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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i>	3 p 09/22/65	A
#2 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 4-14-00 NLS 99-141</i>	1 p 09/22/65	A
#3a cable	copy Saigon 991 Secret <i>Sanitized 2/24/02 NLS 99-60</i>	3 p 09/22/65	A
#5 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President (possible classif. info.)	9/22/65	A
#5a memo	to the President from Peter Jessup info.) Secret <i>Sanitized 2/24/02 NLS 99-60</i>	2 p undated	A
#6 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p 09/22/65	A
#7b chart	re: air strikes Secret <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p undated	A
#8a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Confidential <i>open 7-20-83</i>	1 p 09/20/65	A
#11 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 09/21/65	A
#12 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	2 p 09/21/65	A
#16 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 4-7-00 NLS 97-431</i> secret <i>Dup #278, NSF Files of Holmes' Chrono' Book</i>	3 p 09/20/65	A
#18 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	2 p 09/20/65	A
#19 letter	draft letter to President Ayub Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	2 p 09/15/65	A
#20 letter	draft letter to Prime Minister Shastri Confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	2 p undated	A
#21 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President possible classif. info <i>open 4.14.99</i>	2 p 9/20/65	A
#21a cable	copy Secret <i>open 4-14-00 NLS 99-141</i>	3 p 09/20/65	A
#21 f wire	CINCPACFOR POLAD <i>open 12-10-99 NLS 99-140</i>	1 p	A
#24 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 4-14-00 NLS 99-141</i>	1 p 09/20/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 14, Sept. 1 - 22, 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26 Memo #26a cable	McGeorge Bundy to the President (possible classif.) copy USUN New York 816 confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	9/19/65 3 p 09/19/65	A A
#29 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i> <i>Chrono Box 1</i>	1 p 09/18/65	A
#30a cable	copy New Delhi 699 <i>open 4-14-00 NLJ 99-141</i> secret	2 p 09/18/65	A
#31 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 09/18/65	A
#31a letter	to Ahmed Sekou Toure from President Johnson Secret	2 p 09/20/65	A
<i>mesurization 2/27/02</i> <i>page #33 excerpts</i> <i>9-10 #33a Notes</i>	from the meeting in the Cabinet Room (possible classif. info) " " " " (possible classif. info)	5 p 09/17/65 6 p 09/17/65	A - <i>pening</i> A 12-10-93
<i>sanitized 2/27/02</i> <i>NLJ 99-141</i>	#38 agenda agenda points secret <i>open 3-1-04 NW 03-249</i>	1 p 09/17/65	A <i>NLS 3-08</i>
#39 agenda	agenda points <i>open 3-1-04 NW 03-249</i> secret	1 p 09/17/65	A
#41b memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Sargent Shriver confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p undated	A
#42 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 4-14-00 NLJ 99-141</i>	3 p 09/16/65	A
#43a cable	Karachi 482 secret <i>open 4-14-00 NLJ 99-141</i>	2 p undated	A
#44 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p 09/16/65	A
#44a cable	Deptel 72 secret <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 09/15/65	A
#46a memo cable	to the President from Amb. Clark copy Canberra 240 secret <i>open 3-1-04 NW 03-248</i>	1 p 09/16/65 09/16/65	A
#49 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4.14.99</i>	1 p 09/16/65	A
#50 a memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President	1 p 09/15/65	C
#50b letter <i>sanitized 2-20-04</i>	to the President from Thomas J. Dodd confidential	3 p 09/07/65	A <i>open per TH 5-30-02</i>

FILE LOCATION

nlj 99-141 NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~_____~~
McGeorge Bundy, memos to the President, vol. 14, Sept. 1-22, 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#51a letter	President Johnson to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi	09/16/65	A
#54 memo	possible classified information to the President from McG. Bundy Secret <i>sanitized 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232</i> <i>open 2-5-96 NLJ 91-232</i>	4 p 09/15/65	A
#55 memo	to the President from James C. Thomson secret <i>open 4-7-00 NLJ 97-431</i> <i>[# 33, Files of Bundy, Box 19]</i>	3 p 09/14/65	A
#56 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 3-24-16 NLJ 16-05-80</i>	1 p 09/14/65	A
#58a memo	to the President from A. J. Goodpaster secret <i>open 10-24-83</i>	1 p 09/14/65	A
#58b memo	for the record by A. J. Goodpaster Secret <i>Sanitized 2-28-88</i>	4 p 09/14/65	A
#59 memo	to the president from R. W. Komer secret	1 p 09/14/65	A
#62b cable	text of Santo Domingo 722 secret <i>open 11-15-91 NLJ 91-230</i>	2 p 09/14/65	A
#62d cable	text of Santo Domingo 723 secret <i>11</i>	2 p 09/14/65	A
#64 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy confidential	2 p 09/13/65	A
#65a memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential	2 p 09/13/65	A
#66 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 12-19-88</i> <i>Ap. #287, Files of Komer</i> <i>Chrono Box</i> sanitized 5/23/03 NLJ 03-41 <i>[dup #29, Bundy, "Daily Regional..." Box 19]</i>	3 p 09/13/65	A
#69 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret	1 p 09/13/65	A
#70a memo	to the President from Christian A. Herter secret <i>dup #36a, NSF, File of McG. Bundy, Chron File 9/1-15/65 "Box 11"</i>	3 p 09/10/65	A
#71 memo	agenda for sept. 13, 1965 meeting secret <i>open 6-1-91</i>	1 p 09/13/65	A
#72a memo	to the President from McG. Bundy top secret <i>Sanitized 11-21-84</i> <i>open NLJ 97-435</i> <i>3-25-99</i>	4 p 09/12/65	A

FILE LOCATION

[Duplicate in Navy Backup, 11/13/65]
NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#73a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Open NLT 97-432 9-25-98</i>	1 p 09/11/65	A
#80 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Open u u u</i>	1 p 09/10/65	A
#80a memo	(Karachi 428) <i>OPEN</i> possible classified information NLT 97-429 4-7-99	3 p <i>No Date</i>	A
#80b cable	embtel 564 from New Delhi Confidential <i>sanitized NLT 97-429 4-7-99</i>	2 p 09/10/65	A
#81a cable	copy London Secun Five Secret <i>Open 31-04 NLT 03-248</i>	2 p 09/09/65	A
#82a cable	copy USFDR-CG 8039 <i>Open 12-3-93 NLT 91-233</i> Secret <i>Exempt NLT 87-03</i>	2 p 09/10/65	A
#87a memo	to President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Exempt per NLT 89-495 Sanitized 6/10/00 NLT 97-434</i>	5 p 09/09/65	A
#88a letter	to Robert Gordon Menzies from President Johnson Secret <i>OPEN NLT 97-432 9-25-98</i>	1 p 09/10/65	A
#88b letter	to President Johnson from R. G. Menzies <i>Open NLT 97-435 3-25-99</i> Top Secret	2 p 09/06/65	A
#92 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President <i>Sanitized per TH 8/31/92</i>	3 p 09/08/65	C
#93 memo	to the PRESIDENT FROM McG. Bundy confidential	3 p 08/31/65	A
#96c memo	to Mr. Bundy from James C. Thomson, Jr.	1 p 08/27/65	A
#97a memo	Secret <i>Exempt 10/6/00 per 99-133</i> McGeorge Bundy to the President (possible classif. info)	1 p 09/18/65	A
#99a memo	duplicate of #97a		A
#100 memo	to Mr. Valenti from McG. B. confidential	1 p 09/08/65	A
#101 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>Open 7-30-84 NLT 84-145</i>	1 p 09/07/65	A
#102 memo	to the President Secret from R. W. Komer secret <i>Open</i>	1 p 09/07/65	A
#102a cable	Karachi 398 secret	1 p undated	A
#102b cable	copy cable 503 from New Delhi secret <i>Open per OK 11/20/09</i>	5 p 09/07/65	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]
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#105a cable	Amembassy Karachi for the Amb. secret 4 p	09/03/65	A
#106 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret again 7-30-84 NLS 84-145 1 p	09/03/65	A
#107 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential 1 p	09/03/65	A
#111 memo	Mc George Bundy to the President possible classified info. 1 p	09/02/65	A
#113a cable	copy of Saigon 716		
#117 memo	secret Mc George Bundy to the President possible classified information 2 p	09/02/65	A
#121 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	09/02/65	A
#121a cable	to Karachi and New Delhi secret 2 p	09/01/65	A
#124 memo	to the President from Francis Bator & McG. B. Secret 2 p	09/01/65	A
#125a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret 2 p	09/01/65	A
#126 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret again 7-30-84 NLS 84-145 1 p	09/01/65	A
#128a cable	re: Greece top secret 2 p	09/01/65	A
#128 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President possible classified information 1p	09/01/65	A
#83 memo	Komer to the Pres. Conf. (exempt NLS 91-232) 1p.	9/9/65	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 22, 1965 7:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Developments in Latin America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-232
By vis, NARA, Date 1-7-93

There were no unusual developments in the hemisphere during the past week outside of the renewed fighting in the mining area in Bolivia. The Dominican patient is still on the "serious" list. Colombia and Uruguay are still wrestling with their financial difficulties. Brazil is girding for its important gubernatorial elections on October 3. Otherwise, the general panorama is one of business as usual, as reflected in the fact that the Foreign Ministers of most of the countries departed for New York to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly.

Bolivia

Fighting in the mining area broke out last Saturday evening when miners attacked a National Guard post. Ranger troops had to be called in to restore order. The Junta imposed a curfew and braced for further disturbances in the capital and other major cities as opposition party elements, labor unions, students and extremists gave signs of mobilizing for protest demonstrations.

An uneasy calm prevails. Our Embassy reports its soundings indicate that the Junta and the Armed Forces continue united. The Junta is thus in control but not yet out of the woods. Beyond noting that we are following developments very closely, I think it behooves us to avoid comment on this situation for the time being.

Dominican Republic.

Garcia Godoy fell short this week of achieving his primary objectives: disarmament of the rebels and reincorporation of the rebel zone into the rest of Santo Domingo. He had hoped to make significant progress on these two fronts yesterday but ran into serious difficulties. The difficulties have caused Ambassador Bunker to postpone his return to Washington (he planned to return this afternoon) by at least one day.

Returning rebels have created problems for Garcia Godoy at the university, government agencies and in certain government-owned industrial establishments where they have attempted to gain control by replacing some officials with persons friendly to them. Garcia Godoy has not temporized in dealing with these situations. He issued a warning about

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interference with the university administration; he confirmed public employees holding positions on April 24 in their jobs; and he instructed police to act against unruly demonstrators at several plants. To reassure the military and police, he began a series of visits to their key installations.

As I noted in my previous report, Garcia Godoy is really not going to establish his authority and achieve normalization of the country until the rebel zone disappears. This task at the moment is stymied. What effect Bosch's intended return on Saturday, September 25 will have (if indeed he does come back), remains to be seen. I think the posture we should continue to take with the press on the Dominican situation is one of cautious optimism that Garcia Godoy is slowly, but perceptibly, consolidating his authority.

Brazil

The Brazilian Foreign Office confirmed last Friday (September 17) the ratification by the Congress of the Investment Guaranty Agreement which had been signed ad referendum by Ambassador Magalhaes on February 6, 1965. This may prove to be a significant factor in stimulating U.S. private investment in areas attractive to private investors which the Government of Brazil also considers beneficial to its economy. Prior to ratification by the Brazilian Congress, AID had received tentative applications for insurance from U.S. firms to cover investments totalling in excess of \$200 million. The formal ratification of the agreement is one more encouraging development which can help restore the flow of private resources into Brazil.

The necessary administrative machinery for the approval of projects in accordance with the inter-governmental agreement is now being established by the Government of Brazil. We have indicated that we are prepared to send qualified experts to Brazil in order to assist in working out the procedures necessary to carry out the agreement promptly. The availability of the experts would permit Brazil to move more rapidly than otherwise, since Brazilian officials will be enabled to draw on experience in other countries where investment guaranty agreements are already in effect. The President of the Central Bank of Brazil, which will be administering the project approvals, will be in Washington next week for the meetings of the International Monetary Fund. At that time, our AID officials expect to discuss procedural guaranty questions with him. It is advisable to go slowly in touting the agreement until the procedural issues are worked out.

Chile

Your authorization to Defense to proceed with the credit sale of 6 helicopters to Chile permitted us to make a quick favorable response to the Chilean request. The helicopters are needed for disaster relief operations still underway as a result of severe flooding in late August. Two of the aircraft have already been shipped. Two more will be shipped before the end of the month and the last two in October. Pilots and mechanics for these aircraft are now training in California and will be on hand in Chile to make each helicopter immediately operational when it arrives.

Panama

You have approved the joint statement of progress on the canal negotiations and have agreed to read it before the television cameras on Friday at 1:30. The statement should quickly deflate the mounting campaign of criticism against President Robles for his handling of the negotiations. As I have already reported to you, steps have been taken to gain maximum advantage from the joint statement.

President Saragat's Visit

President Saragat of Italy, accompanied by Foreign Minister Fanfani, is on the last leg of his Latin American tour, covering Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. Throughout the trip they have received a warm, friendly reception, with extensive press coverage. Following talks with Saragat, President Castello Branco of Brazil told a U.S. Embassy Officer that Saragat was the "best friend of the United States who had ever visited Brazil." On two occasions in Argentina, Saragat referred to the desirability of a "Great Society" comprised of Europe, Latin America and the United States. The trip has been good for Italy, the countries which they visited and for us.

Date for the Rio Conference

The Brazilians are having trouble making up their minds whether they want the Conference to be held in mid-November or put off until next March. The decision has been put up to President Castello Branco. We should know the Brazilian preference by Friday. Meanwhile State is going ahead with preparations.

Cc: Bill Moyers

For McGeorge Bundy
Brookley Smith

*to Pres. 9/22 2
7 30 p.m.*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~

NLJ 99-14/

By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

Wednesday

September 22, 1965

6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo
on Thursday, September 23 at 11:30 a.m.

Chiang Ching-kuo (pronounced JEEONG JING-GWO), Defense Minister and probably the next President of Nationalist China, arrived yesterday for a week's visit.

He will be especially interested to hear you emphasize our determination to stay in Vietnam until we get a meaningful settlement. He should also be put straight on our determination to avoid reckless actions which would risk global war. The Chinats are not above regarding the present crises in the Far East as providing their long-sought opportunity to move back to the mainland under a U.S. military umbrella. (In her conversations here, Madam Chiang has been advocating that we launch large-scale "preventive" air attacks on China's nuclear installations.)

Chiang may probe for your reaction to Chinat landings on the mainland as their contribution to our efforts in Vietnam. He professes optimism at the chances of their success. We are very dubious. You may want to quiz him as to why he thinks they can swing it.

His father has taken various opportunities to complain that he is not sufficiently consulted on Far East Policy. The Department of State has discussed this matter at some length with Chiang Ching-kuo and has made some specific suggestions as to how we can increase our consultation, especially in connection with intelligence and operations with respect to the mainland.

Chiang will have had a half hour with Mr. Bundy prior to seeing you.

A longer briefing memo from the Secretary of State and the exchange of correspondence you have had with Chiang Kai-Shek are attached.

McG. B.

CLC

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

Wed. Sept. 22, 1965 - 3PM

3

Mr. President:

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Attached is the latest weekly
report from Ambassador Lodge.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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3a
Wednesday, September 22, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. LODGE (Saigon 991)

1. Political-Psychological

A. The Government of Vietnam has finished its twelfth week of stability--a rather astonishing fact which I attribute in large part to the conviction that the U.S. is truly committed to staying as long as is necessary and to doing whatever is necessary to ward off the Viet Cong aggression. This conviction is created by the U.S. combat presence on the ground.

B. The above statement is impossible to prove, but some unusually well informed and sagacious persons believe it. In other words, your decision on troops is not only a great thing militarily, but is paying big dividends politically.

C. Let us hope that this stability continues, and I try to leave no stone unturned to see that it does. I have made it clear in strategic places that a coup would be most unwelcome. I also am taking steps to make sure we are organized to hear about coup plotting in time to do something about it.

D. The Viet Cong defection rate is still disappointing, and the level of Viet Cong activity remains high, disruptive and not effectively checked by the Government of Vietnam.

E. But there is encouragement in figures indicating an increase in the amount of information which Vietnamese citizens are giving to the Government concerning the Viet Cong. Surely this is a most significant index. In a very real sense, the citizen is not just expressing a Gallup poll type preference; he is actually "voting with his life." If he decides to give information about the Viet Cong and then gets caught, he may very well get killed. This, therefore, represents a vital judgment. I am having the CIA look into it.

F. I also hear that an order has gone out in some place to the Viet Cong not to congregate in groups of more than 100 men, or at any place for more than 48 hours. If this becomes a general Viet Cong policy, it would be significant. Much of their strength has

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

SECRET-EXDIS

been because, in this medievally structured country, they, too, organized themselves in medieval fortresses which were totally impregnable on the ground, where they could stay in safety with plenty of rest for long periods, coming out only to make very well prepared attacks on what the Government had been doing in the countryside. This made the Government's job quite hopeless. Now we are destroying the fortresses.

G. Americans in Vietnam report "cautious optimism"--based on a belief in the Government of Vietnam's ability to carry out its programs, in awareness of Viet Cong reverses, and in passive resistance to Viet Cong "taxes" on recruiting.

H. Yet, all of the above is only the beginning of the impact of the American presence -- an impact before the First Cavalry and before most of the First Infantry Division were here at all. Moreover, the U.S. troops which are here have by no means done everything they can do to organize the Vietnamese "regional" and "popular" forces for joint American/Vietnamese police type tactics and night patrolling. Thorough pacification has thus yet to be done even within the U.S. base areas. When this happens, the psychological effect should be marked.

I. The proposed deployment of the First Infantry Division should allow successful operations against the oldest and most vital Viet Cong redoubt which is not only what has been threatening Saigon for so long, but which is the line of communication from the food source in the Delta to the Viet Cong north of Saigon.

J. On another political front, Prime Minister Ky traveled to Ban Me Thout and personally presided over the return of 483 Montagnard dissidents who had rallied to the Government. In two speeches, Ky stressed the need for national solidarity, freedom from discrimination, and for the complete merger of the Montagnard and lowland people. He also told me he had evidently taken my advice and had urged his local military commander to be gradual and tactful in his relationships with the Montagnards. Tension continues and tangible measures must be taken to relieve their inferior status. The U.S. stands ready to help.

K. In Quang Nam Province of Central Vietnam, Government forces broke up demonstrations protesting against Government air and artillery bombardments demanding reimbursement for damages caused by military operations and calling for the release of husbands and sons from military service. These demonstrations apparently had nothing to do with the recent Hue struggle movement. They followed the pattern of disturbances which have occurred at widely separated points in the past, often as a result of Viet Cong agitation.

2. Military

Combined forces (U.S., Vietnamese, Australian, and New Zealand) thrust into a Viet Cong base area in Binh Duong Province to upset Viet Cong plans to concentrate strong forces in the area. The 101st Airborne Brigade defeated a major Viet Cong unit north of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province. Meanwhile the Viet Cong mounted only one battalion-size attack, their main activity continuing to be interdiction of communication routes.

3. Pacification

The death of Minister for Rural Construction Nguyen Tat Ung was a serious loss to the rural construction (pacification) effort. He was a forceful Minister and Lansdale had begun a relationship with him which promised to be fruitful.

4. Economic

Wholesale rice prices began edging up, reflecting low rice stocks in Saigon, poor prospects for further deliveries from the Delta this season, and estimates that the 1966 crop will be 10 to 12 percent below the level of the 1965 crop. The Government of Vietnam is now relying on PL-480 imports for immediate needs and for stockpile buildup.

5. General Ky

I took the occasion during our most recent joint meeting with the Vietnamese to commend Ky's approach to the desertion problem. He is stressing the necessity of eliminating corruption among top officers, of improving the troops' understanding of the war, and of carrying out in practice the policy of equal sharing by officers of hardships and dangers. I also congratulated him for his imaginative attitude regarding the refugee problem.

LODGE

✓ 4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 22, 1965
2:45 PM

1-403/1114

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke to Mansfield, who was all aglow and full of enthusiasm for what you and Goldberg have accomplished. I read him extracts from the transcript, and he said he took the point entirely and you could be sure that you would have a Bill by the end of the week. He thinks the debate will begin this afternoon, and he hopes it will be over tomorrow.

✓

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 22, 1965
2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Some time ago you asked me to review the matter of covert action against Cuba. I have done so, with the results reported by my CIA liaison officer, [] in the attached memorandum.

3.4(b)(1)

I reluctantly agree with Rusk and McNamara. But if you are not satisfied, we should take the matter up at an early lunch.

M.C.B.
McG. B.

Let it go _____

Bring it up at an early lunch _____

P.S.
President
had negative
argument on
Sept. 29 & agreed to
drop matter
R. no
told her my B

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-60
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-15-02

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Proposed Reactivation of US Paramilitary
Activities Against Castro

On June 2, 1965, Admiral Raborn, in the forum of the 303 Committee, requested the reactivation of the paramilitary effort against Cuba on a highly selective basis. The CIA argued as follows:

1. Castro is supporting and encouraging active or potential insurgent groups in 14 Latin American nations as well as several in Africa. Cuba is a privileged sanctuary within the Western hemisphere from which Communist subversive efforts are launched.
2. Castro defiance of the US strengthens ultra-nationalist and pro-Communist movements in the hemisphere.
3. Although time is on Castro's side, he is still vulnerable. Many divisive forces are at work within Cuba.
4. Reactivation of selective paramilitary harassment at this time is our best means to cost him heavily in money and manpower at a highly critical time and reduce his capability to export revolution.
5. CIA has in being a small paramilitary mechanism composed of Cubans which can mount carefully selected operations which can destroy installations and facilities with loss of life held to a minimum while economic damage is maximized.
6. The program envisaged would include:
 - a. sabotage of Cuban ships in Cuban ports
 - b. maritime raids on coastal targets
 - c. deception operations to keep Cuban defenses on costly alert.

The Department of State examined this proposal; the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) supported the CIA reasoning. They felt that of all possible methods, paramilitary activities have the best chance of creating within Cuba the political, economic, and psychological effects we seek. Reactivation of these operations would provide an

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-60
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-15-02

~~SECRET~~

-2-

unmistakable signal to all concerned of our continuing opposition to Castro. The stronger the regime becomes, the greater the difficulties and danger for US policy in Latin America.

ARA concluded that we can 1) continue our present "limited" policy and probably lose ground. 2) we can increase pressure and perhaps arrest and eventually reverse the forward movement of the Cuban regime. 3) we can move forward toward an accomodation. . . . Of these options, the policy of increased pressure provides the best protection of our position in Latin America.

On 30 August, the Secretary of State made known his views in the attached memorandum. He is "strongly opposed to resumption of such operations at this time" for reasons he makes clear in the attached single page memorandum.

On 20 September, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance confirmed that he and Mr. McNamara hold the same opinion as Mr. Rusk.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1965
2:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Thank you very much for letting me take a half-holiday to go to New York. This is by way of being Jackie Kennedy's "out of mourning" party, and I think you know that Mary and I have special reasons for wanting to be there.

2. Beyond this, I have still further plans for this weekend. If South Asia does not flare up badly, I would hope to take Mary to Martha's Vineyard early Friday and bring her back Tuesday morning. A friend has offered us the use of an isolated but telephone-equipped cottage there, and we have not had a day together without the children since February. I will keep in touch every day with Komer, and it will be good for him to get the feel of acting in my absence.

3. In this connection, I think it may be better to hold up the announcement of his new appointment until after this weekend. If there should happen to be a crisis, we do not want people calling him a neophyte deputy. It is better for him to be the fully experienced and senior staff officer that he is right now. Holding up the announcement also gets us further away from any false inference that there is a connection between these appointments and recent resignations.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER

BY *Ditt* ON *11-30-82*

2

Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1965
12:30 PM

Mr. President:

This is what the situation room has prepared for you on the aircraft losses of the last few days. The most interesting statistics are on the second page, where it appears that our September losses are very much of the same general size as those in June, July and August. The Air people do not think that there is anything especially alarming about having one bad day.

McG. B.

7a S

Wednesday, September 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Reports on 8 U.S. Aircraft Shot Down in one Night.

We can only account for seven aircraft losses in Vietnam on 20 September. Five of the aircraft were lost on missions over North Vietnam and two were lost in South Vietnam when they collided while making a landing approach. A total of 32 aircraft were in the air over North Vietnam during this period.

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 F-104	Escort	The pilot lost his way due to faulty radar and ran out of fuel over Hainon. He has been captured by the Chicoms.
1 A-43	Rolling Thunder Strike	The aircraft was hit by ground fire. The pilot bailed out off the coast, East of Hanoi and was rescued.
1 F-105	Armed Recon	The aircraft was hit by ground fire and crashed near the Laotian border. The pilot was killed in the crash.
1 F-105	Armed Recon	The aircraft was hit by ground fire and crashed near Vinh. The pilot ejected but rescue operations were driven off by heavy enemy ground fire.
1 Helicopter	Rescue mission	The aircraft was hit by ground fire while attempting a rescue of the F-105 pilot downed near Vinh. The status of the crew is not known.
2 F-104's	Regular operation	The aircraft collided over the bay near DaNang while landing. The pilots ejected and were picked up by a patrol boat.

From 1962 to the end of August a total of 270 U.S. aircraft have been lost in combat in Vietnam. The monthly breakdown for the past five months is as follows.

	May	13
	June	27
	July	30
	August	28
To date -	September	22

Attached is a graph showing Rolling Thunder sorties and aircraft losses since February, 1965.


A search of our records reveals that the seven aircraft losses for the 20th is the highest total for one day, however, combat statistics do not include losses such as the two F-104's which collided.

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic regrading; DOD DIR 5200.10 does not apply

ROLLING THUNDER
CUMULATIVE SINCE 21 FEBRUARY
SORTIES-----AIRCRAFT LOST
(INCLUDES STRIKE AND FLAK SUPPRESSION AIRCRAFT)

76



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 22, 1965, 12 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: MR. VALENTI

Do you wish to see Chip Bohlen while he is in town during the week of September 27? In the attached, Dean Rusk recommends that you do so and suggests Monday, the 27th.

fad

Francis M. Bator

mup

Yes, alone _____

Yes, with a small group for a discussion of European policy (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Ball, Leddy, Fowler (?)) _____

No _____

Date and Time:

4079
8a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RECEIVED
McGEORGE WASHINGTON

1965 SEP 21 AM 9 39

September 20, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

I recommend that you receive Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, American Ambassador to France, while he is in Washington the week of September 27.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Ambassador Bohlen will be discussing with us the problems that would arise should the French Government take steps to disengage from NATO and force us to withdraw our military forces from France.

I recommend the appointment be set for September 27, if possible.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED	
State 9-30-77 letter	
By 11-30-82	NARS, Date DCH

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MARVIN WATSON

Subject: Request for appointment from General Sir Francis W. de Guingand

General de Guingand, who was Field Marshal Montgomery's Chief of Staff during World War II, has just arrived in the U. S. General Eisenhower has earnestly requested us to let him have a few minutes with the President, and I think this is something the President will want to do out of thoughtfulness to General Eisenhower. De Guingand is a personal friend of Ike's.

De Guingand is a kind of quiet lobbyist for South Africa, where he now lives. If the President wishes to see him, therefore, I think the meeting should be off-the-record, in order not to raise a stir among American Negroes. I have talked to de Guingand myself about South Africa. He is civilized and reasonable, but his pitch is not one that the American Negro community could approve.

De Guingand is staying at Charlie Engelhard's apartment in the Waldorf, Apartment 40-a, Telephone - Eldorado 5-3100. He has a speaking engagement at lunch tomorrow, and Monday he goes to Canada. So he asks if his appointment with the President could be on Friday -- assuming the President agrees to see him briefly.

I hope to be away on Friday myself, but if this appointment is approved, Bob Komer will receive de Guingand and will get him in and out of the President's office in jig time.

M.G.B.
McGeorge Bundy

Appointment approved for _____

Appointment disapproved ✓

*de G. letter called
& said he didn't want
to press it. I thanked
him & dropped it* *MGB*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓ 10
Tuesday, Sept. 21, 1965
9:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

21
1. In looking at ways of beefing up our non-military efforts in Vietnam, I have come across the problem of the so-called Vietnam Amendments, which are a part of the bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946 that recently passed the House. This bill is Bill Crockett's omnibus foreign service reform bill, and it is right next to his heart. He and Mansfield and Fulbright have agreed that it should wait until the next session. But that delays the "Vietnamese amendments" for several months at a time when they would be most helpful in getting the kind of men you want into the field.

2. The attached memorandum from Crockett tells the story from his point of view. From the straight Vietnam point of view I think you may wish to consider breaking the Vietnam amendments out and pushing them through on their own in this session. Crockett's interest is in a reformed foreign service, but our interest is in changing the shape of our work in Vietnam just as fast as we can.

3. I recognize that the staff work on this is incomplete, but I thought you would want to have it before the Leadership breakfast tomorrow. I am sending a copy to Larry O'Brien.

McG. B.

McG. B.

10a

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

The so-called "Vietnam amendments" are three sections of a bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which was recently passed by the House. This bill, numbered H. R. 6277 and commonly referred to as the Hays bill, provides the legislative base for a new foreign affairs personnel system to which the Administration committed itself in the President's message transmitting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965.

The President's strong interest and support for the new system and its component parts were emphasized in the letters of May 6, 1965 to the Vice-President and the Speaker.

The Vietnam amendments would provide the following:

1. Permits continuation of employees in duty status for up to a year if they incur injury or illness arising from a hostile act in line of duty.

2. Permits the increase of differential payments from 25% to 50% of base salary for employees serving in areas of unusual danger from hostile activity.

3. Permits continuation of medical benefits for employees beyond date of separation and for dependents beyond date of death or separation of an employee if it is in the public interest to do so.

4. Permits

4. Permits the payment of travel expenses of employees and dependents when warranted by extraordinary conditions or circumstances involving unusual hardship.

Although we sponsored these amendments, the Department strongly cautions against separating them from the rest of H. R. 6277 for the following reasons:

1. The House passed H. R. 6277 over the objections of the American Legion and the government employee unions. There is no doubt that the "Vietnam amendments" were instrumental in attracting needed support for the whole bill on the House floor. To divorce these amendments now will weaken support in the Senate where we still face a major battle.

2. At the request of Senator Mansfield, we have abandoned any efforts to have H. R. 6277 considered by the Senate this session. Our reading of the legislative situation, which has been confirmed in part by Larry O'Brien, is that we might jeopardize the chances of passage next session if we were to pursue this matter this year.

3. The Department and the USIA have moved as far as we can administratively with the implementation of the new foreign affairs personnel system. It is interesting to note that AID, for whom the bill was in large measure drafted, has only indicated public support for the "Vietnam amendments." Two legislative actions are necessary before we can proceed further: (a) passage of H. R. 6277, and (b) confirmation by the Senate of the list of USIA career reserve officers as Foreign Service Officers. Len Marks and I agree that if we could obtain Presidential support for any legislative matter, we would consider confirmation of the USIA list to have priority this year.

4. Besides

4. Besides the objections of Senators Mansfield and Fulbright to consider H. R. 6277 this year, it is unlikely that the House Foreign Affairs Committee would support separation of the "Vietnam amendments" from the rest of the bill. I assume that the "Vietnam amendments" would have to be repassed by the House as a new piece of legislation.

In the long run, passage of H. R. 6277 is far more important to the management of foreign affairs activities than any of its parts. Without such a bill, we cannot establish a new personnel system encompassing State, USIA, and AID. Without such a bill, AID cannot move forward in the elimination of its "deadwood" as desired by the President. I believe too much is at stake in the passage of H. R. 6277 to jeopardize it for a very unlikely possibility of Congressional approval now of the "Vietnam amendments."

Alternatively, the President could push for passage of H. R. 6277 in this session, although in light of his legislative priorities, I would suggest that we postpone any action on either H. R. 6277 or any of its parts until the next session of Congress. This would delay the passage of the "Vietnam amendments" only for four or five months.

WJC

William J. Crockett

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F 11

Tuesday, September 21, 1965
9:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here at last is State's proposed reply to the last letter from Senegal's President Senghor. They delayed until the critical comments on our AID policies contained in his letter (Tab A) could be refuted on the spot by an American official of some standing.

Soapy Williams' current trip to Africa provides us with just such an opportunity. Hence, the timing and the reference to Williams in the draft reply. Basically, our aid problems center around (a) Senegolese inability to manage their financial resources, and (b) their failure to implement projects already agreed to. If the level of our aid to Senegal seems low, it is because we refuse to throw good money after bad.

Since you invited Senghor here last spring, and he's again angling for an invite, State has included an indefinite future invitation. I don't see how we could do less without offending him.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

mfb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

(2)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓
1-2
Tuesday, Sept. 21, 1965
9:00 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Sugar Bill

1. Cooley has reported a sugar bill from his committee and has obtained a closed rule for a vote in the House later this week. Tom Mann, who is normally a cool and realistic type, regards this bill as a major scandal. I attach at Tab A a copy of the circular cable which shows the changes between the Administration bill and Cooley's report. There are notable shifts upward among countries whose lawyers are thought to be friends of Cooley's, and downward shifts in cases like Argentina, which had no legislative agent. There is also a pronounced downward shift in the case of the Dominican Republic, which is damaging to us at a critical moment, and in the case of Mexico, which Tom Mann reports as a country which played ball with us particularly well two years ago.

2. Finally there is the comical case of Venezuela. Their Ambassador has told us informally that he hired the lawyer that Cooley recommended. Its quota has gone from less than 3,000 to more than 30,000 tons, and the Ambassador says that Venezuelan production cannot possibly meet it. I have had a quiet survey made by Nick Katzenbach of the registration of lobbyists for sugar-growing countries, and I attach a copy of his summary comment at Tab B.

3. I have talked with Larry O'Brien and Tom Mann, and it appears that we have three choices:

One is to fight in the House. O'Brien and Mann both recommend against this course.

The second course, and the one that seems preferred, is to fight like hell in the Senate. If we can get the Administration bill through the Senate and fight some more in the conference, Tom Mann thinks that we could rectify the worst international consequences of the Cooley bill, though he doubts if we could catch all the private deals.

The third course would be a veto. Tom Mann thinks this would be politically difficult and not very desirable internationally. The principal political heat would come from the domestic beet growers who now exist in 22 States. Both our bill and Cooley's would give the domestic growers about 550 thousand tons more next year (against a slower growth rate in the market in later years). Moreover, the current act is a Rube Goldberg contraption which gives lots of trouble in day-to-day administration, according to Mann.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

9/21/65

4. My own strong preference is for course 2. I would not only make a fight in the Senate; I would seriously consider a propaganda war against the whole procedure of Cooley's committee. There are a number of Ambassadors who would love to tell their stories to sympathetic columnists, and I just do not believe that the House committee can defend its asserted position that it is giving out its rewards and punishments on straight "foreign policy" grounds.

5. One mystery which Tom Mann signals for your attention in all this is the position of Congressman Poage. He is a good friend and no one questions his integrity, but he appears to have given Cooley strong support in reporting this mischievous bill. You will know much better than we whether something can be done through Poage or through the House Leadership about the House conferees, whose membership may be crucial at the end of the road.

6. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Larry O'Brien, who has agreed that the problem should be considered in Wednesday's Leadership breakfast.

McG. B.

McG. B.

12a



126
128

September 20, 1965

Mac --

The rationale of the quotas proposed by the Administration was to reward those countries that delivered in 1963-64 when world prices were higher than U.S. prices (1/3 weight to 1963 deliveries; 2/3 weight to 1964 deliveries). The Committee's quotas do not reflect any formula or uniform rationale even though the Committee says they are based on the 1962 Act. Cooley has also said that the quotas also reflect political faithfulness to the United States and agricultural purchases from the United States.

Our problem with the Committee quotas is that on the one hand we are neither rewarding those countries that delivered sugar to us at a financial sacrifice nor, on the other hand, is there some other uniform rationale which we could use to explain to the foreign governments that will be protesting (primarily Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Australia, India, South Africa, and Fiji). In addition, it will be difficult to explain why certain countries receive larger quotas (Haiti, Venezuela, British West Indies) and why certain countries who never supplied the U.S. market will now receive quotas (Bolivia, Honduras, Thailand and the Bahamas).

Tony 

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR

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Info

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TRSY

Chairman Cooley of House Agriculture Committee today announced Committee had approved sugar bill. Comparison of country quotas (at 9.7 million tons consumption) shown below:

	Administration Proposal	Committee Bill
(a) <u>For Countries in the Western Hemisphere:</u>		
Cuba	0	0
x Mexico	390,135	340,925 -
x Dominican Republic	385,854	340,925 -
Brazil	221,558	340,925 +
Peru	240,824	272,013 +
British West Indies	122,017	150,397 +
Ecuador	49,770	50,267
French West Indies	50,841	42,970 2/-
x Colombia	27,829	42,970 +
Costa Rica	34,786	42,159 +
Nicaragua	40,672	38,511 -
Guatemala	35,321	32,836 -
x Venezuela	2,676	30,809 ++
El Salvador	17,125	30,403 +
Haiti	18,731	28,782 +
Panama	14,449	25,134 +
x Argentina	63,685	21,485 -
British Honduras	4,281	19,864 ++
Bolivia	-	4,054 ++
Honduras	-	4,054 ++
Sub-Total	1,720,554	1,859,483

XX

(b) For

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

E:OR:ICD:TRP:JEB:utton:jkb 9/16/65

Classification approved by:

E:ICD - George Jacobs

Clearances:

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	<u>Administration Proposal</u>	<u>Committee Bill</u>
(b) For Countries Outside the Western Hemisphere:		
X Australia	186,772	162,152 -
Republic of China	67,431	67,293
India	96,865	64,861 -
South Africa	96,865	29,593 -
Fiji	45,489	24,323 -
Thailand	-	19,864 ++
Mauritius	14,985	14,188
Swaziland	9,098	6,081 -
Southern Rhodesia	9,098	6,081 -
Malagasy Republic	7,492	6,031 -
Ireland	2,141	1/++
Belgium	1,605	- -
Turkey	1,605	- -
Bahamas	-	1/++
Sub-Total	539,446	400,517
Total	2,260,000	2,260,000

1/ Ireland and Bahamas will receive 10,000 ton quotas starting in 1966 and 1968 respectively.

2/ France and Reunion were included in Administration bill but receive nothing in Committee bill.

Philippines essentially unchanged from Administration proposal.

ACTION: BANGKOK	LIMA	SALISBURY
BARBADOS (POUCH)	LONDON	SAN JOSE
BELIZE (POUCH)	MANILA	SAN SALVADOR
BOGOTA	MANAGUA	SANTO DOMINGO
BUENOS AIRES	MRABENE	SUVA (POUCH)
CANBERRA	MARTINIQUE (POUCH)	TAIPEI
GENEVA	MEXICO, D.F.	TANANRIVE
DUBLIN	NEW DELHI	PRETORIA
GEORGETOWN	PANAMA	
ANKARA	BRUSSELS	
CARACAS	PARIS	
KINGSTON	PORT AU PRINCE	
LA PAZ	QUITO	
GUATEMALA	RIO DE JANEIRO	

RISK

NOTE: Pouched by OC

UNCLASSIFIED

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12 d




UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : McGeorge Bundy, Special
Assistant to the President

DATE: September 21, 1965

FROM:  J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney
General, Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: SUGAR LOBBYISTS

In accordance with your request to Mr. Katzenbach there is forwarded herewith information as reflected in our files regarding the fees being paid to American agents representing foreign principals for their work regarding sugar quotas.

The information has been compiled alphabetically by countries. Registered agents are required to report each six months regarding their receipts, expenditures and activities.

It appears the Committee decreased the allotments to countries outside the Western hemisphere by nearly 139,000 tons and added that amount to the quotas of various countries within the Western hemisphere.

The firm of Quinn & Quinn obtained increases for each of its foreign principals located in Ecuador, Panama, British West Indies and Honduras.

The amount of money involved in sugar quotas is illustrated by the increased quota given Brazil. If the U. S. price is five cents a pound above the world market, the Committee's increased quota to Brazil would be worth over 11 million dollars.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Sept. 21, 1965
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Title III Problem Again

1. Since you know my own views on this one, I think the best thing to do with the attached memorandum is to send it to you raw, for your own judgment. It seems clear to me that only the New York Times strike has saved us from a very nasty story.

2. Bill Moyers referred Finney to me this afternoon on this problem. I have refused to talk to him. What I would like to be able to say is that there is no interruption of arrangements with the charities -- but I can't until you make your own decision.

= Best:

mcg. B.
McG. B.

13a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. William B. Macomber, AA/NESA

SUBJECT: Suggested Points to be covered in New Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Waters and Macomber -- Suspension of India-Pakistan Title III Food Programs of Voluntary Agencies

When this issue was last raised, we were asked how long a decision could be held off before the situation would become serious -- both from the standpoint of interrupting programs and from the standpoint of a public protest blowup by the voluntary agencies concerned.

That time has arrived.

Ned Kenworthy of the New York Times somehow has obtained the story of the "freeze", and contends it is directly contrary to the expressed intent of Congress which differentiates between Title III voluntary agency "people to people" programs and Title I government-to-government programs. Although the New York Times strike temporarily has blocked printing of the story, Kenworthy's interviews -- all over Washington and New York among Congressmen, Senators, and Voluntary Agency officials -- have eliminated completely any hope of keeping this issue "quiet". John Finney called Nick Farr to follow this up.

Ed O'Brien, Catholic Relief Services Assistant Director, has vigorously protested the program suspension to AID's Near East South Asia Bureau. He states we already have forced a two-month break in the supply pipeline. He has insisted on some answer by Monday, September 20, as to "why".

We have no rational answer to give them and still protect the President.

As you are aware, extreme pressures were exerted by CRS when AID terminated its program in Mexico some months ago -- with entirely legitimate grounds that Mexico could meet its own needs and was willing to do so. Even then, CRS carried the fight to the public in the press,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SEP 21 1965

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

periodicals and over the air with commentators, obtaining Majority Leader Mansfield's support, etc. It took all we could do to "hold the line". As we do not have the answer we had in the Mexican issue, a much greater wave of protest must come over India and Pakistan.

Frank Goffio, CARE Executive Director, has expressed deep concern and protest over program disruptions to Dick Reuter and to AID's Food for Peace Division. He has confirmed to Kenworthy the fact of program disruption and has appealed to AID for quick action. Church World Service Executive Director, Hugh Farley, is expected to object any hour. Kenworthy also has interviewed him. Up to now, Church World Service had thought they were confronted with just bureaucratic delays; Kenworthy told Farley it was a deliberate decision of the President to suspend programs of child feeding, etc., in India for "leverage".

Farley was the instrumental leader in getting the National Council of Churches to adopt a sweeping resolution in June calling for greater U. S. leadership in the War on Hunger. He insisted publicly that we not "play politics with lives of children" by withholding food -- even from people in countries with whom we disagreed in attitudes, policies, etc.

We understand a delegation of church leaders met with Mr. Bundy to outline their views. The present situation is exactly contrary to their request. And importantly, it is contrary to what they say they were told was the President's attitude. (This was in July & was not on Title III. It was on

We are placing the President in an untenable position. Within the week he will be calling on the nation's voluntary agencies and their constituents to mount a greater private effort for the war victims in Vietnam, at exactly the time when we are stopping their on-going efforts in India and Pakistan.

We are seeking to get cooperation of the voluntary agencies in this greater Vietnam effort, and already have found them disturbed over what they regard as efforts to impose a new organization on top of them. We understand it is proposed to invite leaders of these agencies to a luncheon with the President later this week to discuss the Vietnam effort. We want to caution that the same groups being asked to come in to talk about Vietnam are the groups most upset over being banned from activities in India and Pakistan. We suggest that this one irritant should be removed before they meet with the President, to avoid possible embarrassment at that time.

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- 3 -

These major voluntary agencies--CRS, CWS, CARE, etc.--were informed by Kenworthy of the Administration "ban" on voluntary agency programs in India and Pakistan after Chet Cooper talked with them about Vietnam. Cooper's views might be sought as to whether this new irritant might seriously jeopardize his efforts to achieve harmony on the Vietnam proposals.

Because it appeared likely the story would break in the New York Times, it was felt necessary at least to privately inform Charles P. Taft, Chairman of AID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, of the situation during the Committee's meeting here last Thursday. Taft was so concerned that he felt he could not report such an action to the Committee without many of them resigning in indignation. They would regard this step as complete repudiation of what has been firm and consistent government policy through Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and now Johnson Administrations:

Taft's advice was to rush every effort to quietly lift this ban and get the programs approved -- without domestic announcement -- in the hope that no one would publicly notice that the Administration did suspend "people to people" voluntary agencies for political pressure purposes, contrary to expressed intent of Congress, and without consulting the legally-constituted Advisory Committee supervising the government's relations with voluntary agencies for these programs.

Now that heads of the voluntary agencies have been alerted by Kenworthy to this issue, we see no way of stopping a mounting flurry of very embarrassing public criticism, open Congressional intervention, and serious damage to the public's image of the President -- unless the freeze can be quickly lifted.

Herbert J. Waters
Assistant Administrator
for Material Resources

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

September 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Robert Komer
The White House
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: PL 480 Title III

Bob:

Ed O'Brien of CRS has requested an immediate explanation on the Title III "hold up" and John Finney of the New York Times has been following up for Ned Kenworthy.

Herb Waters has quickly pulled together the attached memorandum which describes the current pressures for prompt PL 480 Title III determinations. Herb expected that he and I would prepare a formal joint memo on this subject, but we agree that the important thing is for the White House to be fully up-to-date on these matters. This memo seems to serve that purpose. Rather than go to the trouble and time of reworking it, Herb and I have agreed that I should send it over to you in this rough form.

WBM

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Near East and South Asia

Attachment.

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UNITED STATES OFFICIAL USE

SEP 21 1965

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday,
September 21, 1965
8:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to the President of the Inter-American
Development Bank

I recommend that you sign the attached reply to Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank (Tab A). Mr. Herrera wrote to you (Tab B) complimenting you on your August 17 Alliance for Progress speech and outlining what his bank is prepared to do to achieve the objectives of the Alliance.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1965

Dear Mr. Herrera:

I was very pleased to receive your cordial letter on the occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Your letter is especially welcome since, from the Alliance's inception, you have been one of the leaders of our great cooperative effort.


You have cited the Social Progress Trust Fund's successful record of investments, under the Bank's stewardship, in activities which reach the people of Latin America directly -- in health, in housing, in the modernization of rural life, and in education. I also note that the start of the fifth year of the Alliance coincides with the beginning of a higher level of activity for the Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations. I am confident that the Bank will use the Fund's recently augmented resources both to continue the good work of the past and to explore new approaches to meeting the social needs of the communities of the hemisphere.

The separate tasks of national development in Latin America are, as you suggest, linked to each other through the essential process of economic integration. As you know, at the last meeting of the Bank's Board of Governors the representative of the United States joined in approving the resolution on this subject. Accordingly, I look forward to the Bank continuing to use its resources to further Latin American development through economic integration. As I stated at the commemorative ceremonies, we are also ready to help work out ways of dealing with the problem of financing investment studies for integration programs and projects.

I am heartened by your intention of continuing close collaboration with CIAP. I believe -- and I gather you would agree -- that CIAP has already shown its worth as an instrument of international coordination. As time goes on and the Alliance quickens its pace, it should become even more valuable.

Please be assured of my esteem for the cooperation of the Bank in our common effort to achieve the goals of the Alliance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Felipe Herrera', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Felipe Herrera, President
Inter-American Development Bank
808 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

31 146



INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

CABLE ADDRESS
INTAMBANC

August 18, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

As President of the Inter-American Development Bank and as a Latin American, I wish to express to you my respectful appreciation for the solemnity with which you wanted to mark the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Your frank appraisal of the work already done and, above all, your inspiring thoughts and constructive proposals on the immense task yet to be performed, have served as a great stimulus to all of us who are engaged in the rewarding task of improving the living conditions of the great majorities of the Latin American population.

On this occasion you wished to stress the need to accelerate, even more, the pace of social development and the modernization of the agricultural activities. These are, indeed, fields in which the Inter-American Development Bank has been most active, as shown in the yearly reports of the Social Progress Trust Fund, the last of which was forwarded to you in March of the current year.

In fact, since its founding and up to June 30th, 1965, and particularly since the establishment of the Social Progress Trust Fund, the Bank has committed resources for a total of \$1,258 million, of which, \$891 million have been applied to the financing of 148 projects in the fields of education, low-cost housing, potable water, sanitation facilities and agricultural development.

Important progress has been made in strengthening the technical and administrative capacity of local institutions, in the mobilization of self-help and in the preparation and implementation of sound projects. However, we realize that the task has only been started and that -- as you so well have stressed it -- a long stretch of hard and dedicated work is yet to be performed if the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are to be reached


in time. You can be confident, Mr. President, that the Inter-American Development Bank will continue to make its best efforts in sustaining or even increasing the technical and financial assistance granted in these fields.

I was particularly encouraged by the support that your Government is prepared to give to the economic integration of Latin America. Although a significant progress has been made in the last five years, it is obvious that further progress will be largely dependent on the possibilities to carry on feasibility studies in the fields of regional infrastructure, mainly in the improvement of the transportation and communication facilities and services; large scale industries, such as fertilizers, steel, and heavy industrial equipment; and the development of the main river basins and multinational programs of border line areas. The technical complexity and multinational character of these projects make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Latin American countries to establish mechanisms which would permit them to carry on these studies on effective and expeditious bases. For these reasons we believe that your proposal, Mr. President, to establish a fund to promote and advance the preparation of regional development projects is most timely and effective.

The Bank, as a regional development institution, has also given preferential attention to these matters; in fact, it has granted technical and financial assistance to initiatives of such importance as the establishment of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the construction of international highways and multinational power projects, the development of border line areas, the preparation of pre-feasibility studies of basic industries in the context of a regional market, and, finally, the establishment of a system to finance intra-regional trade of capital goods. In the last meeting of the IDB Governors, held in Asunción in April, 1965, a unanimous resolution was passed in support of the Bank's activities in the field of the regional integration of Latin America and requesting the formulation of additional programs of technical and financial assistance and the promotion of studies leading to the acceleration of this process.

In conformity with this resolution the Bank is strengthening its organization to expand its activities in these fields and is ready to participate in the support and implementation of your proposals. In carrying on these tasks the Bank will continue to work in close collaboration with CIAP in order to assure that all efforts are coordinated to the common purpose of furthering the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Felipe Herrera', with a long horizontal line extending from the end of the signature.

Felipe Herrera

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUT

1965 SEP 2 PM 5 40

Tuesday, September 21, 1965, 10:45 AM

15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your 12 o'clock meeting with Juan Trippe et al

The following will be present:

Juan Trippe (representing Yale)
Arnold Beckman (Cal Tech)
Arthur Dean (Cornell)
R. Keith Kane (Harvard)
Marion Folsom (Rochester)
Maurice P. (Tex) Moore - (Columbia)
Bryant Leeb (Princeton)
David Packard (Stanford)

Francis Keppel
Kermit Gordon
Charles Schultze (if free)
John Gardner (if he can get
away from the moving van
which arrives at his new
house today)
Douglass Cater

This meeting is essentially a brief victory celebration over the removal of restrictions on government overhead payments on university research grants and contracts. The Military Appropriation Bill is not finally passed, but there is agreement in both Houses on this particular item, and Trippe, who never counts chickens before they are hatched, is sufficiently confident to celebrate.

I attach a draft statement which is approved by the Budget and which is consistent with your Education Program. You do not need to read it to this small group, but Bill Moyers' office can put it out this afternoon in describing the meeting.

You also have a free choice whether you want to have a photograph with this group. They would obviously love it. Otherwise, there is nothing to do but rejoice in this triumph of the Education President.

You may want to twit Trippe and Company for their remarkably successful lobbying. For many years, the man most resistant to change here has been Fogarty, who controls NIH legislation. According to Kermit Gordon, these suave and well-heeled trustees have simply wine and dined him into conversion.

McG. B.

September 21, 1965

DRAFT OF STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The partnership of the Federal Government and the Nation's universities in carrying forward man's quest for knowledge has produced enormous dividends in the past two decades.

It has been an enlightened partnership. It must remain so. Creative research through free inquiry is the working way to new greatness in our society. It can open roads to

- man's mastery of his environment
- sufficient food, water, and energy to sustain the massed population that is making ours a crowded planet
- the building of corridors linking the earth to the stars
- ultimate victory over the tragedy of mental and physical afflictions, and
- progress in helping man live in peace with his neighbor

So as a Nation we are committed to strengthen and nourish what Vannevar Bush once called "Science, the Endless Frontier."

Federal grants for academic research perform an indispensable role in strengthening science education in our colleges and universities.

I am happy to see that the Congress is acting on my recommendation to remove the statutory restrictions which have restricted us in reimbursing colleges and universities for the indirect costs of doing research under Federal grants. The Congress is acting wisely. The Government and the research community both owe thanks --

to the men and women in the Congress who are making this progress possible,
and to citizens like yourselves who have helped your Government to understand the needs of the academic institutions.

The universities will, under the new legislation, share to some extent in the cost of research projects. We intend to see that this requirement is administered -- as I know the Congress meant it to be -- in a constructive and reasonable way.

Our hopes demand new excellence in academic science. It must have the talent, the resources, the faith, and the freedom to prosper.

Government's part in meeting this challenge is of critical importance.

We will help

- to bring educational opportunities to our gifted young people
- to build the new facilities that higher education needs
- to create new centers of excellence, and
- to meet the costs of creative scientific research

I know that America's colleges and universities -- which you gentlemen represent -- will continue to help your country in every possible way.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 20, 1965
6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-431
By isa, NARA Date 10-6-98

Developments in Africa. The news continues to be encouraging though mostly background (the items in brackets are those too sensitive for use). Best by far is that of Chicom Foreign Minister Chen Yi's badly botched public relations trip to three so-called African "radical" countries. It's hard for us to crow about it publicly, but "Soapy" Williams' arrival in Africa today on a three-week West African junket may provide an opportunity for contrapuntal noises. For example, you could comment on how you've asked Soapy to express your personal interest in the well-being of the people of the African continent.

Chen Yi's Visit to Africa. He abruptly ended a singularly unsuccessful African tour this weekend. His badly botched public relations efforts assume even greater significance since they were restricted to Algeria, Mali and Guinea -- three nations hitherto lumped with the African "radicals", but which are showing signs of genuine non-alignment. The main purpose of the Chen Yi visit was to get the three to vote against Soviet participation in the coming Afro-Asian Conference. He apparently failed. In fact, unlike previous, high-level Chicom visits to Africa, no joint communiques condemning the US, imperialism, or colonialism were issued at the end of each visit.

The above information might be good deep background for interested columnists, e.g., Drew Pearson who is badly misinformed on US foreign policy in Africa. However, we should avoid official comment which could annoy the African "radicals" and slow their Westward drift.

Williams' Trip to Africa. He arrives in Bamako tomorrow on a three-week tour of West Africa (Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Niger, Upper Volta, Guinea, and Senegal). The point could be made to the press that his trip is a reflection of your personal interest in African affairs, and that he bears personal greetings from you to the African chiefs of state he will encounter.

~~SECRET~~

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Visit of Nigerian Deputy Foreign Minister. It might be worth saying a few nice things publicly about Nigeria when Bamali has a brief meeting with you Wednesday. /He has a letter from Prime Minister Balewa, which probably refers to Viet-Nam and Kashmir./ Nigeria has been most helpful to us in the past and can be even more helpful in the future. It's also Africa's largest country and gets more US aid than any other. A little press and photo coverage following your "friendly discussion" with this able representative of a "great African nation" could earn us some points.

Tanzanian-Zambia Railroad. /The Canadians have agreed to finance half cost (\$210,000) of a feasibility study; the UK will put up the other half. This significant break-through effectively forces the Chicoms out of the picture. Another encouraging development is that both Zambia and Tanzania show signs of accepting AID's offer to finance a parallel road survey./ But public announcement of this one is up to the Canadians, Tanzanians and Zambians.

Aid to Africa. With finance ministers arriving here late this week for the IMF/IBRD annual meetings, there will be a lot of economic talk around town. Since our aid policies are always under fire somewhere, it wouldn't hurt for the press to play a few thoughts from you -- if there's an occasion for casual backgrounding.

One theme applies especially to Africa, though it is important everywhere. As guardian of the taxpayer's dollar, you're determined that aid dollars will be used effectively. Since our funds are limited we have to concentrate on top priority targets. /It's not only true that we're constantly raising the self-help standards, but this argument is also a good defense against charges that we play politics with our aid./

You might cite Tunisia and Nigeria as examples of countries which have done well with our help and where we're prepared to continue large-scale aid. /We want to massage both countries, and are trying to turn off the Tunisians in particular from a \$100 million MAP request./

Congo. Even though there's still a security problem, political and economic issues could cause more trouble than military in the next few months. Mercenaries and Congolese army units will shortly launch a push to wipe out the one big rebel pocket. But the big news may come from

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the new Congo parliament session, which may bring the Kasavubu/Tshombe feud out in the open. Also, unless the government controls expenditures, inflation will push prices up and kick off a new round of complaints like those that partly triggered the rebellion last year.

US-South African Relations. /Unprovoked actions initiated by the Republic of South Africa continue to embarrass and complicate our relations. Remarkably accurate word has leaked to the press in South Africa (and is now picked up by AP and UPI) that South Africa asked that four of our Embassy officers be transferred out because their attitudes were critical of official South African policies. We, of course, refused and were prepared to retaliate in kind if these officers were declared persona non grata. We believe that the South African Government itself was the source of the press leaks to more than five local newspapers. / Our public position is reflected in the State Department statement used here and in Pretoria: "Our officers are continuing in their assignments in South Africa. Any question concerning their acceptability, if such should exist, would be a matter for the South African Government to comment upon if it should so choose." For its part, the South African Foreign Ministry has issued a categorical denial of this story.

Southern Rhodesia. /The Rhodesians may have hoped to trigger a unilateral declaration of independence from the UK by sending a Rhodesian diplomatic representative to Lisbon. A Rhodesian diplomat did arrive in Lisbon, but the Portuguese have cagily held off receiving him officially. They are aware that the UK has told Rhodesia that its representatives will be dropped from UK Embassy staffs in Washington, Bonn and Tokyo if a separate Rhodesian diplomatic mission is established in Lisbon. We would support the UK in such a case by not dealing with the Rhodesians separately. /

/Cledwyn Hughes, UK Minister of State in the Commonwealth Relations Office, began talks with State Department officials here this morning on African affairs. One of the main subjects will be ways in which the US can assist the UK in preventing a unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesians. / State still argues that the South Rhodesian situation requires us to avoid public support of UK efforts to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence.


R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

rec'd
9-22-65
10:00 am

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17

(2)

Monday,
September 20, 1965,
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Selden Resolution

The Selden resolution on communist intervention, about which I spoke to you this morning, passed by a vote of 312 to 52. Voting for the resolution were 195 Democrats and 117 Republicans. Against it were 49 Democrats and 3 Republicans. Congressman Selden read the statement which he worked out with Tom Mann explaining State's position on the resolution.

State reports that so far there has been very little press interest in the resolution. Both AP and UPI carry stories on the House action. The AP account is accurate in reporting the State Department's views. The UPI version is not clear on this point. The wire service accounts are attached.

McG. B.
McGeorge Bundy

Attachments

AP-UPI accounts.

17a

AP 154 HEMISPHERE

WASHINGTON (AP)-BY AN OVERWHELMING 312 TO 52 MARGIN, THE HOUSE TODAY APPROVED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE USE OF FORCE IF NECESSARY BY ANY AMERICAN COUNTRY TO PREVENT A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN ANY HEMISPHERE COUNTRY.

REP. FRASER, D-MINN., WHO LED A SMALL BAND OF OPPONENTS, SAID THE RESOLUTION WAS "VERY BADLY WORDED" AND WOULD PERPETUATE THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AS ONE OF "CLUMSY, HEAVY-HANDED INTERVENTION" IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

REP. SELDEN, D-ALA., SPONSOR OF THE RESOLUTION, ACKNOWLEDGED THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD QUESTIONED SOME OF THE RESOLUTION'S LANGUAGE AND ASKED HIM TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO SAY "THERE A MERE THREAT OF SUBVERSION, STANDING ALONE, JUSTIFIES THE UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE--TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE HOUSE DOES NOT INTEND TO DEPART FROM EXISTING INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUBJECT."

SELDEN SAID WHEN HE ASSURED THE DEPARTMENT HE WOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR, IT "WITHDREW WHATEVER OBJECTIONS IT MIGHT HAVE HAD."

BUT REP. BRADENAS, D-IND., SAID PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD NOT CALLED FOR PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOOK AN "AMBIGUOUS POSTURE."

HE SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH SECRETARY RUSK AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS AND "IF THERE WAS ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS...IT CERTAINLY ESCAPED ME."

WE424PED 9/20

155

WASHINGTON--ADD HEMISPHERE (154)

VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION WERE 195 DEMOCRATS AND 117 REPUBLICANS. AGAINST IT WERE 49 DEMOCRATS AND 3 REPUBLICANS.

REP. BINGHAM, D-N.Y., SAID IF THE RESOLUTION MEANT TO RESTATE THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IT WAS UNNECESSARY. IF IT WENT FURTHER, HE SAID, "IT WILL BE USED BY THE ENEMIES OF OUR COUNTRY."

THE RESOLUTION MENTIONS THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND "INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE."

THE OPPONENTS SAID AS IT WAS WORDED IT WOULD GIVE SANCTION TO INTERVENTION BY ANY LATIN COUNTRY IN ANY OTHER ONE IF THERE WAS A COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE THREAT, WHETHER OR NOT THAT COUNTRY ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE.

REP. FORD, HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER, SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, BUT HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE REPORT ACCOMPANYING THE MEASURE WAS "BADLY WRITTEN."

THE RESOLUTION IS SOLELY AN EXPRESSION OF THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE, AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY BINDING EFFECT ON AMERICAN POLICY. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE SENATE ACTION.

WE427PED 9/20

UPI-127

(HEMISPHERE)

WASHINGTON--THE HOUSE TODAY DECLARED ITS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER AMERICAN STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION TO KEEP COMMUNISM OUT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

IT PASSED BY A 312 TO 52 ROLL CALL VOTE A RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE PRINCIPLE. THE MEASURE, WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, HAS NO FORCE OF LAW. NOR DOES IT REFLECT THE VIEW OF CONGRESS AS SUCH. IT MERELY EXPRESSES THE "SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES."

NEVERTHELESS, PROPONENTS SAID IT WOULD GIVE THE PRESIDENT A FREER HAND IN MEETING THE "NEW FORM OF AGGRESSION. OPPONENTS CLAIMED THAT COMMUNISTS WOULD USE IT AS ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA.

9/20--N406PED

UPI-133

ADD 1 HEMISPHERE, WASHINGTON (UPI-127)

REP. DONALD FRASER, D-MINN., SAID THE RESOLUTION WOULD PERPETUATE AN IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH HE SAID UNFORTUNATELY WAS PREVALENT IN LATIN AMERICA, OF "CLUMSY, HEAVY HANDED INTERVENTION."

REP. JONATHAN BINGHAM, D-N.Y., NOTED THAT A COUNTRY COULD INTERVENE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY EVEN IF THE "VICTIM" OF SUBVERSIVE AGGRESSION DID NOT REQUEST IT.

BUT BACKERS, IN A SHARPLY WORDED AND AT TIMES EMOTIONAL DEBATE, COUNTERED THAT COMMUNISM POSED SUCH A GRAVE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE THAT IN CERTAIN INSTANCES COLLECTIVE ACTION WOULD NOT BE PROMPT ENOUGH.

REP. ARMISTEAD SELDEN, D-ALA., AUTHOR OF THE RESOLUTION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE, SAID THE MEASURE WAS "NOTHING MORE THAN A RESPONSIBLE AND REASONABLE RESTATEMENT OF OUR RECOGNITION OF THIS COUNTRY'S PRIMARY OBLIGATIONS TO OUR OWN SECURITY AND THAT OF THE HEMISPHERE."

THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION ANY NATIONS OR ANY PAST EXAMPLES OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION. BUT SELDEN TICKED OFF SEVERAL, WHICH HE SAID FIT THE BILL, INCLUDING THE EMERGENCE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN CUBA AND "THE QUICK SEIZURE OF STRATEGIC POSTS BY COMMUNIST AGENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN APRIL."

CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. ACTION ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAD BEEN LARGELY LIMITED TO THE SENATE WHERE CHAIRMAN J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE DELIVERED A MAJOR SPEECH CRITICIZING THE EPISODE.

THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT SAID IT WAS A "GRIEVOUS ERROR" AND THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON ACTED ON THE BASIS OF INADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE. FULBRIGHT SAID THE COMMUNIST THREAT WAS OVERSTATED BY JOHNSON'S ADVISERS.

9/20--N425PED

MORE

UPI-136

ADD 2 HEMISPHERE WASHINGTON

ON THE VOTE, 195 DEMOCRATS AND 117 REPUBLICANS VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE RESOLUTION. VOTING AGAINST IT WERE 49 DEMOCRATS AND 3 REPUBLICANS
9/20--N443PED

UPI-145

ADD 3 HEMISPHERE WASHINGTON

THE POSITION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE RESOLUTION WAS UNCLEAR. DURING HEARINGS, THE APPEARANCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE WAS IN CLOSED SESSION.

SELDEN SAID TODAY THAT THE DEPARTMENT "GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESOLUTION AND SO STATED IN ITS TESTIMONY." BUT REP. JOHN BRADEMAS, D-IND., SAID HE HAD WRITTEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING FOR ITS POSITION ON THE RESOLUTION AND STILL HAD NOT GOTTEN AN ANSWER.

THE MEANING AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE RESOLUTION WERE SUMMED UP FOR THE TWO SIDES BY REP. WAYNE HAYS, D-OHIO, AND BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL, D-N.Y.

HAYS, WHO CLAIMED THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH, SAID COMMUNIST CHINA WAS TALKING ABOUT "ANNIHILATING THE UNITED STATES" THROUGH SUBVERSION AND THAT DRASTIC ACTION WAS REQUIRED. AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTION ON LATIN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, HAYS SAID: "I'M NOT PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION IN LATIN AMERICA BECAUSE THE ONLY OPINION AGAINST US PROTECTING COUNTRIES AGAINST COMMUNISM IS COMMUNIST OPINION."

ROSENTHAL SAID THE MAJOR OBSTACLE FACING THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA WAS ITS REPUTATION. THE RESOLUTION FURTHER DAMAGED THAT REPUTATION, HE ADDED.

"WE WOULD BE COMMITTED TO A PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH ANARCHY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ALLOWING ANY AMERICAN STATE UNILATERALLY TO INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANY OTHER AMERICAN STATE," ROSENTHAL STATED.

9/20--N509PED

MEMORANDUM

(2) THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 20, 1965, 5 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting at 5:30 PM - Kashmir and 20th UN General Assembly

At 5:30 today you will be meeting with Rusk, Goldberg, ~~Sisco~~, and me to discuss Kashmir and issues that are likely to come up at the 20th UN General Assembly, which opens tomorrow.

1. Kashmir - It is likely that Goldberg will want to give you a current report on and talk about Kashmir. In fact, this item may take up a large part of the meeting.
2. Goldberg's Opening Speech on September 23. Goldberg may want to discuss with you the themes of his opening speech to the General Assembly (e.g. Great Society; peace keeping; disarmament; economic development) and especially the following two proposals.

(a) Forthcoming noises on certain disarmament questions - e.g., nuclear safeguards for non-nuclear countries; destruction of nuclear weapons; a World Disarmament Conference which would include the Chinese Communists. In this latter regard, there are those who would argue that soft noises to the Communist Chinese on the heels of a Chinese threat to the Indians would constitute poor timing.

(b) Proposals to channel more aid through the UN mechanism - e.g., an expansion of the Mekong idea.

NOTE: In the event Goldberg does raise these specific proposals in the context of his opening speech, you may want to discourage Goldberg from making any bold specific proposals which could be more usefully made by you from either an appropriate Washington or New York forum. On disarmament, I fear there is not much we can wisely add to our present position. On AID we must be careful to protect your right to review next year's programs and reach your own decisions. If you are pressed for time, Goldberg says you can stop with these matters. If you want to hear further discussion, it will probably be on the subjects as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cl, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

3. Presidency of the General Assembly - State will probably want to report to you on the status of the fight between Fanfani (Italy) and Popovic (Yugoslavia) for the Presidency of the General Assembly. The latest word today is that Popovic has withdrawn and that the way has been cleared for Fanfani.

4. Vietnam - While not inscribed as a General Assembly agenda item, State will probably want to red-flag the Vietnam issue, which will provide an important backdrop to the General Assembly session. In this regard, Chinese threats and/or moves against India can be expected to mitigate the heat we receive on Vietnam.

5. Chinese Representation - State may want to report to you that we are safe on this issue for another year. Goldberg, while agreeing, may make the point that we have no better than a 50-50 chance to get a simple majority against the entrance of the Communist Chinese and that the psychological impact of losing a simple majority could conceivably make it tough for us to get the necessary votes to uphold the "important question" principle.

6. Apartheid - Goldberg may make a pitch on doing something in the near future to indicate that the U.S. Government is firmly against apartheid -- e.g., announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U. S. investment in South Africa. If he does, Rusk will probably point out a number of reservations -- that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses tough problems with regard to such other areas as Eastern Europe; that it probably wouldn't work; and that the South Africans could probably retaliate meaningfully in one way or another.

While my own sympathies lie with Goldberg on this issue, I do not think we should consider anything drastic until later on - when we have had a chance to take the UN temperature and when the International Court of Justice finishes with the related South West Africa issue in the spring of 1966.

7. Miscellaneous Issues - Rusk and Goldberg may want to take the opportunity to brief you on such miscellaneous items as UN financing and UN outer space problems (e.g. World Conference on Outer Space).

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/15/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2)

19

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

Dear Mr. President:

Since I wrote you on September 4, the conflict between your country and India has taken a most dangerous turn. I am deeply disturbed by the implications of these developments.

The United States has earnestly sought to maintain the friendliest possible relations with both your country and India. Over the years, we have sought to do all that we can to assist both of you to meet the internal and external threats to peace and stability. We have recognized the needs and desires of your people for a better way of life. We have provided large resources to assist them in fulfilling this aspiration, but we have recognized, as I am sure you have also, that this economic improvement can be achieved only through the maintenance of peace and that armed conflict can destroy everything you and we have sought to achieve together.

It is for this reason that we feel so deeply now the paramount need for an end to the hostilities between Pakistan and India, which could have such tragic consequences for the peoples of both your countries. This is why our hopes and prayers and our strong backing are with the Secretary General of the United Nations. The fearful damage already done will be compounded if he fails. Rarely has world public opinion been so insistent that fighting must end.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I know how deeply your people feel that there can be no lasting peace unless the Kashmir dispute is settled. But that objective cannot be achieved, nor can any friends assist in that effort, in an atmosphere of warfare. Today the nations of the subcontinent are being drained of resources and energies that should be devoted to the pressing demands of national development and to building the defense of freedom for the whole subcontinent. The conflict is being exploited by others, whose ambitions are best served by war and the consequent weakening of Pakistan and India.

At this grave hour, it is time for utmost candor. We could not and cannot support an effort by Pakistan, despite its frustration, to force by arms a settlement of Kashmir. At the same time, I hope you will bear clearly in mind that the United States has not changed its policy toward Pakistan. In fact, I still earnestly look forward to the kind of top-level meeting of minds with you which will remove any misunderstandings and lead to continuation of U. S. aid and support at a level commensurate with the closeness of our relationship.

If the tragic conflict between Pakistan and India cannot be quickly stopped, but expands, it will pose the gravest issues for all peace-loving nations. Chinese Communist involvement, for example, could not but have a great impact on U. S. policy. This is all the more reason for urgency in agreeing to a cease-fire that will end the bloodshed and permit your differences with India to be put on the conference table where they belong.

So I prayerfully hope that you will accept the appeal of the Secretary General, and I have written in the same sense to Prime Minister Shastri.

20.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In your letter of September 7, 1965, you described how events in Kashmir, starting with the crossing of the cease-fire line by armed personnel, have developed into a full-scale conflict between India and Pakistan. I believe I understand how this escalation took place. But what most concern us both now are the implications of this conflict for the well-being and security of all free Asia.

The internal effects of continued strife on the subcontinent are almost beyond imagination. The prospect of famine, disease, and communal disorder is apparent even today. Only if the conflict is brought to an early close will India and Pakistan, with the help of a friendly world, be able to control these challenges to their very existence. If it is not, I fear that catastrophe, which is almost upon the subcontinent, may be inevitable.

The Security Council's unanimous appeals for a cease-fire demonstrate the profound anxiety of the entire world that the fighting on the subcontinent be ended promptly. The longer it goes on, the greater becomes the possibility of wider international involvement in the conflict. Of particular concern in this connection is Communist China. I need not point out the grave implications of any Chinese intervention -- implications of which the United States is particularly aware because of the increasingly heavy commitment we have already undertaken in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

India and Pakistan today stand at a critical time of decision. The days immediately ahead will determine whether conflict can be limited and a political solution obtained, or whether the fires of war will spread, with the danger of involving both India and Pakistan in a larger conflagration.

So I appeal urgently to you, as I have to President Ayub, to end the current fighting and take the road toward negotiation of the differences between India and Pakistan. I realize the strong views of your government, particularly at a moment of grave national crisis, on even expressing willingness to discuss such differences. But I hope you in turn will accept that, if Pakistan and India are to live in peace on the same subcontinent, eventual resolution of their differences is essential to the larger interests of both. It may be that the tragic contest just unleashed is developing militarily in India's favor. Then, above all, is the time for statesmen to show both magnanimity and wisdom, the time when they must respond to the needs of the nation, not the passions of the people.

I prayerfully hope that India and Pakistan can, with honor, find a peaceful way out of the present crisis.

Sincerely,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, September 20, 1965, 3 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach at Tab A a draft statement that might be put out by Bill Moyers at 4 o'clock giving your endorsement of the Security Council Resolution.

(TAB D)
The Resolution is balanced and even-handed. It refers to "Kashmir and other differences" in the preamble, and talks of assisting toward a settlement of the political problem in operating Paragraph 4. In spite of Soviet resistance, it pushes the Indians about as far as any of us think they could be expected to go today.

Meanwhile, Ayub is reaching his moment of truth, at least on this round. At Tab B is a conversation McConaughy had with him at his request, after McConaughy had delivered the essence of our message of Saturday to Bhutto and Shoaib. Ayub swears that he has asked the Chicoms to stay out and that he would like to move to a cease-fire, but could not survive a cease-fire which would look to the people as if he was giving up on Kashmir.

At Tab C is a still later message from McConaughy which urges a message direct from you to Ayub. I think we should wait a day on that.

Meanwhile, we have already voted for the Security Council Resolution, and to seems to Goldberg, Rusk and me that there is no harm, and some good, in a direct Presidential endorsement of that Resolution.

In favor of such a statement are these considerations:

1. It underlines our continuing insistence on the UN as the central channel of action.
2. It associates us both with the prompt cease-fire and with the fact that there will have to be further efforts toward a political settlement afterwards.
3. It notes for both parties that our efforts to help them are gravely compromised by their war with each other.

Against such a Presidential statement are the following arguments:

1. You have carefully avoided direct comment on this crisis, and so far this has proved wise. There is no overwhelming proof that today is the day to change your stance.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -


2. While the draft statement is even-handed in our eyes, it will give some offense to both Indians (who want unconditional cease-fire) and Paks (their agents the Jordanians abstained because the Resolution does not re-affirm old UN positions on a plebiscite in Kashmir).

3. We cannot be sure that a public statement will do as much good as private diplomacy.

On balance, I come out in favor of a statement. It gives a peg for private diplomacy, and provides an umbrella under which our diplomats can make the stronger comments of warning and reassurance that you do not yourself wish to make directly and personally to Ayub and Shastri.

McG. B.
McG. B.

2/2



September 20, 1965

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The United States strongly supports the Resolution passed early this morning by the United Nations Security Council in New York. Throughout the world, men of good will will look for prompt acceptance of the Council's demand for a ceasefire to take effect on Wednesday. The world will also note and support the Council's determination to consider further steps "to assist toward a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict."

The United States has given plentifully of its own resources to help in the development of stable and progressive societies in both India and Pakistan, so that the United States has a special stake in their ability to live in peace together. I know that I speak for all of the American people as I appeal to both sides to agree promptly and without reservation to the Security Council Resolution.

2/c

R

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

September 20, 1965

FROM RAWALPINDI 91

I saw President alone at his request for thirty-five minutes beginning 12:30 today. President showed strain from pressure of issues now bearing down on him. But he was calm, affable and outgoing although distressed. Following covers essence with secondary points to follow in separate telegram.

He reaffirmed his deep conviction U. S. must play decisive role in surmounting present crisis and thereafter. Said Russians have been trying to seize settlement initiative, which should and still can belong to U.S. Thought U. S. actions recently have weighed heavily against Pakistan, although he knew it was not always intended that way. U. S. silence and inaction at various critical moments had also hurt. Chinese Communists expressing sympathetic sentiments in crisis which Paks do not want from Chicoms, and which had been expected from U. S. after events of Sept. 6. Pak people bound to be somewhat influenced by contrasting Chicom and U. S. records last two weeks despite their instinctive aversion for Communists. He said "Hindus" with their usual clever trickery and self-righteousness had given Chicoms opportunity to exploit tragic hostilities -- opportunity which would never have arisen if Indians had not opened up international aggression for first time two weeks ago. Indians had again put Paks, rather than themselves, on spot with U. S. He regretted it had not been made clear to all before Sept. 6 that international aggression was entirely different and more serious thing from clashes in disputed territory of Kashmir resulting from Kashmiri resistance to Indian oppression. If U. S. had warned early that any crossing of international boundary into territory proper of other by either India or Pakistan would not be tolerated, present dangerous opportunity opened up for Chinese Communists would never have been created.

I focused conversation on implications of Chicom ultimatum and on inescapable and imperative requirement for unconditional cease-fire under UNSC resolutions. I said without arguing background, position at this moment is that Chicoms have it within their power to put Paks in impossible situation unless GOP moves before expiration of Chicom ultimatum to reject threatened Chinese intervention and implement unconditional cease-fire with India. Anything short of this would put Paks in position of seemingly abetting or at least passively benefitting from Chicom aggression against India. This would be posture which USG and people could not accept. It would be impossible for Paks or anyone else to prove Chicoms had not been influenced in their decision by Pak failure to disassociate themselves. Such Pak position could not be defended before American government and people, and I did not know how we could get back on our traditional basis after such a disaster. I asked President if he had been

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~
FROM RAWALPINDI 91

- 2 -

fully informed by Bhutto and Shoaib of my talks with them preceding day. President said he had been fully posted and he understood the message.

President said he had just received partial report of UNSC action of last night. I said September 22 was shaping up as critical day, both as to acceptance UNSC resolution and as to Chicom ultimatum. Pak action to disassociate itself from Chicom designs needed to be taken before that time. I did not see how President Ayub and his government could live down a failure to take this action. Even a semblance of Pak association with Chicoms in exertion of Communist military pressures on any free country would put Pakistan beyond reach of U. S. help.

President said with deep feeling that there was no Pak collusion or even consultation with Chicoms. There was no understanding between them and he had no knowledge of Chicom intentions. All he knew of their moves was what he read in the world press.

President then informed me that he had "recently" sent a message to Peiping telling Chicoms "for God's sake, do not come in. Do not aggravate the situation."

I told him this information was significant, and I wanted to cite it in my report of the conversation. I asked him if he could expressly assure me that he had quite recently transmitted such a message to the Chinese Communists, and did he authorize me to quote him directly to this effect? President replied "Yes, I do, except leave out 'for God's sake.'"

I said way seemed open for President to follow through in the sense of his message to Chicoms and I urged him to do forthwith. He answered that he would give the most earnest thought to cease-fire decision to take effect next day or so. Great obstacle was Pak public opinion. He asked, "How can I survive an action which will look to the people as if we are giving up on Kashmir, just to help the INdians?" with justice for the Kashmiris within our grasp?" After all the sacrifices that have been made, how can I explain a decision to throw it all away with nothing but another UN resolution to show them?" He expressed grave concern that he and his government could not stand in the face of the expected violent public reaction. "The people would not understand." I told the President that if I knew anything about the people of Pakistan -- their ideals, beliefs and convictions -- after three and one-half years here, I knew that they understood the inherent evil

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~
FROM RAWALPINDI 91

- 3 -

of Communism and its antipathy to every principle of Islam. I believed that even the rank and file of the Pakistani people without educational opportunities had learned from their mullahs that nothing good could come out of Communism. I believed the people would understand and reject the evil Communist motivation, which aimed at eventual disaster for Pakistan and Kashmir, as much as for India. I believed he could carry the people with him in a decision for national integrity and peace, and for the well being and continued development and progress of the people of Pakistan in association with her true friends.

The President said he agrees with my estimate of the inherent distrust of Communism on the part of the people and their understanding of its complete incompatibility with Islam. Still the people considered China to be less of a threat to Pakistan than were India and USSR. He could not be sure that he could survive what would seem almost universally to be a decision to sacrifice the first national objective for the apparent purpose of helping an India which had not righted its wrongs.

I said the reality was far different and the people could be brought to sense this. I expressed a profound conviction that with his unrivalled place in the hearts and the confidence of the people of the country, he could carry them with him. I assured the President that the U. S. would do everything at its command to support him in any difficulties which might grow out of any affirmative decision by him on the UNSC cease fire call and on the repudiation of Chicom intervention. I told him that if it had ever seemed that the Kashmir settlement question was treated with a measure of resignation by the friends of Pakistan and India, it could never be so treated again after the fires through which we were now passing. President Ayub could count on a new sense of urgency in the international approach to this issue, if the Government of Pakistan played its part in this hour.

In bidding me an affecting good-bye, President put his hand on my shoulder and said "God bless you," words which I repeated to him.

McConaughy

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

a/e



L I M D I S

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD.

INDO-PAK RIISIS: ACTION TO INFLUENCE AYUB'S CEASE FIRE DECISION
RAWALPINDI'S 91. AND 94.

WITH AYUB BELIEVED TO BE LEANING TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE DECISION ON CEASEFIRE AS OF ONE P.M. TODAY, BUT WITH DECISION STILL PRECARIOUSLY IN THEE BALANCE AND HIS EXTREMIST ADVISERS UNDOUBTEDLY WORKING ON HIM NOW, WE NEED TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE IN NEXT CRITICAL 36 HOURS TO IMPROVE THE ODDS FOR FAVORABLE DECISION.

1. IF PRESIDENT FEELS THAT HE MIGHT APPROPRIATELY DISPATCH A MESSAGE TO AYUB AT THIS TIME, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT A PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL BE SENT. IT WOULD HIGHLIGHT OUR CONCERN, REINFORCE THE VALUE WE ATTACH TO OUR TRADITIONAL SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO PAKISTAN, REASSURE HIM THAT OUR PARTICULAR TIES AS OF NOW ARE NOT IRREPARABLY DAMAGED, AND AGAIN AFFIRM THAT THE FULL WEIGHT OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ARE ON THE SIDE OF THE UN'S CALL TO CEASE FIRE. DELIVERY OF LETTER WOULD GIVE ME ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO REASON WITH HIM BEFORE DEADLINE. DRAFT OF LETTER COULD BE PREPARED HHHHEREEEE BUT PRESUMED UNNECESSARY.

2. BRITISH ARE WORKING ENERGETICALLY AND I WOULD HOPE THAT PM WILSON MAY BE ENCOURAGED TO WEIGH IN WITH ANOTHER LETTER FOR UKHICOM JAMES TO DELIVER TOMORROW. JAMES AND I ARE WORKING IN CLOSE CONCERT. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REINFORCE EACH OTHER'S EFFORTS. I HAVE INFORMED JAMES OF SUBSTANCE MY CONVERSATION OF TODAY WITH AYUB, BUT RECOMMEND THAT EMBASSY LONDON GIVE TEXT OR FULL SUMMARY TO UK FONOFF IMMEDIATELY.

3. IRANIANS ARE ACTIVE AND HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL HERE AND THEY CAN BE A MAJOR FACTOR FOR GOOD IF THEY THROW THEIR FULL WEIGHT BEHIND CEASE-FIRE, AS I BELIEVE THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR ANSARY HAS JUST PHONED ME FROM THERAN THAT IRANIAN GROUP FLYING FROM TEHRAN TO PINDI TOMORROW IN SPECIAL PLANE FOR STAYOF SEVERAL HOURS. I AM MEETING HIM IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND WILL ACQUAINT HIM FULLY WITH SITUATION. IRANIAN ALL-OUT INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF UNSC COULD BE AN APPRECIABLE FACTOR.

4. WEST PAKISTAN GOVERNOR KALABAGH IS IN CITY AND IN CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT. HE WILL BE A STRONG VOICE OF REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY AND A GOOD COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE PRESIDENT'S RECKLESS ADVISERS. IT APPEARS IT WOULD STILL BE UNWISE FOR ME TO MEET WITH GOVERNOR KALABAGH IN VIEW OF CRAZY CHARGES OF EXCESSIVE PRO-AMERICAN WIDELY LEVELLED AT HIS BY HIS ENEMIES. I HAVE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH UKHPCOM JAMES WHO CAN SEE HIM WITH LESS RISK OF EMBARRASSEMENT, AND WILL PROBABLY DO SO.
MC CONAUGHY
BT


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-140

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

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(cy of USUN 821, September 20, 1965)

September 20, 1965

Following is the text of Security Council Resolution adopted 10-0-1 at 0135 hours, 20 September. All members supported, except Jordan who abstained.

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the reports of the Secretary General on his consultations with the Government of India and Pakistan,

"Commending the Secretary General for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the Secretary General's Resolutions of 4 and 6 September,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the report of the Secretary General, but noting further with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being,

"Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

"1. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, September 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

"2. Requests the Secretary General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

"3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

"4. Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's Resolution 210 of 6 September has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the

present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end;

"5. Requests the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this Resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Secretary General thereon."

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mon., Sept. 20, 1965
9:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think this note to Dean Acheson will bring him in as soon as he feels up to it. Just getting it will give him encouragement.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1965

Dear Dean:

I haven't seen you for much too long, and I feel the need of a good talk. I don't want to bring you in from the country for this purpose alone, but if you find you are going to be in Washington any day soon, I hope you will give my office a ring so that we can make a date.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Dean Acheson
Covington & Burling
Union Trust Building
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Sept. 20, 1965
9:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Erhard

1. Here is a note of congratulations to Erhard. It takes the initiative in suggesting that the two of you will be meeting soon, but since such a meeting is inevitable in the light of Erhard's speeches and our own real interest, it seems to me to our advantage to say so.

2. If this suits you, we can telephone it to George McGhee and then have Bill Moyers put it out at his 11 o'clock meeting.

M. F. B.
McG. B.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

*Called to Bundy
Jv*

Sept. 20, 1965

DRAFT MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR ERHARD

Heartiest congratulations on your great victory. I look forward to an early chance to meet with you again and to discuss our great common tasks in working for the peace of Europe, the reunion of Germany, and the steady growth of the Atlantic community.

LBJ

24

~~SECRET~~

September 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

When the new Moroccan Ambassador (Dr. Laraki) presents his credentials at 10:30 tomorrow, he'll also give you a letter from King Hassan. He's been tight-lipped at what's in it but we suspect Hassan is making another pitch to meet you.

Laraki told Rusk today that Hassan will be coming to the UN in November and asked about your seeing him then. Rusk said he was sure you'd be delighted, but advised Laraki not to raise this with you. Hassan would be worth a lunch if you can spare it, since he's very pro-West (and very vain). We still have a quiet communications installation in Morocco too. President Kennedy made Hassan feel like an insider during his 1963 visit, and Hassan has been aching ever since you took over to establish a personal line to you.

You might tell Laraki you were pleased to hear that King Hassan tried to divert Arab Summit discussion from anti-Israeli diatribes to common economic problems. We don't want to be overly warm about the Arab Summit, but Hassan as host was largely responsible for its relatively moderate tone.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-141
By is, NARA Date 4-3-07


R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 17, 1965 - 12:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization for Negotiations on Uses of Philippine War Damage Funds

The attached request from the Secretary of State is an outgrowth of the troublesome Philippine War Damage Legislation of 1962, as amended in August 1963. It is also an outgrowth of your joint communique with President Macapagal of October 1964.

In brief, \$28 million in War Damage funds have been set aside in the U.S. Treasury as a "Special Fund for Education", to be used to the mutual advantage of the Philippines and the United States. State now asks that you authorize negotiations with the Philippine Government on the uses of this Special Fund.

In addition, the Filipinos came forward last year with a proposal that a portion of this money be devoted to a Land Reform Education program in connection with the implementation of Macapagal's Land Reform Code of 1962. State also asks that you authorize conclusion of an agreement committing us to the support of this program for Land Reform Education through disbursements from the Special Fund for Education.

These War Damage funds have had a difficult legislative history and have previously caused deep irritations between our two countries (Macapagal cancelled his 1962 State Visit in pique over Congress's failure to pass the War Damage Bill). So our first objective should be to move without unnecessary delay on the uses of the money now that the funds are available. At the same time, we should do all we can to ensure that these funds go to solid, viable projects that can contribute effectively to the Filipino development process. State's terms of reference provide for project-by-project review by Embassy Manila and the relevant U.S. agencies; no funds will be moved from the Treasury until a particular project has been approved; and the Filipinos will issue periodic reports to us on the progress of each project.

Finally, there is a current political angle that we should keep in mind: the Philippine Presidential elections in November. State intends

to move with sufficiently "deliberate speed" to avoid any charges, on the one hand, that we are providing goodies for Macapagal to announce on election-eve, and on the other hand, that we are pulling the rug on our commitment to him and thereby supporting his opponent. As matters now stand, it is unlikely that any funds will be actually disbursed to the Philippines before the elections.

State's package makes sense in delivering on a firm U.S. commitment in the context of adequate safeguards. We recommend that you approve the two authorizations.


James C. Thomson, Jr.


McGeorge Bundy

 9/20/68

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, Sept. 19, 1965
12:15 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. I attach Arthur Goldberg's flash report on the situation as it was last night. His telegram contains the draft resolution which is under discussion now in New York. It has our agreement and Soviet agreement, and Arthur thinks that the rest will come along today, although there will be trouble with the Malaysians (acting for the Indians) and the Jordanians (acting for the Paks).

2. As of now, the Soviets are on board, although Komer fears that the Indians may make a big effort to shift them because this resolution refers to Kashmir directly in its preamble and to "settlement of political problem underlying present conflict" in its operating clauses. I have told Komer to see G. Ahmed.* He reported this properly to George Ball, and George is going to see him too. Since they are both working from the same written instructions, no harm is done. But the advantage of Komer is that he works here and will get the nuances just the way you want them.

* G. Ahmed is in New York -
so they will see Minister -
Bob will see him with George
- and then alone

Goldberg will see Amjad Ali.

both Amjad Ali & Pak MINISTER
ARE BETTER MEN THAN G. AHMED.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (copy of USUN 816)

To: SecState
From: USUN New York 816, Sept. 19, 1965

... The following draft was agreed on subject to clearance with governments on understanding by Seydoux (France) that third preambular, which Morozov (USSR) insisted on re-inserting after remainder of text was agreed on would be in parenthesis:

"Having considered reports of the Secretary General on his consultations with the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan,

"Commending the Secretary General for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of objectives of Security Council resolutions of Sept. 4 and 6,

"Noting that India has declared itself prepared for a cease-fire and Pakistan has declared itself prepared in principle for a cease-fire but that, in fact, no cease-fire has come into being;

"Convinced that an early restoration of peace between the two countries is essential as a first step towards peaceful settlement for all their outstanding differences, in particular the question of Kashmir,

"1. Demands that cease-fire should take effect on _____ at _____, and calls upon both governments to issue orders for cease-fire at that moment and subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to positions held by them before 5 August, 1965; (note: time to be set after consulting Secretary General)

"2. Requests Secretary General to provide necessary assistance to ensure supervision of cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

"3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate situation in area;

"4. Decides to consider, as soon as operational paragraph one of Council's Resolution 210 of September 6 has been implemented, what steps it could take to assist towards settlement of political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on two governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, towards settlement of the problem, having particularly in mind the joint statement by the two heads of governments of 29 November 1962;

"5. Requests Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Council thereon."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The first issue involved in negotiations was reference to Chapter VII, Articles 39 and 40 of Charter suggested in Secretary General's report to the Security Council. Both the Soviets and French resisted this idea in spite of the UK observation, supported by the US, that the Secretary General was clearly in favor. Since the Soviets and French were firm, special reference in first preambular to paragraph 9 of the Secretary General's report was omitted, as were all paragraphs with reference to Article 39.

As for call for cease-fire, it was agreed to remove reference to Article 40 but to "demand" cease-fire (op para. 1 above). (even though this is not Chapter VII language, we plan to emphasize strength of Security Council's "demand" in US speech after resolution is presented).

The second problem was that of noting the failure of the parties to carry out the Sept. 4 and 6 resolutions after India's declaration of Sept. 18 in the Security Council that she prepared unconditionally cease-fire immediately. Seydoux (France) resisted the language (originating with Malaysia) which would distinguish between full acceptance by the Government of India of cease-fire, and Pak acceptance in principle. Morozov agreed to drop the whole idea by not noting the failure of a cease-fire appeal at all, but later, after the entire Resolution was agreed, he insisted on provisional inclusion of third preambular above, after considerable resistance and watering-down of the language by Seydoux, who feared his Government would object.

The third problem involved obtaining some counterbalance in resolution for the Paks. The Soviets originally tried to get "particular emphasis on the question of Kashmir" out of last preambular paragraph. Seydoux and Jackling (UK) resisted. Yost pointed out that Sept. 13 Tass statement had included reference to Kashmir in similar context. Morozov gave in but removed the word "emphasis" and insisted on words "peaceful settlement" rather than "honorable and equitable settlement." Operational paragraph on Indo-Pak talks involved considerable discussion, with Seydoux trying to keep in reference to "previous decisions of Security Council" which Netherlands had suggested, while the Soviets remained adamantly opposed, stating they had not voted for 1948-49 Security Council resolutions.

Netherlands Permanent Representative finally included above language in op. par. 4 (originally drafted by UK). Morozov at the end tried to put it on provisional basis in parenthesis, but Seydoux resisted energetically.

Most of the other changes were non-substantive. The Soviets resisted a US attempt to have operational para. 3 specify "military or other action."

Comment: USUN favored a decision to negotiate the resolution among permanent Security Council members when it became clear in afternoon speeches

that Asian non-permanent members of the Council, Jordan and Malaysia were even further apart on the concept of the resolution than permanent members. Seydoux (France) agreed reluctantly, not relishing a struggle with the Soviets, with the US and the UK looking on.

The draft resolution resulting from negotiation is tenuous in view of conflicting instructions of Soviets and French, but may survive in view of the apparent desire of all not to deadlock or delay long on action. It is clear that both India and Pakistan, and perhaps even Malaysia and Jordan Permanent Representatives who are defending them may object to draft.

Netherlands Representative is attempting to get draft to all non-perms tonight so they also can seek instructions and be prepared to vote after Security Council members reconvene at 10:30, Sept. 19, for final negotiating.

Indians should be able to accept resolution, particularly if preambular paragraph in parens remains in. (We did not take part in haggling over it.) Though they will resist idea of early negotiations, the language on Indo-Pak talks is least they should expect in view of history of issue. Preambular reference to Kashmir will not please them, but it has its antecedent in Tass statement, not in any US output.

Pak denial of collusion with Chicoms was timely. Preambular reference to Kashmir, operational para. 4, with reference to 1962 Indo-Pak statement, and weakening of preambular differentiation between Indo and Paks represent considerable success, which they owe mainly to US, UK and French efforts. Following Pak objection to Article 40, we even avoided specific public endorsement of Secretary General recommendations to Security Council of Article 40, and allowed reference to Article 40 be removed from resolution. It is doubtful if much more could be obtained for Paks, and we will be lucky to keep resolution as is. Unless they wish to turn their backs on UN, they would do well to comply with resolution, and prepare the way for talks by making disassociation with Chicom ultimatum fully explicit.

GOLDBERG

###

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, Sept. 19, 1965
10:15 a.m.

27
(Miss Johnson
taking care of
9/20/65
12)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Greetings to the Ninth International
Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Tokyo

Attached at Tab A is a draft message for your approval to be read by Chairman Seaborg on your behalf to the Ninth General Conference of the IAEA to be held in Tokyo September 21-30. In past years a Presidential message has been sent, and State, ACDA and AEC agree on the importance of having a message from you this year that would highlight the IAEA's growing role in non-proliferation, and also underline the fact that this meeting is the first of its kind to be held in the Far East.

The language here is not glamorous, but there is a good deal of bureaucratic blood on its corners because of the interlocking interests of State, ACDA and AEC. So I recommend that we take it as it stands.

This will make a small but useful release for Bill Moyers on the day that Seaborg delivers it, and as far as I know, there will be no kick-back from Glenn's press agents.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO
THE IAEA CONFERENCE

I welcome this opportunity to speak, through Chairman Seaborg, to the delegates to the Ninth General Conference of the IAEA. I believe it is significant that you are meeting this year in Tokyo, the capital of a nation whose people have made such remarkable progress through the peaceful development of science and technology.

Today we realize, more than ever before, the power of science. We also realize that the mighty force of science is not the domain of any one nation. Its great knowledge springs from sources in many lands. Its fullest development demands international responsibility and the cooperation of all men. This is the reason for the existence of the International Atomic Energy Agency. You are directing the atom, the greatest source of power which man has ever wrested from nature, towards peace, towards the fulfillment of human need.

Since its inception in 1957, the IAEA has made noteworthy progress. In organizing and implementing international programs of scientific and technological cooperation, it has shown the world that men gain far more by sharing their knowledge and tools than by using them alone in secrecy and isolation. The IAEA has offered the advanced countries and their lesser developed neighbors and friends opportunities to work together and to share the scientific developments of many nations.

But the IAEA also has the solemn duty -- and the unique opportunity -- to assure the world that materials and equipment employed for peaceful uses of atomic energy are not used for any military purpose. Prevention of the spread of atomic weapons is one of the most important tasks of our times. It is my deep conviction that the IAEA, through its safeguards system, can make a crucial contribution to achievement of this goal. The United States Government is pledged to do all in its power to assure the success of the Agency's system. I urge every Member State to give its support to the Agency system in principle and in practice.

There must be no resting. The work which you have been doing must be carried on with increasing effort and support. There is no standing still in your two-fold task of keeping the peaceful atom peaceful and directing its enormous energy toward productive uses.

I take this opportunity to renew my country's pledge to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in the full pursuit of those benefits which the peaceful atom can bestow.

With gratitude for your past accomplishments, I send you the best wishes of the people of the United States for your future endeavors.

###

F 28

Saturday, September 18, 1965
4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Review of the Foreign Aid Program

1. As you know, Congress has recommended, and you have agreed, to Executive Branch studies of the aid program to provide a "basis for recommendations as to the future course of U. S. assistance policy."

2. Dave Bell has consulted with all concerned in the Administration and now recommends the establishment of a steering group consisting of Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Freeman, Schultze, Bell, and myself as Executive Secretary. In the attached paper he details the concept and outlines the problem areas, and sets a deadline of November 1 for submission to you.

3. Schultze, Califano, and I have reviewed these recommendations and we agree with them.

4. It would be my objective, as Executive Secretary of this enterprise, to make sure that every alternative is fully explored and that you have an absolutely clear shot at all the choices and possibilities. I would also propose -- with Bell's hearty agreement -- to get informal advice both from his existing advisory groups and from other hard-headed and experienced sources -- and from any individuals whom you wish included. But I agree with Bell and with Rusk and McNamara that this job of analysis is one which your own Administration should do for you, in the first instance. Is this procedure agreeable to you?

McG. B.

Go ahead _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29

Saturday, September 18, 1965
2:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This letter for your signature to President Keita of Mali congratulates him on the occasion of his country's Fifth Anniversary of Independence.

Normally, your personal greetings would be telegraphed to President Keita. However, "Soapy" Williams will be in Mali on independence day and it was felt that our participation in the celebrations would be greatly enhanced if "Soapy" could deliver to Keita a personal letter of greeting from you.

For your information, "Soapy" departs tomorrow on a three-week visit to twelve West African countries.


R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1(b)

Authority: G. H. Jones, Feb. 24, 1983

18, NARA, Date 8-26-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1965


Dear Mr. President:

It is with particular pleasure that I send you personal greetings through my able and respected Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Governor G. Mennen Williams.

It is most appropriate that Governor Williams should be in Bamako while you celebrate your country's Independence. His visit is an indication of the significance the United States of America attaches to developing and maintaining good relations with the Republic of Mali -- relations based on an increasing cooperation and comprehension between our governments and friendship between our peoples.

In a spirit of sincere friendship, the people of the United States of America join with me in extending to Your Excellency and to the people of Mali our warmest congratulations upon the Fifth Anniversary of its Independence. We wish you continued success in your efforts to improve the well-being of your people and in your dedication to the cause of world peace.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Modibo Keita
President of the Republic of Mali
Bamako

X copy
29a
F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30
P
X

Saturday, Sept. 18, 1965
12:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Bowles' latest. It is a good summary of the arguments he has been making for the position you said we should be watchful against, so I send it for your information.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

(copy of NEW DELHI 699, Sept. 18, 1965)

TO: White House for the President

USUN for Goldberg
DOD for McNamaraDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-14/
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

In regard to South Asia and indeed Asia as a whole, the US Government is obviously facing major decisions which will affect our position in this key continent for many years to come. Although the present situation is both tragic and dangerous, like all crises it also opens up opportunities for affirmative action. By shedding some of our past concepts and seizing upon present situation with imagination and boldness, we may be able greatly to strengthen our position in Asia and the world.

I suggest the following course of action:

1. We should affirm our determination to oppose Chinese aggression in India ^{with} ~~and~~ whatever forces will be required. If our statement is to affect Chinese plans following its recent ultimatum, it would have to be issued in the next 24 hours. (Note: A US commitment of this kind at this time might deter Chinese from further action. If they move regardless of our warning, it would not be necessary to commit US ground forces; India has plenty of these. Military people here believe that a relatively small number of US planes could go far towards wrecking Tibetan road system, thereby making impossible any major Chinese movement into India.)
2. In line with U Thant's original proposal, both Pakistan and India should promptly agree to cease-fire.
3. Pakistan should be told that if it desires continuing friendship and help from the US Government, it must promptly and without reservation repudiate its present association with China and Indonesia. This would, of course, include unequivocal rejection of Chinese assistance in present conflict. (Note: It is against US interests as well as India's to see a Pakistan which is covertly allied with China strengthen its position in Kashmir.)
4. If Pakistan takes this action, the US Government in cooperation with the Security Council should urge India to negotiate with Pakistan a basis for enduring peace, perhaps in terms of Kosygin's Sept. 4 notes to Ayub and Shastri, i.e., "The two sides ought to enter into negotiations with a view to settling peacefully the differences that have arisen between them."
5. Henceforth we should base US policies in regard to both countries on what seem to be merging power realities of subcontinent. These include the following elements:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(copy of NEW DELHI 699, Sept. 18, 1965)

a. India is a secular democracy deeply committed to principles for which we are fighting in Southeast Asia.

b. Moreover, India is great power with significant military capacity, capable of becoming a member of the nuclear club, and of acting as major Asian counterweight to China.

c. Pakistan as now constituted is a theocratic dictatorship with strictly limited power potential. For instance, in the next three or four years, regardless of what we do, East Pakistan is likely to break off and become independent nation, and West Pakistan may emerge as significant downgraded influence in this part of the world.

d. By skilled handling there is a real possibility that US and USSR policies can now be made to come together here in India in a way that will have an important constructive impact on our relations with the Soviet Union in other parts of the world.

e. By decisive action at this key moment we have an opportunity not only to restore peace on the subcontinent, but also to draw India with its vast population and industrial potential into much closer relationship with US throughout Asia.

Bowles.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 18, 1965
12:00 noon.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Guinea's President Sekou Toure has offered to mediate the Viet-Nam question. Unlike the recent widely-publicized offer by Ghana's President N'Krumah, Toure stresses his desire to undertake a "discreet initiative" to arrange negotiations.

We are convinced of Toure's sincerity in offering to mediate even though we have doubts as to his chances of success. Nevertheless, Guinea's diplomatic relations with Hanoi and Peiping do provide a channel to both governments which we should not ignore.

The purpose of replying to Toure's letter is to show the good faith of our own offer to negotiate. We have tried to be responsive to Toure's offer without going overboard in encouraging him.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Attachments:

Secretary Rusk's memorandum
President's letter
President Toure's letter

mds - long but good

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *CB* NARA, Date *4-14-99*

Friday, September 17, 1965, 5:40 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Planning for trip to Hawaii to meet other Heads of State of the Pacific area

We have now checked this out with Dean Rusk and Howard Jones, and there is great enthusiasm for the general idea, although there is not any final agreement as to just which Heads of State we would wish to have. Howard Jones would like as many as seven, and my brother Bill thinks it would be wiser to have only three or four. But everyone agrees that we ought to have Sato, no matter who else we have, and accordingly we would like now to explore his readiness to come, on a most confidential basis, if you are willing. Jack Valenti thinks that the date for this meeting ought to be October 18 and not the 25th, so that we have only a month in which to plan.

What I would like to do is to go to Reischauer with a personal and private cable, asking him to sound out Sato as to his willingness to come to Hawaii, if invited, to receive an honorary degree and to have a private meeting with you, and conceivably with a few other Heads of Pacific governments. Reischauer is discreet, and he will handle this with great skill. I would put it all as a possibility, and not as a certainty, but I would want to let Reischauer know that you yourself expect to be there if Sato can be there. Jack tells me that there is a strong possibility that you will be in Hawaii with or without foreigners, so this seems to me a safe position. Do you agree?

McG. B.

Go ahead _____

Speak to me _____

*File in folder
9-17-65*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Mr. B
filed Mr Bell 34*

Fri. Sept. 17, 1965, 12 PM

Mr. President:

As a long-time believer in vacations, and an old friend of Dave Bell, I recommend approval of this, + I think he is a good man to have in Tunisia and Nigeria to explain not only the aid program, but the Great Society.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Yes ☒

No ☐

EXCERPTS FROM THE MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM

Friday, September 17, 1965 -- 6:00 pm.

SUBJECT OF MEETING: India - Pakistan and the Dominican Republic

(NOTES TAKEN BY: Jack Valenti)

PRESENT: The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy, Secretary Ball, Richard Helms, Admiral Raborn, Secretary Sisco, Ambassador Thompson, Bob Komer, Bill Moyers, Joe Califano, Jack Valenti.

- - - - -

THE PRESIDENT: Do we think that the Chinese are going in?

RUSK: Right now it is unlikely.

BALL: Chet Bowles says that old fortifications are on the Chinese side. It's possible to burn these fortifications and it may be that the Chinese will do that.

RUSK: We think there's something more to it than that. Does the CIA have any judgment on that?

RABORN: The Chinese will do something. It could be movements of troops along that border.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you think about this, Bob?

McNAMARA: We believe it's unlikely that any major troop movements will take place. Probably they might try a minor probe. There is less chance of them carrying out what they did in 1962.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-604 NLJ/RAC 99-284
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-26-02

RABORN:

[REDACTED]
We believe that India is in far better position now than they were in 1962.

34(b)(1),(6)

RUSK:

What should we say to Ayub and Shastri?

THE PRESIDENT:

How can we say anything to them without bypassing the Secretary General?

BUNDY:

The thing to move Ayub is to make him believe that getting too close with the Chinese will be a very serious blunder for him. Only the U. S. can do that.

THE PRESIDENT:

I think that he will have a lot more respect for us if we keep tough with him. He's trying to figure out what we are made of -- whether or not we still have steel in our spine.

BALL:

I think we have time before we need to make any final decisions. I think we can wait on:

- (1) What the Chinese reaction is to the Indian proposal.
- (2) Let us see if the Security Council passes a tough resolution. Then we can decide if we reinforce that with a message.

I think it's good sense on the President's part not to get us too involved at this time.

THE PRESIDENT:

We want to back up the Secretary General in every way. But we cannot get involved in unilateral approaches. I think that would be a tragic mistake. I think that we must put the Secretary of State, Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Goldberg in the forefront carrying the ball for us. Let them manifest sufficient interest.

THE PRESIDENT:

(Continued)

We can announce what Sisco and Rusk said -- that they commend U Thant and all the others who want peace. Frankly, I think the time has come for us to wear those VFW caps like Nehru used to do and use his tactics.

Then, I would have McNamara and the Joint Chiefs figure out every conceivable contingency -- everything that we would have to do in case of an emergency.

I made up my mind last April that we simply were out of business with Ayub and Shastri until we sign a contract. We are now in a position to tell them to quit fighting or else we will do no business with them.

McNAMARA:

We can stand behind U Thant now, and I think that's the thing that we ought to do.

THE PRESIDENT:

On this wheat sale business -- I'd like to get both sides of that proposition. What are the advantages and disadvantages? I think I'll appoint my Devil's Advocate (pointing to Ball) to take the other side and give me his views on that.

(At this point there was some discussion about wheat sales. It was brought up by Bundy that both Bowles and Galbraith were very much in favor of this. The President pointed out that both of these are advocates of India. Komer mentioned that at the last crisis that Galbraith was involved in he was becoming more militant than is usually his fashion. The President made it clear that those who are obvious advocates for a particular side are not usually the best advisors.)

SISCO:

The Soviets have been non-committal during the day. Their representatives claim that they need instructions before they can go forward.

THE PRESIDENT:

I think we can summarize by saying:

- (1) Let's try to publicly surface everything we can which shows that we want to cooperate with the UN.
- (2) Let the Defense Department survey every possible contingency.
- (3) Let's get the pros and cons of this food problem.

RUSK:

THE PRESIDENT:

McNAMARA:

THE PRESIDENT:


RABORN:

THE PRESIDENT:

3.4(b)(1), (6)

RABON:

THE PRESIDENT:



3.4(b)(1)(b)

RUSK:

The question is now, what do we say to the Press?

THE PRESIDENT:

I see no reason to announce that we have had a meeting. I would neither confirm nor deny that we've had a meeting. In my judgment I don't think we ought to announce every time I get together with my senior advisors. If we can't have a small meeting like this without it getting into the Press, we are definitely in deep trouble. I would say that Rusk talked to Goldberg and Rusk reported to the President on the conversation. I would do everything we possibly can to show our co-operation and our desire to bring this to a halt, but doing it through the United Nations.

(There followed then a conversation about the situation in the Dominican Republic in which Bunker's conversations were reported by Mr. Bundy. There were no substantive decisions made.)

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332

Cabinet Room INDIA, 'PAKISTAN'
Sept. 17. / 6:00pm.
Pres Bundy Ralston Komer.
Rusk Bull Sisco
McN Helms Thompson

P are Chinese going in?

Rusk unlikely.

Bull Bowles says all fortifications
on Chinese side Possible
to burn these fortifications


Rusk Something more to it than
that.
Has CIA any judgment

Ralston Chinese will do
something. Could be
movements of troops

P what do you think Bob

McN Unlikely any major move.
Probably minor probe.
Less chance of carrying
out what they did
in 1962

Rab



3.4(b)(1), (b)

Rat

Indian info. better
position than 1962.

Rush

What should we say
to Ayub and Shastri?

P.

How can we do that
without bypassing Sec.
Gen.?

Burley

The thing to move Ayub
is to make him believe
that getting in too close
with China — only
we can do that.

P

I think he will have
a lot more respect
for us if we make
them be a gentleman.
He's trying to probe
out what we are
made of — if we
have still in our
spine.

Ball

We can wait on:

1) What Chinese reaction is
to Indian proposal

See if Sec Council passes
tough resolutions.
Do we re-inforce with
message

Bill Good sense on Pres part
not to get too involved
in this.

P We want to back up
Sec Gen But we
can't get involved
in unilateral approach.
would be tragic
mistake

Then Sec. + Secs
do manifest sufficient
interest - announce what
Secs did Pres said -
2d comment U Thant - and
all others who want peace.
We ought to wear those
VFW caps like Nehru.

Have McNamara joint chiefs
figure out every conceivable
thing we would have to do
in case of emergency.

I made up my mind last
April we were out of
business with them until
he signed a contract.

We are in a po. now to
tell them to quit fighting.

McN We can stand behind
U Thant

P.

So like to go the both
sides of the wheat
sale - what is the
advantage and
disadvantage.
So appears my devil's advocate
(Paul) to take other side..

Sisco Starts how been now -
Comm. dat during the day.
They rec instructions


A. Summary

1. Try to publicly purport
everything we can of
cooperation betw us and UN.

2. Defense survey
every possible contingency.


3. Pros and cons of
the food problem.

Rusk



3.4(b)(1), (b)

P.



McN

[REDACTED]

Pres.

[REDACTED]

Rab

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1), (6)

Pres.

[REDACTED]

Rab.

[REDACTED]

P

[REDACTED]

Rusk What do we say to
press

"Sec Counsel ought to
be aware of the possible
chance of this conflict"

P. wouldn't have meeting -
neither confirm nor
deny

Don't think we ought
to announce meetings
If we can't have a
meeting this could
be a real trouble

Rusk talked to Tindley
and Rusk reported
to Pres on his
conversations.

Be prepared to tell
Bill at 10:30 what
he should say.

We should have no meeting
exclusively on Drew/Pak

What about D.R.

P. and it is
scandalous to have so
many non-American correspondents
covering Vietnam.

6.1(c)

30
342

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

(2)

SEP 17 1965

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With your permission, I would like to take a brief vacation between the time when the foreign aid appropriation bill is passed and October 11, when I have to be back for the next meeting of the General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs.

If Congressional action on the aid appropriation bill is completed before Thursday or Friday of next week, which would give me a little over two weeks before the October 11 meeting, I propose to combine a week on some Mediterranean beach with three or four-day visits each to Tunisia and Nigeria, where we have major aid programs that I have never visited in nearly three years in this job.

If Congressional action on the appropriation bill is delayed past next week, leaving only a week or ten days before the October 11 meeting, I propose to spend the time on a beach in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands.

In either case, Mr. Gaud will of course be here.

David E. Bell
David E. Bell

Frid. Se 17, 1965
12:45 AM

35

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been slow in getting this answer to Senator Fulbright's letter of Sept. 15.

I have tried to hit him with everything but the kitchen stove, and you will want to make your own judgment on whether in fact you wish to say these things to him directly. Everything in the letter is accurate, to the best of my ability and belief.

McG. B.

35a

9/17/65

Dear Senator Fulbright:

I have your letter of September 15, which reached my desk some time after the wire services had begun to carry reports of your speech.

Your speech contains no solid evidence to support its conclusions. Those conclusions do not correspond with the facts as I know them. I note that Senators of both parties who took part in the hearings have stated that the evidence before your Committee does not support the conclusions you announced.

Your charges are ostensibly directed at Ambassador Bennett, but in reality they are directed at me, and it would have been more honest to admit it. My decision to put American troops in the Dominican Republic on April 28 was based -- as I have repeatedly stated -- on the need to protect American lives. If you do not believe me, you should say so. You should not seek to avoid an attack on me by hitting at a man who cannot hit back.

In your letter, you tell me that your speech is designed to help provide "reassurance that the United States remains committed to the goals of ^{social} reform." But in fact your speech repeatedly questions that commitment:

1. You describe our people as "the most unrevolutionary nation on earth," although these are years of revolutionary advance in civil rights and in other fields where some of us have been working pretty hard. I do not understand how it is reassuring to foreigners to distort or neglect the reality of our continuing American revolution of progress, even though you yourself may be unwilling to support that revolution.

✓ 2. You say you are "frankly puzzled" as to the attitude of this Government toward reformist ^(movements?) government in the Latin American republics. If you are really puzzled in this way, you have only to look at the record of the relations between this Government and President Frei, or President Belaunde, or, for that matter, President Garcia Godoy. I would have thought that a fair look at these relations would have spread more reassurance than an expression of uninformed puzzlement.

3. Your speech repeatedly refers to your fear that the United States may be supporting military juntas and economic oligarchies, and leaving Latin Americans with no choice except Communism or reaction. But you yourself have shown on other occasions that you know this is not our policy. In one case where our actions have been criticized by some of those who will praise your speech -- case of Brazil -- you yourself wrote me only one month ago that our ✓ present policies were "in balance with the economics and politics of Brazil," ✓ and you recommended "no significant changes." Would it not have been more honest and more accurate to reflect something of this assessment of the complex problem of Brazil in your general discussion of the politics of Latin America? It certainly would have been more reassuring to our friends.

In sum, your speech appears to me to be wrong in its basic judgment, deeply unfair in its personal attack on Ambassador Bennett, and wholly at variance with the purpose which you assert in your letter to me. (A)

Sincerely,

9/17/65

Dear Senator Fulbright:

I have your letter of September 15, which reached my desk some time after the wire services had begun to carry reports of your speech. ⁹ Your speech contains no solid evidence to support its conclusions. Those conclusions do not correspond with the facts as I know them. I note that Senators of both parties who took part in the hearings have stated that ^{the evidence they gave before} ~~the evidence developed in the~~ ^{your the Committee} ~~hearings~~ does not support the conclusions you announced.

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of our continuing American revolution of progress, even though you yourself may be unwilling to support that revolution.

2. You say you are "frankly puzzled" as to the attitude of this Government toward reformist government in the Latin American republics. If you are really puzzled in this way, you have only to look at the record of the relations between this Government and President Frei, or President Belaunde, or, for that matter, President Garcia Godoy. I would have thought that ^{a fair} ~~a candid~~ look at these relations would have spread more reassurance than an expression of uninformed puzzlement.

3. Your speech repeatedly refers to your fear that the United States may be supporting military juntas and economic oligarchies, and leaving Latin Americans with no choice except Communism or reaction. But you yourself have shown on other occasions that you know this is not our policy. ^{conf} ~~Moreover,~~ ^{country where we have been criticized by} In one ~~case~~ ^{an obvious} which has received criticism from some of those who will praise your speech -- ^{case of} ~~the case of~~ Brazil -- you yourself wrote ~~to~~ me only one month ago that our present policies were "in balance with the economics and politics of Brazil," and you recommended "no significant changes." Would it not have been more honest and more accurate to reflect something of this assessment of the ^{complex} ~~problem~~ of Brazil in ^{your} ~~a~~ general discussion of the politics of Latin America? It certainly would have been more reassuring to our friends.

- 3 -

In sum, your speech appears to me to be wrong in its basic judgment,
deeply unfair in its personal attack on Ambassador Bennett, and wholly *at variance*
opposite in its effect with the purpose which you assert in your letter to me.

Sincerely,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, Sept. 17, 1965
11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Dean Rusk wants to provide Arthur Goldberg with contingency guidance, in the expected event that the Indians raise the Chicom threat in the Security Council discussions today. The language which he proposes for Goldberg is attached. It is carefully framed in a low key. It protects our freedom of action while underscoring the importance of the basic peacekeeping effort under the Secretary General. OK?

Mc B
McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

*Approved 11:25
+ I told Sis.
But by then likelihood
of SC ~~action~~ discussion going
this way had declined*

9/17/65

We have heard the representatives of India and _____ refer to the increased threat to peace which results from the Communist Chinese communication to the Government of India regarding the Sikkim-Tibet border. All of us here must share the feeling that a threat of this character can only be designed to increase tension and to complicate the peace-making efforts of the United Nations and the Secretary General.

The United States will follow further developments with the closest attention. I believe the Council will also wish to do so.

F 37

Friday, September 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Augustus Long

1. I talked to Mr. Augustus Long this morning on the telephone and found him really very relaxed and cheerful, but also clear in his mind that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was not something that he really wanted to do. I explained that somehow we had dropped the ball in not speaking to him before his appointment was announced, and he said repeatedly and cheerfully that this really had nothing to do with his decision, and that he simply did not think this kind of advisory work was what he was good at. He mentioned his obligations to Columbia and the Presbyterian Medical Center, and spoke most warmly of you and of his great admiration for you.

2. In the circumstances, I think we should simply find another man and let it be known in due course that Mr. Long found his other obligations so heavy that he asked to be relieved from service on the Board. Unless you object, I will talk to Clark Clifford about finding another nominee.

McG. B.

(bcc: Mr. Clark Clifford)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 17, 1965

AGENDA POINTS

- ✓ A. How Grave is this Mess? It's prudent to assume that Chinese will do some shooting, but how much?
- B. What is our Basic Interest? If it's containing Red China, then clearly our primary interest is to back India. But we want to do so if possible (1) without losing the Paks, and (2) perhaps even get Kashmir settled.
- C. What Signals might be given?
 - X 1. Immediate warning plus reassurance to Ayub to dissuade him from aligning with Peiping?
 - ✓ 2. Delay in responding to Indian request (B. K. Nehru to Rusk) till we see picture more clearly?
 - ✓ 3. Meanwhile, draft contingency response to Indians for use if (a) Chicoms escalate slowly; and (b) rapid escalation to 1962 scale of attack?
 - ✓ 4. Security Council: Back resolution along lines SYG wants (i. e., stay in step with SYG)?
 - ✓ 5. US Public Stance: Might be to show concern over Chicom threat, but no need to over-react. India much better prepared against Chicoms than it was in 1962.
 - ✓ 6. Step up contingency planning? Possibly for (a) resumption of MAP only against Chicoms; (b) US intervention in air only.
 - X 7. Consult with UK. Can we bring them along with us? By what level of communication?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-249
By isa, NARA, Date 2-12-04

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 17, 1965

AGENDA POINTS

CHtg w/pres 6 PM 9/17)

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-249
By iso, NARA, Date 2-12-04

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 16, 1965, 8:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Peace Corps Volunteers to India

The issue here is whether to send about 180 Peace Corps volunteers to India from the United States. They are scheduled to leave in the next day or two. Shriver feels passionately that they should go. The State Department and Bob Komer think it would be more sensible to hold them at home, but they are not passionate.

Shriver's argument is double: first, he thinks that any hold-up might well be interpreted as political and might be the "shot heard round the Peace Corps world." He considers it fundamental to keep the Peace Corps outside foreign policy. His second ground is that there is no real danger. Bowles says it is safe to send the volunteers; his people in India make the same report; they will be kept out of the fighting areas; risks to volunteers in other countries have always proved grossly exaggerated; he would like to go right ahead with these good workers.

The State Department and Komer hold that there is an element of risk in any travel to India now, and that there is no really good reason not to wait a few weeks on these volunteers, except stubbornness in the Peace Corps. While the communal violence we all feared has not yet materialized, it could happen, and this seems not a very smart time to be sending Peace Corps volunteers in. So they would keep them at home for a while.

Having decided the other way, with the support of Bowles, and having given orders accordingly, Shriver is now a very determined man. His volunteers are on their way to New York, to board their flights, and he does not want to turn them around. He asks that you give him a chance to discuss the matter with you before you decide, if you have any reluctance about sending his people. He specifically asked me to put the matter this way, because, as he put it, "I don't want to argue with the President after his decision."

40
✓
TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

The record of the Peace Corps is extraordinarily good. Its self-righteousness is equally outstanding. If it were my decision, I think I would let Sarge have his way, but tell him to give us a better crack at the question the next time. I think probably he is right, but I also think his people are unreasonable in their determination to run a show that is separate from the rest of the Government.

I attach two memoranda from Sarge which make the case. The first is directed at the "political" use of the Peace Corps -- this is what he wrongly thought was motivating the State Department and Komer. The second is directed at the issue of safety.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Let them go _____

Hold them up ✓

Hold them up until Shriver speaks to me ✓

Tell Shriver not to bother me and to keep his people at home until we can see better what is happening in India _____

*I'm totally against
this type of operation
& last known pressure
of the Pres. the answer
is no and if he wants
heaven got him over - L*

PEACE CORPS

Washington, D. C. 20525

September 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: Sargent Shriver

Varge

Attached please find the reasons why we think it exceedingly unwise to stop our Volunteers en route to India. I think it boils down to the following:

1. The Volunteers have left and are leaving their homes to begin assembling in New York tomorrow. It's too late to stop them in any sensible and quiet manner.
2. If we don't send them to India we have to make some other arrangements for them and explain the reasons why we are not permitting them to go to India. There is no question but that this will cause serious repercussions. They are a highly visible group in New York City and their disappointment would be great. Over eighty of them will be there and we can't put them in storage the way we might do with a shipment of wheat.
3. Stopping this group of Volunteers from going to India really doesn't give us any additional leverage on India. It only gives us the disadvantages of headlines and letters to Congressmen and the press complaining that we are diverting Volunteers eager to work in the cause of peace for purposes that have nothing to do with the Peace Corps.

u/a

September 16, 1965

SHOULD PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ENROUTE TO
INDIA BE DIVERTED AS ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON INDIA?

I. SUMMARY

Stopping Volunteers enroute to India tomorrow could well become the shot heard round the Peace Corps world. The reaction of some Latin students who have accepted Peace Corps teachers on the theory that they were not in fact controlled by the "State Department" would be tragically predictable. On the other hand, continuing to keep the Peace Corps outside foreign policy may well help to lay the foundation for a Peace Corps operation in a country like Vietnam.

II. LOGIC

There are three reasons why Volunteers assembling tomorrow in New York should not be diverted from their travel to India:

1. Diversion of Volunteers would be ineffective. More Volunteers to teach school or raise chickens are important in the long run to India and to the United States, but holding up departure of Volunteers as a pressure tactic won't provide any effective leverage on Indian policies with regard to the Indian/Pakistan war. Stopping a shipment of wheat, a planeload of guns or locomotives puts a real squeeze on. Such action can and should be used to bring India to its senses in the present situation. But holding up Volunteers won't be noticed by those Indians making current policy.

2. Withholding Volunteers defeats the U. S. self-interest. Volunteers win friends for the United States and help people to understand our purposes, our policies and our society. We need more such people in India, not fewer. As individuals they represent a kind of people to people assistance that is not involved in short-run political or military considerations. If Volunteers are used for other purposes, Communists will make hay and our friends abroad will be disenchanted.

3. It would be politically unwise at home in the United States to suffer the charge that this "good" Peace Corps was now being subverted by its masters to accomplish security objectives. It is a fact that Peace Corps Volunteers would not understand being diverted to influence a political/military settlement. So far, their value abroad to the United States has been dependent upon their basic idealism and altruism.

- The argument that has caught the imagination and touched the ideals of the American young people who are our Volunteers, is the argument that we are, in practice, apolitical.

III. CONCLUSION

The United States gains nothing by diverting the Volunteers; the United States loses a lot in India, in the rest of the 46 countries where we serve, and at home.

1

416

✓

PEACE CORPS

Washington, D. C. 20525

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MAC GEORGE BUNDY

FROM: SARGENT SHRIVER

Vargo

The attached confidential cables from Bowles in India , speaking for all U.S. elements including the Peace Corps, makes it clear that the field position is that there is no danger now to U. S. Government personnel. As Bowles puts it, "Although situation might change we are not repeat not in danger now."

We have also had a direct message from our Peace Corps Representative to send our people on schedule.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ck, NARA, Date 5-6-99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/18/65

TO McGEORGE BUNDY

FROM: Bill Moyers

FYI.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

41-6

✓

9/18/65

Called RSS and told him to be sure it is understood that the reasons are the safety factor and the uncertainty of the situation.

Has nothing to do with economic assistance to Pakistan.

It is simply the uncertainty of the situation -- the problem with China -- do not wish to send any more Americans to the area.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

With respect to the 179 Peace Corps Volunteers who were scheduled to leave for India tomorrow, we plan to divide the group into two sections, sending 83 to Israel and 96 to the U. S. Trust Territories in the Pacific.

Israel had hoped that we would do exactly this and the plan for further training of these Volunteers in rural work, community development and poultry production is fully within the capacity of the Israeli cooperative movement. They are ready, willing and able to take on these Volunteers and to continue their training.

The Trust Territories are equally eager and ready. The Volunteers would be located primarily on the two large islands, Truk and Yap.

Unless I hear to the contrary from you, this plan will be announced to the Volunteers tonight in New York City where they have assembled prior to departure.

Sarge
RSS

cc: Mr. Bundy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

42
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-141
By id, NARA Date 3-31-00

~~SECRET~~

September 16, 1965
3:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Review of Near East Developments

The Near East is enjoying a moment of relative surface calm. Arab leaders are meeting in Casablanca under the usual Arab unity banner. Nasser has pulled in his horns in Yemen and the Congo, and the sub-surface tensions that hem Nasser in may be greater than ever. Unfortunately from the news-making point of view, most of this is too sensitive even for backgrounding. Quiet diplomacy generally gets us further in the Near East, so there's rarely much useful news.

The Arab Summit which began Monday so far has produced only one major explosion--Bourguiba's decision to boycott it and his Tunis speech on opening day denouncing Nasser's efforts to dominate the Arabs. Otherwise, nothing yet either noteworthy or obnoxious--only the usual lip service to Arab unity against Israel and to continued plans to divert the Jordan. However, the various splits among the Arabs will probably emerge when our intelligence sources begin reporting. All told, Nasser can only count on sure support from the Yemenis and Iraqis. But it's best for us not to take any judicial notice of Arab disarray, lest it lead to new attacks on us.

Western vs. Eastern Arabs. Bourguiba's absence and King Hassan's opening speech at the summit highlight North African efforts to stave off Nasser's efforts to run the whole Arab show. Bourguiba has been persona non grata ever since his statements last spring that the Arabs should consider a few short steps toward a long-range settlement with Israel. Since then, his emissaries have been trying to form a protective mantle of North African cooperation. Libya, vulnerable to any Nasser thrust at its oil, is receptive. Hassan has long been at swords' points with Nasser, and even revolutionary Algeria's relations have been cool since Nasser took exception to Ben Bella's ouster in June.

Yemen. The Saudi-UAR agreement seems to be working, even though any number of things could go wrong. So long as Yemen is quiet, however, it reduces Faisal's complaints to us, and makes it less likely he'll buy a lot of US arms.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

UAR. Against this background, Luke Battle sees straws in the wind that Nasser may be ready to turn inward. His economic problems are more serious than ever, and a recent plot against him may have brought home to him that economic problems can be political threats. We've tried for four years to turn Nasser inward and reduce his trouble-making potential for us but it's too early to tell whether this is for real. He certainly won't give up his pan-Arab aspirations--he'll have to slap back at Bourguiba, and he may be tempted to meddle in the Sudanese rebellion of Negro southerners against the Khartoum government. What we don't know yet is whether any new deals were cooked up by Nasser in his August Moscow visit. However, he's also making overtures to us, and sending his top economic minister here this month, ostensibly for IBRD-IMF meetings, but actually to sound us out on aid. He'll argue that US-UAR relations have now returned to normal, so let's improve economic relations. Battle is here now to help us sort this out, and we hope to present you with our ideas.

Jordan. Nasser still has a troublesome device in the United Arab Command. Under cover of organizing Arab forces against Israel, he can press moderates like Hussein to haul in their pro-Western sails. He's still urging Hussein to take Soviet MIGs to replace his obsolescent Hawker Hunters, and Hussein has been pressing us for jet fighters instead. To stave off Israeli counter-pressures, we've sent Hussein to buy French planes. We thought they had a deal, but the French suddenly hiked the price. So we may be in for another tough choice, depending on how hard the other Arabs in Casablanca hit Hussein for not having met UAC requirements.

Israel. The big news is the 2 November election campaign, with BG giving Eshkol a hard time. BG can't lick Eshkol, but can dangerously cut down his working majority. Meanwhile, Israel has run a couple of cross-border raids on Jordanian targets in the last two weeks. While we tell them these just make it harder for Hussein to resist Arab hardliner pressures, the Israelis persist in mixing a steady dose of force with their diplomacy (largely our diplomacy on their behalf).

Greece. There's some hope that a government can be formed soon, but negotiations are still dragging on. Even if they succeed, Greece will probably still face elections in the next six months or so, and the issue of the monarchy in politics will remain a big one. If they fail, the King will be tempted to try a government based on the military.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

This is quite worrisome, but anything we say publicly will be regarded as intervention by one side or another.

Iran. The Shah has been worried ever since he came back from Moscow about whether he shouldn't trim his westward sails in an effort to avoid becoming another Vietnam. He's also upset about the plight of his CENTO ally, Ayub. However, your show this morning should be a shot in the arm. We may need to devise some more messages for him too.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

mpd

delayed on my desk

cc: Mr. Moyers

~~SECRET~~

9-16-65 11:30 AM
MEMORANDUM

(2)

43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 16, 1965, 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a conversation between the Iranian Ambassador in Pakistan and Ayub, which is of some interest. Ayub knew that Ambassador Ansary would relay the conversation immediately to McConaughy. Thus the comment by Ayub in paragraph 5 (sidelined) is surely almost intended as a message to you.

Md. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Karachi 482

NLJ 99-14/
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

1. Iranian Ambassador Ansary has told me of his private conversation with Ayub and Bhutto September 10 with no one else present. Conversation reflected basis of unusual trust and fraternal intimacy which Ansary has already achieved with top Pak circles. Ayub indicated really disproportionate measure of gratitude for gesture of full sympathy and desire to assist expressed by Iranian Government, showing how desperately Paks grasping for every straw of support, tangible or intangible.
2. Conversation with Ayub and Bhutto dwelt principally on problems of Pak-US relations in situation of deepening emergency. Ansary believes Ayub fully aware he in situation beyond repair if he loses US completely. Quoted Ayub as having only contempt for Sukarno and fully realizes there will be no tangible value, other than limited propaganda effect, in Indonesians' support of Pak cause. Ayub also quite realistic about Chicom cynicism in current situation. He confirmed again absence of any arrangement or understanding with Chicoms and pointed out Indian withdrawal of forces from Chicom border area to beef up attack on Pakistan shows Indians confident Chicoms will not move in any profoundly threatening way.
3. Ayub recognized absolute necessity of reaching some sort of understanding with US. He indicated awareness Ansary and I consulted closely and indicated his satisfaction at this. He asked for Ansary's comments on problems I faced and expressed sympathy at tough row I had had to hoe in Pakistan, especially since late April, citing four US decisions unpalatable for Pakistan which I had had to convey to him in that time. Expressed regret that I had not had any good news to convey.
4. Ansary said he told Ayub frankly that he (Ayub) had compounded difficulties US Ambassador's position by unwillingness consult closely and frankly in difficult days following consortium postponement. Ayub denied impairment of communications had been his intention and indicated he wanted improve contact, by-passing routine foreign office channels as necessary. Ansary indicated he knew improvement had already started with recent full exchanges in amiable personal atmosphere by Ambassador with both Ayub and Bhutto.
5. Ayub reiterated his willingness, already indicated to me on September 6, to make hurried emergency trip to US in early October to reach face-to-face understanding with President Johnson. Said he realized it was imperative and no other meeting could take its place. Two big obstacles were: increasingly critical war situation and consortium problem. He would attempt to overcome grim problem of his absence from country during hostilities, assuming fires

~~SECRET~~

of war could be damped down to less dangerous phase for a period of his absence, provided only US could get him off of consortium hook. Said his government could not survive if it seemed that he was going on consortium begging mission after all that has transpired. If President Johnson could just make gesture of indicating before consortium meeting date that US in principle prepared to pledge if and when hostilities ceased and necessary arrangements made, this action, which would not acutally commit us in advance at all, would save his position and take him off hook.

9-16-65 2-8
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs., September 16, 1965
2:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: False report of a request for illumination from Ayub

1. Bob Komer told me that Jim Greenfield knew nothing of this story, and I decided to call John Hightower. He told me he had written the story himself and that he now understood that there had been a letter to Ayub which had not in fact gone out, but he stuck to the view that at a lower level some sort of inquiry had been made. I then chased down the attached outgoing telegram and read him the first paragraph. He agreed that there was all the difference in the world between saying that the Johnson Administration had asked Khan for his views, and requesting information from an Embassy about the meaning and purpose of a public statement already made. He agreed to rewrite his story.

2. Hightower of course would not tell me who he talked with, but with this much to go on, I think Komer can now find out. The really shocking thing is that someone talked to Hightower about a draft letter from the President to Ayub at a time when there was no decision on the matter.

McG. B.

McG. B.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.

BY DCJ ON 11-30-82

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

08279

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

82

SCAT

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ~~PAKISTAN~~ Office Rawalpindi IMMEDIATE

NEA

Amembassy KARACHI

Info

Info: Amembassy DELHI

USUN

SS

CINCPACAFSA

G

WHITE HOUSE

SP

Rawalpindi's 69

SAH

L

H

FE

IO

P

US IA

NSC

INR

NSA

AID

Request soonest most precise information available on

Ayub's reported public appeal for US "intervention" Indo-Pak

conflict and your assessment of Ayub's motivation making appeal.

Also request whatever information available on Pak

position re SYG cease fire appeal. Our understanding here

is that following ~~receipt~~ highly conditional GOP and GOI

responses SYG's first appeal for unconditional cease fire,

SYG ~~appeal~~ made second appeal evening Sept. 14. It

apparently this appeal which GOI has now accepted (Delhi's

19 to Rawalpindi) subject only GOP acceptance.

FYI Pak Embassy Sept. 15 delivered letter to President

from Ayub containing text Ayub's letter to SYG of Sept. 13

turning down SYG's appeal for cease fire 1800 hours Sept. 15.

Text follows. End FYI.

BALI.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

Lowell B. Leingen 9/15/65

classification approved by: NEA: WJHandley

Clearances:

IO- Mr. ~~STEEN~~ Popper

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-14-99

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM
8-63 DS-322

Thurs., Sept. 16, 1965
12:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In order not to lose time, I called Tom Dodd directly and spoke to him about sweatshops, power rates, and equal rights. He said he agreed entirely and would handle it.

McG. B.

Mr. B
told this to
J on phone

F 45

1 46
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., Sept. 16, 1965.
12:00 noon

Rec'd
12:30 p

MR. PRESIDENT:

A cheering message from Ambassador
Clark in Canberra.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

46a

(COPY OF CANBERRA 240, Sept. 16, 1965)

For: The President

From: Ambassador Clark

1. I have just received from Prime Minister Menzies an acknowledgement of your message to him of last weekend which was in reply to his letter to you on the subject of the defense of Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Singapore and Malaysia. The Prime Minister also wishes to acknowledge the account of Mr. Ball's discussions with the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

2. The Prime Minister wanted me particularly to tell you how delighted he was with your message and also with the course that Mr. Ball followed in his conversations with the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

3. In this connection I have learned from other sources in the Cabinet that the senior Cabinet ministers were unanimous in their praise over the tone of your message and the results of Mr. Ball's discussions. They were relieved and encouraged that you upheld their own views in such a completely forthright and determined manner and for this they are grateful.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-248
By iso, NARA, Date 2-12-04

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 17, 1965, 5:40 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Planning for trip to Hawaii to meet other Heads of State of the Pacific area

We have now checked this out with Dean Rusk and Howard Jones, and there is great enthusiasm for the general idea, although there is not any final agreement as to just which Heads of State we would wish to have. Howard Jones would like as many as seven, and my brother Bill thinks it would be wiser to have only three or four. But everyone agrees that we ought to have Sato, no matter who else we have, and accordingly we would like now to explore his readiness to come, on a most confidential basis, if you are willing. Jack Valenti thinks that the date for this meeting ought to be October 18 and not the 25th, so that we have only a month in which to plan.

What I would like to do is to go to Reischauer with a personal and private cable, asking him to sound out Sato as to his willingness to come to Hawaii, if invited, to receive an honorary degree and to have a private meeting with you, and conceivably with a few other Heads of Pacific governments. Reischauer is discreet, and he will handle this with great skill. I would put it all as a possibility, and not as a certainty, but I would want to let Reischauer know that you yourself expect to be there if Sato can be there. Jack tells me that there is a strong possibility that you will be in Hawaii with or without foreigners, so this seems to me a safe position. Do you agree?

McG. B.

Go ahead _____

Speak to me _____

48

Rec'd
11:30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., Sept. 16, 1965
11:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Dodd's answer to Fulbright.
We gave some help, but most of it is
his own work and that of the very David
Martin that I sometimes have to criticize.
It is a very powerful document and makes
pretty good mincemeat of Fulbright.

I am drafting a short and pungent letter
to Fulbright for your consideration
and should have it in another couple
of hours.

h. f. B.

McG. B.

L 7 48a

REMARKS OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD
ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE
Thursday, September 16, 1965

A REPLY TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. President:

Yesterday the distinguished Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee (Mr. Fulbright) presented to the Senate a statement of the conclusions he had reached on United States policy in the Dominican Republic crisis.

He had reached these conclusions, he said, only after "a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation."

In essence, the Senator's position was that the Administration had made an error of catastrophic proportions in intervening to prevent a rebel take-over in the Dominican Republic.

He said that while there may be legitimate differences about the degree of communist influence in the rebel movement, it could be taken for granted that there will always be a number of communists supporting every revolutionary movement in the Americas aimed at freedom and social justice; and that "the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and, therefore, the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

"And the question inevitably arises," he continued, "whether this shift in the Administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the United States Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America--such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela--as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?"

Among other things, the Senator charged that the President's decision was based on inaccurate or false information from our representatives in the Dominican Republic; that it had done serious damage to our image throughout Latin America; and that the Administration was less than truthful in its first announcement that the Marines were being sent into Santo Domingo for the purpose of protecting American lives.

He said that if the Dominican intervention may be considered a token of the future, "then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America."

I want to make it clear at the outset that I share the Senator's conviction that communism cannot be effectively opposed in Latin America by siding with the landowners and the oligarchs and with dictatorial tyrants.

In a speech which I made only a few weeks ago before the American Legion Convention, I called for a hemispheric attack on the problems of hunger and illiteracy and disease, and of land reform and social reform in general.

And, I made the point that unless there were revolutionary reforms in Latin America, the mere elimination of Castro would resolve nothing, because the anger and desperation of masses of people throughout the Americas would soon give rise to another half-dozen Castros.

(more)

So, on this one point--a point of fundamental importance--we agree.

I also agree with the Senator, and this, too, is a point of fundamental importance, that the best hope for the future in many Latin American countries lies with the parties of the so-called democratic left, with parties like the Christian Democratic Party in Chile, APRA in Peru, and Accion Democratica in Venezuela.

What is more, I know that this conviction is shared by the responsible officials of the Department of State and that it has, in fact, been a cornerstone of our policy in recent years.

But, having said this, I fear that I must take issue with the senior Senator from Arkansas on virtually every other aspect of his statement.

Indeed, I find it difficult to escape the impression that this sweeping condemnation of Administration policy is organically related to the documentation previously published by the Foreign Relations Committee under the caption "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic," with which I dealt in my Senate speech of August 23, 1965.

I said then that the documentation and the supporting chronology had been heavily slanted against the Administration by the simple process of editorial selection.

I pointed out that the hundred or more quotations which appeared in the chronology were culled without exception from the New York Times and Washington Post and New York Herald Tribune, and several other sources critical of Administration policy; and that the chronology had completely ignored the hundreds of newspaper articles by veteran correspondents and by columnists of national reputation which, in general, tended to vindicate the Administration's position.

I also pointed out that the documentation contained in the publication completely ignored the OAS resolution and the minutes of the Fourth Plenary Session at which the special committee on the Dominican crisis submitted its report; and that it also ignored statements issued by the AFL-CIO, by the major Dominican labor federation, CONATROL, and by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers.

I had hoped that by bringing to the attention of my distinguished colleague a number of pertinent extracts from the documents to which I had referred, I could persuade him to read these documents with an open mind.

It now seems evident to me that I overestimated my powers of persuasion, for there is nothing in the Senator's remarks which suggest to me that he has since taken the trouble to read the documents or the articles from which I quoted, and the text of which I inserted into the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Dominican Intervention and Latin American Opinion

The Senator's speech strongly implied that Latin American opinion was united against us.

He said that he was not "reassured by the assertions...that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our action." He said further, that we had particularly compromised American standing with the educated and progressive Latin Americans who make up the generation of the Alliance for Progress.

In my previous remarks, I referred the Senator, among other things, to the statement issued by CONATROL, the major Dominican Labor Federation, which was outspoken on the subject of communist control of the rebel movement, and which accepted the necessity for American intervention.

(more)

The men who make up CONATROL are not oligarchs or reactionaries; they are workers and progressives, many of them socialists and semi-socialists.

One can, of course, disagree with CONATROL's analysis with events in Santo Domingo.

But in the light of statements issued by the leaders of CONATROL, I do not see how any one could reasonably argue that Latin American progressives were uniformly on the side of the rebels and opposed to American intervention.

I also referred to the statement issued by ORIT, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, which embraces most of the democratic trade unions of the hemisphere.

The leaders of ORIT, too, are men who have come up from the ranks of the working class. They are generally anti-capitalist and strongly progressive in their political tendencies, and certainly they are anything but reactionary.

And again I want to make the point that, while no one is under any obligation to accept ORIT's assessment of the Dominican crisis and American intervention, their statement by itself constitutes proof that some of the most important sectors of progressive opinion in Latin America agreed that American intervention was essential to prevent a communist takeover.

There were other important proofs that, even at the height of our intervention, leading Latin American progressives understood and approved of our actions.

For example, the Liberal Daily El Mundo published in Caracas, Venezuela, wrote on May 4:

"Communism, with its claws hovering over Dominican territory, tried to take over one more front in America and establish there a branch of the island governed by Fidel Castro...we freemen of America ought to be on the side of freedom. And the United States besides being a free country, and being the traditional friends of Venezuelans and of all American nations, is defending our right to live in our own way without the intrusion of foreign doctrines which harm and corrupt the thinking of our peoples. Our peoples, traditionally Catholic, never have been on the side of communism."

In Bogota, Colombia, the moderately liberal newspaper El Tiempo wrote on May 5:

"So long as the Latin American Republics do not have an international force that can intervene in cases like that of the Dominican Republic, we must accept, much as it hurts our national pride, the inevitability of American intervention."

In Lima, Peru, La Prensa, which, although conservative, is generally regarded as a moderate newspaper, said in an editorial about American intervention:

"That the myth of absolute 'nonintervention' suits only the Reds is demonstrated by the position taken by the Creole Communists. Their protests against unilateral North American intervention have not been so obstreperous as it has been against the possibility of collective intervention."

And, if my colleagues are interested, I could produce many other similar quotations from Latin American newspapers, some liberal, some conservative.

Surveying the situation in Latin America in early May, Newsweek magazine pointed out that there had been a remarkable absence of rioting and other demonstrations, which, it said, "emphasizes the general feeling that, while intervention is bad, a second Cuba would be far worse."

(more)

But most important of all were the opinions expressed by the five Latin American ambassadors who made up the OAS Special Committee assigned to investigate the situation in the Dominican Republic.

Ambassador Carrizosa, the special delegate of Colombia, told the OAS meeting:

"...With regard to the sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamano, many diplomats accredited in the Dominican Republic, and I can include my country's diplomatic representative, feel that, if not Colonel Francisco Caamano, whom I do not know to be personally a communist, there are indeed numerous persons on his side that, if they are not members of the communist party, are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of government or political purposes. There is such a tendency in the opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and I do not mention other countries in order not to commit countries represented here. They are firmly convinced that on that side there are many persons, I do not say members registered in an officially organized communist party, but persons who do have leanings toward a well-known trend which is prevalent in Cuba."

"What were we to do when blood was running in the streets...what happens when a state in this condition is so close to Cuba? Are we to sit silently on balconies and watch the end of the tragedy as if we were watching some sort of bull fight?"

According to Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, "The whole committee (the OAS special committee) agreed that the Caamano movement could be rapidly converted to a communist insurrection that was susceptible of gaining the support of the Marxist-Lenin powers."

"As to conditions in Santo Domingo in May, it was a no man's land," said the Brazilian Ambassador. "There had been a complete collapse of public authority. The Dominican Republic had disappeared as a legal and political entity--arms had been given to a disoriented nation of fanatics and adolescents who were in a frenzied state, egged on by subversive broadcasts...anarchy reigned...any organized group that made a landing in the Dominican Republic could have dominated the situation..."

Summarizing the views of the Committee, Ambassador Todice of Paraguay made this statement.

"The Government of Paraguay, as I stated clearly when approval was given to the establishment of the collective inter-American force, believed from the beginning that continental security was at stake. The replies by the Ambassadors composing the Committee reporting today on certain questions regarding these delicate aspects of the Dominican situation have been categorical. My government was right. Continental security is threatened. The danger existed, and still exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit international communism to transform the Dominican Republic into another Cuba. With his customary clarity, courage and energy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Alfredo Vazquez

Carrizosa, has categorically mentioned the highly political nature of the problem we are facing. In reply to a question of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has rightly said that the peace of the hemisphere is threatened and, that there is a possibility that another Cuba, another communist government in the hemisphere will arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the Dominican Republic."

Again, I am prepared to concede that no one is under obligation to accept the assessment of the five Latin American ambassadors who made an on-the-spot investigation of the situation in Santo Domingo during the first days of May.

But whether one accepts or rejects this assessment, I do not see how any objective study of the Latin American reaction to our intervention in the Dominican Republic could fail to take into account the statements made by these five distinguished Latin American diplomats.

The facts which I have adduced demonstrate beyond the possibility of challenge that very substantial sectors of Latin American public opinion, including trade union leaders, editors and members of the diplomatic corps, were not opposed to United States intervention in the Dominican Republic but, on the contrary, accepted it as an unavoidable necessity.

I find it most regrettable that the Senator from Arkansas ignored this mass of evidence. Indeed, I fail to understand how he could have ignored it. Somehow, it seems to me that he has shut out from his mind, all facts which failed to harmonize with the preconceived thesis that the rebels were right and the Administration was wrong.

The Question of Communist Control

The senior Senator from Arkansas at one point in his statement agreed that there can be honest differences of opinion about the degree of communist control. But then he proceeded to argue that the Administration had grossly exaggerated the degree of communist influence or control in the rebel movement, and that it had permitted itself to be panicked into the decision to intervene.

"In their panic lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba," he said, "some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some communist support, that there is an important difference between communist support and communist control of a political movement..... . The issue is not whether there was communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something about which reasonable men can differ." "The burden of proof, however," he said, "is on those who take action. And the Administration has not proven its assertion of communist control."

I take exception to this statement on two grounds,

First of all, the Senator seems to demand a degree of mathematical proof which is a virtual impossibility in the complex realm of politics.

It would, for example, have been impossible to prove, by the rigorous standards he suggests, that Fidel Castro was a communist or that his movement was communist-dominated even a year after Castro had seized power. But there was a very substantial body of evidence pointing to communist control of the Castro movement and to the probability that Castro was himself a communist. This body of evidence, regrettably, was ignored by the responsible desk officer in the Department of State, who advised his superiors that "there was no conclusive proof that Castro was a communist or that his movement was communist dominated."

(more)

This excessively legalistic approach resulted in the installation of a communist regime in Cuba, whose massive subversive activities now pose a serious danger to the security of all the Americas.

I note parenthetically at this point that the Senator from Arkansas apparently feels a deep sense of sympathy for the foreign service officer in question who, he said, "had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power," and "has had his career ruined by congressional committees."

Having presided over the hearings in question, I find it difficult to conceive of a more inaccurate construction of what actually took place.

That William Wieland's reputation for political judgement has been compromised, there can be no doubt. But it was compromised not by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security but by his own record of unsound political advice to his superiors, and by a record of testimony before the committee which, I believe, any objective reader would have to characterize as less than candid.

That William Wieland's career has been ruined is completely untrue. As my colleagues are aware he has been promoted to a substantially higher grade since the hearings were instituted; his security clearance has been reinstated by the State Department; and he has recently been assigned to a responsible post in Australia.

I take exception to the Senator's analysis of the degree of communist influence in the Dominican rebel movement, in the second, place, for the simple reason that he has chosen to completely ignore the facts.

I agree with the Senator that there is a world of difference between communist support and communist control; and I also agree that we have to be careful in making judgements.

But there have been situations, and there will be situations in the future in which it is mandatory that judgement be made. In doing so, there are certain criteria which can, I am convinced, be applied with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Criterion number one in determining whether a movement or uprising is simply supported by communists or controlled by them, is the number of identifiable communists in key positions. The Administration has published details about 77 identifiable communists, many of them with training in Castro Cuba, who occupied command positions in the rebel movement.

Criterion number two is the general political composition of the revolt. In the case of the Dominican rebellion, the Administration has pointed out, that apart from the Bosch party whose leaders abandoned the revolt and sought refuge after the first few days, the political support for the rebellion came from the three communist parties which I have previously named, and which, between them, had a membership of several thousands.

Criterion number three in a situation like the Dominican uprising is the pattern of the revolt itself. Spontaneous revolutions, guided by indignant nationalists, are invariably characterized by a certain amount of bungling and amateurism. But the Dominican revolt was characterized, instead, by the highest degree of precision and professionalism.

Those in charge had clearly targeted their first objectives and their second objectives and their third objectives. They had planned their strategy and their tactics carefully. There was no bungling. It was, if anything, a text-book operation in the seizure of political power which could only have been conducted by trained professional revolutionaries.

(more)

Criterion number four is the nature of the propaganda put out by those in charge of the revolt. And I believe that anyone who takes the trouble to analyze the propaganda output of the Dominican rebel movement in the early days of the revolt and afterwards, would have to agree that the radio and TV broadcasts and the printed literature all bore the heavy and unmistakable imprint of trained communist propagandists.

Criterion number five is the attitude of the rebels to anti-communist progressives. And here I think that the true nature of the Dominican revolt was betrayed by the fact that one of the first acts of the rebels was to raid and ransack the headquarters of CONATROL, the non-communist labor federation.

Criterion number six is the collective judgement of the American Embassy officials on the spot. And here I want to underscore the fact that it was not simply Ambassador Tapley Bennett, as the Senator from Arkansas has implied, who urged American intervention. On the contrary, the recommendation to President Johnson represented the unanimous judgement of the entire country team in the American Embassy in Santo Domingo. Beyond this, I have heard that, from desk-level to the level of Secretary of State, the recommendation of the country team was backed by the unanimous concurrence of the responsible Department officers.

Rarely, in the history of the Department has a decision of this moment enjoyed so broad a spectrum of backing.

But all of this evidence was ignored by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in his pronouncement on the Administration's handling of the Dominican crisis.

There was another point of evidence he ignored, and this was the testimony of John Bartlow Martin, who went to the Dominican Republic shortly after the fighting erupted, on special assignment by the President.

Mr. Martin served as ambassador to the Dominican Republic under the Presidency of Juan Bosch. He was an admirer and good friend of Bosch's, and a lifelong friend of the so-called democratic left in Latin America politics. Before becoming ambassador, Mr. Martin enjoyed nation-wide recognition as one of our ablest political analysts, and as a liberal of impeccable credentials.

I have been told on reliable authority that when Mr. Martin was first asked to go to the Dominican Republic, he was convinced that we were doing the wrong thing. But 48 hours after he arrived there he had changed his mind because he realized that it was, in fact, true that the communists were in complete control or that they at least exercised an exceedingly dangerous degree of control.

Mr. Martin's account of the Dominican crisis, which was printed by Life magazine was, incidentally, another one of the many articles substantially supporting the Administration's position which were ignored or overlooked by the Foreign Relations Committee documentation on the Dominican crisis.

I have been informed by a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist that, when the question was put to John Bartlow Martin: "Would you, if you were a journalist writing over your own name, be prepared to say that the communists are in complete control of the revolt?" Martin replied: "Yes, I would."

But for some reason the Senator from Arkansas has chosen to completely ignore the findings of this former ambassador, who knew the Dominican situation intimately, who was a friend of Bosch's, who was initially disposed to sympathize with the revolt, whose liberalism would not be challenged by anyone, and who brought to his assignment a long experience in the field of political analysis and journalism.

(more)

Let me at this point recapitulate a few of the many details which convinced the Administration that the communists had seized control of the revolt and that any serious delay in intervening was bound to result in another Cuba in the Caribbean. And let me add a few more recent details which serve to establish how correct this judgment was.

1. It was known that many communists had secretly returned to Santo Domingo from exile in late 1964 and early 1965 after training in subversion in Cuba and other communist countries.

2. There was solid information about the Dominican Popular Movement, (the MPD), which consisted of some 500 hard core members, which follows the Chinese Communist line, and which was active on the rebel side.

3. There was also solid information about the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), another underground organization of 700-1000 members which follows the Moscow line and which also was active in promoting the revolt. This Party, I want to point out to Senators, recently changed its name to Dominican Communist Party (PCD).

4. Finally, there was solid information about another communist movement, the 14th of June Popular Movement, many of whose members and leaders are Castro-trained Communists and which was in the fore-front of the rebel movement.

5. It has been established from many sources that members of the three Communist Parties took the lead in passing out arms to civilians, including 1,500 hardcore communists. Moving with precision, they were quick to organize street demonstrations, seize newspaper plants, take control of rebel propaganda, organize paramilitary units, establish commando units and command posts, and to place themselves in positions of political control.

6. It is a matter of record that clearly pro-Communist speeches were made over Santo Domingo TV on April 25.

7. There is also proof that important Communist leaders were attending political meetings at the National Palace with Molina Urena, the rebel Provisional President, during the early days of the conflict.

8. It is also a matter of record that among the rebel leaders were such experienced revolutionaries as Antonio Isa Conde who was trained in Cuba in 1963; Daniel Ozuna Hernandez, a leader in the 1963 invasion from Cuba; and Jose Cuello Hernandez, who trained in Cuba in 1964.

And, I want to assure my colleagues that the U. S. Government knew much more, which for a variety of reasons, cannot be documented publicly.

Since the early days of the fighting, there have been increasing indications of Communist activity and communist control in the rebel sectors.

9. The rebel newspaper Patria, by its tone and content, has betrayed an unmistakable communist orientation.

Since June, Patria has been calling for the establishment of a "united anti-feudal, anti-imperialist front" of all "democratic" elements to continue the battle against the "yankees and their creole lackeys."

Another recurrent theme is that all parties, including the Communist ones, should be permitted to participate in elections.

Two editorials have consistently analyzed the revolution in terms of Marxist dialectics declaring that the "socialist countries," headed by the USSR, are the natural friends of progressive movements.

10. The three Communist Parties to which I have referred, the MPD, the PCD, and the 14th of June Popular Movement, established military commands, each controlling specified areas within the rebel zone.

(more)

11. Juan Ducoudray, a leader of the Dominican Communist Party, who worked for Radio Havana, in 1962, and who has traveled widely in communist countries, on August 17 declared that his group would actively oppose an OAS-type negotiated settlement. Instead, he said, his group would continue on the course of armed intervention.

12. The 14th of June Movement issued an open declaration in favor of violent action and against any provisional government. This Movement, in the past two months, has also been very active in enlisting new members, in conducting Communist indoctrination courses, and in giving guerrilla war training to hundreds of young people.

13. The MPD has also engaged in guerrilla warfare training over the past two months. This group has also called publicly for terrorism throughout the country to oppose any provisional government.

14. The August 16 edition of the Dominican Communist Party's official organ, carried a remarkably frank statement saying that the Party attempted to capitalize on a popular uprising at the outset of the April 24 revolt. The Party, analyzing its reasons for failure in April, called on all its members to prepare "for victory in the next popular insurrection."

Even Bernard Collier of the Herald Tribune, who strongly challenged the original charge that the rebels were under communist direction, said in a recent article in the Tribune that there was alarming evidence of communist control in the rebel sector.

All of this the Senator from Arkansas has apparently dismissed as inconsequential. Even at the very serious risk of permitting the establishment of another Castro regime in the Americas, he insists on mathematical proof of communist control before a decision is made to intervene against an actual or threatening communist take-over.

On Revolutions and Counter Revolutions

That the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has difficulty in understanding my viewpoint, and that I have equal difficulty in understanding his, is, I believe, apparent to the press from the several exchanges we have had on the Floor.

Perhaps I have misread the Senator's remarks--and if I have, I hope he will correct me--but it seems to me that he suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or communist.

Time magazine has quoted the Senator as saying in his first Senate speech that "the Russian experiment in socialism is scarcely more radical under modern conditions than the Declaration of Independence was in the days of George III."

This quotation may be inaccurate, or the Senator may since have revised his opinion. But there was a passage in his statement on the Floor yesterday which suggests to me the persistence of a strange confusion concerning the real nature of communism and the Russian revolution. I want to quote this statement, so that I may fairly comment on it.

"It is not surprising," said the Senator, "that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the noncommunist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable; and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian Revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America and Asia and Africa."

(more)

I cannot accept this indiscriminate lumping together of the American revolution, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution.

The American Revolution was the purest, the noblest, and the most democratic in recorded history. It was a revolution based on the fundamental concepts of human equality and the dignity of the individual. It was accompanied by a minimum of terror. It gave birth to no dictatorship, but on the contrary, launched our nation on an experiment in expanding democracy which has set an example for the entire world.

The French Revolution was a more mixed affair. Originally inspired by ideals of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and committed to the liberation of France from feudal oppression, the revolution soon degenerated into a regime of the guillotine and total terror.

The French Revolution vindicated itself historically only after it had purged itself of the extremists who had usurped its leadership. And the process of democratic rebirth which followed the terror gave birth to one of history's most dramatic flowerings of law and learning and art.

But the so-called Communist revolution has nothing in common with the great revolutions of history.

From an historical standpoint, indeed, the Communist revolution can only be looked upon as a counter-revolution as monstrous and retrogressive as Hitlerism.

Instead of expanding the frontiers of freedom and bringing about a greater degree of social justice, the Communist revolution has resulted in the organized impoverishment of the people, in the reduction of agricultural output through the spread of an incentive desert, in the total destruction of justice, and in the most monstrous state of terror since Genghis Khan.

Instead of the cultural and spiritual renaissance that has followed in the wake of true revolutions, Communist totalitarianism has everywhere resulted in the stultification of the intellect and the imprisonment of the spirit.

Perhaps the chief reason why the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I find it so difficult to understand each other is the fact that, while he regards the Communists as revolutionaries, I regard them as counter-revolutionaries.

Perhaps it is because of this that he has never made a single statement expressing concern about the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba, or about the hemispheric campaign of terror and subversion now being conducted by a communist consortium, in which the followers of Castro in every country enjoy the backing of both the Soviet communists and the Chinese communists.

Perhaps it is because of this that, in the first major speech on Latin America he has made in some time, he has addressed himself not to the danger of Castro-Communism in the Americas, but to the danger posed by American intervention against a threatening communist takeover in the Dominican Republic.

The Senator's attitude is, I know, shared by a number of people who consider themselves members of the liberal community. They are not pro-communists. But they are so bemused by the communist pretention to social revolution, that they permit their tolerance of communism to blind them to the very real danger it poses to the survival of freedom.

The Balance Sheet of Intervention

With the establishment of a Provisional Government, it is my conviction that our policy and tactics in the Dominican Republic will be seen in a somewhat more favorable light by erstwhile critics, both in this country and elsewhere.

(more)

Now surely it must be clear that the United States did not intervene for either conquest or exploitation in the Dominican Republic.

Presumably, it is also clear that whatever errors we may have made, we did not seek the imposition of a right-wing dictatorship as an answer to the Communist threat.

Nor can it be said that we regard all revolutionaries as Communists, or that we seek to preserve the status quo at all costs. Much of the criticism of our decision to send in troops on April 28 was based on these assumptions and charges. I recognize that much of this criticism was sincere. But our actions have spoken louder than can any words.

We were accused of bringing bloodshed and taking the lives of Dominicans. But our entrance into the Dominican Republic terminated the senseless killing, and gave the OAS time to assume responsibility. Dominican leaders were brought to the negotiating table to settle their differences, and the emergency needs of the Dominican people were met.

We were accused of favoring a military dictatorship. But we have labored in the OAS patiently to open the way to free elections, so that the Dominican people can after a period of pacification, choose their government.

We were accused of trying to impose on the Dominican people a solution of our choosing. But the Dominican people have clearly demonstrated their support for the compromise offered by the OAS.

We were accused of trying to keep the Dominican people from restoring the liberal Constitution of 1963. But the Institutional Act promulgated by the provisional government contains many of the liberal provisions of the 1963 Constitution.

We were accused of seeing Communists where Communists did not exist. But even some of our accusers now express concern as the Communists proudly display their guerrilla training schools and arms for all to see, and boast that they have opposed a solution these long months and that they intend to fight another day.

No one tried to confound the critics. The policy of the United States was clearly stated from the first days that the United States entered the Dominican Republic. We have faithfully followed that policy and the mandates of the OAS.

The critics confused themselves. Among other things, they failed to read and understand the statement of the late beloved John F. Kennedy when he said in November, 1963, just four days before his death: "We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere. For if there is one principle which has run through the long history of this hemisphere it is our common determination to prevent the rule of foreign systems or nations in the Americas."

I am convinced, as I have indicated, that the majority of those who are critical of our policies, both in this country and in Latin America, today have a clearer understanding of our objectives. Indeed, I have heard from a number of sources familiar with the situation in Latin America that the issue of American intervention in the Dominican Republic, despite the efforts of the communists to keep it alive, has pretty well died off.

President Johnson's speech of August 17 made a tremendous impact in the Latin American countries. And more recently, Assistant Secretary Vaughan received a tumultuous welcome from the people of Bolivia.

(more)

I therefore consider it all the more regrettable that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, with the great prestige that attaches to his position, has seen fit to reopen the entire issue of American intervention in the Dominican Republic in this tendentious manner.

Although the reports are not yet in, I am certain that his speech will be picked up and played heavily by every communist and crypto-communist and fellow-traveler and anti-American leftist who wields a pen in the Latin-American press.

I am certain that there will be a particularly heavy emphasis on his charge that we are opposed, or appear to be opposed, to progress and social revolution in Latin America; that we "prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessman"; that we favor the oligarchs and military reactionaries over the democratic left.

And they will ignore, just as the Senator from Arkansas has ignored, the many massive evidences that we have been using all of our influences for many years now to encourage and support the trend toward social reform and more democracy in all the Americas.

They will ignore the fact that in 1957 we gave our support to the progressive, leftist, but non-communist government of Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, and that, despite the nationalization of American enterprises, we have since 1957 invested more foreign aid in Bolivia on a per capita basis than we have in any other country.

They will ignore our entire record of support for Figueres in Costa Rica, for Betancourt in Venezuela, for Munoz Marin in Puerto Rico.

They will ignore the fact that it was our country which took the initiative in proposing a severance of diplomatic relations with the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, and that it was this action, combined with our cutting off of the Dominican sugar quota, which brought about Trujillo's downfall.

The anti-American scribes will also ignore the fact that we gave our sympathy and tolerance and support to Castro in the mistaken belief that we were supporting a nationalist revolution.

And, they will ignore all these things because the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has declared that we are aligned, not with the forces of social progress in the Americas, but with the capitalists and reactionaries.

And this declaration will be interpreted as proof positive of our attitude by the entire pro-Castro and anti-American clique which occupies so many positions of importance in the Latin-American press.

Some commentators have recently deplored what they described as the decline of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, equating this so-called decline with the increasing evidence of division within the Committee.

I take sharp issue with this evaluation. In my own view, the state of health of the Foreign Relations Committee is directly proportional to the degree of vigorous debate among its members, and the Committee becomes sick in the absence of such debate.

The Chairman and I, for example, have sharp differences of opinion on certain aspects of our foreign policy, and we are both disposed to state our opinions forcefully. But this is the way things ought to be.

The Foreign Relations Committee can never fulfill its function if its members conduct themselves in the manner of a gentleman's club or mutual admiration society, where everyone pats everyone else on the back and no one disagrees with anyone.

The Foreign Relations Committee can only discharge its function responsibly if there is a frank and open and forceful discussion of the issues among its members. I hope that the statement which I have made today will be construed in this light.

RAW. Bundy
49 F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs. September 16, 1965 10 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The whole purpose of your exercise with the Iranian Ambassador at 11:45 this morning is to make a big splash over the 25th anniversary of the Shah's coming to the throne.

While the Shah didn't compromise much of his pro-Western virtue in Moscow, the Soviets made handsome enough offers (steel mill, non-aggression pact) to start the Shah worrying again. He's stood foursquare behind us on Vietnam, but Meyer is sure he's worried by our seemingly slow progress there. He doesn't want to become another Diem, and whenever he worries about his destiny he begins to see rust on his westward anchor. So this, like your call to him in New York, is mostly massage.

However, you could add a specific touch by asking the ambassador to relay your thanks for Iranian help with American evacuees from Lahore. Also, the Shah has just gone out on a legal limb to grant clemency to an American who got wound up in the Iranian courts and was recently sentenced. So a word of thanks for this personal favor in the "Bredin case" would be a nice touch.

Lloyd Hand is sending you separately a memo on details of the ceremony.

R. W. Komer

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 4-14-99

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