

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

105

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo #1	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Sanitized NLS 91-40</i> <i>[Duplicate in NSF, files of M. Bundy, "Daily Regional Staff Rpt to Pres," Box 19]</i>	2 p 10/14/65	A
#3 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i>	3 p 10/14/65	A
#3a memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy " Secret	4 p 10/14, 1965	A
#4a cable	text of Saigon 1273 Secret <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i>	3 p 10/13/65	A
#9 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> secret	1 p 10/13/65	A
#9a report	Bunker's Report.... conf <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-230</i>	3 p 10-12-65	A
#10 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1 p 10/13/65	A
#14 #14 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 12-7-99 NLS 98-162</i> <i>Sanitized 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	2 p 10/12/65	A
#15 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p 10/10/65	A
#16 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>sanitized 8-16-89 NLS 86-193</i> Secret	1 p 10/10/65	A
#16a memo	to the President from William Foster secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-192</i>	5 p undated	A
#16b letter	draft letter to USSR Secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-192</i>	5 p 10/07/65	A
#17 memo	to Mac from RWK secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1 p 10/09/65	A
#18 memo	to the President from Komer Secret <i>Open NLS 18-163 9-28-99</i>	3 p 10/07/65	A
#20 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> secret	3 p 10/06/65	A
#21c wire	to the President from Prime Minister Wilson <i>open 2/6/98</i>	1 p 10/6/65	A
#21d cable	possible classified information to PM Wilson from President Johnson <i>open 2/6/98</i> Secret	1 p 10/05/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~REDACTED~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 15, Sept. 23 - Oct. 14, 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret <i>open 6-13-84 NLS 83-182</i> 1 p	10/06/65	A
#25 memo	to the President from McG. B. & Komer <i>Open NLT 97-432 9-25-78</i> secret exempt NLS 92-377 4 p	10/05/65	A
#27a memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 91-232</i> confidential 1 p	10/05/65	A
#27c attack points	<i>Partially restricted open 5-21-12 (per SC/RG)</i>		C
#28 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>exempt NLS 92-377</i> 1 p	10/05/65	A
#28a letter	to Shan of Iran from President Johnson confidential 1 p	10/05/65	A
#30 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> 2 p	10/04/65	A
#31 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>Open NLT 98-432 9-25-78</i> secret exempt NLS 92-377 1 p	10/04/65	A
#31a message	to Prime Minister Wilson from President Johnson Secret " " " " 1 p	10/05/65	A
#31b	draft of #31a " " " " "		
#31c	near duplicate of #31a " " " " " <i>possible classified information</i>	10/4/65	A
#31d letter	to President from Patrick Dean " " " " " secret <i>open 10-3-97</i> 1 p	10/02/65	A
#31e message	from Prime Minister to President Johnson secret " " " " 2 p	10/02/65	A
#32 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>exempt NLS 92-377</i> " " " " 1 p	10/04/65	A
#33 memo	Mc George Bundy to the President <i>(possible classif. info) CONF per NLS 86-193</i> 2 p	10/04/65	A
#36 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> 1 p	10/03/65	A
#37a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> 2 p	09/27/65	A
#37b notes	talking points with Pope Paul secret 2 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37c bio sketch	Pope Paul VI <i>exempt per RAC 8/05</i> Confidential 1 p	09/65	A
#3839 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> 1 p	10/02/65	A
#42 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy <i>open 6-22-89 NLJ 88-121</i> Confidential 1 p	10/01/65	A
#43 memo	to the President from Francis Bator Secret <i>open 2/6/98</i> 2 p	10/01/65	A
#45 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>sanitized 6-22-89 NLJ 88-121</i> Confidential 1 p	10/01/65	A
#47 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer & McB Secret <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> 2 p <i>Sanitized 6/9/00 UCS 97-434</i>	10/01/65	A
#48a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>exempt NLJ 92-377</i> 1 p	09/29/65	A
#48b cable	London 1311 Secret 1 p	09/29/65	A
#49 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential 1 p	09/30/65	A
#51 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 6/1/92</i> 2 p	09/30/65	A
#53 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential <i>chronology Box 1</i> 1 p <i>Dep. #263, Files of Haynes</i>	<i>exempt NLJ 92-377 open 11/1/01</i> 09/30/65	A
#54a memo	to President and Acting Secretary from Dean Rusk Top Secret <i>exempt per NLJ 83-178</i> 2 p <i>Downgrade to Secret per NLJ 88-121</i>	09/30/65	A
#55a cable	copy of Saigon 1100 Secret <i>open 1-5-84 NLJ 83-178</i> 4 p	09/30/65	A
#55a	<i>page 4 only</i> 1 p	9/30/65	A
#63 memo	to President from McG. Bundy 3 p <i>open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-232</i>	09/29/65	A
#65a report	re: Vietnam <i>exempt NLJ 92-371</i> Confidential 2 p	09/01/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#66 agenda	agenda for 12:30 meeting Secret <i>open NLS/RAC 12-184</i> 1 p	09/29/65	A
#67 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>exempt NLS 92-377</i> 2 p	09/29/65	A
#67a MEMO report	re: Pakistan Secret 1 p	09/29/65	A
#67b memo	from Amb. in Rawalpindi Secret 2 p	09/29/65	A
#68a memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President Secret <i>open 1-22-92 NLS 91-230</i> 2 p	09/28/65	A
#68c cable	text of Santo Domingo 834 Confidential <i>open 4-6-94 NLS 93-323</i> 3 p	09/28/65	A
#68e report	situation report confidential <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-230</i> 3 p	09/28/65	A
#69b cable	text of Bonn 854 secret 2 p <i>[dup. #70, NSF, CF, "Germany, Vol. X", Bx 186]</i>	09/24/65	A
#71 memo	to PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i> 1 p	09/28/65	A
#71a letter	the Shah of Iran to the President 2p (possible classif. info)	09/18/65	A
#73 memo	to President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential <i>open 5-21-12</i> 1 p	09/28/65	A
#74b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> 1 p	09/20/65	A
#77a memo	to Bill Moyers from R. W. Komer confidential 1 p	09/24/65	A
#78 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open NLS/RAC 12-184</i> 1 p	09/27/65	A
#81b cable	text of New Delhi 779 secret 1 p	09/24/65	A
#83 memo	to President from McG. Bundy top secret <i>open 6-13-84 NLS 83-182</i> 3 p	09/23/65	A
#86 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President Secret <i>open 2-20-92 NLS 91-230</i> 1 p	09/23/65	C
#89 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 5-21-12 NLS 92-377</i> 3 p	09/23/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#90 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>exempt NLS 91-231</i> 1 p	09/23/65	A
#91 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 7-9-85 NLS 84-291</i> Confidential 1 p	09/23/65	A
#91a memo	to Director of Central Intelligence from PRES. Johnson <i>open 7-9-85 NLS 84-291</i> Confidential 2 p	09/24/65	A
#92 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 6-13-84 NLS 83-182</i> Secret 1 p	09/23/65	A
#92a memo	to the President from Robert S. McNamara Secret <i>open 8-6-93 NLS 92-376</i> 1 p	09/22/65	A
#93 memo	to the President from McG. B. & Chester L. Cooper <i>Open NLS 98-129 4-29-99</i> Confidential <i>sanitized 2-25-94 NLS 92-378</i> p	09/23/65	A
#93a memo	to the President from McG. B. & Chester L. Cooper Confidential 5 p	09/23/65	A
	<i>sanitized 10-1-84 NLS 84-126</i> <i>sanitized 6-22-89 NLS 88-121</i> <i>open 3/25/16 NLS/2AC 12-184</i>		

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1965
Thursday/6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Week's Developments in the Near East

The Turk elections provide the best news this week, and the Israeli-Jordanian border seems quieter for the moment. Our main business has been on the military aid front with Israeli talks here and a Saudi decision to buy our planes.

Turkey. The Justice Party won an unexpected landslide, and will shortly form Turkey's first majority government since 1960. Suleiman Demirel, the new PM, is highly effective and pro-Western. Although labelled a conservative in Turkey's political spectrum, he's likely to be a little less cautious fiscally and may give us some bad moments on that front. However, we can keep him in bounds and think Demirel's new ideas and dynamism will more than offset any tendency to unbalance the fiscal machinery. We'll have a congratulatory message for you to send when he formally takes office.

A second encouraging aspect of the election returns was the unexpectedly poor showing of the Marxist labor party, which never succeeded in making an issue out of Turkey's alliance with us.

Cyprus. With the new though shaky government in Greece and a well-grounded new team in Turkey, both sides are making Cyprus noises again, mainly because the subject will soon come up for debate in the UN. Turkey is anxious to get the bilateral Greek-Turk talks (interrupted by the Greek political crisis) going again to show progress and dissuade the UN from any substantive meddling. The Greeks are balking, probably because they'd like to say the talks have gone nowhere so the UN could back their cause. Meanwhile, Makarios is pursuing a pointedly reasonable course on the island designed to curry favor in the UN, undercut Turk charges of mistreatment, and undermine Turk efforts to maintain a special position.

[The new Greek government is considering pulling its 12,000 troops out of Cyprus because of the heavy cost. There's no question the Greeks face budgetary troubles, but we doubt they'll give up their leverage without getting something in return. We'd like to see at least the cadres stay on because that's our only way of keeping Soviet SAMs and other equipment out of irresponsible Cypriot hands.]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-302
By id, NARA, Date 1-25-10

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Page Two

[Both sides would like us to launch another Acheson-type effort, but we don't see enough give on either side yet to promise any greater chance of success now than when Acheson first tried. So we're telling them they have to get together first.]

Israel-Jordan. [Our behind-scenes effort to dampen border tension seems to have paid off for the moment. Hussein has denounced hit-and-run cross-border raids into Israel, and the Israelis tentatively agree that Hussein is making an acceptable effort to crack down. Some unfortunate publicity in Israeli papers about our role and Hussein's cooperation leaves us some doubt about whether the Israelis are backing down completely. But at least we've temporarily reversed the trend of rapidly rising temperatures.]

Saudi Arabia. [A letter is on its way to McNamara saying the Saudis have decided to buy F-104s. This ends a long period of procrastination. Training will push deliveries some time into the future but when word of the deal gets around, it may increase Jordanian and Lebanese pressure and give the Israelis an added talking point (though these planes will not be a serious threat to them)]

Lebanon is pressing for a PL 480 Title IV dollar sale, and our bureaucracy is still haggling over our answer. The Lebanese want a government-to-government deal to build up counterpart funds to support a development effort in Lebanon's backward Arab south. Some of our agricultural experts fear such a deal would cut into our normal commercial exports, but others doubt this, and the deal may make political sense.



R. W. Komer

M.R.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., Oct. 14, 1965
10:00 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Seaborg's letter gives his impressions of the annual Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Tokyo, and of his visits to Taiwan, Thailand, the UAR, Turkey and Italy.

Seaborg suggests that at some convenient time you might wish to see him to discuss some of these matters and to get a fuller description of some of the material he covers in his letter. There is no hurry about this, but he is ready at your convenience -- and when you do see him you may want to use the occasion to discuss with him the direction that you would like to see the U. S. atomic energy program take in the period ahead.

h.c.B.

McG. B.

✓ 4437
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C., 20545

RECEIVED
McGEORGE DUNDY'S OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

October 7, 1965 1965 OCT 7 PM 6 18

Dear Mr. President:

This is to report on highlights of the Ninth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held in Tokyo, September 21-28, at which I served as the United States' Representative, and on subsequent visits I made to the Republic of China, Thailand, the United Arab Republic, Turkey and Italy on my return to the U.S.

The General Conference adopted a U.S.-originated resolution to note with approval a revision of the international safeguards system which prevents the diversion to military uses of nuclear materials and equipment which are supplied for peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. The revised system adheres substantively to the system earlier approved but is cast in simpler and more straightforward language. The resolution, which was adopted without vote by the General Conference, had been earlier approved by the Conference's Administrative and Legal Committee by a vote of 54 for, 1 against (Indonesia) and 2 abstentions (Nigeria and Pakistan). Indonesia said, in explaining its vote, that although it had opposed the resolution, as a member of the IAEA in good standing it would abide by the decision of the Committee. Following approval by the Conference, the system was put into effect by the IAEA's Board of Governors on September 28.

A U.S.-sponsored resolution was approved, as part of the 1966 budget, requesting the IAEA Director General, in concert with the United Nations and specialized agencies, to study ways in which the IAEA might strengthen its efforts in the development of desalting, and calling on member states to continue to inform the IAEA of all significant developments relative to the use of nuclear energy in desalting.

Dr. Sigvard Eklund of Sweden was reappointed by acclamation to serve as Director General of the IAEA for another four years.

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The Soviets introduced a politically-inspired resolution in the Conference calling for prohibition of nuclear weapons and total disarmament. The U.S. Delegation, in anticipation of this move, had arranged for a U.S. resolution also to be introduced pointing out that the IAEA, a technical and scientific agency, should not discuss political issues that were more appropriate for consideration in the United Nations and other international organizations. After extensive negotiations with several delegations from Asia and Africa, the Indian delegate proposed that since the IAEA was not a political organization the two resolutions should be postponed. The Soviet delegate agreed, but made a strong anti-American speech in which he commented on the failure of the negotiations in Geneva and specifically charged the U.S. with considering the use of nuclear weapons once again. Ambassador Smyth made an effective statement for the U.S. in which he categorically denied the Soviet charges and pointed out the long and consistent history of U.S. support for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Conference then accepted the Indian proposal to postpone consideration of both resolutions.

Despite these political difficulties with the Soviets, my personal relations with the Soviet representatives continued to be open and friendly, and there was general agreement, including the Soviet representatives, that the Agency was carrying out its programs in an effective manner. Moreover, the Soviets have continued to give their support to the Agency's more important substantive activities, including safeguards.

I left toward the conclusion of the General Conference Meeting and visited a number of developing countries on my return to the United States. In the Republic of China, Thailand and Turkey I was especially impressed by the impact our Atoms-for-Peace Program and its concomitant assistance has had in bringing the scientific and technological advances of the 20th century to these countries. Our nuclear assistance has served as a focal point for awakening their national interest in science, as for example in the Republic of China where a whole University - Tsing-Hua University - has sprung up about the nuclear institute established with the assistance of the United States. However, it was clear that these

developing countries are not as yet able to pursue a completely independent course of nuclear development. This was made quite evident in my meeting with President Chiang Kai-Shek when he asked that the U.S. consider means of increasing its assistance to the nuclear research program in the Republic of China. A useful program which is now underway in Turkey and the Republic of China and which may serve to bridge the gap for these developing countries is a sister laboratory arrangement between the nuclear centers in these countries and the strong national laboratories in the U.S. such as Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago and the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island.


I also visited the UAR for two days to learn somewhat more of their program. Egypt continues to be interested in purchasing a 150 MW electrical nuclear reactor with a desalting capability. They made a strong plea that the U.S. consider favorably their proposal for a low interest dollar loan for this project with the assumption that a U.S. supplied reactor would be used. An interest was also expressed in obtaining U.S. assistance to train a nucleus of Egyptian scientists and engineers in reactor theory and reactor design. The UAR nuclear research program as well as their general scientific research programs seem quite substantial in relation to UAR's economic base. In the past Egypt has received considerable help from the Soviet Union including a 2 MW nuclear research reactor and a Van de Graaff accelerator. However, it was interesting to note that there were many strong ties between the Egyptian scientists and the West resulting from the fact that many of these scientists had received their advanced training and education in the West. I believe this to be a good example of the benefits we as a Nation incur from the training of foreign students in our universities and laboratories.

My final stop on my return home was in Italy where I made a brief visit to the Frascati laboratory outside of Rome. This laboratory is carrying on an excellent program on a limited budget in high energy physics and controlled thermonuclear fusion. A portion of their work is supported by Euratom. In later discussions with Italian AEC officials,

they raised the possibility of cooperating with the U.S. on our proposed land-based maritime facility. From Italy I returned directly home arriving here on October 3 in sufficient time to attend the opening session of the International Symposium on Water Desalination.

I would be pleased to meet with you at a convenient time to provide a fuller description of the Ninth General Conference of the IAEA and my visits to developing countries, if you so desire.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Glenn T. Seaborg". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Glenn" and last name "Seaborg" clearly distinguishable. The signature is positioned above the printed name "Glenn T. Seaborg".

Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

cc: The Vice President

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 14, 1965
1000 a.m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-232
By 118, NARA, Date 1-7-93

SUBJECT: Latin American Developments

The major developments in Latin America this past week were the notable progress toward elimination of the rebel zone in the Dominican Republic, the labor difficulties in Uruguay requiring emergency security measures, and the favorable -- though qualified -- response of Castro to our proposal for the handling of Cuban refugees. A review of these and other significant developments follows:

Dominican Situation. In a special report on Dominican developments which I sent to you yesterday I described the steps being taken to relocate the rebel military personnel from the rebel zone and to reopen the downtown area. About 1,100 were moved yesterday with no significant trouble. This will permit dismantling of barriers and checkpoints around the rebel zone to start today.

Uruguayan Crisis. A week ago the National Council of Government confronted resistance by Communist-led labor groups to its plans to keep wage increases for government employees down in an effort to curb the rate of inflation. The emergency measures prohibited oral and written propaganda and meetings aimed at encouraging work stoppages in public services. Communist labor leaders responded by calling a three-day strike of government workers and a 24-hour general strike to begin October 13. Latest reports indicate that the strike has been at least partially carried out. Lightening demonstrations by students and labor groups scheduled for late today may result in violence. The police reportedly are confident that they can handle any disturbances.

Cuban Refugees. Sunday, October 10 was the date on which Castro said that Cubans in the US could come to Cuba to pick up their relations. Fearing that a flotilla of small boats would leave Florida and lead to an uncontrolled, disorganized flood of new refugees, we took special measures to persuade Cubans in southern Florida to wait until orderly

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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arrangements could be worked out. We have been largely successful in obtaining their cooperation.

Late last night the Cubans replied to our note outlining procedures for handling the flow of refugees. They indicated a willingness to start operations right away. We had expressed a desire to keep the flow to about 3,000 per month, but they said they preferred a 12,000 rate. They said that men of military age (15-26 years) would not be allowed out, but agreed to our priority of immediate family members. On political prisoners they offered only an "exchange" for political prisoners (i. e., Communist agents) held by our friends in Latin America -- this will not work. They want to make up the lists of persons to depart, but they explicitly recognized our right to veto persons on their lists. They do not want the Red Cross to participate, noting that the Swiss can do what is necessary. A reply to the Cuban note is being prepared. It will probably concentrate on getting agreement where agreement is possible, while insisting on orderly procedures for movement.

The negative attitude expressed by the Governor of Florida and what appears to be mounting apprehension among Miami area residents, present a potentially serious situation. We are planning additional measures to be taken to keep the net increase of Cuban refugees in southern Florida to a minimum. John Crimmins is doing a good job with the Florida people, but the Governor and the Mayor are protecting their flanks. The Miami Herald is not helping either.

Panama. Arnulfo Arias continues to press his attack against President Robles on the canal negotiations. He has put together what is called a "United Front" of dissident elements to give the appearance of a national, non-partisan effort. Arias received a setback when the Christian Democrats, who had originally joined the United Front, pulled out on the grounds that the movement had political objectives. In the debate which is going on in the National Assembly, the government is more than holding its own. The same is true in the public debate. Government spokesmen are adhering to their agreement with us not to go beyond the Joint Statement in the discussion of the status of the canal negotiations.

Brazilian Gubernatorial Election Results. The tabulation of votes in the October 3 gubernatorial elections is almost complete. The meaning for

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

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the Castello Branco regime is far from clear. The indicators on how political winds are blowing in Brazil are confusing and some times contradictory. These judgments are suggested:

- 1) The presidential prospects of Governor Carlos Lacerda have been considerably reduced as candidates associated with him in the key provinces of Guanabara and Minas Gerais suffered humiliating defeats. Gordon thinks Lacerda's group is all heart and no body -- not able to command broad national support.
- 2) The party of ex-President Kubitschek -- Social Democratic Party (PSD) -- emerged as the prime beneficiary. Its candidate won the Guanabara and Minas Gerais races, plus three (and possibly four) of the other nine. The PSD success did not reach landslide proportions, but it reversed a downward trend in the party's fortunes and clearly indicated that the PSD must be reckoned with as an electoral force. Gordon says Kubitschek is essentially frivolous, though still popular. At 63 he divides his time equally between politics and pretty girls, but more for the fun of it than for any productive purpose.
- 3) Candidates associated with the Castello Branco Government were victorious in four (and possibly five) of the 11 races. Hence, the elections cannot be read as a repudiation of Castello Branco's revolutionary program.
- 4) Some military elements interpreted the elections as a defeat for the April 1964 Revolution and brought considerable pressure to bear on Castello Branco to annul the results. He refused, but in an effort to mollify his military critics he has announced a series of measures he would seek from the Congress to strengthen the hand of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.
- 5) The effect which these elections will have on Castello Branco's attitude toward the presidential elections scheduled for November 1966 remains unanswered. One course he may decide to follow is to go for indirect elections for the President so as to avoid the risk of an opposition candidate winning. (Gordon's present private judgment is that Castello Branco is the best candidate in sight, from our point of view).

McG.B.

McG.B.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday
October 14, 1965
~~6:00 p.m.~~
10 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Developments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By ing, NARA, Date 1-7-93

The major developments in Latin America this past week were the notable progress toward elimination of the rebel zone in the Dominican Republic, the labor difficulties in Uruguay requiring emergency security measures, and the favorable -- though qualified -- response of Castro to our proposal for the handling of Cuban refugees. A review of these and other significant developments follows:

yesterday
Dominican Situation. In a special report on Dominican developments which I sent to you ~~this morning~~ I described the steps being taken to relocate the rebel military personnel from the rebel zone and to reopen the downtown area. ~~Ambassador Bunker confirmed at 5:00 p.m. today that the first two groups of rebels, consisting of about 250 men each, have already been re-~~
About 1100 were moved yesterday with no significant trouble.
~~located. He is hopeful that the balance of some 500-700 men will be removed before dark. This will permit dismantling of barriers and checkpoints around the rebel zone to start tomorrow.~~ *today.*

Uruguayan Crisis. A week ago the National Council of Government confronted resistance by communist-led labor groups to its plans to keep wage increases for government employees down in an effort to curb the rate of inflation. The emergency measures prohibited oral and written propaganda and meetings aimed at encouraging work stoppages in public services. Communist labor leaders responded by calling a three-day strike of government workers and a 24-hour general strike to begin October 13. Latest reports indicate that the strike has been at least partially carried out. Lightning demonstrations by students and labor groups scheduled for late today may result in violence. The police reportedly are confident that they can handle any disturbances.

Cuban Refugees. Sunday, October 10 was the date on which Castro said that Cubans in the U. S. could come to Cuba to pick up their relations. Fearing that a flotilla of small boats would leave Florida and lead to an uncontrolled, disorganized flood of new refugees, we took special measures to persuade Cubans in southern Florida to wait until orderly arrangements

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- 2 -

could be worked out. We have been largely successful in obtaining their cooperation.

Late last night the Cubans replied to our note outlining procedures for handling the flow of refugees. They indicated a willingness to start operations right away. We had expressed a desire to keep the flow to about 3,000 per month, but they said they preferred a 12,000 rate. They quite categorically said that ~~political prisoners and~~ men of military age (15 - 26 years) would not be allowed out, but agreed to our priority of immediate family members. They want to make up the lists of persons to depart, but they

explicitly recognized our right to veto persons on their lists. They do not want the Red Cross to participate, noting that the Swiss can do what is necessary. ~~We are now in the process of preparing a reply to the Cuban note in being prepared.~~ ~~It will aim at~~ It will probably concentrate on getting

an agreement where agreement is possible, while initiating a orderly procedure for movement.

The negative attitude expressed by the Governor of Florida and other State officials, to a new wave of Cuban refugees and what appears to be mounting apprehension among Miami area residents, presents a potentially serious situation. We are ~~considering what~~ ^{planning} additional measures can be taken to keep the net increase of Cuban refugees in southern Florida to a minimum. John Crimmins is doing a good job with the Florida people, and I am

quitting but the Governor & the Mayor ~~are~~ ^{planning} are protecting their ~~political~~ ^{political} plans. The Miami Herald is not helping either. Panama. ~~Principal~~ ^{the} ~~Opposition leader~~ Arnulfo Arias continues to press his ~~politically-inspired~~ attack against President Robles on the canal negotiations. He has put together what is called a "United Front" of dissident elements to give the appearance of a national, non-partisan effort. Arias received a setback when the Christian Democrats, who had originally joined the United Front, pulled out on the grounds that the movement had political objectives. In the debate which is going on in the National Assembly, the government is more than holding its own. The same is true in the public debate. ~~In the debate,~~ ^{the} government spokesmen are adhering to the ~~commitment made with our negotiators~~ ^{their} ~~not to go beyond the Joint Statement in the discussion of the status of the canal negotiations.~~ ^{agreement with us}

Brazilian Gubernatorial Election Results. The tabulation of votes in the October 3 gubernatorial elections is almost complete. The meaning for the Castello Branco regime is far from clear. The indicators on how political winds are blowing in Brazil are confusing and some times contradictory. These judgments ~~seem justified at this time.~~

are suggested:

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

1) The presidential prospects of Governor Carlos Lacerda have been considerably reduced as candidates associated with him in the key provinces of Guanabara and Minas Gerais suffered humiliating defeats. *Garden thinks Lacerda's group is all dead & no body - not able to command national support.*

2) The party of ex-President Kubitschek -- Social Democratic Party (PSD) -- emerged as the prime beneficiary. Its candidate won the Guanabara and Minas Gerais races, plus three (and possibly four) of the other nine. The PSD success did not reach landslide proportions, but it reversed a downward trend in the party's fortunes and clearly indicated that the PSD must be reckoned with as an electoral force. *Garden says Kubitschek is essentially forgotten, though still popular. At 63 he divides his time about equally between*

3) Candidates associated with the Castello Branco Government were victorious in four (and possibly five) of the eleven races. Hence, the elections cannot be read as a repudiation of Castello Branco's revolutionary program.

4) Some military elements interpreted the ^{election's} results as a defeat for the April 1964 Revolution and ~~they~~ brought considerable pressure to bear on Castello Branco to annul the results. He refused, but in an effort to mollify his military critics he ^{has} announced a series of measures he would seek from the Congress to strengthen the hand of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.

5) The effect which these elections will have on Castello Branco's attitude toward the presidential elections scheduled for November 1966 remains unanswered. One course he may decide to follow is to go for indirect elections for the President so as to avoid the risk of an opposition candidate winning.

This is (Garden's ^{present} private judgment is that Castello Branco is the best candidate in sight, from an point of view.)

Alliance Developments

Brazilian Loan. On October 11, AID signed a \$40 million loan agreement with two Brazilian utility companies serving Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. This amount is part of a \$122 million project to expand electric power distribution in Brazil's industrial heartland. The companies are putting up the other \$82 million from their own resources. Of the \$40 million loan, \$25 million will be used for direct procurement of materials and services from the United States. The \$15 million balance will finance part of the local costs of the project. It is expected that the construction work will generate an additional \$15 million worth of exports from the United States to Brazil.

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- 4 -

Colombian Economic Program. The Colombian Government has reached general agreement with State-AID, the IBRD and the IMF on its economic reform program. This has paved the way for the opening of negotiations on new foreign assistance. We anticipate that the negotiations will probably result in the simultaneous conclusion of agreements under which AID would extend a program loan of up to \$65 million and the IMF would issue a letter of intent on a standby agreement.

Bolivian "Operation Triangular". This past week representatives of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the financing partners in the rehabilitation of Bolivia's nationalized mines (COMIBOL), agreed on the third and final phase of their aid program "Operation Triangular." The three partners agreed on the following division of the \$10.1 million requested by the Bolivian government: West Germany, \$1.5 million; United States, \$6.1 million (\$1.1 million development loans, \$4 million PL 480, \$1 million local currency); IDB, \$2.5 million. The announcement of the third phase paves the way for a resumption in lending to COMIBOL which was suspended approximately 18 months ago. The suspension was due to the Bolivian government's failure to take the necessary self-help measures (reduce costs, improve managerial efficiency, limit extremist union activity) in the nationalized mines which were required in the first and second phases.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Mr. Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~

4/

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 14, 1965
8:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is Lodge's weekly report. We are puzzled by his conversation with Thieu -- in the sense that we see no reason why the Viet Cong should be able to win politically in a fair fight if they are as unpopular as we all believe. I am having a further analysis made on this point. Otherwise, an interesting report. His economic paragraph does not fully reflect the fact that we have broken the immediate log jam at home on rice shipments. There is a long range rice problem, however, and we will be reporting further on that.

McG.B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-371
By ig NARA. Date 8-18-92

Wednesday, October 13, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. LODGE (Saigon 1273)

First and foremost my warmest respectful congratulations on your recovery and best wishes for good health.

1. Trend of the War

A. General Thieu, Chief of State, during a call by me to present CIA visitors, made a rather sweeping review of the whole situation, during the course of which he said:

B. He would not be surprised if the Viet Cong eventually accepted an offer to negotiate --as soon as they were convinced that they could not achieve a military victory with main force units, as guerrilla doctrine prescribes. The purpose of accepting the offer to negotiate would be to end or suspend U.S. military activities, presumably in the expectation that the effect on public opinion in the U.S. would be such that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue operations.

C. He believed that for the last three months, the Viet Cong had been training political cadres to go into the communities in Vietnam and win the war politically which they had been unable to win militarily. He thought there might be as many as 150,000 such cadres. It would mean 5 Viet Cong political cadresmen where now there was one. He spoke of a Viet Cong demobilization following an armistice, with the demobilized men returning to their villages to become active communist political subversive workers. They were already taking credit for the U.S. and Government of Vietnam economic and social programs. The Government of Vietnam was wholly unready for such a political contest. I reported the same from Foreign Minister Tran Van Do in my wire to you of 30 September.

D. There was no doubt in Thieu's mind that they 'could beat us politically now', not because of their appeal, but because of their superior organization. Evidence available to me indicates only about 15 percent "sympathize" with the Viet Cong and that an aversion to Communist methods, particularly to Chicom domination, continues strong. But these are no substitute for terrorism and poor Government of Vietnam operations. Incidentally, a recent survey indicates 97 percent of the people know the

U.S. is helping, with good opinions of Americans prevailing over bad, and 81 percent believing that Americans are here mainly to prevent Communism. Thieu recognized that his view about negotiation was frankly a guess but he seemed absolutely certain that as soon as the Viet Cong were convinced that they could not win militarily, they could switch their effort to gain a political victory, with or without diplomatic negotiations.

E. It is not a fair criticism of the Vietnamese to say that they cannot defeat the Viet Cong politically because they are tired and weak and this implication is a major fallacy in Lippman's recent article, "The Stalemate in Vietnam." The truth is they have not had the chance to do so. When the chance to win over the people was missed some years ago, a situation came into being in which it was indispensable for the Viet Cong large units to be defeated before true community building, with its mixture of political and security measures, would be possible. Otherwise, the Viet Cong battalions, emerging from untouchable sanctuaries, would destroy whatever community building had painstakingly been achieved.

F. Now it looks as though we can surely overcome the Viet Cong main force units. Furthermore, it looks as though the Viet Cong knows this and has already begun to act on this knowledge, transforming themselves into small units, into individual terrorists, and into subversive political operators. General Westmoreland reports an intensification of Viet Cong "incidents" from 605 to 701 in the last week, including a sharp rise in acts of terrorism. This is the highest weekly total since September 1964. There is also a downward total in actions by large units. In fact, no major battles occurred during the week. This transformation to terrorism is emphatically not "de-escalation" as one American "expert" recently said. But it is a change, and a change which we have been anticipating.

G. It cannot be said that since we began defeating main force units the Government of Vietnam have let the grass grow under their feet. When the Minister of Rural Construction (i.e., Community Building) Mr. Ung, was killed in a plane crash, the Government of Vietnam developed a new governmental organization which I discussed in my cable to you last week, and which is as well thought out as one can expect. Lansdale's Committee is in close and constant touch. This week they called a meeting, which I attended, of all Province Chiefs plus elected Provincial Councillors to enthuse them and give them a clear idea of what they had to do. Vietnam is indeed much further ahead militarily than it is politically for the simple reason they could not really get going politically until the Viet Cong battalions were put out of business.

H. I believe the U.S. Mission is doing everything that it can to help prepare this country for a political struggle. But I am eager of new ideas and would very much appreciate any ideas or guidance which Washington can give me so that if a major political offensive were to be undertaken by the Viet Cong, we could gain time until we could score a real political victory. When we win such a victory, we can feel that we have accomplished something durable and truly worthy of our sacrifice.

2. Coup Rumors

A. It is disagreeable to have to report a few coup rumors, the first which have occurred since my arrival. Although they do not look serious today, they are a preoccupation to me, and I am putting out the word in every way available that we do not want a coup, that this is the time to subordinate petty individualistic jealousies and ambitions, and also, that it behooves those who are in Government to try to act like real political leaders, by reasoning with the people who are disaffected, by involving them in the new projects, and by arranging matters so that others get some of the credit. This is not normal procedure for orientals, particularly those who have had a long dose of the egoism of French politicians, but we are trying it.

B. I am also planning to visit the three Corps Headquarters which I have not yet visited, to have some frank and, I hope, helpful talks with Generals who, although theoretically military, are actually the heads of civil and political activity and a serious potential threat.

3. Economic

A. The general price trend for the grade of rice used by the working classes continued its slow increase as it has for more than a month. The end of November stock levels are expected to be low but not dangerously so, as a result of delayed PL-480 arrivals. The early rice crop from the Delta area has begun moving into the milling centers. USOM's index of food prices last week rose by 4 percent to a level of 6 percent higher than a month ago and 34 percent higher than a year ago. Non-food consumer prices went up 3 percent to a level 6 percent over last and 18 percent over last year. The Vietnamese piaster continued to weaken in terms of hard currencies and gold.

4. Psychological

A. Vietnamese popular attitudes during the week reflected a continuing feeling that the war was going badly for the Viet Cong and increasing concern over economic matters.

October 14, 1965

MR. CHESTER COOPER

As you will see, I made two promises
of further reports here,

on your account

McG. B.

Att: Saigon 1273

& cc memo to President.

5a

Thursday, October 14, 1965
8:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is Lodge's weekly report. We are puzzled by his conversation with Thieu -- in the sense that we see no reason why the Viet Cong should be able to win politically in a fair fight if they are as unpopular as we all believe. I am having a further analysis made on this point. Otherwise, an interesting report. His economic paragraph does not fully reflect the fact that we have broken the immediate log jam at home on rice shipments. There is a long range rice problem, however, and we will be reporting further on that.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Saigon 1273, October 13, 1965

cc: Mr. Chester Cooper

6
October 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is a thank you note to Guinea's
President Sekou Toure who sent you a
personally inscribed copy of his political
manual.


R. W. Komer

mgf:R

Wednesday
Oct. 13, 1933 - 4:30 PM

7

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

You might wish to send this letter
to Rhyne, and to let a copy go to
the Secretary of State.

McG. B.

7a

Oct. 19, 1965 *to Pres
13 Oct
5:15*

Dear Mr. Rhyne:

You were most thoughtful to send me a copy of your letter to the Secretary of State. It gives me great encouragement to read your words of understanding and praise for this good man who sits at my right hand.

Sincerely,

Mr. Charles S. Rhyne
Rhyne & Rhyne
400 Hill Building
Washington, D. C. 20006

LBJ:McGB:ab

WASHINGTON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER
SEPTEMBER 12-18, 1965. WASHINGTON, D. C., U.S.A.

Earl Warren
Chief Justice of the United States

Charles S. Rhyne

William S. Thompson

Horace E. Manderson

7-6
L
+ by Dr. Willis Hurst
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Harry S. Truman

John J. McCloy
Lee Model

October 8, 1965

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a letter I have written to the Secretary of State, expressing the appreciation of the undersigned for the outstanding job he is doing in that important office.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Rhyne

glw
enclosure

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center, 400 Hill Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A.

CHARLES S. RHYNE
BRUCE W. RHYNE
THOMAS P. BROWN, III
EDWARD D. MEANS, JR.
ALFRED J. TIGHE, JR.
GEORGE A. WRAY
ANTHONY LOW JOSEPH
ROBERT L. WINTERS

RHYNE & RHYNE

400 HILL BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000

DISTRICT 7-1390

October 8, 1965

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want to express to you my admiration and appreciation for the tremendous leadership you have given and are giving to our Nation's interests in the international field. I have talked with many law leaders of many nations and have learned that they too admire your steadiness and steadfastness in the center of events in a turbulent world, and your steadfastness of our Nation's purposes with the great moral and legal principles which rise of good will everywhere support. I believe that we lawyers who live in (and out of) turmoil, can appreciate more than most the value of your capacity to avoid the appearance of vacillancy or frantic response to the so frequent emergencies. We members of the legal profession are grateful also for your constant support in the rule of law.

I sincerely believe your lifelong ability to comprehend and cope with the problems of the world, which you exemplify daily, is a tremendous national asset in the constant effort to achieve and maintain world peace.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Rhyno

glw
cc: The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

CHARLES E. RHYNE
BRUCE W. RHYNE
THOMAS P. BROWN, JR.
EDWARD G. MEARS, JR.
ALFRED J. THOME, JR.
GEORGE A. WEAVER
ANTHONY LOW JOSEPH
ROBERT L. WINTERS

RHYNE & RHYNE
400 HILL BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000

DISTRICT 2-1380

October 8, 1965

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want to express to you my admiration and appreciation for the tremendous leadership you have given and are giving to our Nation's interests in the international field. I have talked with many law leaders of many nations and have learned that they too admire your steadfastness and steadfastness in the darkest of events in a turbulent world, and your identification of our Nation's purposes with the great moral and legal principles which man of good will everywhere support. I believe that we have yet the lives in hard and cold turmoil, can appreciate more than ever the value of your capacity to avoid the appearance of uncertainty or frantic response to the so frequent emergencies. We members of the legal profession are grateful also for your constant support of the rule of law.

I sincerely believe your image of ability to comprehend and cope with the problems of the world, which you exemplify daily, is a tremendous national asset in the constant effort to achieve and maintain world peace.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Rhyno

cc: The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 13, 1965
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Clark Clifford and I recommend that you sign the underlying letter which is designed to help him and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board do a better job of watching over our foreign intelligence effort.

The draft letter is acceptable to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Admiral Raborn.

We do not plan to release this letter now, but we do plan to use it as appropriate with Congressional leaders when there is any question about our effective supervision of the Intelligence Community.

And if for any reason you want it put out, there is no objection.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM FOR

October 19, 1965

**The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board**

**SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Activities of the
United States**

The interests of national defense and security require sustained effort on the part of the intelligence community to support me and other officials having policy and command responsibilities. It is therefore my desire that priority attention be given to ways and means of strengthening the Government's capabilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields through concerted action to improve the organization, conduct and effectiveness of the major intelligence-related programs in which U.S. departments and agencies are engaged. Efficient management and direction of the complex activities which make up the total foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet day-to-day national intelligence requirements, and to ensure the development and application of advanced means for the collection, processing, analysis, estimating and reporting of intelligence information. In this connection, you have already seen my letter of instruction to the Director of Central Intelligence dated September 24, 1965.

In keeping with Executive Order No. 10938, I will continue to look to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for advice and recommendations concerning the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States. I shall expect representatives of the Board to continue the practice of making on-the-scene reviews of significant intelligence activities carried out in the United States and at appropriate locations abroad.

To facilitate the work of the Board I shall expect the heads of all departments and agencies concerned to make available to the Board any information which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to me.

cbj

LBJ:JPC:BKS:tjs

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Wednesday - 9:30 a.m.
October 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latest Developments in the Dominican Republic

In the last three days, Ellsworth Bunker has made encouraging progress toward getting the rebel zone in downtown Santo Domingo reopened. The key has been a plan to move the rebel military personnel out of this zone to a safe location pending their reintegration into the regular forces. His report and assessment as of yesterday afternoon is attached.

Developments are moving at such a pace that his report was out of date by the time we received it. He has informed us by telephone that the rebel high command has agreed to the relocation plan. The 27th of February Military Camp on the northern outskirts of the capital is to be used. Relocation of the rebel forces is scheduled to begin at 2:00 p.m. Santo Domingo time today. The port is to be opened at the same hour. Integration of the regular and rebel police forces has been completed. Police patrols through the rebel zone have started. As soon as all the rebel military personnel are removed (probably by tomorrow), the Inter-American Peace Force barriers around the rebel zone will be taken down. Then the city can get back to normal. We have had our hopes built up and dashed so many times in the Dominican Republic, that one is always skeptical. But this time Bunker thinks that we will achieve a major breakthrough.

After the rebel zone is cleared, Garcia Godoy must get on with the task of consolidating his authority throughout the country and moving against the communists and extreme leftists who have wormed their way into positions of influence. As Ellsworth notes in his report, we will have to continue pushing Garcia Godoy hard to get him to follow through in this important task.

m.f.B.
McG. B.

Attachment:

Ambassador Bunker's report and assessment.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By sig, NARA, Date 1-7-93

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-230

By ing, NARA, Date 11-12-91

92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 12, 1965

Bunker's Report and Assessment of the Current Situation

1. In my view the situation should be assessed in the light of conditions under which the Provisional Government took office slightly more than a month ago. The Act of Reconciliation did not represent a final settlement of Dominican conflict. We had been unable in the course of the negotiations to achieve agreement on major issues affecting the Armed Forces -- issues which from the beginning were the key to a solution here. These were left for Provisional President Garcia Godoy. His government was installed with the lines still drawn between the contending forces and passions still high. We never expected that the job he took on of trying to find a middle way would be anything but extremely difficult.

2. Garcia Godoy has given first priority to reuniting the City of Santo Domingo, recognizing that elimination of the rebel zone is an essential first step in restoring normal conditions. He has sought to accomplish this without violence or repression, moving cautiously and maintaining conciliatory attitude toward rebels so as to avoid renewed conflict. Progress has been slow and failure of the Provisional Government to take hold in a more authoritative fashion has been disappointing. Nevertheless, I believe the methods employed by Garcia Godoy have had some beneficial effects. I have the strong impression from my recent tours of the rebel zone and talks with rebel leaders that a lot of steam has gone out of the Constitutionalist Movement. Colonel Caamano and his friends quite evidently want no more fighting and would like to return to normal life. I agree with Garcia Godoy that it is important to nurture this attitude, avoiding abrupt moves which could cause a shift back to belligerence before the rebel zone is eliminated.

3. During the last few days prospects have brightened considerably. More than 200 regular police under National Police Chief General Despradel entered the rebel zone yesterday afternoon and established headquarters at the Music Conservatory building on George Washington Avenue. (I understand a crowd in the rebel zone actually applauded their entry.) They were joined by 200 or more rebel police. The meeting reportedly came off in a most cordial atmosphere, due apparently in large part to Despradel's surprisingly adroit handling of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

situation. Garcia Godoy tells me that there was no trouble in the rebel zone last night except for an incident involving two drunken policemen who seem to have been overcome by the return to brotherhood. Garcia Godoy believes that formal reintegration of rebel police can now go forward quickly and smoothly, setting a valuable precedent for reintegration in other services.

4. We have obtained an agreement in principle from Minister of the Armed Forces Rivera Caminero and the Service Chiefs to our proposal for moving the rebel military out of the zone to a nearby camp to await reintegration. Garcia Godoy has arranged a meeting this morning of the military representatives of both sides and the Inter-American Peace Force to discuss details. If problems can be worked out we hope to move the rebels out of the zone in the next day or two. Check-points could then be opened, barbed wire taken down and gradual withdrawal of the IAPF from the center of the city begun.

5. If the city can be reopened in this fashion, Garcia Godoy could then turn attention to the pressing job of establishing his government's authority throughout the country. As the Embassy has previously pointed out, the lack of authority and breakdowns of law and order as reflected in terrorist acts and outright hooliganism are the primary threat here. I agree that Garcia Godoy must display more energy in this field and have told him so. He is cautious and pacific by nature and we will have to continue to press him to exercise his authority. Nevertheless, with our support, and if the Dominican military/police establishment cooperates, I am optimistic that he will gradually be able to take hold of the situation.

6. In his efforts to reunite Santo Domingo without using force, Garcia Godoy has made considerable concessions to the rebels. These and his perhaps exaggerated fears of provoking violent rebel reactions have permitted the rebels, including extremists, to make important gains in key sectors. I share the general concern over the situation, particularly with respect to Communist advances in the labor movement which may prove most difficult to reverse. Garcia Godoy has repeatedly assured me that once the rebel zone is eliminated and rebel armed forces no longer are in being, he will take necessary measures to assure that his government is completely

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

free of Communist influence and that the strict impartiality proclaimed in his inaugural address is maintained. I believe we have means and methods to hold him to this commitment and am confident that with patience and persistence we can do so.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: White House Conference on International Cooperation Year
(November 29 - December 1)

1. Attached is a tentative program for the Conference, which includes the names of some key people whom State would like to ask to participate. Of particular interest are:

- (a) the Vice President as a possible Chairman of the Conference
(he has taken an active interest in ICY)
- (b) Ambassador B. K. Nehru as the honored guest on November 29
(a bow towards the Indians who originated the ICY idea)
- (c) Fulbright or Church as a speaker on November 30, and
- (d) Mrs. Johnson as a possible speaker on December 1

2. The only item that gives me problems is the spotlighting of B. K. Nehru at this particular time in history. Accordingly, if you concur, I will tell State (a) that we want to wait a while before deciding on Nehru, and (b) that State may approach the other key people.

3. In accordance with your instructions, we are not making a commitment on your own role at this stage. At the same time, since you have repeatedly endorsed the Conference, we are helping its organizers along their way.

McG. B.

Go ahead _____

See the program for my deletions _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

R 11
10/13/5-

Dear Mr. President:

This ball is very bouncy -
it comes back fast - it gathers speed
as it goes along - and it has a
pressure + spin which are all its
own. So it is like you, + I
hope you will like it.

As ever

Mae

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Oct. 12, 1965
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement on space cooperation

1. Jim Webb and Dean Rusk have informed us of the successful conclusion of discussions in New York between representatives of NASA and representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences -- on two points.
2. The first and most important is that the Soviets have reaffirmed their interest in our agreement for the exchange of weather satellite data. We have been in some doubt of this because they have not had any weather satellite data to give us so far. They now tell us that they will have it "within a few months." This allows us to go forward with existing exchanges of conventional weather data and strongly revives our hope that there will presently be a joint U.S. -Soviet weather information system of worldwide scope and value.
3. At the same time the negotiators reached agreement on the preparation and publication of a joint review of research in space biology and medicine. This one has been under discussion for nearly three years, and while the agreement is subject to review in Moscow (and in Washington), we think it will stick this time.
4. Bill Moyers and I agree that this is worth a White House announcement, and I attach a draft for your consideration.

McG. B.

(10/12/65)

Secretary Rusk and Director Webb have today informed the President of the successful conclusion of discussions on space cooperation between representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union, in New York on Friday, October 8. Two satisfactory understandings were reached in these meetings.

The first understanding reaffirms the existing agreement for the exchange of weather satellite data between Washington and Moscow. It is now understood by representatives of both sides that satellite data is expected to be available on a continuing basis from both sides in a few months. Meanwhile, the present daily and useful exchange of conventional weather data will continue.

The second satisfactory step is a new agreement for the preparation and publication of a joint review of research in space biology and medicine in the two countries. This agreement provides for a Joint Editorial Board and for full cooperation by both sides in the publication of the materials available in the two countries, probably in two or more volumes.

The President has expressed his great satisfaction with these two forward steps. He believes that progress in the execution of the weather agreement can open the way to a jointly supported weather reporting system of the greatest value to all the world. He hopes that the agreement on space biology and medicine can be not only a major contribution to the future safety and success of astronauts of all nations, but also a model for wider cooperation ~~not only~~ in the peaceful uses of space ^{not only} between our two countries, but with all the world.

###

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, October 12, 1965
10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JACK VALENTI

I attach two letters for the President's signature, which have been held for a disgraceful length of time in the Department of State. Nevertheless, both of them are worth signing, and I send them to you with my pledge that I have now given up forever on the notion that the State Department can be relied on to keep this kind of correspondence moving. It is my plan to give this assignment to one man in my own office, and to keep it there, with a flat rule that any letter from a foreign statesman must be answered within five days of its arrival in the White House, unless the President himself authorizes delay. I am sorry to give as much as five days. In ordinary cases we should be able to act faster. But there are some letters which have to have expert translation in one office and expert study in another.

This will annoy the Department of State, because it will require them to clear such letters as a matter of priority and it will also deprive them of the initial drafting powers. But the Constitution puts the President in charge of foreign affairs -- and common sense puts him in charge of his own correspondence.

If you can trade this pledge for these two signatures, I will be grateful.

As for publicity, our UN people would prefer not to publicize the letter to U Thant, because it makes it look as if we were boasting about our air support. The letter to Mora, on the other hand, can well be published by Bill Moyers as soon as there is time for its delivery to Mora -- although the delay makes it less useful than it should have been.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Note: letters were signed,
dated October 13, and given
to Thelma for despatch. du

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 98-162
By CB, NARA Date 11-16-99

October 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. The number one problem continues to be the crisis over the imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Another crisis may develop in the Congo if President Kasavubu forces Tshombe's resignation -- perhaps this week. [Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use.]

Rhodesia. As predicted, Rhodesian negotiations with the UK over independence broke down last week. Pursuant to your exchange with Harold Wilson, our Charge in London presented a US message to Smith advising against UDI and warning of the consequences. [Similar warnings were sent to Smith by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, West Germany and Japan.] Zambia's President Kaunda immediately cabled you his personal appreciation for the US stand.

So far our efforts to seize the initiative in the UN on this issue have met with success. Ambassador Anderson's speech on UDI met with an encouraging response and an anti-Rhodesian resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by the General Assembly: 107 for, 2 against (Portugal and South Africa) and 1 abstention (France). The UK did not vote, although it confidentially concurred in the language of the resolution.

Wilson has asked us to publicly release an official statement along the lines of our message to Smith; we are preparing one. UK strategy is to appeal to the more moderate elements of the Rhodesian population. The UK is considering a top-level Commonwealth "Peace Mission" to Rhodesia, to be led by Australian PM Menzies. Wilson appears today on BBC in connection with this crisis.

Smith has returned to Rhodesia. His first moves will probably be to (a) meet with his Rhodesian Front party leaders; (b) call a cabinet meeting; and (c) recall parliament. It's anyone's guess how long thereafter UDI will follow. Smith himself is now speaking in terms of "before Christmas". In any case, this is still primarily a UK problem. We will continue to march no faster than they.

Congo. This week may see the climax in the Kasavubu/Tshombe infighting. Kasavubu makes a major policy speech to the new parliament Wednesday. No one knows what he intends, but we have reports that he has changed his mind again and plans to make Tshombe resign in order to strengthen his own hand in bargaining for new cabinet positions. Fast-rising Interior Minister Nendaka is angling for Tshombe's job, and shows signs of turning to leftist support to get it.

this has
just
happened →
(Oct 13)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


/Both the Ambassador and CIA are pushing the line that now is no time to break up the Kasavubu-Tshombe team. A number of influential Congolese agree, but Kasavubu is the key figure and at this point we can only work on him indirectly./ All that can be said in Washington on background is that the US is becoming increasingly tired of trying to help the Congo get on its feet economically while Congolese leaders seem more interested in political squabbling.

Meanwhile the mercenary offensive against the rebel stronghold in the east has now begun to move again and captured the major town of Fizi. This may prove to be the rebel last gasp.

Tanzania. /In a private talk with our Ambassador, President Nyerere expressed his disgust with the Congo rebels. He says he has ceased supporting the rebels, and has told the Soviet and Chicom Ambassadors they can't ship arms in through Tanzania any more. His blocking of support for the rebel cause will further clinch our effort to mop up the rebellion. This is also further indication of Nyerere's disenchantment with the Communists. He acknowledges that he was wrong, and the US was right on this one./

OAU Summit. The Organization of African Unity meeting of chiefs of state in Accra will probably be held on schedule 21 October. But the "moderate" Africans are making N'Krumah sit up and beg. He and his special delegates have been roaming the continent drumming up support for attendance. Strongest hold-outs are his French-speaking neighbors, led by the Ivory Coast, who still are not convinced that he has kicked out of Ghana the plotters against their governments. They've forced N'Krumah to meet with them in Mali on 13 October, where they will make it hot for him before deciding whether to attend the Summit.

If Rhodesian UDI occurs prior to or during the OAU Summit, it will probably eclipse all other items. If not, the only scheduled agenda item that interests us is Vietnam. This Summit meeting is a matter on which we should scrupulously avoid comment.


R. W. Komer
Inf. B.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, October 10, 1965
11:00 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Head of the Department of Urban Affairs

1. A few weeks ago you asked me to think hard about this problem, and I have been doing so. My first set of names was pretty routine and would not have added anything to your decision. But now I have a suggestion which seems better to me -- Jim Webb.

2. Webb has the three things that this department head will need most: energy, political savvy, and reputation. (It is true that he talks too much, but that was no bar with Arthur Goldberg.) In addition, Jim Webb knows the urban problem. He has been interested in it for years and has the respect of some of the ^{Ph.D.} impressive academic students of the problem. He would have a running start on the real issues, in addition to all his other advantages.

3. You know Webb better than I, so it is foolish for me to enlarge on his qualities. The only real problem you have is to fill his place at NASA. You and he would be the best judges on that. But my own impression is that the straight operating processes of NASA go forward very soberly and effectively under Robert Seamans. Perhaps someone like Buford Ellington could take over the political leadership of the agency -- or perhaps Seamans himself is ready for promotion.

4. Very likely you have thought of this one yourself, and I don't want to fan the air with it. But it feels right to me, unless for reasons unknown to me you think it impossible to make a change at NASA.

h.d. B.
McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY DCH ON 2-24-83

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, October 10, 1965 - 10:00 a.m.

being held
for P

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foster paper on Non-Proliferation

1. Bill Foster and Butch Fisher brought me on Saturday the attached memorandum for you (Tab A) -- "A Time for Decision on Non-Proliferation." Their memorandum argues that on grounds of the national interest in preventing nuclear spread, it is now time to give up the MLF and similar mixed-manned weapons schemes in Europe. They believe that Gromyko gave Dean Rusk some encouragement that without an MLF a good treaty is possible (but the memcon is ambiguous). They believe the Indians are approaching a moment of final decision on nuclear weapons. They believe that they owe it to you, as your disarmament advisers, to give you this recommendation.

2. I told them that their memorandum took no proper account of the importance and complexity of our German problem. [REDACTED]

1,3
(a)(5)

3. But even though I think this answer to Foster is right on the tactics, I also think it is right for you to have a look at his memorandum. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a major objective which you have repeatedly and wisely underlined. We are not making progress in strengthening our policy in this field. The MLF problem is a great obstacle, [REDACTED]

1,3
(a)(5)

4. For quite different reasons, I myself am now convinced that we need to develop an Atlantic nuclear policy that will steer away from these mixed-manned forces (though I have been one of their friends and advocates in the past). In this coming week our German policy will be on the table between State, Defense, and this office. After that it will come to you, in preparation for Erhard's visit. The State Department people still cling to the notion that some form of mixed force is desirable. Bob McNamara says he has agreed with State in the past, but now thinks that it is more important to get a decision, one way or the other, than it is to worry about just what that decision is. [REDACTED]

1,3
(a)(5)

[REDACTED] This is what we are now working on. Meanwhile, I do commend to your attention the Foster paper -- one-sided as it is.

~~SECRET~~

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

October 9, 1965

In response to an invitation from the Lok Sabha, a Senate delegation is off to Japan and India. Morse (chairman), Lausche, Dominick, Church, Burdick, perhaps Prokty are planning to be in India 6-13 December (they leave for Japan 24 November).

This is apparently being handled out of the VP's office (Reilly). I'm unimpressed by the calibre of the delegation, but can't see a good reason for saying "no". Any reactions likely upstairs?

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-377

By *pw*, NARA, Date *2-18-94*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18
DECLASSIFIED ✓
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-163
By is, NARA Date 4-28-99

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 7, 1965
4 p. m.

SUBJECT: Week's Developments in the Near East

Comparative surface calm continues, but a major incident on the Israel-Jordan border could shatter it almost any time. Besides trying to keep that lid on, we're tackling the longer range problem of how to help countries where we no longer have big aid programs maintain economic momentum. As our aid declines, we have to rely more heavily on other means--including your occasional letters and other gestures--to keep our hand in.

Israel-Jordan. Small hit-and-run raids into Israel from Jordan continue to raise the temperature. The Israelis threaten to strike back again, and top Jordanians say they'll have to retaliate. The Israelis claim continued forays prove Hussein's security men at the lower levels are undercutting his effort to stop the raids.

We've been pressing Hussein for some time to curb these raiders, and his security people have rounded up quite a few of them. But it's difficult to control these small bands along every mile of the border.

Hussein has authorized us to tell the Israelis in detail about his campaign against the raiders in an effort to dissuade them from another retaliatory raid. Hussein doubts Arab opinion or his own officers will let him turn the other cheek again.

Hussein's "cooperation" with the Israelis is highly sensitive, of course, and the Israelis narrowly averted a press story on it the other day. Fortunately, our press tends to look on these raids as normal border squabbling. If fighting should erupt, we could say something about our efforts to put a damper on both sides without implicating Hussein. /

Greece. The new government is putting the heat on us for aid, to help in its own tough job of looking like a going concern. It's asking for a \$30 million balance of payments loan, \$30 million in help to rebuild from earthquake damage, defense budget support and special concessions on a PL 480 deal. We've struggled over the past three years to get ourselves out of the aid business because the Greek economy, despite

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

ups and downs, has seemed sound enough to stand on its own feet. We think Greece could well draw on its IMF reserves instead of asking us for help; they argue that this would damage Greek morale. Mann is having a careful economic analysis done before we answer.

What the Greeks are probably doing is to make one last bid for special help from us. Our problem is to show them we still consider them special friends without going back into the aid business. The job is especially tricky right now because we want to encourage the new government's efforts to achieve stability and maybe even put on some economic clamps, while not appearing to take sides in the deep-rooted political feuding that will continue for some time.

So far, the American Greek community hasn't taken sides in the political fracas or shown much interest in this problem. When we made up our minds how to handle this request, we might want to do some back-grounding to stave off any unfortunate stories about our deserting Greece in its hour of need.

In Iran, where the Shah is again in a nervous mood, we're also trying to find new ways to show interest without spending money (they don't need it). Your continuing letters and other gestures toward the Shah are our most important asset; he was especially pleased by the fuss you made over his 25th anniversary. Fortunately, we can also rely on our military aid and sales to keep a hand in, though it doesn't make sense even to sell the Shah everything he wants.

AID is studying a new idea for reversing the decline in our influence. Since the chief Iranian problem is coordinating their use of resources they already have, AID is thinking about turning its mission into a group of high-powered analysts who can give the ambassador and AID director the ammo they need to educate the top ministers on existing bottlenecks and how to break them. If the plans meet the test, it would provide you grist to use occasionally to urge the Shah to better economic performance. /

Since the Iranians just initialed an agreement with the USSR for a steel mill, machine tool plant and gas pipeline, we may see a spate of press reports on how Iran is drifting away from us. We might put this in perspective by some backgrounding on the close relationship between the President and the Shah.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

UAR. Nasser's cabinet reshuffle nets out as a plus for greater efficiency in economic and internal security matters, and may be further evidence of increased attention to domestic problems. The UAR's top economic hand is here pressing hard on PL 480, and hopes for an answer from Rusk next week.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "R. W. Komer". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1965

AGENDA FOR MEETING AT 12:30

I. Vietnam

1. Rolling Thunder
2. New voluntary organization
3. Domestic debate

II. India/Pakistan

1. Appointment of Arthur Dean
2. An emissary to the area?
3. Forward planning on food
4. Peace Corps

III. Guidance for AID in the administration of FY-66 funds

IV. Yugoslav aid policy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

20
President
go
his
operations
prep
by
miff
Wednesday, 5:00 p.m.
October 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Developments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-232
By rip, NARA, Date 1-7-93

Events in Cuba and gubernatorial elections in Brazil were the principal developments in the hemisphere this past week. Elsewhere, Colombia and Uruguay wrestled with controls to bring their economies out of a nose-dive. In the Dominican Republic Garcia Godoy made very little progress in reopening the downtown area. The crisis in Bolivia caused by clashes at the tin mines quieted down. Storm clouds appeared on the horizon in Ecuador as dissident elements in Guayaquil showed signs of preparing for demonstrations against the military junta this coming weekend. In Panama President Robles moved to the counter-attack against Arnulfo Arias, head of the principal opposition party, who seized on the Joint Statement on the canal negotiations to lambaste the government. These are some of the details:

Cuba: The Refugee Offer. Castro seems to have misread, deliberately or otherwise, your Statue of Liberty statement, interpreting it to mean that we wanted to conduct all negotiations through the Red Cross. We have pointed out to him through the Swiss that this is not the case. A note to Castro setting forth our position on modalities for the movement of refugees is going to the Swiss Embassy in Havana today. We now have the initiative on this matter. Castro is on the defensive. His reaction to our note will tell how serious he is in following through with his proposal. The Red Cross will probably state publicly today its readiness to participate if the two governments come to an agreement. This will increase the pressure on Castro.

Cuba: Institutionalization of the Regime. In a series of statements during the week, Castro announced: (1) a change in name of his Cuban Socialist Revolution Party to "Cuban Communist Party"; (2) the new structure of the Party -- First Secretary, Central Committee, Political Bureau, Secretariat and auxiliary committees; (3) the holding of the first national congress at the end of 1966; and (4) the study of a new Constitution. These are major steps toward institutionalization of the regime. As long as Castro is around, however, the party will

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

remain unipersonal and serve as his vehicle for exercising control. Significantly, the old Cuban communists occupy relatively low positions in the new structure.

Brazilian Gubernatorial Elections. Some 7 million Brazilians voted last Sunday in elections for 11 of the 22 governorships. Two of the elections were cast as partial tests of strength between elements who supported the 1964 revolt against President Goulart and those in opposition. Returns on these two races show strong popular support for candidates of ex-President Kubitschek (who was stripped of his political rights after the revolt) and will be interpreted as a defeat for the Castello Branco Government. It is premature, however, to reach any conclusions on the significance of the elections for the Castello Branco Government until all the results are in.

Dominican Situation. Ambassador Bunker returned to Santo Domingo last Monday and as the first item of business talked to Garcia Godoy about the importance of integrating the downtown area without delay. Some progress was made during the week in arms collection and reintegration of the rebels in the regular forces but not sufficient to permit a reopening of the rebel zone. Meanwhile, elements on the extreme right and left maneuvered for position. Right-wing groups talked of armed vigilante action against Communists but were not able to muster much support from the Armed Forces. Left-wing groups continued their politically-motivated agitation at several industrial plants and maintained physical control of the University campus. The large majority of the population waited impatiently for a solution of the rebel zone problem, but gave no significant sign of shifting toward either extreme.

Panama. The opposition forces of defeated Presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias, ultra-nationalists and Communist groups violently attacked, as expected, the Joint Statement on canal negotiations and the Robles Government's negotiating policy. The Government decided that the best defense was to counter-attack. In doing so, it counts with the solid support of large segments of the populace, now strengthened by the Joint Statement. To assist in mounting its counter-attack, the Government called back two members of its negotiating team. With the return to Washington of these negotiators and Ambassador Irwin next week, discussion on the three treaties will be resumed.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

In his State of the Nation address on October 1, President Robles reported favorably and comprehensively on Alliance for Progress activities and U.S. aid efforts in Panama. He described the Alliance as a "magnificent program of Inter-American Cooperation," and noted that there was visible evidence of its activity in all parts of Panama. He added, however, that the Alliance objectives of social justice and economic progress were obtained not only through specific projects and international commitments but, under the democratic system of government, were achieved "only by great efforts and sacrifices on our part." He said that it was precisely in the human and institutional aspects of the Alliance that there are the greatest limitations, conflicts and opposition, and he invited all his compatriots to agree that: "There must be new criteria of justice. We must renounce certain privileges, change and discontinue some traditional attitudes and conventional ideas in order to join with vital concepts on which the nation's development must be based."

Argentina: Oil Contract Renegotiations. The Union Oil Company of California and Trans-World Drilling Company, an affiliate of Kerr-McGee, signed agreements with the Government of Argentina on October 1, settling with respect to these two companies the conflict which arose from the cancellation of contracts with a number of petroleum companies in November 1963. Agreements with Shell and Esso are expected to be concluded in the near future and there is a fair chance that an agreement with the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company of Texas may be concluded soon.

Of these five companies, only Tennessee may be considered a major investor. Still to be concluded are agreements with Pan American (Standard Oil of Indiana) and Cities Service. Cities Service is not pressing for settlement at this time since a profitable modus vivendi has been worked out informally with the Argentines.

When agreements with Shell, Esso and Tennessee are signed, we expect to consider releasing a few AID projects of modest dimensions which have been held up pending a settlement of the oil contract problem. A settlement with Pan American would create a possibility of restoring normal aid relations with Argentina.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

That's fine.

LBJ/mf

10-6-65

4:00p

RWK

make sure Brits

know we're acting

Done ^{me} _{RWK}

OCT 7 1965

Red Bundy

Rec'd
10-6-65
7:35 p

2/a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2

Wednesday, October 6, 1965
10:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Prime Minister Wilson has welcomed your message on Rhodesia. Tab A gives our message and his answer. We are now going ahead with a careful statement to be made both to Smith in London and to the Rhodesian Minister here. These will not be Presidential messages, but expressions of the position of the United States Government.

McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~

100

TAB
A

2/c

Wednesday, October 6, 1965

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Many thanks for your message about Rhodesia. I am most grateful for your support in this, as in so many other matters. So far, we have not done much more than state opening positions, but I expect the crunch to come when Smith comes to see me tomorrow, Thursday.

As you say, deterrence is our main objective and, in these circumstances, it would be very helpful if you were able to make your administrations views known to Smith before my decisive meeting with him. May I leave it to you to judge the best way of doing so. Perhaps you would consider using both techniques. I will keep you in touch with developments.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

21d

PRUS001/5
1849Z 5 OCT 65
FM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

SENT
WHCA

SENT TO PRIME MIN.
3:17 P.M. (EDT)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1965

~~SECRET~~
CAP65594
VIA PRIVATE WIRE TO LONDON

1965 OCT 5 19 5 17 1965

~~SECRET~~

TO: PRIME MINISTER WILSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

WE AGREE THAT THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA AFFAIR COULD QUICKLY BECOME A CALAMITY, WITH POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO WESTERN INTERESTS. WE ALSO AGREE THAT DETERRING SMITH FROM ANY FATEFUL STEP IS BY ALL ODDS THE BEST COURSE OPEN TO US.

IF YOU SEE FIT, WE WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU WOULD TELL SMITH WHEN YOU SEE HIM THAT WE AS WELL AS YOU WOULD TAKE A VERY POOR VIEW OF UDI, AND THAT WE WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO OPPOSE IT VIGOROUSLY.

WE WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED, AS YOU SUGGEST, TO APPROACH SMITH DIRECTLY ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, EITHER THROUGH OUR CHARGE IN LONDON OR BY CALLING IN THE RHODESIAN MINISTER ATTACHED TO YOUR EMBASSY HERE. AND IF DETERRENCE IS OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE, IT MAY BE BETTER FOR US TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS BEFORE YOUR DECISIVE MEETING WITH SMITH, RATHER THAN AFTER. WE WILL DO THIS PROMPTLY IF YOU WISH. SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO MAKE OUR VIEWS PUBLIC IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY.

I AM GLAD THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH, SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS WITH YOURS IN DEALING WITH THIS UNHAPPY PROBLEM

END MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 6, 1965, 9:50 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: Dominican Republic Peace Corps Programs

I know you have been cautious on this, but I believe myself it is now time to act. The Peace Corps is popular in Santo Domingo, and if it behaves with proper discipline, it can be a very useful balance to other hard-headed activities which clearly will be necessary as we go ahead. Bunker is for it, and so are Mann and Vaughn.

I have talked to Mankiewicz, who is the Peace Corps expert here in Washington, and I find him smart and good on the political problems involved. I have his assurance that he will make a special effort himself to insure that volunteers understand the sensitive nature of their work. After all, it is quite simple: if they start criticizing U. S. policy down there, ^{more} they ~~you~~ will simply shut down the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and give the whole operation a bad black eye.

The programs involved would include about 210 people divided in 4 categories --

rural elementary school teachers - 50
Public health volunteers - 50
Community development organizers and technicians - 80
town administration technicians - 30

Can we go ahead?

Yes ☒

No ☐

Speak to me _____

Subject to Bill M. Supervision
N

McG. B.

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

22a

October 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Bill Moyers

The attached memorandum and the President's comment give you one more job. I have told Mankiewicz to go ahead and to keep in touch with you on all aspects of what he does, especially any public announcement. Having been through this once before, he is fully alert to the need for discretion among PCV's in the DR.

McG. B.

Attachment

cc Moyers

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 6, 1965, 9:45 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Tear Gas

You will want to know that General Westmoreland plans to conduct a tear gas operation on October 8. Publicity on this matter is being coordinated so that it will be handled in Saigon, while at the same time we give appropriate and careful advance notice to some friendly countries which have been fidgety about this in the past. We may be overoptimistic, but we believe that with reasonable good fortune the correspondents in Saigon will themselves emphasize the basic point -- which is that in certain circumstances tear gas quite simply saves lives.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-182

By us, NARS, Date 6-13-84

10-6-65
10-11-65
MEMORANDUM

24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 6, 1965, 9:30 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations

I think you will want to know that with British support we are quietly urging the usefulness of a carefully phrased resolution on Southern Rhodesia in the General Assembly. This is a matter on which Goldberg, Rusk and I have consulted, and we are all in agreement. We are also acting with British encouragement. Our object is two-fold:

First, to give additional clarity to the fact that Smith will face very strong international opposition if he insists on UDI;

Second, to have our own language in the field and thus to avoid the much more inflammatory and tendentious resolutions that hot-headed Africans would prefer.

We hope that we can get friends to sponsor our moderate resolution, but it is a possibility that we would have to put it forward ourselves. I think you will want to give Goldberg tactical flexibility on this, but if you have a strong view, I know he would want to hear it. He will, of course, act under Dean Rusk's guidance.

A copy of the draft resolution is attached.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Let Rusk and Goldberg handle it ✓ ↖

Speak to me _____

See memo to Sisco
attached

UNSC RESOLUTION 2177 (1966) ON

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The General Assembly

Deeply concerned with the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Noting with particular concern repeated threats of the Government in Southern Rhodesia that it may immediately declare unilaterally the independence of Southern Rhodesia, an act which would perpetuate minority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

1. Deplores any attempt on the part of the present Rhodesian Government to seize independence by unconstitutional means in order to perpetuate minority rule in Southern Rhodesia;

2. Declares that such minority rule would be incompatible with the Charter principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

3. Requests the United Kingdom and all other States Members not to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the current Government and not to recognize any authorities emerging therefrom;

4. Decides

4. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia under urgent and continuing review and, in the event of an attempt by the current Government of Southern Rhodesia unilaterally to seize independence by unconstitutional means, to consider what further steps may be necessary.

24b

Wednesday, October 6, 1965, 9:30 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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First, to give additional clarity to the fact that Smith will face very strong international opposition if he insists on UDI;

Second, to have our own language in the field and thus to avoid the much more inflammatory and tendentious resolutions that hot-headed Africans would prefer.

We hope that we can get friends to sponsor our moderate resolution, but it is a possibility that we would have to put it forward ourselves. I think you will want to give Goldbert tactical flexibility on this, but if you have a strong view, I know he would want to hear it. He will, of course, act under Dean Rusk's guidance.

A copy of the draft resolution is attached.

McG. B.

Let Rusk and Goldberg handle it _____

Speak to me _____

October 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Joseph Sisco

I have now informed the President of our draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia, and he has delegated to the Secretary and to Ambassador Goldberg the tactical authority to decide whether such a resolution should be sponsored by others or by the U. S. He is clearly sympathetic with the basic objective.

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McGeorge Bundy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

95
DECLASSIFIED ✓
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 25

NLJ 97-432

By iss, NARA Date 9-25-98

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 5, 1965, 8:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: India and Pakistan

This is one subject on which I think you may wish to have a brief meeting before you go to Bethesda. There are storm signals in both countries and we can do better in the next two weeks if all hands have up-to-date guidance from you.

Moreover, your stay in Bethesda obviously puts off the time at which Shastri could come here, and, along with Ayub's unreadiness to move in a continued state of crisis, reduces the prospect that we can move forward by pressing for early conversations with you -- although the Shastri possibility remains important and hopeful, perhaps for late October.

Meanwhile, there is a real danger that both Pakistan and India will mis-read our policy. The Paks may wrongly believe that their alternatives are crude pressure on us or a crude bargain with the Red Chinese -- this is the way they are talking and acting. The Indians may wrongly feel that we are using food as a blunt instrument and that the only safe reply in Indian political terms is to move publicly and proudly toward isolation from the West. The Indians may also feel -- again quite wrongly -- that we intend to try to trade our assistance for their "surrender" on Kashmir.

These problems are compounded by the fact that our channels to Ayub and Shastri are clogged, both in Asia and in Washington. Except at the moment of truth on the ceasefire, your government has not succeeded in communicating sharply just what we do and do not want. In part this is the inevitable result of our decision to hold everything until Shastri and Ayub get here. But in part it is also the result of the very rapid changes in Pakistani and Indian thinking because of the enormous national crises into which they have steered themselves. We have not yet adjusted our responses to this new situation.

All of this, I suspect, is at least as clear to you as it is to us. But what we now need to do is to sort out our own thinking, and then make some sober and straightforward noises to the Asians.

Not as final answers, but as indications of the shape of the problem, we suggest the following principles and the following tactical conclusions:

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

A. Principles

1. India is more important than Pakistan and there is enough hope in India to justify continued support by food and economic aid if the Indians in turn are reasonable with us.

2. Within this priority we still need not lose Pakistan if we can show the Paks the emptiness of the Chinese route and the reality of continued Western economic support.

3. We should not kid ourselves about any early Kashmir settlement. American fidgeting over Kashmir will only make us trouble with India and arouse false hopes in Pakistan. The most we can do is what Goldberg is doing: press for acceptance by both sides of the process of peaceful discussion as against the process of trial by arms. (We emphasize this point because it would help wonderfully in this town if you were to announce this conclusion as your own. Kashmir-fixers are a plentiful and dangerous commodity.)

4. We cannot tie our economic aid to positive progress on Kashmir. We can tie it to reasonable progress in the observance of the UN ceasefire resolution and to the acceptance of political process. We can also tie it to other basic US interests such as:

- a. Keeping the Paks out of Chinese arms;
- b. Keeping the Indians from unbalanced surrender to the Soviets (although Soviet help in itself is not intolerable.)
- c. Keeping the Indians away from nuclear weapons;
- d. Pressing both countries toward better economic and agricultural policies.

B. Tactics

1. The thing which is giving us most trouble right now is the absence of dialogue. We are inclined to think that someone clearly speaking for you should be sent to these two countries within the next two or three weeks. This could be Arthur Dean, who begins work tomorrow, but if you want to

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

give him more time to learn, you might want to send one of your own team. There is great advantage in sending someone who really speaks for President Johnson; whatever our other failings, we play your tune, and most people know it.

2. In due course, we should defuse the explosive issue of food as a political weapon. At the same time, we should not get back into long-term agreements. A shift in a couple of weeks from the current one-month basis to a quarterly basis, with appropriate agricultural assurances attached, would do us a lot of good and cost us nothing in terms of leverage.

3. The burden of our song to Ayub and Shastri should be a judicious mixture of firmness, concern, and continued readiness to help on reasonable terms. Specifically, to Ayub:

a. We should drive home to the Paks the folly of threats and the still greater folly of switching to Peking.

b. On Kashmir, we should maintain our commitment to a process, but make it crystal clear that the only real hope the Paks have here is in conciliation and not conflict with India. This is a fact of life, and their adventure this summer proves it.

c. If the Paks are responsive, we are ready to start talking renewed economic aid, but as a simple fact it will be a long time before military assistance can begin again to either party. (These are warnings and expressions of willingness to negotiate -- they should not be commitments, since these ought to be reserved both for a later time and a higher level.)

4. To the Indians, we would make it quietly clear that we accept and indeed support their primary role in the subcontinent, and that in particular we are not agents for Pakistan or supreme judges on Kashmir.

But, within this basic premise, we could and would press the Indians to recognize the necessity for political process and the advantage to them of gradual conciliation, since they too would lose if the Pakistanis made a fatal plunge toward China.

5. With respect to the UN Resolution, and political process, we should emphasize to both that unless there is a return to the methods of peace, it

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

is a fact and not a theory that the whole future of US assistance will be gravely jeopardized. How can the American Congress justify long-range, large-scale efforts to people who cannot do what is needed to keep the peace? It is this test, not the test of a specific Kashmir settlement, which the American Congress will apply.

We have sketched these outlines of a policy, not because we are convinced it is the only one, but because we see a prospect of grave losses in both countries if we go forward in the coming weeks with no policy at all. It is this prospect which makes us urge a meeting even in these last hectic days before you go to Bethesda.

McG. B.

McG. B.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Set Up a Meeting_____

Speak to me_____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, October 5, 1965 3:25 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A New Plan on Howard Rusk's Efforts

In accordance with your instruction, I have shelved the notion of an American Southeast Asia Foundation until we can re-frame it so as to keep it a little away from the White House and make it different from what the Post story prematurely disclosed. Meanwhile, there are some things we can and should do that come out of Howard Rusk's trip. Rusk is coming to dinner at the White House tonight, and we can get these matters settled while he is in town, if you wish.

The things Rusk recommends are the following:

1. That we promptly move 70 Vietnamese paraplegic veterans by air to the United States for care. The Defense Department is ready to move on this in cooperation with Rusk, on 48 hours notice.

Yes _____

No _____

2. A plan for training Vietnamese medical personnel in the care of paraplegics and amputees. This one involves bringing Vietnamese medical people with the paraplegic veterans for training at Dr. Rusk's center. We believe that USOM and the Vietnamese can produce the people as soon as the decision is taken.

Yes _____

No _____

3. The expanding of the manufacture of artificial limbs in Vietnam together with training centers for amputees.

All we have to do here is to direct USOM to go ahead in support of this plan.

Yes _____

No _____

Put on Pres's desk 26
77115

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4. Despatch of voluntary agency representatives to Vietnam to review ^{their} all work on refugee and other welfare programs. One advantage of this would be to get them out there before Ted Kennedy goes. It is more and more clear that Ted is trying to be the one who spotlights the refugee problem, and it is important for us to keep ahead of him.

Yes _____

No _____

If you approve these decisions today, I could have Bill Moyers announce them tomorrow morning and say that Rusk and we discussed them while he was down here today.

Yes _____

No _____

These matters would not ordinarily require Presidential decision, but because Rusk went at your direct invitation, I think his specific recommendations should have your approval. There is also some small news value in it.

McG.B.

McG.B.

27
✓
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1965

TO: MR. BUNDY *je*

FROM: Bill Moyers

The President hasn't decided on this.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, Oct. 5, 1965
12:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Problems of the Dominican White Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-232
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-7-93

1. John Bartlow Martin has been here two days and has reviewed the draft White Paper done by Bob Adams and Harry Shlaudeman in the State Department. Martin has reached some important conclusions which are summarized in the attached memorandum from him to you.

2. In essence, his conclusion is that this is not the time for a White Paper, and that we ought to find other ways of strengthening our defenses on the Dominican Republic. I know that this has not been your view, and I believe that it would be very valuable for you and Martin to have a talk before we go further.

YES _____
NO _____

3. I should add that I have read chapters in Martin's new book (which will not be out until the spring of '66), and I reluctantly share his view that he ought not to engage in a major writing job for a Government paper at this stage. His book states his own conclusions in ways which are occasionally critical of Bennett and Connett, but which are fundamentally affirmative about the basic decisions you had to make. The integrity of his view should not be compromised by engaging him in addition in a Government writing job at this time.

4. The underlying trouble about a White Paper, in my view, is that we simply cannot publish the detailed record of cables back and forth without enlarging the debate, instead of containing it. And anything short of that will not carry conviction with the relatively small but persistent group of critics of whom Fulbright is representative.

5. The underlying issue between us and Fulbright should not be moved to the question of Bennett's judgment in dealing with the rebels on April 27, or to the content of his cables and Tom Mann's. The underlying issue is whether it would have been an act of statesmanship to stand idly by and accept the serious risk of a second Cuba in the last days of April. This is the issue on which you earned your salary in that week, and it does not need a detailed historical review for its justification. What it needs is a careful political argument. This is something which I believe that Cabinet officers, Senators, and even your own staff can handle better than a State Department White Paper. But if you still prefer the White Paper form, I will be glad to go back to the drawing boards myself and get you a quite different paper from the one which is now in draft form.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Tuesday, October 5, 1965

11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic White Paper

The Adams-Shlaudemann paper is an extremely scrupulous and admirable job -- within the tight-lipped limits they set themselves.

The paper does not, however, adequately meet the attacks that have been made. (I attach a list of the attacks and page reference to the rebuttal in the White Paper. I have also made marginal notes on the paper itself). The paper does not, for example, deal at all with the charges that our public utterances on the Dominican Republic this year lacked candor or that since 1963 our Latin American policy has turned right. Too often the paper pleads conclusions and offers no supporting evidence. In some places (e.g., page 37) the paper stops short of real candor, thus, critics will say, repeating our earlier "lack of candor." The paper tells both too much and too little. The paper's detail will revive old quarrels over who said what to whom in April; its sweeping unsupported conclusions will be attacked as lacking evidence.

An alternative would be a true "White Paper," book length, opening the files and printing documents. It is probably too early for that.

A paper limited to the Communist question above would be too defensive.

In sum, I do not believe any Department paper can successfully meet the attacks, particularly on lack of candor, early bad Embassy reporting, Bennett's crucial meeting with the rebels on April 27, and a turn to the right since 1963 -- whether or not those charges are justified. What's done is done; the record is made; a Department paper won't help and will instead only revive old quarrels that can't be won. The Administration cannot candidly admit even minor error without undermining its present position; to do less would invite fresh attacks on a "cover-up." Defense must now come from the outside. Several alternatives exist:

1) Open the files to a friendly journalist and let him write a magazine piece or book. I fear his piece would be suspect. (I cannot do it--- have written my own book. Nor can I be associated in any way with

any White Paper the Department may issue; to do so would undermine both the White Paper and my book, since the two versions are bound to differ, one being an outsider's personal view, the other an official government document. My book may, however, be a useful counter to those of Tad Szulc, Dan Kurzman, and Bernard Collier. My reputation, if its independence is preserved, can, I think, be helpful here).

2. Distribute the Shlaudeman-Adams paper, expanded to include more evidence, to selected journalists and OAS and UN ambassadors, possibly at the time a flurry of papers is distributed at the Rio Conference in November.

3. Let a friendly Senator (e.g., Gruening) make a detailed case for our policy now in a speech that could be expanded into a book.

4. Let Bundy speak to an academic audience on the Dominican Republic as an example of the decision-making process.

5. Let the Secretary make a major policy speech at Rio (see below).

6. I have been invited to speak to the American Civil Liberties Union in Chicago and the Authors Guild of the Author's League in New York, in October and November.

On the whole, difficult though it is to let attacks go unanswered, in my opinion we can roll over them. Your reply to Castro is worth 100 White Papers. The Harris Poll shows 65 percent approve your Dominican policy. We can accomplish much more by forgetting the past and addressing ourselves to the present and future in the Dominican Republic and Latin America by a series of actions, not words; as follows:

1. Appoint an outstanding new Ambassador to the Dominican Republic now. (Suggestions: Ellsworth Bunker, Averell Harriman, Ralph Dungan, John Crimmins, Ambassador Stewart).

2. Let him work immediately to get rid of the Zone, open the city, loan or grant money, pour in the Peace Corps, pour in PL 480 food, work to make the Dominican people's cause our own and to make them know that this is so.

3. Consider the political options in the Dominican Republic for the short 8 months remaining to the election; take a policy decision and work actively to carry it out.

4. Let the Secretary make a major wide-ranging Latin American policy speech at the Rio Conference in November, reaffirming our basic Latin American policy and aligning ourselves with the revolutionary movements of the Hemisphere. (If he wants to touch on the Dominican Republic, he could regret that the extreme emergency there did not permit formal and lengthy consultation with our friends in the Hemisphere but he has no apology to make for the result, which was to preserve freedom of choice for the Dominican people. It is results that count.)

5. Consider goodwill tours of the Hemisphere early next year by important Administration leaders. You would be best of all if circumstances permit. If not, others of your choosing.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "John Bartlow Martin". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly stylized script.

John Bartlow Martin

Attack Points

Fulbright, USG determined from outset to pp. 1,4,8, frustrate Bosch-led rebellion ll.

Marder

Misc. press

Fulbright, LBJ got bad advice and mis- pp. 1, ll. information April 24-28

Fulbright, US policy in LA has turned pp.2-4,8-9, right since 1963, handing ll legitimate revolutions over to Communists.

Fulbright, Embassy missed opportunity on pp.4-5, ll. 4/25 to influence rebellion's course when PRD asked for "a US presence" and Embassy refused to intervene.

Fulbright, USG made no effort to contact p.5. Bosch in "initial days."

Fulbright, Embassy missed opportunity pp. 5, ll. 4/27 (Tues) when rebel leaders Marder asked Bennett to help arrange settlement and he refused.

Fulbright, Embassy (apparently) told Benoit p.6. USG would not intervene unless he said he couldn't protect US lives. He did. We did.

Fulbright, Danger to US lives was "more a pp.7, ll. pretext than a reason" for inter- Marder vention. Real reason was to stop a rebellion we judged Communist dominated.

Adams-Shlaudemann
Rebuttal

p. 24, 29-30, 34. "Primary objective" was to protect American lives. US "sought only restoration of order and preservation of freedom" and "security of W. Hemisphere." Dept. instruction 4/27 added "prevention of a Communist takeover" to lives and law and order. Also p.40, 41-2. (Can be attacked as contradictory).

Implicit or assumed throughout that this is not so.

?

P. 31. This approach lacked substance. (Made by Marmol, a nut).

P. 41. Any US pressure to bring Bosch back would have been "the most flagrant intervention in Dominican affairs. "(See marginal note; seems specious).

P.35-7 gives an account of the meeting. (See marginal note).

Conceded by implication, pp. 38-9.

See first point. Also see pp. 10-11.

Attack Points

Rebuttal

Fulbright, p. 7. Marder Misc.press	USG assumed almost from outset rebellion was Communist- "dominated", or would surely become so. Administration <u>has never</u> "proved" Communists had " <u>control</u> ."	PP. 4, 11-23, 34, 36, 38, 42, 45, 26, 20. (Shows heavy Communist involvement. "Control" probably never can be "proved.")
Fulbright, p. 9. Marder	We set up Imbert on "ill-founded hope" of splitting rebels; he became intractable, and we became his prisoner.	P. 42-3. We were seeking consensus; Imbert emerged.
Fulbright, p. 9, 11. Marder Misc.press	USG lacked candor in public utterances -- e.g., LBJ said 1500 people had heads cut off.	?
Fulbright, p. 12 ff. Marder Misc.press	US intervention was illegal under OAS charter and need not have been (we could have asked OAS to invoke Article 6 of Rio Treaty)	PP. 44-6, 46-52. Tries without much success to establish legal ground. (See marginal notes.)
Fulbright, p. 13.	Non-intervention, far from obsolete, is the heart of the inter-American system.	Agreed by implication, pp. 44-6, 46-52.
Marder Misc.press	Actions by US troops and officials <u>after</u> the landing made US accommodation with rebels impossible; US troops were <u>not neutral</u> .	PP 43, 28-9, 41-2. Troops were neutral. (Not convincing. See marginal notes).
Marder	14th of June is not wholly Communist dominated.	P. 11-12. It is. (I disagree. See marginal notes).
Marder	US accused of using OAS to pull its chestnuts out of fire.	Denied by implication, 48-52, 53-56.
Chi. Trib. & Sen. Geo. Murphy (Cal)	US has deported Wessin, bulwark against communism.	PP. 54-5. He left voluntarily. (Says he was forced out. See marginal note).
Misc.press	USG "over-reacted"	P. 27-8, Heavy demands made many troops necessary. (Good).

Attack Points

Misc.press US policy was uncertain, erratic,
and contradictory.

Fulbright DR wasn't "a particularly safe
place to be."

Adams-Shlaudemann
Rebuttal

Point one above; Imbert point.

P. 9. Chaos and bloodshed.
(Good on facts. Flavor lacking).

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, 12:00 noon
October 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Interview with Virginia Pruett

At the three-quarter mark of 1965 our two fundamental objectives of hemispheric development and security show positive gains. The box score looks something like this:

Alliance for Progress

The Alliance has stirred new hope, self-confidence and willingness to work. This is reflected in the attitudes of people -- governmental and private -- as well as in the statistics. Recent statements on the Alliance by the Presidents of Mexico and Panama in their State of the Nation addresses show this new spirit. Levels of U.S. private investment in Latin America continue to rise. In 1962 net investments stood at minus 32 million. They rose to 64 million in 1963 and 146 million in 1964. In 1965 they are running at a level of 175 million.

In your August 17 speech you listed what the Alliance had accomplished to date for the individual in terms of housing, school-rooms, books, etc. During the current fiscal year the Alliance expects to make the following additional gains:

houses to be constructed	100,000
class-rooms to be constructed	12,000
books to be produced	5,000,000
people to be fed under PL 480	25,000,000
teachers to be trained	25,000
miles of road to be built	1,700
agricultural credit loans to be granted to individual farmers	175,000.

Latin America as a whole last year exceeded the Alliance target of 2-1/2 percent per capita growth rate. This year the performance will probably be about the same.

We are particularly pleased by the economic gains made by such key countries as Brazil and Chile.

Dominican Situation

The danger of the communists capturing the April revolution was averted. The OAS moved promptly behind our initial action to make the restoration of peace and the search for a political solution a collective responsibility. After months of most difficult negotiations Ambassador Bunker and his Brazilian and Salvadorean colleagues succeeded in getting the sides to agree on a settlement. The Provisional Government of Garcia Godoy is now engaged in a delicate balancing act as it moves to consolidate its position. Progress in settlement of outstanding issues such as arms collection, reintegration of the rebel forces and reopening of the rebel zone are going more slowly than we would like but the direction is forward.

Guerrilla Activity

A year ago Latin American communist leaders were meeting in Havana to develop new strategy and tactics for promoting national liberation movements in certain countries. Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti were specifically mentioned in the communique on the meeting. The communists have little to show for their efforts. Only in Peru did they make some initial headway, but here the prompt, strong reaction of the Belaunde Government has checked their progress. There is no room for complacency in dealing with the problem of subversion, but we can derive satisfaction from the progress made by governments in strengthening their internal security capabilities.

Panama

Another yardstick for measuring success in our relations with Latin America is the progress made in the Canal negotiations. Eighteen months ago diplomatic relations were broken. Today the breach has been closed. Negotiations leading to a redefinition of outdated relationships are proceeding in a very satisfactory manner. The Joint Statement issued on September 24 reflect this. It is logical and right that Panama should share in the management and operation of the present Canal and that the activities of all kinds related to this operation should be more integrated than they have been in the life of

the Panamanian community. This objective can be accomplished without sacrifice to the security interests of the United States and the rest of the hemisphere.

The OAS.

The member governments will be meeting in Rio next month to consider how the OAS structure can be made more responsive to changing needs of the hemisphere in the political, security and economic fields. The meeting will give the governments an opportunity to consider specific proposals for modernizing and strengthening the system. and to reach a consensus on which ones should be adopted. We anticipate that some of the issues raised by our action in the Dominican Republic, the Fulbright speech and the Selden Resolution may be raised. This will give us a chance further to clarify United States policy.


McGeorge Bundy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 4, 1965
Monday/7:30 pm

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Pie Oct 5
Tue Oct 5
4 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. / Prime Minister Wilson's weekend appeal for help in deterring a Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) indicates the gravity with which the British view this problem as well as the likely imminence of UDI. / In the Congo, the final push against the rebels in the Eastern Congo is meeting resistance. / Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use. /

Southern Rhodesia. With Rhodesian PM Ian Smith meeting Wilson in London, this week will decide whether there will be a crisis over Rhodesia's threatened UDI. / In the UK there is an increased concern over the economic and financial consequences of UDI if (1) the UK ceases its imports of Rhodesian tobacco and (2) the Rhodesians retaliate by cutting off UK access to Zambia's copper. We are exploring ways in which we might help cushion the economic and financial blow to the UK. / Because of the potentially explosive response which UDI will provoke in Africa and the UN, this problem takes precedence over all others in Africa.

Congo. Mercenaries advancing on the last organized rebel stronghold have met stiff resistance and are bringing up reinforcements before pushing ahead. / We've impressed on Godley that we can't afford any setback that would give the rebels an image of having a new lease on life, but so far he feels the mercenaries and Congolese military can stay on top with materiel now on the ground. / When and if they crack key rebel defenses, we might want to call a few correspondents' attention to this; it pays to get the word around that the rebellion is in tatters. We may be able to do so just in time to take the wind out of any Thanksgiving week anniversary stories on the Stanleyville paradrop.

/ Our talks with the Belgians were disappointing, but they did spur the new Belgian government to speed up its Congo deliberations. Spaak will be here next week for a talk with Harriman, and we can impress on him that they can't expect us to follow unless they lead. /

Tanzania. President Nyerere was overwhelmingly re-elected to office at the same time that some of his more left-leaning associates lost their parliamentary seats. He deftly re-shuffled his cabinet to give more moderate elements the ascendancy. He is also anxious to announce the appointment of a new Ambassador to Washington to replace the one recalled last February

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-377

By pw, NARA, Date 2-18-94

~~SECRET~~

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Page Two

when our relations were at their worst. While not wishing to cheer, we view these developments as further encouraging indications of a slow Tanzanian drift to the West.

Afro-Asian Conference. The Algiers conference is still scheduled for 5 November. The Algerians, Chicoms and Indonesians had been pushing for it; most Afro-Asians have been apathetic. However, Sukarno's troubles may distract the Indonesians for a time /and we have reports that the Chinese and Algerians have had a tiff over Algerian insistence on inviting the USSR/. So far nobody has wanted to take the lead in suggesting another postponement. We'd just as soon the conference fall apart, but we can't say so. The best tack is to wish the Afro-Asians well and say it's their business.

If it comes off, we'll recommend you send a message as we've done in other similar cases. It also wouldn't hurt to encourage columnists to say that, since most Afro-Asians profess non-alignment, we'll be watching to see how non-aligned they really are. So if they invite North Korea, North Vietnam and Indonesia while excluding South Korea, South Vietnam, and Malaysia, they can't expect to be taken seriously.

Mozambique. Trouble here may sneak up on us; fighting could flare up if UDI occurs in neighboring Southern Rhodesia. /Reports from various reliable sources indicate Portugal is having trouble combatting the guerrilla warfare in the northern portions of its "Overseas Province" of Mozambique. African nationalists have suddenly stepped up their insurgency. The Portuguese Army detachments in the area are virtually immobilized in the face of an armed resistance by Africans using sophisticated weapons reportedly supplied by the Chicoms; e. g., land mines and rifles. The African guerrillas represent the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) headed by US-educated, Tanzania-based, Eduardo C. Mondland./

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

inf B

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432
By us, NARA Date 9-25-98

October 4, 1965
Monday/ 7:30 pm

31

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Message from PM Wilson. He's in with attached personal appeal that we support the UK against Southern Rhodesia. Specifically he urges that we join the UK in warning Rhodesia's PM Ian Smith, and making this warning public if Smith's negotiation with Wilson on 6-7 October fails. He is also appealing for help to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Rhodesia's key trading partners.

We here agree that we ought to back the UK on this issue, if only to stay on the right side of all the Afro-Asians. We'll probably be compelled to do so in the UN should Rhodesia kick over the traces. So this is a good opportunity to be helpful to the UK. The best tack is, as Wilson suggests, to help deter Smith from declaring independence in the first place.

So we propose at Tab a forthcoming reply to Wilson which: (1) authorizes him to tell Smith the US will also oppose him; (2) volunteers a direct, private US approach to Smith, either before he sees Wilson or after; and (3) agrees to make our position public if needed to warn off the Rhodesian electorate. We suspect Wilson may be angling for a personal message from you to Smith but doubt this would be useful.

The UK has not yet decided how hard to hit Rhodesia if it goes astray, but may use economic sanctions. Even if we went this far it would not be too great a problem, since our Rhodesian trade is small. The UK's most immediate problem if it uses sanctions is tobacco, so we might be able to help out by offering Title IV PL 480 tobacco, or easing the terms on CCC credit sales.

Approve message check with key

Disapprove and later follow him Wilson

in our message

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Ref. B.

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~

I'm against a message from you to Smith. And if you prefer we can answer Wilson on the Rush - Stewart channel. But on substance I agree. Mac

*3/12
via post. wire
(also to RUK
to send wire
req. wire)*

VIA PRIVATE WIRE to London

~~SECRET~~

TO: Prime Minister Wilson

FROM: The President

DECLASSIFIED Oct. 5, 1965
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432
By isa, NARA Date 9-25-98

We agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. We also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best course open to us.

If you see fit, we would be glad if you would tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very poor view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously.

We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian minister attached to your embassy here. And if deterrence is our prime objective, it may be better for us to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than after. We will do this promptly if you ^{wish} ~~agree~~. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way.

I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem.

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

3/1/65

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

^{he} I quite agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become
a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. ^{he} I also
agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best way
to ~~push the problem in front of us.~~ ^{come over to us.}
^{If} Should you see fit, ^{he} I would ^{be glad to} ~~have no objection if you were to~~ tell Smith
when you see him that we as well as you would take ^{a very poor} ~~a very dim~~ view of UDI,
and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously.

We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly
along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in
the Rhodesian minister attached to your embassy here. ^{but} ~~Indeed it occurs~~
to ^{me} ~~me~~ that if deterrence is our prime objective, it ^{may} ~~might~~ be better for us
to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than
^{we will do this promptly if you agree.}
after. [^] Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our
views public in an appropriate way.

I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is im-
portant to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy
problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432
By is, NARA Date 9-25-97

10/4/65

31c

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I quite agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. I also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best way to push the problem in front of us.

Should you see fit, I would have no objection if you were to tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very dim view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously.

We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian minister attached to your embassy here. Indeed it occurs to me that if deterrence is our prime objective, it might be better for us to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than after. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way.

I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432
By isa, NARA Date 9-25-98

10/4/65



~~SECRET~~

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

31d

2 October 1965

Dear Mr President,

The Prime Minister has asked
me to transmit to you the attached
message.

Yours Sincerely

Patrick Dean.

The President

of the United States of America.

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY JW ON 10-3-97

TEXT OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432

2 October 1965

By us, NARA Date 9-25-98

312

As you know, we have been keeping in close touch about Rhodesia with your Administration at all levels and we are most appreciative of the support which we have received.

We are now entering a crucial phase and the discussions I am to have with Smith next week are likely to be final and decisive. He seems to have retreated from the basis of negotiation which the Commonwealth Secretary established with him earlier this year, and I do not think it likely that we can now reach any agreement with him. The risk of unilateral declaration of independence must therefore be regarded as serious and I know you share with us the belief that this could escalate with disastrous consequences for the whole area and serious damage to Western interests.

If our negotiations unhappily fail, I shall do everything possible to bring home to Smith the consequences of an illegal step in the hope of deterring him from it. If there is still any chance of deflecting him and his colleagues from such a disastrous course I believe that your influence might be a decisive factor. I wonder therefore if you would be prepared to approach Smith in whatever way you think best calculated to bring home to him the gravity of the step which he is apparently contemplating. Subject to the way things go in the next few days I think that a message from you would be most effective immediately after a break-down in the negotiation. Since the timing of such a message could be crucial we will keep your Ambassador closely informed of the
/progress

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

progress of our discussions with Smith. I hope very much that you will feel able to intervene in this way and to do so publicly since your message would then have the maximum effect on the Rhodesian public.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 4, 1965
Monday/5:00 pm

32
✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Rec'd Oct 5
me 4/2m

There is increasing mention in the Indian press that the US is holding back PL 480 to a month by month basis to exert pressure for a Kashmir settlement. This has already been picked up by Selig Harrison in the Sunday Post.

It's understandable how this theme could develop, but against our interest to have the Indians think it is indeed the case. The best way to counter it is to put out on background the attached story that our PL 480 holdup really arises from our discouragement with India's own agricultural effort (which is quite true).

We doubt that this counter will quite blanket the "pressure" theme (though it will help). Also, it will lead to accusations that we're using PL 480 to force India to change its agricultural policies. In fact this could boomerang and undermine our own quiet efforts to do just that, beside hurting people like India's top-notch Agriculture Minister Subramaniam (who wants changes too). But these risks are far less than those of being tagged with using food to force India to disgorge Kashmir.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-432
By iso, NARA Date 9-25-98

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer
m.f.B.

BACKGROUND GUIDELINES

There are growing allegations in the Indian press (and some reflection in the US press) that the US is using PL 480 food as an instrument of pressure for a Pak/Indian political settlement. To the extent that this allegation is raised again, we wish to counter it by backgrounding along the following lines:

The basic reason why US has not yet made another long-term PL 480 agreement with India, but is instead extending existing agreement for brief periods, is US uncertainty as to India's own agricultural plans. For some time now US officials have become increasingly concerned over India's difficulty in coming to grips with its great agricultural deficit. Some experts even claim that India has used massive PL 480 availabilities as a crutch to avoid facing up to this growing problem.

Unless more effective steps are taken to increase agricultural production and control population growth, the food needs in India will in the years ahead be beyond our capacity to meet. We want to be sure the PL 480 program does not operate as a crutch in the Indian agricultural situation rather than stimulating the efforts needed to bring about sharp increases in Indian agricultural production. Against the background of these concerns, the US Government has felt that there must be greater self-help on India's part to complement any new longer term US PL 480 agreement. For example, India badly needs to increase its fertilizer production several fold.

There have been encouraging signs that the Indian planners and Agriculture Minister Subramanian are fully aware of these problems and equally anxious for agricultural reform. However, we do not yet have the new Indian 5-Year Plan which will provide the best index as to India's longer term plans. Moreover, the fighting which recently broke out on the subcontinent seems to have made it difficult for the GOI to proceed with its own planning on the previous schedule.

Until all these matters have been sorted out, the US has been proceeding on the basis of a series of short-term agreements in order to continue to be in a position to assure the steady flow of commodities to India. In so doing, the US is making sure nobody goes hungry. Wheat shipments are proceeding normally under the terms of existing agreements. Shipments are at the usual rate and there has been no hold-up.

US handling of PL 480 to India has nothing to do with pressure for a Kashmir settlement. In fact the Indian two-year agreement expired 30 June '65, and the first two month extension was signed in July, both well before the recent extensive Pak/Indian fighting began.

10/4/65

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, October 4, 1965, 10 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Underground Nuclear Test at Amchitka Island

The second quarter DOD-AEC underground nuclear test package that I checked with you orally included the LONG SHOT test, which you approved last March to be carried out late in 1965. About October 19, DOD will detonate an 80 KT device at a depth of [REDACTED] on Amchitka Island in the Aleutian Chain. [REDACTED]

DOD and AEC, with the concurrence of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests (ACDA, AEC, BOB, CIA, DOD, JCS, State, and OST), have certified that the test can be conducted as planned within the terms of the Test Ban Treaty and without danger to people and property or significant effects on plants and animals. The test has been cleared with the Governor of Alaska and appropriate Alaskan State officials, the Alaskan Congressional delegation and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Secretary of Interior has been consulted and does not object.

At Geneva in September, the U. S. promised to furnish interested governments data resulting from the LONG SHOT test as a part of our effort to advance the comprehensive test ban. The capitals bordering the Pacific, including Red China (through Warsaw), were given copies of our March press release announcing our intention to conduct the test and our Embassies were given guidance on the handling of inquiries from host governments. Governor Egan also issued a press release. DOD has remained in continuous touch with the Alaskan State officials and are currently satisfied that they still support the test. DOD is in close coordination with State and ACDA with respect to the actual date of the event to ensure that a last minute political judgment is exercised prior to the detonation.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-193
By lig, NARA, Date 8-15-89

We have a special public relations problem with some of the wildlife conservationists who are protesting against the test since Amchitka turns out to be a preserve for sea otters. The Fish and Wildlife Service has reviewed the problem and agrees with the DOD that the test will not endanger the sea otter colony on Amchitka. The conservationists who have expressed concern are being informed of this fact as well as of the peaceful and scientific nature of the test.

DOD will supply us with an up to the minute information program, including a public release and questions and answers, immediately before the event.

m. G. B.
McGeorge Bundy

Monday, October 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Press Contacts, Week of 27 September - 3 October

On September 29 I saw Jack Sutherland. After discussion with Bill Moyers, we worked out with him a long U. S. news interview with Professor Lucian Pye of MIT, who is both well informed and helpful on Vietnam, and Sutherland came in simply to express the magazine's thanks for what they regard as an outstanding interview. It will be published on October 11.

On September 30 I talked to Werner Imhoof of Neue Zuercher Zeitung. He is in many ways the Dean of continental correspondents here. He wanted to talk about European problems, and since we agreed at the start that the subject is not yet ripe, not very much happened.

On October 2 I had quite a talk with Joseph Kraft. He had been seeking an interview for several weeks, and I thought it better to agree to listen to him than to cut him off entirely.

Kraft also began with the European problem. He has always been interested in the HNF/MLF problem, and he is quite knowledgeable about it. I told him that this was very much an open subject, not a closed one, and that we continued to be interested in what the real desires of our European friends would turn out to be. I pointed out that Chancellor Erhard might well have to choose between a Common Market bargain with General de Gaulle and a strong position on the nuclear issue, and that we could not make this choice for him.

Kraft moved on to economic issues, and startled me by trying to build a case for 1966 as a year of great economic decisions. He suggested that money and food and aid and the Kennedy Round might all come to great moments of truth, and he suggested that your speech to the World Bank and Fund might foreshadow a large new aid program. I backed him off this very hard, pointing out the difficulties and uncertainties and delays which necessarily surround problems like money and the Kennedy Round, telling him that the food issue was a very complex and unfinished one in which we had to consider not only our own agricultural problem, but the agricultural efforts of others, and finally that I was sure you were not blowing the trumpet for a major new

Aid program, at this moment, in the light of the great difficulties the existing program is having in Congress. I directed his attention to the strong and contradictory kinds of opposition the program is facing, and stated my own view that it had required every bit of your own influence to keep the program at its existing level and to prevent drastic cuts in the last two years. I hope he was impressed, but I am not sure.

Finally, I tackled Kraft once again on his know-it-all view that the Viet Cong are the key to peace in South Vietnam. I told him that we really had a whole lot more evidence than he did, and that it all went the other way. He said that the people he talked to in the State Department didn't seem to know much about the Viet Cong, and I told him he was talking to the wrong people, and that I would try to find a way to get him unclassified evidence that would change his mind.

Like him or not, Kraft is an important source of information on this Viet Cong point, so that I would like to give him a dose of antibiotics if I can find the way.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, October 3, 1965, 12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Odds and Ends for your New York trip

1. I have done a separate briefing paper for your meeting with the Pope, and leave that aside.
2. Your dinner with Goldberg will possibly lead to a discussion of various issues as they are seen at the UN. I think you are up to date on most of them. The most urgent is the Indo-Pak problem. On this, Goldberg is still working to get a 4-Nation Commission (British, French, Soviet and U. S.). The Soviets are still playing hard to get. If such a Commission is appointed, it might well be that this would be an ideal place to use Arthur Dean, and you may want to have a word with Goldberg about this possibility. Goldberg may want to handle the matter himself, but it is hard for me to see how he can manage his own portfolio and this very complex and special assignment too.
3. I notice that Admiral Rickover is to be along on the party at Liberty Island. You may wish to thank him for a very warm letter he has written you from the USS Simon Bolivar, our 31st Polaris nuclear submarine. The Admiral's letter is full of praise of Bolivar and of the spirit of hemispheric Americanism. You can simply thank him and leave it at that.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

36
✓
Sunday, October 3, 1965, 11:30 AM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

George Ball and Bob McNamara have asked me to report to you that they are holding the naval units assigned to possible evacuation duty in Indonesia at 2 1/2 days steaming distance. This decision is based on two facts:

1. If they go any closer, they will come into waters which are a part of the zone of "confrontation" between the British and the Indonesians, and U. S. units sighted in these waters might be used by the pro-Communist faction to inflame feeling or to justify wild charges in the next few days, in a situation which is still very confused.

2. The danger of open violence seems reduced at the moment -- even as between Indonesians -- and Green has made it very clear that non-Indonesian civilians have been in no danger at any time as long as they behave sensibly.

In this situation, Ball and McNamara agree that the risk of giving pro-Communists political ammunition outweighs the need for moving closer at this time. Obviously, if you feel differently, they can change the orders.

m.p.s.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By *ju*, NARA, Date *2-18-94*

MEMORANDUM

37

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, October 3, 1965, 11 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Talking Points with the Pope

I attach Dean Rusk's memorandum of talking points, and I will try to give a summary in this covering note.

A. Points that can be on the record and reported later by Bill Moyers

1. The Pope is here to emphasize his interest in peace and in the United Nations as an instrument of peace. You and he can certainly agree with emphasis on this subject.

As part of this common concern for peace, you may want to emphasize your concern for disarmament. In Bombay last December, the Pope appealed to all nations to divert part of their arms expenditure toward a world fund for relief and medical care. You may wish to say that nothing would give you greater satisfaction and that the whole effort of the United States is to move in this direction just as fast as the actions of others permit it.

2. You and the Pope can surely agree also on the value of informal personal contact like this meeting.

3. The Pope and you can certainly note that this conversation is a natural sequence to the talks which President Kennedy had with the Pope on July 2, 1963.

4. You and the Pope are not discussing diplomatic relations or population control or any of the specific issues for the Vatican Council or the American Congress. (These are the sensitive subjects that reporters may press Bill on, and I think we would want to make an explicit denial on all of them. The one subject you might wish to hedge is population control, where Bill might turn the question and say that you and the Pope obviously expressed concern for improving the lot of the hungry and the poor in every nation.)

B. Off-the-record Points

1. It is of great importance to impress the Pope with our passion for peace in Vietnam, and everywhere else. There have been faint indications that not all Vatican circles are persuaded on this point.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

2. I think you will want to express your appreciation to the Pope for his prompt and effective help in specific situations in Santo Domingo and in Saigon. Archbishop Clarizio in Santo Domingo, and two successive Papal Nuncios in Saigon, have been very helpful to us in tight political situations, and this has been the direct result of the sympathetic interest of His Holiness. We are grateful.

3. You may wish to speak to the Pope about the Alliance for Progress and emphasize the importance which progressive Catholic efforts can have in this area. Some of our people think that the church has been a shade less progressive in Latin America under Pope Paul, and a word from you would be helpful if you think it wise.

4. Our Jewish friends would be grateful if they could be told afterwards that you have expressed appreciation to His Holiness for the efforts of the Vatican Council on the "Jewish guilt" question. The present situation is that the Council will have before it both last year's relatively progressive declaration, and an amended version which is slightly less desirable from the Jewish point of view. We will certainly not wish to choose up sides on this one, and Lee White tells me that the fundamental point is that the Council is dealing with the matter at all. (If time presses, it might be simpler to avoid this very complex subject. Many of the Pope's people will be edgy about any comment at all from Americans.)

5. Cardinal Mindszenty. Properly speaking, the Pope should raise this one, since we are doing a lot for the Cardinal. If he does, you may wish to underline urgently the fact that it really is time for the Cardinal to be removed from our Legation in Budapest. Only the Pope can do it -- and even he will have trouble.

Since you and Bill Moyers are much better judges than I of exactly what should be said after this meeting, I have not attempted a press briefing paper. Instead, I have given Bill and Jack Valenti copies so that they will know the diplomatic background as I understand it.

M. J. B.

McG. B.

4209

37a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1965

RECEIVED
McGEORGE CONROY'S OFFICE

15202

1965 SEP 27 AM 11 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Pope Paul VI

Pope Paul's main purpose in coming here is to emphasize his interest in peace and to demonstrate the importance he attaches to the United Nations as a peace agency. In addition, he no doubt welcomes this occasion to renew personal contact with you without the protocol complications of an official visit. From our standpoint, this meeting provides a useful opportunity to make sure he understands our social objectives both domestically and abroad, and particularly in Asia and Latin America.

In discussing the Pope's peace mission and the prospects for any constructive UN action to halt the arms race, you may wish to refer appreciatively to the Pope's personal efforts in this field, including his public appeals concerning the Congo, Vietnam, and, most recently, Kashmir. You might also refer to the helpful activities during the Dominican crisis of the Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Clarizio.

It is important that Pope Paul fully appreciate your personal dedication to peace, particularly with regard to Vietnam, and I therefore suggest that you outline the efforts we have already made to achieve a settlement there, emphasizing our readiness to talk at any time.

In view of the widespread interest in the United States in the outcome of the Ecumenical Council, you may wish to point out that recent developments in the Council, especially the preliminary vote on religious liberty, have been very favorably received here.

I assume

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ (EXDIS)
ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-371

By isg NARA. Date 8-18-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET (EXDIS)~~

- 2 -

I assume that Pope Paul will not wish to discuss the establishment of formal diplomatic relations before this question is explored at a lower level. To limit the inevitable press speculation on this subject, I propose that any communique issued after the meeting indicate that you met the Pope in his capacity as an eminent religious leader and not as a Chief of State.

Attached to this memorandum are additional suggested talking points and a biographical sketch.


Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking points.
2. Biographic sketch.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET (EXDIS)~~
ATTACHMENT

10-1-65
4-05P

5

38

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(1)

Saturday, October 2, 1965, 4 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: New Ambassador in the Dominican Republic

Bunker, Mann, Vaughn, and I had a huddle after our meeting, and subject to some further checks, our preferences sorted out as follows:

1. Arthur Dean (assuming you really wanted to press him to do this job until after the elections -- I confess to a lingering doubt that this is a good allocation of resources, but I have no doubt whatever of his ability to do the job)
2. Allan Stewart -- assuming his medical examination allows it. This matter will be pursued during the week end.
3. John Crimmins -- Crimmins is the Director of the Cuban Task Force in the Department, and is an uncommonly tough, savvy and experienced professional, even though he has not held an Ambassadorial appointment before.
4. John Burnett -- This is Vaughn's preference, and you told me to learn more about him. Unfortunately, he is out of the country at the moment, but I will keep after it and do some checking meanwhile.

We will have dossiers and details on these people by early next week.

mf. B.
McG. B.

Saturday, October 2, 1965, 9 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Castro and Cuban Refugees

As you know, Castro has now twice announced his readiness to allow refugees to leave Cuba. The first time we said that it was a vague offer, and we would need to know whether he was serious. The second offer is somewhat more concrete, and says that we can check it through our diplomatic channels (the Swiss) if we want to.

The problem has been reviewed intensively in the last two days by senior officials of State, Justice, HEW, and CIA. There is unanimity that we should make clear our readiness to accept Cuban refugees. They will pose problems of screening and welfare, and there is also a problem of sentiment in Florida where the bulk of the burden has fallen in the past. But these difficulties are wholly outweighed by the fact that neither at home nor abroad can we accept the notion that our interest in refugees is a bluff and that we really don't want them.

After agreeing on this basic position, we have checked sentiment through Larry O'Brien. He told us that Congress would be strongly favorable but that we should take particular care with the Florida delegation. So last night I talked to Smathers, and he in turn talked to Holland and to Pepper and Fascell. Smathers himself was strongly favorable, and has already issued a statement supporting the admission of refugees. He has reported that Holland and Fascell support his position. When he also reported that Pepper was withholding judgment, I called Pepper myself (he is an old friend from Harvard money-raising days), and he has now agreed that there is no other course. He does plead with us to make energetic provision for the prompt resettlement of additional refugees so that the burden on Miami will be minimized.

Our recommendation is that any announcement of our continued readiness to accept refugees should give priority to two classes:

1. Those who are joining the rest of their immediate family -- either children to parents, parents to children, or husbands and wives to each other;
2. Political prisoners. The experts are divided on whether Castro will release his political prisoners, but we think the heat should be put on him in any case.

The State Department has an excellent Cuban Coordinator (John Crimmins), and HEW is well organized under Wilbur Cohen. They would plan to re-activate their Miami reception center, and would expect to be able to take up to 5,000 refugees a month, beginning very promptly

This operation needs no funds at this session, but it would be helpful with the Florida delegation if we could indicate readiness to ask for a supplemental promptly in January, if it is needed. There is fear in Florida that the costs of refugees may fall on the state and city, just as there is fear that there may be labor competition from Cubans, although in fact the existing Cuban refugees have been assimilated extraordinarily well, so that there is no abnormal unemployment in the Miami area at present.

It has been suggested that you might wish to reaffirm this fundamentally unchanged policy toward Cuban refugees as you sign the Immigration Act tomorrow. To provide a base for this, if you wish to do it, Ramsey Clark is checking sentiment in the judiciary committees which also have an interest in the refugees. He fully expects a favorable answer and will be reporting back this morning.

Thus there are three questions on which we need your judgment:

1. Do you approve a reaffirmation that it is U. S. policy to accept properly screened Cuban refugees?
2. Do you approve the recommendation that priority should be given to the reuniting of families and to political prisoners?
3. Do you wish to announce this policy yourself tomorrow, or have it announced by the State Department -- presumably today?

McG. B.

Policy approved _____

Policy disapproved _____

Priorities approved _____

Priorities disapproved _____

Announcement in my speech _____

Announcement by State Department _____

Friday
October 1, 1965
12 noon

41
File

41
✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached FBIS recording of the Djakarta Radio shows that the Army has hit back at the September 30 group. The Army evidently has the Djakarta Radio, but who is in charge elsewhere is wholly unclear.

McG. B.

41a
FBIS 81 OUT OF TURN (SUB FOR 78)

INDONESIAN ARMY ANNOUNCEMENT

DJAKARTA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN INDONESIAN 1346Z 1 OCT 65 B

(TEXT) WE EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE TO GOD ALMIGHTY THAT WE, RADIO REPUBLIC INDONESIA, HAVE BEEN LIBERATED FROM COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY CONTROL BY OUR ARMED FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY LOYAL AND RECOGNIZE ONLY BUNG KARNI AS THE GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION.

WE WILL NOW PRESENT AN ANNOUNCEMENT.

ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 27/PENGUMUMAN/PUSANT/SIXTY FIVE (PENGUMUMAN MEANS "ANNOUNCEMENT," PUSANT MEANS "CENTRAL"--ED.):

1--ON 1 OCTOBER 1965 AN INCIDENT OCCURRED WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT BY A COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHICH CALLED ITSELF THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT IN DJAKARTA.

2--THEY KIDNAPED A NUMBER OF HIGH OFFICERS, NAMELY,

A--LIEUTENANT GENERAL A. YANI;

B--MAJOR GENERAL SUPRPTO;

C--MAJOR GENERAL (S. KARMAN);

D--MAJOR GENERAL HARJONO (M.P.);

E--BRIGADIER GENERAL PANDJAITAN;

F--BRIGADIER GENERAL SUTOJO;

3--THEY WERE ABLE BY FORCE TO GAIN THE USE OF THE DJAKARTA STUDIO OF RADIO REPUBLIC INDONESIA AND THE DJAKARTA CENTRAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE.

4--HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT-SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLICAN ARMED FORCES, GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION BUNG KARNI AND HIS HONORABLE COORDINATOR MINISTER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY GENERAL A.H. NASUTION WERE BROUGHT TO SAFETY AND ARE IN SOUND AND HEALTHY CONDITION.

5--THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY IS FOR THE TIME BEING IN THE HANDS OF MAJOR GENERAL SUHARTO, COMMANDER OF KOTRAR (COMMAND FOR THE RETOOLING OF THE APPARATUS OF THE REVOLUTION--ED.).

6--THE GENERAL SITUATION IS AGAIN UNDER CONTROL AND SECURITY MEASURES ARE BEING ACTIVELY CARRIED OUT. THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS URGED TO REMAIN CALM AND CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE TASKS AS USUAL.

THIS WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE ARMY INFORMATION CENTER.

DJAKARTA, 1 OCTOBER 1965.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, INFORMATION CENTER.

1 OCT 1502Z HMS/AC

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 1, 1965
12:00 ~~am~~ noon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report from Quayle in Saigon

1. You will be interested to know that we have a message from Quayle in Saigon saying that he has cleared the rails for a pilot polling exercise. He has made tests which indicate that the chances for success are good. He has evidently converted Lodge who, he says, has been "most helpful." He has obtained Vietnamese approval at a Cabinet meeting and he expects the field work to go on through November, with a final report available after the first of the year.

2. So this is a case where your persistence has paid off, with a particular assist from Bill Moyers at a time when Lodge was quite resistant. But it is also one more proof that when Lodge knows what we really want, he tries to help.

McG. B.
McG. B.

If Quayle's operations come to public notice -- as they well may because of the fact that his people will have to conduct a number of interviews with Vietnamese citizens -- and also because Quayle himself is a well-known public figure -- our position will be that Quayle is conducting experimental interviews on his own initiative in order to test their practicability so that he can respond with more authority to inquiries which he has received from Zorthian's office about the usefulness of public opinion sampling in the overall informational program in Vietnam. This is not perfect, but it is the best we have been able to do in the circumstances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

bcc to Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-121
By sig NARA, Date 6-8-89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 1, 1965, 7:25 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

✓ 28 43
Rec'd 7:44pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Balance of Payments Contingency Planning

The Cabinet Committee met yesterday afternoon to discuss the latest projections for the rest of '65 and for '66, and the proposals of the various departments for possible tightening of your program. Joe Fowler's report will be over shortly, but you might wish to have a preliminary indication of where we are.

We have not yet come to any final conclusions -- work is still going on -- but it was generally agreed that:

1. The best evidence suggests that our 1965 performance, taken as a whole, and excluding money transferred to the British, is likely to be much better than we forecast in January - February. The only really disturbing component has been direct business investment. (None of the British transfer reflects the recent support package. It consists mostly of a draw-down of last year's swap and Ex-Im loan, and a partial cashing in of their portfolio of U.S. securities.)

2. However, even in the absence of another scare like the one last January, we cannot afford to sit on our hands. If we take no action, the deficit during the second half of 1965 is likely to be appreciably larger than during the first six months. We are working on three fronts:

(i) Quick-fix operations to reduce the 4th quarter deficit. Charlie Schultze, working with Defense, will be doing the sort of job on the December outflow that he does on the June budget figure. (Needless to say, this largely cosmetic operation is even more sensitive than the rest.) Also, Joe Fowler will start talking with the British tomorrow about limiting their drawings and transfers during the rest of the year. We'll have a go at the Canadians about their borrowing in New York after their elections.

(ii) A serious tightening especially of the Commerce Program Even on a pessimistic view, the evidence does not now justify a shift to a mandatory program with sanctions. But we do need much sharper criteria, and much

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

fuller reporting by the companies of what they are doing. Jack Connor and his people are hard at work on this, and will consult with his advisory committee. Jack is perfectly clear that he has got to move.

(iii) Contingency planning The current forecast may still be too optimistic -- we have to hedge our bets. Joe Fowler and all your other principals and experts know and share your view that we cannot afford another serious deterioration in the balance of payments. Thus on an absolutely top secret basis, we are preparing a full-blown contingency package in case we run into real trouble.

Timing On most of the fourth quarter quick-fix operations, we should be ready in a week or two. (Those which involve negotiations with the British and Canadians will take longer.) None will require Presidential involvement.

Recommendations for tightening Connor's program will be on your desk during the last week in October at the latest. I agree with Fowler and Connor, and so do Ackley and Schultze, that this is not too leisurely a schedule. Getting a revised program in shape and working it out with the key business people takes time. The risks of too hasty and therefore faulty action outweigh the risks of a 3-4 week delay. Nothing is more likely to produce a hot-money crisis than an emergency atmosphere generated by the government.

In the meanwhile, we'll be taking two preliminary steps early next week. On Monday, the Fed will announce that the base for calculating the banks' 1966 target will remain what it has been: the volume of credit outstanding on December 31, 1964. (There has been speculation that we will shift to a higher base which would tend to penalize the most cooperative banks and might suggest that we are in a mood to relax the bank program for 1966. The proposed Fed announcement is at Tab A.)

In his Tuesday speech to the American Bankers Association, Joe Fowler will try (i) to reassure the business community that we are not about to impose mandatory controls (this to minimize the threat of a panicky shift of corporate money to Europe, without really tying our hands) and (ii) to, nevertheless, warn them that the voluntary program needs beefing up (something they already expect). His proposed language is at Tab B; we'll be working on it over the weekend.

Security All internal papers having to do with balance of payments ^{statistics and} policy will be classified secret and handled on a strict need-to-know basis. This is not likely to stop Slevin, Bartlett, et al, but it should make things somewhat more difficult for them.


Francis M. Bator


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FEDERAL RESERVE ^{43b}

press release

HAPP-INFO-NOTE
43-b

Advance for release in morning
newspapers, Monday, October 4, 1965

October 1, 1965

U. S. commercial banks, cooperating in the Federal Reserve-administered program for voluntary restraint of foreign credits, reduced their foreign loans and investments by another \$200 million in July and August, it was announced today.

J. L. Robertson, who is conducting the program for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, praised the cooperation of the banks and other financial institutions for making the program even more successful than might have been anticipated in its objective of helping to achieve the improvement the President has called for in the U. S. balance of international payments.

Governor Robertson said that the July-August developments, coming on top of a \$300 million reduction in the second quarter that already had offset most of the \$400 million increase in this year's first quarter, leave the banks with a leeway of \$575 million, as of August 31, under the suggested target level.

Of the banks reporting in August, he added, there were only 45 whose foreign claims were in excess of the target--which is set at 105 per cent of the amount of each bank's foreign credits outstanding on December 31, 1964--and then only by a total of \$75 million. Every bank is expected to bring its total foreign credits within its target figure not later than March, 1966.

Respecting the future of the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program, Governor Robertson said that despite the progress which has been made, we must persevere in the program of restraint until equilibrium is attained in our balance of payments.

He said that the program presently administered by the Federal Reserve would need to be extended through 1966. While it is too early to determine what might be an appropriate objective for next year, or what changes in detail might be desirable, he said that any target for next year will continue to have as its base the December 31, 1964, outstandings of each financial institution - bank or non-bank. Any other approach would penalize those who have been the "best performers" of 1965.

43C

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DRAFT

This is draft of comment Secretary
Fowler proposes to include in his speech
to the ABA on Tuesday, Oct. 5, 1965 ^{10/1/65}

~~SUGGESTED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE PROGRAM FOR VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT
OF THE MOVEMENT OF CORPORATE FUNDS
ABROAD~~

I was very pleased to learn this week that our voluntary program aimed at restricting the outflow of dollars from U.S. banks to foreign holders is continuing to show very good results: for the first eight months of the year banks have held their dollar placements abroad to \$_____ less than in the first eight months of 1964.

Without this reduction, our balance of payments position would be worse by that same amount. With this reduction, our balance of payments position is that much better than it would otherwise be. So this program is helping the country in very real and measurable terms to achieve the great national objective of bringing our international accounts into balance. The nation's banks, and the

Federal Reserve System which is managing this part of the program for voluntary restraint of foreign investment, are certainly to be congratulated. They should, and I know they will, keep up this good work/.

I am sure also that we are going to see good results from the part of the program aimed at voluntary reduction of the funds placed abroad by other businesses, chiefly as direct investments. The reports so far show a continued rise in foreign investment. But this reflects in part at least the fact that the companies doing business abroad already had commitments when our program went into effect that they could not ignore or substantially change.

They have given evidence of their support of the program by bringing home some \$_____ funds that they had on deposit abroad. We are taking a new look at this picture, and examining

- 3 -

what, if any new measures of a voluntary character should be taken,
including the possibility of a guidelines program.

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Friday, October 1, 1965
3:00 p. m.

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TO McGEORGE BUNDY

FROM: Bill Moyers

President said not to go this route.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

44c

October 1, 1965

TO McGEORGE BUNDY

FROM: Bill Moyers

I agree.

*Pres
10-1-65 10:08a*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Pres said not to go
this route*

44a

Friday, October 1, 1965, 8:50 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached story in this morning's Post shows that the inevitable and necessary consultations about a new private foundation have begun to hit the papers. They are not the result of any conversation whatever with the press by anyone here. Primarily, they are the product of the Kennedy Hearings which Halloran has been covering. In these hearings, Senator Kennedy has repeatedly asked witnesses about the usefulness of a new private foundation, and since we have been laying the groundwork with literally dozens of representatives of private agencies, they have inevitably talked about these plans both at the hearings and elsewhere.

Since in fact the whole exercise is open and above board, I see no harm whatever in this kind of story, which is accurate and has the incidental effect of taking the lead from Hilsman's blast. I do think it means we ought to get our own planning firm.

I continue to feel that our best course is to make an announcement the next time you have a press conference. I do not think we need to take the time for a separate appointment with Howard Rusk and volunteer agencies, but I do think an undertaking should be launched with your direct endorsement. My impression is that this means that we should plan for an announcement some time next week and I will proceed on that basis, keeping in touch with Bill Moyers.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachment

U.S. Eyes Joint Effort To Help Viet Refugees

By Richard Halloran

Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is considering a high-level organization that would pull together American private and Government aid to rapidly mounting numbers of war refugees in Vietnam.

Informed sources said yesterday that part of the plan under consideration calls for setting up an American-South-east Asia Foundation. This would help coordinate the work and fund raising of private voluntary agencies.

The plan is a result of recommendations made to President Johnson by Dr. Howard Rusk, head of the New York Center for Rehabilitation, and Abba P. Schwartz, head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in the State Department.

Rusk and Schwartz visited Vietnam in early September at President Johnson's request and submitted their report to him about Sept. 18.

The refugee flow, largely from the highlands to cities on the coast, has been swelling since the war was intensified in February. It is estimated that 600,000 people have been displaced so far and that about one million will need help before the year ends.

In Congress, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's subcommittee on refugees is winding up its hearings, which started in July. Yesterday, the committee heard Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, and Wesley Fishel, a professor at Michigan State University and longtime adviser on Vietnamese affairs.

Kennedy has been holding the hearings, an aide said yesterday, to focus attention on the refugee problem. He said that the State Department and the Agency for International Development had been slow to recognize the problem and not much had been done about it.

An AID official pointed out yesterday that in the last two weeks, a refugee division has been set up within the AID mission in Saigon.

In testimony yesterday, Hilsman called the large-scale bombing in South Vietnam a tragic mistake that has alienated the people and made the task of winning a political victory difficult.

Hilsman said Vietcong terror was not responsible for driving South Vietnamese from their homes. "It was American and Vietnamese bombing and shelling," he said.

This means that a great effort must be made to win the allegiance of these people, Hilsman said, "precisely because of their initial resentment."

Hilsman urged a massive program to train the refugees as village defenders, schoolteachers, medical technicians, agricultural advisers, and skilled laborers, in addition to providing relief services.

Fishel disagreed with Hilsman on the cause of the refugee problem but agreed that it is critical and demands immediate attention.

If the problem is badly handled, he said, it will only add to political instability.

Fishel urged efforts to resettle the refugees in the Mekong Delta, where he said

hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile land are idle.

He also said that since February 31,000 Vietcong have voluntarily defected. Of these, 5300 were soldiers, the others propaganda agents, couriers, and other supporters.

Fishel said that the possibilities of encouraging defectors are not being properly exploited by the Saigon government.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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44-d
COPY FOR MR. MOYERS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SANITIZED

File
45


Friday, October 1, 1965
10:50 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Herve Alphand's farewell call, 11:45 a.m., Oct. 1

1. It is understood on both sides that this is a purely farewell visit, and I am quite sure that from our point of view it is best to keep it that way. We have nothing to add to the conversations between de Gaulle and Ball, and Bohlen and Pompidou.



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3.



4. Alphand will be accompanied by John Leddy and Lloyd Hand.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-121
By inf, NARA, Date 6-8-89