

62

October 28, 1965

62

Mr. President:

In view of the rather extreme character of Tom Dodd's assessment of both the Congo and the Dominican Republic, I am having comments prepared by my own people on both of these letters and will get them to you promptly, but I do not wish to hold up the letters in the meantime, because I know that you like to get the word from Senators at first hand.

McG.B.

2 Confidential letters to the President dated October 27, 1965  
Originals sent to the President via 0900 pouch, Friday, October 29, 1965.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT 91-40  
By Goldch, NARA, Date 6/1/92

October 28, 1965  
Thursday/6:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Week's Developments in the Near East

The Near East was quiet this week, but behind-scenes diplomatic activity picked up. Our military programs in Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon here all posed new problems. The Egyptians are increasingly nervous about their food. The Turks are increasingly itchy about Cyprus.

Israel. / Air Force Chief Weizman made another pitch to the French for aircraft and says he got a flat "no." So the Israelis are pressing to renew talks with us in November. We figure the French may not fully know their own minds on the direction new aircraft production will take until after their presidential election, so we want to postpone any US decision. However, the Israelis will keep pressing, and we may have to agree to another round of talks. /

Jordan. / The Jordanians are pushing ahead negotiations with the French for supersonics, although there is still a huge gap between the French price and what the United Arab Command will pay. The Jordanians continue to hope we'll pay the difference. So the crunch on this one is still to come. We want to let them bargain for the best deal they can from the French, and explore Kuwaiti financing. /

UAR. / The Egyptian ambassador sent Rusk a note of thanks for your kind words to Nasser via Rusk and Kaissouni, saying Nasser wanted to develop a good relationship with you. The Ambassador is still pressing hard for a decision on PL 480, which he says Egyptian planners need by 1 November. We're trying to put together for your approval a combination deal that would get us some rice for Vietnam in return for our wheat. /

Turkey. / We're a little disappointed in the new Turk cabinet, which is obviously the result of political compromise rather than a combination of the greatest expertise available. However, the compromise brings moderates out on top and they're politically talented, though not technically expert. / We will have a message for you to send to new prime minister Demiral when he formally takes office later this week.

SECRET

SECRET

Page Two

[The Turks are beginning to press us on Cyprus again. The problem is to keep them relaxed for six months or so until the Greek government is strong enough to think seriously about a solution. Our best bet is probably just to talk the time away. However, the UN debate next month will probably raise temperatures on both sides and make it harder to get away with just talk.]

R. W. Komer

SECRET



64

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 92-377**  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94

*Not sent*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 27, 1965  
6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Political-Military Crisis

This morning President Castello Branco in a nation-wide address announced a new Institutional Act for Brazil. The drastic measure is a response to a deteriorating political-military situation triggered by the results of the October 3 gubernatorial elections and the return of ex-President Kubitschek on October 4.

The "hard-line" supporters of the April 1964 Revolution interpreted the recent elections as a defeat for the Revolution. They fear a return to power of the pre-Revolutionary elements associated with subversion and corruption, such as Goulart and Kubitschek.

In a move to mollify the "hard-liners", President Castello Branco on October 13 sent to the Congress draft legislation to give the federal government authority to deal directly with anti-revolutionary activities, should these develop. The legislation ran into trouble in the Congress. Unsuccessful in obtaining the necessary votes, Castello Branco decided to achieve his objective by promulgating the new Institutional Act.

Linc Gordon, who returned to Rio last night, reports that the main features of the Institutional Act are the following:

1. The Executive is given the right to recess the Congress at any time for an indefinite period.
2. The Supreme Court membership is expanded from 11 to 16 members.
3. Political parties are ordered to dissolve and reconstitute themselves.
4. The Executive is given authority to cancel mandates of elected officials and to suspend the political rights of citizens.

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-2-

5. Provision is made for the Congress to elect a new President at the end of 1966, who would assume office in March 1967.
6. Castello Branco is declared ineligible to succeed himself.

Gordon is sending his interpretation and assessment of events tonight. Some of the possible implications that I foresee are: (1) Serious loss of public confidence and support of the Castello Branco Government in Brazil; (2) Tarnishing of the generally good image enjoyed by the Castello Branco Government in the U. S. and elsewhere; (3) A need to take a fresh look at our assistance to Brazil in the light of this development and reactions thereto; and (4) The possibility that today's action may complicate the holding of the Inter-American Conference, scheduled to open on November 17 in Rio de Janeiro.

State has informed Congressional leaders of developments and is taking the line with the press that this is a domestic matter on which we will not comment.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

*Rec'd Rusk  
10-29-65  
10 00 P*

MEMORANDUM

45

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telegram from Chairman Edgardo Seoane of the  
Inter-American Economic and Social Council

I recommend that you approve the attached reply (Tab A) to a telegram from the Chairman of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Dr. Edgardo Seoane (Tab B). His message proposes arrangements for the next meeting of IA-ECOSOC, and the draft answer accepts them and names Jack Vaughn as our man, which is what Rusk and Mann have agreed on. This could be answered by Dean Rusk, but IA-ECOSOC is a key group in the work of the Alliance, and Seoane is first Vice President of Peru, so an answer direct from you seems worth giving.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Approved ✓

Have Rusk handle it \_\_\_\_\_

I'd rather not be bothered with this sort of thing for now \_\_\_\_\_

*Approved by President LBJ*

10/27/65

Suggested Reply to Cable from Dr. Edgardo Seoane, Chairman of  
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was pleased to receive your telegram of October 20. The United States will participate in the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) at Buenos Aires on March 13 if that date is concurred in by most of the member states. The United States warmly appreciates your fixing the date to coincide with the Fifth Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress as a tribute to the memory of President Kennedy.

In accordance with your excellent suggestion, the United States Representative to the IA-ECOSOC will be included in the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference scheduled to open in Rio de Janeiro on November 17. Mr. Jack H. Vaughn, United States Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, will shortly be named United States Representative. He will be prepared to exchange ideas on matters raised in the CIAP letter.

I take this opportunity to express again my deep personal interest in individual and collective efforts to give greater impetus to our vital Alliance for Progress.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Edgardo Seoane  
Chairman, Inter-American Economic  
and Social Council  
Lima, Peru



66-7-GB  
did not  
send

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. Rhodesia's threatened UDI is still the major current problem in Africa. Its reverberations were felt as far away as Ghana where the OAU Summit meeting was being held. /Items in brackets are too sensitive for release./

Rhodesia. Harold Wilson arrived today to the enthusiastic acclaim of a cheering, banner-waving crowd of some 6,000 Africans. The purpose of his trip is to deter the Smith Government from carrying out UDI, even though it has announced it is already committed. Some observers see a glimmer of hope in Smith's agreeing to the Wilson trip and to Wilson's consulting with jailed African and white opponents of UDI. But Smith's acceptance is more likely for the purpose of pinning the blame on Wilson for any breakdown in negotiations and for the consequences thereof. This week should tell.

/Wilson carried with him the message from Secretary Rusk to Smith advising that the US stands with the UK in opposition to UDI and counselling against it./

At the OAU Summit meeting the African heads of state and delegations present unanimously passed a hopefully meaningless resolution on UDI. In most unhelpful language, the resolution was a veiled threat to the UK if it failed to prevent UDI.

The OAU Summit meeting. It convened in Ghana last week with only 18 chiefs of state attending, 10 countries represented by lower level delegations and 8 countries not attending at all. The "no-show" group were all members of Ivory Coast President Houphouet Boigny's Entente alliance plus Togo, Gabon, Chad and Malagasy -- all so-called African "moderates". The Entente countries (Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey) are mad at OAU host N'Krumah for harboring subversives from their countries and for failing to live up to his promise to expel these undesirables.

Aside from the resolution against UDI, nothing much is coming from this confab of African leaders in the \$28 million conference setting constructed for the occasion by virtually bankrupt Ghana. /From the US point of view, we're happy that Vietnam was dropped as an agenda item. Yet, we don't want to say anything publicly about it./

Congo. Politicking has been mostly behind-scenes since Kasavubu fired Tshombe. The new government hasn't been presented to parliament, because Kasavubu has been in Ghana at the OAU Summit.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-14

By SJ, NARA, Date 10-23-02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

/The prime minister designate has told Godley he wants to do business with us, but he doesn't have a clue about the tough economic problems he faces. He'll be politically weak, so we don't expect him to make needed economic reforms. Although Tshombe seems to be going along for the moment, he'll almost certainly challenge Kasavubu in the presidential election early next year, and that will provoke a new crisis. While we'll try to work with this government, we may have to face up to the question of taking sides later if we want a more effective government./

Afro-Asian conference. The odds are now in favor of its meeting on 5 November as scheduled. Chicom heavy-handedness in their effort to postpone it has infuriated many other participants; even if the Chicoms decide not to boycott the conference, they'll face a far less receptive gathering than they would have last June. /We may recommend you exploit their setback by sending a fairly warm message to the conferees./

Tunisia. Bourguiba in a speech last week reflected on how Tunisian security in the last analysis depends on the big powers and noted that Tunisian leaders would at least have to consider making alliances with them. /This is the first public mention of what Bourguiba, Jr. hinted to us privately in giving Rusk his request for military aid. It is probably a trial balloon./

Portuguese Africa. With National Assembly elections in the offing, the opposition to the Salazar regime published a 4,000-word anti-Salazar "manifesto" which, in part, called for a settlement of the Overseas Territories (Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea) problem on the basis of self-determination. It attracted so much attention that the government felt it necessary to organize public demonstrations in Portugal and the Overseas Territories to repudiate the opposition's proposals. For the most part, the government demonstrations fizzled.

/Ambassador Anderson spent two hours with Salazar over the weekend talking mainly about Portugal's African territories. In view of his extreme sensitivity on this subject, Salazar's willingness even to discuss US suggestions for a peaceful settlement of the problem is encouraging. Anderson reports, "I am mildly hopeful our conversation may have stirred some new thinking."/

cc: McGB  
RWK  
Hal Saunders

R. W. Komer

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

67  
67

Thursday, October 21, 1965, 3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Indian Food Pipe Line

This is the only matter in the foreign field which requires decision over the coming weekend. We authorized a one-month extension last September 23, and on Monday at the latest, we should authorize negotiations for another month if we do not want to run the risk of a break in the pipe line. I have reviewed this matter with State, Defense, Clark Clifford, and Arthur Dean, and they all agree that a one-month extension is the best arrangement. It is more and more clear that Shastri is coming if you want him in December or January, and we are also beginning to get to the Indians with the message that their agricultural performance is weak. They are on notice to respond to this challenge and until they do, month-to-month action is fully defensible. (See Phil Potter story in the Baltimore Sun this morning). (TABAI)

In this situation none of us sees any point in letting the pipe line break, and I would like to authorize Komer to give the green light around the town on Monday morning (but not before).

15/  
McG. B.

One Month Extension Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

F 68

Friday, October 22, 1965  
3:20 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Because it reports General Eisenhower's view, I think you will want to see the attached memorandum from Andy Goodpaster. In essence, Eisenhower is asking why we do not close off shipping to Hanoi. He suggests a declaration that a state of war exists and some undefined reinforcing naval action. But he seems to think the declaration itself might do the trick.

2. Goodpaster has promised Eisenhower additional information on this problem, and McNamara wants you to know that it is one of the issues which is being carefully reviewed as we consider where we go in Vietnam next year. Bob does not think it is a matter which needs urgent attention and decision at your level, and I agree with him.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-183  
By ms, NARS, Date 10-1-84



~~TOP SECRET~~

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68a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

RECEIVED  
MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 OCT 21 PM 5 41  
20 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum for record reports a matter raised with me by General Eisenhower in a phone conversation yesterday. Of significance were not only the specific suggestion he made and the specific questions he raised, but also the concern he evidenced over the continued free flow of materiel, including war materiel, into North Vietnam through Haiphong.

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lt. General, U.S.A.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-297

By us, NARS, Date 9-4-84

~~TOP SECRET~~



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686

~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

At the close of a phone call I had made to him yesterday, General Eisenhower told me he had one matter of some importance that he wanted to raise with me.

He said he had been pondering very hard over the past weekend the question of the materiel support the North Vietnamese are getting by sea from the outside world, principally through shipping using the port of Haiphong.

He asked what Free World shipping is coming into Haiphong, having in mind the possibility of a "declaration" by the U.S. which might serve as basis for stopping such shipping. By making a statement that there existed, in effect, a state of war, we might, he thought, cause such shipping to stop. He said he assumed that we are preventing Chinese shipping from moving into the area now.

I told him the situation was different in major respects from what he evidently believed it to be. First, we are not interfering with Chinese shipping at the present time, and it -- together with other communist shipping -- moves freely in and out of the port. Second, with respect to Free World shipping, the current situation as I understand it is not that we are raising obstacles or putting pressure on our allies, but that they are putting pressure on us to do nothing to interfere with the shipping that they are sending into Haiphong, and that, in fact, a concern over their reactions is frequently expressed as a factor in the U.S. decision not to interfere with traffic into Haiphong or between Haiphong and Hanoi. Finally, in response to a comment by him that we could, if necessary, mount a blockade -- once having made the declaration -- I told him that our studies had indicated that a more effective method, requiring less in the way of ships and effort from us, would be to mine Haiphong Harbor. We have the capability to do so at any time.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 84-297  
By ics, NARS, Date 9-4-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

He indicated he was troubled by the thought that military materiel such as surface to air missiles continues to flow into North Vietnam through Haiphong, and that it will inevitably take a toll in increased U.S. loss of life as well as materiel losses. He said he thought we would be well justified in closing off such shipping, and that a declaration such as he had suggested would seem to have a certain degree of merit.

I told him I would bring the matter to top level attention, and would pull together pertinent facts and background by the next time I saw him.



A. J. GOODPASTER

~~TOP SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON*Mr  
Kallman*  
*R*

Friday, October 22, 1965, 3 PM

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: World News Round-up

1. The overall world situation in short range terms is unusually stable. I see no policy decision required at your level for at least two weeks, unless there is an unexpected new development. (I except the decisions on aid expenditures and on PL-480 agreements which you have deliberately reserved for your own decision. These will come to you without fail as long as you want it that way.)

2. The most difficult current situation is still in the Dominican Republic. All concerned (Rusk, Vance, Raborn, Mann, Hoover and Bundy) agree that the best available prescription is to keep Ellsworth Bunker on the spot. Today is another moment of testing on the effort to clean up the situation in downtown Santo Domingo. Other tests lie ahead. Bunker is the one man who is trusted both by the Dominicans and by the various departments and agencies concerned here in Washington. While Tom Mann and I have differing views on this matter, as you well know, we have had no disagreement whatever on the tactics of recent weeks, and I am leaving it to Mann to recommend a successor to Bennett through Dean Rusk.

Meanwhile, the debate on the Dominican Republic will be stimulated soon by books from foolish journalists. We are getting advance copies in order to have full and annotated answers available for appropriate use as desired. Fulbright's speech today was defensive and did not really add anything to the argument.

3. In Vietnam, the campaign continues. The time of decision will come in about a month when we decide what we want to do in early 1966. The Defense Department is preparing various military proposals, and the State Department is reviewing the diplomatic choices. In my office, we are thinking about ways of reorganizing our nonmilitary effort so as to really put it on a level with the extraordinary achievement of the Army -- this is also on Lodge's mind. The month of November is not likely to be one of great movement or change.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

4. In Europe, we have some important issues to straighten out before you see Erhard. In particular, we need to sort out our own position on NATO nuclear policy. We are having the options put in shape for you to consider at your leisure before Erhard. Meanwhile, we are doing our best to avoid an appearance of division within the government, with moderate success so far.

5. In India-Pakistan, peace-making goes very slowly. We continue to keep the weight in New York, where it belongs. Meanwhile, Arthur Dean is thinking hard about the basics of our policy in the subcontinent, and as and when dates are set for Shastri and Ayub, we will try to have the choices clearly worked out for your judgment.

6. Foreign assistance organization and policy are being reviewed both by the Cabinet committee under Rusk, and by your private committee under Clark Clifford. The object is again to give you a clearly stated set of choices, and my own private and particular hope is that we can show you a hard-headed and practical way of making this program serve the Johnsonian purposes so clearly and eloquently set forth in your statement on signing the Foreign Aid Act of this year. I believe this can be done, and so does Clark.

7. For the rest, there are odds and ends of problems all around the world -- Indonesia, Southern Rhodesia, U. N. General Assembly, and so on. But there is none that needs attention at your level. Communication between State, Defense, CIA and this office has been intimate and active throughout the last two weeks, and we will keep it that way. But we will not bother you until you tell us you are ready, except when we know that the subject is one on which you wish to make the decision yourself.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Rec'd  
10/22/65  
JW

MEMORANDUM

70

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 22, 1965, 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending you separately, for week-end reading, a memorandum which summarizes the international situation as it looks from the basement after two weeks. The net of it is that there is no major problem requiring your decision in the next two weeks. I have sent separate memos on Indian food and on prospective visitors like Erhard, Shastri and Ayub, but all of them can wait.

I am sorry to bother you with a personal plan, but I should report that for more than a month I have had an engagement to attend a Groton School Trustees meeting tomorrow. It is my first chance to welcome a new Texas headmaster, and I would like to go -- but not if there is anything at all that I can do for you here between now and Sunday afternoon, when I will be back. Komer and Smith will of course be on duty, and Rusk and McNamara will both be in town.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Go ahead V

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



Friday, October 22, 1965:1:50

Mr. President:

Having Ayub first -- before he's been softened up enough -- puts the greater burden on you to tell him the score before he's quite ready to hear it. It also exposes you to being badgered by Ayub to do the impossible on Kashmir.

On the other hand, if Shastri comes first, you can better urge him to think big and to allow a Pak/Indian negotiation (which I think Shastri would buy as long as he knew we weren't going to force him to disgorge Kashmir). Then we'd have at best little comfort to give Ayub.

Then if Ayub comes second, he'll be more on the defensive -- and more malleable for that reason. If Shastri comes second, the reverse will be true as the Indians will conclude again that Ayub has our number.

So I come out the precise opposite from Bundy. You'll get more out of both Ayub and Shastri, if you have the latter first. It's not a question of what you give or don't give either -- it's really that if you have Ayub first both Paks and Indians will conclude that Ayub still has the inside track.

R. W. Komer

Friday, October 22, 1965:1:50

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R. W. Komer



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R. W. Komer

Mr. President

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So I come out the precise opposite from Bundy. You'll get more out of both Ayub and Shastri, if you have the latter first. ~~It~~ <sup>the</sup> interest will be better served if we don't ~~give Ayub too much comfort~~ <sup>let Ayub think</sup>. It's not a question of what you give or don't give either -- <sup>it's really that if you have</sup> Ayub first both ~~the~~ <sup>Indians</sup> and ~~Shastri~~ will conclude that Ayub still has the inside track.

A. M. Toner

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 22, 1965  
1:35 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Foreign Visitors

The only agreed visitor in the near future is Princess Margaret, for a White House party on November 17. I myself do not see why this should be a requirement for you -- though it would certainly be a pleasure if you feel like it.

The next would-be visitor is Chancellor Erhard. He has made it clear informally and very politely that if you are ready for him, he would like to come either just before or just after the Thanksgiving Holidays -- that would be about November 22 and 23 or about November 29 and 30. I have told his people that you will need a little while before making this decision, and they are most understanding. As I see it, your choice now is to pick a tentative date, or wait a week or so, whichever you prefer. Your letter to Erhard (Tab A) carefully does not commit you.

Let's wait \_\_\_\_\_

Aim at November 22-23 \_\_\_\_\_

Aim at November 29-30 \_\_\_\_\_

The next candidate is Shastri. I attach at Tab B a copy of the letter which he wrote on October 7. At your request, we have held up on an answer, but probably we should acknowledge it soon in whatever form you prefer. In his letter, Shastri says he would like to come at a later date. In diplomatic channels, his people have been much more explicit and have made it clear he would like to come right after December 10, when his Parliamentary session ends.

Shastri's people have been hinting at one reservation -- namely, that he does not want to come hard on the heels of a visit by Ayub or immediately before such a visit. I do not think his people should be making conditions like this, and I suggest we have Bowles tell them, as his own conclusion,

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

that it would be a great mistake for the Prime Minister's people to suggest any conditions surrounding a visit to President Johnson. Then after doing that, if you want Shastri, it seems to me that you could reply to his letter saying that you hope he will propose any date that suits him after the Parliamentary session. This will make him invite himself, and keep your position clear. I attach a draft of such a letter at Tab C. I'm not sure it fits your tactics, but it gives you something to redraft, at least.

Ayub also has now told us (Bhutto to Rusk, yesterday) that he would like to come, "in late November or December." You told him on the phone that you would see him first, but there is a real question whether you now want him before Shastri. Ray Hare and Bob Komer think Shastri first is better, both because India is more important and because if you see Ayub first, he is bound to press you to mediate Kashmir -- and that is something we can't do in 1966. Bob's view is stated briefly at Annex D.

My own feeling is that just because we have very little to offer Ayub we probably ought to give him the small comfort of seeing him first. So my recommendation would be to get Ayub to propose himself definitely for late November and Shastri for mid-December, and then agree to receive them both.

These decisions can all wait a few days if you wish.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

P. S. In case you are interested, I attach at Tab E a transcript of your talk with Ayub. Your remarks about his visit are at the bottom of page 5.



2020



QUOTE:

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Your re-election as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of German will continue to provide your own people, as well as freedom-loving people the world over, with the great leadership they deserve.

I have long enjoyed our close personal friendship. I draw strength from your support and your dedication to the principles on which our Alliance is based.

I am leaving today to recuperate for several weeks at my home in Texas. You will be most welcome in this country. As soon as mutually convenient dates can be worked out we can name a specific time.

With warm personal wishes.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

*approved by Pres. 11:00 am  
10/22/65*



New Delhi,  
October 7, 1965.

My dear Mr President:

I am sorry to learn of your indisposition necessitating hospitalisation for surgical treatment. I want to convey to you my sincerest good wishes for your full and speedy recovery. In the world of today, you have to carry a very heavy responsibility and it is my earnest hope that you are soon restored to normal health to meet the many challenges of our time.

There are many problems, short-term and long-term, which I have been looking forward to discussing with you personally at an early date. It is my hope that at a later date, it should be possible for me to come and meet you in Washington in response to your invitation.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
The President of the United States of  
America,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OCT 8 1965



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciate your thoughtful message of October 7 in connection with my recent visit to the hospital. I am glad to say that I am safely at home and gradually getting back to work.

I agree with you that there are many short and long-range problems that the two of us need to discuss together, and I am glad to hear that you hope to come to Washington soon. I understand that your Parliament will be in session until December 10, but if you wish to propose an early date after that time, I can assure you of a warm welcome here.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi

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Friday, October 22, 1965: 1:50 pm

Mr. President:

Having Ayub first -- before he's been softened up enough -- puts the greater burden on you to tell him the score before he's quite ready to hear it. It also exposes you to being badgered by Ayub to do the impossible on Kashmir.

On the other hand, if Shastri comes first, you can better urge him to think big and to allow a Pak/Indian negotiation (which I think Shastri would buy as long as he knew we weren't going to force him to disgorge Kashmir). Then we'd have at best little comfort to give Ayub.

Then if Ayub comes second, he'll be more on the defensive -- and more malleable for that reason. If Shastri comes second, the reverse will be true as the Indians will conclude again that Ayub has our number.

So I come out ~~the~~ precise opposite from Bundy. You'll get more out of both Ayub and Shastri, if you have the latter first. It's not a question of what you give or don't give either -- it's really that if you have Ayub first both Paks and Indians will conclude that Ayub still has the inside track.

R. W. Komer

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File 73

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Fri, October 22, 1965  
11:30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Week's Developments in Asia

There follows a summary of significant developments in Asia during the past week. Information classifications are given in brackets.

VIETNAM

The Program Front:

Vietnamese Attitudes. (Secret) Lodge took the occasion of Ky's review of his first 100 days in office to appraise Vietnamese attitudes. He concluded that: (1) most Vietnamese remain fence-sitters; (2) there is no clear-cut increase in public acceptance of Ky's government; (3) people are waiting for some ill-defined, further performance on his part; (4) there is grudging willingness to give Ky a further grace period while each pressure element continues to measure Ky's performance in terms of its own narrow interests; (5) there is a conviction that the Viet Cong are no longer able to achieve a military victory and that the U. S. military commitment is now clearly established; and (6) current Vietnamese preoccupations are concern over damage being inflicted on Vietnam as the war intensifies and economic problems exacerbated by the war, notably inflation.

General Strike - Hate America. (Unclassified) The Viet Cong called for these on October 15. There has been no conspicuous response throughout South Vietnam. The Mission interprets this as a signal defeat for the Viet Cong -- as do we.

Restless Generals. (Confidential) Last week's friction among the ruling directorate over Ky's command changes has ebbed. General Co, the most distressed, has been mollified and has publicly reaffirmed the unity of the war cabinet.

Student Unrest and Agitation. (Confidential) The Mission fears that friction between the Saigon Students Union (SSU) and the GVN

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-185

NARA, Date 03-25-2014

By 4418

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-2-

may break into the open this week. The SSU claims (erroneously) that it speaks for Saigon university students and that the GVN has ignored it in making decisions affecting them. Caught in the middle are the five Vietnamese students dispatched to the U. S. by the GVN without consulting SSU. Our psywar types in Saigon are trying to smooth this over. Meanwhile, we are in daily touch with the students through their escort.

Montagnards. (Secret) Possibly some progress here. Their leader presented a new list of eight proposals to the GVN on September 23 which demonstrated a willingness to compromise outstanding differences. We may yet get a sizeable montagnard force committed against the Viet Cong.

Economic Concerns. (Confidential) The food price index, now up 34 percent over a year ago, is indicative of the inflationary threat that persists; it is causing increasing concern among Vietnamese consumers and could spill over into antagonism toward the U. S. troop presence as the cause of it all. Another hard look at our anti-inflation measures is in order. Roy Wehrle, Deputy Director, USOM, is in town discussing these and other matters. He is an outstanding man.

The Operations Front:

Paraplegics. (Unclassified) Plans for the movement of 60 paraplegics, plus medical trainees, are well under way. November 2 is the date of their arrival in the U. S., and the Air Force, Veterans Administration and the press are in line.

Refugees. (Unclassified) Representatives of the voluntary agencies are now in Vietnam. When they return early next week we will get their report and then prepare a statement on government refugee policy and programs.

Rice. (Unclassified) We are making interdepartmental plans to solve the immediate and longer term rice crisis not only in regard to Vietnam, but (on a contingency basis) in regard to Indonesia. The immediate crisis has been resolved.

AID. (Confidential) David Bell has conducted a full-scale review of next fiscal year's Vietnam program. Highlights: USOM's personnel will increase to about 3000 (including locals and contract types);

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-3-

800 new men will have to be recruited in the U. S. -- a tremendous endeavor since 15 people are interviewed for every one selected.

INDONESIA (Secret)

Events in Indonesia since the abortive September 30th coup are so far a striking vindication of U. S. policy towards that nation in recent years: a policy of keeping our hand in the game for the long-term stakes despite recurrent pressures to pull out, break relations, recall our Ambassador, etc. More specifically, they are a vindication of our post-1963 approach and the recommendations of last spring's Bunker Report.

In the past week we have continued to grope with the obscure but very promising forces set free by the defeat of the September 30th plot. Ambassador Green's early analysis that there are now two Indo Governments -- Sukarno and the Army -- still seems valid; and since each Government needs the other (or rather, is too weak to topple the other), the uneasy balance may continue for a while. The Army is showing considerable courage, and the populace is with the Army to an extraordinary degree so far. Our Embassy is performing well.

Important unknowns remain: Sukarno's health, his degree of involvement in the September 30th plot, the whereabouts of Aidit (reportedly under arrest), anti-Chinese passions, etc. Whatever happens, we should expect no abrupt major change in Indonesia's vocal fuzzy Marxism or in its foreign policy -- regardless of who runs the country. The longer we remain restrained and discreet (and the same for our press), the better.

PHILIPPINES (Confidential)

The election is three weeks away (November 9) and it remains a horse race -- with Marcos somewhat ahead of Macapagal, but perhaps not far enough ahead to hold up against the Government's predictable last-minute effort to buy votes. The inauguration of the winner in January is something to keep in mind: an appropriate occasion for a high level U. S. visit to Manila.

RYUKYUS (Okinawa) (Confidential)

Agitation is increasing in all parties here (and also in Japan)

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-4-

for direct popular election of the island's Chief Executive. Gen. Watson is recommending amendment of the Executive Order to permit indirect election (by the Legislature), but this may not satisfy the Okinawans.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION (Confidential)

There have been some sounds out of New York in the wake of the Pope's speech that give rise to the possibility of a "two-China" initiative. Not only are the Italians and the Austrians showing some interest in the subject, but we also have the curious phenomenon of Ukrainian and Byelorussian speeches which appeared to link membership for two Germanys with the advocacy of Peking's admission -- but without explicitly calling for the exclusion of Taiwan. The debate should begin about November 1. We still have the votes to stick to our own one-China, and that is Dean Rusk's current plan.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 22, 1965  
9:45 a. m.

74

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Indian Food Pipeline

1. This is the only matter in the foreign field which requires decision over the coming weekend. We authorized a one-month extension last September 23, and by Monday at the latest we should authorize negotiations for another month if we do not want to run the risk of a break in the pipeline. I have reviewed this matter with Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford, and Arthur Dean; they all believe strongly that a one-month extension is the best arrangement. It is more and more clear that Shastri is coming if you want him in December or January, and we are also beginning to get to the Indians with the message that their agricultural performance is weak. They are on notice to respond to this challenge. Until they do, month-to-month action makes good sense. (See Phil Potter story in the Baltimore Sun yesterday morning, Tab A). But none of us sees any point in letting the pipeline break, so I would like to authorize Komer to give the green light on Monday morning (but not before).

McG. B.

One-month extension approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-377  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 21, 1965, 10 A. M.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Developments

Garcia Godoy's difficulties in the Dominican Republic and Fidel Castro's maneuverings on the refugee question continued to be our most important problems in the hemisphere. In Uruguay the government weathered the strike crisis but still has not solved the wage dispute which gave rise to it. The return to Argentina of Peron's wife touched off a series of disturbances requiring energetic counter-measures. Post-electoral tensions continued in Brazil. Public and Congressional debate on the treaty negotiations in Panama tapered off. Elsewhere in the hemisphere the situation was generally quiet.

Dominican situation. Last week Garcia Godoy appeared to have removed the principal obstacle to consolidation of his authority: the reopening of the downtown area. By Saturday the rebel military had been transferred to a camp outside the city. The IAPF had discontinued its check-points and removed all its barriers around the rebel zone. The rebel police had been reintegrated into the regular forces. The port renewed operations. Stores reopened. Banks and newspapers made preparations for an early resumption of activities. And Garcia Godoy prepared to address the nation with a "Message of Optimism" on the turn of events.

The optimism suffered a serious setback Saturday evening with the murder of a prominent conservative leader, Severo Cabral, by a rebel mob, when he went downtown to inspect his apartment. The murder alarmed the already jittery right and led to a series of reprisals. These events, plus an incident at the docks on Monday when a labor leader was killed and several persons wounded, showed that the Provisional Government did not effectively control the downtown area and that arms collection needed to be pressed.

Responding to the deteriorating situation, Garcia Godoy issued a decree Sunday making possession of unlicensed weapons illegal and subject to stiff penalties. He authorized the entry of units of the Armed Forces into the downtown area. And he laid plans to make an arms collection sweep of the former rebel zone, using troops accompanied by judicial

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-185

By LCB NARA, Date 03-25-2014

SECRET



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

SECRET

officials with search warrants. The sweep was to have been made yesterday. Garcia Godoy vacillated in giving the go-ahead signal and in the end postponed action. The vacillation angered the regular military chiefs and produced another major crisis. This unfortunate turn of events made it necessary for Ellsworth Bunker to return to Santo Domingo Tuesday. It also produced some very gloomy cables from Bennett and Palmer.

Bunker reported late Wednesday that the city was quiet. Garcia Godoy is planning to make the arms collection sweep beginning today, using four-man teams made up of representatives of the Armed Forces, Justice, Interior, and Ca amano. The military chiefs have decided to cooperate; the damaged relations of yesterday have been patched up for the present. Bunker has done it again.

I have asked Bunker to stay down there until this corner is clearly turned. It is plain from all reports (Bunker, Bennett, and especially FBI) that only Bunker can deal with Garcia Godoy. There is no confidence between Garcia and Bennett. Edgar Hoover strongly reinforced my position with Bunker in our last meeting. We are completing papers on a successor for Bennett. This is now really urgent, in Bunker's view.

Cuban Refugees. There are some indications that Castro may be having second thoughts about his offer to allow dissidents to leave Cuba. The Indicators are: (1) A Cuban note received yesterday morning charges us with alleged "provocative imputations and insinuations" and states that if we want to play a polemical game it would be better to do so in public. It makes no reference to our straightforward suggestions on specifics for moving refugees. (2) The British and Canadian Embassies in Havana report that the response of Cubans wishing to leave is much greater than anticipated and that Negroes and campesinos are in the forefront, a fact that would be particularly embarrassing to the regime. (3) The Castro regime has already made evident its intention to exclude sizeable groups from the refugee movement, e.g. political prisoners, military aged youth, and (as reported by the British) technicians. (4) The Cuban Government has ordered the expulsion of American newsmen who went to Cuba from Florida without visas to cover the departure of refugees from Camarioca because their work is "completed."

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 3 -

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If Castro is seeking a pretext to break off talks, we are not going to give him one. Our two notes so far have been polite and businesslike. Where Castro tried to score propaganda points in his note, we have parried with low-key responses which preserve our propaganda position. We plan to reply promptly to the latest message making clear that we want to continue talks through diplomatic channels to work out arrangements for the movement of refugees.

Since October 10, 681 refugees have entered the U. S. in small boats. The situation with the Florida people is under reasonably good control. As soon as the supplemental appropriation is passed, State and HEW will issue a general statement making clear that we plan to do everything possible to minimize the burden of additional refugees in the south Florida area and announcing the visit to Florida of a high level team to discuss the refugee program with State and local officials and community representatives.

Uruguayan Labor Crisis. The government weathered without much trouble the 24-hour general strike and 72-hour strike of employees of government enterprises, both called by communist-led labor groups. It is negotiating the underlying wage increase problem, apparently holding the line against the large increase sought by the unions. The government also showed signs this week of taking long overdue stabilization measures.

Isabel Peron's Mission to Argentina. Peron sent his wife to Argentina this week apparently to impose his orders for reorganization of the Peronist movement. She seems to have failed in this and to have caused further dissension in the ranks. Her presence in Buenos Aires touched off street clashes between pro and anti Peron groups, making it necessary for the government to crack down on Peronist demonstrations. For Peron the mission seems to have backfired.

Panama. Arnulfo Arias' campaign to mobilize public opinion against President Robles on the treaty negotiations spluttered to a virtual stop this week. He failed to arouse substantial support. Robles appears to have emerged substantially strengthened. The Panamanian negotiators are back in town to resume negotiations.

*h.f.B.*

McG. B.

cc: Bill Moyers

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Rec'd  
10-20-65  
2:45p

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

76  
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October 20, 1965

Mrs. Roberts:

Routine Report for President if he  
wants it.

76a

to Mrs. Roberts:  
Routine Report for President  
if he wants it.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) seems more imminent than ever. In the Congo, President Kasavubu has dismissed the Tshombe government, appointing another Katangese, Evariste Kimba, to form a new government. Both events cause concern for the political stability in the respective areas. /Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use./

Rhodesia. Prime Minister Smith has said that his cabinet will shortly announce a decision on UDI. The top UK diplomat in Salisbury thinks UDI will come by the end of this week. Meanwhile, the UK continued its deterrent efforts by sending a delegation of British businessmen to Salisbury to emphasize the economic consequences of UDI. /The UK is also considering a direct appeal by the Queen to the Rhodesian people./

Meanwhile, Smith rejected the UK's proposal for a Commonwealth Summit Mission. In Washington today, Rhodesia's Minister to the US (still attached to the UK Embassy) held a press conference during which he announced that he expected to be asked by the US and UK to leave when UDI is declared.

We continue to follow the British lead. /At their suggestion, we may shortly release the text of our warning to Smith as an additional UDI deterrent./ Our anti-UDI position in the UN and our vote for the resolution (which we drafted) condemning UDI in the General Assembly have gained the warm praise of the Afro-Asians as well as most other delegations.

Nevertheless, the mood in Salisbury is reported to be increasingly militant. So we may soon find ourselves confronted with supporting whatever measures the UK may take against Rhodesia once UDI is declared.

Congo. Kasavubu finally decided to fire Tshombe and has given an estranged former Katangan associate of his the job of forming a government. Tshombe has refused to participate. If he can keep his parliamentary majority, he might block confirmation to show his own strength and lay the groundwork for unseating Kasavubu in next year's presidential election. If Kasavubu tries to keep him from competing constitutionally, Tshombe could either try to mount a coup with his mercenaries or hole up in Katanga again as he did in 1961-63. So far it looks as if he'll try the constitutional arena first.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-14  
By SJ NARA, Date 10-23-02

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/Our efforts to stave off this break failed because Kasavubu just isn't sensitive to the kind of influence we have. His chief interest is in staying in power, which he does by manipulating tribal policies. So he doesn't really care whether we cut aid or pull out our planes. We're counselling Tshombe not to kick off a civil war, but if he can play out the political game, we might well decide his unseating Kasavubu legally would suit our interests. We want to wait a few more days to see how things break, but we have State thinking through our options in the meantime./

Fortunately, the last organized rebel stronghold has fallen, and mercenaries have begun mopping up smaller centers.

Organization of African Unity Summit Meeting. The OAU Foreign Ministers are meeting at Accra in preparation for the Summit Meeting due on 21 October. UDI is the top priority item on the OAU agenda. Already reports indicate that the African states are considering withdrawing their funds from British banks if the UK fails to take a strong stand. Kenya's representative has gone so far as to urge the African states to prepare for war.

/Unanimity of African opinion on UDI may completely overshadow the basic disunity that exists within the OAU. For example, it is still not certain that the Entente States (Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey) will attend the OAU Summit because of their dispute with host N'Krumah over his harboring subversives from their countries./

Afro-Asian Conference. Whether it will be held 5 November on schedule is more and more uncertain, but /whatever happens we're coming off better than we expected. The Chicoms have decided they can't make much mileage against us right now and are trying to postpone, while the anti-Sukarno coup has taken some of the starch out of the Indonesians. In fact, the Chicoms have made themselves pretty obnoxious in planning meetings in Algiers. So if the conference meets, it may be just a rump session of the more sensible neutrals who by that time will have had their fill of Chicom antics. The wider this split grows, the better off we'll be./

We don't want to crow about this. Our best tack is to continue saying it's something for the Afro-Asians to decide themselves. Then if a rump session takes place and looks as if it may treat us fairly, you may want to send friendly message.

*R.W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., Oct. 20, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Lodge's weekly report. He sheds more light this time on the shape of the political problem. In this sense, it is a better report than last week's, though the more we learn of the problem the harder the job looks.

It remains true that the good reporters coming back from Vietnam are optimistic as they have never been before. I have talked at some length with both Joe Alsop and Warren Rogers -- listened rather than talked -- and both of them are encouraging.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Wednesday, October 20, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. LODGE (Saigon 1355)

Hope you are feeling better.

1. Current Political

The most striking political news of the week was the complete failure of the Viet Cong's call for a general strike in Saigon on October 15 to inaugurate a "Hate America" month. In Saigon and throughout the countryside the population paid not the slightest attention to the strike call.

Prime Minister Ky went on the air with the first in a series of five planned fireside chats. He talked about the rising cost of living for which he blamed hoarders, speculators and the Viet Cong. He explained that the displacement of a number of families in Saigon was due to the construction of a projected new bridge which would increase access to the Port of Saigon and thereby increase the Port's cargo handling capacity. He promised that death benefits to families of deceased servicemen would be paid within a month or that full explanations would be required.

A Conference of Province Chiefs and Members of Provincial Assemblies was held to improve communication between the national and provincial levels of government. The Conference came up with a number of recommendations concerning training, standardization of salaries, and tenure for Province Chiefs, some older politicians among the provincial representatives took the occasion to circulate a petition calling on the Government of Vietnam to form an interim assembly from the Provincial Councils and to prepare for national assembly elections. This initiative aroused very little public attention.

2. Basic Political

The more I study and learn, the more impressed I am with the savage and thoroughway in which the Viet Cong has destroyed the political structure of this country. Everything that I have read about successful counter-guerrilla activity says that one must start in each hamlet by picking out a good man to be chairman of a committee of up and coming young men. In this country the "good man" all too often has had his head cut off, the grade B people have been driven out and what is left are the old and the weak and the children -- not a real community at all.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: FRUS, 64-68, vol. 3, #171  
By: js, NARA, Date: 5/5/72

The Government of Vietnam, therefore, faces the need of actually bringing in the proposed local leadership. I thought the war veterans would be a likely nucleus but I now learn that 80 percent of the war veterans are afraid to live out in the country and have gathered in the cities. We are, therefore, not just starting from scratch but starting well below scratch.

The plan to form cadres of about 200 carefully selected people with above average gumption and recruited as much as possible among men who used once to live in the village which it is planned to pacify seems sensible.

The political action teams which the CIA has formed can be the nucleus and should be a big help.

Lansdale is working on this - and on the psychological and emotional side to try to make people want a new life and stir them up a little bit with songs.

He and I think rural electrification has a great potential as something that can be done quickly -- action rather than words -- and which has a wonderful psychological effect.

As the Government of Vietnam picks its first group of 200 and pacifies -- or rather -- rebuilds--its first community, it will, of course, have the US Operations Mission resources in back of it.

I believe a few genuine successes can have profound psychological effect. We saw how radically psychology can change for the better following your decision to send US troops. I have just learned of 1400 refugees in Binh Dinh Province to whom Americans have given such confidence that they actually want to back home. A similar change as regards community building is not inconceivable. The Viet Cong clearly ~~doe~~ not expect it. But neither did they expect the capacity to destroy main force units which we have demonstrated.

Whatever we do must be durable. Dependable, local security forces must remain. The new village leaders must be protected from assassination. It is better to do nothing rather than simply recreate another pattern of terrorism and assassination.

### 3. Security

The total number of Viet Cong incidents increased for the fourth successive week reflecting largely increased acts of terrorism and increased anti-aircraft fire. The total number of actual Viet Cong attacks decreased considerably. Big U.S. sweeps in two Provinces failed to trap Viet Cong units but did keep the Viet Cong on the move, thus weakening their ability to mount attacks.

### 4. Economics

Saigon retail rice prices dropped slightly during the week, reversing a slow upward trend that had continued for over a month. The prices dropped despite a decrease in rice stocks on hand. This reflected confident expectations that PL 480 shipments will bring in sufficient rice to meet demands. However, concern continued over the increased cost of living in general and the Vietnamese piaster continued to weaken in terms of hard currencies and gold.

The Government took a number of measures against the increased cost of living. It rationed sweetened condensed milk. It withheld new price schedules, reflecting tariff increases, pending the liquidation of old stocks. It arrested and fined merchants who sold old stocks at new prices.

### 5. Psychological

The failure of the Viet Cong's call for a "Day of Revenge" to include a general strike and an "Hour of Silence" on October 15 demonstrated that the Viet Cong enjoy very little real support from the people. The failure of this effort represented a psychological defeat for the Viet Cong and this fact has not been lost on either the Vietnamese people or on foreign correspondents, particularly Asians, who were watching developments closely.

The high cost of living continued to dominate much Vietnamese thinking throughout the country.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1965

TO McGEORGE BUNDY

FROM: Bill Moyers

Announced today.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 15, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Bill Moyers

SUBJECT: Announcement on Komer and Bator

1. I enclose copies of my initial recommendation to the President on Komer and Bator, together with a copy of the draft announcement. At the time that seems appropriate to you, I should be grateful if you would raise this matter again with the President.

2. There has been no hint of a press leak on these appointments in the month that has passed since they were approved, but in the nature of things, plans of this kind do not keep quiet forever. I cleared the initial recommendations with Rusk and Ball in State, and with McNamara in Defense. I have had to inform the two individuals and Bromley Smith in my own office. In the weekend when I was away in September, a few knowledgeable people observed that Komer was on the job for me, and Smith tells me that he has picked up speculation deriving from that fact within the bureaucracy. It seems to me only a matter of time, therefore, before we get a **Whisper** or a **Periscope** item that would read, "Insiders say that Robert Komer is slated for, etc. etc.". It seems to me much cleaner to avoid this kind of stuff if we can.

3. I fully shared the President's initial judgment in September that we ought not to stir the embers of Kiker's false alarm over the causes of the Busby resignation, but that is a dead issue now, and my recommendation is that we act now while we have a clear field.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

EXCLUDED FROM  
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
NOT A TITL SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12350,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY QA ON 6-2883

29  
✓ 78b  
1-14-65  
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 14, 1965  
5:45 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Promotions in your National Security Staff

1. I am now in a position to recommend formally that you appoint Robert Komer as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. I also recommend that, at the same time if possible, you appoint Francis Bator as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Economics), (a cumbersome title, but one which is precisely accurate). I have cleared these recommendations with John Macy.

2. The best reason for recommending Bob Komer is that I do not have to tell you anything about him you do not already know. After wartime service in combat intelligence in Italy, he joined the CIA in 1947 and has been a career public servant ever since. But he is a career servant of a very unusual and energetic sort, as befits a graduate of Valenti's favorite business school. He has extraordinary range, and a steadily growing mastery of the processes of international politics. He is a tiger for work, and he has a temperament which allows him to bounce back easily when his advice is not taken. This makes him the kind of staff officer one dreams of and seldom finds.

3. Moreover, Komer is discreet. He has been dealing with knowledgeable press people for four years, and I have never known him to make a serious slip -- something which I could not claim for myself. He has the respect of the best of them, like Phil Potter. He also has the high regard of the ablest men in the Diplomatic Corps in his areas.

4. What is much more important is that he has the confidence of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, both of whom have tried to lure him away from the White House.

5. More important still is that Komer is enthusiastically loyal to you. He will give you arguments, but he will always do his energetic best to carry out your orders just as you want them executed. He will be still more effective in this latter task with the additional rank and visibility which this new appointment will give him.

6. Finally, and most important of all, Bob Komer is one of the handful of men in the Government upon whom you can rely for sound and prompt judgment in the event of a sudden crisis. He will instinctively alert the right officers and ask the right questions, and he will never hesitate to turn to you directly when he is in doubt. This set of qualities makes me confident that it is right to recommend him for an appointment which will make him the



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

senior officer on this side of the White House when I am not here. In my judgment, it is highly important that there be such an officer here, and I believe Komer is plainly the best qualified man in sight. After this new appointment is made, I expect that either Komer or I will always be on the spot here, and I would expect him to be fully informed on the broad range of National Security issues so that he can always act for me in my absence. Komer is 44.

7. The case of Bator is somewhat different, and the need for a promotion somewhat less compelling. Nevertheless, I strongly recommend that the proposed appointment be made and announced at the same time as Komer's. Francis Bator, at 40, is probably the best all-around international economist in the Government, and he has fully earned the recognition which this appointment would give him. He has won the extravagant admiration of men as different as Joe Fowler and Walter Lippmann. In the last year Bator has had a major role in the defense of the dollar, the defense of the pound, and the coordination of the Kennedy Round. Working with Joe Fowler, he has helped to make Treasury-White House relations closer and more effective than ever before. He has an analytic intelligence of a high order, but he is also a man of good practical sense. He firmly understands the role of a White House staff officer in defending and advancing the President's own interests, and he is wholly loyal to you. His promotion has the warm support of Joe Fowler and Tom Mann, who are the men he has to deal with most.

8. Bator has one disadvantage, which is that for personal reasons his family have been unable to join him in Washington. He therefore goes regularly for weekends to Massachusetts. He compensates for this disability by working morning, noon and night five days a week down here, and he has always been willing to stay over when there is any immediate economic issue to be dealt with. But there is a sense in which this arrangement, coupled with his relative lack of intense political experience, makes him more a staff than a line officer, and for that reason I think it important to distinguish his assignment from Komer's by the parenthetical word (Economics).

9. Finally, I should say a word about the administrative aspects of these appointments. Ideally, I would wish that the Deputy Special Assistant should have a salary in the range of Category IV, and a Deputy for Economics in the range of Category V. When Walt Rostow and Carl Kaysen held the Deputy's post they had the salaries of Assistant Secretaries, which would correspond to these categories. But neither Komer nor Bator is in immediate financial need, and there is no way to get such high-level appointments without

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-3-

putting their whole salaries directly on the White House budget, which I am reluctant to recommend. It is therefore my suggestion that their salaries continue to be paid, at the present GS-18 level, from the National Security Council budget, unless and until it becomes convenient to make a change. I am confident that this arrangement will be acceptable to them.

10. Both Komer and Bator have up-to-date security clearances, and neither has ever had any trouble whatever on this score.

11. I attach a brief statement which might be put out by Bill Moyers at such time as is convenient to you, although I doubt there is much news value in these appointments, except within the Government and among local Government-watchers. Alternatively, you might wish to save these announcements for your next press conference.

*m.f.B.*  
McG. B.

Go ahead ✓

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Have Moyers put out ✓

Save for press conference \_\_\_\_\_

*Con  
Ther*



DRAFT OF SUGGESTED ANNOUNCEMENT

The President today announced that he is appointing Robert W. Komer of Virginia as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Francis M. Bator of Massachusetts as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Economics).

Mr. Komer is a career officer who has served in the National Security area for 18 years. Since 1961 he has been a senior officer of the National Security Council Staff, specializing in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. He is a graduate of Harvard College and the Harvard Business School, and a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

Mr. Bator is a professional economist who has served for many years as a consultant to a number of Government, international and private organizations, including the Department of State, Treasury and Defense. In 1963-64 he served as Senior Economic Adviser to the Agency for International Development and since then he has been a senior officer of the National Security Council Staff, specializing in economic and financial problems. He is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he later took his Ph. D. and served as Associate Professor of Economics.



FRANCIS M. BATOR

Profession: Economist  
Born: August 10, 1925, Budapest, Hungary  
Education: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, S.B. '49; Ph.D. '56  
Military: 1st Lieutenant, Infantry, Army of the United States, 1944-46

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1964-65      National Security Council Staff  
1963-64      Senior Economic Advisor, Agency for International  
                 Development  
1957-63      Faculty of Economics and Center for International Studies,  
                 Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
1954-57      Senior Research Staff, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.  
1951-54      Executive Assistant to the Director, Center for International  
                 Studies, M.I.T.

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Consultant: Department of State; Treasury; Navy; Air Force; Rand  
(1951-63)    Corporation; Institute for Defense Analysis; United Nations;  
                 A. D. Little, Inc.

During the 59-60 academic year, Mr. Bator held a Guggenheim Fellowship. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, American Economic Association and the Royal Economic Society. He is the author of The Question of Government Spending (1960), and a number of technical articles.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

ROBERT WILLIAM KOMER

BORN: Chicago, Illinois - 23 February 1922

EDUCATION: SB magna cum laude, Harvard College 1942; Phi Beta Kappa. MBA, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration 1946/47.

MILITARY SERVICE: Massachusetts State Guard, US Army 1943-46; rose to 1st Lieutenant; Bronze Star. Army Combat Intelligence School, HQ Fifth Army and G-3 AFHQ in Italy

National War College 1956-57  
Presently Lieut. Col. USAR

OCCUPATION: 1947-1961 Central Intelligence Agency;  
1950-57 National Estimates Staff (head Western European Staff, head Middle East Staff, Deputy Chief of Estimates Staff, Chief of Estimates Staff.  
1957-60 Assistant for NSC Affairs to Deputy Director for Intelligence; alternate member NSC Planning Board  
1961- NSC Staff Assistant to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Married to Geraldine Peplin Komer; three children  
(Douglas 16, Richard 14, Anne 12)

*Has lectured at National War College, Foreign Service Institute and other institutions.*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, 7:00 p.m.  
October 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aircraft for Argentina

Last May, DOD, with Secretary McNamara's approval, reached an understanding with the Argentine Ministry of Defense for the sale of 50 of our Navy A-4B aircraft to help them modernize their Air Force. Our offer to help the Argentines came after we learned that they were considering bids for very expensive French planes. We did not want French influence in the Argentine Air Force. Since the Argentines were determined to acquire fighters, we wanted to see them do it at a price more nearly commensurate with their ability to pay. (The French "Mirage" fighter costs 2 to 3 times more than the A-4B.) Another consideration was the desire to maintain standardization of Latin American military equipment with ours.

The Argentines have reached agreement with the Douglas Aircraft Corporation on cost of modification and overhaul of the aircraft and now are ready to conclude the necessary credit agreements with us.

In our 1966 Military Assistance Program for Latin America, there is an item for \$2.5 million in grant assistance to Argentina for spare parts and support equipment for use in connection with the A-4B's. Use of MAP grant funds for training and support assistance has been standard practice in the Latin American area and is designed to help the recipient government maintain and obtain maximum use of its equipment.

In view of your desire to review commitments of this nature, I wanted to obtain your authorization before Defense proceeds to formalize the transaction. I recommend that you authorize me to tell Defense that they may go ahead.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Proceed with the transaction ☒

Hold up for further review ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 31 #125  
By JC, NARA, Date 51578



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 20, 1965  
10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

I attach two papers which need Presidential approval. I think both are straightforward.

The first is a matter of a legally required determination for military requirements in Vietnam. It has the concurrence of State, Defense, Budget, and AID, and would allow an additional drawdown of \$300 million worth of defense articles from Defense Department stocks.

The second is a matter of military assistance to Argentina to support a purchase of Navy A-4B aircraft. It is approved by State and Defense, and is essentially a routine operation to ensure a US dollar sale as against a French competitor, but I think the President wants to see all FY 66 aid expenditures, and this is one of them. The terms as worked out last spring seem to me a little easy on the Argentinians, and I have suggested that we bargain a little more tightly in the future -- but that puts me in the position of second-guessing McNamara, who personally approved this operation in May.

Both of these need to be done within the next few days, if possible.

*McG B*

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ enclosure

21

SHASTRI

✓ Brandy

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AURANGABAD, INDIA (AP)-PRIME MINISTER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAID TODAY HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES "BUT I AM NOT SURE WHEN I CAN GO."

SHASTRI MADE THE STATEMENT TO NEWSMEN IN THIS WEST CENTRAL INDIAN TOWN BEFORE LEAVING FOR NEW DELHI AFTER A TWO-DAY VISIT.

SHASTRI WAS SCHEDULED TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN JUNE BUT THE WHITE HOUSE ASKED HIM TO POSTPONE THE TRIP BECAUSE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS TOO BUSY WITH CONGRESSIONAL MATTERS AND THE VIET NAM CRISIS. THE WHITE HOUSE SUGGESTED THAT SHASTRI PLANS TO VISIT IN THE FALL.

LT951AED10/19

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Shastri visit and the Indian food pipeline

1. The attached cable from Bowles shows that a great deal has been accomplished with Shastri by your policy of the last 3 or 4 months. It also shows Bowles doing a good job of representing the U. S. and not India. It confirms what we have heard from B. K. Nehru and others -- that Shastri is very eager to come and see you in December. In my judgment, it also confirms the prospect that such a meeting would be productive for us.

2. I have told Nehru that, for obvious reasons, no definite plans are now being made, and I think this will keep until you are ready to decide it.

3. The one thing which does need to be watched is the food pipeline. On September 23 you authorized a one-month extension, and by the end of this week we will face that same problem again. While there is some sentiment in the bureaucracy for a longer agreement, my own feeling is that it is much better simply to renew for another month, on the same basis, thus keeping the situation as it is, with a short rein. The Indians understand increasingly that they really have not performed on their own side of the agricultural bargain, and as long as the pipeline does not actually break, I see no harm in this month-to-month process. I have discussed this matter with Clark Clifford, and he asked me to tell you that he strongly agrees with the month-by-month procedure for the present.

4. I am sending this memorandum by Jack Valenti so that he can get your judgment at the time most convenient to you.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-377  
By *ju*, NARA, Date *2-18-94*

804

October 19, 1965  
Tuesday, 11:30 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ - LD

CABLE FROM AMB. BOWLES, NEW DELHI (1025)

On Saturday evening, October 16, I had a frank leisurely 45 minute talk with Shastri at his Minister of External Affairs office which, I believe, may be productive in several ways. Because of the special importance of the Prime Minister's views at this particular moment I shall report our exchange in some detail.

(1) Although the Prime Minister cannot go to the U.S. in November because of Parliament which starts on November 3 and adjourns about December 10, he is considering a visit immediately after this adjournment provided (and he emphasized this) that the President really wants to see him.

He does not want to go primarily to make a speech at the UN because he 'doesn't want to appear to be debating with Bhutto.' If he goes to the U.S. to see President Johnson it is my guess that he may end up with a speech at the UN but he would like the latter to appear as a by-product.

Shastri also said he is anxious to avoid the impression that he is "competing with Ayub Khan for U.S. favors," and therefore is hopeful that his own visit can take place before that of the Pakistan President. Finally, as a general matter, he is concerned about the kind of personal reception he will get in the U.S. "I am sure," he said, "the State Department has no desire to see me."

This unreasonable sensitivity is the result, I believe, of several factors: (a) his lingering disappointment over the postponed visit last spring, (b) negative reporting which I suspect B. K. Nehru is sending back from Washington, and (c) generally anti-Indian coloration of news stories that appear in Time, U.S. News and some American papers which are widely reproduced here in India and which he carefully reads.

Shastri believes that in spite of the fact that it was Pakistan's aggression into Kashmir that set off the recent conflict, India is in the U.S. dog house for reasons that are unclear to him and he feels uncertain as to what to do.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority 7c J 90-95  
By ry/122, NARA, Date 8-27-92

~~SECRET~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - 2 -

I strongly urged him to go, stressing that his doubts were unfounded and that he would receive the warmest personal welcome, not only from the White House but also from my colleagues in the Department of State and other agencies of our Government. If, as he believes, there are certain misunderstandings between us, it is all the more important that he go and straighten them out.

(2) Shastri remarked that every thoughtful Indian understands that the U.S. has helped India more than has any other nation; U.S. attitudes over the years have built up tremendous good will in India for the U.S. However, there is now a strong conviction, which he shares, that U.S. policies have suddenly changed. Is this true and if so what is the reason?

I agreed that this feeling did exist in India but stressed that it is unjustified. Long before the Rann of Kutch incident last spring, President Johnson had decided carefully to examine our aid program in all countries of the world, and particularly those in South Asia which absorb a good part of our funds. The President was anxious to know what precisely our programs were accomplishing, how they could be improved, and whether the recipient nations were doing everything within their power to help themselves. I had told the Prime Minister of this study last April and expressed the personal belief that this review was not only justified, but overdue.

I also reminded the Prime Minister that on my return from the U.S. early in August I had told him of the progress of this examination, stressed that it was in the interest of both India and the U.S., and pointed out that our goal is not to keep India on a permanent U.S. aid dole but to help develop in India an economic formula which could enable it to become self-sufficient in both food and industrial development within a ten-year period. Consequently, the current emphasis of the Indian Government on the need to stand on its own feet is fully endorsed by the U.S. Government.

The flow of economic assistance already contracted for has continued in spite of the Pakistan/India conflict and over 60 grain ships from the U.S. arrived in India in the month of September. We expect the same number in October, November and December.

The only reason the flow of U.S. grain has been on a month to month basis has been concern in Washington that India may not have done enough to increase its own agricultural output.

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I also pointed out that two-thirds of our U.S. overseas grain shipments are now sold for hard currency. Thus we are particularly anxious that our PL 480 grain shipments are not allowed to become a permanent crutch; rather we see them as a temporary program to assist the recipient country while it is achieving food grain self-sufficiency.

As far as the Pakistan/India crisis was concerned, we are not using our aid to pressure the Indian Government. We are, however, anxious to know the total war damage and to make sure our economic assistance is not diverted to other excessive defense expenditures.

Shastri expressed his appreciation for my frank presentation and stated that nothing I said appeared unreasonable to him.

(3) I then suggested that while it is important that America better understand India, it was also important that India understand America. For years we have carried a heavy load in an effort to achieve world stability. We have taken grave risks to keep Germany from falling into the hands of the Russians, and to keep the Russians out of Cuba. We made major commitments of American lives and material, first in the Korean War and now in Vietnam.

Developing countries whose energies are naturally concentrated on their own urgent problems have not fully understood the scope of this effort. I was gratified that India had developed a much better understanding of our commitment to world stability because of our common concern over the expansionist aims of China. I did not mean to claim that America always did the right thing at the right moment, but we were earnestly working for a peaceful world and for a free and prosperous India, and we sometimes wondered if this is adequately appreciated.

No thoughtful American, I added, begrudged India her good relations with the Soviets. Indeed, if India can persuade the Russian leaders to give up their outdated Leninist thinking, it will be a great step forward for us all. If India can build a bridge between the U.S. and the USSR, better still. A good place to start would be in South Vietnam where India and America have a common stake, and where the Russians right now are particularly unhelpful.

China, however, is a different story. India was prepared to fight China along her Northern Frontier and I assumed would also fight to preserve the independence not only of Nepal, but also of Burma on India's vulnerable 700-mile Eastern border.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION



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Shastri said these thoughts were very much in his own mind. Above all, however, the Soviets and China must be kept apart.

I agreed that this was an important objective, but suggested that the end result was beyond the control of either the Indians or ourselves. The Soviets have a long and vulnerable border with China. When Mao dies they will make a major effort to re-establish a working political and perhaps even military relationship with China. If they succeed this agreement inevitably will be at the expense of India as well as the U.S.

Thus, while it was reasonable for India to cultivate the Soviets, it would not be wise to trust them too far. Here in India right now the Soviet wing of the Communist Party is doing everything possible to undercut the Congress Party and to discredit American efforts to help India become economically independent.

(4) Shastri then brought the conversation back to the press and public opinion. That morning he had read the Times of India story criticizing India's handling of the press during the military emergency. He asked how we handled such matters in the U.S. and I described our military information system and its operation in Vietnam.

I then expressed my concern over recent criticisms of the U.S. by members of his Government which I said are easily misunderstood. If the Prime Minister should read in the newspaper that Secretary McNamara, Secretary Udall, or Secretary Freeman had made speeches critical of India he would assume that these comments must have the approval of President Johnson. Just so, when members of his own Cabinet or key members of the Congress Party make speeches critical of America, it may be assumed rightly or wrongly that they must reflect the Prime Minister's views.

Shastri agreed in principle but said he was not conscious that members of his Cabinet had criticized the U.S. I replied that while I would prefer not to go into specifics I would send quotes illustrating what I meant if he wished to see them. He asked how this situation was controlled in the U.S. and I explained the White House speech clearing system. Shastri said one of the difficulties here is that very few Indian officials write out their speeches in advance. Usually they speak to large audiences extemporaneously with a consequent risk of being misquoted.

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(5) Before closing the conversation I again brought up the matter of Shastri's trip to the U.S. He agreed on balance that a trip was essential and stated that I had greatly eased his doubts. He would again talk it over with his associates and ask L. K. Jha to let me know in a few days whether he can come around the tenth of December, provided, of course, that this time is convenient for President Johnson and provided no new emergency develops. He would want to come only three or four days, leaving a longer visit for a milder season.

Comment: Shastri talked freely and confidently, but he seemed genuinely puzzled regarding the itchy relationship with the U.S.

Under the circumstances, I believe it is particularly important that Shastri come to the U.S. as soon as possible and that his visit should be arranged to give him the maximum sense of personal confidence. A successful visit at this time would take much of the steam out of current irresponsible Left Wing criticism of the U.S. and give Shastri more elbow room to deal with problems of mutual interest. The longer we postpone the resolving of key issues the more difficult our task may become.

The mood of Shastri is illustrated by a speech he made yesterday before more than one million people in Bombay: "We can't fight our enemies," he said, "living on borrowed food. The time has come for us to live on what is produced in our own country. India is deeply grateful to the United States for the help she has given India over the past years through PL 480. But how long can we continue on the generosity of others? If we do so we will risk the most basic thing of all, our self respect as a nation." This is not said in a sense of arrogance, but out of a genuine determination to stand on their own feet, a desire which Americans, of all people, should respect and welcome.

BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) seems more imminent than ever. In the Congo, President Kasavubu has dismissed the Tshombe government, appointing another Katangese, Evariste Kimba, to form a new government. Both events cause concern for the political stability in the respective areas. [Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use.]

Rhodesia. Prime Minister Smith has said that his cabinet will shortly announce a decision on UDI. The top UK diplomat in Salisbury thinks UDI will come by the end of this week. Meanwhile, the UK continued its deterrent efforts by sending a delegation of British businessmen to Salisbury to emphasize the economic consequences of UDI. [The UK is also considering a direct appeal by the Queen to the Rhodesian people.]

Meanwhile, Smith rejected the UK's proposal for a Commonwealth Summit Mission. In Washington today, Rhodesia's Minister to the US (still attached to the UK Embassy) held a press conference during which he announced that he expected to be asked by the US and UK to leave when UDI is declared.

We continue to follow the British lead. [At their suggestion, we may shortly release the text of our warning to Smith as an additional UDI deterrent.] Our anti-UDI position in the UN and our vote for the resolution (which we drafted) condemning UDI in the General Assembly have gained the warm praise of the Afro-Asians as well as most other delegations.

Nevertheless, the mood in Salisbury is reported to be increasingly militant. So we may soon find ourselves confronted with supporting whatever measures the UK may take against Rhodesia once UDI is declared.

Congo. Kasavubu finally decided to fire Tshombe and has given an estranged former Katangan associate of his the job of forming a government. Tshombe has refused to participate. If he can keep his parliamentary majority, he might block confirmation to show his own strength and lay the groundwork for unseating Kasavubu in next year's presidential election. If Kasavubu tries to keep him from competing constitutionally, Tshombe could either try to mount a coup with his mercenaries or hole up in Katanga again as he did in 1961-63. So far it looks as if he'll try the constitutional arena first.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-14  
By SJ NARA, Date 10-23-02

~~SECRET~~



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/Our efforts to stave off this break failed because Kasavubu just isn't sensitive to the kind of influence we have. His chief interest is in staying in power, which he does by manipulating tribal policies. So he doesn't really care whether we cut aid or pull out our planes. We're counselling Tshombe not to kick off a civil war, but if he can play out the political game, we might well decide his unseating Kasavubu legally would suit our interests. We want to wait a few more days to see how things break, but we have State thinking through our options in the meantime./

Fortunately, the last organized rebel stronghold has fallen, and mercenaries have begun mopping up smaller centers.

Organization of African Unity Summit Meeting. The OAU Foreign Ministers are meeting at Accra in preparation for the Summit Meeting due on 21 October. UDI is the top priority item on the OAU agenda. Already reports indicate that the African states are considering withdrawing their funds from British banks if the UK fails to take a strong stand. Kenya's representative has gone so far as to urge the African states to prepare for war.

/Unanimity of African opinion on UDI may completely overshadow the basic disunity that exists within the OAU. For example, it is still not certain that the Entente States (Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey) will attend the OAU Summit because of their dispute with host N'Krumah over his harboring subversives from their countries./

Afro-Asian Conference. Whether it will be held 5 November on schedule is more and more uncertain, but /whatever happens we're coming off better than we expected. The Chicoms have decided they can't make much mileage against us right now and are trying to postpone, while the anti-Sukarno coup has taken some of the starch out of the Indonesians. In fact, the Chicoms have made themselves pretty obnoxious in planning meetings in Algiers. So if the conference meets, it may be just a rump session of the more sensible neutrals who by that time will have had their fill of Chicom antics. The wider this split grows, the better off we'll be./

We don't want to crow about this. Our best tack is to continue saying it's something for the Afro-Asians to decide themselves. Then if a rump session takes place and looks as if it may treat us fairly, you may want to send friendly message.

R. W. Komer

cc: McGB  
RWK  
Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

McGB<sup>82</sup>

To Pres  
15 Oct 1965  
via Sit Room

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 15, 1965  
5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

President Leon M'Ba of Gabon wrote you to ask that US officials receive a high-level mission to discuss possible US participation in a World Bank consortium to finance a railroad from the coast to the iron-rich interior. Total cost of the railroad is estimated at \$140 million, to which Gabon is asking us to contribute \$30 million as a long-term loan.

Its mineral and timber resources make tiny Gabon one of the few economically viable states in Africa. A consortium of Bethlehem Steel and European steel producers has already invested \$5 million in the exploration of its large, high grade iron ore deposits. But construction of a 400-mile railroad to the sea is essential to exploitation.

The mission referred to in the M'Ba letter has already held fruitful discussions with State and AID officials. On the face of it, this looks like a wise investment. However, the attached friendly non-committal reply only tells M'Ba that we'll carefully consider participation in financing any railroad.

R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*cc signed by dkg.B*

cc: McGB  
RWK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-377  
By         , NARA, Date 2-8-94



Oct. 19, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your friendly letter about the Mekambo railroad project. I can assure you that this subject will receive our thoughtful consideration.

In response to your request, principal officers of the Department of State and AID have already held discussions with the Ministers of the Government of Gabon and other members of the Mission on October 5 and 6. I believe that these talks were useful to both our governments in clarifying various aspects of the proposed project.

I am aware of your great desire to tap your country's mineral resources and to encourage the economic development of the interior. The United States Government will carefully consider participation in an international consortium to carry forward this great endeavor.

With cordial good wishes,

Sincerely,

CBF

His Excellency  
Leon M'Ba  
President of the Republic of Gabon  
Libreville

LBJ:UH:em (typed 10/15/65)  
cc: McGB  
RWK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01



10-16-65  
1:05 p

✓ 83

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Friday, October 15, 1965  
4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Conference on U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical  
Science Program, Honolulu, Oct. 4-7, 1965

The first planning conference of the U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program which arose from your discussion with Prime Minister Sato, was held in Honolulu between October 4 and 7. There were about 80 participants from the two countries.

Five Joint Panels on cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, schistosomiasis and filariasis, and virus diseases met during the first three days and presented their programs and priorities to a plenary session on the fourth day.

In the case of cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy and virus diseases, emphasis will be on finding new and improved methods of immunization as the most direct method of reducing disease incidence.

For the parasitic diseases, schistosomiasis and filariasis, this approach is not feasible at present, but much can be done through control of the vectors (snails and mosquitoes, respectively) and through improved chemotherapy.

At the organizing meeting of the Joint Committee in Tokyo in April 1965, we raised the problem of malnutrition for inclusion in the program. The Japanese wished to delay decision on its inclusion until the October meeting in Honolulu. Meanwhile, NIH convened a 5-man working group which developed a program for presentation to the Joint U.S. -Japan Committee. The Joint Committee has now agreed to include malnutrition in the program.

New developments in the genetics and breeding of grains to improve the nutritional quality of their proteins appear to offer truly exciting prospects

for the relief of protein malnutrition in Asian populations, especially of infants and children in whom malnutrition is most critical. We intend to push hard at these prospects in our domestic program. The Japanese will restrict their activities to the more medical aspects.

The six chairmen of the U.S. Panels will meet with NIH staff within the next three weeks to define more precisely the steps to be taken to implement our part of the Joint Program and to prepare budgetary estimates.

The general atmosphere of the Honolulu meeting was very cordial. I believe we can look forward to effective collaboration with the Japanese as well as a sharpening of objectives in our domestic programs. Our own research in all of these diseases will have to be increased and we hope the Japanese will be stimulated to do likewise. Recruitment of new scientific talent in all six fields of study is essential for rapid progress.



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1965 OCT 16 AM 9 47