NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1/6

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 86-193 Confidential open 3/25/13 NLJ/RAC 12-185 1 p	11/17/65	A
#4a statement	oral statement to Amb. Dobrynin Confidential Exempt NLJ 86-193 2 p open 3/25/13 NLJ/RAC 12-185	11/15/65	A
#6a cable	copy Saigon 1760 secret open 9-20-85 NLJ 83-179 3 p	11/17/65	A
#7 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy secret 2 p	11/17/65	A
#8 memo dup #69 Bator, Box 2	to the President from Francis M. Bator sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 86-193 Secret open 4-12-94 NLJ 92-19 1 p	11/17/65	A
#9 memo	to the President from McG. B. (dup #109, NSF Files of Mc Bundy Chron File 11/13-30/65 Secret exempt NLJ 91-231 Reni 6-11-10 NLJ 10-108 1 p	11/17/65	A
#9a memo	to the President from W. F. Raborn exempt NLJ 91-234 dup as above secret Exempt per NLJ 84-244 exempt per RAC 9/101 6 pp	11/05/65	A
#10 memo	to the President from Francis M. Bator confidential Open 2/6/98 1 p	11/17/65	A
#10a chart	US Balance of Payments 1965 confidential open 2/6/98 1 p	undated	A
#11 memo	to the President from Francis M. Bator secret Exempt NLJ 86-193 Open 2/6/98 1 p	11/17/65	A
#14a cable	Paris 2682 open 2-21-86 NLJ 85-336 confidential 1 p	11/15/65	A
#14b cable	Paris 2684 Secret open 3/25/14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 1 p	11/15/65	A
#15a cable	from General Palmer in Santo Domingo open 12-3-93 NLJ 91-233 secret (dup. of #185, NSF, CF, D.R., Box 45, Vol 13] 3 p	11/16/65	A
#16a cable	copy Bonn 1396 open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 secret 3 p	11/15/65	A
#19 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret open 10-1-84 NLJ 83-183 1 p	11/16/65	A
#24 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 confidential exempt NLJ 92-377 1 p	11/15/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [redacted]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol.16, Oct. 15 - Nov.19, 1965

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#27 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p	11/14/65]	A
#27a cable	copy of New Delhi 1247 SECRET (SANITIZED) NLJ 89-134 open 8/27/92	3p	11/11/65	A
#28 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	11/14/65	A
#29 memo	to the Preisdent from McG. B confidential	1 p	11/14/65	A
#30 memo	to the Ranch for Marvin Watson from McGeorge Bundy confidential open	2 p	11/13/65	A
#32 agenda	tentative agenda for meeting open 11-28-10 NLJ/RAC 10-59 secret ~~Sanitized 10-1-84 NLJ 83-183~~	4 p	11/11/65	A
#33 memo	to the Presdient from McG. B. open 2.25.94 NLJ 92-377 confidential	2p	11/08/65	A
#33b memo	to McGeorge Bundy from Thomas Mann Confidential open 5.21.12	4 p	10/04/65	A
#33c chart	re: Yugoslavia " confidential	1 p	undated	A
#33d memo	to President from Bator " confidential	2 p	08/18/65	A
~~#33a memo to President from Bator~~				
#34 cable	CAP65668 to President from McGeorge Bundy top secret open 6/1/92 (NLJ 83-183)	2 p	11/08/65	A
#35 memo	to Jack Vaughn from McGeorge Bundy confidential open 3.25.14 NLJ/RAC 12-185	1 p	11/08/65	A
#36 memo	to Jacobsen for President from McGeorge Bundy top secret open 10-1-84 NLJ 83-183	2 p	11/08/65	A
#37a letter	to President from Henry Cabot Lodge SEcret open 9-20-85 NLJ 83-179	5p	11/03/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE [redacted]
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 16, Oct. 15 - Nove 19, 1965

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 cable	CAP 656666 to President from McGeorge Bundy open 5-21-12 ~~top~~ secret sanitized 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	3 p	11/07/65	A
	Downgraded to Secret per NLJ 92-377			
#39 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239	3 p	11/06/65	A
#39a letter	to the President from Thomas Dodd Confidential open 5-21-12	7 p	10/27/65	A+C
#41 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy confidential open 5-21-12; C removed per TH, 2/20/97	3 p	11/05/65	A+C
#41b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential	1 p	11/02/65	A
#42a report	FBI investigation open 5/21/12 (per JC/RG)	4p	4/8/63	C
#41c report	re: Dominican Republic confidential open 6-18-84 NLJ 84-105	2 p	undated	A
#41d report	re: Dominican Republic open 11-15-91 NLJ 91-230 confidential sanitized 6-18-84 NLJ 84-105	2 p	undated	A
#41e memo	to the ~~Pres~~ Secretary from Wm. Crockett ~~Exp~~ confidential open 5-21-12; "C" removed per TH 2/20/97	1 p	10/19/65	A+C
#43 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 13-185 Confidential sanitized 10-1-84 NLJ 83-183	2 p	11/05/65	A
#46b letter	to the President from D. B. Sangster confidential open 5-21-12	1 p	10/14/65	A
#47 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy confidential	6 p	11/04/65	A
#48a memo	to the President from Thomas C. Mann confidential open 6-18-84 NLJ 84-105	2 p	11/02/65	A
#48b cable	No 630 from Bogota, colombia confidential open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 13-185	1 p	11/02/65	A
#48c memo	re Mr. Bundy from W. G. Bowdler confidential open 8/28/92	1 p	11/02/65	A
#49a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer open 5-21-12 secret exempt NLJ 92-377	2 p	11/03/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [redacted]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos tothe President, vol. 16, Oct. 15 -Nov. 19, 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

48 6

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#50 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy Secret open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239	3 p	11/03/65	A
#51a cable	Text of Vientiane 437 confidential Open 8-15-86 NLJ 84-295	3 p	11/03/65	A
#52a cable	text of Saigon 1544 open 5-21-12 secret sanitized 9-20-85 NLJ 83-179	3 p	11/03/65	A
#53 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	2 p	11/02/65	A
#54a memo	to the President from McG. B. secret	3 p	10/30/65	A
#55 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret sanitized 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377 sanitized 11/13/02 per NLJ 02-14 more info no longer	2 p	11/01/65	A
#56 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret sanitized 11/13/02 per NLJ 02-14	2 p	11/01/65	A
#57 memo	to Jake Jacobsen from McG. B. Open 9-28-94 NLJ 96-230 sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 86-193 Secret	1 p	10/30/65	A
#57a report	not yet open Open 5/23/01 NLJ 00-303 re. MLF sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 86-193 Sanctioned 8-28-94 NLJ 94-232 secret Sanct 1994	8 p	10/18/65	A
#57b report	Annex A to above report Open 9-28-94 NLJ 96-230 secret Exempt NLJ 86-193 Sanct 1994	2 p	10/18/65	A
#57c report	Annex B to above report secret Exempt NLJ 86-193 "	2 p	10/18/65	A
#57d report	Annex C to above report Secret Exempt NLJ 86-193 "	1 p	10/18/65	A
#57e report	Annex D to above report sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 86-193 secret	2 p	10/18/65	A
#58 memo	to Bill Moyers from McG. B. Confidential open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/30/65	A
#59a memo	to the President from Charles L. Schultze Confidential open 5-21-12	1 p	10/28/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [redacted]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 16, Oct. 15 - Nov. 19, 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#60b memo	to the President from McG. B confidential open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/30/65	A
#60d memo open 3/04	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	10/30/65	A
#60e memo	to the President from Charles L. Schultze confidential open 5-21-12	2 p	10/29/65	A
#60f memo open 3/04	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	10/30/65	A
#61 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 secret sanitized 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239	3 p	10/30/65	A
##61a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer open 5-21-12 secret exempt NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/30/65	A
#63 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret Open 6/1/92 (NLJ 91-40)	2 p	10/28/65	A
#64 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	2 p	10/27/65	A
#66 memo Dup #23 NSF, Files of Bundy, "Daily Regional Staff..." Box 19	to the President from R. W. Komer open 11/18/02 per NLJ 02-14 secret Dup. # 211, NSF, Files of Haynes, "Chrono" Box sanitized 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	2 p	10/25/65	A
#68 memo	to the President from McG. B. top secret open 10-21-84 NLJ-83-183	1 p	10/22/65	A
#68a memo	to the President from Gen. A. J. Goodpaster top secret open 9-4-84 NLJ 84-297	1 p	10/20/65	A
#68b memo	for the record by Gen A. J. Goodpaster top secret open 9-4-84 NLJ 84-297	2 p	10/20/65	A
#73 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 secret (Duplicate in NSF Files of M. Bundy, "Daily Regional Staff Rpt to Pres.," Box 19; SANITIZED NLJ 89-183)	4 p	10/22/65	A
#74 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/22/65	A
#76 memo #75	to the President from McG. B. open 3-25-14 NLJ/RAC 12-185 secret sanitized 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239	3 p	10/21/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [redacted]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 16, Oct. 15 - Nov., 19, 1965

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#76b memo	to the President from R. W. Komer open 11/13/02 NLJ 02-14			
	secret sanitized 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	2 p	10/18/65	A
	Dup #24, NSF, Files of Bundy, "Daily Regional Staff Rpt..." Box 19			
#77a xxxx cable	xx text Saigon 1355			
	secret sanitized 9-20-85 NLJ 83-179 open 5-21-12	3 p	10/20/65	A
#78a memo	to Bill Moyers from McG. B.			
	confidential	1 p	10/15/65	A
#78d	Biographic Sketch-possible classified info.	1p	No date	A
#79 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 2/4/93			
	confidential sanitized 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/19/65. open 5-21-12	A
#80a memo	to the President from McG. B.			
	secret open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377	1 p	10/19/65	A
#80b cable	text of New Delhi 1025			
	secret	4 p	10/19/65	A
#81 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer			
	secret open 11/13/02 NLJ 02-14	2 p	10/18/65	A
#82 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer open 2-25-94 NLJ 92-377			
	confidential Dup. #237 Haynes, as below	1 p	10/15/65	A
#82a letter	President Johnson to President Leon M'Ba	1p	10/19/65	A
	possible classified information. open 11/1/01			
	Dup. #135c & 237a, NSF, Files of Haynes "Chrono" Box 1			

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [redacted]
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Recd 11-19-65 11:35a

MEMORANDUM

2

1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Attached is a letter from Bob Benjamin which, among other things, extolls the reports that have been prepared for the White House Conference on International Cooperation.

2. A brief but forthcoming acknowledgment, for your signature, is also attached.

McG.B.

McGB

Attachments Yes ___ No ___ - Bundy sh'd acknowledge, since he sold these particular silk socks ___

1a

November 18, 1965

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for your kind letter of November 16 regarding the reports and recommendations prepared by the Committees of the National Citizens' Commission for the White House Conference on International Cooperation. I have heard fine things about the hard and good work you and other members of the Commission have done over the past months, and I am looking forward, with considerable anticipation, to studying the Committee reports personally.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Robert S. Benjamin
Chairman, National Citizens' Commission
on International Cooperation
United Nations Association of the U.S.A.
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

GC:jf

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, November 17, 1965, 7 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visitors

On the Wilson visit, you may wish to know the latest before you see Ambassador Dean this evening. They are eager for an answer on Wilson's proposal of December 17.

George Ball and I fully agree with Bruce that the best thing to do with Wilson is one serious talk at the Ranch, and leave it at that. We also agree that the real point of the meeting is for you and Wilson to talk, and that you will not really want to have a lot of his ministers or your own. We have not been able to reach Dean Rusk to get his opinion, but George and I are quite confident that he will agree on this on the simple ground that if Wilson is in this country to address the United Nations, and asks to see you, there really isn't much choice.

The complicating factor here is Ayub. The Pak Charge has told us today that Ayub wants to come to the US on December 12 and address the United Nations the next day, then come to see you on the 14th and 15th! Your guidance yesterday was that we should accept such a proposal, but it does make a lot of visitors in that week. Since Ayub had the first claim, his coming does give you a reason to put Wilson off if necessary.

Ayub of course could come to the Ranch too, and in his case again what is important is a few hours of man-to-man talk, and not a lot of big meetings.

McG. B.

Okay for Wilson? Yes ✓ No ____ Ranch ____ White House ____

Okay for Ayub? Yes ✓ No ____ Ranch ____ WH ____

Don't know. will wire you before dates — in ample time — will be here myself

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, November 17, 1965, 7 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Clark Clifford's Committee meets to review the major aid issues tomorrow at 12:30 in my office, and will be on the job right through the afternoon. I think we will have a full attendance:

1. Acheson
2. Anderson
3. Black
4. Dillon
5. Rockefeller
6. Clifford (Chairman)

They do not expect to see you during this visit, but it may be that you would want to have a word with one or more of them, and I think you ought to know that they will be here. Clifford and I have done quite a lot of preparatory work to get ready for this meeting, and the members of the committee should be ready to express themselves to you after one more session -- perhaps about the beginning of December.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

Thursday, November 17, 1965, 6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Statement to Ambassador Dobrynin on Soviet "Orbital Missile"

On Monday (November 15) Ambassador Thompson gave Ambassador Dobrynin the attached oral statement concerning recent Soviet claims that they possess "orbital missiles."

In the November 7th parade, the Soviets displayed large rockets which were described by Marshal Katyukov as "orbital missiles whose warheads, unexpectedly to the aggressor, can deliver their blow at the first or any other loop around the earth." This provocative claim, coupled with the public display of an alleged operational rocket, publicly poses the question of Soviet compliance with the UN General Assembly resolution against the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit.

The intelligence community does not believe that the Soviets will have a true orbital nuclear weapons system in the foreseeable future since such nuclear weapons systems are not considered efficient from a military point of view. Nevertheless, the Soviets do have a technical capability to place nuclear weapons in orbit. The fact that such an act would create serious political and psychological problems is a strong motivation to preserve the UN resolution.

The existence of a nuclear delivery system with "orbital characteristics" would not in itself be a violation of the UN resolution as long as missiles with nuclear warheads were not actually placed in orbit. However, the Soviet statement certainly constitutes a violation of the spirit of the resolution. In this connection, you will recall that when you announced the Air Force MOL space project, you specifically reaffirmed this country's intention to honor the UN resolution.

In order to clarify this situation, the State Department concluded that the wisest initial course would be a private representation to the Soviets, pointing out that their statements have raised serious questions in public concerning their intentions and urging them to publicly reaffirm that they will honor the UN resolution.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 12-185
By LCB NARA, Date 03-25-2013

McGeorge Bundy

Att. - Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORAL STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
November 15, 1965

The United States Government notes with concern continuing references by official Soviet sources to the possession of orbital rockets. Reviewing the military parade in Red Square on November 7, TASS reported that Marshal Katyukov announced that included in the parade were "orbital missiles whose warheads, unexpectedly to the aggressor, can deliver their blow at the first or any other loop around the earth." This assertion is even more explicit than one made earlier this year. On July 3, L. I. Brezhnev told Soviet military graduates that the USSR had "orbital" rockets. Radio Moscow several days later defined such rockets as ones "... shot into a terrestrial orbit from where they are capable of hitting any target on earth when needed. Distinct from other types of rockets, they have practically no flight limit and are capable of carrying super-powerful nuclear charges."

The Soviet Government is aware that the General Assembly, in unanimously adopting Resolution 1884 of October 17, 1963, welcomed the intention of both our governments not to station nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The General

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NAC 12-185
By UKD NARA, Date 03-26-2014

Assembly solemnly called on all States not only to refrain from orbiting such weapons but also to refrain "from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

Such public Soviet statements as are noted above seem contrary to the spirit of General Assembly Resolution 1884. They have caused speculation as to the intentions of the Soviet Government with respect to the Resolution. We are coming under considerable public pressure to explain the meaning of Soviet claims and intentions, and may have to do so at any time. In view of the foregoing, and the importance the world attaches to the General Assembly's Resolution 1884, which was co-sponsored by the USSR, my Government believes that a public clarification of Soviet intentions by reaffirmation of the Resolution would seem to be in order.

5

Wednesday, November 17, 1965, 6:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will want to look at this memorandum from George Ball on the subject you charged us to study in our meeting last week. It may help you to decide whether younneed a meeting on this subject tomorrow or Friday.

As you will see on pages 8 and 9, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State come out on opposite sides, and for very good reasons. The man who has to present next year's defense budget will want to have made a last full try. The man who has to cope with an effort by the Communists to embarrass us by ambiguous responses to a pause tends to be against it. (Schoenbrun's story today about the North Vietnamese feelers to the French is an example of what we could expect in spades in a new pause.)

My own judgment is marginally against the pause, perhaps because I am more concerned with the diplomatic aspects than with the military budget. But I also have some feeling that if we pause, we may seem to admit that our bombing is the cause of the trouble, and this is simply not so. This is a matter which we can brood over without a meeting for another few days -- if you wish -- but it is of such importance that I feel an obligation to submit it to you now.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Recd. Pres. 11-17-65 4:35P

D 1 6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., November 17, 1965
4:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Lodge's weekly telegram. He lays proper emphasis on the fact that this week it is the military developments that are the most interesting, but paragraph 4 on rural construction is of equal long-run importance.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

6a

✓

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 83-179
By ing, NARS, Date 9-20-85

~~SECRET NODIS~~

Wednesday, November 17, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1760)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Military

The most interesting event of the week was the appearance of military units in South Vietnam consisting entirely of North Vietnamese personnel. In addition to the three regiments of the North Vietnamese 325th Division already carried, General Westmoreland has evidence of the presence of the equivalent of one other division and possibly more. The North Vietnamese appear to be giving considerable attention to the improvement of the line of communications through the Laos panhandle. Earth-moving equipment had been observed. This would permit greater support to the Viet Cong.

This adds a third facet to the war. We have hitherto had to cope with (1) the main force Viet Cong units, containing about 35 percent of Viet Cong strength and (2) the guerrilla terrorists containing some 65 percent - all directed by Hanoi. Now come units which are all from the north.

The U.S. First Cavalry heavily engaged elements of four regular North Vietnamese regiments west of Pleiku near the Cambodian border for three days at the beginning of this week inflicting heavy casualties in what may turn out to be the biggest U.S. battle in the war to date.

Prime Minister Ky told me at Tay Ninh today that he believes there are two North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam and that "they will keep on sending divisions down until the line of communication is cut".

2. Basic Political

Today I went to Tay Ninh where Prime Minister Ky officially inaugurated a Government of Vietnam program whereby about 700,000 acres of state-owned land goes to about 180,000 farmers.

Communism took over China largely on the strength of the slogan "Land to the Tiller." In Tay Ninh I saw this slogan actually being carried out. I know of your long-standing interest in this and, as you know, the U.S. has helped a great deal. To me this is a concrete example of what we mean by "true revolution".

The number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program again increased over last week's figure. Analysis of police arrest figures for the first week of November showed a downward trend in the number of deserters and draft dodgers apprehended and an increase in the number of suspected Viet Cong and illegal residents rounded up.

3. Economic

For the second successive week prices declined in Saigon, notably in port, fish, charcoal and rice -- the things the masses consume. Rice is actually below last year's level. This is in particular a vindication of our rice policy and in general none of the above would have been possible without U.S. help -- and heroic measures in which many hardworking Washington officials can take pride.

4. Pacification - "Rural Construction"

Minister Thang of "Rural Construction" traveled to the I, II, and IV Corps to meet the new and provisional rural construction committees consisting of corps and divisional commanders and the province chief. He urged realistic planning, stimulation of local initiative, teamwork between military and civilians and, above all, response to the needs and aspirations of the people. He wants elections for executive leadership in the villages to be held as soon as there is freedom from intimidation. He shows marked enthusiasm and verve in all of this.

Thang is also working on creating groups (cadre) which can go into the village and stay indefinitely, capable of self-defense.

I now have learned that his two top priority objectives will be eight villages each in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. The talk now is of a team of 60 men for each village of which the 40 man political action team will be the nucleus. These estimates and plans change all the time as they learn more about the realities, I report it as I learn about it.

My feeling about pacification is two-fold: that we are certainly on the right track and all too often, that the train isn't moving. And then I think of the unfortunate results of going too fast and of striving for flashy effects as the Vietnamese are all to prone to do. I also recall that Minister Thang is not impulsive and is a careful, thorough, though energetic, man. And I conclude that maybe we can't go much faster at this stage.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday
November 17, 1965
11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I spoke to Orville Freeman this morning about getting the Indian Agricultural Minister, Subramaniam, over here. Orville is going to an international agricultural meeting in Rome this week, and will be seeing Subramaniam there. He has undertaken to explore the matter fully, and he strongly supports the basic idea of the Subramaniam visit.

2. Orville pointed out that Subramaniam might find it difficult to come if there were no prospect that he could reach any understanding on help for Indian agriculture -- because for him to go home empty-handed -- as a well-known friend of the United States -- might be politically tough. I told Orville that you were not ready to give any blank checks on this, and that I thought he should make his own estimate in the light of all the evidence as to whether it was likely that Subramaniam's visit would lay a base for a hard-boiled recommendation that limited interim assistance be given in such a matter as, for example, for fertilizer.

3. Orville and I agreed that your own freedom of action should be protected, but I pointed out that you had repeatedly emphasized in the last week that you were looking to the Department of Agriculture for determined efforts to make sure that every single action of the United States in the food aid field was effectively related to agricultural self-help by the receiving country. I said that I thought that since this was your position, you would be prepared to give due weight to a really well-considered and carefully limited recommendation growing out of a Subramaniam visit -- if it had the signature of the Secretary of State for policy, the Secretary of Agriculture for food, the Secretary of the Treasury for dollar drain, and the Directors of AID and the Budget from their points of view. I said that the loans in question had no balance-of-payments import that I could see, so that I thought Freeman himself was the key figure.

4. On this basis, Freeman undertook to have a hard talk with Subramaniam in Rome and make a judgment on the visit at that time. We agreed to report this plan to you in case you had any objection to it.

DECLASSIFIED
NSC 4-15-77; State 7-10-76
By DCA NARS, Date 6-30-83

5. I have since talked to Komer about my conversation with Freeman, and he believes that Subramaniam can fairly easily come here for a "planning" visit without taking any commitments home with him, if it seems better to you when the time comes to play it that way. Moreover, Komer thinks that in the light of the very bad Indian harvest, straight food shipments may turn out to be more important right now, both to the Indians and to us, than fertilizer. So I have agreed again with Freeman that he should be sure to give absolutely no assurance that a visit here would lead to a specific prize for Subramaniam.

6. Meanwhile, a cable is going to Bowles telling him to explain politely to Shastri that while you would like to receive him at any time, and quite understand that he cannot come in December, the dates proposed in the first weeks of January are difficult for the reasons you stated to me yesterday. Bowles is requested to suggest to the Indians that Shastri propose himself for any date that is convenient to him after January 20.

7. We are also going forward to make sure that Ayub knows he will be welcome on agreed dates in December -- if indeed he still wants to come then.

McG.B.

8

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Wednesday, November 17, 1965, 11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Topics for your 1:00 p.m. Meeting today with Ambassador Bruce

1. Wilson Visit As Mac wrote you yesterday (Tab A), Wilson would like to come in December to talk to you about their major defense review--before he makes any decisions. He probably also wants to get a sense of your thinking, post-Erhard, about MLF/ANF and other Atlantic matters. The British Embassy has just called to say that they have a message suggesting December 17, after a UN appearance the day before. Pat Dean will give this message to Mac when he goes up there for lunch with the Princess.

2. On MLF/ANF, you will wish to get David Bruce's views about how we might play the British. This is a very hard problem for Wilson. He must cut back on defense somewhere to make his balance of payments add up without internal deflation, and knows that the best way out would be to get out of the nuclear business. But selling the Queen's submarines for German money would be hard for them to swallow. I doubt if Wilson will show his hand on this issue, except in direct communication with you. He is likely to regard this as a problem for senior politicians and not for discussion with George Ball or even Bob McNamara.

3. This suggests that it might be useful to supplement the Ball/McNamara ANF/MLF probe in London (November 26). Two possibilities occur to me:

(1) A Presidential letter to Wilson (perhaps delivered by Ball), sketching the alternatives from consultation to hardware-right-away, and posing some hard questions to smoke him out.

(2) If you prefer to avoid direct Presidential involvement at this stage, Bundy could write to Wilson's private secretary, Derek Mitchell, on a central staff-to-central staff basis.

4. Because of Bundy's social life, I will stand by at 1 o'clock in case you want me when you talk to Bruce.

FMB

Francis M. Bator

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-19
By ib, NARA, Date 4-12-94

SECRET

8-b

Tuesday, November 16, 1965
11:30 a.m.

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I have just heard from Derek Mitchell in Harold Wilson's office, that Wilson is likely to ask us soon if he can come and see you sometime in the second week of December. This explains the attached ticker item, but it doesn't say why we always learn from the press first about Wilson's plans.

2. What is on Wilson's mind is that the British have completed their major review of defense policy, and before they make decisions, Wilson wants to discuss the problem with you.

3. I told Mitchell, as my totally informal and personal reaction, that December was likely to be an extremely busy month for you because of the press of work that is piling up in the Budget session, State of the Union Message, and your legislative program.

4. At the same time, I think it may well be in our interests to have Wilson here in December, both to make sure their defense review does not result in leaving us in the lurch in some important part of the world, and for the purpose of moving with them and the Germans toward the best possible Atlantic position. Moreover, if he comes to the UN, I don't see how we can easily avoid a visit.

5. The wisest man in the country on our relations with the British is David Bruce, who is here until Thursday, and this feeler from Downing Street may increase the importance of your having a talk with him.

McG. B.

COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1965
Wednesday - 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic -- Admiral Raborn's List of Bad Appointments

The attached memorandum from Admiral Raborn lists the names of twenty-six persons appointed by President Garcia Godoy, or his subordinates, [redacted] derogatory information.

There is nothing particularly new about this list. We are all aware that Garcia Godoy made some bad appointments, particularly in the judicial field. He himself admits this and has already started to do some housecleaning. [redacted] The new Attorney General, Gustavo Gomez, seems to be a good choice. Garcia Godoy vetted him with [redacted] before making the selection.

3.3
(b)(6)

Garcia Godoy has told Bunker that he is sending his press officer, Franklin Dominguez, out of the country. He plans to close Radio Santo Domingo soon in order to reorganize the staff and clean out some of the left extremists. One of these is on the Raborn list. The National Department of Investigations (DNI) is beginning to conduct security checks on government officials. It is working closely [redacted]

Bunker will be keeping the pressure on Garcia Godoy to remove undesirable appointees from key positions. Those already made to the court system represent the most difficult problem because of the autonomy of the judiciary under the Institutional Act.

McG. B.

Attachment:

Raborn memo to President,
dated 5 November, 1965.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 10-108
By ial, NARA, Date 6-7-10

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

[redacted]L November 17, 1965

Mr. President:

Attached is the balance of payments table you asked for. The fourth quarter and full year estimates are highly speculative. We do not even know exactly what went on during the third quarter. For the rest of the year, much will depend on whether we succeed in convincing the banks and Connor's clients that it will do them no good to shift money out of the country in '65 -- that such shifts will count against them in '66. Both Fowler and Connor made that point at the press conference. (I will have the conference transcripts and press releases for you shortly.)

FMB

Francis M. Bator

Attachment: Balance of payments table.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jw, NARA, Date 2-6-98

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1965

(in millions of dollars)

	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	Proj. 4th Quarter	1st Half Actual	Jan-Sept. Actual	Jan-Sept. Annual Rate	1965 Projected	1964 Actual
Overall*	-701	+247	-485	-325	-454	- 939	-1,252	-1,264	-2,798
Regular* Trans-actions	-780	+117	-615	-400 (+/-)	-663	-1,278	-1,704	-1,678	-3,106
Official*	-634	+210	+260	?	-424	-164	- 219	- ??	-1,224

* Seasonally adjusted.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JW, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY November 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: German Position on Consultation versus Nuclear Hardware

As you know, Erhard's man Birrenbach spent the early part of last week -- before your session at the Ranch with Rusk, et al. -- in Washington to scout our position on ANF/MLF, etc. According to two separate and reliable reports, he was pleasantly surprised by American receptivity to a hardware solution. When he arrived, he told a journalist friend -- Hans Meyer, I am told an accurate reporter -- that the Germans were more concerned with status than hardware and hinted that the current emphasis on hardware was a bargaining position, not likely to be sustained. Just before leaving Washington, Birrenbach told Meyer that, contrary to his expectations, the outlook for U.S. agreement to a hardware package is excellent.

The other account came via Cambridge. Apparently just before he left, Birrenbach telephoned an old friend at Harvard to report that he had come to Washington resigned to discuss consultative machinery but concluded from his private conversations around town that the Germans would be able to get hardware. When I asked whether Birrenbach said any more about the "private conversations", I was told that he mentioned Dean Acheson, and rather less clearly, people in the State Department.

The interesting point is that Birrenbach -- who is himself an ardent hardware man, committed to the Schroeder line -- expected that he would have to retreat and take his stand on consultation without hardware.

Francis M. Bator

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

CC: Mr. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JW, NARA, Date 2-6-98

12

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, November 16, 1965, 2:40 p.m.

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting this afternoon with Joe Fowler

Fowler will be asking for your preliminary approval for the broad outlines of the 1966 balance of payments program. We have worked out two alternative packages. One of these would leave us with a small but appreciable deficit of about $500-700 million; the other would take us to zero or into surplus. Fowler will recommend, and I would agree, that you approve the more ambitious option. He will also tell you that to sell that option to Connor's clients and the banks, it would be necessary for the government to dramatize the balance of payments program as part of the total effort connected with the Viet Nam war. What he would like to say-- for the first time tomorrow at the press conference announcing the third quarter deficit--that the world is no longer the same as it was a year ago, that we are in a serious shooting war, and that our voluntary program to bring the balance of payments under control reflects the kind of national effort that is required from all parties.

I thought it might be useful for you to have a prior private indication of the kind of basic change and approach that Fowler will suggest. Connor will take a similar tack. However, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy have not been involved in this discussion and hence have not yet had their say. (My own prejudice, for what it is worth, is that your policy of the past year of being very careful not to over-dramatize the Viet Nam war is still right. It will be difficult enough over time to maintain room for Presidential maneuver and hold off pressure from those who still believe in the notion of a simple, clear-cut military victory.)

Francis M. Bator

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, November 16, 1965
11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I have just heard from Derek Mitchell in Harold Wilson's office, that Wilson is likely to ask us soon if he can come and see you sometime in the second week of December. This explains the attached ticker item, but it doesn't say why we always learn from the press first about Wilson's plans.

2. What is on Wilson's mind is that the British have completed their major review of defense policy, and before they make decisions, Wilson wants to discuss the problem with you.

3. I told Mitchell, as my totally informal and personal reaction, that December was likely to be an extremely busy month for you because of the press of work that is piling up in the Budget session, State of the Union Message, and your legislative program.

4. At the same time, I think it may well be in our interests to have Wilson here in December, both to make sure their defense review does not result in leaving us in the lurch in some important part of the world, and for the purpose of moving with them and the Germans toward the best possible Atlantic position. Moreover, if he comes to the UN, I don't see how we can easily avoid a visit.

5. The wisest man in the country on our relations with the British is David Bruce, who is here until Thursday, and this feeler from Downing Street may increase the importance of your having a talk with him.

McG. B.

McG. B.

7

WILSON

LONDON (AP)-BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WILSON PLANS TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT MONTH TO ADDRESS THE UNITED NATIONS.

INFORMED SOURCES SAID WILSON ALSO WANTS TO CONFER WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN WASHINGTON.

LT859AES 11/16

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

2 14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14

Rec'd Nov 16 11:35 am

Tues., Nov. 16, 1965
11 A. M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Two interesting cables from Paris on Mansfield's movements.

McG. B.

✓ 14a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXDIS 2682 November 15, 1965

From Paris

1. Following is Embassy translation of Sihanouk's reply to Senator Mansfield's message addressed to Nong Kimny who personally transmitted it to Senator morning November 15:

"Plea se inform Senator Mansfield that I would be very happy to receive him in Cambodia at a date to be set by him. Knowing how very great a friend he is of Cambodia, I cordially invite him to visit our country. If the other Senators who travel with him wish to accompany him to Cambodia, they will also be welcome. N. Sihanouk"

2. In discussing Sihanouk's reply, Nong Kimny (a) called Senator's attention to "very warm tone" which he said reflected Prince's esteem and confidence in Senator's understanding of Cambodia; (b) expressed view that Sihanouk's cordiality was indicatinn Cambodia's determination pursue policy of neturality; (c) noted that Prince would need about 4-5 days advance notice on exact date of visit; (d) suggested that Australians be used as channel of communication for working out details visit with Phnom Penh (mentioned in this connection that he will remain Paris until November 23 and that, in Bangkok, Indonesia represents Cambodia); (e) stated that invitation rest of party come Phnom Penh was "act of courtesy" and that Prince leaves it to Senator Mansfield's discretion to decide whether he wishes other Senators to accompany him.

3. In reply, Senator Mansfield (a) expressed appreciation for invitation; (b) said he thought he would go to Phnom Penh late November or very early in December and would keep Cambodians informed of exact date of visit; (c) said he did not know whether others would accompany him but thought it "very likely" that he would be going alone; (d) added that Mrs. Mansfield would definitely not accompany him to Phnom Penh; (e) stressed that discussion in Phnom Penh "of mutual problems would be "on unofficial basis."

4. Comment: Sihanouk's message was sent in clear. Since French will undoubtedly hear about it, we plan inform Manach of developments, stressing unofficial nature of the visit.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 85-336
By lnp, NARS, Date 2-21-86

EXDIS

November 15, 1965

From: AmEmbassy Paris 2684

Lucet told me at Alphand lunch for Senator Mansfield today that he had been received by General for half hour November 13. According to Lucet, de Gaulle was as roundabout as usual in stating his views on U. S. and NATO. One definite statement he made was that he wished Lucet to return to Paris from Washington in February, at which time he would expound further regarding his views on NATO and what should be done thereon. He said nothing would happen before then. Source added that General had stressed he did not repeat not wish bad relations with United States. Although Lucet was somewhat cryptic, I gather there was nothing whatever new in de Gaulle's thinking and he apparently repeated his well-known views on need for changing the alliance to some not repeat not entirely specified degree.

EXDIS ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ /RAC 12-185
By LKD NARA, Date 03-25-2014

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1965

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this account of Senator Russell's visit to Santo Domingo.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-233
By jw, NARA, Date 11-5-93

~~SECRET~~

November 16, 1965
Tuesday, 10:45 a.m.

FROM GENERAL PALMER IN SANTO DOMINGO

1. Senator Russell had a very worthwhile visit here from November 9 to 11, particularly from our point of view. I believe he likewise felt that the visit had beneficial results and gave him better insight not only of the Dominican problem but also wider inter-American problem.

During the visit he saw a good deal of U.S. troop units and had ample opportunity to talk to individual men, especially from the state of Georgia. Our troops particularly appreciated his visit and gave him a warm welcome.

Senator Russell visited San Isidro airfield as well as beach and port facilities in Red Beach-Jaina area. He saw past and current troop billeting areas, and showed keen interest in semi-permanent tent camps under construction.

2. Since Senator Russell stayed in the residence he had ample opportunity for talks with Ambassador Bennett, an old family friend from his part of Georgia. The Senator was happy to see cordial and close relations not only between Ambassador Bennett and myself but at all civilian-military echelons in the Dominican Republic. I took the opportunity to express my personal admiration for Bennett and the fact that we saw eye-to-eye on Dominican fundamentals. The Senator was also gratified to learn of essentially good working relations between CIA and military intelligence people in my headquarters, as well as with service attaches.

3. Senator Russell also had several opportunities for discussions with Ambassador Bunker and General Alvim. He praised Bunker's efforts in a most difficult situation, but at the same time pointed out the necessity to maintain strong and unrelenting anti-Communist position with respect to Godoy Governmen t. He took a liking to General Alvim and got along well with him.

4. Senator Russell also visited President Godoy and Minister of Armed Forces Rivera Caminero. His impression of Godoy is that he is a good "staff type"man, but weak and indecisive; he likened him to the No. 2 man in a law firm who was good at assembling the pertinent facts but wasn't up to making the decisions. He liked Rivera and was impressed that relations between the two men seemed to be good with Rivera reflecting apparently solid loyalty towards Godoy.

~~SECRET~~

5. In my talks with Senator Russell he readily picked up point that the Dominican Republic was not the important thing; rather it was its significance to the Western Hemisphere and the future security and solidarity of the OAS and Inter-American system. In this context he agreed that military personnel assigned to units in the Dominican Republic should not be allowed to volunteer for service in Vietnam as there was little point in moving people from one important operational area to another.

6. I impressed on him the point that the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) had learned to work well together, and although of limited military effectiveness, was improving with U.S. example and incentive of competition with other Latin American troops. Senator Russell was impressed with the considerable disparity between various Latin American troop contingents with respect to arms and equipment, and general effectiveness. He expressed strong opinion that Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force should have been a North American, pointing out that the U.S. was the leader of the Western Hemisphere, that U.S. troops were the backbone of the IAPF, and that the IAPF was possible only with U.S. resources. He seemed to take a dim view of the U.S. putting up most of the blue chips and then letting someone else make the bets. I couldn't agree more with his view.

7. Although he expressed his preference for a more straightforward military solution and a more uncompromising stand against Communism, the Senator nevertheless reflected a basic understanding of the OAS aspects involved. He recognized that political factors simply precluded the more direct approach.

8. With respect to the basic IAPF force structure, I explained in some detail its composition to include the Latin American brigade and a U.S. brigade of 3 airborne infantry battalions, 1 airborne artillery battalion, 1 airborne engineer company and 1 tank company. He seemed to understand and to agree to inclusion of artillery battalion and tank company in order to provide a more balanced force, permit necessary combined arms training, and thus be ready for not only any contingency in the Dominican Republic but also for other possible contingencies elsewhere. I pointed out the high show-of-force psychological value of both armor and artillery, and that all troops could perform basic security and military police types of duties.

9. Since General Alvim had raised question of low Honduran pay, I privately explained entire background to Senator Russell. I brought out the fact that other countries concerned were satisfied with situation and did not want to change things. Costa Ricans were relatively well paid. Nicaraguans seemed to get along all right and even could afford rest and rehabilitation to Puerto Rico. Hondurans and Paraguayans were lowest paid, but their countries wanted it that way for national economic reasons. All troops had ample rations and had a little pocket money; their families back homewere all provided for also. Thus, the real problem was that the Brazilians were over-paid (higher pay than U.S.) and General Alvim wants to take the heat off the Brazilians, because the other Latin American troops resent this fact. Senator Russell seemed to understand situation and to accept my explanation.

10. He and his party, together with Ambassador and Mrs. Bennett, departed Dominican Republic at 9:05 local time, November 11. Senator Russell planned to stay in Bahamas while Ambassador Bennett went on to Atlanta to see his mother who is seriously ill.

3 16

Rec'd Nov 16 1135a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

16

Tues., Nov. 16, 1965
10:30 AM

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in McGhee's conversation with Erhard about Erhard's view of his visit.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

(Copy of Bonn 1396, November 15, 1965)

SUBJECT: Meeting with Erhard - Visit to Washington

FROM: Ambassador McGhee

I saw Chancellor Erhard today at my request. This was the first opportunity I have had to see him since Erhard formed his new government and delivered his declaration of policy to the Bundestag. I expressed appreciation for the strong statement included concerning the importance of US-German relations. I assured him we fully reciprocated this view.

I read to the Chancellor the statement of Secretary Rusk contained in the wireless bulletin of this date to the effect that the Johnson-Erhard talks presented an unusual opportunity. The Chancellor expressed gratification. The following points concerning the visit were discussed.

1. Time and Place

I asked the Chancellor what details he had arrived at with respect to the visit, now that the dates December 3-4 had been agreed upon. He replied that he planned to arrive in Washington by plane on the afternoon or early evening of December 2, and wished to reserve the evening for a meeting with the German delegation. He did not indicate when he would depart. He would be glad to meet either in Texas or Washington as the President desired. I advised that although we did not have the final answer, we were proceeding under the assumption that it would be Washington. The Chancellor observed that the meeting would occur immediately prior to the French elections. This did not concern him. Did it concern us? I replied that we could see no interference. The explanation which would be given today by both governments if asked to explain the change in dates, would make it quite clear that it resulted from the German Parliamentary situation. This would be understandable to everyone. We would, of course, wish to take the elections into account in drafting the communique resulting from the meeting.

2. Participation

When I asked the Chancellor whom he planned to take with him, he did not appear to have decided. He named positively only Foreign Minister Schroeder. I said that, on our side, we anticipated that Secretary McNamara would play an important role in the meetings. Although it was of course the Chancellor's decision, we thought it might facilitate matters if Defense Minister Von Hassel could accompany him. His presence would be particularly helpful in connection

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NAC 12-185
By LWB NARA, Date 03-25-2014

with discussions on NATO, nuclear sharing, and the offset. The Chancellor seemed to agree and raised the further question of whether it would be desirable to bring General Trettner. I expressed no judgment but said I would seek Washington's guidance.

3. Subjects to be Discussed

A. NATO and Nuclear Sharing

I then inquired as to the particular subjects the Chancellor had in mind for discussion. We understood that questions affecting NATO generally would assume an important role. The Chancellor said that he wished, of course, to discuss the question of nuclear sharing within NATO. He had had a report from Christian Democratic Union Deputy, Dr. Birrenbach, on his discussions during his recent visit to Washington; however, he had not yet made a "balance sheet" upon which to base his own position. I observed that there were many variants to a possible solution -- and many problems to be faced. We hoped that the Chancellor would tell us his candid views in Washington, both as to the solution he sought as well as his problems. The Chancellor said that the American attitude toward the MLF itself had not, in recent times, been clear. I observed that no matter to what cause one attributed the slowing down of progress on the nuclear sharing problem, we had, for the last nine months, essentially put the problem on ice because of the Chancellor's own desire not to make it an issue in the German elections. He would find, I was sure, as Dr. Birrenbach must have reported, that we were not at all inflexible in our approach on this matter.

B. Offset

I expressed gratification that our meetings with the Minister of Defense during the past week had seemed to indicate that Germany would be able to meet the offset during the two-year period ending June 30, 1967. However, further action would be required on the German side both to facilitate procurement from acceptable materiel items available and, in the event these are not forthcoming, to introduce some innovation in the means of making payments. I hoped that the Chancellor would have an opportunity to look into both of these questions prior to his Washington visit, since I felt sure that this was a matter in which the President would be highly interested.

C. De Gaulle and the EEC

The Chancellor said that he wished to discuss with the President how to cope with the general problem caused by General de Gaulle, particularly with the current situation in the Common Market. I said that although, as the Chancellor knew, we did not wish to take public positions on purely intra-European matters, I was sure that the President would be glad to exchange views with him, in confidence, on these questions.

D. Other World Problems

I then asked the Chancellor what other subjects he might wish to discuss. He said that he hoped to discuss the world political situation generally, including India-Pakistan, USSR-China, East and Southeast Europe. I indicated that we would, of course, be glad to brief him on the situation in South Vietnam. I was sure that the President would appreciate any reaffirmation of the support that he has always given us in our efforts there, as was indicated in the communique following the meeting last June.

E. Great Society

The Chancellor said that he did not think there would be time at this short meeting to discuss questions related to the President's great society concept. There would be too many other problems. It was obvious that he had nothing really to discuss on this question.

F. The President's Visit to Europe

In closing, the Chancellor asked whether or not the President would come to Europe in 1966. He hoped very much that he would. I disclaimed knowledge. I only knew that the President had, in the beginning of 1965, expressed hope that he could come sometime during the year to repay the visits which Europeans had made him, and had so indicated in his State of the Union Message. This intention had, however, been upset by the South Vietnamese war.

17

Tuesday, November 16, 1965, 10 AM 17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from Dean Rusk requests that you send a personal message to the Rio Meeting for inclusion in the Secretary's speech, tentatively scheduled to be delivered on Monday, November 22. Our own man, Bill Bowdler, suggests an additional paragraph referring to President Kennedy. I can see advantages both ways on this, and think the judgment should be yours. If you want the Kennedy paragraph, you might use something like this:

"By continuing to work together in this great enterprise, we will keep faith with John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who four days before his tragic death gave us this vision of the Alliance:

> '...We can make the Alianza para el Progreso a reality for generations who are coming in this Hemisphere, and ultimately we will hold a continent where more than 20 strong nations live in peace, their people in hope, and liberty, and believing strongly in a free future.'"

McG. B.

Approve message as it stands_____

Approve message with additional paragraph_____

Prefer not to send message_____

18

18

Tuesday, November 16, 1965, 10 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from George Ball gives an interesting account of General Eisenhower's views on NATO. Unfortunately, Ike's suggestion that we be ready to locate in Belgium flies in the face of Belgian public opinion, which is more likely to blame us than the French if NATO leaves Paris. (Spaak has just told Harlan Cleveland that we will be playing into de Gaulle's hands if we move forward with anything like the ANF/MLF this winter. This total switch in his position is politically interesting.

I find my colleague Francis Bator fully persuaded that we have been unreasonably rigid with the French in recent years, and I have asked him to do some homework on this for submission to you. The State Department's views are so rigid that I doubt if we will get much from them, and I don't know whether Dean Rusk reached Douglas Dillon before he left.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, November 16, 1965, 9:45 AM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Wheeler has just called to report that in the heavy fighting in the Plei Me area, General Westmoreland has asked for a special mission of B-52s and also for authority to lay on B-52 strikes by direct communication with the 3rd Air Division of SAC on Guam during the course of this operation. General Wheeler has the approval of Ball, McNamara and myself, the committee which regularly checks B-52 strikes, so I have told him that I am sure you would want him to go ahead. Wheeler says that Westmoreland believes that the 1st Cavalry has the situation well in hand and can be counted on to pursue the battle with great energy and skill. He also reports that Westmoreland is arranging for the commitment also of elements of the South Vietnamese general reserve. This gives me pleasure, because I join with Max Taylor in feeling that we must not let our own forces take over all the fighting.

This is without question the largest single action so far, and all I can tell you beyond the Sit Room reports is that both Wheeler and Westmoreland sound very confident about it.

McG. B.

`McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 83-183
By ics, NARS, Date 10-1-84

17 20

MEMORANDUM

Put on Pres desk

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, November 15, 1965, 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I see from Bill Moyers' briefings that the newspapermen still want to know when you and I are going to talk. My own view is that we are transacting our business perfectly normally, and that we should talk when you want to, and not before.

There are two elements of fact which the tickers have got wrong today, and I think I owe you the straight story. The first is the UPI item saying that I stated that I could not answer without talking with you. It is true that I have said this to John McCloy. It is not true that I have said it to any member of the press at any time, in any way, shape or form.

The second wrong item is an AP report of a statement of McCloy's that they have asked me if I would be available by 1 January. This is not the fact. They have made it very clear that they would expect your convenience to govern the timing of my departure from Washington. My own view is that unless you want a change very promptly for your own reasons, it does not make sense for me to leave this job until we have worked our way through some of the issues which are ahead of us in the months immediately ahead. I made it entirely clear to the Ford people that if I should give them an affirmative answer, I would insist upon freedom to remain here at your pleasure for the necessary number of months. I called McCloy after I saw this item on the ticker, and he reaffirmed that they accept this position, and that all they want to know in the near future is whether, in the long run, I am coming or not. McCloy knows damn well that I have given no answer to this question.

There is one final point which is not in the tickers, but which I want you to know. I have made lots of trouble for all the people I have worked for in my life, but I have never tried to box them in on a matter affecting my own future. I would not do so to a Chairman of a Government Department at Harvard. I would never do so with the President of the United States — even if I could!

Sometime when you are in the mood for a really crazy story, I will tell you all the different things that happened on Friday involving Reston and Gene Black and McCloy, and the fortunately ignorant Bill Moyers. But you have better things to do than hear improbable accounts of chance encounters at the stuffiest club in Washington.

McG. B.

McG. B.

21

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McG. B.

18 22

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1965
7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The squib you sent me from the San Antonio Express on how Shastri said no aid with conditions just ain't so. In fact, it took us two days to figure out how it could have happened.

It was based on wire service stories sparked by a working committee of Shastri's Congress Party, which passed a resolution on 7 November defending India's austerity program and several other reforms to meet the food crisis. The Indian press said Shastri had expressed gratitude for US food but fended off opposition by saying in effect that he would not compromise India's stand on Kashmir to get aid. The background of that remark--and the omitted half of the story--is that the Communists sponsored a resolution calling for termination of PL 480 imports, accusing us of using PL 480 as leverage to pry Kashmir loose. When the Congress executive committee unanimously rejected the Communist resolution, Shastri assured members that he himself would favor ending PL 480 if "political strings" were attached but he was categorical in stating there was no likelihood of this happening.

Shastri has had to tread the difficult line between looking politically independent while knowing he is economically dependent. He's pushing hard now for programs that would make India self-sufficient in food. It's quite clear that Shastri is not talking about economic conditions when he rejects "political strings". In fact, his food minister said in Parliament 8 November that he did not consider it "interference in India's affairs for the USA to insist on scrutiny of India's agricultural programs which would make India independent of PL 480." Not bad.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Me too, MfB

Monday, November 15, 1965, 1 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone call to Carl Marcy

I finally caught up with Carl Marcy this morning after trying to reach him throughout the week end. I told him I had been very much surprised by the AP account, and was at a loss to know how anyone could think that the Majority Leader's trip required clearance in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I said this looked like a real Jack Bell stinker to me. Marcy said that he had never talked to Bell, and that he thought the story came initially from Kenworthy of the Times. (The Times did carry a similar piece.) He said that Kenworthy had talked to a junior member of the Foreign Relations staff, and had "surprised" him into a statement that the Committee had not been informed of Mansfield's plans.

I continued to hammer on the fact that I could not see how anyone would feel that the travel plans of the Majority Leader were anyone's business but his own, and that I had helped to arrange Mansfield's trip with President Kennedy's blessing in 1962 in circumstances precisely like the present ones.

It then began to emerge -- as you expected -- that Marcy did not agree with this view and that the underlying trouble was airplanes. He said that Mansfield and Humphrey had put great emphasis on assembling a strong group to go with Fulbright, and he strongly implied that Mansfield had now spoiled this trip by his own more glamorous expedition. I said that I knew nothing about that, but that I was sure he would not question the importance of providing the Majority Leader with a Presidential plane, and that we had only so many planes to go round. I pointed out that we had authorized the Defense Department to charter a commercial jet and absorb the cost, if that would help Senator Fulbright. He acknowledged that we had made this offer. I repeated my astonishment that there should be any Committee complaint about the Majority Leader's plans and the White House response to them. I said I did not see how the White House could have acted differently, and was surprised that people should be encouraging this kind of story in the press. Marcy got the point. He told me that Fulbright is now planning to go commercial, while Hickenlooper and others go in a DC-6.

Marcy is obviously furious at Mansfield and Valeo for upstaging him and his Senator. But he also knows now that we do not appreciate having these cases tried in the newspapers.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 15, 1965
12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Chancellor Erhard

1. This note to Erhard is drafted at the earnest request of Eugene Black. The particular request it presents to Erhard is framed as Black wants it. He thinks that Erhard might well go to $50 million, but will not have the force to go to the full 75, so this letter allows him to agree on $50 million while giving him the satisfaction of not going to 75.

2. You should know that George McGhee has recommended that we be very careful in using our ammunition on Erhard, but the rest of us here think that the importance of the Asian Bank is such that this very modest request is well worth making.

3. Black has a number of other questions to settle about the bank, and now that you are back in town it occurs to me that you may wish to have a brief meeting with him. He will be here for a meeting of the Clifford committee on aid on Thursday (Nov. 18).

McG. B.

Letter to Erhard: Approved /

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

Make a date for Black _____

I'll see Black another time _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NAC 12-185
By UCLA NARA, Date 03-25-2014

Monday, November 15, 1965, 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ellsworth Bunker reports on the Dominican Republic

Bunker came in this morning to discuss the current situation in the Dominican Republic, and I think you will be interested in his account.

He is genuinely encouraged -- more so than at any time since he went down. The banks are open. The relatively decent newspapers are publishing. The Communist paper is out of business. The police have begun to operate with some effectiveness in downtown Santo Domingo. The Communist-called general strike was a flop, and Bosch strongly and publicly opposed it. Bosch himself has now made at least two helpful public statements supporting positions of the Garcia Godoy government, and Bunker is convinced that Bosch recognizes the seriousness of the Communist problem. Bunker has independent evidence that Bosch's party was decisive in forcing rebel agreement to the whole arrangement at the end of the summer.

Garcia Godoy is moving with more confidence and authority, and he has fully agreed to change his Attorney General, who was the worst single appointment of his early days. He is also going to get Caamano and Montes Araches out of the country. He then means to move on restricting the Loyalist military command, and Bunker is optimistic on that front too. The only hard problem that remains in this area is that of the reintegration of the military, and Bunker is going back tomorrow to keep up his work on this one, which may take some weeks.

Bunker reports that the economic situation is improving, but he urgently requests prompt approval of the economic assistance package we sent you at the Ranch last week. This package now has Joe Fowler's explicit approval, and I attach a copy in case you are ready to approve it.

Bunker also reports that Tap Bennett regards the prospect of an appointment in Portugal with great delight, as we expected that he would. I now have from John Macy a recommendation for this appointment, but I am holding it until George Ball checks with Fulbright. (Dean Rusk did not succeed in getting to Fulbright before he went to South America.)

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, November 15, 1965
11:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Erhard visit

I have just heard from Joe Califano that you felt that the date on the Erhard meeting was changed without consultation with you. I regret that we did not check back again with you after we settled on December 3 and 4, but I do have to recall to you that in our telephone conversation on Friday I reported that Erhard wished to change from the 6th and 7th to any one of three other dates. I gave you these dates over the phone, and you told me that any of the three was acceptable to you, and that I should make that clear to the Chancellor.

McG. B.

File

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, November 14, 1965
2 p.m.

27

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram from Bowles

1. I attach an important telegram from Bowles which reports a definite proposal by the Indians that Shastri come here sometime in the first half of January. If I understand your desires correctly, I assume that we should reply that these dates are difficult for us because of the opening days of Congress and the urgent business that goes with it, and that you would be glad if Shastri could propose himself for any time after the 20th of January.

Have Bowles answer this way_____

Speak to me_____

2. Bowles goes on to recommend that the pro-American Agricultural Minister Subramaniam should be invited here before Shastri for agricultural discussions. All the Indian experts here are in favor of this idea, but I think you may wish to defer decision until you can talk with Arthur Dean this week.

Let Bowles invite Subramaniam_____

Wait for Dean's advice_____

3. Finally, Bowles asks for authority to begin preliminary discussions with the Indians. I am sure this is not what you will want him to do until you are ready to give him much more explicit guidance yourself.

4. One advantage of getting Shastri to pin himself down by proposing a date at the end of January or early February is that then you are in a clear position to have Ayub earlier if he presses and if that is your choice.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
NSC 4-5-77; State 7-10-76
By DCM NARS, Date 6-30-83

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Copy of New Delhi 1247, Nov. 11, 1965

From: Amb. Bowles
To : SecState

Yesterday at his request I called on L. K. Jha, who said he wished to discuss the Prime Minister's visit to the United States. After careful consideration it had been decided that any thought of a December visit should be abandoned. Parliament will not adjourn until the 10th of December, and with the heavy agenda, the session may drag on beyond that date, which would leave almost no time before Christmas. Therefore, the most convenient timing from the standpoint of the Prime Minister would be the first half of January, early enough to enable him to return by January 15 for the annual meeting of the all India Congress Committee in Jaipur on the 16th, 17th and 18th of January.

Jha added that while the Prime Minister was anxious at some future date to spend more time in the US, he felt the current situation in India placed heavy demands on the Prime Minister, and the visit should be a purely business occasion; he contemplated staying two or three days in Washington with possibly a day in New York. This would suggest the Prime Minister's arrival in Washington around the 10th of January and his return to India around the 14th, provided of course this fits the President's convenience. The Prime Minister was anxious that there not be any announcement of the suggested visit until a mutually agreed time in the future. Jha then rather hesitantly stated that the Prime Minister, and indeed the whole Cabinet, was deeply concerned about the outcome of the visit. India badly needed the US, and if there is to be an independent non-Communist Asia with an effective block on Chinese expansionism, the US also needed India. With so much at stake, Jha pointed out that the failure of the President and the Prime Minister to reach an understanding would have a catastrophic effect on the politics not only of India but of Asia at a very critical historic moment.

Therefore, did I see any discreet way of exploring on a preliminary basis the key questions that might arise and thus determine in some measure to what extent a meeting of the minds in Washington was likely? I said that I fully understood his concern, but that I felt that with good will on both sides we can approach the meeting with confidence.

India's basic objectives and ours are very similar, i.e., India and America are equally anxious to block Chinese expansionism, and help maintain stability in Asia and Africa, to strengthen the UN, etc. The US also recognizes that a stable, economically viable, and democratic India with 1/7 of the world's population is absolutely basic to a stable and peaceful Asia.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 89-134
By lg/ws, NARA, Date 8-27-92

(New Delhi 1247)

For nearly 20 years we have been striving to create an Asian balance of power with almost no help from the major nations of Asia, such as Japan, Indonesia, India and Pakistan. This suggested a very key point of critical interest to us all: because we had no mass support for this essential effort we have been forced to fall back on relatively minor Asian powers such as South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan, and because these nations represented only 5% of Asian peoples there has been no alternative but to introduce massive American military power into the equation.

One of the first questions the President might ask would be India's willingness and ability to work towards a more effective balance of power vis-a-vis China and thus to relieve present pressures on the USA. To this Jha responded in a generally affirmative, although quite naturally non-committal, manner.

Comment: We believe that it is of the utmost importance that this meeting go forward and I hope that the dates mentioned will be generally accepted. We also assume that we are as keenly aware as are the Indians that the failure of these discussions would have a profoundly adverse effect on US as well as Indian interests. It is my belief that in order to create a favorable and receptive mood, the following steps are important:

1. As much as our policy will permit, we should seek to relieve India of any reasonable suspicions that we are trying to take advantage of their food dilemma. We have made a vigorous rebuttal to these suspicions and in the effort we have had the powerful and effective support of Subramniam. It would be a master stroke for the USG to invite Subramaniam in the next 2 or 3 weeks to come to the US to discuss the Indian agricultural outlook. This suggestion would be received with warm approval in India and would put the Indian Government in a receptive mood for the kind of discussion which I am sure the President has in mind. If at the same time, we could release the non-project fertilizer loans so that India could order the fertilizer urgently needed for the spring planting, Indian appreciation would be profound.

2. Here in India we could continue to impress on the Indians the need for curbing the careless and sometimes irresponsible statements of such Indian leaders as Indira Gandhi, Chagla, etc.

3. In New Delhi and in the UN we should press the Indians fully to carry out the cease-fire in spite of Pak provocation and to meet Pakistan more than half-way in regard to withdrawal. This will help lay the basis for a discussion of the long-term political problems facing the two countries without running head on into India's absolute determination not to give up the strategically important Kashmir valley.

(New Delhi 1247)

4. With the advice and guidance of the Department we would like gradually to proceed with more substantive discussions with Shastri and his advisors such questions as India's continued willingness to stand up to China, India's defense requirements under varying situations, the willingness of the Indians to give economic development the highest priority and the economic moves by India which encourage us to give India the support she requires to become self-sufficient in 10 years.

There is every evidence that thoughtful Indians in and out of government are deeply conscious that many Indian criticisms of the US during the past months have been grossly unfair, and there is evidence on every side of a desire to bring the situation back into balance. With careful handling in both Washington and New Delhi, we are confident this mood can be strengthened and a basis for successful negotiations in Washington established.

We would appreciate Department's response as soon as convenient, particularly in regard to Subramaniam visit which will require some planning all around.

BOWLES

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SANITIZED
Authority State La 11/9/77
By DNG, NARS, Date 1/25/78

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY

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LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBR

(New Delhi 1247)

SANITIZED

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LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRA

(New Delhi 1247)

SANITIZED

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BOWLES

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28

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, November 14, 1965
12:45 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

As I feared, the Ford Foundation Board proved to be a leaky tub indeed. Scotty Reston called me Friday afternoon to say that the New York office of the Times had a memorandum giving a full account of the Ford Foundation's Board meeting of November 2, and of McCloy's subsequent visit to me. He proceeded to tell me a lot of things I myself did not know about the Board's deliberations -- that the last four names had been McNamara, Bell, Murphy of UCLA, and myself, and that the Ford family had vetoed McNamara (not because of any weakness but precisely because of his strength). I told Reston that he knew more than I did -- if what he knew was true -- and that all I could tell him was that I had been faced with feelers from colleges and foundations for years, and that I knew of no decisions in this case. I then reported the conversation to McCloy. McCloy talked to Reston and hoped he had him turned off. Obviously he hoped in vain.

My current guess is that the reason the Times gave the story to Reston to write is that they are trying to cover the leak from New York. But Reston's conversation with me makes it just as clear as can be that the story came from the Board itself.

I need hardly tell you that I am ready to talk with you whenever you want, and equally ready to hold the matter up until you are ready. From the point of view of the effective conduct of business here, I think it would be best to get it settled -- and I am sure that now that one of them has been leaky, the Foundation trustees will get into a hurry to have a decision. But it is your interest that comes first.

McG. B.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY DCH ON 2-24-83

F-29

Sunday, November 14, 1965
12:45 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY DCH ON 2-24-83

TO THE RANCH FOR MARVIN WATSON

From: McGeorge Bundy Confidential 11/13/65 (TRUMAN LTR) 30

George Ball and I have considered the letter from President Truman and both of us believe that from the foreign policy point of view the President has a free choice in deciding whether to accept or regret. The fact that he would be honoring President Truman and that the cause is that of peace would largely neutralize any Arab criticism. Indeed Ball and I both believe that the credit the President would get with the Jewish community would be useful money in the bank in resisting other desires of theirs which are not so easy to grant. We therefore suggest either a simple and friendly acceptance, or a regret based upon the pressure of other business. I might add that past experience with President Truman suggests strongly that this letter was drafted for him by others, and that his feelings will not be greatly hurt if the President decides not to accept the invitation. But of course one can never be absolutely sure in these matters. Ordinarily I would ask Dean Acheson for advice on such a Truman matter, but he is unavailable today.

Alternative language follows:

Acceptance: "I have your letter of November 9 with its characteristically warm invitation to join in announcing the Center for the Advancement of Peace, which is to be established in the Holy Land and named in your honor. I am delighted to accept this invitation, and I want you to know that I am greatly honored to be included in an undertaking which so fittingly honors your great service to peace. I am asking my staff to be in touch with yours at once about the timing and arrangements for this meeting. Sincerely, LBJ"

...IFIED TO BE AN
...IVE MARKING
...AL SECURITY
...MATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)
BY DCH ON 6-28-83

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Regret: "I have your heartwarming letter of November 9 which invites me to join in announcing the founding of a Center for the Advancement of Peace bearing your name in the Holy Land. There is nothing I would enjoy more, and it is with the greatest regret that I have to tell you that the combined demands of my doctors and of the season of budget-making and legislative planning -- chores you know as well as any man living -- make it impossible for me to accept this invitation. I do send my warmest congratulations and good wishes both to you and to those who are making this center possible, and if there is any way I can participate at the time of the announcement by an appropriate statement or message, I do hope you will let me know.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely, LBJ"

George Ball makes one final suggestions, which may well be worth considering. In such a ceremony the President might well wish to keep the spotlight on Mr. Truman and not on Israel. He could do this by a surprise award to Truman of the Medal of Freedom, which it turns out that Truman himself has never received. Ball and I recognise that the President has had problems with the Medal of Freedom, but we think he might agree that in this particular case there could hardly be any controversy and there might be some advantage to us.

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30a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/13/65

Sir:

The President would like your comments on this letter.

Kenneth Rose.

Mrs. Roberts was asked by the President to get your reaction and Ball's reaction

RICS

HARRY S TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI
November 9, 1965

30-b
cy being sent to Bell

Dear Mr. President:

Your history making visit when you signed the Medicare Bill was a profound personal experience for me. I was deeply moved by your kind and stirring words. The event was the high point in my post White House days.

Now something has begun to shape up which promises to have far-reaching implications towards our peacemaking efforts. It is a development which I should like to relate to your administration.

Briefly put, this is what it is all about. A group of prominent citizens came together for the purpose of establishing in the Holy Land a Center for the Advancement of Peace. Each member of this group has pledged One Hundred Thousand Dollars towards an initial sum of Two Million Dollars.

There is a condition that the Center is to bear my name. It is a condition that personally I would have preferred not to have included.

The project is to be broad in scope and will concern itself in all areas that have a bearing on the stresses of peace.

I know that the cause of peace is closer to your heart than other areas of responsibility. And, I need not tell you that the hope for peace in our time is my one greatest concern. It is something I would like to see significantly advanced before I pass on.

The establishment of the Center will be ready for announcement in a matter of weeks. It has already had the enthusiastic interest of the Israeli Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the President of the University.

If it meets with your approval, I would like the announcement of the founding of the Center for the Advancement of Peace to come from you as the President of the United States, and the leader of the free world, at a ceremony to be held in the auditorium of this Library.

I hope this finds you restored to your full measure of health and energy.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

11/13/65

31

to: Vicki McCammon by wire

Dear Chet:

I have now had a chance to read your letter of October 26, and I want you to know that I greatly value your comments on this most important and difficult set of issues. The specific proposal which you make is one which deserves very careful thought. It happens that we are engaged in a careful review of our policy toward India right now, and I have given instructions that your proposal be carefully considered in that review.

Sincerely,

/ s/ LBJ

(phone to Marie Fehmer--Mr. Watson asked that there be such a draft answer for the President today.)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1756
720
[1036]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 10-59
By ist, NARA, Date 10-4-10

~~SECRET~~

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR MEETING
November 11, 1965

Additional
Cyprus;
Cuba;
ICY
UDI

The President, Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara, Secretary Ball,
Mr. M. Bundy

1. Preparations for Erhard Visit

There are a number of important issues for discussion with Erhard -- France and NATO, offset agreements and troop levels, funds for under-developed countries, policy toward Russia, reunification, trade and finance. But the one which needs urgent discussion today is Atlantic nuclear defense policy and the German place within it.

Three views have developed in recent weeks in Washington. One is that it is important to have US leadership in pressing for a "hardware" solution -- a collective nuclear force in which the Germans would buy a share and in which they could look forward to mixed-manning and increasing responsibility. This solution is strongly preferred by Under Secretary Ball, who would couple it with resolute pressure upon Great Britain to give up a finger on the trigger of an independent nuclear force.

a basic reason for decision now:

The second school of thought which includes Bundy would argue strongly against pressing for a hardware solution now and would prefer a candid statement to the Germans that no such solution seems immediately possible since there is no consensus whatever on its shape or form in Europe. This school believes that the Germans mislead themselves about the real meaning and value of such a hardware solution and that it would be wrong to proceed now even if we could easily get the agreement of other Europeans. This school would prefer to seek maximum value from increased ~~interim~~ consultation on matters of intelligence, targetting, planning, budgeting, and weapons system design. This school would not foreclose an eventual shared weapons system and would not give up existing US language in the non-dissemination treaty at German expense.

What do we say after Erhard visit Surface words are easy. Basic ground words are hard — even impossible. Unless they are agreed

Secretary McNamara would support a hardware solution if it is the President's judgment that such a solution deserves intense and continuous US pressure for its achievement. If not, he would prefer a decision now that we do not expect a hardware solution.

Secretary Rusk recognizes also that we cannot afford a feeling of betrayal among the Germans. Unlike Ball, McNamara, and Bundy, who believe that this issue requires prompt decision, the Secretary has kept open the possibility that the matter might be discussed right through the coming winter. McNamara and Ball will be in Europe in the last week in November, and it is essential that they have a clear sense of the President's own desires before they go.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. Policy Toward Ayub and Shastri

The immediate question is tactical. On November 9 our Ambassadors in both places were instructed to make it very clear that we are not petitioners and that if they want to settle their relations with us, Ayub and Shastri had better get to Washington. Now that Erhard's dates are set, we need to plan our tactics carefully. It is essential to have very clear guidance from you. On October 7th, Shastri wrote you saying that he would be glad to come when you could have him. We have not yet answered this letter. Probably the right answer now is to tell Shastri you have his letter and would now be able to receive him if he will propose himself for any dates outside of December 6, 7, 8 and the Christmas season. A similar indication can be given to Ayub, at the same time, although we do not owe him a letter.

There is some difference among us as to the relative timing of Shastri and Ayub. Komer, Rostow, and Bundy think it would be best to arrange things so that Shastri comes first. Secretary Rusk thinks we should let circumstances decide. You may wish to hear argument briefly on this point.

If Ayub and Shastri can be brought in to settle their affairs in December or January, there is no need for any major interim decisions. The one question you might wish to consider is whether to authorize modest economic assistance to India for fertilizer in connection with our pressure for agricultural improvement. Right now we are in the position of pressing the Indians to come up with agricultural improvement while refusing their earnest pleas for fertilizer for the next rice crop. Many of us feel that we could deal constructively with this sign of Indian good sense without weakening your hand for later talks with Shastri.

63 million
50 000 tons of fertilizer

3. Progress Report on the Aid Review

You may wish to know of the major recommendations which are currently being prepared in the Cabinet Committee, and of the plans for intense study of these recommendations by Mr. Clark Clifford and others. There is no need for decisions here, although you may wish to give guidance on the timing of Congressional consultation.

Vietnam financing
MAP Supp.
Food Bargain
Dr. Morgan

4. Current Aid Decisions

I -> IV
via trade
a food bargain
U.S. commercial sales.

There are in your hands papers proposing a food bargain with the UAR, and a financial-food bargain with Yugoslavia. We will also bring a proposed program loan for Chile which has been cleared by the Bureau of the Budget. You may wish to indicate your decisions on these current matters. We will also have a paper on economic assistance to the Dominican Republic.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. Plans for the Rio Conference

Secretary Rusk will report on this matter and will present planned US policy for your approval.

6. Asian Development Bank

Bailey the case this weekend in mtg

Bundy will report progress and request your guidance on a proposal for a visit to the Ranch by Eugene Black.

7. Nuclear Correspondence with Prime Minister Wilson

Bundy will present routine papers on this point which require Presidential signature.

8. A Special Program in Thailand

Bundy will present a special interdepartmental recommendation on this subject.

ICY --

9. Vietnam

The most important issues here are treated in the long draft Defense memorandum as revised in the State Department. In the main, we are not looking for major decisions but for guidance in further planning. In essence, the issues are these:

(1) Should we currently plan for substantial additional deployments in 1966?

(2) Should any such additional deployments be preceded by a pause in bombing and/or a new diplomatic effort to prevent further enlargement of the contest? If we want a pause, we must begin to plan for it very promptly.

(3) What should be our current attitude toward increased bombing in the North in 1966?

(4) Do we need to choose between the Lodge and Goldberg views of negotiation now?

~~SECRET~~

(5) Are we agreed on the underlying purpose of our effort in Vietnam: is it to seek a compromise settlement which would eventually turn Communist -- or is it to ensure by all necessary means the establishment and maintenance of a non-Communist South Vietnam -- and is this the real choice we face?

(6) We also have questions of timing and consultation: when should Lodge come back or when should we go to him? When should we begin additional consultation with Congress -- or is such consultation needed? What, in short, is the time-table of decision in the coming weeks?

File 33

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 8, 1965

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-377
By jw, NARA, Date 2-18-94

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Yugoslav Package again

1. This is the one which you approved in principle back in August and which has since been negotiated by Tom Mann. (The original approval was marked on the memorandum, which I attach at Tab C) Just before you left for the Ranch, I gave you a further memo from Tom Mann, spelling out his full package. That package is at Tab B, and it carried the strong support of Agriculture, Budget, and the Export-Import Bank. It also has Treasury support, with one reservation relating to your own preferences.

2. Reviewing the paper after you left for the Ranch, I found that it needed reinforcement on the specific points of Congressional support and balance-of-payments impact, and Tom Mann has done a further memo on this, which is at Tab A.

3. I don't know whether you want to read all these tabs or not. In essence, the situation is this:

(1) We have worked out a package which fully conforms to the understanding you approved in August. The principle of this bargain is that we should give moderate credit extensions and Title IV loans and some Exim credit as part of an international package in which a number of other countries are participating, along with the IMF. The underlying premise, as Mann points out, is that the Yugoslavs are moving in a sensible direction and that our long run interests of all sorts are all served by these moves -- they are good for the long-run balance of payments, good for trade, and good for the politics of bridge-building.

(2) The fly in this ointment is its impact on the 4th quarter balance of payments. Tom's package would allow the Yugoslavs to roll over some $12 million otherwise payable in December. The Treasury notes that this is not consistent with your instructions to Fowler, but Joe Barr says that if they were on their own they would still support the basic package.

(3) Rusk, Mann, Bator, and I all feel that the Yugoslav package as a whole is more important than its purely temporary balance of payments effect. So we strongly urge approval.

(4) There is one middle alternative which I should report, though I strongly advise against it: it is to leave out the deferment of December payments and go ahead with the other parts of the package. This does not make any real economic sense, but it would certainly have the specific effect

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

on 4th quarter accounts, the importance of which you have emphasized to the Treasury.

4. Let me say one last word in defense of the package as a whole. It involves no outright aid. The Yugoslavs will have to repay every penny in hard dollars. Approval of this carefully designed package will be a concrete demonstration that we mean what we say about bridge-building with those who will do their share.

McG. B.

The whole package is approved_____

The package is approved, less the 4th quarter balance of payments impact_____

The package is disapproved_____

(A.)

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33a

1-Bator
2-Rit.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 NOV 4 AM 9 27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1965

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assistance to Support Yugoslav Economic Liberalization Program

Before answering your three specific points I should like to comment that this assistance to Yugoslavia is a priority matter in giving content to the President's foreign policy vis a vis the Communist world. Yugoslavia's trend toward consistently increasing trade with the West and its recent major move toward economic liberalization and a free market economy makes highly advisable a favorable United States response along with the other major Western powers.

1. Has this package been cleared on the Hill?

There is a pro forma procedure for informing the chairmen of the agriculture committees on new (and rescheduled) PL 480 agreements once negotiations with a foreign government begin. In addition, since most of the key people on the Hill are out of town we will be in touch with the leadership and Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees staffs. We plan to handle this matter in a pro forma low-key way.

2. What is the likely impact on the balance of payments?

In the long run this support program will benefit the U. S. balance of payments. There is no grant aid here. Export-Import Bank credits and PL 480 sales both raise U. S. exports and both call for eventual repayment in dollars, in this case over a period of two to 12 years. The total gain to the U. S. balance of payments over the whole period is up to $99 million.

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As with all export credits, U. S. goods are shipped before payments are made. This is neutral as far as the U. S. balance of payments is concerned; the gain comes as repayments begin to come in. However, the deferral of the first payment on the 1964 P.L. 480 agreements and the payment due the Eximbank in December do have a short term adverse balance of payments effect as explained below.

3. Can any adverse balance of payments impact be deferred?

The only adverse balance of payments impact from the proposed Yugoslav package is to the extent of $12.4 million due in December of this year which will be rescheduled for 3 to 4 years. However, this is the core of our assistance to Yugoslavia. If we insist on payment of this $12.4 million now it will not be legally possible, next year, to insert a grace period into the P.L. 480 agreements. This technique accounts for $8.9 million of the $12.4 million relief. Moreover, the next payments on past P.L. 480 agreements and to the Exim are not due until December of next year. Given the over-all favorable balance of payments impact and the immediate need of the Yugoslavs to make their move toward a free market economy stick, the $12.4 million loss this year is a small cost well worth paying.

Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs

(B)

43804
336

1-Bator
2-Pate.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 OCT 5 AM 11 52

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

Send to Mr. Marshall only
B of P?
Cayuga?

October 4, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assistance to Support Yugoslav Economic Liberalization Program

My memorandum of July 22 stated that Yugoslavia is seeking financial assistance to support the liberalization of its economy in accordance with a plan worked out with the IMF. It has already obtained a standby from the IMF and has approached the United States and its European creditors for financial support in the form of new credits or rescheduling of existing debt. France, to whom Yugoslavia owes $81 million including interest in the 1965-1968 period, has already given a new credit of $12 million and will discuss the remainder of the request soon. Italy, to whom $65.6 million including interest is owed in this period on an intergovernmental basis, has rescheduled $15 million and will discuss the rest next month. They and other European creditors are interested in what the United States will do before taking further decisions.

The President has approved assistance to Yugoslavia in principle and asked that the interested agencies work out a specific package proposal to be submitted to him for his approval.

The specific Yugoslav requests and the responses contained in the proposed United States package to meet immediate Yugoslav needs are as follows:

A. Exim Bank

1. Yugoslav request

(a) Favorable action on two pending loan applications (Diesel locomotives $9.5 million and Pancevo Fertilizer Plant $24.5 million).

(b) Renewal

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By NARA, Date 5/15/12

(b) Renewal of $5 million annual export credit line.

(c) New five year credits or guarantees totaling $24 million between July 1965 and December 31, 1968 to finance raw materials and semi-fabricated goods.

2. U.S. response

(a) Exim will extend the two loans requested.

(b) Exim will renew the $5 million annual export credit line.

(c) Exim will not extend the new credits or guarantees but will postpone payments due it from Yugoslavia in 1965 totaling $3.5 million.

B. P. L. 480

1. Yugoslav request

(a) Liberalization of the terms of three existing P.L. 480 Title IV agreements as follows:

(1) Postponement of the initial payments on two 1964 three-year wheat agreements for one year and extending the repayment period on each of these agreements from three to 12 years.

(2) Extension of the grace period from six months to two years in the 12-year wheat agreement of March 16, 1965.

(b) Liberal terms on new P.L. 480 Title IV sales agreements covering their FY 1966 program.

2. U.S.

2. U.S. response

(a) (1) The initial payments on the two 1964 three-year agreements will be postponed one year from FY 1966 to FY 1967. The repayment period will not be extended.

(2) The grace period in the March 1965 agreement will not be extended.

(b) A new Title IV sales agreement covering 700,000 tons of wheat will have a two-year grace period, nominal repayments of $1.0 million a year in each of the next two years, with the remainder to be spread over the following 10 years; interest to be at 3 1/2 percent.

Of course, all of these proposals will have to go through the usual channels. These are the ISC, the NAC, and the P.L. 480 Advisory Committee on the P.L. 480 components and the NAC and the Bank's Board on the Exim elements.

Estimates of the benefits of this package to the Yugoslav balance of payments are shown in detail in the attached table. It would give immediate relief of $17.4 million this year which Yugoslavia needs.

In United States FY 1967 and 1968 the benefit to the Yugoslav balance of payments is estimated at $4.9 and $7.6 million respectively. In FY 1969 it is estimated that there would be an adverse effect on the Yugoslav balance of payments of $2.5 million.

It is desirable for the United States to give less at this time than the full amount of Yugoslavia's request for two reasons: (1) to permit us to assess the success of the Yugoslavs in carrying out their liberalization program and their actual future needs, and (2) to encourage the other creditor countries to do their full share. At the same time, the United States response should be sufficiently favorable to suggest a similar response by others. The present package attempts to achieve this balance.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia will need additional P.L. 480 commodities in CY 1966 and at that time we can take another look at the adequacy of the United States contribution.

ACTION REQUESTED

It is requested that the President be asked to approve the package of assistance to support the Yugoslav economic liberalization program, as set forth in this memorandum and the attached table.

Thomas C. Mann

Attachment:

Table showing proposed assistance to Yugoslavia.

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Benefit to Yugoslavia from Proposed Package
(millions of U.S. dollars)

	Value	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969
I. P.L. 480 Base: 2 years grace 12 equal annual installments: 4% interest.					
		Benefit Compared to Base			
(a) 700,000 m.t. wheat Terms: 2 years grace, 2 years with payments of $1 million each, remainder in 10 annual installments, 3-1/2% interest.	45.000				
Principal		--	--	2.750	2.750
Interest		--	.225	.225	.170
(b) Adding grace period to 2 three-year agreements					
Principal		8.900	--	--	8.900 (neg.)
Interest			.364(neg.)	.364(neg.)	.364 (neg.
Total P.L. 480	45.000	8.900	.139(neg.)	2.611	6.344 (neg.)
II. Exim Bank					
		Balance of Payments Benefit			
a) Reschedulings		3.500	--	--	1.167 (neg.)
b) Guaranties		5.000	5.000	5.000	5.000
Total Exim Bank		8.500	5.000	5.000	3.833
III. Combined Total		17.400	4.861	7.611	2.511 (neg.)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By JC NARA, Date 5/15/12

Rec'd
Wed. 8/18/65
9:00 a.m.

C. 15

MEMORANDUM

Put on my desk

33d

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to Bator per phone conv

Wed., August 18, 1965 8:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Request for Easier Ex-Im and PL 480 Credit to Support Economic Liberalization.

With the counsel of the International Monetary Fund, the Yugoslavs are starting on an ambitious program of economic reform: further easing up on controls, a more sensible exchange rate, and the like. To make the program work, they need some extra finance to cover the next three-four years. They are getting $50 million of new money from the IMF and are approaching the Italians, DeGaulle and the UK.

From the U.S., they are asking no outright "aid", but guarantees and easier terms on dollar-repayable credit:

1. Some $20-25 million of additional Ex-Im guarantees of private medium-term credit to finance purchases in the U.S. This would come to about $6-7 million a year over the next 3-1/2 years.

2. A stretch-out of repayments on three recent PL 480 Title IV dollar loans. The total amount postponed during 1965-68 would be about $34 million, or $10 million per year. We would get all the money back in larger payments after 1968. (At Tab A is a precise statement of what they want, and a table showing our total PL 480 involvement with Yugoslavia since FY 1962. You will note that the three loans in question (see arrows) carry much harder terms than the rest.)

3. An indication that in the proposed 1966 Title IV agreement we would not once again harden our terms.

Argument

In a memo at Tab B, Tom Mann recommends that you agree in principle to a package along the above lines. Tom recognizes that Tito's people have lectured us on Vietnam and Santo Domingo, but points out that:

-- Since we warned Belgrade (most forcefully on June 18), they have been more restrained, with no talk of U.S. withdrawal, but only that we should stop the bombing. Tom makes a good point that in any case we should judge the Yugoslavs, as dissident Communists,

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By NARA, Date 5/5/12

by different standards than such "allies" as Pakistan. What matters is not so much that Belgrade be in step with us, but that they be out of step with Peking, Hanoi, and the militants in Moscow. In fact they are. They have no diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, have given Hanoi no help, and have taken a flat anti-Chinese line on wars of liberation. Also, they have generally played a restraining role among the Afro-Asians.

-- By helping the Yugoslavs open up their economy, we serve our long-run political interests -- through the effect on their politics and the showcase effect on other Communists. (I have done some checking on the over-all Yugoslav program. It appears to make a good deal of economic sense.)

No Congressional action would be needed. Ex-Im is required to send a routine report on any Yugoslav guarantee to the Speaker and the Vice President. Judging by previous Congressional reaction, there would be no kick-back. On PL 480, Orville Freeman would give an informal report to the new Advisory Committee. Of the members: Aiken, Ellender, Cooley, Poage and Dague, only Ellender is likely to react negatively. According to State, we might also be criticized by the following (Henry Wilson and Mike Manatos tell me that all but one or two are bitter enders): Dodd, Lausche, and Mundt; and in the House: Curtis, Derwinski, Feighan, Findley, Gross, Edna Kelly, Minshall, Passman, John Rhodes, and Paul Rogers.

If you agree in principle, we will try to work out a package. There would be no need for direct Presidential involvement. With the right signal from here, Orville Freeman and Harold Linder could play this on their own.

FMB

Francis M. Bator

M.G.B.

OK to go ahead with package on above lines_____

OK in principle, but work out details and come back with firm proposal ✓

No_____

Bundy speak to me_____

33e

PL 480 TO YUGOSLAVIA -- FY '62 - '66

(in millions of dollars)

	Total PL 480	Title IV	Maturity	Grace	
FY '62	$110	$17.3	15 yrs.	2 yrs.	
FY '63	$108.3	$16.2	15 yrs.	2 yrs.	
FY '64	$ 64.2	$26.3	12 yrs.	2 yrs.	
		$19.7	3 yrs.	1 yr.	← (1)
FY '65	$ 93.9	$21.9	17 yrs.	2 yrs.	
		$11.4	3 yrs.	1 yr.	← (2)
		$53.4	12 yrs.	0	← (3)
FY '66 (July 31)	$20.6	$20.6	12 yrs.	2 yrs.	

WHAT THE YUGOSLAVS WANT:

(i) A second year of grace and a stretch-out of maturity from 3 to 12 years on (1) and (2).

(ii) A 2-year grace period on (3).

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Authority NLJ 83-183
By sldch NARA, Date 6/1/92

34

EEA087
OO WTE10
DE WTE 237

Received:
11:20 A.M. Monday 8 November 1965

FROM: MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO: JACOBSEN (FOR THE PRESIDENT) LBJ RANCH
CITE: CAP65668

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ TOP SECRET

NOVEMBER 8, 1965

1. AFTER INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE WEEKEND, RUSK, MCNAMARA AND I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR US TO MEET WITH YOU BEFORE RUSK GOES TO LATIN AMERICA ON FRIDAY.

2. THE OVERRIDING SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION IS VIETNAM. WE HAVE AT HAND FIRM MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF MORE THAN 100,000 ADDITIONAL MEN IN 1966, AND HEAVY PRESSURES ALSO FOR STRONGLY INTENSIFIED ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM. THE TENDENCY HERE IS TO ACCEPT THE PROBABLE NECESSITY OF ADDITIONAL TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND TO DEFER DECISIONS ON BOMBING TARGETS FOR THE PRESENT. BUT WE ARE DIVIDED ON A NUMBER OF MAJOR TACTICAL ISSUES. THE MOST URGENT OF THESE IS WHETHER A SUBSTANTIAL PAUSE IN THE BOMBING SHOULD PRECEDE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS. MCNAMARA TENDS TO FAVOR A PAUSE. RUSK AND I TEND TO BE OPPOSED UNTIL WE GET SOME SIGNAL FROM SOMEONE THAT A PAUSE WOULD HAVE RESULTS IN MATCHING ACTION BY HANOI.

3. EVIDENCE OF INCREASING NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION CONTINUES TO COME IN, AND AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT HANOI IS READY TO NEGOTIATE -- THOUGH THERE MAY WELL BE HEAVY STRAINS ON "LIBERATION FRONT" IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE WILL GRADUALLY HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN THE CONTRASTING DIPLOMATIC POSTURES RECOMMENDED BY GOLDBERG AND LODGE. GOLDBERG WOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. LODGE WOULD SOFT-PEDAL THIS TOPIC AS ESSENTIALLY IRRELEVANT IN THE LIGHT OF CONTINUING HANOI INTRANSIGENCE.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. A STILL DEEPER QUESTION UPON WHICH MCNAMARA HAS FOCUSSED ATTENTION IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS IS THE QUESTION OF OUR UNDERLYING PURPOSE IN VIETNAM. ARE WE SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AFTER WHICH THE SUPERIOR POLITICAL SKILL OF THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EVENTUALLY PRODUCE A COMMIE TAKEOVER? OR ARE WE DETERMINED TO DO ALL THAT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AND SUSTAIN A GENUINELY NON-COMMUNIST SOUTH VIETNAM? ALL THREE OF US INCLINE TO THE LATTER POSITION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT ITS COSTS CONTINUE TO GROW, AND IT IS STILL MORE CLEAR THAT ONLY THE PRESIDENT CAN DECIDE IT.

5. A SUBSTANTIAL STAFF PAPER IS GOING INTO SECOND DRAFT TODAY. IT DEALS WITH THESE TOPICS IN DETAIL AND PRESENTS THE CHOICES AS WE NOW SEE THEM. WE HOPE IT MAY LAY A BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION WITH YOU.

6. SECONDARY TOPICS ARE: EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POLICY, U. S. POLICY AT THE RIO CONFERENCE, PROGRESS OF THE REVIEW OF THE AID PROGRAM, AND TACTICS WITH SHASTRI AND AYUB. IT DOES NOT NOW APPEAR THAT ANY OF THESE WILL REQUIRE MAJOR DECISIONS THIS WEEK, BUT IN ALL OF THEM WORK GOES FORWARD, AND THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A CLEAR SENSE OF YOUR OWN CONCERNS, WITH GUIDANCE BOTH ON THE POSITIONS YOU WANT TAKEN AND THE QUESTIONS TO WHICH YOU WANT ANSWERS.

7. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT A MEETING BE SET UP FOR EITHER WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY OF THIS WEEK. THURSDAY WOULD BE A LITTLE BETTER AT THIS END, BUT EITHER DAY IS ENTIRELY WORKABLE, DEPENDING ON YOUR CONVENIENCE.

DTG: 08/1642Z NOVEMBER 1965

TOP SECRET

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

35

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ November 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jack H. Vaughn
Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Loan for the Government
of Colombia

As I told you on the telephone, the President has approved the Colombia loan recommended by the Department of State and AID at the end of October. The President's approval was given "with reluctance, reservations, and considerable misgivings." And the President has particularly requested that the day-to-day administration of this loan and the performance of the Colombian Government be carefully monitored by the Ambassador and by your office, so that the President himself can be kept informed on a timely basis. Since the President also wishes to have the assistance of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on this review, my suggestion is that there be monthly progress reports submitted to the President, through Mr. Schultze.

McG. Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State
Director, Bureau of the Budget

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / NAC 12-185
By LUD NARA, Date 03-25-2014

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ Nov. 8, 1965

LBJ Ranch

TO: JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

1. After intensive discussions over the weekend, Rusk, McNamara and I continue to believe that it is highly important for us to meet with you before Rusk goes to Latin America on Friday.

2. The overriding subject for discussion is Vietnam. We have at hand firm military recommendations for further deployment of more than additional 100,000 men in 1966, and heavy pressures also for strongly intensified attacks on North Vietnam. The tendency here is to accept the probable necessity of additional troop deployment and to defer decisions on bombing targets for the present. But we are divided on a number of major tactical issues. The most urgent of these is whether a substantial pause in the bombing should precede additional deployment decisions. McNamara tends to favor a pause. Rusk and I tend to be opposed until we get some signal from someone that a pause would have results in matching action by Hanoi.

3. Evidence of increasing North Vietnamese infiltration continues to come in, and at the same time there is little evidence that Hanoi is ready to negotiate -- though there may well be heavy strains on "Liberation Front" in South Vietnam. We will gradually have to make a choice between the contrasting diplomatic postures recommended by Goldberg and Lodge. Goldberg would continue to emphasize need for negotiations. Lodge would soft-pedal this topic as essentially irrelevant in the light of continuing Hanoi intransigence.

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By ics, NARS, Date 10-1-84

TOP SECRET

4. A still deeper question upon which McNamara has focussed attention in recent discussions is the question of our underlying purpose in Vietnam. Are we seeking a negotiated solution after which the superior political skill of the Communists would eventually produce a Commie takeover? Or are we determined to do all that is necessary to establish and sustain a genuinely non-Communist South Vietnam? All three of us incline to the latter position, but it is clear that its costs continue to grow, and it is still more clear that only the President can decide it.

5. A substantial staff paper is going into second draft today. It deals with these topics in detail and presents the choices as we now see them. We hope it may lay a basis for an effective discussion with you.

6. Secondary topics are: European nuclear policy, U. S. policy at the Rio Conference, progress of the review of the Aid program, and tactics with Shastri and Ayub. It does not now appear that any of these will require major decisions this week, but in all of them work goes forward, and there is no substitute for a clear sense of your own concerns, with guidance both on the positions you want taken and the questions to which you want answers.

7. I therefore recommend that a meeting be set up for either Wednesday or Thursday of this week. Thursday would be a little better at this end, but either day is entirely workable, depending on your convenience.

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F 37

Monday, November 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Cabot Lodge

Here is a letter which has just come in from Cabot Lodge for you. I have taken the liberty of giving copies to Rusk and McNamara only, because Lodge's views are deeply relevant to the discussions now goigg forward. I have not sent a copy to Arthur Goldberg because I am afraid it would only stir him to a very strong reaction. On the other hand, it may be useful for Arthur to know Saigon's thinking. Which do you prefer?

McG. B.

Let Goldberg see it_____

Hang on to it_____

~~SECRET~~ attachment

37a

Saigon, Viet-Nam,
November 3, 1965.

~~S E C R E T~~

Dear Mr. President:

Herewith is my best attempt to peer into the future:

1. We are beginning to master the technique of thwarting and eventually overcoming the Viet Cong main force units and military redoubts. The process will be long and difficult, but we know what is required to accomplish it.

2. The next step must be to eliminate Viet Cong terrorism and to smash Viet Cong organization in the villages. The GVN, with our help, is just beginning this process.

3. If governmental stability is maintained, I believe that the GVN, with our help, can succeed. But the process is, if anything, more complex than the military one because it involves braiding so many programs together. If the pacification program moves ahead as we intend, I would expect that, within six months, about 300 additional villages of the 2,685 in the country for a total of about 1,100 will have been pacified in the three different areas which are the initial objectives. From then on, it will be straightforward, if slow, plowing ahead with the light at the end of the tunnel growing brighter all the time.

The President,
The White House.

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Authority NLJ 83-179
By ng, NARS, Date 9-20-85

~~S E C R E T~~

4. No assurance can be given that the government will stay in power. But I try to leave nothing undone to prevent a sudden change. Everyone in the U. S. Mission is alerted to let me know of any rumor that they hear, and whenever I hear one worthy of attention, I will certainly try to do something effective.

5. Let us assume that the government stays in power and that the Viet Cong decide that we and the Vietnamese are able to overcome the terrorists as individuals and in small groups. I expect them then to accept our offer for unconditional discussions and to do so at the time and in the way most embarrassing to us. I do not expect to hear through intelligence ahead of time. Mao Tse-tung's manual says, "Fight, Fight. Talk, Talk." When the fighting goes against them, they will try to win by talking, by politics, by propaganda, by public opinion. They go to an international discussion not to end the war but to win it.

6. The three most embarrassing things which I can think of now are: 1. a cease-fire; 2. an end to the bombing of the North; and 3. recognition of the Viet Cong (self-styled National Liberation Front) in some form. Let me submit my views on each of these issues.

Cease-Fire

7. As things stand now, if we were to accept a cease-fire, (without supervision and without withdrawal of troops), the Government of Viet-Nam would be seriously threatened and could even fall, and the fighting spirit would go out of the Vietnamese military--beyond reasonable hope of being pumped up again. The Viet Cong would thus win in one diplomatic stroke what they had not been able to win by fighting.

8. Moreover, since civilian pacification still lags behind the military program, a premature cease-fire would confirm Viet Cong control in a large portion of the country, enable them to terrorize the population in much of the remainder and would do so in an artful way without seeming to do so.

9. An offer of cease-fire has a superficially attractive appearance and yet at the U. N. an offer of cease-fire was not generally considered worthy of respect unless it was accompanied at the same time by an offer by the aggressor to withdraw troops, together with a practical scheme to supervise the withdrawal.

10. One answer to a cease-fire proposal, therefore, could be a.) a cease-fire must be accompanied by the aggressor's withdrawal of troops and by machinery to supervise and verify; and b.) these are obviously things to be discussed at the meeting and should go on the agenda.

11. But I stress the communist tactic of inscribing as an agenda item the substantive result which they wish finally to achieve at a conference. We think of an agenda as a list of things to discuss; they think of it as an opportunity to win the conference before it has even started.

12. We should thus insist that the first item on the agenda should be machinery to supervise and to verify whatever agreement is ultimately reached.

13. We should also hold that the GVN has a sovereign right to move anywhere in its territory and to suppress armed terrorists where it finds them. This is an exercise of the domestic police power which no sovereign state should be asked to abdicate.

Bombing

14. An end of bombing of the North with no other quid pro quo than the opening of negotiations would load the dice in favor of the communists and demoralize the GVN. It would in effect leave the communists free to devastate the South with impunity while we tie our hands in the North.

15. We might agree to end the bombing of the North for a limited period--say thirty days--if the following conditions are met:

a. A withdrawal of NVN units through international checkpoints to the North.

b. Unimpeded access of the GVN to any part of its territory.

c. A significant reduction of incidents.

d. Cessation of infiltration of men and materiel.

e. If enforcement of all these measures is the first item of any agenda.

16. Your advisers might study the merits of making a new discussion offer in which you said in effect that on April 8 you offered unconditional discussions and were rebuffed; that this offer had stood from April 8 to the present time; that it was not, however, an offer to last through all eternity; and that, therefore, you were revising it along the lines of paragraph 15. Such an initiative might relieve you of the embarrassment of a communist cease-fire proposal by making in effect a cease-fire proposal of your own.

17. Such a public announcement, like all public announcements, should be coordinated in advance with the GVN.

Recognition of Viet Cong

18. Any form of recognition of the Viet Cong--other than as individual members of a Hanoi delegation--will lead to a collapse of the GVN. It would be taken in the countryside--and so represented by the still potent communist underground--as the beginning of a communist takeover. This would, I believe, lead to a rapid disintegration of all we have sacrificed so much to create.

19. I would therefore suggest that our attitude on this be that the Viet Cong will not be recognized, though Hanoi is free to include in its delegation any individual it chooses.

20. I would hate to see you in a position where you had to choose between flying in the face of overwhelming U. S. public opinion on the one hand or losing everything you have gained with so much struggle and sacrifice in Viet-Nam on the other.

21. I believe it will be possible to reconcile U. S. and Vietnamese positions with regard to the holding of

discussions with Hanoi, but American opinion must be prepared to give a little ground inasmuch as the Vietnamese have a very different viewpoint, due to their being so close to the conflict and so small and weak a nation, which has suffered so much. Also they take themselves seriously as a sovereign nation--and thus cannot accept a cease-fire for their own troops in their own country in the exercise of their own police power.

With warm and respectful regards,

Faithfully yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge

38

SENT
WHCA

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY NODIS

1965 NOV 7 20 26

Bundy

EEA083
OO WTE1Ø
DE WTE 233F

FROM: MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO : WATSON OR JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP65666

~~T O P S E C R~~ E T E Y E S O N L Y N O D I S

DEAN RUSK HAS ASKED ME TO SEND YOU AT ONCE AN EXTREMELY INTERESTING CABLE FROM LODGE AND THE ANSWER WHICH WE HAVE SENT TO HIM. LODGE'S CABLE REPORTS A POSSIBLE FEELER FROM THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT THAT MIGHT LOOK TOWARD AN END OF FIGHTING BY THEM. RUSK'S ANSWER AUTHORIZES A VERY CAUTIOUS PROBE OF THIS FEELER. NONE OF US KNOWS HOW MUCH SUBSTANCE THERE IS IN THIS, BUT IT IS BARELY POSSIBLE THAT IT REPRESENTS THE BEGINNING OF A MAJOR CHANGE IN OUR FAVOR.

CONTROL: 5676
RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 7, 1965, 2:45 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1605

DATE: NOVEMBER 7

~~T O P~~ S ~~E C R E~~ T NOVEMBER Ø7

N O DI S
EYES ONLY FOR BUNDY

THE SECRETARY OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATION CALLED THE POLITICAL SECTION ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT FOR ARCHBISHOP PALMAS TO SEE ME. THE DATE WAS SET FOR MONDAY AFTERNOON.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON I HEARD RUMORS OF DISSATISFACTION AMONG SOME OF THE VIETNAMESE CATHOLIC CLERGY AND DECIDED TO SEE PALMAS SOONER AND CALLED AT HIS RESIDENCE SUNDAY MORNING.

HE WISHED ME TO KNOW THE FOLLOWING:

A "FORMER VIETNAMESE CABINET MINISTER" WHO, HE SAID, IS WELL KNOWN TO ME, WHO IS REPUTABLE AND INTELLIGENT, AND WHOSE NAME PALMAS DID NOT WISH TO DIVULGE, HAD CALLED A WEEK AGO TO SAY THAT A "DULY ACCREDITED" REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" WHO HAD "PROPER LETTERS OF

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 3, #191
By JC, NARA, Date 5-15-12

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CREDENTIALS" WISHED TO TALK WITH ME. UNDER QUESTIONING FROM PALMAS THE FORMER CABINET MINISTER SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS WAS TO APPROACH ME "ON THE BASIS OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALISH." WHEN PALMAS ASKED WHY THEY DID NOT WISH TO SPEAK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, THE ANSWER WAS THAT THEY DID NOT TRUST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT IT WAS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF MILITARY MEN WHO WOULD NOT PERCEIVE POLITICAL FACTORS. THE AIM IN TALKING TO ME WOULD BE AS VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS WHO HAD ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE FROM THE COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF HANOI. IN SHORT, THE VISIT WOULD REFLECT A DESIRE OF THE NATIONALIST ELEMENT IN THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" WHO APPARENTLY WERE NOW INDEPENDENT OF HANOI TO CEASE THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH.

PALMAS SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY IF THIS WERE WHAT IT APPEARED TO BE ON ITS FACE IT WAS A CAPITULATION AND WAS OF GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WAS EXTREMELY SKEPTICAL ABOUT IT AND THOUGHT IT PROBABLY WOULD AMOUNT TO NOTHING.

PALMAS CALLED ON TRAN VAN DO TWO DAYS AGO AND, AS HE SAID, OUT OF CURIOSITY, ASKED DO WHAT HIS REACTION WOULD BE IF SOMEONE REPRESENTING THE NATIONALIST ELEMENT IN THE SO-CALLED "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" WERE TO PROPOSE AND END OF THE WAR. DO'S ANSWER WAS THAT SUCH A THING WAS INCONCEIVABLE AND THAT THE VIET CONG WAS COMPLETELY UNDER THE DOMINATION OF HANOI.

MY ONLY ANSWER WAS THAT I WOULD HAVE TO REPORT THIS TO THE US GOVERNMENT AND AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

COMMENT: I OBVIOUSLY AGREE WITH PALMAS THAT IF THIS WERE WHAT IT APPEARS TO BE ON THE SURFACE OR IN FACT A CAPITULATION IT WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE. BUT I ALSO SHARE HIS SKEPTICISM. AS FAR AS MAY TALKING WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONCERNED, I FORESEE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY DUE TO THE FACT THAT I AM UNDER CONSTANT OBSERVATION TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY. FOR ONE THING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOLLOWS ME AROUND WITH FOUR MEN IN A JEEP WHEREVER I GO. IN ADDITION I AM SURE THE VIET CONG OBSERVE ME TOO. IF THEREFORE SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL WERE TO COME TO MY HOUSE OR TO COME TO THE CHANCERY IT WOULD SURELY BE OBSERVED.

I ASKED PALMAS WHAT HE MEANT BY "DULY ACCREDITED" AND HAVING "A LETTER OF CREDENTIALS". I WANTED TO KNOW WHO HAD SIGNED THE LETTER BUT HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, THAT THOSE WERE THE PHRASES WHICH HIS VIETNAMESE INFORMANT HAD GIVEN HIM.

IT SEEMS TO ME HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT THEY WOULD THEMSELVES USE A RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICER FOR AN INITIAL FEELER (HENCE THE NEED FOR CREDENTIALS) WHILE HOPING THAT WE WOULD RESPOND AT MY LEVEL. ANYTHING INVOLVING ME, HOWEVER, WOULD OF COURSE ENTAIL SEVERE RISKS AND DANGERS FOR US WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THEREFORE, IN MY JUDGMENT, WE SHOULD FIRST INSIST, THROUGH PALMAS, ON SEEING COPY OF LETTER AND IF SATISFIED ON THAT POINT WE COULD CONSIDER ARRANGING MEETING WITHOUT ME AT RELATIVELY JUNIOR LEVEL PURELY FOR "SIZE-UP" PURPOSES. AT THAT POINT, WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY AND USEFULNESS OF THIS FEELER, WITHOUT HAVING EXPOSED OURSELVES IN THE MEANTIME. OBVIOUSLY THERE COULD BE MANY THINGS WHICH SUCH PEOPLE WOULD SAY TO NO ONE BUT ME.

I AM AWARE THAT WE COULD BE ENTERING A PERIOD OF SUCH FEELERS AND CAUTION AND WARINESS ARE NEEDED THOUGH NO OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE OVER-LOOKED. GP-1 LODGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY.

EMBTEL 1605.

1. AGREE WITH YOU THAT REPORTED APPROACH COULD BE OF UTMOST SIGNIFICANCE. WHETHER OR NOT IT COULD MEAN CAPITULATION -- OF WHICH WE, LIKE YOU, ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL -- IT MIGHT AT LEAST MEAN OPENING WEDGE IN REACHING NON-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTIC ELEMENTS OF NLF. CONTACTS COULD PROVIDE REAL INDICATION OF HOW SIGNIFICANT SUCH ELEMENTS ARE AND, BY CAREFUL HANDLING, WE MIGHT INDUCE SOME DEGREE OF CONTROVERSY AND SPLIT WITHIN NLF-HANOI RELATIONS. EVEN IF ONLY RESULT IS DEFECTION OF ONE OR MORE KEY INDIVIDUALS, THIS COULD BE OF IMMENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

2. WE THEREFORE CONCUR WHOLLY IN YOUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION, ASKING TO SEE COPY OF LETTER AND THEREAFTER, DEPENDING ON CONTENTS, ARRANGING MEETING AT RELATIVELY JUNIOR LEVEL FOR "SIZE-UP" PURPOSES. YOU SHOULD PROCEED ON THIS BASIS. WHILE WE LEAVE THIS TO YOUR JUDGMENT, ARE INCLINED TO THINK OFFICER SHOULD NOT BE FROM LANSDALE GROUP OR IDENTIFIABLY FROM CAS.

3. DANGER OBVIOUSLY EXISTS THAT APPROACH IS ON "AGENT PROVOCATEUR" BASIS DESIGNED TO TRAP US INTO DEALINGS WITH NLF THAT COULD BE PUBLICIZED AS RECOGNITION BY US OR, PERHAPS MORE LIKELY, LEAKED IN GVN CIRCLES TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN US AND GVN. THIS DANGER IS FAR OUTWEIGHED BY CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBILITIES.

PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED NODIS.

GP-3

DTG: 071933Z NOV 65

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY NODIS

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

39

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 6, 1965
Saturday -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Dodd's Letter on the Dominican Republic

Senator Dodd's letter paints a far gloomier picture of the Dominican Republic than is warranted by the facts. Some of the tough problems, such as arms collection, reintegration of rebels, curbing Communist influence and getting the economy back on its feet, remain to be solved. But the general situation has improved substantially over the past three weeks.

These are some of the main contentions in the letter, and the facts:

1. Charge: The situation is deteriorating.

The facts: During the past three weeks, the rebel zone has been dismantled and the rebels relocated to a camp outside the city. The IAPF has secured the downtown area. The port has resumed operations. Banks and commercial establishments have reopened. The principal papers started publishing while the Communist papers have been closed down. The headquarters of the Communist parties were occupied.

2. Charge: The Country is going Communist. Garcia Godoy's appointment of old line Communists to key positions shows it.

The facts: The Communists have made some inroads, particularly in the judiciary, labor and public information fields. The situation is disturbing but not beyond repair. Bunker and Bennett have brought the dangers and our concern forcefully to the attention of Garcia Godoy. He recognizes that he has made some bad appointments. He plans to make changes as rapidly as he can work out the package deal for sending some of the top rebel leaders abroad and changing the military chiefs. The Attorney General and the Minister of Interior are among the first slated to go. He also intends to close Radio Santo Domingo for a general personnel housecleaning. Bunker expects the first changes to be announced next week.

3. Charge: Garcia Godoy gives in readily to the demands of Caamano and the Communists but makes no concessions to the other

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NLJ 91-239
By JW, NARA, Date 11-18-93

side.

The facts: Garcia Godoy is trying to hold to a middle course, balancing concessions to both sides in an effort to avoid further bloodshed. He forced Wessin out, but he also got the rebels out of the downtown area and asked the IAPF to secure the area. He directed the closing of the Communist paper Patria and of the other rebel daily La Nacion. The balancing of changes in the military chiefs with sending rebel leaders abroad shows his even-handed approach.

4. Charge: Reintegration of policemen has permitted Communist toughs and convicted felons to enter the force.

The facts: We do not have the antecedents of the approximately 200 rebels integrated into the police force. But even assuming that many of them are bad actors, the fact that the leadership of the National Police is strongly anti-Communist and that the rebels are incorporated into a body of some 5-6,000 men, I do not believe that they represent much of a threat.

5. Charge: The arms collection effort is a failure. The rebels have smuggled some 10,000 weapons into the interior. The Communists have some interior towns ringed with guns.

The facts: The collection effort has not been effective. The Dominican Minister of Defense estimates that some 3000 arms of various types are unaccounted for. Bunker told us that he estimates that about one half of this number are in the camp where the rebel forces were relocated. These arms will be turned over to the Government as reintegration proceeds. Bunker and Palmer are urging Garcia Godoy to authorize the IAPF and the National Police to conduct joint searches on the basis of tips on the location of caches. Bunker thinks that Garcia Godoy will agree. I know of no town ringed with Communist arms.

6. Charge: Wessin was forcibly deported by US forces at rebel insistence. This will have a serious demoralizing effect on the Dominican and Latin American military.

The facts: Wessin is an officer with a reputation for personal integrity. His poor showing in the fighting during the first days of the revolution does not reflect well on his military ability. Garcia Godoy

decided to remove Wessin because of his disloyalty and insubordination. When he refused to obey his orders, Garcia Godoy asked the Commanding General of the IAPF for assistance in persuading Wessin to take an assignment abroad. Generals Alvim and Palmer spoke to Wessin and obtained his agreement to leave. They asked him what job he would like, and he chose the Consulate in Miami. Wessin visited his command to take leave of his men and then departed on transportation provided by us. He was not forced to go in any physical sense. I have seen nothing that would indicate that his departure unsettled the Latin American military, or that it has had any appreciable effect on the Dominican Armed Forces as a whole.

7. Charge: The Communists have been rapidly gaining control over the labor movement.

The facts: The Communists have made gains in capturing the leadership of some unions. Their success disturbs us and we have made this very clear to Garcia Godoy. But it has also stirred up democratic labor leaders and the PRD (Bosch) Party into doing something about it. The outcome of the struggle will be strongly influenced by changes in the Ministry of Labor which Garcia Godoy contemplates making. He is unhappy with his Labor Minister. In the Cabinet reshuffle he is scheduled to be replaced.

The Senator says, in closing, that in retrospect he thinks that we made a mistake by interposing our forces between the two sides and that we should have allowed the regular forces to finish off the rebels. You will recall that the interposition of our forces is what saved the regular forces. Had we not locked the rebels into the downtown area by establishing the LOC, they would probably have taken over the whole city and then moved into the interior. It was not until after we had set up the LOC, that the regular forces moved to clean up the northern half of the city, while we kept the main rebel force at bay.

McG. B.

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN
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DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

October 27, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On May 26, 1965, when negotiations for the purpose of settling the Dominican crisis were underway, I wrote a confidential letter to you expressing my grave apprehension over the reports then circulating that we would agree to the establishment of a coalition government in which the rebels held the upper hand.

I know it was the belief of our representatives in the Dominican Republic that a Garcia-Godoy government would limit communist influence and would favor, or at least serve to strengthen, the non-communist constitutionalists. But all the evidence is that this calculation was mistaken.

The articles which have appeared in the press over the past several weeks would by themselves be reason enough for concern over the trend of events in the Dominican Republic.

On October 8 I spoke about the situation on the Floor of the Senate, inserting into the Record a statement by Andrew C. McLellan of the AFL-CIO and an article by Mr. Howard Handelman of U. S. News and World Report.

Among other things, I pointed out that there was alarming evidence that known communists and pro-communists had been given important positions in the Godoy government, that the only two papers published in the entire country were the communist papers printed in the rebel zone; that the major Dominican papers remained shut down because of the strike of the workers under communist influence; and that the communists had been able to take over control of the University of Santo Domingo.

Over the past several weeks, I have received information from a number of sources which persuades me that the situation is even graver than it has been depicted by the press, and that we are

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Authority State ltr. 10/3/77
By clrng, NARA, Date 5-15-12

heading toward catastrophe in the Dominican Republic if we fail to re-adjust the policy which has brought about the present perilous situation.

The information I have comes from the following sources:

1. Mr. Andrew McLellan, Inter-American Representative of the AFL-CIO.

2. General Wessin y Wessin, in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

3. An officer defector from the rebel zone, in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

4. Mr. Howard Handelman of U. S. News and World Report, and Mr. Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Star, in confidential personal conversation.

5. An American who has been in the Dominican Republic for some time now and, whose job gives him unexcelled information about the situation throughout the country. (I do not wish to identify this source in my letter because of the delicate nature of his position, but I shall be happy to identify the source to you in personal conversation.)

Let me first of all quote several paragraphs from the letter I received only a few days ago from Source No. 5:

"The situation here is deteriorating more every day. I never thought I'd go thru the process of seeing a country go communist, but we are surely watching it happen here. (1)

"They apparently made the biggest mistake of their lives in their choice for provisional President and now that they have a bear by the tail, they don't know what to do next. He has appointed old line Communists into every key position in the Government and they, in turn, have appointed them in lesser positions. (2) The Attorney General is a Communist; the Chief

Magistrate is too, and they have appointed people throughout the Republic who are Communists, most of them with training behind the iron curtain or Cuba. The Minister of Interior and Police, who is also the vice president, is either a Communist or is urinating through the same quill with them.

"They have integrated the so-called "rebel" police back into the regular police. This included hundreds who were never police officers to begin with but instead were young Communist toughs. The officers who were re-integrated were mostly convicted felons who had been summarily dismissed from the police department before the revolution started. These included a full Colonel (Marte Hernandez) convicted of murder; a Lt. Colonel (Canela) convicted of embezzlement and a Major, convicted of stealing an automobile.

"Any demands made by Caamano, regardless of how ridiculous, upon the President, are immediately taken care of. Ciudad Nueva is still full of guns, as is the entire country. The Army went in to Ciudad Nueva day before yesterday to make house to house searches after a communist mob had murdered a Rightist, Angel Severa Cabral Ortiz, and wounded his wife and daughter. They met with Communist resistance and killed four of them. The President, at Caamano's instance, called off the search and has now set it up for four man teams to go house to house searching for them. That of course gave them two days to truck them in to the interior as these "searches" won't commence until noon today.

"All the name towns in the Cibao area (Puerta Plata, Monte Cristi, San Francisco de Macoris, etc.) are literally ringed with Communist guns. We have information that they know of bazookas, fifty caliber machine guns, mortars, San Cristobal multiple-fire rifles, Thompsons, etc. There are two hundred 60 millimeter mortars that were taken from the Army and not one of them has been recovered.

"If the police made an arrest of Communist trouble makers, they feel sure the Attorney General would turn them loose, and, if he didn't, there aren't any judges who would convict them. All the news media in the Republic, daily papers, radio and television are pouring out the Communist line and making no bones about it.

"One Communist newscaster last Sunday called President Johnson the Spanish equivalent of a son of a bitch over the television."

In his article in U. S. News and World Report toward the end of September, Howard Handelman quoted an un-named ambassador, whom he identified in confidence to me as the Ambassador of Israel. This is what the Israeli Ambassador said to Handelman:

"Please tell me one single thing that is better for your country now than it was last April, when you sent in the marines. The Communists are stronger now than they ever have been in this country. They have come out in the open, publish their own newspaper, hold conventions, even call themselves Communists, openly.

"All the concessions are being made to the Communists -- none to the other side. The rebels signed the compromise agreement to settle the civil war -- but now they ask for more concessions before they will live up to their agreements. First it was Wessin y Wessin. Next it will be the other military chiefs. Already, the street mobs are demanding that they go. They are calling your Ambassador, Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, a Nazi -- and demanding that he be kicked out.

"In these months of revolution, the Communists have built up their political and military apparatus far beyond anything they ever had here before.

"Also, the rebels now have the mystique -- the glamour and prestige that go with standing up to the giants of the hemisphere and the world --

the Yankees. They have the heroes and the legends and the slogans and the songs. They think they have won this revolution.

"I am afraid they are right."

Among the things which the rebel defector told us in his testimony were the following:

1. That rebels had smuggled some 10,000 arms out of the rebel zone into the countryside. Virtually none of the rebel arms had been surrendered.

2. That under the bayonets of the OAS forces, the communists in the rebel zone had operated three training schools for guerrilla and political cadres which turned out almost 10,000 graduates of intensive one-month courses.

3. That the communists from the beginning had been in complete control of the rebel zone and Camaano had for all practical purposes been a capitalist.

4. That the communists had elaborated plans for a campaign of sabotage and terror and guerrilla action throughout the Dominican Republic.

The testimony of Wessin y Wessin in every respect bore out what I heard from these other sources. But there is an additional aspect to this testimony to which I believe we should accord more serious attention. Wessin y Wessin stated the matter thus in his letter to Garcia-Godoy:

"The American representatives who ordered my ouster from Dominican soil in such a humiliating way have struck a decisive blow against the fight for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Can you imagine the impact this act by the OAS and the U. S. government will have on the Latin American military?

"Do you believe that Latin American officers and soldiers will be inclined to fight Communism when they know that the reward for the fulfillment of their duties will be expulsion from their country and the loss of their military career?"

Observers to whom I have spoken find that the low morale of the Dominican military is a contributing factor to Communist success.

Almost to a man they feel sold out by the United States and the OAS.

The forcible deportation of General Elias Wessin y Wessin by the United States at rebel insistence reportedly was the last straw for the military.

High-level officials see in his ouster the first step in the dismantling of armed forces organizations, and with it, the rapid takeover by trained Communist organizations, infiltrated in it now.

United States and OAS officials claim that Wessin y Wessin had to be removed as a "political liability which obstructed a peaceful settlement to the Dominican crisis."

I am a firm believer in the maximum possible degree of democracy and in limiting the power of the military in Latin American countries.

But I believe there are decent elements among the military, and I think Wessin y Wessin is one of these.

That is why the communists were so determined to get rid of him.

From everything I have heard, our own people on the spot thought well of him.

Indeed, I have been told that Ambassador Tapley Bennett said to one correspondent during the summer months that if the communists succeed in forcing Wessin y Wessin out, the situation would be hopeless.

Finally, I want to report to you on my conversation with Mr. McLellan who has spent many years now working with the anti-communist trade unions in Latin America.

Mr. McLellan knows all of the non-communist trade union leaders in the Dominican Republic intimately because he played a key role in helping them establish CONATROL, the independent Dominican Labor Federation.

Before the revolution, the non-communists controlled most of the important Dominican labor unions.

But the communists have been gaining control rapidly since the Garcia-Godoy government was established.

As I understand it, they have been sending organized goon squads along to union meetings and taking control of unions virtually at the point of a gun.

In this way, the communists have been able, over the past few months, to win control of 19 unions that were previously under the leadership of moderate trade union elements.

Looking back upon the record of what has happened, I am more than ever convinced that a mistake was made by those who urged the Administration to stop halfway and to protect the communist-led rebels by interposing our own forces between the rebels and the Dominican armed forces.

In retrospect, I believe it would have been better to permit the Dominican armed forces to finish the job -- and then, and then only, to use all of our own influence for the purpose of restricting the military and assuring a return at an early date to democratic government.

Again, I want to apologize for inflicting so detailed a report on you, but, even at the risk of repeating certain things of which you may be aware, I did feel it important to let you know about the information that has come to me from various sources on the Dominican crisis. Clearly, it is a situation which calls for urgent attention.

With every best wish.

Sincerely yours,

Tom Dodd

THOMAS J. DODD

40

That's all right.

LBJ/mf
11-5-65
10:30p

40a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
5 November 1965
6:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

McGeorge Bundy reports that we will have some definite word from Erhard on Monday. If he can get out a commitment to attend a meeting at Brussels he will come on December 6th, 7th and 8th.

If it is impossible to break this commitment, he will come on December 16th and 17th.

Jake/gt

O' C

40b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

We have had word from the Germans that the 6th, 7th, and 8th of December (perhaps, we are talking of the 7th and 8th, with arrival on the 6th) are convenient dates for Chancellor Erhard and we would like to confirm the dates to the Chancellor if the President decides.

It can be either at Washington or at the Ranch.

YES ✓ NO ___

ANY DATE

McGeorge Bundy

(Delores in Mr. Bundy's office -- was dictated this message by McGB in Secy. Rusk's office)/vm
11-7-65
3:15 pm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, November 5, 1965 - 3:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Candidate for Ambassador to the Dominican Republic

1. In your absence, I have taken it upon myself to coordinate a recommendation on this subject. I have done this because of repeated and increasingly urgent pleas from both Tap Bennett and Ellsworth Bunker that we find a replacement for Bennett soon. Bennett is very near the end of his rope down there, and Bunker tells me that he asks about his reassignment every time Bunker goes back. Bunker himself thinks it urgent on both personal and political grounds that Bennett be reassigned.

2. There is general agreement on the right place for Bennett: Portugal. The Ambassador there is Admiral Anderson, who apparently never misses an opportunity to make snide remarks about our Administration, and we owe him nothing. (Indeed, some of us think that President Kennedy was too kind to him when he sent him there in the first place). Lisbon is a most agreeable place to live, and is regarded in the Foreign Service as a major step up from Santo Domingo. Tom Mann and Ellsworth Bunker are convinced that the Bennetts will be pleased.

3. I have spoken to Senator Russell about this, and he tells me that he wants whatever Bennett wants. He also says that he thinks this is a good time to make the change from the point of view of public attitudes. I asked him what other Senators should be consulted, and he said that there was hardly one he would trust to keep his mouth shut, but after some discussion he agreed it would be safe and wise to check with Hickenlooper, and I have a call in to him.

4. After reviewing a large number of names, I have concurrences from Rusk, Ball, Mann, Crockett, Vaughn, Vance, and J. Edgar Hoover on the nomination of John Hugh Crimmins of the State Department to succeed Bennett. Moreover, this concurrence is warm and enthusiastic among those who know Crimmins best, regardless of political preferences. Tom Mann and I, for example, are equally sure that he is the man we now need.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By NARA, Date 5-15-12

5. We have looked at many other names. Some of us like Tony Freeman, but Mann and Dean Rusk are doubtful. We looked hard at a very able man from the Harvard School of Education (a Gardner and Keppel product), but most of us doubt that you should pick a man without previous diplomatic experience. Some of us would like to send Jack Vaughn, but Tom Mann insists that he is indispensable where he is. Over on the liberal side, people speak of Ralph Dungan, but Tom Mann thinks that this would be a disaster. Tom himself has mentioned one or two senior Foreign Service Officers like Parsons and Albert, but a number of the rest of us think that the older men from the Dulles age, without Latin American experience, would be at least as disastrous as Dungan. To put it another way, the problem is to find a man of tested judgment and balance who has the confidence of all hands.

6. Crimmins is such a man. From 1961-1963, he was the Director of the Caribbean Office and in that position, he had a lot to do with the Dominican Republic. But he did not get "burned" by any specific political decision. He knows the players and they know him, but he does not arouse violent feelings.

7. Since early 1963 Crimmins has been the Cuban Task Force Director. In this job he has won an outstanding reputation as a man who can get things done and who can make sound and effective policy recommendations. Most recently, he has been the organizer of our preparations for the new wave of Cuban refugees and he has deeply impressed us again.

8. In a separate memorandum, you will see that Buford Ellington reports he did a splendid job on his most recent trip to Florida.

9. I think the press both here and in the Dominican Republic will treat the appointment of Crimmins as a sound and strong professional decision. I think neither the far left nor the far right will be able to land any punches on him at the start. His reporting from Santo Domingo will be clear, and your Washington assistants will know the mind of the man they are hearing from. I do not think we can do better -- or indeed nearly as well with anyone else.

10. I should add that Ellsworth Bunker is getting tired, and both Tom Mann and I are worried about him. He came back this week partly to have a bad ear treated, and we need to get Bennett's replacement on the spot within the next month if we possibly can. Crimmins himself needs about three

weeks to brush up on his Spanish and to collect his wits after a tough five-year stint in the Department. Bennett needs time to pack, and of course we need to get the necessary agrements from Lisbon and Santo Domingo. I enclose George Ball's recommendation (Tab A) and J. Edgar Hoover's security clearance (Tab B). Mr. Hoover has also told me on the phone that he hears very good things about Crimmins. Finally, John Macy has just reviewed his dossier and tells me that it looks good to him.

11. I will ask Jake Jacobsen to relay your judgment on this.

McG. B.
McG.B.

4/2



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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your approval is requested for the Department to proceed with the following proposed Ambassadorial appointment:

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - John H. Crimmins, FSO-1

If you approve this nomination, the Department will request the agrement from the host country after the appropriate security investigations and medical examinations are completed. Preliminary security and medical checks have been conducted with favorable results.

for Dean Rusk

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

Enclosures:

Country sheet, biographic sketch and data, security summary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible] TO BE AN [illegible] MARKING [illegible] SECURITY [illegible], E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)
BY DCF ON 6-28-83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

General Country Situation:

Following more than four months of intermittent civil war, a Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic was installed on September 3, 1965. This government is pledged to restore law and order to the country and to bring it to free general elections within a period of nine months (before June 3, 1966). It can expect bitter and perhaps armed opposition from the extremes of both right and left. The Inter-American Peace Force, composed of troops from the United States and smaller contingents from a number of Latin American countries, is not to be employed except in the event government forces are unable to maintain public order. One of the Provisional Government's most pressing problems will be to retain support by the Dominican armed forces while implementing policies to which the military is opposed. The traditional Dominican alignment with the United States in international affairs should be maintained during the tenure of the Provisional Government; our relations with any successor regime are conjectural at this point. In the economic field, the task of reviving a stagnant economy will be complicated by a serious balance of payments problem. The Government inevitably will look to the United States for substantial help in economic and social development.

U.S. Objectives: Our objectives in the Dominican Republic are to promote internal stability, economic recovery and orderly evolution toward political democracy. It is hoped that with U.S. assistance and cooperation the government in power will follow a progressive program of reform and development which will produce conditions permitting a return to representative government, and lay the foundations for long-term national growth.

U.S. Programs: Before the recent civil war, AID funds were used primarily for importation of commodities and equipment. Recent emphasis has been on emergency relief and maintenance of public services. The dimensions of future economic assistance cannot be foreseen at this time, but they are likely to be of major importance. AID personnel in the country could number 75 by June 1966.

/ The

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Authority NLJ 84-105
By ___, NARS, Date 6-18-84

The Military Assistance Program will provide material and training aimed at strengthening the armed forces' ability to maintain internal security, undertake coastal patrols and engage in civic action projects. There are now 35 officers and men in the MAAG.

The USIA program (7 Americans) is active in all media. The program includes operation of an Information Center, two binational centers and a branch post at Santiago. Approximately 155 Peace Corps volunteers are assigned to the Republic.

Suggested Qualifications for the Chief of Mission: The Chief of Mission in the Dominican Republic should possess the broad experience necessary to administer a full range of U.S. programs in a politically volatile country where the U.S. presence is of overwhelming importance. Although it is desirable that he have no previous connection with the Dominican Republic, he should have a Latin American background, as well as a proven flair for dealing intelligently and sympathetically with Latin Americans. He should possess objectivity of a high order and be fluent in Spanish.

41-d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Candidate — John H. Crimmins, FSO-1

John Crimmins bears all the earmarks of a truly outstanding officer. Combining in his make-up the abilities of a policy formulator with those of a superior action officer, he is cooperative, adaptable and versatile, and possesses extra-ordinary powers of analysis, imagination and initiative. He handles delicate political assignments with a sure touch. He is fully cognizant of the public relations aspects of his work. His ability to head a team (as he did in Miami) and to gain the respect and affection of his subordinates mark him as a strong leader. His file reveals no material weakness.

Of medium height and tending toward being over-weight, Mr. Crimmins approaches his responsibilities in a thoroughly professional manner. Tough and resilient, with a direct but invariably courteous manner, he has a quick, probing mind and a quality which an inspector termed "fingertip knowledgeability". Quick to anger, he nevertheless maintains his composure. He works extremely hard, around the clock when necessary. He talks rapidly and rather intensely, but he is articulate and he writes well. His performance at the War College was outstanding, verging on brilliant. Both Mr. and Mrs. Crimmins have been praised for their representational effectiveness. Mrs. Crimmins, a poised and pleasant person, was formerly a research analyst with the OSS in Japan and later with the Department.

In the Department since 1961, Mr. Crimmins has dealt with manifold and delicate problems relating to Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, while also discharging less taxing but nonetheless important responsibilities relative to Mexico, Jamaica and Trinidad. Because of his work in ARA, he is well known and respected by Mr. Mann and Mr. Vaughn. He has also been recommended for the demanding assignment in the Dominican Republic by Mr. Crockett and Mr. Palmer.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-230
By ___, NARA, Date 11-12-91

John H. Crimmins, FSO-1

Biographic Data

Mr. Crimmins was born in Massachusetts on November 26, 1919. He is married and has a daughter born 1948 and a son born 1953. He is a graduate of Harvard University (AB-1941) where he majored in history and literature. He attended the National War College in 1956 and 1957. First employed by the Department of State in 1946, he was appointed to the Foreign Service in 1956. He speaks Spanish and Portuguese and has a limited command of French and German.

Experience

U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel, 1941-46 (Secretariat, Inter-American Defense Board, 1942-46);
Special Projects Staff, Department of State, 1946-56;
Communications and Transportation Officer, Rio de Janeiro, 1957-61;
Deputy Director and then Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, 1961-63;
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 1963 to present.

4/e

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary

FROM: M - William J. Crockett

SUBJECT: Security Summary - John H. Crimmins, FSO-1

A. 1. Date of last FBI investigation: 1963
2. Date of last SY investigation: 1946
3. Date of last security clearance: 1954

B. Summary of Information:

Investigations of Mr. Crimmins have been favorable in all respects. He was highly recommended by all sources interviewed. In 1947, as an employee of the Department, he was suspended for three days because of a security violation that occurred in an area under his general responsibility.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By JC On 5-15-12



John H. Crimmins

John Hugh Crimmins

Speak...
Office ...
Room ~~56~~
Department of Sta...
Washington 25, ...

5-24-63

TRANSFERRED TO STILL PHOTO COLLECTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 5, 1965

JOHN HUGH CRIMMINS

An applicant-type investigation was conducted regarding Mr. Crimmins in 1963, the results of which were summarized in a memorandum dated April 8, 1963. This memorandum summarizes Mr. Crimmins's activities since April, 1963.

Employment

Mr. Crimmins has continued his employment with the Department of State, Washington, D. C., and he is presently serving as Coordinator of the Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. From January, 1963, until May, 1963, Mr. Crimmins was assigned to Miami, Florida, where he directed the Miami Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

Residence

Mr. Crimmins, his wife, Marguerite, and their minor children, Deborah and John, Jr., reside at 4112 Dana Court, Kensington, Maryland.

Interviews

John F. Sullivan, Administrative Assistant to Daniel B. Brewster, United States Senator from Maryland, Washington, D. C., advised he has been authorized by Senator Brewster to state that Mr. Crimmins is not known to Senator Brewster.

Robert W. Adams, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised he has been acquainted with

Mr. Crimmins since March, 1964. Mr. Crimmins served under Mr. Adams's supervision from March, 1964, until April, 1965. They continue to have a close working relationship. He described Mr. Crimmins as a person of impeccable character, conduct, reputation and associates. He said Mr. Crimmins is an extremely able, intelligent, hardworking, discreet, security-conscious and dependable individual. Mr. Adams stated further that Mr. Crimmins is a tough-minded negotiator who is completely devoted to the best interests of the United States. He highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust and confidence.

Mr. Adams stated that, while Mr. Crimmins concentrates on Cuban affairs in the Department of State, his duties are by no means limited to that area alone. He explained that Cuban subversion extends to other Latin-American countries and, therefore, Mr. Crimmins is very familiar with political and economic matters generally throughout the Latin-American area. He said that, with the exception of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, he considers Mr. Crimmins to have the "most across-the-board knowledge" on general Latin-American affairs. He added that he is personally aware that Mr. Crimmins is well versed in Dominican Republic affairs.

Ward P. Allan, Director, Office of Inter-American Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised he has been acquainted with Mr. Crimmins as a colleague in the Department of State since 1947. He has worked closely with Mr. Crimmins as a result of the Cuban "situation." He said Mr. Crimmins has handled very sensitive matters in a highly controversial area and he has never been given any cause to question Mr. Crimmins in any respect. Mr. Allan furnished favorable comments regarding the character, reputation, loyalty and associates of Mr. Crimmins and he highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust and confidence.

Ellsworth Bunker, United States Representative to the Organization of American States and member of the Special Ad Hoc Committee on the Dominican Republic, when interviewed in Washington, D. C., stated he has been acquainted with Mr. Crimmins for approximately three years. He said he considers

Mr. Crimmins a very good Foreign Service officer whose character, reputation, loyalty and associates are above reproach. He mentioned he is also acquainted with Mrs. Crimmins and he described her as a very fine person. He advised that Mr. Crimmins is a very able person whose integrity and competence are above question. He highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust with the Government.

Robert F. Woodward, Special Adviser to the Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations, Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised he has been acquainted with Mr. Crimmins since 1946. Mr. Crimmins served under his supervision during 1961 and 1962 in Washington, D. C. He explained that Mr. Crimmins worked closely with him recently in connection with Dominican Republic affairs and he knows Mr. Crimmins is very knowledgeable in that field as well as in the field of Cuban affairs where Mr. Crimmins has concentrated his efforts in recent years. Mr. Woodward stated that Mr. Crimmins is a loyal and dedicated United States citizen whose character, reputation, loyalty and associates are above reproach. He recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust with the Government, commenting that Mr. Crimmins is an extremely able, intelligent, hardworking and reliable individual.

C. Allan Stewart, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised he has been acquainted with Mr. Crimmins in the Department of State since 1961. He mentioned that he was a co-worker of Mr. Crimmins's in Miami, Florida, in 1963 where they were assigned to handle Cuban affairs. He said there is no question whatsoever concerning Mr. Crimmins's character, reputation, loyalty and associates. He commented that Mr. Crimmins is a capable, intelligent and conscientious individual and he recommended him for a position of trust. Mr. Stewart stated that, while Mr. Crimmins concentrates on Cuban matters, he also has frequent contact with Dominican Republic affairs and Mr. Crimmins can operate very effectively in this field as well as in his main field of Cuban affairs.

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, The White House, Washington, D. C., stated he has had a close professional association with Mr. Crimmins for the past three

years. He described Mr. Crimmins as a highly qualified and dedicated individual who has proven himself to be an outstanding public servant. He stated further that Mr. Crimmins is a good administrator and that no information of an unfavorable nature has been brought to his attention regarding Mr. Crimmins's character, reputation, loyalty or associates. He highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust and confidence.

Marshall Wise, District Manager, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Miami, Florida, advised he was the director of the Cuban refugee center in Miami, Florida, during the time Mr. Crimmins was assigned to that area in connection with Cuban affairs. He described Mr. Crimmins as one of the most able, practical and knowledgeable persons he has ever met. He stated further that Mr. Crimmins displayed outstanding judgment, tact, leadership and decision-making ability. He said he has no reason to question Mr. Crimmins's loyalty and he highly recommended him for a position of trust.

Robert K. High, Mayor, Miami, Florida, stated he has had many conferences with Mr. Crimmins in connection with Cuban refugee problems. He said he regards Mr. Crimmins as a capable and intelligent individual who makes a good personal appearance. Mayor High stated it was difficult to get firm commitments or statements of real substance regarding Cuban problems from Mr. Crimmins. However, he believes this was unavoidable because of the many pressures on Mr. Crimmins. He advised that, based upon his contacts with Mr. Crimmins, he would highly recommend him for a position of trust.

Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, was interviewed in Juneau, Alaska. He said that, regarding communism, Mr. Crimmins is one of the most knowledgeable persons in the Department of State. In that regard he noted that for the past three or four years Mr. Crimmins has done an outstanding job on the "Cuban desk" in the Department of State. He said Mr. Crimmins will not be "fooled or pushed around by the communists, but he is not an extremist." He

stated further that Mr. Crimmins is a very thorough and methodical individual and he is not considered the "flashy type."

Mr. Mann stated he believes Mr. Crimmins is as good a choice as can be found for the position of Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. He said Mr. Crimmins has served in Brazil and one or two other foreign posts. Mr. Crimmins, he stated, gets along well with other people and enjoys a satisfactory reputation in the Department of State. Mr. Mann said further that since Mr. Crimmins has never served as an Ambassador he feels if anything went wrong in the Dominican Republic this might give rise to accusations that the Government sent an inexperienced man to the Dominican Republic. He stated, however, he feels Mr. Crimmins's "good points far outweigh the above and I would vote for the President's selection." He further stated he has been given no reason to question Mr. Crimmins's character, reputation or loyalty, and he recommended him for a position of trust.

Thirty-eight additional persons, including social and professional associates and neighbors, were interviewed and furnished favorable comments regarding the character, reputation, loyalty and associates of Mr. Crimmins. His professional associates described him as an extremely able, intelligent, hardworking, discreet, security-conscious and personable individual who has an excellent knowledge of Latin-American affairs. He was recommended for a position of trust and confidence. Persons acquainted with his close relatives stated they are all reputable individuals and their loyalty to the United States is above question.

Close Relatives

Mr. Crimmins's parents, Mathew and Helen Crimmins, and his brother, Frank Crimmins, are deceased. His sister, Eileen Crimmins, resides in Needham, Massachusetts.

Credit and Arrest Checks

Information has been received from the appropriate credit reporting and law enforcement agencies indicating their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information regarding Mr. Crimmins or his close relatives.

John Hugh Crimmins

Security Clearance

Mr. Crimmins currently has a security clearance with the Department of State.

Passport Record

The records of the Passport Office, Department of State, show that Mr. Crimmins was issued a passport on April 29, 1964, for travel to Paris, France, on Government business. He was issued a passport on November 19, 1964, for travel to Berlin, Germany, on Government business. This passport was revalidated on June 18, 1965, for travel to Lima, Peru, on Government business. The records of the Passport Office contain no unfavorable information regarding Mr. Crimmins.

Agency Checks

Information has been received from the following governmental agencies indicating their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Crimmins:

Bureau of Personnel Investigations, Civil Service Commission; House Committee on Un-American Activities; Central Intelligence Agency; United States Secret Service; and G-2, United States Army Counterintelligence Records Facility, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

The files of the Office of Security, Department of State, show that a background investigation was conducted by that office concerning Mr. Crimmins between August, 1965, and October, 1965. No unfavorable information was developed. The files of the Office of Security contain no additional pertinent information regarding Mr. Crimmins.

The central files of the FBI, including the files of the Identification Division, contain no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Crimmins.

41 h



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

41 i

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 5, 1965

BY LIAISON

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

In accordance with your request of November 3, 1965, an investigation has been conducted regarding Mr. John Hugh Crimmins, who is being considered for a Presidential appointment.

An applicant-type investigation was conducted regarding Mr. Crimmins in 1963, the results of which were summarized in a memorandum dated April 8, 1963. A copy of this summary memorandum was previously furnished to you, the Honorable Marvin Watson and the Secretary of State. Transmitted herewith is a memorandum which summarizes the activities of Mr. Crimmins since April, 1963, a copy of which is also being furnished to the Honorable Marvin Watson and the Secretary of State.

The Internal Revenue Service has advised that income tax returns were timely filed by Mr. Crimmins for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964, and there is no record of unpaid taxes, liens or intelligence investigations concerning these returns.

The investigation of Mr. Crimmins covered inquiries in the continental United States as to his character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiries were made as to the sources of his income.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

CRIMMINS 42

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 4, 1965

BY LIAISON

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

Reference is made to your telephone call on November 3, 1965, wherein you requested an investigation of Mr. John Hugh Crimmins.

An applicant-type investigation was conducted regarding Mr. Crimmins in 1963. Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated April 8, 1963, which summarizes the results of that investigation. A copy of that memorandum has been previously furnished to the White House and the Secretary of State.

The files of this Bureau, including the files of the Identification Division, contain no additional pertinent information regarding Mr. Crimmins.

Personnel of this Bureau, who have had contact with Mr. Crimmins in the past few years in connection with their official duties, characterized Mr. Crimmins as a responsible Foreign Service officer who has a good grasp of the Caribbean situation. They stated he has been cooperative and no unfavorable information regarding him has been brought to their attention.

The 1963 investigation of Mr. Crimmins is being brought up to date, the results of which will be furnished to you and the Secretary of State on November 5, 1965.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

62a

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

April 8, 1963

JOHN HUGH CRIMMINS

I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Birth

Mr. Crimmins was born on November 26, 1919, in Worcester, Massachusetts.

Education

He attended Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, from September, 1937, to June, 1941, receiving an A.B. degree cum laude.

Military Service

Mr. Crimmins was appointed a second lieutenant in the United States Army on June 17, 1941, and he entered on active duty on the same date. On May 5, 1946, upon completion of his terminal leave, he was honorably released from active duty, and he was transferred to the Officers' Reserve Corps as a lieutenant colonel. He served in the Officers' Reserve Corps, inactive duty, until March 29, 1954, when he was honorably discharged as a lieutenant colonel. His service record is clear.

Employment

He has been employed by the Department of State, Washington, D. C., since March 1, 1946. He initially served in Washington, D. C., as an intelligence officer, and from October, 1951, to March, 1956, as a research officer. He was appointed a Foreign Service Officer in March, 1956. Mr. Crimmins attended the National War College, Washington, D. C., from August, 1956, to June, 1957, when he was transferred to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, as a transportation and communications officer. He served in this position until August, 1961, when he was transferred to Washington, D. C., as Supervisory International Relations Officer and Deputy Office Director,

Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. He was appointed Director of the above office in February, 1962, in which position he served until February, 1963, when he was appointed Director, Miami, Florida, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. He is presently serving in this capacity.

The records of the Department of State show that Mr. Crimmins was suspended from duty from April 28, 1947, to May 1, 1947, as a result of a security violation which occurred in an area under his responsibility. The suspension was imposed upon Mr. Crimmins because of the potential seriousness of the violation rather than the actual consequences. The records of the Department of State further show Mr. Crimmins was charged with security violations (improper security of secret material) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on May 15, 1958, and May 8, 1959. A warning letter was directed to him in connection with the violations.

Marital Status

Mr. Crimmins is married to the former Marguerite Virginia Carlson. The permanent residence of Mr. and Mrs. Crimmins and their minor children, Deborah and John, Jr., is 4112 Dana Court, Kensington, Maryland. Mr. Crimmins is temporarily residing in the McAllister Hotel, 10 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida.

II. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Interviews

T. Achilles Polyzoides, Director, Office of Current Intelligence Indications, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised he knew Mr. Crimmins on a close social and official basis in the Department of State from 1946 to 1956. He was Mr. Crimmins' immediate supervisor during that period. He has had limited contact with Mr. Crimmins in the Department of State since that time. Mr. Polyzoides described Mr. Crimmins as a capable, intelligent, discreet, dependable and extremely hard-working individual. He mentioned that he is also acquainted with Mr. Crimmins' wife and children and he described them, as well as Mr. Crimmins, as loyal citizens of excellent character, reputation and associates. He recommended Mr. Crimmins without hesitation for continued employment in a position of trust and responsibility.

John Hugh Crimmins

William A. Fowler, Tacoma, Washington, a former official of the Department of State, advised he and Mr. Crimmins were assigned by the Department of State at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 1959 to 1961. He said Mr. Crimmins worked directly under his supervision. During this period he was also closely associated with Mr. and Mrs. Crimmins on a social basis. He described Mr. Crimmins as a very diligent worker, stating Mr. Crimmins was held in high regard by his fellow employees and the Brazilian nationals with whom he came in contact. Mr. Fowler furnished favorable comments concerning the character, reputation, loyalty and associates of Mr. and Mrs. Crimmins, and highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

Howard R. Cottam, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, interviewed in Washington, D. C., advised he was acquainted with Mr. Crimmins on a social and professional basis in connection with their employment with the Department of State in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 1957 to 1960. He said Mr. Crimmins was one of the most dedicated, hard-working and imaginative officers he has ever known. He said there is absolutely no question concerning the character, reputation, loyalty, habits and associates of Mr. Crimmins. Mr. Cottam highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust. He mentioned that he was also acquainted with Mrs. Crimmins, and he described her as a very fine person.

Mrs. Maurine M. Callahan, Chief, American Republic Branch, Office of Current Intelligence Indications, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, interviewed in Washington, D. C., advised she has been well acquainted on a social and official basis with Mr. Crimmins since 1946. She served under his immediate supervision in the Department of State from 1946 to 1956. She characterized Mr. Crimmins as a dedicated and loyal United States citizen. She stated Mr. Crimmins is an unusually able, conscientious, intelligent, industrious and reliable person. She mentioned she is also well acquainted with Mrs. Crimmins. Mrs. Callahan furnished favorable comments concerning the character, reputation, loyalty and associates of Mr. and Mrs. Crimmins, and she highly recommended Mr. Crimmins for a position of trust and responsibili

J. Glenn Beall and Daniel B. Brewster, United States Senators from Maryland, interviewed in Washington, D. C., advised they do not know Mr. Crimmins, and they therefore have no comment concerning him.

Seventeen additional persons, consisting of social and professional acquaintances, supervisors and neighbors, were interviewed, and they furnished favorable comments concerning the character, reputation, loyalty and associates of Mr. Crimmins. Those who know him well highly recommended him for a position of trust and responsibility.

Close Relatives

In addition to his wife and children, mentioned previously, Mr. Crimmins has the following close relatives:

Father, Mathew V. Crimmins, deceased;

Mother, Mrs. Helen T. Crimmins, nee Casey, deceased;

Brother, Frank Crimmins, deceased;

Sister, Miss Eileen Crimmins, Needham, Massachusetts.

Credit and Arrest Checks

Information has been received from the appropriate credit reporting and law enforcement agencies indicating that their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Crimmins or his close relatives.

Agency Checks

Information has been received from the Bureau of Personnel Investigations, Civil Service Commission; the House Committee on Un-American Activities; and G-2, United States Army Counterintelligence Records Facility, Fort Holabird, Maryland, indicating that their files contain either no record or no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Crimmins.

The central files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contain no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Crimmins.

Rec'd Rent 11-6-65 9:10a

MEMORANDUM

L 43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Friday, November 5, 1965 - 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Reasons for wanting a meeting with you next week

1. Jake Jacobsen has reported your desire for a brief statement on this point. I have talked to Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk, and they have somewhat differing reactions. McNamara says he is convinced a meeting is very badly needed; Rusk says that he does not think we need to decide today how urgent it is. I think McNamara will turn out to be right, but I also agree with Rusk.

2. The two issues on which there are serious decisions not far ahead of us are Vietnam and European nuclear policy. There are two other major problems -- South Asia and the AID program -- but both of them can wait for another two/three weeks until we have all the evidence in better shape for you. Vietnam and Europe are more urgent, for good reasons in both cases.

3. On Vietnam, the problem is that major decisions -- on the budget, on reinforcements for Westmoreland, and on our diplomatic posture -- need to be made at least tentatively before the end of November. Otherwise, time will make them for us. For example, if we are going to have major additional reinforcements in January, we almost surely need to take some political steps in December. One such step may be a pause in bombing (McNamara clearly favors such a pause.) If we have not examined these issues with you before Rusk leaves for South America, the matter will have to wait for his return since it is not something you will want to decide without your Secretary of State. But that brings us to the very end of the month of November, and that leaves you very little time for thought about a very hard set of problems.

4. In Europe, the problem may be somewhat less acute if the Erhard visit gets put off until mid-December -- as now seems likely. Nevertheless, there is a lot of preliminary work to be done on this one too, depending on the course which you choose -- either George Ball's shared weapons-system, or my consultation, or some mixture of the two. McNamara and Ball are going to Europe to discuss some of these questions at the end of November, in meetings which are already scheduled. It will be a great help if they can have a clear sense of your thinking before they go -- and once again the problem is one on which we would prefer not to make decisions with Rusk away.

5. It remains possible that we will all reach pretty much agreed recommendations here, and if that should be the case, the matter might be handled by memoranda to you or be held until mid-November for discussion during Rusk's absence.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ /RAC12-185
By LCL NARA, Date 03-25-2014

6. On the other side of the argument again, it is much easier for your people to work on these very large questions effectively if they can have the advantage of exposure to your own thinking at first hand. I know that McNamara feels strongly on this point. He wants to run this war with sure sense that he is running it the right way for the right reasons, in your view.

7. But let me end as I began -- I agree with Rusk that we do not need to decide today whether we have to press you for a meeting next week. I will send you another memorandum over the weekend, reporting the results of the next two days of discussion here.

McG. B.

Passed to Mr. Bundy

JJ
11-4-65
4:30p

44

44a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4 November 1965
2:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will recall in a telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk that you were amenable to a meeting with Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy on Vietnam and other matters which needed to be called to your attention.

Bundy called to say that Rusk is leaving for South America on November 13 and that the meeting should be held prior to that. Bundy suggests maybe the 11th, 10th, or 12th.

Bundy states that you indicated to Secretary Rusk that the meeting could be held here at the ranch. Do you want me to set up the meeting?

Jake/gt

Yes_____ 11th _____

10th_____

12th_____

No_____

Ask Bundy to send memo on subjects to be discussed

Thursday, No. ,mber 4, 1965

45

45

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a routine authorization that puts in Joe Fowler's hands the multilateral funds (IDB and IDA) of the current Aid appropriation. Charlie's memorandum points out the balance of payments effect is zero in 1965 and very low even next year.

McG. B.

46

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1965

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval and signature is a pleasant negative reply to an invitation from Acting Prime Minister Sangster to visit Jamaica during your period of recovery.

Francis M. Bator

Attachment

(Unless you'd like to go, of course)
MFB

46a

November 4, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Mrs. Johnson and I very much appreciate your gracious invitation to visit Jamaica during my period of recuperation. I remember with great pleasure my visit to your country during the celebration of Jamaica's independence.

While I am strongly tempted by the prospect of your fine hospitality and warm climate, I think it advisable to forego any travel at this time and to remain at home.

I hope you will extend to Prime Minister Bustamante my best wishes for his health and happiness and my warmest regards.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Donald Burns Sangster
Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica
Kingston

LBJ:EKH:vmr:mst
11/1/65 - 6:00 p.m.

46b

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.
P.O. BOX 638,
KINGSTON,
JAMAICA

14th October, 1965

Dear Mr. President,

We all in Jamaica are very happy to learn that you are convalescing nicely after your operation.

Mr. President, I realise how difficult it is for you to leave the United States, but in the event that it is at all possible, the Government of Jamaica would be happy to welcome you and your good lady to spend here any period which you wish during the period of your recuperation. All courtesies and facilities would be extended and you may rest assured that your privacy would be respected.

I am sure that nothing would give the people of Jamaica more pleasure than having you here even for a short stay.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By jc NARA, Date 5-15-12

D B Sangster

(D.B. Sangster)
ACTING PRIME MINISTER

BOX FROM QUICK COPY

President Lyndon B. Johnson,

Rec'd Comm 11-6-65 9:10 a

MEMORANDUM

42

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, November 4, 1965 - 9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Should we go Ahead with the White House Conference on International Cooperation Year?

1. Jake Jacobsen has passed me your message, and I have not done anything further on this matter until I could get back to you. But neither have I issued any general stop order. I want to do just what you want done, but I don't think I should cancel or postpone this Conference without a definite decision from you. It is now scheduled, by your repeated public affirmation, for November 29 - December 1. No one short of the President should make any decision to derail what the President has repeatedly ordered.

2. My memoranda to you have failed to speak adequately of the history of all this. It began in 1964 after the UN General Assembly designated 1965 as International Cooperation Year. You gave that designation your enthusiastic support.

(1) First in your June, 1964 speech at Holy Cross you said,

> "I propose to dedicate this year to finding new techniques for making man's knowledge serve man's welfare....
>
> "We intend to call upon all the resources of this great nation -- both public and private -- to work with other nations to find new methods of improving the life of man."

(2) Then on October 2, 1964 you issued a Proclamation of International Cooperation Year. The operating clauses of this Proclamation are as follows:

> "NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby
>
> - proclaim the year 1965 to be International Cooperation Year in the United States of America;

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING NOT NAT'L SECURITY INFORMATION, E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DCH ON 6-28-83

- rededicate the Government of the United States to the principle of international cooperation; and

- direct the agencies of the Executive Branch to examine thoroughly what additional steps can be taken in this direction in the immediate future.

I also call upon our national citizen organizations to undertake intensive educational programs to inform their memberships of recent progress in international cooperation and urge them to consider what further steps can be taken."

(3) On the same day you addressed a gathering of notables in the East Room and made an eloquent and moving announcement of plans for a White House Conference on International Cooperation:

"I am very proud to welcome this most distinguished assembly of most distinguished Americans. I regret that one of the most distinguished of all cannot be with us this morning - - Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. He is otherwise engaged in Cleveland and Chicago in a pursuit that I regard as no vice.

"You have come here and we are brought together by a very old and a very honored American interest -- the interest of fostering international cooperation instead of international conflict. We are here today to proclaim 1965 as International Cooperation Year in the United States of America."

"In 1965, it is the hope of your Government that International Cooperation Year may be used for a useful review and purposeful planning. For this end, I am appointing a special Cabinet Committee to direct this work and to develop all possible proposals for the future.

"It is my thought that we can find many areas to encourage much more progressive and purposeful labor among the nations of the world. This is what we shall be doing. I have asked you here this morning to make a special appeal to you and to request your labors, too. I hope that each of you will help me and the Secretary of State and others of your Government to carry the story of international cooperation and organization to the American people."

"More than that, I hope that your talents may be turned to systematic study of the next steps that private organizations may take to further this cooperation. There is more extensive interest in this on the private level than I think there has ever been before. Business organizations, farm organizations, labor unions, universities, church bodies, women's groups, professional societies, are all expanding their interests and their operations abroad and are all concerned with what is happening in the other 120-odd nations in the world to an extent that has never been equalled before, I say pridefully and proudly."

"You will be frowned upon. Some will call you an idealist. Some will call you a crackpot, and some may even call you worse than that. They may say you are soft or hard or don't understand what it is all about in some of these fields, but what greater ambition could you have and what greater satisfaction could come to you than the knowledge that you had entered a partnership with your Government that had provided the leadership in the world that had preserved humanity instead of destroyed it."

"If I am here -- I am speaking now politically and not physically -- I don't anticipate any violence, but if I am here, I intend next year to call a White House Conference and I want all of you to start thinking about it now. I want you to talk to your friends about it. I want to call a White House conference to search and explore and canvass and

thoroughly discuss every conceivable approach and avenue of cooperation that could lead to peace. That five-letter word is the goal of all of us. It is by far the most important problem we face. It is the assignment of the century for each of you and if we fail in that assignment, everything will come to naught."

(4) With that send-off, people went to work. On November 24, 1964, you designated a Cabinet Committee under Dean Rusk to prepare for the White House Conference. Committees were formed on a whole range of topics, and the interest of leading private citizens was engaged in a year of preliminary work. They really are leading citizens, and I attach two pages of representative names of those who have taken an interest in the Conference (TAB A).

(5) On March 4, 1965, you received Bob Benjamin and gave the whole undertaking another strong boost.

"On October 2, I proclaimed this twentieth anniversary year of the birth of the United Nations as International Cooperation Year in the United States.

"I am highly pleased by the extent of voluntary support being given to this observance by citizens throughout the country. Mr. Benjamin's progress report this morning was inspiring. I believe Americans today fully recognize that international cooperation is the one sure way toward peace. The depth of such citizen support is a source of strength for all of this nation's policies and purposes.

"I am hopeful that the White House Conference on International Cooperation which I have called for November 29 to December 1, can be a landmark session. I hope the conference and the preliminary discussions leading toward it can be a source of new and thoughtful evaluations of what we can do in every major field of international cooperation."

(6) Since then the wheels have been rolling. Thirty Committees of private citizens have prepared reports which are now going to press. Invitations have been printed. Committee and Panel Chairmen have arranged their programs. A remarkable

group of Americans have responded to the challenge you gave their leaders in the East Room a year ago. All of this can do good. Little if any of it can do harm. You started it in a great speech. Why should it be stopped now?

* * * * * *

3. It may be that I have failed to respond to some special concern of yours. Here are some cases of possible objections with brief answers.

Objection One: The Conference will mess up the White House for three days.

Answer: All that the White House is committed to is a single reception which the President needs to attend only if he is in town.

Objection Two: The Conference will put forward a lot of embarrassing proposals.

Answer: There will be no wild proposals, because the private committees have shown themselves very responsible. Moreover, the freedom of action of the executive branch will be fully protected.

Objection Three: Some far-out type may use the White House for his own protest on Vietnam, or something else.

Answer: This is always a possibility when any group is asked to the White House, but the very presence of 1,000 other well-behaved peace-lovers will be the best possible answer.

* * * * * *

4. So my strong recommendation is that we should proceed on schedule. I can think of no reason whatsoever for cancellation, and the only good reason for a postponement would be to allow you to take a larger part in the Conference after your convalescence. Such a postponement can readily be arranged if you wish -- though it might raise unnecessary questions about your health, and it would also increase the burden on you at a later time. The only other alternative I can see is to proceed with the Conference, enlist the help of Mrs. Johnson and the Vice President, and keep the load on you as light as possible.

Carry on with Mrs. Johnson and the Vice President_____

Postpone it on grounds of health_____

Speak to me_____

McG. B

P.S. Arthur Goldberg just called me on another matter and I checked this problem with him. He asked me to pass this message: It really would be disastrous with all the supporters of the UN if we cancel the Conference. He and Dorothy Goldberg will be delighted to do anything they can to pitch in and keep the load on you as light as possible.

Mr. David M. Kennedy
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. Philip M. Klutznick
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. Alfred A. Knopf, Sr.
New York City

Mr. Arthur B. Krim
New York City

Mrs. Albert D. Lasker
New York City

Mr. James Laughlin
Norfolk, Connecticut

Mr. David E. Lilienthal
New York City

Mr. James A. Linen
New York City

Mr. Sol M. Linowitz
Rochester, N. Y.

Mr. George C. Lodge
Boston, Massachusetts

Mr. John L. Loeb
New York City

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
New York City

Mr. Neil McElroy
Cincinnati, Ohio

Mr. Robert J. Manning
Boston, Mass

Mr. Stanley Marcus
Dallas, Texas

Mr. George Meany
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Raymond D. Nasher
Dallas Texas

Mr. Robert R. Nathan
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Samuel I. Newhouse
Newark, N. J.

Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen
New York City

Mr. William S. Paley
New York City

Mr. James G. Patton
Washington, D. C.

Dr. James A. Perkins
Ithaca, New York

Mr. Maxwell M. Rabb
New York City

Mr. Theodore S. Repplier
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Walter P. Reuther
Detroit, Michigan

Mr. David Rockefeller
New York City

Mr. Irving Salomon
Escondido, California

Judge Edith S. Sampson
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. Marlin E. Sandlin
Houston, Texas

Gen. David Sarnoff
New York City

Dr. Thomas K. Sherwood
Cambridge, Mass

Dr. Joseph R. Smiley
Boulder, Colorado

Dr. Frank Stanton
New York City

Mr. Herman W.
Steinkraus
Westport, Conn

Mr. Wm. P. Steven
Houston, Texas

Mr. Jack I. Straus
New York City

Mr. Arthur Hays
Sulzberger, NYC

Mr. Jesse W. Tapp
Los Angeles, Calif.

Mr. J. Cameron Thomson
Minneapolis, Minn.

Mr. Edward M.M. Warburg
New York City

Mr. Thomas J. Watson
Armonk, N. Y.

Dr. Herman B. Wells
Bloomington, Indiana

Dr. Francis O. Wilcox
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Frazer B. Wilde
Hartford, Conn.

Dr. Logan Wilson
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Douglas C. Wynn
Greenville, Miss

TAB A

Mr. Frank Altschul
New York City

Mr. Joseph A. Amter
Denver, Colorado

Mr. Harry S. Ashmore
Santa Barbara, California

Dr. George P. Baker
Boston, Massachusetts

Dr. Stanhope Bayne-Jones
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Robert S. Benjamin
New York City

Mr. Leonard Bernstein
New York City

Mr. Barry Bingham
Louisville, Kentucky

Mr. Bruno V. Bitker
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Mr. Eugene R. Black
New York City

Mr. Jacob Blaustein
Baltimore, Maryland

Mr. Harvie Branscomb
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Detlev W. Bronk
New York City

Mr. Robert M. Brunson
Beverly Hills, California

Mr. Cass Canfield
New York City

Mr. Erwin D. Canham
Boston, Massachusetts

Mr. James B. Carey
Silver Spring, Maryland

Mr. Joseph V. Charyk
Washington, D. C.

Gen. Lucius D. Clay
New York City

Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen
Washington, D. C.

Gen. James F. Collins
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Andrew W. Cordier
New York City

Mr. Norman Cousins
New York City

Mr. John Cowles
Minneapolis, Minn.

Mr. Donald K. David
New York City

Mr. Arthur H. Dean
New York City

Dr. John S. Dickey
Hanover, N. H.

Mr. Frederick M. Eaton
New York City

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower
Baltimore, Maryland

Mr. Erik J. Eriksen
Somerset, Virginia

Mr. John Fischer
New York City

Dr. John Hope Franklin
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. William Friday
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
New York City

Mr. Leonard Goldenson
New York City

Mrs. Katharine Graham
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Ernest A. Gross
New York City

Mr. Caryl P. Haskins
Washington, D. C.

Rev. Theodore Hesburgh
South Bend, Indiana

Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby
Houston, Texas

Mrs. Anna Rosenberg
Hoffman, New York City

Dr. Geo. W. Hoffman
Austin, Texas

Mr. Palmer Hoyt
Denver, Colorado

Dr. Eldon L. Johnson
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Mr. Jos. E. Johnson
New York City

Dr. Edwin P. Jordan
Charlottesville, Va.

Dr. Joseph Kaplan
Los Angeles, California

Mr. Frederick R. Kappel
New York City

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, November 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Colombian Loan

1. Joe Califano relayed your request for further comment on the Colombian loan by Ambassador Oliver and Tom Mann. I enclose a memorandum from Mann and a message from Oliver. Both of them strongly endorse this program.

2. Our own initial memorandum should have reported that both Mann and Oliver strongly support this program.

3. This really is a tight package, and I think it has been looked at by everyone.

McG. B.

Approved ✓

Disapproved ____

CONFIDENTIAL attachments

Mr. P. B.

We

With reluctance reservations and considerable misgivings - but with the understanding that it results in no loss in bal of pay this yr + that Oliver, Vaughn + Mann follow this day to day adm. + keep us informed ~ D

Authorize

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

48a

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I agree with the recommendations that you approve the Colombian Aid Program. The following are specific comments to concrete questions:

1. We should proceed promptly to conclude the agreement in early November. The reason for this is that we have pushed the Colombian Government very hard for over a year to take difficult self-help measures. If we fail to come through in a timely way with our end of the bargain the progress which has been made could begin to come unraveled because of political pressures in Colombia. The Colombian economy cannot get going again without the outside resources which they expect from us.

2. We should not delay carrying out our end until after the Rio Conference. Colombian political cooperation with us on the Dominican Republic and all other foreign affairs issues important to us has been good. The only exceptions that I recall are:

(a) The Colombian Ambassador to the OAS was quoted by the press as having made some unfortunate remarks in an OAS meeting. He subsequently assured me he was on our side and said that the press had distorted his remarks. He has since been cooperative.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 84-105
By ics, NARS, Date 6-18-84

(b) The Colombian Congress passed a resolution protesting the Selden Resolution. However, it must be remembered that President Valencia sometimes has trouble with his Congress playing politics. I do not believe it would be wise to lay this at President Valencia's door. Our problems with President Valencia have not been problems of cooperation with the United States. They have been problems of his reluctance to take the necessary but unpopular self-help measures; and on this he has yielded after steady pressure from us.

3. The scheduled carrying out of the Colombian program should not adversely affect our balance of payments for calendar year 1965. Only $10 million will be disbursed before the end of this calendar year and arrangements will be made to insure that this $10 million is returned to the U. S. before the end of the year in payment of commercial arrearages due our exporters. I am assured that we already have a gentleman's agreement on this point.

Thomas C. Mann

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CABLE RECEIVED FROM AMBASSADOR OLIVER, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
(November 2, 1965)

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

No. 630.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR.

Jack Vaughn, while here recently, told me of your "report card" review of Colombian performance in relationship to a new assistance program. I am very pleased that you are giving Colombia this degree of personal attention. I am sure you will note that State/AID and the Embassy have themselves been firm with the pupil and that although a slow starter this year, Colombia has come up with a sound program designed to maintain and improve its rates of social and economic development under the Alliance for Progress.

This program meets the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and State/AID. President Valencia and the country now feel that they have responded adequately to the requirements of these agencies, and a new atmosphere of calm and new confidence is discernible. The new program also marks the culmination of my continual efforts over fourteen months to get Colombia going again. A democratic, confident Colombia is of the greatest importance to our strategic and political national interests; and a new program, sound on development merits, is also the best guarantee we can supply that Colombia will achieve orderly, constitutional transfer of power in the 1966 elections.

I am sure that in review you will evaluate Colombia on its prospects and general worthiness, as well as on its total past performance.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NAC 12-185
By UCLD NARA, Date 03-25-2014

48c

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ November 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Colombian Aid Program

Attached are the memorandum from Tom Mann to the President, and the cable from Ambassador Oliver suitably retyped for forwarding to the President.

WGB
WGBowdler

Attachments
1. 11/2/65 Memo for the President
2. Embassy Bogota's 630, 11/2/65 from Ambassador Oliver to the the President.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 8-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recd Rostow 11-4-65 3:45P

49 (2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, November 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

After your second message on the Shastri visit problem, I asked Bob Komer for a rundown on what we have been doing and what Bowles has been doing. I attach his memorandum. The Indians are clearly angling for an answer to Shastri's letter of October 7 and we on our side ought to be ready to give whatever answer you want just as soon as we know definitely when Erhard is coming, and when we can fit Ayub and Shastri around him. My own current feeling is that we should let Shastri come in mid-December and let Ayub wait until the New Year.

McG.B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 3, 1965
Wednesday/7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Shastri Visit Matter. The current state of play is that Shastri seems quite interested in coming here, but is uncertain as to when you'd be ready to receive him. The sense of his 7 October letter to you, as amplified by his own chief aide in Delhi and by BK Nehru here, is that he was ready to come before his parliament session began 3 November but, since you would probably be convalescing through that period, could come next after 10 December when his parliament ends. So he probably regards the ball as in your court.

This whole enterprise sorts out into three phases:

Phase I beginning with the April postponement was signalized by our saying that he had an open invite after the aid bill passed, and the wounded Shastri saying he might not be able to make it this year after all.

Phase II began in early August with feelers from Shastri about an October visit. At your instruction, we authorized Bowles to reply (To Delhi 217 of 13 August) that we regarded Shastri as having cordial standing offer visit here in fall, once aid bill behind us." We told Bowles you were highly receptive but didn't wish to decide finally or issue formal invitation unless there was clear indication Shastri would accept. Mann and then I followed up with BK Nehru that a visit in October rather than later would be most welcome (To Delhi 257, 20 August). BK replied to Mann that it might be possible. But the Pak/Indian fracas then intervened.

Bowles seems to have stayed well within his instructions, though as soon as the cease-fire came he started urging us to authorize him to encourage a Shastri visit, perhaps ostensibly to the UN. Ayub was also nibbling, so you sent me word to find out from his Embassy when he wanted to come, adding that "if the Indians want to come, and I understand that they do, tell them that I would like them to come before the 15th." We duly passed this word. (of October)

Phase III began when your operation intervened. Shastri wrote you a get-well letter on 7 October saying he had been looking forward to discussing many problems with you at an early date but that he now hoped that at a later date he could come in response to your invitation. His people amplified this

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By jcf NARA, Date 5 15 12

to mean that he could come either before his parliament convened on 3 November or after it closed on 10 December. Since then he's been probing through several channels, including a cabinet minister sent here, to find out when you might be ready to receive him.

We here have kept very cool all during this third phase (and so has Bowles), to preserve your flexibility. No one is pleading with Shastri to come. In fact we've merely replied when asked that the matter would obviously have to await your recovery. Meanwhile Shastri, besides nibbling hard, has made a few statements to his own domestic audience apparently designed to make it easier for him to come here without appearing to have begging bowl in hand (both he and Ayub seem worried over the possibility that their visits would be a failure, and affect their own domestic position). Natural press speculation here has also been keeping the question alive, to which we've been responding only by saying that the door is still open.

In sum, Shastri and co. are talking up a visit, while we are keeping mum without appearing to reverse course and say "no." Shastri seems to be waiting for some indication as to when you'd be willing to see him, and trying to keep open his option to come (see attached on his press conference). A possible Ayub visit also complicates matters, since neither would feel able to come hard on the heels of the other.

R. W. Komer

49h

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

Action

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Shastri Visit

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NOV 3

FOLG TEL RPTD YOUR INFO

QUOTE

CONTEL 230 FROM CALCUTTA TO DELHI NOV 2

REPRODUCED BELOW IS EXCERPT TAKEN FROM A TAPE OF PRIMIN'S SHASTRI'S PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT CALCUTTA NOV 1, 1965 THE EXCERPT RELATES TO SHASTRI'S PROSPECTIVE US VISIT.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 136

Q. SIR, ONE POINT- THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION IN THE US ABOUT YOUR VISIT TO THE USA. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS CONSIDERABLY CHANGED IN FAVOR OF YOUR VISIT. DO YOU CONSIDER IT FAVORABLE OR WHAT'S YOUR REACTION.

A. I HAVE NOT SAID THAT I SHALL NOT GO THERE, GO THE US, BUT AS YOU ARE ALL AWARE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS STILL CONVALESCING, AND I DO NOT KNOW.

Q. INAUDIBLE.

A. I SAID I HAVE NOT SAID THAT I SHALL NOT GO TO THE US. BUT, PERHAPS IT WILL TAKE SOMETIME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RESUME HIS NORMAL DUTY AND NORMAL WORK, AND THEREFORE IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY AS TO WHEN I WILL BE ABLE TO GO THERE.

Q. DOES IT MEAN AN INVITATION HAS COME- FORMALLY?

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

A. THERE IS. I HAVE RECEIVED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON- OF COURSE, IT WAS RECEIVED SOMEWHAT, SOMETIME BACK. ANOTHER LETTER IN WHICH HE MADE A SPECIAL THAT I SHOULD GO TO, I SHOULD VISIT, WASHINGTON AS EARLY AS IT WAS CONVENIENT - TO ME.

Q. THIS IS AFTER THE AGGRESSION?

A. NO, A LITTLE BEFORE THE AGGRESSION.

Q. DOES IT MEAN, SIR, WHEN THIS VISIT TO THE US TAKES PLACE, THE ENTIRE POLITICAL QUESTION WOULD BE COMING UP FOR DISCUSSION ON KASHMIR?

A. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY WHAT QUESTION WILL COME UP THERE. THERE WILL BE SO MANY THINGS TO BE DISCUSSED. IT IS RATHER A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. HITCHCOCK
BT

Received Rome 11-4-65 4:45 p

(2) 50

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-239
By jw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

Wednesday, November 3, 1965 - 5:30 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Some Encouraging Latin American Developments

Last week we were confronted with crises in Brazil and the Dominican Republic. The tensions have diminished considerably. The Brazilian crisis generated speculation that the Special Inter-American Conference, scheduled to open in Rio de Janeiro in two weeks, would be postponed. The Castello Branco Government has made clear its intention to hold the meeting. The Cubans today agreed to our memorandum on the movement of refugees.

Dominican Situation

This morning I met with Ellsworth Bunker and members of the Dominican Review Group to go over the political and economic situation in the DR. Bunker gave us a more encouraging picture than we have had for several weeks. The securing of the former rebel zone by the IAPF last week went very well. General Alvim insisted on rather heavy-handed use of tanks, but all of these have been withdrawn. Incidentally, Bunker says that Alvim becomes increasingly difficult, but General Palmer is doing a magnificent job of handling him.

The IAPF action has brought a new sense of security and confidence to the downtown area. The two main dailies published yesterday for the first time since last April. They took a responsible editorial line of support for the Provisional Government. They also published statements by Balaguer and Bosch in the same vein. For Bosch this is quite a change. The banks also opened yesterday and business was brisk.

The occupation of the downtown area permitted the closing of the two rebel (one Communist) newspapers and the headquarters of the Communist parties. After the rebel extremists recovered from the initial shock at the presence of IAPF forces, they began to organize protest demonstrations. These have not been serious.

Bunker reports that Garcia Godoy is working on a "package" which would get the rebel leaders out of the country and make important changes in his

Cabinet and the military chiefs. Caamano and Aristy would be among the rebels sent abroad. Garcia Godoy plans to replace his troublesome, rebel-inclined Minister of Interior and Attorney General. He wants the present Navy chief, Jimenez, in whom he has confidence (and so do we) to be Minister of Defense and to replace the other chiefs with men acceptable to the services. The "package" also includes closing down Radio Santo Domingo for general personnel housecleaning. Bunker estimates that it will probably take Garcia Godoy another week to complete the "package."

Bunker is also pushing Garcia Godoy to complete the reintegration of rebel officers and men and to permit the IAPF and National Police to take over the arms collection chore. Bunker believes that if Garcia Godoy does these two things, plus the "package", the situation should stabilize considerably. He plans to return to Santo Domingo Friday morning.

On the economic front, it is clear that the Provisional Government will need further assistance. The amount is not large, but in view of the drain on the AID contingency funds, we will probably have to go for a supplemental. Dave Bell and Joe Fowler and I will make sure that the effect on our balance of payments is held to a minimum, but this is one area where we are ready to spend a few million now to avoid another breakdown in the reconstruction process.

Brazilian Situation

No significant opposition has developed to the promulgation of a second Institutional Act. In Brazil, the right accepted it with enthusiasm, the opposition with resignation, and the population at large with apathy.

In Latin America adverse comment has not been very great. As expected, it centered in Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico. When speculation began to appear that the Rio Conference would be postponed, the Brazilian Government hastened to reassure the OAS that the meeting would be held on schedule. We have let it be known that we see no reason for delay. All the Latin American Governments, except three, have confirmed their intention to participate. Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela have not been heard from. Argentina and Chile will probably attend. We are not so sure about Venezuela.

Reaction in the US has been surprisingly mild. The only public figure to speak out against the Act was Senator Morse. The line of most editorials has been one of understanding lament. The Baltimore Sun and the NY Herald Tribune are the only papers which were severely critical.

Cuban Refugees

The Cubans informed the Swiss Ambassador this afternoon that they accepted our Memorandum of Understanding spelling out procedures for the orderly movement of refugees. The memorandum gives first priority to immediate family members and provides for a rate of movement of 3,000-4,000 per month. The Cubans have made clear that political prisoners and military-age youths will not be allowed to leave, at least until legal requirements are met. The same holds true for technicians until replacements are found. The exchange of notes with the Cubans is expected to take place tomorrow. Movement of refugees should begin about 10 days afterwards. The Cubans today announced termination of the disorderly exit of refugees in small boats.

Secretary Gardner and Governor Ellington went on Monday to Miami to explain to State and local officials and community leaders what the Federal Government was planning to do to keep the impact of the new refugee movement on the Miami area to a minimum. They report pretty good success in calming those troubled waters.

McG. B.

cc/ Bill Moyers

Read Rostow
11-4-65
3:45P

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(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT

If you have time, you may be interested in this extremely thoughtful telegram from Bill Sullivan suggesting a shift of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia. In essence, what he says is that the Soviets may be moving with some confidence back into Southeast Asia with the double purpose of expanding their own influence in the East and containing the Chinese. I share Sullivan's implied feeling that if this happens, we can probably make a little money on it.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~attachment~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ November 3, 1965

Text of Message from Ambassador Sullivan in Laos (Vientiane 437)

A good deal of evidence has accumulated in the recent past to justify the conclusion that the Soviets have undertaken a fundamental change in their policy towards Southeast Asia. While in the larger strategic sense, I believe we should welcome this change, I think we should also be aware that, in detailed, tactical situations, it will give us problems of a practical nature. This cable is an effort to analyze the situation as seen from the perspective of Laos.

I will start with my own vivid recollection of an evening in the Kremlin, during the Spring of 1963, when I sat with Averell Harriman and listened to Khrushchev tell us quite flatly that he had written off and given up Southeast Asia. Implicit in his remarks was the assumption that this part of the world would be a theater of major confrontation between the U.S. and Chicoms, upon both whose houses he would welcome a proper plague.

This nadir of Soviet interest was characterized by a virtual moratorium on their activity as co-chairman for both Geneva Accords, and by intimations which the British interpreted as marking their intention to abandon their co-chairman's role altogether. After Khrushchev's removal from office, policy and action went into a sort of deep freeze and it was difficult to determine any motion one way or another.

The first tentative feelers of change came with the exchange of missions between Moscow and Hanoi; and, despite Chicom efforts to sabotage, developed into a supply of equipment (and presumably personnel) to North Vietnam. This was accompanied by increasing confidence of the Soviets in dealing quietly with other areas (such as North Korea) which Khrushchev had implicitely abandoned to the Chicom hedgemony. The change accelerated as Chicom international troubles multiplied, and has seemed to reach its most satisfactory results (from the Soviet perspective) in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan armed border conflict. Looking at the position in which the USSR emerged from that imboglio, the foreign affairs specialists in the Kremlin could only conclude that their policy on the subcontinent had proved itself sound and had, indeed, withstood the shock of combat better than the policy of any other major power.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 84-295
By ..., NARS, Date 8-15-86

This experience has seemed to underline, and give impetus to, the basic policy change which was being tentatively set in motion with respect to Southeast Asia. In this regard, I think it important to note that many key Soviet personnel in Southeast Asia (such as Ambassador Kirnassovsky in Vientiane) have spent a few years in India during the formative period of Soviet policy in the sub-continent. I believe, therefore, that we can consider the Soviet policy being applied currently in Southeast Asia is based in part on what they conclude to be correctness of their policy in the sub-continent.

With respect to Laos, this rationale can explain the sudden reasonableness of the line the Soviets have taken on such issues as finances for the ICC, Article 19 re continuation of the ICC and in general the functioning co-chairman role. At the same time, it explains the sudden interest in travel grants for Lao journalists in the Soviet Union, augmentation of the cultural and political staff at the Soviet Embassy, conspicuous support for Souvanna Phouma and ostentations ignoring of the Pathet Lao. It also explains the willingness tacitly to accept a great deal of action which results in direct and severe punishment of the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao, without, to the best of my knowledge, even a whimper of protest directed towards Souvanna and his Government.

In analyzing what all this means for Laos alone, I think we can conclude that the Soviets have reversed Khrushchev's previous policy of cut-and-run, that they intend to stay extremely loose in their operations here, and that they will avoid doctrinaire commitments which might prejudice their opportunities to play for the breaks. I think it means more than half a conviction that U.S. endurance in Vietnam will outlast the North Vietnamese, and that the Soviets feel they have a good opportunity, once the Viet threat to Laos fades, to move into the same posture of sharing influence here with the U.S. as they have already achieved in India, and at very little economic, military or political cost. In short, I think they are prepared to extend their sub-continent policy Eastward, at least into this edge of Indo-China. (Perhaps also to Cambodia, in light of recent happenings there.)

For the long-run U.S. relations with Laos, this prospect should not displease us. It means (assuming we are successful in Viet Nam) the possibility of a tacit U.S.-Soviet undertaking which would guarantee the continued existence of Laos against Chicom (or North Vietnamese encroachment). But at the same time it means the probable development of "neutrality" among the leaders of Laos that will parallel the worst of the casuistic serendipity which obtains

in Delhi. These little Laotian rascals unfortunately have a natural predisposition to such frailties, and I suppose we will have to accept it as the general price of containing the Chicoms. I only hope I am long gone from here when they perfect this loss of innocence to an art.

As for the larger implications in Southeast Asia, we can, if reckless, interpolate this Soviet policy manifest in Laos, to include the shape of things to come in Vietnam. There is already evidence that East European Satellites (presumably with Soviet blessing) are seeking to act as handmaidens for U.S.-North Vietnamese Negotiations. If they (plus the unremitting continuation of our bombing raids and the military pressure in the South) are successful in persuading North Vietnamese to look for a negotiated way out, there will predictably be a sharp break between Hanoi and Peking. And who would then stand ready to move in to hold the heads and swab the wounds in Hanoi but those jolly old green giants from the Kremlin. This would, of course, be a far more significant undertaking and entail greater costs and risks than their maneuvers in Laos; and would presumably be taken only after the most careful scrutiny of circumstances. But, their loose, mobile policy in Laos certainly puts them in a posture to move that way if the opportunity knocks.

My conclusion from all this speculation is that we should treat Soviet policy in Southeast Asia as something that is generally on the make. They see a fluid situation emerging and want to be ready to exploit it. They feel they have been successful in similar circumstances in the sub-continent and can afford, with very little risk, to try it here. This situation will give us certain latitudes strategically and certain problems tactically; but on the whole it is better for us than Khrushchev's policy of 1963. Above all, it will be a lot more interesting.

Rec'd Report
11-4-65
3:45p

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1965

Mr. President:

Here is Lodge's Weekly Report.
More cheerful than usual.

McG.B.

SECRET NODIS ~~Attachment~~

November 3, 1965
Wednesday, 1:00 P.M.

SECRET - NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1544)

Herewith my weekly telegram.

1. American Popularity. You would have been proud of the U.S. troops at the Vietnam National Day celebration on last Monday, November 1. They looked lean and hard -- and tall coming after the Vietnamese. The white and Negro soldiers were intermingled -- a powerful psychological stroke to a crowd of non-whites. What particularly impressed me was that when, with their massed flags, they appeared, they were the only troops which drew a great roar of applause from the public. Other formations had drawn applause from the reviewing stand but the crowd of rank and file people on the sidewalk applauded only the United States.

When I attended this same celebration two years ago, the public was nowhere to be seen and was not allowed to be present. Today was the first time everyone was allowed to see the parade. The Government's self-assurance was justified, for there was no terrorism.

In the afternoon I attended the National Day ceremony at the Buddhist Institute. Mine was the only vehicle, either diplomatic or Vietnamese, which, with its flag, received warm and grinning applause from the crowd outside the pagoda.

We Americans are definitely not considered colonial. They think they know us and our non-imperialistic record in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere. They know that our soliders are helpful and friendly. Unfortunately, the Army of Vietnam still makes enemies.

2. Economic. Happily, retail rice prices continued their slow downward trend despite a continued decline in rice stocks on hand and despite the fact that prices normally rise at this season. Saigon's needs in rice, which are largely met from private stocks, should be provided for at a reasonable price.

The cost of other local and imported products continued to rise, however, and the retail price index was up 3 percent over last week.

American and Vietnamese representatives agreed on a number of measures to speed up cargo handling and reduce congestion in the port of Saigon.

SECRET - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. 3, #187
By JC, NARA, Date 5-15-12

3. Military. For the third week in a row the pace of the war quickened with the Viet Cong attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen Province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia Province and gainst the U.S. Marines' perimeter outside Danang. Heavy fighting mostly in a battle zone stretching from Phu Yen Province north to Thua Thien Province led to increased casualties on both sides.

The total number of Viet Cong incidents decreased slightly reflecting a decline in the number of anti-aircraft fire and propaganda incidents but the number of Viet Cong attacks went up and terrorism and sabotage increased slightly.

4. Basic Political. The number of Viet Cong military or political cadres who came over to the government side during October increased slightly over the September figure, continuing a slight but steadyupward trend since June.

5. Psychological. Press comment reflected optimism and hopefulness that traditional differences among South Vietnamese religious minorities were diminishing. Press attitudes toward the Government of Vietnam were generally favorable although complaints continued concerning rising and fluctuating prices and the preference for an elected government.

6. Pacification. Minister Thang of Rural Construction (pacification) is in the final phase of organizing his ministry so that he will be free for field supervision of the pacification program in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh starting November 5. After considerable neglect of the program these past two years, and the resignation of most of the ministry's civilian staff after the death of Minister Ung, Thang has worked hard to get a competent staff, a doctrine designed to win the voluntary support of villagers, with democratic elections in villages as one major goal, and to make some order out of the many types of cadres assigned to this work by past governments. He got Government of Vietnam approval for his selection of Colonels Lac, Chau and Ahn to be his chief assistants. All three are highly regarded by Americans for their experience and competency in pacification; the latter two have been outstanding province chiefs.

The Political Action Team Training Center at Vung Tao, started, funded, and guided by CIA, will be made into a national training center for what the Vietnamese call rural construction and which is truthfully translated as community building. I have visited this center and was favorably impressed. Now the Vietnamese want it to play a key role in building a political structure in this country from the ground up. Also, 73 selected graduates of the National Institute for Administration (NIA) are being

given a special course in pacification. Thang, who has been participating in this training of selected civil service civilians, will assign the top third in the class to be assistant district chiefs (or district chief, if this is required) in areas selected for priority attention; the middle third of the class will be used at Vung Tao to strengthen the instructor staff; the last third will be used in the ministry.

7. Medical Program. With a party of journalists, I visited the U.S. Operation Mission-aided hospital at Can Tho where major surgery cases went from 86 in 1963 to 170 in 1965 and minor surgery from 30 to 623 in the same period. Outpatient cases went from some 3,300 in 1964 to some 6,600 in 1965.

I also used the opportunity to have a long private talk with the corps commander (one of four political satraps in this country) about the importance of national unity and of everyone pulling together.

LODGE

Rec'd Rm. 1
11-3-65
12:05P

53

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: White House Conference on International Cooperation (November 29 - December 1)

The following is meant to bring you up to date on the planning for the White House Conference on International Cooperation (ICY).

1. At the outset, let me say that while I don't blame you for your concern about the number of White House Conferences, the record shows we are pretty firmly committed to go through with this one as scheduled. In addition to the fact that many leading private citizens have already contributed much time and effort in preparation for the Conference, the public record leaves us little room for maneuver. You announced your intention to hold this Conference as early as October 1964. This was followed up in November 1964 by your publicly-announced appointment of a Cabinet Committee for ICY; and in March 1965 by your meeting with Bob Benjamin, after which you announced the specific dates for the White House Conference. Since March, you have repeated your public support for the ICY concept in general and the White House Conference in particular on a number of separate occasions.

2. Fortunately, this particular conference may well turn out to be one of the more constructive White House Conferences. Pre-conference preparations have been impressive. For one thing, at your direction, 30 committees of leading private citizens (in close consultation with Government people) have worked for months to prepare reports on the problems in 30 different areas of international cooperation - from peacekeeping, to meteorology, to trade and finance. These private sector reports, which are now complete and which will be discussed at the Conference, are likely to include a number of responsible and constructive proposals. For another thing, considerable care has been taken to select, for the Conference panels, moderators and keynoters who will be both responsible and stimulating. Such people as John McCloy, John D. Rockefeller and Frank Stanton have already agreed to moderate or keynote important panels.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)
BY DCH ON 6-28-83

3. Your own role in the Conference can be as large or small as you want. State plans to ask the Vice President to chair the Conference and Mrs. Johnson to speak at a Conference luncheon. If one or both can accept the roles State has in mind for them, it will make it easier for you, while giving full support, to limit your own role in the Conference. Present planning calls for your role, at a maximum, to involve a speech in the late afternoon of December 1 and your appearance at a White House reception on the same evening.

McG. B.

November 2, '65

54

To: The Honorable George Ball

From: McGeorge Bundy

This is a copy of the week end report I sent to the President on Saturday, which he discussed with Dean Rusk on the phone this morning. In principle, the President has agreed to receive us next week -- or conceivably to come up here for a set of meetings.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

Pouch 10/31

54a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekend report on events in the National Security field

We are continuing to keep everything that we possibly can away from your desk, but I think you may wish to have a rundown on the situation as it looks today.

1. The Dominican Republic is still our trickiest problem. As usual the partisans of the far right and of the far left are howling about the outrages and dangers from the opposite side. Bunker is, as usual, right in the middle. The IAPF took over downtown and the Communist paper Patria is closed. The current threat is a Communist-inspired general strike. Meanwhile, Bunker is trying to get a compromise arrangement that will get the most controversial military people on both sides out of the country -- this is a Balaguer proposal which Garcia Godoy appears to support.

2. We asked Bunker what he thought of the possibility of giving up on Garcia Godoy and asking Balaguer to form a Provisional Government. He is strongly against this course for the present on the ground that Balaguer is our best bet for the long pull and that his reputation would be badly damaged if he had to take over now under our protection. So Bunker still thinks we should try to keep the Provisional Government in business and help it to fly right.

3. In Brazil, Castelo Branco wrote himself a new institutional act in order to get out of an impasse with his Congress. His moderate execution of this drastic step has prevented much of a reaction in Brazil, but there is feeling in other countries, and Venezuela may refuse to attend the Rio Conference. Ambassador Gordon asked us to make a statement expressing our regret, but our own judgment here has been against such a course. Gordon's one weakness, as you will remember, is that he likes to get the U. S. out in front a little more than is wise. So far, I think our silence has proved sensible.

4. In Cuba, our negotiations with Castro on refugees have gone well, and there is an agreed memorandum of understanding on procedures. I have sent papers on all this to Bill Moyers and asked him to decide with you whether the White House or the State Department should announce this understanding. The announcement will probably be set for Tuesday by negotiations which have been well handled by our man Crimmins through the Swiss Ambassador, Stadelhofer.

5. In Vietnam, we have some specific troubles. A couple of our planes hit a friendly village in South Vietnam, which is a real misfortune. Defense is reviewing our bombing procedures, and I think they may well be tightened up.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NAC 12-185
By LWD NARA, Date 03-25-2013

We also have diplomatic troubles over an ICC report on Cambodia where the Canadian member has gone off the reservation. The Canadians themselves were aware of this weakness, and we are not putting any more heat on Pearson lest there be a leak of "U. S. pressure" at the height of his fight with Diefenbaker.

6. The larger issues in Vietnam are being worked on. McNamara is preparing a basic paper with respect to 1966 force levels there, and this document should focus everyone's attention pretty sharply on the hard issues.

7. On European affairs, both George Ball and I have now prepared rather long and completely contrasting papers about next steps in Atlantic nuclear policy. George has specifically requested that his paper be sent to the Ranch, and I have sent both of them to Jake Jacobsen with a covering memorandum. You should not feel that this is immediate business, although the issues will probably need your attention before Rusk goes to Rio about November 13. In essence, George feels that we should force the British out of the independent deterrent business and ensure that the Germans have a role in a mixed manned force of some sort. I believe that we ought to back away from all such drastic solutions and see if we cannot satisfy the Germans by greatly intensified consultation of the same kind that the British have in this field -- short of any role with nuclear weapons themselves. There may well be a middle ground between us, but the matter is <u>not</u> ready for your decision.

8. Meanwhile, we are working on a definite date with Erhard. After talking with Dean Rusk about his meeting with you, I offered the Germans the 29th and 30th of November. In the meantime there was a hint from Erhard's office that a date in mid-December might be easier. We have hinted back that the end of November may be better for us because of the press of year-end work and the possibility of visits from Shastri and Ayub. The ball is in their court and we should know more by the first of the week. But if you want to hold Erhard off for any reason, it is clear that it can be done.

9. Meanwhile, Bohlen has been shooting with de Gaulle and learned very little. The General is veiling his international intentions, but it is assumed in Paris that he is going to announce his candidacy next Thursday.

10. Your <u>Aid</u> review is going forward with some energy. Schultze and Bator and I are determined to prove to you that there are at least three hardboiled analysts in the government. We expect to have an interim report for the Cabinet Committee in about a week and a long session with Clifford's group immediately thereafter. In essence, our objective will be to show you ways of organizing the Aid process so that these funds are in your desk drawer for use in the national interest, except when they are deliberately farmed out to bankers like George Woods and Joe Fowler, or military men like Bob McNamara. I am even more convinced than last week that we can have a hard-headed program which is also humane and progressive. The keys are self-help, a short rein, and no softness to stinkers.

11. On India and Pakistan, Goldberg is hard at work and reports that he expects to get a satisfactory resolution out of the present Security Council debate in spite of the messy session which occurred earlier this week under a very inexperienced Council President (the Uruguayan). This resolution will reaffirm our basic position of moving step by step -- cease-fire, withdrawal, and political process. Meanwhile, Shastri still wants to come in December, and the Paks are definitely softening as they see what a box they have worked themselves into. Bob Komer is doing you a separate page on this very interesting development.

12. In Rhodesia, your message has been delivered this morning and Wilson is stringing out the talks just as hard as he can. George Ball says he feels there is some real hope that UDI may be prevented at least temporarily. Meanwhile, the London papers are full of irresponsible speculation about a US/UK/Zambian airlift. You should know that there is nothing of that sort in the works right now -- McNamara's feeling is that it would be easier to airlift a railroad in than to airlift copper out, but neither one is part of our plans.

13. Dean Rusk goes to Rio on November 13. Bob McNamara and I believe that it will be highly important to put some of the emerging issues before you pretty seriously before Dean leaves the country. Accordingly, it looks as if we would want to propose ourselves for a visit -- if you are ready -- about the middle of the week after next: November 10 or 11. A couple of days before that meeting we might also want to send you outlines on the emerging issues in Vietnam, in Europe, and in the India/Pak area. I will ask Jake Jacobsen early next week for your thoughts on this possibility. In all three areas we are heading into major decisions and it would be helpful to get interim guidance from you before Dean disappears for his 10 days in Latin America. If this is too soon for you, however, there is the alternative of discussion during his absence, or of holding the major questions until he gets back November 25.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 1, 1965
5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. The Rhodesian crisis has been temporarily removed from the "critical list", thanks to Harold Wilson's personal eleventh-hour intervention. Other developments in such places as the Congo and Burundi fall under the heading "crises-in-the-making". /Items in brackets are too sensitive for release./

Rhodesia. PM Wilson's discussions with PM Ian Smith and African leaders has paid off in postponement for perhaps two months of a final UK-Rhodesian confrontation over UDI. Wilson and Smith agreed to refer the independence issue to a Royal Commission for study and recommendations. Most estimates are that this is merely a time-buying exercise, since all parties remain adamant.

En route home, Wilson stopped off in Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana to urge them to "lay off" while the UK attempted to find a solution to the UDI problem acceptable to all Rhodesians. In his sober report to Parliament today, Wilson acknowledged that important differences still exist between the UK and Rhodesia.

/Without doubt, your message to Smith added force to Wilson's arguments. We will continue to follow the British lead. The one slim hope is for the UK and others like ourselves to use the next two months to dissuade Rhodesia's white minority from taking the fatal step. Otherwise, now that everyone has chosen up sides, there will be a major crisis which will greatly complicate our African affairs./

Congo. The surface is relatively calm again this week, but /we see signs that the new government will have rough sailing when Kasavubu presents it to Congo's parliament for approval. This results from spontaneous disapproval of the way Tshombe was fired, rather than from any intense opposition by Tshombe. Our best bet publicly is still to say nothing./

Kasavubu came off well at the African summit in Accra, and the Congo was not an issue -- a vast improvement over similar meetings in the past year when the US role there was the most popular target.

Burundi. The abortive coup here springs from basic animosity between the two chief tribal groups. Though they constitute 86% of the population, the Hutu tribesmen are still under the political domination of their traditional rulers, the Tutsis. When loyalist elements of the police and army regained

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NLJ 12-189
By LWD NARA, Date 01-29-2014

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control, the Mwami (King) authorized the summary execution of more than 40 Hutu leaders. Now the Mwami is running off to Europe shortly. When he goes, governmental power could fall into the hands of the pro-Chicom Tutsis. /Plotting has already begun among certain Tutsis to restore the Chicom Embassy and to force the US Embassy to close up. We are trying to encourage the Mwami to remain in Burundi and establish a government representative of the country's tribal make-up./

Afro-Asian Conference. It will be postponed indefinitely. /This, of course, is the best possible outcome from our point of view. Not only does it postpone a confab made to order for anti-US voices, but the dickering over postponement got a lot of the moderates thoroughly irritated at the Chicoms. The best tack behind-scenes is to commiserate with the moderate Afro-Asians on how the Chicoms wrecked their conference./

Moro cco-Tunisia. President Bourguiba completed a highly successful official visit to Morocco. Nothing dramatic, but both sides pledged increased economic cooperation. /The real purpose of the rapproachement is to cement relations against the unknown quantity that is the new Algerian regime. Both sides think Boumedienne is an improvement over Ben Bella, but they're not sure enough to let down their guard./ Moroccan King Hassan has greatly enhanced his own prestige by managing the quietly successful Arab summit, by entertaining Nasser and then by hosting Nasser's current arch-enemy Bourguiba without so much as a mild objection from Cairo. /Against this background, we're getting renewed feelers for an informal Hassan visit with you in connection with a stopover at the UN. We're fending him off because he's second-echelon. In January or so, a lunch with him would serve our interests./

R. W. Komer

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McGB 56

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R. W. Komer

cc: McGB
RWK
Hal Saunders

Pouch 57
10/31

MEMORANDUM

other Encl is cy of Geo Ball's memo

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jake Jacobsen

I enclose for your attention the two memoranda on Atlantic nuclear policy which I mentioned yesterday over the phone. The one with four tabs is mine. The one with the handsome blue binder is George Ball's.

2. These memoranda propose alternate tactics toward the Atlantic nuclear problem. Ball wants to bring the British down to the level of the Germans in all respects. I want to bring the Germans up to the level of the British in all respects but weapons. In essence, the difference between us is that I think nuclear weapons are now a divisive and unnecessary element in the problem. George thinks they are indispensable to German good behavior.

3. Both of these memoranda, in my judgment, are longer than the President would currently want to read. George Ball understood from Dean Rusk that the President was reading a lot more now, and he asked me to send his memo. I therefore send them both to you for whatever use you think wise.

4. The issue which is sharply presented by these two briefs has some room in it for refinement and even compromise, and discussion here next week should help us in this task of refining choices. So this is not required reading -- but George Ball likes his paper, and I admit I like mine.

McG. B.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-230
By ies, NARA Date 6-20-97

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October 18, 1965

THE CASE FOR A FRESH START ON ATLANTIC NUCLEAR DEFENSE
(WITH NO MIXED MANNED FORCES OR PLANS FOR SUCH FORCES)

1. This paper sets forth the case in favor of a prompt US decision that we do not want an MLF or any other mixed manned weapons system at this time, and should adopt other means to ensure the confident partnership of the non-nuclear powers in NATO.

One: The MLF has no adequate base of support in Europe or in the US

2. The proposal for an MLF is one of the best motivated and most imaginative that the US has put forward in the last 15 years. Its purpose was: to limit and even reduce the number of national nuclear forces, while sustaining and even increasing the coherence and mutual confidence of leading members of the Atlantic Alliance. This purpose was and is right.

3. But three years of effort have shown clearly that the MLF and related proposals have no adequate base of political and public support within the Atlantic Community. They are strong only in Foreign Offices. They are unattractive to Finance Ministers and unimpressive to most Defense Ministers. They have little support from professional soldiers. They have few friends in legislative bodies. In no country have they won popular support. They are strongly opposed by the partisans of France, the partisans of disarmament, and by those who are habitually suspicious of Germany. They are an apple of discord in Germany itself.

4. In these circumstances it is not surprising that no head of government has pinned his reputation to their success. At decisive moments, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chancellors have been glad to see the problem postponed. The soundness of their judgment has been demonstrated by the fact that the MLF has been most helpful when it has been in the icebox -- a possibility rather than an imminent proposal for decision.

5. Throughout these three years the MLF has served the useful purpose of demonstrating American willingness to move to new arrangements if those new arrangements were desired by other members of the Alliance. We have given this horse a full run, and our good faith is not in question. But the fact is that opposition to the MLF has gradually increased, while support has slackened.

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By cbm, NARA Date 4-6-01

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6. The passage of time has demonstrated, finally, that there is no strong military need for such a new strategic system at this time. Militarily the MLF was conceived as an alternative to the politically dangerous land-based MRBM system strongly urged by SACEUR at the end of the 1950's to counter Soviet MRBM's. But history has shown that these forces are adequately countered by the deterrent strength of the United States, and NATO Europe solidly accepts this basic proposition.

Two: We now have four choices

7. Now in the fall of 1965 we face another time of choice. The German elections are over, and discussion is inevitable. Already there is speculation about our position, and already British politicians are complicating our task (as they have so often before) by spreading their own views in a way that will upset the Germans. On October 17 the New York Times flatly asserted, from Defense Department sources, that the MLF is dead; this assertion is a reporter's exaggeration, and it is being knocked down. But it shows that the season is open. There will soon have to be a US position.

8. In this situation we have four choices:

(1) To revive the mixed manned proposal and press it energetically. No element of the United States Government currently recommends this course.

(2) To develop a proposal which explicitly encourages further work toward mixed manned forces in the future. This is the course currently preferred in the European Bureau of the State Department.

(3) To proceed as we have been going, without much urgency -- and to allow these proposals to die of their own weight in the months ahead. This is what is likely to happen if we take no firm decisions in the coming weeks.

(4) To reach a clear judgment now that we do not want a mixed manned force and should concentrate instead on joint planning and consultation. This is the course proposed in this paper.

Three: We should not try to revive the MLF

9. There is no visible sentiment to revive the MLF and move ahead with it. The opposition detailed in paragraph 3 above is too strong. Even the Germans are not ready for such a decision now, in view of its costs with France and its possible repercussions on the Common Market. There is a faint possibility that Chancellor Erhard may make support of the MLF his opening position when he meets President Johnson, but we should do what we can to discourage such a choice by him. If against our current expectations the Germans should in fact press for an immediate mixed manned force, we should be prepared to make it clear that we do not share their view. The safest and strongest single argument in such a dialogue with the Germans is that in view of its general unpopularity in Europe, the MLF cannot win the approval of the United States Senate today. Germans who press this issue should be told to come back when they have more support among the European members of NATO.

Four: We should not propose or endorse any collective nuclear force at present

10. The European Bureau's proposal for a "fresh start on the collective nuclear problem" is unfortunately open to most of the objections which now apply to the MLF itself. The proposal does not require a new weapons system at present, but it does aim explicitly at the development of a commonly owned and controlled collective nuclear force. It aims at elimination of the independent British deterrent. It holds that mixed manning is a sound principle and it foreshadows either mixed manned submarines or a surface fleet.

11. This proposal would inherit many of the same enemies the MLF has developed: the French, most British politicians, the American watchdogs of submarine security, the Soviets, and the professional military who are wary of mixed manning. It has most of the disadvantages of the MLF without providing the cementing force of a new weapons system. It is predictable that this proposal would not succeed. It would simply prolong a debate which has now grown weary on all sides.

Five: We should not adopt a policy of calculated delay and indecision

12. The third possibility is to do nothing. In 1965 this is what we have done, and the advantages have been considerable. The heat went out of the international debate. The rigidity of our own position disappeared. We come now to the end of 1965 with considerable freedom of choice and our critically important relations with the Germans are excellent.

13. Unfortunately, continued delay is not likely to have the same constructive results. Everyone could understand the need to wait until after the German elections. No such sympathy will be extended if we delay much longer. Already the partisans of disarmament insist that the MLF should be publicly sacrificed in its favor. Already the French are floating proposals for a new arrangement in which the French nuclear weapon and not ours would be the defender of a non-nuclear Germany. Already the British are suggesting that all these old proposals are dead. Already the McNamara select committee is winning friends, and it must either go forward or slide back. And the Germans when they come at the end of the year will want to know what the United States wants. We are at the end of a time of productive delay. If there is a policy which we firmly favor, now is the time to say so.

Six: We should turn away from collective nuclear forces and strongly endorse intensified Allied and German participation in nuclear policymaking

14. The fourth available choice is to turn away from the MLF, the ANF, and indeed from all mixed manned collective forces -- and to construct the strongest possible alternative. This alternative can only be a highly visible expansion of allied -- and especially German -- participation in nuclear policymaking, at every level and in every practicable way.

15. The essence of this new plan is to give to the Germans a rank and standing in all nuclear matters, except those of the manufacture and control of warheads, which will be equal to that of Great Britain -- and equal to the empty chair which is waiting for France. The Special Committee which Secretary McNamara proposed last spring will necessarily be large, since we cannot exclude the Canadians, the Italians, and others. But the Germans have a special importance. Germany is the one country in Europe whose history and present position make it the unanimous judgment of allies and adversaries alike that there must be no nuclear weapons under German control. It is therefore of cardinal importance to treat the Germans so that they will not decide that the nation without nuclear weapons is condemned to second-class station. The Germans need to be included precisely because they are dangerous.

16. Furthermore, there are also excellent affirmative grounds for including the Germans most intimately in all plans for the nuclear defense of the Alliance. After the United States Germany is the most populous of NATO nations, and the strongest in conventional forces. Moreover,

her location is critical, both strategically and tactically; she is inevitably a primary target for any hostile attack, nuclear or conventional. The interest of the Federal Republic in effective nuclear defense is as great as that of any member of NATO -- and greater than that of any other non-nuclear state.

17. The elements of the proposals to the Germans are set forth in Annex A, attached. These proposals would give the Germans most-favored-nation treatment in all matters of nuclear policy -- intelligence, consultation, programming, and disarmament. In particular, the President would offer Chancellor Erhard the same personal standing in these matters that has been accorded to the Prime Minister of Great Britain (see Annex C for possible terms of understanding). This personal gesture would serve to underline a fundamental proposition of American policy: that control of nuclear weapons is not required for prestige.

Seven: We should adopt the principle that prestige and influence in the Alliance have no necessary relation to participation in nuclear weapons systems, national or collective

18. It is on this critical point that these proposals develop from the MLF idea -- and from all proposals for collective nuclear forces. All such propositions assume that participation in a weapons system is somehow essential for national confidence, and for real participation in nuclear planning. But this is a false assumption, even though British and French heads of government have repeatedly spread it abroad. The "special relationship" between Washington and London has not turned on nuclear sharing. French nuclear weapons have opened no doors that were not open before. There is no need for a mixed manned seal to the existing partnership between Washington and Bonn.

19. It is true that collective nuclear forces, unlike arrangements for consultation and joint planning, do offer the illusion of control over nuclear weapons. But this illusion has not been helpful in any country in the last three years, nor has it any value for the future. Our recent experience does not reinforce the notion that mixed manned forces would be an effective and durable substitute for national ambitions. Yet this is their only important justification. The truth is that there is no prospect of a German finger on the nuclear trigger. The MLF tends to obscure this vital point. It is a point on which clarity is badly needed -- in the true interest of the US, of all Germany's neighbors, and of Germany herself.

Eight: This policy can be made highly acceptable to the Germans, at least for the next several years

20. The underlying political argument for the MLF has been that nothing less would satisfy the Germans in the long run. This is still the view of our Embassy in Bonn and of the European Bureau. No one can prove that they are wrong. But the evidence of the last three years certainly does not prove that they are right. Chancellor Adenauer now opposes the MLF. Chancellor Erhard is very careful about it. Mayor Brandt has turned away from it. Public opinion is indifferent to it. Except for Schroeder -- and to a less extent Von Hassel -- no leading German has allowed his reputation to get entangled in the MLF -- and Schroeder's approaching vindication by reappointment will set him free too.

21. By contrast the Germans have given a general welcome to the Select Committee, and it is easily predictable that they will give a still warmer welcome to intensified consultation between Bonn and Washington. Status for Bonn means status in Washington, and security for Bonn means confidence in Washington. Both are high today, and will be higher under the new plan.

22. It remains possible that these new arrangements will not be sufficient for Germany in the long run. In particular it is possible that some new Soviet military threat will create a need for a new Allied reply. It could easily be good from our standpoint that at such a time the Germans should participate -- and contribute -- in some fashion analogous to the MLF. But such a future threat should be met when it arises -- and when its existence creates the support for new weapons which is lacking today.

Nine: This policy will be more constructive in relation to the French and British deterrents

23. There remain the British and French deterrents. When the MLF was initially proposed, it was hoped that somehow its momentum might serve to offer an alternative acceptable to the British and French governments. That hope was stillborn in the case of France and it has been disappointed at critical moments in Great Britain as well. It remains a real possibility that the United Kingdom will eventually abandon its independent nuclear force. But all the evidence suggests that such a decision is more likely without a mixed manned force than with one. The British will find it easier to move out of the nuclear business when there is no ground for suspicion that the Germans are moving in.

24. Unfortunately, there is no present prospect for agreement with Gaullist France on any of these matters. The General does not want anything from the Atlantic Alliance except the general assurance that American strategic power will deter a Soviet strategic attack on Europe. He does not want consultation which will expose the relatively weak and primitive character of his own nuclear force. He does not want any role for Germany which will diminish the ascendancy of France on the Continent. He will support nothing which serves to reinforce the mutual confidence of Bonn and Washington. Secure in his clear appreciation of the current realities of strategic power, he will play the spoiler's role in the future as in the past.

25. The best we can do with France, therefore, is to adopt policies which are not open to plausible French attack. The current proposal is not flawless in this respect. There would always be some who believe that any new role for Germany is bad. There will always be some who suppose that any offer to Germany is intended to encircle France. Yet in real terms there is no legitimate ground for complaint in the current plans. For better or worse the Germans are important, and their legitimate interest in consultation must be met. To meet it without new hardware and without mixed manning is to go a long way to meet the legitimate concerns on which the French have played. If France herself is treated with dignity and candor as these proposals are put forward, the danger of a damaging French monkey wrench can be reduced.

Ten: This policy meets Alliance needs and is not merely a device to permit non-proliferation

26. This new policy is needed for the good of the Atlantic Aliance. It should be presented and justified in these terms, and not in the context of the effort for a non-proliferation treaty. But if adopted, it will make such a treaty easier to get.

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27. The Annexes to this paper further develop various elements:

At Annex A is a more concrete outline of the kind of consultation that can be offered to the British, French, and Germans.

At Annex B is a draft communique showing how President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard might describe these matters after a meeting toward the end of the year.

At Annex C is a possible memorandum of understanding on personal consultation between the President and the Chancellor -- this memorandum is closely parallel to the existing understanding between the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At Annex D is a discussion of problems of tactics and timing in the execution of a decision to move clearly in the direction here proposed.

28. What is missing from the current paper is a draft of a public statement of a new US policy. Such a statement can be rapidly prepared if needed, but at this stage of the discussion, it seems better to stick to illustrative materials which fall short of such a definitive document.

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX A (10/18/65)

Draft Plan for Atlantic Nuclear Cooperation

1. This plan calls for increased cooperation in the planning of United States and European forces, strategy, budgets, and technology and in consultation on the use of these forces.

2. This plan centers on increased cooperation by the United States in nuclear matters with the Germans, the British, and the French (if and when the French choose). It involves a greater degree of joint planning among these four nations, and the creation of a NATO Special Committee on Nuclear Defense. The remainder of this outline assumes that France would not join -- at least at the outset -- but only because that is the preference of France.

3. An increased role in nuclear matters would be accorded Germany as follows:

a. There would be an understanding between the President and the Chancellor on the use of nuclear weapons similar to that between the President and the Prime Minister. (See Annex C).

b. Communications channels would be set up in order to facilitate this consultation agreement.

c. The German Government would be given certain Intelligence materials of the type we now make available to the British Government.

d. There would be an exchange of views as needed on disarmament and arms control measures of mutual interest.

e. Interchange would take place as needed by heads of government, by ministers, and by key civilian and military planners on the following topics:

- The magnitude of the Soviet threat
- The capabilities and limitations of present and programmed nuclear forces
- The targeting of these forces

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- Possible changes in programmed capabilities

- The defense budgets associated with these forces

- Contingencies that might arise and possible responses

f. Germany (and probably Italy) should be added to the Standing Group. In addition, the possibility of increasing the number of Germans in key NATO military command positions should be explored. But these changes in NATO arrangements should probably be deferred, for the present.

4. The arrangements described in 3. above would give the Germans a role in nuclear matters (excepting warheads) equal to that of Britain. It would be desirable to have joint discussions of the type described above on a US-UK-FRG basis.

5. Concurrently, the Special Committee on Nuclear Defense would be formed and would, in this larger forum, engage in discussions of the topics described in 3 d and 3 e above, as well as consultation arrangements (e.g., The Athens Guidelines) on the use of nuclear weapons. This Special Committee would be supported by working groups to be located in Washington and at the NATO headquarters.

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~~SECRET~~ ANNEX B (10/18/65)

Outline of a section of a possible Johnson-Erhard Communique on Nuclear Consultation

1. The President and the Chancellor reviewed the entire problem of nuclear defense arrangements of NATO.

2. The center of the problem is to ensure confidence and cooperation in maintaining effective nuclear defense of the Alliance as a whole, while keeping the road open for strenuous efforts for progress toward arms control and disarmament.

3. The U. S. and the Federal Republic of Germany have cooperated and will continue to cooperate -- both with each other and with their allies, for these purposes. In this connection they have been in close recent consultation with the leaders of other NATO governments with respect to these problems, and the conclusions which they have reached in this meeting are solidly based upon these wider consultations.

4. The President and the Chancellor agreed that the present nuclear defense of the Alliance is generally effective at all levels. They consider that the strategic, tactical, and defensive nuclear deployments of the Alliance are most impressive in their strength and they note that for several years there has been no active external threat to the peace of NATO.

5. But while the existing powers of the Alliance are wholly adequate, the President and the Chancellor agreed that the existing arrangements for consultation need major improvement. They agreed on the need for closer and more effective coordination and consultation among the nations closely concerned.

6. These needs have special importance to the U. S. and Germany, inasmuch as the U. S. provides more than 90% of nuclear strength of the Alliance, while Germany is in the front line of defense in the center of Europe. It is essential to the United States that the strength of its commitment should be understood, and essential to the Federal Republic that effective deterrent defense should be assured.

7. The President and the Chancellor believe that a number of other allies also have deep concern with these problems, and accordingly they warmly support the establishment and full development of the Special Committee on

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Nuclear Defense. They believe that this Committee should have continuing staff support both in Washington and at NATO headquarters, since the effective defense of the Alliance depends both on the overall strategic strength of the United States and on the forces assigned to NATO.

8. The President assured the Chancellor that both in the Special Committee and by other appropriate means of consultation, the United States Government will ensure to the Federal Government a full opportunity to take part in the planning process by which the effective nuclear power of the United States is maintained. This will include access to relevant information on the balance of nuclear strength, opportunity for advice on plans for new weapons systems and new deployments of existing systems, and all appropriate consultation between the heads of government on any question of a decision by the United States to use such weapons against an aggressor. The President believes that the central position of the Federal Republic makes it essential that these processes be as effective for the Federal Republic as for any ally of the United States. At the same time the President and the Chancellor agreed that such participation be worked out in terms fully consistent with the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of the United States, and with the important undertakings of the Federal Republic with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a beginning in this process, the President and the Chancellor have conducted a careful joint review, during these meetings, of the actual strategic and tactical nuclear balance, and have examined together the present plans of the Alliance for continued effective defense. It is this review which allows them to reaffirm the strength of the present position.

9. In the light of this review, the President and the Chancellor have reached the conclusion that there is no present need for additional strategic weapons systems in NATO beyond those currently programmed, nor for a reorganization of the existing cooperative arrangements among military units of the Alliance which currently share in the task of nuclear defense. The President and the Chancellor consider that a great debt is due to those who have ensured full study of these additional possibilities, but they believe that in the absence of a change in the needed level of strategic defense, the plans set forth in this communique will contribute more effectively to the confident collective defense of the Alliance.

10. The Chancellor made it clear that because of its confident and responsible membership in a well-defended Atlantic Alliance, and because of its clear dedication to a policy of peace, the Federal Republic of Germany neither seeks nor needs any national control over nuclear weapons of its own. The President took note of this position and expressed his view that it confirmed both the wisdom and importance of the plans set forth above.

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~~SECRET~~ ANNEX C (10/18/65)

UNDERSTANDING WITH THE GERMANS ON THE USE OF GERMAN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. The President and the Chancellor will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before any forces equipped with U. S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in Germany will use nuclear weapons.

2. The President will consult personally with the Chancellor before the U. S. uses nuclear weapons anywhere, if time permits.

3. In the event of an emergency which might involve the use of nuclear weapons, the United States will take every possible step to consult with Germany and other Allies.

4. The U. S. and German governments will develop appropriate communication facilities to assure that the President will be able to consult directly with the Chancellor in the event of an emergency.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-230
By iis , NARA Date 6-20-97

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX D (10/18/65)

Possible Time Table of Action

1. The first requirement is a US decision. This decision can be made only by the President, and only after careful presentation of what may well be differing views within the Administration.

2. Any Presidential decision should probably be followed immediately by private discussion with Chancellor Erhard. This discussion should be conducted by a senior American whose devotion to the interests of the Alliance is unquestionable. The best envoy would be the Secretary of State, or the Under Secretary.

3. Just as soon as there has been an opportunity for a private discussion with Erhard, there should be a public statement in the United States shifting the emphasis of discussion clearly and authoritatively from hardware to consultation. The reason for this public statement is that since this decision affects the Alliance as a whole, we should give the smallest possible appearance of exclusive bilateral discussions with the Germans. To put it another way, we need to avoid surrounding the later meeting between the President and Erhard with the bilateral atmostphere of Nassau.

4. This public statement can be either by the President or the Secretary of State, and there is no need for a major speech. A press conference statement will be sufficient, if it is clear and authoritative.

5. Immediately after such a public statement, there should be intensive consultation in London, Paris, and Moscow. In each capital there should be a special message.

6. The British should be reminded that this change meets their desires on a very difficult issue and will require British help in keeping their troops in Germany and on related issues.

7. The French should be offered a most cordial invitation to fill the empty chair. There is nothing we plan to offer the Germans that we should not offer to the French, and there is no reason why there should be any conditions on this offer.

8. In Moscow, we should make it clear that while this decision may open the way to a non-proliferation treaty, the prospect of such a treaty will be indefinitely delayed if the Soviets make the mistake of pretending that Atlantic arrangements for consultation constitute any kind of proliferation.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-230
By lis , NARA Date 8-20-97

9. There will also be a need for discussion with the Italians, since any arrangements with Germany that are not extended to them will give them pain. Their membership in the Special Committee will help, but they will need some comforting talk as well. As Annex A suggests, it may be that future membership in the Standing Group can be held out for the Italians, but this issue should probably await further developments in the general problem of NATO.

10. As the issue of the Standing Group suggests, it may be better to work out these new plans for nuclear consultation as an undertaking which can be separated from the general question of the future of NATO. Real nuclear consultation is something which the United States can offer and execute unilaterally. We should on no account allow the doubts of small nations or a French veto to prevent us from doing what is so clearly in our power and so greatly in our interest.

11. All of these preliminary discussions and statements should precede the Erhard visit to Washington by some weeks, if possible. We want to avoid a crisis atmosphere when Erhard comes. The visit and its communique (see Annex B) should be a smooth conclusion, not a surprising climax.

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to Bill Moyers via Hopkins couriers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

SUBJECT: Cuban Refugee Problem

By Monday (November 1) we expect to reach final agreement with the Cubans on a "Memorandum of Understanding" setting forth the terms and procedures for the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States. A copy of the Memorandum, as it now stands, is attached. I do not anticipate any further modifications in the text, although the possibility exists.

The exchange of notes containing the English and Spanish texts of the Memorandum is tentatively set for Tuesday morning (November 2). The hour has yet to be fixed but will probably be either 10:00 or 11:00 am. The exchange will take place in Habana between the Swiss Ambassador, representing our interests, and probably the Cuban Foreign Minister. Simultaneous release of the notes by the Cubans and us (not the Swiss) would be one hour after the exchange.

I leave up to you the decision whether our release should be made by you or by the State Department. The major announcements on the Cuban refugee question -- i. e., the acceptance of the Castro offer and the Gardner-Ellington mission to Miami -- have been made by the White House. My inclination on this one is to let the State Department handle it. The reason is that there is considerable speculation that the agreement on refugees may presage a thaw in US-Cuban relations. I think that the noise level on this kind of accomodation speculation will be lower if State releases the notes. Another consideration is that the press backgrounding on this complicated and sensitive subject would be easier to handle up here. This is not a major factor, however, since we could send John Crimmins to Texas to backstop you if you decide to make the release down there.

McG. B.

Enclosure: Memorandum of Understanding

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-377
By JW, NARA, Date 2-18-94

✓ Pouch 59
10/31

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1965

signed + sent

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jake Jacobsen

SUBJECT: Finding on Military Assistance to Latin America

The attached is a wholly routine signature which is required by law. It is not an authorization for specific expenditures, and all such decisions will continue to come to the President for his direct approval, through Charlie Schultze and me. We therefore join in requesting the President's signature on the bottom page of this one.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

OCT 28 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Finding on Military Assistance to Latin America

The Foreign Assistance Act requires you to make a finding that the furnishing of military assistance to Latin America is "necessary to safeguard the security of the United States or to safeguard the security of a country associated with the United States in the Alliance for Progress against overthrow of a duly constituted government."

The finding attached to Mr. Bell's memorandum would permit the furnishing of military assistance to all of the Latin American republics except Haiti and Cuba as long as the conditions described in the background annex continue to exist. This proposed multiyear finding differs from determinations in previous years which were for one-year periods. In fiscal year 1966, military assistance will total $140.2 million, of which $78.5 million will be grant assistance and $61.7 million will be sales on a credit basis. While grants are about the same as last year, credit sales are increasing. However, this finding does not deal with credit sales since the new Section 640 of the Act states that other limitations in the Act do not apply to sales.

Defense and AID agree that your approval of this finding does not provide them with authority to make new commitments. Therefore I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to A.I.D. Mr. Bundy concurs.

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By NARA, Date 5-15-12

CONFIDENTIAL

Received Ranch
10-31-65
5:30P

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jake Jacobsen

This one does need a Presidential decision this weekend, if at all possible. Charlie Schultze and I have already delayed the AID people right to the limit while we were plugging a balance-of-payments loophole. This is ~~an~~ a package in which both he and I have great confidence.

M. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~attachment~~

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10/31

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1965

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M. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL attachment~~

606

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Saturday, October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for the Government of Colombia

1. Charlie Schultze's memorandum seems to me first-rate and I fully concur with it. I have checked the balance of payments myself with Joe Fowler, and we have made sure that there will be no negative impact in the fourth quarter -- or indeed at any time. This is the most hardboiled and constructive general package that I have seen out of AID, and I think it is a good augury that it comes to you first in Fiscal '66. The only thing wrong with it is that the package is pretty well bargained out now, and we did not have a procedure to get you in on the takeoff. As Charlie's memorandum says, we can do better on this in the future.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-377
By jw, NARA, Date 2-18-94

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1965

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M. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL attachment~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, October 30, 1965

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McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 92-377
By jwlpw NARA, Date 10/25/05

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CONFIDENTIAL

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 29 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Loan for the Government of Colombia

In the attached memorandum the AID Administrator has requested your approval to sign a loan of $65 million for the Government of Colombia by November 1, or as soon thereafter as negotiations are completed.

This is the first such aid commitment submitted on an individual basis for your approval. We will shortly recommend to you procedures to provide for your review of the AID program at three critical points:

(a) The approval of a country program in the budget process;

(b) Approval of specific commitments ready for execution; and

(c) Regular reporting of progress on the country's self-help efforts and actions taken by AID in this process.

AID has spent almost a year convincing the Colombians that we are serious about self help:

- we have entered into no loan agreements with them so far this year,
- we even withheld a payment last January of $10 million under the previously approved 1964 loan,
- negotiating together with the IMF and the World Bank, AID now is getting written commitments from Colombia that promise some real progress.

Actions already taken

In fact, some of the toughest measures have already been executed.
1. In September, Colombia devalued its currency by a substantial percentage. The IMF, World Bank, and AID all think this devaluation will be successful in eliminating the biggest single drain on the Colombian economy, particularly in the private sector. All three agencies will

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Authority Frus, 64-68, vol. 31, #317
By jc, NARA, Date 5/3/12

be watching the results closely. 2. The Colombians have imposed a 20 percent surcharge on income tax and, 3. They have effectively more than doubled the export tax on coffee, to change a heavy government subsidy into a self-sustaining operation.

Commitments and controls on future action

The loan agreement won't be simply for measures already taken. AID will only disburse the $65 million in quarterly segments, $20 million on signing and $15 million each in February, May, and August. And each release will be made only if a review of performance indicates that Colombia is making good progress in a number of important areas, including:

-- a flexible exchange rate policy and a liberalized trade policy

-- a non-inflationary fiscal, monetary, and wage policy

-- tax improvement measures which should help support a 10 percent increase in public investment

-- new programs for agricultural development and reform

-- an expanded program of primary education financed at the local level.

The funds will be used to finance imports from the U. S. Secretary Fowler is satisfied with the provisions of the loan from a U. S. balance of payments point of view. Special conditions will be attached which have the effect of neutralizing the balance of payments impact in 1965.

Other contributors

In addition to AID, the World Bank and the IMF are contributing $130 million. Their commitments will also be tied to the same self-help efforts that the U. S. is insisting upon. The three agencies (AID, IMF, IBRD) have worked out a common approach and joint arrangements to make this work.

I recommend that you approve this loan request.

Charles L. Schultze

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Charles L. Schultze
Director

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Saturday, October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for the Government of Colombia

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McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 92-377
By jwlw NARA, Date 10/25/05

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekend report on events in the National Security field

We are continuing to keep everything that we possibly can away from your desk, but I think you may wish to have a rundown on the situation as it looks today.

1. The Dominican Republic is still our trickiest problem. As usual the partisans of the far right and of the far left are howling about the outrages and dangers from the opposite side. Bunker is, as usual, right in the middle. The IAPF took over downtown and the Communist paper Patria is closed. The current threat is a Communist-inspired general strike. Meanwhile, Bunker is trying to get a compromise arrangement that will get the most controversial military people on both sides out of the country -- this is a Balaguer proposal which Garcia Godoy appears to support.

2. We asked Bunker what he thought of the possibility of giving up on Garcia Godoy and asking Balaguer to form a Provisional Government. He is strongly against this course for the present on the ground that Balaguer is our best bet for the long pull and that his reputation would be badly damaged if he had to take over now under our protection. So Bunker still thinks we should try to keep the Provisional Government in business and help it to fly right.

3. In Brazil, Castelo Branco wrote himself a new institutional act in order to get out of an impasse with his Congress. His moderate execution of this drastic step has prevented much of a reaction in Brazil, but there is feeling in other countries, and Venezuela may refuse to attend the Rio Conference. Ambassador Gordon asked us to make a statement expressing our regret, but our own judgment here has been against such a course. Gordon's one weakness, as you will remember, is that he likes to get the U. S. out in front a little more than is wise. So far, I think our silence has proved sensible.

4. In Cuba, our negotiations with Castro on refugees have gone well, and there is an agreed memorandum of understanding on procedures. I have sent papers on all this to Bill Moyers and asked him to decide with you whether the White House or the State Department should announce this understanding. The announcement will probably be set for Tuesday by negotiations which have been well handled by our man Crimmins through the Swiss Ambassador, Stadelhofer.

5. In Vietnam, we have some specific troubles. A couple of our planes hit a friendly village in South Vietnam, which is a real misfortune. Defense is reviewing our bombing procedures, and I think they may well be tightened up.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-185
By LLC NARA, Date 03-26-2014

We also have diplomatic troubles over an ICC report on Cambodia where the Canadian member has gone off the reservation. The Canadians themselves were aware of this weakness, and we are not putting any more heat on Pearson lest there be a leak of "U. S. pressure" at the height of his fight with Diefenbaker.

6. The larger issues in Vietnam are being worked on. McNamara is preparing a basic paper with respect to 1966 force levels there, and this document should focus everyone's attention pretty sharply on the hard issues.

7. On European affairs, both George Ball and I have now prepared rather long and completely contrasting papers about next steps in Atlantic nuclear policy. George has specifically requested that his paper be sent to the Ranch, but I have sent both of them to Jake Jacobsen with a covering memorandum. You should not feel that this is immediate business, although the issues will probably need your attention before Rusk goes to Rio about November 13. In essence, George feels that we should force the British out of the independent deterrent business and ensure that the Germans have a role in a mixed manned force of some sort. I believe that we ought to back away from all such drastic solutions and see if we cannot satisfy the Germans by greatly intensified consultation of the same kind that the British have in this field -- short of any role with nuclear weapons themselves. There may well be a middle ground between us, but the matter is <u>not</u> ready for your decision.

8. Meanwhile, we are working on a definite date with Erhard. After talking with Dean Rusk about his meeting with you, I offered the Germans the 29th and 30th of November. In the meantime there was a hint from Erhard's office that a date in mid-December might be easier. We have hinted back that the end of November may be better for us because of the press of year-end work and the possibility of visits from Shastri and Ayub. The ball is in their court and we should know more by the first of the week. But if you want to hold Erhard off for any reason, it is clear that it can be done.

9. Meanwhile, Bohlen has been shooting with de Gaulle and learned very little. The General is veiling his international intentions, but it is assumed in Paris that he is going to announce his candidacy next Thursday.

10. Your <u>Aid</u> review is going forward with some energy. Schultze and Bator and I are determined to prove to you that there are at least three hardboiled analysts in the government. We expect to have an interim report for the Cabinet Committee in about a week and a long session with Clifford's group immediately thereafter. In essence, our objective will be to show you ways of organizing the Aid process so that these funds are in your desk drawer for use in the national interest, except when they are deliberately farmed out to bankers like George Woods and Joe Fowler, or military men like Bob McNamara. I am even more convinced than last week that we can have a hard-headed program which is also humane and progressive. The keys are self-help, a short rein, and no softness to stinkers.

11. On India and Pakistan, Goldberg is hard at work and reports that he expects to get a satisfactory resolution out of the present Security Council debate in spite of the messy session which occurred earlier this week under a very inexperienced Council President (the Uruguayan). This resolution will reaffirm our basic position of moving step by step -- cease-fire, withdrawal, and political process. Meanwhile, Shastri still wants to come in December, and the Paks are definitely softening as they see what a box they have worked themselves into. Bob Komer is doing you a separate page on this very interesting development, Tab A.

12. In Rhodesia, your message has been delivered this morning and Wilson is stringing out the talks just as hard as he can. George Ball says he feels there is some real hope that UDI may be prevented at least temporarily. Meanwhile, the London papers are full of irresponsible speculation about a US/UK/Zambian airlift. You should know that there is nothing of that sort in the works right now -- McNamara's feeling is that it would be easier to airlift a railroad in than to airlift copper out, but neither one is part of our plans.

13. Dean Rusk goes to Rio on November 13. Bob McNamara and I believe that it will be highly important to put some of the emerging issues before you pretty seriously before Dean leaves the country. Accordingly, it looks as if we would want to propose ourselves for a visit -- if you are ready -- about the middle of the week after next: November 10 or 11. A couple of days before that meeting we might also want to send you outlines on the emerging issues in Vietnam, in Europe, and in the India/Pak area. I will ask Jake Jacobsen early next week for your thoughts on this possibility. In all three areas we are heading into major decisions and it would be helpful to get interim guidance from you before Dean disappears for his 10 days in Latin America. If this is too soon for you, however, there is the alternative of discussion during his absence, or of holding the major questions until he gets back November 25.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 30, 1965
Saturday/3:00 pm

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Roundup. While the two sides are still glaring at each other and sticking to rigid propaganda positions, there is considerable movement behind the scene.

There are many signs that the Paks are finally hoisting aboard that they have gotten themselves into a pretty mess, and that if hostilities resumed they'd take a licking. As a result they are now more eager for a withdrawal than for simultaneous talks on settling Kashmir.

This has also led to increasing Pak eagerness to get back in our good graces. Now Shoaib as well as Bhutto are signalling that Ayub is eager to come here soon; indeed Shoaib says Ayub now realizes that a considerable shift in Pak policy will be necessary to get back on a firm footing with us. We even have a report that Ayub intends to sack Bhutto in time.

So the Paks are moving our way. If we sit tight, Ayub should be ready to hear sweet reason within another month or two. However, the Paks are still threatening to move toward the Chicoms (and have leaked that Peiping has offered a tank factory). They also are still hinting that we must give Ayub something first, so he doesn't have to come here as a beggar.

The Indians, who regard themselves as victors, show less flexibility. Knowing they have the upper hand, they've been scaring the Paks with threats to reopen the war if Pakistan won't lay off Kashmir.

Meanwhile, they are refusing even to discuss Kashmir in New York on the grounds that the issue is closed. Their private and public utterances still indicate acute suspicion that the US and UK are trying to pressure them into giving up the fruits of victory. My own reading is that this mood will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he's still eager to come around 10 December.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

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Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 25 #241
By jc , NARA, Date 5-15-10

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