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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| #1 memo | to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p 08/31/65 | A |
| #3a cable | copy of Saigon 694 Confidential <i>open 11-15-83 NLJ 83-177</i> | 2 p 08/31/65 | A |
| #4b memo | to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/31/65 | A |
| #4c memo | to Mac from RWK Secret | 1 p 08/28/65 | A |
| #4d memo | to Secretary of State from McG. Bundy Secret | 1 p undated | A |
| #4e | duplicate #4d | | |
| #4f | duplicate #4d | | |
| #6a cable | cable 30366 from MACJ3 Secret <i>open 4-7-95 NLJ 93-119</i> | 1 p 08/29/65 | A |
| #7 memo | to the President from BKS Confidential <i>open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232</i> | 1 p 08/30/65 | A |
| #9 memo | to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 7.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/30/65 | A |
| #11a cable | text of USUN New York 499 secret <i>Exempt per NLJ 84-23 open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/25/65 | A |
| #12 memo | to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p 08/30/65 | A |
| #13 memo | to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p 08/30/65 | A |
| #15a memo | to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Sanitized 10/3/01 NLJ/RAC 99-57</i> | 1 p 08/28/65 | A |
| #15b cable | TDCS 314/11768-65 Secret <i>Exempt NLJ/RAC 99-58</i> | 4 p 08/26/65 | A |
| #15c letter | text of letter from Prime Minister Wilson to President Ayub Secret <i>Open 12-18-99</i> | 1 p undated | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 13, August 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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|-----------------------|--|----------------|---------------------|
| #17a memo | to the President from McG. B. <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p | 08/27/65 |
| | Top Secret | | A |
| #17b cable | Deptel to USUN, NY <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 6 p | 08/26/65 |
| | Top Secret | | A |
| #18a memo | to the President from Robert McNamara | 2 p | 01/24/61 |
| | Top Secret <i>open 2-19-85 NLJ 84-289</i> | | A |
| #19a cable | copy of Santo Domingo 525 <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p | 08/25/65 |
| | Secret <i>restriction removed 8/25/92</i> | | A |
| #21a memo | to Bundy from James C. Thomson, Jr. | 2 p | 08/19/65 |
| | Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | | A |
| #28 memo | to the President from McG. B. | 1 p | 08/24/65 |
| | Secret <i>open 8-14-84 NLJ 84-18</i> | | A |
| #32b cable | copy Saigon 595 <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p | 08/24/65 |
| | Secret | | A |
| #37 memo | to the President from McGeorge Bundy <i>sanitized 5-96 NLJ 91-232 appeal same same</i> | 1 p | 08/20/65 |
| | Secret <i>sanitized 2-20-01 NLJ 91-232 appeal same same</i> | | A |
| #37a cable | Embtel 469 from Santo Domingo <i>sanitized 11-15-91 NLJ 91-230</i> | 3 p | 08/19/65 |
| | Secret <i>sanitized 10/3/01 NLJ/RAC 99-59</i> | | A |
| #38a memo | to the President from McG. B. | 2 p | 08/19/65 |
| | Confidential <i>open 8-14-84 NLJ 84-18</i> | | A |
| #39 memo | to the President from McG. B. | 1 p | 08/19/65 |
| | Secret <i>exempt NLJ 91-231</i> | | A |
| #41 memo | to the President from R. W. Komer | 1 p | 08/18/65 |
| | Secret <i>sanitized 10/3/01 NLJ/RAC 99-59</i> | | A |
| #45b cable | copy of USUN New York 398 <i>open 12-14-95 NLJ 95-141</i> | 1 p | 08/17/65 |
| | Secret <i>Exempt per NLJ 84-23</i> | | A |
| #46 memo | to the President from McG. B. | 1 p | 08/18/65 |
| | Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | | A |
| #46a cable | copy of USUN NY 399 <i>open 12-14-95 NLJ 95-141</i> | 2 p | 08/17/65 |
| | Secret <i>(dup. #129/130 NSF 6/91 7 file UN Vol 2, Box 66)</i> | | A |

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE,
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 13, August 1965

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|------------------|---|----|---|-------------|
| #47 memo | to the President from McG.B. Confidential <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> | 1p | 08/17/65 | A |
| #47c memo | to the President from Christian A. Herter Confidential | 4p | 08/09/65 | A |
| #47d report | re: agriculture offers Confidential | 1p | undated | A |
| #48 agenda | Lunch with the President Secret <i>open 5-14-84 NLS 83-181</i> | 1p | 08/17/65 | A |
| #50 memo | to the President from McG. Bundy <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> Secret | 1p | 08/16/65 | A |
| #51 memo | R.W. Komer to the President Secret <i>exempt NLS 92-377</i> | 1p | 08/16/65 | A |
| #51b letter | Leopold Senghor to Pres. Johnson possible classified information) | 2p | <i>open 12-17-99 NLS 99-138</i> 04/27/65 | A |
| #51a memo | to the President from Mercer Cook Confidential | 1p | 08/07/65 | A |
| #52 memo | to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> | 2p | 08/16/65 | A |
| #53a memo | R. W. Komer to the President (possible classif. info) | | 08/13/65 | 1 p A |
| #55a memo | Francis Bator from REN Secret | 1p | 08/11/65 | S |
| #56a ltr | McGeorge Bundy fm W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. Confidential <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-230</i> | 2p | 07/31/65 | A |
| #58a cable | TDCS 314/11106-65 Secret | 5p | 08/11/65 | A |
| 59a letter | Aldo Moro to Pres Johnson (possible classif. info) 2p <i>exempt NLS 92-377</i> | | 08/02/65 | A |
| #61e letter | test of ltr to Pres Johnson from Nkrumah Secret | 3p | 08/12/65 | A |
| #61e letter | draft ltr to Pres Nkrumah fm Pres Johnson (possible classified info) | 2p | 08/12/65 | A |
| #65 memo | Memcon between Pres Johnson & Quaison-Sackey Confidential | 3p | 08/11/65 | A |
| #69 memo | to the Pres from McG. Bundy Secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> | 1p | 08/10/65 | A |
| #67b message | Pres. Johnson to Pres. Orlich possible classified information <i>open 5-14-84 NLS 83-181</i> | 1p | undated | A |
| #69a letter | Mohammad Ayub Khan to Pres. Johnson possible classified information <i>open 12-17-99 NLS 99-138</i> | 3p | 8/4/65 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 13, August, 1965

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|------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------|
| #69b cable | embtel 232 from New Delhi Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #70 memo | to the President from R. W. Komer secret exempt NLS 92-377 <i>open 12-17-95 NLS 99-138</i> | 1 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #70a memo | cover memo secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #70b cable | embtel 116 from Tel Aviv secret <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-137</i> | 2 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #71 agenda | Meeting with the President Secret | 2 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #72 agenda | Meeting with the President Secret <i>sanitized 9-8-99 NLS 98-220</i> <i>sanitized 5-14-84 NLS 83-181</i> | 2 p 08/10/65 | A |
| #74a memo | to the President from R.W. Komer Secret exempt NLS 92-377 <i>open 10/3/01</i> | 1 p 08/09/65 | A |
| #74b cable | embtel 193 from Karachi Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 1 p 08/08/65 | A |
| #74c cable | embtel 183 from Karachi Secret <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-137</i> | 3 p 08/06/65 | A |
| #75 memo | to the President from McG. Bundy Secret <i>open 11/30/82</i> | 1 p 08/09/65 | A |
| #75a memo | to the President from Buford Ellington Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/02/65 | A |
| #78 memo | to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> | 1 p 08/06/65 | A |
| #80 memo | to the President from McG. B. Secret exempt NLS 92-377 <i>open 4.14.99</i> | 2 p 08/05/65 | A |
| #81 memo | to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 5-14-84 NLS 83-181</i> | 2 p 08/05/65 | A |
| #82 memo | to the President from James G. Thomson, Jr. & McG. Bundy Secret exempt NLS 92-377 <i>open 10/3/01</i> | 1 p 08/05/65 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 13, August 1965

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|---------------------------------|---|--------------|-------------|
| #83 memo | to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> <i>open 12-17-99 NLJ 99-138</i> | 1 p 08/05/65 | A |
| #85a memo | to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential <i>open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232</i> | 1 p 08/04/65 | A |
| #89a memo | to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> Secret <i>Downgraded per NLJ 92-377</i> <i>Exempt 10/3/01 NLJ/KAC 99-57</i> | 2 p 08/04/65 | A |
| #91 memo | to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>sanitized 8-14-84 NLJ 84-18</i> <i>(dup. #43, NSF Agency file, UN, Vol. 2)</i> | 1 p 08/04/65 | A |
| #92a cable | text of cable from Saigon 364 secret <i>open 11-15-83 NLJ 83-177</i> | 2 p 08/03/65 | A |
| #95a report | for President and Secretary from Harriman Secret <i>Exempt per NLJ 84-26</i> | 2 p 08/03/65 | A |
| #95b memo | to the President from Bromley Smith Confidential <i>open 8-14-84 NLJ 84-18</i> | 1 p 08/02/65 | A |
| #96 agenda | for lunch with the President <i>Open 9/6/00 NS 00-104</i> top secret <i>Exempt per JWS 12/00</i> | 2 p 08/03/65 | A * |
| #97a report | re: Vietnam Secret <i>Exempt per NLJ 84-26</i> | 2 p 08/03/65 | A |
| #99 memo | to the President from McG. Bundy Secret <i>open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232</i> | 2 p 08/02/65 | A |
| #99a xxxxxx cable | embtel 306 from Santo Domingo <i>open 6-14-94 NLJ 93-222</i> Secret <i>sanitized 11-15-91 NLJ 91-230</i> | 4 p 08/01/65 | A |
| #101 memo | to the President from McG. B. <i>Open NLJ 77-435 3-25-99</i> top secret <i>sanitized 5-14-84 NLJ 83-181</i> | 1 p 08/02/65 | A |
| #103 memo | to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> <i>saniper RAC 10/3/01</i> | 1 p 08/02/65 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED] 13
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the PRESIDENT, VOL. 18, August 1965

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON✓ (L)¹
NK 8/31Tuesday, August 31, 1965
8:00 p. m.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sugar Lobbyists

1. I spoke to Nick Katzenbach and asked him for a prompt legislative proposal on this. I also spoke to Tom Mann and asked him to be in touch with Katzenbach because Tom is handling this matter in State and is talking with Cooley about sugar quotas informally tomorrow morning.

2. Mann later called me back to say that he had one worry about Katzenbach's assignment which he would discuss with Nick. It is that, unless it is drawn very carefully, any U. S. law which seems to interfere with the right of foreign governments to hire lobbyists might boomerang badly on U. S. business overseas. Tom points out that Americans doing business abroad almost universally need the services of local lawyers who can well be described as "lobbyists." He says that in Mexico, for example, there is already heavy pressure to penalize lawyers who make money by representing the wicked foreigner. He is flagging this problem to Nick, and we will see whether the ingenious and honorable Attorney General can solve it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

confidential

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Aug. 31, 1965
7:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick Katzenbach says that there is nothing wrong with bills of this kind except that it is the very devil to catch anybody. He sees no possible danger in a letter like the attached to Tom Dodd.

m. B.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 31, 1965
5:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT

I think you will be interested in
Ambassador Lodge's backgrounder
given earlier today. I see no problems
with it.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

(L) 3a
NR 8/31

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
(Cy of Saigon 694, August 31, 1965)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-177
By is, NARS, Date 11-15-83

From Ambassador Lodge

1. Ambassador Lodge gave Backgrounder Tuesday to 16 US media newsmen. Ground rules: no attribution to American sources, no fill-ins, no single stories. He said at 1700 hours Saigon time Tuesday, Mission would announce the appointment of General Lansdale as Chairman, US Mission Liaison Group with South Vietnam Central Rural Construction Council which is designed to create a better life for people. He noted unclassified United States Operations Mission document available with decrees establishing Rural Construction Directorate.

2. Ambassador made the following points in his opening statement:

a. The atmosphere was different than in August 1963 when he first arrived in South Vietnam. Then there was a feeling of impending doom in the air. Bombings and arrivals of US troops had good psychological effect on South Vietnam. Will be important achievement if we can prevent the Viet Cong from moving into phase of large-scale combat or if we can punish them when they do. Viet Cong terrorism works against his own interests and against Communist guerrilla doctrine because it poisons water for guerrilla fish. However, we have not yet found an answer for protecting the population against small groups of guerrillas.

3. Ambassador made following points in reply to questions:

a. Lansdale will advise the US Mission on implementation of economic social programs which are so vital to defeating aggression from the north. If South Vietnam seeks US advice, that would be nice too. Implementation is as important as planning speeches. Have had no contact yet with Buddhists. Prime Minister Ky's manifestations of South Vietnamese independence of us are desirable. My relations with him in two meetings were very good.

b. Continuity in government is more important than whether it is civilian or military. We support the South Vietnamese effort to ward off aggression. My attitude is one of advice, assistance, helpfulness. I am Chairman of US Mission Council. I don't command combat operations. When activities of one US agency impinge on another, I try to settle by persuasion. Can't work together if people at sword points.

c. There is theoretical possibility of conflict between military measures and civilian pacification programs, but US military are completely aware of this and don't think the solution here is exclusively military. I don't regard Lansdale as being in adversarial role to the military. On the contrary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-Saigon 694, August 31, 1965

d. I am not here as a Republican. I'm completely through with politics. America's Vietnamese policy is not a partisan issue. I've thought about it much during the last two years. I cannot see any other possible policy. We are seeking a successful outcome to this situation. I prefer the phrase "warding off aggression" to "victory." South Vietnam is not yet persuaded its aggression is doomed to failure.

e. It is good Nixon is coming. He made good speeches during last six months. He is active, will give many speeches around us, is coming here to gain a fresh, first-hand view.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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KASHMIR

KARACHI, PAKISTAN (AP)-AMID REPORTS OF HEAVY BORDER FIGHTING, INFORMATION MINISTER KHAWAJA SHAHBUDDIN SAID TONIGHT "THE TIME HAS COME WHEN PAKISTANIS WILL HAVE TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO LIBERATE THEIR KASHMIRI BRETHREN FROM INDIAN IMPERIALISM."

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN CUT SHORT A VISIT TO THE STATE OF SWAT AND RETURNED TO RAWALPINDI FOR A CABINET MEETING TOMORROW.

RADIO PAKISTAN ANNOUNCED STRONG ACTION HAS BROKEN OUT AGAIN BETWEEN INDIAN TROOPS AND AZAD (PAKISTAN) KASHMIRI FORCES OUTSIDE HAJI PIR PASS, IN THE TITHWAL SECTOR OF THE U.N. CEASE-FIRE LINE.

CR456P 8/31

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4a

Mac

Though Wed. meeting
has been cancelled, you might
just want to send this on for
night reading as a reminder
about what we wanted to take
up.

My bones tell me the
Pak/Indian part is about to
be laid over. I'd like to see Good
call in S. Ahmed ^{partly} and tell her
we knew what the Pak were up
to and if they escalated it would
be on their heads. Note taken
on short fuses.

RWF

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

46
August 31, 1965
Tuesday/5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday Meeting on Pak/Indian Matters. While the immediate purpose is to talk Title III PL 480, this is also a good chance for you to remind all concerned where you want to go on Pak/Indian matters in general.

In a nutshell, we now have the Indians nibbling on an October Shastri visit and coming to us on aid. The Paks are playing harder to get, but the British hope to see Ayub this week. We've also been passing other quiet signals. The trouble is that the looming Kashmir crisis precipitated by Ayub could easily blow up and wreck all our plans. We have quite disturbing reports that the Paks plan to escalate another notch by committing regulars. Here in brief are the points on which you might hear argument tomorrow.

I. What To Do About Kashmir? Despite our fears, it seems best to push the UN and UK out in front on this one, because intervention wins us no friends and we have plenty of other painful business with Paks and Indians on our plates. If a vicious cycle of escalation develops, however, we too may need to weigh in. We could at least privately urge restraint on both parties, which know by now that US aid is no longer a sure thing.

II. Consortium Strategy. Bundy and I have been steadily putting out the word "no meeting--no pledge," but many people are still putting more energy into worrying about the risks than into trying to get Ayub here. These risks are real, and it would be useful for you to remind all concerned you're well aware of them. Moscow almost certainly scents a chance to get us out of Peshawar, and might happily invest a few MIGs and aid loans in the effort. But Ayub probably recognizes by now that if he starts fiddling with the last real US asset in Pakistan he risks being cut off without a nickel (in fact the Paks have carefully avoided even mentioning Peshawar, despite all their brickbats to date).

So we suggest you tell State to come up with the best way to slide right past 23 September and to get Ayub here. Once the aid bill passes, we'll have to be ready with a new line (a Kashmir flareup, with the Paks to blame, may give us an excuse).

III. Title I for India. The two months time we bought with our million tons of wheat is running out, and the Indian food situation is getting worse. State/AID/Agriculture are working up a stiff interim 10 month agreement to cover

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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2.

August 31, 1965

the period till we revise PL 480 next year. The basic problem here is that if we cut off food to India in the middle of a Kashmir crisis, it will inevitably be regarded as political pressure and a pro-Pak gesture to boot. No action required yet since the proposal will come before you shortly.

IV. Title III Programs for India-Pakistan-UAR-Algeria. This is the item on which you wanted us to see you (we've included Freeman--and Reuter so he wouldn't keep pressing for an appointment). These small programs, mostly school feeding, aren't government-to-government but run by the voluntary agencies. So they give us little leverage, yet their do-good constituency here will be up in arms if we cut them off. If you feel the annual renewal proposed is too much, I'd suggest cutting it to six months. This should carry us through to when new PL 480 legislation has to be introduced next year--and we can then say wait till the new law is passed.

MAP FOR India-Pakistan. We've kept this off the agenda so we can do the analysis you want, and let McNamara get back to review it. There is real appeal to suspending MAP, at least till Kashmir quiets down, but the risk is that (1) we leave the field wholly to the Soviets and Chicoms; (2) trigger a violent Pak as well as Indian reaction which would mess up the delicate game we're playing to bring both around.

- - - - -

There is considerable feeling among the worry-warts that you feel we ought to write off India and Pakistan as bottomless pits, and concentrate on Southeast Asia. We've tried to knock this on the head by saying: (a) nobody needs to tell you that the Indian subcontinent is still the key area we, Moscow, and Peiping are all competing for in Asia, and to which Vietnam is only an antechamber; but (b) somehow the town is slow to catch up with you that we aren't yet getting our money's worth from the \$1.2 billion odd we invest annually in India/Pakistan--the former is floundering and the latter is slipping away from us; so (c) you're bound and determined to use this leverage to get more results or else cut our commitments accordingly. Thus it's up to the town to stop fighting the problem and start doing this job.

Hearing some such word directly from you would help mightily to get people to stop moaning and start working on what may yet become almost as big a headache as Vietnam.


R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4c
August 28, 1965

Mac -

As I mentioned some time ago, we have to get the town focussed on how pending decisions on aid to India might affect the Indian proliferation problem. I doubt that we have yet made clear to the President how, if our holding back on aid precipitated a nationalist go-it-alone psychosis in Delhi, it would powerfully stimulate India's desire to build the bomb.

My hunch is that the best way to approach this problem is to tie a quiet understanding to renewed promises of US aid. In effect we'd accentuate the positive, by saying that we'd continue our massive investment in India so long as the Indians didn't waste their own resources on such things as nuclear weapons (which we'd then be indirectly subsidizing). Tommy Thompson quite agrees.

The real question is how much further we might have to go in bilateral guarantees (e.g. give them a delivery system). Here Rusk and Thompson are much more leery, I gather.

At any rate, a NSAM like the attached would force us to face up to the issue.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

4d

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: US Aid Leverage on Indian Nuclear Proliferation

In connection with the President's review of future economic and military aid policy toward India, we ought to consider the relationship of our aid to our efforts to prevent India from developing an independent nuclear capability. This complex of issues might be up for decision shortly if Prime Minister Shastri decides to visit here.

There seems to be a general consensus that India might be the next country to develop nuclear weapons, which would strongly influence other countries to follow a similar course. We have already made proposals for a multilateral solution to the nuclear proliferation problem, and ACDA is considering other proposals to achieve this end in accordance with NSAM 335. In the short term, however, these multilateral efforts may not be successful, so we may have to count on bilateral arrangements to influence an Indian decision. While there has already been extensive study as to how we might influence the Indian decision on this subject by bilateral arrangements, I gather that it did not focus on how we might most effectively use our economic and military assistance, which may be our best bargaining point, to influence the Indian decision. An Indian commitment to us might be formal in nature, or might simply constitute an informal understanding between Shastri and the President.

I believe, therefore, that it would be most helpful to have a critical study of the forms such an understanding might take and an assessment of the acceptability of such understandings to the Indian Government. To be most useful to the President, it should be ready by 20 September, 1965.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director, ACDA

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ab, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: US Aid Leverage on Indian Nuclear Proliferation

In connection with the President's review of future economic and military aid policy toward India, we ought to consider the relationship of our aid to our efforts to prevent India from developing an independent nuclear capability. This complex of issues might be up for decision shortly if Prime Minister Shastri decides to visit here.

There seems to be a general consensus that India might be the next country to develop nuclear weapons, which would strongly influence other countries to follow a similar course. We have already made proposals for a multilateral solution to the nuclear proliferation problem, and ACDA is considering other proposals to achieve this end in accordance with NSAM 335. In the short term, however, these multilateral efforts may not be successful, so we may have to count on bilateral arrangements to influence an Indian decision. While there has already been extensive study as to how we might influence the Indian decision on this subject by bilateral arrangements, I gather that it did not focus on how we might most effectively use our economic and military assistance, which may be our best bargaining point, to influence the Indian decision. An Indian commitment to us might be formal in nature, or might simply constitute an informal understanding between Shastri and the President.

I believe, therefore, that it would be most helpful to have a critical study of the forms such an understanding might take and an assessment of the acceptability of such understandings to the Indian Government. To be most useful to the President, it should be ready by 20 September, 1965.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director, ACDA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

mic JB 4f

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: US Aid Leverage on Indian Nuclear Proliferation

In connection with the President's review of future economic and military aid policy toward India, we ought to consider the relationship of our aid to our efforts to prevent India from developing an independent nuclear capability. This complex of issues might be up for decision shortly if Prime Minister Shastri decides to visit here.

There seems to be a general consensus that India might be the next country to develop nuclear weapons, which would strongly influence other countries to follow a similar course. We have already made proposals for a multilateral solution to the nuclear proliferation problem, and ACDA is considering other proposals to achieve this end in accordance with NSAM 335. In the short term, however, these multilateral efforts may not be successful, so we may have to count on bilateral arrangements to influence an Indian decision. While there has already been extensive study as to how we might influence the Indian decision on this subject by bilateral arrangements, I gather that it did not focus on how we might most effectively use our economic and military assistance, which may be our best bargaining point, to influence the Indian decision. An Indian commitment to us might be formal in nature, or might simply constitute an informal understanding between Shastri and the President.

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McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director, ACDA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5 ✓ (2)
8/31

Tuesday, August 31, 1965
4:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statement by Nasser

I dare say you have already seen this disagreeable statement by Nasser. As you suggested last week, we are reviewing our policy toward Nasser, but this statement will not make it any easier to make a new food agreement with him. It is the more unsatisfactory because I think it is certain that Ambassador Kamel sent him both warnings and signals of hope last week. Nasser has been on notice for a long time that this kind of statement is not easy to ignore.

McG. B.

McG. B.

NASSER

MOSCOW (AP)-PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER DECLARED TODAY HIS PEOPLE IN THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC "ARE RAISING THEIR VOICES EVEN LOUDER IN DENUNCIATION OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM."

"THIS MAY NOT BE LIKED BY SOME PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON," NASSER TOLD AN AUDIENCE AT A SOVIET-U.A.R. FRIENDSHIP MEETING.

"SOMEBODY'S EARS THERE ARE GOING TO ACHE BECAUSE OF THIS."

NASSER WAS JOINED IN HIS DENUNCIATION OF U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM BY PRESIDENT ANASTAS I. MIKOYAN, WHO SAID "THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN SO DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD."

MIKOYAN ONCE AGAIN DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND WEAPONS FROM SOUTH VIET NAM AND A PEACE SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1954 THAT ENDED THE INDOCHINA WAR.

MIKOYAN SAID THE WORLD WILL NEVER FORGET THE BURNED VILLAGES OF VIET NAM AND CALLED THE FIGHTING THERE A "DIRTY WAR." HE CLAIMED IT SHOWED UP "THE WEAKNESS OF U.S. IMPERIALISTS."

THE SOVIET PRESIDENT FREQUENTLY WAS INTERRUPTED BY APPLAUSE FROM THE WORKERS DELEGATIONS AND OTHER GUESTS IN THE KREMLIN PALACE.

JC1007AED 8/31

MOSCOW--ADD NASSER (32)

MIKOYAN PRAISED NASSER FOR INTRODUCING SOCIAL CHANGES IN EGYPT AND SAID THEIR TWO COUNTRIES TAKE SIMILAR STANDS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO A VIET NAM PEACE PLAN THAT NASSER REPORTEDLY BROUGHT WITH HIM TO MOSCOW.

"LET OUR FRIENDSHIP BE AS VAST AS THE SOVIET UNION AND AS STRONG AS THE ASWAN DAM," MIKOYAN SAID. "THE ARABS IN GENERAL CAN ALWAYS RELY ON OUR SUPPORT."

HE LAUDED THE U.A.R. FOR BEING "AN ACTIVE FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS." HE SAID NASSER'S POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT "HAS WON REAL RESPECT FROM THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD."

THE SOVIET PRESIDENT ALSO ATTACKED WEST GERMAN "REVENGE-SEEKERS FOR TALKING PEACE WHILE TRYING TO GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HE SAID GERMAN MILITARISM HAD FORMED IN ALLIANCES WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAD THE EFFORTS OF WIDENING THE "NEO-COLONIALIST ATTACK ON ASIA AND AFRICA."

JC1010AED 8/31

MOSCOW--ADD NASSER (33)

NASSER HINTED AT A VIET NAM PEACE PLAN WHICH EGYPTIAN SOURCES SAID HE BROUGHT TO MOSCOW. IT REPORTEDLY CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND OTHER CONDITIONS WHICH WASHINGTON REPEATEDLY HAS SAID ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

"WITHOUT LIMITING OURSELVES TO DENUNCIATION," NASSER SAID, "WE ARE TRYING TO BRING INTO PLAY, ALONG WITH OTHER PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES, FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA TO OPPOSE THIS AGGRESSION (IN NORTH VIET NAM)."

HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

NASSER'S ANTI-U.S. REMARKS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE HE MADE AT A KREMLIN BANQUET FRIDAY NIGHT.

EGYPTIAN SOURCES SAID A COMMUNIQUE ON NASSER'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADERS WILL BE ISSUED TOMORROW AND THIS WILL REFLECT HIS ATTITUDE ON THE VIET NAM SITUATION. THEY DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER A PEACE PLAN WILL BE REVEALED.

THE U.A.R. PRESIDENT, LEAVING MOSCOW TOMORROW AFTER A FIVE-DAY STAY, ALSO SPOKE AT THE FRIENDSHIP MEETING OF "OUR MUTUAL STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM."

JC1044AED 8/31

6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 31, 1965
10:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This dispatch from Westmoreland seems to me to be quite realistic -- if we assume that things go well in Vietnam. It ties in with the view which Lodge has often expressed that this thing may end without any formal negotiation.

m.f.B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

6a

9
8/31 11/50
myle

~~SECRET~~

(30366 from MACJ3, August 29, 1965)

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Views on How the War will end

1. In a recent conversation between the J-3 MACV (Depuy) and the J-3 JGS (Thang), the latter expressed the following views on how the war will end:

a. The bombing continues in the north, but the North Vietnamese go underground or into the jungles and, although sorely beset with many problems, they would never, never give up.

b. However, in the south the presence of increasing numbers of US troops would turn the tide and, starting this autumn, the Government of Vietnam/US would start to win the war. Not only would it be clear to the Viet Cong and the DRV that they were losing, but also success might snowball rather rapidly.

c. Then in the face of the bombing and the accelerating deterioration of their position in the south, the DRV would diminish its support at which time the US would in turn diminish the level of its bombing in the north.

d. Later, as the situation in the south improved further, the US would make a token troop withdrawal! Thus giving evidence of its intentions to get out when the problem is solved.

e. This in turn would cause a further decrease in DRV support and, thus by easy stages, the war would simply subside and eventually disappear. Neither side would face the knotty problems posed by negotiation.

2. It is not possible to know the extent to which these ideas reflect views of the High Command or are solely the views of Thang. The US Ambassador has suggested that the substance of this conversation be passed to Washington for whatever value it may have.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-119
By is, NARA Date 3-20-97

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 30, 1965
8:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. We are very close on a settlement in the Dominican Republic.
2. We have been trying to reach Bunker but he is not available.
3. At about 7:50, Ambassador Bennett said that there might be a settlement announced on Dominican TV at 8:00 p.m. tonight.

BKS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By ing, NARA, Date 1-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 30, 1965
7:00 p.m.

8

8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This cable gives the current military estimates of our intelligence team in Saigon. It is a little long, but I think well worth reading.

I saw Max Taylor today and he agrees that it is an unusually good and persuasive assessment.

McG.B.

SECRET Att.

Saigon 624, Aug 26, 1965

Read
11/30/95
345

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9
↓ Held for Panama
meeting Thurs

Monday, August 30, 1965
1:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Panama Canal Negotiations

1. I have just talked at length with Bob Anderson and he tells me that the political problems of the Panama negotiations are now getting ripe for a brief report to you. I agree with him. There are decisions in the offing which only you can make and which I think you will want to make directly with Bob.

2. The essence of the situation is that Anderson and his team are very clear now on the need for a Joint US-Panama Authority to run the present Canal under the new treaties with Panama. You have approved this idea in principle, and for discussion, but there is no final Presidential decision, and still less any public White House position.

3. In discussing this idea on the Hill, in a preliminary way, Anderson's colleagues, Jack Irwin and Bob Woodward, have found substantial preliminary resistance from the House Subcommittee led by Mrs. Sullivan, and also from Senator Hickenlooper.

4. Anderson himself has stayed away from the House Subcommittee so far. He does not want to be in the position of giving them a fat target before there is a definite US Government position. He fears that if he were to advocate the Joint US-Panama Authority before you have made your own decision, he would be inviting public and definite opposition from Mrs. Sullivan and others.

5. Anderson is convinced that the Joint Authority will be indispensable to a successful negotiation. He is also convinced that real US interests can be protected, essentially by giving both Presidents a veto of changes in the existing code which covers the existing Canal. Anderson & Company therefore plan to make a flat recommendation to you in favor of a Joint Authority.

6. The next question is that Bob needs to know whether you want him to be the spokesman or whether you wish to announce your decision yourself, perhaps to an appropriate group of bipartisan leaders. He and I are inclined to think that if the President and Commander-in-Chief were spokesman on an issue of this sort, the chances of effective support would be greatly increased. This is, of course, what happened when you announced that you planned to negotiate these new treaties last December.

7. Anderson is now preparing a definite and clear recommendation on the Joint Authority for submission to you. He can come in and get your decision either in the latter part of this week or after Labor Day. We think our tactics

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

8/30/65

should be decided fairly soon because the Panamanian Congress is in October, and our own Congress should know our position before it goes home. On this basis, may I make an appointment through Marvin Watson for Anderson:

Later this week _____ Early next week _____ Speak to me _____

8. I have talked to Larry O'Brien about the problem of Mrs. Sullivan -- and probably Dan Flood -- and he thinks we have a lot of ways of handling this sort of opposition, and that on the Hill in general it is well understood that it is time for change in U.S. -Panama relations. I will plan to ask him to join in the Anderson meeting (if he hasn't gone off to deliver the mail).

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 30, 1965
11:20 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria

1. Attached at Tab 1, for your signature, is a brief note to Santamaria thanking him for his letter of August 10. In recommending a reply, State notes (at Tab 2) that while you responded favorably to the letter in your Alliance for Progress speech, a formal acknowledgment of Santamaria's letter is in order because of its unusual significance.

2. I concur in the State recommendation.



McG. B.

10a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


August 30, 1965

Dear Dr. Sanz de Santamaria:

I want you and your colleagues in CIAP to know how much I appreciate the constructive ideas expressed in your letter of August 10 to the Presidents of the Latin American Republics and to me.

As you know, I addressed a number of points in your letter at the recent White House ceremony commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. I want to take the opportunity now to pledge again that my Government will review your thoughtful letter with great care and sympathy.

Sincerely yours,



Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria
Chairman,
Inter-American Committee on the
Alliance for Progress
1725 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 30, 1965
10:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This conversation between Goldberg and U Thant occurred on August 25, but I think you have not seen a report of it and that you may be interested in the Secretary General's observations.

McG. B.
McG. B.

13

11a

1

Monday, August 30, 1965

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

Text of cable from USUN New York 499 of Aug. 25

During a meeting with the Secretary General last evening Goldberg told him that our reply to his proposal on Vietnam is in active preparation and should be ready to transmit to him early next week. We are at present consulting Saigon to ensure that, to the degree possible, our replies are consistent and compatible.

Goldberg reiterated that we welcomed the Secretary General's proposal, that we find many of its elements constructive and promising, and that we will wish to discuss in detail those parts where there is some difference of opinion.

In response to Goldberg's query as to whether there had been reactions from other recipients, the Secretary General described efforts he had made to deliver the proposal to the Communists. He said it had first been presented to representatives of Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong August 13 at a location he did not name. The Chinese Communist representative had said he had no authority to receive a document from the UN and refused to do so. The Hanoi representative received the document but said he would have to seek instructions before transmitting it to his government. The Viet Cong representative, who was quite junior, refused to receive the document but said he would seek instructions.

A response was sought again August 15 from all three through the same channel. On August 17 the Chinese and Viet Cong returned the same reply. The Secretary General thought it interesting, however, that the Chinese had said proposals on this subject should come to them from the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The Hanoi representative had not returned the document and therefore the Secretary General presumed he had transmitted it to his government. However, on August 18 the Secretary General had re-submitted his proposal to the same three through another channel which he felt to be more acceptable to them. He had as yet had no reply through this channel.

The Secretary General mentioned that, before his latest proposal was presented, he had heard a report that Peking considers him to be "in league with Washington" in the handling of the Vietnam question, particularly because of his rapid and affirmative response to the President's offer on the Mekong Valley development. He also had the

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

- 2 -

impression Hanoi is suspicious of his association with us.

In response to Goldberg's query whether the Secretary General is hopeful negotiations might get under way in the near future, Thant expressed doubt there would be much chance before the termination of monsoon in October. If Hanoi and the Viet Cong are unable to achieve successes by that time they might be more receptive to negotiations.

GOLDBERG

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

12

Monday, August 30, 1965
9:40 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Valencia

1. Attached at Tab 1, for your clearance, is a telegram to Valencia, thanking him for his warm letter (Tab 2) praising your Alliance for Progress speech. At Tab 3 State notes (a) that Valencia allowed us to release his letter and (b) that a reply by you, among other things, will be useful in the context of the intensive economic negotiations which we are now carrying on with Colombia.
2. I concur in the State recommendation.

McG. B.

☒ Yes.
☐ No.
☐ Speak to me.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

AmEmbassy BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

Deliver following message from the President to President Valencia:

"Dear Mr. President:

"I deeply appreciate the strong support for the Alliance for Progress which you expressed in your letter of August 18 to Ambassador Oliver, who was kind enough to convey your thoughts to me. While the path ahead will not be easy, I share your faith in the continued and increasing success of this great hemispheric effort. With hard work, cooperation, and the continuing exchange of ideas among all of us, we shall surely attain our goals of improving the material well-being of all of our people and strengthening representative democracy throughout the hemisphere.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Department does not plan to release, but has no objection if GOC wishes to do so. END

UNCLASSIFIED

J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 30, 1965
9:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram to Trinidad Prime Minister
Eric Williams

1. Attached at Tab 1, for your clearance, is a telegram to Trinidad Prime Minister Williams expressing good wishes on the occasion of Trinidad's independence anniversary, Tuesday, August 31. In its memo at Tab 2, State notes that this telegram (which is additional to the routine telegram sent to the Governor General of Commonwealth countries on such occasions and which will be delivered at our Ambassador's discretion) may play a part in our effort to block the establishment of a Soviet Mission in Trinidad.
2. I concur in the State recommendation.

McG. B.

_____ Yes.
_____ No.
_____ Speak to me.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13a

13a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AmEmbassy PORT OF SPAIN _____

At Embassy's discretion, deliver the following message:

QUOTE: Dear Mr. Prime Minister, On this celebration of the anniversary of the independence of Trinidad and Tobago it gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the people of the United States and on my own behalf, to send to you and through you to the people of Trinidad and Tobago sincere good wishes and assurances of our warm friendship. LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE.

White House does not plan to release and would wish to be informed in the event GOT should wish release. In this respect, congratulatory message on occasion Jamaican independence was sent only RPT only to Governor General.

Discretionary authority to deliver foregoing message has been provided in thought that Ambassador might wish to use it as opener for discussion with Williams of problems that would be created for Trinidad if Soviets authorized establishment Mission there.

END.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

14

August 30, 1965

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you very much for your personal note about my birthday. I am grateful for your warm good wishes, and I am glad that you are getting a little time off.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in warm regards to you both.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'LBJ', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The Right Honorable
Harold Wilson
Prime Minister
London

LBJ:McG. B. :mz

15
✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, Aug. 28, 1965
11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pak/Indian Roundup

Here is a good roundup on the Pak/Indian situation for your private information. Later today I will be sending on the wires our suggestions as to what you might want to say on this and other international issues if you meet the press tomorrow.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

MEMORANDUM

SANITIZED
Authority NLS/RAC 99-57 + FEUS, Vol XXV, #175
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-13-01

15a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 28, 1965

Saturday/10:30 am

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Roundup. Kashmir is still bubbling merrily and could blow up. U Thant fears the whole 1949 cease-fire agreement may collapse. He wanted to report blaming the Paks for starting the mess, but the Paks threatened to withdraw from the UN if he did. Nor are the Indians too eager to take Kashmir to the UN lest the whole question of its status be reopened (which is what the Paks want).

Bowles sees mounting pressures for Indian retaliation and urges we call the Pak bluff that they aren't involved, lest they be encouraged to think they are getting away with the game. In fact, we have [redacted] a most reliable report that both the Kashmir infiltration and the earlier Rann of Kutch affair are part of a "well-organized plan" to force a Kashmir settlement. This plan was checked out with both the Chicoms and Indos. Worth reading (Tab A).

The UK gambit. Wilson sent a rather bland letter to Ayub (Tab B), as an opener to get Ayub to see his envoy next week. We think we frightened the Brits enough to get them to try hard, but I suspect that after they sound out Ayub Harold Wilson will be back at you.

Meanwhile the true extent of our disillusionment with the Paks is being gotten out through various quiet channels (the Pak Ambassador here is highly chastened, whatever his demeanor on the Sequoia). Even if Ayub doesn't come till October or so, all this will help insure that he comes in the right mood.


Ayub and Shastri Visits. The Kashmir flare-up makes it difficult for either to firm up plans now, though I'll wager we could land Shastri if you wrote him directly, reminding him we'd love to have him though we realized Kashmir might get in the way. My hunch still is that this would also help move along Ayub.

Wednesday Meeting. Though we've scheduled a Wednesday morning meeting of Rusk, Mann, and Bell with you on Title III feeding programs, Bundy and I suggest we broaden it to include Pak/Indian problems in general. We keep putting out the word "no meeting no pledge"; but getting it directly from you would be quite useful at this point.

A. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~On suggestions in what might be said
going with follow in a more general message
in line later today.~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(Text of letter from Prime Minister Wilson to President Ayub)

I was glad to have your reply of 27 July to my message of 23 July in which I expressed my anxiety over developments in regard to the Pakistan Consortium.

I am sure that your Ambassador in Washington has kept you fully informed of the continuing and acute problems which face the United States Administration in getting their whole aid programme through Congress. There seem to have been profound and dangerous misunderstandings in the United States and in Pakistan which in particular affect United States aid to Pakistan and thus threaten the interests of us all.

In these circumstances I thought it right to send Pickard to Washington last week to ascertain more precisely the United States' difficulties and to explain our deep concern. I am so impressed by the dangers that I suggest, subject to your agreement, that we should, as your Commonwealth partner, explore what we can do to help. I am therefore asking Sir Morrice James to seek a frank exchange of views on the subject immediately on his return to Pakistan later this week.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

ISC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 6-17-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

16
16
Saturday, August 28, 1965
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two answers to Prime Minister Wilson

I attach draft answers to two messages from Prime Minister Wilson:

1. At Tab A is a copy of his message on Singapore, with a draft answer which fits our current plans. We think it better to have the first discussions before George Ball gets to London, and are sending Sam Berger, who is a very able and knowledgeable professional. If any progress is made, George can pick it up when he gets there a week later. This message is very non-committal about the purpose of the talks and does not pick up the Prime Minister's suggestion that whatever the British do should be done after agreement. The point is that we don't want to let them off the hook of their special responsibility in Singapore, but at the same time we are glad of a chance to look over their shoulder, just as a safeguard against unilateral weakening by them.

2. At Tab B is the Prime Minister's birthday message to you. I feel that in this case the response should be checked with you because of the rather special character of Wilson's message. I have avoided the topic of the White book because I doubt if you will want to share your full opinion of that with Wilson. Suggested reply is attached.

m.f. B.
McG. B.

✓

| | | |
|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Singapore message: | Approved _____ | Disapproved _____ |
| | (Signed etc.) | |
| Birthday message: | Approved ✓ _____ | Disapproved _____ |

by ¹⁷
Returned/Mrs Roberts 11/ '65

172

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, August 27, 1965

2:55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached Aide Memoire has been drafted for delivery to U Thant as soon as it has your approval. There is no great rush about it, but we make a few social points by promptness. The Department itself has been quicker than usual on this and has coordinated its answer with Saigon in a neat piece of work by Lodge.

The Aide Memoire is polite, but at the same time firm on a number of points. It maintains our basic four-point position on the end of aggression from the north, the relation of that aggression to US withdrawal, the right of free choice in South Vietnam, and the use of supervised free elections on the reunification issue.

In its later paragraphs (8 & 9) the message says that we see many roads to a ceasefire, and that we think the question of the role of the so-called National Liberation Front should not bar the way to a settlement.

Dean Rusk and I consider that this entire paper represents no modification of our position, but only a careful and diplomatically skillful statement of it for U Thant's eyes.

This answer has been prepared in close collaboration with Arthur Goldberg, who is in full agreement with it.

McG.B.

McG.B.

Approved _____ Speak to me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MR. McGeorge BUNOY

copy 2 7 4

175

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BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

17-8

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON
" LONDON
" OTTAWA
" CANBERRA
" BANGKOK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By CG, NARA, Date 4-14-99

EXDIS

Following is ~~approved~~ text of US aide-memoire for SYG on
Deliver at earliest opportunity on receipt final
Viet Nam, ~~which should be delivered at earliest opportunity~~
authorization.

Begin Text. AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. The United States believes that your memorandum of August 12 contains a number of highly constructive suggestions. It is our earnest hope that the memorandum will be useful in initiating discussions which can provide a basis for the settlement of the Viet Nam conflict. The views expressed below are designed to contribute to this important objective.

2. We agree with your observation that the objective of a Viet Nam settlement should be "a return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva Agreements."

3. We concur in the principle you have set forth that

Drafted by: FE:WPBundy
IO:DHPopper:mle 8/26/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

David H. Popper

Clearances:

IO - Mr. Sisco

FE - Miss Bacon
~~Mr. Bundy~~ RB

~~TOP SECRET~~

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neither zone in Viet Nam should adhere to a military alliance or furnish military bases to others, and that foreign troops should be withdrawn from both zones. You have already cited President Johnson's statement of April 7 to this effect on military alliances and military bases. On troop withdrawal, the United States stated on April 8 in reply to the 17-nation declaration on Viet Nam "...when conditions have been created in which the people of South Viet Nam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet Nam."

4. Equally basic is the principle of the Geneva Agreements that neither zone of Viet Nam should interfere in the affairs of the other zone. This principle was incorporated in numerous provisions of the Agreements, including Articles 19 and 24 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam and in the provision of Article 5 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference, providing that the respective zones "shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy." It is the violation of this principle by the DRV which has led to the conflict in Viet Nam and to the presence of American forces in the Republic of Viet Nam. These forces,

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Classification

like the forces of other states assisting the Republic of Viet Nam, have as their sole purpose its protection against aggression, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

5. It is therefore essential that provision be made in any settlement of the problem of Viet Nam for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the troops and cadres infiltrated from North Viet Nam into the South. The modalities and timing of withdrawal of American and other forces assisting the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam can, of course, only be worked out in the light of similar dispositions regarding the tens of thousands of regrouped Southerners and Northerners infiltrated by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam over the past several years.

6. A third basic principle of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 was to ensure that the people of Viet Nam have the right of free choice. That purpose still guides our actions in two fundamental respects related to the Geneva Agreements:

a. We maintain that the people of South Viet Nam should have the right to shape their own destiny by peaceful, democratic means and without interference from an aggressive neighbor to the north.

b. We believe that the people of both South Viet Nam and

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North Viet Nam should have the right of free choice regarding the reunification of Viet Nam. As called for in the Geneva Agreements, any elections held for this purpose should be truly free and secret, with effective international supervision. It was in this sense that President Johnson on July 28 referred to "free elections... throughout all Viet Nam under international supervision."

7. With respect to the political problems of South Viet Nam, we do not consider that the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 are directly applicable to the resolution of the internal problems of either North or South Viet Nam ^{separately,} ~~separately,~~ pending procedures for reunification as discussed above. In this connection, the United States Government notes that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, on June 22, made clear the view of the Republic of Viet Nam that South Viet Nam should be free to shape its own destiny "in conformity with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form and whatever source." As Secretary Rusk noted on June 23, the United States Government fully supports this principle, and it was in this sense also that President Johnson referred on July 28 to "free elections in the South." North Viet Nam appears to have expressed a different

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point of view. We would welcome any appropriate efforts by the Secretary-General to determine whether these divergencies are in fact as profound as they now appear.

8. We concur in the Secretary-General's suggestion that a cessation of military activity might be subject to a variety of formulae, and that it might initially be a matter for de facto action -- by both sides -- rather than for a more formal arrangement. In any unconditional discussions, or in a conference, conditions for the cessation of hostilities might well be the first order of business.

9. Finally, with respect to the role of the so-called National Liberation Front, we agree that issues of this type need not and should not obstruct the way to a settlement. On July 28 President Johnson referred to negotiation taking place with governments (for example, if there should be a Geneva Conference, those governments which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954), and indicated that the Viet Cong would have no difficulty being represented ~~and having their views represented~~ if Hanoi desired a peaceful settlement. ~~This should not be an insurmountable problem and could be worked out. This position does not, of course, prejudice the~~

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Classification

National

~~United States Government's view that the so-called Liberation~~
~~Front is not in fact an independent party inasmuch as it has been~~
~~established and is controlled by Hanoi.~~

10. We remain prepared to ^{immediately} engage in unconditional discussions
looking toward a peaceful settlement ^{the moment} whenever the other side is
ready. This can be done, for example, through reconvening the
1954 Geneva Conference or by other means, including discussions
through your good offices. We shall give serious consideration
to any proposals of this character. END TEXT.

~~XXXX~~ Prior to delivery, inform GVN observer, pursuant
to last para Deptel 310 (sent Saigon as 564).

END

GP-3

W 11 18

Thursday, August 26, 1965
7:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Bob McNamara's notes of the topics discussed between President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and their Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, on Thursday, January 19, 1961. The McNamara notes do not correspond either to Dean Rusk's recollections or to what Rowland Evans told me, in that they do not give a clear signal that Herter and Eisenhower were in favor of ground troops in Laos, if necessary.

Evans called me again today and indicated that he is planning to use his version in a column. I told him that I myself would not use information obtained from President Kennedy in this way, and that I could neither confirm nor deny his version.

191
McG.B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

18a

24 January 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You asked that I put in writing my recollection of the subjects discussed at the meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on Thursday, January 19. My notes taken at the meeting are not complete, but they indicate that the following statements were made:

A. With respect to Laos:

1. President Eisenhower advised against unilateral action by the United States in connection with Laos.

2. The President stated that the British and French were reluctant to fulfill their obligations under the SEATO Treaty.

3. Secretary Herter stated that if the Phoumi government requested aid from SEATO, he, Herter, believed we would be bound by our obligations under the SEATO Treaty to supply such aid. In this event, he stated he believed the British would probably fulfill their treaty obligations, but that the French would not.

4. Herter added that if a political settlement in Laos is not possible, we must support the Royal Laotian Government's request for SEATO intervention.

5. President-elect Kennedy inquired of President Eisenhower whether, in the event of intervention in the Laotian conflict by either the United States or SEATO, the Sino-Soviet bloc could be expected to counter with forces in excess of those provided by either the SEATO nations or the United States. President Eisenhower's answer was not completely clear, but he implied that the Sino-Soviet bloc could support the Pathet Lao with resources of men and materiel substantially larger than those which the SEATO nations could be expected to provide for the support of the Royal Laotian Government.

6. Secretary Herter stated that the introduction of communist members into the Laotian Government would undoubtedly lead to subversion of the government, and the ultimate replacement of a coalition government with a communist government. President Eisenhower replied he was not certain that this would be the result; he believed it might be possible to maintain indefinitely a coalition government including representatives of the communists.

7. President Eisenhower stated without qualification, "If Laos is lost to the Free World, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia."

8. President-elect Kennedy asked, "What action can be taken to keep the Chinese Communists out of Laos?" There was no answer to this question from President Eisenhower.

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Authority NLS 84-289

By is, NARS, Date 2-19-85

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

B. With respect to Cuba:

1. President Eisenhower stated in the long run the United States cannot allow the Castro Government to continue to exist in Cuba.

C. With respect to "limited war":

1. Secretary Gates stated, "The United States can handle any number of small limited war situations at one time."

2. Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Department had taken the funds authorized by the last Congress over and above what the Department had requested, and had committed these funds to additional airlift capacity and to the design of a new cargo plane.

3. Secretary Gates stated that major problems relating to airlift capacity were:

- a. the right to over-fly;
- b. the congestion of landing fields.

D. With respect to the gold flow:

1. President Eisenhower stated the United States would be better prepared for limited war if we were to bring a division back from NATO and station the division within the continental limits of the United States. He pointed out that such action would ease the gold problem, but would require careful preparation with NATO.

2. President Eisenhower stated that if the order restricting travel of military dependents remains in effect, similar restrictions should apply to the dependents of personnel of other governmental departments, including the State Department.

Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓
19

Thursday, August 26, 1965
6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the latest from Ambassador Bunker. The last paragraph shows he has felt our needle, but persists in the view that he must take it carefully and patiently.

The meeting of the OAS this morning was given over to a long diatribe by the Colombian Delegate, Vazquez, who has some of the same impatience we do, and was also suggesting that the OAS should get a personal report from the Committee. We answered (Bob Sayre) that such a personal report would only delay matters, and our impression is that, except for some marginal press leaks, this closed meeting does not prove much either way.

mf 12
McG. B.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

(Cy of Santo Domingo 525, August 25, 1965)

From Ambassador Bunker

1. I am fully in agreement on the necessity to apply maximum pressure to induce Imbert to fulfill his commitment to sign "Act of Reconciliation." The excuse that the Imbert Government only accepted the "Act" on the basis that not one word would be changed is patently phony and we have no intention to allow him to use that line.
2. Revisions in the "Act" were worked out by Committee, not by Caa mano Government, and we believe they have improved and strengthened the Act as a whole without altering its basic substance or objectives. The new language of Article 4 is stronger and more precise from the point of view of Imbert's own frequently reiterated concern as to the future of "Communist focus" in Camaano Government. The perimeter around the Zone will now be maintained until the Communists and others have given up their arms. The other changes in the "Act" should also be welcomed by Imbert and Armed Forces Chiefs as strengthening the Provisional Government's authority to deal with the problems of Constitutionals and their Zone free of hampering prior commitments. Article 8 in particular is now more favorable from that standpoint.
3. The revised text has been accepted by the Camaano Government and the Committee is now using all avenues of persuasion and pressure open to it in an effort to obtain agreement from the other side. The principal external pressure is economic, represented in the Committee's decision to withhold financial assistance and retain OAS control of the Central Bank. Other pressures, means of persuasion -- individual and group -- are being employed to the fullest extent possible.
4. I believe the problem of Imbert is complicated by the fact he continues to receive bad advice from friends, hangers-on, self-serving politicians and professional anti-Communists -- all of whom put personal interest ahead of country. (Imbert is a rather unsophisticated man and his attitude often seems to be influenced by what the last person he saw had to say.) In addition, it must be recognized that he himself has never fully accepted the necessity for the establishment of a provisional government.

I am hopeful, however, that appeals to Imbert's patriotism and pride, combined with pressures on both him and the military chiefs will obtain the desired results.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

5. The problem of the Armed Forces' Chiefs is more difficult and more important. They apparently entertain some suspicions about Garcia Godoy's intentions and are reluctant to put too much of their future or that of their institution in his hands. They also seem to suspect -- completely without reason as far as we know -- that he has made secret commitments to Caamano and Company. With the valuable assistance of Embassy Attaches, we are making an intense effort to reassure the chiefs of our own and Garcia Godoy's firm intention to preserve integrity of the Armed Forces.

6. In the event Imbert Government/Armed Forces acceptance of the "Act" is not forthcoming within a few days, the Committee contemplates issuing another declaration to the Dominican people reporting on the status of the negotiations. Because virtually all communications media are in the hands of the Caamano Government and the Imbert Government, this step may be necessary in order to further mobilize public opinion. Fortunately, there obviously now is mounting public pressure for a settlement which should have its effect.

7. I am aware of the feeling of exasperation and frustration on the part of the US Government at delays caused by the constant maneuvering for advantage by both the Caamano Government and the Imbert Government, and by the childish refusal of each side to deal with or even recognize the existence of the other. This is a feeling fully shared by myself and my colleagues. However, given the Mandate under which we are operating, I see no alternative to continuing along the course we have set, combining patience with pressure and persuasion to achieve our objectives.

McGB
20

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, August 26, 1965
12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

We fully endorse State's recommendation that you send the attached "get-well" note to Tanzanian President Nyerere's brother who is being treated here at our expense.

This short note to Nyerere's favorite brother could further the recent improvement in our relations with Tanzania, whose naive romance with the Chicoms shows definite signs of cooling.

R. W. Komer

mcg B.

cc: McGB
RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

McGB
20a

Dear Chief Nyerere:

I am happy to welcome you to the United States and to Washington, D. C. All of us are hopeful that the doctors and staff at Providence Hospital will be able to help you return to good health very soon so that you may be reunited with your family.

Sincerely,

Chief William Nyerere
Providence Hospital
1150 Varnum Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

cc: McGB
RWKomer

LBJ:UH:em
(typed 8/26/65)

6" 21

Thursday, August 26, 1965
12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a memorandum to me from Jim Thomson which raises the possibility of a Presidential visit to Hawaii, with invitations to Pacific Heads of State to join in. The argument is sufficiently interesting so that I think you will want to read it, and I should be glad of any guidance you can give us as to whether you would be interested in further exploration.

McG. B.

Do some invisible ~~staff~~ work
on this _____

Leave it alone _____

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

21a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

August 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Hawaii Summit Meeting in Lieu of Far East Presidential Travel?

As you know, considerable pressure has accumulated over the past four years in support of a Presidential trip to the Far East. The last such expedition was the ill-fated Eisenhower trip of 1960; the last Vice Presidential tour was that of Mr. Johnson in March 1961. Primary sources of the current pressure are the Philippines and Korea.

Counter-balancing this pressure is the difficult calculus of itinerary: you cannot go to Japan without going to Korea, and vice versa; nor to Japan without going to Taiwan; and once you are in Taiwan and the Philippines, you cannot avoid Vietnam, etc. Clearly, any narrow selection of countries would do more harm than good, and a full tour of all our clients and their neighbors would be impossible.

Yet the rationale for personal Presidential diplomacy remains compelling: the need to allay perennial anxieties and to demonstrate our concern with the problems and progress of Free Asia above and beyond the Vietnam war; a projection of a U.S. image of warmth and strength; and not least significant, the establishment of rapport between our President and the Heads of Government of non-Communist Asian nations.

It is our view that some alternative to a Far East Presidential tour should be found before the end of 1965. Here is one possible substitute that seems worthy of consideration:

1. The East-West Center of the University of Hawaii will celebrate the Fifth Anniversary of its opening on October 25, 1965; at this time, if not before, Ambassador Howard Jones, is scheduled to be formally installed as Chancellor of the Center. (It is tentatively planned that the Vice President and Congressman Rooney would be present at this installation to make speeches and receive honorary degrees.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

2. The October 25th anniversary should be transformed into a much more significant occasion: the President himself should attend and should invite the Heads of State of appropriate Far Eastern countries to join with him for three days of festivities.

3. The President's attendance would be entirely justifiable in view of the fact that he sponsored the authorizing legislation for the East-West Center in 1959 and 1960 and delivered the dedication address for the Center in May 1961. He has not yet visited Hawaii as President. Furthermore, the Center is an ideal site for such a Pacific gathering in view of its aim to serve as a bridge between the peoples of the West and East Pacific. Honolulu hotel and governmental facilities are entirely adequate.

4. Possible Guest List: Sato of Japan, Pak of Korea, Chiang of Taiwan, Macapagal of the Philippines, Sukarno of Indonesia, Lee of Singapore, the Tunku of Malaysia, Thanom of Thailand, Ne Win of Burma, Souvanna of Laos, Ky of Vietnam, Menzies of Australia, and Holyoake of New Zealand. (Sihanouk is omitted because of our lack of diplomatic relations; an invitation to him should nonetheless be considered.) Turn-downs may be expected from a number of these figures, most likely Chiang and Ne Win, perhaps from Sukarno, in view of the invitations to the GVN and the CRC.

5. Format: The chief ingredients would seem to be a major speech by the President, honorary degrees for all Heads of Government, and extensive entertainment, recreation, and banqueting, with opportunities for private bilateral conversations scheduled at regular intervals. The degree of substantive discussion to be expected would vary in terms of the participants. The chief purpose of the occasion would be to provide good hospitality, to show off the President and Hawaii, and to make generous sounds about our faith in Pacific Partnership. Yet the possibility for substantive progress might be considerable (e.g., among Sukarno, Lee, and the Tunku).

If this suggestion makes any sense to you at all, we could explore in greater detail the arrangements, issues, and dramatic personae.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


22

August 26, 1965

Dear Chief Nyerere:

I am happy to welcome you to the United States and to Washington, D. C. All of us are hopeful that the doctors and staff at Providence Hospital will be able to help you return to good health very soon so that you may be reunited with your family.

Sincerely,



Chief William Nyerere
Providence Hospital
1150 Varnum Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 25, 1965
9:10 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Warning to US Tourists on Disorders
in Greece

I have taken staff readings on this problem and I find unanimous opinion in the State Department and in the Embassy that any open expression of our concern for public disorder in Greece would be taken as a kind of "intervention" which we have been doing our very best to avoid. Anschuetz, the able Charge in Athens, points out that Center and Left editorialists would be delighted to compare disorders in Greece with disorders in Los Angeles.

He also points out that there has been no injury to American tourists beyond a few whiffs of tear gas.

One of the troubles here is that ever since the Greek Civil War, every American whisper has been taken as a roar in Athens. Since, in fact, we have very little real influence in the contest between the King and Papandreou, it seems to everyone I have talked to that we would do better to avoid public comment as long as we can.

The Embassy is, of course, making it clear to all the Americans it is in touch with that they should stay clear of demonstrations, rallies, and crowds. This will not stop undergraduate adventurers, but that is just as true at home as abroad.

McG. B.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 25, 1965
9:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further Comment on the Republican
White Paper

When General Goodpaster saw General Eisenhower last week, they worked out an agreed form of language which may be worth repeating in your press conference.

They agreed that there has been continuity of purpose and policy, together with evolution of means and action -- an evolution in the situation and in what is needed in view of what the enemy has done.

I attach the paragraph from Goodpaster's reporting memorandum which includes this language.

McG.B.
McG. B.

Attachment

2-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

General Eisenhower stressed strongly that there is no question in any of this about his support for what the President is doing. He supports it strongly. The real point is that action has now taken a different form from that of ten years ago, while the policy aim of course remains the same. After further discussion and review of the documents (particularly the letter to Winston Churchill) I suggested as a summary that there has been continuity of purpose and policy, together with evolution of means and action. General Eisenhower added that there has also been an evolution in the situation and in what is needed, in view of what the enemy has done. He indicated he thought there could be no misunderstanding of the matter on that basis.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25
77

8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Since dictating this, I have had a call from Rowland Evans, who tells an extraordinary story: he says he had lunch with President Kennedy on the 19th of January 1961. The President-Elect had just come from a meeting at the White House in which both Herter and Eisenhower had said that if troops were needed for Laos, they should certainly be sent. If true, this is a two-edged statement, because, of course, we did not send combat troops to Laos. I have asked Clark Clifford to check his own files on this meeting, which he attended, and he is to let us know. Dean Rusk thinks he kept the only record on our side.

McG. B.
McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

256

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
8:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Republican "White Paper"

1. I have read the White Paper and discussed it with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, and my brother Bill. I also got some free advice from Phil Potter, who called on another subject. Our unanimous view is that it is a pretty feeble effort and that it does not deserve top-level reply. So I would be inclined to go right past it in the press conference tomorrow and to say simply that we maintain the closest touch with Republican leaders like President Eisenhower and Senator Dirksen (who has dissociated himself from the report already), and that there has never been a Republican or Democratic policy toward Southeast Asia in the last 15 years.

2. If you want to hit harder, it is interesting that this report omits the name of Ambassador Lodge in its discussion of the last months of Diem. It misstates your own position on Southeast Asia in 1961, in that your farsighted report specifically warned that we might need to make a commitment of troops if circumstances should change. The document also conveys a false impression of your views on Laos. In Bob McNamara's judgment, it totally distorts his own record on Vietnam.

3. In sum, this document imports into the discussion of foreign affairs the very spirit of narrow partisanship which you have been trying to exclude. We are confident that the American people prefer the attitudes of Republicans like Eisenhower, Dirksen, Lodge, and McNamara, just as it has traditionally expected a spirit that rises above party from Democratic leadership both in Congress and in the White House.

4. I attach a copy of a memorandum done by my brother Bill which gives a still more detailed and comprehensive set of criticisms which could be made if one wanted to make them.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Notes on the Republic White Paper on Viet-Nam

1. In general, the document will probably not create much of a splash. It is loaded with what most people would regard as ancient history, and its criticisms are accompanied by no indication whatever as to what the Republicans would have advocated in place of what the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have done.

2. A few of the criticisms might draw blood and can be refuted effectively without giving the report additional play. For example:

a. It is just wrong to say that our objective has ever wavered. All of our statements at all times have made clear that our objective is the removal of external interference from South Viet-Nam. This is what we mean by winning, and it is what we believe the Communist side will recognize as a necessity once its hopes for a military victory are completely dashed.

b. Equally, there has been no change in our position on reunification. Actually, we have ourselves repeatedly defended the refusal to go through with the elections provision in 1956 in exactly the same terms as the Republican document, and all of our recent statements have simply been reiterations of the same position of principle taken at that time.

c. Equally, it is nonsense to say that our reference to South Viet-Nam not being part of an alliance and not being a military base is a change of position. These were the provisions of the 1954 Accords, which we have consistently supported in their essentials.

← 3. If one wanted to attack aspects of the Republican record, there are striking omissions and points that could be made, to wit:

a. While Eisenhower's letter of December 1954 did indeed refer only to economic assistance, the Eisenhower Administration early initiated the policy of military assistance and Eisenhower's 1960 statement expressed a deep and fundamental commitment on the military side. (This statement is in our green book.)

b. Most observers have always felt that the Eisenhower Administration made a basic mistake in the character of military forces it developed in

South Viet-Nam. A succession of conventional-minded senior officers tried to create a South Vietnamese army formed into divisions and designed to meet a repetition of Korea. This grave misjudgment of the threat contributed greatly to the weakness of the South Vietnamese, and it was left for the Kennedy Administration to turn the emphasis where it belonged, to smaller unit actions designed to meet guerrilla tactics. The weaknesses of past training still plague us, but we have made a great deal of headway under President Kennedy and President Johnson to overcome the difficulties of the concepts introduced in the Eisenhower Administration.

c. Although the Eisenhower Administration may have suggested the regional development of Southeast Asia including the Mekong River program, it in fact did almost nothing to carry this forward during the time when a great deal could have been done and before security conditions made it difficult to move.

d. On the political side, the decline in Diem's effectiveness began in the Eisenhower Administration, and nothing effective was ever done to check it. Most observers believe that Diem's increasingly personal and ingrown methods were well under way as early as 1958 and that much more effective work could have been done to moderate them in the early stages. (The inside story here is that the State Department attempted to do a lot, but was largely undercut by the special and preferred position of the hard-headed and utterly conventional military assistance chief, General Williams.)

e. In sum, while we have never tried to make a point of it to any great extent, the situation by early 1961 had been allowed to deteriorate to a very great extent by the Eisenhower Administration's policies. By training the wrong kind of army and tolerating the growing political weaknesses of the Diem regime, we made a great contribution to Viet Cong success. In making this point, however, we must never take a position that would tend to dilute our correct position that Northern infiltration lies at the root of the whole Viet Cong movement.

f. So far as candor is concerned, there have undoubtedly been mistakes of judgment by Administration leaders in the last four years, but the Eisenhower Administration, in 1959 and 1960, swept the whole thing clean under the rug. Only when the Kennedy Administration came into office, and President Johnson made his visit, were the American people really made aware that there was an increasingly serious problem and indeed a crisis in South Viet-Nam.

1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
7:55 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If it is not already decided, I would hope that we would not invite the Soviet observation of Gemini shots by public invitation in the first instance. It seems to me much better to extend the invitation privately. If it is accepted, we can then make it public in whatever way suits us best. If it is rejected, then we do not ^{add} a small bother to US/Soviet relations by a public invitation and a public rejection.

In short, it seems to me that both policy and propaganda argue for a private invitation. I really do not think it helps us to invite them publicly and get turned down publicly right now, with overtones of Vietnam.

McG. B.
McG. B.

27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
7:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If it is not already decided, I would strongly urge that we not make a Presidential statement out of Bob McNamara's Military Sales Program as the attached announcement suggests. Bob McNamara's Military Sales Program has been an extraordinary achievement, but it is not one that I think a great peace President ought to put his own personal stamp on. There is a heavy flavor of the sale of arms for dollar profit in this statement, and the program is not popular with our competitors.

Finally, there has been a strong undercurrent of feeling in the State Department for several years that this program has been pressed without full consultation between the two Departments. Bob McNamara will stoutly deny this charge, but I must say that I myself think State has been treated pretty briskly on a number of occasions. McNamara's principal salesman is a tough and very effective man, Henry Kuss, and we are really lucky he has not been pilloried in public before now as a modern day Merchant of Death.

So it seems to me that the possibility of backlash in this announcement is substantial, and I think that the Defense Department can well be left to toot its own horn on this one.

m.f. B.
McG.B.

No 27a

Announcement by the President
at Press Conference, 25 August 1965

Secretary of Defense McNamara has reported to me on the Military Export Sales Program. I consider the results of this program to be an achievement that should be of interest to all Americans. The report states:

- that since June 1961 the U.S. has received orders and options for over \$9 billion of military equipment from countries with which we share the defense of the free world.

- that these sales will result in about 1,200,000 man-years of employment spread through all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

- that almost \$1 billion of profits to U.S. industry will result from this effort.

- that cash receipts, equivalent to a gold inflow, have already amounted to \$5 billion.

- that the backlog of orders for U.S. industry has grown from approximately \$900 million in 1961 to over \$5 billion today.

The Secretary's report also makes clear that this program has been accomplished in a manner which supports the foreign policy objectives of our country.

- 90% of all the potential sales are to the NATO nations and other industrialized countries of Europe and the Far East.

- the program includes extensive international cooperation in bilateral and multilateral production and research projects.

We continue to be opposed to the unnecessary spread of munitions and our sales program is carried out consistent with that policy. It has provided weapons to our allies which would have cost twice as much if they had been developed and produced independently. The program has conserved the resources and strengthened the defenses of the Free World.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
6:50 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reporting of Viet Cong Casualties

At your request, we have asked Westmoreland for his estimate of the accuracy of the official reports of Viet Cong casualties. He tells us that reports of Viet Cong killed in action have been based on a count of bodies by US or Vietnamese officers, and that in the case of Vietnamese counts, they have been confirmed by US advisors whenever possible. Nevertheless, General Westmoreland feels that reports from Vietnamese commanders are exaggerated and must be used with caution. Estimates of wounded and bodies carried from the battlefield are especially suspect.

In an effort to improve reporting, Westmoreland has now given orders that only bodies of males of fighting age or others believed to have carried arms will be counted (the Vietnamese tend to count all bodies in a Viet Cong area, regardless of age or sex). Additionally, photographic evidence will be obtained when feasible.

Westmoreland says the reporting of casualties killed by air action is more difficult unless friendly troops are able to move in for a body count. Estimates are based on reports from pilots, forward controllers, and agents. In the past, estimates have been derived rather automatically from the percentage of the target destroyed and the number of VC thought to be present at the time.

In future reports of air actions, more emphasis will be placed on detailed visual observations, aerial photography and high confidence agent reports. "Possible killed by air" figures will be upgraded to "confirmed" only when sufficient evidence is developed. Results of air action will always remain less certain due to the difficulty of determining what has taken place within a bombed building.

The net of it is that this message has led to some tightening of procedures, but that there will always be some uncertainties -- and I fear some exaggeration -- in this numbers game.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-18
By ms, NARS, Date 8-14-84

m. J. S.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
6:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Amendment to Agreement with Spain for Cooperation in the
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve the proposed amendment to the existing agreement with the Government of Spain relating to cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy.

The amendment has been reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget, particularly from the standpoint of the budgetary and fiscal aspects, and it has no objection to your favorable action on the proposed amendment.

The amended agreement which has been negotiated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would extend and modify the present agreement with Spain which was signed in 1957. The agreement is intended to ensure the Spaniards of fuel on a long-term basis for their planned nuclear power program. The amendment will extend the expiration date from 1968 to 1988. In addition, the amendment provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will assume responsibility for safeguards to those materials and facilities that are subject to safeguards under the agreement. The transfer of safeguards responsibility would be achieved by means of a trilateral agreement to be negotiated among the United States, Spain and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

If you approve, the proposed agreement will be formally executed and will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

If you concur in this recommendation, there is presented herewith an approval letter for your signature.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

24 Aug 65

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123-a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me a proposed "Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Spain" and has recommended that I approve the proposed Amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123-b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) Approve the proposed Amendment, and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

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The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

LBJ:CEJ:feg

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., August 24, 1965
6:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission has requested your signature on the message of greetings from you to the people of Guatemala in connection with the opening of the AEC exhibit at the Guatemala City Atoms at Work exposition. Our exhibit is scheduled to open August 26 and your signature is recommended at your earliest convenience.

McG. Bundy

McGeorge Bundy


___ Approved
___ Disapproved
___ See me

(signed)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1965

I am happy to extend the greetings of the people of the United States of America to the people of Guatemala on the occasion of the opening of the "Atoms at Work" exposition in Guatemala City. This exposition, a cooperative endeavor by scientists of our two countries, is impressive evidence of our mutual desire to extend the benefits of the peaceful atom to all the people of the world.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

2 31

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Freedom House press release on Vietnam

The attached release did not get the attention in the newspapers this morning that I would have liked, but we are circulating it to all our own people who may have to do with the teach-in problem this fall. Any knowledgeable academic man would know that this list of ^{supporters} ~~sponsors~~ is a whole lot more distinguished and knowledgeable than any list of critics yet published.

McG. B.

I have read it....and I agree.

LBJ/mf

8-24-65

1:20p

telephoned to Holman

32
fin
✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
12:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lodge and Westmoreland reports

1. You will want to know of this report from Lodge and Westmoreland. They report that they will take energetic action. So will we -- by directing Zorthian's attention to repeated statements by yourself and others showing that we are aware of the heavy efforts made by Vietnamese troops themselves.

2. Westmoreland's problem, of course, is that he can do these things better -- and with less risk of leaks -- if he does not share too much with the Vietnamese.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

(copy of SAIGON 595, Aug. 24, 1965)

From: American Embassy Saigon (Ambassador Lodge)

To: Secretary of State

MACV staff have received somewhat disparaging reactions from some South Vietnamese general officers of the Joint General Staff to the Marine victory south of Chu Lai indicating a sensitivity to the extensive press coverage of the Marine action.

I flag this small straw in the wind as pointing up the importance of portraying our operations here as combined with the Government of Vietnam in nature. General Westmoreland plans to do all possible to include in the early stages of any large operation at least some Vietnamese elements to which a fair share of the credit can be attributed. We also intend to pay particular attention to this aspect in our briefings and public output here and would hope that Washington and other interested parties would be able to do the same.

(copy of 29713 from General Westmoreland)

Subject: Vietnamese reaction to Marine victory

1. From certain South Vietnamese general officers on the Joint General Staff, we have received a rather peculiar reaction to the Marine victory south of Chu Lai. While not hostile, the reaction was clearly somewhat disparaging and probably indicates a sensitivity to the extensive press coverage of the Marine action.

2. We intend to make every possible effort to portray our operations as combined in nature. This means we must include in the early stages of any large operation some Vietnamese elements to which a fair share of the credit can be attributed. We are not overly concerned about this first adverse reaction, but wish to flag it for all interested parties.

3. Amb. Johnson has noted this message.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

Tuesday, August 24, 1965
9:45 a.m.

33

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

33

SUBJECT: Paul Dudley White and Mainland China

1. Last week you sent me for comment a letter from White in which he offered his services in any way that might be useful "in helping to break our deadlock with China."

2. It turns out that Dr. White has had a long interest in this problem! He was invited to China by the President of the Chinese Academy of Medicine in July 1962. The Department of State agreed to his visit, but at the last minute the Chinese withdrew their invitation on the ground that the U. S. "has persistently adopted a reactionary policy against New China, and blockaded every possible channel of communication between the peoples of our two countries."

3. This is a characteristic example of the way in which the Red Chinese have tried to pin on us a responsibility which is really their own. I bet that 80% of those interested in the problem think that the reason more Americans cannot go to Red China is U. S. intransigence -- while the fact is that it is mainly the Red Chinese themselves who have prevented such travel.

4. Under our own current policy guidelines, I know of no way we can use Dr. White at this time. If we were to give official backing to a White visit to China, it is predictable that the Red Chinese would turn it down. This would not gain us much.

5. On the other hand, the White case does raise the question whether we are smart to let it appear that we are the people who block communication between our two countries. Our Chinese experts have recommended for some time that we should ease our present travel restrictions and make a general rule that doctors and public health specialists -- or perhaps all workers in the fields of health, education, and welfare -- would be authorized to receive visas. (Our present rule includes (1) authorized news correspondents, (2) families of the four imprisoned Americans, and (3) individual cases in which the national interest is served -- Dr. White's visit would have come under this third category.)

6. We discussed this matter at a Tuesday luncheon earlier this winter, and you felt then that it would not be wise to change our current policy. But perhaps if we were to change it in response to an appeal by Paul Dudley White -- and at a time when our policy in Vietnam has reached a new level of clarity and firmness -- we might make a useful stroke in all directions. I will put this matter on the agenda for our next Rusk/McNamara meeting. Meanwhile, I have given Dr. White a cordial interim acknowledgment, as attached, and protected your right to answer him yourself when you are ready.

McG. B.

August 24, 1965

Dear Dr. White:

I want you to know that the President has read with great interest your letter of August 10, and asked us to review the questions which it presents for his further consideration. You can be sure that after this study is complete we will be back in touch with you again.

I am delighted to have this chance to write to you and to send warm personal regards. I wish our paths crossed more often.

Sincerely,

151

McGeorge Bundy

Dr. Paul Dudley White
264 Beacon Street
Boston,
Massachusetts

Confidential

PAUL DUDLEY WHITE, M.D.
264 BEACON STREET
BOSTON, MASS.

CONSULTATION BY APPOINTMENT

August 10, 1965.

Dear Mr. President,

For a long time I have had it in mind to get in touch with you directly and confidentially apropos of the possibility of my usefulness in our relations with Mainland China. Two or three years ago in Moscow I met and conferred with two or three of the leading Chinese physicians, including in particular Professor Huang, President of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences in Peking and a fellow foreign member with me of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, and with Professor Hu of Shanghai, a

graduate of the Harvard Medical School. Incidentally Huang had had four years of thoracic surgical training at Ann Arbor, Michigan, during the Second World War and was well liked.

Both of these expert and very personable physicians, who spoke English fluently, invited me to visit China, but of course I couldn't go. We have corresponded a little since.

With my very wide acquaintance-ship in medicine throughout the world, including all the European Communist countries, I have been hoping that I might in some way be useful in helping to break our dead lock with China.

If at any time you think that you may be able to use me in any mission, no matter how difficult or hazardous, please don't fail to call on me. Most sincerely,

Paul D. White

MEMORANDUM

(2) THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 23, 1965
9:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Remarks of Mendel Rivers in Hartford

1. Congressman Mendel Rivers went to the Exchange Club in Hartford, Connecticut, on August 11. The official version of what he said is in the Congressional Record for August 12, placed there by Congressman Hébert (pp. A4497-98-99) attached at Tab A. A couple of more spicy quotations were reported on the front page of the Washington Post on August 12 through an AP dispatch (Tab B). These were later read into the record with a good deal of peppy comment by Senator Young of Ohio on August 16 (pp. 19781-82) attached at Tab C.

2. Meanwhile Rivers made a clarifying statement to the Post which was printed on August 14 (Tab D).

3. On balance, I am inclined to think that both the AP story and the marked passages of the official text are useable, but I note that what Congressman Hebert inserted in the record does not include the language used in the Post. Probably someone corrected something before the insertion was made.

McG. B.
McG. B.

34a

A

August 12, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—APPENDIX

A4497

played in the building of the new plants, expansions, and highways in the Mobile area.

The total civilian labor force in Mobile County averaged 119,660 during 1964 compared to 119,090 the previous year.

LESS UNEMPLOYMENT

The monthly average of total employment was 114,350 in 1964 compared to 113,690 in 1963. Unemployment averaged 4.4 percent of the total labor force last year compared to 4.5 percent in 1963.

An analysis of employment figures shows the nonmanufacturing segment increased 1.3 percent during the period while the manufacturing segment showed a slight gain of 0.6 percent.

As of January 1, 1965, there was more than \$130 million in industrial construction underway in the Mobile area, chamber officials noted in regard to employment predictions, which are favorable for the current year.

As to highway construction in this area, much of it will continue for many years. While contracts let on road work here in 1964 amounted to \$54 million, an additional \$27,600,000 is slated to be let in 1965.

The chamber's studies and surveys show that population continued to grow during 1964. The estimate at the end of 1964 was 227,211 for the city of Mobile, and 353,000 for Mobile County.

An Address by Hon. L. Mendel Rivers Before the Exchange Club, Hartford, Conn., August 11, 1965

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. F. EDWARD HEBERT

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 12, 1965

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I believe the Members of the House, and the Nation, should have the benefit of the views of the distinguished chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who spoke in Hartford, Conn., yesterday before the Exchange Club.

L. MENDEL RIVERS, who has demonstrated such outstanding leadership as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has expressed his candid, well-reasoned, and forceful views in a manner that can be clearly understood by those who are willing to face the facts of life.

I congratulate him for his courage, I compliment him for his candor, and I want to express my great admiration for him and for the outstanding leadership he is providing the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives.

The text of the speech follows:

SPEECH OF L. MENDEL RIVERS BEFORE THE EXCHANGE CLUB, HARTFORD, CONN., AUGUST 11, 1965

Mr. Chairman, it is a very great pleasure indeed for me to be with you today. I have been a member of the Exchange Club for many years and I have always enjoyed my association tremendously.

As I look about Hartford, I wonder how much of this city I helped to build with my premiums.

But Hartford has also used these premiums for other purposes—making money available for industry, as well as individuals, and thus

in great measure, helping to build America. The insurance industry here in Hartford and elsewhere, and members of the Exchange Club everywhere, have made invaluable contributions to progress and the free enterprise system.

But I did not come today to discuss the free enterprise system with you because I doubt whether there is anyone here that needs any words from me on that subject.

Each of you is a staunch advocate of that system. Each of you knows the importance of the free enterprise system. Each of you is an adherent of that system.

I mention it only because the free enterprise system is an important element of a way of life that we are trying to defend and protect in a very chaotic world.

I am heartened, to some extent, by the belief that the Soviet Union, although Communist in its operation, is tending more and more toward the principles of the free enterprise system. As a matter of fact, there is even some semblance of the profit motive in effect in Russia.

I think the Soviet Union is in a rather difficult position. We constantly express our concern about the Soviet Union, and I presume that speakers in the Soviet Union express their concern about the United States.

But there is a difference today that did not exist 30 or 40 years ago in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has a great deal to lose in the event of a war and very little to gain.

Back in the 1920's and the early 1930's, and immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union had very little to lose by war and something to gain.

Today the Soviet Union has a substantial industry. They have constructed, quite successfully, huge hydroelectric dams; they are increasing their production of steel and other vital products for their industry, but one of their neighbors to the east, I suspect, is looking with a rather greedy eye upon these successes in the Soviet Union and yearning to take over its assets.

My instinct tells me that the Soviet Union has far more to fear from the Red Chinese than they have from any other nation in the world.

Be that as it may, the Soviet Union is still our enemy as far as our way of life is concerned. I don't believe that the Soviets will ever give up their goal to communize the world.

And certainly there will come a day when the nuclear capability of Red China will pose a threat to every nation. Just remember those words of Mao Tse-tung: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Let us not kid ourselves—when Red China gets a nuclear delivery capability, it will control that part of the world just as the Soviet Union controls the Balkans.

Because of that, we have no choice but to constantly strengthen our national defenses, increase our combat capabilities at every opportunity, and be ever ready to turn back any aggression, no matter where it may take place in the world.

Our arms—our weapons systems—must be the most sophisticated in the world. We have no choice but to expend vast sums, not only in procurement, but in research and development. And, of course, one of the great threats to freedom and our way of life exists today in South Vietnam.

I wonder if the American people, that is the vast majority of them, truly understand the importance of South Vietnam?

Do you remember the game of dominoes? Do you recall standing the dominoes end up in a twisted path? Visualize the path of a hook, and recall knocking over the first domino. As the dominoes fell, one after the other, they made a complete circle and even-

tually arrived at the end of the hook. All of the dominoes fall.

This is the situation we face in South Vietnam. South Vietnam is a courageous little country, struggling for its own independence and its own freedom. But it is a highly disorganized country, made up of people who lack unity; split by political discord; and even separated by ethnic differences in many areas, because there are highland tribes as different from the mountain tribes as are those who live along the coastal plains. To this must be added the problems of communication difficulties, language barriers, and transportation problems.

And you are also familiar, of course, with the religious conflict that exists there, stemming from a variety of Buddhist groups, competing with Christianity, introduced as a result of many years of French colonization.

South Vietnam itself is not the final target of the Chinese Reds—Thailand is the first true objective. And if Thailand falls, with it will go 26 million hard-working, industrious people who export some of the finest rice grown anywhere. And if Thailand falls, Laos and Cambodia would be just a wayside stop, and then the Malaysian Peninsula would fall, and if that goes, Singapore goes.

Should Singapore go, a great port disappears as far as the free world is concerned, as well as the export center of much of the world's supply of tin and natural rubber.

After that would go all of Indonesia, as if we did not have enough problems in that area alone.

And after Indonesia would go Borneo and Sumatra, and possibly the northern territory of Australia, as a beginning, and then the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and, finally, Japan and South Korea.

This is the grim picture that faces the free world. That is the importance of South Vietnam.

It is for our own protection, it is for the preservation of these United States, that we defend South Vietnam. That is why we are fighting in South Vietnam—that, plus the inherent respect and admiration we have for people who are willing to fight for freedom.

And even if we win the war in South Vietnam, I cannot help but think that we are merely postponing the final victory. Red China—unless the Nation is prepared to risk the possible consequences of destroying her nuclear capability. And unless we make that decision, it is possible that all of our fighting in South Vietnam will have been in vain.

We have helped people fight to preserve freedom in other parts of the world and we cannot turn our back on this courageous group of people who are willing to make the supreme sacrifice for a way of life which for them is still something of a mystery—with only the promise of future peace and prosperity.

Remember that the Vietnamese, in addition to colonization by the French, have known nothing but war since 1941.

War has almost become a way of life with them, albeit an unpleasant one. The amazing thing is that they have stuck so well, instead of completely capitulating in abject surrender.

We have been told the war in South Vietnam may go on and on and on. I am inclined to agree with that conclusion, particularly if we continue the policy of what I call retribution escalation.

But the more important question is, Are we prepared to fight a war in South Vietnam of larger proportion, or of long duration? Do we have the equipment, the trained manpower? Do we have the ships? Do we have the aircraft? Even more important—does the war have to last forever? Why not victory now?

We are now pouring additional men into South Vietnam. We are pouring aircraft into

South Vietnam, to the point where the airfields can't hold anymore planes.

But what will they be used for—or against? If we want victory—we must be prepared for the risks associated with the effort.

There have been some rather inconsistent positions disclosed insofar as South Vietnam is concerned.

Let me paraphrase some testimony before our committee on February 19 of this year.

The Secretary of Defense, testifying before the committee of which I am chairman, said: "It is my view, and I believe it is the view of the Chiefs, that our casualties will be fewer with 23,000 men than they would be with more men exposed to guerrilla attacks."

He then made this significant statement: "We are trying to carry out our mission with the smallest number of U.S. casualties. We believe the present deployment will best accomplish that objective."

When our committee urged him to increase the number of American troops in South Vietnam last February, the Secretary said: "But I'm not interested in percentages. I'm interested in men's lives."

A member of the committee said: "I won't belabor the question, but I certainly am shocked and amazed at such a statement coming from the Secretary of Defense and backed up, as you say, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those 209 boys are dead. Their families have lost 209 American boys and we are going to lose more, according to your statement, because we cannot give them more protection. There will be that many more."

Mr. McNamara said: "But if I follow your plan, I think according to your own admission, the casualties would be higher still, and that is exactly why I don't propose to follow that plan."

Now, what I am pointing out does not prove that Mr. McNamara was not particularly far-sighted. But what I am suggesting is that Mr. McNamara's plans, and they are Mr. McNamara's plans, were based upon the deployment of far fewer troops in South Vietnam last February. And today as you know, just a few months later, our plans have changed radically.

Are the rest of our plans—our equipment inventories—our preparedness—standing on just as weak a reed?

If I am correct in my information, the Secretary of Defense is the only member of the Defense team, who opposed the construction of another nuclear-powered carrier. As I understand it, almost all, if not all, of this other knowledgeable civilian advisers and practically all the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the next carrier be a nuclear carrier. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in its report in December 1963, said: "In summary, the committee still does not know of any qualified technical person or group who recommended to the Defense Department that nuclear propulsion not be installed in the new aircraft carrier," the John F. Kennedy.

But Mr. McNamara, an individual with a tremendous amount of power, made the decision in the face of military advice to the contrary, and proceeded to award the contract for the construction of a non-nuclear or conventional carrier.

We need the carrier, there is no doubt about that. And that is the only reason why, in this session of Congress, I did not raise the issue and seek to change the carrier now under construction from a conventional carrier to a nuclear carrier. It would have delayed us that much longer in the actual completion of a badly needed new carrier.

I have felt, and the members of the Committee on Armed Services feel, that the collective judgment of the Congress, together with the collective judgment of the executive branch of Government, will produce far

better results than the judgment of a strong man on horseback who makes all the decisions.

I am afraid that I just do not believe in the concept of infallibility insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned. And I think that the evidence that is unrolling itself today with respect to the situation in South Vietnam is a classic example.

We have fumbled and bumbled under civilian military tactics in South Vietnam long enough. Now let's turn the conduct of the war over to those trained in war—the professional military men. We must never let the military make policy decisions—but once made—let us turn the war over to the experts who will be doing the fighting.

Just recently, Gen. Omar Bradley said: "Military professionalism requires long training, rigid discipline, a high degree of versatility, and unflagging dedication."

Can you imagine anyplace on earth where this philosophy is more necessary than Vietnam? Remote control of the war in South Vietnam is about as effective as bailing out the ocean with a coffee cup.

Last spring, I spoke before a large group in Washington and told them that as far as I was concerned the Congress of the United States would insist upon being a full partner in the matter of national security. I reminded the audience that I had taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. And I meant every word of the oath that I took. I swore that I would uphold the Constitution and that I would see that it was faithfully carried out. And I have done that so far.

Part of the Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 8, to be exact, says that the Congress shall raise and support armies, provide for a navy, and make rules and regulations therefor.

No one else has that authority. Only the Congress has that authority, and with that authority goes the responsibility. We have no other choice in the matter, unless we sit idly by and let others usurp the powers vested in the Congress by the Constitution.

I have been accused of leading a revolt against the executive branch of Government. That is not correct. I have great respect and admiration for the President of the United States. I do not envy him his responsibility. I do not want his responsibility. I have enough of my own. I do not want any of the responsibilities or the powers vested in the executive branch of Government.

I respect and admire Secretary McNamara. He is a dedicated public servant and undoubtedly one of the most competent men in the Nation in business matters. But no one man can fully manage in every respect—the Department of Defense. He needs the combined help of the Congress, his professional military advisers, and his service Secretaries.

And I want the Congress to exercise its authority. The Congress has plenty of responsibility and plenty of authority. If we'll just use it.

So far as national security is concerned, that responsibility is imposed upon the Committee on Armed Services. And I have a responsibility imposed upon me as chairman of that committee. I intend to fulfill the responsibility—I intend, in fact I insist, that the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives and the Congress be made a full-fledged partner in all matters affecting our security. And that is exactly what we are now doing. That is exactly what we will continue to do.

The other day, the House passed by a vote of 410 to 0 a pay bill written by the Committee on Armed Services and opposed by the administration. Here is an example of the Committee on Armed Services and the House of Representatives fulfilling their constitutional responsibility in every respect.

No one can convince the members of our

committee or the Members of the House that our military personnel are adequately paid. They know better than that. And yet, we listened to evidence, if you could call it evidence, based upon Department statistics, which we refuted and disproved, that the men and women in our armed services are adequately paid and only need a token increase.

Tell that to the wife of a sergeant who is moonlighting. Tell it to a corporate wife who is standing in line at a commissary wondering whether she can pay her bill and worrying whether the commissary is going to remain open. Tell it to a first lieutenant's wife trying to find some way to buy new clothes for the baby, especially when she knows the wife of a classmate of her husband is in industry earning double her husband's salary.

And add to all of that the fact that her husband is either at sea or serving an unaccompanied tour in South Vietnam and she goes to bed every night wondering whether he is still alive.

No, the Committee on Armed Services was not fooled. The committee exercised its responsibility. The House, to its everlasting credit, supported us unanimously, and I have every hope that the Senate will do likewise.

One of the great things about the Congress of the United States is that, individually and collectively, the Members understand people. We do not work with computers. We work with people. And when all is said and done, there is nothing more important in the world than people.

Everything we do revolves around people. And there are many, many decisions that affect people that must be based upon intuition or just good commonsense. These are not the kind of answers that come out of computers. These are the answers that come out of people's hearts and minds. These are the answers that come from people who know and understand people.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff system is constantly being threatened by those who would eliminate it and substitute a single Chief of Staff. Efforts continue to strengthen the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order that that Office may become more of an operational office and less of a policy office.

We will continue to oppose any erosion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and any strengthening of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from an operational viewpoint.

There are those who would seek to increase the Joint Staff, which could only lead to a further step toward the direction of a single general staff system—a system which has brought defeat to every nation which has used it.

There is even a proposal to increase the rank of the Director of the Joint Staff, so that he may hold an equal rank with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All this tends toward the weakening of the single services, the weakening of the military departments, and the establishment of a single operational organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In a recent interview, the Secretary of Defense was asked this question:

QUESTION: "Mr. Secretary, what role do the Service Secretaries play? Are they your assistants or do they represent the services?"

ANSWER: "They are my assistants and they do not represent the services."

Now this may seem unimportant to those who are not familiar with our Defense organization, but I can assure you the separate identity of the services is a vital part of our national security.

The jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none concept, if adopted, could destroy the most vital ingredient in our Armed Forces, esprit de corps and morale.

Some time ago, a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, of which I was then chairman, made a report about the

seriousness of our naval ship-obsolence. The Secretary of Defense says there has been a 100-percent increase in general ship construction and conversion to modernize the fleet. But how many of these ships are major combatant vessels? I can only tell you that our fleet is not being relaxed at a rate sufficient to overcome what will eventually become a serious obsolescence situation. And sea power is vital—absolutely indispensable—to our survival.

We have been told about the increase in our conventional war capabilities—but we are still using four different kinds of small arms ammunition in South Vietnam.

Just a few weeks ago we were told that we had all of the weapons and ammunition we needed to win a war. Then the situation suddenly reversed itself.

I mention all of this only to indicate that while our nuclear missile strength is overwhelming, there are still deficiencies in our defense planning.

Some of these deficiencies may be the result of unilateral decisions; some the result of well-intended economies; and others the result of miscalculations.

But the well-meaning, well-intentioned amateurs, who worry more about escalation than victory, have had their day. Let the civilian heads of government tell our military personnel what they want done but let trained military professionals decide how to accomplish the objectives.

But let me hasten to add that recrimination will gain us nothing—the objective today is to win the war in South Vietnam. To paraphrase a famous expression—if we start a quarrel between the past and the present, we may discover that we have lost the future.

The Congress has reasserted itself as an indispensable partner in providing for the security of the American people. We represent the people—and the people want victory.

There is no substitute for victory—and there is no shortcut.

Wishing would not make it so—only grim resolve—and a recognition of the will of the American people.

Two men in our century have left an indelible imprint upon the scrolls of history.

One of them, Douglas MacArthur, said about our trained military personnel: "Yours is the profession of arms; the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed; that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country."

The other, Winston Churchill, said: "Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves."

I prefer to follow the advice of those two truly great men, MacArthur and Churchill, who have become legends in the struggle for freedom.

I want victory—even yesterday was too late.

U.S. Chance To Woo World Opinion

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. RICHARD (DICK) ICHORD

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 12, 1965

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, in a recent editorial Mr. David Lawrence makes

some very important observations on the world scene. He states the necessity for finding a new approach for winning over world opinion. He declares, "Moral force can transcend military force in shaping the destiny of the world." I wholeheartedly agree. The bills now awaiting congressional action which would create a Freedom Academy represent one new approach to the problems Mr. Lawrence ably describes. I recommend this article to my colleagues and further, after reading this editorial I urge you to pick up a copy of H.R. 9713 and its report from the House Committee on Un-American Activities and see if you do not think that the Freedom Academy is a step in the right direction.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled, "U.S. Chance To Woo World Opinion" which appeared in the Washington Star on August 4 be inserted at this point in the Record.

The article follows:

U.S. CHANCE TO WOO WORLD OPINION

(By David Lawrence)

Moral force can transcend military force in shaping the destiny of the world—if all available resources are used to transmit to peoples everywhere the realistic truths about the events that usually lead up to wars.

President Johnson today has an opportunity in the court of world opinion to advance the American case in Vietnam by showing the true origin of the war and placing the responsibility where it belongs—on the shoulders of the Communists.

Time magazine in its current issue has an editorial essay entitled "Communism Today: A Refresher Course." It contains the facts about the growth of communism and the menace of its present-day operations throughout the world. The U.S. Government has even more facts at its disposal, but the magazine article certainly furnishes the basis for an information effort of far-reaching significance that could well be undertaken by the American Government. The Time essay says in part:

"Underground and in open combat, by subversion, terrorism, blackmail, riot, and rhetoric, faithful Communists the world over have for decades waged a holy war against the rest of humanity. The tempo and techniques vary from era to era, from continent to continent. And the nature of communism changes. Whereas Moscow now shuns the perilous confrontations that so often brought the cold war to boiling point, Peking grows ever more militant. For both capitals of world communism, the focal points of conflict have shifted from Europe to Africa, Latin America, and—most notably—southeast Asia, where the Johnson administration last week solemnly committed the United States to what could be a prolonged and painful war.

"Thus the Marxist dream of world domination is palpably no McCarthyist mirage. From Indonesia, where government-sanctioned mobs howled for the ouster of a newly arrived U.S. Ambassador, to Cuba, where Fidel Castro proclaimed that 'the imperialists' will not prevent Red regimes from taking over throughout the hemisphere, it was also becoming clear last week that the United States would have to stand increasingly alone against the free world's enemies.

"Since the United States-Soviet 'detente' that developed after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, more venerable and more qualified commentators also have begun to sound as if communism had quietly buried itself. Not long ago, the Manchester Guardian pronounced: 'The Russians and the Americans no longer have any reason to quarrel.' And there is a widespread school of chop logic that maintains simultaneously: (1) Russia

can no longer be seriously regarded as a threat to the West, and (2) by its firm stand in southeast Asia, the United States is inviting Russian retaliation.

"Both premises are debatable at best; together, they are not an argument but a plea for passivity. The danger of such wishful thinking, as the State Department's Walt Rostow has warned, is that 'out of a false sense that the cold war is coming to an end, out of boredom or domestic preoccupations, or a desire to get on with purely national objectives, we will open up new opportunities for the Communists to advance.'"

The magazine article goes on to say that, while there have been some changes in Communist philosophy, "control over the worldwide Communist movement is still vested in special departments of the Soviet and Chinese central committees," and then adds:

"Of the world's 105 Communist Parties, Moscow can count on 72, as against 21 for Peking. Twelve other Communist Parties—mostly in western Europe—are vaguely independent. In 1964, foreign aid by Communist countries amounted to \$1.7 billion, of which Soviet funds accounted for half, eastern European funds for a quarter. Of 17,530 Communist technicians working in foreign countries—a sharp rise from the preceding year—only 15 percent were Chinese.

"One of the most effective instruments of Communist subversion remains the front organization. In McCarthy's heyday Communist terminology was tossed about too carelessly, and in many quarters today words and realities such as 'infiltration' no longer seem entirely credible. Yet the leading fronts still reflect the reality and breadth of the Communist subversive effort. They range from pacifist groups such as the World Peace Council—headquartered in Prague—and the International Institute of Peace—Vienna—to various youth and professional outfits such as the International Union of Students and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers—Prague and Brussels.

"Most of these organizations—many launched by non-Communists with the best intentions and then taken over—are dominated by Soviet-line communism, although the Chinese are fighting hard to capture them and are setting up rival fronts of their own. Despite such dueling between the two Red giants, and to some extent in reply to it, Communist subversion proceeds apace, highly successful in some quarters, disastrously failing in others, but always at work."

The essay also declares that since 1960 Castro has trained guerrillas from most Latin American countries, and that propaganda and arms "are readily available to potential revolutionaries throughout Latin America."

If such views were translated into different languages and publicized by the U.S. Government itself in every country in the world, this could develop into a most effective crusade in which world opinion would be mobilized to prevent further wars and to bring a lasting peace.

Clyde W. Anderson

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROBERT E. JONES

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 12, 1965

Mr. JONES of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of our colleagues a touching tribute to Clyde W. Anderson, prominent businessman and

civic leader of Florence, Ala., who died recently. The tribute, written by Louis A. Eckl and appearing in the *Florence Times*, truly delineates the fine qualities of character which made all who knew him respect and love Clyde Anderson. The article follows:

[From the *Florence (Ala.) Times*,
Aug. 3, 1965]

CLYDE W. ANDERSON

(By Louis A. Eckl, executive editor)

The sadness we feel about this column about our longtime friend Clyde W. Anderson is that we didn't say these things while he was alive.

He was a living example that hard work is the best investment a man can make in his life, in his family, and in his community. While he was a little older than ourselves there was never any gap in our friendship. Soon after we went to work for the *Tri-City Daily* and the *Florence Times* we met Clyde, then operating a little news and soft drink stand on East Mobile Street, through his brother, the late Owen P. Anderson, then business manager of the *Times* and later *Florence* postmaster.

Through the years we learned to know and like him more. He was the kind of man who "wore well." We found that he always had something to do, something to love, and something to hope for. And now that his life has been cut short we like to think the happiness he enjoyed and the usefulness of the man made up in height what it lacked in length.

OVERCAME MISFORTUNES

Considering the humble circumstances in which he was born, he was a remarkably successful man in many ways, and we cannot help but feel that it was due to the fact that he felt he had many blessings, as do we all without realizing it, and that he reflected upon these in a positive sort of way instead of worrying negatively over those misfortunes which befell him, of which all men have some.

He was the kind of man, we think, who traveled light, unencumbered by the envies, fears, and unforgiveness that so often stalk men to defeat. He was a successful man because when he couldn't find a way, he made one, and although he was not without his critics, we think his work, from the time we first knew him until death interrupted, speaks for itself.

To us, and we do not judge him or any man for that, is the providence and the mercy of God; he was in some senses a lamp-lighter who left a lot of good trails behind him. Often we thought he had more faith than he realized, as do many of the most able men in all walks of modern life.

TOO BIG TO BE SMALL

We think we gained a real insight into Clyde Anderson because we worked with him in many community and political matters and issues, and opposed him on occasion, which he always seemed to understand; and we always got the impression that he never carried a chip on his shoulder about these occasional differences because to have done so would have been to carry too much excess baggage through life.

Perhaps the thing we admired about him most was his loyalty to his friends. He seemed to be content to work with and for them, and they numbered most of the people of the greater Muscle Shoals district; and he never fretted because his role might not have been the leading one on the stage. That always puzzled us, in a way, because his influence was widespread, and he knew the uses of power for himself and for the development of the shoals area, but there was a humility about him, too, and although a man without a great deal of formal educa-

tion except self-taught, he seemed to understand that, after all, Horace Greeley was right when he said that fame is a vapor, popularity an accident, and that riches often take wings.

CRITICS MISUNDERSTOOD

But there is one thing that endures in our thought of him, and that is we are willing to defend his character. Not that we did not hear those occasional criticisms of him by those who did not know him well and understood his motivations less. We just happen to know that he wasn't given to lectures or a little charity, but that he was full of compassion and that he often gave of himself to community, to friend and stranger alike. Clyde Anderson held an inherent faith that everything comes in good time, including death itself, to him who hustles while he waits, and we never had any other thought but that when death came it would find him busy.

BOLSTERED BY COURAGE

We always gathered the impression that he was never easily discouraged; that he tried to do his best without worrying about his failures or shortcomings, for all men are imperfect, and that he enjoyed a great measure of happiness among family and friends in great use of his talents.

It has long been recognized by people who accomplish things that the greatest enemy of the democratic process are those citizens who don't give a damn. A wise man once pointed out that the Greeks have a word for such people. They called people "idiotus"—the word from which we get our "idiot." The original meaning of this word was someone who neglected his public responsibilities while living an entirely private and selfish life.

The abstention of such men from the good of the communities in which they lived was not without an immoral dimension. Our friend, Clyde Anderson, was not one of these. He was an interested and active citizen in every way in behalf of those things he considered good for all of us, and that is one of the best things that can be said for any man—he cared.

Anniversary Salute to Pakistan

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ADAM C. POWELL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 12, 1965

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, August 14, Pakistan will celebrate its 18th anniversary of independence, and it is a pleasure for me to direct the attention of the House of Representatives today to this occasion, since the House will not be meeting on Saturday. We therefore send warm felicitations to His Excellency Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, and to His Excellency Shulam Ahmed, the Pakistan Ambassador to the United States.

Although Pakistan has been independent for just 18 years, the dream of an independent Moslem nation to be created out of a partition of India, once that nation had achieved its independence from Great Britain, began as early as 1930. By 1940, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the revered leader of the Muslim League, officially endorsed the goal of establishing Pakistan as an independent

homeland for the Moslems of the Indian subcontinent.

Seven years later, on June 3, 1947, the British Government declared it would grant full dominion status to India and Pakistan. Pakistan officially became an independent sovereign nation on the 14th of August, 1947.

The early years of independence for Pakistan were not easy ones. The economy was already weak in 1947 and it gradually deteriorated with the political instability which came with the fierce partisan politics and cabinet reshuffles in the central government and provinces which continued until 1958.

In the light of the difficult times of that first decade, the achievements made since the peaceful revolution of 1958 have been impressive indeed. In the first years of independence Pakistan was an almost exclusively agricultural country; there were no indigenous banks, no industries, and practically no trained technicians. Today, despite the scarcity of natural resources generally required for economic growth, Pakistan has already achieved a substantial amount of industrialization as well as establishing several local banks and businesses. Moreover, the nation now claims a considerable amount of technical and professional talent. Such economic growth is indeed impressive; all the more so since it is primarily a product of the last 7 years.

Her political growth has been no less impressive; today Pakistan takes her place as one of the leaders of Asia and the newly emerging nations of the world.

The road to independence was long and difficult for Pakistan. That in itself makes every anniversary of her independence worth celebrating. But beyond the struggle for independence there has been the climb to political and economic maturity which has made her independence something to be cherished beyond its original expectations.

Let us extend our heartiest congratulations on Pakistan's 18th anniversary.

Reaction to Johnson's Voting Rights Bill

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES D. MARTIN

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 12, 1965

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my remarks in the Record I would like to include the following pertinent editorial from the *Gadsden, Ala., Times* of August 8, 1965:

He's No LINCOLN

Vengeance is now L.B.J.'s.

He has duly punished the little handful of Southern States that preferred another can didate last November.

With a dozen pens, given as mementoes to the cronies who hovered over his desk, he signed the voting rights bill that impose intolerable regulations on the States that rejected him in the election but leaves the rest of the Union free to enjoy its constitutional rights.

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**Rivers Warns
Of China Threat**

HARTFORD, Conn., Aug. 11 (AP) — "Should we use our atomic power to wipe out Red China's atomic capability?" Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, asked rhetorically today.

"We must get ready to do this very thing if we want to stop Red China," was his reply before the National Exchange Club convention.

"I will insist on victory in Viet-Nam," Rivers said. "Anything short of that would be treasonable."

(Washington Post)

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Judge Burnett, in other words—

that the temper and personality traits of this particular trial judge were as well known before his appointment by the President and his confirmation by the Senate, as now, and therefore that must be what was wanted.

Let me say to the distinguished lawyer who made those remarks that "that" most certainly was not what was wanted, not by the Senate and certainly not by anybody concerned with the honor and fairness of our judicial system.

Let me say to the Senate that this man's term expires next year and that this Senator from Alaska is irrevocably committed to oppose any attempt by this man to seek another term on the bench of this or any other court.

His behavior, his inexcusable manner, his utter disregard for the interests of the children whose parents come before him—due apparently to his strange and pitiable obsession—make him unfit to wear the judicial robe.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 8283) to expand the war on poverty and enhance the effectiveness of programs under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will resume consideration of the bill.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Louisiana withhold his request?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I withhold my request.

UNTHINKABLE THAT THIS NATION WOULD DESTROY COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the statement made by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives in a speech he delivered recently in Connecticut. He asked a rhetorical question:

Should we use our atomic power to wipe out Red China's atomic capability?

Then he added:

We must get ready to do this very thing if we want to stop Red China. I will insist on

victory in Vietnam. Anything short of that would be treasonable.

In this same speech the gentleman also stated:

And even if we win the war in South Vietnam, I cannot help but think that we are merely postponing the final victory of Red China unless the Nation is prepared to risk the possible consequences of destroying her nuclear capability. And unless we make that decision, it is possible that all of our fighting in South Vietnam will have been in vain.

In other words this Member of the other body really outdid some hard-nosed militarists in our Armed Forces who in the past have been advocating preemptive war against the Soviet Union and in recent months have raised their voices advocating a sneak attack or preemptive war on Red China to destroy the crude nuclear installations of the Red Chinese. The very suggestion of this is so un-American as to be abhorrent. Yet, here is a Member of the other body occupying the position as chairman of one of the most powerful committees in that body advocating this procedure.

Mr. President, the facts are that I am a fervent believer in the seniority system. It is one of the advantages of our Congress that under that system, men who have served long years in the Senate and in the House of Representatives attain promotions within the committees of which they are members, and finally some of them with long years of congressional service become chairmen of committees. By and large, chairmen of all the committees of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States are eminently respected, are most knowledgeable, and deserve the promotion to chairmen by reason of the experience that they have acquired over the years.

Nevertheless, it is somewhat shattering to my faith in this seniority system to read of the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives advocating a suicidal policy on our part, and I feel obligated to speak out against this without delay lest in this country and overseas such a rhetorical question would be taken seriously.

That the person making this statement is chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the other body causes me to fear that in Europe and Asia, among the heads of states, it might be regarded as authoritative and that his views are respected and might be followed. Were we as a nation to undertake any such course, we could gain nothing except, at most, a very temporary advantage and at a great price—loss of respect and degradation.

Now let us consider the facts. No matter what single location or several locations we might bomb and utterly destroy into ashes within the mainland of China, that nation—Communist China—with its great population, its far-flung geographic area, and its scientists and scholars would retain the capability of very soon again producing even more nuclear weapons and far better and more powerful than the first crude warheads produced there. We should realize that

in this nuclear age of change and challenge even a small group of scientists are just as valuable or more valuable to any nation, to China and to this Nation, than any existing nuclear installations.

Assuming that we could destroy China's capability for producing nuclear weapons for a short time and that we did destroy all the existing nuclear installations, how could we possible bar or prevent the access of the Chinese to the raw materials necessary for the production of fissionable nuclear charges? Assume we did hurl our air power over the Chinese mainland, as this gentleman suggests. Would we have our Air Force attempt to lay waste all of the factories that they beheld below them where they might suspect that some use was being made of raw materials to manufacture nuclear bombs? How could we do that anyway when it is readily possible for men of intelligence to disperse such installations and even locate them in cities in the midst of massive centers of population or underground in other sections of the country in such manner that our bombs could not destroy them?

Then, above everything else, it would not be possible for us with our missile power, air power, and land forces to kill all of those individuals who comprehend how atomic weapons are made. In other words, even now in a preemptive war in a day of infamy followed by other days of infamy, were we to destroy the lives of million of Chinese men, women, and children, we could not possibly kill off all the scientists.

I am mentioning this to state how foolhardy the gentleman's proposal is. Let us realize that China is a huge nation that has great diversity and a great quantity of natural resources; that there are 700 million men, women and children living within the borders of China; that China is a nation with a great history and its people have a tradition of being industrious. The Chinese are people of high intellectual attainments and business and scientific achievements. They have a great cultural background. It is obvious to all that China is now a great power and within 10 or 20 years it will be one of the three greatest powers on the earth.

We are proud of the American citizens we have in our midst, in Hawaii and elsewhere, men, women and children of Chinese descent. We have in this body as a U.S. Senator from the sovereign State of Hawaii HIRAM FONG, one of the ablest and most respected Members of this body, whose father and mother and all his ancestors were Chinese and lived in China.

I advert to that fact to indicate another facet and to indicate how foolhardy that suggestion or rhetorical question was.

Furthermore, there is nothing Representative Rivers or anyone else can do to stop China's advance. Even the grossly inhumane use of atomic and bacteriological weapons could not do that. Let us hear no more about this rhetorical question. A proposal to do anything of this sort would be foreign to the American

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way of life, foreign to the great history and noble traditions of our country from colonial days to the present time. Furthermore, it would be so inhuman and so callous that we as a Nation would be downgraded before all of the world, even to a greater extent than was Adolph Hitler's Germany.

The distinguished Congressman who made this bombastic speech gave little or no thought to the fact that were we to bomb the nuclear installations within the Red Chinese mainland, immediately Communist China with its population of 700 million and with its tremendously powerful land army would go to war against the United States, overrunning southeast Asia, and in doing this killing many thousands of American GI's.

Any self-respecting nation attacked in such a manner as was proposed in this Connecticut speech made by the gentleman from the other body would have no other course open to it. Furthermore, as certain as sunrise follows the sunset, the Soviet Union, obligated by its commitment and alliance to Communist China, and despite the fact that its leaders and the Russian people seek friendship and not war with this nation, would inevitably mobilize its forces and unleash its missiles, and the third world war—and this a war on annihilation—would begin.

Mr. President, this arm-chair militarist says:

I will insist on victory in Vietnam. Anything short of that would be treasonable.

It would be difficult to find anywhere a more bombastic statement than that. Unfortunately, this particular arm-chair militarist has the title of chairman of a powerful committee.

The President, who is Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, has repeatedly announced his desire and hope that representatives of the Vietcong and North Vietnam and other nations meet with us at a conference table, that we are glad to talk settlement and seek a ceasefire.

He has said time and time again—and that is our position at the present time, despite the bombast from the gentleman from the other body—that we should seek negotiations unconditionally, without any conditions whatsoever.

Our situation is bad in South Vietnam. It is far worse than it was a year ago or when President Eisenhower first committed our Armed Forces in South Vietnam. It is too late now for us to say a mistake was made, because we were committed in 1954 and we have been involved there since that time, and apparently things have gone from bad to worse.

Despite these statements that should never have been made—he said:

I will insist on victory in Vietnam. Anything short of that would be treasonable.

We Americans seek and hope for a negotiated settlement involving major concessions by both sides which will offer the Communists and Vietcong a reasonable and attractive alternative to military victory.

We seek a ceasefire and seek the time when the neighbors to the North and certain people in South Vietnam will

cease their aggression. Then we look forward to withdrawing our forces from southeast Asia.

Such a ceasefire or peace similar to that attained in South Korea is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Let us try to attain it.

I yield the floor.

UNIVERSITIES GROUP NOT IN COALITION

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, on July 7, I inserted in the RECORD—pages 15246-15247—an article from the Des Moines Register which purported to describe a coalition of organizations working together for legislative and partisan political purposes.

In a letter to the editor of the Register, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, one of the organizations included in the article, said the report as far as it was concerned was without foundation.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter, entitled "Universities Group Not in Coalition," from the Register of July 19, 1965, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Des Moines (Iowa) Register, July 19, 1965]

UNIVERSITIES GROUP NOT IN COALITION TO THE EDITOR:

A July 6 news story by Nick Kotz [purported] to describe a "coalition" of interest groups "working quietly behind the scenes in Congress to reelect Democratic Congressmen and to lobby for Johnson administration legislation." The name of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges was included in the list of organizations which, Mr. Kotz says, have been "meeting regularly in Washington under the chairmanship of Donald Ellinger of the Democratic National Committee."

The article is completely without foundation as far as the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges is concerned. The association has not, does not, and will not participate in partisan political activity of any kind.

With respect to education legislation, it has long been customary for organizations interested in this area to meet together with or without representatives of the administration currently in office. At no time have I or members of my staff participated in meetings of this kind at which there was discussion of or plans for support of or opposition to candidates for public office, or of proposed legislation in partisan terms.

RUSSELL I. THACKREY,
Executive Secretary, National Association
of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges, Washington, D.C.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to proceed on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection—

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, has the Senator in charge of the bill agreed to this?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Then I shall not object.

VIETNAM—THE REAL MEANING OF "UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS"

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, ever since President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore on April 7 all kinds of interpretations have been made of the meaning of "unconditional negotiations"—the phrase which appeared in his address.

All peace-loving people are prayerful that there will be a prompt end to the war in Vietnam and that peace will come to that area. But few peace-loving people will tolerate an end to the war at the price of freedom or the profit for aggression. The national interest of the United States and South Vietnam—indeed the national interest of all nations, large and small, whose people live in freedom—repudiates a policy of peace at any price. There is a price to be paid for peace and it is only with a clear understanding of what that price is that those who speak of "negotiations" can speak meaningfully.

The President has emphasized on several occasions that the United States will take such action as is necessary to achieve our objectives in Vietnam. These objectives, he has pointed out, are to persuade the North Vietnamese to leave their neighbor, South Vietnam, alone—to cease and desist from directing, controlling, and supplying war materiel and manpower to the Vietcong military forces in South Vietnam; further, to assist the South Vietnamese in ending the attacks of the Vietcong so that the people can live in peace and freedom. This is the price of peace in South Vietnam.

These objectives could be achieved through peaceful negotiations—if the leaders in Hanoi were willing to pay this price. They understand very clearly that this is the price and they have to date been unwilling to pay it. They have chosen, instead, to pay a higher price by forcing South Vietnam and her allies to achieve these objectives in a war.

The President has said that "We do not intend to be defeated." This is another way of saying that we do not intend to fail in our military efforts to achieve our objectives.

The President has also stated a "win" policy for our war effort when he declared on June 1:

In the future I will call upon our people to make further sacrifices because this is a good program, and the starts we are making are good starts. This is the only way that I know in which we can really win, not only the military battle against aggression, but the wider war for the freedom and progress of all men.

Winning the military battle would naturally mean attaining our objectives.

I might point out that earlier this year Secretary of State Rusk stated that we are going to help the South Vietnamese win the war.

There are some who say that no one ever wins a war. While it is true that war brings great hardship and suffering, it is not true that the objectives stated by the President of the United States cannot be won. They are moral objectives.



Washington Post **Retaliation by Alert Urged¹⁴ By Rivers**

The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, said yesterday that the United States should be prepared to hit Peking with everything in its arsenal if Red Chinese troops move into Viet-Nam.

Rivers said, however, that he was not advocating a shoot-first nuclear attack on Communist China.

"What I am saying," the South Carolina Democrat declared in an interview, "is that Americans must be prepared to make the decision to attack Mao Tse-tung's homeland if Mao's forces start moving."

The United States would have to hit them "with every single, solitary gadget in our arsenal," he said.

The Southerner is not an Administration spokesman on military affairs, but because of his position as Armed Services Committee Chairman his views attract wide attention.

Thus his speech Wednesday night in Hartford, Conn., which some interpreted as suggesting a preventive attack on Red China's nuclear installations, stirred up debate in the House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1965

Mr. President:

This is a preliminary report
on the illegal leakage of foreign
exchange from Pakistan.

Final reports from State and CIA
will be sent to you as soon as the
field offices send in their findings.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

Not Very Good!
L

Rec'd
Pres's office
8-21-65
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR RECEIVED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

1965 AUG 21 PM 1 46

August 21, 1965

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Leakage of Foreign Exchange From Pakistan

1. A news report quotes the Pakistan Minister of Commerce as stating that Pakistan is losing foreign exchange at a level of about \$250 million a year. The methods he mentioned being used are: (a) smuggling of some \$60 - \$100 million yearly, (b) under-invoicing exports, and (c) over-invoicing imports. In the latter two cases collaboration with someone outside of Pakistan is necessary to conceal the false valuation of the sale.
2. We have asked for a quick report from our Mission on what the Minister actually said and an assessment by our staff.
3. Based on information available here, while some leakage of foreign exchange is always encountered in heavily controlled economies, particularly where the currency is overvalued, the \$250 million figure referred to sounds highly inflated. Pakistan's total trade (exports plus imports of goods and services) is in the neighborhood of \$1,800 million, and we do not believe leakage as high as suggested is at all likely.
4. There have been allegations of leakage in connection with A.I.D. financed transactions, primarily those involving U.S. steel exports. Leakage can take place by collusion between the buyer and seller either by charging and paying a higher price than the going price, or by shipment of lesser amount or lower quality goods than is specified in the shipping document. In either case the excess payment is divided between the buyer and seller outside of Pakistan. Remedial actions taken with respect to A.I.D. transactions are as follows:
 - a. The A.I.D. audit staff examines transactions and compares them with going market sales. When over-pricing is identified, a refund is claimed. A number of refund claims approximating \$1 million are in process.

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-2-

b. When manipulation of quantities or quality is alleged or suspected, the A.I.D. inspection staff conducts a full investigation in the U.S. and overseas. Several investigations are underway.

c. Because of the difficulty of identifying collusion after shipment is made, we have suggested to the Government of Pakistan a number of improved procedures, including dockside inspections of quantity and quality; requiring quantity and quality certificates from the U.S. mills; tighter specifications; and elimination of multitudinous small orders which are difficult to police. Pakistan has now put these improved procedures into effect.

5. We will report further when we have received the information we have requested from our Mission.

David E. Bell

David E. Bell

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August 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Booklet on Vietnam

The State Department has prepared the attached material to be published as a booklet entitled "Why Vietnam?". It includes two of your speeches and edited testimony of Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

McGeorge Bundy has reviewed the booklet. The contributions of Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara have been cleared by their offices.

For your consideration is a one-page draft Foreward which gives your blessing to the project and explains the educational purpose of the publication.

Bromley Smith

_____ Foreward is approved

_____ Tell State to publish promptly

_____ Hold until Bundy can talk to me

Friday, August 20, 1965
1:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bosch Charges Against our Military Attaches
in Santo Domingo

EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs
(S)

Ambassador Bennett has replied in detail to the charges made by Juan Bosch against our military attaches in Santo Domingo contained in the [REDACTED] which Marvin Watson brought to your attention.

Bennett has checked into the allegations carefully and reports that there is no basis for the charges.

McGeorge Bundy

Santo Domingo 469

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NLJ/RAC 99-57
By cb, NARA Date 1-29-01

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BOSCH'S REMARKS AS REPORTED IN DOCUMENT REFERRED TO IN REFTEL ARE QUITE AT VARIANCE WITH FACTS AS WE KNOW HERE. CHARGES AGAINST ATTACHES ARE UNWARRANTED AND ARE UNJUSTIFIED ASPERSIONS AGAINST PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS WHO ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR JOBS IN RESPONSIBLE MANNER AS PART OF COORDINATED COUNTRY TEAM EFFORT.

1. AS REGARDS FIRST PARAGRAPH REF REPORT, DEPARTMENT WELL AWARE

PAGE TWO RUESSD 984 ~~SECRET~~
THAT OAS COMMITTEE NOT "INSISTING THAT FOUR GENERALS HAVE TO BE PART OF GOVERNMENT DOMREP."

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2. WITH RESPECT SECOND PARAGRAPH BOSCH INSTRUCTION TO GUZMAN TO "TELL THE PEOPLE" THAT FOUR GENERALS ARE ACTING UNDER ORDERS OF TWO US MILITARY ATTACHES IS RIDICULOUS. WHILE ATTACHES HAVE USEFUL RELATIONS WITH PRESENT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THEY HAVE NO REPEAT NO COMMITMENTS TO THEM AS TO TENURE OR FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS. IT WOULD BE QUITE IMPROPER FOR ATTACHES TO INDULGE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES EVEN IF THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT IT. ATTACHES HAVE NOT HAD AND DO NOT SEEK SUCH RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER MUCH THIS HAS BEEN FAVORITE THESIS OF VERY ACTIVE BOSCH/PRD RUMOR MACHINE.

3. AS FOR BOSCH/CAAMANO CONVERSATION MENTIONED THIRD PARA REF REPORT, COLONEL CISBON (PHONEIC) IS PRESUMABLY COLONEL FISHBURN, EMBASSY AIR ATTACHE. COLONEL FISHBURN HAS REACTED INDIGNANTLY TO IDEA THAT HE EVER "ORDERED" DE LOS SANTOS TO "BOMBARD" THE CITY OR TOUCHED ON SUCH ACTION IN ANY WAY. ONLY CONVERSATION REMOTELY TOUCHING THIS SUBJECT MATTER WAS ONE BETWEEN FISHBURN AND DE LOS SANTOS AT 4:00AM SUNDAY, APRIL 25 (EMBTel 1041) WHEN, ON REQUEST THEN TRIUMVIRATE PRESIDENT REID CABRAL, COLONEL FISHBURN INQUIRED

PAGE THREE RUESSD 984S ~~SECRET~~
OF DE LOS SANTOS WHETHER HE PLANNED TO PUT AIRPLANES IN THE AIR THAT MORNING. DE LOS SANTOS REPLIED NO AND FISHBURN TRANSMITTED REPLY TO REID.

4. BOSCH'S TALK OF "CASS" AS US NAVAL ATTACHE INDICATES IN-ACCURACY OF HIS INFORMATION AND EXTENT TO WHICH HE OUT OF TOUCH WITH AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN LOCAL SITUATION. COLONEL CASS DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO FOR NEW ASSIGNMENT IN US IN SEPT 1964 REPEAT 1964 HE AND CAAMANO ARE PERHAPS CONFUSING CASS WITH PRESENT NAVAL ATTACHE, LT COL KEYWOOD, WHO HAS NORMAL PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SECSTATE FOR ARMED FORCES (WHO HAPPENSTO BE NAVAL OFFICER) AND DOES SEE AND TALK WITH HIM IN COURSE OF HIS DUTIES.

5. CAAMANO STATEMENT IN PARA 4 TO EFFECT HE HAS TAPED CONVERSATION BETWEEN RIVERA CAMINERO AND US NAVAL OFFICER MAY BE TRUE. IN LATE APRIL AND MAY WHEN US NAVY FORCES HAD CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SHIPS PATROLLING OFF SANTO DOMINGO AND DOMINICAN NAVY WAS IN SAME WATERS THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL MESSAGES EXCHANGED BETWEEN TWO FLEETS IN SUCH CLOSE PROSIMITY.

6. WITH RESPECT PARA 1, NEITHER EMBASSY, [REDACTED] NOR ATTACHES

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 986S ~~SECRET~~
HAVE ANY KNOWLEGE OF SCATTERING OF HANDBILLS RELATING ALLEGED CON-VERSATION BETWEEN MOLINA URENA AND FIDEL CASTRO. CERTAINLY "CISBON" (FISHBURN) GAVE NO SUCH ORDERS AS ALLEGED BY BOSCH.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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7. SIMILARLY WITH RESPECT TO NEXT PARAGRAPH, SINCE COLONEL CASS HAS NOT BEEN IN SANTO DOMINGO DURING PAST YEAR, THERE COULD HARDLY HAVE TAKEN PLACE TALK BY CASS TO DOMINICAN OFFICERS FOR QUOTATION IN A RIVERA CAMINERO BROADCAST OF WHICH CAAMANO CLAIMS PRESENT NAVAL ATTACHE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY DESCRIBED TO HAVE RECORDING.

8. WITH RESPECT TO TWO FINAL PARAGRAPHS AND BOSCH'S INSTRUCTIONS TO CAAMANO, THERE HAVE BEEN THREE MENTIONS IN EXTREMIST PATRIA, AUG 12, 18 AND 19, OF ALLEGED PRESSURE BY AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE TO HAVE PRESENT CHIEFS OF STAFF RETAIN IN THEIR POSTS. THESE HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN MAJOR PLAY AND WERE GIVEN PERHAPS LESS EMPHASIS THAN BOSCH INTENDED. BOOK BEING PRINTED IN THE US TO WHICH BOSCH REFERS (PROBABLY ONE UNDER PREPARATION BY BARNARD COLLIER. WE UNDERSTAND COLLIER WAS FURNISHED CAAMANO REGIME WITH COPIES OF TELEPHONE TAPS AND SIDE-BAND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS US UNITS AND BETWEEN US AND DOMINICAN UNITS DURING CRITICAL DAYS OF LATE APRIL WHEN NO OTHER COMMUNICATION

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 984S ~~SECRET~~

FACILITIES AVAILABLE AND WHEN THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT TO USE OPEN CHANNELS. QUOTATIONS OF PORTIONS OF THESE MESSAGES OR USE OF THEM OUT OF CONTEXT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENGAGED IN BY SOME ELEMENTS OF US PRESS AND SIMILAR ACTIVITY BY BOSCH/CAAMANO OF COURSE POSSIBLE.

9. QUITE TO CONTRARY OF TENDENTIOUS BOSCH ALLEGATIONS RE ACTIVITIES BY ATTACHES TO BOLSTER CURRENT DOMINICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP, PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF CONFIDENCE WHICH ATTACHES EVOLVED WITH DOMINICAN CHIEFS OF STAFF HAS BEEN ONE OF MAJOR FACTORS IN WINNING AND KEEPING LATTERS' SUPPORT FOR OAS COMMITTEE'S PLAN FOR PROV GOVT AND SOLUTION DOM CRISIS. THUS FAR DOM CHIEFS, IN CONTRAST OTHER ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF CONTROVERSY, AVE MAINTAINED FIRM SUPPORT OF COMMITTEE, NOTWITHSTANDING ACTIVE EFFORTS OF CERTAIN CIVILIAN POLITICIANS TO BREAK THEM AWAY. ATTACHES ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ACTIVELY ON MEANS TO EFFECT REMOVAL OF WESSIN

10. IN SUM, BOSCH ALLEGATIONS RE ATTACHES ARE ON PAR WITH HIS FANTASTIC CHARGE TO US CORRESPONDENTS EARLIER THAT AMBASSADOR HAD "ORDERED MASSIVE ATTACK ON CITY" BY US FORCES AND CURRENT STORY BEING PUT OUT BY HIM TO EFFECT AMBASSADOR ACTUALLY PRESENT IN SANTO DOMINGO ON APR 24 (INSTEAD OF BEING IN US EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON AS IS MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD) AND THEN FLEW IN MILITARY PLANE SECRETLY TO WASHINGTON VIA PUERTO RICO ON EVENING APRIL 25 CORRECTION APRIL 24 . GP-3

BENNETT
BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

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8/19/65

Mac:

The President asked me to tell you that this is not enough.

He wants ---- "by the time I get up in the morning" --- everything "that was pertinent in the SEATO debates, everything every Republican Senator and Congressman --- and Democrats alike --- said which indicates that SEATO requires us to give arms to SEATO countries or Protocol states ---- the whole debate ---- everything Eisenhower said in office that builds our case --- the full text of his letter to Churchill and Diem. I want the kind of brief Abe Fortas would prepare on Gideon. It's got to be full and convincing.

"Then, I want Mac to get Goodpasture to helicopter up to Gettysburg tomorrow. I want him to go 'to brief the General on the ~~main~~ battle we have just had out in Vietnam,' but I want him to take this letter (attached) to Ike and I want him to take a copy of all the material that Mac Bundy is going to get overnight.

"Tell Mac to get that fellow Tom Hughes out of bed over at State and make him do all this research tonight, and his people."

And that, my unfortunate friend, is almost all verbatim.

Bill Moyers

9:50

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, August 19, 1965
4:00 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 84-18

By is, NARS, Date 8-14-84

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. I attach a rough first draft of the memorandum we discussed this morning. Will you let me know if it is in the ball park?

2. A review of the document suggests to me that one possible line of Republican attack may be that in the "good old Republican days" we planned to defend in Southeast Asia by what Dulles called our "deterrent power." The SEATO hearings contain a reservation by him on this point which is interesting:

"I might say in this connection, departing somewhat from order of my presentation, that it is not the policy of the United States to attempt to deter attack in this area by building up a local force capable itself of defense against an all-out attack by the Chinese Communists if it should occur. We do not expect to duplicate in this area the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its significant standing forces. That would require a diversion and commitment of strength which we do not think is either practical or desirable or necessary from the standpoint of the United States.

"We believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking power, and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe that is more effective than if we tried to pin down American forces at the many points around the circumference of the Communist world in that area.

"It may very well be that other countries of the area will want to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the area under this treaty. But we made clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large force including, for example, United States ground troops for that area, but that we rely upon the deterrent power of our mobile striking force."

3. The only other general line of attack which I see is that the Republicans -- and the Southeast Asia Treaty -- spoke of unified action. Specifically, for example, the Southeast Asia Treaty does not commit its members to assist a protocol state against "subversion." In that case it only requires consultation. It could be argued that since 1961 we have had a "go-it-alone" policy. Three important members of SEATO -- the United Kingdom, France, and Pakistan -- are not really helping in Vietnam, and the contribution of all the others -- Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Thailand -- does not amount to much, or so they may plan to argue.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

4. I myself think that the best single defense in all this is simply to keep General Eisenhower firmly on board with respect to present policy, and to insist that we have no real difference with him over the past. I have spoken to Goodpaster, and he feels the same way. If the draft memorandum is on the right track from your point of view, we might ask Goodpaster to take it to General Eisenhower and see if there is any chance that it could be the basis of an agreed joint position.

M. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~: August 19, 1965

SUBJECT: The Continuity of United States' Policy in Southeast Asia

From 1954 to 1965, the fundamental purpose of the United States in its Southeast Asian policy has been unchanged. That purpose has been to prevent the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political power of communism, backed by China and the Soviet Union. As President Eisenhower explained to Winston Churchill on April 4, 1954, such a result in Southeast Asia "would be a grave threat to the whole free community," and "this possibility should now be met by united action and not passively accepted."

In the conditions of early 1954, united action did not prove possible, and at the Geneva Conference later that spring, agreements were reached which conceded one-half of Vietnam to Communist power.

But the United States did not change its purpose. It proceeded promptly to take the lead in the negotiation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. In the words of Secretary of State Dulles, ^{Jul 8} "The purpose of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is the creation of unity for security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific... It is a Treaty for collective defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion. Although the United States has no direct territorial interest in Southeast Asia, we have much in common with the people and governments of this area and are united in the face of a common danger that stems from international communism." ^R The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed on October 14, 1954. ^T And the Senate

approved it four months later by a vote of 82-1. Vietnam is not a member of the Treaty, but it is protected by the Treaty under a protocol agreed at the same time.

On October 25, 1954, President Eisenhower made a specific offer of help to the Government of Vietnam. He pointed out that the implications of the recently concluded Geneva Conference "have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war, and faced by enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within." The President said that he was instructing the American Ambassador in Vietnam to discuss with the Vietnamese Government how an intelligent program of American aid could assist Vietnam in its hour of trial, provided that the Vietnamese Government in return would give assurances as to its own standards of performance. President Eisenhower stated that "the purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

This purpose is the same as the purpose of the United States Government today.

In support of this purpose, changes in the shape of American assistance and support have been made from time to time in the last ten years, as subversion, terror, and infiltration from the North have increased.

American economic assistance was followed almost at once by an
Advisory Group, in 1955.
American Military Training Command.

In the late 1950's, economic and military assistance were stepped up, and in October, 1960, President Eisenhower assured the Vietnamese Government that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult but hopeful struggle ahead."

In December, 1961, President Kennedy responded to increasing Communist pressure by a major enlargement of the Military Advisory and Assistance Command.

In August, 1964, President Johnson replied to direct aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the Congress overwhelmingly passed the Southeast Asia Resolution by a combined vote of 504-2. This Resolution reaffirmed the vital importance to the United States and to world peace of "the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." It declared that "the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom..."

In February, 1965, after repeated military sneak attacks upon US installations in South Vietnam, President Johnson authorized controlled and measured air action against North Vietnam.

In the spring and early summer of 1965, after careful review of the military situation in Vietnam, President Johnson authorized further deployments of US forces for combat assignments in South Vietnam, having

determined that it was essential to meet the needs of the American Commander, General Westmoreland.

Throughout these 11 years, there has been no partisan division within the United States on Southeast Asia or on South Vietnam. Democrats have supported a Republican President, and Republicans have supported two Democratic Presidents. Senator Lyndon Johnson fully supported President Eisenhower, and General Eisenhower has given generously of time, counsel, and support to President Johnson.

The purpose of the United States today is the purpose of the United States in 1954. That purpose was clearly stated by President Johnson on July 28, as follows: "to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement."

MEMORANDUM

(6)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-57
By CB, NARA Date 1-29-01

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 19, 1965, 5 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic -- Handling of Communist Problem

Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett reported last night on another long discussion with Garcia Godoy on the Provisional Government's handling of the Communist problem. The highlights of the discussion are:

1. Garcia Godoy emphasized his determination that the Provisional Government will be anti-Communist and aligned with the U. S. in opposing Communism in all its facets.

2. He intends to use every opportunity to eradicate the movement's growth and he will so instruct his Interior Minister and Security Chief.

3. He agreed that no Communists or Castroites, or their sympathizers, should hold critical positions in the government. He was somewhat less firm on the "14th of June" group. He would like to use moderate, non-Communist elements in non-critical positions to provide them with an alternative to the extremists.

4. He raised the possibility of permitting the "14th of June" group to take part in elections. Bunker and Bennett stressed that he should not. They will follow up on this. This may be a trouble spot.

5. He is looking to us for support and advice in setting up the units which will handle intelligence and operations against subversion.

6. He readily agreed to the need for keeping Communist subversives under close surveillance and detaining those who break the law. But he was less enthusiastic about arrests of Dominican Communists and Castroites who have re-entered the country illegally.

7. He plans to issue a decree-law providing penalties for persons possessing arms illegally. Communists would get first priority in application of the law.

8. He was hesitant about issuing a decree-law regulating political parties incompatible with the principle of representative democracy. He had difficulty grasping the intent of the proposal and asked to discuss it further.

9. He liked the idea of a "Council of Information" to deal with abuses of freedom of speech and the press. He wants to put main responsibility on media owners for self-regulation.

10. He welcomed the idea of a memorandum orally approved covering the foregoing points. The Embassy is drawing up such a document.

Garcia Godoy's response is moderately encouraging. This type of arrangement is about the best we can get under the circumstances. For it to work, we will have to keep after Garcia Godoy with material and moral support.

~~SECRET~~

huf. G.
McG. B.

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