

1066

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4a letter	To Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge from LBJ Confidential <i>open 8-14-84 NLS 84-19</i>	1 p 07/28/65	A
#5 memo	To the President from McG. B. Top Secret	1 p 07/27/65	A
#5b report	re: Vietnam Top Secret	3 p undated	A
#6 agenda	Agenda for NSC Meeting <i>open 8-17-83</i> Secret	1 p 07/27/65	A
#8 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p 07/27/65	A
#9 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy <i>open 4-15-91 NLS 90-221</i> Top Secret <i>sanitized NSC letter 8/1/81</i>	1 p 07/26/65	A
#10 memo	to the President from McG. B. Top Secret <i>open 2-24-00 NLS 98-161</i>	1 p 07/26/65	A
#10a agenda	meeting of 7/26/65 Top Secret <i>open 8-17-83</i>	1 p 07/26/65	A
#11a cable	Deptel 190 to Moscow Confidential <i>open 4-11-90 NLS 90-83</i>	3 p 07/17/65	A
#11b memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Llewellyn E. Thompson Top Secret	1 p 01/14/65	A
#11c report	re: Soviet Union Top Secret <i>open 8-15-90 NLS 90-84</i>	3 p 01/14/65	A
#11d	duplicate #11b		
#11e	duplicate #11c <i>open 8-15-90 NLS 90-84</i>		
#12a memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	3 p 07/24/65	A
#12b Memo	to the President from Robert McNamara Top Secret	52 p 04/21/65	A
#13 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 2/10/98</i>	1 p 04/24/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 12 July 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret	1 p undated	A
	<i>open 2/16/98</i>		
#17 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 07/22/65	A
#19 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	2 p 07/22/65	A
	<i>open 4.14.99</i>		
#24a memo	to the President from J. D. O'Connell Secret	3 p 07/22/65	A
	<i>open 4.14.99</i>		
#25 memo	memo to the President from R. W. Komer Secret	1 p 07/21/65	A
	<i>open 2/16/98</i>		
#29 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p 07/21/65	A
	<i>open 4.14.99</i>		
#31 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential	1 p undated	A
	<i>open 8-18-87 NLS 85-220</i>		
#37 agenda	for Luncheon	2 p 7/20/65	A
#33a cable	text of Saigon 205 cable Secret	2 p 07/20/65	A
#38 memo	to the President from Robert McNamara Top Secret	10 p 07/20/65	A
#39b cable	Text of Saigon #182 cable Secret	2 p 07/19/65	A
#40 report	re: troops in Vietnam Top Secret	1 p 07/19/65	A
#42 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy Confidential	1 p 07/19/65	A
	<i>open 4.14.99</i>		
#45 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President	1 p 07/19/65	A
#45a memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret	2 p undated	A
	<i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i>		
#47 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret	2 p 07/16/65	A
	<i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i>		
#47b	duplicate #47		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#48 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential	3 p 07/16/65	A
#48a report	Outline Message to Congress... Secret	5 p 07/15/65	A
#50a report	Harriman's flash report of his meeting with Kosygin Secret open 12-7-95 NLS 95-96	4 p 07/15/65	A
#51a message	to Bundy from Wright, No. 10 Downing Street Confidential	2 p 07/15/65	A
#52 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open 4.14.99	1 p 07/15/65	A
#54a memo	to the President from Ulric Haynes & Charles Johnson Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 07/13/65	A
#55a memo	to the President from Charles Johnson & Ulric Haynes Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 07/13/65	A
#56b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Confidential open 4.14.99	4 p 07/06/65	A
#59a memo	Text of Embassy Saigon 131 cable Secret open 7-18-84 NLS 84-31	1 p 07/13/65	A
#64 memo	to the President from Francis M. Bator Confidential open 2/6/98	2 p 07/13/65	A
#65a cable	to Chancellor Erhard from President Johnson Secret open 4.14.99	1 p 07/13/65	A
#66 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 07/12/65	A
#66a Letter	President Johnson to Modibe Keitz possible classified info. No date		A
#67 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & Ulric Haynes Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 07/12/65	A
#68 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential open 4.14.99	1 p 07/12/65	A
#70a memo	to Mr. Bundy from Chester L. Cooper Secret open 8-14-84 NLS 84-19	3 p 07/10/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#73a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Confidential <i>Open 2/6/98</i>	4 p 07/06/65	A
#74a cable	copy of Manila 66 Secret <i>open 5-22-12</i>	2 p 07/09/--	A
#75 memo	to the President from R.W. Komer Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 07/09/65	A
#75a memo	to the President from Robert McNamara Secret	5 p 07/06/65	A
#79 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy Secret	1 p 07/08/65	A
#81a memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 5-22-12</i> Secret <i>sanitized 1-24-01 NLJ/RAC 99-56</i>	1 p 07/07/65	A
#81c cable	Embtel 63 from Saigon Top Secret <i>open 3-2-84 NLJ 84-31</i>	2 p 07/07/65	A
#81e cable	Deptel 61 to Saigon Top Secret <i>open 7-18-84 NLJ 84-31</i>	3 p 07/06/65	A
#86b memo	from the Prime Minister to the President Confidential <i>Open 2/6/98</i>	2 p 07/06/65	A
#86d Draft	Acknowledgment <i>possible classified info.</i>	1 p No date	A <i>open 6/23/95</i>
#86e cable	from Prime Minister to President Confidential <i>open 6/23/99</i>	2 p 07/06/65	A
#88 memo	to the President from McG. B. Top Secret <i>open 4-14-87 NLJ 86-72</i>	1 p 07/07/65	A
#90 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 1-4-00 NLJ 99-134</i> Top Secret <i>sanitized 8-14-84 NLJ 84-19</i>	1 p 07/07/65	A
#90a cable	copy of Saigon 41 <i>NLJ 84-31</i> Top Secret <i>open 3-2-84</i>	1 p 07/05/65	A
#91 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 8/25/92</i>	1 p 07/07/65	A
#93a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 2/6/98</i>	1 p 07/06/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#93c biosketch	William K. Leonhart Confidential	open 6/23/99	1 p undated A
#93d memo	to Secretary State from Wm. Crockett Confidential	open 4.14.99	1 p 06/11/65 A
#94a memo	to the President from The Prime Minister Confidential	open 2/6/98	2 p 07/06/65 A
#95 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential	open 4.14.99	1 p 07/06/65 A
#96a memo	cover memo Confidential	open 4.14.99	1 p undated A
#96b message	to President from Prime Minister Wilson Confidential	open 4.14.99	1 p 07/05/65 A
#97 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret	open 4.14.99	2 p 07/06/65 A
#101a memcon	memcon Amb. Dobrynin, & Sec., & Amb. Thompson Secret	amended 4-14-84 NLS 8483 open 8-8-97 NLS 96-301	10 p 07/03/65 A
#102b memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Thomas C. Mann Confidential		1 p 07/02/65 A
#102c memcon	memcon between Amb. B. K. Nehru & Thomas C. Mann Confidential	open 4.14.99	4 p 07/01/65 A
#104 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	open 8-14-84 NLS 84-19	1 p 07/03/65 A
#105 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	open 4.14.99	1 p 07/03/65 A
#106a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret		2 p 07/02/65 A
#106c memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McGeorge Bundy Secret		1 p 01/12/65 A
#106d memo	to the President from David E. Bell Confidential	open 4.14.99	2 p 01/09/65 A

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 McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 12, July 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#106f report	re: India Binational Foundation confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	4 p <i>undated</i>	A
#107c cable	Embtel 2158 from Bangkok top Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i>	6 p <i>06/30/65</i>	A
#98#108a memo	National Security Action Memo 335 confidential <i>open 6-17-87 NLS 86-171</i>	1 p <i>06/28/65</i>	A
#109 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p <i>07/02/65</i>	A
#110 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy top secret <i>open 4-14-87 NLS 86-72</i>	1 p <i>07/02/65</i>	A
#112 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Top Secret	2 p <i>07/01/65</i>	A
#116 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret <i>open 8-14-84 NLS 84-19</i>	1 p <i>07/01/65</i>	A

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Friday, July 30, 1965, 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Press contacts, July 18-July 30

Back on July 20 I talked to Mary McGrory and Joe Alsop about the Goldberg appointment. Mary was for it and Alsop against. She wrote about it and he didn't, which is par for the course.

On Friday, July 23, I talked briefly to Phil Potter about Vietnam, and had to tell him that everything was awaiting McNamara's return and further decisions.

On July 25 I talked to Joe Kraft on the phone. His main object was to be protected against surprise decisions before his Wednesday column, and I was able to comfort him with no resulting damage.

On July 28 I talked to Tom Wicker after he had filed his very good story on your press conference statement. We went up and down the issues, and I found him already well instructed by Dean Rusk's backgrounder. That day I also spoke to Fred Friendly and urged him onward in his August series on Vietnam, which Bill Moyers is watching over. He asked me if I would take part, and I said I was reluctant to do so but would go by any judgment he got from Bill.

On July 29 I talked with Hugh Sidey about the President as Commander-in-Chief and found him very understanding and receptive. I tried to give him a sense of the number of considerations you had to weigh and the clarity of your personal control over the process of decision-making in this last go-round on Vietnam.

I had two minutes with Henry Brandon in which I refused to answer a number of very trenchant questions.

I had a brief lunch with Joe Alsop after he had written his snippy column for today. I found him more friendly than his column indicates, and he has now gone off to Greece for a month, which is as much of a relief to me as it will be to you.

Chalmers Roberts called me on Friday for comment on two reports: (1) that your decisions on the Reserves was governed by the SAM shoot-down and (2) the notion that your decision was governed by Congressional views like Mansfield's. I shot down both reports, I think successfully.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 28, 1965
8:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Joe Fowler at 12:30 Tomorrow

What Fowler wants to talk about is the Pound Sterling, the prospects of imminent crisis, and the conditions for rescue action. I want to join in, with our expert, Francis Bator, because tomorrow evening I begin 24 hours of intensive discussion with Burke Trend, my British opposite number. Trend is coming for a meeting that he and I agreed on months ago, but there is a sense of urgency in his coming just now which gives me a feeling that the Prime Minister is trying to set the stage for a private understanding with you. I already know enough to be tough with Trend on this, but I want to be sure to use this meeting to get the right message to the Prime Minister, so that when and if there is a crisis your bargaining position will be the way you want it.

Fowler will be able to spell out the technical money considerations very well indeed. He has been talking with all the experts and has reached clear conclusions, which are sensible enough in straight money terms. He is very clear indeed on the point that any solution must be fully multilateral. One point he will probably wish to emphasize is that if the British are forced to devaluation, we will all be losers. He does not draw any soft conclusion from this point, but he wants to be sure that some of the rest of us understand that devaluation really is the wrong way out -- and not only for the British.

My own interests, and those of Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk -- are wider. We are concerned with the fact that the British are constantly trying to make narrow bargains on money while they cut back on their wider political and military responsibilities. We want to make very sure that the British get it into their heads that it makes no sense for us to rescue the Pound in a situation in which there is no British flag in Vietnam, and a threatened British thin-out in both east of Suez and in Germany.

What I would like to say to Trend myself, is that a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for Sterling. But I don't want to say it unless you want it said.

The economic measures announced by the British yesterday have had a somewhat better reception in the money market than we expected. Part

of this may be due to the accidental but amusing fact that the election of Heath by the Tories has given the bankers some encouragement. So it is unlikely that we will have an imminent crisis on our hands tomorrow. But we do need to be on guard for one both over this weekend and in weeks ahead. The Fowler meeting should be a useful first stage in making sure that we all understand each other as well on Sterling as we have come to ^{do} on Vietnam in the last seven days.

McG.B.

McG.B.

Rec'd
7-28-65
6:25P

(2)
NR 7/28

19

3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 28, 1965 - 6:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Phone call to Jack McCloy and Arthur Dean

1. I called Jack McCloy this morning -- and Douglass Cater called Arthur Dean -- to give them a fill-in on the background of your final decisions on Vietnam. They both understood and approved of the international reasons for not blowing the thing way up to the level of option 4. Dean is going full steam, and McCloy is doing what he can to help him.

2. McCloy asked me to tell you that he has heard a lot of playback about Dean Rusk's appearance at Bohemian Grove, and that it was a really outstanding success. He said that he had noticed your reluctance to let Dean go last week, and thought you would want to know of the really deep impression which the Secretary of State made on this group. McCloy stated he had this not from beer-drinking lobbyists but from first-rate people. The conversation occurred just before the news conference and I did not have time to find out just whom he was quoting.

McG. B.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 28, 1965, 2:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Letter for Cabot Lodge

Cabot Lodge has asked for a "Taylor letter" -- namely, a letter reaffirming his responsibility as Ambassador in the same way we did for Max Taylor last year. As you will recall, Taylor wrote his own letter and it is fairly sweeping -- with the result that we granted him powers as Ambassador which he would not have wished Lodge to have in the days of Lodge and Harkins. I have talked to Bob McNamara about this, and both of us think that we must not make any distinction now between Taylor and Lodge. Accordingly, I have drafted a letter to Lodge for your signature which reaffirms the authority granted to Taylor by reference. However, I have not repeated the specific language used with Taylor because on the face of it, we all know that Lodge will not exercise day-to-day authority over military matters -- as a matter of fact, Taylor himself was very restrained.

Along with a draft letter, I attach a copy of the letter to Taylor so that you can see where the problem is.

McG. B.
McG. B.

*If you approve this, we will hold it for
dating after L. is confirmed.*

4a

July 28, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Ambassador Lodge:

As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this expression of my confidence and this reaffirmation of my desire that as Ambassador you exercise full responsibility for the work of the United States Government in South Vietnam. In general terms, this authority is parallel to that set forth in my letter to Ambassador Taylor of July 2, 1964, and it rescinds any conflicting instructions to U. S. officers in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
The American Ambassador
Saigon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 84-19
By is, NARS, Date 8-14-84

LBJ:McGB:ab

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 27, 1965

4:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Progress on Vietnamese diplomatic front

You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political position at the same time that we move forward with the planned U. S. reinforcements in Saigon. Taylor and Johnson tried out on Ky and Thieu the political language which we drafted over the weekend. They did not call it a Presidential statement, but simply a draft U. S. position which might be stated at some point by a high U. S. official. Ky and Thieu accepted the entire position, and that now allows us to use language equivalent to the paragraphs at Tab A. This language takes us a long way forward and gives us a good political punch to go with our military decisions. The attached paragraphs can be shortened and tightened into whatever form of statement we make from here, and they can be expanded and elaborated in any following presentation by Secretary Rusk. What is new in these paragraphs is the following:

- (1) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of using the UN if we can get it into the act.
- (2) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of free elections under international supervision.
- (3) Definite and clear-cut support for the purposes (but not the weak machinery) of the '54 agreements.
- (4) An offer of hope for the Viet Cong if they will turn from war to peace.
- (5) A concrete offer to discuss both their proposals and ours -- this will be read as movement toward a negotiation in which their points and our points would both be on the table.

All these are important from the point of view of men like Mansfield and Fulbright. A couple of them -- like the offer to consider their proposals and the offer of hope for the Viet Cong after a peaceful settlement -- may have real impact in Communist circles as well. Yet there is no weakness in them. And I repeat that Taylor has obtained Saigon's approval for them.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED	
NSC letter	7-10-79
By <i>DCU</i>	NARS, Date 10-27-82

~~TOP SECRET~~

5a

A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TAB A

~~TOP SECRET~~

While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen efforts to get discussion started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the US will not be discouraged.

In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America's friends in these countries know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States.

And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in Viet-Nam. The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement.

At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all. Already in June, the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the fundamental principles of such a peace:

- An end to aggression and subversion.
- Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic principles and without foreign interference.
- An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.
- And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

DECLASSIFIED
 NSC letter 7-10-79
 By DCH NARS, Date 10-27-82

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

-2-

Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means -- including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under international supervision.

These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice -- not in the quality of the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of 1954.

But the program of peace remains as the US has stated it. This program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia.

For the people of South Viet-Nam -- on both sides of the current contest -- it will bring opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing society.

For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south.

For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area.

For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no threat and no danger.

And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communist and all of those who don't.

For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression -- and probes for peace -- it is planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to help has been made plain.

So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that they choose. The US will come with its proposals -- let them come with theirs. And let diplomacy replace destruction.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TAB A

TOP SECRET

-3-

The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready.

This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength -- not from weariness but from resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America's efforts will go on and they will grow.

The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard task of battle until others are ready, too.

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6

~~SECRET~~

Agenda for the NSC Meeting, 5:30, July 27

Situation in Vietnam

- (1) Political report by the Secretary of State
- (2) Military report by the Secretary of Defense
- (3) Discussion as the President desires

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 8-17-83

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 27, 1965, 3:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cabot Lodge's hearing.

I talked to Lodge about his hearing and he reports that it went very well as far as he himself was concerned. I asked him whether there was any apparent criticism of our policies, and he said that noses seem to be out of joint over the fact that everybody but the Congress has now been consulted. He said he got this kind of feeling from Fulbright and Lausche and Mundt, and even from Stuart Symington. He thinks that you may wish to suggest to the Leadership and to any other Congressional groups you see that you have wanted to get the alternatives sorted out and clear before consultation with them. Lodge said that he was pressed a good deal as to what the meetings were about, and that he refused to answer. He limited himself to telling the Committee that he thought it had been the most careful and thorough study that he had ever seen in Government.

Lodge was pressed as to why we do not go further in bombing the North -- especially with respect to POL dumps. He pleaded ignorance of this military question.

He reports that the Committee was pessimistic, but that the Members seemed to share his view that it is political progress on the ground in South Vietnam that is essential. He was having lunch with Lansdale to discuss this problem when I reached him.

I invited Lodge to the NSC meeting; and you can make your own decision there as to whether you want him at the Leadership meeting. So far for the Leadership meeting I have invited only Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler and Raborn from the Executive Branch.

hms
McG. B.

SECRET

8
July 27, 1965
Tuesday/10:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THRU MR. WATSON.

Bowles appointment. Minor nuisance though it is, I really would urge that you give Bowles a few minutes before he leaves Sunday.

Put the blame on me, but in the note you sent him after his operation (I drafted) you told him you looked forward to seeing him, and when I volunteered to go straighten him out (I did) I again told him you wanted to see him (I thought with your OK).

On the merits, if a guy like Chet goes back without having seen you, his ability to work on Shastri will be that much less. His own morale will be shot as well. So I hope you'll make an honest man out of me.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

SECRET

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY DCM ON 11-5-88

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓ 9
July 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I understand that you will be dining this evening with Sir Norman and Lady Brookes and Ambassador and Mrs. Waller of Australia. You may wish to refer to two key communications that were exchanged in the last 24 hours.

As you know, a message was dispatched yesterday from you to Menzies which reviewed the current situation in Viet Nam, indicated the likely increase in U. S. armed forces there, stated our determination to continue our diplomatic efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement, and emphasized our intent to use "care and restraint" to insure that the war did not expand. The message also acknowledged Australia's present aid to the GVN and asked that "most earnest consideration" be given to increasing such assistance. Finally, you stressed the importance of you and the Prime Minister keeping "in close touch" during the coming days, directly and through our respective diplomatic representatives.

Menzies' reply was immediate and sympathetic. I quote it in full:

"Thank you for your message about your intention to commit further substantial forces for South Vietnam. I appreciate your action in keeping us informed and, also, in recognising our own difficulties. You may be sure of Australia's continuing support and readiness to assist in the defence of South Vietnam to the best of our capacity. We shall consider your message very carefully and with the will to do whatever more we can to assist when practicable. I shall make a statement here welcoming the additional steps you are taking."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-221

By ij, NARA, Date 4-8-91

McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, July 26, 1965
11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is the agenda for the noon meeting. There is one additional item, relating to covert negotiations, which should be discussed in a still smaller group. The only ones who know about it now are Rusk, Ball, McNamara and myself. We doubt if any other individual should be informed at this time. You may wish to have a small follow-up meeting in your own office on this.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 78-161
By is, NARA Date 2-15-00

10a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

AGENDA

MEETING AT 12:00, Monday, July 26, 1965

Attendance: Vice President, Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Wheeler, Lodge,
Goldberg, Moyers, Busby, Bundy

1. The SAM site problem. Secretary McNamara will have a report and recommendations.
2. Position at the UN -- the pros and cons of a U. S. initiative.
3. The general plan of Congressional consultation and public announcement.
 - a. Shape of meeting with the Leadership.
 - b. Timing and form of a Presidential statement or a message.
 - c. Follow-up statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
 - d. Speeches by Congressmen and private citizens.
4. Further consultation with Saigon Government.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCA NARS, Date 8-17-83

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2)

Monday, July 26, 1965
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose two copies of your private Pen Pal message of January 14, 1965. This message was delivered by Ambassador Thompson to Dobrynin. I also enclose a copy of a recent explanatory telegram to Harriman which gives the history of other discussions between us and the Soviets on military expenditures. The fundamental exchanges actually occurred between Rusk and Gromyko, rather than between you and Kosygin.

The exchanges with the Soviets were quite complex, because different budgetary measures were used in different messages. But none of them had anything to do with the kind of new problem that we now face in Vietnam. Moreover, there was no "agreement" -- there was simply an exchange of information about independently developed military defense plans.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Enclosures

08849

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

✓ Bundy B1

85
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW 190

JUL 17 5 46 PM '65

INFO: US Mission GENEVA TODIS 1741

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-83
By ip NARA, Date 4-4-90

FOR HARRIMAN

If suitable occasion arises you may wish draw on following background of (1) alleged agreement in November-December 1964 respecting mutual military budget reductions and, (2) actual and estimated levels US military expenditures as well as budgets.

Kosygin speech of December 9, 1964, to Supreme Soviet reported USG intention to reduce military expenditures 1965-66 fiscal year. Kosygin may therefore feel he has something personally at stake in this matter. In this speech he said QTE Representatives of the US Government have given us a relevant statement on the plans of the US Government. These statements say that the US Government also intends to reduce military expenditures in 1965-66 fiscal year. Thus the reduction of Soviet military expenditures in the 1965 budget and the expected reduction of US military expenditures represent a certain

ACDA/E 7/17/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ACDA/D - William C. Foster
RSivard:EUR/SOV;VToumanoff: EHVeatch jam;mew	
BOB - / ... (in draft)	ACDA/E - Mr. Finley
EUR - Mr. Davis	ACDA/E - Mr. Finley
G - Amb. Thompson	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
DOD - Mr. Vance, Actg. Secy.	CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

positive step in the direction of reducing international tension. UNOTE

~~UNNOTE~~

The Kosygin speech came after several discussions of US and Soviet military budget trends during Rusk-Gromyko private talks of November-December. On November 30 and December 2 Secretary informed Gromyko that, in absence of special circumstances, our military budget in FY 66 was expected to be \$1.25 billion lower than in FY 65. On December 5 Secretary provided promised clarification prior references in form quotation McNamara press statement of November 10 indicating that military expenditures in FY 66 will be at least \$1.25 billion below the level of FY 64. In other words delivery to Gromyko and explanation of press statement which referred to change in expenditures FY 64 to 66 was intended to clarify Secretary's first remarks which referred to change in budget FY 65 to 66. In view technical nature of subject matter involving differences between expenditures and budgets and the two sets of years concerned, we are not certain what precisely the Soviets understood with respect to US intentions.

Concerning the \$700 million supplemental authorization of May 1965, to provide an emergency fund for financing the additional costs of deployments to and activity in Southeast Asia, this action did not cause an increase in FY 65 expenditures. In fact the

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QTE near final UNQTE figures for DOD military functions plus military assistance which SEC McNamara announced publicly July 14 indicate that FY 65 expenditures were \$3.8 billion less than in FY 64, when they were \$51.2 billion. New obligational authority (NOA), including the supplemental of ~~\$2x~~ \$700 million for SE Asia for FY 65, was \$500 million below FY 64.

To recapitulate, the comparative totals for DOD military functions plus military assistance are as follows for FY 64 and 65.

	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>NOA</u>
FY 1964	51.2 (actual)	50.9
FY 1965	47.4 (tentative final estimate)	50.4

For FY 1966 new obligational authority requested by the President in January 1965 for the Department of Defense was \$48.6 billion and expenditures were then estimated to be \$49 billion. No ~~significant~~ ~~significant~~ significant changes have yet occurred in either of these budget totals. No supplemental appropriation in FY 66 has been requested. The expenditure estimates have not been revised. Whether ^{appropriations} and when supplemental ~~appropriations~~ ^{appropriations} will be requested depends upon ⁱⁿ developments ~~and plans regarding~~ Southeast Asia. Continuation present course events will make supplemental appropriations probable before end of fiscal year. GP-3

END

Note: Handled Lindsis per SS/O.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jan. 14 → Reply to Nov. 3 ✓ 116
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

Pen Pal

January 14, 1965

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Dear Mac:

Your beefed-up version was re-typed, omitting the salutation and changing the first sentence of the last paragraph on page two.

Dobrynin is coming in at four this afternoon, at which time I will give it to him.

Sincerely,

Tommy

Llewellyn E. Thompson

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosure

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY DCH ON 11-5-81

January 14, 1965

Now that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk have had a series of discussions of our mutual problems, I wish to reply to the message from your Government of November 3, 1964, which was transmitted through Ambassador Dobrynin. I was particularly pleased to have the expression of the interest of your Government in first restraining and limiting the arms race, and then decisively reversing it. I think that we can take some satisfaction in the fact that both our Governments have been able, without formal agreement, to reduce our military budgets by amounts which may be small in relation to our total arms expenditure but are nevertheless of some significance in that we have both succeeded in putting an end to the annual increases in this heavy burden. I am able to tell you now that our budget for the fiscal year 1965 will call for expenditures in our Department of Defense of \$47.9 billion, which is more than \$2 billion less than was requested in my budget submitted to the Congress in January 1964.

As I have already touched upon disarmament questions in my New Year's message to you, I will not discuss them further at this time, other than to say that I continue to believe deeply that there would be advantage to us all in progress toward the specific arrangements I have proposed. In particular, we are convinced that the interest of our two peoples, and indeed of all mankind, would be advanced by steps beyond the limited test ban treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. I am able to confirm to you once again that it is this fundamental policy that underlies all our actions in this field, including those about which your Government has expressed concern, in the area of the nuclear defense of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. I remain convinced that if we work together with the common purpose of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be able to eliminate misunderstandings between us and serve our common interests.

I fully share your view that agreements reached between our Governments should be honestly observed by both sides, and I can assure you of our good faith on this score. Many of the problems which today plague the world, and which in one way or another involve the Soviet Union and the United States, are highly complex, both in their origins and in their ramifications.

- 2 -

I am hopeful, however, that with good will on both sides, a steady and consistent effort to resolve them can succeed. We shall, of course, have to proceed step by step, but every success will, in my opinion, make the remaining problems easier to resolve. You may be sure that I am determined to persevere on this path.

I am concerned that the United Nations has not yet been able to resolve the problem related to Article 19 of the Charter. I can assure you that our position on this question is one based on both principle and a consideration of the practical consequences of a failure to uphold the Charter as we see it. Our position is not in any sense directed against the Soviet Union, and on the contrary, I regret that an issue of this seriousness has arisen and particularly that we are obliged to deal with it so soon after the constitution of new governments in both of our countries. In our handling of the matter in New York, we are seeking a solution which would not prejudice either your or our positions of principle.

I am hopeful that we can continue to make progress in our strictly bilateral relations. In this field, I intend to press forward in an effort to develop our trade relations. There are many difficulties, but if the international political atmosphere remains calm, I believe there is a good prospect of improvement. We consider that this field is important both because of the practical advantages of peaceful commerce and because of the high value of active, peaceful, and straightforward relations between the citizens of our two countries. For these same reasons I shall continue to give my strong support to the increase of cultural and technical exchanges between our peoples. And in this connection I have recently had most interesting talks with my Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, and those who accompanied him on his important visit to the Soviet Union. I have also listened with great interest to the encouraging reports of the distinguished group of American businessmen which had the advantage of a meeting with you and many of your associates at the end of last year.

In this same spirit I have expressed my hope for a visit from your side to the United States. I believe that such a visit would allow us to have serious and constructive discussions together. It would also allow us a chance to show you the real dedication to freedom and peace of the American people, who share with the people of

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

the Soviet Union such great responsibilities for the future of mankind. If this hope should meet with a positive response from the Soviet Government, it would be a great satisfaction to propose definite times and to offer a more formal invitation.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Jan. 14 → Reply to Nov. 3 ✓ 11d
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

Pen Pal

January 14, 1965

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The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosure

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY *Delt* ON *11502*

January 14, 1965

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- 2 -

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the Soviet Union such great responsibilities for the future of mankind. If this hope should meet with a positive response from the Soviet Government, it would be a great satisfaction to propose definite times and to offer a more formal invitation.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2) ¹²

Saturday, July 24, 1965
8:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I enclose two memoranda. One is from Joe Sisco, and the other is a paper on the history of troop recommendations which you instructed me to prepare in our meeting yesterday.

I also had a talk with Sisco, and my own belief is that with further effort we can find a way, showing our readiness to go to the UN without exposing ourselves to much danger in the Security Council. We did it successfully at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, and I think we can do it again. I believe that the public advantage of showing readiness to speak our peace in the Security Council outweighs the disadvantage of the Soviet response, and I also think that with appropriate pressures, we can keep at least 8 members of the Security Council on our side in keeping the focus sharply on the need for discussions. The members of the Security Council, for your information, are:

US, UK, France, Nationalist China, and
the Soviet Union -- Permanent Members

The Netherlands, Uruguay, Bolivia, Jordan,
Ivory Coast, and Malaysia -- Temporary Members

Sisco himself says we can get the US, the UK, the ChiNats, the Dutch, and the two Latin Americans. I believe that strong diplomacy would give us Jordan, the Ivory Coast, and Malaysia as well -- all three of them owe us a lot in different ways.

McG. B.

12a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 24, 1965
8:15 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The History of Recommendations for Increased US Forces
in Vietnam

This story relates almost entirely to 1965. When you became President, US forces in Vietnam totalled 16,000. On 31 December 1964, they totaled 23,000. Today they are between 75 and 80,000, and you are considering increases of another 100,000 between now and November.

In December and January, our attention did not focus upon increased ground forces. We were trying to get the Huong Government to pull up its socks, and we were preparing to authorize air strikes at the right moment. We had no recommendations from the military for major ground force deployments.

At the end of January, after Bob and I discussed with you our growing doubts, you sent me to Vietnam. During that trip, the attack on Pleiku occurred and in February, you put into effect the program of limited air strikes against North Vietnam, and unlimited air action in South Vietnam. It is in this connection that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and you approved, the deployment of Marines to Danang. Two battalion landing teams were approved for such deployment on February 25.

The bombing did not reverse the situation and we did not expect it would. In the first week of March, you sent General Harold Johnson to Vietnam. He returned with three basic recommendations:

First, a 21-Point program of small actions which was promptly approved;

Second, a deployment of a tailored division force either to the highlands or to certain bases; and

Third, a four division ground force to contain infiltration by land.

The last two recommendations were tentative in form and were not pressed to a decision. General Taylor, in an important dispatch on March 16 (Saigon 3003)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD letter 4-23-76
By DCA NARS, Date 10-27-82

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-2-

weighed the pros and cons of a single US division and recommended that judgment be reserved.

At the end of March, General Taylor visited Washington and there was discussion of a possible three-division force, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Taylor himself was skeptical and reported a similar skepticism in Prime Minister Quat. The Secretaries of State and Defense recommended that the decision be deferred and that instead we should approve deployment of two additional Marine battalions and an 18-20,000 man increase in other US support forces. This recommendation was accepted in the first days of April.

The study of ground-force deployment continued in April, and on Tuesday, April 20, McNamara, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharpe, Westmoreland, McNaughton, and William Bundy met in Honolulu. At that point there were 2,000 Koreans and 33,000 US troops in the country, and an additional 18,000 were already approved. After the Honolulu discussions, McNamara recommended additional deployments leading to a total strength of 82,000 -- including 13 combat battalions. Part of this recommendation was given formal approval on April 21; and other parts, on May 15. This set of recommendations was the most important between January and the present, and I attach McNamara's memorandum of April 21.

Early in May, you requested \$700 million for Vietnam, and our defense of this request and related statements made it clear that additional forces were being sent. On June 16, McNamara gave a full public exposition, announcing the planned deployment of 15 battalions, with a total military strength of 70-75,000.

Meanwhile, on June 11, after discussions with MACV and Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs recommended additional deployments to a total of 116,000. The most important element in this recommendation was the air-mobile division. On June 19 you gave approval to the necessary preparatory steps for these deployments, without deciding on the deployment itself.

On July 2, the Joint Chiefs produced a further recommendation for a total troop strength of 179,000, again in coordination with MACV and Ambassador Taylor. Before approving this recommendation, you sent McNamara to Vietnam. With marginal modifications, it is this recommendation which is now before you for decision.

The essence of this history, I think, is that initially we all had grave objections to major US ground force deployments. Even those in favor, (like my brother

SECRET

Bill), wanted to try other things first, and none of us was prepared to urge on Westmoreland things he was not urging on us.

Then when we got major bases of our own, largely for air action, we moved quite promptly to protect them. These deployments did not give us bad reactions, and it became easier for Westmoreland to propose, and for us to accept, additional deployments. Thus, between the end of March and the beginning of July -- a period of only three months -- we moved from recommended force levels of 33,000 to recommended force levels of 180,000. We also moved from the mission of base security to the mission of active combat in whatever way seems wise to General Westmoreland.

I have found this review instructive. It suggests to me that McNamara's Plan 3 is better than his other two plans. I think we should now approve the recommended deployments through November. I think that at the same time we should explicitly and plainly reserve decision about further major deployments. After all, we have not yet had even a company-level engagement with Viet Cong forces which choose to stand their ground and fight.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1631
126

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

21 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.
2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign -- both psychologically and physically -- but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.
3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for "victory", over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding -- for psychological and morale reasons -- a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.
4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

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DECLASSIFIED	
DOD letter 5-25-76	
By OCH	NARS, Date 10-27-82

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions		<u>16,000</u>	not yet approved
TOTAL: US 13 btns		82,000	
ROK & ANZAC 4 btns		7,250	

5. Possible later deployments, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns - 15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns - 14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns - 24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164 (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

- a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.
- b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.
- c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.
- d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II), relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.
- e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:
 - 1) The contemplated deployments.
 - 2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.
 - 3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.



Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Appendix I
Actions Relating to the 7 Points of Def 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but (rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership.) These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was agreed that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Appendix II - Instructions to Ambassador Taylor

The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat Government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from U.S. and third country sources.

The USG accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional U.S. ground forces and to work with the GVN in obtaining participation of third countries. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. The USG is prepared to provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents. Also, it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN approach to these governments.

You will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that the total U.S. in-country strength at the end of this phase will approximate 80,000.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd
Mon: Jul 26
9 am

(2)
14R7/27

4/13

~~SECRET~~

July 24, 1965
Saturday/10:12 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am operating on the assumption that our general holdup on new aid to India and Pakistan does not apply to PL 480 Title II and III disaster relief, voluntary services, school lunch programs, etc.

However, the inter-agency committee is holding up the attached because it's quite sizable--\$41 million.

R.W. Komer
R. W. Komer
in file

Go ahead _____
See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

We are presently holding up the final clearance on our food donation program to India. These distributions are administered by the voluntary agencies and this year reach 11.1 million recipients with food valued at 34.3 million dollars. The program for fiscal '66 calls for the addition of almost a million school children and preschool children with 40.7 million dollars worth of commodities to reach 11.9 million recipients.

The distribution of these commodities through schools, institutions, and city feeding centers is financed by Indian state and local government funds.

I would recommend the approval of these feeding schemes.



Richard W. Reuter

Approved:

Disapproved:

Rec'd
Fri 7/23/65
6:00 p.m.

9

14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓

Friday, July 23, 1965
4:55

Mr. President:

This is a revised version of
an earlier paper, but it may
clearly be out-of-date.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2
ik 7/23

14a

Friday, July 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reasons for Avoiding a big Military
Appropriation in Vietnam

1. It would be a belligerent challenge to the Soviets at a time when it is important to do only the things which we have to do.
2. It would stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation -- at a time when controls are not needed and inflation is not that kind of a problem.
3. It would play into the hands of the Soviets at Geneva and elsewhere, because they could argue that it was a flagrant breach of the policy of "mutual example" on defense budgets.
4. It is not needed -- because there are other ways of financing our full effort in Vietnam for the present.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Friday, July 23, 1965 11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Ralph Dungan at 1 P. M.

The attached memorandum gives you the State Department's views and seems sensible.

I have had a long talk with Ralph myself, and I find him right on our wavelength with respect to Frei. He is obviously working hard at his job. On the Dominican Republic, he is a good soldier if not entirely a true believer. He has a heavy emotional investment in the Bosch experiment and is not temperamentally in tune with a man like Bennett. He nevertheless remains a very good man for Chile, and he will go on doing a very good job with just a little charging of the batteries from you.

McG. B.

✓ 16

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Dungan

State has prepared the attached briefing memorandum for your meeting with Ralph Dungan tomorrow. The memorandum reviews the general trend of our relations with Chile since Frei took office. I have nothing to add to it, except to emphasize the importance which I attach to making the Frei experiment of peaceful revolution with freedom work in Chile and to maintaining cordial relations with Frei.

I understand that Ralph has no specific issues on which he will seek your guidance or decision. I suggest that in the general review of where we stand with Chile, you might ask the following questions:

1. How well is Frei doing in carrying through his program of reform and development?
2. What is behind Chile's sharp adverse reaction to our action in the Dominican Republic and uncooperative attitude in the OAS?
3. Will the Frei Government take effective steps to block the holding of the communist-sponsored "Congress of Solidarity with Cuba," which Uruguay prevented from being held in Montevideo last month?
4. What will be Chile's objectives at the Rio Conference, with respect to restructuring the OAS, economic integration and establishment of an Inter-American Peace Force; and what we might do to bring Chile's position into closer harmony with ours?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, July 22, 1965 8:30 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Delegation to UN Meeting in Outer Mongolia

1. Attached is a memo which, reportedly, was drafted personally by Secretary Rusk and which notes that, unless you have objection, the U. S. intends to send a delegation to a UN Human Rights seminar in Outer Mongolia. On the con side of the issue, the Secretary notes (a) that a U. S. delegation has never before attended a UN-sponsored event in a country we don't recognize (reportedly, the issue has never come up), (b) that our presence could stimulate speculation about possible changes in our policy towards Mongolia, and (c) that our delegation would have to accept Mongolian visas even though we don't recognize Outer Mongolia. On the pro side, the Secretary says (a) that the U. S. has regularly participated in such seminars as a way to maintain U. S. leadership, (b) that we could explain our attendance by the fact that the seminar is being sponsored by the UN and hosted by a UN member, and (c) that our delegation could travel on regular U. S. passports.

2. While I personally do not think the world will come to an end if no U. S. delegation goes to the meeting in Mongolia, I tend to agree with the Secretary on this one. In addition to the reasons he notes in favor of attending the meeting, the following might also be mentioned. First, there are no U. S. Government travel restrictions on travel to Mongolia which will be breached if we send a delegation. As a matter of fact, over the past several years, some Americans have traveled there -- e. g., Justice Douglas, Charles Thayer. Second, as Communists go, the Mongolians are pretty good fellows. They are the only Asian Communists to have signed the test ban treaty, they have frequently sought closer relations with the U. S. and, generally speaking, they strongly support the relatively softer Soviet line in the Sino/Soviet conflict. When appropriate, it would appear to make sense to treat them differently from other Asian Communist countries.

McG. B.

- _____ No objection.
- _____ I want to hear more argument.
- _____ I'm against it.

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By jw , NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

34¹⁰

18

Thursday, July 22, 1965
7:45 PM

Mr. President:

This is the quick and dirty report from the Bureau of the Budget on alternative methods of calling up reserves which I mentioned to you on the phone today.

McG. B.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

✓ 18a

July 22, 1965

(2)
NR 22

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Alternative methods of call-up of Reserve Forces

Legally the Reserves may be called up either by Executive Order or through legislative action. Regarding Executive Order action, 10 U.S.C. 673 authorizes the calling up of up to one million Reserves. However, the President must first declare a new national emergency. 10 U.S.C. 673 does not permit the extension of enlistments except for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The Reserves may also be called up by the Service Secretaries "in time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law..." (10 U.S.C. 672). This was the route used in 1961 during the Berlin crisis when Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to "order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an Armed Force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months." This law also limited the number of Ready Reservists on active duty (other than for training) without their consent under this section at any one time. The law also authorized the involuntary extension of enlistments or other obligated service for not more than twelve months. The Resolution was followed by an Executive Order delegating to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments the authority conferred by the Joint Resolution.

This method of calling up Reserves seems far and away the best. It assures Congressional participation and support and avoids the problems involved in declaring a new national emergency.

Finally, in light of experience we should think about including limitations on the maximum number of Reservists to be called up and the duration of active service under a Congressional Joint Resolution.

Harry
Henry S. Rowen
Assistant Director

MEMORANDUM

33¹⁹

(2)
MK 1/22
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 22, 1965; 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We had a session of the heads of all the agencies concerned with disarmament this afternoon, and I think the recommendations for our Geneva position are now in order for your approval. In essence they are as follows:

1. We do not recommend an extended substantive Presidential statement. Instead we will draft a short, general, and emphatic endorsement of the cause of disarmament, with special emphasis upon finding means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This is consistent with your previous positions and does not create too much of an ironic contrast between our effort in Geneva and the other activities that are in prospect.

2. Foster will develop our position at greater length and will use existing US positions and proposals, at least in his opening statement. He will, however, indicate our readiness to discuss additional possibilities and will take every opportunity to show how serious we are about this matter. As the discussion develops, if there is any sign of seriousness on the Russian side, he may come back to us for guidance on possible new positions. This is in line with a position strongly urged in the Committee by the Vice President, Rusk and McCloy -- namely, that there is no point in getting into a fight with ourselves or with our allies on controversial proposals if there is no sign of serious interest or activity on the Soviet side.

3. One further special aspect of the plan is worth noting: back in 1964 you trumped a Khrushchev ace by making good, strong proposals about agreements to prevent indirect or direct aggression across recognized boundaries. I attach a copy of the letter you sent Khrushchev. We have agreed that Foster will use this document as a basis for a strong counterpunch if the Soviets -- as we expect -- try to inject Vietnam into the discussions.

4. Finally, we continue to have a complex internal struggle with the British to prevent them from tabling a nonproliferation treaty which the Germans would read as an attack on the MLF. Rusk is taking this question direct to Foreign Secretary Stewart, and Foster is going through London to press the question himself. The US view is that it is perfectly possible to find language which protects both German and British interests, and that nothing should be tabled in the sight of the Russians until this problem has been solved. But it may take some doing to persuade the British and the Germans that we are right.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The net of all this is that we shall be playing a sober, responsible, but low-key tune in Geneva. I think this is right, and I believe it to be in line with your own thinking.

I will ask for your comment briefly in the 11:30 meeting on Vietnam tomorrow, because Rusk and McNamara will both be there to comment further if you wish.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19a

NOTE: There should be no premature release of this correspondence nor should any of its contents be paraphrased or alluded to in earlier stories. There is a total embargo until Monday, January 20, 1964 at 5:30 a.m.

Pierre Salinger
Press Secretary
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT
ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY
NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV, JANUARY 18,
1964

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome the stated objective of your December 31 letter and agree with much of its contents. It is my hope that we can build on these areas of agreement instead of merely emphasizing our well-known disagreements. This Nation is committed to the peaceful unification of Germany in accordance with the will of the people. This Nation, which has fundamental commitments to the Republic of China, has for many years sought the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait. This Nation's forces and bases abroad are for collective defense, and in accordance with treaties and agreements with the countries concerned.

Let us emphasize, instead, our agreement on the importance your letter places on preserving and strengthening peace -- and on the need to accompany efforts for disarmament with new efforts to remove the causes of friction and to improve the world's machinery for peacefully settling disputes. In this spirit, let us both present new proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference -- in pursuit of the objectives we have previously identified:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

I am sure you will agree that our task is to work hard and persistently on these and other specific problems and proposals -- as you and President Kennedy did on the Test Ban Treaty -- instead of confining ourselves to vague declarations of principle that oppose some wars but not all.

Your letter singles out the problem of territorial disputes and concludes that "the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or any country." I agree; moreover, the United States proposes guidelines to implement this principle which are even broader and stronger than your own.

First, all governments or regimes shall abstain from the direct or indirect threat or use of force to change

- international boundaries;
- other territorial or administrative demarcation or dividing lines established or confirmed by international agreement or practice;

MORE

Sk1 Cont. No. 1049

(OVER)

-- the dispositions of truce or military armistice agreements; or
-- arrangements or procedures concerning access to, passage across or the administration of those areas where international agreement or practice has established or confirmed such arrangements or procedures.

Nor shall any government or regime use or threaten force to enlarge the territory under its control or administration by overthrowing or displacing established authorities.

Second, these limitations shall apply regardless of the direct or indirect form which such threat or use of force might take, whether in the form of aggression, subversion, or clandestine supply of arms; regardless of what justification or purpose is advanced; and regardless of any question of recognition, diplomatic relations, or differences of political systems.

Third, the parties to any serious dispute, in adhering to these principles, shall seek a solution by peaceful means -- resorting to negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, action by a regional or appropriate United Nations agency or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Fourth, these obligations, if they are to continue, would have to be quite generally observed. Any departure would require reappraisal; and the inherent right of self-defense which is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would, in any event, remain fully operative.

You will note the basic similarities in our position. Agreement should not be impossible on this or other propositions -- and I share your hope that such agreement will stimulate disarmament and peaceful relations.

The prevention of wars over territorial and other disputes requires not only general principles but also the "growth and improvement" to which you refer regarding the machinery and methods for peaceful settlement. The United States believe that the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations -- and specifically its Security Council -- should be more fully used and strengthened and that the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries -- particularly the permanent members of the Security Council -- deserve greater attention in solving its financial problems.

In conclusion with our allies, we shall offer specific proposals along these lines in the weeks ahead. Both the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the United Nations are appropriate places for such discussions.

Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that practical progress toward peace is my most fervent desire. This requires, not only agreements in principle but also concrete actions in accord with those principles. I believe this exchange of letters offers real hope for that kind of progress -- and that hope is shared by all peace-loving men in every land.

Sincerely,

(s)

Lyndon B. Johnson

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RECEIVED

JUL 22 10 43 AM '65

OFFICE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY

Possible Items for Discussion

July 22, 2:30 P. M.

1. How big a change in policy is this and how do we explain it -- in political and military terms?
2. How do we inhibit Chinese and North Vietnamese response by both carrot and stick?
3. How do we combine a peace offensive with stepped-up military action?
4. Is this policy justified in terms of Vietnam, Asia or U. S. national interests -- or all three?
5. How do we get a political and social effort within Vietnam that is equal in strength to the military effort?
6. What are our war aims? What is the answer to Walter Lippmann's question on this point?

*Rec'd
Thurs. 7/22/65
4:25 P.M.*

8

21

*rest of file
in C. Jones*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 22, 1965
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from Wilbur Mills asks me to speak in his home county on the same platform with him next October 14.

I have sworn off public speaking, and I have turned down every invitation for the fall. My own personal preference would be to do the same on this one, but I have memories of officials who have turned Wilbur down and then found themselves turned around by higher authority. Wilbur likes to bring the Administration to his own county, so before I turn this one down, I think I ought to ask your judgment.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Turn it Down as Politely as you can _____

Take it on _____

Accept only after telephoning Wilbur, telling him what an exception this is and how much he will owe President Johnson if he insists on it _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 22, 1965
10:30 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The candidates for your afternoon meeting might be chosen from the following:

State

Rusk ✓
Ball ✓
W. P. Bundy _____
Unger _____

CIA

Raborn _____
Helms _____

AID

Gaud _____
(Bell is in Europe)

Defense

McNamara ✓
Vance _____
Wheeler ✓
McNaughton _____
Resor _____
Nitze _____
Zuckert ✓ (Brown ✓)
Other Chiefs _____

Other advisers

Clifford ✓
McCloy ✓
Arthur Dean ✓

USIA

Rowen _____
Marks _____

White House

Bundy ✓
Moyers ✓
Valenti ✓
Busby ✓
Cater _____
Cooper _____
Goodrum ✓ may not be back in time

M.F.B.
McG. B.

Time 2:30

Thursday
July 22, 1965
9:40 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further to my Note About Paul
Freund

The attached letter comes from a man who might well be regarded as a rival of Freund in the field of Constitutional Law. The sincerity and simplicity of his argument will show you another wonderful human being at work, even if the advice does not prevail.

McG. B.

Ltr to Mr. Bundy from Charles Fairman
5334 Calumet Avenue
La Jolla, California
20 July 65

24

Alie

just file this

McB said not to
send D Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is an interim response to the President's request for information concerning the provision of early communications satellite service for African nations.

By international agreement the United States and forty-five other nations from all regions of the World, except the Soviet Bloc, are dedicated to the establishment of a commercial global communications satellite system as part of an improved and expanded global communications network. The dedication is to the establishment of the space segment with satellites in view of all populated areas of the World by late 1967. Development of the space segment capability is progressing under the management of the Communications Satellite Corporation acting on behalf of the International Consortium established under the International Agreement.

To hasten the provision of access to the global system by African nations, it would be necessary to underwrite initial earth station costs, operating expenses, and satellite channel allocation charges until the resultant economic benefits are great enough to enable the countries to meet the costs themselves. The estimated costs are about \$700,000 per year to operate a station costing about \$5 million to construct.

Based upon studies by the Communications Satellite Corporation it does not now appear the Central African nations, in most instances, will have developed and recognized an economic base for satellite communications service prior to 1970.


~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

United States interests and free world political needs may dictate a requirement for U. S. assistance to hasten the provision of communications satellite service. Advantages to accrue would include:

1. Offsetting possible Soviet-dominated communications satellite service for Africa;
2. Improving the position of the United States and the Communications Satellite Corporation for further development of a commercial global communications satellite system;
3. Removal of European constraint on communications service for Africa;
4. Highlighting U. S. technological and economic leadership; and
5. Providing improved trade and diplomatic communications service.

An Ad-Hoc Study of Communications Satellite Service for African Nations is the purpose of a group recently organized by my office with representation by the Department of State, Federal Communications Commission, Agency for International Development, National Aeronautics and Space Council and National Security Council. The Communications Satellite Corporation will provide contributions to the study group. Areas for consideration by the study group are listed on the attached page.


J. D. O'Connell
Special Assistant to the President
for Telecommunications and
Director of Telecommunications Management

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Ad - Hoc Study of Communications
Satellite Service for African Nations

Areas of Consideration

Background of Requirement

Communications Satellite Consortium/Communications
Satellite Corporation Implications

Technical/Economic Feasibility

Earth Stations

Space Segment

Long Distance Trunk and Local Communications

Distribution Networks

Multiple Access

Costs/Time

Economic Viability

Economic Value

To United States

To African Nations

To Communications Satellite Consortium

Political Acceptability

To African Nations

To Communications Satellite Consortium

Other Implications:

Competitive Situation - Soviet Union

Vested Interests - European Nations

Vested Interests - Commercial Common Carriers

Effect on Other Regional Groupings of Nations

Effect on Other African Nations of Provision of Service
to Minority of African Nations

Supporting Studies:

NASA

AID

STATE

COMSAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(17)

Wednesday
July 21, 1965
8:10 p.m.

23 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Aid to India stories. We've busted a gut to deflate the stories out of Delhi on big new aid programs. I've blasted State and AID, and ~~sent~~ ~~drafted~~ a rocket to our Embassy last night. State put out a flat denial today, we've told Bowles and John Lewis to lie low, and we're batting down all press queries.

I think I have the story. Our Aid Mission in Delhi has been working up a recommendation for increased aid next year. Just last week it completed its study and the Embassy admits that it discussed the "concept and nature" of the study with the Indians. So my reading is that Indians talked, and perhaps floated a trial balloon. The first article appeared in the Times of India, and most of our press is just repeating it. I strongly doubt that Bowles triggered it; he's been on home leave for six weeks.

I'll keep doing my best on this business, which I'm painfully aware couldn't have come at a worse time.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

hfb

~~SECRET~~

(12) ✓ 26

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 21, 1965
8:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Timing of Decision and Actions in Vietnam

(1) MK 7/21

Bill Moyers tells me we got through Wednesday with the White House press well enough, but I think the probability is that we will have rising pressure in the coming days. For this reason, I myself continue to think that the right time for your message -- or a fireside chat -- or both at once, is Monday. We really cannot get an orderly and well-considered decision made before that, but I doubt if we can hold the fort any longer.

I myself feel very strongly that we should not dribble out bits and pieces of this to the Press or to publishers before you make your final decision and announcement. The Press people we need most on this particular issue are the regular reporters, and the best thing we can do for them is to be sure they get the news straight, and from you, and on-the-record. If you didn't scare the meeting into silence today, I will be greatly surprised, and I think it makes good sense for your Government to deliberate for three days on an issue of this magnitude. On this basis, it seems to me that on Friday, or Saturday morning, we might announce that you are calling the Leadership to a meeting Sunday afternoon or Monday morning, and expect to go to Congress Monday noon or Monday evening.

I have an additional reason for proposing this schedule. Dean Rusk is going to the Bohemian Grove to give a speech on Saturday, and he has been hoping to take a day of rest in the bargain. He would like to leave Friday morning and return Sunday afternoon. Yet he should clearly be very much on hand when we meet the Leadership. The schedule I have suggested meets both objectives.

I have discussed this matter only with Bob McNamara, and I find that he concurs in this recommendation.

On a separate matter -- Bob is carrying out your orders to plan this whole job with only \$300-\$400 million in immediate new funds. But I think you will want to know that he thinks our posture of candor and responsibility would be better if we ask for \$2 billion to take us through the end of the calendar year, on the understanding that we will come back for more, if necessary. Bob is afraid we simply

cannot get away with the idea that a call-up of the planned magnitude can be paid for by anything so small as another few hundred million. Cy Vance told me the other day that the overall cost is likely to be on the order of \$8 billion in the coming year and I can understand Bob's worry that in the nature of things, these projected costs will be sure to come out pretty quickly, especially if he looks as if he was trying to pull a fast one.

I have not told Bob that I am reporting his worry to you; don't give me away.

McG. B.

McG. B.

27

July 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

The President invited alternatives to the McNamara proposal. What follows, however, is not an alternative but rather an ancillary approach.

This morning's discussion noted two possible military outcomes resulting from a substantial increase in US forces:

- a. The VC main forces will be forced by US forces into reverting to guerrilla warfare.
- b. The VC main forces will choose not to confront our units head-on and voluntarily revert to guerrilla actions.

Either way, it would appear that we and the GVN will be faced with the problem of guerrilla rather than positional warfare. The fact that this may mean that the VC cannot achieve a military victory offers small comfort; neither we nor the GVN have as yet demonstrated that we can win this kind of war. The idea of leaving "pacification" duties to the ARVN (while we defend our bases and come to the relief of besieged ARVN units) will not, in itself do the trick. In effect, the VC will be doing what it is best at. What is needed, if we are successfully to cope with the VC under the circumstances of widespread guerrilla warfare, is a political-economic-psychwar program as carefully developed and as massive in its way as the military effort envisaged in the McNamara proposal. In fact, it may well be that many of the US forces would be redundant under these circumstances and our hopes for "a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our non-military efforts.

In brief, I would recommend that if the McNamara proposals are accepted, there be developed simultaneously a major non-military program to deal with the guerrilla phase of the war. In fact, I do not see how the McNamara approach can succeed without such accompanying non-military planning.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 21, 1965
6:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Postponement of Rio Conference

The Council of the OAS, by a vote of 14-5, (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay) - 1 (Brazil), decided to postpone the Rio Conference. State informs me that the discussion in the Council reflected no bitterness over the decision to put off the holding of the conference a second time.

McG. S.

McGeorge Bundy

To Mr. Watson
Orig + 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Wednesday
July 21, 1965
6:10 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador McGhee at 1:15 P.M.
on Thursday - East German Helicopters

1. Between March 23 and June 21 there was a series of identified East German helicopter flights over and/or along the borders of West Berlin. Our guidelines for responding to such flights have been and presently are relatively conservative -- e. g., protest; attempt to chase the intruders away.
2. When Ambassador McGhee meets with you on Thursday, he may indicate his interest in obtaining authorization for taking sterner military/diplomatic counter-actions in the event another East German helicopter flight occurs over or along the borders of West Berlin. He may also indicate his interest in obtaining authorization to resume U. S. helicopter flights over East Berlin.
3. Both of these problems, which, as you know, are extremely complicated and sensitive, are presently being staffed out in detail in the Departments of State and Defense. While there is no need at this point to burden you with the details, you should know that State and Defense (and especially State) tend to be more conservative and cautious on this spectrum of problems than McGhee. McGhee, who is understandably more sensitive than Washington to West German heat, feels that we should be prepared to go to some fairly extreme lengths to halt future East German helicopter flights over and along the border of West Berlin; in certain circumstances, for example, he would probably be prepared to cause East German helicopters to crash.
4. If McGhee does raise the issue with you, you may want to hear him out and tell him (a) that you understand that the Departments are now studying his recommendations, (b) that you don't want to prejudge the issue until you hear from Rusk and McNamara, and (c) that, given Vietnam, you are interested, generally speaking, in keeping the Washington/Moscow temperature at a low level.

McG. B.
McG. B.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ct NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 21, 1965
10:20 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your 11:30 meeting

1. The main business of the general 11:30 meeting will be McNamara's report. From 10:30 on the rest of us will be in the Cabinet Room, and my guess is that we will be ready for you earlier if you want to join us.
2. The people present will be those you checked last night, with the exception of Goodpaster and Yarmolinsky. I removed them because Bob McNamara expressed very strong feeling that there would be resentment among the JCS if junior officers were brought over while they were not. This does no immediate damage. I understand that Goodpaster has very interesting views of his own, and I will try to have a private talk with him in the next 24 hours.
3. The military recommendations, as usual, are in pretty good order. On the political side, we have hard problems, also as usual. Lodge and McNamara have a disagreement on how far we should have a "peace offensive." This difference may turn out to be more apparent than real.
4. There is also a major political problem of U. S. leadership in Saigon below the level of the Ambassador. My own view is that the solution is to get not one but two outstanding deputies -- Bill Sullivan and Frank Meloy. Meloy can run the ordinary Embassy work, and I think Sullivan can coordinate the pacification activities in a way in which no one else in government can. Lodge is no administrator -- a fact which both McNamara and Chet Cooper report as fully confirmed from this trip.

To give him two deputies is ^{abnormal} ~~illegal~~ -- but Vietnam is not normal. A little heat from you on the State Department would help, although my brother Bill is already sympathetic.

Lodge's confirmation hearing has been put over until Tuesday. Both McNamara and I think it would be wise to keep him out of the immediate argumentation on your program, and Lodge himself wants a last few days of rest.

I will know more after the 10:30 meeting.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Postponement of Rio Conference

Over the weekend Secretary Rusk exchanged views with the Brazilian Foreign Minister concerning the holding of the Rio Conference on August 4. I understand that Secretary Rusk spoke to you about this exchange.

This morning the OAS Preparatory Committee for the Rio Conference met to consider whether to postpone the meeting. During the course of the session the delegates of eleven countries voiced varying degrees of official or personal preference for postponement. The eleven countries are: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. The Mexican representative personally came out strongly for postponement, indicating that his government would back him.

Only four delegates spoke in favor of proceeding with the August 4 date: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.

The Brazilian Ambassador stated that his government was prepared to hold the conference on schedule. On the question of postponement, he said that this is for the other governments to decide. Ambassador Bunker stated that while the U. S. was prepared to attend on August 4, we believe that the Committee should not insist on holding to this date if a considerable number of governments wish to have the conference postponed. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela did not take a position during the meeting. Afterwards the Venezuelan Ambassador said privately that he would vote for postponement.

The Preparatory Committee is scheduled to meet tomorrow afternoon to vote on whether to postpone the conference. Assuming that those who favor postponement at this morning's session maintain their position in the balloting tomorrow, there should be sufficient votes to carry the motion. If the majority holds together, we will join with them. If not, we will abstain.

McGeorge Bundy

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cls, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CZ
ME 7/20

Tuesday, July 20, 1965
7:15 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It is not my department, but I cannot resist saying that I hope you will look at the qualifications of Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School before you make a decision on the Supreme Court vacancy. I think that Freund is without much question the most distinguished student of the Constitution in the country. He is also a wonderful human being. I think he would help to make the Johnson Administration famous in the annals of the Court.

I am encouraged in making this recommendation because I know that if he were alive, your friend Felix Frankfurter would be making it too. And Frankfurter would probably be the first to argue that Freund has it in him to be a greater judge than Frankfurter -- he has fewer quirks and is more judicial in essential temperament. He is, in fact, that very rare thing, a truly wise man.

McG. B.
McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday
July 20, 1965
3:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the latest report from
Ambassador Taylor.

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McG. B.

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Tuesday, July 20, 1965
1:15 P.M. - rec'd 3:10 p.m.

(Text of Cable from Embassy Saigon 205) June 20, 1965

For the President

From Ambassador Taylor

The only report worth your reading this week is the one which Bob McNamara is carrying back on his plane to you tonight. We have had a very fruitful five-day period together and the important recommendations which he will present to you have the full concurrence of Johnson, Westmoreland and me.

Two events below the level of importance of the Secretary's report are still worth mentioning. The first is the capture and death of Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, the inveterate and skillful intriguer whose hand was behind the abortive coup attempts of February 19 and May 20 of this year. Since the latter, he has been lying low in the vicinity of Saigon eluding apprehension by the police and thus avoiding the execution of the death sentence leveled on him in absentia by a military court. Although Thao was close to the extremists within the northern Catholic refugee bloc, leading clerics such as Papal Delegate Palmas have been openly expressing the hope that Thao could be removed from the country and his troublemaking activities suppressed. Although his death, presumably from wounds received at the time of his apprehension, may stir resentment in lower Catholic circles, it is doubtful that it will generate any emotional reaction among the substantial members of the church.

The Viet Cong monsoon offensive dropped off rather sharply during the week in which the guerrillas initiated only one battalion size attack. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, on the other hand, executed successfully one of their most complex military operations of the war in opening the road from Qui Nhon to Pleiku for the movement of essential civilian and military cargo. Participants included 12 Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions and the B-52 SAC bombers from Guam which engaged in a close air support mission to assist Vietnamese marines. The operation seems to

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State letter 4-8-76
By DCB NARS, Date 10-27-82

have taken the Viet Cong by surprise who thus far have made no reaction, and convoys are rolling freely back and forth. They were badly needed to relieve the shortage of commodities in the highland area resulting from Viet Cong interdiction of routes.

The main question of the public mind is, "What will the U.S. do next as a result of the McNamara visit?"

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 20, 1965
6:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Meeting on Vietnam at 11:30 tomorrow

We have now set our meeting with you on Vietnam at 11:30 tomorrow morning. Rusk, McNamara and others of us will have met beforehand to try to get the problems lined up for your consideration.

The only immediate question is whom you would like to have at the meeting. I have had a number of requests from people to come, and most of them have good reasons. But as you know, Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk both often prefer very small meetings. In my judgment, it is your judgment which should govern. Will you check those whom you want from the list below:

Vice President _____

White House

- Bundy ✓
- Moyers ✓
- Cater _____
- Busby _____
- Valenti ✓
- * Cooper ✓

State

- Rusk ✓
- Ball ✓
- W.P. Bundy ✓
- * Unger ✓
- * Lodge ✓

Defense

- *McNamara ✓
- Vance ✓
- *Wheeler ✓
- *McNaughton ✓
- *Goodpaster _____
- Yarmolinsky (chief drafting officer) _____

CIA

- Raborn ✓
- Helms ✓

USIA

- Rowan ✓
- Marks ✓
- Wilson _____

*part of McNamara mission

I am assuming that you will not want any members of the Congress until after you have heard this first report.

McG. B.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Tuesday, July 20, 1965
11:30 A. M.

*Rec'd
11:31 am*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bill Fulbright is delighted and surprised by the Goldberg appointment -- delighted at the quality of the appointment and surprised only that Goldberg has accepted it.

Bill then turned the conversation to his two-year authorization and hopes that you will have a word with Doc Morgan about how many better things there are for him to do. He also lobbied me for his Binational Foundation, and I told him that you were having the matter reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget.

Finally, he reported that the nominations were going too slowly but that Clark had cleared the committee easily. Right now they are questioning Leonard Marks. Bill says both the questions and the answers are too long.

McG. B.

McG. B.



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Tuesday, July 20, 1965
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Doc Morgan's Right to Work

There are a large number of foreign policy problems which can benefit from hearings and reports.

Policy in each Continent should be intensively reviewed at least once every other year. Such a review would be a stimulus to the Administration and an outlet for other citizens. Often the Committee would have its own experts, but a judicious use of consultants could give it additional strength.

Special topics deserve special attention. Examples from the past are the Special Committee on the Marshall Plan and the Humphrey Hearings on Disarmament. Examples for the present are East-West trade (though Mills has a share of that), worldwide hunger (though Agriculture should have a share of that), the future of the UN, and disarmament, again.

It would be a very good thing if the Foreign Affairs Committee could somehow set up a counterweight to John Rooney in the field of foreign policy administration -- at least if it could be done effectively. I have no notion ~~whether~~ this particular proposal is practicable or not, but there is just no doubt that legislative complexities and false economy clearly make the management of our foreign affairs inefficient and expensive. We could do twice the job we are doing with one half as many people -- assuming that those people were able to operate with the kind of administrative freedom that we have here in the White House.

In short, there is literally an enormous amount of constructive work to be done by a committee which takes the lead. And if the problem is in the lethargy or weakness of Doc Morgan's staff, it would not be hard to find him some good men.

15/
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

AGENDA FOR LUNCHEON - July 20, 1965

1. The Pierrelatte overflight. Cy Vance will have up-to-date reports on what did and did not happen. In essence, it appears that we did overfly a uranium plant, but this plant was not a prohibited area, so far as we knew. Flight plans were filed with the French equivalent of FAA, and the film was surrendered on request. There remains a fuzzy edge as to whether the French really knew that these routine training flights included photography.
2. Harriman and Kosygin. Harriman has asked for any further instructions we may have in connection with his talk with Kosygin tomorrow. I think we might well send him a few words of firmness on Vietnam and peace in general from you, as follows: "You are authorized to tell Kosygin that the President has read with great care your report of your conversation. The President shares Kosygin's view that the US and the USSR have heavy responsibilities for peace. Kosygin can be assured that US action in Vietnam will be that which is necessary -- and only that which is necessary -- to stop the armed attacks which have been mounted under direction of Hanoi against the people and government of South Vietnam. The President agrees with Kosygin's emphasis upon the tasks of disarmament, the importance of direct US-USSR relations, and the advantage of personal contact in appropriate circumstances. The President is now making final review of US disarmament position for Geneva meeting and hopes very much that Soviet Union will join in fresh and constructive approach to these problems, especially that of nonproliferation."
3. Article 19. I have copies of the Secretary of State's proposal and you may wish to review that with him or to ask him to review it promptly with Arthur Goldberg.
4. A problem with Italy. We have had some curious feelers from the Italians on their internal political situation, which I will report orally.
5. Progress on the Disarmament position for Geneva. I will report very briefly on this. A meeting in which you will hear the views of interested agencies is planned for tomorrow if possible.
6. Pakistan. Up-to-date report on the situation in Pakistan. The Secretary of State will be able to report on this.
7. ROLLING THUNDER. Next two weeks.
8. The East-West Trade Bill?

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 85-220
 By isp, NARA, Date 8-18-87

9/ Anti-famine program?

10. Vietnam. Vance and I will review the planning we have done so far and ask for your guidance on the timing of further actions.

McG. B.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

20 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam

1. Introduction. Our object in Vietnam is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the Soviet Union and in a way which preserves support of the American people and, hopefully, of our allies and friends. The following assessments, made following my trip to Vietnam with Ambassador-designate Lodge and General Wheeler, are my own and are addressed to the achievement of that object. My specific recommendations appear in paragraph 5; they are concurred in by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador-designate Lodge, Ambassador Johnson, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland. I have neither asked for nor obtained their concurrence in other portions of the paper.

2. Favorable outcome. In my view, a "favorable outcome" for purposes of these assessments and recommendations has nine fundamental elements:

- (a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.
- (b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.
- (c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.
- (d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).
- (e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.
- (f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
- (g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.

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Authority OSD 10-25-78; State 7-10-79
By lco; NARS Date 1-8-82

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(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

A favorable outcome could include also arrangements regarding elections, relations between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by international forces, membership for North and South Vietnam in the UN, and so on. The nine fundamental elements can evolve with or without an express agreement and, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are more likely to evolve without an express agreement than with one. We do not need now to address the question whether ultimately we would settle for something less than the nine fundamentals; because deployment of the forces recommended in paragraph 5 is prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable settlement, and a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality, whether to compromise in any particular.

3. Estimate of the situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few-months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. US combat troop deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United States will forsake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines are cut.

The economy is deteriorating -- the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened.

Original on exhibit

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The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals. His government is youthful and inexperienced, but dedicated to a "revolutionary" program. His tenure depends upon unity of the armed forces behind him. If the directorate holds together and the downward trend of the war is halted, the religious and regional factions will probably remain quiescent; otherwise there will be political turbulence and possibly uncoordinated efforts to negotiate settlement with the DRV. The Buddhists, Catholics, out-politicians and business community are "wait-and-seeing;" the VC, while unable alone to generate effective unrest in the cities, can "piggy-back" on any anti-government demonstration or cause.

Rural reconstruction (pacification) even in the Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress. Gains in IV Corps are being held, but in I and II Corps and adjacent III Corps areas it has lost ground fast since the start of the VC monsoon offensive (300,000 people have been lost to the VC, and tens of thousands of refugees have poured out of these areas).

The Government-to-VC ratio over-all is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1. Some ARVN units have been mauled; many are understrength and therefore "conservative." Desertions are at a high rate, and the force build-up has slipped badly. The VC, who are undoubtedly suffering badly too (their losses are very high), now control a South Vietnamese manpower pool of 500,000 to 1 million fighting-age men and reportedly are trying to double their combat strength, largely by forced draft (down to 15-year-olds) in the increasing areas they control. They seem to be able more than to replace their losses.

There are no signs that we have throttled the inflow of supplies for the VC or can throttle the flow while their materiel needs are as low as they are; indeed more and better weapons have been observed in VC hands, and it is probable that there has been further build-up of North Vietnamese regular units in the I and II Corps areas, with at least three full regiments (all of the 325th Division) there. Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than a complete take-over.

4. Options open to us. We must choose among three courses of action with respect to Vietnam all of which involve different probabilities, outcomes and costs:

- (a) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that

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can be arranged -- almost certainly conditions humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future effectiveness on the world scene.

(b) Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks -- a course of action which, because our position would grow weaker, almost certainly would confront us later with a choice between withdrawal and an emergency expansion of forces, perhaps too late to do any good.

(c) Expand promptly and substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and maintain the military pressure against the North Vietnamese in the North while launching a vigorous effort on the political side* to lay the groundwork for a favorable outcome by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communication. This alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer a good chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same time it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear through at considerable cost in casualties and materiel and would make any later decision to withdraw even more difficult and even more costly than would be the case today.

My recommendations in paragraph 5 below are based on the choice of the third alternative (Option c) as the course of action involving the best odds of the best outcome with the most acceptable cost to the United States.

5. Military recommendations. There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in Vietnam; they, together with other combat personnel and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 75,000.

a. I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions -- together with increases in helicopter lift, air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support and miscellaneous log support and advisory personnel which I also recommend -- would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam

* Ambassador Lodge states "any further initiative by us now before we are strong would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson would maintain discreet contacts with the Soviets, but otherwise agree with Ambassador Lodge.

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to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure). It should be understood that the deployment of more men (perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter is possible but will depend on developments.

b. I recommend that Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number -- approximately 125,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 10,000 Navy -- would provide approximately 36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. The call-up would be for a two-year period; but the intention would be to release them after one year, by which time they could be relieved by regular forces if conditions permitted.

c. I recommend that the regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966. The increase would be accomplished by increasing recruitment, increasing the draft and extending tours of duty of men already in the service.

d. I recommend that a supplemental appropriation of approximately \$X for FY 1966 be sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the build-up in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the fiscal year.

It should be noted that in mid-1966 the United States would, as a consequence of the above method of handling the build-up, have approximately 600,000 additional men (approximately 63 additional maneuver battalions) as protection against contingencies.

6. Use of forces. The forces will be used however they can be brought to bear most effectively. The US/third-country ground forces will operate in coordination with South Vietnamese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will assist in providing security in neighboring areas; they will augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of key logistic areas and population centers. Also, in the initial phase they will maintain a small reserve-reaction force, conducting nuisance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening and securing selected lines of communication; as in-country ground strength increases to a level permitting extended US and third-

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country offensive action, the forces will be available for more active combat missions when the Vietnamese Government and General Westmoreland agree that such active missions are needed. The strategy for winning this stage of the war will be to take the offensive -- to take and hold the initiative. The concept of tactical operations will be to exploit the offensive, with the objects of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation and of destroying their morale. The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces, are to gain and hold the initiative -- keeping the enemy at a disadvantage, maintaining a tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, and pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them. The operations should combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight at a higher and more sustained intensity with resulting higher logistical consumption and, at the same time, to limit his capability to resupply forces in combat at that scale by attacking his LOC. The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea anti-infiltration campaign and includes increased use of air in-country, including B-52s, night and day to harass VC in their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units, the South Vietnamese must reinstitute the Program of Rural Reconstruction as an antidote to the continuing VC campaign of terror and subversion.

7. Actions against North Vietnam. We should continue the program of bombing military targets in North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war materiel to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow. The number of strike sorties against North Vietnam -- against fixed targets and for armed reconnaissance -- should increase slowly from the present level of 2,500 a month to 4,000 or more a month. We should be prepared at any time to carry out a severe reprisal should the VC or DRV commit a particularly damaging or horrendous act (e.g., VC interdiction of the Saigon river could call for a quarantine of DRV harbors, or VC assassination of a high-ranking US official could call for destruction of all of the major power plants in North Vietnam); the chances of our reprisal action leading to escalation is not large in such an instance. After the 44 US/third-country battalions have been deployed and after some strong action has been taken in the program of bombing the North (e.g., after the key railroad bridges north of Hanoi have been dropped), we could, as part of a diplomatic initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pause in the program of bombing the North.

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8. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military program cannot do the job alone. Among others, the following actions should also be taken in South Vietnam:

a. Continue doggedly to "strengthen the rear" by pressing forward with the rural reconstruction (pacification) program, realizing both that the program has little chance of meaningful success unless and until security can be provided, and that the program is fundamental to full success once security is provided.

b. Keep working with the government in Saigon to make it more effective and more stable. Consider using the deployment of the US troops as the occasion to lay down some terms -- e.g., regarding the presence and use of a US-controlled rice reserve, an effective US veto on major GVN military commanders, statements about invading North Vietnam, and so on.

c. Take steps to meet the economic shortages and disruptions. Especially, the recurring threat of rice inflation should be countered by the provision of an in-country US-controlled rice reserve.

d. Take informational actions to undermine VC morale by reference to VC defeats, to GVN/US weapon superiority, to air attacks on their bases, etc., and by encouraging VC to defect either to the government or "back home." In this connection, the Chieu Hoi program (to induce VC defections) must be revitalized immediately.

9. Expanded political moves.* Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we should make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam and from generating crises elsewhere in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.

* Note footnote to paragraph 4 (c).

10. South Vietnamese reaction to expansion of US forces. Three factors dominate the psychological situation in South Vietnam: (a) the military situation (i. e., the security problem), (b) the effectiveness of the government as a vehicle for dynamic leadership, and (c) the implications of the growing American presence. The deployments recommended in paragraph 5 run some risk of causing the Vietnamese to "turn the war over to us" and of generating an "anti-colonial" type resentment toward us. The GVN has requested the additional US forces urgently (indeed, they want 9 battalions more than the 44 recommended here). When Ky was asked about the popular reaction, he said, "We will explain it to our people." Thieu agreed saying, "They know that you are not here to make us a colony." Former Prime Minister Quat told me, "The only way to save Vietnam is to send a large number of troops." He added, "The people of South Vietnam will not object." The spectres of widespread adverse public reaction have been raised each time we deployed personnel in the past, and, while no deployment has been so massive as this one, no such reaction appeared. Furthermore, the key requirement for continued viability of the Vietnamese spirit in the short run is evidence that RVNAF/US/third-country forces can contain the VC/DRV monsoon offensive and reopen communications; in the longer run the requirement will be evidence of bringing the war to a satisfactory close.

11. Communist reaction to the expanded program. The Soviets can be expected to continue material assistance to North Vietnam and to lodge verbal complaints, but not to intervene otherwise. The Chinese -- at least so long as we do not invade North Vietnam, do not sink a Chinese ship and, most important, do not strike China -- will probably not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. The DRV, on the other hand, may well send up to several divisions of regular forces in South Vietnam to assist the VC if they see the tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. This possible DRV action is the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to "counter-invade" North Vietnam and to extend air strikes to population targets in the North; acceding to these pressures could bring the Soviets and the Chinese in. The Viet Cong, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways to continue almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced by some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition, and cadres can be cut off and, if they are cut off, whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent.

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-9-

12. Evaluation. ARVN overall is not capable of successfully resisting the VC initiatives without more active assistance from more US/third-country ground forces than those thus far committed. Without further outside help, the ARVN is faced with successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and population centers particularly in the highlands, piecemeal destruction of ARVN units, attrition of RVNAF will to fight, and loss of civilian confidence. Early commitment of additional US/third-country forces in sufficient quantity, in general reserve and offensive roles, should stave off GVN defeat.

The success of the program from the military point of view turns on whether the Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they are only now being tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam -- a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy.

The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with China or the Soviet Union can be kept small. US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase -- just how much cannot be predicted with confidence, but the US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another will probably see the thing through* and the United States public will support the course of action because it is a sensible and courageous military-political program designed and likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.

It should be recognized, however, that success against the larger, more conventional, VC/PAVN forces could merely drive the VC back into the trees and back to their 1960-64 pattern -- a pattern against which US troops and aircraft would be of limited value but with which the GVN, with our help, could cope. The questions here would be whether the VC could maintain morale after such a set-back, and whether the South Vietnamese would have the will to hang on through another cycle. It should be recognized also that, even in "success," it is not obvious how we will be able to disengage our forces from Vietnam. It is unlikely that a formal

* Ambassador Lodge points out that we may face a neutralist government at some time in the future and that in those circumstances the US should be prepared to carry on alone.

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
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-10-

agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be negotiated -- because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. A fairly large number of US (or perhaps "international") forces may be required to stay in Vietnam.

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum -- if the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination -- stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.



Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

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45-39

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, July 19, 1965
8:25 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Planning at Close of Business, July 19

We currently expect Bob McNamara back at 8 a. m. Wednesday. We assume you will want to see him that morning -- or possibly that afternoon after he has had time to take a reading with Rusk and Vance. The attached cable from Cooper and Unger (TAB A) shows where they are at half time in Saigon.

Meanwhile, Vance has gone ahead with planning for the reserve call-up, the extension of tours, and the increased draft calls which are foreshadowed in the military planning. A first draft exists of a Presidential message and of the necessary legislation. The planned reserve call-up will be one Marine Division and six Army Reserve Brigades (a total of 27 battalions). Beyond this, there would be temporary additions to the active forces of 27 battalions (nine Marine and 18 Army), plus a permanent addition of nine more Army battalions. This makes a total addition of 63 battalions. (At TAB B is a one-page statement of current planning which Cy Vance regards as very tentative and which Bob McNamara has not had a chance to approve.)

In addition, my brother has drawn up an action checklist for Congressional and diplomatic steps. We will have appropriate messages for all foreign leaders. Some should go early in the game, as soon as you know your own mind. Others should wait until after public announcement of your plans -- presumably in a message to the Congress.

Indeed the timing of the message to the Congress is really the D-Day for the whole operation. If McNamara reports to you Wednesday, you probably do not wish to give an appearance of great haste in reaching a decision, and for that reason I would recommend against going to the Hill before the first of the week. But a delay beyond Monday would seem to me to create too wide a gap between McNamara's return and the point of decision. If you agree, we might tentatively plan that you would see McNamara Wednesday, see him again with a view to decision Friday, and talk with the Congressional Leadership either Friday or Saturday to get ready for a formal message on Monday.

At the same time, it is increasingly urgent that we get ahead with planning for public support. Doug Cater is ready to go ahead with plans to provide

speech materials to friendly Senators and Congressmen, and everyone is ready to go ahead with the Citizens Committee as soon as you give the signal. I continue to think that Arthur Dean would be an excellent choice for us, but he is by no means the only possibility.

I have suggested to Jack Valenti that Rusk and Vance and I have lunch with you tomorrow, or come in at any other time at your convenience to review the bidding on all these matters. I ~~will call in the morning to learn your pleasure.~~ You have just agreed to this, & I have told Marvin.

McG. B.
McG. B.

39a

TAB
A

SECRETMonday, July 19, 1965
5:30 PM

NODIS

(Text of Cable from Saigon #182 dated July 18, 1965)
Report of Cooper and Unger on McNamara Mission at half-way point.


Regarding: Military Situation-A briefing on the Government of Vietnamese plan for utilization of U. S. military forces was provided by General Thieu and the Vietnamese Army planning group. Briefly, the Government of Vietnam contemplates a U. S. force of 200,000 with 3 U. S. divisions to take over responsibility for the highlands in the II Corps and defense of major U. S. bases and installations throughout the country. The South Vietnamese would concentrate on pacification primarily in the populous sections throughout the country. The Government of Vietnam also unveiled a home guard plan with the sketchiest explanation.

MACV and the visiting team are disinclined to accept the Government of Vietnam's concept. The MACV concept will be reflected in the McNamara team and U. S. Mission recommendations now in preparation.

The team was given intensive briefings on the MACV strategic and tactical situation and logistic requirements. The biggest bottlenecks appear to be in sea interdiction. McNamara is formulating recommendations to break this and other binds. Thus far there has been little opportunity to discuss pacification/rural reconstruction with either the Government of Vietnam or MACV.

Regarding: Economic Situation-Excellent briefings by the acting U. S. Operations Mission chief and the Government of Vietnam Minister of Economic Affairs point up the danger of incipient inflation, shortages of key commodities (e. g. rice, building materials) labor scarcities, black market and transportation bottlenecks. Recommendations to deal with these and some major policy proposals to cope with over-all Government of Vietnam weakness will be incorporated in the team report (some suggestions will be forwarded to Washington prior to the team's departure.)

Regarding: Political Situation-A meeting with Thieu, Ky, et. al., subsequent informal conversations at dinner, additional sessions yet to come, and an intensive series of Unger-Cooper meetings with a cross-section of political

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types in and out of government should provide a reasonably good feeling of the political scene.

Initial, tentative impressions are: Thieu and Ky appear to take pains to present a collective front. Both make the right noises about solidarity, stability, revolution, Chieu Hoi, etc. Both convey a sense of sincerity and determination, although both (especially Ky) seem to be concentrating on the daily quick-fix and neither seems to have yet harnessed the resources, (if indeed they exist) to work out fundamental, solid plans for the longer term. Possibly excluding Co, other members of the Government of Vietnam's first team, especially the Economic Minister, seem quite impressive.

We have pressed the Government of Vietnam hard for their estimate of the reaction to introduction of large U. S. forces (no basic problem, but the same underlying worries regarding black market, etc.), the Chieu Hoi repatriation program (they say the right things, but see the more extensive report below), government stability (Ky and Thieu stress the reliance on support of the mass of citizens rather than individual groupings) and representation abroad (they are working on it, but no immediate progress seems in sight). In short, we want to probe more before coming to any firm conclusions.

Regarding: The Chieu Hoi-Ky claims he has given this program increased importance by combining it with rural reconstruction. He also claims that statistics of increased numbers of ralliers have been either inflated by provincial Chieu Hoi officials or are meaningless because the Viet Cong itself has used Chieu Hoi centers as "rest camps."

In a session with the Chieu Hoi investigation team (headed by Col. Jacobson) we got the impression that the program was not doing too badly despite the apparent massive indifference on the part of the Government of Vietnam. Jacobson is preparing tentative conclusions and recommendations for incorporation in the McNamara team report (a final report of the survey will not be available for a month).

Miscellaneous-Lodge and Cooper went to Cam Ranh Bay this morning and both were extremely impressed with the pace and scale of construction of the logistics base. Unger to Hue to get provincial impressions. Embassy morale is high, even inspiring.

Hertz Case. The CIA representative is more optimistic of release (perhaps this week) than at any time since February.

TAYLOR

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39c

TAB
B



~~TOP SECRET~~
Proposed 63 Battalion Plan

7/19/65

40

1. Purpose:
 - A. Reconstitute ASAP by calling up reserves substantially all elements of US ground combat forces introduced into SVN under 34+10 Bn Plan.
 - B. Make certain temporary and permanent additions to active ground combat forces (by draft increases, volunteers and tour extensions).
2. Combat Ground Forces Involved:
 - A. Call-up of reserves (27 Bns):

4th Marine Div, including air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 60 days
6 Army reserve brigades (~~9 Bns~~): combat ready in 8-12 weeks
(18 Bns)
 - B. Temporary additions to the active forces (27 bns):

3 Marine Brigades, w/out air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 4-6 mos.
3 Army Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready in 6-8 months
1 Army Division (9 Bns): combat ready in 8-10 months
 - C. Permanent additions to the Army (9 bns):

3 Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready at end of 3d, 4th, and 5th months respectively
3. Options provided: At end of one year, retain all, part or none of Army and/or Marine reserves on active duty, thereby reducing 63 Bns not at all or by up to 27 Bns (18 Army plus 9 Marine Bns).
4. Service end strength increases:

A. <u>Personnel:</u>	<u>If Reserves deactivated</u>	<u>If Reserves retained</u>
Army	250,000	350,000
Navy	56,000	56,000
Marines	86,000	131,000
Air Force	<u>102,000*</u>	<u>102,000*</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>494,000</u>	<u>639,000</u>

* Includes 16,000 civilians for MATS augmentation.

- B. Units:
 - Army - Shown above.
 - Navy - 17 Destroyers plus 24 combat support/supply vessels (plus undetermined number of private charters).
 - Marines - Shown above.
 - Air Force - 9 TFS (F-100); 6 Recce Sqdn (RF-84).

Note: Above figures and units are tentative and will be reviewed in light of actual decisions reached following Mr. McNamara's report. In addition, these figures have not been scrubbed and are merely rough planning estimates at this time.



~~TOP SECRET~~

46 22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 19, 1965
8:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Reasons for Avoiding a Billion Dollar Appropriation
in Vietnam

1. It would be a belligerent challenge to the Soviets at a time when it is important to do only the things which we have to do (like calling reserves).
2. It would stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation -- at a timewhen controls are not needed and inflation is not that kind of a problem.
3. It would create the false impression that we have to have guns, not butter -- and would help the enemies of the President's domestic legislative program.
4. It would play into the hands of the Soviets at Geneva, because they could argue that it was a flagrant breach of the policy of "mutual example" on defense budgets.
5. It is not needed -- because there are other ways of financing our full effort in Vietnam for the rest of the calendar year, at least.

Rewrite elementary

McG. B.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday

July 19, 1965

6:25 p.m. - rec'd 6:26pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Postponement of Rio Conference

Over the weekend Secretary Rusk exchanged views with the Brazilian Foreign Minister concerning the holding of the Rio Conference on August 4. I understand that Secretary Rusk spoke to you about this exchange.

This morning the OAS Preparatory Committee for the Rio Conference met to consider whether to postpone the meeting. During the course of the session the delegates of eleven countries voiced varying degrees of official or personal preference for postponement. The eleven countries are: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. The Mexican representative personally came out strongly for postponement, indicating that his government would back him.

Only four delegates spoke in favor of proceeding with the August 4 date: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.

The Brazilian Ambassador stated that his government was prepared to hold the conference on schedule. On the question of postponement, he said that this is for the other governments to decide. Ambassador Bunker stated that while the U. S. was prepared to attend on August 4, we believe that the Committee should not insist on holding to this date if a considerable number of governments wish to have the conference postponed. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela did not take a position during the meeting. Afterwards the Venezuelan Ambassador said privately that he would vote for postponement.

The Preparatory Committee is scheduled to meet tomorrow afternoon to vote on whether to postpone the conference. Assuming that those who favor postponement at this morning's session maintain their position in the balloting tomorrow, there should be sufficient votes to carry the motion. If the majority holds together, we will join with them. If not, we will abstain.

McG.
McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CS, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 19, 1965
5:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two Interesting Press Contacts, July 19

This morning I had a telephone call from Mary McGrory. She was on a fishing expedition on Stevenson's successor. I told her that I simply could not and would not discuss names, but that I could tell her that the White House thought it was an important appointment and hoped to be able to act reasonably promptly. I quoted your cable to U Thant describing Stevenson as a man who had represented the US at the UN and the UN to the US, and said that I thought you would probably wish to find the best possible man to go on with this job. She told me that she had heard discussion of Justice Douglad, of Gene McCarthy, and of Chester Bowles. I said they were all fine men.

This afternoon Joe Kraft came in. I had hesitated about seeing him because I think he is a curve ball artist, but I was glad I had seen him because it turned out he was planning an article on me for Harpers, and I spent quite a lot of breath trying to tell him to stop it. As of today, I think the chances are a little better than fifty-fifty that I succeeded.

I found Kraft quite relaxed about Vietnam. He told me that he was skeptical of the stories that you changed decisions because of premature publicity. I told him that I know of no appointment which had been modified on this score, and that I thought that people who tried to predict the outcome of decisions that had not been taken were proceeding at their own risk. He was particularly inquisitive about Article 19 and the San Francisco speech and I told him that, to my certain knowledge there had been no decision on Article 19 at that time or now, and that the matter was under review at a time when people began making tendentious predictions. I said that I was confident that your final decision would be unrelated to news stories, one way or another. He seemed to agree.

Kraft is moving from the Star to the Post and is going with a new syndicate three times weekly. I told him I would answer his phone calls for a while if he would not write about me. We shall see.

15/
McG.B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 19, 1965
5:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have had a report from Des FitzGerald on Red Raborn's testimony this morning before Fulbright's Committee on the Dominican Republic.

FitzGerald says that he has never seen anything like it. After three days of intense preparation for a tough session, all of the Senators were as smooth and friendly as they could be. Morse asked no questions, and Joe Clark was positively helpful to Raborn.

Fulbright himself was apparently very friendly, although he was intent on establishing that the presence of Communists was the reason for our initial move. Raborn denied this conclusion repeatedly, and FitzGerald says that his testimony fits in consistently with what Mann and Vance have already said. So far so good -- and I am inclined to think you must have been talking to some Senators.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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Rec'd 5:35

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Rec'd
Mon. 7/19/65
5:00 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By sig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

Monday, July 19, 1965
4:50 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

△

SUBJECT: Frei's Trip to Europe

This brief report may be of interest to you in case you agree to see Ralph Dungan during his visit this week.

Within the framework of his own political position, Frei took a firm and helpful line. His own personal sentiments about the Dominican Republic are probably much like those of other Latin American "liberals" like Betancourt, but according to all these reports, he has resisted the attempt of De Gaulle et al to trap him into an anti-American position.

In brief, the Embassies report the following:

1. In response to President Saragat's observation that one of the main aims of Italian foreign policy is the maintenance of the closest ties with the Anglo-Saxon world, especially the United States, President Frei said that friendship with the United States is also a basic point of Chilean foreign policy. Foreign Minister Fanfani told Under Secretary Ball that the deep friendship of Chilean leaders toward the United States was evident. (The Italian Ambassador has given me an identical report, and in terms which suggest that Frei asked to have his good behavior brought to your attention).
2. President Frei during an official reception in Paris made a point of telling our Deputy Chief of Mission that he entertained especially friendly feelings for the United States. He said he would point out to Europeans, particularly in France, how much the United States had aided the Chilean economy and what close ties unite Chile and the United States. A French Foreign Office official subsequently told our Embassy that President Frei had gone out of his way to state "at the Elysee" his recognition of the fact that Chile depended primarily upon its relations with the United States. Ambassador Bohlen reports that, contrary to some press accounts, President Frei's remarks at the diplomatic press association lunch did not cater to De Gaulle and were not critical of the United States. In fact, he was adroit in avoiding being mousetrapped by newsmen into criticizing the United States and the OAS.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Ambassador-at-Large for the East Pacific

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Frei's Trip to Europe

President Frei has completed his visits to Rome, Paris and London, and is now in Bonn. We have reports from our Embassies covering the first three stops. I have been pleased to note that in his talks with officials of the three countries he has manifested friendship and respect for the United States.

In brief the Embassies report the following:

1. In response to President Saragat's observation that one of the main aims of Italian foreign policy is the maintenance of the closest ties with the Anglo-Saxon world, especially the United States, President Frei said that friendship with the United States is also a basic point of Chilean foreign policy. Foreign Minister Fanfani told Under Secretary Ball that the deep friendship of Chilean leaders toward the United States was evident.

2. President Frei during an official reception in Paris made a point of telling our Deputy Chief of Mission that he entertained especially friendly feelings for the United States. He said he would point out to Europeans, particularly in France, how much the United States had aided the Chilean economy and what close ties unite Chile and the United States. A French Foreign Office official subsequently told our Embassy that President Frei had gone out of his way to state "at Elysee" his recognition of the fact that Chile depended primarily upon its relations with the United States. Ambassador Bohlen reports that, contrary to some press accounts, President Frei's remarks at the diplomatic press association lunch did not cater to de Gaulle and were not critical of the United States. In fact, he was very adroit in avoiding being mousetrapped by newsmen into criticizing the United States and the OAS. When President Frei spoke with Governor Harriman in Paris, he stressed also that he had told the Italians and de Gaulle that the United States had been very helpful to Chile in her economic program.

3. The head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office told our Embassy that during President Frei's visit nothing unexpected or offensive to the United States was said. Ambassador Bruce reports that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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the Chilean Ambassador called him to say that President Frei disavowed and was vexed by reports that he had made disparaging remarks about United States policy during his trip. President Frei maintained that, on the contrary, he had been especially careful to state his friendship for the United States. Ambassador Bruce also points out that President Frei, after leaving a state dinner, insisted on going to the Embassy residence about midnight to offer his personal condolences over the death of Stevenson.

I am attaching copies of the cables from Paris, Rome and London with the pertinent sections underscored.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, July 18, 1965
10:30 A. M.

ret'd from ⁴⁶
✓ Pres "Haw"
seen 7:45 am
19 July 65"

Att 3 Ed fur
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Pakistan

Yesterday you told me that you would like to get a message to the Paks either through a letter to Ayub or a talk with the Ambassador -- making it very clear indeed that you do not propose to talk about assistance programs until they have been authorized and appropriated by the Congress. I spoke to Dean Rusk about it. He said that this message had been communicated over and over, but that he thought it would be good to do it again. He is drafting a Presidential letter to Ayub, and he will make the point again to Ahmed next week himself. He and Ahmed had an unsatisfactory conversation Friday, and the Secretary is very fearful that the Paks may "overreact" in the next few days. My own impression is that there is a contest between the bad Bhutto and the good Shoaib, and that Ayub will not do anything final in the next little while.

Meanwhile, I think it is getting more urgent that we get beyond the immediate tactical point -- that we can't do business until the Congress has acted -- and get as clear an understanding as we can of what you really want from the Paks. McConaughy certainly, and Rusk probably, do not really know what you want, and with the best will in the world, their ignorance may lead to complicate the problem. Even your White House troops may fall into the same error.

For this reason I venture to offer for your consideration the attached paper prepared by Bob Komer's very bright Asian hand, Hal Saunders. The first four pages are all you really need to read, although the supporting paper on Pakistan behavior in the last three years is instructive. If the policy Saunders outlines is somewhere near your own view, it might well be wise for us to draft a memorandum from you to the Secretary of State which would spell out your views. If Saunders is way off base, then we need to know it.

I don't quite know how to offer a set of choices for ^{your} ~~an~~ answer on this one. If you could write just one line of your own views, it would be a great help, or, alternatively, I can ask you for a reaction sometime in the coming week.

McG B
McG. B.
Ambassador-at-large for
South Asia.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 16, 1965, 2:35 PM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett on the Dominican Situation

The OAS Ad Hoc Committee in six weeks of negotiation with the Imbert and Caamano factions has made considerable progress, but there are still many points to work out before a Provisional Government can be installed. The Garcia Godoy-Read Barreras ticket has now been generally accepted. The issues which remain to be resolved include: (1) the content of the Institutional Act, (2) whether elections for a Constituent Assembly should precede general elections, (3) how soon the Inter-American Peace Force should depart, (4) what is to be done with the regular military personnel in the Caamano forces, (5) the composition of the high command of the Armed Forces, (6) how to disarm the rebels, (7) how to settle the debts contracted by the rebel government, and (8) what to do with the Communists in the rebel zone.

The inability to reach a prompt political settlement is giving rise to a series of other problems. One of these is the critical economic situation in the Dominican Republic. The country for the past three months has been living off the U. S. Treasury to a considerable degree. We have made available \$42 million during this period. Until a political settlement is reached, it will not be possible to reopen the key banking, commercial and communications facilities located in the rebel zone which are essential to economic recovery.

Another important problem is whether or not the Special Inter-American Conference should be held as scheduled in Rio on August 4 if the Dominican situation is not settled. The Ad Hoc Committee believes that it would be very risky to go to the Rio Conference with a Dominican settlement pending. State has taken soundings around the Hemisphere on the disposition of the Latin American governments to postpone. The results show a divided opinion, with the current running in favor of going ahead with the August 4 date. A decision on this matter will have to be reached by the OAS in the next few days.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-232

By ijp, NARA, Date 1-7-93

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7/16
2:45 PM

I recommend that you explore fully with Ambassador Bunker the possibility of the Ad Hoc Committee stepping up the pace of the negotiations to see if a Provisional Government cannot be established within the next ten days.

I am attaching for your consideration a suggested press statement on the meeting.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT

Ambassador Bunker returned to Washington yesterday to attend to several official and personal matters. In the meeting this afternoon, which included Ambassador Bennett, there was an opportunity to examine all aspects of the Dominican situation. Tomorrow Ambassador Bunker will join with his colleagues on the OAS Ad Hoc Committee in reporting to the Meeting of Consultation on their activities to date in the Dominican Republic.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 16, 1965, 2:35 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett on the Dominican Situation

The OAS Ad Hoc Committee in six weeks of negotiation with the Imbert and Caamano factions has made considerable progress, but there are still many points to work out before a Provisional Government can be installed. The Garcia Godoy-Read Barreras ticket has now been generally accepted. The issues which remain to be resolved include: (1) the content of the Institutional Act, (2) whether elections for a Constituent Assembly should precede general elections, (3) how soon the Inter-American Peace Force should depart, (4) what is to be done with the regular military personnel in the Caamano forces, (5) the composition of the high command of the Armed Forces, (6) how to disarm the rebels, (7) how to settle the debts contracted by the rebel government, and (8) what to do with the Communists in the rebel zone.

The inability to reach a prompt political settlement is giving rise to a series of other problems. One of these is the critical economic situation in the Dominican Republic. The country for the past three months has been living off the U. S. Treasury to a considerable degree. We have made available \$42 million during this period. Until a political settlement is reached, it will not be possible to reopen the key banking, commercial and communications facilities located in the rebel zone which are essential to economic recovery.

Another important problem is whether or not the Special Inter-American Conference should be held as scheduled in Rio on August 4 if the Dominican situation is not settled. The Ad Hoc Committee believes that it would be very risky to go to the Rio Conference with a Dominican settlement pending. State has taken soundings around the Hemisphere on the disposition of the Latin American governments to postpone. The results show a divided opinion, with the current running in favor of going ahead with the August 4 date. A decision on this matter will have to be reached by the OAS in the next few days.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By ng, NARA, Date 1-7-93

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- 2 -

I recommend that you explore fully with Ambassador Bunker the possibility of the Ad Hoc Committee stepping up the pace of the negotiations to see if a Provisional Government cannot be established within the next ten days.

I am attaching for your consideration a suggested press statement on the meeting.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

47-c

PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT

Ambassador Bunker returned to Washington yesterday to attend to several official and personal matters. In the meeting this afternoon, which included Ambassador Bennett, there was an opportunity to examine all aspects of the Dominican situation. Tomorrow Ambassador Bunker will join with his colleagues on the OAS Ad Hoc Committee in reporting to the Meeting of Consultation on their activities to date in the Dominican Republic.

MEMORANDUM

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*Rec'd
11:50 am
7/16/65*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 16, 1965
11:05 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Food for the Hungry, the Hill, and the Indians

The best way of meeting your objectives has been studied by Komer, Bator, Schultze, AID, Agriculture, and State (Freeman is away, but Schnittker has signed on).

The basic problem is to steer a course that will endorse food for India, and open the way for a broad new food program next year, without undermining or attempting to replace your existing PL 480 authority this year. (To seek small changes in the present law would merely open Pandora's box for the Committees, and to put a whole new program forward for legislation this year is just not practicable, according to Budget and Agriculture).

The best arrangement we can think of is as follows:

First, to give turn-around time, authorize an interim food program for India, redesigned to meet as many as possible of the new criteria. This is purely a standby operation and we recommend four months instead of two simply to avoid useless nervousness both in the bureaucracy and in India. We also believe it may be better not to use a short-fuse deadline on the Congress, but you will have a better judgment on this point.

Four Months _____ Two Months _____ Speak to me _____

Second, send up a message asking for a joint Congressional resolution with the following components:

1. An endorsement of this brief extension of the PL 480 agreement with India.

DECLASSIFIED	
NSC 8-12-76	
By <u>DCH</u>	NARS, Date <u>10-27-82</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. A further endorsement of other interim programs that will be necessary in the months between now and the new legislative proposal.

3. A broader endorsement (after the manner of the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948) of your intent to develop a basic new program to provide food for the hungry in cooperation with the governments of the hungry nations and the other food-producing countries -- a new world-wide war against hunger. The components of the resolution would be framed to match the following position, which would be set out in an accompanying message:

a. Stress your concern over the dangerous food problem facing the world and particularly Asia in the coming years.

b. State your conviction that our Food for Peace program will require major redirection if we are to help the developing nations cope with this problem.

c. Announce that you are now studying ways of redirecting these programs so that US food aid will:

--be contingent upon effective self-help efforts by the recipient nation, particularly those aimed at securing an expansion in agricultural output.

--maximize the contribution of food aid to overall economic development goals.

--meet the nutritional needs and prevent famine among the peoples of the recipient countries.

--encourage the cooperative participation of other food exporting countries in this whole effort.

d. Emphasize the connection between the food problem and the population problem and reiterate your willingness to work with LDC's on programs to moderate the population explosion.

e. State your intention to submit major changes in PL 480 legislation at the next session, once your intensive study has been completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

The attached outline message shows the skeleton of what could be done. There are plenty of statistics and lots of eloquence which can be supplied in support of this basic argument.

What we need to know now is whether this basic approach meets your requirements. If it does, we can produce a fleshed-out resolution and a draft message over the weekend with help from Goodwin and Galbraith, both of whom are in town.

Yes _____ No _____ Speak to me _____

McG. B.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/DRAFT

July 15, 1965 - 3:35 p. m.

OUTLINE MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

FOOD AGAINST FAMINE: A NEW APPROACH

1. For some time I have viewed with growing concern the widening gap between world's exploding population and its ability to feed itself. A war on want is essential not only to prevent sheer famine but to help provide a fuller life for peoples of less developed areas of this globe. Perhaps half of the 3 billion people on this globe are plagued by inadequate diet if not chronic hunger.

I. The Problem of India

2. For example, I have just received an urgent request from the Indian Government for an additional PL 480 agreement. US has always sought to use its agricultural abundance to help countries like India, which face an uphill battle to feed their teeming millions until such time as they have achieved self-sustaining growth. India's 485 million people, more than those in Africa and Latin America combined, present a special and in my judgment overwhelming need. As the most populous country of the Free World, and as the world's largest working democracy, India has a special claim on friendly support. Beyond this, however, is the human compassion we feel for populous new nations that have not yet harnessed the new techniques and developed the capacity to feed their people.



DECLASSIFIED
NSC 8-12-76
By DCA NARS, Date 10-27-82

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- 2 -

3. The existing PL 480 agreement with India expired on 30 June.

To prevent interruption of food shipments, I have authorized conclusion of an interim extension of ^{two} ~~one~~ million tons of feed grains. But this will only meet India's continuing needs for a period of a few months.

4. Therefore, I call on the Congress to join with me by expressing its sense that the U.S. Government should undertake a new massive longer term program to help meet the Indian food deficit, on a basis which will not only prevent famine but will encourage the Indian Government's own efforts to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. When our friends appeal to us, I am confident that we shall not be found wanting.

II. The Larger Need

5. But the needs of India--great as they are--are only part of the growing need for a new approach to the war on want. With the explosive increase in the world's population--especially in those areas which are least able to feed themselves--many other countries make a call on our conscience (Pakistan, Brazil, Ceylon, etc.)

6. The stark fact is that these needs are growing at a time when the surplus output of US agriculture is declining. It is quite possible that the US will no longer have a surplus of certain major food crops within a few years. Moreover, PL 480--under which the US has contributed so greatly to meeting food deficits in friendly countries--expires next year.

SECRET

7. Confronted with this dilemma of rising demand for help to the world's hungry peoples and declining surpluses in the US, I believe that we must begin to move now toward reconciling this dilemma. A new approach to US food production policy is urgently needed, which shifts focus from problem of using surplus commodities to one which harnesses US production capacity to dynamic search, for meeting world food needs. I intend to make this one of my major legislative proposals for 1966:

8. I expect a report from my agricultural task force shortly and will then direct a series of further studies, aiming toward legislation next year. In my judgment this problem is urgent and must be attacked on the following lines:

A. US must continue to help close food gap. Must prevent famine--but must do more. Must use its food to help stimulate greater food production on part of LDC's themselves.

B. Countries which cannot yet meet their own basic needs must redouble their own effort to achieve self-sufficiency. Indefinite US donation merely postpones rather than solves problems. So US must tie its own help increasingly to self-help on their part. Agricultural development is just as important as industrial development--if not more so. Too many LDCs penalize their agriculture to secure foreign exchange to develop industry.

C. Meeting food deficit not just problem of quantity but of quality too. Basic food grains alone cannot meet nutritional needs of LDCs.

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- 4 -

We must jointly study new techniques of enriching the diet of the deficit areas.

D. Other producer nations should join increasingly in this effort. Once the US has completed its examination of the problem, I expect to call on other like-minded nations to help us meet it. A new look should be taken at multilateral programs on massive scale.

9. Any new PL 480 agreement reached in the meantime with India, and other countries will be consistent with these principles insofar as possible under current law. For example, we will insist on increased fertilizer production--so essential to higher crop yields.

10. The world food crisis is not just one of crops but one of people. Exploding population in some areas of world is exacerbating the problem faster than we can ameliorate it. Here is a most important area of self-help, and one in which this country is prepared to assist. We may be on the threshold of bold new effort to come to grips with the population explosion--an effort which is essential to economic development as well as to defeating hunger. India's new program here merits our praise. But even extraordinary success in population control programs cannot expect have decisive impact on eliminating world food deficit for decades to come.

III. A US Response

11. Because under US system of government the executive and legislative must collaborate fully on any such bold new initiatives, I ask

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- 5 -

the Congress to endorse in general the broad directions in which the Executive Branch is proposing to move. I urge that it be the sense of Congress that food help for deficit countries like India is a firm commitment of this government, and that the legislative will join the executive in working out new programs to give life to this on-going commitment.

12. I am not asking the Congress today for a binding legislative undertaking. The Administration will submit legislation next year which will then be fully subject to legislative process. What I am asking is for both Houses to join me in rededicating ourselves to war on want and in declaring US determination to proceed with all deliberate haste toward framing a bold new approach to one of the most acute needs of the less-developed world.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
July 15, 1965
8:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from Joe Clark

This letter appears to have been jinxed. First it was slow in getting to you; then it was slow in getting to Marv Watson; and now it is slow in coming back from me.

I have now done a short but warm answer which Joe cannot use against us. He is so emotional that he might jump to the conclusion that we really agree with him, and then we will be in some trouble.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 15, 1965
6:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Harriman's Flash report of his meeting with Kosygin. It gives neither encouragement nor discouragement.

What is striking is the rather routine character of Kosygin's comments: a standard list of disarmament objectives, a standard attack on the MLF, a standard speech in favor of national liberation movements, and a standard exchange on Vietnam. I fully concur with Harriman's judgment that Kosygin was working from an agreed Soviet line.

They have agreed to meet again Wednesday and there may be a little more news then.

I am suggesting to Bill that he should say that you have a report of the conversation and that we have no comment on it. I am suggesting to the State Department to say on background that both Harriman and Kosygin are understood to have presented well-known positions of their two governments; *Tommy agrees*

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-96
By lip, NARA, Date 11-7-95

Thursday, July 15, 1965
6:50 P.M.

(For the President and Secretary of State from Harriman in Moscow)

I had three hours and a quarter talk with Kosygin this morning in Stalin-Khrushchev old office in Kremlin. He was alone except for Smirnovsky, the head of the USA Section of the Foreign Office and a notetaker. Skhodrev interpreted for both of us. Kohler and Embassy Officer Bremont accompanied me.

Kosygin was completely negative, in fact at times insulting though occasionally with a smile.

I told him I had no message or authority to negotiate but would gladly explain US position on any subject he wished and answer any questions. It was important to avoid any misunderstanding of each others intentions. For example, I gathered from Soviet press that they thought President Johnson had changed President Kennedy's policies, whereas the fact was President Johnson was carrying on the same policies and objectives. I explained that President Johnson had sincerely desired to come to Soviet Union, meet and talk with him and his colleagues, that he believed in values of personal discussions and that he was anxious to strengthen the objective of peace by finding ways to overcome differences and settle disputes.

Kosygin commented that if I was finished with my statement, he would expound the Soviet positions in confidence and with expectation his remarks would not reach press. They had voted for Johnson against Goldwater although their ballots could not be counted, as they had hoped President Johnson's election would make possible progress in our relations. Our bilateral relations, he maintained, were the most important subject in maintaining peace. He then listed six points which he considered most important:

1. Non-proliferation
2. Ending all nuclear tests
3. Reduction nuclear weapons
4. Reduction overall military expenditures
5. Increase in our commercial transactions

6. Closer personal contacts

These problems were difficult of solution, but they had been hoping for progress and that trust and confidence between our two countries could be developed. Frankly they had lost confidence and he would state why. He said there were dangerous forces at work and mentioned West German revanchism. He also stated that there were others who want to bring our two nations at loggerheads.

Since President Johnson's election, antagonism had grown. The multilateral nuclear force in Europe was aimed at the Soviet Union and US was thereby protecting German revanchism.

He went so far as to say the US had become a symbol of revanchism in Europe, (possibly having Eastern Europe in mind).

Furthermore, the United States was trying to strangle national liberation movements everywhere in the world. In this we would fail as attempts to strangle national liberation movements had never been successful.

Another factor, he said, is that unlike US, Soviet Government always strictly abides by all understandings even informal and mentioned as an example the understanding with President Kennedy on voluntary arms reduction by mutual example. USSR had done its part in accordance with statement by Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk in cutting expenditures by 500,000,000 rubles, whereas we had increased our expenditures \$700,000,000 to pay for "your war in Vietnam".

President Johnson had also made statements against the Soviet Union (he mentioned that I had done so also) and had ignored the Soviet Government wishes in regard to the MLF and other matters. He concluded this part of this statement by saying US cannot dictate to others by force.

I refuted his charges emphasizing the MLF as a means of preventing proliferation in Europe of individual national nuclear capability. I tediously went through the post war history of the Soviet aggressive attitude in Europe under Stalin as the basis for the formation of NATO.

A lighter touch arose when I pointed out MLF was a method by which a number of fingers had to pull the nuclear trigger. Kosygin asked why

the arrangement should not be truly multilateral thereby including the Soviet Union as well. I agreed that was an objective to which we could well address ourselves.

I underlined the dangerous situation that arose in Latin America and other areas where the Soviets support NLM's* that were in no sense indigenous but imported from outside. I referred specifically to Venezuela where terrorists were trained outside the country and were sent back with arms to attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government. This led at last to Vietnam. Kosygin asked if I truly believed there was a legitimate government in Saigon. I countered by asking him if he truly believed the National Liberation Front was an independent movement or aided and abetted by North Vietnam.

This led to another prolonged discussion in which he accused first me and then President Johnson of pretense, contending "you can't believe what you say". I explained the hard information gained over the last three and half years of Viet Cong direction and support by North Vietnam and questioned the validity of the sources of his information. He maintained that he knew the facts.

At this point he indicated he had another engagement and had nothing more to say unless I had some constructive proposal. I referred to the fact that we hadn't discussed our bilateral problems he had mentioned, including normalization of our commercial relations. He responded to this and asked how long I was remaining in the Soviet Union explaining he would be away until Monday evening on a visit to Riga.

It was arranged that I would see Matskevich, the new agricultural minister, whom I had known in 1959 and possibly take a trip outside Moscow. He agreed to see me on his return-hopefully Wednesday.

The conversation was tense at some moments and Kohler and I gained the impression he was following a line agreed upon with his colleagues in advance.

I emphasized several times that he must understand President Johnson had the overwhelming support of the Congress and the American people and that he would stand firm on the commitment taken by President Eisenhower a decade ago to the people of South Vietnam to protect their right to determine their own future and that North Vietnam would not be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force. President Johnson was ready to undertake discussions without preconditions.

* national liberation movements

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Kosygin, however, said they could not influence this question. Hanoi was the responsible party and that we should approach them. He added "of course people with the noise of bombs in their ears are not anxious to negotiate". He also complained that our actions are helping Peiping in its dispute against the Soviet Union.

Reid
Thurs. 7/15/65
10:05 a.m.

51

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 15, 1965
10:00 A. M.

Mr. President:

The Prime Minister's office
has sent us the following
message which may be of
interest. No action is re-
quired.

McG. B.

(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 15, 1965

TO: Bundy

FROM: Wright, No. 10 Downing Street

Harold Davies is now back from Hanoi and has reported to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will be making the following statement to the House of Commons later this afternoon.

Statement by the Prime Minister

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement.

My honorable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, returned from Hanoi yesterday and he has given my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary and myself a full report on his discussions there. As the House is aware, my honorable friend was unable to see any North Vietnamese Ministers or to obtain any undertaking that the Commonwealth Mission would be received in Hanoi. Nevertheless, during his five-day stay, he was able to impress on the officials of the Fatherland Front and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom he had protracted conversations, the views of Her Majesty's Government and of the Commonwealth Mission. My honorable friend tells me that copious notes were taken throughout these meetings and I have no doubt that the arguments which my honorable friend urged with all his accustomed fluency and persistence will be passed on to the leaders of North Vietnam.

In presenting his arguments in favor of receiving the Commonwealth Mission, my honorable friend had to struggle against the evident conviction on the part of his North Vietnamese hearers that their prospects of victory were too imminent for it to be worth their while to forsake the battlefield for the conference table. In such an atmosphere it is scarcely surprising that he was unable to bring back any word of encouragement, but I am extremely glad that the arguments which are not only our arguments but those of the Commonwealth and of much of the world--in favour of peace and negotiations--should at last, and for the first time, have been

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY OCH ON 10-27-82

fully and faithfully expounded to the North Vietnamese in the artificial isolation of their own capital. They may not have exerted an immediate and visible effect, but I believe the passage of time will reinforce them and that there will be a general recognition of what I believe to be self-evident, that the Vietnam problem will not be solved by military means alone. As soon as this occurs, as soon as the North Vietnamese are ready to receive the Commonwealth Mission, we shall be ready to go. Meanwhile, I am sure that my honorable friend deserves our thanks for undertaking this difficult task and for discharging it so faithfully in the face of so much discouragement.

Statement ends

We shall of course let your people have a fuller report when it is ready.

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July 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Pak reactions to consortium postponement. The Paks have apparently decided to take a tough line (perhaps to test how serious we are). After appeals to us not to postpone the consortium, Bhutto then announced our request (he expressed doubt that the US actually intended to cut off aid "or that it would dare do so even if it wanted to, in view of uniformly adverse and violent Afro-Asian reaction which could be expected.")

The result is that the postponement has now become a public issue. McConaughy says "our position in Pakistan is rapidly assuming crisis proportions." Ayub himself in a speech said Pakistan seeks "friends not masters" and that the US has been acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's interests in Indo/Pak disputes. It is not unusual, he said, that big powers become overbearing in their attitudes. The Pak press is taking this line.

Earlier, Bhutto gave McConaughy a tough time, saying that Pakistan not the US was really the injured party. Hence, we should come to them, not they to us. Then on 9 July Pak Ambassador Ahmed delivered a tough oral message to Rusk calling the postponement "ill-advised"; its "invidious nature" would not be lost on the Pak people.

Rusk talked briefly with Ahmed today, but asked Ahmed to come back tomorrow, because he had to meet the Stevenson plane. Rusk's main reason was that he wants to talk with you first. He and Talbot are deeply troubled that we're approaching an open confrontation with the Paks, and are inclined to play it cautiously. Rusk emphasized to Ahmed that our Hill troubles were real, citing the conference deadlock as evidence of a deeper malaise. In answer to Ahmed's question as to whether we still intended to make a pledge in September, Rusk told him this was our present intention.

We're in for a rough ride, but there are even greater risks in backwatering in the face of the foolhardy Pak decision to create a public spat. Since we hold the better cards, we can afford to sit tight and keep quiet for a while longer, and see if they'll come to us.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

strongly agree M.C.B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 14, 1965
7:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke to Lodge and told him that you had not moved an inch from last April, and that I felt that if this gave him a different view of the mission, you would surely want to know about it. I told him that you had shown me the letter, and that as I read the letter you were not saying anything of the sort, and he hastily agreed. (The letter does flatly say that "you are assured of my best and most unsparing efforts in any event.")

I made your position absolutely clear and flat, and he accepted it, saying that he had felt a duty to make the argument, and would of course abide by your decision.

I have no doubt that he will return to the charge at some future point, but he now has it clearly in his mind, for the fifth time, that your judgment is that a great many thousand soldiers will wholly fail to understand it if Mrs. Lodge is in Vietnam and their wives are not.

My private judgment is that this decision is entirely right for now, and that at some point in the future you may wish to change it. I cannot get out of my head a remark that Felix Frankfurter once made: "Emily is the man of the family." And once Taylor is safely home, it seems to me that you might reasonably distinguish between Lodge as a political representative of 63 with no children -- and the younger men, both civil and military, who will be with him. But as far as Lodge is concerned -- or anyone else -- my position will be that your position is clear and plain and not being re-examined, for a speech in San Francisco or any other occasion.

m. b.

McG. B.

Reid
Thurs. 7/15/65
10:05 a.m.

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54

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 14, 1965
4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I think this memorandum, drafted by two members of my staff, is worth your reading. The statement referred to in the last paragraph will not be issued except in response to questioning.

For your information, Charles Johnson is a veteran NSC Staff Officer who monitors NASA and AEC. Rick Haynes is a talented young Negro Foreign Service Officer who covers Africa under Bob Komer.

It was Johnson's initiative that led to the contingency planning which has given us a prospect of alternative facilities if we run into a dead-end with the South Africans.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 13, 1965
9:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Status Report - Tracking Stations in South Africa. For his own domestic political reasons Prime Minister Verwoerd is taking a tough line toward our non-segregation policy. In a recent speech he said that South Africa would not permit US Negroes to work at US space tracking stations in his country. His statement followed only weeks after South Africa's similar ban on mixed aircrews from our carrier Independence and after repeated official criticism of the US Embassy for holding multi-racial functions.


Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic policy. Failure to do so ^{if} ~~over~~ this issue becomes widely publicized, would alienate some members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church groups and liberals in general. It would also jeopardize our continued use of important installations in the rest of Africa, and could result in some loss of Afro-Asian and Latin American support in the UN.

However, it might also force us to get out of certain US installations in South Africa. NASA, DOD and the Smithsonian have space facilities manned by 143 South African contract employees and 53 Americans. None of the Americans is Negro. Some of these facilities are required to read out "Mariner IV" pictures of Mars this month, and for the first attempts at a "Surveyor" lunar landing in the fall of 1965 and spring of 1966.

We've anticipated this problem, and through sensible contingency planning alternate facilities are now under construction in Madagascar, Spain and on Ascension Island. They will be fully operational by June 1966. To meet expected continuing pressure to accommodate to South African racial practices, we are (a) examining emergency measures to be taken if early evacuation becomes necessary; and (b) fixing the timing of the scheduled transfer of facilities to assure the least interference with our on-going space programs.

In the past, the US has quietly complied with South African racial practices by not sending Negroes to represent us at our Embassy or other official establishments. However, ^{probably} we cannot continue to avoid the issue. Therefore, the State Department is considering issuing a statement emphasizing that (a) the tracking station agreements contain no racial clauses, (b) the South African Government has not approached us for modification of these agreements, and (c) the US cannot accept the imposition of racial conditions by the South African Government at our tracking facilities. While avoiding a confrontation, this approach puts us on record as firmly opposed to racist conditions on our activities in South Africa. It remains to be seen if the South African Government will choose to press the issue.


Charles E. Johnson


Ulric Haynes, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday
July 14, 1965
11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I think this memorandum, drafted by two members of my staff, is worth your reading. The statement referred to in the last paragraph will not be issued except in response to questioning.

For your information, Charles Johnson is a veteran NSC Staff Officer who monitors NASA and AEC. Rick Haynes is a talented young Negro Foreign Service Officer who covers Africa under Bob Komer.

McG. B.

Tuesday, July 13, 1965
0 a. m.

Dr. Welch
552

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Status Report - Tracking Stations in South Africa. For his own domestic political reasons Prime Minister Verwoerd is taking a tough line toward our non-segregation policy. In a recent speech he said that South Africa would not permit US Negroes to work at US space tracking stations in his country. His statement followed only weeks after South Africa's similar ban on mixed air-crews from our carrier Independence and after repeated official criticism of the US Embassy for holding multi-racial functions.

Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic policy. Failure to do so over this issue becomes widely publicized, would alienate some members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church groups and liberals in general. It would also jeopardize our continued use of important installations in the rest of Africa, and could result in some loss of Afro-Asian and Latin American support in the UN.

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- cc: McGB
- RWK
- Dr. Ed Welch
- Lee White
- Cliff Alexander
- C. Johnson

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson

Ulric Haynes, Jr.
Ulric Haynes, Jr.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 14, 1965
10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I forgot to follow up on the Article 19 papers before the press conference yesterday, so I send again a copy of Dean Rusk's position paper with my covering memo. The Secretary would like to know whether you want him [redacted] to go ahead with the Congressional leaders on this basis.

McG.B.
McG. B.

He [redacted] should
go ahead with Congressional
consultation _____

Speak to me _____ ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 9, 1965
5:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Dean Rusk's memorandum on Article 19. I deliberately held it up yesterday because I did not want you to be pinned down before you heard the Panel of Consultants. Rusk's basic recommendation is that we let the Assembly decide whether it will or will not apply Article 19 and then act accordingly with respect to our own position. I think yesterday's advice from the Panel is good: that we should put it more sharply to the Assembly and say that if it doesn't vote to apply Article 19, then we will be guided accordingly.

The rest of the Rusk memorandum seems right to me, and unless you have drastic reservations about it, I will put this matter on the agenda for discussion, and for your guidance to the Secretary during our next Rusk-McNamara meeting.

McG.B.

McG.B.

Attachment

*And do you think it would be good to have
Bill Moyers at these meetings regularly? I do.*

McG.B.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDT'S OFFICE

1965 JUL 7 AM 9 57

July 6, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: US Position on Article 19

Ambassador Stevenson and I have reviewed the Article 19 issue and recommend to you the course of action described below. If you agree, we would discuss it with key members of Congress and subsequently with our allies over the next few weeks. Our allies can in general be expected to react favorably.

Following is the course of action to be discussed with Congressional leaders:

1. Ambassador Stevenson would inform members of the Committee of 33 just before it reconvenes in early August that the US position is as follows:

a. If, when the Assembly reconvenes, the UN membership is not prepared at this stage in the UN's development to require the major powers to pay assessments levied for major activities which they do not wish to support, we would note this conclusion and consider it applicable to the US. On this understanding, we would acquiesce in the Assembly resuming its normal business when it reconvenes in September.

b.

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By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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b. We would oppose proposals to write off the Soviet and French debts, preferring to leave these on the books even though the GA is unlikely to enforce their collection.

c. The Assembly will still have the problem of restoring UN solvency, and we believe it should make every effort to raise sufficient funds, especially from those who have not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations.

d. We would also state in general terms our willingness to join with the membership in helping to strengthen the UN and to assist in future peacekeeping operations.

e. The integrity of the regular budget should be sustained.

2. We will continue to insist that the amortization of bonds is an obligation of the organization properly funded from the regular budget. Most members will agree with us on this point. But the USSR will probably continue to refuse to pay this portion of their regular budget assessment. As a result, repayment of the bonds may have to be made in part from the UN's miscellaneous income. If this succeeds, it would have the effect of making the Soviets indirectly help pay off the bonds.

3.

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3. The procedural choices are: (a) a vote deciding not to apply Article 19; or (b) letting the GA simply go ahead with its normal business without a vote on the Article 19 issue. We conclude it would be disadvantageous to seek a vote since the more likely result would be a consensus which favored letting the Soviets and the French off the hook; we do not think the Assembly would be willing to say formally that failure to uphold the "loss of vote" sanction and its mandatory taxing power has weakened its Charter powers in this regard for the future. It is therefore preferable for us to draw and state our own conclusion and act accordingly in the future in light of the dictates of our national interests.

The above is recommended in light of some hard, unattractive facts. Both Adlai Stevenson and I are convinced that our position on Articles 17 and 19, which was supported by the World Court and an overwhelming majority, will now not be supported by the Assembly. Lester Pearson recently informed us that Canada can no longer support us on the application of Article 19. The U.K. has urged a course of action which even goes beyond the limited one described above by proposing, in effect, that the GA not apply strictly the past GA resolutions on financing the Congo and UNEF. This could mean Assembly exoneration of the delinquents.

The recommended course of action would help break the deadlock while cutting our losses in that the United States would draw the conclusion that the Assembly's unwillingness to apply Article 19 means that we would not feel bound to pay for any future major activities voted by the UN to which we might have objection. This would make the above package palatable on the Hill and offer further protection for us against a possible ganging up by the Afro-Asian majority in the Assembly. It is also designed to shift the burden from ourselves to the Assembly for failing to apply Article 19, by making it clear that the decision is one for the

membership.

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membership at large. It would tend to desensationalize the issue by defusing it in a sub-organ of the UN during the summer doldrums; and would give us a "quid pro quo" by making clear that a double standard cannot be applied for major activities.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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Wednesday, July 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with John Steele Scheduled for 6:15 Today

Steele is both knowledgeable and cooperative on Vietnam, and I think he wants this to be a good story.

He already has most of the hard news, and will be looking more for the flavor of your own thinking. I suggest the following possible thoughts:

a. The breadth and insistence of your own attention to the problem. You work on it more than any other subject. You consult with political leaders, with many members of the Administration, and with wise men who disagree, with foreign statesmen from Menzies to Pearson, and with the men who have been on the spot -- Taylor, Johnson, Lodge, etc.,

b. As the problem gets more serious, its meaning becomes clearer than ever. Is the US going to do what it sets out to do? You may want to comment on the clarity and force of the advice you received on this point from the Foreign Policy Consultants -- Lovett, Dean, McCloy, Acheson, Bradley.

c. You may want to keep a line drawn between your policy and the Goldwater/Ford/Laird crowd. But it is worth pointing out to both Time and to the world that these critics are more numerous, more powerful, and more dangerous than the fleabite professors that both Bundy and Time have spent too much time on.

d. I doubt if you will want to go beyond Bob McNamara's press conference with respect to details of our planning. But you may wish to emphasize that the political and economic effort is just as important as the military effort and that you have emphasized this point in nearly every meeting you have had with anyone on this subject.

McG.B.

Tuesday, July 13, 1965
5:50 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom Mann, Cy Vance, Abe Fortas and I have just had an hour and 40 minutes on the testimony Tom and Cy will be giving tomorrow on the Dominican Republic. We are in broad agreement, and I think we are in pretty good shape with one exception: Tom does not plan an opening statement (Cy does). Abe thinks that Tom will be in a much stronger position if he does have a brief prepared opener, for two reasons. First, it will give him a base-point which can be used during cross-examination and possibly made available later for public use if something has to be said. The second reason is that it helps a man to know exactly what his own thinking is.

Tom feels that he has very clear and explicit instructions direct from you and therefore I think if he is to have a prepared statement, it would have to be at your direction.

That is why I have asked Juanita to pass this note to you.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 13, 1965
3:20 PM

Mr. President:

Attached is Ambassador
Taylor's weekly report.

McG. B.

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MR 7/13

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Tuesday, July 13, 1965
2:55 PM

NODIS
For the President
From Ambassador Taylor
(Text of Cable from Embassy Saigon 131) July 13, 1965

Generals Thieu and Ky spent most of the third full week of their Government on the road making a tour of Phong Dinh and Dinh Tuong Provinces in an effort to rally support to the new administration. Ky also made a radio broadcast to the armed forces on July 7. Such actions are showing considerably more sensitivity on their part to the need for appealing to public opinion and for carrying the Government to the people than has characterized the political leadership in the past.

The big news of the week was made in Washington by the announcement of the change of American Ambassadors in Saigon. The reaction to the reappointment of Ambassador Lodge is just beginning to come in and it is following rather predictable lines. The Buddhists seem unanimously pleased with the choice whereas some of the Catholics are displaying an attitude of reserve. Overall, the reaction has been of general approval arising from the high regard in which Lodge was held during his previous service in Saigon.

There was little in the military situation to call to your attention. I was pleased by an operation launched in War Zone D by the 173rd Airborne Brigade which included the Australian battalion. The Brigade went into a very tough area, engaged in three days of rather sharp fighting and performed extremely well in this, their first engagement. Some 50 Viet Cong were killed and 28 captured, while the Brigade lost 10 killed and 46 wounded.

Their action clearly established the fact that none of the former Viet Cong safehavens are off limits to American troops. The impression is getting around that there will be no sanctuary for the enemy either in North or South Vietnam.

Lights are burning late in government offices and the U.S. Mission in preparation for the McNamara visit. Generals Thieu and Ky understand the importance of the event and intend to present the government's case in their own words. This is the first time which I recall that the government has shown a desire to participate actively in the presentations of a visiting mission from Washington.

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Authority NLS 84-31
By is, NARS, Date 7-18-84

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