

40

Wednesday, June 23, 1965
11:20

MR. PRESIDENT:

It looks to me as if Rusk's final revision may not get here much before he goes to give his speech, so I think you may wish to look at this next-to-last draft, which he tells me is the same in substance as what he now plans to say.

McG. B.

41

41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 22, 1965, 9:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senator Robert Kennedy's Statement on Nuclear Proliferation.

At Mr. Bundy's request, I prepared the attached comments for him on Senator Robert Kennedy's Statement on Nuclear Proliferation, scheduled for delivery tomorrow. I have read the main points to Mr. Bundy on the phone, and he asked me to send the memorandum directly to you for your evening reading.

Spurgeon Keeny
Spurgeon Keeny

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

41a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Bundy

Subject: Senator Robert Kennedy's statement on nuclear proliferation.

The proposals contained in Senator Kennedy's speech (attached) have for the most part been widely discussed in disarmament circles both inside and outside of government. Much of the material was in fact included in Governor Stevenson's opening speech before the United Nations Disarmament Committee. I have reviewed the texts of the Gilpatric Report, Secretary Rusk's Memorandum to the President on the San Francisco speech, and the ACDA* Memorandum to Secretary Rusk on the San Francisco speech and have concluded that Senator Kennedy's speech was not drawn directly from any one of these documents. At the same time, I believe that the author may well have been familiar with the content of the Gilpatric Report and was almost certainly aware of the current proposals being made in connection with the San Francisco speech.

I base the above conclusions on the following observations on the contents of the speech:

1. The first proposal, calling for a non-proliferation treaty, is fundamental to this entire subject as is the concept of guarantees to non-nuclear countries against nuclear blackmail. However, coupling the two ideas in a single package is somewhat distinctive. While both suggestions were mentioned separately in the Gilpatric Report, they were specifically coupled in both the ACDA and Rusk Memoranda on the San Francisco speech. Although the subject is frequently discussed in disarmament circles, it is significant that none of these documents suggests that we modify our MLF plans to overcome Soviet objections to a non-proliferation treaty as Senator Kennedy's statement suggests.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-171
By ig, NARA, Date 6-17-87

* Arms Control & Disarmament Agency.

2. The second proposal, the concept of nuclear free zones, is also fundamental to the problem and was emphasized by the Gilpatric Report. Neither the ACDA nor Rusk Memorandum includes this point.

3. The third proposal, suggesting that the partial test ban treaty be extended to underground tests presumably without on-site inspection, is a new proposal that has very recently been pushed by ACDA and was not contained in the Gilpatric Report. This proposal was included in the ACDA Memorandum on San Francisco but was dropped in the Rusk Memorandum. Although the concept of a threshold treaty is very old and was at one time in fact the U.S. position, it has recently to my knowledge only been discussed in inner government disarmament circles.

4. The fourth proposal that suggests we couple reductions in our strategic nuclear forces to our existing proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, has been discussed in disarmament circles inside and outside of government. However, it is significant that this was the principal new proposal in both the ACDA and Rusk Memoranda on San Francisco. This point was touched on but was not central to the argument in the Gilpatric Report.

5. The fifth proposal that we should strengthen and support the International Atomic Energy Agency is, of course, central to present U.S. policy. The problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the IAEA was emphasized in the Gilpatric Report and was not mentioned in either the ACDA or Rusk Memorandum. The speech mentions one special aspect of this problem that has not been widely discussed but was of considerable concern to the Gilpatric Panel, namely, the fact that Euratom operates outside of IAEA safeguards. It also repeats a rather specialized suggestion that was touched on in the Gilpatric Report but was not mentioned in either the ACDA or Rusk Memoranda, namely, that we consider IAEA controls for fabricating and processing of all fuel for all peaceful reactors.

6. The sixth proposal that we continue our present efforts to lessen our own reliance on nuclear weapons is a point generally not included in lists of non-proliferation measures. It was emphasized, however, in the Gilpatric Report. There is no reference to this subject in either the ACDA or Rusk Memorandum or in any other recent discussions of this subject of which I am aware.

7. The final reference to the desirability of involving China in the disarmament negotiations has, of course, been proposed by many groups. The subject was discussed in general terms in the Gilpatric Report. Although a specific proposal along this line was made in Harlan Cleveland's memorandum to Rusk on the San Francisco speech, the subject was not discussed in the ACDA or Rusk Memorandum.

Although none of the above items is in itself unique, the overall package appears to be too close to the proposals for San Francisco to be coincidental. The connection with the Gilpatric Committee is much more tenuous but the overall organization and some of the details certainly suggest familiarity with the findings of the Gilpatric Committee.

Spurgeon Keeny
Spurgeon Keeny

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

42
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Tuesday, June 22, 1965
6:55 PM

Mr. President

Admiral Raborn has asked
me to pass on this report
in response to your request.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

NLJ.019,003.003/5
~~SANITIZED~~
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-54
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-01

2574
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42a

22 June 1965

SUBJECT: Estimate of Attitudes of News Media and General Population in Certain Countries, to U.S. Policies as Exemplified by our Actions in Vietnam and Santo Domingo

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. This is a narrative tabulation of the general thrust of the responses received [REDACTED] to the question posed:

a. In Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Thailand and the Philippines, our policies, particularly on Vietnam, receive general understanding and support. Our policies on Santo Domingo are clearly of less interest and concern. The minority opposition to our policies, where it exists in these countries, takes full advantage of our domestic opposition as it finds expression in our own news media. (This factor is prevalent generally, in varying degrees, in the countries we queried.)

b. In England, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, reactions to our policies are mixed and confused.

(1) In England, divided opinion among the population and the major newspapers, which favored U.S. policies slightly a few months ago, has shifted to a more pronounced attitude of questioning and disfavor as a result of the bombings of North Vietnam and the possibility of U.K. involvement in a disagreeable conflict of doubtful outcome. Here again, interest is high on the Vietnamese situation and on a low order of magnitude and declining on the Dominican question.

(2) In Norway, which is generally sympathetic to the U.S. objectives, there is opposition to our policies both in the press and among the people, caused mostly by concern over the broader possible consequences of escalation, with particular reference to the fact that Norway has a common border with the Soviet Union and would not like to suffer the fate of Finland.

~~SECRET~~

(3) In Denmark, while our policies in Vietnam on the whole receive general support, and are understood, our position in Santo Domingo is not adequately understood and is therefore criticized.

(4) In Sweden, although there is much ambivalence of attitude and vocal criticism, the estimate is that strong moves in Vietnam or Latin America would ultimately be viewed rationally by the Swedes and receive their political support.

c. In Japan and Finland, the press and the public generally are unsympathetic if not strongly critical of our policies, and in France a measure of public support of our firm stand in Vietnam is being eroded by De Gaulle's anti-U. S. position and press criticisms of our policies in both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

d. In Iceland, very little interest is shown in either Vietnam or Dominican issues. The local government papers are generally sympathetic to the U. S. policy and difficulties, and the Communist press highly critical.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. On a world-wide basis, we can draw the following generalizations



a. In many sectors of the populations there is a basic apathy toward both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, except as various forms of local self-interest are affected, in terms of local elections, present commitments in the areas concerned, or national survival. The situation in Vietnam is far better understood and the issues more clear, although there is doubt about the future. There is some frustration over the fact that modern technology has not prevailed in a jungle war. The most prevalent fear is that the bombings of North Vietnam could lead to further escalation and perhaps a general war.

b. On the other hand, the Dominican questions are in many instances too remote to stimulate any real concern, or are considered to be localized. The rationale behind the U. S. action is often misunderstood, and our "intervention" regretted or vilified.

~~SECRET~~

c. Where there is strong opposition to U. S. policies, it is often lead by the left-wing media and organized leftist or Communist front groups. (France is an exception, where their role is secondary.) A disproportionate advantage is taken of U. S. news media and news services coverage of domestic U. S. dissent to the Administration's policies.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. The tenor [REDACTED] suggests that in all our policy statements, news releases, and guidances to receptive journalists and editors, the U. S. must project the image of a nation mindful of and willing to exercise its responsibilities as a Free World leader. The U. S. must show that we are ready to take positive initiatives -- unilaterally or in concert with other nations as time and circumstances permit -- to expose the true character of Communism, to oppose Communist subversion and aggrandizement in any form, and to employ force judiciously when the Communist side proves unreceptive to negotiation and consultation and persists in its subversive efforts. The U. S. needs frequently to reiterate its objectives and to express them in terms understandable and acceptable to the man in the street here and abroad. The U. S. must avoid giving the impression that it is we who are afraid of the Communist bogeyman; we must make clear the implications of Communism and our objectives, to each country or region. Above all, it is imperative that the other nations of the Free World understand our policies, and retain full confidence in our interests and capabilities.

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd
6-22-65
6:30 P

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(1)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 22, 1965
6:10 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: UAR PL480 announcement

John Finney of the Times got hold of the \$37 million wheat sale today (we think through Congressmen to whom we have been giving final briefings). Dean Rusk has decided to go ahead with the story for the morning papers on an official basis, with a release for about 7 PM tonight. The release is simple and straightforward. I have called Manny Celler and Abe Multer to ask them to keep the peace among Jewish members as much as they can. They both see the point, although they are both distressed.

We will be meeting in the next day or so with the Jewish members of the House here, with Lee White, Harry MacPherson and Bob Komer, to remind them quietly of all the things we do for Israel.

McG. B.

myda

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday
June 22, 1965
12:15 PM

*Rec'd - 16
12*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Jap-ROK settlement

Dean Rusk, on second thought, feels that it would be dangerous to attach your name to the Japanese-ROK settlement in the statements today, because of the possibility of backlash from Tokyo. So, on his recommendation I have agreed that the initial statement will be made in the Department of State. We will pick up the backgrounding in a day or so to show your own deep interest in the matter and how it has contributed to a settlement.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Tuesday
June 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reply to Macapagal on Sugar

Way back on June 2 Ambassador Ledesma brought you a letter from Macapagal on sugar. The Department has advised holding up an answer until we could see just what our own proposal was going to be. They have also wanted to hold back while Ledesma pressed the matter of troops for Vietnam.

Now the sugar plan is getting into shape. Instead of giving the Filipinos a share of the former Cuban quota, we expect to propose that they participate in the annual growth of U. S. demand for sugar. This is not so good in the short run, but much more dependable in the long run, and we think it can be sold. At the same time, we want to keep you out of the direct outcome, so this letter is phrased rather generally.

The particular reason for timing it now is to get it into Ledesma's hands as a kind of payment for his own efforts on the troop issue. That is not finished business yet, but it is making progress.

McG. B.

June 22, 1965

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46
J

Dear Wayne:

I want to thank you warmly for your memorandum on the relation between Vietnam and the United Nations. This is a subject of great importance, and yours is a thoughtful memorandum. I have asked that it be given careful study. You can be sure that if, at any time, we think there is a real prospect of progress through the United Nations, we will be the first to move.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Wayne Morse
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

(note from mjdr: Pres has kept Sen. Morse's memo and Mr. Bundy's covering note and 1 cy of this reply. 6/22/65)

LEJ:McGB:ab

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Reid
Mon. 6/21/65
2:30

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-55 / FRUS 64-68, Vol. XXV #134
By eum, NARA Date 7-3-01

✓ 47
Staff
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28

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday
June 21, 1965
1:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have set in train the following actions to flesh out your new tactical line designed to soften up the Paks and Indians, and make them come to us:

1. Stalling on MAP. Though matters referred to you recently have involved only economic aid and PL 480, we're operating on the assumption that you want well-orchestrated action across the board. So we've told DOD that, while not suspending everything, we should delay action on certain key MAP and sales items to make both Paks and Indians come to us. In India's case this means chiefly continued stalling on F-5s; in Pakistan's case on F-104s, ammo, and perhaps armor.

Since there is a higher risk of a Pak/Indian flareup than any time since 1947, our stalling on MAP makes sense as a warning here too. A major risk, however, is that we're driving the Indian military to get more from the Soviets, which doesn't serve our longer term interest.

2. Intelligence. Since Ayub thinks the Peshawar facility is his top card, we're looking at ways and means of convincing him it isn't all that important to us. For example, we could halt new construction. This would make the intelligence community scream, but is probably worth it. We're also planning to use [redacted] to get across indirectly to Ayub that we're close to giving up on the Paks.

Get Kaboru opinion

3. Stalling on Pak Consortium. So far our hold-up on economic aid is hurting the Indians more than the Paks (for the simple reason that more Indian matters have been pending). But the next big occasion will be the FY 1966 pledge to the Pak Consortium, due 27 July. We favor telling the Paks now that we want to postpone this a month, ostensibly for economic reasons. Our thought is to have George Woods go to London and tell Ayub. This will shake Ayub, and buy us more time to see whether our signals are getting through.

↓
Last late!
Woods
break 6:30
He did
is
this

Are we on the right track on the above? Our new tough-minded Pak/Indian tactics are causing much anguish in the town, especially from those who see their programs endangered. It would help if you'd tell Rusk in particular (he missed the June meeting), so that we'll have State with us, instead of dragging its feet on such matters.

Yes
No

(in l com - info)

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer
1 0 2

Monday
June 21, 1965
1:30 PM

48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your June 8 memorandum to the Secretary of State was circulated as an EXDIS paper in the Department to:

Under Secretary Ball
Under Secretary Mann
Assistant Secretary Cleveland (action)
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. William Foster - ACDA
Mr. Lloyd Hand - Protocol

McG. B.

Rec'd
June 21
11 am

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RR 6/21

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(15)

49

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 21, 1965
10:50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

calmness

This two-page summary of the African problem by Bob Komer is well worth reading. In essence, he proposes a policy of friendliness but ~~coolness~~ calmness. He points out rightly that the furor over our Congo operation has died down and that great big aid programs simply do not do what we want them to do. (The whole Ghana project is a case in point, although a backout now would have the kind of effect on a smaller scale than came out of the Foster Dulles-Aswan decision).

My only reservation about Bob's proposal is its endorsement of Presidential noisemaking about the Portuguese and the South Africans. I think we have to be very careful with this and speak much more in sorrow than in anger. In practical terms, both the Portuguese and the South Africans have more of a case than our liberal attitudes find it easy to recognize. And what is still more important is that righteous noises from here do not make them more moderate. I believe, therefore, that we should be very careful indeed in the way we support African aspirations here -- though I do agree that in the end, this is the side we should be on.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

June 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Our African Affairs. This responds to your request via Bill Moyers. First off, we've recovered a good deal from the low point of the Congo paratroop last fall. The back of the Congo rebellion has been broken, though cleaning up may go on for months. More and more African states are beginning to do business with Tshombe. Meanwhile, a surprising number of countries are adopting a more pro-Western stance--Kenya, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and now perhaps Algeria. Our biggest problem at the moment is the backlash from Vietnam and Santo Domingo, although our parochial African friends are not too responsive to Communist propaganda on these affairs.

Problems on the Horizon. Looking ahead, what will mostly agitate Africans over the next few years will be the "liberation" of the southern third of Africa, which the new African countries regard as their chief unfinished business. In Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, Southwest Africa, and South Africa itself white minority governments are sitting repressively on volcanoes.

These issues will provide the chief test of outside sympathy for African aspirations in 1965-70. So I'm convinced that the stance we take toward them will have greater weight in determining our African image and influence than any "Marshall Plan for Africa" or similar grandiose schemes. The Soviets and Chicoms have a big advantage in this competition; they preach violent revolution while trying hard to pin on us guilt by association. This is true in a way. The Azores base makes us chary of seeming too anti-Portuguese, and we and the UK have major investments and trade ties with Rhodesia and South Africa. So we do have assets we could lose.

Proposed US Stance. The more we can stay ahead of the game on southern African issues, instead of being dragged reluctantly toward the inevitable, the better we will get along with Africa. In any case we want to press the intransigent white regimes to modify their repressive policies before there are explosions which the Communists will exploit. Ideally, we want evolution not revolution, which will minimize the likelihood of violence and of risk to our assets in the area. The way to start is by a more forthright declaration of US policy, initially in general terms. This can come best from the White House itself.

US Aid Policy. Soapy Williams and our country teams all tend to see the African problem too much in terms of US aid. We are already investing about

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

\$145 million in economic aid and MAP, and \$150 million in food. I don't see us going up very fast. Nor do I think we'd buy much. The new African countries are mostly in such a primitive state of development, and are so hipped on inter-necine quarrels that I doubt whether even a massive US investment now would show a commensurate result. In any event, there are more profitable ways to spend our aid money. So I'd argue for only a gradual increase in US aid, with concentration on such dramatic impact projects as the communications satellite idea (if it proves feasible).

Tactical Disengagement from the Bad Guys. Our Africanists tend to run too fast after the radical Africans. They overstate the risks to us from a degree of Chicom or Soviet influence in certain countries. Our experience to date has been that most African states which have tasted the fruits of Communist support in the first flush of independence have tended to get a stomach ache (Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Kenya are cases in point). So I'm against rushing in too fast to bail out radical regimes in trouble. Let's keep a foot in the door everywhere, and let's be decently responsive where opportunity offers, but let these wayward countries come to us rather than courting them too eagerly.

The above is the bare bones outline of what I see as a sensible new policy toward Africa. I'd lay heaviest stress on deliberately showing greater sympathy for the remaining independence movements, even if it breaks some crockery. A few rousing speeches will buy us more than \$200 million in aid.



R. W. Komer

F

"I've got to read that memorandum tomorrow.

50
✓

Take it off and let the letter go, and put that on my desk tomorrow."

LBJ/vm
9:20 pm
6-21-65

This can be
filed.
WML:tk
7/9

Raid
Mon 6/21/65
11:45 am

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50a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday
June 21, 1965
10:00 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think Morse's memorandum is tightly argued and complex, and if we answer it point by point at this stage, we will be almost sure to trip over ourselves as we make tactical decisions in the coming months. So it seems to me better to give him the soft answer which is suggested in the attached draft.

And just because his paper is so well argued, I am sending a copy to Harlan Cleveland so that in anything we do we can take account of the possibility of flanking fire from Morse.

McG. B.

McG. B.

SECTION I

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON UNITED STATES POLICIES IN VIETNAM

1. United States policies toward Vietnam should encompass at least the following essentials:

(a) They should command widespread support and respect throughout the world and throughout the United States. This is not presently the case.

(b) They must contemplate the cost of "victory" as well as defeat. The cost is already high and we have no sign of victory.

(c) The United States will make a profound error if we do no more than prosecute the war. The longer it continues, the more likely it will escalate, and we cannot escalate it ourselves without China and Russia escalating their participation, too.

It would be a very serious mistake to think the American people would support a stalemated ground war in Vietnam for a period long enough to force the Communists into negotiating. They refused to support that kind of war in Korea. It became a choice between going all out to win, or ending it on almost any terms.

We alone cannot stop the war in Vietnam. But the United Nations could. The United States has more to gain from a U. N.-imposed peace than from a continuation of the fighting, leading we know not where.

It is frequently alleged that the United States has three possible courses of action in Vietnam: to escalate, to get out, or to stalemate the issue until the other side gets tired.

But there is another course of action which is positive in a world framework, even if the short range effects in Vietnam may be difficult, embarrassing, and involve loss of face. This course is for the United States to call on the United Nations to make the Vietnamese war its business. More is involved than suggesting that the Secretary General visit Hanoi and Peking. What is required is a specific application of U. N. procedures.

2. If we have a desire and determination to use the United Nations as prescribed in the Charter, there are many ways in which it can be done. If we desire only to make a gesture to the U. N., there are many ways in which we can make sure our gesture is rejected.

On the record, our unilateral action has served to spread both the war and the degree of Communist control in South Vietnam. It is a real question whether the United Nations could do more poorly than we have done, if it is our objective to keep the peace and to forestall Communism.

3. Because North Vietnam -- a non-member of the U. N. -- said U. N. action was "inappropriate" in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Security Council or the General Assembly over any situation that threatens the peace.

To give a veto to North Vietnam over this matter is a travesty on the power of the United Nations.

Those of us who were here when President Truman rallied the United Nations in 1950 to throw back aggression in Korea remember that even the opposition of the Soviet Union did not stop us. She walked out of the Security Council and in her absence it took up the breach of the peace in Korea. When Russia came back and used her veto on the implementation of the decision to intervene, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, and it acted.

North Korea was not invited to take part in the discussions, and she did not ask to take part; that did not deter the U. N. from acting. Like North Vietnam, North Korea was not a U. N. member.

North Vietnam, mainland China, and South Vietnam are not members of the United Nations. None should be accorded a veto over prospective United Nations action in Southeast Asia, either by declining to take part in its discussions or by opposing what is proposed.

4. We could request the Vietcong to join us, South Vietnam, and possibly North Vietnam in negotiations. The use of acceptable mediators and conciliators could be discussed.

The terms of the Charter provide certain steps to be taken when breaches of the peace occur. The first is Article 33:

"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means."

Our offers to negotiate with North Vietnam and with China have not been accepted. However, the Vietcong is a principal party to the dispute in South Vietnam, and until we offer to negotiate with them or undertake with them any of the other means of settlement above, we have not really explored the possibilities of this Article. Moreover, China could be left out of arrangements under this Article since she is not a party to the dispute.

5. Article 34 describes the jurisdiction of the Security Council:

"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

Obviously, the war in Vietnam qualifies for at least "investigation" by the Security Council.

Article 35 continues:

"1. Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

"2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations to pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

"3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12."

There is a considerable movement afoot among members of the British Labor Party to induce the British Government to act under this Article to put the Vietnam war before the Security Council. Article 99 of the Charter also impowers the Secretary General to bring before the Security Council a dispute he regards as a potential threat to peace. Since members, non-members, and the Secretary General all have the right to do it, the United States would be in the best position if it acts to seek U. N. jurisdiction before someone else does it and, in effect, makes the United States a defendant in the matter.

6. If we fail to get discussions, we should invite the Vietcong, North and South Vietnam to join us in laying the dispute before the Security Council.

Article 37 is a clear statement of American obligation if we fail to settle the Vietnam problem by peaceful means of our own choosing:

"1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

"2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute in fact is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate."

Very likely the Vietcong and North Vietnam will never join us in referring the war to the Security Council. But they are not U. N. members, and we are. They do not claim to stand for the rule of law in the world, and we do. They could not muster anything like the support in the U. N. that we could.

Like North Korea, they probably would not appear at all. But it is their objective to take control of territory they do not now control; and it is our objective to keep them out. A peace-keeping mission of the U. N. could very likely do more to achieve our stated objective than we are doing.

7. Public notice should next be served that we intend to lay the Vietnam war before the Security Council under Articles 35 and 37. Then we should engage in some realistic private talks with the Russians over what kind of U. N. action they would support, making it clear that if we fail to get Security Council action, we will go to the General Assembly.
8. As with many legislative matters, this is one of whether we want "an issue or a bill." If we want a "bill," in the form of U. N. action, we would have to deal with the other powerful U. N. members -- chiefly Russia and France -- to work out a United Nations program which they at least would not veto. After all, the Soviet Union did not veto the Cyprus peace force.

And there is every reason to think Russia is anxious to see the Vietnam war brought under control so she will not continue being forced to come to the support of a sister Communist state. It is worth a great deal to us to find out whether Russia is interested in a U. N. jurisdiction over the war in the form of a peace mission that would stop it, or more interested in her rivalry with China over who does more to aid wars of liberation.

Some say that bringing it up in the U. N. would force Russia to take China's part and drive them closer together. That is an excuse, not a reason. The longer the war continues, the more involved Russia must become simply because of her rivalry with China.

9. If we do find that Russia prefers the war to continue, or if France or Nationalist China poses some insurmountable obstacle, we can still go to the General Assembly. We have done it before, both with Korea and the Congo.
10. There is nothing in such a policy that would be inconsistent with our commitment of support to South Vietnam. Article 51 of the Charter affirms the right of individual or collective self-defense --

"until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

We can help South Vietnam until the U. N. acts to restore peace. Moreover, our 1954 commitment was from an American president to a South Vietnamese president. It is not a treaty; but the American commitment to the U. N. Charter is a treaty.

Our commitment to South Vietnam called for U. S. aid, meaning foreign aid, and we extended it "provided your government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied."

The Government of South Vietnam was unable to fulfill its obligations. Yet we went infinitely beyond our obligation, into co-belligerency. By so doing, we have become involved in a situation that brings us under those provisions of the United Nations Charter to which I have referred.

SECTION II

SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE WHITE HOUSE

POLICY STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

At the risk of being presumptuous, I respectfully submit the following language for the President to consider using in his address in San Francisco..

"I stand here today to rededicate the United States of America to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. I propose to do this not by word, but by deed.

"Today there rages in Indochina an undeclared war. Some call it a civil war. Others call it a war of aggression. Others call it a war of liberation.

"I care not what it is called. It is war. It can spread and destroy all man has built. Men and women and children are dying. Passions are rising, uncontrolled.

"The United States is involved in this war. Let there be no mistake, the United States can win it. We believe great and fundamental issues are involved that may affect the future of mankind and the direction in which he grows. We believe that the independence of all small states is involved in Vietnam.

"But we are ready to be judged by the conscience of mankind as represented in the United Nations.

"I am, therefore, calling on the Security Council of the United Nations (Articles 34, 35 and 37) to vest itself of the situation in Vietnam as a 'dispute or situation. . .likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security..'

"I also take this occasion to state that my government will abide by such decision as may be taken by the Security Council. I go further and say that if the Security Council should not be able to resolve the war in Vietnam, my government will call for a Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and place the situation before that body of world conscience. We will abide by its recommendations.

"Finally, I have ordered the military forces of the United States to suspend all air and naval attacks north of the 17th parallel for a period of one month while the United Nations considers the threat to the peace implicit in the situation in Vietnam."

Dear Wayne:

I want to thank you warmly for your memorandum on the relation between Vietnam and the United Nations. This is a subject of great importance, and yours is a thoughtful memorandum. I have asked that it be given careful study. You can be sure that if, at any time, we think there is a real prospect of progress through the United Nations, we will be the first to move.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Wayne Morse
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:McGB:ab

~~TOP SECRET~~

(copy of VIENTIANE 2054, June 21, 1965)

In company with Air Attache, I spent all day Sunday with Royal Laotian Air Force Commander General Ma. He first reviewed with us (at his Savanna-Khet headquarters) action which he has undertaken in the course of the past month meticulously tracing out routes which he believes North Vietnam is using to support the 325th Division now located south of the 17th parallel. This has involved literally hundreds of sorties, flown mostly at tree-top level, to determine roads, way stations, and truck parks. He now believes he has a fairly good fix on two principal routes, generally moving eastward from Muong Nong to the South Vietnam frontier. He has occasionally flushed out convoys on these routes and has succeeded in destroying several trucks.

Nevertheless, all our Yankee team photo reconnaissance missions over this area have failed to turn up a decent trace of a recognizable route. Moreover, there have been two occasions during the past week when General Ma has called for U. S. jet strikes (Bango mission) on these routes and jets, upon arrival at the scene, have not, repeat not, been able to find the road, or their target. In part, this has been due to dicey weather, but in even greater measure, it has, I am sure, been due to impenetrable tree canopy which high-speed, high-flying jets literally cannot, repeat not, see through.

In order to demonstrate significance of this latter point, General Ma and Colonel Noupheut, Commanding GM 18, took us by helicopter to some forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I, despite our several years' experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "trail," even in this rainy season, was a thoroughly passable road. We drove two jeeps over it for more than a mile. It would have easily accommodated 4x4 trucks. Yet nowhere on this road, except for two very limited areas, was it open to the sky. Even flying over it slowly with a helicopter, the road was not discernible from above. The Air Attache took several photographs demonstrating the canopy which he will submit through his channels.

It seems clear to me, from this experience, that significant quantities of logistics can still be moving over routes which General Ma and his men have so meticulously plotted out for us but which our strike aircraft are unable to discern. This obviously poses a number of military problems, but it also involves some fairly basic political decisions. Among them are questions of massive employment of defoliants, bombing on infra-red rather than visual controls, using saturation bombing tactics to create major choke points, etc.

Any decisions on these matters, I realize, will require Washington discussion at high levels, and will doubtless demand more detailed information than I have provided in this message. By the same token, if Souvanna sticks to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 83-253

~~TOP SECRET~~

By is, NARS, Date 2-14-84

~~TOP SECRET~~ (Vientiane 2054, 6/21/65)

original Algiers schedule, he will be leaving here tomorrow morning and will, in any event, be leaving in the near future. I have undertaken no significant military departures since I have been here without full and frank discussion with Souvanna. This is, in my opinion, a sound practice both with respect to US and Royal Laotian Government interests. Therefore, if there is to be any Washington inclination to move towards tactics suggested in preceding paragraph, I believe I should have some guidelines soonest, so that I can at least be prepared to discuss this matter in principle with the Prime Minister before his imminent departure.

SULLIVAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, June 19, 1965
10:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pros and Cons of a June Pause

The Case for Such a Move

1. It will dramatize the good faith of our quest for a peaceful solution.
2. It will further shift the onus for continued hostilities to Hanoi and Peking, if they fail to respond with action.
3. It may allow the USSR increased leverage in pressing Hanoi towards negotiations, if any such inclination exists within the Soviet leadership. (Very doubtful, on the evidence of May).
4. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi's interest in negotiations, if any such inclination exists.
5. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers.
6. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (primarily the British and the Japanese, but also the Australians and Canadians) to stop their support of our Vietnam policy.
7. It will meet some persistent objections of unaligned nations and leaders (primarily the Indians and U Thant).
8. It will somewhat de-fuse the Algerian meeting by strengthening our supporters and putting the heat on our adversaries.

The Case Against Such a Move

1. It may cause deep apprehension on US determination in the already weakened Saigon Government.

2. It may allow Hanoi to catch its breath, repair damaged communications, and increase its assistance to the Viet Cong.

3. It may appear to the Communist side to be an admission of the ineffectiveness of the bombings and an indication of US desperation for "negotiations now."

4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic hardliners -- particularly among Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of our softness in Vietnam.

5. It might make a return to air-strikes difficult in the context of inevitable international pressure to make the suspension permanent.

If US forces were to get hurt during a pause, we would be giving a dangerous opening for Mel Laird; people just wouldn't understand it.

McG. B.

Saturday, June 19, 1965
10:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have made the additions that you suggested, but I have not yet made the counterbalancing subtractions, so that this is now a bit long. I think we can squeeze several hundred words out of it. But I do plead with you not to make us chop it up too sharply. This is intended to be more a document of record than a campaign speech, and in one sense, the more comprehensive it is, the better the commentators will like it.

McG.B.

Attachments (3)

Dictated, but not
read by Mr. Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday
June 18, 1965
8:20 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Wayne Hays and the NATO Parliamentarians meeting in Norway

I agree that you ought not to hold out hope that you will address the NATO Parliamentarians in New York. They are an interesting group, but they are seldom able to agree, and the Parliamentary group is probably not the most hopeful one for NATO at present. So I would suggest a message to Hays along the following lines:

"I send you best wishes for the NATO Parliamentarians Meeting in Oslo and hope that the meeting will be highly successful. I am glad to know that the Parliamentarians are coming to New York in October, and I trust that you will make it clear to them, on behalf of all Americans, that they will be most welcome guests among us then."

If you approve this message, we will get it to Hays with an explanation that you simply cannot make a speaking commitment for October and hope that no encouragement will be given to the Parliamentarians that any such invitation could be accepted, simply because of the pressures on your time.

m.d.B

McG. B.

Send this message

Send no message

*relayed to
Holmes in
McG. B.'s. eye.
on Sat. a.m. -
approx. 10:45 am
6-19-65
vm*

Reid
Fri: 6/18/65
12:50 am

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday
June 18, 1965
12:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These are the post mortems on the London
teach-in. I think they may be of interest
to you.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 18, 1965
11:15 AM

Text of Cable from London 6060

Ambassador Lodge last night faced a strongly left-wing audience of about 900 packed into Oxford Union Hall for the Vietnam "Teach-in." Many attendees are not students and 80-90 percent was hostile to the US Vietnam Policy by Ambassador's estimate. The audience was clearly loaded with Communist sympathizers whose "questions" were more often pro-Communist polemics than a serious effort to stimulate discussion or elicit information. Many of the "questions" directed to the Ambassador (and later to Foreign Secretary Stewart) bore the unmistakable stamp of Hanoi-Peking propaganda. Hand-outs prepared by the organizing committee included Ho Chi Minh's message to the American people; the Embassy provided a USIS release on recent negotiating efforts, which also was distributed.

During the Ambassador's presentation (25 minute speech followed by 20 minute question period), the Chairman made no effort to limit "questions" or keep order amid foot stamping, boos, catcalls and hisses, until the Ambassador was impelled to call upon him to do so.

The Ambassador's description of recent efforts to arrange discussions with Communists on Southeast Asia was given the most serious and best reception. During the remainder of the speech and question period, the Ambassador was constantly interrupted by jeers, moans, groans, rude remarks and foot stamping, even the Ambassador's reference to British heroism during World War II drew catcalls and boos.

Despite the rough treatment during both the presentation and question period, Ambassador Lodge feels his participation (which was essential because of British request) was on balance worthwhile. It provided a forum for getting the US point of view across to a wide audience through extensive radio, TV and Press coverage given the "Teach-In." Although none of those in the hall was converted, the reaction to the failure of the US to participate would have been highly adverse.

There are some early indications that the TV audience was critical of Oxford Union's rowdyism and unwillingness to give Ambassador Lodge a fair hearing. A senior Foreign office official expressed the view that the meeting was obviously rigged and that the response of the great mass of British media audience would be far more sympathetic and approving than what was manifested in Union Hall. Embassy agrees.

BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED
State letter 5-14-76
By OCH NARS, Date 8-23-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Text of Cable from London 6067

Friday, June 18, 1965
12:27 PM

Foreign Secretary Stewart gave a brilliant defense of US policy on Vietnam and Her Majesty's Government's support for it at the Oxford "Teach-In" June 16.

As a former President of the Oxford Union, Stewart was thoroughly at home and prepared for the rigged and biased audience with which he had to deal. During the acrimonious question period he fielded a series of loaded and tendentious questions superbly countering hostile allegations with cool, factual replies shot out without hesitation and avoiding pitfalls with masterly skill. Throughout he gave the impression of having thought out his positions after a careful study of the facts and arguments of his opponents. His opening speech was outstanding for its lucidity, moderation, fair-mindedness, command of fact, conciseness, logical structure and exactitude of phrase. He presented a case which had been refined to razor-sharp precision in the course of a gruelling series of encounters on the floor of the House of Commons where the Foreign Secretary has often been violently attacked by extreme left-wingers regarding the Government's Vietnam Policy. As on these earlier occasions, the Foreign Minister gave staunch and unswerving support to the US. Although Stewart's performance may not have changed the views of many of his Oxford listeners, it commanded wide public attention. It was broadcast on a third program of BBC in full and was widely reported in British press. His courage and forcefulness in defending Her Majesty's Government's policy in an academic forum have unquestionably enhanced his reputation.

The Embassy is transmitting the full text of the Stewart speech by pouch in the belief that the Department may find its argumentation useful.

Stewart made forceful use of the argument of the refugee flow from North to South as eloquent evidence of where political sympathies lay. He explained it is impossible to hold elections in the present condition in Vietnam. He repeatedly stressed the unacceptability of Viet Cong and Chinese insistence that a settlement on Vietnam should be worked out by the Communists in North and South Vietnam following the withdrawal of

US troops. He pointed up numerous western attempts to open discussions in Vietnam and asked critics of British Government Policy to consider whether support of rigid Communist refusal to come to conference table in the end can be in the interests either of the people of Vietnam, of the great powers or of mankind itself. He pledged the British Government would continue working for a Conference. Following the lines of his statement in the House of Commons on June 3, the Foreign Secretary adumbrated a possible sequence of events which might lead to settlement: the holding of a Conference under whatever arrangement offered best hope of success; ceasefire either before the Conference or as a result of it; a guarantee against aggression for both North and South Vietnam; subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases from South Vietnam which should be tied to no military alliance. This should create a situation in which South Vietnam could move into situations where they could make a free choice of their future form of government. In such circumstances the UK would be willing to contribute to a program for economic aid and reconstruction administered by the UN. Stewart rejected the possibility of having the Viet Cong represented at any Conference since only Governments should attend, but suggested North Vietnam might include Viet Cong members in their delegation.

BRUCE

Rec'd
June 18
9:07 am

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56

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 18, 1965
9:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Murrey Marder's Dominican Republic Article

1. I finally decided to talk to Murrey Marder about his Dominican Republic article because I had an appeal from Tap Bennett to straighten him out on one charge -- namely, that Bennett had sabotaged the Guzman solution after my return. Marder took this correction, and indeed said that he had never accepted the other view.

2. I then poked him a little about the nature of the story, and I find his main theme is going to be the difference which he asserts between what we said and what we did. He apparently thinks that we have given different explanations at different hours and that we have overstated the case unnecessarily. He is particularly critical of the speech of May 2 on the ground that we could not know that much about Communist control in downtown Santo Domingo.

3. I told Marder that we had a very clear picture that all ^{other} power groups had quit and that the Communists were more and more in charge, but he insisted that our "overstatements" had brought great criticism and were unnecessary. It seems clear to me that this will be his theme. Moreover, it sounds as if the story will be a very long one and may make quite a splash.

4. My own reluctant conclusion is still that it is better not to argue with Marder. Every time we open our mouths he will compare our language of this week to our language of last week (thus, for example, he hinted that we were now using the death of Dominicans as a major justification, whereas earlier we had used the danger of Communism).

5. This particular battle of words is not going to be won with the Washington Post "sophisticates," so I would be inclined to let it lie. Vietnam is a different matter, and there I think we can turn them all around by the right kind of speech. We are working on it in the light of your guidance of yesterday.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARSINGI

BY DCH ON 11-4-82

McG. B.
McG. B.

Rec'd
4/3/65

57

(4)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 17, 1965
3:55 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke to Dean Rusk about UPI 117 -- the story on the British drive to "paralyze the UN financial crisis." Rusk said that the British had given us no word whatever of any notion that we would drop our demand for Russian payment under Article 19. He has agreed to go to Pat Dean at once and see if we can get the British to make it clear that their scheme for voluntary contributions has nothing to do with our position, and is designed simply to get the Russians to pay, by hook or by crook. We will see how this works, and my own view is that unless the damage is worse than the ticker item suggests, we should still keep a free hand to make our own judgment next week. We should also make damn sure that everybody stonewalls against any questions about possible U. S. concessions, and I am speaking directly to Cleveland on that.

McG. B.

McG. B.

58

Thursday, June 17, 1965
2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I still think it is a mistake to signal specific staff duties for Busby and Cater without a little more thought, and I cannot promise to get it right off the top of my head. But if you have to go today, I would say the following:

Busby: Space and certain aspects of defense.

Cater: USIA and some aspects of the UN.

These are areas which do not have known senior staff officers working on them in my office or in any other White House area.

You could also add that both of them have an important role in the preparation of your speeches, statements and press conferences, and that for this reason they are kept fully informed on all major national security affairs. The fact is that both of them have worked closely with me on a whole series of subjects ever since they came into the White House.

McG. B.

Thursday
June 17, 1965
10:20

59

Mr. President:

This is a polite answer to
a letter from Sato on a favor
you did for him.

15
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chow
to Pres
17 June

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Bolivian Co-Presidents

1. Attached at Tab 1 is a long letter from Bolivian Presidents Barrientos and Ovando which was hand-carried to Washington by a Bolivian economic delegation at the beginning of June and which, among other things, notes that Bolivia requires "solid financial cooperation on the part of the Government of the United States."

2. Attached at Tab 2, for your signature, is a reply to the Bolivian letter. The reply is consistent with the line that we took with the Bolivian delegation when it came to Washington. Among other things, the letter (a) shows that we are thinking of Bolivia, (b) demonstrates our interest in Bolivian unity (which is a problem these days), and (c) reassures the Bolivians without tying ourselves on to any specific aid package.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

602

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1965

Excellencies:

I have read with great interest your letter of June 2, which discusses the purposes and plans of your Government and which the members of your special mission delivered during their recent visit to the United States.


I sincerely regret that an extremely heavy schedule prevented me from receiving the members of the mission personally. However, I have been kept fully informed on their economic talks with United States officials, and I want you to know that we stand ready, as we have in the past, to join with you in efforts to solve Bolivia's social and economic problems. So that we may move together rapidly in this area, I have directed Ambassador Henderson and his staff to be ready to examine and make recommendations promptly on any proposals that your Government may decide to put forward.

While I noted with sympathy your description of the formidable social and economic problems still facing Bolivia, there is clearly reason for hope. Collective efforts under the Alliance for Progress have already borne substantial fruit in the Hemisphere and I am confident that your great people, inspired by Alliance goals, will continue to share in the benefits of our common effort. In this regard, I was pleased to hear of the renewed solidarity of all elements which support your Government for the purpose of achieving these goals.

In closing, I want to convey my gratitude for the message of President Barrientos thanking this Government for assisting in the evacuation of Bolivian citizens during the

conflict in the Dominican Republic. I also want to express to you both my best wishes for success in the great tasks which are now before you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Rene Barrientos Ortuno', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

General of the Air Force Rene Barrientos Ortuno
General of the Army Alfredo Ovando Candia
Co-Presidents of the Military Junta of Government
La Paz, Bolivia

June 17, 1965

In the Dominican Republic in the last two days there has been renewed, repeated and heavy firing on the Inter-American force, in flagrant violation of the ceasefire. This ^{sustained} firing has been accepted without reply by the Inter-American forces for periods up to one-half hour, ~~with~~ before the necessary replies were given under the orders of General Alvim and General Palmer. In these actions three Americans have lost their lives and 37 more Americans and five Brazilians have been wounded. These unprovoked attacks on the Inter-American force appear to have been premeditated by elements which seek to prevent the establishment of peace in Santo Domingo. ~~Only~~ Our forces there have no other mission, and they will continue to observe the same soldierly restraint they have shown ^{for 7 weeks} in the face of more than 900 ceasefire violations and in suffering almost 200 casualties, ^{though} when it is plain that they could readily remove all opposition on command. But no one should mistake ^{their} ~~this~~ restraint for weakness ^{or} suppose that continued wanton violation of the ceasefire can be permitted by the Inter-American force without a fitting reply.

Mr. President:

The only trouble with this sentence is that it should come from OAS, not from us. We might meet the problem by cutting bracketed phrases

Mcf. B.

*Mr. Bundy
had original of this
w/P's note in
P's office when
Dirksen was here
6/17/65* 62

RECENT HISTORY OF NEGOTIATING

EFFORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

During the last four and one-half years the United States has made repeated attempts with Communist countries to reach reasonable solutions in Southeast Asia. The results to date have in all cases been negative or unsatisfactory.

(1) Bilateral Talks with USSR and Peiping. The United States has frequently held bilateral talks with the Soviets and Chinese Communists on these problems without finding any genuine desire on their part to arrive at any settlement except Communist takeover.

(2) Geneva Conference on Laos. Only one agreement has been reached, and that one has not been honored. In 1961-62 the United States entered the Geneva Conference on Laos and accepted an agreement to neutralize Laos. The United States withdrew all its military personnel. But Communist North Vietnam did not withdraw its thousands of combat military personnel, and these forces have supported Pathet Lao offensives against the forces of the Laotian Government. North Vietnam has also continued to use Laos as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in violation of the Laotian agreement. Repeated attempts to enforce the agreement have been frustrated by Communist obstruction.

(3) Cambodia. The United States has always supported the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. In 1964 the United States and South Vietnam responded favorably to Cambodian call for a conference, but the proposal came to nothing when Prince Sihanouk formally withdrew it in March, 1964.

In 1965, following a renewed Cambodian proposal for a formal conference on Cambodia, the United States and South Vietnam agreed to such a conference, but the Chinese have opposed it; the Soviets have now backed away from it; and the Cambodians too have changed their position.

(4) United Nations. The United States raised the Tonkin Gulf events last August in the Security Council. The President of the Security Council invited North Vietnam to furnish information relating to the complaint of the United States, either through participation in the

in the Security Council discussions or by other means. The Foreign Minister of Communist China, in a letter of August 12 to the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, emphatically pointed out that the United Nations had no right at all to consider the Indochina question. North Vietnam then responded on August 19 to the President of the Security Council, stating that the war in Vietnam does not lie within the competence of the Security Council.

In early April, 1965, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, considered visiting Peiping and Hanoi on the Vietnam question. Communist China through the medium of the People's Daily commented on April 12 that U Thant was knocking at the wrong door and should spare himself the trouble since "the Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations." The Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, in a statement on April 8 said that "any approach tending to secure United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is...inappropriate."

(5) Exploration of a Vietnam Settlement. On February 20 the United Kingdom, with our encouragement and support, proposed to the Soviet Union that the British and Soviets undertake as Geneva Co-Chairmen to explore the bases of a possible Vietnam settlement with all the Geneva Conference countries. The Soviets -- obviously under pressure from Hanoi and Peiping -- were not even prepared to cooperate in seeking the views of the parties concerned regarding the grounds for settlement.

(6) Gordon Walker Mission. The British then undertook to send Gordon Walker to visit interested countries and explore the bases for a Vietnam settlement. Gordon Walker visited South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma in April. Peiping, however, informed the British Government that he would not be welcome. Hanoi also declined to receive him.

(7) United States Readiness for Unconditional Discussions. On April 7 President Johnson stated that the United States remains ready for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. He noted that we have stated this position over and over again to friend and foe alike. Hanoi and Peiping have refused to respond, calling the proposal "a hoax," "a big swindle," "a lie covered with flowers."

(8) Appeal of Seventeen Nonaligned Nations. In responding April 8 to an appeal of seventeen nonaligned nations for a peaceful solution through negotiations without preconditions, the United States reiterated President Johnson's statement that it remains ready for unconditional discussions.

But through the medium of the People's Daily Communist China rejected unconditional negotiations. Marshal Tito and other unspecified backers of the 17-nation appeal were labeled "monsters and freaks." North Vietnam likewise rejected the nonaligned appeal through an authorized statement by the Vietnam News Agency.

(9) Indian Proposal on Vietnam. The Indian Government has proposed (a) the cessation of hostilities by both sides, (b) the policing of boundaries by an Afro-Asian patrol force, and (c) the maintenance of present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it. The United States has publicly noted this proposal with interest and is giving it very careful consideration. The United States is continuing discussions of this proposal with the Indian Government.

Communist China has denounced the Indian proposal as a plot to use Afro-Asian countries to serve US aggression against Vietnam, and accuses the Indian Government of betraying the Afro-Asian stand against "imperialism" and "colonialism." Hanoi has also rejected the Indian proposal.

(10) Bombing Pause. During the period May 13-17 the United States suspended bombing operations against North Vietnam. This fact was known to Hanoi, but there was no response indicating an intention to move toward a settlement. The Vietnam News Agency in Hanoi called the suspension "a worn-out trick of deceit and threat." The New China News Agency in Peiping characterized the suspension as "a peace swindle," "an American hoax," and "war blackmail."

(11) Canadian Approach to North Vietnam. At the end of May the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission in Vietnam went to Hanoi to learn the North Vietnamese reaction to this pause. On the basis of his report, Canadian Foreign Minister Martin has concluded that North Vietnam and Communist China are not receptive to peace overtures at this time. They are not ready for negotiations.

*Rec'd
June 3, 1965
10:08 am*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 3, 1965
9:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Juan Bosch

Here is the letter from Juan Bosch, which has been on its way for two days. It was drafted by Benitez, who read a first draft to me over the phone, and at my suggestion some of the sharper language about the OAS and Mora was removed. There are other things I might have criticized, but I did not press because of the last sentence which assures us that he will keep it private unless we decide otherwise.

I have acknowledged receipt of the letter and said that it would be delivered to you. I think probably you should not answer directly, but I will draft an answer in my own name for consideration in the light of Bunker's mission.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-232
By ing, NARA, Date 1-7-93

636

Juan Bosch

Box A.
University of Puerto Rico
Río Piedras Puerto Rico

65

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday
June 16, 1965
6:35 rec'd 6:44p

Mr. President:

Will you let me know if this
does not give you what you
want?

McG. B

*Excellent letter that
it is delivered
paraphrased to P.M. [unclear]
at once [unclear]*

*copy sent
to AS
personally
to Rowan*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

RECENT HISTORY OF NEGOTIATING
EFFORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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(4) United Nations. The United States raised the Tonkin Gulf events last August in the Security Council. The President of the Security Council invited North Vietnam to furnish information relating to the complaint of the United States, either through participation in the

in the Security Council discussions or by other means. The Foreign Minister of Communist China, in a letter of August 12 to the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, emphatically pointed out that the United Nations had no right at all to consider the Indochina question. North Vietnam then responded on August 19 to the President of the Security Council, stating that the war in Vietnam does not lie within the competence of the Security Council.

In early April, 1965, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, considered visiting Peiping and Hanoi on the Vietnam question. Communist China through the medium of the People's Daily commented on April 12 that U Thant was knocking at the wrong door and should spare himself the trouble since "the Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations." The Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, in a statement on April 8 said that "any approach tending to secure United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is...inappropriate."

(5) Exploration of a Vietnam Settlement. On February 20 the United Kingdom, with our encouragement and support, proposed to the Soviet Union that the British and Soviets undertake as Geneva Co-Chairmen to explore the bases of a possible Vietnam settlement with all the Geneva Conference countries. The Soviets -- obviously under pressure from Hanoi and Peiping -- were not even prepared to cooperate in seeking the views of the parties concerned regarding the grounds for settlement.

(6) Gordon Walker Mission. The British then undertook to send Gordon Walker to visit interested countries and explore the bases for a Vietnam settlement. Gordon Walker visited South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma in April. Peiping, however, informed the British Government that he would not be welcome. Hanoi also declined to receive him.

(7) United States Readiness for Unconditional Discussions. On April 7 President Johnson stated that the United States remains ready for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. He noted that we have stated this position over and over again to friend and foe alike. Hanoi and Peiping have refused to respond, calling the proposal "a hoax," "a big swindle," "a lie covered with flowers."

(8) Appeal of Seventeen Nonaligned Nations. In responding April 8 to an appeal of seventeen nonaligned nations for a peaceful solution through negotiations without preconditions, the United States reiterated President Johnson's statement that it remains ready for unconditional discussions.

But through the medium of the People's Daily Communist China rejected unconditional negotiations. Marshal Tito and other unspecified backers of the 17-nation appeal were labeled "monsters and freaks." North Vietnam likewise rejected the nonaligned appeal through an authorized statement by the Vietnam News Agency.

(9) Indian Proposal on Vietnam. The Indian Government has proposed (a) the cessation of hostilities by both sides, (b) the policing of boundaries by an Afro-Asian patrol force, and (c) the maintenance of present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it. The United States has publicly noted this proposal with interest and is giving it very careful consideration. The United States is continuing discussions of this proposal with the Indian Government.

Communist China has denounced the Indian proposal as a plot to use Afro-Asian countries to serve US aggression against Vietnam, and accuses the Indian Government of betraying the Afro-Asian stand against "imperialism" and "colonialism." Hanoi has also rejected the Indian proposal.

(10) Bombing Pause. During the period May 13-17 the United States suspended bombing operations against North Vietnam. This fact was known to Hanoi, but there was no response indicating an intention to move toward a settlement. The Vietnam News Agency in Hanoi called the suspension "a worn-out trick of deceit and threat." The New China News Agency in Peiping characterized the suspension as "a peace swindle," "an American hoax," and "war blackmail."

(11) Canadian Approach to North Vietnam. At the end of May the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission in Vietnam went to Hanoi to learn the North Vietnamese reaction to this pause. On the basis of his report, Canadian Foreign Minister Martin has concluded that North Vietnam and Communist China are not receptive to peace overtures at this time. They are not ready for negotiations.

*Read
June 16
HBP*

66
(X) 6-22-65

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 16, 1965
3:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Bohlen

Raymond Aron is much the best political commentator in France, and the attached cable from Bohlen is worth reading as a corrective to what Lippmann has been saying.

McG. B.
McG. B.

R

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

(Copy of PARIS 7054, June 13, 1965)

Those who may be led to believe that Walter Lippmann report entitled "As Others See Us" (Paris Herald Tribune June 11) represents completely balanced view of informed French opinion re US foreign policy should read column by Raymond Aron in Figaro June 12-13, last two paragraphs of which follow:

"Cost of war in Vietnam is enormous in human suffering, but it is easier to criticize American strategy than to suggest one to take its place. A few months ago US no longer had any choice between giving up struggle -- which would have led to extension of Communism in Southeast Asia -- and escalation. First alternative would have meant an American disaster with consequences felt in all Asia, or even in entire world. Bombardments of North Vietnam are no more or no less contrary to international law than support given by Hanoi regime to Viet Cong. I do not pretend to know which regime peoples of South Vietnam would freely choose, but to prevent oneself from making categorical judgments, it is sufficient to remember number of those who emigrated from the north in 1954.

"Will these bombardments convince the leaders of Hanoi? At present not at all, but up to now objectives have been very limited. In any case, a decision one way or another will not be taken before military operations planned for the rainy season. As for France, which fought Vietnam for more than 7 years, I do not see why she would have an interest today in victory of Viet Cong, heir of Viet Minh. The US has force necessary to win, and all depends on its resolution. The Sino-Soviet quarrel is weakening and paralyzing the Soviet Union. The loosening of ties between Europe and the US has ^{on}the policy of the latter an exactly opposite effect. After all, the US too can affirm its right to an independent diplomacy."

Comment: There is a tendency under fifth republic to forget that adage "Two Frenchmen, three opinions" may still have validity.

BOHLEN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Revised
Wed. 6/16/65
10:00 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed. June 16, 1965 9:40 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk has recommended that you sign the attached letter to Chancellor Erhard, stating our continuind and abiding interest in the German problem, on the occasion of the anniversary of the East German uprising of 1953, now celebrated as German Unity Day on June 17.

The letter covers two purposes. It not only emphasizes our continuing close relations with the German people and government, but also puts us firmly on record again on the reunification issue.

The Secretary of State has recommended that you sign such a letter and I strongly support his recommendation.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachments

67a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1965


Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I want to tell you how thoroughly I enjoyed seeing you again and what a personal pleasure it was. I was gratified to find once again how closely we agree on the goals to be pursued and the means to achieve them. The visit was, in fact, still another manifestation of how harmoniously our two governments continue to work together.

I want also to convey to you on the occasion of the Day of German Unity our determination to keep the goal of German reunification in the foreground of those purposes we seek to achieve. The commemoration of this day in Germany makes us all keenly aware of the fact that until the problem of divided Germany is resolved, we will not have just and lasting peace in Europe or elsewhere.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Dr. Ludwig Erhard,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany,
Bonn.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Wed June 16, 1965, # 9:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We join Rusk in recommending that you see Sadat. For obvious reasons we have rarely had any top UAR officials here, while the Soviets go out of their way to invite Nasser and his people to Moscow (Nasser is going again in September). As a countermove President Kennedy approved in principle a Nasser visit, but the time never seemed ripe.

[Handwritten signature]

Your seeing Sadat for even 20 minutes is less important for reasons of substance than as a gesture to show that the door is open.

R. W. Komer

McG. Bundy

Attach. Rusk Memo to President 6/11/65, subj. United Arab Republic Parliamentary Delegation
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Yes _____

No _____

I would make this a straight Protocol visit, and go through it in 10 minutes -- 5 of them in a quick private talk with Sadat -- this would be easy to explain and would get small but good notices.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

Wed. June 16, 1963 9:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

m
Bundy

Planes for Israel. Our Israeli friends are typically pressing us to enrich the secret arms deal as much as possible. Since we've done even better than they originally expected on tanks, they're now zeroing in on aircraft.

When I was out there, they talked about an old light bomber like the B-66, which they thought they could buy for peanuts. We agreed to help them get up to 24 "combat" planes (not necessarily bombers) either in Europe or here. Since then we've convinced them that the B-66 is not available as surplus so now they're asking for the F-4, our fanciest current operational model.

The F-4 is (a) simply outside the spirit of our understanding; (b) would cost them a mint; and (c) would raise hob with the Arabs. Rusk is very strongly opposed; he doesn't even want to sell old planes.

This memo is to (a) inform you so you'll be ready for any backdoor approaches; and (b) ask you to let me say I've confirmed our negative position at the highest level--hopefully this will fob off further useless talk. We can always take another look later. The alternative is not to bring your name into this yet, but I fear the Israelis won't look seriously in Europe unless I can do so. I already have Feldman on my neck.

Approve _____

Keep me out of this as yet _____

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb/ng, NARA, Date 5-6-99

Wed. June 16, 1965 9:15 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Marshall Green (Indonesia)

In the present uneasy state of Indo-U. S. relations, it would be very helpful if you were to meet briefly with Ambassador Marshall Green before July 1, as State requests in the attached memorandum.

Green is succeeding a man who has been on the job for seven years, and he will need all the Presidential buttressing we can give him in order to get off to a good start in Djakarta.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

Yes _____

No _____

McGeorge Bundy

This can be xxx
3 minutes and a picture

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-224

By ig, NARS, Date 9-10-85

Att: File #2516

June 16, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: East German Helicopters Over Berlin

The East German Communists have started to put helicopters into the air in Berlin along the sector and zonal boundaries and inside the Western sectors. They have also armed these craft with .50 calibre type machine guns. These flights not only violate the Berlin air agreements (the East Germans have no right to fly in the Berlin area); they also represent a hazard to regular allied traffic in and around Berlin since they fall outside of allied control. Oral protests to Soviet personnel in the Air Control Center have been to no avail, and clearly some action on our part is required, both for reasons of safety and political posture. (The fact of these flights is a matter of public knowledge.)

The French Ambassador, who will be calling upon his Soviet counterpart in Berlin, plans to raise the issue with him, pointing out that the flights and guns are provocative and will not be tolerated.

Coming up for consideration is the matter of the Western counter-moves. Proposals include putting small Western aircraft and/or helicopters into the air to chase off the Communist helicopters, as well as the use of arms to deal with possible East German gunfire. Any of these actions could produce a chain reaction. I would not underestimate the seriousness of this possible development, and therefore I have arranged for contingency plans to be looked at here before they are put into effect.

This matter does not require any White House action at this time, but will, if the problem becomes more serious.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MW Bundy?

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday June 16, 1965 9:00 a. m.

Saudi Arms Talks. Given the occasional press flurry, I want to keep you briefed. This is quite unlike the Jordan arms deal: (a) there's no problem of pre-empting the Soviets; (b) there's little real threat to Israel involved--Saudi Arabia is too far away and too incompetent; (c) we're not running after this business--it's the Saudis who are coming to us.

The Saudi desire for modern air defense is aimed at the Nasser threat from Yemen, not at Israel. The issue arose way back to early 1963, when as bait for the Bunker mission effort to get a Yemen disengagement, we offered to help the Saudis develop an air defense system. We gave them our views in September 1963, and they've been hemming and hawing in typical Arab style ever since. Meanwhile the British, French, and two US companies have been actively seeking the business, so at Saudi request we're sending yet another survey team to help them make up their minds.

Our goal is to keep our oil-rich Saudi friends happy and to insure that if they finally do buy anything we get the sale. We've recommended against fancy aircraft and HAWK because Saudis couldn't handle them; but we're willing to sell if they insist. The total package could range from \$110-210 million over several years, but we think Faisal will end up buying only the lower figure, if that.

We've made other sales to Saudi Arabia. In 1957 we offered a \$100 million credit to facilitate extension of our Dhahran air base rights. Since 1961 we've extended two small credits totalling \$18 million. The Saudis also bought four C-130s for \$15 million cash this spring.

The Israelis have never objected to these sales, since they recognize the Saudis are too far away and too ineffective to be a threat. The one problem in the current deal is that if we sell F-104s, the Jordanians and then the Israelis might press for them. This is one reason (the other is that F-104s are just too complex for Saudis) why McNamara wrote recommending the F-5. I personally doubt the Saudis will make up their minds soon on anything.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-139

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

R. W. Komer

W. C. S.

~~SECRET~~

(2)
MR 6/14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia \$89 Million and \$700 Million.

Before he left, I had a message from Mac to send you a note on where the \$89 million stands in the Congress.

The authorization request is now part of the Senate bill. It is not in the House bill, which was passed before the June 1 Message, and hence will have to be dealt with in conference. (Rusk/Bell offered to testify before the House Committee, but Doc Morgan thought it unnecessary.)

Regarding the appropriation, we have asked Passman to add the \$89 million to the bill. As you know, he has not yet begun mark up, but Bill Gaud expects him to begin late this week or early next.

I am not clear whether you also had a question about the \$700 million supplemental. Following passage, and your approval of the apportionment proposed on May 14 by Bob McNamara, he has already released the money to the services and they are busy committing it.

FMB

Francis M. Bator

Monday
June 14, 1965
9:30 A. M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I would recommend approval of the attached
two requests.

McG. B.

Seaborg and Halaby trips
June 23-25 - Ontario
June 17-20 - Paris Air Show



FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Washington 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

June 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Survey of European Aviation Program

Congressman Oren Harris has urged me to accompany him and 15 members of the House Commerce Committee and House Appropriations Committee to Paris next week so as to arrange meetings with the British and French on the Concorde.

Traditionally, the FAA Administrator has attended the Paris Air Show to reconnoiter the state of civil aviation in France, U. K., USSR and other European countries who display their talents and products there every two years. The United States is exhibiting its aerospace products and a Defense Department jet transport with a number of Senators and Congressmen will depart on June 17th. The show is next week and the last three days, June 17-20 (over the weekend), would permit me to accomplish the following purposes.

In addition to assisting the Harris Committee, it should be possible to fulfill the recommendation of your Advisory Committee on Supersonic Transport to prepare an intelligence estimate of the relative merits, timing and competitive position of the U. S. SST vs. the Concorde.

Finally, it may be feasible, in view of their reportedly spectacular display, to analyze the Soviet progress in aviation since you sent me to Moscow in December 1963.

From a personal point of view I am not anxious to go, but in view of the request of the Congressmen, the opportunity to wind up work on the estimate of the Concorde and Soviet aviation, and taking into account the likelihood that General McKee's nomination will not have been confirmed prior to June 22, I would appreciate your approval of this mission.

(Signed) Jeb

N. E. HALABY
Administrator

Monday, June 14, 1965
8:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT :

These two cables give a good perspective on the Mayobre problem. In this instance I think Stevenson has the right prescription -- which is to bury both Mayobre and the Secretary General with information and reports from the OAS itself. We will keep pressing in this direction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 12

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By DCIT, NARS, Date 8-23-88

31 840

1965 JUN 12 5 26

BUNKER FROM STEVENSON
UN REP IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

^{attached}
RE URTEL 220, I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT MAYOBRE MAY CONTINUE CAUSE COMPLICATIONS FOR YOU IN DR AND WLD NOT QUESTION YOUR JUDGMENT THAT HE IS LIKELY BE MORE UNHELPFUL THAN HELPFUL IN FINDING TYPE OF POLITICAL SOLUTION WE WANT. I WLD NOT RULE OUT LATER, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD BE USEFUL, AS HE COULD TURN OUT TO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE WITH SAAMANO WHEN WE MIGHT NEED IT.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 138

HIS GVN VIEWS WERE VERY STRONGLY IN FAVOR GUZMAN SOLUTION, AS YOU KNOW FROM HIS DETAILED PRESENTATION TO ME (USUN 4817). I THINK BUNDY MADE IMPRESSION ON HIM AND ON SYG6N ESPECIALLY AGAINST HIS VIEW GUZMAN SOLUTION WITH THEN PREVAILING DETAILS WAS "ONLY" POSSIBLE ONE. BUT MAYOBRE WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE EXPRESS HIS OWN VIEWS PRIVATELY. ON OTHER HAND SYG DOES NOT WANT HIM TO BECOME MEDIATOR AND I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WILL ACTIVELY INTERFERE WITH YOUR WORK.

WHILE HIS PRESENCE IN DR WILL BE SOURCE OF WORRY, I AM SURE YOU CAN ALSO APPRECIATE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE HERE. THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISAPPROVAL IN SC OF OUR MOVES AND CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AS WELL ABOUT EXTENT TO WHICH IT PROPER USE FORCE THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE LATTER CONCERN MAINLY BASED ON LONG-RUN AND SERIOUS, NOT ANTI US OR OAS, MOTIVES. AND THERE SIMPLY IS NO RPT NO SUPPORT IN SC FOR KEEPING UN OUT OF DR SITUATION ENTIRELY. THIS APPLIES TO BOLIVIA, UK AND NETHERLANDS, WHO ARE FRIENDLY, AS WELL AS TO FRANCE, JORDAN AND URUGWAY, WHO HAVE BEEN HOSTILE. EVEN OAS DECISION AND LA NOTE RECENTLY CIRCULATED TO SC DO NOT GO THAT FAR. SO WE ARE ALONE IN PREFERRING TO KEEP UN OUT ENTIRELY, AND CONTINUED UN PRESENCE WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED AS FACT OF LIFE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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XEROX FROM QUICK COP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 4997 June 12, From New York

BEST WE CAN DO IS PREVENT IT FROM EXPANDING. NET EFFECT OF DEBATE CURRENTLY GOING ON IS THAT THERE DOES NOT APPEAR BE ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER UN MANDATE WILL BE EXPANDED. BUT THERE STILL DANGER SYG WILL EVENTUALLY ENLARGE UN STAFF SOMEWHAT AND THAT EFFECT OF CURRENT DEBATE ALSO WILL BE TO MAKE UN REP MORE ACTIVE IN "REPORTING" ON CURRENT SITUATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS PRESENT MANDATE. IF AND WHEN SYG SAYS HE WANTS SMALL EXPANSION I FEAR WE WILL BE UNABLE PREVENT IT, AS EVEN UK, AGAIN, IS LIKELY GIVE IT SUPPORT.

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 138 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEST DEFENSE AGAINST UNHELPFUL UN ACTIVITIES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE TO CONTINUE TO INCREASE FLOW OF OFFICIAL INFO FROM OAS TO UN-BOTH TO SYG DIRECTLY AND THROUGH MAYOBRE. WHENEVER THERE ARE TELS TO UN FROM CURY OR OTHER FORMAL COMPLAINTS PROMPT ACTION BY OAS AND PROMPT REPORTS TO MAYOBRE, BEGIN UNDERLINE WITH REQUEST THAT HE REPORT THEM OFFICIALLY TO SYG, END UNDERLINE WOULD BE VALUABLE. AIM SHLD BE TO MAKE REPORTING BY MAYOBRE CONTAIN VERY HIGH PROPORTION OF OAS MATERIAL AND THUS BRING OAS MORE PROMINENTLY BEFORE SC THROUGH UN'S OWN REPORTS. IN OTHER WORDS, WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO MAKE SITUATION NOT OF OUR CHOOSING HELP US AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

I MIGHT MENTION ONE OTHER LONGGARUN CONSIDERATION WHICH I THINK WE NEED KEEP IN MIND, THAT IS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND UN. ASIDE FROM CAS CASES WE ARE MOST LIKELY TO WANT TO HAVE UN KEEP PRETTY STRONG HAND IN PICTURE AGAINST MILITARY STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN BY REGIONAL AGENCIES. POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTIONS BY OAU AND ARAB LEAGUE, WHICH SYG RECENTLY REFERRED TO PUBLICLY, ARE GOOD EXAMPLES, AS MOST OF WHAT THEY MIGHT WANT TO DO IS LIKELY TO BE UNSATISFACTORY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. CONFIRMATION OF CONCURRENT LEGAL JURISDICTION AND POSSIBILITY OF UN ACTING AT SAME TIME AS REGIONAL AGENCY IS DOING SO, WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION, MAY THEREFORE IN LONG RUN BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO US THAN DISCOMFITURE WE ARE FACING NOW.

GP-4

STEVENSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1965 JUN 8 PM 2 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 8

FROM BUNKER

DESPITE MAYOBRE'S VOLUBLE PROTESTATIONS TO COMMITTEE THAT HE DETERMINED AVOID SUBSTANCE OF PROBLEM AND INTENDED LIMIT A ACTIVITIES TO OBSERVATION, I LEARN THROUGH SALVADORAN REP, TO WHOM MAYOBRE CONFIDED, THAT HE HAD LONG TALKS JUNE 7 WITH BOTH IMBERT AND CAAMANO.

RSR

MAYOBRE APPARENTLY CONTINUED TO DISCUSS WITH CAAMANO FORMULAS FOR SETTLEMENT AND CONFIDED TO SALVADORAN THAT HE HOPEFUL, AS RESULT, THAT CAAMANO'S INFLEXIBILITY ON 63 CONSTITUTION MAY NOW BE SOMEWHAT SOFTENED AND HE MAY BE PREPARED EXEMPT CERTAIN (UNSPECIFIED) PROVISIONS FROM IMMEDIATE ENTRY INTO FORCE ALTHOUGH WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON "INTEGRITY" OF CONGRESS AS PRESENTLY COMPOSED. MAYOBRE ALSO REPORTED "CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT" HAS NAMED SPECIAL COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF CAAMANO, ARISTY, CURY, GUZMAN, CAMPAGNA (SENATE PRES) AND BLANCO AS SOLE AND CORPORATE BODY TO NEGOTIATE WITH OAS. MAYOBRE ALSO BELIEVES (AND NO DOUBT TOLD CAAMANO) THAT THIRD FORCE, NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT POSSIBILITIES OF WHICH COMMITTEE NOW EXPLORING IS NOT VIABLE AND HAS NO CHANCE SUCCESS.

REGARDLESS HIS MOTIVATION, IT INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT HE "CONSTITUTIONALLY" UNABLE TO REFRAIN FROM BECOMING INVOLVED IN SUBSTANCE OF PROBLEM OR EFFORTS AT MEDIATION, TO DETRIMENT COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS. IT WILL CLEARLY BE TOO RISKY FOR COMMITTEE TO REPEAT OPEN DISCUSSION WE SOUGHT TO HOLD WITH HIM JUNE 6.

I REMAIN CONVINCED HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE UNHELPFUL TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION WE SENT HERE TO CARRY OUT.

GP-3. BENNETT
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 2:50 p.m. 6/8/65
Passed to White House, DOD, CINCSO, CINCLANT,
and CIA at 3:15 p.m. 6/8/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-473 appeal

By *fw*, NARA, Date *5-3-94*

PRESERVATION COPY

Rec'd
June 11 1965
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(2)

SECRET

Saturday
June 12, 1965
1 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Perhaps the best way to move along ^{with} your thought of getting an informed outside appraisal of the India problem is to suggest a list of useful names. The following are the type of man whom we think might be considered for the job you have in mind:

Doug Dillon would be first class. He has a lot of background in the problem besides being toughminded.

George Woods would also be excellent but there's a problem in asking the World Bank head to undertake a straight USG task. He'd be a good man to consult on the side however.

Ellsworth Bunker would perhaps be best of all given his long experience as a first class ambassador from us to India, not from India to us. The problem here of course is whether we could break him loose from Santo Domingo in time.

Gene Black knows the India problem in general but is probably too heavily engaged on Southeast Asia.

Clark Clifford has the combination of brains, energy, and toughness to give you a good reading.

Abe Fortas would do the same in my judgment.

Phil Potter knows India as well as anyone, but he has little policy experience.

Bob Anderson might be good, though he's a little dogmatic about the "private sector."

David Rockefeller has gotten to think too much like a banker but might be considered.

Lucius Clay was strongly in favor of massive aid to India when he headed the Clay Committee but would certainly take a hard new look. But he is very Republican and not a good team player.

R. W. Komer

Inf.

McG. Bundy

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY DCH ON 11-5-82

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, June 12, 1965
9:55 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Buzz asked me to check over the report of his conversation with Herve Alphanand (attached).

Alphanand makes a business of arguing that there is no real difference between us and France. I honestly don't know how far he persuades himself and how far this is a deliberate game. I suspect it is more the former than the latter, just as I believe Walter Lippmann is sincere in his quite similar conclusions.

I do not think that Alphanand is making any authorized overture, but I do think he would dearly love to have cozy relations with you. I can imagine nothing more foolish than for us to give special attention to him at this time -- one has only to imagine what the Ambassadors of real friends would think.

If Alphanand ever tries this line on me, I think I will give him a touch of what Couve is telling foreign diplomats -- or even what de Gaulle told Lippmann -- that the United States is more dangerous than Russia or China.

*Mc
Lippmann*

McG. B.
McG. B.

R

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1965
1:45 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Mr. Bundy
for comment to me
A*

SUBJECT: Conversation, Ambassador Alphand

I am sure you will be interested in various comments made to me within the past several days on his own initiative by the Ambassador of France, who has just returned from a visit to Paris.

1. Alphand says the "poor relations between France and America are a figment of the journalists in both Washington and Paris." He says that among the people, outside Government, he finds no anti-American sentiment in France and little other than pro-France sentiment among Americans. "All of this," he says, "is salon talk among a limited number of people in or on the fringes of our Governments."

2. Alphand says, "Whatever is said in Paris, France will always be with you when we are needed. The average Frenchman knows this, just as the average American knows it. Your President is being misrepresented by his press, so is my President -- except that my President has more trouble with cartoonists in both countries than your President has in either country. The journalists want to keep alive the fight that was started before your President became President -- and President DeGaulle knows that President Johnson has discouraged the people in your Government from keeping that fight alive."

3. Alphand says, "Mr. Martin made a speech that has been badly reported in this country. If you will read it carefully, he is only saying that the Western countries should look at the international monetary situation and its problems and do some things about that which have not been done all through these post-war years. What Mr. Martin says -- if you forget his remarks about 1929 -- is only the same thing that General DeGaulle and Mr. Reuff have been saying too. When General DeGaulle talks about gold standards, he doesn't have a Council of Economic Advisors guiding him on what he says -- he just has Mr. Reuff. The General does not know much about gold or international monetary matters. What he has asked for, I believe, is not a return to the Gold Standard as much as he has asked the allies

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

to look for a better standard than what we have now. I think many people in your Government feel the same way, although they would not follow the same way that General DeGaulle suggests. President Johnson has a fine opportunity to take leadership in this field that has been neglected by too many people in my Capital and your Capital, too. "

Comment: I am not sufficiently informed to make judgments about this, but some of the Ambassador's observations, made on and at his own initiative, seem to be in the nature of an overture. Perhaps others could explore this more usefully and more intelligently than I.


Horace Busby

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Saturday, 9:30 AM
June 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached paper from Joe Fowler represents a real achievement by Joe and Francis Bator. What Joe is now asking is that you should instruct him to do what everyone really wants him to do -- namely, take the lead in an important, quiet study of the next steps on the monetary front. A Presidential instruction is needed simply because while everyone agrees in principle that the Treasury should do this job, they will not pitch in energetically except with a Presidential summons. The paper is carefully drawn so as to commit you to nothing and yet to force a broad-gauged study of the problem as a whole. As Joe Fowler points out in his covering memorandum, this plan has so far been held between his office and mine. Before we ask for your final signature, we would like your permission to talk about it with Gardner Ackley and George Ball. Bator assures me that they would be favorable, but we would not wish to go outside the immediate White House-Treasury circle unless this is something which you think well of at least in principle.

McG. B.

OK to check with Ball and Ackley _____

OK for Joe Fowler to check with
the panel of consultants proposed
on page 4 of the memorandum _____

Handwritten notes:
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. ...

79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 11, 1965
11:45 AM.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

1. Abe Fortas thinks less than nothing of the "Bunker-Mann" plan. He just does not think that a government of "technicians" can do the job, and his belief is that this phrase covers an intent to have a hard-nosed right wing government. He believes that there is no real middle-of-the-road here, and that we have to be for progress, or against it, right from the start. That is why he strongly urges that we go back to the task of constructing a political government which would have the support of "constitutionalists" and which would not be violently opposed by the others.

2. Abe drew my attention to the fact that you and I together had changed the Department's draft on four critical points: the treatment of the Communists, the treatment of the Constitution of 1963, the role of the military, and the shape of the government (this last was a change which I had put into the telegram before you saw it). He thinks we are trying to get our principles with Tom Mann's practices and that it won't work.

3. I told Abe that we were trying to get agreement and not disagreement among the President's advisers, but he stood his ground. He told me he was going to Texas with you, and no doubt you can pursue the argument then.

4. That leaves the question whether you want to have this cable go out in the meantime. Here it is in its currently revised form. Perhaps we could change the introductory paragraph and simply authorize Bunker to explore this possibility rather than tell him that we agree with it.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 91-232 appeal

By cb, NARA Date 1-18-96

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

(6/11/65)

ACTION: Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE
FOR BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 91-232 Appeal
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-96

We are in substantial agreement with ideas in your 2323.

(1) We conclude it would be extremely difficult to hold general elections within time available this year, but we await your best judgment on best target date both for possible elections for constituent assembly and elections of constitutional government.

(2) Establishment of interim government at the earliest possible date is of highest priority. Economic problems of DR compounding at accelerating rate. Meaningful progress towards solution of economic problems impossible until political solution has been achieved. Positions of both USG and OAS (within DR and in world opinion) can be expected to become increasingly difficult as time passes and no political solution evolves. Danger of rapid emergence anti-US nationalistic sentiment in DR increases as time passes and no generally acceptable political solution is found. Same is true to lesser extent with respect OAS.

(3) Our preference at this time, like yours, would be for an apolitical government of technicians if this could be achieved. Most important slot would of course be candidates for single or plural executive. Names which occur to us offhand as well known to Embassy are Alejandro Gruillon, Rafael Herrera, Nicolas Pichardo, Bishop Polanco and Tomas Pastoriza. You will undoubtedly have other individuals in mind as well. In reference to cabinet, there may be some advantage in moving toward a consensus

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

in selecting names which are respected by all groups even though they do have some political affiliation. At time Guzman formula was considered, following names appeared to fit this category:

Here again you may have other individuals in mind.

(4) Composition of either type government at cabinet level and below will present obvious difficulties given human resources on which Dominican nation may call. Many of these officials will probably require technical support, regardless of type of government which eventually emerges.

Question: Should USG offer and/or attempt to provide this technical support or should other OAS member governments be called upon? We tend towards latter course because: (a) if USG technicians are provided, USG will bear ultimate blame for inability to "solve" long list of insoluble problems DR faces; and (b) a truly OAS "solution" to current crisis should have as much OAS flavor as possible.

(5) The 1962 Constitution was reinstated at the time of the 1963 coup and is now in effect. However, one of the major conditions Bosch has established for political solution is reinstatement 1963 Constitution. This condition is unacceptable various Dominican groups including GNR. On the other hand ^{there are} ~~it is~~ obvious advantages from several points of view in using as much of 1963 Constitution as is feasible.

(6) We do not see how 1963 Constitution could be accepted in toto for simple reason it would not work in present situation without considerable improvisation

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

-3-

and twisting of some articles.

(7) Possible alternative solutions would be (a) reinstate 1963 Constitution and then suspend all articles which are not applicable in present situation or which would present effective action against Communists, or (b) prepare basic law under which provisional government would operate until constituent assembly or group of experts could prepare new constitution which would become effective when promulgated, when approved by newly elected Congress, or approved by people in plebiscite. Request your comments on these alternatives. In meantime we will draft possible basic law using 1963 Constitution as point of departure.

(8) Since Dominican military and police will have responsibility for law and order in country, adequate safeguards will be required to insure that Dominican military police establishment will be apolitical and under control of and responsive to will of interim government and elected government which succeeds it. Individual officers will require special treatment such as assignment or leave outside country. Query: Should efforts towards restructuring of Dominican military establishment be held in abeyance pending inauguration of elected government, or will it be feasible to begin this task earlier?

(9) OAS presence would presumably continue in DR in some form until elected government is inaugurated. OAS supervision of elections taken for granted.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

(10) We continue to believe Imbert must step down. Once Dominican military establishment has acceptable alternative which it can rally, Imbert should be much easier to deal with. FYI. We continue ready to offer and help provide safeguards for Imbert and his family, provided he goes along with us when time comes. END FYI.

(11) We agree that it is highly unlikely that Bosch and rebel group will accept solution mentioned above. Hopefully, once provisional government is established, non-Communist elements in the rebel group will find solution sufficiently attractive to cease organized resistance. We should be thinking now of proposals that can be made to non-Communist rebels to encourage them to accept provisional government including guarantees against reprisals if they remain in country, and safe departure for those who wish to leave. Best argument with rebels will be that they will have their chance to participate in free and fair elections. It will also be helpful to be able to show clear path to constitutional government and respect for as much as possible of 1963 constitution. We also believe there should be room in provisional government for non-Communists who have been sympathetic to rebels if they wish to serve.

(12) Provisional government should be committed to deal effectively with Communist problem. The most important single safeguard for dealing with Communists is solid agreement on cooperation between provisional government

and OAS experts with whom in turn our experts could cooperate. This close cooperation in identification and surveillance of Communists is an indispensable requirement for us. Within this cooperation, two steps are involved: (a) agreement should be reached on the definition of "a Communist"; and (b) agreement should be reached on method of dealing with individuals so identified. On question of definition, we tend towards identifying Communists as members or known collaborators with MPD, PSPD, and extreme left wing of 14th of June movement. Provisional government should consult with OAS and USG on this. On question of disposition, our position is that Communists should be allowed to depart country voluntarily. We also believe those unwilling to go voluntarily should be rounded up and deported to a country of their choice provided arrangements can be made for their entry into country of choice. Otherwise, they should be sent wherever they will be accepted. But we repeat that this particular/^{preferred} solution is less important than basic pattern of cooperation on this problem.

(13) Once interim government installed and recognized, USG stands ready and eager to seek agreement with it on program aimed at relieving short-term economic problems and promoting rapid long-term development. We expect OAS-CIAP to play leading role.

(14) Finally, we are anxious for your current estimate of prospects for formation of interim government and time frame within which you believe it will be possible to get agreements necessary for its installation.

###

Friday, June 11, 1965
11:45 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke to Adlai, who is here for the NSC meeting, and he agrees entirely that there should be no advance speculation on your possible speech in San Francisco, and he has undertaken to get the word to the Mission in New York in no uncertain terms.

When I read through the UPI notice I also called Butch Fisher in ACDA because this particular story looks to me more like the Disarmament Staff than Adlai's people. It is even possible that it could have come from Bill Foster in a misguided effort to show that we are still interested in disarmament while we try to steer people away from a General Disarmament Conference. Butch also took the point right away and has agreed to sound the alarm with all his people, from Foster down.

On all the evidence I am inclined to withdraw my initial suggestion that this might have come from Stevenson's office.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 11, 1965
9:20 a. m.

81

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Irving Davidson

This is all I have on Irving Davidson. I will be glad to look into it further if you will give me guidance as to what you need. These papers came to me via Kennedy Crockett, who may be dumb but is completely straight. I feel sure that he used Davidson simply as a means of putting a little distance between himself and Balaguer at a time when Balaguer was not a man who could be seen on the record.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-276
By is, NARA Date 2-9-00

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Irving Davidson and the Washington Star

1. Attached at Tab 1 is a letter from Irving Davidson to Justice about Davidson's messenger work between Belaguer and Ken Crockett. The "Star" has the story and will print it today.

2. Attached at Tab 2 is a first draft of State's press guidance. We will be asked to clear the final version later in the day.

3. The draft guidance looks sensible to me. How about you?

GC
Gordon Chase

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY PUT ON 11-5-82

81-b

for Mr. Crockett

I. IRVING DAVIDSON
SUITE 306 CITY BUILDING
1812 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.
DISTRICT 7-3400

May 17, 1965

Mr. Nathan B. Lenvin, Chief
Registration Section
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lenvin:

I have been a close personal friend of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, former President of the Dominican Republic for the last several years. Our friendship has not been political or commercial in any way.

My purpose in writing this letter is to advise you that over a number of months and during the recent and current Dominican crisis and up to this very day, I have been called upon by Mr. Kennedy Crockett, Director of Caribbean Affairs, Dominican Task Force, U. S. Department of State, RE-7-5600 extension 3602, to carry messages to and from Dr. Balaguer.

I have never received remuneration from either group and I am glad to be of service to my government in any way I can. However, I wish you would advise me if I am obligated to register under any phase of the Foreign Agents Registration Act for these activities.

Sincerely,

I. Irving Davidson

To be filed
in KMC's
"Davidson file"

5/25/65

812

Dear Ken:

Met personally with
Lennin & his staff.
He advised me that for
activities mentioned in
my letter attached,
that I do not have to
register.

Sincerely
Irv Davidson

81d

Sully

June 3, 1965

TO: Mr. Nathan B. Lenvin
Chief, Registration Section
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice

FROM: INR/DDC - Gene F. Caprio

SUBJECT: Foreign Agents Registration Act;
I. Irving DAVIDSON, Dominican Republic

This is in response to your memo of 5/18/65 asking for any comment which the State Department might wish to make with respect to the veracity of the assertions made in the letter, dated 5/17/65, addressed to you by I. Irving DAVIDSON, as well as any details which we might be able to furnish re the nature and extent of Mr. DAVIDSON's activities in connection with Dr. Balaguer.

Mr. Crockett to whom Mr. DAVIDSON refers in his letter affirms that the statements made in the second paragraph of Mr. DAVIDSON's letter are correct.

Clearance:

ARA/CAR - Mr. Kennedy M. Crockett - 6/3/65



FIRST DRAFT 6/9

QUESTION: Is there anything to the report in the Evening Star that Irving Davidson was used to get messages to Joaquin Belaguer, former President of the Dominican Republic?

ANSWER: Mr. Davidson is known to the Department of State. It was also known to the Department of State that he was a friend of Joaquin Belaguer. The Department did ask Mr. Davidson for help in making arrangements in contacting Dr. Belaguer and getting a message to him. The Department wanted to maintain contact with Dr. Belaguer just as it has maintained contact with all political elements in the Dominican Republic.

If pressed on the question of compensation for Mr. Davidson's services, you may state that Mr. Davidson is an American citizen who was able to perform a useful service in an emergency. He was not compensated for this incidental service.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Petition for re-hearing on the Medal of Freedom procedure

1. I am sorry to say that I doubt very much if we can get a group of outstanding men to award a "Presidential Medal of Freedom" if the President himself will have nothing to do with the results. Moreover, I am very much afraid that we would get criticism that would have some justification if the President were to take no interest in citizens who have given a lifetime of service, while he is able to take the time to congratulate college freshmen. It seems to me that we would be giving the snipers a fat target for no purpose.

2. I believe that if we move the responsibility for selection entirely outside the White House and the Executive Branch, your own role will be that of simple ceremonial in which both the President and the Presidency will be immune from criticism or from complaint. If an award is criticized, it will be the committee that gets the criticism. If a particular winner misbehaves, his behavior will have only a very marginal relation to you -- because it will simply make no sense to turn down an award that comes from this kind of committee just because he does not like our policy toward Lower Slobbovia.

3. If we can't keep the President in this affair at all, I would think we would do better simply to let the whole process wait for a year on the ground that we had made large numbers of awards last year and the year before, and that we wanted time out for a breathing spell. Such a procedure could be readily understood and explained, and you could make a fresh choice next year when we will know better where we are in our dealings with angry artists.

McG. B.

Let's wait a year _____

All right, I will join in the award ceremonies _____

Proceed as I indicated earlier, by getting a committee to give this Medal in its own way, and on its own time, and somewhere else _____

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.
BY DCM ON 11-4-83

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA

NSC Meeting - June 11, 1965 - Noon

1. Report on Developments in Viet-Nam - Ambassador Taylor
2. U.S. Political Planning for Viet-Nam - Secretary Rusk
3. U.S. Military Planning for Viet-Nam - Secretary McNamara
4. Discussion.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCA NARS, Date 8-17-83

23c

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 552th NSC MEETING
JUNE 11, 1965, AT 12:00 IN THE CABINET ROOM
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding

The Vice President of the United States

AID

David E. Bell, Administrator

CIA

Admiral William F. Raborn, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary

John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman

OEP

Buford Ellington, Director

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary

George W. Ball, Under Secretary

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the UN

Ambassador Maxwell Taylor

TREASURY

Henry H. Fowler, Secretary

USIA

Carl T. Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

McGeorge Bundy

George Reedy

Bill Moyers

Douglass Cater

Bromley Smith

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Nicholas DeB. Katzenback

File 84

June 11, 1965

To: Mr. O'Brien

From: McGeorge Bundy

Larry:

The President would like to have this memorandum sent from your office to Fulbright, Mansfield, and Dirksen.

84a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 8, 1965

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of Congressional Attack on \$89 Million for Southeast Asia

1. Why Extra Economic Money Now in Such a Hurry?

(Senator Aiken: "Mr. President, I am not now in a mood to be very obliging when the Administration asks for \$89 million which it does not need at the present time. The Administration does not need it now any more than it will need the money on the 1st of July. It can get it on the 1st of July. What it now desires is to propagandize the world into believing that the Congress is unanimously behind any move which the Administration chooses to make. For that reason I am voting for the amendment and against the substitute.")

a. Vietnam (\$56.5 million)

It is difficult for a country with per capita income of \$100 to fight a war, and at the same time to maintain a growing civilian economy to support the essential long-term task of nation building. During 1965, there is a massive build-up of the Vietnamese' own war effort. (Vietnamese spending for military purposes will rise by the equivalent of about \$100 million. Military and para-military forces are scheduled to increase by about 160,000 men.) We have just completed detailed planning for FY 1966. It is now clear -- as we said it might be in the Aid message in February -- that without substantial new resources from the U. S., the local Vietnamese military build-up would result in (i) an appreciable cutback in the already meager standard of consumption; (ii) a sharp reduction in basic economic investment; (iii) run-away inflation.

If we were concerned only with the short-run military effort, we could say: "Shift resources to defense from investment." But since we are in this for the long pull, that would be short-sighted.

\$45 million is explicitly earmarked to cover additional industrial and construction materials and consumer goods which we don't think the local economy can supply; \$5 million is reserved for important village electrification projects; \$5 million for improved

medical services; and \$1.5 million for feasibility surveys to map out further nation building investment.

- b. Baltimore Follow-Up, \$19 million (Nam Ngum Dam \$13.5 million; Laos-Thailand transmission lines \$0.5 million; feasibility/engineering studies of other Mekong projects, \$5 million.)

The Nam Ngum is the International Mekong Committee's highest priority project. On the basis of his diplomatic explorations following the Baltimore speech, Eugene Black strongly recommended that we make a commitment now to support half its cost. In Black's judgment, if we had dragged our feet on this -- or on financing of the feasibility and engineering studies -- the momentum generated by the Baltimore speech would have been lost.

- c. Other Regional: Laos/Thailand, \$13.5 million

Police Program, \$4.5 million
Medical, \$2 million
Village Public Works, Equipment and Training, \$6 million
Agricultural Development, \$1 million

The \$4.5 million extra for the police program in Northern Laos and Thailand reflects a reassessment of security needs in the area.

The other \$9 million is a proof that the President meant business in Baltimore, and that we really care about peaceful development in the entire area. Health, agriculture, and village public works are the fields in which we can move both quickly and productively.

2. Will this commit us to unlimited economic spending on the Mekong (Hickenlooper, Williams, Gruening, and Ellender)? No
3. Not a dime will go to support the war effort (Williams).

Wrong: The large increase in Vietnam's own defense effort would be impossible without such help. It would result in run-away inflation in the short run, and stagnation over the longer run.

4. Why not spend it all in Vietnam "on the bull's eye" (Mundt)?

The President meant what he said in Baltimore about the peaceful development of the entire region.

5. Any of it to be spent in North Vietnam (McClellan)? No.
6. This will help the VC, which really controls the country (Morse)

No: funds will be spent in and in support of secure areas.

7. Take it out of original MAP appropriations (Morse Amendment, 22 votes in favor)

This is an attack on the FY '66 MAP request, and has nothing to do with the merits of the \$89 million.

8. They tacked it on the aid bill "as a whip to make us vote for the whole package" (Cotton) Not so.
9. Is this part of a comprehensive plan, or an emergency palliative (Cooper)?

It is both an emergency measure and a first step in a larger plan.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 8, 1965

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of Congressional Attack on \$89 Million for Southeast Asia

1. Why Extra Economic Money Now in Such a Hurry?

(Senator Aiken: "Mr. President, I am not now in a mood to be very obliging when the Administration asks for \$89 million which it does not need at the present time. The Administration does not need it now any more than it will need the money on the 1st of July. It can get it on the 1st of July. What it now desires is to propogandize the world into believing that the Congress is unanimously behind any move which the Administration chooses to make. For that reason I am voting for the amendment and against the substitute.")

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It is difficult for a country with per capita income of \$100 to fight a war, and at the same time to maintain a growing civilian economy to support the essential long-term task of nation building. During 1965, there is a massive build-up of the Vietnamese' own war effort. (Vietnamese spending for military purposes will rise by the equivalent of about \$100 million. Military and para-military forces are scheduled to increase by about 160,000 men.) We have just completed detailed planning for FY 1966. It is now clear -- as we said it might be in the Aid message in February -- that without substantial new resources from the U.S., the local Vietnamese military build-up would result in (i) an appreciable cutback in the already meager standard of consumption; (ii) a sharp reduction in basic economic investment; (iii) run-away inflation.

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The President meant what he said in Baltimore about the peaceful development of the entire region.

46

846

Tuesday, 7:15 p. m.
June 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of Congressional Attack on \$89 Million for
Southeast Asia.

1. Why Extra Economic Money Now in Such a Hurry?

(Senator Aiken: "Mr. President, I am not now in a mood to be very obliging when the Administration asks for \$89 million which it does not need at the present time. The Administration does not need it now any more than it will need the money on the 1st of July. It can get it on the 1st of July. What it now desires is to propagandize the world into believing that the Congress is unanimously behind any move which the Administration chooses to make. For that reason I am voting for the amendment and against the substitute.")

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9. Is this part of a comprehensive plan, or an emergency palliative (Cooper)?

It is both an emergency measure and a first step in a larger plan.

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M.P. B.
McG. B.

McC -
Get history to
Send to Fulbright -
& Mansfield & Pastore
A

TO REWRITING FILE

Rec'd 5/10/65
Thurs 10:05 a.m.

86

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 10, 1965
9:45 a.m.

Rec'd 10:05

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for Meeting on Vietnam
at 10:30 a.m.

We will be ready to talk about these items at our 10:30 meeting. In addition, General Taylor has said to me privately that he hopes to have a word alone with you at the end of the meeting -- I think he wants to talk about his personal affairs. Since you are still deliberating on this matter, you may want to make a date with him for later today or Friday morning, and have a talk with Bob and Dean and me in between.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-252

By ics, NARS, Date 6-19-84

86


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Agenda for meeting on Vietnam, Thursday,
June 10, 1965

1. Review of planned deployments
2. Review of Congressional relations and possible
Congressional Resolution
3. Review of political proposals to the Quat Government
(the Acheson Plan)
4. Review of international propaganda position before Bandung II
in Algiers at the end of June



File 87

Tuesday, June 8, 1965
12:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bernie Gwertzman's story on Czech advice to us

1. Gwertzman's story seems accurate, but very one-sided. It is outrageous that American officials should have spoken to him as they apparently did. What they have done is to translate an extreme case of localitis into public criticism. But I have no doubt some Czechs said what Gwertzman says they said.

2. The fact is that in our policy toward Eastern Europe we have to walk a tight rope between talking too much and talking too little. If we overdo it we can get serious backfires -- though this one is trivial. But if we never suggest that we are interested in the erosion of the Iron Curtain, we cannot possibly get public support for the kind of practical actions which the Miller Report recommends. The public policy of bridge-building is a necessary part of the democratic conduct of foreign policy on this very sensitive issue. A man as friendly to these countries as Averell Harriman thinks we should make much more noise than we do.

3. The language of your last statement was very carefully constructed. It reads as follows:

"First, we must hasten the slow erosion of the iron curtain. By building bridges between the nations of Eastern Europe and the West we bring closer the day when Europe can be reconstituted within its wide historic boundaries. For our part, after taking counsel with our European allies, I intend to recommend measures to the United States Congress to increase the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the United States."

This language was cleared by Tommy Thompson, who watches very closely on just this issue. It is in no sense provocative. It lays a necessary basis for the practical actions we hope to take as time goes on.

4. This type of wiseguy criticism is normal and not very important. It is a very different thing from what Lippmann is about to do. So the real trouble with the Gwertzman story is not that he should have written it, but rather that it should be given front-page play in a paper like the Star. This kind of narrowly based nitpicking does not deserve that kind of treatment. I will needle Crosby Noyes on this the next time he calls, which he does quite a lot.

McG. B.

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

June 8, 1965 Tuesday
12:15 PM

Memorandum to:

Secretary Rusk
Undersecretary Ball
Ambassador Stevenson
Assistant Secretary Cleveland

In approximately fifteen days I am ^{tentatively} scheduled to speak at the 20th anniversary of the United Nations. I would like, by the beginning of next week, ^(consider) to have some positive and constructive proposals for restoring and strengthening the United Nations. I don't believe I can make such a speech -- given the current condition of the UN -- unless we have some imaginative and realistic initiatives.



REFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

6-8-65
11:15 AM

89

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 8, 1965
11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Secy Rusk

Something like this would, I think, have a stimulating effect in the Department. I know that some good men are hard at work, but this will give them a much stronger mandate.

McG. B.

McG. B.

June 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State

As you know, I have stated that "it is my hope and plan at this time to be in San Francisco" during the commemorative sessions of the General Assembly on June 24, 25 and 26. I do not wish to make a final decision about this visit until I am convinced that the occasion can be used for a truly useful statement of our policy.

Accordingly, I would like to have by next Monday, June 14, a full set of the most imaginative and constructive proposals that you and your colleagues can suggest for inclusion in such a statement. You and I will need to review these proposals in the following days before final decisions are made on them, but what I would like in the first instance is a set of ideas widely and boldly conceived.

I should add that I am not interested in empty flattery or in neglecting the fact that there are real issues to be met in the future work of the United Nations. Any statement we make on this occasion should be one which combines practical good sense with our deep and proven concern for effective international cooperation.



LBJ:McG:EM:mz

Monday, June 8, 1965
7 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Komer's background paper on the Pak/Indian Aid Decision. I think he makes a very good case for authorizing the immediate public decisions, while insisting on a hard new look at our Indian/Pak policy. We can turn this around much better in private than in public in the first stages.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

(2)
MK/17

(3)

91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Monday, June 7, 1965
7:15 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached report of a conversation with Balaguer is interesting.

My own feeling is that his solution is very near to what we should come out with. I would throw in a substantial dash of "constitutionalism" precisely in order to be forthcoming to the Caamano forces, even though they did not accept it. My object will be to leave them as the dogs in the manger while the country goes about its business.

On another subject, I talked with Abe this afternoon and he will do his best with Munoz and Benitez. He thinks both of them can be made to see the point, but he doubts if Bosch can -- I am afraid I agree with him.

incl. 15
McG. B.

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-205
By ics, NARS, Date 8-15-84

EXDIS TEL
Sent S.D.
June 5, 1965


~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

June 4, 1965

SUBJECT: Dr. Joaquin Balaguer's Views as of June 4, 1965

I met with Dr. Balaguer for several hours this evening. I gave him our line. I heard and discussed his views. The bare bones of the conversation can be summarized as follows:

Balaguer believes:


1.  1.3(a)(5)
2. Despite the risks involved, an electoral solution offers the only apparent way out at this time.
3. An apolitical interim government capable of winning general national support must be formed and installed as quickly as possible -- preferably within the next few days.
4. Such a government will not be supported by Bosch or the Caamaño crowd in Ciudad Nueva.
5. It will not be possible to talk Caamaño and his crowd out of Ciudad Nueva -- it would be a mistake to shoot them out.
6. During the interim period, they should be left alone, but contained in Ciudad Nueva. Time, attrition and the people will dissolve them in a matter of weeks once an interim government of national consensus is installed and has gained recognition.
7. At best, any interim government will be weak and capable of holding office for only a limited period -- a year at the outside, but perhaps no longer than six months.
8. Elections should be delayed until the climate is more propitious -- at the same time, elections

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

must be held as soon as possible. The trick is to delay the holding of elections for a period which can be gauged as the probable effective life expectancy of the interim government.

9. There can be no assurance who will win when elections are held, but it seems highly unlikely Bosch will run. Barring a sudden and extreme surge of nationalism, the eventual winner will probably be someone capable of heading a government not unacceptable to the US.
10. Although illiterate and unsophisticated in politics, the Dominicans can learn and have learned a good bit from their unhappy experiences since Trujillo's death. This is reassuring.
11. The military establishment must be greatly reduced in size and completely restructured. This should be accomplished, to the extent possible, during the tenure of the interim government and while the IAF is still in the Dominican Republic.

Balaguer will take the following actions:

1. 
2. Urge his contacts and followers to establish liaison with like-minded groups and come to the OAS committee with concrete proposals, including a slate of names from which a single interim Chief of State might be selected.
3. Impress upon all of those with whom he is in contact that they should make their views and proposals known to the OAS committee, regardless of whether they are able to agree on a common plan of action.

1.3(a)(5)

SECRET - EXDIS


-3-

4. When and if a national consensus is judged by the OAS committee to have emerged, Balaguer will fall into line if it is at all possible for him to do so, regardless of whether his supporters have at the point in time thrown their lot in with the group heard by the OAS committee.

Balaguer estimates:

1. Viriato Fiallo is no longer the power he once was, in the Cibao or elsewhere. He might capitalize on a wave of nationalism.
2. Bonnelli is an elder statesman -- heard but no longer heeded.
3. "Youth" in the Dominican Republic is restive and looking for a change. They want work and stability just as much. Both ends cannot be achieved fully and simultaneously -- but the problem must be recognized. One way of partially dealing with it would be to include young, progressive but non-communist elements in both the interim and elected governments to the extent reasonably competent individuals can be identified and recruited.

Augusto Lora, who heads Dr. Balaguer's party in the Dominican Republic, is now in the U.S. He will carry Dr. Balaguer's message to the Partido Reformista faithful and other sympathetic groups in the D.R.


Kennedy M. Crockett

Copies to:

Mr. Read - S/S - 4
Mr. Vaughn - ARA - 1
Ambassador Bunker - 1 (by telegram through Mr. Vaughn)
Mr. Allen - RPA - 1

SECRET - EXDIS

Monday, June 7, 1965

5:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Estimate, "Soviet Attitudes
Toward the US"

1. The attached CIA estimate is unusually interesting, and I think you will want to read at least the first page and perhaps the whole thing.

2. The net of it is that the Soviets made a policy decision to mend their Communist fences even at the expense of good relations with us. This is a point which is worth making publicly, and I will be making it to newspapermen who listen, unless you object.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment
SNIE 11-11-65 26 May 65

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 7, 1965
3:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dean Rusk gave me two pieces of information after the Menzies luncheon ended:

1. Senator Dirksen has agreed not to press his Free China military assistance amendment.
2. Senator Fulbright has agreed not to press for my appearance at hearings on the Dominican Republic unless I ask for an invitation. I told Dean I could be counted on not to crash that particular party.

McG. B.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2)

Monday, June 7, 1965
3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Shooting of Civilian Vietnamese in
Saigon by US Sentries

Alexis Johnson takes a fairly serious view of this matter and says that it may have political repercussions. Since the shooting occurred on a public street and not on US territory, it is a violation of Vietnamese law. Preliminary investigations suggest that the sentry was hasty at least, and since the man killed was a Catholic, there may be some ugly reaction. The Embassy is watching closely and will obviously do what it can. I attach a copy of Johnson's reporting cable.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

94a

RECEIVED
WHCA

1965 JUN 7 14 27

SD

EHX839
PP RUEPWW
DE RUEHCR 5996 07/1425Z
P 071328Z ZEA
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INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEPIA/CIA
DE RUMJIR 389A 07/1230Z
P R 071215Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4100
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 2394
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 7.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SERIOUS SHOOTING INCIDENT WITH POSSIBLE POLITICAL OVERTONES OCCURRED LAST NIGHT BETWEEN US MILITARY GUARDS AND FOUR VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. WHILE ALL FACTS NOT YET VERIFIED, APPEARS THAT FOUR VIETNAMESE WERE STOPPED BY VIETNAMESE POLICE AT 0300 (ONE HOUR AFTER BEGINNING OF CURFEW) JUNE 7 ABOUT BLOCK AWAY FROM US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND VIETNAM BEQ NEAR INTERSECTION YEN DO AND TRUONG MINH GIANG STREETS, SAIGON, IN RATHER ROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD. VIETNAMESE SAID WERE ON WAY HOME FROM OLYMPIC THEATER AND LIVED NEARBY; TICKET STUB FROM OLYMPIC LATER FOUND ON ONE OF YOUTHS. POLICE TOLD THEM GET ON HOME AND THEY TOOK SHORTCUT DOWN ALLEY WHICH LEADS PAST BEQ.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 389A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
US PFC ON GUARD IN ALLEY (ONE OF US WERE MP'S AS THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH OF LATTER TO GUARD ALL US INSTALLATIONS) SAW

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLS 83-253

By

us, NARS, Date 2-14-84

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

FOUR MEN COMING TOWARDS HIM DOWN ALLEY, HOLLERED "HALT," AND WHEN THEY KEPT ON HE THEN FIRED WARNING SHOT OVER THEIR HEADS. VIETNAMESE THEN BROKE INTO RUN. TWO US EM ON GUARD AT FRONT OF BEQ PURSUED VIETNAMESE FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS THROUGH ONE OR MORE ALLEYS, FIRING FIVE SHOTS IN AIR, AND THEN SEVEN AT THEM. POLICE STATE MP'S WERE BLOCK AWAY FROM BEQ WHEN VIETNAMESE STUDENT, 17, WAS KILLED, AND 16-YEAR-OLD CYCLO DRIVER WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN STOMACH. POLICE SAY THEY YELLED "DON'T SHOOT" AT US GUARDS AFTER HEARING FIRST WARNING SHOT. POLICE TOOK INTO CUSTODY OTHER TWO VIETNAMESE, 15 YEAR OLD COOLIE AND 30 YEAR BWD CYCLO DRIVER. AT LEAST THREE OF VIETNAMESE ARE SAID TO BE CATHOLICS FROM BINH DINH PROVINCE.

US GUARDS ARE INSTRUCTED AGAINST USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THEIR DUTIES AND ARE TOLD NOT TO SHOOT TO KILL OR INJURE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE OR IN EVENT OF EVIDENT ATTACK ON FACILITY THEY ARE GUARDING. THREE GUARDS INVOLVED ARE UNDER RESTRAINT PENDING INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT, ON WHICH DEPENDS FILING OF ANY CHARGES UNDER ARTICLES OF WAR, WHICH COULD RANGE FROM VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER DOWN TO FAILURE TO OBEY ORDERS.

UNDER PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT US HAS INCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS AND ANY OTHER INCIDENTS INVOLVING US FORCES. UNDER

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 389A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
VIETNAMESE LAW YOU MAY NOT INJURE OR KILL EVEN AN INTRUDER OR TRESPASSER UNLESS HE THREATENS YOU WITH BODILY INJURY AND YOU MAY DO SO THEN ONLY IF HE IS WITHIN CONFINES YOUR OWN PROPERTY. KILLING IN PUBLIC STREET IS CONSIDERED MURDER OR MANSLAUGHTER. VIETNAMESE IN THIS CASE WERE NOT INTRUDING ON US FACILITY AND PUBLIC REPERCUSSIONS CAN BE EXPECTED. ACCORDING TO POLICE UGLY RUMORS OF MEANING OF INCIDENT ARE ALREADY CIRCULATING AMONG CYCLO DRIVERS AND CATHOLICS, BOTH PRESENTLY VOLATILE GROUPS.

AT REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING TODAY INITIAL REPORT OF INCIDENT, WHICH HAD BEEN BROADCAST OVER AFRS, WAS ISSUED TO PRESS, WITH CORRECTIONS BASED ON LATER INFORMATION. RELEASE DOES NOT INCLUDE INFORMATION ON SUPPOSED RELIGION OR OCCUPATIONS OF VIETNAMESE INVOLVED. ONLY QUESTION ASKED WAS WHETHER ANY EXPLOSIVES INVOLVED, TO WHICH SPOKESMAN SAID NO. FOR TIME BEING MISSION WILL RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS TO EFFECT THAT WHILE CASE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION NO COMMENT CAN BE MADE OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED. JOHNSON
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

94-6

UPI-35

(SHOOTING)

Bundy

SAIGON--U.S. Sentries on duty outside an American enlisted men's billet in Saigon early today shot and killed a Vietnamese man and wounded another when they ignored challenges to stop.

A U.S. military spokesman said the incident took place during the 2 A.M. to 4 A.M. curfew in Saigon.

Four men approached the billet along an alley at the rear of the building. They started to run when challenged in Vietnamese to halt. Warning shots were fired over their heads but they continued running.

The Vietnamese police arrived and arrested the other two men. U.S. and Vietnamese authorities were investigating the incident.

THE BILLET HOUSES ABOUT 50 SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.
6/7--GE1004A

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands
on Whale Conservation

Attached at Tab A is a letter from Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands asking your assistance in securing international agreement for conservation measures to protect declining whale resources.

The principal problem has been getting the Russians and the Japanese, the major whalers in the Antarctic, to accept a system of quotas. Preliminary agreement has been reached to put such quotas into effect by the 1967/68 season. Prince Bernhard would like them implemented sooner. Our negotiators are convinced we could only get Russian and Japanese agreement to a quota arrangement if we were prepared to compromise on the timetable, and an agreement to this effect is now in the making. Bernhard's proposal could undo the package, and we see no gain in this.

Given these considerations, I am inclined to go along with our negotiators and have had a reply to Bernhard prepared indicating our support for his purposes, but making it clear that we were prepared to accept a slippage in the timetable in return for a workable arrangement.

The proposed reply to Prince Bernhard is attached at Tab B.

McG. B.

Attachments

Approved and signed _____

Disapproved _____

Discuss _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: John Chancellor Broadcast

Jake Jacobsen last week asked me to give you a comment on a May 14 broadcast of John Chancellor (attached). On the whole it seems to me that Chancellor has given a pretty accurate description of the problem we have in the Caribbean. He nit-picks on the question of what we might do about a freely elected Communist regime (John Oakes raised the same question with me in New York last week), but then he goes on to agree that we have to use our influence to avoid such a result, and referring to the Cuban missile crisis, he says we would not wish to wait so long again in a crisis situation for the exercise of American power.

This commitment against Communism in the Caribbean is a development of our foreign policy, but it is a development which goes back at least four years. In your speech of May 2 you quoted what President Kennedy said in 1963. You could also have quoted what he said in 1961:

"But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction -- if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration -- then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!

"Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on "intervention" by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest!"

McG. B.

Saturday, June 5, 1965
7:50 p. m.

97

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ch'en Yi message on Vietnam

In view of the importance which some of us have attached to the Ch'en Yi message via the British, you may be interested in this rather cooler assessment by a bright guy named George Denney in the State Intelligence bureau. It is well written and persuasive, except that I think the actual transmission of the message has a little more meaning than he gives it.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

Saturday, June 5, 1965
6:35 p. m.

File 98

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here is Bob McNamara's memorandum about the views of our leading people in Europe on the IL-28. The delay on this one is my fault.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2347
98a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

2 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

While I was in Europe for the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers, I discussed with U.S. civilian and military representatives the movement of IL28 bombers into Hanoi and possible U.S. responses. Their views follow:

Ambassador Bruce: He does not believe that it is necessary for either political or military reasons to strike the bombers now or in the immediate future. Such an action would carry with it a high risk of escalation. He suggests it would be well for the U.S. to inform the Soviets, through appropriate private channels, that we view the introduction of these aircraft with great concern, and if they are used to strike our forces or military or civilian centers of the South Vietnamese, we would find it necessary to respond with great force. He emphasized the absolute necessity of "prior consultation" with the British in the event we do carry out a strike on Phuc Yen.

General Lemnitzer: So long as there are no more than a small number of IL28's in North Vietnam (I reported to him that at present we estimate there are approximately 9 aircraft at Phuc Yen), he would be inclined to defer a strike against them. When the number becomes large and militarily significant, General Lemnitzer would strike to destroy them. In his opinion, the Soviets would not respond to a U.S. strike against Phuc Yen with overt military action in Western Europe -- they might harass the corridors to Berlin, and in that event General Lemnitzer would suggest we harass their seaborne commerce.

Ambassador Bohlen: He does not believe the Soviets will allow the bombers to be used initially against Saigon or other civilian targets in South Vietnam. For this and other reasons, he recommends against attacking the IL28's until they move south of the 17th parallel. If and when they do so, we should hit back hard. He said it would be a tossup as to how the Soviets would react if we strike the IL28's before they move south of the demarcation line. He pointed out the Soviets are in a bad spot: They do not want to become involved in the war in Southeast Asia, but they do have to protect their position in the Communist world, and the current regime does not have the stability of Khrushchev's. In the event we did strike first, he doubts that the Soviets would start any military action in Europe because they would recognize that to do so "would be committing suicide for fear of death." And he does not believe they would go to war in the Far East


~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, vol. II, item 325
By *gwl/mg* NARA. Date 3/2/98

~~TOP SECRET~~

because they would think such action would lead to war in Europe. Their military reaction would probably be slight, but the international reaction to our move would be very bad, e.g., we would probably lose the support of the British. He made exactly the same suggestion as Ambassador Bruce, i.e., couldn't we get word to the Soviets that if the IL28's are used against us or against the South Vietnamese, "we will blast you."


Robert S. McNamara

cc: Secretary Rusk
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

99 J

Saturday, June 5, 1965
6:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bob McNamara's paper on
economic aid to Pakistan and India

Here is Bob McNamara's paper on economic aid to Pakistan and India, which was mentioned at lunch. Our records show that it was sent to you at the Ranch, and returned from your office after last weekend.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Log 2360)

100
2

Saturday, June 5, 1965
6:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: George Ball's cable to Taylor

1. Here is George's outgoing of June 1, and the answer from Taylor and Johnson. What they say in essence is that they would like to maintain and increase pressure by air attacks as well as by efforts in the South. They would avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area except for an occasional selected target -- and they believe a little more than we do that pain in the North will help bring a change of heart in Hanoi.

2. I share Bob McNamara's view that we can readily frame a specific program over the next month that will be acceptable to the Embassy without unacceptable risks of escalation. I myself am more attracted than Rusk and McNamara by the notion of an occasional limited attack inside the Hanoi perimeter -- probably in the Haiphong port area.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

file 2769
saigon 4035

DECLASSIFIED
State 3-27-78 NSC 6-6-78
By DCB NARS, Date 8-23-82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, June 5, 1965
5:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 65 money for India and Pakistan -- again

1. I attach a memorandum which Bob Komer has prepared at my request. He and I are acting here for Dean Rusk and Dave Bell, both of whom feel that time is running out on the India/Pak aid decisions affecting FY 65. ~~As the memo shows,~~ We had thought that this could wait until the latter part of the month, but Dave now has a problem with Otto Passman which makes it important to get a decision in this coming week.

2. Komer has set out the alternatives, and I myself strongly favor alternative A. I do not think this month is the time for a sharp turn-around in aid policy toward India and Pakistan, though Komer and I both think that before we move ahead with any '66 funds we should take the time for a badly needed review of our whole policy with these two countries. Moreover, I have had a preliminary talk with Don Cook, and he is very much interested in doing this if you rate it as a really serious problem (I have told him that I think you do, and he is beginning homework on this basis).

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 12, NARA, Date 10-20-97

101a
✓

~~SECRET~~

June 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I hesitate to bring this matter up again, but a new wrinkle has developed on remaining FY 65 aid loans to India and Pakistan. Otto Passman is pressing Dave Bell on how much money AID expects to have left over at the end of this fiscal year. Bell seeks guidance as he feels he can't delay answering Passman beyond next week or the latter will begin to smell a rat.

A lesser problem is that the Indians and Paks are beginning to ask insistently how soon some of these loans will be released. They are not aware to date of any hold order; instead we think the Indians in particular are worried because their foreign exchange reserves have dropped to a record low of \$162 million (they've even been forced to draw a \$125 million standby from the IMF).

To recap, AID and State seek a go-ahead on three categories of aid: (a) Some \$227 million in loans to India and \$18.5 million to Pakistan, which have already been approved, authorized, and announced, and where only formal loan agreements remain to be signed; (b) some \$76 million in loan applications for India and \$51 million for Pakistan-- AID would like to authorize those which pass muster; and (c) new program loans of up to \$100 million for India and up to \$70 million for Pakistan as a first installment on this year's pledges. All but the new \$70 million for Pakistan is covered by pledges already made.

Bell expects to obligate fully all other AID funds, so his answer to Passman depends essentially on the India/Pak items above. There seem to be three options:

A. Authorize Bell to proceed to the extent necessary to obligate all FY 1965 aid funds before 30 June, but to continue holding off on anything beyond. This is the course which State and AID recommend on foreign policy grounds, and to meet existing commitments. It would also permit Bell to meet the Passman problem.

B. Authorize proceeding on all previously announced loans and other feasible project loans, but not the new program loans for India or Pakistan. In this case Bell sees us falling short on obligating FY 65 funds by about \$125 - 175 million.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C la 7-25-80

By copy kg, NARA, Date 8-25-92

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

C. Hold off on all further loans to India and Pakistan, in which case AID will have about \$250-300 million in Development Loan funds left over.

Approve Course A, B, C. (check your choice), or

Tell Bell to keep stalling Passman
until we can discuss the matter
further _____

or

Speak to me ✓

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

M.P.S.

~~SECRET~~

*Read
June 5, 1965
12:30 P*

102

LT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, June 5, 1965 12:30

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Corrections to USUN
account of conversation

Since the Situation Room sent you the long and somewhat fuzzy USUN account of my conversation with U Thant yesterday, I think you may want also to have this cable of correction which I have just sent out.

MB
McG. B.

TO: USUN New York

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

INFO: RUESSD/AmEmbassy Santo Domingo

Ref USUN 4872.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-232

By iso, NARA, Date 1-7-93

Your 4872 gives thoughtful account of our talk yesterday with U Thant, but I request the following corrections:

1. Telegram significantly understates degree of skepticism which I expressed on present viability of Guzman solution. Whole object of meeting was to turn ^{U Thant} SYG away from endorsement of this formula, and I believe we succeeded.

2. Specifically, I emphasized that discussions with Guzman and other rebels had failed to produce agreement on control of Communists, control of armed forces, and parallel treatment for a limited number of controversial leaders on each side. I also pointed out that elements like Balagueristas were no longer in favor of this solution, which time was passing by. I made it clear that in our view other solutions should now be explored and that Mayobre rationale for imposed Guzman solution was weak. I said we might have to lean on both sides, and not merely on one.

3. The last sentence of paragraph 5 also needs correction. I said that while we were not insisting on any single procedure for dealing with Communists, the attitude of the rebels on this issue made us feel that if their supporters were to dominate a new government,

(6/5/65)

we would need very specific guarantees. I made the further point that with a more evidently anti-Communist government, the question of specific procedures might present itself in a different form. My object was to avoid giving U Thant the impression that we were insisting on any "impossible" conditions, while reserving a free hand for Bunker.

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-405

By is, NARA Date 5-7-99

Friday, June 4, 1965
11:50 A. M.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Foreign Policy over the weekend

1. Today, Friday, is not a good day for serious talk on either Santo Domingo or Saigon. Bunker is just beginning his work, and Taylor and Johnson are still fully engaged in trying to keep the Quat Government glued together. Moreover, intelligence estimates on the IL-28s problem are still under consideration, although they may be ready by the end of today.

2. Tomorrow will be different. We should know about the IL-28s, and we will have had a day to think about the [redacted] which I sent to you separately. It would be a good day for a quiet talk at Camp David, if you should be going there. Such a talk should turn mostly on the big choices in Vietnam, but we could also catch up on other items.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. Dean Rusk has a speaking engagement Saturday morning and a reception Saturday afternoon, both with the International Book Publishers. I think he could cancel one or the other at your preference.

The membership of such a discussion, I think, should be Rusk, Ball, McNamara and myself, with Red Raborn if you want him. (Bob is a little wary about Raborn, who is quite belligerent on Vietnam and who takes careful notes of our talks -- but I am sure he would treat such a meeting as totally off the record if you told him to).

4. Sunday is another alternative, but not a good one from the point of view of your advisers because Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy all have speaking engagements at University commencements -- Rusk here, McNamara in Ohio, and Bundy at Notre Dame.)

5. There is nothing in all this that cannot wait until Monday, except that the issues of choice in Vietnam are so serious that it seems a mistake to lose 3 days. At a minimum we need to decide whether to send a careful message to the Soviets about the importance of avoiding provocation by offensive use of the IL-28s. We should also be thinking right away of the appropriate shape of an answer to the Chinese, and these later considerations suggest that you might want to have Tommy Thompson at any Camp David meeting tomorrow.

McG. B.

Come to Camp David Saturday _____

Invite: Rusk _____ McNamara _____ Ball _____ Raborn _____ Thompson _____
M. Bundy _____

Don't come _____

107

Rec'd
June 4, 1965
11:25 am

J.F.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, June 4, 1965

11:10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Item in CIA daily brief

1. The CIA daily brief last night had a very important annex on Chinese Communist policy toward Vietnam, but they did not make it wholly clear that this account was part of a direct effort to send a message from Chou en-lai to the U. S. Government. This is so interesting that I think you will want to read it yourself in the [redacted] telegrams which have been provided to us. The first two pages of the attached give a brief summary, and there follows a long reporting telegram which is worth reading in full.

2. Dean Rusk's first impression is that this is a relatively defensive message. My own feeling is more mixed. The basic trouble with the message is that it does not tell us at all at what point the Chinese might move in Vietnam itself in a way which would force us to act against China ~~herself~~. And that of course is the \$64 question.

McG. B.
McG. B.

25X1A

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-003-38
By [signature], NARA, Date 12-7-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107a

107a

CYPHER/OTP

FROM PEKING

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO 720

D. 10.54 PM 31/5

DATED 31 MAY 1965

R. 7.52 PM 31/5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-406

By is, NARA Date 8-20-98

CONFL

ADDS TO F O TEL NO 720 OF 31 MAY REPTD FOR INFMN TO WTON 230 MOSCOW SAIGON HANOI AND SAVING TO PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK 27 UKDEL NATO SHANGHAI HONG KONG BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE (POLAD).

CH'EN YI RECEIVED ME FOR OVER AN HOUR THIS MORNING. THE WHOLE TIME, EXCEPT FOR TEN MINUTES OR SO DEVOTED TO BILATERAL SINO BRITISH RELATIONS, WAS TAKEN UP BY HIS EXPOSITION OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION. HE WAS COURTEOUS THROUGHOUT AND IN GOOD HUMOUR.

2. MAIN POINTS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE THAT ALTHOUGH NOT NORMAL, RELATIONS WERE "NOT BAD" EITHER. USUAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENT WERE QUOTED, E G UN QUESTION, CONSULATE IN TAIWAN AND OUR SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM.

3. MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST IN HIS VERY LONG EXPOSITION ON VIETNAM WERE AS FOLLOWS. THE VIETNAMESE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASSURED HIM RECENTLY IN BANDUNG THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WD CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AMERICANS TO THE BITTER END WHATEVER HAPPENED. THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT AT PRESENT NEED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE BUT ONLY MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FM CHINA. CH'EN YI SAID CHOU EN-LAI HAD ASKED PRES. AYUB KHAN TO GIVE THE FOLLOWING FOUR-POINT MESSAGE TO THE U S GOVT:-

- " (I) CHINA WILL NOT PROVOKE WAR WITH UNITED STATES;
- (II) WHAT CHINA SAYS COUNTS;

CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action

/ (III)
Plus
UKMIS New York (27)

567:CHY:as.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

(III) CHINA IS PREPARED; AND,

(IV) IF UNITED STATES BOMBS CHINA THAT WD MEAN WAR AND THERE
WD BE NO LIMITS TO THE WAR."

AS PRES. AYUD'S VISIT TO WTON HAD BN CANCELLED, PERHAPS THIS
MESSAGE HAD NOT GOT THROUGH. HE WD BE GRATEFUL IF THE BRITISH
GOVT WD PASS IT ON.

4. FOR FULL REPORT ON CONVERSATIONS AND MY COMMENTS, SEE MY
THREE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELS.

FOR F O ONLY.

I HAVE REPEATED ALL THESE TELS TO HANOI BUT PLEASE USE
DISCRETION.

(PASSED SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK AS F O TEL NO 944)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107-8
DECLASSIFIED ✓
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-406
By us, NARA Date 8-20-98

CYPHER/OTP

FROM:- PEKING

TO:- FOREIGN OFFICE

NR 722

D.2.53 P M 1/JUNE

JUNE 1/1965

R.12.27 P M. 1/JUNE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDSD TO F O TEL NO 722 OF 31/5 REPTD FOR INFMN TO WTON 232.
MOSCOW SAIGON HANOI AND SAVING TO PARIS UKDEL NATO HONG KONG
SHANGHAI BANGKOK AND SPORE (POLAD).

MI P T

FOLLG IS SUMMARY OF CH'EN YI'S EXPOSITION ON VIETNAM.

2. REFERRING TO INCREASE IN SCALE OF WAR AND U S INITIAL HOPES OF MAKING NORTH VIETNAMESE SUBMIT AFTER ONE OR TWO MONTHS OF BOMBING CH'EN YI ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE DETERMINED NOT TO SURRENDER WHETHER BOMBING LASTED THREE MONTHS OR THREE YEARS AND EVEN IF HANOI WERE ATTACKED. OVER LAST TEN YEARS NORTH VIETNAMESE SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE BUT EVEN IF THESE WERE ALL LAID IN RUINS BY U S VIETNAMESE WD RESIST TO THE END. THIS MIGHT SEEM TO EUROPEANS A SURPRISINGLY HIGH PRICE TO PAY BUT HO CHI MINH AND PHAM VAN DONG WERE DETERMINED TO RESIST REGARDLESS OF COST. FOR SAKE OF RE-UNIFICATION OF THEIR COUNTRY VIETNAMESE WD GIVE UP MILLIONS OF POPULATION AND MANY ACHIEVEMENTS. THEY WERE A NATION "WORTHY OF RESPECT" AND WD HAVE THEIR DUE POSN IN THE WORLD. U S TALK OF ESCALATION WD NOT MAKE THEM SURRENDER.

CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action

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592:CHY:as.

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3. - PHAM VAN DONG HAD MADE THESE VIEWS CLEAR DURING BANDUNG CELEBRATIONS EXPLAINING THAT NEGTS HELD NOW WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO ASKING NORTH VIETNAMESE TO SURRENDER. IN DISCUSSION WITH HIMSELF SUKARNO AND AFRICAN (SIC) REPVES PHAM VAN DONG HAD SAID THAT IN 1962-3 VIETNAMESE HAD OVERESTIMATED U S STRENGTH. BY GETTING TO KNOW U S THROUGH BATTLE IN 1964 THEY NOW KNEW (GRP OMITTED) WOULD BE VICTORIOUS. SPEAKING TO REPVES OF 13 AFRICAN (PERHAPS "AFRO-ASIAN" WAS INTENDED) COUNTRIES IN DJAKARTA PHAM VAN DONG HAD CONCLUDED WITH THESE WORDS: "WE DON'T NEED MATERIAL AID OR WEAPONS: WE CAN DEFEAT THEM OURSELVES. BUT GIVE US POLITICAL SUPPORT AND CONDEMN U S AGGRESSION THAT'S ENOUGH". THIS STATEMENT HAD BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED BY HIMSELF AND THE AFRICANS PRESENT.

4. HOW STRONG WERE THE AMERICANS? THIS WAS AN OF EXPERIENCE. IF YOU HAD NOT FOUGHT THEM YOU DID NOT KNOW. THE CHINESE HAD NEGOTIATED WITH AND FOUGHT THE AMERICANS AND KNEW THEM WELL: SIMILARLY THE AMERICANS KNEW THE CHINESE. THIS WAS NOT A QN OF TAKING RISKS BUT OF UNDERSTANDING. EUROPEANS AND ASIANS MIGHT HAVE A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK. FORMER BEING RICH WERE INTERESTED KEEPING THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS. LATTER BEING POOR HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BUT COULD GAIN FREEDOM. WITHOUT STRUGGLE LIFE WOULD GET WORSE AND WORSE.

5. AMERICANS BRIT AND SOME OTHERS HAD AN ERRONEOUS VIEWPOINT IN THINKING THAT THE WAR WAS BEING FOUGHT BECAUSE OF CHINESE SUPPORT. THEY ALSO THOUGHT WRONGLY THAT IF CHINESE BROUGHT INFFUENCE TO BEAR THERE COULD BE PEACE. IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANTED PEACE, "WE WOULD SUPPORT IT "; IF THEY WANTED TO FIGHT ON, "WE WOULD EQUALLY SUPPORT THIS". THE POINT WAS THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY

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LISTEN IF THE CHINESE INTERFERED ON HIS RECENT DEPARTURE, A NORTH EUROPEAN AMBASSADOR (PRESUMABLY THE DANE) HAD ENQUIRED WHETHER CHINESE CD NOT EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. HE (CH'EN YI) AGREED THAT THE CHINESE CD ASK THEIR FRIENDLY CONTACTS TO TALK, BUT THE VIETNAMESE LISTENED WAS UP TO THEM. THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE COUNTRY WAS AT STAKE, AND THEIR HOPES FOR REUNIFICATION. THE CHINESE THEREFORE HAD NO RIGHT TO PLACE OBSTACLES IN VIETNAM'S PATH TO LIBERATION. IT WAS ENTIRELY UP TO VIETNAMESE TO DECIDE "WHETNER WE HELP OR NOT, THEY WILL STILL FIGHT."

6. AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR, A NUMBER OF NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALWAYS BLAMED FOR THESE, BUT HOW CD THE RUSSIANS HAVE DIRECTED ALL THESE REVOLUTIONS? EVER SINCE THE ADOPTION OF REVISIONIST LINE IN SOVIET UNION AFTER 1956, ALL THE BLAME FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES HAD BN TRANSPOSED TO CHINA. BUT THE CHINESE ONLY BECAME AWARE AFTER THE EVENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE REVOLUTION IN DOMINICA HAD HAPPENED. WHEN A NATION FOUGHT FOR ITS EXISTENCE IT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO

INTERFERENCE FROM FOREIGNERS. THE CREATION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS EVERYWHERE WAS NOT DIRECTED BY THE CHINESE, BUT WAS DUE TO AMERICAN POLICY. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PEACE IN CHINA AFTER THE JAPANASE WAR. THE BRITISH, BEING SENSIBLE, HAD CONFORMED TO TO REALITY AND SAID THAT (GRP OMITTED) WD LEAVE CHINA ALONE.

THE U S HOWEVER

INSISTED ON TAKING PLACE OF JAPANESE MILITARISTS AND SUPPORTED CHIANG KAI-SHEK. THE CHINESE SHOULD REALLY THANK THE AMERICANS.

THE COMMUNISTS HAD BN MUCH WEAKER THAN CHIANG KAI-SHECK.

CHIANG AND THE AMERICANS THOUGH THEY CD SMASH MAO AND HIS FOLLOWERS WITH TANKS, PLANES, ETC. BUT THEY HAD BN DEFEATED AND THE U S WENT HOME. THE SOVIET UNION HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT.

THEY HAD PROVIDED MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT BUT NO MATERIAL OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF ANY KIND. /7.

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7. AMERICANS WERE IN "BOTTOMLESS PIT" IN VIETNAM. HO CHI MINH AND PHAM VAN DONG HAD SAID THAT IF THEY DID NOT DEFEAT AMERICANS IN THIS GENERATION, THEN THEY WOULD IN NEXT. U S COULD NOT HOPE TO DESTROY ALL FORESTS, HILLS, ETC. WITH MODERN WEAPONS. IT WAS GREATEST LACK OF SENSE ON PART OF BRITISH LABOUR GOVT TO SUPPORT U S EVEN MORE THAN CONSERVATIVE GVT. EVEN FOR AN ALLY, THIS WAS BAD POLICY. BRITISH GOVT SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO GET U.S. TO STOP WAR AND TO WITHDRAW FM VIETNAM. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE TRAGEDY AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR U K TO SHARE IN IT. IT MIGHT AS WELL BE SAID THAT IF BRITAIN HAD TO FOLLOW AMERICA, THEN CHINA HAD TO FOLLOW VIETNAM. BUT IF BRITAIN GAVE GOOD ADVICE TO AMERICA PERHAPS CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO ADVISE VIETNAM.

(LAST TWO SENTENCES WERE THROWN OFF WITH A LAUGH).

8. CHINA SUPPORTED VIETNAM UNCONDITIONALLY. AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM WAS AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA. IF WAR WAS EXPANDED TO CHINESE TERRITORY, CHINA WOULD TAKE PART. HALF OF CHINA COULD BE BOMBED, THE WHOLE OF CHINA COULD BECOME A BATTLEFIELD, BUT CHINA WOULD NEVER ADOPT AN "OPPORTUNIST" POSITION. HE HOPED THAT CHINESE DETERMINATION WOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO BRITISH GOVT. ONLY ONE YEAR AFTER LIBERATION, CHINA ENGAGED IN KOREAN WAR. SHE WAS STILL AS READY FIFTEEN YEARS AFTERWARDS. PEOPLE SAID THAT SOVIET UNION WAS BEHIND CHINA THEN AND NOT NOW AND THEREFORE CHINESE WOULD NOT BE AS RESOLUTE. THIS WAS FUNDAMENTALLY MISTAKEN. IN FACT CHINA HAD PARTICIPATED IN KOREA BECAUSE RUSSIA HAD REFUSED TO DO SO. NOW THIRTY MILLION VIETNAMESE WERE INVOLVED. THE CHINESE MADE THEIR OWN REVOLUTION, SO WHY SHOULD THEY WANT PROTECTION OF SOVIET UNION, WHY SHOULD THEY WANT "KHRUSHCHEV'S PROTECTION"? LET THE AMERICANS, JAPANESE AND INDIANS ALL COME. CHINA WOULD SUFFER GREATLY.

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IT MIGHT MEAN DESTRUCTION OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIES BUT SACRIFICE WOULD BE WORTH IT TO HOLD DOWN AND DEFEAT U.S. THE MANCHUS AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAD BEGGED FOR MERCY BECAUSE THEY HAD NO STRENGTH AND WERE DIVORCED FROM THE MASSES. TODAY IN CHINA ALL PEOPLE WERE ONE. PERHAPS ONE OR TWO PER CENT OF THE CHINESE MIGHT HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT RESISTANCE, ALTHOUGH EVEN THIS SMALL MINORITY AMOUNTED TO SOME MILLIONS IN A COUNTRY AS LARGE AS CHINA. THERE WERE CHINESE "RIGHTISTS" AND WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY ITSELF THERE WERE REVISIONISTS. BUT THESE PEOPLE COULD NOT MOBILISE THE MASSES. IF U.S. DARED TO ATTACK EVEN THIS ONE OR TWO PERCENT WOULD CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND THEY WOULD HAVE GOOD REASON TO RESIST.

9. CHINA WAS NOT AFRAID OF U.S. EXPANSION OF WAR. IF AMERICA WANTED TO "BREAK DOWN LIMITS" OF WAR CHINESE WOULD HAVE RIGHT TO GO TO ANY LENGTHS. EVEN IF U.S. ATTEMPTED TO RALLY JAPANESE, FILIPINOS, THAIS AND INDIANS FOR A CONCERTED ATTACK, CHINESE WOULD BE READY FOR IT. THEY HAD NO ILLUSIONS. THIS WOULD IN FACT PROVIDE THE SOLUTION. SITUATION COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED IN "MAJOR STRUGGLE". CHINESE DID NOT USE EMPTY WORDS. IT HAD BEEN CHINA'S PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALIST DUTY TO HELP KOREANS, AND SO IT WAS IN CASE OF VIETNAM. KOREANS AND VIETNAMESE HAD SPILLED THEIR BLOOD IN CHINA'S REVOLUTION, SO HOW COULD NOT CHINESE SHARE SAME WEAL AND WOE? "WE ARE PREPARED. LET JOHNSON ESCALATE IF HE WANTS. WHEN HE ESCALATES TO THE LEVEL OF CHINA THEN WE'LL TAKE PART." EVEN IF DOCTRINE OF "NO SANCTUARY" APPLIED CHINESE WOULD RESIST.

/10.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHOU EN-LAI HAD ASKED PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN TO CONVEY FOUR SENTENCES TO U S GOVT. SINCE AYUB'S VISIT TO U S HAD BN POSTPONED, CHOU'S WORDS MIGHT NOT HAVE GOT THROUGH AND PERHAPS BRITISH GOVT MIGHT CONVEY SAME MESSAGE. THE POINTS WERE:-

(I) ~CHINA WILL NOT PROBVOKE A WAR WITH U.S.~

AMPLIFYING THIS CH'EN YI SAID THAT E.G. CHINESE HAD NOT PROVOKED CLASH WITH U S SEVENTH FLEET, BUT WAS CONTENT TO WAIT TILL TIME WAS RIPE FOR LIBERATING TAIWAN. THERE CD BE REASONS FOR PROVOKING A W AR WITH U S BUT CHINESE GOVT WOULD NOT.

(II) ~WHAT WE SAY COUNTS.~

IF WAR WERE THRUST UPON CHINA SHE WD RESIST AND WD NOT ADOPT KHRUSHCHEV'S "OPPORTUNIST LINE".

(III) ~CHINA IS PREPARED.~

VIETNAM WAR HAD ALREADY GONE ON FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS, SO OF COURSE CHINESE HAD BN PREPARING. THEY DID NOT SLEEP AND DO NO WORK. WHAT DID WE THINK MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAD BN DOING ALL THIS TIME?

(IV) ~IF U.S. BOMBS CHINA, THAT WD MEAN WAR AND THERE WD BE NO LIMITS TO THE WAR.~

IF WAR WERE FURTHER EXPANDED CHINA WD NOT SIT BACK. IF U S SENT TROOPS ABROAD WHY COULDN'T CHINA? "SHALL WE SIT BACK AND BE BOMBED, OR SHOULDN'T WE BOMB OURSELVES?" CHINESE TECHNIQUE WAS ADMITTEDLY BACKWARD BUT ALL ARMS OF THE FIGHTING SERVICES WD MAKE THIS "UNCONDITIONAL SACRIFICE" FOR MOTHERLAND. CHINA WD FOLLOW U.S. WHEREVER THEY WENT (EXCEPT OF COURSE, TO THE MOON, WHERE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS WERE NOW AIMING, SO PERHAPS THIS WAS NOT QUITE UNCONDITIONAL).

11. IN REQUESTING ME TO ASK BRITISH GOVT TO INFLUENCE U.S. TO WITHDRAW FM VIETNAM, CH'EN YI REMARKED THAT PEACE WD PREVAIL IN THE END! IN CHINA'S HISTORY OF 5,000 YEARS THERE HAD ONLY BN SOME HUNDREDS OF YEARS OF WAR. CHINA'S STRUGGLE WAS FOR THE GOAL OF FINAL PEACE. THE CHINESE WERE SAID TO BE WARLIKE; BUT WAR WAS TEMPORARY AND CD BE PREVENTED. IT WAS UP TO THE U S. IF THE WAR LASTED ONE HUNDRED YEARS PEACE WD COME IN THE HUNDRED AND FIRST SEE M IF T.

Thursday
June 3, 1965
8:30 P. M.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Chancellor Erhard at 12:30 tomorrow

This is Erhard's last trip to Washington before the German elections in September. Since Brandt succeeded in making the most of his Washington stopover, the Chancellor is under pressure to do at least as well. (The latest German election polls indicate a fairly even split between the two major parties, with the Christian Democrats probably receiving a plurality.) Moreover, Erhard's visit this time precedes his next meeting with General de Gaulle by about a week, and he hopes his talks here will serve to bolster him for that round.

Since the Chancellor asked for a private meeting with you, our assumption is that the 12:30 meeting will begin with you and him alone, while the rest of us will be on hand as needed. Before coming to the White House, the Chancellor will have already met with Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk, so that the more detailed questions will have already been dealt with.

The principal subjects for your discussion are:

1. Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Erhard is anxious to hear your views on both problems and get your assessment of future developments. Schroeder has told me that the Germans are with us on both issues. Erhard will offer a German contribution to the proposed Asian Development Bank. He is prepared to announce this publicly at the end of the talks. (We asked him to raise it first with U Thant in New York, so that the Secretary General would not feel by-passed, and we think he has done so.)

2. De Gaulle and NATO. The Chancellor is as concerned as others about de Gaulle's future course, particularly with reference to French participation in NATO. But he evidently wants us and others to avoid the kind of frontal attack which would give the General a plausible excuse for kicking over the traces of the Alliance. The Germans recognize the need for contingency planning to deal with possible Gaullist antics, but they strongly urge that unnecessary blowups be avoided, especially between now and German election time. I think your own views on de Gaulle, as

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232

~~SECRET~~

By sig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

I have heard them, will be most encouraging to Erhard; we may face a fight with de Gaulle in the end. But we are not about to give him the pleasure of seeming to be the aggressor.

3. The German Problem and Reunification. This subject is a regular must for the Chancellor and a reiteration of our position will do it. You can remind him that the firmness of the U. S. was the main cause of the satisfactory 3-Power Declaration of May.

4. The Near East, Israel, etc. We helped bail Erhard out of the Israeli arms mess, for which of course we were partly responsible. Fortunately, in the end this affair actually produced a modest plus, precisely because Erhard decided to recognize Israel, and did not lose his Hallstein Doctrine to Nasser. So you might also congratulate him on this. As the situation stands, Germany is now over the hump with Israel. Three Arab States did not sever relations with Bonn. Several others will probably restore them quietly and soon. Moreover, the experience seemed to have sobered the Arabs a little, which is all to the good.

5. Indonesia. The Germans are concerned about Indonesia's intentions to break relations with Bonn and recognize the East German communist regime. In a sense the problems the Germans face with Sukarno are not unlike ours, and so Erhard may turn to us for advice. The point you might make is that both of us should try to keep our feet in the door as long as possible, without losing dignity, so as to keep as many contacts as we can and play for the long term.

Dean Rusk's memorandum (attached at Tab A) contains several other items. Among them are two which we hope you will raise yourself, if Erhard doesn't. These are (1) our regular reminder to the Germans of their responsibilities for aiding the developing countries (if you leave it out, he will think we don't really care), and (2) a reiteration of our intention to keep our forces in Europe, always on the understanding that we expect the Germans to produce the necessary offset to help finance this.

Finally, the Germans have asked for a joint statement to be released at the end of the meeting. A draft is now in the mill. In its final form it will contain a declaration on the German question; Erhard's expression of support for your policies in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic; a German pledge to contribute to the Asian Development Bank; and a joint declaration of support for the Atlantic Alliance.

McG. B.

102-b

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-230

By up, NARA, Date 11-12-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-5

Action

SS

Info

NNNNDT726
OO RUEHCR RUESSD
DE RUEHDT 726 05/0530Z
O 050500Z ZEA
FM USUN NEWYORK

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4872
INFO RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO IMMEDIATE 63
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 5

005015

SECTION ONE OF TWO

1965 JUN 5 AM 1 52

DOMINICAN CASE

SANTO DOMINGO 189 AND USUN 4873

THIS AFTERNOON BUNDY MET WITH SYG AND MAYOBRE DISCUSS DOMINICAN SITUATION. ALSO PRESENT BUNCHE, ROLZ-BENNETT, NARASIMHAN, AMB YOST, CATES. MTG ARRANGED PRIVATELY WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT TO PRESS AND SINCE INCONSPICUOUS MEANS TAKEN ENTER UN HOPE AVOID PRESS COMMENT.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 726 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BUNDY, ON BASIS PREVIOUS USUN CONTACTS WITH MAYOBRE AND WITH BENEFIT REFTEL, OUTLINED DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN SITUATION FROM US POINT OF VIEW COVERING: POSSIBILITY IMPOSITION GUZMAN REGIME; CONCERN RE CONTROL OF COMMUNISTS; VARYING OPINIONS RE BASIC SYMPATHY CAAMANO MOVEMENT AND US DEEP INTEREST ARRIVING VIABLE

DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION VIEW ALL DIFFICULTIES.

REACTIONS AND QUESTIONS BRIEFLY AS FOLS:

IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY HOW LONG SITUATION COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT EXPLOSION, BUNDY REPLIED THINGS LESS EXPLOSIVE THAN IN PAST. REF NEW OAS COMITE, BUNDY STRESSED ADVANTAGES NOT HAVING "A MADE IN USA" GOVT AND STRESSED INDEPENDENCE BOTH OF OAS AS INTERNATIONAL COMITE AND OF DISCRETION GIVEN BUNKER AS US MEMBER THIS COMITE. REF QUESTION RE POSSIBILITY FAILURE MEDIATION AND POSSIBILITY ELECTIONS WITHIN NEAR FUTURE, BUNDY COMMENTED DOUBTED ANY SOLUTION WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO BOTH SIDES AND IN END MUST LEAN ON ONE. ALTHOUGH PROBABLY HONEST ELECTIONS WOULD RESULT PRD VICTORY, DIFFICULT IMPOSE SUCH SOLUTION. BUNDY QUERIED WHY IF CAAMANO SO SURE HIS STRENGTH WOULD NOT AGREE ELECTIONS. ANSWER TO

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 4872, June 5, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from New York

COMMENT DIFFICULT HOLD ELECTIONS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUNDY REFERRED TO SUCCESS OF OAS IN BUILDING ELECTION MACHINERY FOR 1962 ELECTIONS AND STATED HE UNDERSTOOD MACHINERY STILL AVAILABLE. AS TO QUERY WHETHER ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD AFTER CARETAKER GOVT ESTABLISHED, BUNDY COMMENTED PROBLEM WAS TO GET CONSENT TO JUST SUCH "A NON-POLITICAL GOVT". EXPATIATED ON DIFFICULTIES INHERENT WHEN CIVIL WAR INTERRUPTED.

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 726 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

MAYOBRE COMMENTED HE HAD RETURNED TO NY BECAUSE HOSTILITIES AND OTHER NEGOTS UP IN AIR WAITING FOR POSSIBILITY BUNDY FORMULA. IF BUNDY FORMULA BASED ON GUZMAN GOVT FAILED, DANGER IS OF WAR EXTENDING TO COUNTRYSIDE. FURTHER DELAY IMPOSING SOME SOLUTION WILL FURTHER EMBITTER ALL PARTICIPANTS AND INCREASE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF CITY "LIVING ON CHARITY".

BUNDY COMMENTED BOTH OAS AND US WOULD CONTINUE IN EFFORTS. US HOPED THAT BY HOLDING ELECTIONS WE CAN SHOW NOT ONLY OUR GOOD FAITH BUT ALSO WHICH FACTION REALLY IN MAJORITY. SYG ASKED ABOUT PROCEDURES HANDLING COMMUNISTS AND BUNDY REPLIED AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION TACTICS AND PEOPLE INVOLVED THAT STRONG HAND NEEDED. HOPED GUZMAN AND MORA WILL SUCCEED IN WORKING OUT PROCEDURES BUT AS OF MOMENT PRD DOUBTFUL AS TO NUMBERS, DANGER AND IDENTIFICATION OF COMMUNISTS. GUZMAN APPEARS MORE DEDICATED TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES DEALING WITH COMMUNISTS THAN CAAMANO. IN ANSWER WHETHER EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH COMMUNISTS WAS CONDITION FOR SETTLEMENT, BUNDY REPLIED IN NEGATIVE.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY WHETHER DELAY IN SETTLEMENT WAS DANGEROUS OR WOULD IN FACT CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION, BUNDY STATED THAT DURABLE SOLUTION NEEDED AND NO ADVANTAGE RUSHING INTO SOLUTION FOR SOLUTION'S SAKE. PEOPLE MUST UNDERSTAND JUST BECAUSE US COULD PREVENT CERTAIN SITUATIONS GETTING OUT OF HAND COULD NOT FORCE SOLUTIONS ON PEOPLE.

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 726 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SYG INQUIRED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF OAS FAILS AND VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT, BUNDY REPLIED THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OAS WHICH WITH ITS IAF, WAS A FORCE IN BEING AND SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE TO MEET IMMEDIATE SITUATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 4872, June 5, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from New York

WHEN YOST QUERIED SYG AS TO WHETHER HE HAD IN VIEW UN DOING MORE, SYG REPLIED FUTURE UN ACTION DEPENDED ON OAS. BUNDY COMMENTED THAT WE ALL OUGHT TO KEEP AT IT THROUGH OAS; THAT PRES JOHNSON DEDICATED SEEKING SOLUTION AND HAD APPOINTED FULLY RESPONSIBLE REP WITH GREAT DEAL OF DISCRETION. SYG COULD BE ASSURED US SAW NO ADVANTAGES IN FABIAN POLICY.

WHEN MAYOBRE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ELECTIONS DIDN'T WORK, BUNDY REPLIED THAT BUNKER IS LIMITED TO NO ONE PROGRAM AND THAT BUNKER BOTH AS REP OF US AND AS MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMITE FULLY AUTHORIZED TRY ANYTHING.

REF EXPANSION MAYOBRE MANDATE OR OF UN INVOLVEMENT, SYG NOTED RIFA'I (JORDAN) SEEMED HAVE IDEAS OF FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT INCLUDING POSSIBLY UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES. SYG DID NOT INDICATE HE FAVORED SUCH MOVE BUT DID MAKE CLEAR SC MEMBERS INTEREST IN DOMINICAN SITUATION CONTINUED AT HIGH LEVEL.

PAGE FIVE RUEHDT 726 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMENT: UN GROUP EXTREMELY RECEPTIVE TO BUNDY PRESENTATION AND IMPRESSED BY HIS CANDOR. USUN HOPEFUL SYG AND STAFF LESS COMMITTED TO VIEW THAT GUZMAN FORMUAL AS PRESENTED BY MAYOBRE ONLY SOLUTION. WE RECEIVED NO INDICATION SYG INTERESTED EITHER IN ENLARGING MAYOBRE MANDATE OR STAFF NOR WOULD IT APPEAR SYG WOULD RECOMMEND SUCH MOVES IF HIS OPINION REQUESTED BY MEMBERS SC. BUNDY INTEREST IN MEETING WITH SYG IN PRIVATE SESSION GIVING BUNDY OPPORTUNITY RENEW HIS PREVIOUS PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH SYG, BUNCHE AND MAYOBRE, EFFECTIVE IN GAINING UN OFFICIALS INTEREST AND CONSIDERATION. HOPEFUL ALSO MAYOBRE NOT ONLY IMPRESSED WITH JUDGEMENT AT VARIANCE HIS OWN BUT ALSO MAY TACTFULLY MAKE US RESERVATIONS KNOWN IN VARIOUS CIRCLES DR PARTICULARLY THOSE OF CAAMANO GROUP.

FOL ABOVE MTG BETWEEN SYG AND BUNDY, LA ADV HAD BRIEF PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MAYOBRE SUMMARIZED AS FOLS:

IN ANSWER TO INQUIREIS, MAYOBRE STATED HAD NOT EXPRESSED HIS VIEW RE GUZMAN FORMULA AND NECESSITY ITS IMPOSITION US TO ANYONE OTHER THAN SYG AND IMMEDIATE STAFF. HIS PRESENTATION ONLY VERBAL AND HE HAD WRITTEN NOTHING ON SUBJECT. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY AS TO DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER REPS, MAYOBRE STATED HAD TOLD FRENCH AND URUG SC REPS OF HIS BELIEF FOR "NEED OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION". HOWEVER, HE MADE NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AS TO DETAILS OR AS TO HIS PERSONAL BELIEFS RE VARIOUS ASPECTS SITUATION. PLIMPTON.

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 2:20 a.m., June 5.
Passed White House 2:35 a.m., June 5.
Handled as EXDIS per S/S-0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action 00 RUEHCR RUESSD
DE RUEHDT 727 05/0545Z
O 050500Z ZEA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

55
Info FM USUN NEWYORK
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4872
INFO RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO IMMEDIATE 63
STATE GRNC
BT

005016

1965 JUN 5 AM 1 53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 5

(SECTION TWO OF TWO)

STATED HE HAD TALKED TO NO OTHER MEMBERS OF SC EXCEPT US, FRANCE AND URUG.

LA ADV URGED MAYOBRE GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION VIEWS PUT FORWARD BY BUNDY RE DIFFICULTIES WHICH US SAW AS INHERENT IN SITUATION AND EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT IN AN INFORMAL APPROPRIATE WAY IMPRESS CERTAIN VIEWS AND RESERVATIONS ON CAAMANO GROUP. WHEN MAYOBRE STATED HIS MANDATE LIMITED, LA ADV NOTED FULL US AGREEMENT LIMITATIONS ON MAYOBRE MANDATE BUT SUGGESTED IN VIEW APPARENT PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS CAAMANO ON WIDE RANGE SUBJECT MAYOBRE SURELY COULD ARRANGE CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO CAAMANO IN APPROPRIATE DELICATE MANNER.

ANSWER QUERY, MAYOBRE GAVE ASSURANCES HE HAD NO INTENTION IMPLYING HIS MANDATE BE ENLARGED IN ANY WAY INCLUDING AUTHORIZATION DEAL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINTS. REITERATED HE FAMILIAR WITH AND HAD FAITH IN OAS HR COMMISSION.

COMMENT: RESULT OF VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH MAYOBRE AS REPORTED AND IN ADDITION BRIEF CONVERSATIONS THIS MORNING AND AT BETANCOURT DINNER LAST NIGHT BETWEEN MAYOBRE AND LA ADV, MAYOBRE HAS HAD FULL OPPORTUNITY REALIZE BOTH SPOKEN AND UNSPOKEN US OBJECTIONS TO MAYOBRE VERSION OF BEST SOLUTION AS WELL AS DIFFICULTIES WHICH HE PREVIOUSLY HAD NOT FORESEEN. HOPEFUL MAYOBRE DISCUSSIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH STEVENSON AND BUNDY, WILL RESULT HIS TAKING FRESH LOOK SITUATION. SEE SEPTTEL (USUN 4873).

RE HUMAN RIGHTS MORA TEL TO U THANT CONTAINED IN SANTO DOMINGO TEL TO NY IMMEDIATE 191 TO WASH 2213 BEING DISTRIBUTED AS UN DOC THIS WEEKEND.

GP-4.

PLIMPTON
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 2:10 a.m. June 5, 1965

NOTE: Passed White House at 2:55 a.m., June 5, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Handled as EXDIS per S/S-0

Friday
June 4, 1965
1:40 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

If you could have a quick look at this reply to Shastri, we can get a final decision on it, either by a word to Komer this afternoon or by revision tomorrow. My brother Bill points out that Shastri leaves on Tuesday for Canada, and therefore it would be well to get this delivered to him in the next day or two. A quick look suggests to me that the letter is a helpful one, but I have asked Bob Komer to see if he can tighten it a little.

The signed copy can be done later because this must go as a cable in order to get there in time.

McG. B.

Ok _____

Ok as revised _____

Komer or you speak to me _____

Rec'd
Fri. 6/4/65
1:45 p.m.

(17)

104

(2)
MC 6/4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 4, 1965
1:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My excessive speaking engagements in June

1. I have your message saying that you do not think I should appear on Face The Nation, and I am delighted to stay off it. As you know, I have done these things in the past only when you have approved. Until this last week, you had asked me a number of times to accept such TV chances to explain our policy.

2. This is also the June speech-making season, and I have accepted a number of engagements which had particular appeal from one point of view or another. I have been in Hyde Park in honor of FDR on Memorial Day because I could not say "no" on emotional grounds. I talked to some book publishers here on Wednesday because of your standing suggestion that large Washington audiences are useful. I am talking tonight off-the-record ~~to~~ in N.Y. to the National Assembly of Councils of Foreign Relations, which is a "leadership" audience that can be helpful to us. On Sunday, I am going to Notre Dame because Father Hesburgh is an old friend. That leaves only two further public appearances. One is the Phi Beta Kappa speech at Harvard on June 15 -- which is very hard indeed for me to turn down because this is the occasion which Ralph Waldo Emerson made famous, and these are my home folks. The other, which I am afraid you will not like at all, is my unfinished obligation to talk back on Vietnam with some of our academic critics. My current hope is that this can be done in a very dignified and carefully arranged television program which would avoid most of the troubles of the Teach-In and also do some good to our policy. I really believe that much of the trouble we are getting from "intellectuals" comes from the feeling -- to which I have contributed by my rude letter in TIME -- that we do not understand them and do not appreciate them. I think it is possible to answer them and love them at the same time, and this is what I will try to do.

3. After that, there will be total silence in the basement until further orders.

McG. B.
McG. B.

105
J

Friday, June 4, 1965
12:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Taylor

This cable from Taylor says that the immediate deadlock in Saigon appears to be broken. This is good news, and while I suspect we should wait another 24 hours before we count on it, I suspect it means that Taylor will start home over the weekend. It also means that we should begin to think about next political steps in Saigon, and it makes a meeting tomorrow even more desirable (I have sent a separate memo through Jack Valenti on that).

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
State 8-7-78; NSC 10-10-80
By DCH NARS, Date 8-24-82

105a

EHX787
 OO RUEPWW
 DE RUEHCR 4166 04/1530Z
 O 041457Z ZEA
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY
 RUEKDA/DOD
 RUEPIA/CIA
 O R 041420Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4056
 INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 917
 RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 694
 RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 2367
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ JUNE 4

DECLASSIFIED
 State 13-19-77
 By DCA NARS, Date 8-24-82

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 BUI DIEM CALLED MANFULL TO SAY THAT THE "CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS WAS SOLVED" AND ASKED HIM TO CALL AT THE PRESIDENCY FOR DETAILS. QUAT, DO AND DIEM WERE IN GOOD SPIRITS AND IN CONFIDENT MOOD.

QUAT SAID MEETING CONVENED AT 1600 UNDER SUU'S CHAIRMANSHIP AND WITH PARTICIPATION OF TWO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, CHAIRMAN AND MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF NLC. QUAT LATER JOINED.

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 268A ~~SECRET~~
 MEETING AT 1700. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON TEXT OF NLC COMMUNIQUE (TEXT BY SEPTTEL) STATING IN SUBSTANCE THAT:

- (A) CHIEF OF STATE, NLC, AND GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED ON A SOLUTION FOR THE CASES OF THE TWO MINISTERS OF INTERIOR AND ECONOMY.
- (B) CHIEF OF STATE WOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CONTACT PROPLAR AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WHO HAD SIGNED JUNE 2 AND PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN ORDER FIND SOLUTIONS TO STABILIZE SITUATION AND PROSICUTE WAR.

QUAT SAID WITH RESPECT TO (A) ABOVE, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT AUTHORITY DISMISS TWO MINISTERS WAS LIMITED TO THEIR SPECIFIC CASES PENDING AMENDMENT OF CHARTER. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, QUAT SAID IT AGREED THAT NLC WOULD IN FACT PROCEED WITH AMENDMENT PROCEDURE. HOWEVER, NLC WOULD WAIT FOR FEW DAYS TO ALLOW TEMPER TO CALM DOWN. BUI DIEM INTERJECTED THAT HE CONFIDENT GOVERNMENT HAD NECESSARY VOTES IN NLC TO CARRY AMENDMENT.

XEROX FROM QUICK COP

QUAT SAID HE WOULD SEND TO SUU TOMORROW DECREE FOR SUU'S SIGNATURE ON TWO MINISTERS. QUAT AND DO SAID THEN WOULD BE NO PROBLEM WITH THEIR REFUSAL TO RESIGN SINCE QUAT'S RIGHT TO CHANGE

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 268A ~~S E C R E T~~

NOT RESUBMIT HIS ORIGINAL CANDIDATE FOR MINISTER OF ECONOMY BECAUSE OF CATHOLIC OBJECTIONS. QUAT INTENDS TO WAIT FOR AT LEAST A WEEK BEFORE NOMINATING NEW MINISTERS AND IN MEANTIME WILL DESIGNATE OTHER OFFICIALS TO SERVE IN INTERIM CAPACITY.

WITH REGARD TO (B) ABOVE, DO SAID SUU HAD FIRST PROPOSED IN EARLIER MEETING THAT HE, QUAT AND NLC SIT DOWN WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS TO SEEK A SOLUTION FOR THEIR COMPLAINTS. DO REFUSED ON QUAT'S CHARGES LEVELED AT QUAT. ALTERNATE PROPOSAL THAT SUU SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THESE GROUPS ADOPTED IN LATER SESSION. MANFULL OBSERVED ALSO IMPORTANT THAT QUAT AND HIS ASSOCIATES MET FREQUENTLY WITH THESE GROUPS AND WITH MEMBERS OF NLC. THERE WERE NODDED ASSERTS ALL AROUND BUT EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBT AS TO WHEITER ANYONE COULD REALLY INFLUENCE REFUGEE CATHOLIC LEADERS IN THEIR PRESENT FRAME OF MIND.

COMMENT: IN VIEW OF LIMITATION OF CABINET CHANGES TO CURRENT RECALCITRANT MINISTERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR MANEUVERING IN NLC AN AMENDMENT OF CHARTER, QUAT MAY NOT BE COMPLETELY OUT OF THE WOODS. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATE DEADLOCK APPEARS BROKEN.

TAYLOR
BT

NNNN

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 3, 1965
Thursday, 8:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Exchange with Prime Minister Moro of Italy

Ambassador Fenoaltea (Tab A) and our Embassy in Rome (Tab B) have reported in detail Prime Minister Moro's foreign policy statement of May 14 to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in which he spoke warmly of his meeting with you, and expressed firm support for your policies. Moro not only cited and endorsed the key sections of your May 7 address; he told the Parliament that in Southeast Asia "the United States is following a policy of honorable and just peace and security" and that in the Dominican Republic American intervention is justified "partly for humanitarian reasons and partly for the security of the American Continent", pointing out that this action had to be evaluated in the light of the implications of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

There is no question but that Moro's visit to Washington last month strengthened his political hand in Rome immeasurably; and that in the light of this development he has come out more strongly for the courses of action we are taking than perhaps any other Western leader.

The Secretary of State thinks (Tab C), and I wholly agree, it would be politic to send Moro a note, expressing your appreciation for his stand and support. I am certain he would not only appreciate this for personal reasons; it would also be useful to him politically.

A letter to Moro, assuming you concur, based on a State Department draft, is attached at Tab D for signature.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachments
Tabs A - D.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 3, 1965
7 P. M.

100-9-1-50
S. H. H.

(2)

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| NLS 83-252 | |
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By CB/TH, NARA, Date 6-17-94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British and Vietnam

On a number of occasions you have showed your skepticism when one or another of us has remarked that the British have been very solid and helpful on Vietnam. And of course you have recollections, which the rest of us only have at second hand, of Harold Wilson's effort to telephone his way into a fancy trip to the White House at just the wrong moment. Moreover, you feel the wounds of what Home said about busses and what Michael Stewart said about gas, although everyone else has long since forgotten those particular episodes.

It remains a fact that every experienced observer from David Bruce on down has been astonished by the overall strength and skill of Wilson's defense of our policy in Vietnam and his mastery of his own left wing in the process. The support of the UK has been of real value internationally -- and perhaps of even more value in limiting the howls of our own liberals. It is quite true, of course, that we would get this kind of backing more or less automatically from a Conservative government, but support from Labour is not only harder to get but somewhat more valuable in international terms.

The only price we have paid for this support is the price of keeping them reasonably well informed and fending ^{off} one ill-advised plan for travel. This is not a very great cost. Moreover, we have had no leaks from the British, and no public expression of worry about the length of the pause. It is true that Gordon Walker has been making some moderately foolish noises lately, but he is not a member of the government.

My own feeling is that it is well worth our while to keep the British on board as long as it can be done simply by keeping them fully informed and giving them the feeling that they are in the know as we go ahead. To put it another way, I see no advantage at all in putting them at arms length and thus increasing the risk that they will be tempted to criticize. You have taught us all a great deal about the advantages of Congressional consultation in the last year and a half -- I myself believe that the same rules apply in diplomatic consultation. After all, we are dealing with human beings in both cases.

I attach Bruce's latest cable on this subject.

McG. B.
McG. B.

(1)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday

June 3, 1965 - 6:25 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit from Scotty Reston

Scotty Reston came in today at his request. He had a number of things to say, none of them very agreeable.

He began with the question of academic attitudes toward the Administration. He says there is now a deep-seated distrust because of a feeling that we are not fully and frankly explaining what we are doing. I asked him for examples, and he took your press conference remarks on the Dominican Republic as his text. He asserted that everybody with any knowledge of the matter knows that we did not seriously consult with the Latin Americans before we put the Marines in-- that there was no discussion of this possibility in the Peace Council or the OAS before our decision -- to have mentioned the Dominican Republic problem to fourteen different countries had nothing to do with consulting them about landing the Marines -- and that while your explanation would be persuasive to the mass of the people who did not need persuasion, it would only increase mistrust among those who know better.

I told him that you were not saying that the decision to land Marines had been discussed with the OAS, but only that we had been in continuing touch with them, and that at each stage would had been eager to have them take more responsibility than they were in fact ready to assert. Since I myself believe the real record of consultation before Thursday is weak, I did not press the case strongly -- and indeed I agree with Tom Mann, who has more than once pointed out in our discussions that we could not very well consult about landing Marines since we did not expect it to be an issue, until Wednesday afternoon.

I went on to tell Reston that any President who was asked to choose between understanding and support of the American people, and the understanding and support of the intellectuals, would choose the people. He said that he did not think we had to make an either/or choice, and that we must somehow find a way of reopening communication with these people. He gave me the impression, nevertheless, that on the substance of policy he was more with us than against us, both in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam.

He then shifted his fire to the process of decision-making and told me that the Embassies were now reporting a kind of frantic disarray at the White House. I asked him what he was talking about, and he said there was talk of very long monologues with the press and about the press -- of an intensity of preoccupation with past events and justifying them, which suggested a lack of calmness and confidence in the management -- and even worse questions about the sober good sense of our whole approach. I told him somewhat sharply that he had known you for so many years that he must know that this was nonsense -- and he hastily said he was not talking about realities but what the Embassies are reporting.

He then shifted to the international scene itself and said that he thought the heart of our problem was that we would not get anyone to help us in peace-keeping until we stopped doing it all for them. We agreed on the very great difficulty which we are having in getting any of our allies anywhere to do their share, and I found him quite steamed up about it. He almost suggested that we should have let the Dominican Republic stew in its own juice so as to serve the rest of Latin America right -- but he agreed when I suggested that the American people would not have applauded such a decision. He wondered then whether we had the strength to carry the peace-keeping task alone. But he then went on to point out that the one thing he thought the Communists were going to have to learn is that the Johnson Administration was not going to be interested in retreat or defeat. I agreed cheerfully with that and renewed my assertion that it is not the White House but the academics who are currently out of step with the main line of American conviction and purpose. This led to a discussion of the two kinds of young men -- those who protest and those who do the fighting -- and Scotty expressed his strongly held belief that our draft processes as now organized encourage wholesale evasion in the name of education and marriage. This being a view I share, I said so, and the interview concluded in a more harmonious vein than it began.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Saturday, June 3, 1965 - 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Press contacts

Mary and I went to dinner with Kay Graham on Thursday night and had an extremely interesting evening. The dinner was in honor of an Englishman, Henry Fairlee, but he did almost no talking. Most of the talking was in praise of the rent subsidy victory, and was led by Larry O'Brien, who did the best job of political education I have ever heard from him. As you know better than anyone else, the country did not know what it was all about. Kay Graham herself simply did not understand it. Bob Novak, of Evans & Novak, was also there. He talked mainly about the problems of the Republicans. I had not talked at length with him before, and he is evidently a deeply conservative type. The conversation was general, and there was no probing for hard news. Kay Graham was hit pretty hard about the Herblock cartoon, and insisted that Herblock himself had not intended it to have the kind of flavor it did.

The most important piece of conversation was one which Kay asked me to pass on privately to you. She has decided to move Ben Bradlee from NEWSWEEK to the POST. He is to be Al Friendly's deputy on the news side, and is to move into Friendly's place in a couple of years if all goes well. Kay knows you have reservations about Bradlee, but she also knows that he has the respect of the professional press and she has had to go on her own best judgment. She wants you to know this decision from her.

This may be as good a time as any for me to repeat my own judgment that while Ben Bradlee is a very determined and inquisitive reporter, he is not hostile to us or in anyone else's pocket. It is certainly true that he was a great personal friend of President Kennedy. But he has never been close to Bobby -- they are temperamentally opposites. What made Bradlee and President Kennedy friends was a shared coolness and irony and detachment, which was the side of JFK that does not appear in his brother.

At the end of this same evening the WASHINGTON POST was delivered to Kay, and Novak foolishly directed our attention to the Evans-Novak column on Dean Rusk and the B-52s, and all. I read it and then tore into him. I pointed out that most of the facts were wrong and that they did not prove the point, in any case. I told him that this was as bad a piece of reporting as I had seen in the column, and I was so rough on Rowlie that Mary told me afterwards that I had overdone it.

Yesterday I also talked with John Hightower, who had called about the TIMES story on the Gilpatric report. I told him the story was dead wrong, that the report was not open to public discussion, and that the problems of disarmament continue to get intense attention through the government. He kept boring in on the specific question of the relation between nonproliferation and the MLF, and I told him that the question of choice was purely hypothetical at the moment, both in practical and theoretical terms. Our position is that there is no inconsistency between the two projects. And in any case, neither of them is very hot in July of 1965.

Today I called Max Frankel, having heard that he is going to do a piece on Dean Rusk. I asked to see him, and he will be coming in next week. It is possible that you may want to see him yourself, because nothing would do more to reinforce the Secretary's position as Frankel will describe it than a few words direct from you.

McG. B.

*Return to Mr Brundley 113
per Bill Hoops
✓*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 3, 1965
2:30 p.m. - *Rec'd 2:40 pm*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: IL-28's

The State Department people did not get a question on IL-28's in their one o'clock briefing. McNamara, Ball, and I nevertheless believe that we should get this news out in Saigon promptly. The "Periscope" item attached (Tab A), and questions from TIME, Lisagor and Maggie Higgins, suggest that this matter is ~~on~~^{on} a short fuse. The proposed press guidance and follow-up makes sense to us (Tab B).

McG. B.

McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

Let's talk about it tomorrow _____

113a

A

THE PERISCOPE

AHEAD OF THE NEWS

U.S. Diplomatic Offensive

Western Europe can expect a full-dress U.S. diplomatic offensive when the German elections end—and before the French balloting in December. The new drive will stress goals like European unity and the multination nuclear fleet, with the aim of showing French voters that only their country is out of step with the West.

Independence in Saigon

Washington officials were surprised by a recent unpublicized speech by South Vietnam's Premier Pham Huy Quat in Saigon. Quat said that South Vietnam was "master of its own house," insisted "we cannot accept foreign aid under coercion or pressure" and "our destiny will be decided by ourselves." He also announced that his government was not bound by the 1954 Geneva Treaty that split up Vietnam.

A Brake on Gold Losses

An idea for checking the outflow of U.S. gold will soon be in the news. This plan would have the U.S. Treasury announce that it would buy only limited amounts of gold at the fixed \$35-an-ounce price. Such a move, proponents say, would cool the desire of other governments to hoard gold as monetary reserves, encourage them to hold dollars instead.

Bundles for Britain

Without fanfare, Britain's top economic officials have asked for some American expertise. The Labor government wants Gardner Ackley, LBJ's top economic adviser, Treasury Under Secretary Frederick Deming and outgoing Budget Director Kermit Gordon to spend a week in London, probably in July, to show how budget, monetary and economic planning work in the U.S.

OVERSEAS CABLES

Breakdown in Budapest

While Pope Paul has been reported ready to visit Communist Poland, Vatican relations with another Red government—Hungary—are deteriorating. Hungary and Rome worked out an agreement some months ago, but the Hungarians have not delivered. (For one thing, Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, a virtual prisoner since 1956, still has not been released.) Tipoff on the new strain came when a Communist newspaperman in Rome, who had been scheduled to visit Budapest and report on the new era, suddenly had the assignment canceled.

Berlin Blockade—With a Twist

The U.S. has passed the word that it will approve no more sessions of the West German legislature in Berlin. Bonn's lower house, the Bundestag, staged a special one-day meeting in West Berlin in April. Now the upper house, the Bundesrat, wants to hold a similar one before the September elections. Reason for the U.S. turndown: in Washington's view, the Bundestag meeting produced nothing but traffic slowdowns, buzzing by Russian planes and other forms of Soviet reprisal.

Air Buildup for Hanoi

Peking seems to be building up Hanoi's air fleet. For the first time, Soviet-made Il-28 light jet bombers (with a 1,500-mile range) have been spotted in North Vietnam, apparently moved in from China. Until now, only one Il-28 was in the area, on Hainan Island off the coast.

INSIDE STORY

George Wallace's Future

Alabama's Gov. George Wallace may quietly drop efforts to get legislative permission to succeed himself or to run for the U.S. Senate next year. (Both moves now are barred by the state constitution.) Rather than have the legislature filibuster his succession bills to death, Wallace is now expected to let them expire in committee. Last year, when the governor met resistance to a similar plan, he abandoned the fight.

A Lady for Notre Dame

Notre Dame's all-male faculty will soon have its first regular woman member. She is Sister Suzanne, a Benedictine nun from Tulsa, Okla., who will teach history of science to junior classmen at the South Bend, Ind., university. Until now, women have taught only at summer sessions, never on the regular faculty.

The FBI in War, Peace and Hollywood

The FBI is keeping a close watch on a new TV series about the bureau, set for next fall. All prospective performers on ABC's hour-long "FBI Story" (now going into production at Warner Brothers in California) must submit their real names, place and date of birth for an FBI check before getting the job.

A Rival for Pat Brown?

California's Democratic Gov. Edmund (Pat) Brown may not have the clear shot at renomination that he expects. Political experts now see Los Angeles's Mayor Sam Yorty as an added

THE PERISCOPE

starter in the 1966 primary. And Yorty, they think, could give Brown a race. Reason: the strong showing by Yorty's candidates in recent local races, his own big victory over Rep. James Roosevelt, and his ties to California Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh (whose truce with Brown, the experts say, could easily come undone).

New Negro Enterprise

Mississippi Negroes plan a million-dollar business enterprise—a plant to make women's shoes—near Jackson. Some 180 Negro teachers and businessmen organized the venture, have already sold \$35,000 of stock to 2,000 investors (100 of them white). Balance of the capital, it is expected, will come from a Federal small-business loan and from Mississippi banks. Except for a half-dozen out-of-state manufacturing experts and some salesmen, the plant will be staffed and run by Negroes.

Thurmond the Invincible

Much as they would like to replace Democrat-turned-Republican Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina with a real Democrat, Administration experts see little use in an all-out effort in 1966. White House aides recently showed one would-be Democratic opponent of Thurmond a poll indicating that the senator would wind up with 76 per cent of the South Carolina vote.

Countdown for Calories

U.S. space officials are taking special pains to keep corned-beef sandwiches and other contraband out of the Gemini 4 capsule. (Astronaut Gus Grissom ate a smuggled sandwich on the last flight and NASA dietary experts were appalled.) This time everything in the capsule, including personal effects carried by astronauts James McDivitt and Edward White, will be carefully catalogued before blast-off.

WHERE ARE THEY NOW?



They Also Sassed

The columnist who 30 years ago used ridicule as a weapon against Hitler and Mussolini much as Art Buchwald uses it against today's dragons (page 47) is watching Buchwald's world from the sidelines in Tucson, Ariz. He is **Westbrook Pegler**, sportswriter-turned-Pulitzer-Prize columnist and, for the past twenty years, the most belligerent spokesman for the far right. Son of a top Chicago reporter, Pegler was an office boy for the United Press at 16, a World War I correspondent, a syndicated sports writer during the 1920s (which he christened "The Era of Wonderful Nonsense"). His daily column, "Fair Enough," begun in 1933, aimed savage humor at targets that ranged from Nazis to racketeers. His Pulitzer came in 1941 for "Peglerizing" mobster George Scalise. At 70, Pegler now spends most of his time at home near Tucson with his third wife, Maud, concentrating on a new book. A vocal admirer of Buchwald, he says: "Buchwald is a unique specialist in a unique field."

Another newspaperman with a sharp eye and a sharp word for the world around him is New Yorker **Frank Sullivan**, now retired to his native Saratoga Springs, N.Y. After a \$7-a-week job on The Saratogian, college (Cornell) and Woodrow Wilson's invitation "to become a private in his army" (actually a second lieutenant), Sullivan came to New York city rooms in 1919. He left The New York World to freelance in 1931, created his famous interviews with "Mr. Arbutnot, the cliché expert" and turned out eleven books (most recent: "A Moose in the Hoose" in 1959). A bachelor, he lives alone in an eight-room house a block from the Saratoga race track and "ducks the social life." At 72, he rises late, spends most of his time reading. He also continues to write his annual Christmas poem for The New Yorker magazine. Buchwald's consistently high-grade product amazes him. "I was supposed to be funny three times a week at the World," Sullivan says, "and nearly ended up in a nut factory."



IL 28s

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Statement

During the past week some half-dozen IL-28 light subsonic jet bombers have been observed in North Vietnam. We will continue to watch the situation closely.

Q Who supplied the bombers?

A Although the Soviet Union has been the chief supplier, a number of Communist countries have had these bombers for some time.

Q What does the U. S. intend to do about them?

A We do not speculate on matters of this kind.

Q Are they considered defensive?

A These planes can carry bombs but it is not known for what purpose they are intended.

Q Does the U. S. consider provision of these aircraft to be escalation by the other side?

A This would depend on the use made of them.

Q What is the nationality of the crews flying them?

A We do not know who will be flying them.

Thursday

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 3, 1965
9:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Juan Bosch

Here is the letter from Juan Bosch, which has been on its way for two days. He read a first draft to me over the phone, and at my suggestion some of the sharper language about the OAS and Mora was removed. There are other things I might have criticized, but I did not press because of the last sentence which assures us that he will keep it private unless we decide otherwise.

I have acknowledged receipt of the letter and said that it would be delivered to you. I think probably you should not answer directly, but I will draft an answer in my own name for consideration in the light of Bunker's mission.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-232
By mg, NARA, Date 1-7-93