

MEMORANDUM

(8) ✓ 40
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 19, 1965
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preventing a Horseback Ride on Pearl Harbor Day

1. I have spoken to Joe Califano, and he is going to get out a general memorandum in a week or so calling the attention of all agencies to the excellent practice now observed in some (e.g., Defense, State, and Treasury), under which either the No. 1 or No. 2 man is always in residence.

2. In addition, I have checked Defense, State, and Treasury for their plans from here through Labor Day. I find the following situation:

(1) In State, Dean Rusk will be here throughout, except for a speaking engagement (I think the American Legion) on Monday and Tuesday of next week in Portland, Oregon. George Ball will be away from August 28 to September 11 with Joe Fowler in Europe, but Rusk will be here continuously during Ball's absence.

(2) In Defense, McNamara will be here steadily until 28 August. He will then be gone through September 7, but Vance and Wheeler will be on hand throughout his absence.

(3) In Treasury, Joe Fowler will be here steadily except for the period August 28 - September 11, when he will be in Europe working on the general balance of payments problem. Joe Barr will be on duty continuously during his absence.

3. This overall picture suggests to me that there is some problem of adequate presence between August 28 and Labor Day (September 6). I therefore plan to take a longer weekend this week and to be here over the weekend of 28-30 August. I can decide about Labor Day when the time comes.

4. Unless you object, therefore, I will plan to get out of here tomorrow morning and then be here through the last weekend of August. This involves no sacrifice, and I think we will be a little better covered that way.

Mc - Fine
my love to the attractive Mrs B
N
McG. B.
REFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

41
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/KAC 99-57
By cb, NARA Date 1-29-01

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1965
8:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Congo troubles. We are busting a gut to prevent a split between our two Congolese prima donnas--Tshombe and Kasavubu. Tshombe wants Kasavubu's job as President and Kasavubu is talking of sacking Tshombe.

Our policy is crystal clear. We've been providing all-out support to both in an effort to finally close out the rebellion. Our line is that they must stick together till the war is won, or they'll hang separately. A Kasavubu-Tshombe split just now might easily cause the whole rebellion to flare up again.

But Tshombe is bidding desperately for our favor. He got hold of Senator Dodd in Europe and gave him an earful about how at least our people in the Congo are anti-Tshombe. Dodd says he intends to see you as soon as possible. This is an old story and sheerest nonsense--

The fact is Tshombe wants us to back him against Kasavubu, and we say we insist they pull together, not against each other. I hope you'll say so to Dodd, if he calls you first. If we can catch him first, we will.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

imp. 3

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 18, 1965, 8:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Max Taylor as a Consultant

1. Bob McNamara, John Macy, and I have talked to Max Taylor about coming aboard as a continuing consultant to you. He is very receptive, and we have worked out a proposed package which we would now like to check with you before it is made final.
2. Max would like to do some solid work, but he does not think currently that he will want to work full time. Accordingly, we would propose to make him a consultant at a rate of pay corresponding to his Ambassadorial salary, and at the top level of your White House Staff (\$30,000 a year). This would give him a per diem of \$115, and would allow him to earn up to \$15,000 a year. At the same time, John Macy would rule -- as he has full power to do -- that Max's retirement pay should not be interrupted.
3. Max would like to be available for specific tasks on your assignment. He assumes that one such task would be to keep himself fully informed on Vietnam, and to be available for consultation on any aspect of this problem. He and I agree that another appropriate task would be the review of the whole counterinsurgency program and organization, which he had much to do with setting up in 1961, and which now needs this kind of hard new look. McNamara suggests that a third task should be to advise and consult with him on recommendations to you in the field of military personnel policy and military educational programs. It is clear from this listing that there will be plenty for him to do.
4. Max works best on the basis of clear-cut understandings, and he is drafting a possible job description to be turned into a letter from you to him, if you concur.
5. Max is on the State Department payroll until 14 September, which carries him through this next period of travel and speech-making, and his suggestion is that he might take a little leave in the first part of September and then be available to begin over here on September 15. I will have Bromley Smith work on the question of a proper office in the Executive Office Building, where Max has lived happily before.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

6. You may wish to know that Bob Kennedy has been after Max to take on the Presidency of the Kennedy Cultural Center here in Washington. Taylor and I believe that the Cultural Center would be a full-time job, and is really incompatible with the consulting arrangement suggested above. I think Taylor would much rather work for you, but if for any reason you should wish to have him working fewer hours on our payroll, the time to say so is probably now while the Cultural Center job is open.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Go ahead and complete the consulting plan
with Taylor for my approval ✓

Speak to me _____

Wednesday, August 18, 1965, 8:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.
McG. B.

Go ahead and complete the consulting plan
with Taylor for my approval ✓

Speak to me _____

42-b

September 1, 1965

Dear General Taylor:

Upon the termination of your assignment to the Department of State about September 14, 1965, I would like you to serve me as a part-time consultant with an office in the Executive Office Building. In this capacity I expect to assign you from time to time specific tasks in fields of activity related to your past experience. Although the requirements of this position in terms of time must be developed by experience, I understand that you are prepared to give up to half of your time to this assignment.

From the outset, I should like you to keep abreast of the situation in South Vietnam and be prepared to participate in this field as I may direct. As a second immediate task, I would like you to review all governmental activities in the field of counterinsurgency (i.e., the resistance to "wars of liberation") and make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to cope with future situations similar to that in South Vietnam. In the discharge of this and similar tasks, you are authorized to call on any governmental department or agency for the temporary assignment of personnel to assist you and for such information as may be necessary to execute your responsibilities.

Sincerely,

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Care of Department of State
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:McG. B. :mz

42c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ray E. Jones

(S-5) 7-19-64 to Saigon

Ten

Dear General Taylor:

Upon the termination of your assignment
to the Department of State about September 14, 1965,
I would like you to serve me as a part-time
consultant with an office in the Executive Office
Bldg. In this capacity I expect to assign you
from time to time specific tasks in fields
of activity related to your past experience.

Although the requirements of this position in terms
of time must be developed by experience I understand
that you are prepared to give up to half of
your time to this assignment.

(over)

From the outset, I should like you to keep abreast of the situation in SVN and be prepared to participate in this field ~~in~~ as I may direct. As a second immediate task, I would like you to review all governmental activities in the field of counterinsurgency (i.e., the resistance to "War of Liberation") and make appropriate ^{assure} recommendations ~~to~~ to our readiness to cope with future situations similar to that in SVN.

In this discharge of this and similar tasks, you are authorized to call on any governmental department or agency for the temporary assignment

of personnel to assist you and for such
information as may be necessary to ~~disseminate~~ to you representative

I am directing _____ to provide you

with an office, secretarial and staff assistance and

~~and~~ logistic support to include a car and driver.

42 e

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Address for Ambassador Taylor

c/o Mrs. Marjorie Post
Lake Clear Junction
Upper St. Regis
Franklin County, New York

Phone - Paul Smiths 26-F-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

Mac:

Here is my cut at
a directive.

As to the immediate
stepping of my office I
would like to locate
an executive assistant and
a first-class secretary.
Unless you have other ideas,
I would be inclined to ask
Bob McNamara for a
first class officer of the
grade of about Lt. Colonel.

In the second, I would like
to get my Saigon secretary,
Ray Jones, who will have
no assignment after Dodge
arrives.

Will you ask whoever is
setting up my office:

a Start wheels to get Jones

b Work out arrangement

for a car-chauffeur assignment

Dean Rusk is agreeable to my
staying in State until mid-Sept.

MM

Wednesday, August 18, 1965
7:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at the State Department at 1:00, Thursday,
August 19

You know better than anyone else what you want to say, but the following checklist may be useful:

1. The importance of unity in what we do.

You expect frank, private advice and counsel before decisions are made and full and unified support after they are made. This point is fundamental, because the best policy in the world cannot be put into effect if the people who carry it out are not for it all the way. Once you have made up your mind, you expect the entire Government to pull in the same direction.

Examples: Panama 1964, Ayub and Shastri 1965, and the Dominican Republic.

2. The importance of unity in what we say.

The press are continually trying to divide the Government against itself and we simply must not play their game. Any officer who is in doubt of any policy ought to keep his mouth absolutely shut. These men are the ones who have the responsibility not only for their subordinates, but for themselves. The higher the rank, the more damaging the leak. The Department of State -- except for Secretary Rusk himself -- simply does not have the kind of discipline in dealing with the press that a President must expect. (Incidentally, President Kennedy used to feel at least as strongly as you do on this point).

3. The importance of respect for the United States.

We are not trying to throw our weight around, but we do not expect other people to take us and our help for granted.

Examples: Panama 1964, Pakistan and India 1965, Harold Wilson and Lester Pearson.

4. The importance of dealing fairly with those who deal fairly with us.

Examples: Panama 1965, Australia, Erhard of Germany, and, for that matter, the Soviet Union itself.

5. The importance of peace.

- Secretary Rusk's job in Vietnam.
- Ambassador Goldberg's job in New York.
- Everybody's job on disarmament.

My final thought is simply that no briefing paper is worth much for this meeting. The essence of it is that these people should feel at first hand the quality of their President and the flavor of what his State Department should be like.

151
McGB

Wednesday, August 18, 1965, 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Understanding with Willard Wirtz on Sugar Cane Growers --
For your Call to Senator Holland

Wirtz tells me that he has today received a report (Tab A) which proves that a fair effort has been made to find US workers for the Florida sugar growers and that this effort has not been successful. He is therefore ready to give appropriate relief to grower's requests for foreign labor. He will say this to representatives of growers tomorrow morning. His current information is to authorize 300 promptly and another 300 for September 1, but he is prepared to offer further relief on a responsible showing of need. So far, only one outfit -- the Florida Sugar Producers -- has applied for supplemental foreign labor. The growers who are members of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association have not applied.

Wirtz believes that there will also need to be a substantial use of foreign labor for the cane harvest in the fall. He believes that in fact what will end this problem is cane harvesting machinery and not US labor.

On citrus, the Secretary considers that the case is not proven, although he agrees that there may be real difficulties. He asserts emphatically he is prepared to honor requests for foreign labor after fair efforts have been made to get US labor and he cites as an example that he makes no trouble for the Maine potato growers who use Canadian workers in Aristook County.

Senator Holland made it a point to me that he hoped any favorable decision would be the decision of the Secretary of Labor so that no one would be "overruled." He may not be ready to believe what I think is a fact -- that Wirtz was moving in this direction even before my call 0- but you will know how to handle this aspect with him.

Bill Wirtz makes good decisions, although he does not make them tactfully. But men who make good decisions are more rare than men with tact.

171
McG. B.

Rec'd 8/18/65
Wed 11:45 a.m.

14

45

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2)
NR 8/18

Wednesday, August 18, 1965
10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here are two cables that will interest you. One is a Toronto Globe & Mail editorial on Pearson's troubles of last week, and the other is a report from Ralph Bunche about the troubles that U Thant is having in delivering his Vietnamese message to Hanoi, Peking, and the Viet Cong.

McG B
McG. B.

45a

Copy of OTTAWA 183, Aug. 17, 1965

To: Secretary of State

From: Ambassador Butterworth

Following is August 17 Toronto Globe & Mail editorial comment on Pearson-Johnson correspondence and Canadian aid to Vietnam:

"Prime Minister Lester Pearson has sustained rather a sharp defeat, and in that area where he is generally believed to offer his best performances -- diplomacy. Having got himself into difficulties by being ambiguous about the kind of aid -- military or otherwise -- that President Lyndon Johnson had asked Canada to contribute in South Vietnam, he has compounded these difficulties by inviting, and getting, a flat "no" from the President to a request that he be permitted to publish the relevant correspondence.

"This might not have been so humiliating had not Mr. Pearson indicated last week that he was hopeful that Washington would shortly agree to the disclosures. His hopes have been publicly dashed. Mr. Johnson would not agree to publication of his July 26 letter, he would not agree to publication of the pertinent paragraphs, he would not agree to a press statement summarizing the correspondence.

"Mr. Johnson's disinclination to remove Mr. Pearson from the hook of his own contriving can be understood. He may fully appreciate that Canada ought not to send military aid to Vietnam because to do so would be to disqualify this country as a member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam or as a possible mediator in future peace negotiations. But he is surely entitled to feel that Canada could increase rather more rapidly and generously its other aid to Vietnam and Southeast Asia generally.

"Both Mr. Pearson and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin have stated that Canada supports United States objectives in South Vietnam, understanding these objectives to be: no success for aggression in that country, a cease-fire, negotiations at any place or time that are directed toward an equitable settlement, and massive economic aid to bring viability to that part of the world.

"If Canada means what its two spokesmen say, then it should be giving expression to their words with considerably more aid of a non-military nature than it now offers.

..."Mr. Johnson is entitled to feel cross at the leader of an ally who knows that he ought to increase foreign aid, whose External Affairs Minister has admitted it, and who has been too timid to tell his country that this is what it is going to do. "

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~~SECRET~~

Copy of USUN New York 398, Aug. 17, 1965

To: Secretary of State

From: Plimpton

Subject: Vietnam

Prefacing his remarks by saying that the following must be held in strictest secrecy, Bunche confided to Yost this afternoon that great difficulty is being encountered in delivering the Secretary General's message on Vietnam to Far Eastern Communist authorities. The Chinese Communist Ambassador in Cambodia, without even consulting his government, categorically refused to receive the document. Representatives of Hanoi and the Viet Cong have not accepted the document but are seeking instructions.

Transmittal is being carried out by the UN representative in Cambodia.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-141
By sig, NARA, Date 12-1-95

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 18, 1965
9:45 a.m.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report from Ambassador Goldberg

1. I think you will want to see very promptly this report of Goldberg's direct effort with Amjad Ali of Pakistan. You will see in the fourth paragraph that the Paks are suggesting visits to Ayub by Goldberg, or George Woods, or some other high-powered "envoy." Goldberg told Amjad Ali he would be discussing this possibility with Rusk and with you.

g Travel Card. I regret it!! Tell Goldberg we are out
2. If I understand you clearly, you do not want us going to Ayub in this way right now. There is still some uncertainty in the State Department on this point -- and some talk of a Harriman visit. So we probably need to straighten this out promptly. *no!!*

3. This approach to Goldberg gives a favorable opportunity for Goldberg to say that the only really good answer is for Ayub to come here in September, and that a most cordial invitation will be forthcoming if there is a clear indication that it would be accepted.

McG B
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~

(Copy of USUN NY 399, Aug. 17, 1965)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 95-141
By lip, NARA, Date 12-1-95

TO: Secretary of State

Re: Consortium aid to Pakistan - US relations

Amjad Ali (Pakistan) called on Goldberg today to reply to informal suggestions made by the latter, on behalf of President Johnson, to improve Pakistan-US understanding.

Amjad Ali said that Ayub was highly pleased at the friendly contact established through Goldberg, and wants the latter to convey his "warm personal friendship for President Johnson." (Amjad Ali recalled that Ayub visited the President at LBJ Ranch). Ayub was reassured on the US reasons for postponement of commitments on aid. News of the postponement came at a very sensitive time, the day after issuance by the Pakistan Government of a semi-annual announcement of import policy. The announcement included estimates of imports, which depend in part on aid. Since the legislature was in session, Ayub had to bring the matter to their attention, and this inevitably created an unfavorable impression. The US move had come as an unpleasant surprise to those (including Amjad Ali) who had worked for closer relations between the two countries.

Ayub believed that any temporary deterioration in relations between our two countries can, "with objectivity," be put right. Any doubts the US had re Pakistan foreign policy could be discussed in Washington. Ayub was certain that misunderstandings would thus be cleared up. Ayub noted further that there is a large area of agreement in general orientation of policy of Pakistan and US, and Pakistan intended to continue such orientation. Pakistan cherished friendships with the West in general and the US in particular. It was always prepared to hold bilateral talks and believes they would be useful.

Having conveyed the foregoing message from Ayub, Amjad Ali made, apparently on his own initiative, several alternative procedural suggestions: (1) Perhaps Justice Goldberg could take a hand in talks by going to Pakistan; (2) alternatively, George Woods, President of IBRD, who is also well regarded by Ayub, might go to Karachi (Woods met with Ayub during the last Commonwealth meetings in London; (3) high-powered "envoy" be sent to Karachi from Washington.

Goldberg welcomed the spirit of the Ayub response. As the New York Times reported today, Conference Committee appears virtually to have resolved differences between House and Senate Foreign Aid bills and early passage

~~SECRET~~

-2-

is likely. He was sure that President Ayub would receive a cordial welcome. He was particularly gratified at Ayub's assurances that Pakistan orientation will continue as in the past; he had no doubts himself about Pakistan's orientation and was glad that the misunderstanding is in process of being cleared up.

Re suggestions that he go to Karachi, Goldberg said that he would talk to both the President and the Secretary of State about Amjad Ali's three procedural suggestions, including a visit by high-level Pakistan envoy to Washington. He would respond after consultations in Washington.

Comment: The most striking element of the Ayub message as conveyed by Amjad Ali was the firm restatement of (a) friendship with the West and with the US in particular, and (b) the continuance of its traditional foreign policy orientation. Presumably this implies continuing membership in SEATO and alliance with US.

PLIMPTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

sy Mr. Bundy
✓
41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, August 17, 1965
7: 30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on Kennedy Round, Wednesday, Aug. 18, at 1 p.m.

1. The attached by Bator, with covering papers, gives all you need for a meeting on the Kennedy Round tomorrow (Wednesday) at 1 o'clock.

2. The two men that you may not know well in this meeting are Bill Roth and Mike Blumenthal. During Herter's prolonged illness, Roth has run the Herter office. He is a Californian of the family which controls the Matson Lines -- a Regent of the University, and a good sensible Democrat. He is also a very able and disinterested man of the Yale vintage (1939) which produced Vance, Scranton, young Bob Taft, Bill Mailliard, Marshall Green, Stanley Resor, and my brother Bill.

3. Mike Blumenthal is the negotiating linchpin of the whole Kennedy Round. He is a professional economist with a sound and sophisticated sense of economic bargaining. He is much more likely to get something for Agriculture than Freeman's stiffnecked subordinates -- an opinion which the Vice President emphatically shares.

4. Agriculture in the Kennedy Round is not going to be a success story. The problem is to prevent it from being a failure that is marked as our fault.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By *fw*, NARA, Date *2-18-94*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at 1:00 P.M., Wednesday, August 18, on
Agriculture in the Kennedy Round.

Attending: ^{Van Dyke.} The Vice President; Buford Ellington; Freeman/Schnittker;
Ball/Solomon; Roth/Blumenthal from Herter's office;
Bundy/Bator (McPherson is out of town).

The purpose of the meeting is for you to hear the arguments about
whether we should:

- Table our tariff offers on agriculture on schedule on September 16,
even though the European Economic Community will not table.
We would (1) leave out all items of interest to the EEC, and (2)
make clear in public that this is the beginning and not the end
of the bargaining and that we will withdraw part or all of our
offer if that is necessary to avoid an unbalanced bargain either
in agriculture or over-all. (This is the position recommended
by Chris Herter. He is supported by Dean Rusk as well as by
Ball and Mann, and by all the other departments except Agriculture.)
- Postpone tabling until the EEC is ready to go. (This is what Orville
would prefer.)

You may wish to begin by having Bundy briefly spell out the problem, and
then hear out Freeman, Ball, Roth and Blumenthal (who is the man on the spot
in Geneva).

The Vice President has all the papers. His people confirm that he is
inclined to side with Herter on this.

A Compromise We Should Avoid It is possible that Orville will propose
that we go ahead and table, but announce publicly that unless the EEC comes
through with an agricultural offer which we like we will (1) certainly withdraw
our agricultural offers in their entirety, and (2) call off the Kennedy Round.
This would rule out in advance the possibility of a modest Kennedy Round in
which we would get substantial industrial concessions from the EEC as well
as the others, useful agricultural concessions from the UK, Japan, Canada,
and the less developed countries, and marginal agricultural concessions from
the EEC. Such a modest Kennedy Round might or might not be a better
bargain than no Kennedy Round at all, but that is not a bridge we need to cross
now.

The only way to find out if we can get a bargain worth having is to table agricultural offers (as we did industry) and start bargaining. In the meanwhile, you might wish to instruct everyone that you do not want to cross bridges before you have to, and want to keep your range of choice as wide as possible.

~~One last item: Herschel Newson of the Grange has told us that they would not object to our tabling agricultural offers on Herter's terms.~~

He changed
his mind
again.

Reading Matter

1. You will wish to glance at Bill Roth's good memo on his Congressional consultations (Tab A).
2. At Tabs B, C, and D are Herter's and Freeman's memos which you saw last week, and my note which argues that Orville's proposal is likely to generate just as much political heat as Herter's, and would damage our bargaining position besides.

F.M.B.

Francis M. Bator

476


OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1965

Re: Discussions with Congressional Advisors

This morning I discussed the proposed tabling of agricultural offers with our Congressional Advisors, Senators Talmadge and Carlson and Congressman King, and also with Wilbur Mills. Tom Curtis is out of town, but Blumenthal talked to him last week and he is in agreement with our approach. I made clear in talking to the Congressmen that Freeman was not completely in agreement and would prefer to have no offers made on September 16th. Each one of them thought that such an approach would do damage to the original Congressional concept of tying industry and agriculture together in the negotiations. On the other hand, they all wanted to be sure that the items selected were not of principal interest to the Common Market and that the U. S. would continue to have flexibility in withdrawing what offers were made in whole or in part. I read to each one of them the proposed headnote and they thought this wording adequately protected the U. S. position.

I was particularly pleased that Carlson with his deep agricultural interest so readily approved this approach. Mills, too, was strongly opposed to any suggestion that Agriculture should take itself out of the negotiations. Talmadge asked what might happen if the Community never came up with acceptable offers, and I said that this would be a new ball game and we would have to look at the situation at that time. He agreed that this was much too early in the game to decide what the United States should do under such hypothetical circumstances and we should begin the negotiations now in as meaningful a way as possible.



William M. Roth

PRESS STATEMENT
OF
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
AUGUST 9, 1965

The United States will table its agricultural offers on September 16, 1965, the date agreed upon by the countries participating in the Kennedy Round. It expects that other major negotiating partners will also table specific and concrete offers on the agreed upon date. As regards the EEC, we understand the difficulties confronting it at this time and hope they may be resolved. We anticipate that the EEC, which occupies a key role in the negotiations, will be able to table agricultural offers, if not on September 16 then at an early date.

The U. S. offer will essentially comprise products of interest to countries tabling agricultural offers. The United States has repeatedly made clear that offers it puts forward are made in the expectation that the other major participants will make and be willing to implement offers of a like degree. If this proves not to be the case, the United States will withdraw or modify its offers on both agricultural and industrial products to the extent it deems necessary to achieve reciprocity in the negotiations.

The United States wishes to again emphasize the importance it attaches to the Kennedy Round. We are confident that a fair and equitable agreement will be reached in Geneva leading to a substantial liberalization of world trade.



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

47-f

AUG 9 1965

To: The President
From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture
Subject: Agriculture in the Kennedy Round

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "Orville L. Freeman", is written over the typed name and title.

We face an early decision on whether the United States will make its offers to cut tariffs on agricultural products as scheduled on September 16 even though the European Economic Community will not do so. I have serious doubt that the EEC will be able to participate effectively in the agricultural negotiations in the two years left to complete the Kennedy Round.

Last fall it was decided against considerable agricultural resistance to table industrial offers but to withhold agricultural offers because the EEC was not ready. It was argued then that the EEC needed time to shape its agricultural system and that we should not press them to open agricultural negotiations. It is being argued with equal force today that it is imperative that the rest of us make our offers "in order to maintain the momentum of the industrial negotiations, despite the absence of the EEC." I find myself in the strange position of trying to understand why we should table now even though the EEC is not ready, when a year ago, we could not table until the EEC was ready.

You will recall that it was difficult to explain to farm groups why we went ahead in industry but not agriculture last fall. There will be similar resistance to tabling our offers now, particularly from those commodity interests here at home affected by our proposed tariff cuts.

The United States industrial offer now on the table is far better than the offers of the EEC and most other countries. To make offers now on all agricultural products would further overbalance that offer. Hence a procedure has been proposed to make limited offers on agricultural products if the other major countries do so, leaving out the items which could be of major benefit to the EEC, and making it clear that we are ready to withdraw our agricultural offers in whole or in part if necessary. This procedure, as outlined in detail in other memoranda, does reduce the risks involved in making agricultural offers now, but I have grave doubts about the value to the United States of any such limited procedure. This tactic relies heavily on the possibility of our being able to withdraw agricultural offers if we do not achieve

reciprocity. I fear that those advocating this seriously misjudge the difficulties of withdrawal.

Offers stimulate counter-offers, and quickly become woven into the fabric of a negotiation, especially if they remain on the table until its close. Withdrawals then stimulate counter-withdrawals and start an unravelling process which could threaten the whole negotiation. The prospect of having the negotiation fall apart just as the Administration was preparing to seek renewal of Trade Agreements legislation would be a great deterrent to withdrawing our agricultural offers, no matter how weak the reciprocity situation.

It is not the only alternative open to us. There are in fact four distinct alternatives:

1. To suspend all negotiations--industry as well as agriculture--until the EEC is ready to participate in an effort to liberalize trade. This is the course of action which uses our maximum bargaining power. It is fully consistent with our previous statements, and with the legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act, which recognized the crucial role of the EEC in the negotiations.
2. Postpone agricultural offers until the EEC can participate--possibly early in 1966. This has the merit of not playing our cards in agriculture and sustains our position that no final bargain can be reached without significant liberalization in agriculture as well as industry.
3. Make limited and qualified offers as proposed by Governor Herter. In the form it has been proposed however, this has serious defects. To be reasonably acceptable to the U.S. farm community, the qualifications should be about as follows:

The U.S. agricultural offers would be subject to withdrawal in their entirety if the EEC failed to table offers early next year that would provide for meaningful liberalization of agricultural trade on a large proportion of the commodities now imported by the EEC. Offers by the EEC based on the montant de soutien would not be acceptable. These qualifications should be stated publicly at the time the offers are made, and should make it clear that in view of the fact that our position has consistently been that liberalization for agriculture must be an integral part of any final result of the Kennedy Round, such a withdrawal of agriculture offers would mean the end of the negotiations.

4. Withdraw agriculture completely from the negotiations now and stake our hopes for trade liberalization in agriculture on an extension of the Trade Expansion Act and the possibility that time will make the EEC more flexible.

I recommend alternative (2) -- postponing agricultural offers while we wait to see whether the EEC can participate in the agricultural phase of the Kennedy Round. We can decide early in 1966 whether or not to go ahead on a limited basis as in (3) above if the EEC is again not ready. We would thus avoid the political hazards of making agricultural offers while the farm bill is before the Congress, while preserving the opportunity to move ahead later on agriculture. Agricultural interests in this country would probably support alternative (2) just as they would strongly support holding up the entire negotiations until the EEC is ready. I do not know of any major agricultural group that would support our going into an agricultural negotiation that does not include the EEC.

Some argue that alternative (2) runs the risk of collapsing the entire negotiation; I know of no basis for this judgment. But I recall that it was being argued a year ago that the success of the entire negotiation depended on "not going ahead in agriculture", just as it is being argued today that everything depends on "going ahead in agriculture." I believe that if we go ahead without the EEC on September 16, the world will conclude that the U. S. is getting panicky and has decided to get the best deal it can before the Trade Act runs out on June 30, 1967, and will make the best deal possible in agriculture, even if the EEC makes no offer.

The domestic political danger of alternative (3) is that we cannot anticipate any clear benefits for U. S. agriculture, while at the same time some U. S. commodity interests will insist they will be adversely affected by proposed tariff cuts.

As in the past, then, so far as United States agriculture is concerned, any decision to table United States agricultural offers without a simultaneous tabling by the EEC must be justified on foreign policy grounds. The small benefit that United States agriculture might anticipate from a limited negotiation will not nearly offset the criticism we will receive as the result of failure to use the Kennedy Round to curb the growing protectionism in the EEC. This in turn would almost certainly cause grave difficulties in trying to extend the Trade Act. ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agriculture in the Kennedy Round

We need instruction from you on an important Kennedy Round decision which might generate some political heat. The issue is whether we should:

1. Table our tariff offers on agriculture on schedule on September 16, even though the European Economic Community will not table. (Because DeGaulle has thrown a monkey-wrench in their machinery, the EEC will not be ready until January 1966 at the earliest.)

2. Postpone tabling until the EEC too is ready to go.

In a memo at Tab I, Chris Herter recommends that we go ahead, leaving out all items of interest to the EEC, and making clear in public that this is the beginning and not the end of the bargaining -- that we will withdraw part or all of our offer unless the EEC comes through and we get a balanced bargain both in agriculture and overall. Chris is strongly supported not only by Bill Roth and his Geneva negotiator, Mike Blumenthal (who is first rate), but also by Dean Rusk personally, as well as Ball and Mann and all the other departments except Agriculture.

Orville Freeman (at Tab II) recommends that we hold up until the Common Market is ready. He is skeptical, as is everyone else, about their coming through on agriculture, and is worried about the political heat if we put even conditional offers on the table while the EEC sits on its hands.

The trouble with Orville's proposal is that it is likely to generate just as much political heat, while damaging our bargaining position. We would either have to bring the industrial negotiations, too, to a halt during the autumn, and risk having the Kennedy Round pronounced dead both here and in Europe. Or, if we push full steam ahead with industry, we will be charged with decoupling agriculture from industry, and throwing in the towel on agriculture without a real try.

No one is very bullish about what the EEC will in the end offer on agriculture. However, by going forward now, we maximize the chance of getting worthwhile concessions for our farmers from the UK, Canada, and Japan -- all important markets for us -- and even of getting something useful from the EEC. Chris Herter and his people are right when they say that it is too early to quit, and to risk the collapse of the entire negotiation.

You might wish to hear the arguments in person. However, if you instruct us to go ahead without a meeting, Orville has made it quite clear that he will do his best to keep the agricultural community quiet. (My impression is that he and John Schnittker are much more open-minded about this than some of their staff.)

FMB

Francis M. Bator

Organize meeting with Freeman, Rusk, Herter's man Blumenthal, the Vice President (?) *Ellington*

Go ahead with Herter's proposal


Bundy speak to me

Ask the Vice President and Ellington to look at it

↑ This first
N

MEMORANDUM


① the 3-Cen Program.
Small



① division of domestic program
② P. and Dept - Recog. Bureaus.
639
402
232

A talk to Bill Moyers
SECRET on Freindly Program

Agenda for lunch with the President, Tuesday,
August 17, 1965, 12:30



1. Vietnam

Q 2
634
1036
1670
90
148

DR to
Harold Stassen

President ✓ (1) Rolling Thunder operations.
✓ agrees to RSM. Secretary McNamara will present proposals.
recom

President reads
discuss
3D Session

✓ (2) Vietnam negotiations.
The instructions for X and preliminary report on responses to the Secretary General. Dean Rusk will be familiar with both of these.

77. McClary
against
peind. ad.

(3) Information policy on Vietnam.
A number of efforts are going forward, but we have a problem of coordination which deserves brief discussion.

~~Frank~~ Greenfield - Sylvester - ~~Coste~~ Marks - Calen - Moyers.

Private
Sector.

2. The Dominican Republic

- USUN - 30thian

This has slowed down again, but I will present a brief situation report.

Valentia
Yes

3. Some special problems of prospective visitors
The Pope, Madame Chiang, Ted Heath, and Ayub Khan

in N.Y. few w/ Mr. LBJ

(A) D/A

④ The resignation of Ambassador Mercer Cook - Senegal

Senegals' P.M.

- welcome -

⑤ Don't protect President from offensive mail. - P. answers his own mail.

all of you

5. Plans for the President's Thursday luncheon at the State Department

Went only the area men.

Aid - { Food & Medicine generous - Chen Table
International Org.

AID people not 10 I'd
Ambassadors McG B

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-181

By iss, NARS, Date 5-14-84

File
49

August 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The United Nations Association (UNA) is putting together a commemorative book for the 20th Anniversary of the effective date of the UN Charter (October 24). UNA would like to include in the book a signed statement by you.

2. Attached, for your signature, is the proposed statement for the UNA's commemorative book. It was drafted and cleared in State and looks O. K. to me.

15/
McG. B.

August 18, 1963

49a
sent to
Ben Read
+ Wilson
as Aug
w/cover note
from
H. Chase

For the foreseeable future there will be many conflicts of interest among proud and independent nations.

For the indefinite future national and international life will be subjected to powerful forces of change.

To resolve these conflicts of interest without resort to arms -- to accommodate these forces of change without resort to violence -- is difficult, complex, and overwhelmingly important. The human race simply cannot fail in finding the answers.

I say "answers" because there is no single answer. One answer lies in the perfection of adequate and reliable international machinery to contain conflict and resolve dispute; another answer lies in the direct attack upon those economic and social injustices which demean the human condition; another lies in the literally thousands of common enterprises to exploit the benefits of science and technology; and yet another lies in the unending pursuit of human dignity and human rights for all peoples everywhere.

The United Nations was conceived and established for the purpose of finding these answers and, daily, is engaged in active pursuit of them. For this reason, the United Nations is an indispensable imperative of our time. And for this reason, the United States, as it has done for twenty years, intends to continue its policy of strong support to the United Nations.

signed 

*Rec'd
mon aug 16
6 pm*

MEMORANDUM (2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-232

By *ing*, NARA, Date *1-7-93*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 16, 1965, 6 P. M.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Dominican Negotiations

On August 9 the OAS team presented to Imbert and Caamano, and the Dominican people, the "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" containing their proposals for a political settlement. After some stalling, Imbert indicated he would sign the Act. Caamano initially raised strong objection to three points. Public reaction has been favorable.

A week later, Caamano is still holding out, although in the negotiations during the past week, he has shown increasing willingness to compromise. The rebel objections are that the OAS proposals 1) do not require the chiefs of the military services to step down; 2) provide for incorporation of the rebel zone in the International Security Zone (ISZ); and 3) do not fix a time for withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Bunker reports that the rebels now appear to be backing away from the demand for prior removal of the Armed Forces chiefs. Garcia Godoy wants to handle the problem of the chiefs after he assumes power. He has a commitment from the Minister of Armed Forces, Rivera Caminero, to step down in 30 days. This is largely a problem of face. The rebels have agreed to handle the incorporation of their zone in the ISZ by a memorandum spelling out steps for the dismantling and disarming of their zone. Bunker reports that in their last talks with Caamano, he did not raise the issue of the IAPF withdrawal, indicating he may have dropped this objection.

If Caamano leaves the military chiefs' problem to Garcia Godoy, Bunker plans to press for immediate agreement to the Act of Reconciliation. The zone incorporation problem would subsequently be handled in a side agreement.

The rebels early last week asked for an emergency session of the UN Security Council on a baseless charge that the Act of Reconciliation constituted a threat. There has been no enthusiasm for such a meeting among the members, but today the Soviets formally asked the British to call one. No date has been fixed.

State has asked Bunker for his views on alternative lines of action if the rebels do not accept the Act of Reconciliation reasonably soon. He is considering alternatives, but continues to believe that the present proposals and tactics are sound and that they will result in an acceptable solution.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

Reid 8/17/65
Tues. 10:20am

MEMORANDUM

51

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 16, 1965
5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassadorial Resignation. Attached letter to you and Rusk from our Ambassador to Senegal (Tab A) is a nasty affair. Rick Haynes and I have investigated, and find it the culmination of a long and painful argument between Mercer Cook and Washington over US aid.

Cook is a nice fellow (a Negro writer), but one who has never been able to grasp that we don't just give money away. He's been badgering State/AID repeatedly for aid to Senegal, but never grasped that it must be for feasible projects, and that decent project requests must be submitted. Instead he's acted as Senegal's advocate here. I might add that even the French say it's pretty hard to help Senegal because of its own ineptitude.

Cook has also been trying to promote a visit for Senegal's Senghor; he told Senghor that the only way to get US aid was to go see President Johnson. State suspects that he also put Senghor up to his April 27 letter to you (Tab B), which is a pretty baldfaced plea.

I take full responsibility for not showing you the Senghor letter. State and Haynes both argued that it would be unnecessarily annoying, and that we could politely cool Senghor down by an oral reply via one of Soapy's deputies visiting the area. As it turned out, Cook didn't want the deputy to come unless he brought a written reply from you. Then Soapy Williams had Cook back here twice and tried hard to explain the facts of life. They clearly didn't take. (Cook also talked twice of resigning in a similar situation in 1964, when he was Ambassador to Niger.)

I'm told Rusk was irked at Cook's letter; his instinct was to fire him, but he wanted to look at the possible repercussions first. Rusk will be making his recommendation to you shortly.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-138
By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer
M. B.

~~SECRET~~

August 16, 1965

*Skipped to Pres
at Hy ranch*

~~Confidential~~

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

Following message contains a draft Presidential statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty which Foster will table at Geneva tomorrow morning.

Non-Proliferation Treaty will be essentially United States draft, but has general concurrence of other Western powers, although British retain right to express concern about possibility that our language may be more permissive than they would like on future control of possible MLF. We consider British concern unjustified and are still hopeful of minimizing public divergence.

In any case, the tabling of US draft is important forward step and Moyers and I believe you will want to notice it by a brief Presidential statement which he could read at 11:00 briefing.

Draft
Last statement contains two points of substance: first is emphasis on US leadership in tabling draft which meets legitimate needs of all concerned. Second is emphasis on fact that problem is universal. This second point will be construed as open door for Red Chinese adherence. This is right and important, and I think it will be recognized as realistic and forward-looking. If Red China joins, she would have to take self-denying ordinance, which would be helpful to us, and while prospect of her signing is zero at present, this draft treaty and statement give US the lead in peacemaking on this issue.

Can be reached at any time by phone for approval or correction of draft statement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-377
By *ju*, NARA, Date 2-18-94

DRAFT

Presidential Statement

on the

**Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Presented by the United States to
the Geneva Disarmament Conference, August 17, 1965**

**This morning, on my instructions, the United States Delegate to the
Geneva Disarmament Conference, Mr. William C. Foster, has presented
a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.**

draft
**This treaty would bind its signers in a pledge to refrain from actions
which would lead to any further increase in the number of nations having
the power to unleash nuclear devastation on the world. This United States
draft is an important step forward. It plainly demonstrates that a treaty
can be drawn which meets the legitimate interests of nuclear and non-nuclear
powers alike.**

**Our draft treaty is now open for discussion and negotiation. The United
States is prepared to move forward with promptness and determination to
make this proposal a reality. We call upon all those at Geneva to join in
this effort.**

**I speak for all my countrymen in reaffirming our conviction that the peace
of the world requires firm limits upon the spread of nuclear weapons.**

This has been the policy of the United States for 20 years. The hour is late -- but the policy is still as right as ever. ^P In this great issue the interests of the people of the United States are at one with the interests of all peoples everywhere. The threat to peace -- and to human life itself -- is universal. If the response is universal, the threat can be met.

Alice —

for files

returned from
B. W. H.'s office 26 Aug

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Saudi/UAR tension over Yemen is heating up. The worried Saudis have asked us to send a fighter squadron to scare off the Egyptians, who have increased minor crossborder activities from Yemen into Saudi territory. They've also asked us to speed up a destroyer visit already scheduled for Jidda on 25 August and to schedule a few more closer to the Saudi-Yemeni border. Faisal has asked through his Defense Minister that we bring this to your attention.

We're prepared to authorize the destroyer visit, but not any more jet fighters like we sent to Saudi Arabia in 1963. We only sent the unit after the Saudis agreed to stop clandestine arms supply, etc. to the Yemeni royalists. Now the story is repeating itself. Fortunately, we've told the Saudis repeatedly we couldn't send another air unit to deter Nasser, if it would only serve as an umbrella for renewed secret aid to the Yemeni royalists. Should the Egyptians unexpectedly launch a full-scale attack on Saudi Arabia, however, that would change the name of the game (and we'd reconsider). Meanwhile, we want to keep the pressure on both Saudis and Egyptians to talk out a Yemen settlement themselves.

To protect your freedom of action on the above, I've said no air deployment without Presidential OK. I've taken the same precaution with another step State and Defense are considering--a long planned exercise to stage a 500 man rifle team into Dhahran for a two week exercise demonstration--as a quiet reminder to the UAR to lay off. This isn't as risky, or as expensive as an air squadron, but I think State and DOD ought to get your express approval before starting down this Yemen road again.

Approve _____

He Me

Disapprove _____

R

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

RWK.

for action as indicated

my

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT/RAC 99-57 & FRUS 64-68, Vol. XXII, # 336
By CBM, NARA Date 9-13-01

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 12, 1965, 8:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: August Weekends for Bundy

You are good to complain so little about my August weekends. I will, of course, be here whenever there is any really tense moment, and I am never more than a few hours away by the regular Boston-Washington planes.

The weekends that I am away, Bromley Smith will be here, and he is fully and currently informed on all the immediately urgent matters. He has excellent crisis judgment, and I have told him never to hesitate to bring any urgent matter to your direct attention.

Dean Rusk is not taking a holiday until after the Congress goes home. At that time, I hope and believe that he will do what he has never succeeded in doing -- taking a genuinely uninterrupted break. At that time my family will be back here for school, and I will be on the job continuously again.

And even when I am in Manchester, I will be in touch with Bromley and available to you on call.

Thanks again.

McG. B.

McG. B.

mc
I am not complaining so little - I'm
not complaining at all - I'm a good
August *N*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

rec'd
Bator
10:30 AM
8-14-65

55

Bator
has original

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 12, 1965,
8:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Francis Bator has mischievously showed me this memorandum to him from Dick Neustadt. Neustadt is one of the people who has been beating up the British for us on an informal basis. Francis cites this memorandum in defense of his contention that the British get their illusions about the value of a private deal with President Johnson more from you than from your wicked staff.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Mc -

L'd give Bator some substantive
assignment to keep his
talents employed usefully -

L

33.6

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

August 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANCIS BATOR

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jim Callaghan

One of the people I ran into when we were in London the week before last was the Chancellor. I think the President might be interested to know about the Chancellor's comments to me concerning their meeting at the White House on June 29.

Jim told me about it with great pleasure. He discoursed at some length on the warmth of his reception and on the President's insistence that he stay beyond the appointed time.

Jim said he found the President to be a man with whom he was confident one could do business "as politician to politician". Jim felt the President had really understood his problems, as one politician to another, and he flattered himself that he understood the President's.

Callaghan said further that he had come back able to confirm Harold Wilson's view that Johnson was a politician's politician and is a good man to do business with.

He also told me, with amusement, of the President's comments regarding MLF last December and "chopping his advisers off at the ankles". This, Callaghan said, amused his colleagues also.

You had briefed me on that meeting so I knew how well the President had kept Jim from talking substance, by engaging in charming, evasive action. But I don't think you were aware of how successful the President had been. He avoided talking business so well that he left Callaghan convinced he was a great man in the world to do business with!

REN/m
R. E. N.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 4-14-99

REC-1
Rancho
8-14-65
10:30 a

56

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 12, 1965
8:15 PM

Mr. President:

I think you will be interested
in this note from Tap Bennett.
I am afraid it doesn't make the
matter as clear as we might
like, but it is the best he can
do.

McG. B.

McG. B.

✓ L 56a

Santo Domingo, July 31, 1965

~~Personal and Confidential~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-230

By inf, NARA, Date 11-12-91

Dear Mac:

You will perhaps recall that at our meeting with the President on July 20 he mentioned the matter of the headless bodies. This is a subject which has concerned us since the very early days of the trouble here, and we have put a great deal of time and effort into trying to confirm the numerous stories of this type that have circulated. Now I believe we have finally obtained some definite proof.

Under the auspices of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, an extensive investigation of executions was carried out by the Chilean criminologist, Daniel Schweitzer. Their report was published under date of July 11 as Document No. 231 of the OAS. We have a copy here of that document in Spanish. On page 28 a description of Cadaver No. 6 includes the words "hay ausencia de cabeza...". We have also now come into possession of a picture of the remains of a human body on which no head can be seen. Ellsworth Bunker and other members of the staff and I have examined it very carefully. It is a very grisly scene, and it seems to me the less distribution there is of the picture the better. However, if it would be of use to you there, I would of course *send* send you a copy.

There is no reason to believe that the two bodies mentioned in the previous paragraphs are the same. It would appear therefore that we have at least two confirmations of this ghoulish subject. These may or may not be the bodies of the earliest stories. There is simply no way of knowing.

Atrocity stories of this type have continued to be circulated. On June 30 the rebel radio reported that "over 50 bodies were seen that day floating down the Ozama River," and there were rumors that some were headless. These claims proved to be greatly exaggerated. Units

The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

of the 82nd Airborne on June 30 did remove two bodies from the River. They were turned over to the Red Cross. There was talk that one of these was headless, but investigation proved the story inaccurate. On July 11 the rebel radio carried a story of 20 headless bodies having been found. The Human Rights Commission was asked to look into this and, insofar as I know, nothing further has been heard from it.

However, as the Embassy commented at the time of the rumors of late June, what had been confirmed provided sufficiently grisly indication of the blood-letting that could have been expected to have occurred had there been no international presence here. It is distressing that that conclusion still seems accurate today.

I send you the above information for such use as you may wish to make of it in connection with the President's expressed interest in the matter. I got the impression he would like to clear his mind of the uncertainty.

Thanks so much for your help and counsel in Washington recently. It was very good indeed to see you again. I hope you will be getting a day or two off from all the pressures that beat upon you.

With warm personal regards.

Yours very sincerely,

Tap

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

rec'd
Rich
6-14-65 10:30a

57

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
August 12, 1965 - 8:00 PM

Memorandum for the President:

Bob Lovett thinks you will be amused by General Eaker's column on Lippmann, and I agree.

McG.

McG. B.

✓ 57a

Lippman and the New Isolationists
by
Ira C. Eaker

In a recent column Walter Lippman violently attacked our present policy in Vietnam. Among other things he said, "The conception of ourselves as the solitary policeman of mankind is a dangerous form of self-delusion. The United States is quite unable to police the world and it is dangerous to profess and pretend that we can be the policeman of the world."

Lippman is the high priest of a new group of isolationists. They were not isolationists when Hitler was on the rampage. They were not even hawks; they were screaming eagles. The Nazis must be stopped at all costs. It was obviously our job, since we were the only nation with the power to do it, they said.

Lippman also deplores that we are now fighting Asiatics in Asia. Horrors! When Japanese armies and navies were sweeping over Asia, the present "come home" cult expressed great satisfaction when we took on the grim task of defeating them.

It has now become apparent that these new isolationists are only isolationists when communists are the aggressors. When Hitler and Tojo were ravaging peaceful, defenseless neighbors, these aggressors must be destroyed. When Stalin, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh commit these same crimes or worse, we must forgive them, we are told, as they are merely agrarian reformers or innocent revolutionaries.

This inference that since we cannot police the whole world, we should make no attempt to keep peace in any part of it, is a strange and errant philosophy. It is obviously impossible to prevent all

death from disease. Does this suggest that all our present effort to combat illness should cease?

It is now impossible to eliminate all poverty, hunger and want. Would these new isolationists suggest therefore that any effort in that direction is folly?

Lippman, in his diatribe, makes a great point of the fact that we stand alone for all practical purposes in Vietnam, therefore we must be wrong. Britain stood alone in 1940 against the victorious Hitler juggernaut. Does that mean that the British were wrong to oppose the Nazi madman?

This suggestion that only the U.S. resists Red aggression is grossly in error. Our NATO allies stand stoutly beside us on the Western front today, as they have done for twenty years. Britain supports Malaysia against Red threats from Sukarno. The Organization of American States joins us to resist Red infiltration from Cuba.

As a matter of fact, we have the understanding, sympathy and support of all free men west of the iron and bamboo curtains except a small group of communist sympathizers, a somewhat larger group of misguided pacifists, and the escalators -- a craven, trembling group which professes to believe that any resistance to communist aggression must lead inevitably to the nuclear holocaust. If we listened to these fearful escalators we would be sitting ducks for nuclear blackmail.

These new isolationists have until recently opposed all our efforts to help South Vietnam. Since President Johnson's recent television address to the nation reaffirming our Vietnam policy -- our willingness to negotiate, but our determination to stand firm -- and

the many evidences of strong, popular support for this wise and courageous decision, there has been some retreat by the Vietnam critics.

Lippman now suggests we may be forgiven if we stop bombing and go on the defensive, fortify a few strongholds near the coast and hold these until the Viet Cong decide to negotiate.

This makes no sense. It is defeatist, surrender talk. No military operation was ever won while on the defensive. This would abandon six million courageous people to slavery or death.

If we had limited our effort after Pearl Harbor to defense of Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles, most of Asia and all the Pacific area would now be in the Japanese domain.

The greatest danger from these new isolationists is the encouragement and support they give the enemy. Ho Chi Minh probably already would have come to the conference table but for them.

*Rec'd -
8-12-65
Thurs 7:15p.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

L 58

Thursday, August 12, 1965
5:30 P. M.

Mr. President:

I send along this intelligence report on the Ghana mission to Hanoi for its sheer amusement value, although in the very last page it shows what Nkrumah would like to talk about if we ever let him in over here.

Mr.
McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, Aug. 12, 1965

4:45 p.m. *rec'd 4:45 pm*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Answer from Moro

Ambassador Fenoaltea came in this afternoon with this answer from Moro to your letter on Vietnam. The answer is about what we could expect. Moro is with us, and the Italians will do a little more of what they have been doing -- medical assistance.

Fenoaltea has instructions to deliver the original to you personally, and I fell in with his plan to save you an appointment by handing it to you at dinner this evening. But you may want to have had a look at it beforehand.

h.f. B.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 12, 1965

4:45 p.m. - rec'd 4:45pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Linus Pauling

Linus Pauling has collected a lot of Nobel Peace Prize signatures for an appeal on Vietnam which I think must be going to a lot of other people besides you. His letter to you was received this morning, and I think we ought to have a prompt answer that can be put on the record just as soon as the appeal itself is published. The attached draft has been cleared with Dean Rusk and gives an apparently forthcoming answer.

There is one tricky point in the appeal: it is addressed to all the governments "and parties" concerned. We have ignored that part of it, and have focused attention on the need to persuade Hanoi and Peking to come to the conference table.

M. B.

McG. B.

*Back to Mr Bundy
might quit - go.
want it to go.
over Paul's signature
not mine -*

60a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1965

Dear Mr. Pauling:

I have received today your letter of August 10 with its enclosed copy of an appeal to all concerned to seek an end to the conflict in Vietnam.

The United States Government is absolutely ready for the meeting which you urge "to seek a political settlement. "

We are entirely ready to stop all military action in Vietnam whenever there can be an end to the aggression which has required our military reply. We are also entirely ready for negotiations for this purpose.

We have given our help and support to every one of the many efforts to open the way to unconditional negotiation.

We give the same support to your appeal. We hope it may help to persuade the government in Hanoi and the government in Peking that this conflict should be moved to the conference table.

Sincerely,

Mr. Linus Pauling
Box 4068
Santa Barbara, California

August 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached communication from Linus Pauling has been brought to the President's attention. The President believes that the answer should come from the Department of State, and would like the letter to be signed by Under Secretary Ball. I enclose a draft reply which the President thinks is satisfactory, and he hopes that Secretary Ball will use this or similar language in his acknowledgment.

McGeorge Bundy

*Shouldn't
not right
average*

*Alan
McG.*

①

61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1965

Juanita:

This needs to be done before
the President leaves today.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 12, 1965, 4:30 PM

6/12
McG. B.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A is Nkrumah's long letter, and at Tab B is a draft answer. I think the sooner we scotch this the better, and I would like to get a cabled answer out today, if you agree.

Charge Troxel, in receiving this message, did a good job in suggesting to Nkrumah that its contents should be kept confidential. But Nkrumah has already put it on the ticker that he is sending you a message, and so the fact of the correspondence is known. Nevertheless, I think we ought to protect ourselves as much as we can from a public rebuff to Nkrumah -- much as he deserves it. So I would plan to put in the outgoing cable that we think the content of this exchange should be kept private, and we should say simply that there was a further exchange of views on the situation in Vietnam, and that there is nothing in it that changes the immediate prospects there.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Ok  _____

Speak to me _____

616

A

SECRET

Thursday, August 12, 1965

Following is text of letter being pouched today which Nkrumah gave to Charge Troxel for transmission "to President Johnson and no one else." Comment follows:

"12th August, 1965

"Dear President Johnson,;

"Many thanks for your letter of August 6, which has been delivered to me by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey.

"My special envoys brought me some information from Hanoi which I did not divulge to my Foreign Minister before he left for Washington, because I wanted time to reflect on the main issues raised. At the same time, I was hurriedly making arrangements to go to Hanoi in spite of the fact that President Ho Chi Minh intimated that he could not guarantee my personal safety. After careful study of the Hanoi report I am now satisfied that something good might come out of the information from President Ho Chi Minh.

"You will recall that in my letter of August 4, I requested the cessation of air attacks on North Vietnam to enable me to visit Hanoi. I made this request to you through my Foreign Minister because, in the light of information brought to me from Hanoi, I considered that it might be useful for me personally to seek clarification on certain points from President Ho Chi Minh, if I went to Hanoi.

"Since it has not been possible for me to go to Hanoi immediately, because President Ho Chi Minh is not in a position to guarantee my safety, I am now writing to inform you of some of the impressions I have gained from studying the report which my envoys brought to me from Hanoi. It is necessary for me to discuss these impressions and certain other matters with you personally at your convenience. I am certain that a discussion with you would be of immense help in my peace talks when eventually it is made possible for me to go to Hanoi.

"From what I gather from the observations and discussions of my envoys with the authorities in Hanoi, and, in particular, with President Ho Chi Minh, it is clear that after 21 years of continuous fighting the Vietnamese want peace as much as the people of the United States. But they say they want a peace that will guarantee the

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State	10-21-75
By DCH	NARS, Date 11-16-82

independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity on Vietnam. The Vietnamese emphasized that any settlement of the Vietnam problem will have to be on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

"It is clear to me that President Ho Chi Minh himself and the Vietnamese people have no intention of humiliating the United States which is a great power and entitled to great respect. President Ho Chi Minh pointed out, however, that the Vietnamese are determined to fight to the end to preserve the independence and unity of their country in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

"I have also got to know from the report of my envoys that the current view that the Chinese are encouraging the Vietnamese to adopt an intransigent attitude is incorrect. It is clear from the report of my envoys that the Vietnamese have taken their own decisions and are determined to see them through. It may be true that they receive a lot of material assistance from China and Russia, but the will to fight to the end is their own, and needs no prompting from outside.

"Mr. President, I am informed that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam also make the Geneva Agreement the basis of any settlement in Vietnam. They also consider that some kind of a National Coalition Government in the initial stages might help to achieve a solution. With regard to the reunification of Vietnam, they are prepared to establish normal relations between the two zones and to advance towards the peaceful unification of Vietnam. They are prepared, further, to carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality and to establish diplomatic relations with all countries which respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam.

"I know that you and your Government are also prepared to accept a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva Agreement. The neutralization of the area and the unity of the two parts of the country by the exercise of the free will of the people of Vietnam through elections. It is appropriate that you, Mr. President, should have taken this stand.

"Mr. President, it is clear to me that the gap which divides the parties to the conflict in Vietnam is very narrow. I believe that with goodwill and patient effort it will be possible to bridge this gap in order to lead to a negotiated settlement and thereby ensure world peace.

SECRET -3-

"I would very much like to come to Washington to explore with you further these points advanced by President Ho Chi Minh and all possible avenues by which settlement may be found.

"In this regard, I am glad to emphasize that the optimism expressed in your letter of 30th July to me and the penultimate paragraph of your letter of 6th August, 1965, to the effect that you will be delighted to add your full weight to any initiative that may arise, is most encouraging.

"I fervently look forward to meeting with you personally in the hope that a way may be found which may lead to the solution of this conflict.

"With my best wishes and highest esteem,

Yours Sincerely,


Kwame Nkrumah

61d

B

61e

DRAFT



8/12/65

Dear President Nkrumah:

Thank you very much for your letter of August 12. I have just received the advance text by cable.

I am glad to have your further discussion of the situation in Hanoi, as your emissaries reported it, just as I was glad to have a chance to talk with your Foreign Minister last week.

In talking with Foreign Minister Quaison-Sackey and in my last letter to you, I tried to make our position as clear as I could. I have also instructed my ^{representatives} ~~Ambassador~~ in Accra to be available to you at all times for up-to-date and comprehensive discussions of the situation as I see it.

Moreover, I can repeat to you again by this letter that there is no justification whatever for any apprehension that you would be in danger from any American military forces when you carry out your planned visit to Hanoi. We wish you well in this project and we can assure you that there is no hazard of this sort.

In this situation my own conclusion is that it is not necessary for us to have a meeting at this time. It seems to me that the better course is for you to proceed with the acceptance of the invitation which you have from President Ho to carry out your planned visit to Hanoi. As I explained to your Foreign Minister, we could then judge better whether a personal discussion between us was needed.

8/12/65

Let me say again that your effort to be helpful in this matter is understood and appreciated here, and that if your visit to Hanoi produces any hope of progress toward a peaceful settlement, you can be assured of the prompt and effective support of the United States in moving in that direction.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah
President of the Republic of Ghana
Accra

62

Thursday 12
~~Wednesday~~, August 11, 1965, 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Administration policy on books and articles by those who leave us

After two long talks together, Abe Fortas, Clark Clifford and I join in recommending that we deal with this matter not by circulating an official memorandum, but by a press conference question and answer. We attach a draft which is basically Abe's, but in which all three of us concur.

The reason for doing this by a press conference and not by a memo is that we do not think it is wise to try to govern the future actions of members of the Administration after they return to private life in any formal way. We have no real power over them, and we run the risk of being charged with an effort to "manage history."

We think we can get the same result with much less pain by a simple press conference comment. All responsible members of the Administration know that what a President says at a press conference becomes Administration policy. Moreover, what you say this way becomes a part of the permanent public record just as much as if it were an official memorandum. Your comment will be there as a standing rebuke to anyone who violates these standards in the future, and by that very fact it should undercut the damage that any such individual might do.

One other drafting point is worth noting: we have put in a paragraph saying that the real problem here is not so much the protection of the President as the protection of other members of the Administration. We have done this mainly because it is a simple truth -- the President is on the bull's eye and there is really no way of protecting him in the long run. But an additional reason for making the point is that we want to disarm those who might say that the statement was designed for self-protection. The fact is that former officials who fire at a man who was their President generally hurt only themselves, and it really is the reputations of others which you are trying to safeguard in advance.

If you think well of this, I will pass it to Bill Moyers for use at an appropriate time.

McG. B.

Pass to Bill _____
Speak to me _____

8/12/65

Question and Answer for News Conference

Question: Mr. President, would you comment on the articles by Arthur Schlesinger, with particular reference to his comments about the Secretary of State?

Answer: No. I have nothing further to say about this. I am sure you all know my high opinion of the Secretary of State. But I have given some thought to the standards which may be appropriate for those who face this question in the future.

I don't believe that the special responsibility of a government official ends when he leaves office. He is free, of course, to state his considered opinion on public issues as he sees fit. He may, if he chooses, write articles and books within the limits marked out by the law and good practice relating to the use of information which he obtained during his government service. Such writings are part of our historical heritage.

But while history has its claims, my own belief is that a former government official should exercise the utmost restraint in reporting the non-official or offhand views of his colleagues and in discussing matters not part of his colleagues' official actions.

I think this protection is less important for the President himself than for his associates. It is true that a President's private statements are protected by unwritten law. But a President is under such a bright and continuous spotlight that I doubt if one book or article more or less can make much difference to him. A great President has taught all his successors that if you can't stand the heat you should get out of the kitchen.

It is a different and more serious matter for the Administration as a whole. Candid, cordial, and informal relationships among officials are essential to effective government. Such relationships cannot survive unless the men concerned can be certain that they will be judged by their actions and their ultimate conclusions -- and not by any remark or opinion which is the product of the moment's impulse and does not represent a considered judgment.

Men who bear great responsibility are apt to be under stress and tension. Not every statement uttered to friends and associates reflects their true opinion or attitude. Like everybody else, they are entitled to believe that their associates are loyal, understanding, and reliable, and are not waiting with poised pen to record and publish the off-hand statement or the thoughtless comment.

I have a great regard for history; but neither history, nor the public interest, I think, is served by the reporting of destructive personal comment -- particularly with respect to those who are still charged with responsibility for the conduct of the nation's affairs.

####

63

Thursday, August 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached request from Lloyd Hand that you reconsider your decision not to schedule a courtesy call for Prince Mikasa of Japan (the youngest brother of the Emperor) has been double-checked with Ambassador Reischauer, who is in town briefly this week. Reischauer and State agree that a handshake and photograph would mean a great deal to the Japanese if you could possibly fit it into your schedule. Alternatively, we could ask the Vice President to receive the Prince.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 11, 1965
7:45 P. M.

done by
phum
to
Lupin

64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Morse's Vietnam Speech of August 10, 1965

Here is a summary of the major points made by Senator Morse in his Vietnam speech on the Senate floor on Tuesday, August 10th:

1. The White House Congressional briefing on August 9th was "another of its attempts to disguise the war in Vietnam to make it palatable to Members of Congress."
2. Events in Vietnam have proved that the U. S. cannot cope with insurgency on its own terms but can fight it only by "turning a guerrilla war into a conventional one fought by American forces." The war is now an American war.
3. Our policy is based on ignorance of the "politics of war." Both the Pentagon and the State Department see the war in Vietnam as essentially a matter of military tactics.
4. Singapore's secession from Malaysia underscores the futility of Western attempts to create "artificial states" like Malaysia and South Vietnam.
5. The failure of our Vietnam policy is dramatized by the lack of active support for us among the great nations of Asia and Europe (specifically, "where are India, Pakistan, Japan, and Indonesia . . . Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands -- where are they?"). The "36 flags" represent little "manpower, muscle, and blood."
6. The Administration's "lip service" to the possibility of a UN mediating role is merely an attempt to "pass the buck" to U Thant -- a man who apparently has "no capacity at all for dealing with the issues among the great powers," a man who has not come up with any ideas for settlement over the past two years.

7. The Administration has failed in its obligation, under Article XXXVII of the UN charter, to refer the Vietnam conflict formally to the UN Security Council. We have apparently refused to do this because we don't want to irritate or embarrass the Soviet Union by forcing a Soviet veto.
8. The Congress should stay in session up to January 1, 1966, in order to act as a brake on the Administration's escalation of the war; unless this happens, the Administration will merely continue the war, fail to achieve negotiations, and then declare a national emergency, reserve call-ups, etc. in early January.
9. The prospects, therefore, are for an all-out war in Asia -- and eventual pull-back from the Asian mainland through negotiations some-time in the future after heavy losses of life.
10. In these circumstances the President should instruct Ambassador Goldberg to refer the Vietnam conflict to the Security Council with the assurance that we will cooperate with the UN's decision and will look forward to introduction of international troops to keep the peace.


James G. Thomson, Jr.

McGeorge Bundy

Wednesday, August 11, 1965, 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Kennedy Round

Attached is a good memorandum from Francis Bator on another important tactical Kennedy Round decision.

I had a word on this with the Vice President last night and found him inclined to believe that Agriculture is being unwisely rigid on this. He also noted that this was a matter on which Buford Ellington would have good judgment. If you want a further reading, you might want to have one of them look at it, and I have added that possibility to the other three listed by Bator.

McG. B.

66a

Tuesday, August 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agriculture in the Kennedy Round

We need instruction from you on an important Kennedy Round decision which might generate some political heat. The issue is whether we should:

1. Table our tariff offers on agriculture on schedule on September 16, even though the European Economic Community will not table. (Because DeGaulle has thrown a monkey-wrench in their machinery, the EEC will not be ready until January 1966 at the earliest.)

2. Postpone tabling until the EEC too is ready to go.

In a memo at Tab I, Chris Herter recommends that we go ahead, leaving out all items of interest to the EEC, and making clear in public that this is the beginning and not the end of the bargaining -- that we will withdraw part of all of our offer unless the EEC comes through and we get a balanced bargain both in agriculture and overall. Chris is strongly supported not only by Bill Roth and his Geneva negotiator, Mike Blumenthal (who is first rate), but also by Dean Rusk personally, as well as Ball and Mann and all the other departments except Agriculture.

Orville Freeman (at Tab II) recommends that we hold up until the Common Market is ready. He is skeptical, as is everyone else, about their coming through on agriculture, and is worried about the political heat if we put even conditional offers on the table while the EEC sits on its hands.

The trouble with Orville's proposal is that it is likely to generate just as much political heat, while damaging our bargaining position. We would either have to bring the industrial negotiations, too, to a halt during the autumn, and risk having the Kennedy Round pronounced dead both here and in Europe. Or, if we push full steam ahead with industry, we will be charged with decoupling agriculture from industry, and throwing in the towel on agriculture without a real try.

No one is very bullish about what the EEC will in the end offer on agriculture. However, by going forward now, we maximize the chance of getting worthwhile concessions for our farmers from the UK, Canada, and Japan -- all important markets for us -- and even of getting something useful from the EEC. Chris Herter and his people are right when they say that it is too early to quit, and to risk the collapse of the entire negotiation.

You might wish to hear the arguments in person. However, if you instruct us to go ahead without a meeting, Orville has made it quite clear that he will do his best to keep the agricultural community quiet. (My impression is that he and John Schnittker are much more open-minded about this than some of their staff.)

Francis M. Bator

Organize meeting with Freeman, Rusk, Herter's man Blumenthal,
the Vice President (?) _____

Go ahead with Herter's proposal _____

Bundy speak to me _____

FMB:DJW:mst
7:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 11, 1965, 10:45 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

President Orlich on Vietnam

At a press conference last week, President Orlich of Colombia ^(via) made a good statement on Vietnam. (Tab A) The State Department now suggests the answer at Tab B. We would not plan to publish it here because Costa Rica is so small that it might seem as if we were hard up for allies. But Costa Ricans could use it to good effect, and it would be helpful to Orlich and to our relations with him.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Approved ✓

Not approved _____

Speak to me _____

over Jan 67
ok
8/12/65
1255 PM

COMMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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87

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AUG 05

SUBJECT: VIET NAM

AT PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY PRES ORLICH EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT US DECISIONS ON VIET NAM. FOLLOWING ARE KEY EXCERPTS HIS STATEMENTS:

"THE WORLD HAS LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO PRES JOHNSON ANNOUNCE HIS DETERMINATION INTENSIFY US PARTICIPATION IN VIET NAM WAR. AT SAME TIME JOHNSON REITERATED HIS FERVENT DESIRE NEGOTIATE PEACE. THE SACRIFICE THAT MANY NORTH AMERICANS ARE MAKING IN VIET NAM IS A HEROIC SACRIFICE CONVINCE COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM IT CANNOT USE MILITARY FORCE WITH IMPUNITY TO DOMINATE PEOPLES WHO WISH LIVE INDEPENDENTLY."

"THE NATIONS OF AMERICAN ARE LINKED BY A THOUSAND HISTORICAL TIES AND, IN RECENT YEARS, BY THE GREAT AND NOBLE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. PEOPLES OF AMERICA HAVE SOLICITED, JUSTIFIABLY, FROM THE UNITED STATES AN EXTRAORDINARY (AMOUNT OF) COOPERATION TO IMPROVE STANDARDS OF LIVING AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS. LEAST THEY CAN DO NOW IS OFFER SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE AT TIME WHEN (AMERICAN PEOPLE) ARE PREPARING THEMSELVES ONCE MORE, AND WITH NOBLE SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE, TO DEFEND CAUSE OF FREE WORLD. THAT (CAUSE) AND NOT OTHER NOURISHES OUR ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS."

"I AM CERTAIN OF REFLECTING COSTA RICAN SENTIMENT ON OFFERING TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLES OF UNITED STATES OUR MORAL SUPPORT IN VIET NAM STRUGGLE, WHICH IS STRUGGLE FOR WORLD PEACE AND LIBERTY".

COMMENT: FULL TEXT IN SPANISH SENT USIS CHANNELS TODAY. SUGGEST PRESIDENT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE ORLICH STATEMENTS. TELLES
BT

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SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OR LICH:

Dear Mr. President:

I have just read your statement on Vietnam at your recent press conference. Ambassador Telles has also reported to me on your conversation with him and your offer of help at this time.

It is heartwarming to me -- and I know to the American people also -- to know how fully you and the people of Costa Rica value and share the objectives for which we and other Free World countries are striving in Vietnam and realize the sacrifices being borne by the people of this country.

The announcement which I made in my press conference caused me the most searching moments of decision but I knew that we could not abandon our commitments to other countries or leave those who trusted us to the terror of a Communist conquest. While resisting aggression, we seek also to follow every honorable avenue toward peace and we welcome the concern and assistance of all nations.

Your forthright and public statement of the issues at stake is an eloquent expression of the love of liberty felt by the peoples of this continent. Your support will contribute to the attainment of those objectives on which depend the hopes of peoples everywhere for peace and justice.

Speaking for myself and the American people, I send my warm appreciation to you and to the Costa Rican people for your support at this time in this common struggle.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

White House does not plan to release but has no objections if Costa Ricans wish to do so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-181

By ies NARS, Date 5-14-81

10 68
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Aug. 11, 1965
10:30 A. M.

Mr. President:

I think you will be interested
in this evidence of good
work by Ed Welsh.

mfB.
McG. B.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

August 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: Radio Interference

1. During the Gemini 4 flights, radio interference developed from other countries, as the broadcasters in those countries did not know what frequencies we would be using to communicate with our spacecraft.

2. I considered this an intolerable situation arising from unnecessary secrecy. Hence, I wrote NASA asking that they see what could be done to provide advance notice of the frequencies to be used during our Gemini flights.

3. NASA responded promptly to advise that in accordance with my memorandum they were making arrangements to provide the State Department with the air-ground HF to be used for future Gemini flights and recovery operations. They advised that this information would be provided two weeks prior to each future flight so that State Department in turn could advise our embassies in sufficient time.

4. The Gemini 5 flight is scheduled to be initiated August 19. Based on the previous mentioned arrangements, State Department has advised an appropriate list of countries who use the intended frequency so that they might limit or suspend use of such frequency during the flight if actual interference occurs. No action by missions or host governments is expected unless the former receive notification from the State Department of the existence of actual interference.

5. The above arrangement seems quite satisfactory and is evidence of excellent cooperation on the part of NASA and the State Department.

E. C. Welsh

bcc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 10, 1965, 8:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are two items bearing on Indian-Pakistan affairs. First is Ayub's answer to your letter of July 25. It is full of his troubles and not very helpful on ours.

The second is a cable from Bowles which shows that Shastri appears to be thinking hard about a visit to us in the fall. This may well be an important new factor, since if Shastri decides to come, my own guess is that Ayub will try to get here sooner still. I will ask you in the morning if you want us to do anything to help Shastri to his decision.

New Delhi: ~~232~~ 232 M. A.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94



From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan,
N.Pk., H.J.

RAWALPINDI.

August 4, 1965.

69a

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of July 25th, on recent developments in the tragic conflict in Viet Nam, has come to us at a time when we are in the midst of a searching appraisal of our own national objectives, our place in the world and particularly in this region and our relations abroad. In their determination to live in dignity and in peace, the people of Pakistan are facing one test after another.

2. I appreciate your reference to the Rann of Kutch Agreement. As you have rightly observed, we cherish freedom and peace. It is because we cherish these objectives in the pursuit of our national destiny, that we seek solutions through peaceful methods.

3. I fully share your concern for the developments in Viet Nam. I would like to thank you for taking me into confidence. It is indeed sad the way things are moving. A year ago, I had said that I did not think the Viet Nam conflict was capable of a military solution. Since then positions have hardened on both sides. You are, of course, the best judge of your interests. We can only hope that the increasingly difficult situation can be resolved and peace restored to the area on the basis of a lasting settlement.

4. In spite of our total commitment as a nation to the defence of our territory, we continue to be deeply concerned and fully conscious of the gravity of the Viet Nam War and the likelihood of a much larger conflagration. Our own position needs to be better understood particularly by our friends. Ever since we attained independence, India has faced us with a continuing threat of aggression by resorting to the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes. She took over the State of Jammu and Kashmir by force and has held it ruthlessly in her armed grip for the last 18 years. She forcibly occupied and absorbed the States of Junagadh and Manavadar which had legally acceded to Pakistan and which constitutionally are still a part of Pakistan. She captured the State of Hyderabad also through force. She seized Goa by the force of her arms. Earlier this year she occupied Dahagram also by force and proceeded soon after to take over militarily the entire Rann of Kutch, rejecting our repeated peaceful overtures, so as to present Pakistan with a fait accompli in the dispute concerning that territory also. She did not let it rest at that. She used the Rann of Kutch dispute to bring about a major confrontation between the two countries involving 30 divisions of troops on both sides and creating a situation in which the slightest spark might have brought about an appalling catastrophe.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-138

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99



5. Even as I write, armed clashes are occurring along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, involving considerable loss of life every day, and into East Pakistan flow daily, hundreds of hapless Indian Muslim families who are being forcibly evicted by Indian authorities from the bordering Indian States of Assam and Tripura. During the last two years, nearly half a million Indian Muslims have been driven out of India into East Pakistan. We have made numerous attempts to persuade the Indian Government to settle this issue peacefully, but in vain. There are 60 million Muslim and Hindu minorities in the two countries. However, the daily trek of persecuted humanity continues and, if not arrested, may at any time ignite a major conflagration in the Sub-Continent.

6. Pakistan has been in a state of mobilization ever since its independence. During the last three years, however, the situation has become much worse. India has made full use of her armed might to subjugate and acquire disputed territory. Now she is embarked on a policy which is clearly aimed at the destruction of Pakistan. She is receiving massive military assistance for the augmentation of her armed might and in the expansion of her already considerable arsenal. The prospect for Pakistan is clear. India will continue to repeat many a Rann of Kutch and much worse. For Pakistan, the times ahead will be much more difficult and even critical.

7. It has been our misfortune that in spite of our past record of correct assessments with regard to Indian intention, our friends have chosen to differ with us on the very fundamentals of Indian policy. While we seek the sympathy and understanding of our friends, we ourselves cannot be unmindful of the need to exercise the greatest vigilance in the interest of our national integrity. What is at stake is the very existence of Pakistan.

8. Notwithstanding the gravity of our own situation, our concern for an early resolution of the situation in Viet Nam is real and deep. This mortal conflict is taking place in our own region. Vietnamese and American lives are being lost every day. There is danger of a much wider conflagration resulting from the present situation. However, under the circumstances which face us in this sub-continent, requiring us to extend ourselves to the limit, all we can do is to exercise our moral influence, however, limited that might be, to try and bring about a lasting settlement of the tragic conflict in Viet Nam.



-3-

We in our own way have done everything possible in the past to counsel moderation. You can rest assured that our influence will continue to be exercised in the direction of moderation and peace as it has been in the past and we shall lose no opportunity to make our fullest contribution in this regard.

with warm regards

Yours sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

696

~~SECRET~~

47
Action
NEA

Control:
Rec'd:

6603
AUGUST 10, 1965
7:10 AM

051

Info

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 232 PRIORITY

INFO: LONDON 47

DATE: AUGUST 10 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

Burdy

SS
SP
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E

FOR SECRETARY AND MANN

RSR

L.K. JHA BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF SHASTRI'S VISIT TO US BY REFERENCE TO AMB B.K. NEHRU'S BELIEF THAT VISIT SHOULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THIS FALL. JHA STATED THAT MONSOON SESSION OF PARLIAMENT THAT OPENS ON AUG 16 RUNS UNTIL LATTER PART OF SEPT AND THAT NEXT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT OPENS IN NOVEMBER. THIS MEANS THERE WOULD BE RELATIVELY FREE PERIOD OF FIVE TO SIX WEEKS FROM LATE SEPT TO EARLY NOV. ALTHOUGH SHASTRI ALREADY HAD OTHER ENGAGEMENTS OF SOME IMPORTANCE SCHEDULED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE POSTPONED.

HOWEVER HE STATED PRIMIN WAS QUITE FRANKLY AT LOSS AS TO HOW TO HANDLE SITUATION. HE REALIZED THAT US WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE IN REGARD TO VIET NAM AND CRITICAL OF SOME OF HIS REMARKS, AND ALTHOUGH HE FELT OUR CRITICISM HAD BEEN BASED ON MISINFORMATION HE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO OFFEND US ANY FURTHER.

I STATED THAT I COULD SEE NO REASON FOR DIFFICULTY ON THIS SCORE PROVIDED PRIMIN STILL ACCEPTED PRES RADHAKRISHNAN'S PROPOSALS AND RESOLUTION OF 17 NONALIGNED NATIONS AT BELGRADE, BOTH OF WHICH HAD IMPRESSED US AS BEING CONSTRUCTIVE.

I ADDED THAT FROM MY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS I HAD HAD WITH MEMBERS OF INDIAN GOVT I FELT THAT FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF INDIA'S VIEWS ON VIET NAM COULD DO MUCH TO REMOVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN MINDS OF MANY AMERICANS INCLUDING THOSE HIGH IN OUR GOVT. JHA AGREED WITH THIS AND ADDED THAT MY POINT WAS

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State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

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By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

-2- 232 AUGUST 10, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

ILLUSTRATED BY FACT THAT PRES JOHNSON'S RECENT SPEECH OUTLINING US POLICY IN REGARD TO VIET NAM HAD BEEN RECEIVED WITH APPROAVL THROUGHOUT INDIA AND HAD RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN INDIAN CABINET.

IN CLOSING THIS PARTICULAR PART OF DISCUSSION I SAID THAT DECISION IN REGARD TO TIMING OF VISIT WAS UP TO PRIMIN; THAT PRESIDENT FELT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT INVITATION WAS OPEN AND THAT DECISION AS TO WHEN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT WAS IN HANDS OF MR. SHASTRI. JHA STATED THAT HE WOULD SET UP DATE FOR ME TO TALK WITH PRIMIN WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT I WOULD COVER FRANKLY AND FULLY GROUND WHICH I HAD ALREADY COVERED WITH HIM.

GP-3

BOWLES

JTC

~~SECRET~~

(2) 110
ME
~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

30
70 ✓
August 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Israeli nuclear problem. As authorized, our Ambassador expressed your keen disappointment at Eshkol's evasive response to your request he put the Dimona reactor under IAEA control. He got a replay of the same Israeli arguments that Harriman and I got last February.

This is one of those issues on which we'll have to keep going back hard at the Israelis in order to keep them on the defensive. And it will have to be done mostly from here, because they listen only to the White House.

But my own sense is that we can keep the Israelis from going nuclear in the next few years (though not from getting ready) because they don't yet see enough of an Arab threat. India is a much more likely proliferator, precisely because it sees itself as in direct competition with the Chicoms.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-138
By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

70a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive Secretariat

August 10, 1965

Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY cls ON 4-13-99

For your information and
files.

Enclosures:

TEL AVIV 116, CY 2 and 3
BANGUI 75, CY 2 and 3

EWK
Let's be sure
I know where of this
return / my

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

AUG 10 1965

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

70-8

706

4

~~SECRET~~

Action

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 116

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~~SECRET~~ AUGUST 10

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 99-137

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

002

EXDIS

DEPTEL 103.

IN MEETING LAST EVENING I TOLD P.M. ESHKOL OF PRESIDENT'S VEEN
DISAPPOINTMENT AT HIS RESPONSE TO LETTER OF MAY 21 RE IAEA CONTROLS.
I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT I HAD FAILED TO GET ACROSS IMPORTANCE
WE ATTACH TO THIS PROBLEM AND ITS SPECIAL ASPECTS WHICH TRANSCEND
NORMAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND ALSO INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF SITUATION AND PARTICULAR COMPLICATION
PREVAILING THIS TIME I WAS NOT DISPONSED TO PRESS HIM FURTHER PRIOR TO
FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS BUT I WOULD TAKE UP AT EARLIEST MOMENT PROMISE
CONTAINED HIS RESPONSE THAT NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH I FELT WOULD BE ONE

PAGE TWO RUQML 335A ~~SECRET~~
FORMED BY HIM, WOULD GIVE URGENT FURTHER THOUGH TO MAKING PROGRESS
IN MATTER.

I SAID FURTHER THAT I WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED AT PROSPECT THAT
FAILURE MAKE PROGRESS WOULD PRODUCE CLOUD OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS OVER
US-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND HIS OWN RELATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
AND UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

ESHKOL EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING, PARTICULARLY HIS REGRET AT
IMPLICATIONS OF LATTER COMMENT, AND AGREED THAT HE WOULD GIVE
MATTER FURTHER PROFOUND THOUGHT WHEN AND IF HE FORMED NEW GOVERNMENT.
HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO REITERATE HIS PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITION
THAT BEST HE COULD NOW SEE ISRAEL DOING WAS TO MAINTAIN COMMITMENT
NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE FIRST TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
HE COUNTERED MY ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL AS BEST-FRIEND OF

U.S. SHOULD BE FIRST TO COOPERATE WITH US IN REMOVING THREAT OF
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BY SAYING HE DOES NOT RPT NOT TRUST INDIA NOR

~~SECRET~~

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AUG 10 1965

~~SECRET~~

-2- 116, AUGUST 10, FROM TEL AVIV

AND THUS

OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS / ON CONTRARY ISRAEL
SHOULD BE LAST . AS TO HIS STANDARD CONTENTION THAT OPTION
OF MAKING WEAPON IS VALUABLE DETERRENT TO NASSER, I ARGUED
THAT THIS DOUBTFUL IN MY MIND SINCE I COULD NOT SEE ISRAEL

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 335A ~~SECRET~~
USING WEAPON EXCEPT AS RETALIATION AT WHICH TIME IT TOO LATE.
HIS REACTION SUGGESTED THIS LINE MAY HAVE MADE IMPRESSION.
IN ANY EVENT I REPEATED POINT THAT NUCLEAR EQUATION TRANSCENDS
HIS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS TOWAISYNASSER AND AGAIN URGED
IMPORTANCE MAKING PROGRESS PROBLEM EARLIEST POSSIBLE. HE AGREED.

IT OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE ASSESS WHETHER CONVERSATION
MADE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPRESSION. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT
IT WORTHWHILE EXERCISE. P. M. WAS MORE TIRED PHYSICALLY
THAN I HAVE HERETOFORE NOTICED HIM AND CLEARLY ALMOST WHOLLY
PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE WHICH HE REMARKED
BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT DAILY. NEVERTHELESS, HE UNQUESTIONABLY
IMPRESSED BY AND UNHAPPY TO BE CAUSE OF PRESIDENT'S DISAPPOINTMENT.

GP-3

BARBOUR

(#)-OMISSION. CORRECTION TO-FOLLOW-MADE

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217
EO 13526-1
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 10, 1965

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon

Porter This remains the most important overseas appointment we have, after Lodge himself -- and precisely because of Lodge himself. Dean Rusk and my brother have been working on it all week, and Dean will be talking to Lodge before we meet. The two possibilities are Bill Sullivan, whom you know, and Ambassador Porter, who has been in Algiers and is currently slated for Saudi Arabia. I believe most of the State Department people now favor Porter, and McNamara and I are still unrepentantly for Sullivan. Dean Rusk will present the matter for discussion.

done
2. The Zorthian appointment


If you and Secretary Rusk have not settled this to your satisfaction, this meeting may be a good time to do it.

4
3. A letter from Mike Pearson and a Canadian request

Pearson has written what is for him a relatively forthcoming letter to you about aid to Vietnam, and he would like, with your agreement, to put out both his letter and part of yours in order to deal with an internal political problem.

Y
4. American troop behavior in Vietnam

This is going to be a major political problem, at least internationally, if not in Vietnam itself, and Bob McNamara has undertaken to have another look at it and will give an up-to-date account of the problem as he sees it.

Review


Wait
6. Possible East-West Trade legislation

Again you have asked me to speak to you about this, and it will be useful to do it when Dean is present.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

7. Enlarging the Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs

*Don't
have
can or
me* The State Department has suggested this course of action, and we need your approval in principle. In particular, there are a couple of names that I think we might helpfully add promptly.

8. The discussions in Geneva

I will give a brief account of the situation there. It begins to look as if we have a chance of avoiding a foolish run-in with the British on the non-proliferation problem.

9. The Pakistani problem

*a DS
swing around
the world* Dean Rusk wants to review with you his plan for a briefing for the British Ambassador, and also the possibility of sending Harriman out to Pakistan and India.

10. Aid Legislation

Dean Rusk wants to review with you his memorandum on Aid Legislation of August 6, of which I will have copies. (A copy went to Camp David on Saturday.)

*Japanese
much too* 11. We need your counsel on the advisability of having a committee of Governors go on from their scheduled trip to Japan to Vietnam. Dean Rusk will be prepared to present the State Department's views -- there may be a difficulty in connecting Japan and Vietnam in this way.

12. If we have time, I would like to get a reading on your current thinking about the Arthur Dean Committee, in the light of the McCloy letter.

McG. B.

Free

A keeps saying around

lets for him to go around the country

as much money as you can.

needs a job

Consultant

~~SECRET~~

RSM.

*P. SAM difficulties are considerable
authority is still not quite enough.*

MEMORANDUM

✓ 73

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 9, 1965
10:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Arthur Goldberg

Arthur Goldberg gave me this memorandum for you this morning. We might have a preliminary discussion of it at lunch tomorrow, and then have a somewhat larger meeting with Arthur included before he goes to New York Wednesday evening.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment - to Ed for file (Vietnam)

MEMORANDUM

✓ 74

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 9, 1965
9:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan

The attached roundup on Pakistan from Komer may be out of date, in that he does not know of your talk with Dean Rusk about sending Harriman. Nevertheless, it contains some background information that may be of interest, and the Canadian dispatch shows Ayub's current frame of mind.

M. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

742
August 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Pakistan Roundup. Our Embassy says the Paks are at it again criticising the consortium postponement (Karachi 193 attached). Bhutto just gave another speech criticising our aid to India over Pak protests. He blamed the US for the aid "stoppage," but said it wasn't aid anyway because it was loans which had to be repaid with heavy interest.

Since in fact we haven't stopped aid, only postponed new FY'66 commitments, would you see merit in discreetly letting out this fact (we have almost \$300 million in old aid in the pipeline, are still shipping last year's wheat, etc.)?

Canada's High Commissioner, who saw Ayub recently, is slightly more optimistic than our Embassy (Karachi 183 attached). He sees Ayub as at least admitting Pakistan might have been "guilty of some excesses."

Pak pressure on Kashmir. We have good evidence that the Paks are stepping up infiltration into Kashmir, which could build up to a good-sized flap. The Indians are again threatening "strong countermeasures." This could be the Rann of Kutch all over again, with each side alleging the other is misusing our MAP arms.

Iran's Ambassador to Pakistan, a shrewd observer, says that Bhutto admitted his policy is based on the assumption that the US will be forced out of Vietnam and that Pakistan had better accommodate to an increasingly powerful Red China.

Suspending Peshawar Construction. Bundy and I have pushed this, but our intelligence people claim it wouldn't be understood. It's up to Rusk and McNamara.

Ayub Visit. Shoaib told the Australian Hicom that it was up to the big power, not the little one, to take the initiative for improving relations. We've sent your "message" via John Bonny, Goldberg has talked with the Pak at the UN, and we are waiting for Rusk to activate the promising UK circuit. You may want to raise this at Tuesday lunch.

In sum, it's too early yet to tell whether we're moving the Paks. If we don't get some indications in the next week or so, however, we may want to step up our effort another notch.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NIS/PAC 88-57 + F245, 148, 100, #165
By: CBW, NARA, Date: 9-13-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2-S

~~SECRET~~

Action P R 080745Z
NEA FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 193
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI 42
SS RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 18
G STATE GRNC
BT
SP ~~SECRET~~ AUG 8
SAH
L REF: EMBTEL 175

SEAR P CONSORTIUM POSTPONEMENT
EUR
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
AID
E

RSR IN VIEW OF THIS CONTINUING SITUATION AND LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION SINCE JULY 3, I BELIEVE I SHOULD SEEK FORMAL APPOINTMENT WITH PRES AYUB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. DEPT. WILL RECALL PREVIOUS ATTEMPT ARRANGE INFORMAL MEETING WITH PRES DURING COURSE 18-DAY PINDI STAY FRUITLESS. AS RESULT UNABLE TO DATE TO CONVEY DIRECTLY TO AYUB SUBSTANCE DEPT'S 105 TO KARACHI IN WHICH DEPT DESCRIBED UNFAVORABLE EFFECTS OF GOP OVER-REACTION ON WASHINGTON OPINION.

I THEREFORE NOW PROPOSE TO CONVEY TO PRES AYUB SENSE OF ABOVE MESSAGE ELABORATING ON UNFORTUNATE EFFECT GOP PRESENT CAMPAIGN LIKELY HAVE ON CURRENT STATE PAK-US RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY I WOULD WANT MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT PRESENT ATMOSPHERE IS NOT AT ALL CONDUCTIVE TO EFFORTS TO GET OUR RELATIONS BACK ON EVEN KEEL. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT AT THIS MEETING TO BE ABLE ALSO TO GIVE PRES AYUB AN INDICATION OF OUR PLANS FOR BLACK OR WOODS VISIT. I WOULD ENSURE THAT AYUB UNDERSTANDS THAT PROSPECTS FOR FRUITFUL OUTCOME, ON WHICH WE COULD SEEK REBUILD RELATION OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, WOULD BE OF COURSE DIMINISHED IF VISIT SURROUNDED BY ANYTHING RESEMBLING PRESENT DRUMFIRE OF OFFICIAL AND PRESS CRITICISM.

GP-3 MCCONAUGHY

1965 AUG 8 PM 0551 00

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
EGGMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KORNER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

Consent

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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74-c

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-137

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEIN
KROMER
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1965 AUG 6 PM 12 40

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FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (183)
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA TWO
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BT

~~SECRET~~ AUGUST 6

LIMDIS

CANADIAN REPORT ON AYUB REACTION TO CONSORTIUM POSTPONEMENT.

1. CANADIAN HICOM STEPHENS HAS GIVEN ME GENERAL SUMMARY OF A PORTION OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT AYUB AUGUST 2 DEALING WITH PAK-US RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY CONSORTIUM POSTPONEMENT.

2. STEPHENS DESCRIBED AYUB AS BEING IN REASONABLE MOOD AND AS SPEAKING WITH DIGNITY, CALMNESS AND BASIC GOOD WILL TOWARD US, ALTHOUGH STILL INDIGNANT OVER ALLEGED INCONSIDERATE TREATMENT BY US.

3. HE TOOK STEPHENS TO A GLOBE TO SHOW HOW PAKISTAN IS HEMMED IN

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 338-~~SECRET~~

BY THREE LARGE AND PREDATORY NEIGHBORS. SAID IT HAD TO BE FUNDAMENTAL PAK POLICY TO AVOID GIVING THESE POWERFUL NEIGHBORS ANY TEMPTATION OR EXCUSE FOR ATTACKING PAKISTAN. HE ACCUSED USG OF FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THIS AND OF INSENSITIVITY TO CONSEQUENCES OF ARMAMENT OF INDIA. HE SAID PAKISTAN WAS WELL AWARE OF DANGERS OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NO INTENTION OF GOING BEYOND SAFETY POINT. HE SAID AIM OF "NORMALIZATION" POLICY WAS NOTHING MORE THAN ESTABLISHMENT OF CLEAR POSTURE OF NON-PROVOCATION WHICH WAS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIABLE SECURITY PRECAUTION. SAID PAKISTAN WOULD NEVER GO WAY OF BURMA, WHICH HE CONSIDERED AS DEPRIVED OF ALL FREEDOM OF ACTION AND TOTALLY LOST AS INDEPENDENT NATION; NOR WOULD PAKISTAN FOLLOW CAMBODIAN PATH. HE SAID WEST RPT WEST PAKISTAN AND IRAN WERE ABSOLUTELY FIRM AGAINST COMMUNIST PRESSURES.

4. STEPHENS QUOTED AYUB AS BEING VERY PESSIMISTIC ON VIET NAM OUTLOOK. AYUB PREDICTED PROLONGED AND COSTLY MILITARY DEADLOCK IN

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 183, AUGUST 6, FROM KARACHI

VIET NAM, WITH COMMUNISTS UNABLE TO DISLODGE US FORCES BUT STILL REJECTING NEGOTIATIONS; AND US UNABLE TO PUT AND END TO COMMUNIST EXTERNAL SUPPORT OF VIET CONG WITHOUT INCURRING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS OF GENERAL CONFLAGRATION. AYUB APPARENTLY GAVE NO SIGN OF

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 338 ~~SECRET~~

ANY GOP INCLINATION TO TAKE SIDES PUBLICLY IN THIS SITUATION AS HE ANALYZED IT.

5. STEPHENS REPORTED THAT AYUB STRONGLY AFFIRMED HIS ESSENTIAL GOOD WILL TOWARD US AND HIS CONVICTION THAT US WAS NATURAL ALLY FOR PAKISTAN AND ONLY LARGE AID-GIVING COUNTRY WHICH HAD NO DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN. HE STATED AN EMPHATIC DESIRE FOR RESTORATION OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH US AND HIS OPTIMISM THAT EVENTUALLY RESTORATION WOULD OCCUR. BUT HE PROFESSED PUZZLEMENT AS TO HOW TO PROCEED IN PRESENT SITUATION. HE ACCUSED US OF WISHING TO UTILIZE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO FORCE CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY OF GOP. HE THOUGHT THE CHANGES WHICH THE US WANTED TO BRING ABOUT WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH GOP EXTERNAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS HE HAD OUTLINED, AND HE OBJECTED TO THE INVOCATION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES IN ANY EVENT. HE SAID PAKISTAN COULD NOT YIELD ON THIS PRINCIPLE, AND HE INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THAT A BASIS PRESENTLY EXISTED FOR A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

6. STEPHENS TOLD ME THAT HE EXPRESSED TO AYUB CANADA'S GREAT REGRET THAT GOP HAD CHOSEN TO PUBLICIZE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH US IN WAY WHICH HAD NEEDLESSLY EXCITED ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AMONG

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 338 ~~SECRET~~

PRESS AND PUBLIC. HE TOLD AYUB THAT HE FELT DIFFERENCES COULD MUCH MORE READILY HAVE BEEN IRONED OUT IF ENTIRE MATTER HAD BEEN HANDLED ON STRICTLY PRIVATE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS, AS AMERICANS NO DOUBT HAD ANTICIPATED. HE SAID AYUB ADMITTED THAT PERHAPS GOP WAS GUILTY OF SOME EXCESSES BUT HE LAID MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT TROUBLES AT DOOR OF US.

7. ACCORDING TO STEPHENS, AYUB MADE PITCH FOR SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SURPLUS FOOD AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CANADA IF US ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN SHOULD BE CUT OFF.

~~SECRET~~

5
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4523
CORRECTION ISSUED: 8/7/65, 2:45 a.m., HC
~~SECRET~~

-3- 183, AUGUST 6, FROM KARACHI - CORRECTED PAGE 3

WHEN STEPHENS SHOWED UNCONCEALED SURPRISE AT MENTION OF MILITARY AID, AYUB SMILINGLY REPHRASED HIS REQUEST TO OMIT MILITARY PART.

8. STEPHENS REPORTED GOP AS BEING VERY GRATEFUL FOR CANADIAN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASE IN ITS CONTEMPLATED CONTRIBUTION TO PAKISTAN CONSORTIUM FOR NEW FISCAL YEAR. HE SAID GOP HAS DECIDED TO PLAY THIS NEWS IN RATHER LOW KEY RATHER THAN WITH EXCEPTIONAL FANFARE. STEPHENS INTERPRETS THIS AS INDICATION THAT PAKS ARE BEGINNING TO DESIST FROM THEIR APPARENT EARLIER SCHEME TO DIVIDE US FROM ITS CONSORTIUM PARTNERS.

9. STEPHENS TAKES RATHER HOPEFUL VIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTION OF PAK-US IMPASSE, BASED ON HIS HIGH ESTIMATION OF AYUB'S

PAGE FIVE RUSBKP 338 ~~SECRET~~

SOUNDNESS AND STATESMANLIKE QUALITIES, AND ON EVIDENT COOLING DOWN OF AYUB'S ANGER, AND AYUB'S EXPRESSION OF SOME FRIENDLY AND CONCILIATORY SENTIMENTS ABOUT US. STEPHENS SEEMS TO OVERLOOK COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGN OF AYUB FLEXIBILITY ON BASIC DIFFICULTY, AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TO OPEN UP A CHANNEL FOR GETTING MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE STARTED. STEPHENS DESCRIBED AYUB AS STILL RESENTFUL AT TREATMENT HE HAS RECEIVED, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING POSTPONEMENT OF SCHEDULED APRIL VISIT. HE ALSO DESCRIBED AYUB AS UNFORTUNATELY INCLINED TO DISCOUNT ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER US AGENCIES IN DEALING WITH PRESENT CRISIS. STEPHENS THINKS AYUB ASSUMES THAT EVERYTHING MUST BE HANDLED DIRECTLY WITH WHITE HOUSE AND THAT LITTLE CAN BE DONE WHILE HE IS OUT OF EFFECTIVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH WHITE HOUSE.

10. STEPHENS THINKS AYUB ASSUMED AND INTENDED THAT GIST OF THIS CONVERSATION WOULD BE PASSED ON TO US. STEPHENS CREDITS AYUB WITH INTENTION THUS OF EXTENDING LEFT-HANDED AND GRUDGINGLY A SMALL OLIVE BRANCH.

GP-2.

MCCONAUGHY
BT

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd
8-9-65
9:55 am
(for Bob Komer)

(2)

75

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 9, 1965, 9:45 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A short report from Governor Ellington attached herewith gives a good birds-eye view of some of the contingency plans being looked at in the Office of Emergency Planning to anticipate possible emergency requirements.

A copy of the report was sent to Secretary McNamara with a suggestion that it is important OEP be given adequate guidance to permit it to fulfill its function of providing coordinated civilian support to the defense effort.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

This document regraded
UNCLASSIFIED when
separated from enclosures.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY DCH ON 11-30-82

~~SECRET~~

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING RECEIVED
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1965 AUG 3 PM 12 14
AUG 2 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is a summary of readiness to put into effect civilian mobilization measures as necessary to support an increased military commitment to Vietnam.

- . The Nation faces the present situation with greater economic strength and preparedness to mobilize our civilian effort in support of national defense than ever before in our history.
- . The Defense Production Act of 1950 contains authority to meet the immediate problems of the buildup. It provides for priorities and allocations and other actions for expediting defense production. Authorities for price and wage stabilization have expired. Legislative proposals are ready if needed.
- . The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning coordinates, on behalf of the President, all mobilization activities of the Executive branch. Executive Order 10480 gives him the priorities and allocations authorities conferred upon the President by Title I of the Defense Production Act.
- . The Defense Materials System provides machinery for expediting and allocating materials for defense production. It is administered by the Business and Defense Services Administration (Department of Commerce) under redelegation from the Director of OEP. It successfully supports Defense, AEC, and NASA programs today, and can be expanded.
- . Although the economy may be able, in general terms, to accommodate a stepped-up military effort, there will be instances where specific industries, materials, components, or facilities will require action under the Defense Production Act to facilitate production.
- . The state of our strategic and critical materials stockpiles, having a market value of about \$8 billion, is very good. Sixty-three of the 77 stockpiled materials equal or exceed stockpile objectives for limited or conventional war. Although the inventories for the remaining 14

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Authority FEMA Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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materials are adequate to meet a limited war of short duration, they should be brought to the level of established stockpile objectives, and we are taking steps to this end without unduly affecting markets.

- . We are in touch with the Council of Economic Advisors and other agencies to watch economic indices affecting mobilization.
- . Economic stabilization measures are of two types--indirect controls and direct controls. Indirect include: taxes, credit controls, and other monetary measures within the responsibility of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board. Some of these measures are part of our day-to-day economic system.

Direct controls include those for prices, wages and salaries, and rents as well as rationing. Authority for such controls does not exist today. Legislative proposals are kept ready, but capability to administer these controls does not exist since substantial national organizations would be required. Preliminary plans and arrangements have been developed as a part of our regular preparedness. A national organization could be established and in operation in a period of 60 - 90 days.

- . No major national manpower problem is foreseen. Manpower shortages, to the extent they would exist, would be in critical skills and localized. These shortages could generally be met through existing voluntary manpower measures already established by the Department of Labor and endorsed by the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee. Care will have to be exercised in meeting military requirements for medical personnel to minimize the effect on civilian communities. Selective Service is ready to meet increased calls for military personnel.
- . In the transportation field there are three areas of possible shortages: ocean shipping (where the Maritime Administration has already pulled 14 ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet), air cargo, and rail freight. Shortages occur in rail freight today. Necessary action to meet national defense requirements can be taken by the President under existing law.
- . To evaluate the potential economic and industrial impact of increased defense spending, and to plan effectively the mobilization effort, we must have a clear and detailed statement from the Department of Defense on the size, composition, and phasing of defense requirements. I will review this matter with the Secretary of Defense so that we can provide coordinated civilian support.


Byrd Ellington
Director

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1965

Mac:

The President wants
John Macy to do the
talking to Long about
this.

Horace Busby

✓ 76

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, August 6, 1965
2:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New appointments to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The appointment of Abe Fortas to the Court removes one man from the list which you gave me the weekend before you announced Abe's appointment. I have spoken with Clark Clifford about it, and he tells me that he thinks you would now like him to proceed with the following: Ambassador Taylor, Admiral Sides, and Mr. Gus Long.

2. Clark says that this list seems just fine to him. He initially preferred Crawford Greenewalt to Long, because of Greenewalt's somewhat wider international experience and his outstanding work with Radio Free Europe. But he recognizes Long's great competence and feels that if he is willing to work, the Board can make excellent use of him.

3. Clark also thinks that three more members is just the right number. It will bring the total membership of the Board to ten, and share the heavy load of work more reasonably.

4. Unless you have already checked with Sides and Long, Clark's suggestion is that he might speak to both of them and then come back to us with a draft announcement. Is this satisfactory to you?

h. q. B.

McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

*John Henry talk to him
to Long*

77
Tom S. Nichols
SIC-
-40046

Friday, August 6, 1965
7:10 P.M. (EDT)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following report was released today by U.S. military sources in Saigon:

Casualties inflicted upon the communist Viet Cong forces during July reached the highest point recorded during the struggle in Vietnam.

An American military spokesman said that during July, the Viet Cong suffered 3,050 killed. These deaths were verified by checks on the ground. This is the largest total recorded since the Viet Cong began to step up their effort in 1960. A considerable number of other communist soldiers -- probably several thousand -- are believed to have been killed by air strikes on Viet Cong forces.

Viet Cong captured in the field increased from 220 in June to 500 in July -- an increase of over 100%.

Viet Cong defections also increased sharply, with defections by Viet Cong military personnel reaching 775 in July, compared with 520 in June.

Vietnamese government forces and other friendly forces in Vietnam suffered 1,335 dead, less than one half the number of verified Viet Cong killed.

The American military spokesman pointed out that, in addition, it would be anticipated that about two Viet Cong would suffer wounds for each one killed. This would add another five or six thousand to the overall total of Viet Cong casualties.

He pointed out that the government forces had been more active in July than in June, while the Viet Cong had initiated fewer attacks. Battalion-sized operations by government forces increased, as did patrols and other small-unit actions. The number of small-unit actions which exchanged fire with Viet Cong forces increased sharply.

Mrs. Roberts 7:15 P.M.

Incidents initiated by the Viet Cong in July totalled 2,480, a decline from the level of 2,700 reached in June.

Only 46 of these Viet Cong incidents in July were classed as attacks; the remainder were harassments, terroristic incidents, sabotage, and propaganda forays. In June, 80 Viet Cong incidents were considered as attacks.

Other causes cited by the spokesman for the favorable military balance achieved by the government forces during July were increased air activity by the Vietnamese air force, the American Air Force, and U.S. Navy aircraft, and more effective defense by the government forces against ambushes.

When Viet Cong-initiated attacks and other incidents rose in June, some observers considered this the beginning of a sustained offensive by the Viet Cong designed to take advantage of the protection against air strikes supposedly afforded by the summer rainy season.

U.S. Air Force officers, point out, however, that the summer monsoon does not block air activity against the Viet Cong. Unfavorable weather conditions are transitory and scattered, and it is possible to reach any target in South Vietnam at some time during a 24-hour period.

The all-weather capability of tactical aircraft operating in Vietnam also makes it possible to carry out missions despite cloud cover, these Air Force officers point out.

Combat missions flown by Vietnamese and American Air Force aircraft during July rose by 20% over those flown in June, to a total of over 2000 per week. The vast majority were close-in support missions to assist ground operations.

This air capability is considered to have contributed greatly to the slackening in the Viet Cong effort during July. The increased activity by government forces and stepped-up air attacks have led to the unprecedented number of Viet Cong casualties during July, these officers point out.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Friday, August 6, 1965

3:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Quaison-Sackey's Visit at 3:30 p. m.

1. Dean Rusk fully agrees that it is best to see Quaison-Sackey today, and is having him come in quietly through the West Basement so that he gets to your office without moving past the press. Our suggestion is that you might pose for a photograph with him, and that neither he nor you should make any statement to the press at this stage. Bill Moyers could tell them at his next briefing that you have received a letter, that you had a friendly talk with the Foreign Minister, and that he will be talking further with the Secretary of State.

2. Quaison-Sackey has not yet given a copy of Nkrumah's message to Dean Rusk, but at lunch he said that it dealt with two subjects, as we expected: (1) a request to receive Nkrumah here in Washington, and (2) a request to stop the bombing in the North so that Nkrumah can go to Hanoi. This is not a very attractive package, and we will probably have to give it a cool answer on both counts, which only confirms the usefulness of getting him in and out today, so that he does not hang over us as a problem for next week.

3. Your visit is advertised as very short indeed, and all you really need to say is that no one wants peace more than we do, and that what is really needed is a sign of similar purpose from Hanoi. Just off the top of my head, I think it can also be said that if Nkrumah goes to Hanoi and stays within the city limits, he will be entirely safe from American bombs. But probably it is better for Dean Rusk to say this after appropriate reflection.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-377
By gw, NARA, Date 2-8-94

Rec'd
1:31 P.
8-6-65

MEMORANDUM

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✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, August 6, 1965
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Quaison-Sackey's visit

1. I know you are handling this direct with Dean Rusk, and of course he will have the closest reading of what Quaison-Sackey has to say. My guess is that it will be nothing, except ~~perhaps~~ they would like us to stop the bombing and Nkrumah might like to come to Washington.
2. The point I'd like to make in this memorandum now is a different one: it is that the international appearances will probably be helped if you can find just five minutes to shake Quaison-Sackey's hand this afternoon. The fact that we are probably not about to stop the bombing and not eager to have Nkrumah may make it all the more important to be publicly courteous to Quaison-Sackey.
3. To put it another way, five minutes with him today may save you an hour on Monday or Tuesday. The pressure of your business today and the short notice would be ample excuse for keeping the meeting brief.

h.f.B.
McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 5, 1965
9:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Sterling Crisis Deepens

1. The British have been into us on three wires today reporting their growing concern for the very near future of Sterling -- and we think they are right to be worried. Cromer at the Bank of England has called Martin repeatedly, Callaghan at the Exchequer has called Fowler, and Derek Mitchell in the Prime Minister's office has just talked to me for a half-hour on the secure direct line.

2. In essence, the situation is this. There is heavy pressure against Sterling from a variety of sources. They lost \$80,000,000 yesterday and \$180,000,000 today. Estimates of possible losses tomorrow run between \$300,000,000 and \$500,000,000. If it goes on at this rate into next week, they would literally run out of reserves and be forced into devaluation in a very few days.

3. This situation has triggered intense trans-Atlantic discussion of the basic proposal discussed with you by Joe Fowler a week ago. The essentials of this emergency deal are three: first, that the British take action which we can responsibly report to central bankers as proof of their readiness to make an effective defense of Sterling over time; second, the U. S. takes the lead in organizing a central bankers' defense; third, the Europeans -- especially the Germans -- agree to go with us in a big way so that we are not left with an essentially U. S. defense of Sterling. It remains the flat opinion of all your advisers that it would be better to let Sterling go than for us to take on its defense without a major foreign contribution.

4. The British know that this is our position. Their difficulty is in finding the right proof of their continued determination. Of the available measures, only one meets their double requirement: that it pleases the bankers and also makes sense economically; that one is a wage-price freeze. Such a freeze requires legislation, and Parliament rose today! Still more serious, from the Prime Minister's point of view, is the fact that, in his judgment, he simply cannot unilaterally announce a wage-price freeze in the first week of August without losing an intolerable amount of his union support. The unions will feel betrayed, because the Trades Union Congress meet in September, and this issue should be settled between the government and the congress there, democratically, not now, by fiat. Mitchell says that the Prime Minister would rather devalue and go to the country than try to impose a wage freeze now.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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-2-

August 5, 1965
9:30 p.m.

5. The best the British seem prepared to do is to give us private assurances now that they will get a wage-price freeze in September -- either by agreement with the TUC or by legislation obtained in spite of union resistance. (It seems clear to me that Wilson believes that he can get union support in September and then put it through Parliament in a special session. This is what he is prepared to promise, with ifs, ands, and buts still undefined.)

6. We have not yet focused sharply as a government on the question whether such assurances would give us enough to take to the European central banks. Francis Bator's first guess is that it could be done this way if the assurance is strong enough for Bill Martin to believe in it. We will know more on this tomorrow when Deming gets back from London tonight and Callahan gives more details to Fowler.

7. Meanwhile there are two special problems:

First, tomorrow itself may produce a deadly hemorrhage of Sterling. The best we can do to guard against this is for the Fed to act on its own in local defense measures of a straight short-term sort. This Martin has already undertaken to do.

Second, Mitchell made it very clear in his talk with me that if the Prime Minister is faced with imminent devaluation, he will try to come over here and dump the problem in your lap, no matter what stage of agreement or disagreement the two governments may be at. I have told Mitchell in the strongest possible terms that there should be no such visit unless we agree to it, and that I do not myself see what the virtue of it is. I told him that if we had an understanding the visit was unnecessary, and that if we did not have one, I would think it very dangerous indeed. I am sure the Prime Minister will not come without further consultation (he is in fact on a train to the Scilly Isles, because if he changed his plans and stayed behind it might deepen the panic for tomorrow). But we may have to make our point with them again tomorrow.

8. Francis Bator is watching this problem through the night. In particular he will meet Deming's plane at midnight and arouse us all if there is a need for nighttime action. Otherwise, we will be on deck early to watch the London market. Then we will meet with Fowler at 10:00 a.m. and be ready to report to you at 11:00, when Fowler already has an appointment with you.

*I'll be at home, if you want more
on this tonight please call.*

*McG. B.
McG. B.*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-181

By is, Date 5-14-84

Thursday, August 5, 1965, 2:45 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Agenda for the 5:45 Meeting

You have said that the main item on your mind is the Goldberg suggestion of a pause, but before you come to it, you may wish to have brief reports from Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara on their testimony and Congressional reaction this week. You may also want to have a report from General Taylor, as we said yesterday we would. So I suggest an order somewhat like this:

1. Brief report by Dean Rusk.
2. Brief report by Bob McNamara.
3. Final report by Max Taylor.
4. Discussion led by the President on the possibility of a bombing pause. In this discussion, the following would be important commentators:

Goldberg - (pro) Arthur can make his own case better than anyone else, if not more briefly. It is surely important that everyone understand the fact that it is the bombing which is now the target of international pressure. Some, but not all, of this pressure is orchestrated from Moscow. Interestingly enough, the bombing is not the centerpiece of propaganda from Hanoi or Peiping, nor is there any indication from either of these Asian capitals that a pause in the bombing would have any effect whatever.

McNamara - (con for now) While Bob believes strongly that at some point a substantial pause may be an important diplomatic card, he would not play the card at a time when it might be thought to come from weakness. He would prefer a sustained pause at a somewhat later stage, after we have shown that we can hold our own, and perhaps even make some money in the South.

Marks - I think Leonard should be asked for comment on the world opinion aspect of this matter. I do not know his current judgment.

Wheeler - if you call on him -- will surely go very hard on the military advantages of continuous bombing. Even if he does not make the argument explicitly, he will remind those present that many Americans will find it odd to pause in the bombing that is supposed to restrict aggression just at the time when we are sending ground forces to take casualties in resisting that same aggression.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Rusk - (pretty much con) Dean is inclined to think that we ought not to have a pause until there is some clear signal that it would be matched in some way by the other side. You may wish to ask him what specific matching action we would find acceptable. We need to have a more solid opinion on this point than we have now. (My own judgment is that it will be hard to find a realistic short-term matching action, because such action needs to be visible and provable in order to be acceptable to us, and the only visible actions are in South Vietnam, where the people in Hanoi have to maintain that they have no influence. This is one reason why a long pause at a time of relative U. S. strength seems to me more sensible than a short one now. From a position of strength, we would not have to insist upon public and prompt matching action; we could simply let matters develop for a while with the diplomatic pressure on the other side.)

Just as a checklist, I list the following set of pros and cons:

Pro 1. Pause will sustain peaceful momentum of press conference.

2. Pause will help our allies deal with domestic pressure, especially Japanese.

3. Pause will reassert our flexibility and give us leeway to move up and down in future.

4. Pause will please domestic peacemakers.

5. Pause may put some diplomatic pressure on Hanoi, during Nkrumah visit.

Con 1. Pause may arouse apprehension in South Vietnam.

2. Pause will give real military advantage to Hanoi.

3. Pause may seem sign of weakness to the Communists -- or even a reward for propaganda pressure.

4. Pause may be sharply criticized by Republicans and other hardliners.

5. Pause will do no real good diplomatically.

I am afraid this memorandum is not as evenly balanced as I would like, but that defect at least shows you where I myself come out.

m.f.s.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SUBJECT: Ray Cline's Talks with Chiang Kai-shek

Ray Cline, CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and formerly Taipei station chief, visited Taiwan this week at the urgent personal request of Chiang Kai-shek. Cline had two long talks with the Gimo, the first in the presence of our Charge, the second one alone on August 3 for five hours at the Gimo's mountain retreat.

Chiang's aim was to use Cline, whom he trusts, in order to communicate a "message" directly to you. (Chiang feels that more normal "diplomatic channels" have distorted and disregarded his views in recent years.)

The Gimo's message, in brief: The Chinese Communists and their Vietnamese allies are about to engage the U. S. in a long ground war of attrition which we cannot hope to win; Chiang stands ready to provide troops to Vietnam if we want them; but most important, he urges that now is the time for an amphibious Chinese Nationalist landing on the South China (Kwangtung) coast in order to cut Peking's supply lines to Vietnam and to begin the reconquest of the mainland. The Gimo believes that it is now or never; the Sino/Soviet dispute assures that the U. S. S. R. will not intervene, and the Chinese Communists have not yet achieved a sufficient nuclear buildup to deter a Nationalist invasion.

Regardless of our views on such undertakings, the Gimo asks that we do some coordinated strategic planning for such a move. He intends to spell out his proposals more fully in a letter to you that will be carried by his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the Defense Minister, when he comes to Washington in late September.

Ray Cline comments that the Gimo was more emotional than the situation warrants and probably fears that his control of Taiwan will weaken unless he appears to be doing something active about fighting the Chinese Communists. Hence the revival of the "counter-attack" theme. In balance, Cline's visit seems to have provided a boost to the Gimo's ego -- and a healthy escape-valve for his pent-up feelings that the U. S. had written him off.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/RAC 99-57+FRUS, Vol. 100 #95
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-13-01

James C. Thomson, Jr.
McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

✓ 83
August 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION ONLY

Our Pak Affairs. This is the first of a series of roundups to keep you fully up to date at your request:

1. Softening up the Paks. I've met with Mann and several others to get the show on the road. Tom is reluctant to conduct such a delicate exercise on too broad a front. He suggests making the chief approach about Ayub shutting up and then coming here through the British (who are the most reliable channel). He's so proposing to Rusk. I agree, but am pushing also a broader series of softening up exercises through various channels.

2. Arthur Goldberg will see Amjad Ali ^{tomorrow} ~~shortly~~. I've briefed him.

3. Admiral Heintz, our new Pentagon MAP chief, will growl at the Pak military this weekend.

4. Pak Ship to Cuba. We have a reliable report of the first Pak ship caught in the Cuba trade, apparently taking a cargo from Red China. We're reminding the Paks stiffly that countries which fail to curb such shipping can't get US aid.

5. C-130 Help to Indonesia. We have increasingly firm evidence that Paks helped to service an Indo C-130 and may have provided Indos with MAP-supplied spare parts. We're going in hard on this too.

6. Wheat Spoiling in Karachi. No one knew anything here, so we queried the field. First returns indicate no real spoilage but some backing up in Karachi port, which should be cleared up shortly. We're looking at diversion of ships in the meantime (if we hold up ships already chartered, we have to pay the charges).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-138
By id, NARA Date 10-30-99

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer
mfb

~~SECRET~~

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84

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: East-West Trade Legislation

Following your instructions, Tom Mann and Doug MacArthur have sounded out Senators Mansfield, Fulbright and Long on an East-West Trade Act, as a follow-up to the Miller Report. The Senators are agreed that:

1. Senator Fulbright should present a bill along the lines worked out by State and Commerce.
2. Both Fulbright and the Finance Committee should hold hearings.
3. The bill would not be brought to a vote during this session.

FWB
Francis M. Bator
mfb

OK to go ahead as above _____

Bundy speak to me ✓ _____

545
6

85

(7)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Aug 4, 1965
7:45 P. M.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Yesterday you asked about the financial position in the Dominican Republic, and I attach a memo drafted by Bill Bowdler of my office, which I have signed. In essence what it says is that on present predictions, we can meet emergency requirements from funds presently available and from the FY-66 contingency fund of AID. This will not make a garden society of the Dominican Republic, and the open question is whether we want to go for broke after we get a government, perhaps with a supplemental in January. Any indication of your opinion would be helpful.

m.f.B.

McG. B.

I would like a draft plan
that would be bold and
imaginative even if it needs
a supplemental _____

Let it wait for now _____

85a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 4, 1965, 7:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Estimated Future Dominican Republic Requirements for
Emergency Financial Assistance

In the period from April 24 to the present, more than \$42 million of emergency assistance has been made available to the Dominican Republic, of which \$8.3 million has not yet been spent. In addition, some \$5.5 million was used for PL 480 food supplies.

The July requirements total approximately \$12.5 million. The OAS plans to meet this amount from Dominican tax revenues and by forcing the Central Bank to advance all but \$1 million of the total from its peso reserves. The OAS plans to cover this \$1 million from the unspent \$8.3 million which it still has. The balance of this amount will be disbursed by September 15 against commitments already made.

Ambassador Bunker indicates that he will need about \$6 million to help the Provisional Government prime the pump. It is now impossible to estimate precisely what additional requirements the Provisional Government will have for supporting assistance to meet requirements not covered by tax receipts or advances from the Central Bank. A conservative estimate would be that from \$20-25 million more will be required during the current fiscal year, provided foreign commercial banks are willing to finance the sugar corporation with new credits of \$15 million and to roll over \$10 million of previous loans.

If Dominican Republic requirements prove to be as indicated above, and if the Congress appropriates a contingency fund sufficiently large to permit the Dominican Republic to receive as much as \$30 million from it (the authorization bill now provides for \$50 million), there should be little likelihood that recourse to the Congress for an additional appropriation to cover Dominican Republic requirements this year would be necessary.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By *ijp*, NARA, Date 1-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
Attachment

86
Wednesday, August 4, 1965, 7:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with the question of a bombing pause, you may be interested in this thoughtful resume on North Vietnam and Negotiations prepared by the Asian experts in Tom Hughes' office in State Department. These experts are a little more "soft" than the Department as a whole, but their assessment is interesting.

McG. B.

SECRET SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

RFE -29 July 28, 1965

Reid
8-1-65
6:32P

MEMORANDUM

17

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 4, 1965, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You should know that some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are still trying to get me to testify on the Dominican Republic. The move is apparently led by Wayne Morse and Joe Clark, although Morse at least knows better than to expect that a White House Staff officer will ever come to a formal Committee hearing. I have talked to Joe Clark myself, and tried to cool him off, but he finds it hard to understand that we simply cannot afford to break the tradition of executive privilege as it applies to your own staff.

In this situation, I have talked to Bill Fulbright, and told him that I hope very much that they will not send me a letter or any other formal invitation, which I should only have to decline. I told him that if he and other members of the Committee wished to have an informal talk with me, I was entirely at their service, since I would like nothing better than a chance to tell them exactly what we had done to try to work for peace in the Dominican Republic. But I repeated that under no circumstances could I say anything that could become a part of a formal committee record. He said he would try to see whether the members would like to have an "informal tea party" on this basis.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Mc
I would be very slow on
this - I told Clark that
this a m. We are
asking for trouble -

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Perit
8.4.65
6.32p

MEMORANDUM

16

88

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 4, 1965
5:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arthur Goldberg

1. I talked to Arthur Goldberg to prime him for the meeting tomorrow at 5:45 p.m. He will be there, and he asked me in return to give you this message about his explorations on Article 19.

2. He has talked to Mansfield, Fulbright, Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Church, and Gore on the Senate side, and to the Speaker and Carl Albert on the House side. Tomorrow he will see Ford and Doc Morgan and Mrs. Bolton. (His consultations with members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees are being conducted jointly with Dean Rusk. The rest he has been doing alone.)

3. He reports a green light from everyone so far, although under questioning he admits that orange may be a better color for Hickenlooper's response. The Speaker and Albert predict some trouble in the House, but nothing unmanageable.

4. Goldberg will report further to you at the time of the meeting tomorrow, when he will have had his further consultations. If he feels then as he does now, he will recommend that our new position be unveiled in the meeting of the Committee of 33, which is scheduled for the middle of August.

McG. B.

McG. B.

89

Speak to me about this.

LBJ/mf

8-4-65

6:35p

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 4, 1965, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have at last talked with Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas about the question of a memorandum which might set standards for public comment by former members of your Administration after they resign. We turn out to have quite similar ideas, and I have written the attached draft memorandum as a basis for discussion with them in a meeting at 2:30 tomorrow. The memorandum is also consistent with some suggestions which Dick Goodwin offered. On the theory that it is easier to cut than to add, I have put in every point which occurs to me.

At this point we need no decision from you, but I would value
(a) any suggestions about the memorandum, and
(b) any guidance as to others whose opinion you would like us to get.

If I don't hear back from you, we will try to frame an agreed recommendation in our Thursday meeting.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~See me~~
McG.

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

8/4/65

DRAFT MEMORANDUM ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES
WITH RESPECT TO PRIVILEGED INFORMATION

1. I wish to share with all those holding Presidential appointments in this Administration my view of the responsibilities of such officers with respect to privileged information which they obtain while holding such appointments.

2. It is self-evident that while he holds such an appointment, each officer is under clear obligation to protect all privileged information, whether or not it be formally classified. I am proud of the fact that members of this Administration do not engage in public wrangles with each other. I hope and believe that this record will be continued.

3. A somewhat different problem is presented, however, when the holder of a Presidential appointment resigns or retires. His legal and moral responsibility to safeguard classified information is unaffected by this change in his status, but obviously he is no longer a member of the Administration and no longer bound by its continuing discipline. What are his obligations then with respect to the protection of the privileged information obtained while he held a Presidential appointment?

4. Self-evidently, there can be no permanent bar upon the right of a public official to give a responsible public account, from his own point of view, of the events in which he has participated. The record of American history would be much impoverished without the memoirs and other accounts left to us by public men in every generation. The claims of history deserve the respect of all.

5. At the same time, any member of the Administration has obligations to his colleagues which do not cease when he leaves office. Any officer who leaves the Government has the right and duty of every citizen to state his considered opinion on public issues as he sees fit. But I believe he has no right to use the privileged information obtained as a member of the Administration in ways which can damage the effectiveness of those who remain on active service. The claims of history are not instantaneous. They do not justify the sale of gossip that gains commercial value from the present rank of those attacked.

6. Beyond questions of public propriety, there are questions of private taste. Within the Administration we work closely together and we come to know each other well. It is not to be expected that every one of us will admire every other. But I believe that our service together imposes an obligation to avoid personal attack after we separate, especially when such attack is based upon things we have learned and done as members of this Administration. It is true that here again history has its claims. Our understanding of our past is richer because we have the unvarnished opinions of many distinguished Americans about each other. But my own belief is that unconstrained personal assessments of others should be avoided, at least during their lifetime. Any variations from this standard would seem to me to require extraordinary justification.

7. I circulate this memorandum not as an instruction, but as an expression of my own thinking. What any of us does after he leaves office will be a matter mainly for his own conscience and judgment. I hope nevertheless that all members of the Administration will give consideration to this expression of my views, and

- 3 -

I hope to hear from any member of the Administration who takes a radically different view, so that we may consider together the question which such a difference would present.

8-4
Rec'd
Pres's office
10:00am

MEMORANDUM

V 91

(21)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 4, 1965
9:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: British reaction to Goldberg's letter to U Thant

1. You should know that the British have followed up very briskly on Goldberg's letter of last week to U Thant. Foreign Minister Stewart has sent word to Dean Rusk that the British, as Chairman of the Security Council this month, feel that they would be seeming to question our sincerity if they did not press very hard to find ways of having an early meeting of the Security Council on Vietnam. In presenting this view, the British have also presented a resolution which would match an end of our bombing against an unpoliced North Vietnamese undertaking to send no more forces into the South -- a notion which is plainly unacceptable to us.

2. Dean Rusk has given the British a very skillful answer, stressing the need for intense private consultation before there is any Security Council meeting, and pointing out the defects in the UK draft resolution. Meanwhile, Yost talked yesterday to U Thant in New York and found him still adamantly opposed to a Security Council meeting. The Russians have told him they would have to use such a meeting for violent denunciation of the U. S. U Thant has said the same thing to the British, and it may be that Stewart will be cooled off.

3. It is obviously going to be hard for State and Goldberg to keep the right balance between good sense and a forthcoming posture at the UN, but so far they are doing very well. It remains to be seen whether Foreign Minister Stewart is really as unhelpful as this particular demarche suggests. Up till now, he has been our best defender in the UK, but there is a fishy smell to this one.

McG. B.
McG. B.

92

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., Aug. 4, 1965
8:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to read the attached telegram from Alexis Johnson before you see Max Taylor. It gives a summary of what has been a rather quiet week in Saigon, by their standards.

h. f. S.

McG B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

✓ 922

SECRET

August 3, 1965

(Text of Cable from Embassy Saigon 364) August 3, 1965

For the President

From U. Johnson

Last week was amazingly quiet both on the political and military fronts, with the major event your own announcement of increased American forces complemented by Prime Minister Ky's address to the Nation. As the New Zealand Ambassador in Bangkok who periodically visits here told me, he heard less in the way of rumors and rumblings on his visit last week than any time during the years he has been coming here.

The two matters are, of course, related as your announcement of increased U.S. forces has served further to convince even the most tortured Vietnamese mind that the U.S. really intends to see this thing through, and thus to dampen those psychological frustrations that are at the base of so much of the political instability. This does not mean that the millennium of long-term political stability here has now arrived, but only that we seem to have a little breathing spell of which we will seek to take maximum advantage. The "Directorate" of the Generals, principally Thieu, Ky and Co, seem to be continuing to work well and harmoniously together. (General Thi in first corps is still an unknown factor.) However, one of our troubles in "getting things done" is that the three of them have taken so enthusiastically to getting out among the people in the provinces that there is all too often no one left in Saigon for us to talk to who can make decisions. One of their more useful trips was to Tay Minh to cement Cao Dai support.

We are continuing to labor at getting them to do something about the Moribund Chieu Hoi program and are encouraged that Co has now told us that he strongly favors its restoration to ministerial status. Ky also publicly announced he intends to establish a Ministry of Veterans Affairs. This is a good move.

It is harder to account for the relative quiet by the Viet Cong on the military front which continued for the third week. While harassment, sabotage (particularly of the Lines of Communications) and terrorism maintained their level, main force Viet Cong units continued to avoid contact. Such cycles are, of course, typical of the Viet Cong activity and are at least in part forced on them by their limited supply system. No one here believes they are badly enough hurt to have

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-177
By us, NARS, Date 11-15-83

been forced to subside and that the only question is when and where they resume the offense. The Vietnamese still seem to be convinced that it is going to be in the highlands.

During the week the Montagnard problem had begun to heat up along lines all too suggestive of last September's uprising, and, in fact, involving the same group as last September. However, by the beginning of this week we had actions underway which we hope will dampen it down. As last September, we were faced with the problems of the Montagnards attempting to play us off against the Vietnamese, and Vietnamese suspicions of American sympathy for the Montagnards. To deal with the first problem we had a meeting yesterday in Ban Me Thuot with the representatives of the dissident Montagnards on one side, and on the other side representatives of all the American and Government of Vietnam agencies presenting a united and coordinated front. They were given a signed statement by Prime Minister Ky (which we had largely drafted) making a forthcoming offer to negotiate with them as Vietnamese citizens, and a signed statement from me saying they must deal with the Government of Vietnam, but if both parties wanted we would be glad to be present as "observers." The next move is now up to the Montagnards. To deal with the second problem of Vietnamese suspicions we promptly and without argument moved out of Darlac two Americans suggested by General Co, although we feel, and Co agreed, they had done nothing wrong. (I hope this will encourage similar prompt action in cases we raise with them of their personnel.)

USOM signed an interim aid agreement on July 28 which contains language that we hope will provide the basis for more effective coordination and management of Government of Vietnam activities in relation to our own.

Retail rice prices continued fairly stable in Saigon, although there were localized price increases in certain areas of the center brought about by temporary shortages. However, the measures that we and the Government of Vietnam have taken to transport rice to the central area, including the use of airlift where essential, have prevented any serious shortages.

In all, it was a good week as we measure things here.

Wednesday, August 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. Valenti

SUBJECT: Meeting with Watson Committee on Private Enterprise
and Foreign Aid

As you know, an Advisory Committee chaired by Arthur Watson of IBM has been working for a year on a report on the role of private enterprise in foreign aid. The report is done, and ready for release.

In a memo at Tab A, Dave Bell recommends that:

1. You meet with the Committee, and perhaps some people from the Hill, for a presentation of the report. The list of members is at Tab B.

2. The report be released at the White House.

I am inclined to agree with Dave that a short meeting, with a Presidential statement about the role of private business in fighting poverty abroad, would be useful.

A copy of the report is at Tab C. It makes some constructive suggestions while giving general support to what we are now doing. (Dave's memo gives a brief summary of the major recommendations.)

Francis M. Bator

O. K. to schedule meeting_____

Valenti speak to me_____

FMB:djw:mst
2 p. m.

87. 94
(2)
MR 8/3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Aug. 3, 1965
8:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is a memorandum which Cabot Lodge asked me to send on to you. I don't know exactly where his negotiations with Lansdale are, but I expect to find out tomorrow. Lansdale appears quite ready to take over MACV -- and yet he's not all wrong. Can we afford some creative tension?

McG. B.
McG. B.

August 3, 1965

✓ 94a

TO: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge

H.C. Lodge

Following is an excerpt from a memorandum to me from Edward Lansdale in response to a paper of mine to him on "Solving the 'politico' part of the 'Politico-Military' Viet Nam problem." It contains ideas of which, I believe, you should be aware:

"'Politico'. Your paper states sound conclusions when it speaks of the need for an affirmative answer to the threat of Communist-Subversion/Terrorism", the need for good practical politics in Vietnam, the fact that our other programs even though excellent are no substitute for a real political program, and the need for underscoring the truth of promises through actual performance. Personally, I don't see how the Communists can be defeated without these positive steps. The military can suppress the Communist forces, even keep them suppressed by continued military action, but cannot defeat them short of genocide unless our side puts the war on a political footing in Viet Nam.

"The enemy in Vietnam understands thoroughly the political nature of the war he is waging. The enemy sees his every act as a political act, and uses psychological, military, and socio-economic weapons to gain his political goals. This is a strict rule the enemy borrowed from Clausewitz. Lenin, Mao, Ho, and Giap have been clear and firm on this basic rule. The Viet Cong have obeyed it amazingly well. Our side has broken this rule over and over again. It is being broken daily right now.

"Thus, when you ask my help to get a Counter-Subversion/Terrorism program moving, you really are asking me to help you to get our side to start obeying and applying the prime rule of the war in Vietnam. It isn't separate from the other programs. It is the basis upon which the war in Vietnam will be won or lost. The psychological, military, and socio-economic programs are

its instruments, not ends in themselves. Political bankruptcy in Vietnam and the direct use of U.S. combat forces complicate your task vastly. (A U.S. commander, tasked to attack a suspected enemy position, is going to clobber it first by bombing or artillery to cut his own U.S. casualties to a minimum when they attack; casualties of Vietnamese non-combatants must be secondary to his responsibility to his own command and mission). I point this out to underscore the fact that something brand new, perhaps of considerable difference from anything previous, will have to be worked out in Vietnam to put the war on the essential political footing. It might require heroic measures, such as moving non-combatants out of Central Vietnam into the far South, to permit the military threat to be resolved conclusively in Central Vietnam by military means while non-combatant refugees get a real chance at a new life. Again, this could be a wrong move. You are going to need some exceptionally expert help to solve this vital problem; for many reasons, it's your biggest."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON(2)
1/12 8/3Tuesday, Aug. 3, 1965
7:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harriman's telegram

1. Here is Harriman's last important telegram. You may wish to see it before he comes in tomorrow.
2. While there has been more noise than substance in Harriman's visit, I think it has been well worthwhile. First, it has given us a good press with those who like diplomatic contacts for their own sakes. Second -- less certain but more important -- it may well have had a real effect upon the temper of Communists like Tito and Kossygin. They do value high-level foreigners, and sometimes such visits affect their behavior at least marginally.
3. And if such travels obviously give Harriman himself an unusual amount of simple personal pleasure, what is the harm in that?

McG. B.
McG. B.~~SECRET~~ enclosure

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Tuesday, August 3, 1965
11:30 A.M.

For President and Secretary From Harriman

Accompanied by Charge, I had frank and to the point 35-minute conversation with Prime Minister Wilson this morning just prior to Cabinet meeting.

When I congratulated him on last night's vote in House, he expressed regret that noisy house had prevented him from giving his full speech which had "a good deal of substantive matters on economic situation". He had managed, he said, to mention that progress had to be made in four main areas: technology, restrictive labor and management practices, wage and price stabilization, and training and re-training manpower. In addition, he pointed out that under the stimulation of government, the National Export Council was putting pressure on a thousand individual firms to get them to take specific actions to increase their exports.

After reviewing highlights of talks I had with Kosygin and Tito, Prime Minister discussed in particular the situation in Vietnam as it related to our relations with Soviet Union. Prime Minister was in full agreement that while pushing ahead in Vietnam it was essential for us to maintain continual dialogue with Moscow. "Kosygin," he said, "is desperately anxious to keep in contact with West in spite of Vietnam." On the other hand, Prime Minister stated that he was "more cynical than others on Soviet motives for coming to Geneva." He thought the Soviets wanted to stir up the German situation. If he had his way, following two or three weeks of general discussion, the Geneva Conference should recess until after the German elections. He thought that at that time there would be a real chance to pursue seriously the possibilities of an agreement on non-proliferation as well as to explore how far the Soviets were now prepared to go on comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement.

When I pointed out to the Prime Minister that the President had publicly approved his personal and commonwealth initiatives on Vietnam, the Prime Minister asked me to express his gratitude to the President. I also called the Prime Minister's attention to the recent action taken by the President with U Thant. Prime Minister stated that "we would

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~- EXDIS

obviously support any valid proposal that came out of the UN." In fact, he added, it was only after U Thant had told him just prior to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference that he thought there was nothing the UN could do at that time that Wilson decided to explore the possibility of commonwealth initiative.

We then discussed at some length the bombing of North Vietnam. On this point the Prime Minister is firm. He stated that he and his Foreign Secretary keep getting suggestions from various countries that the bombing be stopped so that negotiations might start, but thus far there were no indications that Hanoi would negotiate under these circumstances. "Clearly," Wilson said, "these suggestions are valueless until some country is in a position to state responsibly that Hanoi would come to conference and take specific positive reciprocal action if the U.S. stopped its bombing." He fully appreciated that we could not agree to a cessation on any other basis.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

956

Monday, August 2, 1965

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Government Reactions to President's Vietnam Statement

Official reactions to the President's July 28 statement on Vietnam to date shows:

Favorable - 30

Australia	Germany	Lebanon	Panama
Bolivia	Great Britain	Liberia	Philippines
Brazil	Iran	Malawi	Portugal
Canada	Italy	Malaysia	Thailand
China	Japan	Morocco	Tunsia
Columbia	Kenya	Netherlands	Upper Volta
Costa Rica	Korea	New Zealand	
El Salvador	Laos	Nigeria	

Apprehensive - 5

Ethiopia	Senegal
Egypt	Zambia
Trinidad and Tobago	

Critical -

Ghana

All Communist states with the exception of Yugoslavia and Rumania which are apprehensive.

No Response - 67

Of these 67 states, 32 have taken no official position while 19 are known to be favorable to our Vietnamese policy:

Austria	Honduras	Malta	Saudi Arabia
Belgium	Iceland	Nicaragua	South Africa
Denmark	Ivory Coast	Paraguay	Spain
Ecuador	Kuwait	Peru	Venezuela
Guatamala	Luxemburg	Nigeria	

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-18

By ics, NARS, Date 8-14-84

MEMORANDUM

96
(2) THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Agenda for lunch with the President
Tuesday, August 3, 1965, 1:15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-104
By CB, NARA Date 8-2-00

1. Personnel for Saigon

There are two related issues here. One is the recommendation from State, AID, and Lodge that Killen be succeeded by Charles Mann, who is now in Laos.

The other and more important issue is the replacement of Alexis Johnson. The front-runner has been Bill Sullivan, but there is some concern in the State Department now about removing him from Laos at what may be a difficult time there. Mann's prospective departure obviously strengthens this worry. It remains my own judgment that with a non-administrator as Ambassador in Saigon, the appointment of the very best possible Deputy is absolutely essential. There may be other senior Foreign Service officers who can do this job, but we went wrong with the highly recommended Nes a year ago, and we ought not to repeat that mistake. The trouble is that we are trying to meet three very difficult criteria: high standing with Lodge, high standing in the Foreign Service, and real effectiveness in the management of a complex and rapidly changing situation. We know that Sullivan has these qualities -- and I have not heard of anyone else who would not be a gamble on at least one count. But I think Dean Rusk may have a different view, and you will want to hear him.

2. Rolling Thunder Operations

Bob McNamara will have proposals on this for the next two weeks. The unofficial version of the recommendation shows important new targets in the Haiphong area.

3. A Medal for Max Taylor

Taylor is back, and we have recommended an appointment for you with him tomorrow. You may also wish to consider whether he should not have a medal. The logical one is the Medal of Freedom. This award can be given by the President himself directly to an individual -- and indeed was given only in this way before President Kennedy revised the procedure to make mass awards in 1963.

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. The Dominican Republic

Bunker is trying to bring matters to a head down there, and there is one particular document which needs your attention -- it is a proposed private understanding on the treatment of Communists between the U. S. and Garcia Godoy.

5. Disarmament Negotiations in Geneva

We are still having trouble preventing the British from tabling a non-proliferation treaty which would give the Germans legitimate trouble. This may have to go to the level of the Prime Minister, and the State Department may bring a draft letter from you to him for your consideration.

6. The Test Ban Anniversary

Thursday, August 5, is the anniversary of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Last year we made joint statements with Khrushchev and Home. This year there is a somewhat different recommendation, and I will have an up-to-date account of it by lunchtime.

7. Pakistan

In order to be sure that we are all on the same wave length, I think we should take 3 minutes to review the bidding as you and Bob Komer discussed it over the weekend.

8. Briefing General de Gaulle

We went out to Bohlen to ask him to brief the General. He comes back saying that the General is in the country and receiving no one. We suggest that Bohlen brief the Foreign Office for relay to the General, and George Ball has also suggested that he would be available to see de Gaulle face to face at the end of August, if you wish, when he goes abroad with Joe Fowler.

9. Congo-Brazzaville

This half-civilized outfit has arrested one of our diplomats, and the State Department plans to report its own views and recommendations.

10. Vice Presidential Travel

The Koreans have asked urgently for a visit by the Vice President, and the State Department wants another reading on your views of Vice Presidential travel.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 3, 1965, 10:45 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a retyped copy of a CIA report of what the Soviets are leaking from Geneva about the SAM-site problem. The marked passage is all you need to read.

The CIA thinks this is a very solid report and is what the Soviets want the West to hear on this subject.

McG. B.
McG. B.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

98
(2)
NR 8/3

Tuesday, August 3, 1965, 9:45 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach for the record a report from Carl Rowan on progress achieved on informational and psychological warfare programs in Vietnam since his report of March 16. One or two specific items, like a budget supplemental, are now up for approval but ought to be decided with Leonard Marks, and we will have recommendations shortly. There is also the open issue of Zorthian's authority (Item 2) but this also should be worked out with Marks and Lodge. Otherwise this is a reasonable account of USIA's efforts in recent months, and it makes a better showing than I hoped.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Att to Ed for file
log 3322

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, August 2, 1965, 7:15 P. M.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By W.P., NARA, Date 1-7-93

Ellsworth Bunker has sent his estimate of the current status and future course of the negotiations. A copy of his cable is attached.

He expects that the fish-or-cut-bait point will come by the end of this week. By that time, he states, Garcia Godoy's arrangements for establishing a Provisional Government should be finished; the Institutional Act should be ready; and the OAS Committee will have reduced the outstanding issues separating the two sides to an absolute minimum. These ^{familiar} issues are likely to be: future composition of the military high command, disposition of the rebel military, and handling of the communist problem. Ellsworth is hopeful of being able to work out a mutually satisfactory formula for dealing with the military issues during the course of this week. On the communist problem, he states that he and Tap Bennett are sending a separate message, which has not yet arrived.

The Committee plans to incorporate the terms of settlement in a document ("Act of Dominican Reconciliation") which the GNR, the Constitutionals and Garcia Godoy would hopefully sign. If the two sides are unwilling, the Committee would release the document as its proposal and exert maximum pressure on both sides to accept it. The Committee would also issue a second "Declaration to the Dominican People" reviewing the course of the negotiations, explaining the proposal and calling for support of the general public.

Ellsworth is hopeful that the combination of pressures accompanied by a reasonable proposal for a final solution will turn the trick and permit the Committee to install a Provisional Government by the middle of this month.

I hope he can pull off a settlement in the time framework indicated. The military and communist problems have been the gut issues from the very beginning. Exactly how much real progress they have made on a formula for solving the military question is not clear to me. On the communist question, Garcia Godoy has gone on record publicly against deportation of the leaders. This would seem to leave as alternatives a) detention or b) close surveillance. I think Ellsworth leans toward surveillance, but we shall have to await the cable which he and Tap are sending.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I agree that this phase of OAS negotiations should be brought to a close. The issues have been thoroughly aired. As time passes, I note a hardening of positions, rather than a greater disposition to compromise. If the sides will not agree to a reasonable settlement, we should know this without further delay so that consideration can be given to other alternatives.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

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1965 AUG 1 PM 3 55

FM AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 306

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AUGUST 1

LIMDIS

FROM BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-322

By ju, NARA, Date 6-9-94BUNDY SMITH
BATOR
BOWLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
CHAPIN
HAYNES
JESUP
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

SUBJECT: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. WE ARE NOW APPROACHING POINT AT WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REDUCED TO HARD ESSENTIALS, I.E., COMPOSITION OF ARMED FORCES, HIGH COMMAND, FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALIST MILITARY AND AMNESTY/ DISARMAMENT PROCEDURES. PROBLEMS IN THESE AREAS ARE, OF COURSE, CLOSELY INTER-RELATED AND CAN BE TREATED AS A WHOLE.

2. RIVERA CAMINERO AND MILITARY SERVICE CHIEFS ARE ON RECORD AS DEMANDING: (A) ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL BE CONTINUED IN THEIR JOBS DURING PERIOD OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND (B) COMMITMENT TO EXPELL LEADING CONSTITUTIONALIST

PAGE TWO RUESSD 826S ~~SECRET~~

OFFICERS FROM COUNTRY FOR PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS. WE UNDERSTAND THEY ARE PREPARED MODIFY SECOND DEMAND BUT HAVE NO INDICATION OF RELAXATION ON FIRST.

3. CONSTITUTIONALIST HAVE OFFERED LEAVE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF MILITARY PROBLEMS FOR DECISION BY PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAVE ANY INTENTION DISMANTLE THEIR ZONE AND TURN IN THEIR ARMS UNTIL PRESIDENT TAKES MEASURES THEY REGARD AS ESSENTIAL. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT FROM GARCIA GODOY AND GUZMAN, IDEA IS THAT PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT WOULD, IN NORMAL COURSE OF THINGS, APPOINT NEW MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES IN PLACE OF RIVERA CAMINERO AT TIME OF TAKING OFFICE. THIS STEP, IN CONSTITUTIONALISTS' VIEW, WOULD OPEN WAY FOR DISMISSAL OF DE LOS SANTOS, WESSIN AND MARTINEZ ARANA. CAAMANO AND COMPANY COULD THEN NEGOTIATE DELIVERY OF THEIR ZONE AND RE-ENTRY OF THEIR OFFICERS INTO REGULAR ARMED FORCES.

4. FOR HIS PART, GARCIA GODOY IS UNWILLING TAKE OFFICE UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES AS TO HOW THESE KEY ISSUES ARE TO BE HANDLED. AS NOTED IN DEPTTEL 163, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEAL EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH MILITARY PROBLEMS AFTER

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-2- 306, AUGUST 1, FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

INSTALLATION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--ALWAYS PRESUMING ARMED FORCES WILL ACCEPT PG WITHOUT FIRM PRIOR COMMITMENTS ON THEIR DEMANDS. HOWEVER, GARCIA GODOY DOES NOT BELIEVE PG COULD FUNCTION WITH CONSTITUTIONALIST ZONE STILL IN BEING AND IS NOT PREPARED USE COERCION OR FORCE AGAINST CAAMANO GROUP BECAUSE OF WHAT HE ANTICIPATES WOULD BE STRONGLY ADVERSE REACTION ON PART OF DOM PEOPLE. HE MAY YET BE PERSUADED OTHERWISE BUT ONLY, UN MY JUDGMENT, IF HE IS CONVINCED HE WILL HAVE FREE HAND IN MAKING CHANGES IN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. (ARGUMENTATION IN DEPTEL 162 RE FINANCIAL SITUATION, WHILE MOST USEFUL IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON IMBERT AND MILITARY, DOES NOT APPEAR PERTINENT IN CASE OF GARCIA GODOY. IN FACT, HE HAS ALREADY INDICATED HOPE THAT OAS WILL CUT OFF FUNDS FOR MEETING GNR PAYROLL SOONEST.)

PAGE THREE RUESSD 826S ~~SECRET~~

5. SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY IMBERT'S CONTINUING RESISTANCE TO FORMATION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH SEEMINGLY MORE TRACTABLE AT LAST MEETING WITH COMMITTEE, HE APPARENTLY STILL MEANS TO HOLD ON IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. AT ONE POINT MADE REMARK ONLY FIFTEEN MORE DAYS ARE NEEDED BEFORE CONSTITUTIONALISTS COLLAPSE, REFLECTING HOPE THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY PROLONGED WE WILL BE PRESENTED WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI OF GNR IN CONTROL ENTIRE NATIONAL TERRITORY.

6. DILEMMA IS POSED BY OUR DEPENDENCE ON ARMED FORCES TO GET RID OF IMBERT. SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS INVOLVING MILITARY MAY WELL DEPEND ON CHANGES IN HIGH COMMAND--AT MINIMUM REPLACEMENT OF RIVERA--BUT THESE ARE DIFFICULT TO ASK FOR WHEN, AT SAME TIME, WE ARE ASKING CURRENT CHIEFS TO MOVE AGAINST IMBERT.

7. COMMITTEE IS PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING ARRANGE MEETING BETWEEN MILITARY REPS OF BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE HOPE THIS CONTACT WILL LEAD TODIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TWO MILITARY FACTIONS. DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-ESTIMATED. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE STICKY QUESTION WILL BE FUTURE OF REBEL SYMPATHIZERS IN OFFICER RANKS WHO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED AND/OR CANCELLED BY HIGH COMMAND DURING COURSE OF PRESENT CONFLICT. IHRC LISTS 22 OFFICERS CURRENTLY CONFINED IN LA VICTORIA AND WE UNDERSTAND THERE MAY BE MORE ELSEWHERE.

8. DESPITE THESE VARIOUS COMPLEXITIES, COMMITTEE INTENDS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY ON JOB OF OBTAINING AS MANY CONCESSIONS AS POSSIBLE FROM BOTH SIDES. I EXPECT THIS PHASE CAN BE COMPLETED BY END OF NEXT WEEK. QUESTIONS THEN STILL AT ISSUE SHOULD BE REDUCED TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM; BEST OBTAINABLE DRAFT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACT SHOULD BE READY AND GARCIA GODOY'S ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING PG SHOULD BE FINISHED.

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-3- 306, AUGUST 1, FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

9. COMMITTEE WOULD PROCEED FROM THERE AS IT HAS ON COMPLETION OF FIRST TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS (DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BASIC PROPOSAL AND SELECTION OF

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 826S ~~SECRET~~

GARCIA GODOY TO HEAD PG). WITH TWO SIDES STILL APART WE WOULD PUT FORTH OUR OWN PROPOSAL FOR AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION AND EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT IT.

10. PROPOSAL WOULD BE EMBODIED IN DRAFT OF FINAL AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED BY GNR, CG AND GARCIA GODOY. OUR PRELIMINARY VERSION OF THIS "ACT OF DOMINICAN RECONCILIATION" INCLUDES FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) GNR AND CG ACCEPT PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT PRESIDED OVER BY GARCIA GODOY AS SOLE AND SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT OF DR. (B) PARTIES ACCEPT INSTITUTIONAL ACT AS CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENT UNDER WHICH PG WILL EXERCISE ITS FUNCTIONS. (C) PG WILL PROCLAIM GENERAL AMNESTY ON DAY IT TAKES OFFICE. (D) CONSTITUTIONALIST ZONE WILL DISAPPEAR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING INAUGURATION, BEING INCORPORATED INTO PRESENT SECURITY ZONE. (E) PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT WILL ASSUME EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC ORDER IN SECURITY ZONE AND MAY CALL ON IAPF FOR ASSISTANCE IN THAT REGARD. (F) PG WILL ESTABLISH CENTER FOR COLLECTION OF ARMS IN SECURITY ZONE. (G) REPS OF CG WILL ASSURE THAT ALL ARMS NOW IN POSSESSION OF CIVILIANS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION ARE DELIVERED WITHIN 48 HOURS. AT CONCLUSION THIS PERIOD PG WILL TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES COLLECT ALL ARMS NOT DELIVERED VOLUNTARILY. (H) ARMED FORCES WILL RETURN TO THEIR BARRACKS AND PLACE SELVES UNDER ORDERS OF PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. ALL CONSTITUTIONALIST OFFICERS AND MEN WILL BE PERMITTED REJOIN THEIR REGULAR UNITS UNDER NORMAL MILITARY DISCIPLINE. (I) NO OFFICER OR ENLISTED MAN, EXCEPT THOSE ACCUSED OF COMMON CRIMES, WILL BE SUBJECT COURT MARTIAL OR PUNISHMENT ANY KIND. ANY WHO DESIRE RETIRE OR LEAVE COUNTRY CAN DO SO. (J) SECURITY ZONE WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR AT LEAST 30 DAYS. DURING THIS PERIOD IAPF AND OAS WILL CONSULT WITH PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT ON RELOCATION AND EVENTUAL EVACUATION OF FORCE. (PROPOSALS RELATING TO IAPF HAVE NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH ALVIM AND PALMER AND THEREFORE ARE SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION.)

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 826S ~~SECRET~~

11. TWO KEY POINTS CANNOT BE COVERED IN PUBLIC AGREEMENT OF TYPE OUTLINED ABOVE: I. E., FUTURE COMPOSITION OF ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND AND HANDLING OF COMMUNIST PROBLEM. FIRST WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT INFORMALLY DURING COURSE OF COMING WEEK; SECOND WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BENNETT

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-4- 306, AUGUST 1, FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

AND MYSELF.

12. CONCURRENTLY WITH PRESENTATION OF FINAL PROPOSAL COMMITTEE WOULD ISSUE SECOND "DECLARATION TO DOMINICAN PEOPLE", REVIEWING COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, EXPLAINING PROPOSAL AND CALLING FOR SUPPORT OF GENERAL PUBLIC. AS DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED FROM OUR RECENT REPORTS, COMMITTEE IS PRESENTLY ENLISTING AID OF LABOR, CIVIC AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANXIOUS FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR FROM THESE WIDELY-REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS.

13. COMMITTEE AND EMBASSY WOULD ALSO PLAN INTENSIFY FINANCIAL PRESSURE DURING COMING WEEK, MAKING IT UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THAT THE END TO EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REACHED. AT SAME TIME WE WOULD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT OAS INTENDS MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER CENTRAL BANK AS PROTECTION OF PATRIMONY OF DOM PEOPLE. WE COULD EXPECT LOUD AND VIGOROUS PROTEST FROM GNR BUT I SEE NO OTHER WAY CONVINCE IMBERT THAT RESOURCES TO FINANCE HIS GOVERNMENT WILL SIMPLY NOT BE AVAILABLE, LEAVING HIM NO CHOICE BUT TO GIVE WAY.

14. I AM HOPEFUL THAT COMBINATION OF PRESSURES ACCOMPANIED BY REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR FINAL SOLUTION WOULD TURN THE TRICK AND ALLOW US INSTALL PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT BY MIDDLE OF MONTH AT LATEST. WILL APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS OR REACTIONS DEPT MAY WISH OFFER. BENNETT

GP-C*

* AS RECEIVED, WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8/1/65, 4:00 P.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CIA, 4:18 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 2, 1965, 6:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Organization of the National Security Staff

1. Once or twice you have asked me about the people who work on the National Security side here, and I have the impression that you may wish to know more about who they are and what they do. You may even think there are too many of them.
2. When I took over this job in 1961, there were 71 people assigned to the NSC/OCB. Currently there are 48 people, and the real reduction is greater still because a number of the present people are shared with outfits like the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
3. About one-third of these people (plus a CIA-supplied group of rotating watch officers in the Situation Room) constitute a classified message center for the whole White House and Executive Office Building. We handle all classified papers for the NSC staff, most of your own classified stuff, and also cable traffic for the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Science and Technology. This is a matter of keeping proper control and distribution of several hundred items a day. It is a service which we could turn back to the State and Defense Departments, and to CIA, but only at the price of losing our own grip on the flow of information.
4. The real heart of the office is in 17 professional officers with their secretaries. Of these, two are here in the White House keeping track of the daily business -- Bromley Smith as executive manager, and Gordon Chase as my assistant (and UN liaison). The remaining 15 are in the Executive Office Building. There the three top men are Bator on Economics and Europe, Komer on the Middle East and Africa, and Cooper on the Far East, especially Vietnam. These three officers have a total of six junior professionals to assist them.
5. The remaining professionals are essentially liaison officers and monitors for specific agencies and offices -- one (Bowman) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; one (Jessup) for CIA covert operations, one (C. E. Johnson) for the AEC and NASA; one (Bowdler) for Latin American Affairs; and one (Keeny, half-time) for military technology and disarmament. Finally, we have one FBI graduate (Ash) who does our security checks with one finger and uses the other nine to assist Pat Coyne in the work of Clark Clifford's Intelligence

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

Board. (If Ash were not on the NSC payroll, he would have to be carried by the White House.)

6. Three of these liaison officers (and several of the other junior professionals) are paid by the Departments with which they work -- but I think I can claim that all of them have demonstrated that their first loyalty is to you, and not to any one agency.

7. Man for man, I would not trade this staff for any other in Washington. Its one present weakness is that there is no all-around Deputy. There are a couple of ways of dealing with this problem, but they tie into State and Defense personnel questions. Perhaps we can discuss them at one of our Tuesday lunches soon.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 2, 1965, 1:45 P. M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: News from the British Front

I attach Harold Wilson's answer to our appeal for further help in Vietnam. In delivering the message this morning, Ambassador Dean added three points:

First, that the domestic political repercussions of direct military help in Vietnam would really be unmanageable for the Government;

Second, that a small military contingent would not do any real military good and would bring very powerful political lashback in the UK;

Third, that the British will try to find a way of increasing the numbers of their police advisers and of sending a civilian surgical team. We will follow up on this possibility and make sure that it gets as much publicity as the British can stand when and if it happens.

On Thursday and Friday I had a long and searching discussion with Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the British Cabinet. In accordance with your instructions, I kept the two subjects of the pound sterling and Vietnam completely separate. I think Trend now understands that on the subject of the pound, we are absolutely clear in our own conviction that devaluation would be destructive to all concerned, but that we cannot undertake to defend sterling alone. The British are now clearly on notice that any rescue operation will have to be multilateral and for that reason will have to be accompanied by a package that can be sold to European bankers. It was a helpful meeting.

McG. B.
McG. B.

CC: Secretary Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-435
By us, NARA Date 3-25-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, August 2, 1965, 1:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from Robert Stevens

Mr. Robert Stevens has written you the enclosed long memorandum on his visit to Vietnam in June. This was at Clark Clifford's suggestion. Clark wanted simply to give Stevens the encouragement of feeling that his views were given careful consideration. But I have now had a chance to read the memorandum, and I think it may be of interest to you as well. I have sent a copy to Bob McNamara for whatever value he and his colleagues may find it its technical recommendations.

I have acknowledged Mr. Stevens' letter already, but you may wish to give him the additional pat on the back of a note from you. A suggested note of this sort is attached.

McG. B.

8/4/65

Dear Bob:

I want to thank you warmly for taking the time to put your thoughts on Vietnam in writing, as you did in your letter of July 24. I have read it with great interest, and I am asking Bob McNamara and his colleagues to give careful attention to all of your specific suggestions. It is a great encouragement to have your support and help in this wholly nonpartisan spirit.

Sincerely,

751

The Honorable Robert Stevens
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Stevens Building
1460 Broadway
New York, New York 10036

LBJ:McGB:ab

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-57
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-13-01

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Monday, August 2, 1965, 1:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Views of Chiang Kai-shek on Vietnam

Chiang Kai-shek has just had a three-hour meeting with Ray Cline of CIA. Cline went at Chiang's request -- he is an old friend of the Generalissimo, [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

Chiang spent most of his time expressing concern about our current Vietnam policy. He believes that we cannot win in Vietnam, and should instead be dealing with the central problem -- Communist China. He did not say exactly what we should do about Communist China, but he talked a good deal about Chinese nuclear weapons and the danger they would soon pose for Taiwan. He also appeared to feel that the Americans were not consulting him enough, and insisted that he was thinking in terms of our interest and not of his own. While he made no specific action proposal, his comments strongly suggest that he is still thinking in terms of a use of U. S. power and his own troops against the Communist Chinese, somehow, somewhere.

Cline is likely to see him again in the next few days, and we will have a further report. Our own position continues to be clear -- we do not want to escalate to a direct contest or confrontation with Communist China if we can help it. Unfortunately, it is just such escalation that represents Chiang's own faint hope of a return to the mainland.

m4/s.
McG. B.

P. S. Chiang seems to have taken an even more violent view in this week's U. S. News and World Report, as the attached UPI story points out.

~~SECRET~~

103a

Bundy

UPI A42

ADVANCE FOR 6:30 AM EDT TODAY

CHIANG--WITH VIET NAM (A37)

WASHINGTON, AUG. 2 (UPI)--PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK OF NATIONALIST CHINA URGED THE UNITED STATES TODAY TO DESTROY COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS "BEFORE THEY CAN AMASS A STOCKPILE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND DEVELOP A SYSTEM OF DELIVERY."

IN A COPYRIGHT INTERVIEW WITH "U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT" MAGAZINE, CHIANG SAID:

"WE ASIANS BELIEVE THAT THE PEKING REGIME IS TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE, AND THAT IF IT CAN PRODUCE IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF, SAY, TEN ATOMIC BOMBS, HOWEVER CRUDE THEY MAY BE, IT WILL NOT HESITATE TO USE THEM ON ITS ANTI-COMMUNIST ASIAN NEIGHBORS."

HE ADDED, "THERE IS EVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT WITHIN THE COMING FIVE, OR AT MOST, TEN YEARS, PEKING MAY BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A LONG-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEM."

CHIANG ALSO SAID THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE SAVED CHINA FROM COMMUNISM 16 YEARS AGO AT A TENTH OF THE COST AND EFFORT IT IS NOW PUTTING INTO COMMUNIST-MENACED SOUTH VIET NAM.

HE CAUTIONED AGAINST TRYING TO SETTLE ASIA'S PROBLEMS BY NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

"AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE," CHIANG SAID, "A COMMUNIST NEVER NEGOTIATES TO SEEK SOLUTIONS. HE TALKS ONLY TO GAIN TIME OR TO WRING RECOGNITION FOR HIS PLUNDER."

AS AN ANSWER TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, CHIANG ADVOCATED A MILITARY ALLIANCE BETWEEN ASIA'S ANTI-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, SUCH AS NATIONALIST CHINA, SOUTH KOREA AND SOUTH VIET NAM.

"SO FAR, THE GREATEST SINGLE FACTOR PREVENTING ITS FORMATION IS THE 'NO-WIN' POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS DEMONSTRATED IN HER NOT SUPPORTING SUCH AN ALLIANCE," HE SAID.

"THE ROLE AMERICA NEEDS TO TAKE IN THIS ALLIANCE IS PRINCIPALLY THAT OF PROVIDING MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. THUS, AT MOST, HER MILITARY PARTICIPATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF HER NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. HER GROUND FORCES WILL NOT BE INVOLVED."

ADVANCE FOR 6:30 AM EDT TODAY.

FM559AED

Monday, August 2, 1965, 1 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached letter to me, Jack McCloy raises a question about whether we should go ahead with the Arthur Dean Committee at this time. McCloy's point is that you have done such a good job of pulling public support together that it may be unwise to go ahead with a group like Dean's which might merely stimulate the formation of an opposing group. He thinks that the situation is not the same as that which we faced in the case of the Committee on the Present Danger, in that we are now really in a fighting situation, and everybody knows it. I am sending a copy of this letter to Doug Cater, who has quite different thoughts, and in the next day or two one or the other of us will come back to you to see what your current thinking is.

McG. B.

CC: Mr. Cater