-Canadian relations.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLJ. 020 R. 009. 003/2
By je, NARA, Date 8/2/12

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 28, 1965
7:45 PM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-231
By ing, NARA, Date 2-17-93

Agenda for Tuesday Lunch

There are a number of special issues which need brief discussion in order to have your guidance clearly understood, and it may save you time to list them this evening.

1. Vietnam

a. We should have a preliminary discussion of the contingency planning which you directed last week. The papers are in very rough draft and we have not had a chance to discuss them below your level, but I think you will want to hear briefly what is being done. I think Bob McNamara will also have a new Rolling Thunder program, and will wish to discuss contingency planning in the event of an outrage against leading Americans in Vietnam.

b. I have told Cabot Lodge that you do not expect to make the change in Saigon immediately, but that it will probably come before the end of August. I have told him that as far as I know, there is no change in your own desire to have him. He seemed a little disappointed but cheerful. He says that he knows General Ky and that it might have been a good thing to begin right away with Ky. He plans a brief European holiday with a couple of his grandchildren but will be available on short notice when needed.

In the light of some Congressional reservations about Lodge, I wonder if he is still definitely the man you want. If not, you may want to ask us to review the possibilities again.

2. Disarmament

In accordance with your instructions of last week, I have arranged for a full review of this subject by ACDA, which will make proposals in due course. These proposals will be reviewed by appropriate agencies, and the proposals and the comments will come forward to you thereafter. You will thus have

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a free judgment. Dean Rusk (and I think Bob McNamara as well) will reserve their own position in order to be free to advise you privately and to support your decision when the time comes.

In this same connection, we need an agreed position on protecting the Gilpatric report. Glenn Seaborg suggested to me today that it could be handled simply as an "oral report!" The difficulty with that is that the ten members of the Gilpatric Committee and the seven members of the Committee of Principals have seen it in writing. With that many people in the know, the existence of a written document cannot be kept a secret. A quick review of the paper makes it entirely clear to me, however, that it is a classified document in the strict sense of the word - in that its publication would be damaging to the interests of the United States. For that reason, I think we should go on holding it just as tight as we can.

3. The India-Pakistan problem.

Both on Pakistan and India, it is time for specific guidance from you. In the case of the Paks, what is now needed is decision to postpone the Pak consortium scheduled for July 27. You have approved this ^{not to proceed} in principle, but we have not made a direct instruction on it, and that is what will be needed. There is also a smaller matter of Pakistan year-end arms purchases which Dean Rusk may bring up for decision. This is an \$8 million straight sale which could go either way, depending on whether you want the foreign exchange or the signal to the Paks.

On the Indian side, the principal problem is PL-480. The program is held up, in accordance with your instructions, but the Indians have been fobbed off with a series of stories about technical difficulties, and they simply do not understand that the United States Government is not going to come forward with any proposal at all until they come in and ask us for it in a serious political way. As a practical matter, they may not get this signal unless we make sure that it is communicated to them, and I think it may be time for you to authorize such a communication. It would have to be very skillfully done, and I think Rusk himself may be the man to do it. But you and he should have a very clear understanding of exactly what is to be communicated. Are we talking about not having a PL-480 agreement? Or is there a particular condition attached to it which Rusk should know about?

4. Walt Rostow has made the intelligent suggestion that we might wish to follow up on the economic paragraphs of your UN speech, and has suggested an NSAM to get the town moving on this. His draft memorandum is attached at Tab A. In a sense it is an economic parallel to the disarmament memorandum I have already sent out and reserves freedom of action to you.

But in another sense it does give a promise of action on these matters, and I do not want to send it out unless you want this kind of sustained pressure applied.

5. Covert action against Cuba - In commenting on a memorandum of mine this morning, you asked that we look at this one again. I will have a brief comment to make on a proposal for the way of studying it.

6. Dominican matters - There is a Defense recommendation for withdrawal of two more battalions, and a State recommendation for encouraging the defection of leading Liberals, including Caamano. I will have the details on both.

7. Communication with the Soviets - I continue to be troubled by the fact that you yourself are not in direct communication with any member of the Soviet Government, and I would like to raise for consideration the possibility of an interview between you and Dobrynin after his interview with Rusk. I believe myself that it would have a helpful holding effect in a relatively cool period. The alternative would be a Pen Pal letter, ^{but} and I see no good basis on which to generate such a message right now.

8. At Tab B I attach a proposal from Dean Rusk which has just come in for a modification of policy on travel of Americans to Red China.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
June 26, 1965
1965 JUN 28 AM 9 25

A

Draft National Security Action Memorandum

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Agriculture
Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Actions to Implement the President's San Francisco Speech.

In San Francisco the President called upon all members of the United Nations to:

"Raise the goal for technical aid and investment through the United Nations.

"Increase our food and health and education programs....

"...act on the fact that less than \$5 invested in population control is worth \$100 invested in economic growth."

The President wishes to have your concerted proposals for action in these fields. They should include:

a. Actions we can initiate and execute on our own initiative.

b. Actions we can try to initiate for execution through multilateral institutions, including United Nations institutions, the Alliance for Progress, and multilateral development institutions that exist or may be created in Asia and in Africa.

c. Actions

c. Actions we can try to induce other nations to undertake.

The President expects Mr. David Bell to assume responsibility for concerting these proposals which should be presented to him by August 1 at the latest.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON RECEIVED
MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

June 28, 1965

1965 JUN 28 PM 7 26

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Modification of Policy Governing Travel
of Americans to Communist China

Recommendation:

That you approve a Department of State announcement, adding a new category, medical doctors and public health specialists, to the existing categories of Americans entitled to receive passports valid for Communist China. If you approve, I propose to instruct our Ambassador at Warsaw to mention it to the Chinese Communists at the next scheduled meeting on Wednesday, June 30.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

We have won wide support in recent years for our policy of allowing American newsmen to travel to Communist China. The Chinese Communists have given almost none of them visas, and our willingness to promote such contact in contrast to Chinese Communist intransigence has scored heavily for us here and abroad.

A move to extend this policy would be appropriate at this time. It would reaffirm our belief in the importance of mutual understanding if the Chinese Communists are ever to be brought to live in peace in a world with other ideologies. More practically, the Chinese Communists will almost certainly

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cts, NARA, Date 4-14-99



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refuse to accede to visits by Americans, and we would thereby underline that it is they, not we, who are intractable and perhaps fearful of the contagion of ideas.

As you know, Congressman Zablocki's Subcommittee in the House has recently urged that travel to Communist China be broadened at the appropriate time, and Senator Fulbright and other key Senators have repeatedly stated their sympathy for an expansion of our passport policy to Communist China. Based on public opinion polls as well as the reaction to the granting of a passport to Dr. Rosen last January to travel to mainland China (he was refused admission by the Chinese Communists), we believe that Congressional and public reaction to a limited step at this time would be mild and generally favorable. It would undoubtedly be well received by scholars and experts, some of whom have been among our policy critics.

What we propose at this point is a rather limited move. We have selected the new category, medical doctors and public health specialists, as relating to humanitarian purposes--and yet also broad enough to give a good test. At the same time, we would reiterate our interest in promoting travel by scholars and others to Communist China, but would not broaden our policy on these groups at present.

Mentioning this modification to the Chinese Communists at next Wednesday's scheduled meeting would further a line of readiness for wider private communication which we have successively pursued for some years in these talks, and which seems to have put the Chinese much on the defensive. It is well to show ourselves ready and anxious to engage in the exchange of ideas, both for the record and for the impact upon the Chinese Communists. We would propose to cite again your January 1964 State of the Union address ("Our ultimate goal is a world...in which all men...and ideas can freely move across every border...").

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

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The Chinese have ignored or rejected our previous initiatives in this direction (we regularly propose the exchange of newsmen). They will almost certainly reject any new idea on travel, but, if they should respond, we could then begin to discuss the specifics of any exchange. We want to minimize the possibility that the Chinese would simply pick and choose favorably disposed Americans, and thus we must seek to retain some measure of government control through emphasis on exchange of groups. We believe that such control could be maintained.

I think that this action would transmit a signal of confidence and firmness, rather than of "softness."

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Draft Departmental Statement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT NOTICE
on
TRAVEL TO COMMUNIST CHINA

Over a period of several years the Department of State has validated passports of newsmen for travel to Communist China because we believe that it is vitally important for both the Chinese Communists and ourselves to achieve a better understanding of each other's motives and actions. Increased understanding requires increased contact and communications. Toward this end we also have tried to arrange an exchange of newsmen. In addition we have authorized certain individuals, including some in the medical profession, to obtain passports validated for travel to mainland China.

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Consequently, and as a step in this direction, the Department is expanding the categories of citizens who may receive passports validated for travel to Communist China to include medical doctors and individuals in public health or related fields with legitimate professional reasons for such travel.

In addition to this new category, present policy permits the issuance of passports valid for travel to Communist China to authorized news correspondents and to family members of Americans imprisoned in Communist China.

Passports valid for travel to Communist China also are issued from time to time on grounds of national interest. If a U.S. citizen believes that his proposed visit would justify consideration on such grounds and if he has evidence that he will be allowed to enter Communist China, the Department will give his application serious consideration.

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Put on desk

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 28, 1965
7:45 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-231
By 128, NARA, Date 2-17-93

Agenda for Tuesday Lunch

There are a number of special issues which need brief discussion in order to have your guidance clearly understood, and it may save you time to list them this evening.

1. Vietnam

a. We should have a preliminary discussion of the contingency planning which you directed last week. The papers are in very rough draft and we have not had a chance to discuss them below your level, but I think you will want to hear briefly what is being done. I think Bob McNamara will also have a new Rolling Thunder program, and will wish to discuss contingency planning in the event of an outrage against leading Americans in Vietnam.

b. I have told Cabot Lodge that you do not expect to make the change in Saigon immediately, but that it will probably come before the end of August. I have told him that as far as I know, there is no change in your own desire to have him. He seemed a little disappointed but cheerful. He says that he knows General Ky and that it might have been a good thing to begin right away with Ky. He plans a brief European holiday with a couple of his grandchildren but will be available on short notice when needed.

In the light of some Congressional reservations about Lodge, I wonder if he is still definitely the man you want. If not, you may want to ask us to review the possibilities again.

2. Disarmament

In accordance with your instructions of last week, I have arranged for a full review of this subject by ACDA, which will make proposals in due course. These proposals will be reviewed by appropriate agencies, and the proposals and the comments will come forward to you thereafter. You will thus have

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a free judgment. Dean Rusk (and I think Bob McNamara as well) will reserve their own position in order to be free to advise you privately and to support your decision when the time comes.

In this same connection, we need an agreed position on protecting the Gilpatric report. Glenn Seaborg suggested to me today that it could be handled simply as an "oral report!" The difficulty with that is that the ten members of the Gilpatric Committee and the seven members of the Committee of Principals have seen it in writing. With that many people in the know, the existence of a written document cannot be kept a secret. A quick review of the paper makes it entirely clear to me, however, that it is a classified document in the strict sense of the word - in that its publication would be damaging to the interests of the United States. For that reason, I think we should go on holding it just as tight as we can.

3. The India-Pakistan problem.

Both on Pakistan and India, it is time for specific guidance from you. In the case of the Paks, what is now needed is decision to postpone the Pak consortium scheduled for July 27. You have approved this ^{postponement} in principle, but we have not made a direct instruction on it, and that is what will be needed. There is also a smaller matter of Pakistan year-end arms purchases which Dean Rusk may bring up for decision. This is an \$8 million straight sale which could go either way, depending on whether you want the foreign exchange or the signal to the Paks.

On the Indian side, the principal problem is PL-480. The program is held up, in accordance with your instructions, but the Indians have been fobbed off with a series of stories about technical difficulties, and they simply do not understand that the United States Government is not going to come forward with any proposal at all until they come in and ask us for it in a serious political way. As a practical matter, they may not get this signal unless we make sure that it is communicated to them, and I think it may be time for you to authorize such a communication. It would have to be very skillfully done, and I think Rusk himself may be the man to do it. But you and he should have a very clear understanding of exactly what is to be communicated. Are we talking about not having a PL-480 agreement? Or is there a particular condition attached to it which Rusk should know about?

4. Walt Rostow has made the intelligent suggestion that we might wish to follow up on the economic paragraphs of your UN speech, and has suggested an NSAM to get the town moving on this. His draft memorandum is attached at Tab A. In a sense it is an economic parallel to the disarmament memorandum I have already sent out and reserves freedom of action to you.

But in another sense it does give a promise of action on these matters, and I do not want to send it out unless you want this kind of sustained pressure applied.

5. Covert action against Cuba - In commenting on a memorandum of mine this morning, you asked that we look at this one again. I will have a brief comment to make on a proposal for the way of studying it.

6. Dominican matters - There is a Defense recommendation for withdrawal of two more battalions, and a State recommendation for encouraging the defection of leading Liberals, including Caamano. I will have the details on both.

7. Communication with the Soviets - I continue to be troubled by the fact that you yourself are not in direct communication with any member of the Soviet Government, and I would like to raise for consideration the possibility of an interview between you and Dobrynin after his interview with Rusk. I believe myself that it would have a helpful holding effect in a relatively cool period. The alternative would be a Pen Pal letter, ^{but} and I see no good basis on which to generate such a message right now.

8. At Tab B I attach a proposal from Dean Rusk which has just come in for a modification of policy on travel of Americans to Red China.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
June 26, 1965
1965 JUN 28 AM 9 25



Draft National Security Action Memorandum

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Agriculture
Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Actions to Implement the President's San Francisco Speech.

In San Francisco the President called upon all members of the United Nations to:

"Raise the goal for technical aid and investment through the United Nations.

"Increase our food and health and education programs....

"...act on the fact that less than \$5 invested in population control is worth \$100 invested in economic growth."

The President wishes to have your concerted proposals for action in these fields. They should include:

- a. Actions we can initiate and execute on our own initiative.
- b. Actions we can try to initiate for execution through multilateral institutions, including United Nations institutions, the Alliance for Progress, and multilateral development institutions that exist or may be created in Asia and in Africa.
- c. Actions

c. Actions we can try to induce other nations to undertake.

The President expects Mr. David Bell to assume responsibility for concerting these proposals which should be presented to him by August 1 at the latest.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

June 28, 1965

1965 JUN 28 PM 7 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Modification of Policy Governing Travel
of Americans to Communist China

Recommendation:

That you approve a Department of State announcement, adding a new category, medical doctors and public health specialists, to the existing categories of Americans entitled to receive passports valid for Communist China. If you approve, I propose to instruct our Ambassador at Warsaw to mention it to the Chinese Communists at the next scheduled meeting on Wednesday, June 30.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

We have won wide support in recent years for our policy of allowing American newsmen to travel to Communist China. The Chinese Communists have given almost none of them visas, and our willingness to promote such contact in contrast to Chinese Communist intransigence has scored heavily for us here and abroad.

A move to extend this policy would be appropriate at this time. It would reaffirm our belief in the importance of mutual understanding if the Chinese Communists are ever to be brought to live in peace in a world with other ideologies. More practically, the Chinese Communists will almost certainly



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-301
By irs, NARA Date 6-10-97

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- 2 -

refuse to accede to visits by Americans, and we would thereby underline that it is they, not we, who are intractable and perhaps fearful of the contagion of ideas.

As you know, Congressman Zablocki's Subcommittee in the House has recently urged that travel to Communist China be broadened at the appropriate time, and Senator Fulbright and other key Senators have repeatedly stated their sympathy for an expansion of our passport policy to Communist China. Based on public opinion polls as well as the reaction to the granting of a passport to Dr. Rosen last January to travel to mainland China (he was refused admission by the Chinese Communists), we believe that Congressional and public reaction to a limited step at this time would be mild and generally favorable. It would undoubtedly be well received by scholars and experts, some of whom have been among our policy critics.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

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Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Monday
June 28, 1965
6:45 PM

17

MEMO for the President

This memorandum gives
a clear summary of a
painful subject.

McG. B.

OCI NOL 1785/65 (Status of US Prisoners of the VC in SVN)

26/18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2)
MR 6/28

~~SECRET~~

Monday
June 28, 1965
6:40 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following message from Embassy London is worth repeating:

"Extremely good British source has told us in great confidence that the reason Prime Minister Wilson decided not to recruit Ayub for Commonwealth Minister Vietnam mission was that, after talking to Ayub, he felt that Ayub was so 'enamored of the Chinese' that it would be too difficult to try to work with him in the project."

McG. B.

McG. B.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By jis, NARA Date 4-8-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

28 June 1965

1965 JUN 28 PM 5 57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Deployment of B-52s in the Western Pacific

As an alternative to continuing B-52 operations from Guam, I have examined the possibility of redeploying to Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, the thirty B-52s now on Guam, as well as an additional fifty B-52s we plan to send to Guam in the future.


In examining the Kadena alternative, the following facts are pertinent:

1. Thirty B-52s can be deployed to Kadena at the expense of some overcrowding of base facilities.
2. Because of the size of the B-52 and its requirement for wide taxi ways, a maximum of forty-five B-52s could be accommodated at Kadena. Larger deployments would require additional pavement construction.
3. A deployment of greater than thirty B-52s would necessitate movement of some aircraft currently on the base to other locations in the Western Pacific, creating basing problems at these already overcrowded facilities.
4. Basing B-52s at Kadena would generate significant logistic problems in terms of fuel, conventional weapons, supplementing of base personnel complements, and nuclear weapon movements. These are not insurmountable problems, but our current effort in Southeast Asia would be degraded for a period.
5. An eighty B-52 deployment to the Western Pacific would require the basing of thirty-five aircraft at some location other than Kadena -- presumably Guam. Some complication of air operations would result, particularly with respect to tanker basing in support of the Guam operation.

In view of the above, I recommend against basing B-52s at Kadena at this time. Any additional deployments of B-52s to the Western Pacific should be to Guam, with increased tanker support at Kadena.

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara



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COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES.

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 3534

19a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 28, 1965
6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last week you asked me to check the possibility of redeploing B-52s to Okinawa. Here is Bob McNamara's answer. He recommends strongly against it, primarily in the light of the fact that we are now aiming at a larger deployment of 80 B-52s overall. No such movement can be handled at Okinawa, and a split force is considered cumbersome and inefficient.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reid
Mem. 6/28/65
2:30 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NR 6/28

Monday
June 28, 1965, 1:05 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: RAND Studies of Viet Cong Motivation and Morale

The RAND Corporation has recently completed studies of Viet Cong motivation and morale based on interviews with Viet Cong PWs and defectors. The studies indicate that while older, hard-core VC have a deep commitment to Communist objectives, the younger, newer recruits have a much more shallow sense of commitment. Morale of the VC armed units has been significantly affected by air attacks within South Vietnam. Indeed, preliminary and unpublished findings based on recent interviews indicate that morale has fallen significantly over the past few months as a result of our air harassment.

MOTIVATION AND MORALE

The Viet Cong movement embraces a mass of Vietnamese, ranging from the casual peasant supporter who occasionally buys supplies for the Viet Cong on a trip to the local market, to the most deeply dedicated cadre in the main forces. The main forces fall into two generations of recruits: the hard-core Viet Cong cadre and Party member who usually is a Southern Vietnamese "returnee" from North Vietnam where he received, after 1954, five to ten years of systematic training and indoctrination; and the younger generation comprising those recruited mainly after 1958.

The Hard Core Cadre

This group fought as Viet Minh against the French. Many of them were regrouped in the North, but some remained underground in the South. These men form the backbone of the revolutionary effort in the South, which they regard as a continuation of the war of independence against the French. The regroupees were bitter at the United States and the GVN for the cancellation of 1956 reunification elections and the consequent prolonged separation from

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Authority NLS 83-252
By js, NARS, Date 6-19-84

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their homes in the South. Although many were antagonized by the harshness of the DRV land reform of that period, they nonetheless appear to have maintained their faith in the wisdom of the leadership in Hanoi.

The Younger Generation

Whereas the older group joined the Viet Cong mainly for nationalist reasons, the younger generation joined for a variety of motives: protest against social injustice at the village level, lack of opportunities on the GVN side for education and employment, avoidance of the GVN draft, fun and games. Intertwined with these as a result of Viet Cong political indoctrination is a desire to protect Vietnam from "the American imperialists and their lackey, the GVN." Although coercion is used in recruitment by the VC, it is usually combined with persuasion and patriotic appeals.

Both Generations

The Viet Cong claim that they "live splendidly and die gloriously," even though their living conditions are in fact miserable. Most of those interviewed believed that the war would last a long time and would end as a result of a gradual exhaustion of the enemy, rather than through a dramatic VC victory.

Defections from the Viet Cong have resulted mainly from personal rather than ideological factors. While defectors and some PWs did criticize the Viet Cong, they more frequently expressed embarrassment or guilt over their own inability to stand the rigors of guerrilla life.

The second generation of Viet Cong has a shallower comprehension of Communist doctrine and cites the revolution's goals as simply "peace, independence, democracy and neutralism."

Both generations regard the revolution as an indigenous Southern movement, albeit with some welcome assistance from Hanoi. The nationalistic idealism of the movement is stressed rather than Socialism or Communism. Many Southerners appear uninformed

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on the extent of Hanoi's role in the war.

RAND (and we) are convinced that the flow of defectors could be markedly increased by improved GVN treatment of its PWs. The Viet Cong is now able to convince its men that surrender to or capture by the GVN will only bring torture or execution. (As indeed it too often does.) We have a special mission out on this one now.

EFFECT OF US-GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON VC BEHAVIOR

On the basis of its interviews of Viet Cong captives and defectors, RAND suggests that air harassment should be a major objective of our operations in Vietnam. The Viet Cong are especially fearful of detection and attack from the air, and intensified and continuous air surveillance and harassing activities by day and night are likely to have a major disruptive effect on Viet Cong living conditions, morale, movement, and operations. Air envelopment operations, because of surprise, have a major effect on Viet Cong morale and inflict heavy losses. Recent interviews, not yet published, indicate a growing belief that the VC can no longer win the war militarily.

Artillery fire is feared by the Viet Cong. Because of good Viet Cong intelligence, however, there seems to be a need for more ARVN artillery and frequent changes in the location of the pieces and concentrations.

The interviews suggest that intensified ground patrolling has had a significant disruptive effect on Viet Cong operations, and that protracted ground sweeps should be assessed primarily in terms of their harassing impact rather than the casualties they inflict on the Viet Cong.

RAND CONCLUSIONS

"Although the interviews indicate that certain weapons, tactics and operations have a significant effect on the Viet Cong, their impact will depend not only on their scale and intensity, but also on the way they are integrated into and supported by a range of

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political, psychological, economic, and social programs designed to exploit fully their effects on the Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong morale may significantly decline as a result of intensified aerial surveillance and harassment, but the rate of Viet Cong defections will continue to depend largely on the treatment the GVN accords to its Viet Cong captives and defectors.

Similarly, aerial harassment and attacks may directly lower the scale, intensity and effectiveness of Viet Cong activities, but in the end only the ground forces can transform the Viet Cong from hunters into hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete control and security over the population."

M. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday
June 28, 1965
11:15 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister
Holyoake at Noon Today

Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake is in town for the one-day ANZUS Council meeting today at State. He is on his way back to New Zealand from the Commonwealth Conference in London.

Although his meeting with you is scheduled as a very brief courtesy call, it offers an opportunity to stress our appreciation of New Zealand's assistance in Vietnam and, more important, our desire that that assistance be maintained and increased.

The New Zealanders currently have a 35-man military engineering detachment at work on high priority projects in Vietnamese military training centers; this outfit has performed extremely well. On May 28th Parliament voted approval of the Government's decision (39 to 33) to send an artillery unit in response to the GVN's request. At that time Holyoake announced that the engineers would be withdrawn on arrival of the artillery unit. Since then, the Government has delayed sending the artillery unit, in part because of its hope that the Commonwealth Peace Mission might achieve some success.

Holyoake's heart is in the right place, and he has personally given his full support to our Vietnam actions. He is faced, however, with intense domestic opposition on this subject from church leaders, labor leaders, and academics. Such groups build on New Zealand's desire for aloofness from Great Power conflicts.

You could usefully (a) thank Holyoake for all his personal support; (b) urge that the artillery unit be sent without further delay; and (c) urge that he find some way to circumvent his public commitment to pull out the engineering detachment (perhaps by replacing the present engineers with others).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

James C. Thomson, Jr.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

June 28, 1965

Here's the India/Pak memo. I didn't mention Mann's memo (due tonight or tomorrow) lest it be contaminated by my comment. It ain't bad.

Ball took it on himself to have Woods suggest Shoiab come here (not Bhutto). Ayub bit, so we'll probably have a high level visitor. Let's decide first to postpone Pak consortium.

Rusk may favor ammo sales to Paks. These amount to only \$8 million so I'm not excited. But I do feel that if we want to show displeasure we ought to be consistent. I'd vote for selling half.

We've documented over a score of Indian approaches to us about PL 480. They go back to late March when the No. 1 civil servant in Indian Agricultural Ministry took it up with Freeman. Indians are now expressing real concern.

Unless we sign a new PL 480 deal by 15 July at the latest we can't avoid an interruption in shipping. We must allow several days for negotiating the agreement too. So I come up with 6 July as the final target date. We can afford to make our friends sweat till then.

RWK

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cg, NARA, Date 4-14-99

7W. Bunnay ^{22a}

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 28, 1965

Our Pak/Indian affairs. Here is a current rundown, prior to your Tuesday lunch.

The UK mediation effort on the Rann of Kutch seems on the brink of success. A deal here, and subsequent pullback of Pak and Indian forces from their border, will greatly reduce the risk of a major clash.

Ayub is apparently starting to hoist aboard our unhappiness with him. George Woods gave it to him straight in London last week, though Ayub's reaction was to send Woods (or Finance Minister Sholab) back here to explain he really was a right guy.

To keep up the pressure, our next move should be to postpone the 27 July Pak consortium session (ostensibly on economic grounds). Our guess is that this will bring the Paks running. This won't happen, however, unless you order it. We also want to postpone in a way which won't upset Pakistan's promising import liberalization program (a great success); this may involve assuring them of at least \$40-50 million in FY 66 program loans. This wouldn't interfere with our larger purpose since what they're really interested in is whether we come through with the full \$250 million in consortium pledges they want.

As to India, its request for a new PL 480 agreement is the chief aid matter pending. We recommend giving them only an interim one-year agreement on pretty stiff terms (see attachment). We've stalled the Indians till they're nervous as cats, and are pleading that we come through before shipments are interrupted.

Unless we get a go-ahead in early July, there won't be enough lead time to negotiate the new agreement, put out bids, and line up shipping in time to prevent an interruption in actual shipments. Indian food stocks are so low that this could trigger an almost immediate round of hoarding and inflation. It could also lead to emotional claims that we were playing politics with food. So going ahead shortly with a minimum program would both avoid these risks and still let the Indians know we are no longer such easy marks.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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- 2 -

All in all, the town is slowly coming around to pull in the direction you want. There is still a great deal of bureaucratic resistance, however, and great concern lest we throw out the baby with the bath. We've sought to make clear that you are not clamping down on all aid to India or Pakistan but you do insist that (a) we prove to you why so much is needed; and (b) show we are using it more effectively to produce results.

R. W. Komer

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*Cover note to
Mc (see June 28, 1965
6/28
India)*

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(a)

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Unless we get a go-ahead in early July, there won't be enough lead time to negotiate the new agreement, put out bids, and line up shipping in time to prevent an interruption in actual shipments. Indian food stocks are so low that this could trigger an almost immediate round of hoarding and inflation. It could also lead to emotional claims that we were playing politics with food. So going ahead shortly with a minimum program would both avoid these risks and still let the Indians know we are no longer such easy marks.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 5.4

NLJ 89-05

~~SECRET~~

By WJ, NARA, Date 6-28-89

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- 2 -

All in all, the town is slowly coming around to pull in the direction you want. There is still a great deal of bureaucratic resistance, however, and great concern lest we throw out the baby with the bath. We've sought to make clear that you are not clamping down on all aid to India or Pakistan but you do insist that (a) we prove to you why so much is needed; and (b) show we are using it more effectively to produce results.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: George Ball's paper on US Commitments
Regarding the Defense of South Vietnam

1. The attached paper from George Ball was prepared for your use last Wednesday, but we did not get it to you before your departure Thursday. George asked me to say that he himself does not think the legal arguments about support for Vietnam are decisive. The commitment is primarily political and any decision to enlarge or reduce it will be political.

2. My own further view is that if and when we wish to shift our course and cut our losses in Vietnam we should do so because of a finding that the Vietnamese themselves are not meeting their obligations to themselves or to us. This is the course we started on with Diem, and if we got a wholly ineffective or anti-American government we could do the same thing again. With a "neutralist" government it would be quite possible to move in this direction.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
State 11-30-78; NSC 8-10-79
By DCH NARS, Date 8-23-82

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Commitments
Regarding the Defense of South
Viet-Nam

I.

The Nature of our Legal Commitment

1. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, when read together with its protocol, provides that in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack" against South Viet-Nam each party will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

2. The United States has determined* that there has been such aggression against South Viet-Nam, which has brought this Treaty obligation into operation. Although other SEATO powers are providing assistance to South Viet-Nam, the United States, to the best of our knowledge

* The determination that North Viet-Nam was committing "aggression by armed attack" was explicitly stated in the so-called "White Paper" entitled "Aggression from the North" issued by the Department of State in February 1965.

DECLASSIFIED
State letter 12-15-78
By OCH NARS, Date 8-23-82

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

knowledge, is the only one that has made this determination. There has been no decision by the SEATO members to act collectively "to meet the common danger" in Viet-Nam.

3. Since South Viet-Nam is not a party to the Southeast Asia Treaty, our obligation under the Treaty does not run directly to South Viet-Nam. Authorities on international law generally agree that only parties (and not "third-party beneficiaries") acquire rights under a treaty. However, since the United States has determined that there has been "aggression" against South Viet-Nam within the meaning of the Treaty, our assistance to the South Vietnamese Government to meet that aggression is in discharge of our treaty obligation.

4. Our provision of military assistance to South Viet-Nam is consistent with the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense--although it does not impose an obligation of collective defense on UN Members.

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-3-

5. In addition to its treaty responsibilities with respect to South Viet-Nam, the United States has repeatedly promised the Government of South Viet-Nam to assist it in its struggle against aggression. These promises have been embodied in a series of messages and statements, beginning in October 1954 when President Eisenhower promised to aid "the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion and aggression through military means." The implied -- and frequently expressed -- conditions to the provision of United States assistance have been (a) the continuing request of the South Vietnamese Government for such assistance and (b) its will and ability to use that assistance effectively.

II

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-4-
II.

Consequences of Withdrawal

1. The consequences of an abrupt withdrawal of our assistance from South Viet-Nam should be judged not in juridical terms but in terms of its effect on the credibility of our commitments throughout the world. The relevant questions would be:

a. To what extent would such withdrawal impair the confidence of other small nations on the periphery of Communist power that the United States had the will and resources to help them prevent a Communist takeover?

b. To what extent would such withdrawal shake the faith of our partners in other security treaties--whether in Latin America, Europe, the Far East or elsewhere--that we would and could meet our treaty obligations?

c. To what extent would such withdrawal reduce the prestige of the United States and hence diminish its power and effectiveness in its dealings with other governments?

2. The

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-5-

2. The answers to these questions would not depend on the differences or similarities in the nature of our legal commitments. Our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, are quite different from our responsibilities for Viet-Nam under SEATO, since we have obligations running directly to each of our NATO partners to take action, including the use of armed force, in the event of an armed attack on any NATO power.

Our obligations to West Berlin are covered not only by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty but by our status as an occupying power pursuant to the unconditional surrender of Germany at the end of World War II.

We are obligated directly to the other American republics under the Rio Treaty of 1947 to come to their assistance in the event of armed attack.

3. In the longer term, we must judge a decision to withdraw assistance from South Viet-Nam primarily in terms of its effect on the ability of the United States

to

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-6-

to maintain its role of world leadership. That role is not an easy one. France could withdraw from Indochina or Algeria without wide-ranging consequences since it was not a great power and other nations did not depend on France for their own security. The United States must, however, always act with the consciousness that if it fails to discharge its role of leadership there is no other free world power capable of taking its place.


George W. Ball

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1965

Just
to review w/ attachments

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

1. The attached papers give the necessary background for a decision on the Dominican Republic, which should be made tomorrow after Tom Mann comes back from a weekend at the beach.

At Tab A is a copy of Bunker's summary cable relayed to the Ranch this morning.

At Tab B is Tom Mann's draft cable of instructions which has been somewhat revised in the light of comments from others and has not yet had his final review.

At Tab C is an important cable on Imbert's future from Bennett. You will see that Bennett asks for a good deal of Presidential attention to Imbert -- which I myself do not recommend.

2. The principal difference between Bunker's recommendations and our draft cable is that he sticks to a 9-month period for elections, while we urge 12, in accordance with your instructions to Tom Mann last week. This is a difference between April '66 and July 1966. You know the advantages of 12 months. The advantage of the 9-month figure in the present situation is simply that it has been the basis of discussion with Dominican groups for 10 days and changing it now might make quick agreement more difficult. I myself would leave this judgment in Bunker's hands, although I would reemphasize our desire for a longer term, if only to prevent any backsliding from 9 toward 6.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-232
By mg, NARA, Date 1-7-93

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1965

25
orig +
tabs via
pouch
6/28

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Mansfield

I have finally done a memorandum (Tab A) to Senator Mansfield covering his three memoranda of June 5, 9, and 14 (Tab B). I have drafted this for my own signature, but it now occurs to me that it may be better to redraft it as an unsigned memorandum with a covering note from you. If you want to do it that way, I enclose a possible covering note (Tab C).

McG. B.

Send it direct _____

Redraft it as a memorandum to go
with my covering note _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: Senator Mike Mansfield

I have been very slow in carrying out an instruction from the President to respond to your memoranda of June 5 and June 9. He has now passed me in addition your memorandum of June 14. I hope you will forgive me if I comment on all three at once.

Your memorandum of June 5 deals primarily with the bombing of North Vietnam. Since the President has authorized no air attack in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, I think it is inappropriate for me to comment on the array of arguments which you set forth against such action. Let me say only that in the case of any possible actions in the Hanoi-Haiphong area it would be important to distinguish clearly between limited attacks upon military targets and saturation bombing of large areas. Your memorandum is not explicit as to whether its arguments apply to any air action of any sort in this area, or only to relatively sweeping attack on the area as a whole.

The remaining parts of your memorandum of June 5 deal mainly with General Eisenhower's views, the results of air action against North Vietnam to date, and the importance of action in South Vietnam. Let me comment briefly on each of these three points:

(1) General Eisenhower's position in Korea included a clear warning that if there were no armistice agreement, the war would be very substantially enlarged. His position on the current contest in Vietnam, as I understand it, is one of firm support and approval for the actions the Administration has taken, specifically including the air operations against North Vietnam and the ground force build-up.

(2) The air operations in North Vietnam since February have accomplished what they were designed to accomplish. They have substantially increased the difficulty of infiltration from north to south. They have given encouragement to South Vietnamese forces at a critical time and they have had a converse effect on the Viet Cong. It was not our expectation that these air operations would bring the Communists running to the conference table, nor that they would bring an early end to what is a demanding and continuing contest. Moreover, the reactions of all three Communist capitals have been consistent with our expectations. In particular, the reactions of Moscow and Peking on the ground have been very modest, as the intelligence community predicted.

(3) It remains true, as your memorandum says, that the center of the contest is in South Vietnam. It is what happens there that will determine the result. It is their hopes in South Vietnam, and not resentment of our air operations in North Vietnam, that make the Asian Communists unwilling to move to the conference table. So the Administration certainly agrees with you that we have to make the necessary military effort to hold the situation in the south. We also agree that it is important to make maximum efforts to get this matter to a conference table as soon as possible.

II.

I turn now to your memorandum of June 9. I do not believe that we are in a position to make a clear choice among the three alternatives stated in your memorandum, and still less do I think it clear just what level of force would be necessary to meet each objective. Indeed, flat predictions of this sort have brought trouble both to the Administration and to other observers in recent years. Our general object is clear -- it is precisely to be strong enough to get a peaceful settlement which will be based on self-determination on the part of the South Vietnamese people. Your memorandum suggests that you may think the South Vietnamese would freely make a pro-Communist decision. Our judgment in the Administration is the opposite, and of course one great difficulty in negotiating with Communists is their lack of interest in the principle of "reasonable choice." What they want is Communist control.

While we would resist choosing among the particular alternatives you set forth, we agree with your view that in each decision on the size of the American commitment in Vietnam we have to ask ourselves what we are trying to accomplish and whether the proposed level of effort is reasonably related to that purpose. We also have to ask ourselves what the relation is between our efforts and those of the Vietnamese. Our judgment is that the estimate which you make of the Vietnamese military and political situation in the opening part of your memorandum of June 9 is unduly pessimistic, but we can certainly agree on the underlying proposition that what we do in Vietnam has to be done in support of a continuing effort by the Vietnamese themselves. Secretary Rusk made this point very plain in his address of June 23.

The question of the identity of Ambassador Taylor's successor and the question of the usefulness of a further Congressional Resolution are matters on which I do not feel qualified to comment, so I pass on to your last memorandum.

III.

Your memorandum of June 14 makes important suggestions on our diplomatic position. We share your view that we should throw out signs and signals of our own, and a number of such signs and signals have been thrown out both in Secretary Rusk's speech of June 23 and in diplomatic communications. While there are some differences between these signs and signals and those which you recommend, I think the differences are marginal compared to the similarities, and I do not think it is weakness of our signals that currently stands in the way of negotiations.

Let me now comment on each of the five points in the memorandum:

(1) As you note, the Administration shares your judgment on the Cambodian problem.

(2) A cease-fire is something which everyone favors on his own terms but which will be very difficult to define and enforce. Our way of calling for a cease-fire is to urge an end of "aggression and subversion," and the Communist way is to urge that we end our bombing and leave Vietnam. My own expectation is that we will need a conference in order to get clear terms for a cease-fire, simply because we are dealing with so many different kinds of military and paramilitary activity. This was the experience in the case of Vietnam in 1954 and Korea in 1951-53.

(3) Your position on the ultimate political solution is very close to that which Secretary Rusk stated on June 23.

(4) The general principle of amnesty is one which we agree with. The ways and means of stating this principle depend in part on what the Vietnamese Government itself says and does. I think progress can and will be made on this one.

(5) This principle of withdrawal when agreements are reached and enforced again is one which was supported in Secretary Rusk's speech of June 23.

In sum, I do not think there is any decisive difference between your five points and the points in the Secretary of State's speech. It is already very clear indeed that we are in favor of any initiative which will lead to a conference. In particular we have already supported one unsuccessful British effort to get the Co-Chairmen to reconvene the Geneva Conference.

As I see it, the one substantial difference between us is on whether a detailed proposal for a cease-fire before a conference is practicable. But I can assure you that this subject is under constant study in the Administration, and that there is no doctrinaire rigidity in our approach to it.

Let me close by assuring you that my delay in responding to the President's request for comment is no measure of my interest -- and still less of his -- in your memorandum. The President greatly values your counsel on this hard problem, and my delinquency reflects only my own heavy involvement in other pressing business.

McGeorge Bundy

Rec'd
6-22-65
12:40p
MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

256

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your consideration some suggestions on the Vietnamese situation which I was prepared to offer a week ago if you had raised any questions about the two memoranda (dated June 5 and June 9) which I sent to you through Bill Moyer. In view of our conversation at the Leadership Breakfast this morning, I am therefore taking the liberty of sending you these suggestions on my own initiative with the hope that they may be useful in facing up to the impasse which confronts this country at this time in Viet Nam.

With best personal wishes, I am

Respectfully,



Enclosure

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

June 14, 1965

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Suggestions on the Vietnamese Situation.

If we are going to make a maximum effort to get this business to the conference table as quickly as possible, I think we should throw out some clear signs and signals of our own instead of waiting for the other side. These signs and signals might be considered:

1. That we favor a non-involved Cambodia and will consider, in a reconvened Geneva Conference, participating in international guarantees of its frontiers. (I note this was done on June 5. It should be reiterated and stressed.)
2. That we are for a cease-fire and stand-fast throughout all Viet Nam, north and south as a concomitant to the convening of a peace conference on Viet Nam.
3. That we do not foreclose any ultimate political solution, whether independence, confederation or unification in Viet Nam--north and south--provided the conditions for a free choice by the Vietnamese people can be established under international auspices and, further, that we welcome the participation of any and all nations in the effort to establish the conditions of a free choice.
4. That we insist, as a part of any settlement that the lives of all South Vietnamese on all sides of the conflict shall be covered by amnesty guarantees which are sustained by the presence of international peace forces, of which U. S. forces would be a part, as long as necessary.
5. That we will be prepared, in due course, as international and intra-Vietnamese agreements can be devised and carried into effect, to withdraw our forces as part of a general withdrawal of all foreign forces, north and south, from Viet Nam.

If it is once made clear that we stand on a policy something along the above lines and that that is what the phrase "unconditional discussions" means, it would be in order, I think, for you to call on the co-chairmen to re-convene the Geneva Conference with a view to negotiating it into agreement in detail. If the response is encouraging, you might consider, too, the possibility of calling for a Heads of States meeting to open such a conference and, then, turning over the actual negotiations to the Foreign Secretaries.

The world-wide reaction to something along the above lines, I would estimate, would be immensely favorable regardless of whether or not it leads to negotiations and it might just be decisive in bringing the Vietnamese problem to the conference table.

25A

Wednesday, June 9, 1965
5:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

FYI

Bill Moyers

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

June 5, 1965

(2)
NR/6/5

MEMORANDUM:

TO: The President
FROM: Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Viet Nam

Pursuant to Thursday's Leadership meeting, I want to stress my support for your resistance to pressures for an irreversible extension of the war in Asia. That is what the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong could well amount to. I say that because the bombing would be more than just another military measure. It would also be a political act of the first magnitude.

In keeping the lid on these pressures you are on sound historic and realistic grounds in terms of the vital interests of the United States. The word "vital" is used most advisedly because the following is what I believe would result from the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong:

1. The bombing is likely to have no significant value to us in the military situation because the Communists in Hanoi and Peking have long expected it and have undoubtedly made their plans accordingly.
2. The bombing is likely to forestall indefinitely any prospects of discussions with the other side, unconditional or otherwise.
3. The bombing is likely to provide another world-wide impetus to nations to disassociate themselves from the American position and, in Asia, this separation could begin to extend to Japan.
4. The bombing is likely to insure the irreversibility of the Chinese involvement and will act to seal Chinese domination over North Viet Nam.
5. The bombing is likely to freeze Russia into the role, at least, of principal outside supplier of military equipment for North Viet Nam and China.

6. The bombing is likely to bring about an enlargement and acceleration of the ground war in South Viet Nam and, hence, it will compel the rapid injection of more American forces on the ground, even to hold the situation in that region.

7. The bombing is likely to insure that the war eventually will have to be carried, in the search for decision, into North Viet Nam, into other parts of Southeast Asia, and probably into China itself. And who is going to carry the main burden of this extension, if not United States ground forces? Secretary McNamara spoke of 300,000 Americans to deal with Giap's forces if they came south. That is but a beginning. If the expansion goes on to include combat with Chinese forces all over Southeast Asia, we had better start thinking in terms of millions.

These consequences of a bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong would do violence to the vital interests of the United States. For, at the end of the line, even if there is something which could be called a victory, we would be faced with a cost of an occupation and reconstruction in Asia which would dwarf anything which has yet been seen.

Getting in deep on the Asian mainland is a course which has been rejected repeatedly throughout our history and most emphatically by Dwight D. Eisenhower at the other extremity of Asia. As President, the choice was his to make in Korea. He could have pushed the air-war in the search for a clear-cut decision. He chose, instead, to negotiate a cease-fire in Korea, rather than to proceed to deepen the involvement by bombing beyond the Yalu. On the basis of that cease-fire in Korea, we held what was, in fact, already held on the ground and yielded to them what they already held on the ground.

It is clear that our side does not have much on the ground, even in South Viet Nam. But if we are determined to hold that entire region on our terms, it is going to have to be in South Viet Nam and not in the air over North Viet Nam that the ground has to be won. Indeed, the bombing of the North, after the initial sallies, appears to have made the military task in the South more difficult and costly. Certainly, it is related to the rapid expansion of our own ground forces in the South. And it would be my judgment that if we bomb Hanoi-Haiphong it will serve to raise the ante to us on the ground in South Viet Nam once again.

I think it is about time you got an accounting from those who have pressured you in the past to embark on this course and continue to pressure you to stay on it. It is time to ask, not only what immediate advantages it has in a narrow military sense, but where does it lead in the end: What was promised by the initial extension of the war in the air over the North? And what, in fact, has it produced to date?

As I see it, and you know it is a view which I have long held, there are no significant American interests which dictate an essentially massive, unilateral American military effort to control the flow of events in View Nam or even on the Southeast Asian mainland as a whole. There is, on the contrary, only a general interest, shared with many other outsiders, in the stability, peace and progress of the region. That is not the kind of interest which we can serve by overwhelming the region with either our military strength or our substance. It is the kind of interest which requires us to do a share, along with the other outsiders whose tangible, political and economic and commercial stake in the region is in some cases much larger than our own. It is the kind of interest which, it would seem to me, calls for the minimum military effort which is necessary to hold the situation in the South from falling apart altogether and a maximum initiative on our part to get this whole sorry business to a conference table as soon as possible.

3

25f

Wednesday, June 9, 1965
5:35 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

FYI

Bill Moyers

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

(Handwritten initials)
M/M

June 9, 1965

To: The President
From: Mike Mansfield
Subject: Viet Nam

Pursuant to our telephone conversation last night, here are some additional thoughts.

The formal delegation of authority to Westmoreland to commit American combat troops comes at a time when the last semblance of constituted government (the Quat group) in Saigon is disappearing. As I understand it, Westmoreland will respond to requests from the Vietnamese military not the Vietnamese government. This underscores the fact that there is not a government to speak of in Saigon. In short we are now at the point where we are no longer dealing with anyone who represents anybody in a political sense. We are simply acting to prevent a collapse of the Vietnamese military forces which we pay for and supply in any event and who presumably are going in the same direction we are going. That reality is not going to be lost on any government--friend or foe--anywhere in the world.

It raises again the question, and it is a crucial one: In what direction are we going in Viet Nam? We can talk of negotiations, conferences and peace. We can talk of the independence and welfare of the people of South Viet Nam. We can talk of unconditional discussions. But the question is going to be asked increasingly: What do we mean when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam and for what specific United States or Vietnamese ends are we going to stay there? The question will be asked increasingly at home no less than abroad.

And it is the crucial question because the answer to it should control the extent and nature of our military involvement in Viet Nam. As I see it, at this point, we can mean one of three things when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam. I am no military expert but, on the basis of our past experience elsewhere and developments in Viet Nam since the first of the year, it seems to me that the military costs of each of these three alternatives would look something like this:

The President
Regarding Viet Nam
June 9, 1965
Page Two

1. Do we mean that we are going to stay in Viet Nam until we or our Vietnamese military allies prevail everywhere south of the 17th parallel down to the smallest hamlet? If that is what we mean, we are talking in terms of years or decades, and upwards of a million American soldiers on the ground in South Viet Nam, assuming that the Chinese do not become involved with men.

2. Or are we talking about holding the military situation about where it is now? So far as I can judge, from second hand reports, this would mean that our side must retain the provincial capitols, the larger towns in the interior, Saigon, and the coastal cities and we must be able to maintain at least tenuous lines of communication on the ground in between. If that is what we are talking about when we say we are going to stay in Viet Nam, then the 300,000 McNamara estimate is probably too low but something in the range of 500,000 might do it, at least if Giap's army does not move in full and open force across the 17th parallel.

3. Or are we talking about staying in Viet Nam in order to hold a bargaining position for negotiations which might be expected to permit some reasonable choice--self-determination--on the part of the South Vietnamese people as to their political future, some protection for Vietnamese who have been on our side and some prospect of a bonafide peace based on eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces. If that is what we are talking about, then it would appear to me that instead of committing United States combat forces to the difficult-to-defend Vietnamese outpost cities and towns scattered in the interior, we ought to be drawing the Vietnamese garrisons in those towns into the coastal bases and into Saigon where they would add to our strength, rather than the reverse. And at the same time, we should stop waiting for signals but rather launch a powerful diplomatic peace-offensive to try to get to a conference table. Unless the situation is already totally hopeless, this kind of holding of South Viet Nam may be feasible--at least for a year or so with something on the order of 100,000 or less United States combat forces on the ground backed by powerful naval and air units.

Moreover, if a sustained peace offensive, simultaneously, succeeds in bringing about a conference during the next six months, new elements will inevitably be introduced into the situation and it is conceivable that they could begin to point the way to a resolution of the problem.

The President
Regarding Viet Nam
June 9, 1965
Page Three

The absence of a decision as to which of the above approaches really serves our national interests, seems to me to be the crux of the difficulty which has confronted us all along. I think you know my personal view as to which course is preferable in the national interest. But as things are now going, it is apparent that you are being advised to continue to take at least the second course. The rate of commitment is accelerating and it is quite likely that it will lead rapidly to pressure to follow the first course, if not to go beyond it to all-out war with China. That may not be the way it looks now but a course once set in motion, as you know, often develops its own momentum and rationale whatever the initial intentions.

As for the question of Taylor's replacement, as I told you, Lodge's name may set off an immediate and hostile debate of the whole situation in the Senate. You have got U. Alexis Johnson out there already. He has played a major role and has had a major responsibility in this situation for years. It would seem to me that if we are going to continue on the course of getting in deeper he is the logical man to continue with it.

With respect to another Congressional resolution on the situation, I cannot see the value of it at this point whether it originates here or with you. The Senate cannot direct you in the conduct of foreign relations even if it wanted to and I think you know that there is no substantial group in the Senate which is going to take the initiative in urging you to put more American ground forces into South Viet Nam. I think you know too, that what has been done to date in the way of resolutions, however one-sided the votes, has been done with grave doubts and much trepidation on the part of many Senators. It has been done largely on faith, out of loyalty to you and on the basis of the general view that when the President has the responsibility and when he requests legislative support in a crisis, he should have it.

But if you make another request, at this time, in connection specifically with the use of ground forces, I am concerned at the possible reaction. It is not nearly as predictable as in the past when the requests have been for support of policy in general terms or for funds. A request at this time could set off a wave of criticism and of demands for inquiries which, in the end, even though a resolution were overwhelmingly approved, would not in any way strengthen your hand, render your task easier or make your burden of responsibility lighter.

26

Monday, June 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

Jack:

I see no way out of this one and as a matter of fact, I think the President himself will agree.

Can I have a quick answer please?

McG. B.

Monday, June 28, 1965
8:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. Valenti

Prime Minister Wilson has sent a message through Ambassador Dean asking that the President grant an interview to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Callaghan who is here Tuesday and Wednesday. Callaghan is seeing Fowler and others starting Tuesday morning and my suggestion is that the President should let the first interviews go forward with others. I am also planning to see Ambassador Dean and one of his technical people and will know the burden of Callaghan's message before he comes. It almost surely has to do with the state of the Pound.

So my suggestion is that you may want to offer Callaghan a brief meeting either Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning, by which time we will know just what is on his mind and will have had a chance to report to you.

We had a full discussion on the British problem in Joe Fowler's office and we are all agreed that we should not make any deals with the British on the Pound. Any deals we make should be put together in terms of our overall interests -- political and economic, as well as monetary. None of us expects this kind of deal can be made with Callaghan. It will have to be a bargain at a higher and broader level.

McG. B.

17

DECLASSIFIED ^{26-b}
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: East-German Helicopter Flights - a report

1. We have reviewed this problem further and are now seeking Allied and German agreement to the following guidelines:

(1) By a series of graduated steps to bring about cessation of East German helicopter flights over West Berlin.

(2) So long as East German helicopters do not overfly West Berlin and do not constitute safety hazard to Allied air access to Berlin, we will not take direct action to prevent such flights.

(3) We shall continue to protest in all cases East German helicopter flights as violations of quadripartite agreements, and to seek practical means short of use of force to discourage them.

(4) We retain right to fly US helicopters over East Berlin when we so desire.

(5) We do not believe US helicopter flights should be equated with East German helicopter flights.

2. We distinguish flights over West Berlin from those over East Berlin on the same practical ground that has governed our Berlin policy for many years: namely, that we have power in West Berlin but none in East Berlin. We lodge regular protests over what the Soviets and the East Germans do in East Berlin when it violates quadripartite agreements, but we do not use force on the far side of the wall.

3. We are asking our people in Bonn and Berlin, and Lemnitzer's people, for recommendations on the ways and means of stopping any further helicopter flights over West Berlin. We will then try to get British and French agreement on these specific measures.

4. This matter is politically urgent because of the German election and the sensitivities of Brandt and Erhard. But there have not been new violations of West Berlin air space in recent days, so that its military urgency is not so high for the moment.

McG. B.

OK —

~~SECRET~~

Speak to me —

26-c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

6/26/65

TO: LBJ RANCH FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

1. Rusk, McNamara, ^{Balls} Wheeler, Bill Bundy, and I have just met for an hour to review all aspects of possible reprisal for restaurant and Bennett outrages.

2. We concluded that if reprisal is ordered, best target is either power plant or POL depot in Hanoi-Haiphong area. No target outside this area is sufficiently important to be a noticeable departure from present Rolling Thunder pattern.

3. In order to strike a target in the Hanoi-Haiphong area with minimum international backlash, we all agree that we must consult major friendly nations. Attack without such consultation could easily drive Wilson and others clear off the reservation, and while they are not as much help to us as they think, we would not look smart if a single act of reprisal gave them an excuse to jump ship.

4. This consultation would probably lead to fairly heavy argument against attack in reprisal form. Allies ^{could} ~~would~~ point out that repeated executions of prisoners by Nazis in World War II were not used to justify specific reprisals. They ^{could} ~~would~~ point out also that once we move ^d to measured air operations in North Vietnam after Pleiku we avoided specific acts of reprisal as in the case of the Embassy bombing.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(page 1 of 3 pages)

Authority ^{State memo 9/11/45} FRUS Vols, 6-12/65 Hem #22
By *SPH* NARA. Date 6/25/96

6/26/65

5. We believe nevertheless that by a strenuous diplomatic effort ~~placing emphasis upon need of military operations and downplaying reprisal aspect,~~ we could probably keep most allies with us, although not happy.

But one condition of this effort would be that we emphasize military need for attacks on these targets and downgrade reprisal aspect. But if we are to use ~~this~~ straight military argument with allies, we ~~would~~ should use it with our own people too.

6. And that leads to the main argument which seems important to all of us -- namely, that major new acts against the North should be undertaken in terms of our whole policy in Vietnam, and not repeat not in response to particular outrages. We don't all agree as to when and how it will be necessary to hit targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area. We do all agree that this is a major decision which should be made in a wider context than these atrocities.

7. Secretary Rusk also feels strongly that Gromyko/Kohler conversation forwarded separately shows at least a hint of Soviet readiness to work toward serious negotiations. Attack in Hanoi-Haiphong area right after this conversation might easily be misunderstood in Moscow.

8. You should also know that Alexis Johnson is reported by George Ball to oppose reprisal action.

9. Finally, we believe that both public and private statements and messages can be used to make ~~xxx clear to American people xxx~~ clear to Hanoi that American people are bound to react with great force to continued atrocities. We can and will make this point to allies as well, so that further outrages

~~SECRET~~

(Page 2 of 3)

~~SECRET~~

-3-

6/26/65

of this sort can be used to lay a base for such additional military actions as you may wish to authorize on overall grounds. ~~We continue to think that a series of events of this sort would create a much stronger ground for action than a part of~~

10. Next following message contains text of statement as issued by Department of State:

(quote attached statement)

DRAFT STATEMENT BY STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CONCERNING BENNETT EXECUTION AND MY CANH RESTAURANT BOMBING.

The regime in Hanoi and their puppet Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam have ~~not only~~ acknowledged their responsibility for the execution of Sgt. Bennett and for the bombing of the My Canh Restaurant in Saigon, in which 44 persons, Vietnamese, American, French, Swiss, Filipino were killed and many more persons injured. ~~but~~ They have compounded their brutal conduct by publicly bragging about their action and making threats to carry out even more outrageous acts. We in America and people around the world cannot help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity. These Communist threats to intimidate, of course, will not succeed. ~~and~~ Our determination to help the embattled people of South Viet-Nam to avoid their falling under a regime which is capable of such brutality will only be strengthened. [We and the South Vietnamese know that there is a long road ahead and that in dealing with such an enemy we must expect a brand of behavior which would be unthinkable for a civilized people, but this would not deter us from our task.]

Hanoi's recent statements have surely also made it clear to anyone who may have had any doubt that it is the power directing the policies and actions of the VC, its instrument in South Viet-Nam, and must bear full responsibility for these acts.

F 27

to Pres
via
Jouchy
6/27

June 26, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: RAND Studies of Viet Cong Motivation and Morale

The RAND Corporation has recently completed studies of Viet Cong motivation and morale based on interviews with Viet Cong PWs and defectors. The studies indicate that while older, hard-core VC have a deep commitment to Communist objectives, the younger, newer recruits have a much more shallow sense of commitment. Morale of the VC armed units has been significantly affected by air attacks within South Vietnam. The interviews were conducted prior to our major bombing raids on the North and RAND was not able to assess the significance of Rolling Thunder on VC morale.

MOTIVATION AND MORALE

The Viet Cong movement embraces a mass of Vietnamese, ranging from the casual peasant supporter who occasionally buys supplies for the Viet Cong on a trip to the local market, to the most deeply dedicated cadre in the main forces. The main forces fall into two generations of recruits: the hard core Viet Cong cadre and Party member who usually is a Southern Vietnamese "returnee" from North Vietnam where he received, after 1954, five to ten years of systematic training and indoctrination; and the younger generation comprising those recruited mainly after 1958.

The Hard Core Cadre

This group fought as Viet Minh against the French. Many of them were regrouped in the North, but some remained underground in the South. These men form the backbone of the revolutionary effort in the South, which they regard as a continuation of the war of independence against the French. The regrouped were bitter at the United States and the GVN for the cancellation of 1956 re-unification elections and the consequent prolonged separation from

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DECLASSIFIED State memo 9/11/95

Authority FRUS Vol 3, 64-68, Item 27

By J/ags, NARA, Date 6/25/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

their homes in the South. Although many were antagonized by the harshness of the DRV land reform of that period, they nonetheless appear to have maintained their faith in the wisdom of the leadership in Hanoi.

The Younger Generation

Whereas the older group joined the Viet Cong mainly for nationalist reasons, the younger generation joined for a variety of motives: protest against social injustice at the village level, lack of opportunities on the GVN side for education and employment, avoidance of the GVN draft, fun and games. Intertwined with these as a result of Viet Cong political indoctrination is a desire to protect Vietnam from "the American imperialists and their lackey, the GVN." Although coercion is used in recruitment by the VC, it is usually combined with persuasion and patriotic appeals.

Both Generations

The Viet Cong claim that they "live splendidly and die gloriously," even though their living conditions are in fact miserable. Most of those interviewed believed that the war would last a long time and would end as a result of a gradual exhaustion of the enemy, rather than through a dramatic VC victory.

Defections from the Viet Cong have resulted mainly from personal rather than ideological factors. While defectors and some PWs did criticize the Viet Cong, they more frequently expressed embarrassment or guilt over their own inability to stand the rigors of guerrilla life.

The second generation of Viet Cong has a shallower comprehension of Communist doctrine and cites the revolution's goals as simply "peace, independence, democracy and neutralism."

Both generations regard the revolution as an indigenous Southern movement, albeit with some welcome assistance from Hanoi. The nationalistic idealism of the movement is stressed rather than Socialism or Communism. Many Southerners appear uninformed

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on the extent of Hanoi's role in the war.

RAND (and we) are convinced that the flow of defectors could be markedly increased by improved GVN treatment of its PWs. The Viet Cong is now able to convince its men that surrender to or capture by the GVN will only bring torture or execution. (As indeed it too often does.)

EFFECT OF US-GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON VC BEHAVIOR

On the basis of its interviews of Viet Cong captives and defectors, RAND suggests that air harassment should be a major objective of our operations in Vietnam. The Viet Cong are especially fearful of detection and attack from the air, and intensified and continuous air surveillance and harassing activities by day and night are likely to have a major disruptive effect on Viet Cong living conditions, morale, movements, and operations. Air envelopment operations, because of surprise, have a major effect on Viet Cong morale and inflict heavy losses. The intensification of such operations, therefore, may be of significant value.

Artillery fire is feared by the Viet Cong. Because of good Viet Cong intelligence, however, there seems to be a need for more ARVN artillery and frequent changes in the location of the pieces and concentrations.

The interviews suggest that intensified ground patrolling has had a significant disruptive effect on Viet Cong operations, and that protracted ground sweeps should be assessed primarily in terms of their harassing impact rather than the casualties they inflict on the Viet Cong.

RAND CONCLUSIONS

"Although the interviews indicate that certain weapons, tactics and operations have a significant effect on the Viet Cong, their impact will depend not only on their scale and intensity, but also on the way they are integrated into and supported by a range of

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political, psychological, economic, and social programs designed to exploit fully their effects on the Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong morale may significantly decline as a result of intensified aerial surveillance and harassment, but the rate of Viet Cong defections will continue to depend largely on the treatment the GVN accords to its Viet Cong captives and defectors.

Similarly, aerial harassment and attacks may directly lower the scale, intensity and effectiveness of Viet Cong activities, but in the end only the ground forces can transform the Viet Cong from hunters into hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete control and security over the population."

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET-SENSITIVE

June 26, 1965

F 28

*memo to 303
JFK sent to Kennedy
re: 4/29
McG. B.*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Covert Action Against Cuba

1. I think you should know that Admiral Raborn has recommended reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. This matter has been considered in the 303 committee (the committee which monitors all covert operations). Tommy Thompson, Cy Vance, and I are against the recommendation, but, along with Raborn, we have agreed to report the matter to you in case you want to pursue it further.

2. The Raborn recommendation calls for the following types of operations:

- (1) Maritime raids by commando teams against coastal targets.
- (2) Use of an underwater demolition team to blow up ships in Cuban ports.
- (3) Night attacks on major Cuban merchant vessels while in Cuban territorial waters.
- (4) Air bombing of selected targets in Cuba by covert aircraft.
- (5) Deception operations designed to give the impression of imminent invasion by U. S. forces.

3. The trouble most of us see in such operations is that their international noise level outweighs their anti-Castro value. Especially with the Dominican problem before us, most of us do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba. I believe this is also the opinion of Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara. But if you feel differently, we can have the matter examined again.

McG. B.

Look at it again _____

Leave it alone for now _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-106

By cbm, NARA Date 4-24-01

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

✓ 28a

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE WASHINGTON

June 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba Covert Program - Your
Presentation to the President

1. As you requested, attached at Tab 1 are the minutes from the Special Group meeting on Cuba.
2. Also attached are some documents which you may find useful. At Tab 2 is the CIA paper which was prepared for the Special Group meeting in question. At Tab 3 is a recent John Crimmins paper which the President recently saw and which makes a few references to covert possibilities.

GC

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 84-292
By ing, NARA, Date 3-24-87

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

^{28c}
Peter needs
the minutes +
paper

23 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT : 303 Reminder

The minutes of 11 June, paragraph
3.e., stated:

"Mr. Bundy said he would
summarize the disparate views
(on Cuba) and present them to
higher authority."


Peter Jessup

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 84-292
By inf, NARA, Date 3-24-87

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

28d

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Excerpt from Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting of 10 June 1965

3. Cuba - Proposed Reactivation of CIA's Paramilitary Effort

a. Admiral Raborn stated that he had requested this subject on the agenda and went on to say he felt strongly that as a result of the Dominican situation and increasing subversion in the Hemisphere, we should make Castro's life as difficult as possible at home as a deterrent to his mounting interference outside his own borders. There were a number of things that could be done with existing capabilities and we should concentrate on hitting the source of the difficulty.

b. Mr. Bundy observed that the paper was a good statement of that viewpoint but we had spent some months in searching for ways to hurt Castro without hurting ourselves more and had not found them. He remained skeptical as to whether any or even a combination of the various methods would permanently damage Castro without our incurring high collateral political costs. Mr. Vance said he had just discussed the methods enumerated in a. through d. with the Secretary of Defense, and they had emerged negative on all higher noise-level operations at the present time. Ambassador Thompson indicated State was opposed, if for somewhat different reasons. Continual harassment by the U.S. might stimulate Soviet aid, whereas if left alone, the Soviets might tire of the rising costs, of Cuban disarray and ineptitude.

c. Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the problem of internal morale. If the Cubans on the island realized that the U.S. was faint-hearted, they would continue their coalescence into the Castro body politic. Already, agent recruitment was decidedly more difficult. Admiral Raborn asked about damaging the Cuban sugar crop with pesticides, for example. Mr. Bundy felt that the U.S. would be more severely hurt by widespread charges of B/W against Cuba.

d. The limited activities consisting of infiltration/exfiltration operations, intelligence collection, and economic measures appeared to be all the Committee members were prepared to endorse at this time.

e. Mr. Bundy said he would summarize the disparate views and present them to higher authority.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 019-003-3-3
By *JP* NARA, Date 12/7/01

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EYES ONLY

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Orig Chase 6/18

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~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

JUN 18 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Summary Statement of U.S. Policy
Toward Cuba

In response to your request, the attached summary statement concerning U.S. policy toward Cuba has been prepared by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. It has been approved by Assistant Secretary Vaughn and Deputy Under Secretary Thompson.

GRANT G. HILLIKER

Grant G. Hilliker
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-293
By icc, NARS, Date 12-7-84

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

I. Present Policy and Courses of Action: Our ultimate objective has been to replace the Castro regime. The immediate objectives have been (a) to reduce the will and ability of the Soviet-supported regime to organize Latin America in a form inimical to our interests and (b) to prevent the use of Cuba as an offensive base. In practical terms, we have been (a) trying to maintain pressure in order to exacerbate Cuban internal economic and political conditions; (b) trying to strengthen the Latin American ability to withstand subversion; and (c) hoping for the breaks that might produce a major change which would serve both the immediate and ultimate objectives.

Our principal pressures have been economic (the economic denial effort) and paramilitary (externally mounted hit-and-run sabotage and harassment actions, either directly under Agency control or through "autonomous" groups). Both kinds of pressures have been exerted only partially. The application of some economic denial measures has been inhibited, and the introduction of others ruled out, by the judgment that the risks of incurring political costs in our relations with allies outweighed the advantages to our Cuban policy. Similarly, the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started, and the program of the "autonomous" groups was abandoned after a reasonable trial, because of the decision that the damage to our broad interests, especially our relations with the USSR and the Vietnamese situation, would be disproportionate to benefits which we might obtain in terms of our Cuban policy. (In the case of the "autonomous" groups, moreover, there were, in practice, very limited benefits.) The overflights issue has also been a major factor in the calculation. These judgments have been influenced by the belief that developments in Cuba and Latin America were moving, even though slowly, in the right direction.

With respect to Cuba, this belief seems no longer to be warranted. According to very recent estimates, the Cuban economy improved in 1964 and will probably continue to move upward in 1965, principally because of increased sugar production. The economy is probably now back at or close to the pre-Castro level. Our economic denial program, limited by broad political considerations, has had only partial effects. In 1964, when Cuba was flush with foreign exchange, we were unable to prevent its acquisition of Western goods up to the limits of its exchange availabilities. In 1965, Cuban imports from the Free World will almost certainly be sharply down as a result, not of the denial program, but rather of exchange stringencies brought about by the very low world price of sugar. It is certainly true that we have prevented sales of critical commodities, that we have persuaded the

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Authority 019-003-3-4
By Ⓞ, NARA, Date 12-7-01

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

major Western powers to withhold further official credit facilities on the basis that Cuba was not credit-worthy and that we have hampered the development of the economy. But it has been a constant, scrambling struggle to do even this, and there are very recent reports that the British and the French are considering granting large amounts (\$50 million each) of credits. Moreover, we have always been faced with the possibility that the Soviets will simply make additional foreign exchange available to Cuba. The large (6 million tons) sugar crop, the signs of economic revival in Cuba, the continued Soviet assistance, and the general lack of sympathy with our economic denial efforts indicate that the program, as constituted at present, will become more and more difficult to carry out and less and less effective. With the decrease in external economic pressures, the prospects for continued economic progress become brighter, even though the economy will probably continue to be far from healthy for the next one or two years.

With respect to the internal political situation, the regime is subject to some stresses, but its control is firm. Morale among anti-Castro elements is low because of the efficiency of the security apparatus and the apparent permanence of the regime.

Externally, frictions between Castro and the Soviets and the Chinese exist and are potentially helpful. The community of interest is so great, however, as to override current difficulties. In the subversion sector, Cuba, with Soviet acquiescence, if not encouragement, has been trying to step up the pace. At least in the short term, the Dominican crisis probably has improved the atmosphere in Latin America for general Communist subversion. In spite of his uneasiness about our intervention in the Dominican Republic as an augury for himself, Castro almost certainly will try to capitalize on the situation and to intensify subversive efforts.

We have three gross options: (a) to continue our present programs; (b) to increase pressures; or (c) to adopt a "softer" line.

a. A continuation of our present policy will probably mean that, barring some fortuitous development, we will progressively lose ground in terms of our objectives. We will, however, incur relatively few risks with respect to other national objectives.

b. On the assumption that we do not intend to resort to military action, we can increase pressure by either taking additional economic measures or returning to paramilitary activities. The ex-

panded economic program could include (1) putting foreign firms trading with Cuba on a US proclaimed list, thus prohibiting business transactions in the United States (high political costs in our relations with our allies and limited effectiveness); (2) formally denying US Government contracts to foreign firms trading with Cuba (moderate political costs and potentially moderate effectiveness); (3) vigorously applying the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in areas hitherto considered politically sensitive (moderate political costs and quite limited effectiveness); and (4) financially assisting Free-World sugar producers to compete with Cuba (small political costs, high financial costs and moderate effectiveness). In the paramilitary field, the Agency could undertake a variety of actions involving sabotage and harassment designed to inflict economic and psychological damage and to create political tensions. These measures would be effective only if vigorously and continuously executed. They would involve serious political risks, particularly in our relations with the USSR.

c. The adoption of a "softer" line would entail a fundamental change in policy toward accommodation. Basically, it would involve the acceptance of a Communist state in Latin America, with a strong effort being made to curb its aggressive tendencies, probably in favor of a "Titoist" orientation. The chances are better than even that the choice of this option would be seriously damaging to our long-term interests, particularly in Latin America.

There is a fourth, very broad choice: The cessation of Soviet support of Castro as part of a global settlement of outstanding US-USSR issues. The analysis of this option is beyond the scope of this summary statement.

Rec'd
Cable
6-26-65
10:00 a

29

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 25, 1965
11:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Prime Minister Wilson has assured Ambassador Bruce that under no conditions will he agree to have his mission proceed on tour unless Hanoi or Moscow or Peiping agree to receive its members.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-300
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

London 207

Read
Ranch
6-26-65
10:00a

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 25, 1965 11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Disarmament Proposals

1. I have spoken to Dean Rusk and to Foster and Fisher, and we have agreed on a procedure for bringing up proposals in this field in such a way that you get a clear, free look at both sides of the argument.
2. In essence, our plan is that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should develop a full set of proposals and then submit them for critical comment by Defense, CIA, AEC, and State. These critical comments will be reviewed, discussed, and briefed for your consideration.
3. At the same time, Secretary Rusk expects to hold himself aloof from the comments of his department so as to be in a position to give you final private advice in the light of the situation as it develops.
4. We are hanging this study on your announcement today that we will be ready with proposals when there is a new international conference on disarmament. We do not know just when that meeting will be, but it will probably not be before General Assembly in the fall.
5. I will watch the development of these proposals closely and keep you informed on a current basis as the staff work goes forward.
6. Finally, and on a somewhat separate topic, I have now heard from several sources that a principal adviser on Senator Kennedy's speech was a Harvard professor named Roger Fisher. He is a sincere and zealous believer in arms control, but he should not be confused in any way with Adrian Fisher of ACDA, who is no relation.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-171
By ing, NARA, Date 6-17-87

Friday, June 25, 1965

31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Second Visit of Prime Minister Menzies

Ambassador Waller tells State that you urged him at the astronauts' reception to have Menzies come home through Washington to talk with you. He says Menzies would like very much to do this, if you still want him. He will be arriving in New York late on July 5 and will be moving on to the Pacific early July 7. He would therefore be available, either in Washington or in Texas, for a brief and informal meeting on July 6.

Shall we arrange such a meeting?

Yes _____

No _____

McG. B.

32

Thursday, June 24, 1965
7:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are two memoranda from Dean Rusk on your meetings with U Thant. I think you will want to follow your own lead on the more general memorandum. The one on Vietnam, however, is helpful.

On the whole, though, I think the simple thing to do with U Thant is to keep the heat on him to keep the heat on Hanoi (Peking is probably hopeless). The only way we will get out of this struggle is to have the North Vietnamese recognize their interest in negotiations. If U Thant knows how tough you are, he can give real help in the same way Nehru helped Eisenhower get an armistice in Korea.

McG. B.

~~SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS~~

Log Nos. 2710 and 2715



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 24, 1965

5:50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is one page shorter, and I have removed about ten excessive adjectives and overstatements. I think the speech stands up now as sober and appropriate for an anniversary. It does have some news in it, but I think it remains within your basic guidelines, and if there were no news at all, we would get an unnecessary roasting.

Other modifications I have made are at the points marked with numbers in the margins, as follows:

1. An emphasis upon the Anniversary.
2. (page 5). A sentence saying that we will support effective action by the UN in Vietnam.
3. (page 6) A reference to our desire to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. I have put this in simply to avoid the comment that we would get if we left it out.
4. (page 7) I have put the reference to increased food programs in lower case because Charlie Schultze tells me that if we say World Food Program, we will get into a budgetary commitment, that you may not like.
5. (page 7) I have checked with Francis Bator, who is a hard boiled economist, and he thinks we are safer if we say \$5.00 of population control is worth \$100 of the ordinary economic investment. This is conservative, but one to one hundred is rash.

McG. B.

Thursday, June 24, 1965
1:50 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am off to lunch with Kay Graham and the Washington Post people. The object of this lunch, which is the result of a good suggestion by Jack Valenti, is to educate them on the foreign policy process, and in particular to turn them away from the notion that a small group of hawks are running everything. I will also be working on substantive matters like Vietnam, and I expect they will press me on disarmament, on which I will take the view that these very tough matters are being worked out within the Government, and that alternatives are being prepared for your consideration -- and that in such a period I really cannot go very far in substantive discussion.

McG. B.

re

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 24, 1965
11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a possible page which would send Adlai to the Security Council.

There are two bases we ought to touch on this one -- the Saigon government and Stevenson himself. Saigon will be nervous, and the time for consultation is very short. Moreover, Taylor will probably take a cool view of this proposal. (I know my brother Bill is against it, for example, and I think he reflects the Embassy feeling.) Stevenson has also been wary because U Thant has been against using the Security Council. On the other hand, Cleveland has been entirely converted, as I know from a private staff job he did for me a week ago -- and I think with other topics out of the speech, Adlai will see the force of the argument for upgrading the UN by calling its attention to the present No. 1 world problem of war and peace.

Do you want me to generate a flash message to Saigon and a private talk with Stevenson?

McG. B.
McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

(6/24/65)

As we meet the peace is dangerously broken in Vietnam. The cause of the war is clear -- it is aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. Bound by our interests and commitments, and faithful to a charter framed to end aggression everywhere, we act with friends to turn back that ^{assault} aggression. Yet we have also acted, as others have not, to bring this dangerous situation to the conference table -- and we have steadily observed our obligation to report our actions to the United Nations.

Our efforts for peace have been matched by those of others. And more than once members of the United Nations and the Secretary General himself have sought to bring to bear the influence of this great organization. These attempts have been blocked by the opposition of others. But the world can no longer watch the raging fires of an aggressive war against South Vietnam while no voice is raised to call the United Nations into action.

I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to ask a meeting of the Security Council in New York as soon as these days of celebration have ended. In the Security Council the United States will seek support for unconditional discussions looking toward an honorable peace in which the people of South Vietnam can be free to frame their own future. If the United Nations can find ways to act, all who suffer from this war will be the gainers. And if not, the world will know just who is standing in the way.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36
Thursday, June 24, 1965
9:40 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Morse, Vietnam, and the UN

1. The Morse memorandum makes the tightest case I have seen for taking Vietnam to the UN. He recognizes that the Soviet Union might block action in the Security Council, and in that event he would press on into the General Assembly. He would "abide by" a majority vote in the General Assembly.

2. What he does not say is what kind of resolution he would press for either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. It is on this point that I think he should be pressed. Does he want the UN to vote ways and means of getting the North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam? Or does he want the General Assembly to validate a Communist takeover? Or does he simply want it to "observe", as it is doing in the Dominican Republic? The last is about all we could really hope to get, and while it might be worth it, it would certainly not bring peace, in and of itself.

3. As you know, I myself think that we can and should take further initiatives to see what the UN can do about Vietnam. I think this is primarily a tactical matter, designed to show that the Soviet Union is not prepared to desert other "socialist" countries on this issue. The trouble with this tactical approach, of course, is that a man who holds Morse's basic view is likely to denounce it as a fraud unless we take it all the way through and actively work for a resolution which would get us out of there. And if we are going to get out of Vietnam, I do not think it serves any good purpose to blacken the reputation of the UN by trying unsuccessfully to unload this responsibility on it. No one would be fooled, and both the UN and the US would be damaged.

4. So I think the underlying difference between us and Morse is not whether we should take the case to the UN, but what we take it there for. I would take it there to pin the rose of aggression on the Communists. I think Senator Morse would take it there in order to cover a withdrawal and a Communist takeover. But I am not sure, and this is what a talk with him may uncover.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-252
By ics, NARS, Date 6-19-84

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S
DESK

Wed., June 23, 1965
4:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is what a member of de Gaulle's
French opposition says about the
Vice President's visit. It just shows
you can't please everybody.

McG B
McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1)

(copy of PARIS 7274, June 23, 1965)

Jean Lecanuet (President of the Mouvement Republique Populaire, which is the equivalent of Christian Democratic Party) expressed his view to Embassy Office June 23 that the Vice President's visit had been providential for de Gaulle, as it gave the General a most effective rebuttal to those in France who criticize him for anti-American and anti-NATO policies. Lecanuet referred to pictures on State-controlled television June 20 showing Prime Minister Pompidou surrounded by the Vice President and the American astronauts, and by Soviet Vice President of Council and Soviet astronaut. Such pictures are highly useful to de Gaulle to demonstrate that France is the center of world attention (or, as de Gaulle put it last April: "They (his critics) are alarmed at our isolation, at a time when there have never been so many eager people about us") and that Franco-American relations, as well as Franco-Soviet relations, are good and friendly. Lecanuet said the Vice President's visit had completely cut the ground from under Democratic opposition which now will no longer be able to use de Gaulle's anti-Americanism as one of the key issues in Presidential elections. Source thought de Gaulle's electoral strength had been enhanced by Vice President's visit, and that opposition candidacies were now even more meaningless.

Finally, Lecanuet believed we could expect "continued campaign of smiles" from de Gaulle between now and elections, but warned that after re-election, de Gaulle would rapidly resume previous policy of demonstrating "national independence."

BOHLEN

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 23, 1965
4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for 5:30 Meeting

I attach an annotated agenda for our meeting at 5:30 this afternoon. The top sheet shows the bare outline of each subject and the names of those attending.

At Tab 1 is the agenda on Vietnam; at Tab 2, that on Berlin; at Tab 3, the Dominican Republic.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

*Reid
Wed. 6/23/65
4:28 p.m.*

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State 11-30-78 NSC 8-10-79
By DCH NARS, Date 8-23-82

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
Wednesday, June 23, 1965, 5:30 PM

1. VIETNAM

- (1) Rolling Thunder 20
- (2) Saigon's planned break of relations with France
- (3) Future use of B-52's
- (4) Soviet attitudes and what we should do about them
- (5) Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's mission
- (6) Report on political programs of the Ky government

Present:

<u>State Department</u>	<u>Defense Department</u>	<u>White House</u>
Secretary Rusk	Secretary McNamara	Mr. Bundy
Under Secy. Ball	Deputy Secy. Vance	Mr. Busby
Amb. Thompson	Asst. Secy. McNaughton	Mr. Cater
Asst. Secy. Bundy		
	<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>	
	Admiral Raborn	
	Mr. Richard Helms	

2. BERLIN

- (1) The Helicopter problem

Present:

<u>State Department</u>	<u>Defense Department</u>	<u>White House</u>
Secretary Rusk	Secretary McNamara	Mr. Bundy
Under Secy. Ball	Deputy Secy. Vance	Mr. Busby
Amb. Thompson		Mr. Cater
Asst. Secretary Leddy	<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>	
	Admiral Raborn	
	Mr. Richard Helms	

3. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- (1) Progress report on OAS proposals
- (2) Review of troop levels
- (3) Report on planning for OAS meeting

Present:

<u>State Department</u>	<u>Defense Department</u>	<u>White House</u>
Secretary Rusk	Secretary McNamara	Mr. Bundy
Under Secy. Ball	Deputy Secy. Vance	Mr. Busby
Under Secy. Mann		Mr. Cater
Asst. Secy. Vaughn	<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>	Mr. Chase
	Admiral Raborn	
	Mr. Helms	

Tab

TAB
1

VIETNAM~~SECRET~~

1. Rolling Thunder 20

Bob McNamara will have a chart and I think he and Dean Rusk will have an agreed position. You probably will not wish to discuss targets in detail, even with such a select group as this. Bob needs one good solid target, and I think he will have settled it with Dean before you come in. He already has my proxy.

2. Saigon's Breach of Relations with France

The new military government has apparently decided to break relations with Paris. We all think this is a mistake because of the French power of retaliation. There remains a slight difference of opinion as to whether we should say out loud it is a mistake. You will want to hear Rusk on this point.

3. Future Use of B-52s

Bob McNamara wants to go right on with the B-52s, and in principle, most of us agree. The real problem is not in the military decision but in the public relations handling. I have asked Doug Cater to study this one and he may have ideas.

4. Soviet Attitudes and What we Should do About Them

This is not an action matter, but I think it would be helpful for us all to hear Tommy Thompson's current thinking. The Soviets have just turned down the Wilson Peace Mission and in rather tough language. At the same time they are floating the notions that Tony Lewis picked up in the Times this morning -- even hinting that we can do anything we want as long as we do it in South Vietnam. It is worth a moment's discussion.

5. Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's Mission

My brother Bill will have the latest on this one. We expect the British to move right ahead even though no Communists give them the time of day.

6. Political Progress of the Ky Government

I have put this one in to keep everybody's attention focussed on the fact that our problem is indeed as much political as military. My brother will be ready to comment.

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Authority NLS 83-252~~SECRET~~By is, NARS, Date 6-19-84


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TAB
2

BERLINSECRET

The Helicopter Problem

This is the matter of East German helicopters over West Berlin which I reported to you last week. Thompson has talked with McCloy and Acheson and other wise men and will be prepared to tell you how this problem now looks. The most interesting proposal yet made is that we might get some kites for the Berlin children to fly -- helicopters apparently hate kites. (Thompson's memo to me is attached).

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Thompson
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The Secretary, George Ball, the German boys, and I had a useful discussion yesterday with Dean Acheson and Jack McCloy on the helicopter problem in Berlin. There was no disagreement with the steps we are already taking, such as official representations in Moscow and/or the three capitals. It was also agreed that we should press the Germans to suspend negotiations between Airflot and Lufthansa relating this to the helicopter problem.

The main issue discussed was whether or not we should ourselves resume helicopter flights over East Berlin. The military are in general opposed to doing this at this time as they fear that linking these with the East German flights might end in our losing our right to fly over East Berlin. We probably have little chance of stopping the East German flights over East Berlin unless we take some very strong action, such as paralleling their flights along the sector border with flights of our own inside East Berlin. It is not certain that this would lead to cessation of their flights but if it did, we would probably end up by having to give up our own flights.

The general judgment of Acheson and McCloy was that we should maintain the legal position that all East German flights ^{in the Berlin control zone} are a violation of quadripartite rules but that in fact we only act to prevent the East Germans flying over West ~~East~~ Berlin. They would go quite far in this connection even to the point of using force to bring down an East German helicopter over West Berlin.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99


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- 2 -

The Secretary suggested we should investigate the "dirty tricks" department to see if we could not make the East Germans look ridiculous. The most hopeful idea which we are investigating is to encourage West Berlin youths to fly kites along the sector borders to harass the East German flights.

General Clay was not available but may be able to come down tomorrow.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Tommy". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Llewellyn E. Thompson

~~SECRET~~

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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TAB
3

DOMINICAN REPUBLICSECRET

1. Progress Report on OAS Proposals


Tom Mann will have the latest on this.

2. Review of Troop Levels

I think we should work on this one regularly and have asked Bob McNamara to be ready to speak.

3. Report on Planning for the OAS Meeting in Rio in August

This meeting is still somewhat uncertain, but it is none too soon for you to hear the shape of the problem, and Tom Mann will be ready on this one, too.

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6/24/65
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 24, 1965
1:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have talked with my brother Bill and with Dean Rusk and at their suggestion, also with George Ball. The Secretary is the least negative and Bill the most so.

The basic arguments against going to the Security Council now are three:

- a. that it would be unsettling in Saigon. This can be controlled, but not prevented.
- b. that it would require Moscow to take a harsh public line against us at a time when we still have some hope to engage them more usefully in negotiation.
- c. there is a danger that Hanoi would read this appeal as weakness.

Given these difficulties, I am inclined now to back away from this one. I think it would be wiser to take the position that if there should ever be a prospect of effective action in the UN, we would be the first to work for it. Language which might do that sort of thing follows and could be fitted in to the present draft quite easily, I believe.

If at any time there is a prospect of effective action for peace in Vietnam, through any of the agencies of the United Nations, the United States will be the first to work for UN action.

McG. B.

McG. B.