

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Confidential <i>open 4-23-14 NLJ/12AC 12-181 P</i>	12/31/65	A
#2 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. Secret <i>open 4-23-14 NLJ 96-103 4 p</i>	12/31/65	A
#3 memo	to the Preisident from W. Averell Harriman Secret <i>Sanitized 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180 2 p</i>	12/23/65	A
#3a memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret 1 p	12/17/65	A
#3b message	Embtel 1456 re: Dominican Republic Secret 4 p <i>(dup. #34, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 6 - Sanitized Attd la 5/22/77)</i>	12/17/--	A
#4 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy Secret <i>open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239 2 p</i>	12/30/65	A
#5 memo	to the President from Bromley Smith Secret <i>open 4-23-14 NLJ/12AC 12-187 1 p</i>	12/30/65	A
XXXXXX	to the President from McGeorge Bundy		
#7 memo	Confidential 1 p	12/29/65	A
#7a bio sketch	re: Brazil confidential 2 p	12/65	A
#8 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 5-21-12 1 p</i>	12/28/65	A
#9 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential <i>open 5-21-12 2 p</i>	12/28/65	A
#10 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential <i>open 5-21-12 2 p</i>	12/28/65	A
#11 memo	to the President from R. W. komer secret 1 p	12/28/65	A
#12 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret 1 p	12/28/65	A
#12b report	CSDB-312/02964-65 Secret 2 p	12/20/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, [REDACTED]
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 17

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#12d memo	to Mr. Solomon from Richard N. Cooper open 12/17/02 Confidential 6 p	12/17/65	A
#12e	"Zambian Contingency Exercise possible classif. info. No date A-open 12/17/02		
#13 memo	to the President from Komer 2p Secret open 5-21-12 1 p	12/28/65	A
#16 memo	to the President from Bundy Secret open 8-15-84 NLS 83-184 1 p	12/27/65	A
#21 letter	to Prime Minister Harold Wilson Secret open 2/6/98 2 p	12/23/65	A
#21a report	The Nuclear Question Secret open 12-1-99 NLS 98-164 4 p	12/20/65	A
#26 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open 8-13-98 NLS 97-145 1 p	12/21/65	A
#26a letter	to Ayub from President Johnson Secret open 8-13-98 NLS 97-145 1 p	12/21/65	A
#27 memo	to the President from McG. B. Top Secret 1 p	12/20/65	A
#27a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Top Secret open 8-13-98 NLS 97-145 1 p Attempt 09-23-99 NLS 98-266	12/20/65	A
#28 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open 8-28-92 1 p	12/20/65	A
#29a memo	Comments on the President's three foreign visitors possible classif. information 2 p when 4-23-14 NLS 12-187	12/20/65	A
#30 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 1 p	12/20/65	A
#31 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 2 p	12/20/65	A
#31a memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy confidential open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 1 p	02/20/65	A
#32 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy confidential 1 p	12/20/65	A
#33b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Top Secret open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371 2 p	12/19/65	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#33c memcon	re: Vietnam secret open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371 4 p	12/16/65	A
#34 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential open 311-05NLS 04-117 1 p	12/18/65	A
#34a letter	to King Constantine from President Johnson confidential open 311-05NLS 04-117 1 p	12/18/65	A
#35 memo	to President from R. W. Komer top secret open 5-21-12 1 p	12/18/65	A
#36 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential 1 p	12/17/65	A
#37 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 confidential 1 p	12/17/65	A
#38 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 11/24/09 Secret 1 p	12/17/65	A
#39 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 Confidential 1 p	12/17/65	A
#41 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential open 5-21-12 1 p	12/17/65	A
#42 memo	for the record from McG. B. open 2-14-00 NLS 99-285 Secret 3 p	12/17/65	A
#43a memo	to the President from McG. B. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-503 secret Exempt per NLS 84-136 1 p	11/28/65	A
#43b letter	to the President from Arthur Goldberg top secret sanitized 4-9-85 NLS 84-136 2 p	11/20/65	A
#43c letter	translation of letter from Fanfani top secret 2 p	11/20/65	A
#43d letter	to Fanfani from Dean Rusk open 4-9-85 NLS 84-136 secret 4 p	undated	A
#46 cable	text of Paris Sec 14 secret 1 p	12/16/65	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#44 memo <i>sanitized RA 7-16-83</i>	to the President from McG. B. Secret possible classified information 1 p	12/16/65	A
#44a report <i>declass 2-10-04 NLS 03-246</i>	CSDB 312 312/02910-65 Secret <i>declass 01-19-05-3 (12/01)</i> 2 p	undated	A
#46 cable <i>OPEN 7-16-03</i>	Text of Paris Secto 14 Secret 1 p	12/16/65	A
#47b memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy Secret <i>OPEN 5/29/98</i> 3 p	12/16/65	A
#47d memo	to the President from George W. Ball Secret <i>Sanitized open 1-10-11 NLS/RAC 10-58</i> 2 p	undated	A
#48a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 4-28-14 NLS/RAC 12-187</i> 1 p	12/16/65	A
#49a memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>Sanitized 11-26-84</i> 3 p	12/16/65	A
#50 memo	to the President from Arthur H. Dean Secret <i>open 8-28-92</i> 1 p	12/15/65	A
#51 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Sanitized NLS 589-01</i> 2 p	12/15/65	A
#51a communique	Draft Joint Communique Confidential 1 p	12/15/65	A
#53 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 5-21-12</i> 1 p	12/15/65	A
#54 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 5-25-90 NLS 88-17</i> 1 p	12/14/65	A
#54a report	re: AID program confidential <i>open 6-19-03</i> 7 p	undated	A
#54b chart	proposed programs <i>open 6-19-03</i> confidential <i>Dup. # 5b NSF Files of Hamilton 'Non Committee on Foreign Aid' Box 4</i> 1 p	11/16/65 xxxxxx	A
#54c chart	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx comparison programs confidential <i>Dup. # 5d, as above, open 6-19-03</i> 1 p	11/10/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the PRESIDENT, VOL. ~~XX~~ 17

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55 memo	to the President from McG. B. top secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 2 p	12/14/65	A
#56 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret 1 p	12/14/65	A
#56a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 5-21-12</i> 1 p	12/14/65	A
#57a memo	to the McGB from Rick Haynes <i>open 7-30-84 NLJ 84-135</i> confidential 1 p	12/14/65	A
#58 memo	Checklist of Talking Points with Ayub (possible classif. info.)	12/14/65	A
#60 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret <i>sanitized 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239</i> 3 p <i>same sanit per RAC 9/01</i>	12/10/65	A
#61 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 1 p	12/09/65	A
#62 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>open 3-22-93 NLJ 91-231</i> 1 p	12/09/65	A
#63a memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	12/09/65	A
#63b memo	to Mr. Bundy from Chester L. Cooper confidential 1 p	12/09/65	A
#64 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. <i>sanitized 3-28-90 NLJ 89-216</i> secret 1 p	12/09/65	A
#64b report	re: Vietnam <i>open 8-20-92 NLJ 92-371</i> secret 8 p	12/08/65	A
#65 memo	duplicate #64		
#66a memo	to Mr. Bundy from Chester L. Cooper confidential 1 p	12/09/65	A
#67 memo	to President from Bundy top secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 3p	12/06/65	A
#67a report	re: Vietnam top secret 3 p <i>sanitize 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i>	undated	A

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National Security File,
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 17

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#67b report	re: Vietnam <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i> top secret 2 p	12/06/65	A
#67e report	re: Vietnam <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i> top secret 4 p	12/06/65	A
#68 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy top secret 2 p	12/04/65	A
#69 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy top secret <i>open 5-21-12</i> 2 p	12/04/65	A
#70 memo #71	to the President from McG. Bundy secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 1 p	12/04/65	A
#71a memo	to Mac from John T. McNaughton secret <i>open 11-19-90 NLJ 90-223</i> 1 p	12/04/65	A
#72 memo	for President from McGeorge Bundy top secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 3 p	12/03/65	A
#74 memo	to the President from Bundy secret <i>open 4-23-14 NLJ/rac 12-187</i> 1 p	12/01/65	A
#78 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. Confidential <i>open 4-23-14 NLJ/rac 12-187</i> 1 p	11/30/65	A
#79a memo	McGeorge Bundy to Sec. Rusk (Sanitized) 4p <i>open 5/21/12</i>	11/30/65	C
#82 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>Sanitized, NLJ 89-11</i> 1 p	11/29/65	A
#82a report	re: Pakistan confidential 1 p	11/29/65	A
#84 cable	for the President from Bundy secret <i>open 4-28-14 NLJ/rac 12-187</i> 2 p	11/27/65	A
#84b cable	text of cable to Eugene Black from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i> 3 p	11/27/65	A
#84c cover memo	to Valenti for the President from Mr. Bundy Secret	11/27/65	A

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#85 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Open 2/6/98</i>	11/27/65	A
#85a memo	to the President from Maxxx Dean Rusk confidential <i>Open 2/6/98</i>	11/26/65	A
#86 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy top secret <i>Sanitized</i>	11/27/65	A
#86a report	re: Vietnam <i>Open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i> top secret	undated	A
#87 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. confidential <i>Open 1/8/83</i>	11/25/65	A
#87a cable	copy of New Delhi 1333 confidential <i>Open 8-28-92 NLJ 9095</i> <i>Sanitize 8-15-84 NLJ 83-180</i>	11/25/65	A
#88 memo	to Jacobsen for the President from Bundy confidential <i>Open 11-28-10 NLJ/RAC 10-57</i>	11/25/65	A
#89 memo	to Jacobsen for the President from Bundy secret <i>Open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239</i>	11/25/65	A
#90 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	11/25/65	A
#90a cable	copy of New Delhi 1333 confidential	11/25/65	A
#92 memo	to the President from McG. B. top secret <i>Open 3-28-90 NLJ 89-216</i>	11/25/65	A
#92a memo	Memorandum of conversation by McG. B. top secret <i>Open 11-28-10 NLJ/RAC 10-57</i>	11/24/65	A
#95 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	11/22/65	A
#96 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret	11/21/65	A
#101a memo	for Mr. Bundy from Chester L. Cooper secret <i>Open 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i>	11/19/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#102 memo	re: Vietnam by Chester Cooper secret <i>sanitized 8-15-84 NLJ 83-184</i> 9 p <i>11/20/01 019-005-3 (12101)</i>	undated	A
#29b letter	Mohammad Ayub Khan to Mr. Secretary possible classified information 1p	12/20/65	A

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*Read
Ranef
12-31-65
11:45p*

MEMORANDUM

F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, December 31, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recognition of the Government of Guyana and
Establishment of an Embassy

I recommend approval of both recommendations made by
Secretary Rusk in the attached memorandum.

On the question of the person who should be named Amba-
sador to Guyana, which will be the subject of a separate memo-
randum, we need to look for someone who can work his way into
the confidence of Prime Minister Burnham as Ellsworth Bunker
has done with Garcia Godoy. The inexperienced Burnham, faced
with a country as divided as Guyana is, will need much sound
political advice and a strong shoulder on which to lean.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-187

By LULB NARA, Date 04-23-2014

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Recd
Ranck
12-31-65
11-45p*

~~SECRET~~

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Friday, December 31, 1965
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Averell Harriman and I owe you an interim report on the effort to get troops from Brazil to Vietnam. With your permission we separated the \$150 million program loan from the issue of troops, but in the same meeting in which Gordon told Castelo Branco about the loan, he made a very strong pitch on the troops and made it clear how much this matters to you. Castelo promised to give the matter his prayerful consideration. He pointed out that under the Brazilian Constitution Congressional approval is required before troops can be sent abroad and the Brazilian Congress does not reconvene before March. Gordon and our excellent military attache General Walters (who are very close to Castelo Branco) are following up on this and although it is clear that Castelo faces a bigger and harder political problem than Harriman and I thought possible, Gordon and Walters think that in time a Branco contribution in some form can be worked out.

Just before Christmas Harriman submitted to me a memorandum for you on this subject, but he asked me to hold it to see whether we would get something more from the Brazilians in the next few days. Nothing new and startling has come in and the above report is the essence as it now stands.

h.f.B.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-103
By C6, NARA Date 3-2-97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory review
Case # NLJ 83-180
Document # 3

SANITIZED 5428 3

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1.3(a)(B)

December 23, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On the plane back to Washington from the Ranch on Friday afternoon, December 10, I discussed with Bob McNamara the potential for new flags and additional military contributions to Viet-Nam. I also reviewed the problem with Dean Rusk on my return. It was agreed that both Secretaries would discuss the possibility of a Greek and Turkish military contribution at the NATO Meeting in Paris, and that other NATO countries would be encouraged to increase their material assistance. As you know, Dean made a vigorous speech at NATO, urging that NATO Members make a greater effort in support of South Vietnam. Dean's initiative will be followed up with each country, as you did with Erhard.

As to the Far East, Hubert Humphrey will take up the question of a Philippine military contribution with the new Philippine President, and will discuss getting a second division from Korea when he visits Seoul. These Korean negotiations are already under way.

I talked with the Australian Ambassador here last week and our Embassy in Canberra has been in touch with the Australian Government. []

1.3(a)(B)

[]
The manner in which Thailand can be most helpful is being reviewed. As you know, the Thais are giving us the fullest possible cooperation in the use of their facilities.

In Latin America, Brazil is the first case. Ambassador Gordon explained to President Castelo Branco that while the

program loan

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 83-180
By us, NARS, Date 8-15-84

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-2-

program loan decision was not contingent on a Brazilian military contribution in Viet-Nam, it was expected that Castelo Branco would make every effort to help in Vietnam. In a long and serious conversation with Castelo on December 15th he explained our position in great detail. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gordon and our military attache, General Walters, will follow this up closely and, although keenly aware of the political problems Castelo faces, they are hopeful that a Brazilian contribution in some form can be worked out.

We will take up with each of the other Latin American countries on a case by case basis the kind of contribution each might be induced to make.

As far as Africa is concerned, all hands agree that there is no possibility of a contribution from any African country particularly at this time with the preoccupation over Southern Rhodesia.

On Iran, Dean feels that a military contribution might stir up the Russians and that it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. We are, however, going after Iran for a military-medical team on a large enough scale to take care of one Province. The senior USOM Public Health officer in Saigon, General Humphreys, will go to Iran to work out the details.

I will continue to keep in close touch with the Regional Bureaus to see that the maximum effort is made to get more flags and more assistance, military or material, as well as to try to get more publicity on what is being done.

Dean thinks that it might be useful for me to make a trip in January to certain European countries, possibly including Yugoslavia. Based on my talks with Tito last summer, there is a possibility that he might be induced to exert his influence on Moscow to persuade the Soviets to take greater initiative with Hanoi to come to the negotiating table. It might also be useful to stop off in the North African countries and Iran.

W. Averell Harriman

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SECRET - NODIS

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR GORDON TO THE DEPARTMENT
(Embassy's telegram 1456, December 17)

1. President Castello Branco received me for a full hour's talk late Wednesday afternoon. After an exchange of courtesies, complimentary references to Ambassador-designate Leitao da Cunha, and rapid disposition of the point on timing of the change of Commander of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic, President said that the agenda was mine.

2. I said I had two matters, the second being especially grave. Then for about ten minutes I explained the problems involved in authorization of 150 million program loan, including budgetary, balance of payments, and inflationary pressures on the United States Government; the economic impact of Viet-Nam; procedures for personal Presidential reviews; general admiration in the United States Government for Brazilian self-help and reform measures but technical doubts as to effective transferability of the full 150 million; consequent divided counsels as to the amount; and Presidential decision favoring 150 million because of the President's deep personal interest in seeing him get Brazil back on its feet.

3.



SANTITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Authority State ltr 2/22/77
By sg/kg, NARA, Date 8/28/92

Pages 2, 3, and 4 are completely sanitized.

*File
Ramp
12-31-65
11:45p*

MEMORANDUM

L

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 30, 1965
6:00 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Some Latin American Developments

✓
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copy in regular file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-239
By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93

During the period from Christmas to Twelfth Night, the Latin Americans are supposed to forget about political shenanigans. This year it has been different. Plotting of coups and counter-coups have continued in Guatemala and broken out in El Salvador, Ecuador and Bolivia.

The plotting does not appear to have reached serious proportions in any of the countries. Our efforts in Guatemala have helped to stabilize a situation which was deteriorating rapidly two weeks ago. There are still two months before elections. We cannot guarantee that the situation will not become unstuck. But so far, President Peralta is holding his own, and he is confident that he can take the country to elections on March 6.

In El Salvador, plotting against the Rivera Government emerged very suddenly and unexpectedly this week. President Rivera, being a decisive and energetic type, moved quickly against the coup leaders, sending some into exile and detaining and admonishing others. This situation looks as if it is well in hand.

The problem in Ecuador stems from rivalries within the Air Force and unrest over the delay in setting a date for presidential elections. The Military Junta has announced that elections will be held on June 5, 1966, with the campaign to start on April 1. This should take some of the steam out of the plotters.

The plotting in Bolivia turns out to have an odd twist: to force Junta Co-President Barrientos to set a date for elections. He had been dragging his feet on this matter while trying to establish a political base for his own candidacy. The first reports of moves against him by military elements, assisted by one of the political parties, appeared designed to oust Barrientos. Our Charge reported this afternoon that what is involved is a maneuver to force him to fix a time for national elections. The Cabinet has approved July 1966. Barrientos is supposed to make the announcement tomorrow.

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- 2 -

Cuban Refugee Program. The airlift of Cuban refugees which began December 1, will have brought by tomorrow approximately 3,350 persons in its first month of operation. This is within the 3-4,000 monthly average which we set in the negotiations with the Cubans. HEW tells us that around 60% of the new arrivals have already been resettled outside the Miami area.

Secretary Gardner has organized an inter-departmental task force, which is concentrating on measures to keep the impact of the new refugee movements on the Miami area to a minimum. Miami-Dade county community leaders responded by establishing a local task force to work with the Federal group. In contrast with their earlier criticism and gloomy predictions, the Miami press has published articles complimentary of the way Federal authorities have handled the new influx. Congressman Michael Feighan (Chairman of the House Immigration Subcommittee) last week spoke of the refugee movement as "one of the shining stars in today's strife-torn world."

The mood may change as the number of refugees increase. But, we are off to a good start. The situation requires careful monitoring. Secretary Gardner's task force is now set up to do this. Meanwhile, Castro continues to show signs of his discomfort over our having taken him up on an offer which he thought we would turn down. The latest move by the Cuban Government is to dismiss persons from their jobs who have indicated a desire to go to the United States.

Dominican Situation. Ellsworth Bunker this afternoon reported that things were quiet in Santo Domingo and he expects it to remain this way over the weekend. Garcia Godoy told him last night that he had decided to put off making any report to the nation on the Santiago affair until after the New Year. This seems wise, as the passage of time lets passions cool and reduces the dimensions of the problem.

The Communists and other extremists are laying plans for a general strike if Garcia Godoy does not make the military responsible for what took place in Santiago. Bunker says that both Balaguer and Bosch are strongly against a strike. Without Bosch's support, it is unlikely that a general strike would be effective.

McG

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 30, 1965

File 5

FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Bromley Smith

SUBJECT: Report on the Diplomatic Front, as of 10:30 a.m., Dec. 30

1. Governor Harriman is en route to Belgrade from Warsaw. He will meet Tito tomorrow morning.
2. Harriman reports from Warsaw that the Poles are transmitting to Hanoi their opinions and judgments together with their own statement of our position. The Poles say their initiative is in good faith but that time and secrecy would be required to get a response of any value from Hanoi. The Poles added that it was not easy to communicate rapidly with Hanoi.
3. The Hungarians have replied that they do not think Harriman should visit Budapest now because his arrival would compromise the secret negotiations now going on in Washington between Secretary Rusk and the Hungarian Charge. #4 Ambassador Kohler's report on his one-hour cordial courtesy call on Pordgorny follows as a separate message. Pordgorny repeated the standard Soviet line on Vietnam. He expressed great appreciation for President Johnson's good wishes and reiterated several times the hope that U.S. -Soviet relations would be better in 1966.
- #5. Ambassador Sullivan reports from Laos that Souvanna wholeheartedly supports these current diplomatic efforts but asks that bombing operations continue in Laos while they are stood down north of Vietnam. In commenting on Shelepin's visit to Hanoi, Souvanna said he had always felt that only the Soviets could persuade Hanoi to halt its aggression. He added that the Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane told him that the Soviets were working on his request that the Soviets restrain the North Vietnamese from further violating Lao territory.
- #6. Goldberg is in Rome and will be calling on officials today. We have not yet received a reply from the French as to when he can see DeGaulle but the appointment will probably be arranged for tomorrow.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / DAC 12-187

By UCLW NARA, Date 04-23-2014

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Amendment to Agreement with Indonesia for Cooperation
in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State recommend that you approve the proposed amendment to the existing agreement with Indonesia on cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. The Bureau of the Budget concurs.

The amended agreement would extend and amend the present agreement with Indonesia, which was signed in 1960, for an additional five years. The amendment would provide for certain International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. There are no other changes in the basic 1960 agreement.

State and AEC agree that the extension of the agreement with Indonesia is the best course of action at the present time for the following reasons:

1. If the agreement is not extended, we will be faced with the problem of repossessing the special nuclear material now fueling the Indonesian research reactor. The probable opposition of the Indonesian Government would present us the choice of abandoning the material, in violation of the Atomic Energy Act, or using sanctions or pressures against them.
2. State and AEC agree that the continued operation of the Indonesian research reactor for which we have provided fuel will not contribute in any meaningful way to an Indonesian nuclear weapons capability.
3. The renewed agreement provides for IAEA safeguards. This is the standard approach we are applying to all new agreements on peaceful uses.
4. The renewal provides for no commitment of U.S. assistance whatsoever.

In view of Congressional and public interest in the Indonesian nuclear program, members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have been kept informed of developments on the extension of the agreement and have supported the policy of a simple extension with IAEA safeguards.

If you approve, the proposed amendment will be formally executed and will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

One special problem has been the rumored possibility last summer that the Indonesians might set off a borrowed Chinese bomb. This possibility has declined to the vanishing point with the Army's assault on the PKI and the chill in Sino-Indonesian relations; but it might conceivably re-emerge. There is no connection between our small research reactor and a bomb, but both are "nuclear" and there is some risk of wild charges that we helped them in this crazy course. Should the Indonesians appear about to violate the Test Ban Treaty, we could, under the agreement, request physical inspections in Indonesia to insure that the reactor and its fuel are being used solely for peaceful purposes. Should Indonesia be found in violation of this undertaking or deny a request for an inspection, the United States would be able to terminate the agreement and request the return of the fuel elements. This isn't very good, but it may serve to neutralize the wilder charges that we helped the Indonesians set off a bomb.

At the moment, the political situation in Djakarta is more promising for us than at any time since 1963. In circumstances that could use a very low-key gesture of U.S. confidence in the Indo military, we should be particularly willing to extend this agreement.

If you concur in this recommendation, there is presented herewith an approval letter for your signature.

In summary, this amended extension is the best way out of a bad bargain made in 1960.

McG Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

6a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 1, 1966


Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter of September 23, 1965, a proposed "Amendment to Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," and has recommended that I approve the proposed Amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed Amendment and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

Wed., Dec. 29, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Brazilian Commander
of Inter-American Peace Force
(IAPF)

The Brazilians have appointed Major General Alvaro Alves da Silva BRAGA to replace General Alvim. On the basis of CIA's biographic sketch (copy attached), he looks very much like a younger version of the man whose place he is taking.

General Palmer will be leaving shortly. Brigadier General Linville will take his place. Linville, who has been Palmer's Executive Officer since the 82nd landed, knows the Dominican situation well, is an able officer, and has the ability to get along with his Latin colleagues.

McGeorge Bundy


CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

2
Rec'd Ranch
12-31-65
11:45 P
orig in regular file
New folder
seen file

BRAZIL

Alvaro Alves da Silva BRAGA


Commander Designate of the
Inter-American Peace Force
(IAPF)




Director of Ordnance Materiel Maj. Gen. Alvaro Alves da Silva Braga, a veteran career military man who is said to be democratically oriented and of a pro-Western and pro-US disposition, is reportedly slated to become the new Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the near future. Braga is completely loyal to President Humberto Castello Branco, who holds him in high regard for his democratic orientation and personal qualities. The general served with the President as a member of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF) which fought under Gen. Mark Clark during World War II. He is intensely proud of his role in the BEF and reputedly believes that the Brazilian and American armies were bound together in the defense of freedom by common ideals, common doctrine, and blood shed. Braga has had considerable experience in the command of troops and enjoys the reputation of being an officer of judgment and integrity who exercises firm control over his subordinates.

Particularly germane to his new assignment are the general's expressed views on the Dominican Republic situation. A warm endorser of the US intervention in that beleaguered country, he has also praised Brazil's political support for the United States in the United Nations and the Organization of American States on the Dominican question. In addition, he strongly favored the sending of Brazilian troops to the strife-torn Republic. In lauding the aforementioned Brazilian actions in support of US policy, he averred that he hoped these actions would bring home to the United States that Brazil was a reliable friend and deserving of treatment different from that given to the other Latin American Republics. Brazil, he said has proved that it was different in World War II and in the recent Dominican crisis. It is interesting to note that in a June 1965 conversation with a US official, Braga revealed himself to be strongly against rebel leader Francisco Caamaño Deño and mildly critical of US neutrality between Caamaño and Gen. Antonio Imbert.

Alvaro Alves da Silva Braga was born in Rio de Janeiro on 20 November 1906. Following his graduation from the Brazilian Military Academy in 1927, he steadily worked his way up through the officer ranks. All his field-grade promotions have been for merit. Highlights of his lengthy career in addition to his previously mentioned World War II stint in Italy, include the following assignments: Army General



~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~



XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Alvaro Alves da Silva BRAGA (cont.)

Staff, 1946-52; member of the War Minister's cabinet, 1954, and again in 1957; commanding officer of the 2nd Mixed Brigade and Mixed Corumbo Garrison, 1959-60; commandant, Rio Military School, 1962-August 1963; commanding general, 1st Armored Division, 1963-64; and commanding officer of the 2nd Infantry Division in São Paulo from 1964 to sometime after mid-1965, when he apparently took over as director of ordnance materiel.

The general was reportedly active against the Communists in the 1935 revolution and was reputed to have been "very restless" under leftist-oriented President João Goulart. He did not actively plot against the ex-President, who was deposed by the April 1964 revolution which subsequently installed Castello Branco in the Presidency; however, he had also made it plain that he would not obey Goulart in defiance of the Constitution.

The general is known to have traveled to the United States in 1943, when he attended the Infantry Officers Career Course in Fort Benning, Georgia, and to Europe in 1958 on the way back from Suez. Numbered among his many decorations are the US Legion of Merit; the French Croix de Guerre; the Italian Order of the Crown; and the Brazilian Combat Cross. Braga is short, very much overweight, and suffers from a heart condition. He is married and has two sons. He understands Spanish and speaks some English.

TRS:bjh

December 1965

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, Dec. 28, 1965
4:45 p. m.

Mr. President

Despite its length, this long cable from Bowles on his talk with Shastri is worth scanning. Between the pressures of circumstance and our own policy, we have Indians as well as Paks coming more our way. Note particularly Shastri's evolving position on Vietnam.

We ought to use the same softening up technique on Shastri that worked so well with Ayub, i. e., get word to him in advance on what is worth talking about and what isn't. I'll send some thoughts shortly on this. Aside from Kashmir (on which Ayub may be back hard at you if Tashkent flops), the Shastri visit should be an easy one. His main concern (though, like Ayub, he may not ask directly) will be when and on what terms we'll resume badly needed economic aid.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By pc NARA, Date 51512

*Read Ramoth
12-31-65
11:45p*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 95-400(25)
By jc/kb, NARA, Date 5-15-12

CONFIDENTIAL

December 28, 1965
Tuesday, 4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I've held off as long as I could bothering you with this year's Israeli aid package. We have Israeli requests for \$39 million in development loans (nearly double the FY'64 and '65 levels) and for two years of PL 480 Title I, starting with \$34 million this year (\$32m. FY'65, \$23m. FY'63 and '64). However, I see this as strictly a bargaining position.

In economic terms there's no justification for either AID loans or Title I food. Israel is doing far better than several other countries where we've already shifted from concessional AID and Title I terms to Ex-Im Bank and Title IV. Bell again recommends we make that shift in Israel this year, and Mann agrees. They argue that failure to do so soon in Israel undercuts the credibility of our worldwide effort to get out of the aid business once a country is really moving, and makes it tough to cut back in other places. Moreover, past Title I programs have banked us excess Israeli currency, so Title IV dollar sales would make more sense. In general, the harder the line we take the more favorable the balance of payments effects.

Of course, State and AID recognize that the case for Israeli aid is basically political, so each year they buck the decision to the White House. The Israelis claim that economic need is not the real test; they have since 1959 regarded our aid, with some justice, as a defense subsidy in compensation for our reluctance to give them grant military aid or a public defense guarantee. Finally, there is the domestic political factor, especially at a time when we are resuming food to Nasser.

Nonetheless, I think that our Israeli relationship is in good enough shape to sustain some cut in aid and stiffening of our loan terms. We are now selling Israel hardware on concessional loan terms, which weakens its argument for a defense subsidy. Moreover, on the horizon is our contribution to a nuclear desalting plant (though this is more likely an FY 67 or 68 matter) and possibly some jets.

Our aid to Israel has averaged around \$80 million per annum 1961-65. Last year we gave \$83.6 million (\$20 million in DL, \$4m. Ex-Im, \$32m. in Title I and \$27.6 million in a MAP credit for tanks). This year we'd all favor cutting to about \$65 million, but the big issue is over loan terms. I'd see three basic choices:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page Two

A. The Bell/Mann hard line of shifting Israel to all ExIm loans (\$20 million) and Title IV (\$30 million), plus the \$14.4 million in MAP credits already given. This would generate a strong Israeli beef.

B. A soft line, essentially repeating last year's performance of \$20 million DL and \$32 million in Title I. The Israelis would probably be quite happy with this.

C. Splitting the difference by going for \$10 million DL and \$10 million ExIm, and insisting that Israel take one-fourth of the \$32 million PL 480 under Title IV (the same proportion as for Nasser). This option makes a start toward shifting Israel on to harder terms, but cushions the transition. It would generate plenty of Israeli complaints, but not too much to live with so long as Israel sees hope for planes and desalting (State will probably recommend shortly that we sell jets to Israel and Jordan -- a repeat of last winter's tank deal).


I'd favor this last as making the most political sense. I've also tried it out on Harriman, who agrees that it's the least we can do. We ought to put it hard to the Israelis as our best offer, but could always retreat if they scream too loudly. Moving pronto on this will also soften Israeli complaints about food for Nasser.

R. W. Komer



Approve Bell/Mann line _____

Approve soft line _____

Approve compromise  _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: PLJ 95400 (v5)By: scb, NARA, Date: 5-15-72~~CONFIDENTIAL~~December 28, 1965
Tuesday, 4:00 p.m.

Komer informed by

phone

1/1/66

President approves
compromise
By phone from French
1/1/66
12/31 R/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page Two

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R. W. Komer

Approve Bell/Mann line _____

Approve soft line _____

Approve compromise _____

See me _____

By phone
from
Jacobsen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

11a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1965

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
No. 66-10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination that Sale of Surplus Agricultural Commodities
to the United Arab Republic is Essential to the National
Interest

In accordance with your recommendation of 17 November, I hereby
determine pursuant to Section 107 of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, that it is
essential to the national interest of the United States to finance
export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United
Arab Republic under title I of that Act.



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E
Deputy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 17, 1965

TO : E - Mr. Solomon

FROM : IMA - Richard N. Cooper

SUBJECT: Alternatives in Zambian Contingency Planning

This is an attempt to summarize where we stand on the problem of supplying Zambia in the event its railroad access through Rhodesia is cut off. It is preliminary and rough since not all the information is firm but it gives, I think, a reasonably clear picture of what the alternatives are.

Summary

Briefly stated, at a cost of perhaps \$150 million it appears possible to restore full or substantial copper production in Zambia and Katanga within a year from the time the decision is made to go ahead with the necessary expenditures. In any case, no copper production would be available for at least three months with production being gradually resumed within three to six months, achieving a substantial level by the sixth month. There are, however, certain important conditions which must be fulfilled if this estimate is to hold. Consequently, this may be somewhat optimistic. The basis of our assessment is given below. The attached table shows the time dimension of achieving various levels of tonnage and their sources if Rhodesia cuts off Zambia now.

Discussion

Crucial to the decision of what steps should be taken in the event Zambia is cut off is a political assessment of how long it would take before Rhodesia would be forced to capitulate. Clearly, if it is expected that the sanctions would be effective within three months, the course of actions that should be taken would be quite different and far less expensive than if it were thought that sanctions might require twelve months or more to become effective. The costs of alternative courses of action would clearly be quite different. To put it differently, certain decisions are reversible, e.g., an airlift, and others irreversible, e.g., those including heavy capital expenditures for roads, ports, and railways, depending on the time span one considers necessary for sanctions to become effective against Rhodesia.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By cbm, NARA, Date 12-17-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

As it happens, the spectrum of outcomes outlined below falls nicely into convenient time periods, e.g., three months, six months, and within a year or longer. Before describing what can be accomplished within these time periods, one important point should be reemphasized. These outcomes depend upon certain conditions or "ifs" which qualify the achievability of the results.

On the assumption that Rhodesia cuts off the railroad and coal from Zambia but Kariba power remains unaffected, the time sequence, subject to certain important qualifications of what can be done and achieved, is as follows:

1. For the first three months, little can be expected except a care and maintenance program without any copper production either from Zambia or from Katanga. This care and maintenance would be provided by an airlift with a maximum potential of 100,000 tons annual rate each way declining over a three-month period and an urgent import program via the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Beira using trucks over the Great Northern Road and the Great Eastern Road. The cost of the airlift would be, for the period under consideration, about \$5 million plus some extras for airport improvement. The emergency construction costs on the land routes plus equipment needs and added costs of transport would together come to perhaps \$10 million. Thus, the total emergency cost of this first phase would be close to \$15 million with very little copper sent out.

2. If the decisions were taken now, one could move from a care and maintenance basis to copper production within six months and perhaps sooner. Copper production could be resumed in the fourth or fifth month and by the end of six months might reach in Zambia 400,000 to 500,000 tons annual rate. Katanga production resumes at a similar rate but reaches full production by the end of the sixth month.

To achieve this, the following steps would be necessary:

(a) Completion of the Cubal Variant of the Benguela Railroad within six months at a cost of \$20 to \$25 million.

(b) Resolution of the present bottleneck on the Bas Congo-Katanga (BCK) railroad in the Katanga. This will pose formidable political and managerial problems.

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- 3 -

The new Congo Government would have to consent to a large intake of railroad technicians (perhaps 120) most of whom for linguistic reasons would have to be Belgian. Recruitment may be difficult. Full GDRC cooperation will be necessary even if Katanga is to get off care and maintenance in three months. Estimated cost: several million dollars in spares, \$2 million per year in technical assistance, plus additional rolling stock at unknown cost, perhaps borrowed from Zambia, perhaps purchased for about \$5 million. Total cost of this aspect would be about \$10 million.

(c) An immediate crash program to improve the Great Northern Road from the copperbelt to Dar-es-Salaam, a distance of 1,225 miles. The present road has a very limited capacity which could be upgraded to perhaps a million tons a year if a massive program were undertaken. Fairly minor and inexpensive--perhaps \$1.5 million--improvements would raise the capacity to 300,000 tons. Going further would require a great deal more--perhaps \$10-\$15 million and would require continuous maintenance. Initial truck needs could be handled by hire and requisition, but a longer-term effort at high tonnage would require perhaps 400 tractor-trailers at a cost of \$30 to \$40 million.

To summarize, the Benguela Railway will cost \$20 to \$25 million. The BCK would cost about \$10 million and the Great Northern route would cost \$40 to \$55 million. The total cost of these decisions would be \$70 to \$80 million.

(d) To make effective use of the Great Northern Road would mean expanding the capacity of Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa. It is not clear whether the port facilities can be adequately improved within six months but we believe that if enough money is spent they can be sufficiently improved within the time period to carry the additional capacity. While no figures are available, we are guessing that this might come up to \$20 million. Thus the cost for phase two would be around \$90-\$100 million. The total cost of the first two phases would be in the neighborhood of \$125 million.

(e) Attaching to all these projects is not only the condition that governments cooperate fully and money be spent readily but also, and most important,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 4 -

that strong, able management be given authority to innovate, cut through bureaucratic procedures, and make and quickly execute decisions. This sort of management capacity might be the most critical limiting factor for all the actions which have to be taken.

3. The third phase would consist primarily of consolidating the emergency steps taken in the first two phases such as improving the road, making whatever improvements still need to be made in the railroad and in the ports, returning the operation from an emergency high cost basis to a more normal, relatively reasonable cost basis. This might cost as much as \$25 million. Thus the total cost of all three phases would be around \$150 million. It should be emphasized that in order to accomplish phase two, the decisions to act must be taken at the beginning of phase one; otherwise, the time span will stretch out by the amount of time lag in deciding to implement the longer range measures.

Qualifications

There are some major "ifs" in this time sequence which may be considered rather optimistic. One serious problem, already mentioned, is negotiating with the Congo Government to improve the efficiency of the BCK bottleneck. This could be very difficult but presumably it is achievable because the Congolese Government has a heavy stake in the restoration of Katanga production and the measures necessary to do this will apply also to solution of Zambia's difficulties. There is some feeling that obtaining the kind of cooperation needed may be politically impossible for the Congolese, e.g., permitting virtual Belgian control of the railway.

If cooperation from the BCK is unobtainable, then an even more massive effort on the Great Northern route would be necessary and the schedule for resuming full production would be slowed by perhaps another twelve months. The loss of the BCK would save perhaps \$35 million but the additional costs of developing the Great Northern route plus parts could easily cost much more. This could extend the care and maintenance phase to perhaps beyond six months with a very slow resumption of Zambian copper output thereafter. However, the Congolese might be able to do enough to restore Katanga within six months.

The situation would be much more difficult if the power from the Kariba Dam is cut off even if the BCK is operating at full projected capacity. If this were to occur our overall capital cost estimates would remain the same but copper

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- 5 -

production in Zambia will resume more slowly, that is, to only 200,000 tons annual rate at the end of six months. Maximum production by the end of the year would level off to about 400,000 tons, this limit being set by the amount of electric power which can be generated within Zambia and imported from Katanga. The output of Katanga copper would be completely resumed regardless of what happens to Kariba power by the end of six months. Even if Kariba power is out, blister copper could be exported and refined elsewhere. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be enough refining capacity to take care of more than 100,000 to 150,000 tons. Even so, however, the total gap between present availability of a million tons of Zambian plus Katanga copper would be about 250,000 tons so that you could still have available 750,000 tons of refined copper compared to present output of close to a million. The issue of what you do in building up generating capacity in Zambia will depend on whether Kariba Dam or power is out indefinitely.

Financing

The \$150 million estimated cost of restoring copper production in Katanga and Zambia could be financed by the governments involved including the U.K., U.S., Zambia, the copper companies and the consumers. Part of the financing could take the form of a loan if tonnage guarantees were given for a period of time sufficient to amortize the cost. For example, Tanganyika Concessions has already begun construction of the Cubal Variant; however, their target date is several years hence for completion. To warrant doing it in six months on a crash basis would require either giving them the \$20 million or lending it to them and guaranteeing a flow of tonnage for relatively long periods of time. The Great Northern Road would presumably, like any road, have to be financed by grants or, alternatively, a forty-year loan.

Transportation Costs

Present transportation costs for Zambia are \$38 a ton for copper delivered at the Mozambique ports. The present price of coal delivered from Wankie to the copper belt is about \$5 a ton. Total transport costs are therefore \$43 a ton. (Roughly one ton of coal is needed per ton of copper.)

Under the program described above transport costs of copper to the new outlets would probably be about \$30 a ton.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6 -

However, the delivered cost of coal would be about \$50 a ton, or a total cost of \$80 per ton. (We are including ocean freight for copper as being constant in any event.) The additional cost of copper is thus about \$40 a ton or 2 cents a pound. (For Katanga the additional costs would be about \$31 a ton or \$10 less than to Zambia since the cost of delivered coal would be lower to Katanga.)

These are the additional transportation costs on the assumption that the \$150 million capital costs would be amortized separately. Suppose it were desired to recover the \$150 million out of the first year's output. We estimate that copper output in the first twelve months following the break with Rhodesia would be 500,000 tons of which 300,000 would be from Zambia and 200,000 from Katanga. If the whole 500,000 tons bore the burden equally, the further additional costs would be \$300 per ton or 15 cents a pound. If, however, Katanga were to absorb only the costs attributable to BCK and the Benguela Railroad, and Zambia the balance, it would cost Zambia an additional \$400 per ton or 20 cents a pound and Katanga \$175 a ton or 9 cents a pound extra. Assuming that 40 cents a pound is a fair supplier's price these additional costs would raise the price of copper to 62 cents for Zambia and to about 50 cents for Katanga.

Attachments:

Tables.

OMA:BCaplan/MECEly:meh
12/17/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Estimated Sources and Requirements for
Zambian Contingency Exercise

(Thousands of tons at annual rate)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-17-02

<u>Route or Source</u>	<u>Immediate to One Month</u>	<u>Three Months</u>	<u>Six Months</u>	<u>Up to a Year</u>
Benguela--BCK Rail ^{1/}	nil	nil	up to 300	750-1,000
Kandabwe Coal Mine ^{2/}	nil	180	300	unknown
Beira-Salina Rail, Great Eastern Road	20	50	100	100 +
Great Northern Road ^{3/}	100	300	up to 900	900 +
Dar-Kigoma Rail-Mpulungu	10	60	100	100 +
Barge, Road to Ndola ^{4/}	<u>230</u>	<u>590</u>	<u>up to 1,600</u>	<u>2,000 ?</u>
Airlift	<u>100</u> 330			

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Care and Maintenance</u>		<u>200,000 tons copper</u>		<u>500,000 tons copper</u>	
	<u>with Kariba</u>	<u>without Kariba</u>	<u>with Kariba</u>	<u>without Kariba</u>	<u>with Kariba</u>	<u>without Kariba^{5/}</u>
Coal	97	217	290	920	600	1,220
Food	140	140	.			
POL	85	85	410	410	450	450
Other	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>				
Total minimum requirements..	<u>3446/</u>	<u>464</u>	<u>700</u>	<u>1,350</u>	<u>1,050</u>	<u>1,670</u>


- 1/ Assumes BCK imports 120 technicians, spares and rolling equipment as soon as possible. Cubal Variant is completed in six months, and major improvements to BCK within a year.
- 2/ Assumes copper companies will immediately switch their heavy equipment to mining Kandabwe's deposit of 300,000 tons removable by strip mining. The prospects for underground mining depend on too many variables to be predicted: if the value of the coal were high enough, it might reach 500,000 tons.
- 3/ Assumes immediate crash road program, importation of heavy tractor-trailers, and massive E.A. port capacity improvements within six months.

- 2 -

- 4/ Imports are assumed to be largely POL and not affected by possible E.A. port bottleneck.
- 5/ 400,000 tons is maximum production without Kariba power.
- 6/ The 14,000 ton shortfall from care and maintenance is assumed to be taken care of by use of stocks.

Source: British estimates, CIA estimates, Zambian estimates and information supplied by U.S. Posts.

ZAMBIAN TRANSPORT ROUTES



~~Secret~~

Dec. 28, 1965

13

TO; Ranch, for the President

FROM: Komer

The following is now underway to make the record on the pause.

Rusk has seen the Hungarian. Thompson has seen Dobrynin. State also hit the UK, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders here. Messages are going out to Warsaw for Gronouski, Tokyo, Seoul, Bangkok, Vientiane, and Manila. State will probably add Delhi.

Since Goldberg is away, Yost is making the point to U Thant at lunch today. We are also considering having the ICRC in Geneva use the occasion to appeal for prisoner exchange. We will report the results of all these probes.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By jc/r NARA, Date 5/5/12

Dear Mr. Presider

I am asking my trusted friend and counselor, Vice President Humphrey, to bring you this personal message of congratulations and greetings as you assume the great responsibility of the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

No two countries in the world have had a closer relationship of trust and friendship than your country and ours. We have worked together in war and in peace, and the independence and progress of your great people are a deep and continuing interest of your friends in the United States. Ties of personal friendship bind many thousands of our citizens one to another, and our common commitment to freedom makes us friends and allies for the future as we have been in the past.

As you embark on this high service to your country, I want you to know that you can count on the friendship and cooperation of the United States, and on my own deep personal hope for the high success of your Administration.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in warm personal regards to you and to Marcos.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Philippines

Manila

12/27/65
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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further notes on Bombing the North

12/27/65
phoned to Vicki¹⁵

1. I had a meeting of second-level public relations people dealing with Vietnam this afternoon, and they all said very strongly that if the pause goes more than another day or so it should go long enough to be a real answer to our critics. Otherwise we would fall between two stools and get criticized by the military without making any money with the peace-makers. I argued with them, but I think the point has force.

2. Bill Moyers has reaffirmed to me this afternoon his own feeling that since we have come these three days, we should go on through New Years Day. He thinks we will be heavily criticized for a half-hearted effort if we resume now.

3. Most interestingly, General Taylor came to see me this afternoon to say that he now feels very strongly that since we have endured four days of pause, we might as well go on for ~~six more to prove~~ long enough to take the starch out of idea once and for all. He also undertook to write personally to Westy and to Admiral Sharp if you decide to continue the current suspension and to explain to them the great importance of this course of action from the point of view of proving to the American public that we have left no door to peace untried. Taylor says that he does not think the military cost is great and that the political reward of making a solid try is worth it at this stage.

4. I should report that I plan to be in New York tomorrow for a day of talks with my prospective employers. I can easily cancel this visit if you wish, and of course I can be reached on the telephone through the White House board at all times.

TO: Ranch for the resident from Bundy

1. I talked to Dean Rusk to urge him to get on every diplomatic wire and tell people that there has been no noise over North Vietnam for four days and that we certainly would like to know it if anyone has heard any signal of any sort that this lack of action has done any good. I found him very resistant indeed and he told me that he and Alex Johnson and Tommy Thompson and my brother Bill all think that we cannot get diplomatic mileage this way. They really would prefer to resume bombing right away and have a longer pause later on, with advance notice to the Russians, as they initially recommended last week.

2. I tried gently to say to Dean that this was not the present problem. I said that I thought we now had a 4-day start and the question was what use we could make of it if we continued for another period of up to a week. He continued to resist my suggestion, and I do not feel that I should make further diplomatic contacts tonight behind his back.

3. What I do think is that if you should decide -- as I myself hope you may-- that it makes sense to withhold the bombing for another several days, you might then speak to the Secretary yourself about the usefulness of directing the attention of every available diplomat to the fact that there is a pause and the further fact that we certainly want to know it if anyone has any way of finding out whether there is any prospect of ^a response.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-184
By is, NARS, Date 8-15-84

12/27/65 ¹²

To: Ranch, for Jacobsen from Bundy

Following is draft reply for the President to letter from Houston Citizens for Action in Vietnam:

I have carefully read your letter about peace in Vietnam. I want you to know, as I want all the American people to know, that not a day passes but what I ask myself what more I can do, as President of the United States, to open the way to peace in Vietnam. Not all of your proposals seem to me to be useful for this purpose, but it is certainly right that all of our citizens should concern themselves with this problem, just as their President does.

I am glad you approve the decision that our troops would not fire except in self-defense during Christmas. Unfortunately, this decision ~~was~~ ^{has been} not matched by any similar restraint on the Communist side. After a large number of Communist attacks on innocent civilians as well as military units, the armed forces of South Vietnam and General Westmoreland's forces have found it necessary to resume military operations in South Vietnam.

Let me turn now to your particular proposals:

(1) We have made it clear again and again that we stand ready to terminate our air action against North Vietnam whenever anyone can show us any evidence that such a step would lead to a response that could open the way to peace throughout Vietnam. We suspended these attacks in May, and they ~~were~~ ^{have been} suspended again over Christmas. But the aggression of the Communists has continued both times. I cannot ask the South Vietnamese, and the Americans who are helping them, to accept the doctrine that there can be no military operations against military targets in the North, as long

as the North remains committed to the command, and supply, and reinforcement of the Communist campaign in the South, ^{and refuses to talk of peace with anyone.} ~~and refuses to~~ ^{and refuses to} ~~talk of peace with anyone.~~

(2) The United States is firmly in favor of a settlement along the lines of the Geneva Agreements. The United States is eager to see the peace-keeping offices of the United Nations used to the full. And the United States is also in favor of a cease-fire under terms and conditions which protect the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam. It is the Communists who insist on conditions which would nullify the Geneva Agreements, and who reject all U.N. efforts, and who seek to ~~impose their rule by force~~ ^{not by force} ~~on~~ ^{up on} the people of South Vietnam.

(3) ~~The~~ We have repeatedly stated our adherence to the concept of self-determination for all peoples through the avenue of free elections. As I said on July 28, we favor such elections in Vietnam. The whole record of the last 20 years should make it clear to you and to all Americans that, whenever there is a difference between Americans and Communists, it is not the Communists who are in favor of free elections. What we seek in South Vietnam, ~~indeed~~, and what the Communists would deny, is the right of the people of that war-torn country to shape their own destiny without coercion of any kind, ~~from any quarter.~~

You quote a Buddhist leader in Saigon to the effect that most of the Vietnamese people do not want the war to go on. I am sure this is so. It is only ~~the~~ Communists who want the war to go on, ~~the rest of the~~ ~~Vietnamese want peace.~~ The people of Vietnam want peace. The people of the United States want peace. The Government of South Vietnam wants peace.

The Government of the United States wants peace. It is the Government in Hanoi which makes war and refuses to move to the peace table.

As I said only last week: "Our object in Viet-Nam is not war but peace. There will be peace in Viet-Nam the very moment that others are ready to stop their attacks. We will push on every door for peace. We will go anywhere to talk. We set no conditions. We neglect no hopeful step. But, as ~~you~~ all of you know, it takes two to talk and it takes two, as well, to stop the fighting."

###

17a

(phoned by Mr. Jacobsen 12/27/65)

Ltr to the President from Houston Citizens for Action on Vietnam

In the spirit of this season we are gathered here today in a vigil to encourage you to use all the power of your office to bring peace to Vietnam. We commend you for the informal Christmas cease-fire which provided a merciful respite for soldiers and civilians alike. While recognizing that our Government has made some efforts toward peaceful settlement, we feel that these have been wholly inadequate. We hold that fighting in Vietnam cannot benefit the Vietnamese people, and that our involvement in it does in fact alienate the people of Southeast Asia, thereby threatening world security.

As a Saigon Buddhist leader said in a statement released to the U. S. press last February: "Most of the Vietnamese people do not like war to go on and wish the end of the war as soon as possible in order to stop the bloody scenes of their Vietnamese brothers killing one another."

We propose that the U. S. Government take further steps as a means of resolving the Vietnamese conflict. Among these we particularly urge:

(1) An immediate termination of the policy and practice of bombing North Vietnam as a show of our good intentions to make peace;

(2) A formal cease-fire followed by a settlement to be carried out along the lines of the Geneva agreements with simultaneous utilization of the full peace-keeping offices of the United Nations;

(3) A clear, unequivocal statement of our adherence to the concept of self-determination for all peoples through the avenue of free elections.

Mr. President, we join with the substantial segment of our population which imposes upon you the mandate to make peace. We suggest further that the U. S., with its enormous power and prestige, demean itself by passively awaiting peace overtures. We therefore urge our Government to seize the initiative for peace-making by unilaterally scheduling the time and place for a peace conference.

MEMORANDUM

✓ (L) 18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 27, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Further Notes on Bombing the North

1. I had a meeting of second-level public relations people dealing with Viet Nam this afternoon, and they all said very strongly, that if the pause goes more than another day or so, it should go long enough to be a real answer to our critics. Otherwise, we would fall between two stools and get criticized by the military without making any money with the peacemakers. I argued with them, but I think the point has forced.
2. Bill Moyers has reaffirmed to me this afternoon his own feeling that since we have gone these days, we should go on through New Year's Day. He thinks we will be heavily criticized for a half-hearted effort if we resume now.
3. Most interestingly, General Taylor came to see me this afternoon to say that he now feels very strongly that since we have endured three days of pause, we might as well go on for long enough to take the starch out of the idea once and for all. He also undertook to write personally to Westie and to Admiral Sharp if you decide to continue the current suspension and to explain to them the great importance of this course of action from the point of view of proving to the American public that we have left no door to peace untried. Taylor said that he does not think the military cost is great. He thinks the political reward of a solid pause is worth it at this stage.
4. I should report that I planned to be in New York tomorrow for a day of talks with my prospective employers. I can easily cancel this visit if you wish, and of course, I can be reached on the telephone through the White House Board at all times. Bob Komer will cover here and is fully briefed.

5:30 pm

vm

Tuesday, December 21, 1965
3:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Arthur Goldberg just called and said that Fanfani has just told him that he has a very important message for you personally. He has not told Arthur what the message is.

Goldberg does not take the message very seriously and thinks we can easily arrange to have Fanfani give it to Dean Rusk tomorrow. He does suggest that you may wish to make a phone call to Fanfani today and simply tell him in a minute or two how grateful you are to him on the St. Louis Post Dispatch affair. (He helped quite a lot by allowing prompt publication of the real facts.) You might also say in another minute or two how sorry you are not to be able to see him because you are leaving for the Ranch, and that you hope he will feel free to give any message he has to ~~your~~ most trusted colleague -- the Secretary of State.

McG. B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tuesday, December 21, 1965
2:00 p. m.

SUBJECT: Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem

The attached memo from State (Tab B) explains that the US-Mexico Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) has come up with a recommendation for solving the lower Rio Grande salinity problem. The solution involves building a canal in Mexico to take the saline drainage to the Gulf of Mexico. Cost of construction and of operation and maintenance (estimated \$1.2 million) would be shared on an equal basis. State proposes that announcement of the IBWC recommendation be in the form of a joint press release by you and President Diaz Ordaz.

The IBWC recommendation has been staffed out. Bureau of the Budget is on board. Congressman de la Garza wants to introduce the enabling legislation. Senator Yarborough has been filled in and supports the project. The local Texas farmers, needless to say, are all for it. Interior is not directly involved, but has been informed.

The project is a good one. It is beneficial to farmers on both sides of the border. It is in line with your general effort to solve boundary problems with Mexico. At a time when other Latin American countries are denouncing -- and shooting -- each other over border disputes, it is a good example of how states with a common border can cooperate to mutual advantage. From a domestic and foreign standpoint, I think it would be advantageous for you to be associated personally with it.

I, therefore, recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the Mexicans for a joint Presidential announcement along the lines of Tab A. If you authorize the negotiations, we will, of course, check the text worked out with the Mexicans with you before giving it to Bill Moyers for release.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

Authorize negotiations for a Presidential announcement _____

Prefer not making it a Presidential announcement _____

~~SECRET~~

December 23, 1965

p File 21

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just completed a day and a half of meetings with Chancellor Erhard in which we have had a good opportunity to talk not merely about the problems presently occupying the German leaders, but also the need for the Federal Republic to play a role in world affairs more nearly commensurate with its resources.

In the course of our discussion the Chancellor presented the case for Germany's participation in some form of collective nuclear defense -- a question on which his Government is placing considerable emphasis. In order to make clear the nature of the German interest he gave me a memorandum, a copy of which, with his permission, I am enclosing.

As you will note, the Chancellor has come down squarely on the side of a "hardware solution." I know of your own reservations about this matter and I have taken them into account in my discussions with the Chancellor. I have explained to him that the point of greatest importance was for the three of us to reach an agreement that could form the basis for the possible participation of other powers.

The proposals presented by the Chancellor will give me some problems with Congress, and I am sure they will not be easy for you. But what is essential is a stable and healthy Germany that can play a constructive role on the side of the West. On balance it seems to me that you and I should make a serious effort to respond to the German proposals as the Chancellor has broadly outlined them in his memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. XIII, p. 295

By fw, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The nuclear force he describes would appear to fall within the broad framework of your ANF proposal. Unlike the MLF, it would not contemplate the creation of a new weapons system. From our discussion, it would appear that the Chancellor and his Ministers have been generally thinking in terms of an assignment by the United Kingdom of its Polaris submarines and a matching contribution of Polaris submarines by the United States. These submarines would form the basic elements of the force, which might be added to later. It is our impression that the questions of mixed-manning, veto rights, and a "European clause" can be worked out in a manner consistent both with your requirements and ours.

I think it important that we move ahead on this expeditiously since the matter has been so long in limbo. I would hope, therefore, that Ambassador Bruce might have a talk with you when he returns to London about the middle of January. He will bring with him suggestions as to the best way to carry on the necessary discussions among our three Governments in as quiet a manner as possible. Meanwhile, I should greatly appreciate your comments on this development.

Let me say again how good it was to see you and how much pleasure and profit I derived from our conversations. We must keep closely in touch.

Sincerely,

/S/

The Right Honorable Harold Wilson
The Prime Minister
London, England

~~SECRET~~

LBJ:McGB:ab

~~Secret~~

~~Geheim~~

21a

Translation

20 December 1965

The Nuclear Question

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-164
By is, NARA Date 11-29-99

We understand by the term "nuclear question"

- ^ushare of the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance in the responsibility for nuclear weapons;
- the prevention of additional nuclear powers from coming into being.

I. In dealing with the nuclear question the German Government is guided by the following general considerations:

- In view of the fact that a superior conventional force and a strong MRBM force of the Soviet Union are threatening Europe it is of the greatest importance that the European non-nuclear NATO partners have specific nuclear protection in the case of a conflict with the Soviet Union.
- For that purpose the non-nuclear NATO partners should have an appropriate share in nuclear responsibility.
- This should be done in a way which strengthens the cohesion within the Alliance.
- The solution to be implemented should enhance the deterring effect on the Soviet Union.
- The principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into national control should be promoted.
- The reunification of Germany and a future unification of Europe ought not to be impaired by the solution.

~~Secret~~

~~Geheim~~

~~Secret~~~~Secret~~

II. We welcome the studies to be worked out in the "special committee" of defence ministers as proposed by Secretary McNamara regarding

- the nuclear capability of the enemy and of the Alliance
- the possibilities of improving and expanding allied participation in the planning concerning the use of nuclear weapons in all phases.

The Federal Government will participate in these studies. The results to be expected of these studies will in themselves, however, not be sufficient to bring the nuclear question as a whole to a satisfactory solution. They will not give the non-nuclear partners an appropriate direct share in nuclear responsibility nor will they solve the problem of preventing new nuclear powers from coming into existence.

III. According to the German view it is therefore necessary to give the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance a share in the decision concerning the use of nuclear weapons in a way which increases both their own security and the deterring effect on the enemy.

This should be achieved by the setting up of a joint nuclear force which, in the German view, should have the following characteristics:

1. The weapons belonging to such a force should be able to reach those areas of the potential enemy in which the missile sites threatening Europe are situated. As compared with this overriding criterion the questions of delivery systems or their combination (surface vessels, Polaris submarines, Pershing, F 111 aircraft, if useful also V-bombers) are of secondary

~~Secret~~~~Secret~~

importance. The force should be assigned to SACEUR.

2. The force should be jointly owned and jointly administered by the participating partners. It should be jointly financed. The delivery systems should, as far as possible, be mixed-manned.

(A structure of this kind would have a strong integrating effect on the countries participating in the force. We would assume that at least the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Germany will participate, other NATO partners will perhaps follow. The project would thus give new impetus to the principle of integration within NATO which is at present jeopardized.)

3. The partners should jointly decide on the use of the weapons. The United States should have a veto right. The question as to whether additional veto rights should be envisaged requires further examination.

(Notwithstanding the American veto, the force would enhance the deterring effect on the Soviet Union and thus the security of the European partners as compared with the present situation. In the case of an attack upon a European partner of the force the Soviet Union cannot know to what extent the partner concerned will influence the decision regarding the use of the force. The fact that the partner attacked is a co-owner of the force and has a seat and a vote in the decision-making body makes it probable, in Soviet considerations, that the nuclear weapons of the joint force will be used for this defence.)

~~Geheim~~

~~Secret~~

~~Geheim~~

4. A revision of the treaty concerning the establishment of the force should be envisaged in the case of a political unification of Europe and in the case of Germany's reunification.

IV. We suggest that the United States and we inform the other interested states of the result of the Washington talks and propose to them the resumption of the discussions concerning the setting up of a joint nuclear force.

~~Secret~~

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DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

Dec
How 21, 1961

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard have completed two days of intensive, cordial and candid conversations in Washington. They were accompanied by Secretaries Rusk, Fowler and McNamara; Ministers Schroeder and von Hassel and other advisers. They discussed all major matters of joint concern to the US and the Federal Republic of Germany and of general import for the Free World.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance was a central topic in the conversation. The President and the Chancellor agreed that close political and military co-operation among the nations of NATO was necessary. They affirmed the determination of both Governments to maintain and to strengthen the Alliance and its political and military institutions.

The President and the Chancellor gave close attention to the nuclear problems confronting the Alliance. They agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested partners in the Alliance should have an appropriate part in nuclear defense.

In this connection the Chancellor emphasized that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intended nor desired to acquire national control over nuclear weapons, that it had in 1954 given an undertaking to its allies not to produce such weapons in Germany, and that, finally, it is the only State in the world to have subjected itself to international supervision of such an obligation.

The President and the Chancellor noted with satisfaction that the Defence Ministers of a number of NATO countries have started discussions on the possibility of improving present nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. ⁹ The President, after noting that the deterrent power of the Alliance had proved completely effective and was being constantly modernized, stated the views of the US that arrangements could be worked out to assure members of the Alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate ^{share in} ~~role in matters of~~ nuclear defense. The President and the Chancellor agreed that discussion of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

The President and the Chancellor had an intensive exchange of views on the question of Germany's reunification. They reaffirm their strong determination to pursue all opportunities for attaining as soon as possible the common objective of the peaceful reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination. The President and the Chancellor reject malicious allegations designed to cast doubt on the peaceful intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany. The exchange of views between the two Governments on the German problem and related questions will be continued.

The President and the Chancellor emphasized that pressures on Berlin would continue, as in the past, to be met with firmness and determination. They underlined that a lasting solution of the problems of Berlin can only be found in a peaceful solution of the German problem on the basis of self-determination.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the view that a lasting relaxation of tension in Europe and in West-East relationships will require progress toward the peaceful reunification of Germany in freedom. Both leaders restated their intention to continue to seek improvement in relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

The President and the Chancellor were in agreement in upholding the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of States. They were of the view that effective Alliance nuclear arrangements would not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and in fact should contribute to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. They stressed the importance of continuing efforts to reduce the threat of war and bring about effective arms control.

*Go to
bottom
of 3.*

The Chancellor reaffirmed Germany's fundamental commitment to European unity and his confidence in the ability of the effective institutions already created to contribute to its achievement. The President assured the Chancellor that the United States remained convinced that a united Europe is important to the achievement of an effective Atlantic Partnership.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations is of major importance to the progress of the Free World, for developed and developing countries alike. They also agreed that, to attain their full promise, these historic negotiations must move forward as rapidly as possible with the active participation of the EEC.

Recent developments in other parts of the world, particularly in the Far East, were also examined. The President described the situation in Viet-Nam and the efforts of the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the US, together with their allies, to bring about a peaceful and just settlement. He expressed his appreciation for the support of the FRG in the struggle to deter Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam. The Chancellor stated the determination of his Government to continue to assist in this effort for the cause of freedom.

The President and the Chancellor also welcomed the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, to which their governments would make substantial contributions. They reemphasized the value of economic and social development in Southeast Asia as a way of promoting peace in that region.

2/11 + to p 8

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the aid programs of their governments and emphasized the great importance of effective aid to developing countries. In this connection, they noted that over 90 per cent of all external resources flowing to these countries is provided by the Free World. They agreed that there was need for increased effort on the part of developed countries to provide funds to assure that adequate levels of aid are maintained. At the same time, they emphasized the need for greater self-help by the developing countries. The President was pleased to hear the Chancellor's description of the progress of the German Development Aid Service (German Peace Corps).

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N ← (X) from page 7

They also discussed the arrangements between the two governments whereby US military expenditures in Germany entering the balance of payments are offset by the Federal Republic through its purchase of US military equipment and services. It was agreed that these arrangements were of great value to both governments and should be fully executed and continued.

The President and the Chancellor voiced mutual satisfaction at the arrangements worked out ^{and already successful in such way} between the U.S. Space Agency and the German Ministry of Scientific Research for a joint project to launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. The President suggested several other possible ^{cooperative} projects, including a probe to the sun and a probe to Jupiter. He also indicated his intention to send a Commission to Europe early in 1966 to consult with the German Government and other European Governments which wish to join in the cooperative exploration of space.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the tradition and practice of effective consultation between their governments -- reflecting the friendship and trust which has grown up between the people of the US and Germany -- would lead to even closer and more fruitful relations in the future between the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and their partners.

Tuesday, December 21, 1965
4:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Eddie Reischauer in Tokyo and Win Brown in Seoul have done extraordinary work over a long period of time during the Japan-Korea settlement. The State Department now comes forward with the good idea that you might wish to send messages of congratulations to both of them. I have revised slightly the State Department language and suggest the following, subject to your approval:

QUOTE. I want you to know of my great personal appreciation of your patient and skillful efforts which contributed so much to the settlement between Japan and Korea. I extend to you and your staff my warm congratulations on this achievement. UNQUOTE.

McG. B.

Message approved ✓

Message not approved _____

Tuesday, December 21, 1965, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Back in November I reported my follow-up on some Fulbright leaks in the attached memorandum to you, and you said you would like the memorandum shown to Mansfield on his return. In the light of your continuing discussions with Mansfield -- and Fulbright's continuing leaks -- I think I should run this by you once more before sending it to Mansfield.

McG. B.

Send to Mansfield _____

Hold on to it _____

Tues. Dec. 21, 1965
1:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here is Lodge's weekly telegram.
It is mostly about Ky as a political
leader.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

26
December 21, 1965
Tuesday/11:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Message to Ayub. Sorry, I got a bum steer. Attached is a redraft. However, I'd have real qualms about a rice for Vietnam message just now. First, Agriculture's latest crop report (just in) estimates that Pakistan will just break even on rice, instead of having an exportable surplus. Of course, they could still ship rice if we gave wheat in return.

If you come in with this request just after the five loans, however, it might vitiate the impact of that gesture. I can see Bhutto telling Ayub that the loan gesture was just designed to soften him up for a ploy that would get Pakistan in dutch with Red China. So I'd hold up on this one till we saw more evidence that Pakistan was swinging our way, and no connection could be drawn between your two messages.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-145
By is, NARA Date 8-6-98

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26a
December 21, 1965

Please deliver following message from President direct to Ayub.

Dear Mr. President,

I greatly appreciate your last message. We must both now show by word and deed over the coming period that our meeting has cleared the air. The most urgent matter still on my mind is rice for Vietnam. Remembering your friendly response when I mentioned the hope that Pakistan might be able to provide some, I would like to broach this matter again. As I told you, we would be happy to replace any such rice with wheat in some suitable fashion.

I fully realize that you have your own domestic political problems, so don't wish to press you unduly.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-145
By isa, NARA Date 8-6-98

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Bundy
28

SECRET

December 20, 1965
Monday, 6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The AP lead on Subramaniam (AP 126) that the US "is considering an Indian request for about 10 million tons of food grain for delivery in 1966" is plain wrong. I've taken steps to correct it.

Freeman says that Subramaniam replied to a question that this was the likely size of their deficit, but specifically disclaimed any such request. He only said he was discussing the whole problem here. I've warned everybody to stay away from any specifics on US responses unless authorized by you.

R. W. Komer

McGB

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/5/77; Stat ltr 7/10/76
By any/ry NARA, Date 8-27-92

126

INDIA-FOOD

WASHINGTON (AP)-THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERING AN INDIAN REQUEST FOR ABOUT TEN MILLION (M) TONS OF FOOD GRAINS FOR DELIVERY IN 1966 TO HELP AVERT WHAT COULD BE THE WORST FAMINE IN A HALF CENTURY.

INDIA'S SHORT TERM NEEDS AND LONG TERM PLANS FOR INCREASING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONS WAS DISCUSSED AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN A MEETING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AGRICULTURE SECRETARY FREEMAN AND INDIA'S MINISTER OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, CHIDHAMBARA SUBRAMANIAM.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SEEKING TO DETERMINE HOW WELL INDIA COULD HANDLE AT HER PORTS SUCH A LARGE FLOW OF WHEAT, RICE AND OTHER GRAINS.

INDIAN SOURCES REPORTED EARLIER THIS MONTH THAT THE PRESENT FLOW OF ABOUT 600,000 TONS OF WHEAT PER MONTH COULD BE INCREASED TO 800,000 TONS PER MONTH. NOW SUBRAMANIAM HAS DECLARED THE INDIAN PORTS ARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING 900,000 TONS PER MONTH OR ABOUT 11 MILLION (M) TONS PER YEAR.

KB328PES 12/20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mon. Dec. 20, 1965
6:30 p. m.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: McG. B. *McG.B.*

I have done the attached notes in response to a message from Bill Moyers, suggesting that you might wish to have them at hand for possible press conference use tomorrow.

I have sent Bill a copy.

12/20/65

✓ H 29a

Comments on the President's three foreign visitors

All three visits were unusually successful and confirmed our conviction that very important work can be done for the United States by close personal contact between the President and the heads of foreign governments.

No large-scale decisions were planned or carried out in any of the three meetings, although a number of useful understandings were reached that could not have been worked out at any other level. (None of these can really be made public, but I am thinking of things like the spare parts for the C-130s, the clear understanding about our view of China in the case of Ayub; the Asian Bank pledge and the Zambian oil air lift in the case of Wilson, and your offset discussions, and also the Asian Bank -- I hope -- in the case of Erhard.)

The real point of visits like these is that if personal confidence can be established between the two heads of government, the major issues affecting the countries concerned can then be dealt with much more effectively by Cabinet officers and Ministers on both sides in the future. This principle is demonstrated in each of these three visits as follows:

The Ayub visit reestablished an important personal friendship and opened communications which had been made difficult by misunderstanding and differences for more than three years. The President and Ayub did not reach agreement on every point, but they do understand each other's concerns and problems, and both of them now believe that their relations are on the "upward track" (a quote from Ayub's last message to you), ^{unattached} ~~and that~~ We think the Government of Pakistan understands what we can and cannot do about the things that matter most in Pakistan, and we in turn are hopeful that the Government of Pakistan understands our deep concern for the security and freedom of all non-Communist Asia.

The Wilson visit marked another step forward in the understanding and mutual respect between the British Government and our own. Prime Minister Wilson was most generous in his expressions of understanding for the way in which the United States Government has stood with the British Government in facing certain financial problems over the last year or more, and the two governments were able to confirm their close understanding and support for each other's policies in Vietnam and Rhodesia. The President and the Prime Minister were able to understand each other quickly and easily on every issue they discussed, and both governments will now be able to move forward with confidence in a whole series of efforts which are of great concern to both of them.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / DAC 12-187

NARA, Date 04-23-2014

By LLA

Perhaps a special example here is the British defense review. The British Government faces very important problems of matching its commitments to its resources, and in most of the areas where there is a British interest there is a very important American interest too. After listening to the Prime Minister's exposition and discussing it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, the President is confident that the two governments can work fruitfully together to meet their ~~shared~~^{common} responsibilities. What makes this possible is the firm and clear determination of the British Government to play a constructive world role within the limits of the available resources. The President was impressed by the Prime Minister's firm grasp of the fact that the defense of freedom and peace in every part of the world is a matter of high importance to all free men.

The Erhard visit is a visit with a man whom the President has known well and easily ever since their informal meeting at the LBJ Ranch two years ago. The discussions with the leader of the Federal Republic are always built on a basis of friendship and trust, and this meeting was no exception. The President and the Chancellor share the same basic view of the problems of the Atlantic Community. In particular, they both agree that the close friendship between Germany and the United States must always be based on equal friendship and partnership with other members of the Alliance. This is not an exclusive relationship, but an open one. The President and the Chancellor share a common confidence in the future of the Atlantic Alliance and in the ability of men of good will to make continued progress by just such friendly and candid meetings as this one. The President expressed his clear understanding of the German desire for closer and more effective relations between nuclear and nonnuclear powers in the alliance, and the Chancellor in turn made clear his full understanding of the meaning for freedom of what the United States is doing in Vietnam. And here again the clear understanding of each other's problems by the heads of governments will now permit constructive work to go forward in the level of Ministers and Cabinet officers. The President is particularly interested in the prospect of increased cooperation in the exploration of space between the U. S. and such nations as the Federal Republic in Europe, and he was delighted to find that the Chancellor shared his enthusiasm for this kind of wholly peaceful cooperation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday

Sunday, December 20, 1965, 2 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dominican Republic: Incident in Santiago

We have spoken to Ellsworth Bunker about the shooting incident involving Caamano and his men at Santiago this morning. He confirmed that Garcia Godoy had asked the IAPF to send forces to rescue the Caamano party and bring them to Santo Domingo. He said this operation was being carried out but had no reports as of this hour on the results.

Bunker said that Colonel Lora Fernandez, one of Caamano's principal lieutenants (Chief of Operations during the revolution), was reportedly killed in the shooting. If this is true, it makes the situation more serious. Lora Fernandez was one of the more decent elements in the Constitutionalist forces.

Anticipating possible disturbances in Santo Domingo and elsewhere in the country, Bunker said that the IAPF had been put on the alert. At the request of Garcia Godoy, the IAPF has begun patrolling Santo Domingo.

Bunker had planned to return tomorrow. We have told him to remain until the situation quiets down. It is fortunate that Ambassador Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador is in Santo Domingo with Bunker. This means that two thirds of the OAS Ad Hoc Committee is on the scene taking the basic political decisions on use of the IAPF in this crisis.

We will keep you posted on developments.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-239
By fw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

31

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-239
By pw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

Monday, December 20, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker reported this morning that the situation remained quiet in Santo Domingo, Santiago and the rest of the country. The remaining members of the Caamano group were airlifted from Santiago early today. Garcia Godoy has set up a Special Investigating Commission to make a thorough study of the incident.

Bunker said that as a result of yesterday's developments, labor leaders are threatening a general strike if Garcia Godoy does not replace the military chiefs. The leaders are meeting with the President this morning. We have no report of the outcome.

Bunker reports no one has a clear picture of how the shooting started. The rebels should not have gone to Santiago in the first place. Garcia Godoy advised Caamano against it, but did not take steps to stop them. When the trouble started, the Dominican regular forces seem to have over-reacted. The most serious consequence of this incident is that it endangers the fragile -- yet growing -- confidence which was developing between Garcia Godoy and his military chiefs.

What the incident makes clear is that as long as Caamano and his principal lieutenants (Montes Arache, Aristy, La Chappelle) remain in the Dominican Republic, there are going to be periodic incidents.

I understand that you may be receiving the Dominican Ambassador, Milton Messina, for credentials presentation this afternoon or tomorrow. He may bring up the incident. I recommend that you tell him:

1. We deplore the senseless shooting which resulted in so many casualties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

2. We understand that President Garcia Godoy has announced that he will appoint a high level commission to investigate all aspects of the incident. This is a wise approach for dealing with an emotionally charged situation when the facts are not clear.

3. We hope that the incident will not jeopardize the growing understanding that President Garcia Godoy has been developing with the Defense Minister and the service chiefs during recent weeks. (While I would not mention this to Messina, there is nothing in our Embassy reporting or from Bunker to indicate that the chiefs had any responsibility for the flash fire fight. The commanding officers of the Santiago garrison has already been removed).

4. The incident shows the importance of completing the reintegration process as rapidly as possible. (In Garcia Godoy's plan -- this includes sending the rebel leaders on foreign assignments, but I strongly recommend that you not discuss this aspect with Messina).

5. We share with President Garcia Godoy the strong desire that all sectors in the Dominican Republic cooperate in the five months remaining before elections to establish an atmosphere of tranquility and confidence, which are essential for a free and open campaign and balloting.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-239
By W, NARA, Date 11-18-93

Monday, December 20, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status Report on Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker called at 5:30 PM to report that the situation in Santo Domingo continues tense, but generally quiet. The joint IAPF-Dominican patrols are in control. General Palmer had made survey of the city and thinks that the lid can be held on until passions cool. Because of some demonstrations and scattered shooting this morning, most of the stores and banks closed their doors. A good many public employees remained away from their jobs. Labor leaders have not called for a general strike, saying that they will wait for the report of the Investigating Commission. Garcia Godoy has named the Vice President, the Attorney General and a Minister without portfolio. Bunker thinks this is a good group.

Bunker saw Garcia Godoy and Defense Minister Rivera Caminero and the military chiefs today. We have his cabled report only on the first talk. Bunker says Garcia Godoy blames both sides for the incident: the PRD for encouraging and sponsoring the trip of the rebels to Santiago and the military for the assault against the hotel. Bunker and his colleague Clairmont Duenas pressed Garcia Godoy to complete the reintegration plan and send the rebel leaders abroad. Garcia Godoy's reaction was that both would be harder to do now. They warned him that he must stop Caamano from taking political junkets around the country or face new incidents. Garcia Godoy appeared to understand. He is resuming talks with Bunker and Clairmont Duenas tomorrow morning.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, December 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following press calls were taken by my Staff today:

Robert Kleiman, NY Times, called James Thomson to ask:

1. What is our estimate of the number of people killed and/or injured in Indonesia since October 30? Mr. Thomson said our figures were widely ranging - from 20,000 to over a 100,000.

2. Who are the Chicom news representatives in Canada? Mr. Thomson gave him two names. Mr. Thomson thinks the Times wants to invite these two newsmen to New York.

Chalmers Roberts, Washington Post called Mr. Thomson to ask if there was anything new or significant to Peking's or Hanoi's reaction to the Fanfani episode? Mr. Thomson said he did not see anything very new and indeed had sensed nothing very new in the Peking, Hanoi, Moscow configuration over the past several months.

Richard Dudman, St Louis Post Dispatch, asked Mr. Thomson to have lunch this week. Thomson said no. Mr. Dudman asked about next week and Thomson said maybe. Mr. Dudman wants to "discuss Southeast Asia."

McGeorge Bundy

Hand written note - Thomson should
have jumped on Dudman. I'll
tell him.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DCH ON 6-29-83

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, December 19, 1965, 5 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach two papers which you commissioned yesterday afternoon.

At Tab A is a memorandum from Dean Rusk on alternative diplomatic actions. As he points out himself, the proposals are modest -- not because of caution, but because there simply is not much more that we can do by diplomatic means alone.

At Tab B is a draft speech for your use in the United Nations. It is very much of a first draft, and it needs a lot of cutting and polishing. There are three points worth making about it:

1. It includes an announcement of a pause. I know this is not something you are planning to do, but I thought it important to have a try at the right kind of language because Art Goldberg has told me most emphatically that he thinks it would be a great mistake for you to go to the UN if you do not have some sort of dramatic announcement to make. I can't think of any other.

2. I have included a pretty full discussion of the international programs which are now being prepared by Joe Califano's office in the fields of food, health and education. I have also drafted a pretty bold statement on population policy. I feel sure that Joe would recommend strongly against such a discussion of major elements of your 1966 program in the UN forum. But we have given all the general assurances before, and without something concrete, this part of the speech would have little interest.

3. I have reviewed your speech to the 20th Anniversary celebration in San Francisco, and I attach a copy at Tab C, because I think it shows the problem we are up against. That speech was thoughtful and eloquent, but it had little hard news in it, and it got a disappointing reception. Unless we go beyond it in some clearly specific way, we run the risk of a renewal of this same line of argument -- that the Johnson Administration takes no real interest in the UN and has nothing of importance to tell it.

I think there may well be some way of stating our Vietnam position which is a little less precise about the pause but which still has some news and punch in it, and I will have another look at that problem this evening. But I send you these papers now because I know how hard and steadily you are thinking about this whole business.

M. J. B.
McG. B.

33a



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-371
By 128, NARA. Date 8-18-92

December 19, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

1. We have established the American position with regard to Viet Nam and have made known our position through all possible channels, public and private. The result has been a firm and repeated negative from Hanoi and Peiping.

2. We see no serious possibility of immediate diplomatic progress of a public nature unless we are prepared to change the conditions under which public diplomatic action could be undertaken. The principal change of condition available to us would be a pause in the bombing.

3. We have reexamined the question of a formal consideration of Viet Nam by the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly. I have discussed this today with Ambassador Goldberg. We both believe that the results would be negative. There would not be general and strong support, in the votes cast, for the United States position, and there is a high probability that a majority in the Security Council or in the Assembly would call for a unilateral termination of the bombing by the United States. We believe that the Soviets would bitterly resist any constructive action by the United Nations and would veto any resolution in the Security Council acceptable to us. The point remains that a bitter debate in the United Nations would further freeze the Soviet public position and reduce their options for the future.

4. Private diplomacy. I do believe we should continue our discussions with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Yugoslavia and others to make sure that at least the Eastern European Communists fully understand our position and understand that Hanoi's insistence upon their four points (amounting to victory in South Viet Nam) is the central obstacle to peace. I am attaching a copy of a memorandum

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-2-

of conversation between Mr. Zinchuk of the Soviet Embassy and William Bundy which you will find of interest. From this memorandum it appears that Hanoi's attitude toward a pause would be negative, but that the Soviets themselves would be much interested in one.

5. I believe that we should send a new circular on Viet Nam to all of our Missions abroad giving them an up-to-date recapitulation of peace efforts and our understanding of the present position of Hanoi, as a basis for full discussion of the problem with other governments.

6. The Vice President, after attending the Philippine inauguration, should visit Korea and Japan and make a special effort in Japan to explain the Viet Nam question.

7. I should think, also, that Averell Harriman might take a trip after the Christmas holidays and combine interest in Viet Nam with a number of other matters, visiting, for example, Paris, the North African Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are a number of other questions which he could usefully take up in a number of these capitals. While in Paris he could get a full report from Chauvel's trip to Hanoi and Peiping.

8. The above proposals are rather modest. The central point is, however, that diplomacy cannot produce miracles if Hanoi remains determined to seize South Viet Nam. I have no doubt that this remains their objective. The reason they do not come to a conference table is that they know that we would not agree to the attainment of their objective at such a conference. What is true of Hanoi is even more true of Peiping. In this instance diplomacy is working within the limitations imposed by Hanoi's objectives in South Viet Nam, which are still in fundamental conflict with our own, and Hanoi's continuing hope that they can somehow succeed on the battlefield.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

336
48
20348

DATE: December 16, 1965
1:00 PM

SUBJECT: Vietnam (This is an excerpt of a long luncheon conversation, held at Zinchuk's suggestion. The full memorandum covers other less sensitive points).

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alexander I. Zinchuk, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the USSR
Mr. William Bundy, FE

COPIES TO: S/S. ←
Ambassador Johnson
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-371
By ing NARA. Date 8-18-92

Zinchuk brought up Vietnam after we had discussed a number of other topics. I said that the situation looked very difficult, and he agreed. I said that inevitably we would be having to increase the scale of our action in the new year.

I then mentioned that we had been interested to see Hanoi's broadcasts of December 10 and 11 relating to a possible second pause. I said that we had been puzzled as to how to interpret these and asked whether the Soviets had any reaction. Zinchuk responded that he knew of the broadcasts, but, without referring specifically to them, could say that Hanoi generally took the attitude that a "mere interruption" of our bombing did not call for any responsive action by them. There would have to be something more, dealing with US actions in the South, where, as he put it, the issue would really be decided. I asked what specifically he might mean in the way of action, and he declined to elaborate.

He then went on to urge that a pause would have benefit "in the long run." It would ease the atmosphere somewhat and might open the way eventually to some way of getting at a solution. He specifically did not say anything about what the Soviets might do, although my reference to Ambassador Dobrynin's talks to the Secretary and McGeorge Bundy might

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

have made him feel that it was unnecessary to repeat what the Ambassador had said. However, the implication seemed to be that there really was not much hope of a short-term response by Hanoi unless we threw in something quite major and specific relating to the South. (Perhaps, for a guess, suspension of reinforcements).

I then asked whether the Soviets were able to have fairly extensive conversations with Hanoi leaders. He said that they did, but that they had never found any flexibility whatever in Hanoi's statement of the four points. I said that, as he must know, the one point on which we had insuperable difficulty was the one speaking of the NLF program, which we could only take to mean a communist-dominated coalition. He seemed to understand this completely, and did not dispute my interpretation.

He then asked how we visualized a final settlement. I said that the most immediate problem, either in negotiations or by prior action, would be the withdrawal of North Vietnamese-introduced elements from the South. We and the Vietnamese would insist that these be withdrawn at an early date. He then asked about parallel withdrawals on the US side; I responded that we certainly meant what we said about withdrawing, and that if the over-all situation permitted, it might be possible to visualize substantial withdrawals at an early stage. However, the timing would be very hard to agree to, and this would doubtless be one of the toughest problems in a negotiation. He agreed.

He then asked about the internal political situation. I said that once peace was restored it might well be possible for individual members of the Viet Cong to participate in the political life of the South, which might be restored through some sequence of local and general elections. He did not press this one further.

He then asked whether there had not been greater rigidity in recent US statements, notably by the Secretary. I said that this had not been intended, and asked what he had in mind. It turned out he was referring to the use of the phrase "independent South Vietnam under guarantees", and was also struck by the fact that we had not recently referred to eventual free elections on reunification. I emphasized that there had been no change in our position on this point, and that I thought there was no serious difficulty, at least verbally, between ourselves and Hanoi in this area. I said that we might find an early occasion to reiterate brief formulations, which definitely stood as our position.

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~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

He then asked what our intentions were with respect to Cambodia and Laos. I said that it was important to keep the two separate, and noted that the press and Cambodians had apparently misinterpreted Ambassador Johnson's being asked about Cambodia and Laos on TV, and replying solely on Laos. I said that our policy on both countries remained what it had been, i. e., that we did not wish to cause any unnecessary trouble with Cambodia and that in Laos our objective was to maintain the settlement, although we had to deal militarily with Hanoi's use of Laos as its principal supply route. He seemed satisfied with these responses and did not pursue either point.

I then felt him out a little on the future shape of things in Southeast Asia generally. I said that if the "aggressive powers" could be persuaded that things could not be altered by force, it might be possible to visualize a situation in which the whole area was composed of independent nations that took a neutral external position and had economic and other ties with other nations, including the Soviets themselves. I referred to Ambassador Stevenson's letter in the Times as being along these general lines, making clear that I was merely expressing a personal future hypothesis premised on resolution of the present problem. He said that ideas of this sort had come up when he was one of the Soviet delegates at the Laos Conference. I specifically noted that Thailand would have to be fully satisfied that its security was assured under any over-all arrangement for the area. Neither he nor I mentioned the question of what military guarantees or arrangements might be made to this end.

Incidentally, in our discussion of Soviet contacts with Hanoi, I asked whether the Soviets thought Hanoi really misunderstood the limited significance of the demonstrations in this country. He gave an unexpectedly confident reply to the effect that he did not think they did misinterpret these demonstrations, since he thought they had people with good experience and judgment about American politics. (Sic).

We concluded this phase of the discussion with his expressing regret that it had made US-Soviet relations more difficult. I said that this was unfortunate, but difficult to avoid as long as our basic viewpoints were so different. Like the rest of the conversation, this exchange was in a low key, and his whole tone was personally friendly throughout.

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~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Comment. It may be noteworthy that Zinchuk did not raise any question about the meaning of our bombing of the Uong Bi power plant. At another point in the conversation, he had asked whether Secretary Rusk's emphasis on Vietnam and Secretary McNamara's emphasis on the future ChiCom military threat, at the NATO meeting, had any special significance. I replied that it was natural that both topics would come to the fore at this particular meeting, which happened to come now, but that these statements in themselves did not have special significance. This would have already given him a chance to raise the Uong Bi bombing, but he conspicuously did not do so.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN

1965 DEC 18 PM 3 02

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12/19/65

DRAFT STATEMENT

Mr. President:

On this final day of the 20th session of the General Assembly, I am proud to join you and the representatives of 117 states -- and to bring you once again a message of peace. On this eve of the holiday so sacred to the Christian world -- and so closely associated in all our minds with peace and good will among men -- I come to pledge you the unremitting dedication of the American people to peace.

In this cause my country joined in creating this organization twenty years ago. In this cause we have vigorously supported its peace-keeping capacity and its peace-keeping operations throughout these twenty years. In all this organization's great undertakings -- and above all as it plays its role in the maintenance of international peace and security -- I pledge again my Government's firm and substantial support.

This essential purpose of the United Nations has been the main object of your labors here in the past three months.

Praise of Pope Paul

You have been the first Assembly to receive the leader of the Roman Catholic Church. You do not need my help to recall that splendid day. In Pope Paul VI all have found a new and incomparable friend. In the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Pope found a new and incomparable forum. No one has ever stated with more eloquence the fundamental purpose of the United Nations than Pope Paul in his historic address: "You have performed and you

continue to perform a great work: the education of mankind in the ways of peace. The United Nations is the great school where that education is imparted. We are today in the assembly hall of that school ... you labor in this great instruction. But you are still at the beginnings."

* * *

Congratulations to the Assembly on its peace work

I congratulate the Assembly on what it has done for peace in this session.

In the great field of Disarmament, you have recommended the negotiation of a treaty to end the perilous proliferation of nuclear weapons. You have recommended the extension of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty to make it fully comprehensive and effective. You have recommended the establishment of nuclear free zones when this can be done without upsetting the fragile balance of military forces. You have recommended that the states involved in the 18-Member Disarmament Committee in Geneva press on diligently in pursuit of general and complete disarmament. You have recommended that efforts be made to convene a truly comprehensive world disarmament conference in 1966. I pledge my Government to play its full part to carry out your recommendation.

Moreover, you and the Security Council have in recent months considered and acted upon several specific situations endangering the peace of the world. The Council took concrete steps in its Resolution of September 20 last to end

the conflict between India and Pakistan, and those steps are being carried out, in spite of minor violations. The cease-fire is holding and the Secretary General is pressing measures for a withdrawal of forces to their positions of August 5. Once again, I pledge my Government to do whatever lies in its power to insure that the Resolution of September 20 is carried out in all its parts and that a stable peace is restored in the subcontinent.

Both you and the Security Council have since November 11 dealt with the situation in Rhodesia. There a small and rebellious minority denies the fundamental right of the vast majority of the people of that country and has illegally proclaimed an unreal independence. The Security Council has called on all states to exert their utmost efforts to apply effective economic measures, including an oil embargo, to bring the rebellion to an end. Mr. President, my Government has responded and will continue progressively to respond to that call until its purpose is achieved and the rule of law and freedom is restored in Rhodesia.

* * *

New attacks on hunger, ignorance and disease

You have also done much constructive work in the fields of human rights and economic development. Next to the quest for peace, the agenda of mankind has no more vital tasks. The United States remains fully pledged to the great common effort to improve the life of all mankind, especially in the new and developing countries.

My own commitment to this undertaking is the same in depth and meaning as my commitment to the prosperity and welfare of the people of our own

great American society in the United States. In this last year we have made great progress here at home. Next year, it is our aim to move outward to the world -- with major new attacks upon the ancient enemies of hunger, ignorance and disease.

At the very center of mankind's wants today is food. Next year I will propose to the Congress that the United States should join in a new world-wide attack on hunger. Those of us who have food enough must help those who have less -- but not simply by shipping what we have to spare. We must help others in the path of self-help, for in the end all parts of the world must learn to feed themselves -- either by the food they grow or by other products which they sell for food. The agricultural revolution in the United States and in other countries gives ample proof that with the right techniques, the right energy, the right investment and the right purpose, the hungry can be fed. And this will be our goal.

But the new societies cannot grow in strength and health unless they also win the battle against ignorance. Next year in the United States, I will ask the Congress for a bold effort in this field too -- a new effort of partnership between American education and the schools and colleges and universities of the new countries. In this new effort we will seek to establish

--partnerships by the thousand from school to school

--an exchange Peace Corps which can bring young foreign volunteers to live and work with us

--a doubling of our summer teacher corps

--a strengthening of our schools and their ability to give our children knowledge of the world

--an expansion of our support for education at all levels in the developing nations

--and a swift enlargement of our educational and cultural exchanges with all the world.

And we will make an equal effort in the field of health. I plan to present to the Congress a new and broader program with five basic purposes:

1. To build a new international health service in the United States;
2. To help meet the health manpower needs of developing countries;
3. To set targets and start programs for the eradication of the diseases that still kill and cripple -- malaria, measles, small pox, cholera, tuberculosis, and infant diseases;
4. To combat the malnutrition that so dangerously saps the strength of mothers and children in hungry countries;
5. And to cooperate in worldwide efforts to deal effectively with population programs.

The growth of the world's population still threatens to outrun the growth in the world's resources. In this great problem area each people must make its own decisions. The United States does not presume to decide the policies

of others. But it is a matter of simple and straightforward logic that the best of development plans and the most advanced of agricultural programs will not meet the needs of poor and hungry peoples unless they are effectively related to the present and future population of each land. Whatever our private or religious convictions, all of us must recognize this problem. All of us must be ready to respond to its imperatives. In our attack upon hunger and disease and illiteracy we must never forget that programs for the farm, and programs for the school, and programs in the field of health, must always be matched by programs for population. Those who adopt such programs can count on help from the United States.

New moves on Vietnam

So there is work ahead of us, a great constructive work which can absorb our skills and energies for the decade of the seventies which lies ahead. And it is the yearning of mankind, and the yearning of the people of my country, that we should all be set free from fear and from war to go about this work of progress with our fellow men. To make this kind of progress, we need progress also toward peace. And that is why I wish to end by reporting to you first of all, and through you to the whole community of man, of a tangible, significant and earnest step in the cause of peace which the United States has taken today.

No situation anywhere in the world is the cause of more profound concern to the people of the United States and to me personally than the conflict in Vietnam. No present situation is more immediately dangerous to the peace of the world. At

the same time, no situation more gravely tests the capacity of nations and of the international community to insure that all the people of the world may continue to be able to live in security and freedom, without fear that armed minorities within or armed intruders without will deprive them of their independence and sovereignty, often so newly and so dearly won.

I shall not, on this solemn occasion, enter into polemics or repeat again the often told story of how the fighting in South Vietnam began. I will only remind this assembly how often the United States has declared its profound desire to move this conflict from the battlefield to the conference table, and how often I have said that we are ready for unconditional negotiations.

Throughout these many months we have, through various contacts, sought from the other side, from Hanoi to Peking, a constructive response to our desire for unconditional negotiations. The only response has been a series of scornful and uncompromising statements to the effect that the United States must accept intolerable conditions before negotiations are begun. Yet we hope, Mr. President, that these harsh responses are not the last word.

It has often been said throughout recent months that the U. S. aerial bombing in North Vietnam was the chief obstacle to negotiation and that, if we would ^{suspend} ~~stop~~ this bombing, negotiations would promptly begin. We have not had the slightest reliable indications from Hanoi or Peking themselves that this was in fact the case. We even suspended bombing for five days in May. But once

again, Mr. President, the only response forthcoming was a charge by Hanoi that we were trying by our suspension to "blackmail" them into negotiation. Nevertheless, Mr. President, I refuse to give up the pursuit of peace, just as I refuse to give up the defense of freedom.

I therefore today gave instructions to the Armed Forces of the United States to suspend all bombing operations in North Vietnam. I have asked the Government of South Vietnam to join in this suspension. We shall, of course, continue to defend the people of South Vietnam in their own territory by all appropriate means at our disposal.

I hope that this suspension of bombing will be taken for what it is -- the very opposite of "blackmail." It is not pressure; it is a relaxation of pressure. We threaten no one. We simply seek to see if there is truth in the reports that a suspension can help move this matter to the peace table. As I have said before, we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

This step is of course on the part of the United States a self-denying limitation of real significance upon the exercise of our military power. It must not be interpreted as a sign of weakness or as the slightest slackening of our determination to do whatever is required to carry out our commitments in South Vietnam and to defend its freedom and its legitimate rights. No one who knows the character of our people and the magnitude of our power should have illusions on this score. If fighting is necessary, then we have just begun to fight. But if

if peace is possible, we shall be the first to grasp it. We have extended the olive branch 100 times. We extend it again. Let others show equal good faith and a conference table can be set up before the year is out. The Geneva Accords kept the peace in Vietnam for several years. They can be revived to do so permanently, or new accords concluded. Our offer of negotiation is, I repeat, unconditional. President Ho Chi Minh was quoted by private persons who saw him recently as saying "I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone." I do not know whether he was correctly quoted, but if he was, I can assure him and this august assembly that he will find the United States equally ready to go anywhere, to meet anyone, in pursuit of an honorable peace in Vietnam.

The door to peace is open. The Communist war of aggression against South Vietnam cannot be won. The time for talk has come. It is my hope that in this season and in these days of peace and pause, men of good will in every country, and leaders of peace in these United Nations, will carry to others the message which I have brought to you. No one can win from war -- and all can win from peace.

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Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations

Following is the text of an address made by President Johnson at the opening of the U.N. 20th anniversary commemorative session at San Francisco June 25, together with the text of an address made at the close of the session on June 26 by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 25

White House press release (San Francisco, Calif.) dated June 25; as-delivered text

On my journey across the continent I stopped in the State of Missouri, and there I met with the man who made the first such pilgrimage here 20 years ago as the 33d President of the United States—Harry S. Truman.

Mr. Truman sent to this assembly his greetings and good wishes on this anniversary commemoration. He asked that I express to you for him—as for myself and for my countrymen—the faith which we of the United States hold firmly in the United Nations and in the ultimate success of its mission among men.

On this historic and happy occasion we have met to celebrate 20 years of achievement and to look together at the work that we face in future meetings. I come to this anniversary not to speak of futility or failure nor of doubt and despair. I come to raise a voice of confidence in both the future of these United Nations and the fate of the human race.

The movement of history is glacial. On two decades of experience, none can presume to speak with certainty of the direction or the destiny of man's affairs. But this we do know, and this we do believe: Futility and failure are not the truth of this organization brought into being here 20 years ago.

Where, historically, man has moved fitfully from war toward war, in these last two decades man has moved steadily away from war as either an instrument of national policy or a means of international decision.

Many factors have contributed to this change. But no one single factor has contributed more than the existence and the enterprise of the United Nations itself. For there can be no doubt that the United Na-

tions has taken root in human need and has established a shape, and a purpose, and a meaning of its own.

By providing a forum for the opinions of the world, the United Nations has given them a force and an influence that they have never had before. By shining the light of inquiry and discussion upon very dark and isolated conflicts, it has pressed the nations of the world to conform their courses to the requirements of the United Nations Charter.

And let all remember—and none forget—that now more than 50 times in these 20 years the United Nations has acted to keep the peace.

By persuading nations to justify their own conduct before all countries, it has helped, at many times and in many places, to soften the harshness of man to his fellow man.

By confronting the rich with the misery of the poor and the privileged with the despair of the oppressed, it has removed the excuse of ignorance, unmasked the evil of indifference, and has placed an insistent, even though still unfulfilled, responsibility upon the more fortunate of the earth.

By insisting upon the political dignity of man, it has welcomed 63 nations to take their places alongside the 51 original members—a historical development of dramatic import, achieved mainly through peaceful means.

And by binding countries together in the great declarations of the charter, it has given those principles a strengthened vitality in the conduct of the affairs of man.

Today, then, at this time of anniversary, let us not occupy ourselves with parochial doubts or with passing despair. The United Nations—after 20 years—does not draw its life from the assembly halls or the committee rooms. It lives in the conscience and the reason of mankind.

Dangers to Peace in Southeast Asia

The most urgent problem we face is the keeping of the peace.

Today, as I speak, clear and present dangers in Southeast Asia cast their shadow across the path of all mankind. The United Nations must be concerned.

The most elementary principle of the United Nations is that neighbors must not attack their neighbors—and that principle today is under challenge.

The processes of peaceful settlement today are blocked by willful aggressors contemptuous of the opinion and the will of mankind.

Bilateral diplomacy has yielded no result.

The machinery of the Geneva conference has been paralyzed.

Resort to the Security Council has been rejected.

The efforts of the distinguished Secretary-General have been rebuffed.

An appeal for unconditional discussion was met with contempt.

A pause in bombing operations was called an insult.

The concern for peace of the Commonwealth prime ministers has received little and very disappointing results.

Therefore, today I put to this world assembly the facts of aggression, the right of a people to be free from attack, the interest of every member in safety against molestation, the duty of this organization to reduce the dangers to peace, and the unhesitating readiness of the United States of America to find a peaceful solution.

I now call upon this gathering of the nations of the world to use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the tables those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts, as we will support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations.

Agenda of Peace Not a Single Item

But the agenda of peace is not a single item.

Around the world, there are many disputes that are filled with dangers, many tensions that are taut with peril, many arms races that are fraught with folly, among small nations as well as large.

And the first purpose of the United Nations is peacekeeping. The first work of all members now, then, just must be peacemaking. For this organization exists to resolve quarrels outside the confines of its headquar-

ters—and not to prolong quarrels within.

Where there are disputes, let us try to find the means to resolve them—through whatever machinery is available or is possible.

Where the United Nations requires readily available peace forces in hours and days—and not in weeks or months—let all pledge to provide those forces. And my country is ready.

On another front of our common endeavors, I think nothing is more urgent than the effort to diminish danger by bringing the armaments of the world under increasing control. Nations rich and poor are burdened down by excessive and competitive and frightening arms. So let us all urgently commit ourselves to the rational reduction of those arms burdens. We of the United States would hope that others will join with us in coming to our next negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind.

International War on Poverty

And after peace, high on the agenda of man is devotion to the dignity and to the worth of the human person—and the promotion of better standards of life in larger freedom for all of the human race.

We in this country are committing ourselves to great tasks in our own great society. We are committed to narrow the gap between promise and performance, between equality in law and equality in fact, between opportunity for the numerous well-to-do and the still too numerous poor, between education for the successful and education for all of the people.

It is no longer a community or a nation or a continent but a whole generation of mankind for whom our promises must be kept—and kept within the next two decades.

If those promises are not kept, it will be less and less possible to keep them for any.

And that is why—on this anniversary—I would call upon all member nations to rededicate themselves to wage together an international war on poverty.

So let us then together: raise the goal for technical aid and investment through the

United Nations; increase our food, and health, and education programs to make a serious and a successful attack upon hunger, and disease, and ignorance—the ancient enemies of all mankind.

Let us in all our lands—including this land—face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to this most profound challenge to the future of all the world. Let us act on the fact that less than \$5 invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth.

For our wars together on the poverty and privation, the hunger and sickness, the despair and the futility of mankind, let us mark this International Cooperation Year by joining together in an Alliance for Man.

Realizing the Promise of the Future

The promise of the future lies in what science, the ever more productive industrial machine, the ever more productive fertile and usable land, the computer, the miracle drug, and the man in space all spread before us. The promise of the future lies in what the religions and the philosophies, the cultures and the wisdoms of 5,000 years of civilization have finally distilled and confided to us—the promise of the abundant life and the brotherhood of man.

The heritage that we share together is a fragile heritage.

A world war would certainly destroy it. Pride and arrogance could destroy it. Neglect and indifference could destroy it. It could be destroyed by narrow nationalism or ideological intolerance—or rabid extremism of either the left or the right.

So we must find the way as a community of nations, as a United Nations, to keep the peace among and between all of us. We must restrain by joint and effective action any who place their ambitions or their dogmas or their prestige above the peace of all the world. And we just must find a way to do that. It is the most profound and the most urgent imperative of the time in which we live.

So I say to you as my personal belief, and

2-11
the belief, I think, of the great American majority, that the world must finish once and for all the myth of inequality of races and peoples, with the scandal of discrimination, with the shocking violation of human rights and the cynical violation of political rights. We must stop preaching hatred, we must stop bringing up entire new generations to preserve and to carry out the lethal fantasies of the old generation, stop believing that the gun or the bomb can solve all problems or that a revolution is of any value if it closes doors and limits choices instead of opening both as wide as possible.

As far back as we can look—until the light of history fades into the dusk of legend—such aspirations of man have been submerged and swallowed by the violence and the weakness of man at his worst.

Generations have come and gone, and generations have tried and failed.

Will we succeed?

I do not know. But I dare to be hopeful and confident.

And I do know this: Whether we look for the judgment to God, or to history, or to mankind, this is the age, and we are the men, and this is the place to give reality to our commitments under the United Nations Charter. For what was for other generations just a hope is for this generation a simple necessity.

Thank you very much.

Mr Bundy
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 18, 1965

3:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

We've already effectively answered King Constantine's letter to you by announcing last Friday our PL 480 and Ex-Im Bank help for Greece.

However, a written reply gives us another chance to play the theme that the Greeks are big boys now and should stop leaning on us. Hearing this straight from you will encourage them to buckle down, instead of reverting to the ways of yesteryear. Constantine probably isn't the best audience, but just as his government put him up to writing you, he'll pass your reply back.

R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-117
By ms, NARA, Date 10-18-04

Mr. Bundy

340

12/18/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear King Constantine:

The concerns raised in your letter of November 29 have also been ours in recent weeks. Having followed closely events in Greece since the days of my support for the Greek-Turkish aid legislation of 1947, I understand fully the psychological aspect of your current economic problems and have approved measures to help.

The security, political health, and economic stability of Greece continue to be of major importance to the United States and the Free World. We made this clear during recent conversations in Washington with Deputy Prime Minister Tsirimokos, but I also want to assure you personally of our undiminished interest.

When Mr. Tsirimokos was here, we also explained to him some of our own problems. Our economy, productive as it is, bears a heavy burden in meeting Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, while at the same time continuing worldwide programs to help other nations progress economically and thwart subversion. So we are twice-pressed. Despite this pressure, we reactivated the Public Law 480 program for Greece and made available Export-Import Bank credits as immediate steps to show our concern. We have full confidence that the courageous steps which your Government is now taking will overcome its short-term economic difficulties and that our actions will help meet the psychological problem.

I have asked Ambassador Talbot to stay in close consultation with your government, so that we and other members of the consortium may remain abreast of Greece's short-term and long-term problems. We will continue in that way to help mobilize Free World resources to supplement Greece's own efforts.

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Constantine
King of the Hellenes
Athens, Greece

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-117
By jis, NARA, Date 10-18-04

Mr. Bundy 35

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 18, 1965
Saturday, 1:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Alternatives to Pak Facilities. Though I'm modestly optimistic that our Pak affairs are now moving up rather than down, I still think this alternatives package a prudent insurance policy. It doesn't call for getting out of Peshawar but only for spreading our investment against the risk, which is still appreciable.

You've already signed the NSAM, but told us to hold it up till Ayub visit. May we issue it now?

R. W. Komer

Yes _____

Hold up awhile longer _____

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NJ.03 2.048.004/1
By je/c, NARA, Date 5-15-12

Friday, December 17, 1965
6:00 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press calls

1. At my staff meeting this morning I put in a new rule as a result of our discussion on the telephone about the Kiker story. I asked the staff to call the Situation Room whenever they get a press call, and to report what was on the reporter's mind and how they responded. This rule has already paid dividends.

2. Members of the staff have taken two press calls today. Bromley Smith spoke to John Hightower of Associated Press, and Don Ropa spoke to Walter Friedenberg of Scripps-Howard. Hightower asked Smith for confirmation of a report that the Administration was again considering a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, and Friedenberg asked Ropa to discuss our stand on a possible "Christmas bombing lull" in Vietnam. Both Smith and Ropa said they knew nothing about it. Smith referred Hightower to Moyers. Ropa referred Friedenberg to me. Neither Hightower nor Friedenberg has pursued the matter with either Moyers or me.

3. On the strength of these calls, I spoke to Bill Moyers and then to Jim Greenfield. I asked Greenfield to make sure that everyone at State was knocking down any question of this kind very hard. Greenfield said this is what they are already doing on the basis of what Bill Moyers has said in recent days. Greenfield says he thinks most of these questions are originating out of rumors in New York. He thinks these rumors do not come from Goldberg or his people, but rather from other UN sources.

4. In any event, we have battened down the hatches once more.

McG. B.

P.S. Since dictating this, I have received one other report as follows: Robert Komer talked with Robert Kleiman of the New York Times. He was interested in the India food program and the Ayub visit. Komer gave him standard replies.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT A NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DAH ON 6-39-83

P. S. Since dictating this, I have received one other report as follows:

Robert Komer talked with Robert Kleiman of the New York Times. He was interested in India food program and Ayub visit. Komer gave him standard replies.

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E. since dictating this I have
received one other report
as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following reporters telephoned members of my staff today:

John Hightower, Associated Press, called Bromley Smith to ask confirmation of a report that the Administration was again considering a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. Mr. Smith said he was not able to reply to his question and suggested he call Bill Moyers.

Walter Friedenberg, Scripps-Howard, called Don Ropa and asked the Administration's position on a possible "Christmas bombing lull" in Vietnam. He said he was not in a position to comment and suggested he call me.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, December 17, 1965
4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strike Situation in the Dominican Republic

Ambassador Bunker has just called to say that Dominican security forces have taken charge of the area where there were disturbances yesterday, and that everything is quiet and under control. He also reports that a settlement was reached with the sugar workers and that they are expected to be back at their jobs on Monday.

Ambassador Bunker said that he would be back in town on Tuesday and would like to see you if your schedule permits. *but I*

Doubt if this is urgent.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-239
By *ju*, NARA, Date *11-18-93*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, December 17, 1965
3:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Deepening Crisis in Guatemala

1. Recent reports from our Embassy and CIA sources in Guatemala indicate that President Peralta's position has deteriorated and that a military coup may be attempted prior to December 20.
2. The leader of the coup is Col. Miguel Angel PONCIANO, candidate for President of the minority, rightist Movement for National Liberation (MLN). Ponciano suspects that Peralta is working to insure the election of another candidate. The elections are scheduled for March 6, 1966. Ponciano is trying to develop enough support among military commanders to overthrow Peralta.
3. Embassy officers met with Ponciano on Tuesday and told him that we strongly favor return to constitutionality via the scheduled elections. He made quite clear that the issue is Peralta's suspected support of another candidate. He said in effect that either Peralta stops interfering in the elections, or he must go. He claims that he would remove only Peralta and his cousin and that elections would be held on schedule. What is clear is that Ponciano wants to count the ballots on March 6.
4. The danger in this situation is that an attempted coup may split the military, lead to protracted fighting and play into the hands of the Communists. We have instructed Ambassador Mein to convey a strong warning against a coup to Ponciano. At the same time, we want him to urge Peralta, in his own interest, to request OAS supervision of the elections with a visit now by OAS Secretary General Mora or OAS Council Chairman Penna Marinho (Brazil). Such a proposal might give Peralta some insurance and could not do any of us any harm. He is seeing Peralta today and will afterwards lean hard on Ponciano.
5. This is not at present a Dominican Republic situation, but it may easily require some energetic diplomatic pressures in order to prevent real deterioration via military civil war.
6. We are following developments closely. State, DOD and CIA are doing some contingency planning.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 31, #84

By pc, NARA. Date 11-23-09

M. J. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

12-17-86
5:30P

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Friday - 10:30 a.m.
December 17, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Strike Situation

Press stories this morning paint a picture of increasing disorder in Santo Domingo as a result of the Christmas bonus strike.

We have just spoken to Ambassador Bunker and he reports the following:

1. There is some disorder along the old LOC and the approaches to Duarte Bridge, but the police and Dominican military are moving in at Garcia Godoy's direction to establish order.
2. The rest of the city is quiet, including the downtown area.
3. The general strike situation is more favorable this morning.
4. Bunker has talked to Garcia Godoy and the head of the Dominican Sugar Corporation and they are hopeful that they can get the sugar strike situation resolved today.
5. Garcia Godoy is holding firm on the Christmas bonus issue and Bunker believes that he has the vast majority of the country behind him. Balaguer yesterday came out with a very strong statement in support of the Provisional Government on the strike.

mf/s
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-239
By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, December 17, 1965, 9 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your talk with Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara at 9:30

Rusk and McNamara both believe that the most important question before us is that of peaceful actions before January. When last heard from, they were both strongly in favor of the pause. Bob and I have been doing further work on the wider notion of a cease-fire in all Vietnam. I do not know his views, but I continue to think we are not ready for this one yet.

Another matter for discussion is Rusk's report on his European trip. Like Bob McNamara he has found the responses pretty thin on Vietnam. But it remains a good thing that he put our case as strongly as he did.

You might also wish to consider the next steps in the Wilson talks. McNamara, Rusk, Ball and I are invited to talk with the Prime Minister at 11. I think we can usefully spend the time mainly on the defense review issues, and the problem of alliance nuclear arrangements. There is no need for conclusions on either one, and we should be able to learn quite a lot about British thinking.

Finally, I should mention the Asian Bank. Gene Black has just had a letter from Erhard which indicates pretty plainly that the Germans will reconsider their contribution if you ask them to on Monday. Gene points out that it will be hard for the Germans unless we can get some movement from the British. He says that if the Prime Minister could move from 10 million dollars to 10 million pounds, he thinks the Germans would be in the bag. Between them the British and German additions would be about \$40 million, and there would be only \$10 million left to find. Gene says he can get that from Asians -- and thus what is really a Johnson Bank would be over the top by New Years. This would be helpful to us in the overall Vietnamese debate.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12 17-65
4:55 P
CONFIDENTIAL

✓ 41
Friday, December 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

For information

SUBJECT: The Gustav Hertz Case

1. Gustav Hertz, a USOM official, was kidnapped by the Viet Cong on February 2, 1965. In April, the VC threatened to execute him if a man named Hai were executed by the GVN for his part in the March 30 bombing of the U.S. Embassy. Since Hertz's abduction, indirect contacts have been made with the Viet Cong in a concerted effort to free him. At one point, the Viet Cong offered to exchange Hertz for Hai, but the offer was not taken up for fear that it might set a precedent which would encourage the Communists to capture and make hostages of other U.S. civilians. We were also concerned about GVN sensitivities. But Max Taylor did get the GVN to postpone Hai's execution indefinitely to provide time to negotiate Hertz's release.

2. In the time gained, we have persisted in exploring every possible course that might free Hertz. The Viet Cong has stood fast on its position of exchanging Hertz for Hai. New overtures on our part following the appointment of Vu Van Thai as Ambassador in Washington have now resulted in GVN willingness to accede to this exchange, and everyone concerned now recommends it. There is also agreement that the International Red Cross should be asked to attempt these arrangements as a first step toward the broader prisoner exchange that remains our basic objective. Chester Cooper left for Geneva on December 15 to initiate these procedures. He has since confirmed the presence in Algiers of the VC representative there, and a Red Cross approach to him is in the offing.

3. Although the Hertz family has not been informed of this latest development (we are worried about leaks and are anxious not to raise their hopes), we have been in constant touch with them since last April. Bob Kennedy and Ogden Reid have interested themselves in the case (Hertz is a New Yorker), and we have kept them informed of our various moves up to now.

4. If this comes off, it will be largely because of Cooper's persistence, and the Hertz family will know they owe his life to you. But unless you disagree, I am inclined not to get the White House into this publicly.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 11-39 (#4)
By plie, NARA, Date 5-15-12

McG. B.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-285
By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The President's account of his private conversation
with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 5:15 to 6:15 p.m.
December 16

The President said that the most important thing about the meeting was the feel of it, not the substance. He said it was like two partners meeting each other after each of them had taken a business trip and reaching a conclusion that each thought the other did all right.

The Prime Minister expressed his warm gratitude for the staunch support which the United States had given him on money matters twice since he had been Prime Minister. He also expressed warm appreciation for the effectiveness and above all for the promptness of our responses on the Rhodesian problem. In his darkest days of need we had never hesitated in our responses, and he wanted to thank us.

The Prime Minister also expressed warm appreciation for the attitude of the President a year ago on the MLF. When he came here for those discussions he had not known what to expect. He had understood that he would be faced with an ultimatum. Instead, we had acted with reason and with judgment and he thought that events had confirmed the wisdom of that position at that time. He thought all would now agree that it might not have been wise to move ahead rapidly with the MLF a year ago.

The President reminded Wilson of the differences of judgment of the year before with respect to the attitude of the Germans on nuclear matters. He reminded the Prime Minister that the British had then said that the German desire was unreal and had been stimulated by the American proposals. The President had suggested that the British go and test German sentiment. Now a year had passed; what did the

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- 2 -

Prime Minister think now? The Prime Minister replied, as he had to Ball and McNamara in London, the British were still willing to support their own ANF proposal. They would put their submarines in if the Americans would put submarines in, and then the Germans could pay for a part in the undertaking. He thought it was all a bit unreal and he did not think we needed as many missiles as we already have in the Atlantic area. He himself thought we ought to consider using the British POLARIS as part of some international security arrangement east of Suez. But he was ready for more discussion on the subject.

On Vietnam, the Prime Minister reported that he had taken some raps but his position had been unshakeable since the President's Baltimore speech. He could tell everyone that if they could get the Communists to the conference table, he could get Johnson. He said he had had a little trouble from the Severeid article, but he himself had not taken it seriously. He thought U Thant had an obvious obsession with Vietnam; he had given the Prime Minister thirty minutes last year and thirty minutes this year on his own attitudes.

The Prime Minister wanted the President to know that he was going to make a trip to Moscow. He was constantly searching for ways to peace and he would constantly urge the Soviets, as he had others, to come to the peace table. He thought it was important to keep searching and to keep hoping.

The Prime Minister told the President of his talks with Ayub and that he had given Ayub the advice we had suggested. He thought Ayub a good solid soldier who was much under the influence of Bhutto. The Prime Minister thought Bhutto one of the most evil men he had ever known.

The Prime Minister gave the President a short account of the preliminary thinking on the British defense review. (The President said that his account in the Cabinet Room was more detailed, and he did not elaborate on the Prime Minister's private exposition to him.) The Prime Minister emphasized that all decisions on this matter would be made only after full consideration of American views.

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- 3 -

In sum, the President made it clear that this had been a most satisfactory and helpful discussion. He said that the Prime Minister's expressions of gratitude had been really touching, and you could not help but like him. He would have liked to have continued the discussion but had broken it off in order to fit in a brief meeting with officials of both sides in the Cabinet room before going on to his next meeting.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Copies to:

Mrs. Roberts for the President

Secretary Rusk

Secretary McNamara

Mr. Valenti

Mr. Bator

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1962

✓ 43

Mr. President:

This is the background on the
feeler between Ho and La Pira
and Fanfani.

McG. B.

L J.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, November 28, 1965, 8:30 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On November 20, Arthur Goldberg reported (Tab A)) an urgent phone call from Fanfani, and when he called on him he received a handwritten letter reporting certain conversations of Italians in Hanoi. Fanfani's letter is at Tab B.

We have spent a week studying Fanfani's letter and watching the other reports from Hanoi. It is now clear that the conversations there were held by the Mayor of Florence, La Pira, a rather fuzzy-minded non-Communist leftist who has been critical of our position in Vietnam. Moreover, it is quite clear that Ho Chi Minh managed to fold in his unacceptable conditions, while giving an appearance of interest in peaceful negotiations. This is not at all a real feeler for negotiations.

At the same time, conscious of the Sevareid affair, State Department is determined to make it clear that we remain ready for unconditional discussions. Dean Rusk has prepared the attached letter to Fanfani (Tab C) which makes that point clear, while at the same time giving a patient but careful analysis of what La Pira heard. The letter leaves the door open for further discussions between Goldberg and Fanfani. It represents a compromise between the somewhat hard-boiled view of George Ball and my brother Bill, on the one hand, and the desire to be fully forthcoming which Arthur Goldberg and I have shared. We all support it in its present form.

Goldberg would like to be able to deliver the letter to Fanfani tomorrow -- Monday -- so as usual we have spent the week in staff work, and now ask for a prompt approval. In this case we do have the excuse that we had to wait for Dean Rusk's return. Moreover, the world will not come to an end if Arthur has to wait another day or two.

McG. B.
McG. B.

LETTER APPROVED ✓

DISAPPROVED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-503

By *sig*, NARA, Date 9-10-92



DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Schindler DATE 1/28/85

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 84-136

Document # 436

THE REPRESENTATIVE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 TO THE
 UNITED NATIONS

SANITIZED

436

November 20, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

In response to an urgent phone call from Assembly President Fanfani, I called on him this morning and was handed the enclosed handwritten letter transmitting views reportedly expressed by North Vietnamese leaders concerning a negotiated settlement.

361
3/8/5

In light of the recently exploited Stevenson episode and since the present approach comes from Fanfani who is Assembly President, Italian Foreign Minister and a good friend of the United States, it seems to me that it should not be brushed aside but should be seriously explored. On the other hand, I should certainly not advise that you become directly involved. If you should think it

The President,
 The White House.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 84-136

By is, NARS, Date 4-9-85

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
SANITIZED

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~

appropriate, since the matter has been raised in New York, the two men might be asked to come here to meet with me and whomever else you might designate. On the basis of our conversation with them, you would be better able to decide whether or not a reply to Hanoi through this channel would be desirable.

Sincerely yours,


Arthur J. Goldberg

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Fanfani:

My government is most grateful to you for your help and cooperation in transmitting views attributed to the North Vietnamese Government on negotiations to deal with the problem of Vietnam. We have carefully examined the suggestions you have conveyed, and I wish to make the following comments.

1. As it has repeatedly stated, the United States is prepared to enter into discussions or negotiations with any government at any time without any preconditions whatsoever. We reaffirm this willingness.

2. Although there is some ambiguity in the statement of Hanoi's position, your source seems to indicate that Hanoi would agree that negotiations might be undertaken on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 without any qualifications or conditions. We for our part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this basis without any qualifications or conditions.

3. The United States does not, however, agree with the contention that the "four points" advanced by Hanoi constitute an

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLJ 84-136
By is, NARS, Date 4-9-85

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

authentic interpretation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Elements in the four points, notably the political program of the so-called National Liberation Front, have no basis in the Geneva Agreements, and Hanoi's apparent insistence on a prior declaration accepting the four points thus appears both to be inconsistent with the Agreements and to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to include these four points for consideration in any peace talks along with any proposals which the United States, South Vietnam and other governments may wish to advance.

4. Your sources also mention another apparent Hanoi condition calling for a cease-fire and other measures prior to negotiations. The United States would be prepared for negotiations without the imposition of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction or cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and reciprocal basis. If there were a cessation of certain military activities on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cessation of military activities on the other. The formulation proposed by Hanoi's leaders does not appear to meet this test, for example, in that it imposes no

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- 3 -

restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and equipment from North to South Vietnam.

5. The United States Government notes the message conveyed that North Vietnam would not insist on the actual withdrawal of American forces prior to the initiation of negotiations. However, the clarification of this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions discussed in 2. and 3. above.

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real willingness for unconditional negotiations. We would be pleased, for our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above and perhaps in light of any further soundings your sources may make with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available to you at any time for this purpose.

Further, if it develops following such discussions, or further contact by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States would be authorized to meet with them privately.

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- 4 -

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on the contents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with your sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this important matter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

His Excellency

Amintore Fanfani,

Foreign Minister of Italy.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 16, 1965, 5:45PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your informal talk with Lucet

Lucet is a thoroughly nice man and has very decent instincts about the United States. He is also a good professional, and we believe he has been given pretty stern ~~and~~ anti-American instructions by Couve. 25X

~~but~~ You will want to stay a mile away from all of this with Lucet, although you should know about it.

As safe topics for a discussion this afternoon, I would suggest the following:

1. Lucet's earlier experience. He has served here before and has many friends here and is welcomed in a most cordial way.
2. You hope that he will get around the country while he is here. This is something which Ambassadors to this country do not do nearly enough of, and I think Lucet might be flattered with the thought that if he cannot conquer social Washington, he will find friends of France all around *outside*.
3. The long-run prospects of our relations with the Soviet Union. This is a subject on which we have no real difference with the French, and Lucet is an intelligent and observant diplomat who may well have interesting thoughts on what Couve learned in Moscow and on the general problem of our long-term relations with the Soviet Union.

I think it is really an excellent idea to meet Lucet in this informal way. We are not likely to do much useful business with de Gaulle, but our relations with France, over the long pull, are quite a different matter, and while this man will be wholly loyal to the government he serves, your personal relations with him may well be helpful in the reconciliation with France which is bound to come sooner or later.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/29 : NLJ-019-005-3-4-2

~~SECRET~~
Authority NLJ. 019.005.003/4
By jc NARA, Date 7-9-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 16, 1965
5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from Red Raborn asks your permission for a short holiday in Florida. He came to us with no time off whatever between jobs, and I think he has in fact not had any real holiday in about three years. Red has been working at full steam, and I believe this brief breathing spell would do him a lot of good. Some of our favorite columnists have treated him pretty roughly lately, and while he has bounced back well after being quite badly hurt initially, I hope you will feel that he should have this rest.

m. j. B.
McG. B.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

P. S. My notion is that Red would really like to leave a day or two early, and if you approve this request, I may suggest to him that I don't think you would care if he leaves just as soon as his budget sessions with Schultze are complete.

*Raborn informed by phone
Mon Dec. 17*

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

14 December 1965

Dear Mr. President:

If it meets with your approval, depending on travel accommodations I plan to depart Washington about 23 December for a little vacation in Florida and return about Monday, 3 January.

I will be on the Air Force Base at Cape Kennedy and at the end of a telephone at all times, should there be a need for my presence in Washington or consultation by telephone. Mr. Richard Helms, my deputy, will be in town and on the job during my absence.

May I take this opportunity to wish you, Mrs. Johnson and your nice family a Merry, Merry Christmas and best wishes for a Happy New Year.

Respectfully yours,



W. F. Raborn

The President
The White House

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
December 16, 1965
3:45 PM

Mr. President:

This is the cable from Dean Rusk which George Ball mentioned this morning. I did not send it up to you yesterday because we were holding it to get the necessary staff work done before Erhard gets here. This staff work is still going on in DOD.

McG. B.
McG. B.

*Rec'd
Dec 16
4:45p*

100

December 16, 1965
Thursday, 4:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM
SECRETARY RUSK (Paris Secto 14)

For your preparation for talks with Erhard I should report a conversation with Schroeder on further German help for Vietnam. I pointed out to him that the full revelation to the Congress of the extent of our requirements in Vietnam will raise major questions about what others are doing in the face of our own continuing commitments in such areas as NATO. I told him it was of the utmost importance that Germany find a way to send considerable numbers of people to South Vietnam. I mentioned specifically engineers of all types, medical personnel, private contractors to undertake building programs, police personnel, etc. Schroeder's reaction was very negative. He mentioned that they were the second largest contributor to Vietnam economically but said that they had not been successful in getting volunteers to go to perform services. He had talked with a number of organizations with little result. He commented that people in Germany are under the impression that all of South Vietnam is a war zone. I told him this was in effect true and that it was a dangerous place and that was a major reason why free countries ought to take a hand in it.

When he discounted the possibility of private citizens I raised the question of military or police units to perform similar services. He seemed to think they had legal as well as policy obstacles to any such answer.

I report this because I was very disappointed with his general attitude. It seems to me that we should marshal a strong case for Erhard and put to him some very specific suggestions as to units or type personnel that we strongly want from the Federal Republic. I would advise against combat units as such but it is important that we get some Germans into the field.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 16, 1965, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Talking points with Prime Minister Wilson

With two exceptions, I think the basic talking points for this afternoon are covered in the memorandum we had before us this morning, which I attach at Tab A.

The first exception is the European nuclear problem. On this one, Ball, Bruce, McNamara and I had a talk after our session with you this morning, and we all agree on the approach which is sketched in George Ball's memorandum at Tab B. In essence, what we hope is that you could talk quite privately with Wilson and draw him out on his own present attitude towards moving away from an independent nuclear deterrent. The further he is willing to move, the better for us, and this is the best way of getting a real map of his own personal intentions. We all agree that any British step in this direction will help us, and that the steps we might take can best be decided after you know Wilson's view -- and then Erhard's.

The second point worth recalling is the Asian Development Bank. I attach at Tab C a memorandum on the British contribution which was prepared some time back. Their position has not changed. In essence, we are trying to get them to move from a paid contribution of \$1 million a year to one of \$3 million a year. Gene Black has just told me that he personally saved the British from being wholly excluded by angry Asians in Manila because of the very low level of their contribution. Wilson can surely do this for you if he tries, and it is the one specific item that we have to press upon him.

McG. B.

McG. B.

P. S. I attach at Tab D a bootleg copy of the report on Wilson's performance this morning at the UN. The original may be coming over at any minute from George Ball.

47a



~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Thursday, December 16, 1965
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Wilson Visit

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 80-40 (Office Files of President, Vietnam)
By DCH per CCS, NARS, Date 11-26-84

You currently have three meetings with Wilson: 5:15 today (1-1/2 hours), lunch at 1:00 tomorrow with a small working group, and a third meeting, with a communique, at 4 p.m. tomorrow.

There are six main subjects which I list in the order of their importance to the British:

1. Rhodesia
2. The British defense review
3. Vietnam and Malaysia
4. India/Pakistan
5. Non-proliferation and East/West relations
6. Nuclear arrangements with the Germans

Dean Rusk will be here tomorrow morning but not before, and for this reason I think you might wish to save Vietnam, Soviet relations, and nuclear arrangements with the Germans until tomorrow. That would leave Rhodesia, British defense, and India/Pakistan for this afternoon.

(1) Rhodesia

This is Wilson's make-or-break issue. He must go the limit to break Smith without shooting, and we are not at all sure he can do it. So far we have given full support on economic measures, including airlift support for oil to Zambia. But Wilson may use this meeting to lay the basis for more: in particular, he may feel us out on help to keep Zambian copper moving or even for access to U. S. stockpile copper. We have resisted any such feelers, and you may want to hear George Ball on this subject.

(2) British defense review

We have a preliminary report [REDACTED] that the British review is leading toward these conclusions: (1) maintain current strength in Europe; (2) stay in the Persian Gulf but pull out of Aden in 1968; (3) cut-back in the Far East as soon as confrontation ends -- hopefully in 1968-70.

If these are Wilson's preliminary conclusions, the sore spot for us is

12/16/65

is the projected Far Eastern cut-back. We need a British role at Singapore for as far ahead as we can see, and I think you may want to press the Prime Minister hard on this point. If the Indonesian confrontation ends, the ordinary cost of this Far Eastern position should go way down, and some British presence there is of very high importance to us. As long as confrontation lasts the practical problem does not arise, but the issue of principle is nevertheless very important because if the new British defense policy foreshadows withdrawal in Southeast Asia, the impact on our own effort will be real.

(3) Vietnam and Malaysia

This topic should await Dean Rusk's return. Wilson will be very inquisitive about our future plans, and there is no doubt that frankness with him will help to keep his flag nailed to our mast. But you may want to speak to him very privately on this tomorrow, especially in the light of the fact that many of our next decisions are still not final.

(4) India/Pakistan

The Prime Minister will be interested to hear your impressions of Ayub. The parallel between his conversations and yours with Ayub is almost complete, and it may be more useful to turn the conversation to Shastri and our possible future relations. The British are eager to get back into moderate military sales.

(5) Relations with the Soviet Union

This is another good topic for discussion when Dean Rusk is present. Neither the British nor we have made any money with the Soviets on substantive issues.

[REDACTED] 1-30

The Prime Minister is almost sure to emphasize the value of a non-proliferation treaty and to place it well ahead of NATO nuclear arrangements. We should hold him hard to the fact that a good understanding with the Germans is at least equally important and in point of time becomes first.

(6) NATO nuclear arrangements

I am doing a separate memorandum on this, and I hope there can be a brief talk with both Rusk and McNamara about it tomorrow morning.

[REDACTED] 1-301

The essence of our position is to encourage the British in any action

~~SECRET~~

-3-

12/16/65

which "lowers the status" of their "independent" deterrent. Thus, there may well be some money to make in talking with the Prime Minister about still closer NATO assignment of his Polaris submarines. But plans for shared ownership are much more tricky. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You will wish to decide whether to press Wilson in this direction. Walt Rostow would favor it. I would oppose it. You will wish to know the opinion of Rusk, McNamara and Ball. 1-30/-

Incl. A.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~Thursday, December 16, 1965
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Wilson Visit

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Dean Rusk will be here tomorrow morning but not before, and for this reason I think you might wish to save Vietnam, Soviet relations, and nuclear arrangements with the Germans until tomorrow. That would leave Rhodesia, British defense, and India/Pakistan for this afternoon.

(1) Rhodesia

This is Wilson's make-or-break issue. He must go the limit to break Smith without shooting, and we are not at all sure he can do it. So far we have given full support on economic measures, including airlift support for oil to Zambia. But Wilson may use this meeting to lay the basis for more: in particular, he may feel us out on help to keep Zambian copper moving or even for access to U. S. stockpile copper. We have resisted any such feelers, and you may want to hear George Ball on this subject.

(2) British defense review

We have a preliminary report via my friend Burke Trend that the British review is leading toward these conclusions: (1) maintain current strength in Europe; (2) stay in the Persian Gulf but pull out of Aden in 1968; (3) cut-back in the Far East as soon as confrontation ends -- hopefully in 1968-70.

If these are Wilson's preliminary conclusions, the sore spot for us is

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By et/rq, NARA, Date 5-13-98

12/16/65

is the projected Far Eastern cut-back. We need a British role at Singapore for as far ahead as we can see, and I think you may want to press the Prime Minister hard on this point. If the Indonesian confrontation ends, the ordinary cost of this Far Eastern position should go way down, and some British presence there is of very high importance to us. As long as confrontation lasts the practical problem does not arise, but the issue of principle is nevertheless very important because if the new British defense policy foreshadows withdrawal in Southeast Asia, the impact on our own effort will be real.

(3) Vietnam and Malaysia

This topic should await Dean Rusk's return. Wilson will be very inquisitive about our future plans, and there is no doubt that frankness with him will help to keep his flag nailed to our mast. But you may want to speak to him very privately on this tomorrow, especially in the light of the fact that many of our next decisions are still not final.

(4) India/Pakistan

The Prime Minister will be interested to hear your impressions of Ayub. The parallel between his conversations and yours with Ayub is almost complete, and it may be more useful to turn the conversation to Shastri and our possible future relations. The British are eager to get back into moderate military sales.

(5) Relations with the Soviet Union

This is another good topic for discussion when Dean Rusk is present. Neither the British nor we have made any money with the Soviets on substantive issues, but British Prime Ministers are always chasing the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow marked "East/West Friendship." The Prime Minister is almost sure to emphasize the value of a non-proliferation treaty and to place it well ahead of NATO nuclear arrangements. We should hold him hard to the fact that a good understanding with the Germans is at least equally important and in point of time becomes first.

(6) NATO nuclear arrangements

I am doing a separate memorandum on this, and I hope there can be a brief talk with both Rusk and McNamara about it tomorrow morning. The essence of the British position is that we should stay clear of hardware arrangements for the present and let the McNamara committee grow.

The essence of our position is to encourage the British in any action

~~SECRET~~

-3-

12/16/65

which "lowers the status" of their "independent" deterrent. Thus, there may well be some money to make in talking with the Prime Minister about still closer NATO assignment of his Polaris submarines. But plans for shared ownership are much more tricky. It seemed last month as if the British might support such a scheme centering on UK and US Polaris submarines. Today it appears more doubtful. You will wish to decide whether to press Wilson in this direction. Walt Rostow would favor it. I would oppose it. You will wish to know the opinion of Rusk, McNamara and Ball.

incl. S.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

47c



47-d

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister Wilson (NATO
Nuclear Arrangements)

Following our meeting with you this morning on the Wilson visit, Bob McNamara, David Bruce, Mac Bundy and I had a further discussion of the question of NATO nuclear arrangements and of the manner in which this should be handled with the Prime Minister.

We agreed to recommend that you take the following line on this subject when you see Wilson:

1. Draw him out on his present attitude toward abandoning the independent British nuclear deterrent. (He indicated to McNamara and me in London that he was prepared to assign the British Polaris submarines to NATO on an irrevocable basis if we would do the same with four United States submarines.)

2. Indicate to Wilson that the problem of meeting German desires for more equality in the nuclear field still remains, but that we do not wish to express a definite view as to any new arrangements until we find out from Erhard what the Germans have in mind.

We also agreed that it would be best if you could discuss these points with the Prime Minister in private,

preferably

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-58

NARA, Date 12-29-10


By *isl*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

preferably at your meeting with him this afternoon.


George W. Ball
Acting Secretary

47e



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1965

McG. B. :

Subject: British Contribution to Asian Development Bank

I have verified the information I gave you early this afternoon;

1. The Draft Charter of the Asian Development Bank provides that one-half of the contributions of developed nations are callable, rather than payable. It further provides that up to one-half of the payable portion may be paid in the form of non-interest bearing notes or other such instruments. These instruments will be cashed as the Bank needs cash for disbursement. Our experience with regional banks is that disbursement need for contributions in this form does not arise for a very long time after the bank is founded. (We are only now beginning to see on the far horizon the possibility of encashment of any of our note contributions to the Inter-American Bank, which was founded in 1960.) Therefore, if the Brits agree to \$30 million:

- a. the total annual contribution would be \$6 million
- b. the total annual paid contribution would be \$3 million
- c. the total annual cash contribution would be \$1 1/2 million
- d. there will be no prospect of encashment of the non-cash portion for several years.

2. Because of our zany budget structure, we are able to work a system whereby the non-cash portion of our payable contributions to international financial institutions is not treated as a budget expenditure or a balance of payments item until encashment. (Basically, the procedure is akin to giving the recipient a checking account and delaying the recorded expenditure until he writes checks on it.) It seems very likely that the British could work a similar deal, though it probably isn't our place to suggest it.

3. As I mentioned, part of the British announcement was that they would forego the non-cash option in supplying their \$1 million in payable contributions per year. Therefore, assuming that they would withdraw this offer in connection with a new \$30 million pledge, the cash difference between that and their previous pledge would be only \$ 1/2 million a year.

4. The corresponding members for the FRG (assuming a pledge of \$50 million, as compared to their current \$30 million and our original target of \$75 million) are as follows:

- a. total annual contribution of \$10 million
- b. total annual paid-in contribution of \$5 million
- c. total annual cash contribution of \$ 2 1/2 million.

5. The pressure point on all of this is a charter-signing meeting scheduled for Manila, beginning December 2. It will be ministerial level (Black and Barr will head a large U. S. delegation, including several Senators or Members of Congress) and will require that all issues of membership and capitalization have been settled.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Ed Hamilton', with a stylized, cursive script.

Ed Hamilton

413



December 16, 1965

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Southern Rhodesia

1. Wilson's UN address: The Prime Minister discussed the British objective (majority rule) and the UK tactics (economic sanctions but no force). He asked for the support of all UN nations. A number of Africans walked out.

The speech left open two issues: a) Whether the UK intends to issue an order in Council barring oil to Rhodesia (Michael Stewart is seeing George Ball at 3:00 p.m. to discuss this and b) What the UK plans to do if Smith retaliates by cutting off coal, power and transport to Zambia.

2. What Wilson may say:

a) The Prime Minister may ask for a commitment to help meet the costs--to Zambia and the UK--if Rhodesia shuts down the Zambian copper industry.

b) He may also reopen the question whether we will absorb some of the copper shortage.

3. Points which might be made to Wilson:

a) The UK must, as it has, take the basic initiative.

b) We can play a supporting role--by providing some airlift help if Rhodesia stops Zambia's POL, and perhaps emergency maintenance of the road through Tanzania.

c) We do not see how we could effectively offset a major shutdown of Zambian-Katanga copper. We cannot undertake an open end commitment to release our copper stock pile, contribute our domestic copper production to international rationing or absorb the balance of payments effect on the UK.

d) We urge the UK to longer-term efforts to break Smith's stranglehold on Zambia, for instance by real work on the rail link to the Atlantic. We can possibly help with development lending.

e) He may then probe on our reaction to a British move against Smith if Rhodesia strikes out against Zambia (and the UK) in this way.) We would not contemplate US military involvement but we would give our moral support.

r

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Push for speedy
answers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 16, 1965
Thursday/10:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Letters from Nyerere and Kaunda. The frustrated Africans are beginning to come at you too on Rhodesia. This will be a growing problem, as the Africans inevitably tend to bracket us with the UK.

At Tab A is a letter from Nyerere. He pleads for (a) US support for UN mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the Charter; and (b) US support for a UN peacekeeping force to take over the Kariba Dam. Beyond this, Nyerere told us he planned to fly to the UN to speak soon after Harold Wilson, and then requested an appointment with you in Washington. We have since heard nothing more of his plans and suspect he is waiting for your answer.

At Tab B is a letter just in from Kaunda of Zambia. Since he's more sensible, his requests are less painful. All he wants at this juncture are some C-130's to help in an airlift of emergency supplies if Zambia breaks with Rhodesia. One trouble with airlifts, of course, is that they may begin small but tend to get awfully big.

My own judgment is that the more we can push the UK into a genuine "quick kill" operation even at cost of promising some limited US support (say airlift for Commonwealth troops), the less likelihood that we will be dragged piecemeal into an even larger exercise designed to rescue Zambia from economic chaos and to keep its copper moving.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-187

By UCK NARA Date 04-23-2014

~~SECRET~~

Thurs., Dec 16, 1965
9:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to look at this memo
before the 11 o'clock meeting.
Otherwise, we can work through it
at that time.

We will do sharper talking papers
before you meet Wilson, in the light
of the 11 o'clock discussion.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

49a

~~SECRET~~Thursday, December 16, 1965
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Wilson Visit

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 80-40 (Office File of President, Valenti)
By DCH, per LCS, NARS, Date 11-26-84

You currently have three meetings with Wilson: 5:15 today (1-1/2 hours), lunch at 1:00 tomorrow with a small working group, and a third meeting, with a communique, at 4 p.m. tomorrow.

There are six main subjects which I list in the order of their importance to the British:

1. Rhodesia
2. The British defense review
3. Vietnam and Malaysia
4. India/Pakistan
5. Non-proliferation and East/West relations
6. Nuclear arrangements with the Germans

Dean Rusk will be here tomorrow morning but not before, and for this reason I think you might wish to save Vietnam, Soviet relations, and nuclear arrangements with the Germans until tomorrow. That would leave Rhodesia, British defense, and India/Pakistan for this afternoon.

(1) Rhodesia

This is Wilson's make-or-break issue. He must go the limit to break Smith without shooting, and we are not at all sure he can do it. So far we have given full support on economic measures, including airlift support for oil to Zambia. But Wilson may use this meeting to lay the basis for more: in particular, he may feel us out on help to keep Zambian copper moving or even for access to U. S. stockpile copper. We have resisted any such feelers, and you may want to hear George Ball on this subject.

(2) British defense review

We have a preliminary report [REDACTED] that the British review is leading toward these conclusions: (1) maintain current strength in Europe; (2) stay in the Persian Gulf but pull out of Aden in 1968; (3) cut-back in the Far East as soon as confrontation ends -- hopefully in 1968-70.

If these are Wilson's preliminary conclusions, the sore spot for us is

1-301(d)

12/16/65

is the projected Far Eastern cut-back. We need a British role at Singapore. for as far ahead as we can see, and I think you may want to press the Prime Minister hard on this point. If the Indonesian confrontation ends, the ordinary cost of this Far Eastern position should go way down, and some British presence there is of very high importance to us. As long as confrontation lasts the practical problem does not arise, but the issue of principle is nevertheless very important because if the new British defense policy foreshadows withdrawal in Southeast Asia, the impact on our own effort will be real.

(3) Vietnam and Malaysia

This topic should await Dean Rusk's return. Wilson will be very inquisitive about our future plans, and there is no doubt that frankness with him will help to keep his flag nailed to our mast. But you may want to speak to him very privately on this tomorrow, especially in the light of the fact that many of our next decisions are still not final.

(4) India/Pakistan

The Prime Minister will be interested to hear your impressions of Ayub. The parallel between his conversations and yours with Ayub is almost complete, and it may be more useful to turn the conversation to Shastri and our possible future relations. The British are eager to get back into moderate military sales.

(5) Relations with the Soviet Union

This is another good topic for discussion when Dean Rusk is present. Neither the British nor we have made any money with the Soviets on substantive issues.

[REDACTED] 1-301

The Prime Minister is almost sure to emphasize the value of a non-proliferation treaty and to place it well ahead of NATO nuclear arrangements. We should hold him hard to the fact that a good understanding with the Germans is at least equally important and in point of time becomes first.

(6) NATO nuclear arrangements

I am doing a separate memorandum on this, and I hope there can be a brief talk with both Rusk and McNamara about it tomorrow morning.

[REDACTED] 1-301


The essence of our position is to encourage the British in any action

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12/16/65

which "lowers the status" of their "independent" deterrent. Thus, there may well be some money to make in talking with the Prime Minister about still closer NATO assignment of his Polaris submarines. But plans for shared ownership are much more tricky.

 You will wish to decide whether to press Wilson in this direction. Walt Rostow would favor it. I would oppose it. You will wish to know the opinion of Rusk, McNamara and Ball.

incl. 6.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1965
Wednesday, 3:00 p.m.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. This is written before your meeting with President Ayub today and may therefore not be entirely correct.
2. It seems apparent, as you well know, that until after the Shastri visit and something more definitive can be said to President Ayub that not much concrete will come out of the Ayub visit. The establishment of an Entente Cordiale and the allaying of any feeling about the visit's postponement and your obvious personal friendship are all to the good and will pave the way for further agreement.
3. If you approve shortly after New Year's and the Tashkent meeting I would be glad to make a fact-finding visit of about five days to Prime Minister Shastri of India. I know you don't like personal emissaries and I share this view. But before Prime Minister Shastri comes over there are several matters of substance to be cleared up objectively and without emotion. I believe a personal visit would make the Shastri trip more productive for you.
4. After the Shastri visit I would be glad to make a separate and independent visit to Pakistan to explain what we can do in the light of the Shastri visit, if that seems advisable at the time.
5. It is apparent it will take some time and study to work out both agreements.
6. These are just suggestions as to how I could be most useful to you. As you know, I am not looking for trips. If you don't think well of the suggestions I will fully understand and you won't need to explain.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By rg/wsp, NARA, Date 8-28-92


Arthur H. Dean

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

51
Free
Ayub Visit

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-07

By up, NARA, Date 11-30-89

~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1965
Wednesday/2:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last talk with Ayub. You are the best judge of whether all the essentials have been covered. After your statement last night ("we'll keep trying but I have no illusion that the US can settle Kashmir; if this were possible we would have settled it already."), it's clear that you need no coaching from us.

I think that Ayub now realizes that far from being out to get him, you regard him as a personal friend. But he also knows that we aren't going to turn on the spigot till we see the color of his money. [redacted] but he had to hear it personally from you, and to have a chance to try and convince you of his case. Now that he's had a highly sympathetic hearing, he'll probably go home and rethink the problem before deciding whether to choose us or China.

This afternoon you might confirm the above, and strike the positive note that we should both now start looking at ways to reknit the relationship. We recognize that this would require graduated steps on our part as well as Pakistan's, and are prepared to start examining these once we've taken Shastri's measure. In fact you are thinking of sending your personal advisor, Arthur Dean, out to see Ayub just after the Shastri visit (he'll stand by in Watson's office).

Unless you've already covered it, I'd urge stressing the highly unfortunate impact of Pakistan's anti US press campaign on Ayub's US constituency. How can the Congress vote massive help to those who slang us? You have never uttered an unkind word about Pakistan.

[redacted] But it would remind Ayub that our Vietnam war makes us doubly serious about China.

I'm all for trying out Freeman's idea of Pak famine relief for India, but bet he replies that India must move on Kashmir first.

[redacted] Your attention to Aziz Ahmed last night visibly

~~SECRET~~

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Page 2

worried Bhutto, who is his direct superior. So a little direct message may be in order, perhaps calling him and G. Ball into your office for the last five minutes.

Attached a side press statement for you and our draft of the communiqué. If we run into trouble on the latter, we may have to refer it to you and Ayub.

R. W. Komer

cc: Moyers
Valenti

Bundy

~~SECRET~~

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ORAL STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

12/15/65

I wish to underline the great personal pleasure it has given me to have President Ayub back in this country. He has explained eloquently to us the problems which he and Pakistan face, and we have given him the full and sympathetic hearing which an old and valued friend deserves. In turn I have explained fully to him the deep commitment of our country to help defend freedom in Asian nations, as we are now doing in Vietnam.

We each now understand more fully the other's viewpoint, and I hope that this will help re-establish a constructive relationship between our two countries.

I am also encouraged to look forward hopefully toward a process of reconciliation between Pakistan and India. President Ayub says that both India and Pakistan must take the road of peace, and I believe that he is fully prepared to do all he can toward this end. He and I have agreed to keep in close touch.

Themes Ayub might use:

1. Firm friendship of Pakistan for American President and people.
2. He now has fuller understanding of many grave problems confronting US President.
3. Pakistan's desire to live in peace with all its neighbors, and determination to go the extra mile toward peaceful settlement of all differences with India.
4. Ayub too hopes that a new basis of Pakistan/US understanding can be reached.

December 15, 1965

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MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached message from Chester Bowles has come in through intelligence channels. I am sending a copy to George Ball only, unless I get further instructions from you. As you will see, Bowles proposes that we package every available "peace initiative" and try them all at once.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, December 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

For information

SUBJECT: The Gustav Hertz Case

1. Gustav Hertz, a USOM official, was kidnapped by the Viet Cong on February 2, 1965. In April, the VC threatened to execute him if a man named Hai were executed by the GVN for his part in the March 30 bombing of the U. S. Embassy. Since Hertz's abduction, indirect contacts have been made with the Viet Cong in a concerted effort to free him. At one point, the Viet Cong offered to exchange Hertz for Hai, but the offer was not taken up for fear that it might set a precedent which would encourage the Communists to capture and make hostages of other U. S. civilians. We were also concerned about GVN sensitivities. But Max Taylor did get the GVN to postpone Hai's execution indefinitely to provide time to negotiate Hertz's release.

2. In the time gained, we have persisted in exploring every possible course that might free Hertz. The Viet Cong has stood fast on its position of exchanging Hertz for Hai. New overtures on our part following the appointment of Vu Van Thai as Ambassador in Washington have now resulted in GVN willingness to accede to this exchange, and everyone concerned now recommends it. There is also agreement that the International Red Cross should be asked to attempt these arrangements as a first step toward the broader prisoner exchange that remains our basic objective. Chester Cooper will be leaving for Geneva this evening to initiate these procedures.

3. Although the Hertz family has not been informed of this latest development (we are worried about leaks and are anxious not to raise their hopes), we have been in constant touch with them since last April. Bob Kennedy and Ogden Reid have interested themselves in the case (Hertz is a New Yorker), and we have kept them informed of our various moves up to now.

4. If this comes off, it will be largely because of Cooper's persistence, and the Hertz family will know they owe his life to you. But unless you disagree, I am inclined not to get the White House into this publicly.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17141
By *plies*, NARA, Date 5/5/12

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54
Tuesday, December 14, 1965
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aid program

1. Clark Clifford, Dean Acheson, Bob Anderson, Gene Black, Doug Dillon, and David Rockefeller have been meeting at intervals for six weeks now to prepare their views for your consideration as you face decisions on the aid program for next year. They meet again -- we hope for the last time -- on Thursday.

2. At that meeting they will consider the attached draft of a memorandum to you which would summarize their conclusions. These conclusions are closely consistent with your own thinking, as I understand it, and I think also that they make a substantial contribution to shaping the aid program in directions that will be better for the country and also more popular on the Hill. Clifford's group does not have the advantage of having studied the health and education programs which have been developed within the last couple of weeks, but otherwise they are up to date with the best thinking inside the government.

3. What is most encouraging about their report is that they are united in thinking that the direction you are setting is right. They also believe that Bell and his people have been moving in that direction in a quite encouraging way in the last two years. Their judgment lays a solid basis for an assertion that the Johnson aid program is already well on its way. There is complete consistency between the program as it now stands and the new emphases that are being prepared in self-help, food, education, health, and multilateral aid.

4. Clifford's group will be here through Thursday morning, and they will be available individually or collectively to you if you wish to see them. If you ~~wish~~ have time to look at their report, you will see that it presents its conclusions with a minimum of detailed argument, and you may well wish to cross-examine them either on Thursday or at some later time convenient to you.

5. Clark and I have it in the back of our minds that some of these people -- Black, Rockefeller, and Dillon, for example -- might be very helpful witnesses when the time comes for hearings on this year's aid program -- but we have not said this to them at this stage.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-17

By inf NARA, Date 8-10-89

M. D. B.

McG. B.

1. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE AID PROGRAM

The U. S. foreign assistance program is necessary because it serves important interests of the United States.

The United States has an important interest in extending assistance to developing countries in non-Communist countries which give solid evidence that they are determined to help themselves. This interest is particularly strong in the eight major countries in which 80% of our development assistance is now concentrated, and we favor a continued policy of heavy concentration upon the countries of highest political importance.

The AID program should not be presented to the Congress -- this year or any year -- as a series of proposed handouts to a long list of specific foreign countries. It should be presented instead as a proposed appropriation of funds to the President and his Administration for use in foreign countries only in so far as there is a clear-cut understanding on self-help in each receiving country.

2. THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT OF THE AID PROGRAM

We believe that in the last two years under David Bell the administration of foreign assistance has reached a wholly new level of quality. We believe that the Johnson Administration has already moved strongly to adopt and execute the basic purpose set in the preceding paragraphs. We hope that in presenting its program for next year, the Administration will point with pride to the achievements of 1964 and 1965.

The Foreign Assistance Program is now more effectively administered than at any time in the last decade, and we therefore strongly recommend against any major reorganization of AID. We favor the prompt passage of the Hays Bill, with amendments as recommended by the Bureau of the Budget. We also hope that there will be continuing encouragement of the Administrator of AID in his efforts to recruit senior executives of the highest quality.

3. FOOD AID POLICY

There should be a drastic revision of the present food aid program. Except for emergency relief and private charity, American food aid and other American assistance relating to agriculture should be given only when there is a clear-cut and fully developed plan for agricultural self-help

in the receiving country. In any country with inadequate long-term agricultural prospects, there should be an equally clear-cut plan for the development of non-agricultural exports which can pay for the food needed by the country concerned.

American food aid policy should not be governed by pressure to provide a safety valve for the surpluses resulting from domestic agricultural politics.

4. POPULATION POLICY

The Foreign Assistance Program of the United States should take full account of the growing problem of population in the less developed countries. All American assistance should be governed by a requirement that the economic programs of receiving countries be realistically related to their present and future population. While the United States should not undertake to force measures of population control on any other country, it should be prepared to give full support to such programs when they are freely adopted by receiving countries. American resources should not be used for development assistance to countries which have no adequate plan for keeping development effectively ahead of population growth.

In order to give strong public emphasis to the problem of population policy, we recommend careful consideration of a public statement that the AID program will include up to \$50 million of funds for technical assistance in this field, where such assistance is requested by receiving countries.

5. ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The largest single open question in AID policy is that of assistance to India and Pakistan. If adequate programs of self-help are developed and continued, especially in the agricultural field, and if adequate population policies are adopted and energetically prosecuted, it is in the interest of the United States to continue the major effort of agricultural and economic assistance to these two countries which has been a constant part of our policy since the mid-1950's.

This assistance should be based on a requirement that India and Pakistan should not make war upon each other. It cannot be based on an expectation that there will be any early settlement in Kashmir. The Indians won the war, and no leverage available to us will reverse that result.

The timing and scope of resumed economic assistance can hardly be decided until after the President's meetings with Ayub and Shastri. Moreover, in the case of India the problem is made more complicated by the immediate prospect of famine, and we fully support the emergency decisions of December 9.

Subject to these provisos, we believe that the priorities for assistance should be roughly as follows:

- (1) assistance for agricultural self-help;
- (2) assistance in population policy;
- (3) general economic assistance;
- (4) and finally (if at all) military assistance.

We have reached no firm conclusion as to whether military assistance will in fact become practicable and desirable any time soon. We think it plain that it should come last in priority. Until there is a more solid prospect of peace between India and Pakistan, American opinion will rightly be wary of resuming military assistance to countries which appear to have used our arms against each other.

Nevertheless, a case can be made for limited military assistance to both countries, if only as a means of moderating their own military appetites and expenditures.

One additional important variable in this area is the possibility that India may move toward the development of nuclear weapons. Some of us believe that what the Indians decide in this matter is not open to much influence from the United States -- except at the cost of open-ended security guarantees which we ought not to give. Others of us believe that careful use of economic and military assistance may be very important in sustaining Prime Minister Shastri's present determination not to move toward nuclear weapons. All of us believe that the President will wish to review this question closely before his talk with Shastri.

In sum, we believe that there are important political questions and important standards of self-help which must be agreed on at the highest levels before major programs of development assistance are resumed in India and Pakistan. If those questions can be resolved and

proper guarantees obtained, we strongly believe that large-scale development assistance in the subcontinent is in the interest of the U. S. Most of us believe that under proper conditions the level of assistance recommended by AID for FY 1967 is about right. Mr. Black would be prepared to support a somewhat larger program because of his belief that our interests will be gravely damaged if the cloth is cut too fine in these two critical countries.

6. NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PROBLEM

The United States should continue its efforts to reduce the total number of countries receiving U. S. bilateral aid. At present this is primarily a problem of AID policy in Africa. The Alliance for Progress has been open from the beginning to all qualified Latin American countries, and it would be wrong to exclude any of them now on grounds of size - - although it is certainly right to continue the present practice of concentrating the bulk of our assistance in strategically important countries like Brazil, Chile and Colombia. In the Middle East and in Asia, the number of recipient countries is not large, and each of them has its own justifiable political importance. So what remains is Africa.

Mr. Bell has informed us that within a year's time it should be possible to organize our Technical Assistance Programs in most parts of Africa on a regional basis. Mr. Bell also believes that within the same time-span development lending in Africa can reasonably be left to the new African Development Bank. We believe that these current expectations should become firm U. S. policy.

Meanwhile, for Fiscal 1967, we believe that development loans in Africa should be held at a minimum, except for Nigeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Liberia. The first two countries are currently of considerable importance to us, and in the other two we have important traditional relations.

If these changes are made, the number of countries receiving direct American assistance could be reduced from 34 to less than 10 within the next two years. We believe that the AID program for the coming year can and should state this objective plainly.

7. BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

We have carefully reviewed this issue, and we are convinced that the U. S. can and should adopt the firm policy that it is prepared to move increasingly from bilateral to multilateral methods of development lending just as fast as other developed countries are ready to take their fair share of the multilateral lending burden. Much the best agent of multilateral lending is the International Development Authority of the World Bank group. We hope that the new Asian Development Bank will earn an equal reputation, and we warmly approve the initial American subscription of \$200 million to this undertaking. We have reservations about the Inter-American Development Bank simply because the U. S. is by far the heaviest lender, and because the receiving states have disproportionate influence in the decisions of the Bank.

Since no increase in the planned American subscription to the Asian Bank is now desirable, the focus of any increased multilateral effort in the immediate future should be in IDA, and we recommend strongly that the U. S. should make clear its readiness to increase its subscription to IDA just as fast as that subscription is properly matched by other lenders.

The present IDA program runs at a level of \$250 million a year. The U. S. pays 42%. It would be in the interest of the U. S. to support an effort by the World Bank to double the program, to \$500 million a year. The U. S. contribution to the first \$250 million should remain at 42%. The U. S. should be ready to make a contribution of up to 50% of the second \$250. We recognize that there has been Congressional pressure to reduce the overall U. S. percentage in multilateral lending, but we see no realistic possibility of increasing IDA lending unless U. S. participation in the increase is 50%. We call attention to the fact that overall U. S. bilateral lending is currently 65% of the world total. Thus if we can get increased multilateral lending by paying half the bill, we will still be reducing our own proportionate contribution.

We have carefully examined the argument that multilateral lending is bad for the U. S. balance of payments since purchases under such loans cannot be tied. A careful discussion with the Secretary of the Treasury persuades us that he is right in his conclusion that this argument is unfounded. The net balance of payments cost of multilateral lending appears to be only a very few cents on the dollar as against

development lending through AID, and we think this small cost is entirely acceptable in the light of the solid political and economic advantages of the multilateral approach through IDA.

8. THE MULTI-YEAR AUTHORIZATION

We are in favor of an open-ended multi-year authorization. We recognize that it will be resisted by many Members of Congress, but it is badly needed. We hope that this sensible means of saving the time and energy of all concerned will have the strong support of the President.

9. SEPARATING MAP FROM AID

We support the recommendation that in legislative presentation the Military Assistance Program be separated from other forms of foreign assistance.

10. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

We support the two proposals of the Watson Committee for a 30% investment credit and for strengthened investment guarantees. Moreover, we believe that investment guarantees should be extended to the field of agriculture.

More deeply, we believe that American administration of foreign affairs in all agencies and at all levels should be more effectively imbued with an understanding of the role of private enterprise abroad. There has been improvement in this respect in recent years, but too often there is still an assumption among government officials that it is wrong for American business to make money, and wrong for American policy to rest on a belief in the effectiveness of well-managed private enterprise, both American and foreign. We believe that the record plainly demonstrates the effectiveness of private as against public management in developing countries and we think American policy should be guided accordingly. Specifically, we believe that development loans should not be granted in support of government-owned manufacturing enterprise in underdeveloped countries.

11. MEANS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

We note a strong tendency in recent months for the supervision of individual AID programs to be centralized in the White House or in the

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Executive Office of the President. We recognize that in exercising his own ultimate responsibility the President must make his own decisions about the administration of foreign assistance, but we wish to state our own view that once the basic guidelines have been laid down by the President, the development of country programs and the execution of bargaining strategies should be a matter for the Department of State and AID. Appropriate instruments of review should be established under the President's direction so that he can be confident about the basic direction of the program, but we doubt that the White House can administer the AID program directly.

12. THE SIZE OF THE AID PROGRAM

We have reviewed the AID program for FY 1967 as proposed by Mr. Bell. His proposal would maintain overall AID expenditures from all sources in FY 1967 at the same level as that requested for FY 1966, with Vietnam treated as an exception. Because of the availability of other funds, his appropriation request for 1967 is about \$150 million lower than the request for 1966. We give our general support to Mr. Bell's request. We recognize that the unusual budgetary stringency of FY 1967 may require a Presidential decision to curtail this program, along with many others of high importance, but we are not in a position to make an informed judgment on this broader question. We can only assert that the AID budget as a whole is as important to the national interest of the United States as the Defense budget itself.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Comparison of 1965, 1966 and 1967 Proposed Programs ^{a/}
(\$ millions)

	1965 Oblig- ation	Program 1966		1967 Req.	New Obligational Auth.		
		Cong. Req. (incl. supp.)	Current Est. (incl. supp.)		1965 Approp- riations	1966 Approp- riations (incl. supp.)	1967 Request
<u>Development Loans</u>	<u>721</u>	<u>840</u>	<u>630</u>	<u>940</u>	<u>774</u>	<u>618</u>	<u>726</u>
Africa	45	100	90	125			
Far East	69	50	95	75			
Near East South Asia	605	690	445	740			
Non-Regional	*	*	*	*			
<u>Technical Cooperation</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>231</u>	<u>241</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>204</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>243</u>
Africa	80	92	85	90			
Far East	39	34	45	62			
Near East South Asia	50	46	47	46			
Non-Regional	51	59	64	66			
<u>Alliance for Prog.</u>	<u>531</u>	<u>596</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>617</u>
Loans	442	503	493	550	425	433	530
Technical Cooperation	89	83	88	90	85	75	87
<u>Supporting Assist.</u>	<u>439</u>	<u>603</u>	<u>610</u>	<u>656</u>	<u>401</u>	<u>594</u>	<u>644</u>
Africa	37	23	27	26			
Far East	326	501	501	563			
Near East South Asia	39	35	35	32			
Latin America	36	39	45	34			
Non-Regional	1	2	2	*			
<u>Contingency Fund</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>295</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>50</u>
General	58	100	106	50	99	100	50
South East Asia Prog.	-	189	189	-	-	189	-
<u>Contribution to Inter- national Organizations</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>158</u>
<u>Investment Surveys</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
<u>American Schools and Hospitals Abroad</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>Administrative:</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>61</u>
AID	55	57	58	60	51	54	58
State	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
<u>Total Program</u>	<u>2178</u>	<u>2774</u>	<u>2571</u>	<u>2783</u>			
Total EQA	-	-	-	-	2195	2423	2663

a/ Numbers may not add due to rounding

*Less than \$500,000

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 6-19-03

PC/EPD:11/16/65

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Comparison of 1966 Estimated and 1967 Program
Programs (excluding Vietnam)
1966

	Orig. Cong. Request	Cong. Request (incl. Suppl.)	Est. Avail. (incl. Suppl.)	Current Estimated Program	1967 Tentative Request
<u>Development Loans</u>	<u>840</u>	<u>840</u>	<u>780</u>	<u>630</u>	<u>511 932</u>
Africa	100	100		90	<u>100 125</u>
Far East	50	50		95	75
Near East South Asia	690	690		445	739
Non-Regional	*	*		*	-
<u>Technical Cooperation</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>254</u>
Africa	92	92		85	90
Far East	29	29		43	51
Near East South Asia	46	46		47	46
Non-Regional	59	59		65	67
<u>Alliance for Progress</u>	<u>596</u>	<u>596</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>640</u>
Loans	508	508	493	493	550
Technical Cooperation	88	88	88	88	90
<u>Supporting Assistance</u>	<u>204</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>215</u>
Africa	26	26		27	26
Far East	130	144		139	123
Near East South Asia	34	34		35	32
Latin America	14	39		45	34
Other	*	*		2	
<u>Contingency Fund</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>50</u>
Africa					
Far East					
Latin America			10	48	
Near East South Asia			7	7	
Non-Regional			1	1	
CF Supplemental			150	50	
<u>Contributions to Inter- national Organizations</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>158</u>
<u>Administrative</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>63</u>
AID	57	57	58	58	60
State	3	3	3	3	3
<u>Investment Surveys</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>American Schools and Hospitals Abroad</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>12</u>
<u>Total Program</u>	<u>2129</u>	<u>2218</u>	<u>2170</u>	<u>2019</u>	<u>2307 2331</u>
Recoveries, etc.	110	110	300	149	272
Total NQA	2019	2108	1870	1870	<u>2035 2059</u>

PC/EPD:11/10/65

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 6-19-03

Comparison 1966 Request and 1967 Request
(excluding Vietnam)

Explanation

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
NOA Revised Request	2,289	2,106 2510
Supplemental	<u>375</u>	
	2,664	
- Vietnam		
Original Request SA	- 296	- 440
Original Request IC	- 14	- 11
Supplemental SA	- 186	-
Supplemental SEA CF	<u>- 100</u>	<u>-</u>
	2,108	2,106 2059

Alternative Explanation
(excludes Vietnam throughout)

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
NOA	2,019	2,019 2059
SA Supplemental	39	-
DR	(25)	-
Thailand	(6)	-
Laos	(8)	-
CF Supplemental	<u>50</u>	<u>-</u>
	2,108	2,106 2059

Comparison of Estimated Recoveries (Deobligations)
Carryover, etc., as Estimated in FY 1966 Request and Tentative
FY 1967 Request

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Est. Unobligated Carryover	2	151
Receipts and Reimbursements	32	40
Recoveries (Deobligations)	<u>76</u>	<u>81</u>
Total "Recoveries, etc."	110	272

CStockman:cg:
PC/EPD:11/10/65

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

55

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, December 14, 1965, 7:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Broodings on Vietnam

As I said on Saturday, I think the moment of truth on peaceful moves before Christmas is likely to be Friday morning after Dean Rusk's return. (Bob McNamara gets back Wednesday night, but Dean is spending another day on a long scheduled visit to Madrid.) As of Saturday, Rusk and McNamara and all their top subordinates were strongly favorable to the pause. Rusk himself has moved steadily and strongly in that direction over the last two weeks, although he wants you to be absolutely certain that whatever you decide will also be his recommendation. The arguments are wearisomely familiar to you, but the interesting thing to me is that people with very different basic views of the course of the war think that a pause would help now. And no one believes, either, that the other side can trap us or that a two-week pause in the North would weaken us in the South.

Today Bill Moyers and George Ball and I have discussed the wider proposal of a cease-fire and a peace mission to Hanoi in accordance with your instruction to Bill this morning. This is an idea which has real attractions and real disadvantages. We will be working on it some more tomorrow with Cy Vance, because it turns out -- not for the first time -- that the people in Defense have done more staff work on this peace proposal than the people in State.

The possible advantages of a cease-fire are these:

1. To the degree that it is respected by the other side, our casualties stop;
2. We get a chance to emphasize peaceful actions and to go about the work of relief and reconstruction, and other works of peace. If the other side allowed such free movement, we should be able to make some money in the countryside. If they did not, it would be plainly their fault.
3. If the cease-fire is rejected -- which is quite possible -- the international political rewards are very great indeed.
4. If the cease-fire is accepted, the chances of turning the whole business toward the peace table are considerably greater than they would be with a pause.

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Authority NLS 83-184

By is, NARS, Date 8-15-84

The disadvantages a cease-fire offers are also serious:

1. The Chiefs and Lodge and Westmoreland would all be unanimously and very strongly opposed. They would use some or all of the arguments that follow.
2. The whole object of our deployment is to get the initiative against the Viet Cong. A cease-fire would hand it back to them and allow them to rest, refit, regroup, retrain, and redouble their resistance after the fighting begins again.
3. A cease-fire would gravely shake the morale of the GVN and of the people in Saigon. It would also reopen the whole question of U. S. determination, doubts of which were so near the center of the crisis in morale a year ago.
4. A cease-fire offer could convey a very bad signal of apparent weakness to Hanoi (I don't quite believe in this one myself because if we ourselves use a cease-fire to move around the countryside, we can make things very tough for Hanoi and the Viet Cong both.)
5. If the South Vietnamese stop fighting, it may be very hard to get them to start again.

My own personal worry about a cease-fire right now is that I doubt if we can get organized to do it right in the short time between now and Christmas. I also believe that it is a card which we can play a little better some distance down the road than we can today. I believe the pause is both easier to defend and easier to execute, and I do not believe that it carries unacceptable costs with the troops in the field or public opinion. I feel this far more strongly because I am quite certain that with careful explanation of the need for a pause as a prelude to cease-fire, we can get the solid support of both Westmoreland and Eisenhower and if they are with us, I do not fear those who are against us.

M. G. B.

McG. B.

P. S. George Ball made an interesting argument this afternoon to the effect that it would be a very good thing for us all if we could get out of bombing in the North altogether. He was talking from rough notes, and I asked him to leave them with me for my instruction. Because of your interest in every aspect of this problem, I think they may interest you too, and I attach them at Tab A.

55a



55b

9. Ball's informal notes on bombing.

VIET-NAM:

Original purpose of bombing North:

1. Primarily to improve morale in South.
2. To interdict movement of supplies to South.
3. To persuade Hanoi to quit or to come to
conference table

Present consequences of bombing:

1. ~~Favorable:~~ *Did fulfill purposes?*
 - a. Not needed to raise morale in South with
massive troop deployments.
 - b. Not effective to reduce flow of supplies
below critical level although it raises cost.
 - c. *It* Is not breaking popular will of Hanoi, *but*
is uniting country against U.S.
2. Unfavorable: *impact?*
 - a. Driving Soviet and Peking together when
we should be splitting them since Soviets
want a pause.

- b. Prevents possibility of settlement since

Communist cannot settle in the face of US

bombardment of socialist state.
- c. Enormously raises the dangers of escalation--

already signs of creeping involvement on

both Chinese and Soviet sides.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1965
Tuesday/4:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It sounds to me as if the two of you have staked out your first positions-- Ayub has used all his charm to convince us that if only we get Kashmir arbitration and cut back Indian arms all would be rosy. You in turn have told him that we admire him but that we can't get in bed with China. Now the real bargaining will begin.

I'd suggest you let George Ball give him the hard line at 7:15 on China, on squeezing India, on the only way to get Kashmir being the road of reconciliation. This would make your later dinner conversation that much easier.

The two words Ayub most wants to hear are plebiscite or at least arbitration. He makes a good case, and we've always sympathized with it, but the hard fact is that these are the two things that will drive India up the wall.

If Ayub goes to Tashkent thinking we'll back arbitration, he won't even begin to compromise and we'll be back in the middle of the very insoluble dispute out of which we've just skilfully maneuvered. In fact, I wouldn't even let him at Goldberg tonight (Arthur hoped we'd stay off of Kashmir).

Instead the trick is to stay away from Kashmir and on those Pak policies we don't like. What we must explain is that, no matter how much you admire him personally, the US Congress and people just won't let you resume massive aid to a country which seems to be misusing our arms and consorting with the very enemy we're fighting in Vietnam.

1. We can only give such help to countries which see a community of purpose with us, rather than China, and which show it.

2. So if Pakistan and India want our aid they must both take the road of peace.

3. We want to reach a new meeting of minds with Pakistan which will permit aid resumption. Let us both move down this road. It will take time, but with goodwill on both sides we can start talking about a number of interim steps. Any big moves, however, will have to wait until we've taken Shastri's measure too. *INVENTORY OF LITTLE MOVES ATTACHED*

DECLASSIFIED

R. W. Komer

Authority 7C 889-07

By cg/cip, NARA, Date 8-28-92

~~SECRET~~

mj ✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1965

Tuesday/11:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the inventory of interim things we could do for the Paks if we were so disposed:

1. The safest thing would be to go ahead with the \$39 million worth of loans already authorized during FY 1965. There are six of them--all relatively important. We could indicate that this was a parallel action to the \$30 million in fertilizer for India.

2. We could make a new interim PL 480 agreement, which the Paks are requesting. It would be relatively small as Pakistan's current food picture is pretty good.

3. Military aid is much trickier, for the simple reason that it would be hardest for the Indians to understand at a time when the cease-fire and withdrawal on which we hinged such resumption have not yet firmed up.

a. As Ball suggests, we could allow commercial sales to both India and Pakistan. This would help the Paks more because they could buy urgently needed spare parts.

b. We could quietly allow the Paks to buy from third countries (at present we are blocking US-origin sales).

c. More important and, in my view, more desirable would be simply to indicate that if a good US/Pak relation can be restored, we would be prepared to discuss Pakistan's future security needs, including MAP and sales. I really don't think Ayub expects more.

d. Finally, the question of reassurances against India. Arthur Dean and I feel that reiteration of the fact that if Pakistan is allied to us, we would simply not stand by and let India take over Pakistan would be highly valuable to Ayub, given his present acute fear that the Indians have the upper hand. On the other hand, it would be imperative that you avoid the sins of yesteryear by making clear that our assurances simply could not be operative in a situation of other than unprovoked aggression. Ayub knows full well how cloudy the last case was.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 12812, w/ 25*262
By: JCH, NARA, Date: 5/5/12

R. W. Komer

they could buy them the C-130 starter cartridges motors.

57
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., Dec. 14, 1965
3:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am getting regular situation reports from Ulric Haynes on the Rhodesian crisis. This one is rather a clear-cut and useful summary of the current situation, and I think you may wish to glance at it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

57a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 14, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

McGB:

Authority NLS 84-135

By ica, NARS, Date 7-30-84

Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis

- ✓ 1. At Kenya's request, today's UNSC meeting on Rhodesia has been cancelled; Kenya reserves the right to call for another meeting later this week.
- ✓ 2. State's approach to the major US suppliers of oil to Rhodesia on voluntary compliance with an oil embargo met with a reluctantly favorable response. While doubting the efficacy of an oil embargo, the oil companies' sole condition was that the UK issue an order-in-council to provide them with "legal cover" for voluntary compliance.
- ✓ 3. Approaches to US importers of Rhodesian lithium, chrome and asbestos (accounting for about 75% of US imports from Rhodesia) for voluntary compliance with sanctions met with no apparent dissent. However, compliance would raise technical problems for some importers.
- ✓ 4. We have told the UK we are prepared to support a Zambian airlift with either three DC-7C's or one 707 provided, (a) support is limited to a 2-month period, (b) cost is kept below \$300,000 per month, and (c) it is understood this is not an open-end undertaking.
- ✓ 5. An IBRD Vice-President is enroute to Rhodesia and Zambia to explore the possibility of the Bank acting as a trustee or custodian of the Kariba Dam installation.

✓ Comment: The cancellation of today's UNSC meeting temporarily takes some of the pressure off the US and UK to broaden and intensify sanctions. Kenya's request for cancellation is probably due to the lack of any instructions from the Kenyan Government. With increasing defections from the OAU December 15 deadline for a diplomatic break with the UK, the position of the Africans is both confused and weakened.

The next move is the UK's when Wilson addresses the UNSC on Thursday.



Rick Haynes

cc: RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F 59

Monday, December 13, 1965
4:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A joint letter from House Members
opposing extension of bombing

You may not have seen the attached letter from a group of 17 Congressmen, and I think you may want to know about it. It has been acknowledged by Henry Wilson and I think needs no further action.

McG. B

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday - 5:30 p.m.
December 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Some Favorable and Unfavorable Latin American
Developments

Crisis situations threatening the stability of the governments of Guatemala and Uruguay developed this week. The news from Brazil and Chile is favorable as these governments weathered their recent difficulties successfully. The situation in the Dominican Republic continues to be encouraging.

Plotting in Guatemala. Problems on several fronts culminated this week in a serious crisis of public confidence in the Peralta regime. The small communist guerrilla-terrorist forces have stepped up their activities. They recently kidnapped three members of prominent families and ransomed them for substantial amounts of money. The government's inability to apprehend the kidnappers has raised doubts about its capacity to deal with terrorism. The economic situation is continuing to deteriorate, undermining the confidence of the business community in the regime. Destructive political maneuvering related to the March 1966 elections has further shaken public confidence. And on top of all this, right-wing military leaders, led by Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ponciano, are plotting to overthrow Peralta.

Peralta says he is confident he can deal with the situation but we have our doubts unless corrective measures are taken promptly. To help accomplish this, we have told Ambassador Mein to make clear to Peralta that we support him in his efforts to take the country to elections. We have sent one of our best public safety officers to Guatemala to help the security forces on the kidnapping problem. The Embassy has been instructed to make it clear to the coup leaders that we favor a return to constitutionality via the scheduled elections. Other ways in which we might buttress the Peralta Government are under consideration.

~~SECRET~~

SANTITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-239
By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

-2-

General Strike in Uruguay. Last October Uruguay weathered a labor crisis arising from the Government's refusal to give in to wage demands by its public employees. Another crisis broke this week over the government's unwillingness to reduce the sanctions imposed on the October strike leaders. In the face of another strike, the Government on Tuesday reimposed emergency security measures. The public employee union leadership called for a 24-hour strike yesterday. The communist labor machine, using the new security measures as a pretext, agitated for inclusion of the private sector in the strike plans.

The Embassy reports that the strike was not very successful. Talks held yesterday between the Government and the pro-democratic head of the public employees union seems to have defused the crisis. Ambassador Hoyt has been working quietly behind the scenes to encourage a prompt settlement. As he points out, it is tragic that the Uruguayans are squandering their energy on this foolishness when they should be putting all their effort behind constructive action to remedy their serious economic problems.

Chilean Copper Strike Ends. The good news is that the 37-day copper strike in Chile has ended. The Frei Government stuck to its guns and came out on top. But the cost of the strike in economic terms is heavy: some 60,000 metric tons representing some \$30 million in foreign exchange receipts.

Another favorable development is that President Frei's veto of various provisions of the copper legislation was upheld in the Chamber of Deputies. The bill now goes to the Senate which is expected to complete action by the first of the year.

Victory for Moderation in Brazil. Last Sunday Negrao da Lima, opposition Governor-elect of Guanabara assumed office. Despite the pressure of the "hard-liners", President Castello Branco thus fulfilled a promise decisive to his maintaining his authority. Beyond honoring a pledge, Castello Branco's action represents a considerable victory for the moderate, democratically-oriented policies which he advocates, and, conversely, a defeat for the authoritarian "hard-liners" who oppose him.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Castello Branco is not completely out of the woods, however, on the Negrao installation. The Supreme Military Tribunal has yet to rule on charges that Negrao's victory in the recent elections was invalid since it was achieved with Communist Party assistance. Although it seems unlikely, a Tribunal ruling against Negrao is possible. Such a ruling might well force the President to remove Negrao and undo the victory which he has scored.

1.3(a)(5)

Progress Towards Elections in the DR. We talked this week with Ellsworth Bunker, the AID Mission Director [redacted] all of whom were in town. They gave us a picture of Garcia Godoy having turned the corner and starting down a smoother road than the one he has travelled since September.

The change is reflected in the way that he has moved during the past ten days to prepare for elections. He officially announced June 1, 1966 as the date for the elections. He filled the two vacancies on the Supreme Electoral Board with relatively unknown, but impartial and otherwise unobjectionable men. He wrote to Dr. Mora asking for OAS assistance in preparing for and supervising the elections. Dr. Mora is in the process of naming a three-man commission.

These steps will contribute to stability in the DR and will be reassuring to hemisphere opinion.

WGB + m.f.s.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~