

Fri., Oct. 1, -765, 7:30PM

46

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a draft message from
you to the International Conference
of the Red Cross in Vienna.

We hope that this conference can
be kept on a high humanitarian plane.
A message from you ^{surely} may help.

The opening session is tomorrow
at 1 PM our time.

McG. B.

Ok to send ✓
Speak to me

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONBy cb, NARA Date 6-7-00
October 1, 1965
Friday/ 6:00 pm~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Affairs. The situation is still confused. The cease-fire is still tenuously holding as more UN observers appear on the scene. But the latest Indian attack in the Chaamb sector is thoroughly arousing the Paks, and could lead to resumption of full-scale hostilities. We're pressing the SYG to act.

In any event withdrawal to the 5 August positions will be a tricky matter. The UK believes the UN must press for it immediately, lest the war erupt again. The British feel the SC must take a tough stance, including sanctions if needed. But the Paks are insisting that withdrawal go hand in hand with the creation of machinery for Kashmir settlement. India's counterploy is to hint that the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line is no longer valid.

Meanwhile Goldberg is conferring about an SC Commission of the four big powers (US, USSR, UK, France) to help the SYG work out a Kashmir settlement. The USSR is reluctant, and the Indians too.

Pak Attitudes. Ayub's attitude toward us seems to have hardened; we're not quite sure why. But he's now made clear he can't come here for 6-8 weeks at least; perhaps he wants to soften us up first through such devices as the squeeze on our installations.

Meanwhile, the Paks are allowing the almost wholly government-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-Chicom sentiment in Pakistan. Our Embassy and USIA report US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner, and lose his ability to move back toward us even if he decides to do so. There is also a distinct risk that the frustrated die-hards may yet force Pakistan to go the Chicom route, even at the cost of US support. We are simply not in effective communication with Ayub at this critical moment, so if he's unable to come here it may now be important to send someone there.

Pressure on US Installations. The Paks have now closed up practically everything [REDACTED]

3.4(b)
(1),(6) [REDACTED] But this was three weeks ago, so the consensus still is that the Paks are pulling a pressure play on us. Ball is still considering what retaliatory action, if any, to recommend; some argue that this is no time to goad the Paks further lest we help push them off the deep end, while others feel that a prompt, quiet reaction would cool the Paks off rather than the reverse.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

Indian Attitudes. Embassy Delhi emphasizes that Indian success has united the nation and produced a new surge of nationalist fervor. Bowles and his UK colleague flatly assert that in this mood the Indians are highly unlikely to compromise on Kashmir. Instead continued hold-up of US aid is rapidly being interpreted as political pressure on India to give up Kashmir.

Embassy Delhi contends that if we hold up everything much longer it will dangerously stimulate the growing sentiment to go-it-alone in Delhi, which will only benefit the Soviets. According to Bowles, we face a critical opportunity either to maximize US influence in a newly self-reliant India or to face a rapid decline in this influence and an accelerating shift towards the USSR.

We here feel that Bowles' fears are probably premature, but that we do face a growing dilemma. There is little doubt that our decisions at this moment of truth in both India and Pakistan can have basic implications for our future influence for many years to come. We are trying to get the basic issues formulated to put before you, because we inevitably face some decisions shortly, whether or not Shastri or Ayub come here.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

M. J. B.

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1965

Juanita:

Mr. Bundy said to send this up
for the President's night reading.

Dolores

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jm, NARA, Date 2-6-98

(2)
MR 9/30
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 29, 1965

8:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Perhaps imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would present us with certain problems. The UK must react strongly, under pressure from its African Commonwealth members. Firm US support of the UK seems warranted: (a) UDI is both legally and morally wrong, (b) our UK ties argue for helping them in a tough situation, which threatens them economically and politically; and (c) almost all Afro-Asians oppose UDI, and will be watching the US as well as UK response. With the UNGA on, we need African votes. We have told the UK that we'd consider actions they felt appropriate to discourage UDI, and support them when and if Rhodesia declared UDI. The British may ask us to:

- A. Back their request for Security Council support for UK measures against the Rhodesians. Their strategy here would be to pre-empt disruptive Afro-Asian and Soviet Bloc initiatives.
- B. Join in a Commonwealth boycott of Rhodesian tobacco, as well as in other economic measures. This would work little hardship on us, as our trade with Southern Rhodesia is minimal compared to that of the UK.
- C. Join in discouraging intervention by Afro-Asian nations or Rhodesian African nationalists. We might also be asked to help discourage Afro-Asian withdrawals from the Commonwealth over this issue.

Effect of UDI on Zambia. Since Rhodesia shares power and rail transport with neighboring Zambia, the Rhodesians might just cut off these essential services if Zambia reacts violently to UDI. If so, the UK might ask us to help execute a Zambian contingency plan which we are cooperating in developing. The most extreme contingency envisaged is an airlift of Zambian copper out and general commodities in. We've told the UK that the most we could contribute is personnel for manning the essential flight control centers. The plan is designed to help the UK economy as much as that of Zambia.

Immediate actions. State is considering (a) telling our Consul General to issue a statement of the US position to warn off the Rhodesians; (b) sending a high-level US mission to London and possibly Rhodesia for the same purpose. We may be able to help at least marginally to forestall UDI. This memo is to advise you on current planning.

mjs: RWR.
R. W. Komer

Goldberg's views are attached.

~~SECRET~~

48-6

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

September 29, 1965

Ref: London 1311

I am much encouraged with list of actions which UK has under consideration for implementation in event SR proclaims independence unilaterally. I greatly hope consideration of actions which we can take is proceeding urgently and that any list of such actions will be extensive and dramatic.

I also hope we will make certain that it is absolutely clear in advance to GSR that we will take these actions immediately if UDI occurs and that GSR is left in no doubt concerning our determination to do so.

If despite this, and despite presumed knowledge of firm British intentions, GSR proceed with UDI, I hope we will make an immediate statement of non-recognition at highest level. (If UK prefers our statement be made prior UDI, as indicated in London 1321 to Dept., I of course see no objection.) Any such statement should be prepared ASAP and should include not only announcement of non-recognition but, where appropriate, entire list of actions which it should be stated are immediately being placed in effect.

It is clear to everyone that we shall find ourselves in midst of most difficult SC mtg within briefest possible time after UDI. We shall be facing demands for economic sanctions and possibly UN military intervention. Our best equipment with which to enter such meeting would be prior public announcement of US actions, preferably through a Presidential statement.

SR, and particularly threat of UDI, is one of three colonial issues on which feeling among ASAFS runs highest. Reaction on their part in UN in event UDI may be even more violent and emotional than generally anticipated. Only firm action by UK, and concomitantly by US, can mitigate this reaction. It might even abort demands for more serious forms of UN action while chance is given UK measures to have their effect.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Bob Anderson's latest report on the Hill and the Panama Canal

5. Finally, and as a quite separate matter, Anderson said that he thought we ought to know that the atmosphere on the Hill this week is dramatically different from what he found two weeks ago. He said that member after member spoke to him of his fatigue and eagerness to get home, and he says that even some of our best friends are in a resentful mood. I told him that I was sure you knew more about the mood of the Congress than anyone else, but that I would pass this message along.

McG. B.

BY Dust ON 2-24-83

Thursday, September 30, 1965, 5:35 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Charlie Bartlett's Column

I have read the Bartlett column and I have spoken to Francis Bator. Bator has met Bartlett only once in his life -- at a casual luncheon about a year ago. He has not talked with him in any way, shape, or form about the balance of payments or about any other problem. At my instruction, Bator has asked the same question of the one other man in our office who works on the balance of payments, and this young man -- Ed Hamilton -- has never even talked to Bartlett at all.

I would like to add that Francis Bator has been here a year and a half and has learned by heart that we never discuss differences in the Administration with members of the press. The kind of thing which is in Bartlett's column today could not have come from our office, ~~and~~ even if Bator had seen him, ~~it~~ would have felt quite confident in telling you that the whole effort of Bator's interview would have been to prevent this kind of column.

But, as I say, Francis did not talk to him; Hamilton did not talk to him, and I did not talk to him.* No one else in this office has anything to do with the balance of payments.

McG. B.

* As I initial this, I recall that I did have one sentence with Charlie Bartlett at Mary Margaret Valenti's birthday party, but we did not talk any business, ^{from} because he was more interested in talking to Mrs. Johnson than to me, and I was more interested in talking to his wife, Martha, than to him!

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 30, 1965
Thursday/5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Week's Developments in the Near East

The British and French capture the limelight in the Near East this week. But we may find ourselves on the griddle in Turkey as the campaigning for the 10 October election heats up.

Nasser and the UK. A long-prepared British effort to begin mending fences in Cairo ended last weekend in a nasty setback. Some say UK-UAR relations will again be almost as bad as after the 1956 crisis. This may influence London's re-evaluation of its position east of Suez.

Nasser has long since zeroed in on Aden as a key obstacle to his expanding influence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The UK and UAR have clashed over British refusal to recognize Nasser's republican regime in Yemen, over Nasserite efforts to increase influence in the trucial states on the Gulf, and over the UK base in Aden. Recently the Nasser-supported liberation organization stepped up its terrorist activities and assassinated a couple of British officials. The UK has promised independence by 1968, but last weekend to crack down on the terrorists they suspended the constitution.

This sudden move unhappily coincided with a visit to Cairo by George Thomson, No. 2 in the Foreign Office. He had hoped to convince Nasser that the British really would grant independence by 1968. But Nasser refused to see him at the last moment, because London suspended the Aden constitution. We hear that demonstrations are only planned this weekend by pro-Nasserists in Bahrain, the oil-rich site of Britain's only naval base in the Persian Gulf. Our interests are involved because we've relied on the Brits to police the oil-rich Gulf.

Nasser and France. Meanwhile French are busy mending their fences with Nasser possibly to pick up ground they think we and the UK are losing. This French move illustrates how De Gaulle takes advantage of US-UK distress. UAR Vice President Amer arrives in Paris for an official visit 14 October. De Gaulle may offer French aid to fill some of the gap left by the drop in our food shipments. This rumor may represent more Arab wishful thinking than De Gaulle's intent, but the French have a way of dressing up commercial transactions and making the Arabs think they got a good deal.

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Authority NLS 91-40
By gldch, NARA, Date 6/1/92

~~SECRET~~


Page Two

A good example took place last week, when De Gaulle caught Jordan's King Hussein on the rebound from the Arab Summit. Hussein was upset because his Arab brethren had given him only 60 days to buy Western jets or take MIGs. De Gaulle, who couldn't have been more cordial, ordered an immediate offer to sell Mirages. The hooker is that the price is still much higher than the United Arab Command will probably pay, so Hussein will be looking to us to pick up the difference.

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus. Greek PM Stephanopoulos has now won his confidence vote, but we still see prolonged instability in Greek politics. Papandreou is at his demagogic best in opposition, and defection by only two deputies could bring down the uneasy coalition government. The regime's thin majority will make it hard to get moving again toward a Cyprus settlement.

Turk Foreign Minister Isik last week had a soul-searching round of talks here. He pushed for a more active US role in finding a Cyprus solution, including even joint US/Turk planning. However, prospects for renewing Greek-Turk talks seem dim in view of political queasiness on both sides. Ball reminded Isik that Acheson's effort failed precisely because neither government was ready to make the necessary compromises. Meanwhile Makarios goes on quietly eroding the position of his Turk minority.


R. W. Komer



~~SECRET~~

Rec'd
9-30-65
5:25p

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 30, 1965
5:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Roger Hilsman's Crimes


1. After checking around and making sure of my grounds, I called Roger Hilsman and read him the riot act. I found him defensive and unimpressive. He tried to tell me that the UPI story was inaccurate, but I have now obtained a text of his statement, and the UPI story has clearly picked out the lead, which Roger should have known would be the lead -- namely, that he says bombing the south is a tragedy. He told me that he had meant to distinguish between combat bombing and "interdiction," but there is not a shred of such an effort of distinction in his statement. I told him that he had enormously complicated our task, and that I simply could not understand how a man who had served as a colleague could make a statement like this without any preliminary discussion whatever with any of his former associates.

2. I then arranged to have the same tune played at him hard by people he respects, beginning with Averell Harriman and Adam Yarmolinsky, both of whom are very solid and effective on this particular issue of Vietnam -- and both of whom are friends of his.

3. None of this will help much on this particular Hilsman story, but I think we can be sure that the next time he will at least give us a whack at him before he pops off.

4. This raises the more general question of Ted Kennedy's subcommittee, and unless you object, I would like to have words with the Senator from my State about that operation. The refugee problem is a rough one and one which needs attention, but these hearings do not need to be a platform for irresponsibility like Hilsman's.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Go ahead and try your luck with Ted Kennedy  _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Thursday, September 30, 1965
2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This letter of appreciation from Tanzania President Julius Nyerere is to thank you for the medical treatment we provided his older brother over here. *He only arrived, by slow boat, this week.*

As with Mali, Tanzania under Nyerere shows definite signs of turning away from the Chicoms. Our small humanitarian gesture to Nyerere's brother helped contribute to their further disenchantment with the Chinese Reds.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

m-15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANGANYIKA.

7th September, 1965.

Dear President Johnson,

I am writing to convey my personal thanks for the assistance which has been given to my brother, William Nyerere, by you and your people. My brother has told me of the careful attention which he received and the good specialist treatment. Although this was his first time out of Tanzania he was made to feel very welcome. I have great hopes that the treatment which was recommended will restore him to full health.

I would also like to thank you personally for your great courtesy and thoughtfulness in sending a personal letter to my brother shortly after his arrival in your country. This was a gesture which was most unexpected in view of your very heavy responsibilities, and I do appreciate it very much.

With many thanks,

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere.

President Lyndon Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday,
September 30, 1965
12:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Dean Rusk's first report
on his conversation with Gromyko.
We seem to have had more to tell him
than he to tell us. The Secretary's
own summary is in the last paragraph.

Inf. B.
McG. B.

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(1)
MAR 9/30

~~TOP SECRET NOBIS~~

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from Secretary Rusk

We had our first dinner this evening with a second meeting scheduled Friday evening when he returns hospitality. I will report separately on the dinner table discussions on Kashmir and disarmament matters.

Before dinner Gromyko and I had a private talk with no one else present. I told him that following Harriman's discussion with Kosygin, we had taken Kosygin's suggestion and had been in contact with Hanoi for the purpose of exploring possibilities of peaceful settlement and counter proposals on Hanoi's four points. He was much interested, appeared to have been uniformed by Hanoi, and did not press for details on the nature of the contact beyond asking whether a third government was involved -- to which I replied no.

Gromyko refused to acknowledge the basic fact of North Vietnam's infiltration and other action against South Vietnam, but it was quite clear that he surely understood that we knew about such things even if on policy grounds he could not admit it. He said it was his impression that Hanoi could not possibly enter into discussions on negotiations while bombing was going on. His point was that Hanoi looked upon discussion during the bombings as a plea from a position of weakness. I told him that Hanoi was not denying to us the facts of their intervention or the presence of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. I told him we were not asking for conditions because we were prepared to talk while the fighting continued or were prepared to have preliminary discussions about circumstances which would permit more formal negotiations to occur. I told him that we had been unable to get from any communist capital the slightest indication as to what would happen if the bombing stopped. We were not asking this question to raise a condition but were simply asking for a simple factual statement as to what consequences any one could see in the direction of making peace. Obviously, if we stopped the bombing and nothing else happened this would be unacceptable.

Gromyko was much interested in whether contacts with Hanoi had been definitively concluded without result or whether such contacts remained open. I told him that it was my impression that both sides were prepared to renew contact if there was anything interesting to say. His attitude seemed to indicate a hope that whatever channel that was involved would

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-183

By UCLB

NARA, Date 06-06-2013

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

remain open. He did not confirm but did not contradict my remark that there seemed to be some differences of views in Hanoi and that some debate might be going on in that capital.

Under the impact of Chen Yi's Press Conference he seemed less reticent about acknowledging that Moscow has a real problem with China than he personally has been with me in the past. For example, in response to a question from me, he stated "very flatly" that he was confident that if Hanoi came to a conference at which the Soviet Union and the United States were present that Peiping would not use force to prevent it.

It was significant to me that he showed no bluster or threats about the matter of Soviet support for Hanoi that he reflected in Vienna in May.

I hit Gromyko hard on personal attacks on the President by Soviet leaders and propaganda. He wanted to assure us that what had been said "was not intended" to reflect personal disrespect for the President and that he hoped we would not attach undue importance to what had happened. He seemed to take the point, however, and it will be interesting to see whether it makes any difference.

He reflected considerable satisfaction over the fact that we and they had acted together in the Security Council on India and Pakistan affairs. At dinner I asked him whether the Soviet Union was prepared to accept any solution which was agreeable to India and Pakistan, indicating that that was our general attitude, and he indicated that their position was similar to ours.

He went to some pains to emphasize that Kosygin's invitation to Ayub and Shastri to meet in Tashkent was a suggestion and not a demand, that it was made in good faith in an effort to help toward a settlement, and that they did not have anything whatever in the back of their minds except peace in the sub-continent. He specifically asked whether we had advised Pakistan to give a negative reply and I told him that we had not.

My general impression was that Gromyko did not bring with him any instructions to heat up crises on particular points with us, that he did not expect any major break-through in the direction of agreements on important matters, and that he was prepared to be relaxed but direct and businesslike in discussing any matters in which we both are involved. He did not attempt to apply pressure nor did he use threats or any of the normal language associated with the rugged discussions of 1961 and 1962.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
September 30, 1965
12:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is Lodge's report of September 30.
It is focussed properly on political
and security elements rather than
strictly military ones, and is well
worth reading.

h.f.B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET NODIS~~

(Cy of Saigon 1100, September 30, 1965)

Thursday, September 30, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

For The President from Ambassador Lodge

Authority NLS 83-178

Politico-Military

By is, NARS, Date 1-5-84

1. Progress along strictly military lines appears to be considerably ahead of progress along civil and political lines. Yet civil-political progress is utterly indispensable to a successful outcome.
2. For one thing, the majority of Viet Cong are probably still in small groups rather than in main force units and will thus not be reached by the planned military offensives. These small Viet Cong groups cannot be overcome without the support of the population, organized on a precinct basis. If these Viet Cong are not overcome, the worst of the aggression will still be going on, requiring continuing presence of American ground troops.
3. It seems clear that U.S. military can prevent the Viet Cong from taking over the state, can destroy or neutralize main force units, and can destroy hitherto impregnable redoubts. These are very big achievements indeed. But they do not prevent the Viet Cong from continuing to have a disruptive and debilitating effect on the country which would mean that as soon as we left, the Viet Cong would take over again. In other words, a durable result would not have been accomplished.
4. In order to hasten the day when a true precinct organization exists which will destroy the Viet Cong in small groupings, I called a meeting on Monday and presented a working paper for illustrative purposes which was discussed in detail paragraph by paragraph. As a result, there is in the U.S. Mission an organized effort under the chairmanship of Ambassador Porter to help the Government of Vietnam create their own precinct type structure which will enable it to overcome the Viet Cong in small groups.
5. The text of the working paper is as follows:

"In each city precinct and each rural hamlet immediately adjacent to a thoroughly pacified city (i.e. the smallest unit from a public safety standpoint) the following program should be undertaken in the following order:

A. Saturate the minds of the people with some socially conscious and attractive ideology, which is susceptible of being carried out.

B. Organize the people politically with a hamlet chief and committee whose actions would be backed by the police or the military using police-type tactics. This committee should have representatives of the political, military, economic and social organizations and should have an executive who directs.

C. With the help of the police or military, conduct a census.

D. Issue identification cards.

E. Issue permits for the movement of goods and people.

F. When necessary, hold a curfew.

G. Thanks to all those methods, go through each hamlet with a fine tooth comb to apprehend the terrorists.

H. At the first quiet moment, bring in agricultural experts, school teachers, etc.

I. The hamlet should also be organized for its own defense against small Viet Cong external attacks.

J. When the above has been done, hold local elections.

End text of working paper.

6. I believe that all Americans here are pulling together on this--which is the indispensable first step towards getting the Government of Vietnam to move. We now await the appointment of a Minister of Rural Construction (pacification) by Prime Minister Ky -- at which time we are prepared to move in.

7. After the Viet Cong has been overcome by force, both in its large and small grouping, there must be a certain degree of indigenous political development. Otherwise, our defeat of the Viet Cong by force could be followed by a Communist takeover by political means. It could then well be said: The operation was a great success, but the patient died. Tran Van Do, the sagacious Vietnamese Foreign Minister, says:

"If peace were suddenly to return to the land and if elections were to take place soon afterwards, the results would be catastrophic. What would happen if there were to be a ceasefire? The Communists would simply step in to fill a political vacuum."

8. The United States must thus leave no stone unturned politically, working through both the official and the unofficial (but highly influential Vietnamese) to insure that our victory over the Viet Cong by force is not followed by a Communist takeover by politics.

Government of Vietnam

9. The Government shot three Viet Cong ringleaders at DaNang on the night of September 22. The Viet Cong subsequently shot two American military prisoners. The U.S. Mission is actively studying the implications of this tragic subject.

10. Prime Minister Ky went to Hue on September 23 and shared the platform with General Thi, First Corps Commander, who castigated those who caused trouble on the home front while troops were dying in the field. This represents a change in Thi's public attitude.

11. We hear that Ky is planning to make a number of changes in key military posts and in the cabinet in the interests of increased efficiency. The military changes may in fact reflect a response to sentiments expressed by junior officers during the recent Armed Forces Convention in Saigon.

12. While waiting for the Korean Prime Minister's arrival at the airport, Ky talked at length and quite freely with the press. He probably did some injudicious ad-libbing, but the overall impression he gave was one of complete self-assurance.

13. The Viet Cong became considerably more active militarily during the week particularly in Central Vietnam, but so far have taken heavy losses. They seem to be making a major effort along Highway No. 1 north of Qui Nhon.

Economic

14. The Prime Minister and Chief of State put out a decree increasing custom duties on a wide range of goods which should increase annual customs revenues on the order of some 1.8 billion piasters.

15. I have appointed a small economic warfare working group to recommend policy measures to deny needed resources to the Viet Cong and to monitor the execution of such denial programs. This has great potential importance.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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September 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROBERTS

Juanita --

Only the President could say whether he has a favorite Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale, and if so whether he wants to say so for the record in the Hans Christian Andersen collection. If he will indicate his preference, we can easily draft a letter either way.

McGeorge Bundy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 29, 1965, 7:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Foreign Aid Review Once More

I think we are quite near to getting what you want on this review. As I understand it, you are ready to have us go ahead with a Cabinet Committee which will analyze all the available choices, as long as this committee makes sure to take note at the beginning and middle and end of its proceedings of the questions and attitudes of an appropriate review group which will be asked to make separate and wholly private recommendations to you.

On this basis, all we need now is to get a Chairman for the review group. The six names which you approved the other day were:

— { Dean Acheson ✓
Bob Anderson ✓
Gene Black ✓
Clark Clifford ✓
Douglas Dillon ✓
David Rockefeller ✓

As I look at this group, the two who seem the possible Chairmen are Clark Clifford and Douglas Dillon. Acheson has genuinely violent opinions against aid. Anderson has Panama and other New York commitments. Black has the Asian bank and is a slightly weary veteran of these issues. Rockefeller has less direct experience and is something of a Republican New York banker.

Douglas Dillon, though a Republican, has been your Secretary of the Treasury and has the full confidence of all your present administration. He is fresh from six months of rest, and looks like a man of 35 all ready for a heavy job. I think he would be delighted to take this on. Clark Clifford has a very heavy practice and significant other duties with you, but he also has the confidence of your Cabinet and wide experience in seeking out the views of a group of determined men. I think either Clifford or Dillon would be excellent, and so do Bill Gaud and Bob McNamara.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

{ The one name I would ask you to reconsider for inclusion in the committee is that of James Perkins. Perkins is the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of AID, and I think it would be queer if he were not a member of a review group. He is hard-headed and very eager indeed to be helpful to you.

Thus, what we now need is a choice of a Chairman and an answer as to whether Perkins can be included, to make a group of seven.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Sound out Dillon for the Chairmanship_____

Sound out Clifford for the Chairmanship_____

Ok to include Perkins_____

I still prefer not to have Perkins_____

Speak to me_____

P. S. My intent in asking members of this review group to serve would be to tell them that the whole undertaking is totally private and informal, and that if we ever get asked about it, we will simply say that there is no committee and no report and no formal organization of any sort. They are all men whom the President consults regularly about many matters, and that is all there is to it.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(2)

58

Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1965, 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Works of Peace in Vietnam

As I said in our meeting at noon, I asked this morning for a draft statement that you might consider if you had a press conference this week. I now learn from Bill Moyers that such a conference is unlikely.

It may still be of interest to you to look at what might be said, both about Howard Rusk in the first two pages, and about the more general effort in the last three pages of this memorandum. This language can be tightened up, but the ideas seem about right to me.

I will call you in the morning to see whether you would be willing to have such a statement given out after a meeting with Rusk, or in any other way this week.

McG. B.

McG. B.

9/29/65

Proposed Statement

As you know, Dr. Howard Rusk, the noted authority on Physical Medicine, recently went to Vietnam at my request. The purpose of his trip was to review at first hand the medical and refugee problems there. I have read Dr. Rusk's report and have asked him to come to Washington to discuss some of his findings. He is with me now.

On the basis of Dr. Rusk's report I am directing the Agency for International Development to enlarge substantially present programs and facilities in Vietnam for the rehabilitation of disabled veterans. Prime Minister Ky has enthusiastically endorsed this project.

At my request, the World Rehabilitation Fund, of which Dr. Rusk is President, is prepared immediately to purchase the necessary equipment and supplies for the expanded program. It will also make available the services of Mr. Juan Monros, an assistant of Dr. Rusk, to conduct the new training program. There are an estimated 30,000 amputees and many other persons with disabilities resulting from both military action and disease who can be served from this new program.

I have also directed that Air Force evacuation planes be sent to Vietnam to bring to Veterans Hospitals in this country approximately 70 paraplegic Vietnamese veterans. There is presently no adequate facility in Vietnam for the treatment and rehabilitation of these veterans. These men will be accompanied by a cadre of Vietnamese military medical

personnel who will be trained here in techniques of rehabilitation of paraplegic and other severely disabled persons.

/Finally, I am asking a group of leading citizens including representatives of many voluntary agencies to come to Washington next _____ to discuss the problems of human need in Vietnam./

Dr. Rusk /and Mr. Monros/ will be available after our press conference to discuss his program further. (Note: Bracketed portions are "optional.")

Dr. Rusk's program is but one phase of a massive effort under way in Vietnam to build a better future for the Vietnamese people. While the war goes on, the battle to improve the life of the Vietnamese people must also be waged relentlessly. The Vietnamese Government has recognized this challenge and is devoting major resources to the improvement of the life of its people. Over the past decade we have been assisting the Vietnamese in a wide range of economic and social programs.

Let me cite just a few.

The village is the key to Vietnam. This summer more than 5000 Vietnamese students participated in 180 work camp projects in rural areas. An even larger program is planned for next year. Americans in the provinces are working with Vietnamese colleagues to improve agricultural productivity and the development of new crops. Over 100,000 tons of low cost fertilizer were distributed to needy farmers last year, along with improved seed and pesticides. With our encouragement and assistance the Vietnamese Government is attacking the important question of land tenure and administration.

It recently approved a new program for the distribution of over a half million acres.

In education, school enrollment increased to approximately 2 million students this year, as compared with 1,300,000 in 1960. About 2,000 classrooms were constructed this year, and some 7 1/2 million school text books were produced -- written in Vietnamese by Vietnamese educators -- all with major help from the United States.

Despite the rigors of war, industrial development has not been neglected. During the past year, 8 new plants were constructed and 51 existing facilities expanded. We are helping in the development of a major industrial complex, commercial port and model community at Cam Ranh Bay, in Central Vietnam.

In the field of health, we are giving first attention to the improvement of medical facilities, especially in the provinces where the need is the greatest. Programs are under way to support and improve medical and sanitation teams at the village and hamlet level. Another goal is the complete rehabilitation of each provincial hospital with adequate surgical facilities. In 28 of the 43 provincial hospitals, surgical suites have been constructed and 12 are already in operation. American doctors are being brought to Vietnam to help fill the tremendous gap in this area. Forty American doctors and 100 supporting medical personnel are already there.

The needs in Vietnam are great, but let me assure you that no aspect is being ignored, whether it be increased food, housing, clothing and medical facilities for the people in the provinces and cities of Vietnam or whether it be measures to improve the agricultural and industrial productivity of the country.

At great personal risk and sacrifice American teachers and nurses and doctors and engineers and agricultural specialists have been living in the towns and hamlets of Vietnam. Although in earshot and sometimes in the midst of gunfire their efforts and their thoughts are in the direction of the future -- a future of peace and security and of progress.

The dedicated, hand-picked men from the Agency for International Development, the energetic and inspired young people in the International Voluntary Services, and the American students who have spent the summer working in the Vietnamese countryside are a tribute to our tradition of service and an earnest of our intention to help the Vietnamese build for peace in the midst of war and suffering.

As I said not long ago, "It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 23, 1965, 6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Revised Proposal for Reviewing the Foreign Aid Program

You told me the other day that the proposal we had sent forward merely placed foreign aid review in the hands of a lot of people who have already voted and who do not have open minds on the subject. The fact that you feel this way is sufficient reason for doing the review differently because it is of cardinal importance that you yourself should have confidence in the result -- so I will not enter any plea in defense of our recommendation.

It remains true that it is the government agencies which have the best resources for intense staff work on the real structure of an aid program and on the real choices which are available to us. Moreover, these agencies work best when they are working for their Heads -- a principle which you have repeatedly emphasized to us.

So what I suggest is that we combine an intense analysis of choices by our proposed Cabinet Committee with advance advice and continuing review of the work by an outside committee of the men you trust most. My suggestion is that you might want this committee to be small and high-powered, and that you might wish to choose it from among the following possible names:

Clark Clifford ✓
Bob Anderson ✓
Dean Acheson ✓
David Rockefeller ✓

~~James Perkins~~

~~Barbara Jackson~~ (informally, since
she is not a US citizen)

~~Kenneth Galbraith~~

~~Kermit Gordon~~

✓ Douglas Dillon

✓ Eugene Black

These people are of many opinions about foreign aid and I would not suggest that we ask for unanimous advice. I would see their function rather as that of sharpening the choices and the meaning of the choices.

*those with
check ✓ ok
C*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

I have one ulterior motive in proposing a Cabinet Committee which I think I should confess. That is that Bob McNamara feels at least as strongly as I do that the real alternative ^{the} on a foreign aid program is to make it much bigger and better or else to let it gradually die away. We both think the second course would be catastrophic, both politically and morally, and we both believe that a powerful case can be made for a wholly new level of effort -- and that this can be done in a way that will win public and congressional support. (Just as an example, I think McNamara himself would be ready to take on the aid job if this were the plan for its future, and if you told him that you needed him for it).

Since I am in the mood for confession, let me tell you also that I think we have sometimes seemed to have two policies on this whole front in the last four years. We have regularly talked about the obligation of the rich people to help poor people, at the same time that the percentage of our wealth that goes into this whole effort has been declining. I do not think we can have it both ways for much longer, and I myself think we are right when we talk about the obligation. The problem is to turn the ideas of a Barbara Ward into the realities of a Bob McNamara, and it cannot be done without money, marbles, and chalk.

But I put too much of a sermon into what is a procedural memo. If you want to go ahead on this basis, with a committee of wise men watching the proceedings:

If you check the box of approval below, we will go ahead with a committee of review -- and perhaps you would also check the names that appeal to you. Alternatively, I can try again for another framework.

I attach at TAB A my earlier memorandum and Bell's original proposal, in case you wish to review them.

McG.B.
McG.B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, September 18, 1965
4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Review of the Foreign Aid Program

1. As you know, Congress has recommended, and you have agreed, to Executive Branch studies of the aid program to provide a "basis for recommendations as to the future course of U. S. assistance policy."

2. Dave Bell has consulted with all concerned in the Administration and now recommends the establishment of a steering group consisting of Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Freeman, Schultze, Bell, and myself as Executive Secretary. In the attached paper he details the concept and outlines the problem areas, and sets a deadline of November 1 for submission to you.

3. Schultze, Califano, and I have reviewed these recommendations and we agree with them.

4. It would be my objective, as Executive Secretary of this enterprise, to make sure that every alternative is fully explored and that you have an absolutely clear shot at all the choices and possibilities. I would also propose -- with Bell's hearty agreement -- to get informal advice both from his existing advisory groups and from other hard-headed and experienced sources -- and from any individuals whom you wish included. But I agree with Bell and with Rusk and McNamara that this job of analysis is one which your own Administration should do for you, in the first instance. Is this procedure agreeable to you?

McG. B.
McG. B.

Go ahead _____

Speak to me ✓

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

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fairfile.*

SEP 17 1965

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
The Honorable Charles Schultze

This memorandum proposes a concept, a procedure, and a time schedule for this fall's review of the foreign aid program.

In summary, I suggest:

- a rapid but thorough re-examination of the program, which will put before the President, by November 1st, sharply focused statements of the alternatives and the arguments concerning foreign aid in each major geographic area and with respect to each major aspect of the program (economic, military, P.L. 480);
- this work to be done under the supervision of a steering committee, with Bundy as executive secretary and coordinating staff work, and aiming at documents which, with appropriate redrafting and polishing, can be usefully put before the Congress as background for considering aid legislation next spring;
- the November 1st date being set both in the light of the budget schedule and in the expectation that the President would wish, after his own preliminary consideration, to have the issues discussed with appropriate Congressional leaders prior to sending his foreign aid message to the Congress early next year.

Concept

Both the Congress and the President have called for a review of the aid program this fall, preparatory to next year's legislative recommendations. Neither has specified in any detail the nature or extent of the review. The Conference Committee on the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill recommended "a review of the aid program as presently constituted, seeking to direct it more effectively toward the solution of the problems of the developing countries." The President quoted this recommendation in his signing statement and said, "the Executive Branch will, this fall, undertake appropriate studies of the program" to "provide the basis for recommendations as to the future course of U.S. assistance policy."

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-2-

Secretary Rusk added certain elements of specificity in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 12th. The Secretary said that in conducting the review we will give particular attention to the issues raised by this Committee: the number of countries receiving assistance; the requirements for assistance and the prospects for achieving our objectives and terminating assistance; the contribution of other developed countries; and the appropriate relationships between bilateral and multilateral assistance. "

Beyond this, the President has made one commitment with respect to next year's program. In his signing statement on the authorizing bill, he said, "I expect to request that the multi-year principle approved by the Congress in 1961 and 1962 for development loans be extended to the other categories of assistance. "

We have, therefore, a fairly clean slate to write on in determining what kind of review to make. I suggest that the following considerations should be controlling.

1. The fundamental question that should be addressed is: what kind of foreign aid program makes sense in terms of U. S. foreign policy as it is today and as it will be in the future. I think what is troubling the Congress (and the President?) most is whether our present foreign aid policy is in large part an anachronistic holdover from prior and different circumstances. We should meet this point head on, not by trying to defend what we have now, but by facing the question: what do U. S. interests require of us in the way of aid programs for the future.

There are in addition other questions that trouble the Congress and the President, some of which are simply reflections of the main question identified above, but others raise additional issues of method or objective: why do we need aid programs in so many countries? could we not accomplish more, at less cost in foreign and domestic criticism, by putting our aid through multilateral agencies? does it make sense in today's world for the U.S. to provide military aid against external aggression, as distinct from internal subversion? how can we better harness private efforts (here and in the developing countries) to the development effort? And so on.

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2. These are primarily issues of policy, which need to be answered by the President this fall, in determining his budget and legislative recommendations and by the Congress next spring in reviewing same. We have little time for external research, although there may be aspects of the problem on which research should be undertaken for later benefit. At present, we need the best thinking that can be put together for the President's use this fall - and if possible the same materials, appropriately revised, should be made available to the Congress next spring.

3. Accordingly, I believe that what we want from this fall's aid review are analytical papers addressed to fundamental issues - as few papers as possible, and as little encumbered as possible with detail, with standard formulations and with clearances. Nevertheless, the subject is necessarily complex and many-sided. Subject to review by the steering committee suggested below, I suggest assigning preparation of the following papers:

- a general overview, addressing the question how far is an aid program necessary to U.S. foreign policy, what should its objectives be, and roughly how soon can they be realized. This paper should concentrate on the relationships between aid and U.S. foreign policy, and undoubtedly should be organized on a regional basis, (Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia from Afghanistan to Korea), with brief annexes on the eight or ten key countries. It should cover all forms of concessional aid, and suggest the main outlines of a five-year forward program;

- a paper on military aid, summarizing the valuable recent work of Townsend Hoopes, addressing among others the question of arms against external aggression v. arms against internal subversion, and proposing the main outlines of a five-year forward program;

- a paper on the development problem, outlining what we have learned about self-help requirements, widespread private and local participation, and the nature and limits of our influence, addressing the question how rapidly could we expect progress toward self-sustaining growth, indicating the implications for trade and monetary policy, and suggesting the outlines of a five-year forward program;

- a paper on the world food problem, (primarily a sub-category of the development problem, but warranting special treatment), summarizing the valuable recent work of the USDA-AID-BOB task force, and proposing the outlines of a five-year forward program ("The War Against Hunger");

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- a paper on the number of countries problem - that is, primarily, the question of what to do about the fact of so many small countries - indicating the policy and administrative alternatives and proposing a course of action;

- a paper on multilateral versus bilateral aid, summarizing what we know about the relative efficiency of each, the Congressional attitudes thereon, and other considerations affecting our policy choices, and outlining a five-year forward program;

- a paper on the aid programs of other donor countries, summarizing recent trends and forward intentions so far as they are known, and proposing a U. S. policy position toward other donors both as a group and, for major donors, individually.

Procedure

I have suggested an ambitious objective and a tight timetable. Moreover several government agencies are necessarily involved. I suggest the following means for moving ahead:

1. The President to approve the establishment of an informal steering group consisting of: Secretary Rusk (with Mr. Mann acting for him as desired); Secretary McNamara (with Mr. McNaughton acting); Secretary Fowler (with Mr. Barr acting); Secretary Freeman; Mr. Schultze, Mr. Bell, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy as executive secretary and coordinator of staff work. The function of this steering group would be to lay out the work to be done, and to review and discuss the initial products before putting them to the President.

2. The steering group to assign the preparation of papers to individuals in one or another agency. I suggest this method as the most rapid way to obtain clear, hard-hitting issue papers, and not simply mushy institutional products. Individuals so assigned should have the help of people designated from other agencies as may be appropriate, and draw on outside consultants if that can usefully be done in the time available.

3. The main ideas in each paper should be discussed, at such time and in such form as may be convenient, with existing advisory groups such as the General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (Perkins Committee), and the Advisory Committee on Economic Development (Mason Committee). Moreover, preliminary discussions should be held with key

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Members of Congress and Congressional committee staffs to make sure all the issues they consider important are being addressed. All this would be done in confidence, however; I believe any broad discussions with Congress or any public testing of ideas should only occur after the President has had an opportunity to consider the results of the work outlined above.

David E. Bell

David E. Bell

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61

Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1965, 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: The Works of Peace in Vietnam

As I said in our meeting at noon, I asked this morning for a draft statement that you might consider if you had a press conference this week. I now learn from Bill Moyers that such a conference is unlikely.

It may still be of interest to you to look at what might be said, both about Howard Rusk in the first two pages, and about the more general effort in the last three pages of this memorandum. This language can be tightened up, but the ideas seem about right to me.

I will call you in the morning to see whether you would be willing to have such a statement given out after a meeting with Rusk, or in any other way this week.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 29, 1965, 7 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Conversation with Chip Bohlen

I had a good talk with Bohlen today, and he at once said of his own initiative that he had no need to see you on this trip. He agrees with McNamara that the real European questions will come up nearer the end of the year. He will be home on leave at that time, and available at any moment for discussion of tactics with de Gaulle.

Bohlen says that he does not think the General has any clear notion himself of what his tactics will be in 1966 -- always assuming that he runs. Bohlen thinks he will run and win, unless there is some undisclosed illness.

Bohlen thinks we should play it very cool between now and the time the French begin to raise questions, meanwhile making every possible preparation to be able to move firmly in reply.

He does not recommend a trip to Europe in 1965, and his belief is that there is no need for you to go to Europe, for Europeans to know and feel your influence and the influence of the United States. If you do go next year some time, then he recommends a quite brief and very careful and polite visit in Paris, unless -- against his expectations -- there is something on which we can expect to have an agreement with France.

Bohlen went out of his way to say that Joe Fowler had made a first-rate impression in France, and he expressed his agreement with Joe's own view that it was the French who lost by their failure to join in the defense of sterling this year.

Finally, in lieu of a visit, Chip asks if you would put an autograph on this photograph of you giving a Presidential medal to his son Charlie. It might simply go "For Charlie Bohlen, with congratulations."

McG. B.
McG. B.

These don't
write reaction
"to Charlie Bohlen"
with regards 10-1-65

63

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday
September 29, 1965
6:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Developments in Latin America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-232
By up, NARA, Date 1-7-93

The Dominican situation continued to occupy center stage in our hemispheric relations. Further delay in the dismantling of the rebel zone was accompanied by another crisis between Garcia Godoy and the military chiefs. Bunker had to return to Santo Domingo hastily on Sunday to prevent a break. He was successful, but the basic problem of the rebel zone continues. We have asked Bunker to examine with Garcia Godoy steps for the prompt dismantling of the zone. The absence of Bunker from Washington has prevented the OAS from acting on a pending resolution providing for a continued OAS presence in the DR. There is no pressure, however, on the part of the Latin American countries for an airing of developments in Santo Domingo.

Elsewhere in the hemisphere these were the significant developments:

Panama. The initial reaction in Panama to the Joint Statement on canal negotiations has been favorable. It appears to have achieved its purpose of strengthening public confidence in President Robles' ability to negotiate satisfactory new arrangements with the U.S. The political opposition and the Communists are trying to deprecate the statement but are not likely to have much success. The Canal Zone employees took the statement well. They seemed to be resigned to changes in the present system and are waiting to see what the precise changes will be. Press and editorial reaction in the U.S. has to date been generally favorable. Congressional criticism has come from the expected quarters, but expressions of support have more than matched the adverse comment. Additional Senators and Congressmen are expected to comment favorably on the statement in the next few days. In the rest of Latin America the reaction has been quite favorable and has served to take some of the edge off the criticism over the Selden Resolution.

Bolivia. The government succeeded in restoring order in the mining area after the outbreak of fighting on September 11 but ran into difficulty in the capital this past weekend when extremist-led demonstrators tangled with law enforcement units. Several demonstrators were injured. The

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-2-

situation remains tense but the military junta seems firmly in control. Meanwhile, we are moving ahead with the West Germans and the Inter-American Development Bank in the third phase of the operation to modernize the tin mines.

Guerrilla Activities. Mexico had a taste of communist-led guerrilla activity this past week when about 20 guerrillas attacked a small detachment of Mexican troops in the High Sierras of western Chihuahua. The government forces handled the outbreak without difficulty. The incident caused little stir in Mexico.

Guerrilla groups in other Latin American countries continue to be active but are not making any noticeable headway. In Venezuela there has been a decrease in activity as the logistic and morale problems of the guerrillas has increased and the effectiveness of the Venezuelan internal security forces improved. In Colombia there has been some sporadic urban terrorism but the guerrillas have not been able to mount a sustained campaign. In Guatemala the security forces last July pulled off a series of unusually successful raids against subversive hideouts in Guatemala city. Urban terrorism has been negligible since then. In rural areas the guerrillas have not been active. Peru is the only country where the guerrilla movement has been on the ascendancy in recent weeks. The Embassy reports, however, that the counter-guerrilla campaign of the Armed Forces has achieved a measure of success in dispersing guerrilla bands.

There is no room for complacency in dealing with the guerrilla threat, but at the present moment the different guerrilla movements have nothing to crow about and find themselves on the defensive.

British Honduras Mediation. / We informed the British and the Guatemalans yesterday that we would accede to their repeated requests to mediate their dispute over British Honduras. We have been using our good offices since 1963 to bring the parties together. Last month we offered to suggest names of private U.S. citizens to mediate the controversy. Both countries indicated a preference for direct mediation by the U.S. Government. In order to maintain the momentum for mediation and, hopefully, facilitate an eventual solution of the dispute, we have agreed to do this. /

Rio Conference Date Set. The Council of the OAS has unanimously approved November 17 as the opening date for the twice-postponed Rio Conference. The meeting is designed to focus primarily on means for strengthening the inter-American system. Because of the lack of time

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-3-

to prepare adequately for the meeting, we are suggesting that it be held in split session. At the first session the delegations could exchange views on how to improve the system and determine what modifications might be introduced. The Conference would then recess until the spring to allow the Council of the OAS to work up specific drafts for consideration and action at the resumed session. There is a possibility that a consensus might develop to amend the OAS Charter. Secretary Rusk will be taking initial soundings on this approach with the Latin American Foreign Ministers in New York this weekend.

I think it is important to make clear that barring some unforeseen event of major importance, we plan to follow through with the November 17 date. There are some misgivings current that we might urge another postponement if the Dominican situation does not proceed satisfactorily.

Ship Loan Legislation. The Senate last Friday approved a bill authorizing the loan/sale of 3 destroyers to Brazil and 2 to Argentina. Earlier the House had approved the Administration's bill providing for destroyers for Chile and Peru, in addition to Argentina and Brazil, and a submarine for Venezuela. Chile and Peru have already expressed their displeasure at being dropped by the Senate.

The background to the Senate action is that Senator Russell initially was opposed to any ships for Latin America. Secretary Rusk succeeded in persuading him to include Argentina and Brazil. The basis for picking these two countries is their past cooperation in the OAS in the missile crisis and the Dominican situation.

Selden Resolution. The adverse reaction in Latin America to the Selden Resolution was ~~much~~ sharper than anticipated. The congresses in several countries (Colombia, Peru, Chile, El Salvador) passed resolutions denouncing it. The reaction in most cases was highly emotional and based on inaccurate press reports. The criticism has now abated, although we are likely to feel the shock waves for some time to come.

McG. B.

McGeorge Bundy

Cc: Mr. Bill Moyers

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Rec'd
9-29-65
6:50p

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✓ 64

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 29, 1965, 6:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A New Attack on Your Bridge-Building Policy

The major tobacco companies have been under sharp attack by a small group of right-wing economic warriors who want them to stop their small purchases of Yugoslav tobacco. If the tobacco industry gives in to this sort of blackmail, we can expect attacks on many other consumer goods industries which do business with Eastern Europe.

George Ball and Tom Mann^{*} have been urging the tobacco people to stand firm. The companies claim that they can't hold the line without public support from the Government. Specifically, they want a public statement from the Administration that commercial purchases of tobacco from Communist Europe are as much in the national interest as is other peaceful trade.

Ball is meeting with the companies tomorrow morning and needs your approval to make one of the following offers (in return for a hard industry commitment):


1. White House release of a joint memorandum to the President (~~draft at Tab A~~) from Rusk, Fowler, Connor, Freeman, Wirtz and Katzenbach, stating the case for peaceful trade and deploring organized blackmail by organizations bent on stopping such trade. There would also be a one-paragraph Presidential statement approving the sense of the Cabinet memorandum.
2. A joint letter from Rusk, et.al, to the heads of the tobacco companies making the same points but with no explicit reference to the President. (Alternatively, they could state explicitly that their letter reflects Presidential policy.)
3. Authorize Ball to propose alternative #2 (no direct White House involvement) and to offer #1 only if he thinks it necessary to keep the companies from folding.

* also RUSK AND McNAMARA

We all believe that, following on Firestone, this may be a critical test case. We will need instruction from you before George's meeting with the industry at 9:45 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday.



Francis M. Bator



1. Have Ball offer #1: White House release of Cabinet memo to the President _____
2. Have Ball offer #2: Cabinet letter to companies _____
3. Authorize Ball to offer #2 but fall back to #1 if necessary ✓
4. Bundy speak to me _____

*File
9-30-65
10:00am*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ret'd 10/7 65

September 29, 1965

Mr. President:

Although this report from Hanoi
by the British Consul General is
a month old, it is still well worth
reading.

MFB

McG. B.

*I'm also sending a copy to
Arthur Goldberg, as part of our
continuing discussion of this problem.*

650

British Consulate General,
HANOI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 September, 1965

Bohumil Mucha, Czechoslovak Ambassador here, has recently returned from almost two months leave. I called on him this morning and was greeted with much enthusiasm, Czech sausages, beer and brandy.

2. In the course of conversation the Ambassador made the following points:-

(a) I had made some passing remark about Ho Chi Minh. The Ambassador interrupted me to say flatly that all decisions were made without Ho's approval or consent. He was merely a figurehead who appended his signature to "interviews" with the press and appeared in public from time to time. The Ambassador thought that his prestige as "Uncle Ho" was still very high, especially in the Viet-cong held areas in South Vietnam. The Ambassador's remarks were made without hesitation or equivocation.

(b) Since his return to Hanoi he had been struck by the prevailing mood of at least outward optimism shown by some of the North Vietnamese leaders whom he had met. The Minister for Foreign Trade, for example, had told him that the North Vietnamese had carefully studied each and every statement by President Johnson and other American leaders and had evaluated them to mean that the United States was showing signs of giving ground. He cited, as an example given to him by the Vietnamese, the fact that the United States was prepared to see the NFISV as part of a North Vietnamese delegation at any future conference. Why, the Vietnamese ask themselves, do the Americans make so many public pronouncements in their efforts to reach the conference table? Apparently the Vietnamese give themselves the convenient answer that the United States is weakening in its resolve.

The Ambassador also said that it was his personal firm conviction that the North Vietnamese derive much comfort from the peace-seeking efforts of Presidents Nasser, Tito and Nkrumah, Prime Minister Shastri, and, he claimed, some of the Scandinavian leaders. So long as these efforts can be interpreted in some way or other as condemnation of the Americans, the North Vietnamese see them as underlining the correctness

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-247
By SJ, NARA, Date 5-28-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

of one of their favourite theses; that world public opinion is on their side, and that it is only a matter of time... The Ambassador repeated the well-known point that the North Vietnamese were excessively nervous of going to a conference and coming away with less than they hoped for.

(c) The Ambassador was very insistent that the Chinese position in North Vietnam was not as strong as it was, or as some people believed it to be. He did not advance any evidence to support this theory apart from saying that it was own personal opinion, although he said that the amount of aid, both civil and military, now reaching North Vietnam from Eastern Europe was assuming very significant proportions in relation to what the Chinese could provide.

(N. W. Ponsonby)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1965

AGENDA FOR 12:30 MEETING, 29 SEPT.

1. Vietnam

- (1) level of forces
- (2) tear gas
- (3) rice shipments
- (4) possible press conference statement

2. The Dominican Republic

- (1) situation report
- (2) Bunker's return and a second meeting

3. Foreign visitors

4. Pakistan/India

5. Foreign aid review

6. Nuclear testing program

7. Operations against Cuba

8. Fulbright and 50-50 shipping on wheat to Communists

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-184

By CH NARA, Date 11-24-15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ret'd
10/7/65 68

Tues, Sept 28, 1965
8:25 pm

Mr. President:

Just as I was concluding the attached memo on the Dominican Republic, we received a Flash message from Bunker saying that the immediate crisis has been dealt with by a satisfactory meeting between Garcia Godoy and the leaders of the Armed Forces. I am still sending you my memo because I think the underlying problem will be with us and because the longer reporting cables at the back are worth your reading if you have time.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 91-232 appeal
By cb, NARA Date 1-18-96

Tuesday, September 28, 1965, 8 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

Bunker's peace ^{was} ~~is~~ in grave jeopardy ^{for a while today.} tonight. Bunker has described the situation on the phone as very serious. His cable account has not yet arrived, but there appears to be a renewed crisis of confidence between Garcia Godoy and the military chiefs. This is not surprising, because both Godoy's general behavior and his recent specific decisions about control of the police have given the armed forces understandable worry about the balance of his sympathies. (The military are not the ornaments we wish they were, but their sentiment is a fact).

Bunker feels he should stay in Santo Domingo at least through Wednesday, and probably through Thursday, to keep this situation from going off the rails.

Nevertheless, he believes as we do here, that a thorough discussion of the Dominican situation this week with you is essential. I have called a meeting in my office of all the people who have parts of this puzzle for tomorrow morning, and any time after that we will be able to give you our best assessment. It will not be a very cheerful one.

Moreover, down the road, I believe that we will face a very tough and almost inescapable political choice: whether to cooperate with a winning leftish coalition or whether to try to produce a military Frankenstein's monster to take control. Bosch's proof of his own demagogic skill, and Garcia Godoy's evident belief that popular sentiment is more pro-rebel than not are straws in the wind. I feel that it is wishful thinking for us to tell ourselves that virtuous, conservative, pro-American is likely to win a free election.

But if we are to play the card of cooperation with non-Communist liberals, we really must have a new Ambassador. But on that, too, we owe you names.

None of this is hopeless, but all of it is tough, and it needs the kind of sustained and continuing attention from a top-notch managing group that it is not getting right now. Bunker can do this job for us up here, but only

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

after we have got him the right man to pick up the task down there.

Finally, for your information, I attach Bunker's report of last night. (TAB A). It is out of date with respect to the details, but it tells of Bunker's own effort to get Garcia Godoy into balance. I also attach at TAB B Bennett's overnight situation report. I wish I thought Bennett was right about the public reaction to Bosch.

h. f. S.

McG. B.

TAB
A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-323
By JW, NARA, Date 3-11-94

68c

Tuesday, September 28, 1965

Text of Cable from Embassy Santo Domingo 834, September 27, 1965

From Bunker

1. I had long talk with Garcia Godoy this morning. After initial discussion OAS Situation and Penna Marinho's probable return Wednesday, I reiterated, from OAS point of view, both our understanding and our concern at current developments here, precipitated in large part by Bosch's untimely return and his continued failure to observe political truce. I put forward idea that President should now go before people again over TV and radio and make general public call for observance of political truce, in accordance with Article 49 of Institutional Act and August 9 OAS Declaration to People. I suggested he make clear that he expects this truce will be strictly followed by all citizens, and that he express his determination that Provisional Government will maintain law and order. I thought he might point out that Article 48 of Institutional Act gives Government basis for taking action if persons fail to observe truce and abuse the exercise of their liberties so as to jeopardize "public order and the general welfare". He seemed receptive to idea and took notes of points.

I suggested that if Bosch persisted, President would have good basis for seeking bring about his departure. I raised possibility he might have private talk with Bosch to request compliance and to warn him of President's determination to see truce observed. Garcia Godoy obviously (and understandably) wary of any move against Bosch and did not seem think well of idea of private talk. (I may see Guzman privately myself but both President and I doubtful Guzman strong or influential enough bring about much moderation in Bosch's attitude.)

2. Re problem of arms recovery and reintegration of Zone, Garcia Godoy reported that, following delays and lack of cooperation from Armed Forces in effectuating transportation of arms collected in music conservatory, he has obtained crane and trucks from Department of Public Roads and that physical delivery of these arms to temporary depository beside Palace is to be carried out today under supervision of the Minister of Interior.

Although not referring specifically to memo on procedures given him last night, he states he plans talk with Caamano today re idea or reintegrating all Constitutionalist enlisted men and non-controversial officers within next three day period. He is thinking of having them brought to National Palace in groups for reintegration ceremony, after which they would leave their arms in same Palace depository and proceed to barracks unarmed. He expects difficulties and incidents in this process. He pointed out as example that when he visited local Army Transportation Corps Headquarters recently, he saw large posted banner intended for returnees saying "Welcome Back Traitors". (He had previously mentioned report that one voluntary returnee had been put in solitary imprisonment upon his return to barracks.)

3. Returning to recent developments, I stated that, aside from internal reaction, we are necessarily concerned at reaction in US and other countries and at the international image which is being created of a Government we all recognize and support. A mere listing of steps taken in recent days necessarily creates impression of series of concessions to pressure from one side: workers' "purge lists" of personnel in Government and elsewhere; removal of Wessin, removal of sugar corporation directors, strike in peanut oil factory to force out certain heads, pressure to remove head of electrical power plant, insurgent takeover of University, etc. Now if, on heels of Bosch's demand for removal of military leaders, he should replace Rivera Caminero at this moment, I am convinced international opinion would reach only one conclusion -- that he had again given in to pressure from left.

4. He states he very aware vital importance of international image of his Government, but feels that his actions are not thoroughly understood abroad and that extreme delicacy and complexity of situation throughout country not fully appreciated. He laments that international opinion tends to view his steps as concessions to Caamano and to those in Ciudad Nueva, which he stoutly asserts is not the case. He is convinced from knowledge of his people and from all sources of information (including his Cibao trip) that there is deep and growing demand of the people for prompt changes, not only in personnel but in approach to nation's ills. He says he is therefore not giving in to Caamano but only heeding the call of general public opinion. He reiterated his number one problem is cleaning up downtown, which is continuing focus of discontent, and establishing governmental authority there. This is greatly complicated by attitude of people toward military. He remains unwilling to use force and feels obliged to "play with" the Constitutionlists in order to bring them around.

5. Discussion abruptly interrupted by dramatic entrance of Interior Minister Castillo and Caamano who announced that a Dominican soldier on guard inside fence at corner of Palace ground had just shot and killed a young unarmed student.

Student was apparently part of a group protesting failure of Inter-American Peace Force units to evacuate their school in order to permit resumption of classes. Garcia Godoy ordered investigation and military aide later reported action of soldier was inexcusable and had been arrested. Garcia Godoy highly concerned at probable immediate consequences of this tragedy in inflaming entire student population and in further complicating problems we had been discussing. He pointed out that if he sought to have soldier submitted to civil courts, Armed Forces would not permit it. However, with great historical grounds, people have not confidence in military justice since it usually results in such cases being released after two or three days.

6. It is evident Garcia Godoy is becoming discouraged and weighed down by his burdens. He fears his Government is rapidly losing the widespread good will and general support it enjoyed throughout the country in the initial days. He expressed real concern that this would then force him to rely more and more on military in order to retain reins of government. With military, in turn, then demanding more as price for continued support, he sees real danger in repetition of same vicious circle as he said Reid found himself in, resulting in his overthrow.

Repeating our understanding of the great burdens he is carrying, I pointed out situation not quite same as with Reid, given OAS and IAPF presence and support. I said it seemed to me the important thing is to strike a balance between heeding public opinion in order to channel unrest on one hand and asserting firm authority of Government on other in order to maintain law and order which is foremost duty of any government. I repeated firm intention of Ad Hoc Committee to be of all assistance possible to him and stated I remain available at any time on any problem on which he thinks OAS can be useful.

68d

TAB
B

68e

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-230

By 48, NARA, Date 11-12-91

Tuesday, September 28, 1965

Dominican Republic Situation Report from Ambassador Bennett

Garcia Godoy Decries Recent Incidents

Garcia Godoy made a short unscheduled radio-TV address at 10:25 last night solemnly decrying shooting incidents of 25th and 27th and announcing decision to regulate by law reintegration of rebel military into regular ranks.

Referring to his obligation to keep public informed on matters affecting peace and tranquillity of nation, he stated that as President he shared nation's shock at incidents of 25th (involving caravan of Bosch partisans), reassured listeners that he had ordered exhaustive investigation of it, pledged firm action against those who may be found responsible and, rapping lightly at both sides, noted repetitions could be prevented only by "posture of equanimity" on part of public and by strict observance of discipline by authorities.

Concerning incident at Palace on 27th (see below), Garcia Godoy stated soldier responsible acted in "clear excess of authority", reported he had immediately been disarmed and arrested, and indicated that examination had revealed soldier lacked the mental capacity to understand his responsibility towards citizens. President tied this to need for greater care in choosing human material for Armed Forces and for reforms in military. Latter, he said, (introducing some of balance which has been lacking in his previous addresses), will be accomplished gradually and will be effort in which Armed Forces will take part.

Garcia Godoy then led into announcement of his decision to regulate by law the thorny problem of reintegrating rebel military into Armed Forces. He said he hoped reintegration would be completed in 3-4 days, adding that special coordinating commission could be appointed to oversee task. Making every effort to put his decision in best public light, he emphasized that such reintegration would be starting point for re-examination of problem arising from pressures to reform military. Also in this vein, he announced that he was transferring National Police back to Interior Ministry (from Armed Forces) in order to ensure police responsiveness to civil authority and to reestablish necessary confidence in police so as to allow their early resumption of normal functions downtown.

Garcia Godoy ended with plea that all respect his good intentions and help him through patience and understanding to resolve grave outstanding problems.

Shooting Incident Fired Day's Atmosphere

Unfortunate incident in morning in which soldier within Palace grounds shot and killed one student and reportedly wounded another set tone for another day of tension and anxiety, and was in part responsible for Garcia Godoy's late evening report to public. Casualties were members of group of students demonstrating outside Palace fence against continued IAPF occupation of their schools. Some stone-throwing and name-calling preceded shooting which, however, seems to have been entirely unjustified. US news media amply covered incident. Ambassador Bunker was with Garcia Godoy in Palace at time, and reported latter was greatly concerned at possible consequences of tragedy in inflaming entire student population and further complicating number other problems.

Bosch

Bosch apparently spent quiet day downtown. In morning he visited wounded of revolution and of incident on 25th. In evening he was scheduled to hold his first lengthy meeting with top PRD leaders. According to local Dominican reporters who followed him around all weekend, Bosch spent considerable time during past two days reviling against IAPF and military chiefs.

Incidents, particularly those involving shooting, that have occurred since Bosch's arrival, as well as individually colored accounts of what he has said, have greatly disturbed Dominicans at all levels of population, including many of his present and former partisans. General feeling among those concerned about meaning of his presence, and uncertain about his possible courses of action, is fearful anxiety. Many among lower and middle classes seem distressed that his return, contrary to bringing immediate peace, brought immediate violence, which coupled with lack of resolution to problem downtown and multiplicity of stories of military "repression" has seriously discouraged them.

Well-informed and balanced observer returning from eastern part of country reported general atmosphere there is one of fear stimulated by grossly distorted or exaggerated accounts of happenings in capital. Awareness of this feeling also in part prompted Garcia Godoy's speech and decisions of last night.

American Consul in Santiago reports reaction to Bosch's arrival speech in Cibao, where it was barely heard, has been negligible, but that those who persisted in attempt to follow his train of thought were impressed by his irresponsibility. Among Dominican military listeners, there was surprise that Bosch did not hit them harder and feeling that his violent attacks on US had harmed him because Dominican people are surfeited with hate-mongering.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 28, 1965, 6:00 p.m.

File 69

26.10.65
E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A, George McGhee reports that Erhard is tentatively thinking of a visit (subject to your convenience) sometime during the last two weeks in November. Would that be workable in terms of your schedule? (In terms of his own situation, Erhard can't easily make it before November 15.) If so, would you like me to try to wrap it up in time for a possible announcement on Thursday?

McG. B.

McG. B.

Try for announcement by Thursday____

No ☒

Speak to me____

~~Francia:
let's get on with this
substantive to suffice with. I want
for P's clearance. to hold up on them
decision till next week.~~

69a-

A

2 20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., Sept. 28, 1965
1:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am sure you will want to see this
note from Tap Bennett.

hfb
McG. B.

(4)
MR 9/28

Santo Domingo, September 22, 1965

Dear Mac:

The telegram sent by the President to the Atlanta dinner in my honor last Friday was extremely generous and characteristically thoughtful of him. I would be grateful if you would express to him my deep appreciation for his kindness.

With warm personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

Tap

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

The Honorable
MacGeorge Bundy,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

(copy of telegram)

Sept. 17, 1965

Mr. Felton Gordon
Dinner Chairman
Big Beef Banquet
Progressive Club
1050 Techwood Drive NW
Atlanta, Georgia

I am very happy to join the many friends of Tapley Bennett as they gather to applaud his dedicated record of public service.

Yours is a richly deserved tribute to an outstanding professional who has shown his coolness, courage and good judgment in danger and difficulty. To Ambassador Bennett and to all his fellow Georgians who honor him this evening, I extend my warmest good wishes for a memorable event.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

1-28-65
2/28
✓
Tuesday - 12:10 PM
September 28, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a bread and butter letter from the Shah, thanking you for your gift and message on the 25th anniversary of his reign.

No immediate reply is necessary, but you should know that our relations with Iran have entered into another troubled period as a result of the Shah's worries about Pakistan, his unhappiness over the high interest rate we are charging on his extensive arms purchases, and his nervousness over our adverse reaction if he buys a Soviet steel mill. We may want to ease up at least on the interest rate in order to calm him down.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

hpr.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-377
By *fw*, NARA, Date *2-18-94*

~~SECRET~~

S basic to country of Laos
du

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday 12:00 PM
September 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU MR VALENTI.
SUBJECT: Visit with Prime Minister Souvanna of Laos

Secretary Rusk recommends that you see Souvanna when he is here during the week of October 18. So do we. Souvanna has behaved admirably since he assumed office following the Geneva Conference in Laos in 1962, in the face of difficult internal and foreign problems. He has often expressed a desire to retire from office -- a development which would compound our problems in Laos and Indochina generally. He would be encouraged and stiffened by a session with you. *A. A. Grace / JV*

Secretary Rusk's memorandum is attached.

Yes
No ☒

Attachment

McG. B.

McG. B.

C
CLC

CLC:
this might be
reversed next week
my

RECEIVED
W. MARVIN WATSON

1965 SEP 28 PM 3 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Castello Branco of
Brazil

Under Secretary Ball recommends that you send the attached letter to Brazilian President Castello Branco. The letter is a reply to a message from Castello Branco stressing the importance to Brazil of the pending ship loan legislation.

I recommend that you sign the letter, *which has been checked for content with Larry O'Brien.*

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment

Letter to President
Castello Branco

*← signed
29 Sept 65*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

By *jc*

NARA, Date 5-14-12

74

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept. 28, 1965

Mac:

Bohlen telephoned on Friday to ask about his appointment. I told him that the President wanted to keep his Tuesday-Thursday schedule fluid, and asked that a decision about when he could see Chip be left until after his return from Texas. (I mentioned the long weekend, difficult week coming up, etc.)

Will you raise it again with the President this afternoon? (Bohlen would like to leave on a mid-afternoon shuttle on Thursday.)



FMB

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 22, 1965, 12 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: MR. VALENTI

Do you wish to see Chip Bohlen while he is in town during the week of September 27? In the attached, Dean Rusk recommends that you do so and suggests Monday, the 27th.

fed

Francis M. Bator

mep

Yes, alone _____

Yes, with a small group for a discussion of European policy (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Ball, Leddy, Fowler (?)) _____

No _____

Date and Time:

me - see me

N

*→ Hse (Rusk, Bundy)
Bohlen after Tuesday lunch
when take Europe...*

3171

Handwritten notes and signatures

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74b

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RECEIVED
McGEORGE GUNBY'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

1965 SEP 21 AM 9 39

September 20, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

I recommend that you receive Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, American Ambassador to France, while he is in Washington the week of September 27.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Ambassador Bohlen will be discussing with us the problems that would arise should the French Government take steps to disengage from NATO and force us to withdraw our military forces from France.

I recommend the appointment be set for September 27, if possible.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-371
By 128 NARA. Date 8-18-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: ICY

1. As you will see from the attached, the President has approved his participation in the ICY White House Conference "if I'm available, which I doubt." Perry Barber tells me that the "which I doubt" probably does not reflect any specific alternative plans that the President has in mind but probably does reflect a general reluctance to get tied on firmly to anything so far in advance. His own guess is that, in the final analysis, the odds are very high that the President will participate as requested.

2. I have passed the word to State that the President will participate on December 1 "if he is available." I asked State to make sure that as they go ahead with their planning they do not make any commitments with regard to the President which could be embarrassing to State or the President if, for some reason, he cannot make the Conference. State says it can go ahead on this basis, at least for a while.


G. C.

MEMORANDUM

75a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 23, 1965, 4:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH MR. VALENTI

Re: White House Conference on International Cooperation Year --
November 28-December 1.

1. Last October you announced that you intended to call a White House Conference on International Cooperation in 1965 -- as part of our celebration of the International Cooperation Year, which has been designated as part of the birthday of the United Nations.
2. Now George Ball has presented the enclosed basic program with a recommendation for your agreement in principle.
3. Specifically, George asks for your agreement to make remarks at the final session of the Conference on December 1, and for your agreement to a reception between 6-8 that same evening at the White House.
4. I warmly support these recommendations. Quite a lot of good work has been done by a very large number of panels on various forms of international cooperation, and I think that your own remarks can be substantial and constructive. I also think that it is hard to have a White House Conference without at least one visit to the White House by the participants.
5. I would put all this even more affirmatively if I did not feel that you were wary of additional engagements. I believe that your support can make a real difference to this Conference, and that the Conference, in turn, can make a real difference in American support for some of the things that need doing in the national interest and that do not have all the political backing that they could use, either in the Congress or in public opinion.
6. George's memorandum has the appropriate boxes for approval and disapproval.

McG.B.

McG. B.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 SEP 23 AM 10 16 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT September 22, 1965

Subject: White House Conference on
International Cooperation

Recommendation

1. That you agree in principle to the proposed program of the White House Conference on International Cooperation scheduled to be held November 28 through December 1, 1965.

If in available which I doubt
Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

2. That you make remarks at the final plenary of the Conference on December 1, 1965. (Text to be provided.)

See above Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

3. That following the final plenary there be an early evening reception at the White House.

See above Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Discussion

Following your designation of 1965 as International Cooperation Year (ICY), you appointed a Cabinet Committee to coordinate the Government's participation. The private sector was engaged through the United Nations Association.

In response to your public requests (excerpts enclosed), the Cabinet Committee and the United Nations Association created joint committees on various areas of international cooperation. We expect a number of the committee reports will contain proposals worthy of consideration for your State of the Union message. You will recall that this was discussed when you recently joined us for a luncheon in the Department.


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It may be desirable for you to release some of the recommendations before the opening of the Conference. We plan to make specific suggestions to this end.

We have developed the enclosed tentative program of the Conference which would personally involve you, high government officials and congressional leaders.

You would participate in the final plenary session of the Conference on Wednesday, December 1, by receiving the reports and recommendations of the Conference and making appropriate remarks. This would be followed by an early evening reception at the White House.

The Congress passed a concurrent resolution supporting the ICY program and designated six Senators and six Congressmen to attend the Conference. Other legislators will also participate. We expect about 1200 top citizen leaders and 300 government officials to participate. The Conference will, therefore provide you and the United States Government with the opportunity to present graphically the efforts of the Administration to achieve peace and cooperation in the world.


George W. Ball
Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Excerpts
2. Tentative program

Public Presidential Statements on ICY

1. "To commemorate the United Nations Twentieth Birthday, 1965 has been designated International Cooperation Year. I propose to dedicate this year to finding new techniques for making man's knowledge serve man's welfare...In the midst of tension let us begin to chart a course toward the possibilities of conquest which bypass the politics of the cold war.

"For our own part, we intend to call upon all the resources of this nation--public and private--to work with other nations to find new methods of improving the life of man." --- Holy Cross Commencement, June 10, 1964
2. "I rededicate the Government of the United States to the principle of international cooperation and direct the agencies of the Executive Branch to examine thoroughly what additional steps can be taken in this direction in the immediate future." -- Proclamation of 1965 as International Cooperation Year in the United States, October 2, 1964
3. "I hope that each of you will help me and the Secretary of State and others of your government to carry the story of international cooperation and organizations to the American people...More than that, I hope that your talents may be turned to systematic study of the next steps that private organizations may take to further this cooperation.

"I intend next year to call a White House Conference...to search and explore and canvass and thoroughly discuss every conceivable approach and avenue of cooperation...to peace." Remarks to the International Cooperation Year Group in the State Dining Room, October 2, 1964.

Proposed Program

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Sunday - November 28

Prelude to the Conference

7:00 p.m.	Symphony Concert
	Secretary of State in attendance
9:00 p.m.	Post concert reception for all conference participants at the State Department

Monday - November 29

9:00 -	
10:00 a.m.	Opening Plenary
10:15 -	
12:45 p.m.	Six simultaneous panel meetings
1:00 p.m.	Lunch
2:45 -	
5:45 p.m.	Six simultaneous panel meetings

Tuesday - November 30

9:15 -	
12:15 p.m.	Six simultaneous panel meetings
12:30 p.m.	Lunch (Congressional emphasis)
2:30 -	
5:30 p.m.	Six simultaneous panel meetings
7:30 p.m.	Dinner (UN emphasis)

Wednesday - December 1

9:15-		
12:15 p.m.	Six simultaneous panel meetings	
12:30 p.m.	Lunch (emphasis on women)	
2:30 p.m.	Closing Plenary	
	Special panel evaluating the role of the private sector in inter- national cooperation	
<i>I recommend</i> <i>5⁰⁰ or 5³⁰</i> <i>but we don't</i> <i>need to</i> <i>decide</i> <i>now</i> <i>mfb</i>	4:30 p.m.	Presentation to the President of the reports and recommendations of the Conference
		Remarks by the President
6:00-		
8:00 p.m.	Reception at the White House	

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to President Belaunde
of Peru

Secretary Rusk recommends that you send the attached letter to President Belaunde along with an enclosure which consists of a recent speech by Senator Morse praising Belaunde as a great democratic statesman.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

m.f.B.

McG. B.

Attachment

Letter to President Belaunde

15
September 27, 1965
3:15 pm

✓ 22

(2)
NR 9/27

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S NIGHT READING

FROM: Bill Moyers

Pres. imp. reading

??a

CONFIDENTIAL

September 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

I backgrounded Walter Lippmann at lunch today on the Pak/Indian problem. There was no discussion of US policy, instead simply what the crisis was all about, how it had happened, etc. Actually, Lippmann was quite complimentary of the President's role in staying out of the middle on this one.

We did have a larger philosophic discussion on US policy in Asia, in which he cited his favorite themes on Vietnam and I simply cited our case. Lippmann does see South Asia as quite important in any case, and seems generally understanding of both our policy dilemmas and how we have handled them so far.



R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

EX-100-1000000

EX-100-1000000
274-83

~~SECRET~~

September 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Gene Black is urging that you see Kuwait Finance Minister Sheikh Jabir, who's here for the Bank and Fund meetings. State favors, but doesn't want to push lest we set a precedent for all the other finance ministers in town.

Kuwait is a mighty good client (we own half its oil), and Black is head of their development advisory council. Therefore, while Sheikh Jabir is not very impressive it would be useful if we could bring him in for five minutes off-the-record Wednesday. Not vital, however.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approve _____

Disapprove ✓

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 12-184

By CH NARA, Date 11-24-15

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL 480 Rice for Vietnam

Lodge, in his report to you of 22 September, stated that rice stocks in Saigon were low, prospects for rice deliveries from the delta were poor, and 1966 crop estimates were significantly below 1965 production. He pointed out that the Vietnamese were relying on PL 480 deliveries.

You passed the word that we should move ahead as expeditiously as necessary to get PL 480 moving out to Saigon. Here is where we stand: 200,000 tons of US-financed rice (175,000 tons PL 480 and 25,000 tons under AID financing from Thailand) have been programmed for shipment during 1965. USOM is authorized to buy an additional 25,000 tons from Thailand if PL 480 deliveries and domestic rice appear likely to fall short of consumption and stockpile requirements during the remaining months before the next harvest in December.

If these shipments moved promptly there would be no problem. However, there have been delays in PL 480 procurement resulting from Vietnamese Government fumbling. For example, the Vietnamese only yesterday signed an agreement for 100,000 tons of PL 480 rice which was offered for signature a month ago. The GVN Embassy tied up a 15,000-ton increment in August for nearly a month by insisting on an award of a negotiated contract with an ineligible contractor. Now the GVN has delayed issuance of letters of credit for contractors for that 15,000 tons and an additional 21,000 tons contracted last week with the result that ship sailings have been missed. We are continuing to prod Saigon to accelerate GVN paperwork. We also have been seeking alternative and speedier searift through use of MSTs chartered vessels. Finally, we hope that with a new and more effective GVN Ambassador here we will get the Embassy in line.

Chester L. Cooper

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓ 80

Friday, September 24, 1965
11:10 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a laudatory letter from Senator Mansfield on your handling of the Pak/Indian crisis, and a possible reply. I don't think it overcommits you, but you may prefer to reply less substantively, or to have Bundy do it.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

signed

80a
Dear Mike:

I am grateful for your kind words on our handling of the India-Pakistan problem. It has been a tough nut to crack and, while the fighting has now been stopped, the underlying problem is still before us. I propose to stand firmly behind the United Nations in its new efforts to come to grips with this long-standing feud.

There is no difference between us on the question of being cautious about any resumption of development and especially military aid. Indeed, I share your feeling that we should handle this in a way which will back Arthur Goldberg's efforts in the UN. It might be difficult to get explicit Security Council guidance on this matter, because of the Soviet role in the Security Council.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:RWK:du:24 Sept 65

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

(2)

September 23, 1965

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I want to add this personal note to what I said on the floor, yesterday, with respect to the handling of the India-Pakistan problem. The careful judgments and decisions which have been made and the wise public handling of the matter by you, Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg have placed us in a most effective position. In my judgment the position is in full accord with the interests of the nation in that part of the world.

May I suggest most respectfully that a critical factor in maintaining this excellent position from now on will be our handling of aid programs--particularly military aid--to India and Pakistan. Having suspended military aid, because of the conflict, it would seem unwarranted to hurry to resume it in the old pattern. Indeed, it might be a significant achievement if we could get some common United Nations Security Council guidance by way of a general resolution on arms to Pakistan and India before resuming it, if it is to be resumed at all. At the very least, I would think that there ought not to be an automatic resumption of military aid to either India or Pakistan, without some assurance from Arthur Goldberg that it will further whatever future efforts the Security Council may make in the situation.

I realize that the China-India border conflict is a complicating factor in the military aid problem. But it may be that the time has come to try to get the Security Council to take a look at this factor, too, in relation to the problem of peace in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.

Respectfully,

Mike Mansfield

distinguished colleague from the State of Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] introduced S. 2127, in order to provide special indemnity insurance for members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones. I was indeed happy to cosponsor this legislation with him. It was also cosponsored by the very able and distinguished Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS].

On August 19 the Senate unanimously passed this measure, and it was referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in the House of Representatives.

After the Committee on Veterans' Affairs made improvements in the legislation sponsored by Senator TALMADGE, Senator WILLIAMS and myself, the House unanimously passed this legislation.

As it is true in the legislative process of the Congress each body makes improvements in legislation before it is finally enacted.

I would like to compliment the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the House [Mr. TEAGUE] and the members of his committee, for doing a remarkable job in further improving this legislation so that today we have before us a bill to provide needed protection for those serving in our Armed Forces.

In discussing the improvements and changes made by the House of Representatives with Senator TALMADGE and Senator WILLIAMS, I urge my colleagues to accept the House amendments and send the measure forthwith to the President hopefully for his approval.

The bill as presently before us provides a group life insurance plan for all members of the uniformed services on active duty on and after the effective date designated by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs.

Coverage is automatic with the serviceman being required to take affirmative action to remove himself from the program.

The coverage provided is \$10,000 or \$5,000. Premium rates for the servicemen are expected to be \$2 a month for the \$10,000 policy and \$1 per month for the \$5,000 policy. These premiums would be deducted from the pay of the servicemen by the Department of Defense and remitted to the Veterans' Administration.

All costs traceable to extra hazards of servicemen will be borne by the Government, otherwise the program would be self-sustaining with the deductions that I have previously referred to.

Under the provisions of the measure, if an individual has a service-connected disability, he would be eligible for a commercial policy without medical examination, and in addition would be eligible for a \$10,000 disabled veterans' insurance policy administered by the Veterans' Administration. In the latter case he must apply for the policy within 1 year of the date of the establishment of the service-connected disability.

Another important improvement made in the bill as passed by the Senate provides for the period January 1, 1967, and continuing until the effective date of the group insurance plan a maximum death gratuity of \$5,000 to a widow, child or children and the parents of individuals

who served during this period in one of the branches of the Armed Services and who lost their lives under certain hazardous conditions as a result of such service.

This gratuity would be reduced by the amount of any dependency and indemnity compensation, National Service Life Insurance, or U.S. Government life insurance payable in the particular case.

I feel that this much-needed legislation warrants the prompt and final action by the Congress to provide for those in the Armed Forces who are making great sacrifices in defending this country's freedom as well as that of the free world.

Knowing that we care at home about the future welfare of our armed forces personnel and their dependents certainly would do much toward bolstering their spirits at times when many of us have a tendency to forget and take for granted the freedoms which we enjoy today as a result of the services they are rendering to our country.

I cannot urge too strongly that the Senate accept the House amendments and send the bill forthwith to the President for signature.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE].

The amendment to the House amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on concurring in the House amendment as amended.

The amendment of the House, as amended, was agreed to.

CEASE-FIRE IN THE INDO-PAKISTAN DISPUTE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the cease-fire which appears to have been achieved in the Indo-Pakistan dispute is an event of great magnitude for the orderly and peaceful management of international conflicts. It brings renewed hope in the efficacy of the United Nations Security Council as a major instrument for the maintenance of peace. To be sure, the basic problem of Kashmir remains to be resolved. To be sure, the cease-fire may not hold indefinitely. But neither factor detracts from the achievement. The cease-fire reflects, may I say, great credit both on India and Pakistan and on the policies of every government represented on the United Nations Security Council. It is the best possible response not only to the immediate fighting between India and Pakistan but to those who would fish in troubled waters.

On the part of the United States, I want to say, further, that President Johnson has guided our limited but significant part in this matter with policies of exceptional wisdom and great good sense.

In their cautious and restrained approach to this problem, the President, the Secretary of State, and our outstanding Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, have made a highly significant contribution to the restoration of order in the Indo-Pakistan sub-

continent, to the forestalling of the rapid spread of chaos in Asia and to the general strengthening of the prospect for international action for peace through the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I join with the Senator in expressing gratification over what has happened. It is especially significant because it again establishes the importance of the role of the United Nations, which seemed for the moment to have fallen into a state of desuetude because of its financial troubles.

We are all indebted to President Johnson and to United Nations Ambassador Arthur Goldberg for the part they played in avoidance of what could have led to the terrible conflagration of a war much broader than the conflict between India and Pakistan, and in the revival of the role of the United Nations in a most significant way.

I am grateful to the Senator from Montana for his comments.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from New York. Furthermore, I believe that the outcome of the difficulties between India and Pakistan indicates quite strongly the wisdom of the President's approach through the United Nations and, in effect, emphasizes that the idea of unilateral intervention on our part was not the correct procedure but, rather, that it was multilateral intervention, in a sense, through dependence on the Security Council of the United Nations, which, in this instance, I am informed, was unanimous in its outlook.

Mr. JAVITS. I am grateful to the Senator for his remarks.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I rise to commend the United Nations, Secretary General U Thant, President Johnson, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the many other nations who have participated in bringing about a cessation of the murderous hostilities between India and Pakistan.

This action illustrates the power of concerted effort by men and nations of good will. It also illustrates once again the vitality and urgent necessity for a world organization such as the United Nations. I commend that organization and the principle of collective security.

I applaud the existence of a world organization where debate and consultation among nations can occur—indeed, where debate even between nations engaging in hostilities on the battlefield can occur.

I also applaud the existence of a world organization in which the power of world opinion can be focused. Once again it seems to me that the success of the United Nations and the members thereof, in bringing about a cessation of hostilities, demonstrates the necessity and the urgency for the existence of such an organization.

DEDICATION OF EISENHOWER COLLEGE, SENECA FALLS, N.Y.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, yesterday, an event occurred in the State of New York which I believe deserves the attention of Congress. The first college

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"Tell Bob Komer to get in touch with the Pakistani Embassy and find out when they want to come. If the Indians want to come, and I understand that they do, tell them that I would like them to come before the 15th."

LBJ/vm
12:45 pm
9-24-65

Alvin

Done

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, September 24, 1965, 9:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Visits by Ayub and Shastri

As predicted, both Ayub and Shastri are now nibbling furiously at coming here. In the attached, Bowles asks for advice on whether to encourage Shastri. May we do so?

The only problem is your phone invitation to Ayub to come first. We could mention to Shastri that Ayub may come early in October, so we suggest that Shastri come a week or so later. Or we could simply wait and see who signs up first. They'll both be annoyed whichever we do, but this won't stop either from coming.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer.

✓ Approved

Disapproved

Speak to me

✓ I called Bob and (not here - in NY)
then Bob Min and inquired 25 Sep.
RWK

82

Mr. Bundy:

Returned from the
President's office.

du

82a

Rec'd-65
9-23-65
5:40 P

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✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1965
Thurs. 8:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This paper came in after I left the office yesterday, and I think it is one you will want to read yourself and discuss directly with Bob.

Bob Komer knows the problem exists, and he will be glad to do any staff work you wish, but I have not cut him in, without your authority, on the numbers involved or on the nature of the McNamara recommendation.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Merrin
Put on my desk
& let's get me over
△

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

19
82
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
September 23, 1965
8:15 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Current and Future Strategy in Vietnam - An Exchange
of Views between Washington Principals and Lodge

A recent review of the situation in Vietnam by key officials of State and Defense and myself indicated that the emerging situation there required some hard thinking on future U.S. military and political actions. We posed several questions to Lodge for comment.

U.S. Ground Operations. In the light of our military build-up we felt that the VC may be avoiding major unit actions and reverting to a strategy of small-scale actions over a prolonged period. The problem arises as to how we use our substantial ground and air strength effectively against small-scale harassment-type action, whether we should engage in pacification as opposed to patrolling actively, and whether, indeed, we should taper off our ground force build-up.

Lodge agreed that VC may seek to avoid large-scale operations but felt that the Vietnamese must deal with small-scale actions through an effective military-political campaign. U.S. forces should undertake "thorough pacification" within their own areas. Lodge endorses Westmoreland's current strategic concept which calls for the deployment of all troops now scheduled for Vietnam. Westmoreland's concept:

1. Halt the VC offensive.
2. Destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected high priority areas.
3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control.
4. Support "rural reconstruction" with comprehensive attention to the pacification process.

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By ics, NARS, Date 6-13-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Continue the air campaign against the DRV and infiltration routes into Laos.

Lodge and Westmoreland feel VC "lie-low" tactics will become increasingly a police-social action problem. They expect increased VC terrorism, subversion and economic warfare. Thus far, there is no evidence of significant GVN resentment of U.S. ground actions.

Use of Airpower. We noted and endorsed a recent directive by Westmoreland concerning civilian implications of U.S. air operations, but we still felt a need for a better overall analysis and evaluation of our air operations. We suggested the possibility of sending a military-civilian survey team (similar to those of World War II) to Vietnam.

Lodge replied that Westmoreland is already looking into the problem of using our increased air capability more effectively and is opposed to a group coming out from Washington at this time.

Pacification. We asked Lodge to develop a specific plan for our joint consideration which would involve the concentration of GVN forces on pacification and the reliance on U.S. forces to handle large-scale VC actions. We suggested that he propose a system of priorities and a definition of clear objectives in the pacification program.

Lodge reports that the Mission has started to grapple with this whole problem. The Hop Tac operation (pacification of provinces bordering Saigon) is getting priority attention and Lodge is encouraging Ky to concentrate GVN efforts on pacification. Westmoreland is working up a joint U.S. -GVN campaign plan and will be prepared to brief Washington on this by the end of this month. Lodge believes this will be responsive to our desire for a definition of the respective roles for U.S. and GVN forces.

Acheson Plan. We posed the possibility to Lodge of getting the GVN to apply some of the key elements of the Acheson Plan (land reform, Chieu Hoi, etc.) and to select one or more areas for the application of the plan as a whole, including local elections.

Lodge feels that GVN is already giving attention to land reform

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

and Chieu Hoi. He agrees with our desire to get an electoral process started and has been talking to Ky about having the provincial councils elected last May elect, in turn, representatives to a national assembly. The assembly would concentrate on working up a national constitution.

Negotiations. Lodge and we both agree that we have sufficiently stressed our willingness to negotiate and any further public emphasis, except as necessary in the UN, might be misunderstood by the Communists.

Internal Political Situation. Lodge and we agree that Ky's government seems to be settling down. We also agree on the necessity to keep a watchful eye on any potential coups and to encourage Ky to generate more positive popular support.

M. G.

McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thurs., September 23, 1965 - 6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Howard Rusk and People-to-People Work in Vietnam

1. Howard Rusk has been to Vietnam and come back, and he has prepared a full report to you which I attach at Tab A. What he recommends is essentially what was discussed with you before he went -- namely, the establishment of a new private foundation with direct encouragement from the White House, so as to give it as much power as possible.

2. The question of substance, therefore, is whether you are willing to give your endorsement and backing to this undertaking. What we propose is an American Southeast Asia Foundation, with a chairman like Charles Mortimer of General Foods (who would ^{probably} do this one, where he would not do the East-West trade job), a treasurer like David Rockefeller, and a blue-ribbon board of trustees. We think this outfit could raise ten or fifteen million dollars, as against the million or so which is now being spent by all private agencies in Vietnam. It would work primarily on voluntary and private help in the fields of health, refugees, welfare, orphans, veterans, youth, etc. It would also, as a major by-product, engage public attention and support to the whole U. S. non-military effort in South Vietnam.

3. If you support the creation of such a voluntary ^{organization} ~~prggnization~~ with White House approval and backing, then we get to tactics. Rusk suggests the following scenario:

(1) A brief visit by him for a report and formal recommendation. This could be done in 10 minutes.

(2) Invitations to Mortimer and others to serve, with your personal backing. (I think I could make the calls, but I would need to be able to speak in your name.)

(3) A launching meeting at the White House -- Rusk would like a luncheon, but I think we could manage with a luncheon at the State Department and a brief meeting with you at the end of the morning or the end of the afternoon.

(4) Immediate authorization in his 10-minute meeting for sending an Air Force plane to bring back the first set of paraplegic victims for remedial treatment (the plane is available and Defense would be glad to send it).

(5) Announcement of a crash program for the production of artificial limbs in Vietnam, and

(6) Announcement of plans to organize a new foundation.

McG. B.

Objective approved _____

Tactics approved _____ Disapproved _____

Specifically, arrange an early meeting with Rusk _____

Do not arrange an early meeting with Rusk _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 23, 1965, 5:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Ambassador Duke, with the endorsement of the State Department and NASA, has recommended that the Presidential letter transmitting the MARINER IV photograph to the Government of Spain not be the standard letter that you have approved for this general purpose, but be modified to recognize the Spanish contribution to the success of MARINER IV. They have recommended that the following text be used for the third paragraph of the standard Presidential transmittal letter:

The successful flight of MARINER IV would have been considerably more difficult but for the cooperation of the Spanish Government and Spanish scientists and engineers. The American people gratefully acknowledge Spain's cooperation in the construction and operation of the deep space tracking station at Robledo de Chavela which played so significant a part in the success of the historic mission of MARINER IV.

The NASA tracking and data acquisition facility at Robledo de Chavela is a part of the global deep-space network for support of the lunar and planetary exploration program. This is a new facility that became operational just in time to participate in the reception of the first photograph of Mars from the MARINER IV. It was constructed with the assistance of Spanish contractors and we have planned with the Spaniards to increase progressively the role of qualified Spanish engineers and technicians in the operation of the station. When the Mars pictures were received, five Spanish engineers (in addition to Spanish personnel in maintenance and support functions) assisted in the operation of the facility.

Your signature on this draft reply is recommended.

hfb -
McGeorge Bundy

Approved  _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

9/24/65

Dear General Franco:

I take great pleasure in sending you on behalf of the American people a copy of a television photograph of Mars which was taken from the MARINER IV spacecraft on July 14, 1965. This photograph was taken at an altitude of about 7,800 miles above the surface of Mars while the spacecraft was 134 million miles from the Earth.

This photograph as well as others taken on this historic flight will be made available for intensive study by the world scientific community.

The successful flight of MARINER IV would have been considerably more difficult but for the cooperation of the Spanish Government and Spanish scientists and engineers. The American people gratefully acknowledge Spain's cooperation in the construction and operation of the deep space tracking station at Robledo de Chavela which played so significant a part in the success of the historic mission of MARINER IV.

The flight is indeed a triumph of the human spirit in its constant effort to expand the frontiers of human knowledge and to realize the benefit of that knowledge for all mankind. I am confident that this achievement will reinforce the determination of people everywhere, shared by the people of the United States, that man's conquest of space shall be carried out in the spirit of a peaceful quest for knowledge.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde
Chief of the Spanish State
Madrid

LBJ:BHR:feg

86

Thursday, Sept. 23, 1965
5:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Books on the Dominican Republic

1. I have heard alarming reports in recent weeks to the effect that Szulc and others who are writing about the Dominican Republic are going to divide the U. S. Government into the "good guys" and the "bad guys" in their books. This would not bother me except for the fact that I appear to be slated to be a "good guy," which is not what I want from this particular crowd.

2. I have heard you say on a number of occasions that you can tell where a leak comes from by the praise that is awarded in the story, so I want you to know that I have had literally no contact with Szulc or any other of these birds in the course of their book-writing. The only times I have seen them were in official backgrounders in the Dominican Republic, which are fully reported in my cables from there.

3. Unofficially, my relation to Kurzman is a simple one. I have been after the management of the Post for sometime, and just last night Kay Graham told me that she was planning to fire him (top secret).

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 23, 1965, 5PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Dominican Republic White Paper

I talked to Tom Mann again about this, and he tells me that it will be another week before the State Department draft is in shape to send over. He has real reservations about putting out a white paper, but we agreed that we should do the very best job that we can, and then see what we have.

This would be good

I have also talked to John Bartlow Martin, who says he will be glad to come to work on this if we need him. Meanwhile, he has referred me to his own long report which was submitted to us back in May (I think while I was in Santo Domingo). We are making sure that State takes account of Martin's conclusions.

My guess is that we will have to do the final editing and organizing over here, and that it may take us another week beyond the State Department's submission. I do not think this delay is damaging, because I think it would be wrong to have our statement come out too close to Fulbright's speech. But if this timetable is not satisfactory to you, please let me know.

McG. B.

McG. B.

*OK,
Hurry!
✓*

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Thursday, September 23, 1965
4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Contacts, September 12-22

1. On September 14 I saw Mrs. Graham and Mr. Luce informally at dinner. They were both in very good form, and Luce in particular was delighted with the time he had spent with you at the White House. Although I share your view that Kay Graham made a mistake when she hired Joe Kraft, I am certain that she herself is fundamentally friendly.
2. On September 15 I saw Scotty Reston. Most of the meeting was devoted to comments by him on Vietnam, which were closely parallel to what he has said in his columns. As I have already reported to you, he did mention the problem of Mrs. Lodge (and I have dictated a letter to Cabot with a gentle warning on this subject). Reston was very high on the quality of AID's young men in the provinces and agreed that there should be more news stories about their work.
3. I called Douglas Kiker that day. The object of the conversation was simply to disabuse him of the preposterous notion that Buzz was leaving because of any problem with this office. The fact is that in recent months Buzz has given very valuable help on some of our problems, and I'm sure he knows it.
4. On September 16 I talked to John Hightower on the State Department story about a probe of Ayub's intentions which gave us so much trouble that day. You know more about this than I do. I also talked to Hedley Donovan of Time to put him in touch with Tomas Pastoriza of the Dominican Republic. Pastoriza is Garcia Godoy's brother-in-law and a very good friend of the US. As such, I think he can be helpful to us in preventing a press war against Garcia Godoy from the right. We have real troubles with this government, but we do not want it to come under right-wing drum fire at this stage.
5. On September 17 I had lunch with Walter Lippmann. He had nothing to add to what he has said in his columns, and he listened glumly to my report that things are just a little better in Vietnam.
6. I also talked on that day to Chuck Roberts and Tom Wicker, both of whom were trying to get hard news on South Asia. I referred them both to Bill Moyers.

7. On September 21 I talked to Tom Collins of Newsday on General Taylor, at Bill Moyers' request. He seemed to be receptive to the simple truth of your warm and close relation with Taylor, and Taylor's value as a senior member of your team of advisers.

8. Finally, I talked today to Robert McCabe of Newsweek. I did this more to listen than to talk. McCabe is Newsweek's Hong Kong man, and he has a fine reputation for fairness and knowledgeability. I must say he made more sense in ten minutes than any of their Saigon people have made in 3 years of reporting. I plan to tell Kay Graham how good he is by comparison.

McG. B.

2, 6
MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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89
September 23, 1965
Thursday/ 4:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Week's Developments in the Near East

While we came out of the Arab Summit unusually well, we don't want to crow about it. You've already asked the new Moroccan Ambassador to tell King Hassan you're pleased at his role in keeping the lid on. Feisal also deserves credit. But this kind of statement is best kept confidential, since we get farther in this part of the world by quiet diplomacy.

Arab Summit. As far as we can tell from preliminary reports, the Arab Summit did little more than maintain a semblance of momentum toward Arab unity. If the communique is a measure, the moderates prevented any tough positions against our role in Vietnam or the Congo, our support of Israel or our base in Libya. However, anti-Israeli plans were given another small push forward.

Jordan. One troublesome result was that Hussein had a rough time explaining why he hasn't contracted for supersonics yet. His brethren gave him 60 days to sign up. According to one clandestine report, he agreed in effect to take MIGs then if he fails to get Western planes. We're working hard to persuade the French or British to sell planes, but the big problem is competing with the cut-rate MIG price. Hussein did resist stationing other Arab troops in Jordan, but reported offers to send an "interim" air squadron will be harder to resist.

Nasser. We reserve judgment on how Nasser came out until more of the clandestine reports are in, but so far it looks as if he made no effort to dominate and was relatively restrained. He stuck to the position that no military action against Israel is possible in the near future. So we continue to get a picture of a somewhat subdued Nasser, although he may have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward us until he finds out how we answer his food requests. We have indications, too, that government censors have been weeding anti-US noises out of the Cairo press recently.

Water diversion and United Arab Command. The Arabs paid lip service to pushing ahead with diversion projects, but concentrated on building up their military ability to protect them. This will increase the pressure on Lebanon and Jordan to station other Arab troops on their soil, but may take a little of the heat off the diversion works. The Lebanese will still have a

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Authority: N.S. 032.012.004/3d
By: JCL/13, NARA, Date: 5-14-12

SECRET

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Page Two

problem, however. They stopped work in July, under US and Israeli pressure, on the Arab plan to divert water into Syria. But they'd now like to divert enough water within Johnston Plan limits to irrigate their own arid south. They're sure the Israelis will retaliate, even if they only divert for their own needs.

Iraq. An abortive coup against President Aref by so-called "pro-Nasser" elements apparently took even Nasser by surprise. As far as we can tell, there wasn't any Egyptian collaboration, even though the Egyptians are pretty well wired into those groups. The whole thing quieted down quickly without any significant change in the balance of political forces.

Israel. The election (2 November) campaign is getting more tense. Eshkol's forces came close to losing a majority in elections in Histadrut, the big labor confederation (which may be a weathervane since it reaches most Israeli workers). This doesn't mean they'll lose control in the election, but it does underscore the vote-getting power of the Ben-Gurion name, especially among the less literate voters who have trouble understanding that Ben-Gurion is wrong this time. Since it increases the possibility that BG might win enough seats to be included in a governing coalition, Eshkol will probably run a little more scared; he'll increase the pressure on us to say something about our secret arms help or on desalting.

Greece. Stephanopoulos finally reckons he has just enough votes to squeak by a confidence vote. However, there are already hints of policy disagreement within his patchwork coalition, and Papandreou shows every sign of keeping the heat on. Papandreou brought down the Karamanlis government in 1963 by a steady drumfire of sniping and a few months later won one of the largest votes a Greek political leader has ever put together. So he probably figures he can do it again. Stephanopoulos will delay elections as long as he can. Many Greeks will blame us for backing the monarchy against Papandreou's popular reform programs. Since we don't want to appear opposed to important educational and social reforms, we're still better off saying nothing about the new government.

Turkey. Reports in our press that astronauts Cooper and Conrad got an official cold shoulder in Turkey aren't borne out by the embassy. But they do remind us that we've lost some ground there. The Turks feel we've hurt them in Cyprus over the past 2 years, and sympathize with what they feel are Pakistan's similar problems in Kashmir. Greek-Turk talks have come to a

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~~SECRET~~

Page Three

standstill because of the Greek political crisis, and the Turks fear lack of progress will make Cyprus another festering sore like Kashmir. However, we have worked steadily to show our good faith by making a success of the originally shaky aid consortium. Foreign Minister Isik will be at the UN until 7 October and has asked to see you. State understands the problem of not opening the flood gates to all the foreign ministers in New York and is fending him off politely. However, your seeing him would give the Turks a boost.



R. W. Komer



~~SECRET~~

Recd
9-23-65
4:25P

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., September 23, 1965 - 3:30 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Clark Clifford has recommended that you send a general memorandum of instructions to the Director of Central Intelligence on the coordination of our foreign intelligence efforts.

The attached draft represents the views of Clifford and his committee members. It contains one minor revision which makes it acceptable to the Secretary of State. (Tab A)

President Kennedy sent a personal memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence in January of 1962. (Tab B)

I recommend that you sign and send it to Raborn as a reflection of your personal interest in his efforts to improve the organization, management and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-291

By ig, NARS, Date 7-9-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 24, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Coordination of the United States
Foreign Intelligence Effort

Our Government is making a substantial effort and is expending large sums of money to obtain timely intelligence vital to our national defense and security. This effort requires the most efficient possible organization of the activities of the various departments and agencies concerned. It is essential that these activities be conducted as an integrated endeavor best suited to meet both current and longer-term national intelligence needs. One of the essential objectives of this integrated effort is to give timely notice to me and to other officials of critical developments which have an important bearing on our national security.

In view of the urgent necessity for maintaining effective coordination of all U.S. foreign intelligence functions, I request that you serve as the Government's chief intelligence officer, and that you pursue as a primary responsibility the task of coordinating and guiding the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort in accordance with National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number One of March 4, 1964.

In the performance of your responsibility I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of U.S. Government departments and agencies having foreign intelligence responsibilities, with a view to assuring the proper coordination, correlation, evaluation and prompt dissemination of intelligence obtained from all sources. You are authorized and directed to establish, in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community, such arrangements and guide lines as are necessary for this purpose. It is my wish that you receive from the departments and agencies concerned the full cooperation and assistance which are essential to the success of your coordinating responsibility.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 84-291By isp, NARS, Date 7-9-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

I will continue to look to your efforts as a means of achieving significant improvements in the organization, management, and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system.

lhy

Copies to:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

LBJ:MCGB:BKS:tjs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 23, 1965
3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Tear Gas in Vietnam

General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of authority to use certain riot control agents in Vietnam, and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara join in recommending that he be given clear authorization to use tear gas (CS and CN), but not the more violent nausea-producing gases (DM and CN-DM), either alone or in combination. As you know, Ambassador Goldberg has had reservations about this recommendation, and in deference to his wishes, the recommendation has been held up until after his initial speech. But now Westmoreland wants to use the tear gas in an operation on Saturday, and we all think it is time to go ahead.

If this recommendation is approved, our plan would be to have no announcement in Washington, but to have Westmoreland make it clear in due course after the Saturday operation that tear gas (and tear gas only) is authorized in cases where it is more humane, and especially with respect to civilians.

There will be some international criticism, but even the New York Times is resounding with us on this, I do not worry you with the pros and cons because it seems to me that the common sense of the matter is so clear.

Secretary McNamara's letter is attached. Can we go ahead?

YES Returned per
NO our conversation
Jan 11

Inf. B
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-182

By ics, NARS, Date 6-13-84

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92a

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
McGEORGE DUNDY'S OFFICE

22 September 1965

1965 SEP 22 PM 1 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of his authority to use standard riot control munitions in certain specified combat situations in South Vietnam and Ambassador Lodge has supported his request. This authority would extend only to lacrimatory agents (tear gas) known as CS and CN. Use of nausea-producing agents DM and CN-DM would not be authorized.

The agents would be used primarily to clear tunnels, caves, and underground shelters in cases where their use will lead to far fewer casualties and less loss of life than would the combat alternatives which involve high explosive or flame munitions. Of particular importance would be the reduction in casualties to civilians who are inevitably mingled with hostile military elements as the result of VC tactics.

I agree with General Westmoreland that the use of these riot control agents far outweighs disadvantages that may accrue; in fact there is every indication that we may be in for censure if civilian casualties should accrue because we didn't use tear gas. The disadvantages to which I refer are the likelihood of some sharp international criticism, spurred by Communist propaganda, of the U.S. Government authorizing the employment of what will inevitably be called "poison gas".

Unless you indicate otherwise I will reaffirm to General Wheeler the current national approval for use of the riot control agents CS and CN under the combat conditions described above.

Secretary Rusk concurs in this recommendation.

If you approve, the Department of State will send a message to all posts informing them of the decision and providing public affairs guidance.

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-376

By *ju*, NARA, Date 7-22-93

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- **5464**

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-129
By is, NARA Date 4-29-99

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Week's Developments in Asia

There follows a summary of significant developments in Asia during the past week. Information classifications are given in brackets.

VIETNAM

The political atmosphere in Saigon was as calm as it has been for some time. The major events of the week were the Convention of the Armed Forces, further momentum toward establishing a civilian advisory council, and attempts by the GVN to cope with montagnard dissidence.

Armed Forces Convention (Unclassified)

This day-long experiment intended to mobilize armed forces support for Ky's government was attended by over 1600 officers, ranging in rank from sub-lieutenant to major general with representation drawn from each corps, VNAF, the Navy and special units. Ky's failure to check inflation and Co's mobilization policies came under attack, but the gathering apparently succeeded in its purpose. Included among the nine resolutions adopted was a rejection of any negotiation or coalition with the DRV.

Civilian Advisory Council (Unclassified)

In a speech two days prior to the armed forces convention General Thieu suggested the political blueprint for the future by announcing that the creation of a Civilian Advisory Council in the near future would be the first evolutionary step toward returning the country to civilian rule. Plans for the Council now call for a body of 100 members; each provincial and municipal council would elect a delegate, with the others chosen from among sect leaders, professional groups, labor unions and political parties. Target date for its investiture

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

is November 1. Ambassador Lodge apparently does not expect much from the proposed Council. His primary concern is adequate "floor management". Ky claims he will manage the Council himself. The Ambassador is convinced that Ky will not have enough time to do the job, and that failure to trust others is the weakest trait of the Vietnamese.

Montagnards (Unclassified)

The Embassy assessment of recent developments affecting ethnic tribesmen in the central highlands is that the situation is still fluid despite precipitous moves by the GVN which threatened to shake the loyalty of the tribes. Despite the danger of the government provoking new tribal disaffection by resorting to harsh actions, the conflict has been temporarily smoothed over through a ceremony attended by Premier Ky on 15 September. At that time, the surrendering montagnard troops pledged their allegiance and were welcomed back to the government side.

Rural Construction/Pacification

Status of Hop Tac. (Unclassified) General Thinh, III Corps Deputy Commander, advised the US-GVN Council Meeting that there has been no significant improvement in the past month aside from technical completion of several hamlets and a number of socio-economic projects. Viet Cong incidents, on the other hand, have increased. The major problems continue to be recruitment difficulties and a shortage of civilian cadre because of the draft. We have queried Saigon on what steps the GVN is taking to insure that essential non-military programs are not being impeded by the higher draft calls for the military forces.

Lansdale Mission. (Confidential) The team successfully weathered the uncertainties, rumors and fears that greeted its arrival. It has concentrated so far on methods for working closely and informally with key GVN officials on pacification. Lansdale has seen Ky and Thi; he believes prospects for candid and constructive cooperation with the GVN are promising. Lansdale views the refugee problem as an opportunity for re-invigorating the entire pacification program and is actively assisting in the Mission's efforts.

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- 3 -

CAMBODIA (Confidential)

The departure of Sihanouk from Cambodia for three months will likely mean a lull in Cambodian diplomatic initiatives. However, he will probably continue his soundings in various capitals, notably Moscow and Peiping, regarding international guarantees of Cambodia's territory. He is currently undergoing medical treatment in France. The French report some Cambodian annoyance with the Chinese for frequently ignoring their position and making them feel their small power status. Paris warns, however, that this doesn't imply any willingness on the part of the Cambodians to move closer to the West. They still see in the Chinese their only friend in a hostile regional sea.

BURMA (Unclassified)

In his Moscow trip Ne Win reportedly declined being drawn into any public statement on Vietnam as, in equal vein, he had ignored the Vietnam question in Peiping last July. Ne Win reportedly sent identical letters to Shastri and Ayub appealing for restraint and moderation. These actions continue to support Burma's neutral status.

THAILAND (Unclassified)

The Thai Cabinet has reportedly approved a set of principles for local self-administration as part of the "Developing Democracy Program" to be tested in Northeast Thailand to undercut nascent insurgency there.

SINGAPORE (Unclassified)

Lee Kuan Yew continued his anti-American press campaign during the week with three attacks against the U.S. and one against Malaysia. The latter provoked a Malaysian warning against Singapore interference in Malaysian affairs. Our Consul General reports private statements from Lee confirming that his intent in all this is to discourage the UK from serious consideration of a military withdrawal.

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- 4 -

LAOS (Unclassified)

The new cabinet has been approved by the National Assembly. The changes apparently strengthen rightist representation in the cabinet but are not likely to upset Souvanna's control. The selections will enable the regime to retain a tripartite posture which seems necessary for maintaining the political status quo in Laos and upholding the Geneva Agreements. The Lao Communists are entitled to provide a Deputy Premier and Minister of National Education, Minister of Information, and two Secretaries of State, but they are not expected to participate in the government.

(Confidential) Souvanna is working on a frank statement to the UN General Assembly in mid-October on North Vietnamese aggression against Laos.

INDONESIA (Confidential)

Recent demonstrations and continued harassment by Indonesian mobs of our consulates in Medan and Surabaya has caused State and Embassy Djakarta to make plans for closing them unless the Indonesian Government takes immediate steps to protect U.S. property and personnel. Ambassador Green fears that closing these posts under Communist pressure will only whet the appetite of these groups and that the Embassy will then be the target of the growing Communist-sponsored anti-American drive. The State Department is under considerable pressure to reduce our official presence in Indonesia to a minimum, and the prospects for continued diplomatic relations with Indonesia become dimmer every day.

PHILIPPINES (Confidential)

We have reached agreement with the Philippine military that third country ships and aircraft wishing to use our bases are to receive GOP clearance within specified time limits and are to be considered cleared if no GOP reply is made. We expect resolution soon of a problem created by Philippine insistence that third country craft enter our bases via Philippine commercial ports.

KOREA (Unclassified)

There were no major student demonstrations during the week. Park and the Education Minister have agreed to permit school authorities

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- 5 -

to exercise their own discretion in punishing politically active students and professors. This may re-open the universities. Peoples Party leaders reportedly have decided in principle to return to the Assembly, possibly before ratification of the Korea-Japan agreements. Embassy Seoul believes something approaching normalcy on the political scene may ensue in coming weeks.

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The Japanese Cabinet Council on Okinawa, established after Prime Minister Sato's visit there last month, has confirmed the Japanese position that: (a) Japan has residual or "basic territorial" sovereignty over Okinawa under Article III of the Peace Treaty; (b) problems should be handled by US-Japan bilaterally and not referred to the UN, and (c) the Japanese intend to use the US-Japan Consultative Committee to express their views on administration of Okinawa in preparation for eventual reversion.

JAPAN (Confidential)

Secretary Rusk is scheduled to meet with Foreign Minister Shiina at the UN opening session 27-28 September to discuss mutual interests in South Vietnam, Okinawa, Japan defense, and civil problems.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE UN (Confidential)

Our count on the substantive issue remains the same -- around 5 to 7 votes to spare. On the "important question" we have at present count approximately 16 votes to spare. There may be some erosion in this, however, as the French appear (against their prior assurances) to be lobbying for Chinese admission among delegates of French-speaking West Africa.

Chester L. Cooper

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd
Pres. Off.
9-24-65
2:30P

MEMORANDUM

93a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/rac 12-184

By UUG NAR, Date 03-24-2016

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- 2 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

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C d C
Chester L. Cooper

m45
McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT RIVERA, EL SALVADOR

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your congratulations concerning developments in the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Bunker has indeed done a splendid job, in which he was joined by the other talented and dedicated members of the Ad Hoc Committee. The skill, untiring energy and devotion of Ambassador Ramon de Clairmont Duenas deserves the highest praise. He has brought great credit to his country and the Inter-American system.

With warm regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Julio Adalberto Rivera

President of the Republic of El Salvador

San Salvador, El Salvador.

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO, BRAZIL

Dear Mr. President:

I have been greatly impressed with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the OAS in the Dominican Republic. We have been exceptionally fortunate to have three such dedicated and capable men on the scene. The skill and untiring energy of Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho deserves high praise. His work has been in the best tradition of the distinguished Brazilian diplomatic service.

With warm regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Humberto Alencar de Castello Branco

President of the United States of Brazil

Brasilia, Brazil

94
Approved
9/24/65

September 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Congratulatory Messages to the Presidents
of El Salvador and Brazil**

I recommend that you approve the attached messages to the Presidents of El Salvador (Tab A) and Brazil (Tab B) commending the work of their representatives on the OAS Ad Hoc Committee in the Dominican Republic.

President Rivera of El Salvador sent you a message of congratulations on the work of Ambassador Bunker (Tab C). As you know, Bunker was ably assisted on the Committee by the Ambassadors of Brazil and El Salvador. State believes that President Rivera would welcome a reply expressing appreciation for the Salvadorean Ambassador's work. If a message is sent to him, a similar message should be sent to President Castello Branco concerning the Brazilian Ambassador's contribution.

If you approve the messages, they will be sent by cable via our Embassies in the two countries.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachments

Tabs A, B and C.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Message of September 3, 1965 from President Rivera of El Salvador
to President Johnson

"The President

The White House

I take pleasure in expressing to your Excellency my most sincere congratulations for the important and decisive action carried out by your government through Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Member of the OAS Ad Hoc Committee, which has happily culminated in a solution to the Dominican problem. I renew to your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Julio Adalberto Rivera

President of the Republic of El Salvador".

(above transmitted via US Embassy/San Salvador, as Nr. 184.)