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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, December 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

1. I attach Bob McNamara's account of his telephone conversation with members of Congress on South Vietnam. It is highly instructive. Before he left for Chicago and the Coast, Dean Rusk had seen Sparkman, Church, and Javits. He gave me the following account of their views:

Sparkman thinks we need a resolution and that it should be quite a tough one. He would favor a pause if there is even a 5% chance that it would be successful in opening the road to negotiations.

Senator Church does not think a resolution would be a good idea unless we are proposing some major change, like bombing Hanoi, or putting ground forces in Laos. He is strongly in favor of a pause.

Senator Javits is in favor of a resolution and would like to be helpful in any way he can about it. He would also favor a pause unless the military authorities say it would have a major military impact on the effectiveness of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.)

- 2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter again on Saturday morning, and at that point it may be wise for us to call you and take a final reading. It will be very difficult to do a good job of the pause if the decision is put over beyond that point.
- 3. My own basic reason for supporting the pause is simply that we are going to have to do these other tough things in January. I think the criticism the pause will get will be rubbed out by the energy of our January message, and on the other hand, I think the peace-lovers will support our January actions a whole lot more if there has been a pause beforehand. I find that Komer strongly shares this view, and that Califano seems to be shifting toward it.

m. 6.

McG. B.

Authority NLJ 83-184

By ico, NARS, Date 8-15-84

9 December 1965 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RELATING TO SOUTH VIETNAM I called but was unable to talk to the following men: Senator Lister Hill - has had minor surgery and will be out of his office for two or three days. Senator Stuart Symington - out of the country Senator Henry Jackson - in Vietnam Representative Glenard Lipscomb - in the Far East Representative Robert Sikes - in the Far East Representative George Mahon - on vacation; cannot be reached until 14 December Representative William Bates - in Europe Representative Philip Philbin - in Europe Representative Mendel Rivers - in Europe With each of the following I summarized the current situation, the prospects for continuing increases in Viet Cong strength, the possibility that the conflict would increase in intensity, and the need for increased U.S. deployments if we were to avoid a military defeat or stalemate. I estimated that the cost of our South Vietnamese operations would require a January Supplement of some \$10-12 billion and a FY '67 budget of equal amount. I asked for their opinions on expanding U.S. forces; requesting Congressional support, intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, and initiating diplomatic initiatives, (e.g., a pause in the bombing, an appeal to the UN, visits to Communist states by peace emissaries). 1. Senator John Pastore a. He asked trhetorically where we are going if we put in 400,000 men. b. Most of the American public doesn't understand what we are up against -- the American public won't take the war for long. c. We should make a serious effort to settle the conflict (through use of pause, etc.) before we start bombing on an expanded scale or further increase the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. d. The President should come before the Congress and see the matter debated before he expands U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

2. Senator Mike Monroney

- a. He is leery of escalation beyond the current level of conflict. The country doesn't want to see the war expanded beyond its present boundary.
- b. The country would accept the deployment of a total of 400,000 men if it believes the war will not spread beyond South Vietnam.
- c. We should not undertake an expanded military program without holding out the opportunity for peace negotiations through the UN or through other third parties.
- d. He seriously questions whether we should substantially expand the bombing in North Vietnam -- he does not believe the added bombing would be worth the risk.
- e. We should go to Congress for a Joint Resolution if substantial additional forces are to be sent to the Far East.

3. Senator Warren Magnuson

- a. The people now feel we are at war and we should do whatever is required to finish the job -- in particular, we should deploy whatever troops are necessary.
- b. He is not certain how the bombing program should be changed, if at all. He is unclear as to how effective it has been to date, but he is certain the people would support more if the President considers it desirable.
- c. Peace moves should be made to coincide with whatever additional military action we take.
- d. The President should request Congressional support in the form of a Joint Resolution.
- e. He wished to emphasize again the President should with one hand carry on the war and with the other hand fight for peace.

4. Senator Leverett Saltonstall

a. Increasingly, the people are asking what do we want and how far are we going.

- b. The Congress will support the deployment of additional troops, but such action should be complemented by a request for some form of Congressional Resolution.
- c. The increasing number of casualties is beginning to stir up the people to ask why are we in South Vietnam; what can be done about further losses; how far are we going.
- d. Expanding the bombing program in the North is a terrible risk, but we must consider it. He would support a Presidential decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong because we must do enough to bring the Viet Cong to a sensible peace negotiation. He believes we should mine Haiphong Harbor.
- e. He doesn't believe a pause in the bombing would accomplish anything. We must keep the military pressure on so that Hanoi will be forced to sit down at the bargaining table.

5. Senator Robert Kennedy

- a. It is difficult for him to provide a worthwhile judgment after only two or three minutes of thought.
- b. People are becoming more and more concerned as the casualties rise. They do not understand the alternatives open to us and these should be explained to them. The political situation is extremely dangerous because the people do not understand the war.
- c. He cannot give an answer as to whether or not we should expand our troop deployments after only two or three minutes of discussion.
- d. We should take some form of dramatic political action. Such action might be built around Christmas. Political action is absolutely required if a further military buildup is likely. Among actions which might be considered would be an appeal to the Pope; a cease fire; contacts with the Liberation Front in Algeria; a longer suspension of the bombing. Political actions are important for support both within the U.S. and also abroad. He sees no sign of any major effort on the political side.

e. If we do authorize an additional military buildup, some form of Congressional action is desirable.

6. Speaker John McCormack

- a. We are committed in Vietnam and we must do everything necessary to carry out our commitment.
- b. He is on the side of expanding our military strength in Vietnam.

- c. The situation is comparable to that faced by the Free World when Hitler started his aggression. If South Vietnam goes, the rest of Asia will collapse like dominoes before an aggressive China.
 - d. Whatever additional bombing is necessary he would initiate.
- e. Without further thought, he would be hesitant to ask action of Congress, but he would want more time to think about this question.
- f. Whatever decisions are made by the President he will back up.

7. Representative Gerald Ford

- a. People are asking: are we getting too deeply involved on the ground; are we fully utilizing our air power; why don't we stop the flow of goods into the port of Haiphong.
- b. Before supporting an expansion of our ground forces, he would like to see us use more air power against military targets in North Vietnam, and, in particular, he believes we should mine Haiphong Harbor.
- c. He believes it would be wise to ask for Congressional support of an expanded program of military deployments.

8. Representative Edward Hebert

- a. We should do whatever is necessary to win. If more troops are required, send them. If more bombing is necessary, including mining the Haiphong Harbor, initiate it.
 - b. We haven't made clear to the people why we are there.
- c. Diplomatic moves may help psychologically, and if so, they should be undertaken, although nothing concrete is likely to follow from them.
- d. If additional deployments are undertaken, it may be necessary to go back to Congress to get a Resolution of support.

9. Senator Sam Ervin

- a. We ought to bomb North Vietnam out of existence because they are initiating the aggression. We can't afford to retreat further in the world.
 - b. He would put more troops in South Vietnam if they are needed.

- c. It might be advisable to go back to Congress for further support.
- d. He believes it would be wise to give North Vietnam a warning or a chance to negotiate (e.g., through a pause) before expanding the bombing.

10. Representative Leslie Arends

- a. If we need more men in South Vietnam we should send, them, although he hates to think about it.
- b. He believes we should expand the bombing in North Vietnam and he is certain we should do this if we send in more troops.
- c. He would favor a request for a Congressional Resolution of support.
- d. He does not favor diplomatic moves now. He doubts the values of negotiation because we can't trust the other side. However, we should continue to probe peace offers when they come.
- e. He believes we should stay in Vietnam. We are doing what needs to be done. He will continue to support us.

11. Senator Thomas Kuchel

- a. He believes we should and must expand our forces in South Vietnam.
 - , b. The people in California want us to get on with the war and would favor expanding the bombing.
 - c. The people would like to see the problem moved to the conference table, but they believe the initial move must come from Hanoi.
 - d. He does not feel qualified to advise on whether we should initiate a pause or move to the UN.
 - e. He does not believe additional Congressional action is required.

Robert S. McNamara

Dictated but not read

Thursday, December 9, 1965

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic poll

- 1. I attach the preliminary report on the nationwide Dominican Republic poll. I also attach at Tab A a technical analysis of the field work. It looks like a good professional job to me, and it has had a careful technical review from Kirkpatrick and Scammon, the two experts recommended by Ollie Quayle when he advised against his own participation.
- 2. There will be further reports as we go along, but I think it remains safe to say "So far, so good."

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-23/

By , NARA, Date 2-/7-93

Let's talk about this.

LBJ/mf 12-11-65 2:00p Borg 10,000



630

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

December 9, 1965 7 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I think you probably ought to know right away about this call for a cease-fire by church groups. I do not feel clever about it right now, but will try to have more ideas by tomorrow.

miles,

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

December 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Church Interest in Cease-fire in Vietnam

Professor Gilbert White, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Friends Service Committee, contacted Len Unger from Austin, Texas, yesterday. He wanted Unger to know that representatives of various church groups were promoting a call for a cease-fire in the Vietnamese war during the Christmas and the Tet seasons; this appeal will probably be made next week and would be an appeal to, among others, President Johnson. According to White the National Council of Churches and the National Catholic Welfare Conference were involved in this and they had brought the Quakers into it. While the group intends to make an appeal it was White's personal thought that they would be very much more pleased if the President should take the initiative on this himself.

Professor White added that the NCWC representative has underway a proposal through their representative in Rome that the Pope be invited to make such an appeal himself.

Meanwhile, Dr. Kenneth Maxwell, National Council of Churches, tried to reach me yesterday and we finally made contact this afternoon. He told me much the same story that Gil White told Unger. He expressed considerable understanding of the political and military problems involved in the cease-fire, but felt strongly that the President should take the initiative in proposing the cease-fire, at least over the holiday season. He said that the church groups were preparing to make an appeal to the President before the Communists' initiative; in the light of the VC cease-fire offer they felt it was even more important that the President make a forthcoming response. I told Dr. Maxwell I would pass on the views of the National Council of Churches.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ACMINISTRATIVE MARKING NOT WAT'L SECURITY INFORMATION, E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DON 6-19-83

Chester L. Cooper

CONFIDENTIAL



THE WHITE HOUSE

Thursday, December 9, 1965

SECRET SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I attach a copy of a conversation that Dean Rusk had with Ambassador Dobrynin after our meeting at the Ranch. The Secretary tells me that he and Thompson both interpret this conversation as confirming their view that the Soviets would make an effort to move things onward during the pause. In this sense they incline to think that it substantiates their belief that Dobrynin's talk with me was important. My own valuation remains somewhat more cautious,

(2) (5)

McG. B.

SECRET attachment

SANITIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NU 89-2/6 NV 89-2/6 NARA, Date 3-23-9/

SECRET SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

5295 64a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

12/9/65

Mac:

The Secretary wishes this memo to be placed in the "series" and very closely held.

LEThompson

S/AL - LEThompson:mac

SECRET RECEIVED

Approved in S/AL 12/9/65

1965 DEC 9 PM 6 .0

Dec. 8, 1965

Place: Secretary's office

Time: 6:00 p.m.

Viet-Nam

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
Department of State

S/AL (3)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-37/

By 12 NARA. Date 8-/8-92

The Secretary said with respect to the hostilities in Viet-Nam, that it was not clear how we turn at this point. We had been in touch with Hanoi and with various capitals around the world. We had also had conversations with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter here in Washington. The Ambassador inquired if we had been in touch with Hanoi after the General Assembly discussion.

The Secretary replied that we had. There had been no indication of the slightest interest in bringing this affair to a peaceful conclusion. He did not fully understand why the two co-Chairmen could not take some initiative. He said that both we and Hanoi had referred to the 1954 Agreements. Hanoi puts four points as its interpretation of these Agreements but the Secretary wished to point out that the NLF is not mentioned in these Accords.

The Ambassador asked if we had talked with them with regard to the other points. It appeared to him that we were asking unconditional surrender. He said he was not speaking of Hanoi but of the Liberation Front. He said that even yesterday the Secretary indicated he did not want to speak with the people when we were fighting; namely, the NLF. At least they were doing the major fighting.

The Secretary pointed out that our combat troops had not been in Viet-Nam until Hanoi had moved in.

The Ambassador said our own figures showed the great number of South-Vietnamese that had been fighting us. He said no one from their side could accept that it was only Hanoi.

The Secretary said that among the fourteen million people in South Viet-Nam there was an overwhelming consensus that they did not want Hanoi. We were prepared to support the elections in South Viet-Nam but the Liberation Front said. "no."

The Ambassador asked under what formula we would propose elections. The Secretary replied on the condition that there was peace in the country which would permit elections.

The Ambassador pointed out that Diem had refused to talk of elections. He then inquired about the possibility of stopping the bombardment of North Viet-Nam. Were we prepared to consider this? Parenthetically, he noted that a twelve hour suspension of fighting had been offered and that our press spokesman had said neither yes nor no.

The Secretary asked that if the Ambassador were in Viet-Nam, would he put his arms down for twelve hours. The other side had said they would not shoot people who went to church unarmed.

Dobrynin said that this was an aside and he returned to the subject of bombing, which was the main thing.

The Secretary said he had been careful not to close the door on this in his public statements but he could not understand why it was impossible to find out privately what would happen if we did stop the bombing. He had asked Mr. Peter and we had asked Hanoi. Ho Chi Min had sent Linus Pauling a message which Pauling interpreted to mean that the four points were not a precondition of negotiations. If this were a fact, why did they not say so?

Dobrynin said they could not talk of negotiations while the bombing went on. He said, frankly, he did not understand the American

stubborness. The United States was a big power. No one would think we were weak if we stopped the bombing to create a better atmosphere. His feeling was that we were too sensitive to domestic criticism.

The Secretary said this was not the problem. Dobrynin said he did not understand our position and he made clear that in these and other remarks he was speaking personally. He said the suspension for four days had not been enough and may even have done harm. This did not give anyone any chance to do anything about it. He asked what harm it would do to have some criticism in the United States. He was sure it would be understood abroad.

The Secretary said he agreed this was an informal conversation. He continued that we don't even know the direction of the attitude the Soviet Union would take if we stopped bombing. Would they try to arrange a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Accords? Dobrynin said that stopping the bombing would create a better atmosphere. He could not give any undertaking as to what would happen but the Soviet Union would not try to influence North Viet-Nam while they were being bombed.

The Secretary remarked that only the United States is not supposed to have face. During the Berlin blockade we had talked to the Soviet Union privately. (The Ambassador interjected that there had been no fighting going on.) The Secretary continued that during the Korean war we had private talks that had led to peace.

Dobrynin said he did not see any loss for the United States in stopping the bombing. No one would seriously say that the United States was a weak power. He asked whether the Secretary thought the Soviet Government would think that we had lost face.

The Secretary said it was not a question of Moscow, but of Hanoi. Apparently they thought the United States was about to collapse, judging from the publicity they gave the demonstrations in this country against United States policy. Perhaps stopping the bombing would make them think this was so. Neither he nor the Ambassador knew what Hanoi's reaction would be.

The Ambassador said he did not invite us to resume bombing after a suspension, but implied that this was our option. He asked

SECRET

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whether the Secretary thought that more and more bombing would convince the other side.

The Secretary said he was prepared to bet a new hat that when Johnson defeated Goldwater, Hanoi had said to themselves that they could have a larger war without reaction from the United States.

Dobrynin said the question was how to finish the affair. Why not begin with the suspension of bombing? The only argument he had heard was that this would be a sign of weakness.

The Secretary said that Hanoi had never even hinted that they would do anything if the bombing stopped. Dobrynin pointed out that both the Hungarians and the Soviets had suggested that this could be a step on a way out. Neither of them, however, had the authority to speak for others.

The Secretary said it was hard for us to understand the failure to carry out the agreement on Laos. Hanoi had never complied with it and there was nothing we wanted more than one thousand percent compliance with it in every respect. The other side had referred to the military clauses of the 1954 Agreement. Why not get back to this and the 1962 Agreement? We have said that we wanted no bases or forces in that area. The South Viet-Namese could determine their own fate provided North Viet-Nam did not intervene by force. Dobrynin said that in view of what the Secretary said regarding bombing in North Viet-Nam, and he was aware that we were already bombing in Laos, he did not see any way out or how the conflict could fail to be enlarged.

The Secretary said we did not want even the present level of hostilities. Dobrynin said that he had heard talk of bombing Hai-phong and Laos and Cambodia. The Secretary said the problem was how could we find restraint on the other side? Dobrynin repeated that the United States was a big power but did not want to make any gestures. We were increasing our troops. Were we trying to impress the Soviets? The Secretary said no, we were trying to impress Hanoi. Dobrynin asked what would come afterwards. Would we intervene in North Viet-Nam? If this occurred, then what would happen?

The Secretary said that Dobrynin had used the phrase "unconditional surrender." Speaking frankly, this was an abuse of language. We were not asking the other side to surrender or do anything but to stop their intervention. Dobrynin said we were trying to force the Liberation Front to admit they were only tools or stooges of Hanoi. He pointed out that they had representatives in Peking and Moscow and elsewhere. The other side was asked to accept unconditional discussions, ignoring the Liberation Front, and to accept the United States position that it was only Hanoi that was involved. This made the situation very difficult for Hanoi, as well as for the Soviet Union. He was not sure that some of the people in South Viet-Nam would continue their activities no matter what happened.

The Secretary pointed out that we were not shooting them until Hanoi came in. Dobrynin repeated that from the beginning we demanded Hanoi accept our condition that we were not fighting local people but Hanoi. He said there could be no armed intervention unless there were local people fighting and we did not wish to recognize the people that were fighting us.

The Secretary replied that we wished to recognize them all, including the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Montagnards.

Dobrynin contended that the Secretary was saying to the other side, "Accept our formula and then we will have unconditional talks." He asked if we were at war with Hanoi.

The Secretary said we had told Hanoi that they could talk about their four points but we wanted to talk about our points. He did not see any other way than to sit down at the table to do this.

Dobrynin again said his personal feeling was that the best thing was to stop the bombing. He could not say what would happen but he was sure the atmosphere would be better.

The Secretary inquired whether if we did stop bombing and there were no response, would the crisis then be greater?

Dobrynin responded that if we stopped it only for a short time and put it in the form of an ultimatum, this might be. The Secretary

asked what if we stopped and there were an ultimatum from Peking or from Moscow as to what would happen if we resumed? We did not even know if this would happen or not.

Dobrynin said there was nothing to discuss now while we continued to wage a big war.

The Secretary said it was extraordinary that there could be discussions only if one side stopped shooting.

Dobrynin replied that he presumed we would continue shooting in the South, although he was not suggesting we do so.

The Secretary raised the question as to whether North Viet-Nam would keep infiltrating the South. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were sure that North Viet-Nam did not have control of all Viet Cong units. The Secretary rejoined that we were very sure and had good information that there were very few that Hanoi did not control.

After a brief discussion reported separately on non-proliferation, the Secretary said that both the Soviet Union and the United States had enormous stakes in Asia. We believed that frontiers should not be changed by force. If help were needed to demarcate the frontier or to settle disputes, we should both help. We had a considerable community of interest in this.

Dobrynin said that as far as he knew, there was no question of frontiers. The Secretary said the Chinese had asked for changes in their frontier with India. Dobrynin interjected that the Soviet Union had made clear its disapproval of this.

The Secretary said they also had some claims for a large chunk of Soviet territory.

Dobrynin replied that there had been reports in the press to this effect but in fact they had asked for only five kilometers. (It was not clear whether he was talking of square kilometers or what.) Dobrynin continued that he thought we must give more attention to our relations, which were not developing well. He did not

SECRET

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know if this deterioration was deliberate or a result of a chain of events. He made reference to the Renkovsky papers and a recently published Dodd Committee report which accused the leaders of the Soviet Union of being murderers. He also mentioned a man who paraded near the Soviet Embassy with a placard saying that Kosygin and Brezhnev were murderers.

The Secretary remarked that he understood there were ten thousand demonstrators in front of our Embassy today. Dobrynin continued that he now understood that Soviet attaches had no right to buy books in Brentano's on certain subjects unless they asked the Pentagon first. He thought this was incredible. The Secretary replied that we were aware of the instructions given to the Communist Party in this country. Dobrynin said they did not come from his Embassy.

The Secretary concluded by stating that perhaps he would be in touch with the Ambassador again on how to proceed. He again referred to the bitterness in this country after the breaking of the Laotian agreement. He also referred to a recent interview charging us with aggression. He said the Soviets must realize what disappointment the breaking of the Laotian agreement had caused here.

Dobrynin said the Soviets were in favor of compliance. The Secretary asked if they could not get together with the British and demand compliance.

Dobrynin said this was difficult now as our planes were flying there. The Secretary said this should not be a problem as we were ready to comply completely. He continued that the Soviets had accused us of being dragged along by the Germans. We thought that the Soviets were being dragged along by Hanoi. Dobrynin referred to the number of times he had come to the Secretary to try to get discussions going on Cambodia, but he had refused. The Secretary replied that this was because Sihanouk had raised these matters in complete hostility to Thailand and South Viet-Nam. We had been working with Thailand and South Viet-Nam to get these matters settled before a conference.

At this point, since both the Ambassador and the Secretary had dinner engagements, the conversation ended.

December 9, 1965 7 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

December 9, 1965

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CETESTIECD TO BE AN ACTUAL TO THE SECURITY L. FOREAVIOU. E. O. 12356

L. FORE ATION, E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

EY 1C# ON 6-29-83

CANDENTIA

Chester L. Cooper

12/6/65

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

- 1. Joe Califano has told me that you wonder if we are really ready for the meeting tomorrow. It is a fair question, and this message aims fully to answer it. In the largest sense, we are not/ready, but nevertheless there are immediate decisions that cannot wait, and on these we believe we are ready.
- 2. We do not have a complete and fully developed political, economic and social program to match the major new military deployments proposed for 1966. We can and will develop such a program, but we have to understand that unless and until there can be military victories, this program is irrelevant. Moreover, we are making major non-military efforts now which should produce results with victories, although they will come to nothing without them.
- 3. A strengthened political and economic program can and will include such items as the following:
 - a. New economic programs to prevent inflation.
 - b. Intensified countrywide health programs.
 - c. Highlighted educational efforts.
 - d. Stronger propaganda, including television.
 - e. Strengthened defector programs.
 - f. Establishment of model pacification districts and provinces.
 - g. Economic warfare denial program.
- h. Streamlined organization for peace actions both in Saigon and in Washington.

- i. Appointment of outstanding executives for peace in both capitals.
- j. Redeveloped political action efforts leading toward strengthened anti-Communist political organization and to pave the way for elections.
- k. Wider and stronger agricultural reform programs.

 Lodge and company would say that they are doing much of this now, but we all know it can be done better, and in any event it should be a major part of your 1966 Vietnam policy.
- 4. But with or without this stronger non-military program, we face major immediate military and diplomatic decisions. McNamara and the Chiefs are already engaged in detailed planning for the additional deployments and expenditures Westmoreland's program requires. Thus the issues presented in the military paper which was sent to you earlier today (CAP 65822) have to be decided this week.
- 5. We also have to decide now on a pause, if we are to have one before January. Advocates and opponents of a pause agree that it must be about three weeks in length to have any value. It is also agreed that it must have preliminary diplomatic preparation in Saigon and other capitals if it is not to backfire. We also agree that you should have freedom to end the pause before Congress returns, if you wish. In combination, these requirements mean that we must decide to go ahead now, if we are to go ahead at all before Congress returns. It is the calendar and not a lot of insistent subordinates that is forcing the hour of decision.

- 6. Next following messages contain three papers relating to a pause. The first is State Department's statement of a plan, with a summary of the pros and cons. Second is suggested points for Presidential statement announcing a pause. The third is a paper giving questions and answers that might be used by U. S. spokesmen in the wake of a Presidential announcement.
- 7. We have discussed these papers at length today with Clark Clifford, and he sides with Raborn, Wheeler and the Joint Chiefs against a pause. The rest of us are for it. I will be prepared to summarize arguments pro and con tomorrow. Two basic arguments against a pause are, first, that it suggests that bombing is wrong, and second, that it exposes us to diplomatic entrapment which would make resumption very difficult.
- 8. My own conviction is still that the best preparation for the tough programs of January is a peace offensive in December, and that the pause is the necessary centerpiece of that effort.

TOP SECRET

A Plan for a Pause

Paper No. 1
LBJ LIBRARY 1.3a)
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 83-180
Document # 67a

In view of the major additional effort required to continue the South Vietnam conflict along present lines during 1966, we can and should take a major new initiative at an early date both (a) to make another bona fide effort to find a peaceful solution; and (b) to convince the American public and all the key nations that we have in fact exhausted all possibilities before stepping up our effort.

The public and private exchange of negotiating positions between Hanoi and ourselves has been most active in the last nine months. We have gone as far as we can in verbal messages, and only some major new element in the form of a "pause" offers real hope toward either (a) or (b).

Need for a Pause:

l. A pause may be essential to achieve either successful negotiations or a tapering-off of military action in South Vietnam. There is a significant difference between our activities in the South and our bombing of the North. For reasons of face, the Hanoi regime may find it difficult to begin negotiations while its own territory is being bombed. For reasons of prestige in the Communist world, Peiping -- and perhaps even Moscow -- may feel compelled to prevent any negotiations while a fellow Socialist state is under air attack by the United States.

2.

- 1.3%/(3)
- 3. In addition to improving (although by no means guaranteeing) the chances for a possible successful negotiation, a pause could improve our peace-seeking posture throughout the world, which has been significantly weakened by the Sevareid story in Look.
- 4. A pause could also make it easier for the American people to accept the substantial increase in our 1966 effort, since it would further demonstrate that, before committing more American lives and resources to Vietnam, we are doing everything possible to find a peaceful solution.
- 5. A pause should reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement

 [] 1.3(a)(5)

SATISTIZED

Authority NLJ 83-180

By LLS , MAPS, Doi: 8-15-84

Dβ

The Dangers and Disadvantages of a Pause

- 1. The peace demonstrations in this country and the first heavy US casualties have increased the danger that Hanoi might interpret a pause as a signal of weakness. Continued large US deployments during the pause period would partially offset the chances of such an interpretation.
- 2. There is no assurance that a pause would lead to significant negotiations; the chances are much less than fifty percent.
- 3. What Hanoi is seeking is not a pause, but a complete cessation of bombing. They could be expected to do everything possible to prevent our resumption of bombing -- and in this effort they would probably be joined not only by the Soviet Union and Peiping, but by many of our friends around the world.
- 4. Ambassador Lodge foresees great dangers in a pause and it would certainly be hard to persuade the GVN that a pause is necessary. We must, therefore, assume that a pause would create considerable concern in Saigon.

Recommendation for a Pause

After balancing these considerations, we recommend that you approve a pause as soon as possible this month. This decision would, of course, be subject to consultation and joint action with the GVN.

Action Issues

The two main issues that need to be faced in carrying out a pause are:

- 1. The conditions under which we would resume bombing or continue the pause.
 - 2. A timing scenario for a pause now.
- 1. Conditions of Resumption or Continuation. We have all along taken the position that we could suspend or cease bombing only in return for reciprocal actions by Hanoi. We all believe that this must be the way in which we present the pause both publicly and through diplomatic channels.

Nonetheless, the question arises whether we would in fact be prepared to continue the suspension of bombing if Hanoi were to drop its present conditions for negotiation, specifically its insistence on the acceptance of the "NLF program." Such a switch in Hanoi's position would make it difficult for us to resume bombing at any early date. But it would also represent a really major concession by Hanoi that would tend to create sharp frictions and loss of morale as between Hanoi and the Liberation Front. The latter

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This is a possibility to which both Hanoi and the NLF are most sensitive because of the general belief of Vietnamese Communists that Hanoi itself was sold out in similar fashion by the Soviets in 1954.

We now believe we should be prepared to continue the suspension if Hanoi makes this concession, provided, however, that we would reserve the right to resume bombing if Hanoi in fact kept up the infiltration and high levels of military activity in the South, particularly by regulars. So we are talking of a suspension that might be continued while we fully explore the new possibilities of negotiation, but we would maintain our freedom to resume bombing even while negotiating efforts were still under way.

There is a third Hanoi response that might cause us difficulty: agreeing to negotiate only if the NLF were accepted as a principal party. We believe that your July 28 statement, offering the NLF the chance to present its views but not as a principal party, has gone as far as we can go. We would have to accept the difficulties and criticism of refusing to go further.

- 2. <u>Timing Scenario</u>. We estimate that it would take 12-15 days to complete the preparatory actions after decision, before a pause could be begun. The key elements are:
- a. Consultation with Lodge. We would need to bring him carefully aboard, probably in Saigon, and this would take 3 4 days, with an emissary far preferable to attempting to handle it by cable. We have to go over with him carefully just how he would handle it with Ky, and we have to bring him into all our reasoning.
- b. Lodge's Consultation with GVN. This will certainly encounter some initial skepticism or resistance, and we may have to make quite firm commitments on our future ground force deployments. Moreover, the group nature of the GVN means that at least four and possibly more senior leaders have to be brought in. We cannot estimate less than four days for this process.
- c. Notification of the Soviets and key allies, and consultation with Congress. We believe this must take place not less than 2 days before the announcement.

The scenario would also provide for a message to Hanoi just before the announcements, and for a short public announcement by the South Vietnamese and US Governments jointly on the day the pause starts, probably supplemented by a fuller statement by you.

TOP SECRET
December 6, 1965

Paper No. 2

Suggested points for Presidential statement announcing suspension of bombing of North Vietnam

- Aggression in Vietnam continues to be gravest current threat to peace of world.
 - 2. Brief review of basic U.S. position as stated July 28 -
 - a. Firmness against aggression;
 - b. Readiness to do all that is necessary to turn it back;
 - c. Strengthened economic and social action in South Vietnam;
 - d. Energetic efforts to move toward peace.
 - 3. Events since July have shown -
 - a. Gallantry and effectiveness of U.S. combat forces;
 - b. Persistent and increasing aggression from the North;
 - c. Need for still further strengthening of nonmilitary effort; and
 - d. Continued complete rejection of peace efforts by Hanoi and Peking.
- 4. The continuing and increasing Communist infiltration and aggression now produce the prospect of further sharp increases in the level of fighting, with mounting losses and suffering for all concerned.
- 5. The U.S. remains strong and determined and can meet any challenge at any necessary level.

Authority NLA 83-185

By iis , NARS, Date 8-15-84

- 6. But the U. S. wants peace and will leave no path unexplored.
- 7. The President has therefore decided to suspend air attack on North Vietnam in order to see whether parallel actions by others can open the way to peace.
- 8. Meanwhile, our joint effort in South Vietnam will continue.

 Our peaceful photographic surveillance of North Vietnam will continue,
 the effort for political progress in the South will continue, and our search
 for unconditional discussions will continue.
- 9. This action is based on strength, not weakness. Bombing was and is amply justified, but the object of the bombing is peace, and if a suspension can move us in that direction, no one will be more pleased than the United States.
- 10. The responsibility for aggression rests with others. The responsibility for action in response to this new decision also rests with them. It is for them to decide whether to move now toward peace or whether their continued aggression will force upon all concerned the additional costs of still more violent war in 1966.
- 11. Designation of Ambassador Harriman as U. S. plenipotentiary for peace talks at any time, at any place.
- 12. Designation of Vice President Humphrey to undertake a diplomatic mission to friendly countries explaining both this initiative for peace and the determination of the United States to move forward firmly if there is no adequate response.

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Authority NLJ 83-180

TOP SECRET

By is , NARS, Date 8-15-84

December 6, 1965

Paper No. 3

Questions and Answers for appropriate U. S. spokesman in the wake of the Presidential announcement of a suspension of bombing

1. The military consequence of the suspension.

- Q. Does this suspension increase the danger to U. S. fighting men in South Vietnam?
- A. No. There is only a slow and indirect relation between bombing activity in the North and the level of battle in the South, and it will be quite practicable to make up the time lost in the pause by intensified air attack afterwards if necessary. Moreover, the whole purpose of the suspension is to induce matching action by the other side to back off from its infiltration and aggression, and any such back-off would itself greatly decrease the dangers facing U. S. forces in South Vietnam.
- Q. Will not the pause allow dangerous time for reconstruction in the North?
- A. No. Any repairs which are effected during a pause can be dealt with afterwards. Our reconnaissance will continue, and our forces will be ready to renew their attacks promptly if necessary.
- Q. But you have claimed the bombing is effective. Surely it must follow that the suspension gives an advantage to the enemy.
- A. Obviously, the suspension does give a respite while it lasts.

 But we have never believed or asserted that the bombing of the North is
 the central part of our activity. To put it another way, we have been

bombing the North for 40 weeks. Each week of suspension loses for us only a small proportion of the overall effect of our bombing so far. This is an acceptable loss in order to demonstrate our good faith in seeking peace and in order to open the door to peace if possible.

2. Political terms and conditions of the suspension.

- Q. Under what conditions do you plan to resume the bombing?
- A. The President has said that this decision will be determined by the actions of others, and we do not wish to lay down precise conditions or to make any sort of ultimatum. We are trying to make it easy for others to respond -- not hard.
- Q. Are you in communication with Hanoi and Moscow and Peking about this matter?
- A. We are making appropriate diplomatic communications on a very wide scale but we think it more productive to do this privately, and we do not expect to discuss these private communications. All of them are governed by the policy declaration of the President.
- Q. You used to say that you would only suspend the bombing if there were evidence that others would respond by action on their side. Do you have persuasive evidence or have you changed your position?
- A. We have no clear evidence, but the situation has changed in one important respect. The increasing infiltration from the North, and increasing

Communist violence in the South have made it clear that unless there is a change in the situation, there will be much intensified warfare in 1966.

In this situation the President thinks it right to explore every opportunity for peace, and it is in that spirit that he has suspended the bombing.

- Q. Would you keep up suspension in return for unconditional discussions?
- A. We would certainly welcome unconditional discussion, and that would be a very encouraging development. But we could hardly sustain this pause for a protracted time if aggression and infiltration from the North are continued as at present.
- Q. Is the designation of Governor Harriman indication that you expect another Geneva conference?
- A. The designation of Governor Harriman is designed to underline the sincerity and determination of the United States in seeking to move to the peace table. The form and membership of such a conference are not important to the United States, which will meet with any interested government at any time.
- Q. The Communists will undoubtedly now press you on the question of negotiations with the Viet Cong. Are you ready to soften your position on this as you have apparently softened your position on a pause in the bombing?

A. We continue to stand on the President's statement of July 28.

"If Hanoi is ready to negotiate, the Viet Cong would have no difficulty
in being represented and having their views presented. We would not think
that would be an insurmountable problem at all."

MONDAY

'65 DEC 6 PM 7:30



THE WHITE HOUSE

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Saturday, December 4, 1965

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

NL381-10	DECLASSIF		2-12-81)
By DCH	NARS, D	ate 6-	30-83

- l. I promised you yesterday a memorandum by this pouch on the pros and cons of the pause as it now looks. This memorandum is a personal assessment for your interim consideration. There should be a further paper with fairly general support within the Administration by the end of the day on Monday.
- 2. The opinion in favor of a pause continues to grow here. This morning there seems to be a favorable consensus among Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Ball, McNaughton, the Bundy brothers, and Tommy Thompson. We think this is the best single way of keeping it clear that Johnson is for peace, while Ho is for war. This has great advantages in balancing the further military deployments and the big military budget. It has advantages with all third countries, and perhaps particularly with the Soviet Union. Thompson points out that a pause would greatly strengthen the Russian resolve to stand clear of our fighting in Vietnam.
- The pause also has an important political advantage which has only recently emerged in our discussions. If a pause should lead to the conference table, it would mean that Hanoi had given up one of its current conditions -which is the acceptance of the program of the NLF (the Viet Cong). such a move by Hanoi would drive a sharp wedge between Hanoi and the Communists in South Vietnam. We know that it is just this kind of sell-out that the Southern Communists fear. Thus, a pause which led to negotiations could be strongly defended in Saigon and with hard-liners at home as a very powerful instrument of attack on Viet Cong morale -- since all of our mounting pressures in the South would still continue. Moreover, we are increasingly persuaded that there is no trap we cannot manage in deciding when and how to end the pause. We would make it clear at every stage that the continuation of the pause and its ending would both be governed by our judgment on the continuing aggression from the North against the South. (To put it another way, while a pause might lead to negotiations, we would never commit ourselves to a permanent end of the bombing merely in return for a conference.) Thus either the infiltration would stop, or we would have a perfectly legitimate and internationally defensible reason for renewed bombing at a time of our choice.
- 4. We are not agreed here on the timing of a pause. Most of us have thought that it probably ought to happen in December and early January, so that you could end it or not -- as you chose -- around the time of the State of the Union message. But we now think that perhaps it could come later -- and might even be a balancing element in your military announcements for the

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON

-2-

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

12/4/65

effort in South Vietnam in January. This needs more thought.

5. The weaknesses of the pause are two -- one international and one domestic:

The international danger is that it would simply shift the propaganda of soft-liners from the bombing to the need to recognize the NLF. Our current line on this is fairly good -- that Hanoi can bring anyone it wants. But the pressure would grow to give some more explicit recognition to people who "control one-half the country." This is exactly what we must not do if we do not wish to lose the whole game in South Vietnam. But sooner or later we are going to have to face this music, and perhaps it is not so bad to face it now during a pause.

The domestic problem is more severe. The Joint Chiefs are now pressing very hard for escalation of the bombing, and the whole American Right is likely to be tempted by the argument that just at the moment of trial we are weakening in our support for our men in Vietnam. McNamara can make a very convincing argument that the bombing in the North is only marginally related to the fighting in the South -- whether or not we escalate. But it is hard to get certified military agreement to this proposition. Against this, of course, we have the pronouncement of the National Council of Churches, but it is far from clear that they really represent their congregations.

6. This is only a preliminary paper, but I think it does contain the central elements of what will be the most urgent question before us when we meet with you.

my.s.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 10 u. 5. 4-68, w. 1-3, =215

By 10 178 NARA, Date 5.15-12

Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday, December 4, 1965

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

12/4/65

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my.s.

McG. B.

SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

Saturday, December 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter of resignation

- 1. I attach a revised letter of resignation. John McCloy is out of town, so I have spoken to his successor, Jay Stratton, who is a deeply discreet man. Stratton immediately undertook to agree, in the name of the Trustees, to the condition which I have stated in the next to last paragraph. I hope it is stated in a way that is acceptable to you.
- 2. If you think well of it, you might wish to add the fact that we asked for this condition and that the Ford Foundation granted it, to any background account which Bill Moyers might give of our discussions. The month in which we have worked on the matter might then look something like this:

November 7 - McCloy offered Bundy the job.

November 8 - Bundy reported the offer to the President.

November 11 - At the Ranch the President told Bundy he would talk with him the following week in Washington.

November 19 - The President and Bundy had a thorough talk in Washington. The President told Bundy he was free to make his own decision in the light of his judgment of what he could most usefully do, and Bundy told the President that he would like to accept the Ford offer if the Ford Trustees would allow time for an orderly transfer of his duties at the White House. The President authorized Bundy to report this decision to Mr. John McCloy personally, and asked him to work out a time schedule for the transfer in terms of the national interest alone -- and then to see if that schedule was acceptable to Mr. McCloy.

Between November 20 and 28, Bundy studied this problem and consulted about it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. He reached the conclusion that he ought to stay on his present job through February, 1966. The President has agreed with this judgment, and Mr. McCloy, for the Ford Foundation, accepted the delay it involves on November 29.

On December 2, the President and Bundy discussed the matter further and began the consideration of a successor. The President asked Bundy to obtain assurance from the Ford Foundation that he would be available to undertake special assignments, and on December 3 Bundy obtained such assurance from the Ford Foundation.

McG. B.

Dear Mr. President:

I submit herewith my resignation as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to take effect on February 28, 1966. I leave this work with great regret, but the Trustees of the Ford Foundation have offered me another opportunity which it is not in my heart to reject, and I believe that after five years here it is right for me to move on. I am deeply grateful to you for your generous understanding of my decision.

I shall always be proud to have been a member of the White House Staff under two such leaders as President Kennedy and yourself. The achievements of the last five years are great by any standard. They are greater still in the light of the clear prospect that in the years ahead your continued leadership will enlarge and strengthen both our own society and our service to the peace and progress of mankind.

There are dangers ahead, as there are dangers that we have put behind us. In Vietnam a hard and testing struggle continues. But you have set a course there that is both right and brave, and I know our country will continue in its understanding support of both your resolution and your steady search for peace. While the effort in Vietnam goes on -- both in battle and in the works of peace -- I know that our country will also go ahead in other fields. It will respond to your standard of energetic cooperation for progress with all who will cooperate with us.

I now look forward to joining the great mass of private citizens who work for peace as they can, and upon whom you can always call. I have asked the Trustees of the Ford Foundation if I may accept their invitation on the understanding that I shall always be free to accept any special assignments from you, and they have generously agreed to this condition.

Mary and I will always cherish the friendship which you and Mrs. Johnson have offered us so warmly. We will never forget your kindness to us both, and you can count on our deep and lasting affection.

With great respect,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson The President of the United States Washington, D. C.

Saturday, December 4, 1965

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Allied combat forces for Vietnam

1. I attach a quick fix from John McNaughton on the subject of Allied combat forces for Vietnam. He and I will be working to refine this, but I know you wanted it promptly. I myself would omit the Nationalist Chinese until after more overt Chinese Communist participation on the other side, but they are worth bearing in mind. They would certainly fight like hell.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 83-184

By ..., NARS, Date 8-15-84

12/4/65

Mac:

You asked for an Optimist's View of where we can get combat forces for Vietnam.

- A. We already have combat forces from -- Korea l division, etc. (20,300)

 Australia l battalion, etc. (1,400)

 New Zealand l art. bn & tank troop (150)
- B. With pressure, \$300-500 million to play with, and priorities on deliveries of cumshaw, we should be able to get soon —

of population these plus 2 div (35,000) (they would have more per thousand than we) Korea 5 div (80,000) China (GRC) (obvious implications in VN and re Chicoms) 4 bn (4,500) Philippines (plus some engineers) Australia plus 2 bn (3,000) (no cumshaw) (best used to help seal Trail in Laos) Thailand l div (17,000) 1 bn (1,500) Greece 1 tac fighter sqdn

C. On longer term (and longer shots, in some cases involving selling our souls and raising hob in various ways) are —

D. Omitted for obvious reasons (though the capability exists) are -

Canada 1 bn (perhaps to police a Lastian "barrier") India 1 div (same) Pakistan 1 bn Lebanon 1 bn Jap an 3 bn Argentina 3 destroyers 4 destroyers Brazil Chile 2 destroyers Peru 2 destroyers

John T. McNaughton

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-223

By NARA, Date 11-17-90

To: The Ranch, EYES ONLY for the President from McGeorge Bundy

- 1. In two meetings today, Rusk and McNamara have made significant progress in clarifying their own thinking on Vietnam. So far they have concentrated mainly on the actual course of war and diplomacy, and have not yet got deeply into the critical questions of political management which Joe and Bill and I opened in our message to you last night.

 But I cannot disagree with their judgment that it is important to sort out the military and diplomatic priorities.
- 2. Today's discussions confirm the judgment that we shall almost surely wish to proceed energetically on Westmoreland's course in South Vietnam. Thus all of us believe that we should accept for planning purposes additional deployments averaging fifteen thousand a month over the next year. It does not repeat not follow that we should announce a large lump sum increase anytime soon. Indeed our preliminary judgment is that steady increase of pressure on the ground should be as undramatic as possible and of course should have as many third country battalions as we can get (separate paper from McNaughton on this will be in tomorrow's pouch).
- 3. At the same time the two Secretaries do share increasing concern about pessible Chinese involvement. There will be a special briefing tomorrow morning at which they will hear what Max Frankel has already been told. I continue to share Alex Johnson's view that Chinese Communists will not fight for South Vietnam but only for what they regard as survival of North Vietnam.

 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NL 1 83-184

By is, NARS, Date 8-15-84

In 1 of 3 pp

TOP SECRET S SITIVE

- 4. The open question is the pause. The day's discussions there have increased support for some form of pause. I will send a memo tomorrow developing pros and cons further, but the long and short of it is thatwe think the international advantages outweigh the international traps. We also think that firm and steady action in the south, together with public awareness of Chinese Communist danger, should keep most Americans in line with any decision you take on this matter.
- 5. We have agreed to make assignments for detailed planning documents in all relevant fields in a further meeting tomorrow morning, and it is our current intention to have all papers ready for discussion with you by the end of Monday, so that we could fly to you on Tuesday if you wish.

 The controlling item in urgency here is the pause because it will require intensive diplomatic preparation in more than one capital if it is to have minimum danger and maximum benefit.
- 6. Meetings today have shown the Secretary of State at his best, in wift a small group he furnes well, the leadership of a complex discussion. At the direct request of the two Secretaries, Califano and Moyers have not been included in these meetings, but I have told the Secretaries that I think it important to keep them both fully informed of the course of discussion separately, and both Secretaries for any femalisty have agreed. Both of them have a deep understanding of your immediate interest, and together the three of us will try to keep in touch with all aspects of the matter from your point of view. But the Secretary of State feels that

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (page 2 of 3 pages)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-3- flis review 12/3/65

he has a direct instruction from you, and my judgment, in which Moyers concurs, is that we should let him run this show his way unless you have other instructions.

.


(page 3 of 3 pages)

Mr. President:

We returned a copy of this to Mr. Bundy.

The original is for your use in talking to him.

mf 12-5-65 Just Therm



WASHINGTON

December 2, 1965

Skaff much

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Unrestricted Passports for Doctors and Public Health Specialists

Early this autumn you agreed to a modification of restrictions on the travel of Americans to countries we don't recognize so as to permit medical doctors and experts in public health to visit such places in the advancement of international health and welfare. You asked that this change be publicly tied to an appeal by Dr. Paul Dudley White, who wrote you in August about his concern over our "deadlock" with Red China.

State now proposes to announce such a modification in response to a second letter to the Secretary in which Dr. White strongly urges this change. As you will see from White's letter (attached), he suggests this move as a logical follow-up to your Smithsonian speech and Rusk's talk at the White House Conference on Health.

The countries to which the new travel regulations would apply are Albania, Communist China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea.

Under State's proposed plan, this move would be a purely Departmental action, with public reference to Dr. White -- not a Presidential action, unless you feel otherwise.

hy. B. McG. B.

Have State do	1t	
Re-frame for	Presidential action_	
Speak to me _	V	

PAUL DUDLEY WHITE, M. D. 264 BEACON STREET BOSTON, MASS.

November 22, 1965

COPY

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On the basis of the President's remarks in his Smithsonian address on September 16, and of your own statement on November 4, at the Health Conference, appealing for the free interchange between nations of personnel devoted to the care of the health of all the peoples of the world, I would personally ask that there be unrestricted passports in the future for such individuals serving in this capacity, with the obvious need of individual consideration, case by case.

A good many of us physicians have, in the past decade or more, found, as in the instance of our association with our medical friends in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, that this approach has been of the greatest value in aiding the establishment and development of peaceful cooperative programs. I believe that this same experience can be applied throughout the world without any exception.

Sincerely yours,

Saul J. Wit

The Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State Washington, D. C. December 1, 1705

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

The following dispatch from David Bruce on Rhodesia is well worth reading. I think his position will commend itself to you. It will not surprise you that Komer takes a somewhat more energetic view. Bob is not eager for us to get ahead of the British, but he does think that the British themselves are playing a bit slowly and weakly. Moreover, he and I both question whether in fact Smith and company can be undercut from within Rhodesia by the gradual course which Bruce appears to favor.

Nevertheless, what David writes is worth reading, if only because it is so well written.

Quote 2494

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 NLJ / RAC 12-187 NARA, Date 04-23-2014 74

75

Wednesday, December 1, 1965; 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$10 Million A. L. D. Loan to Korea

The attached papers in support of this loan are in accord with the proposed procedure on A. I. D. commitments which Schulte and I sent you last week. Dave Bell's memorandum (Tab A) explains that this loan is a small part of the commitment made in the communique issued after your meeting with President Park last May. He also identifies the self-help conditions which the Koreans will be expected to meet.

Charlie Schultze's memorandum discusses Korean performance, as well as the self-help conditions and the loan's balance of payments effects. Joe Fowler has reviewed and approved these papers—his initials appear on Schultze's memorandum.

Our negotiators would be helped considerably in influencing Korean monetary and fiscal policies over the next year if they could use this loan as bait during the formulation of the Korean budget, which will be finished early this month. Therefore, if we are going to do this, it makes sense to do it as quickly as possible.

I recommend that you approve.

Mc George Bundy

Approve_ yhis come back affroved
Disapprove_

Wednesday, December 1, 1965; 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$10 Million A. I. D. Loan to Korea

The attached papers in support of this loan are in accord with the proposed procedure on A. I. D. commitments which Schulte and I sent you last week. Dave Bell's memorandum (Tab A) explains that this loan is a small part of the commitment made in the communique issued after your meeting with President Park last May. He also identifies the self-help conditions which the Koreans will be expected to meet.

Charlie Schultze's memorandum discusses Korean performance, as well as the self-help conditions and the loan's balance of payments effects. Joe Fowler has reviewed and approved these papers--his initials appear on Schultze's memorandum.

Our negotiators would be helped considerably in influencing Korean monetary and fiscal policies over the next year if they could use this loan as bait during the formulation of the Korean budget, which will be finished early this month. Therefore, if we are going to do this, it makes sense to do it as quickly as possible.

I recommend that you approve.

Mc George Bundy

Approve	3	1. 1	1
Whbrose	-		
	- 4		18.14
Disapprov	e .		v.

P sile

Wednesday, December 1, 1965, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is one point which I want to be sure you know about, although I have refused to have any direct part in it myself. ago Henry Heald offered Dave Bell appointment as a Vice President of the Ford Foundation, and Bell said he would be interested in the job about the middle of 1966. John McCloy told me of this outstanding offer, and I told him that I would have nothing to do with any question of recruiting of government officials for the Ford Foundation as long as I was working for you. McCloy asked me whether the appointment of Bell would be acceptable to me if I were to be at the Ford Foundation as President, and I told him that it would be. but that I would not lift a finger to persuade Bell, nor would I conduct any negotiations with him on the matter. Both McCloy and Bell have now reported to me that they have talked to each other about it, and my impression from both of them is that Bell still would like to do this job -- although the timing seems to be open. John Macy has also told me that Bell has spoken to him, and I have agreed with John that within the White House Staff, this is his problem and not mine. But I do think it proper that you should know about it.

A slightly different problem has been presented in another case of a man whom the Ford Trustees want as a Vice President -- a man named Harold Howe, who happens to be just about my oldest personal friend. In this case again I have told both Howe and the Trustees that I would not list a finger to persuade him, but that if he wanted the job, I would certainly accept the recommendation of the Trustees if I were to accept the Presidency. I report this case to you because it happens that John Gardner and Frank Keppel have also been trying to get Howe for the Office of Education. He is currently at work on a special educational project in North Carolina, and I do not know what his decision will be. Whatever it is, I will not be the agent of it.

McG. B.

Running of MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

told Tensor the con ball 1/65 as

CONFIDENTIAL


Tuesday, November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

George Ball has tactfully turned off the Gilpatric exercise, on the ground that he incautiously overplayed it to Wilson and that the British reacted so energetically that all of us felt they were putting us on the spot prematurely. George says that Gilpatric was very understanding and even relieved.

George would now like to turn to young William Rogers of the Fortas firm. I think well of him, as you know, and he has low visibility and would be a State Department consultant, and in no sense your personal representative. But in the light of the Gilpatric episode, George and I would like to be sure this has your approval before we act. I should add that while I do not think that I gave an advance clearance on the Gilpatric approach, I did know about it in time to have stopped it, and I also knew enough of your view so that I should have acted instead of letting it go ahead. I think I was a little misled by an impression I had that you preferred to leave decisions of this kind with the State Department for the present, and I apologize.

OK to go ahead with Rogers	McG. B.
Speak to me	



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK

On Sunday you asked me for a memorandum on members of my professional staff, and here it is.

My principal deputy is Robert Komer (age 43), who has been here for four years. Before that he worked in the Central Intelligence Agency in intelligence evaluation. He is a graduate of Harvard College and the Harvard Business School, and served in the Army in World War II. You know Komer well enough to make your own judgment, I am sure. To me he has been an invaluable colleague. He is able, energetic, quick and highly knowledgeable. While he presses his point of view with energy, he is disciplined in the execution of decisions, whether or not they accord with his recommendation. I believe him to be, in many ways, the most suitable candidate to succeed me here, and I think that if he were the principal officer, he would accept the need for insuring fair and complete presentation of other points of view than his own. It is indeed precisely because of his alertness and reliability in moments of tension and uncertainty that I initially recommended him to the President for appointment as my Deputy. He is a man upon whom we can all rely in times when I am out of town or otherwise unavailable.

Francis Bator (age 40) is my deputy for economics. He came here in early 1964, after a year as consultant to David Bell in AID. Before that, he was an associate professor of Economics at MIT, where he did his graduate work after taking his Bachelor's degree at Harvard. I think him to be the most gifted analytical student of international economics now working effectively in the bureaucracy. He has played a quite critical role in all of our balance of payments work. In addition, since the departure of David Klein, he has been the principal staff officer here for European problems, and has established close relations with John Leddy and John McNaughton. I think you will find that George Ball knows him well, and thinks highly of Bator does not have the experience or the breadth of political knowledge to take over the top job here, and in some ways he might be still more valuable to the government in a sub-Cabinet post in the Treasury. As a practical matter, he does extremely good work where he is, and the President has found him quick and helpful in a number of important matters.

DETERMINED TO BE AN AS MINUSTRATIVE MARKING NOT LAT'L SPOURNY IMPORMATION, E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DCH ON 6-29-82

The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, as you know, is Bromley Smith (age 54), and I think he would like to leave his present job, in good time. The NSC as a formal council has had even less to do under President Johnson than it did under President Kennedy. But Smith is not sure just where he would want to go if he does leave. I was wrong in telling you the other day that he would be ready now for a chance at an Embassy. As you suspected, his wife's architectural undertakings make such a move impractical in the near future. Bromley Smith is one of the most experienced and loyal of professional bureaucrats. He has chosen not to develop a taste for active participation in the making of policy.

The next senior member of my staff is Chester Cooper (age 48), who works on Far Eastern affairs. He came to us in 1964 from CIA, where he ranked just after Ray Cline on the "open"side of the house. He has done extraordinarily devoted and useful work here, but both he and I agree that for reasons which are hard to explain, his service has not been quite up to either his hopes or mine. I believe he intends presently to seek an academic leave or absence from the Central Intelligence Agency, and I believe that this arrangement would be very much more in his interest and also in ours. I think the timing of this move can be adjusted so that my successor would have the opportunity which he deserved to pick his own principal Far Eastern staff officer. My instinct would be to concert a choice with my brother Bill.

Two of my staff members have great seniority on the National Security Council staff -- Charles Johnson, age 53, who is the liaison officer for space and telecommunications, and some parts of atomic energy; and Russell Ash (age 51), who spends most of his time supporting Patrick Coyne in the staff work for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but also has responsibility for our internal security. These two men have long-standing civil service status within the NSC. They are both loyal public servants of real ability. Neither of them is likely to move to substantially higher responsibilities, as far as I can tell.

Our Latin American affairs are handled by William Bowdler (age 41), an FSO 2. Bowdler was picked out by Jack Vaughn, and has done genuinely outstanding work over here. He handles the entire Latin American account, and he does it in the closest cooperation with ARA. I see no reason why he should not continue sympathetically and effectively in the same work in the future.

Under Komer in Middle Eastern and African affairs are two able young men. One is Hal H. Saunders (age 35), a GS-13, who came to us three years ago from CIA. He is unusually thoughtful and hard-working, and I think he has the confidence and trust of the working levels in all departments. Where Komer goes Saunders is likely to go, and he is an admirable staff assistant to his able boss.

Ulric Haynes (age 34), FSR-4, handles African affairs. He is the ablest young Negro I have met in ten years of fairly constant looking. He has both judgment and energy. He is also unusually clear-headed about African affairs. He came to the Department from the Ford Foundation, and an intelligent Foundation executive might well try to get him back.

Under Cooper, in Far Eastern affairs, there are three more junior staff officers. Miss Ruth Nicolo is a veteran of the National Security Council staff, and I am ashamed to have to say that I do not know much about her work, although I know she has been very helpful to a number of my colleagues in the Executive Office Building.

Mr. James Thomson (age 34), FSR-3, came to us from the Far Eastern bureau two years ago. He was brought into the Department by Chester Bowles, and is a gifted young man. He has not been the most hardworking member of this staff, and my hunch is that in due course he should go back to academic life (he has received regular feelers from Yale, where he did his graduate work in Chinese).

Don W. Ropa (age 38), GS-14, came to us from CIA only last July when the expanding struggle in Vietnam placed heavier requirements of coordination upon Cooper's office. Ropa has shown great energy and determination, and I think my successor would probably wish to keep him here, with a more senior officer, after Cooper's departure. If not, I am equally confident that the CIA would be glad to get him back.

Under Francis Bator in economic and European affairs is Edward K. Hamilton (age 26), GS-13. Hamilton came to us from the Budget Bureau, where he established an extraordinary reputation as the most effective young man to join that bureau in recent years. He has done outstanding work here, and while his life has been clouded in recent months by family troubles, I feel confident that he will go on to make a record as one of the best public servants of his generation. If for any reason he should decide to leave the government, I am equally confident that he would succeed in private life.

Finally, I should mention two special lisison officers: Mr. Peter Jessup (age 45), who handles the staff work for our supervision of covert intelligence operations. He came from the CIA and he, or an officer like him, should be here as long as the 303 Committee continues. Jessup does this work with great skill and sense.

Colonel Richard Bowman (age 39) is our liaison officer with the JCS. He is an able and hard-working officer, even if he sometimes has trouble in separating his Air Force allegiance from his staff obligations here.

PROCESSING NOTE regarding document #79, NSF, Memos to the President, "McGeorge Bundy, Volume 17," box 5:

The original folder contained one document numbered #79. However, in 1982 a copy of the first page of this document was attached to pages 2-4 of a similar document (document #2, NSF, Files of McGeorge Bundy, "Management," box 16) and a sanitized copy was placed in the open file. The error was noticed on this date and the full document as it originally came to the Library was placed in the open file.

Since the sanitized combination of documents #79 and the similar document has been in the open file since 1982 and seen by many researchers, we are leaving it here, attached to this processing note.

Jennifer Cuddeback

May 21, 2012

SANITIZED

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1.

November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK

On Sunday you asked me for a memorandum on members of my professional staff, and here it is.

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Authority Donor's instrument of gift

Ry MIE NARS, Date 8-10-80

ETC. 1.1(a)

BY DEAT ON G-34-82

2. NSC veterans

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Two other staff members have great seniority on the National Security Council staff -- (1) Charles Johnson, age 53, who is the liaison officer for space and telecommunications, and some parts of atomic energy; and (2) Russell Ash (age 51), who spends most of his time supporting Patrick Coyne in the staff work for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but also has responsibility for our internal security. These two men have long-standing civil service status within the NSC. They are both loyal public servants of real ability. Neither of them is likely to move to substantially higher responsibilities, as far as I can tell.

3. Far East

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7. Disarmament and Technology

I get great support here from the half-time service of Spurgeon Keeny, who divides his time between Don Hornig's office and mine. Keeny is a really extraordinary public servant, and almost nothing happens in this complex field that he does not hear about from his wide circle of trusted colleagues in every department. He tends to know about sensitive new developments in weaponry before Cy Vance and Bob McNamara, and he knows about tricky issues in technical intelligence before Helms and Raborn. But he is much more than a source of information -- he also has good judgment and broad experience in his subject. If he did not look like an undergraduate, I think he would already be emerging into the level of Presidential appointments.

8. Finally, I should mention two special liaison officers:

- (1) Mr. Peter Jessup (age 45), who handles the staff work for our supervision of covert intelligence. He came from the CIA and he, or an officer like him, should be here as long as the 303 Committee continues. Jessup does this work with great skill and sense.
- (2) Colonel Richard Bowman (age 39) is our liaison officer with the JCS. He is an able and hard-working officer.
- 9. And last of all, I should mention my personal assistant, Gordon Chase (age 33), GS-15, although he is leaving any day now to accept a double promotion in AID. Chase came to us from the Foreign Service and has proved himself to be fully first-rate as a staff assistant. He now wants a chance to spread his wings in a job with more direct responsibility, and he has fully earned it.

McGeorge Bundy



- 80

Tuesday, November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am preparing and will send by the next pouch a paper on the shape of this office and the problem of dealing with my departure, together with some private notes on possible successors.

After consulting Rusk and McNamara, I believe that I should plan to leave, if you agree, about March 1. I think that the first month of the Congress is a poor time for a change, and the relatively quiet time between Lincoln's Birthday and the end of February should, with luck, be a good time for an orderly turnover to my successor. But of course I can plan to leave earlier if for any reason that is better for you.

The more immediate problem is that of an announcement. The Ford Board meets again on December 9, and McCloy does not think he can avoid telling them my decision at that time. Moreover, all of us will look a little silly if we seem to be unable to speak to each other on this matter -- and this is particularly unfair to you, in the light of the fact that I have never had a more understanding and generous reception than in our talk on November 19. So I think you may want to have Bill Moyers put out a statement sometime in the next week or so, and I have tried my hand at the following language:

"Mr. McGeorge Bundy has informed the President of his wish to resign from the White House Staff in order to accept appointment as President of the Ford Foundation. The President has discussed the matter with Mr. Bundy and has agreed to accept his resignation, effective at the end of February." If you have picked a successor, he could be named in the same announcement. If not, the naming of the end of February would give you some turnaround time.

I am not a great believer in public letters of resignation -- especially when a man is going to stay on the job for another while. But Bill may find it useful to have such a letter, and so I will try my hand at that too.

And finally, I think we might let Bill put out an accurate chronology of our communications on this matter, since it is creditable to both of us. Here it is, in case you want to follow that course;

On November 7 Mr. McCloy offered Bundy the Ford job. Bundy said he could not answer until after he had spoken with the President.

WASHINGTON

-2-

On November 8 Bundy reported the Ford offer to the President and made it clear that he would hold the matter in abeyance until he could discuss it with the President.

On November 11, at the end of a long meeting at the Ranch on other subjects, the President told Bundy he would talk to him the following week in Washington.

On November 19 the President and Bundy had a thorough talk in Washington. The President told Bundy he was free to make his own decision in the light of his judgment of what he could most usefully do, and Bundy told the President that he would like to accept the Ford offer if the Ford trustees would allow time for an orderly transfer of his duties at the White House. The President authorized Bundy to report this decision to Mr. John McCloy personally, and asked him to work out a time schedule for the transfer in terms of the national interest alone -- and then to see if that schedule was acceptable to Mr. McCloy.

Between November 20 and November 28 Bundy studied this problem and consulted about it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. He reached the conclusion that he ought to stay on his present job through February, 1966. The President has agreed with this judgment, and Mr. McCloy, for the Ford Foundation, accepted the delay it involves on November 29.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

november 9. 1965.

Dear Mr. President:

Much an I hate to bother you with personal matters, I think I should report to you that on Soundary Jack Mr. Clary + Henry Ford arked me to be the next president of the Ford Formulation. I told them I could not even consider the matter motal after the New Year + I also told them that I have they wild keep the whole matter completely private. They agreed to try - but they have a large Board. So there is a risk of some thing getting into the papers, and I could not endew to have you learn of it that way. There are myork and attractions on the Ford job, But this is not are regard matter. I would not would not wollen you with it if it were not for the danger of goosige from other sources.

Respectfully

man

Mcs. Bund THE WHITE HOUSE

8

The President

Personal + Private

100

Tuesday, November 30, 1965

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McG. B.

82

CT-COTT-

November 29, 1965 6:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ayub Visit. Now that this is fixed at last, the Paks are losing no time setting out their position via the press (attached are NYT and Sun pieces). We can expect more.

However, I fear that this critically important meeting will be largely wasted if Ayub spends most of the time telling you how we "betrayed" Pakistan by not coming to its help against India, why we must help Pakistan get a Kashmir settlement now, and how the US should hold up aid to India till it comes through.

The best way to forestall this sort of thing is to soften up Ayub first, using all credible channels to say that there's no point in raking over old chestnuts. If we play our hand right, we can at least increase the chances that Ayub will come in a mood to listen rather than rant. And only if he's prepared to settle for what we can do for him-rather than insisting on what we can't-can our Pak affairs be straightened out. So we'd like to put out right now the attached line.

Rusk has little confidence that McConaughy could handle such a chore. He's right. But there are other ways to skin this cat.

this can be handled without bringing you directly into it. The Goldberg/Amjad Ali channel in New York isn't too good because Ali keeps warning that he's not really in close touch-but we can try again. We'd also do what we could here in Washington and with the press, following up Bill's Sunday backgrounder. Rusk plans to talk with you about the Ayub visit Friday, but these preliminaries just can't wait, since Ayub leaves on the 10th.

R. W. Komer

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-11 NARA, Date 8-24-89

Analysis.

Ayub's Visit To Give U.S. Chance At Kashmir Peace

By JAMES S. KEAT [New Delhi Bureau of The Sun] .

Karachi, Pakistan, Nov. 28-tan would negotiate their dis-President Khan's visit to the United States Closely related to the issue of next month will previde the first Indo-Pakistani relations is a retest of Washington's hopes of storation of United States mili-

The Pakistani President is expected to couple his attempt to Ayub's immediate policy as rerepair relations with the United gards Kashmir is described here States with proposals that go to as flexible. Pakistan still publicly the heart of Washington's policy demands a plebiscite in the whole in this area.

Commitment Sought

Although Ayub is keeping his settle for something less. own counsel, the outlines of Pakistani policy can be discerned from recent Government state-much conjecture here. Only the ments and private soundings immediate objective is clearly deamong senior officials.

lieved to be a firm and specific commitment from President Johnson to initiate some sort of

Mohammad Ayub putes, particularly over Kashmir.

maintaining a balance of peace in tary and economic aid, which was South Asia. warfare broke out between the

> state to determine its political future, but there are strong indications that Ayub would eventually

> > Much Conjecture

How much less is a subject of fined to outside observers-the Ayub's principal objective is be-creation of machinery by which a

process by which India and Pakis- (Continued, Page A 2, Column 7)

Analysis

Ayub's Visit To Give U.S. Chance At Kashmir Peace

By JAMES S. KEAT (Continued from Page A 1)

remains undescribed.

need even be what Zulfikar Ali India would not be alienated be-Bhutto, Foreign Minister, has called "self-executing" machin-Johnson. ery, presumably along the lines of the reaching of an understand-the reference of the Kutch dispute ing between the American and to binding arbitration.

But most observers believe so easy.

Ayub wants some assurance that One of Washington's principal ly and indefinitely as have other ser ties that have grown between Indo - Pakistani bargaining ses-Rawalpindi and Peking.

Third Party Implied

ne aegis of the United Nations.
One way or another, the PakisBut, as one diplomat here obthe aegis of the United Nations.

has thus far displayed no enthu-Pakistan and China ever closer.

price guideposts as acule, particing and scenarion under certain price guideposts as acule, particing in Vietnam places on everturation in Vie The Secretary sees the need to was urged today to indorse abor-American Medical Association Philadelphia, Nov. 28 (A)-The

Uniform State Laws Report To A.M.A of troops

ON ABORTION

by which these negotiations would, derstanding, the challenge then be brought about, and carried on, will be to devise some formula by which Ayub would not leave There is no certainty here it Washington emptyhanded while

Pakistani Presidents may not be

the negotiation process, once objections to Pakistan's policies started, will not drag on fruitless- in the last three years is the clo-

Analysts here disagree over the Third Party Implied
This seems to imply some participation, as catalysts, of a third party. That party might be the United States or, more likely, a group of countries perhaps under against taking Pakistan for grant-

One way or another, the Pakis-tani objective includes help from Washington in bringing India to the negotiating table. Auyb and India's Prime Minister, Lal Baha-dur Shastri, have been invited to meet in Russia, but New Delhi keeping pressure on India hind

ry American." follow the Administration's wage- tion and sterilization under cer-New Orleans.

speech before the Press Club of Fowler's views came in a Speaks in New Orleans

creases—is much greater.... restraint on wage and price in sponsible restraint - particularly and said ". . . the need for resures that would create inflation, He warned against any pres-

Pakistan Hopes To Defrost U.S. Relations By Ayub Visit

By JAMES S. KEAT [New Delhi Bureau of The Sun]

Karachi, Pakistan, Nov. 26--Pa- attacked, as Pakistan believes it kistani officials today are pinning was by India. considerable hopes on the out-come of President Mohammad Ayub Khan's talks with President Johnson. Despite a good deal of coming and going, Pakistani officials are holding key decisions in abeyance until the visit.

Pakistani hope is probably can campaign here. Ce heightened by Foreign Minister Americans are not popular. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's conferences in Moscow this week.

Pakistan Concedes A Point

By agreeing to discuss all outstanding disputes with India, not just Kashmir, Pakistan has accepted one of India's conditions for a meeting between Ayub and American aid to India. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, of India, under Soviet

Unless the Russians do a greatwithdraw their long-standing diplomatic support of India, Pakis tan is relying heavily on the United States for assistance in bringing India to terms.

Ayub also hopes to restore what them with India. Pakistan considers the close and fruitful relationship between the Washington has a potent weapon two nations from 1954 to 1962, to use in forcing India to negowhen Washington began limited tiate a political settlement on arms aid to India.

Seeks Aid Restoration

military aid and economic assistance which was cut off when war broke out between India and Pakistan last September.

Most evidence indicates Pakis tan would prefer to repair its strained relations with Washington rather than have to turn else where for the assistance it badly needs.

But Pakistani officials insis Washington, not they, is responsible for the strains which have de veloped.

Considerable bitterness develop-

The once close relationships between American and Pakistani civilian and military officials range from cool to hostile at present. Some American diplomats believe there is a concerted anti-American campaign here. Certainly

American displeasure with Pakistan has its roots in the closer relations which developed between Rawalpindi and Communist China three years ago as part of its expression of bitterness at the

Charges Equipment Misused

Like India, Pakistan charges that American military aid equipment was used against it during er turnabout than is expected and the fighting last September. A renewal of American arms shipments to the other country would badly strain relations with Pakistan and almost certainly rupture

Pakistani' officials believe Kashmir. This is the fact that India will be severely short of food This means a restoration of the this winter or spring and thus desperately in need of American shipments of surplus wheat.

Killing Of 9 Indians Reported By Pakistan

Rawalpindi, Pakistan, Nov. 26 (P)—A spokesman said today nine Indian troops have been killed in three recent clashes on the cease fire line.

No casualties were mentioned on the Pakistan side, but the spokesman added that a complaint had ed here last spring, when Mr. been lodged with Unied Nations nostponed_the cease-fire observers against alleged violations by India.

Ayub to Press Case AYUB TO ADDRESS For Kashmir at U.N.

By DREW MIDDLETON Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y. Nov. 26-President Mohammad Ayub Khan plans to argue Pakistan's case for Kashmiri self-determination when he ad-

dresses the General Assembly here and confers with President Johnson next month.

Marshal Ayub, according to officials of the Pakistani mission, will emphasize to both the United Nations and to Mr. Johnson that the Kashmir issue must be solved before there can be any improvement in relations between his coun-

try and India. The Pakastani President is scheduled to arrive in New York Dec. 12. He is to address the assembly the next day and fin to Washington for takes with Mr. Johnson Dec. 14. President Ayub and his Go

Continued on Page 11, Column's

said, as a vigorous, almost desperate attempt to awaken United States and United Nations opinion to the dangers implicit in the smoldering situation in the disputed state of Kashmir. One-third of it is held by Pakistan, and the remaining two-thirds by India. ing two-thirds by India.

According to the Pakistani ing in September is not work-informants, their President will tell Mr. Johnson that Pakistan The latest letter from Pakitell Mr. Johnson that Pakistan is threatened by the arms, including airplanes and submarines, that the Soviet Union India. India, in turn, charges 43 is making available to India.

President Ayub will also Since the cease-fire order, the offer evidence, the informants said, that India used arms provided by the United States against Pakistan in the fighting last summer and early this U Thant, in a message to the ment contends that these arms ment of Brig. Gen. Tulio Mawere given India under an rambio of Chile as his repre-understanding that they would sentative in formulating a plan not be used against Pakistan.

One reason for the importance accorded Marshal Ayub's visit by his Government is the failure thus far to arrange any talks with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India on Kashmir.

The Indian leader is willing to meet President Ayub it is over in London for talks said, but will not discuss the Prime Minister Wilson disputed state. This is because Mr. Shastri and his Government consider Kashmir an integral part of the Indian union and not a subject for discussion or negotiation.

China to Be Discussed

Consequently, President Ayub plans to try to convince both the United Nations and the Johnson Administration that,

explosive.

The visitor will stress to President Johnson, it was re-ported, that his Government is not an ally of Communist China and that there was no collusion

tember, the Chinese Com-munists demanded that India dismantle fortifications along the Sikkim-China frontier. The demand was withdrawn when D. Moyers said today that the the Chinese said they were sat-meeting

The: impression that Peking's threat was the LBJ Ranch, where Mr. mounted to draw Indian forces Johnson is convalescing from from opposing Pakistan. Pakistani officials said Pros-

uld fell

been set.

The Kashmir dispute goes back to 1947 when Britain withdrew and the subcontinent was drew and the subcontinent was With President Ayub flying had with the subcontinent was with President Ayub flying had with President Ayub flying

cease-fire that halted the fight-

new violations by Pakistan.

U Thant, in a message to the autumn. The Pakistani Govern- Council, announced the appointand schedule for troop withdrawals.

London Stopover Expected Special to The New York Times

KARACHI, Pakistan, Nov. 26 President Ayub's trip to the United States is expected to include a one- or two-day stopover in London for talks with and other British leaders.

On his way home from the United States, the President is expected to meet with President de Gaulle and other French leaders in Paris.

There may also be a stop-over in Bonn for talks with West German officials, in-formed sources reported.

President Johnson unless negotiations on a long-term political settlement can be ary But to But I settlement can be ary But I states last Januorigin begun, the situation will remain for April, was abruptly post-post-Tile visitor will stress to

The official reason given by Washington was the workload of the Congressional session a the seriousness of the situati in Vietnam. The view wide y held here, however, was that it between China and Pakistan before the outbreak of the Kashmir fighting.

During the Indian-Pakistani fighting over Kashmir last September the Chinase Control of was a rebuff of Pakistan for her

Talks May Be at LBJ Ranch Special to The New York Times

between Ayub and President Johnson remained would probably take place at

Indian sources said no date had his gall bladder surgery of Oct. 8.

However, the

continued From Page 1, Col. 6 broken out in Kashmir, which ernment regard the visit, it was said, as a vigorous, almost dependent and the succontinent was with President Ayub flying from New York Dec. 14 for the broken out in Kashmir, which meeting, Mr. Johnson will be conferring with three world leaders during a one-week period. He is scheduled to see Prime Minister Wilson of Prime Wilson

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

83

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am preparing and will send by the next pouch a paper on the shape of this office and the problem of dealing with my departure. After consulting Rusk, McNamara and Clifford, I believe that I should plan to leave, if you agree, about March 1. I think that the first month of the Congress is a poor time for a change, and the relatively quiet time between Lincoln's Birthday and the end of February should, with luck, be a good time for an orderly turnover to my successor. But of course I can plan to leave earlier if for any reason that is better for you.

The more immediate problem is that of an announcement. The Ford Board meets again on December 9, and McCloy does not think he can avoid telling them my decision at that time. Moreover, both you and I will look a little silly if we seem to be unable to speak to each other on such a matter -- and this is particularly unfair in the light of the fact that I have never had a more understanding and generous reception than in our talk on November 19. So I think you may want to have Bill Moyers put out a statement sometime in the next week or so, and I have tried my hand at the following language:

"Mr. McGeorge Bundy has informed the President of his wish to resign from the White House Staff in order to accept appointment as President of the Ford Foundation. The President has discussed the matter with Mr. Bundy and has agreed to accept his resignation, effective at the end of February."

I am not a great believer in public letters of resignation -- especially when a man is going to stay on the job for another while. But Bill may find it useful to have such a letter, and so I have tried my hand at that too. (Tab A) I mean every word of it, anyway.

And finally, I think we might as well let Bill out out an accurate chronology of our communications on this matter, since it is creditable to both of us. Here it is, in case you want to follow that course:

On November 7 Mr. McCloy offered Bundy the Ford job. Bundy said he could not answer until after he had spoken with the President.

On November 7 Bundy reported the Ford of or to the President and made it clear that he would hold the matter in abeyance until he could discuss it with the President.

On November 11 at the end of a long meeting at the Ranch on other subjects, the President told Bundy he would talk to him the following week in Washington.

On November 19 the President and Bundy had a thorough talk in Washington. The President told Bundy he was free to make his own decision in the light of his judgment of what he could most usefully do, and Bundy told the President that he would like to accept the Ford offer if the Ford trustees would allow time for an orderly transfer of his duties at the White House. The President authorized Bundy to report this decision to Mr. John McCloy personally, and asked him to work out a time schedule for the transfer in terms of the national interest alone -- and then to see if that schedule was acceptable to Mr. McCloy.

Between November 20 and November 30 Bundy studied this problem and consulted about it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. He reached the conclusion that he ought to stay on his present job through February, 1966. The President has agreed with this judgment, and Mr. McCloy, for the Ford Foundation, has accepted the delay if involves.

McG. B.



SENT

EEA262 00 WTE10 DE WTE 449 1965 NOV 27 18 40

FROM: MR BUNDY

TO: MR VALENTI FOR THE PRESIDENT

CITE: CAP65759

SECPET NODIS

SECRETARY RUSK HAS DRAFTED THE FOLLOWING CABLE TO GENE BLACK, AND ASKS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CLEARANCE BEFORE IT IS SENT. CABLE FOLLOWS:

SEORET

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR EUGENE BLACK FROM SECRETARY.

FOLLOWING UP ON OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE EXPLORATION:

- 1. GET THE JAPANESE VIEWS AS TO HOW THE SHORT-FALL SHOULD BE MET. IF THEY INDICATE ANY READINESS TO HELP MAKE UP THE GAP THAT WOULD BE HIGHLY RELEVANT HERE.
- 2. OUR DELEGATION AT BANGKOK SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE OTHER ASIANS WOULD BE RESISTANT TO THE US OR THE US AND JAPAN MAKING UP THE SHORT-FALL WITH EVENTUAL INCREASE IN VOTING RIGHTS. WE WOULD NEED TO BE CLEARER ABOUT WHETHER THE ASIANS WOULD WELCOME AN EFFORT BY THE US WITH OR WITHOUT JAPAN TO CLOSE THE GAP.
- 3. WE NEED YOUR BEST JUDGEMENT AS TO POSSIBILITIES OF CLOSING GAP WITH ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FROM THE UK, GERMANY AND ITALY, REMOVING BARRIER TO KUWAIT/YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION AND ENLISTING ADDITIONAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT YET MEMBERS WHO WOULD NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE PROCUREMENT OF THE BANK WITHOUT JOINING.
- 4. I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT CERTAIN BEEFING UP FROM LARGEST ASIAN BENEFICIARIES WOULD BE DESIRABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, LAOS OUGHT TO BE IN FOR FIVE MILLION DOLLARS RATHER THAN FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND. FACT THAT THIS MIGHT CREATE SOME PROBLEM FOR OUR OWN BILATERAL AID PROGRAM IS A FACTOR BUT ONE WHICH ALSO APPLIES TO A NUMBER OF ASIAN PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING INDIA.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 NLJ/RAC 12-187 NARA, Date 04-23-2014

- 5. WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DATE OF SIGNING IN MANILA AND THE PRIVILEGE OF JOINING UNTIL JANUARY 31ST? DOES THIS SUGGEST THAT THE MANILA GROUP SHOULD APPOINT A COMMITTEE TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO CLOSE THE GAP BEFORE JANUARY 31 AND REPORT BACK TO THE MEMBERS BEFORE ANY FINAL ACTION IS TAKEN BY THE US OR JAPAN? IF SUCH A COMMITTEE COULD RAISE ANOTHER FIFTY MILLION DOLLARS AND ITSELF RECOMMEND THAT JAPAN AND THE US BE ASKED TO CLOSE THE GAP THAT COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFIT COMPARED WITH TRYING TO DRIVE THE TOTAL THROUGH IN MANILA. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE REASON TO DOUBT THAT BRITAIN WILL INCREASE ITS AMOUNT AT MANILA AND MAY WITHHOLD FURTHER ACTION UNTIL WILSON VISITS WASHINGTON.
- 6. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WOULD FAVOR, IF NECESSARY AT THE END OF THE DAY, AN ADDITIONAL US CONTRIBUTION BECAUSE I DO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE BANK BEING LAUNCHED WITH ITS BILLION DOLLARS PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ASIANS HAVE RAISED THEIR QUOTA.
- 7. YOU MIGHT CONSIDER THE WORDING OF A PARAGRAPH IN YOUR SPEECH IN MANILA WHICH WOULD MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT US ATTACHES GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE BANK'S BEING LAUNCHED WITH ITS FULL BILLION DOLLARS AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO INSURE THAT THAT IS ACHIEVED BY LEAVING THE WAY OPEN FOR (A) CLOSING THE GAP FROM OTHER SOURCES, AND (B) AN ASIAN OBJECTION TO OUR DOING IT OURSELVES.

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON ONE OR MORE OF THESE POINTS AS YOU GO ALONG.

RUSK

MG - 271/

SHAFT

NODI:



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

November 27, 1965

TO VALENTI FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BUNDY

Secretary Rusk has drafted the following cable to Gene Black, and asks for the President's clearance before it is sent.

Cable follows:

- BECRET

Amembassy TOKYO

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR EUGENE BLACK FROM SECRETARY.

Following up on our conversation yesterday I should like to make the following suggestions for your immediate exploration:

- Get the Japanese views as to how the short-fall should be met. If they indicate any readiness to help make up the gap that would be highly relevant here.
- 2. Our Delegation at Bangkok seem to feel that the other Asians would be resistant to the US or the US and Japan making up the short-fall with eventual increase in voting rights. We would need to be clearer about whether the Asians would welcome an effort by the US with or without Japan to close the gap.
- 3. We need your best judgement as to possibilities of closing gap with additional amounts from the UK, Germany and Italy, removing barrier to fixely Kuwait/Yugoslav participation and enlisting additional European countries not yet members who would not have access to the procurement of the Bank without joining.

S:DRusk:jmr 11/27/65

The Secretary

AID - Mr. Bell

Authority NLJ 83-180

By is NARS, Date 8-15-84

SECRET

SECRET

- 4. I personally feel that certain beefing up from largest Asian beneficiaries would be desirable. For example, Laos ought to be in for five million dollars rather than four hundred thousand. Fact that this might create some problem for our own bilateral AID program is a factor but one which also applies to a number of Asian participaths, including India.
- 5. What is the relation between the date of inner signing in Manila and the privilege of joining until January 31st? Does this suggest that the Manila group should appoint a committee to make a diligent effort to close the gap before January 31 and report back to the members before any final action is taken by the US or Japan? If such a committee could raise another fifty million dollars and itself recommend that Japan and the US be asked to close the gap that could have considerable political and psychological benefit compared with trying to drive the total through in Manila. For example, we have reason to doubt that Britain will increase its amount at Manila and may withhold further action until Wilson visits Washington.
- 3. I want you to know that I would favor, if necessary at the end of the day, an additional US contribution because I do attach importance to the Bank being launched with its billion dollars particularly since the Asians have raised their quota.
- 7. You might consider the wording of a paragraph in your speech in Manila which would make it very clear that US attaches greatest importance to the Bank's

SECRET

being launched with its full billion dollars and we are determined to do everything we can to insure that that is achieved by leaving the way open for (a) closing the gap from other sources, and (b) an Asian objection to our doing it ourselves.

Would appreciate your comments on one or more of these comments as you go along.

END.

RUSK

FOR COMM CENTER USE)

1965 NOV 27 17 449

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE



IMMED PRECEDENCE

SECRET NODIS

NOV. 27, 1965

FROM: MR BUNDY

TO: MR. VALENTA FOR THE PRESIDENT

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING NOT NAP'L SECURITY INFORMATION, E.O. 19358, SEC.

MDCH 016-29-83

88

THE WHITE HOUSE



November 27, 1965 Saturday/1:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Rusk's request for another monthly 500,000 tons of food for India and 175,000 tons for Pakistan. Freeman's cables to you confirm that a new Indian food crisis is upon us. As a result, there will be pressure for a sharp increase in monthly shipments, perhaps from 500,000 to 700,000 tons. In fact, after Rusk's memo was drafted, we got an official Indian request for 650,000 tons (including 100,000 tons of milo) next month.

We're looking into this, but suggest going ahead on the old basis now and awaiting Freeman's recommendation on anything further. The reason for moving fast is that we've actually been taking five weeks to make each four week allocation, which means that we're really shipping at a slower rate when the problem is growing.

Freeman seems to have gotten quite an impressive set of commitments from Subramaniam (though without any reciprocal commitments on our part). Thus we're making progress on the long-term problem, though we still have the short-term food crisis to sort out. Freeman clearly wants to come to the ranch to report. Would you prefer to have us ask him to give his recommendations in writing first?

Approve India/Pak allotment	
Ask Freeman to report in writing	
I'll handle Freeman	

R. W. Komer

my. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By M. NARA, Date 2-6-5%



850

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

November 26, 1965



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: PL 480 Title I Agreements with India and Pakistan

Recommendation:

1. That you authorize amendment of the existing Title I PL 480 sales agreement with India to provide for an additional 500.000 tons of wheat.

500,000	tons of wheat.			
	A	proved	Disapprove	d
2. Pakistan	That you authorize under its existing) To 1	
	App	proved	Disapprove	d
	Department of Agric			International

Discussion:

India

On October 27 you authorized us to go ahead with another one month's extension of our PL 480 agreement with India, to provide 500,000 tons of wheat. That amendment was signed on November 4. It is now time to authorize our mission in New Delhi to negotiate another one month's extension if it is to become effective by December 4.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

GON TOWNSTAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

NARA, Date 2.6-98

11/27/65


There has been no decline in India's need for PL 480 assistance. On the contrary, reports during the past month indicate that, as a result of the poor monsoon, the fall crop is well below last year's and that India may be heading for another food crisis. The extension of our existing agreement so as to provide another 500,000 tons of wheat for another month is necessary as we continue to press the Indians on their own agricultural self-help program and as we aim for a sorting out of other issues when Prime Minister Shastri comes here. Meanwhile, discussions are under way with the Indians to get a clearer picture of their food needs in the months ahead and what they are doing to help themselves.

Pakistan

Pakistan's foodgrain situation is more secure, but the returns of the current harvest remain to be fully evaluated. Under the current multi-year PL 480 agreement with Pakistan, which expires on December 31, 175,000 tons of wheat which were programmed previously remain undelivered. The release of this amount would cover Pakistan's requirements through late winter. We believe it desirable, particularly in the context of an early Ayub visit, to take such action vis-a-vis Pakistan as we provide additional assistance to India. While 175,000 tons would assure Pakistan's supplies for longer than the period we have in mind for India, the difference would be justified by Pakistan's good performance in agriculture.


Dean Rusk

Demkusk





THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Saturday, November 27, 1965, 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Once more on the pause

This is such an important question that I think you may want to look at it once again. Bob McNamara and I have the impression that your mind is settling against a pause, but we both believe that the matter is too important to be decided without making sure that the question has been explored to your satisfaction. I have mentioned our concern to Dean Rusk and while he is still against a pause at present, he has encouraged me to raise the matter with you once more.

On November 17 I sent forward a memorandum from George Ball to you which outlined a scenario for a pause, and gave the pros and cons. The scenario is out of date, but the pros and cons are still pretty solid, and I attach them at Tab A, together with the conclusions and recommendations then reached by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

In the last ten days, one or two additional considerations have developed.

First, the Sevareid episode, rightly or wrongly, has strengthened the impression among critics at home that we have not gone the full distance in seeking negotiations. There is now increased value in proving our good faith by a new pause.

Second, Westmoreland's recommendations for 1966 deployments have increased, and the fighting in the Plei Me area shows that we may have to look forward to a pretty grim year. This again strengthens the argument for one further demonstration that our determination to seek peace is equal to our determination on the battle field.

Third, McNamara's budget shows that the alarming figure he mentioned at the Ranch may turn out to be an understatement. Thus the argument for preceding that budget request by one more peaceful effort is strengthened.

OP SECRET SENSITIVE

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By llw, NARS, Data 6/8/8/

Fourth, there is growing evidence that we can count on quiet but strong Soviet diplomatic support in pushing Hanoi toward the conference table during another pause. At the minimum, a pause will certainly intensify dissension between Peking and Moscow, with Hanoi in the middle.

Finally, it is clear from the McNamara/Ball discussions in London that Prime Minister Wilson has some new Vietnam gambit up his sleeve which he means to discuss with you on December 17. (He has not said what it is.) We will spike his guns and those of everyone else like him if we have a pause in effect at the time of his visit.

Thus, both the domestic and the international arguments for a pause seem to me substantially stronger than they were two weeks ago, and on balance my own judgment has shifted over toward McNamara. I think that any pause should be very hard-nosed, and we should expect that it will not lead to negotiations, but it will strengthen your hand both at home and abroad as a determined man of peace facing a very tough course in 1966. It is quite true, as I have argued before, that the bombing is not what started the trouble, but it is also true that we have a great interest in proving our own good faith as peace lovers.

I also think that the diplomatic risks can be minimized by firmness and clarity about what we are doing, and that hardline criticism at home can be answered by what is done after the pause ends.

Do you want further work from Rusk and McNamara on this?

Yes			,	# # W	- 4.5	
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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London R. Johnson Li

The principal arguments for a pause are:

- l. A pause could lead to either successful negotiations or a tapering off of military action in South Viet-Nam. Although the odds of this happening at this time may be long, the stake is high enough to justify the risks involved. It seems quite clear that the other side does not believe it can agree to negotiations or a cessation of military action while the bombing continues and we cannot know whether or not they desire a settlement until we try them out by a pause. Even if this pause does not bring about the desired result, it can set the stage for a later pause which may bring the desired result.
- 2. The President's offer of unconditional negotiations greatly strengthened our position throughout the world. A pause can have a similar effect by taking away from the other side the one valid argument they have against negotiations.
- 3. American casualties are mounting and further involvement appears likely. A pause can demonstrate that the President has taken every possible means to find a peaceful solution and obtain domestic support for the further actions that we will have to take.
- 4. There are already signs of dissension between Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong. The pause is certain to stimulate further dissension on the other side and add to the strains in the Communist camp as they argue about how to deal with it.
- 5. A pause could reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement.

 It would not only help to convince Moscow that we genuinely desire a

 settlement but would also decrease the ability of Hanoi or Peking to

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bring

Authority NLJ 83-180

By 115, NARS, Date 8-15-84

TOP SECRET

bring pressure upon the Soviet Union for escalating their support.

- 6. Judging by experience during the last war, the resumption of bombing after a pause would be even more painful to the population of North Viet-Nam than a fairly steady rate of bombing.
- 7. The resumption of bombing after a pause, combined with increased United States deployments in the South, would remove any doubts the other side may have about U. S. determination to stay the course and finish the job.

Cons

The principal arguments against a pause are:

- 1. Although Hanoi has repeatedly stated that it cannot "negotiate" as long as the bombing goes on, there is no indication whatever from Hanoi that a pause would lead to meaningful negotiations or actions. Hanoi's continued military reinforcement of the South, plus what Hanoi undoubtedly considers a still weak security and political situation in the South, add up to what appears to be a very small chance that a pause would produce a constructive response.
- 2. Hanoi's objective with respect to the bombing is not a "pause," but rather a complete cessation. They could be expected to do all in their power to exploit a pause, not to move toward an acceptable settlement, but to prevent our resumption of bombing and cause us to lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement that does more than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in the South.

3. Regardless

TOP SECRET

- 3. Regardless of any resolve we have made beforehand, a unilateral pause at this time would give Hanoi an excellent chance to interpose obstacles to our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement. For example, they could offer to enter into negotiations on condition that the bombing not be resumed and that the Viet Cong be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality with the Government of Viet-Nam. As it would not be possible to accept this latter condition, they could place us in the position of having resumed the bombing over a "procedural" question with respect to a conference. Thus, in the absence of any expression of interest or intent on their part to move toward a settlement that we would find satisfactory, the other side could at this time use a pause to reverse the present international situation, which is very favorable to us.
- 4. There is danger that, in spite of any steps we may take to offset it, Hanoi may misread a pause at this time as indicating that we are giving way to international and domestic pressures to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and that our resolve with respect to South Viet-Nam is thus weakening.
- 5. Resumption of the bombing following a pause of considerable duration would assume a much more dramatic character than otherwise and could present the Soviets with those difficult choices that we have heretofore been successful in avoiding presenting to them.

6. Apart

6. Apart from the foregoing considerations, it will at this time be very difficult to obtain GVN acquiescence to a pause and could adversely affect the tenuous stability of the present government. Any overturn of the present government in South Viet-Nam could set us back very severely. Even if we obtained the acquiescence of the GVN, it would be very difficult to obtain their continued cooperation, particularly in public statements, throughout the duration of the pause.

IV.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Secretary of Defense believes that a pause, with the associated obvious efforts to bring the DRV to a settlement, should be carried out. His main reason is (1) to lay a foundation, especially in the minds of the American people and of our allies, for the increased U.S. deployments, casualties, costs and risks that are in prospect. He believes also (2) that a pause now has a bare chance of starting a chain reaction toward a settlement. He thinks that, before intensifying the military confrontation and risks in Viet-Nam, the United States should make every effort to back the DRV/VC down by other means.

Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense believes (3) that, even if a pause does not produce the full result this time, it would contribute toward a settlement later -- that the "tacit bargaining" process with the Communists will probably involve several stages before the DRV/VC sights

are



are brought down to a "settlement level" and that a pause now, even if the bombing must be resumed, will contribute to that end.

The Secretary of State feels the balance of arguments is against undertaking a pause at the present time and that a pause should be considered only at such times as the chances appear to be greater than they now seem that it would lead in the direction of a peaceful settlement acceptable to us.

The Secretary of State thus recommends that we continue our discussions with the other side through all possible channels, particularly exploring "what would happen" if there is a pause in the bombing. If such probes at any time give firm indications of a response by specific and acceptable actions on the part of Hanoi, a pause should then be undertaken. This is also entirely consistent with our public position and maintains what he feels is our present favorable international posture.

George W. Ball Acting Secretary

TOP SECRET



THE WHITE HOUSE

Thurs., November 25, 1965

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

This cable from Bowles matches a number of other reports we have had of a gradual but quite significant change in Indian psychology -- and not only on Vietnam. I think you will find it interesting.

McG.B.

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12 810

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Thursday, November 25, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL (cy of New Delhi 1333)

From Ambassador Bowles

Subject: Changing Indian View of Vietnam

- 1. A subtle shift of Indian attitudes about Vietnam seems to be taking place. It is more evident in absence of criticism than in public expressions of support. In part it is a by-product of Indian preoccupation with Pak confrontation. It is of uncertain depth and susceptible to reversal if US/Indian relations should deteriorate.
- Sophisticated Indians appear much less ready to offer gratuitous criticisms of US policy. Most of them clearly recognize that India's interests are served by effective US resistance to Communist expansion in Vietnam.
- The most dramatic manifestation is recent Indian disinclination to seize upon issues which some months ago would have been occasion for much moralistic criticisms of US Vietnam policy. There was very little reaction in India over recent US use of tear gas, to 'Vietnam Day" protests against US policies, or to Morrison suicide before Pentagon.
- Except for Communist press, other Vietnam news played straight and generally in low key. All-India Radio has refrained from anti-US play of Vietnam views which, in view of the unbalanced political views of the Minister of Information and Director of All-India Radio; , suggests high-level government instructions to avoid criticism of US. In personal contacts, Embassy Officials are periodically asked how the Vietnam fight is progressing, but US policy is seldom attacked. Very few letters re US policy in Vietnam have been received by the Embassy in recent weeks.
- 5. Various non-governmental groups are more actively helpful. Ambassador Johnson's Tokyo speech on Vietnam placed by USIS in "Indian Express." Indian National Trade Union Congress in August passed a resolution noting

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By csp/4, NARA, Date 8-27-92

"expansionist moves of Communist China in some countries surrounding India." Swatantra leaders in Lok Sabha and in Stockholm have said quite frankly that "all free countries of Asia have reason to be grateful to the United States" for its help to Vietnam.

- 6. Official Government of India attitude still more visible in its restraint than in active support of President Radhakrishan, in recent tour, avoided pressures to endorse his hosts' hostile views toward US policy in Vietnam. Indians in the International Control Commission are generally helpful in incidents involving US violations of the demilitarized zone and "buzzing" of ICC aircraft.
- 7. Prime Minister Shastri in August for the first time referred publicly to American desire for peace in Vietnam. Privately, Indian officials have several times assured us that the Cabinet now takes a new and more understanding view of the US role in Vietnam. The most recent example was Deputy Minister Dinesh Singh's remarks to Deputy Chief of Mission. Dinesh Singh, who as recently as August remained caustically criticial of US Vietnam policy, in recent discussion refrained from criticism, and admitted that the battle was not lost, and seemed actually to be seeking to help with the comment that the problem now is "to engage loyalties of people in South Vietnam."
- 8. Newspapers on September 1 reported that two legislators had put forth the suggestion that American policy in Vietnam was similar to Indian action in Kashmir and that the Government of India should stop criticizing us for bombing North Vietnam. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh was said to have rejected the suggestion and to have reiterated traditional Indian line of US "intervention." That incident apparently is the last one in which a government leader openly criticized US Vietnam policy.
- 9. Although the strong contributing reason for the change may be Indian absorption with Pak confrontation, Chinese ultimatum of September 16th helped to remind India of the long-term danger of China, and as a result there is an awareness of need for US diplomatic and material support and of the fact that righteous sermons about Vietnam do not help in getting much support. Many thoughtful Indians have learned from the Kashmir experience that "indirect aggression," can be a very real threat and not the creation of American propaganda. Furthermore, both anti-Communist Indians and those who see Asia in terms of real-politik could see Indian interests advanced by American action in Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10. More speculatively, we would suggest that Kashmir crisis dramatized and hastened a process underway for some years, whereby the Indians are becoming increasingly aware of the costs to their own interests of a foreign policy which views the world in terms of moralistic generalization. The tendency toward pragmatism is growing, and inclination to make policy decisions on the basis of direct Indian national interest. The transition may have been made easier for India by the current dissolution of the myth that there is a single Afro-Asian consensus, and by the growing awareness that India is not obligated to condemn US use of its military power as a price of staying within that consensus.
- 11. The Government of India has not yet gone so far as to despatch the long-awaited blood transfusion unit to Vietnam. We expect that the Government of India will remain reluctant to commit itself more fully in Vietnam, and that decisions on specifics such as blood transfusion units will be taken on calculation of particular gains vis-a-vis US weighed against losses vis-a-vis Russia, Yugoslavia, and others. We would expect however that some recent lessons will stick, that the Government of India will not criticize us so lightly for Vietnam policy, and that both public and private spokesmen gradually will become more willing to discuss our shared interests in Vietnam.

November 25, 1965

to ranch

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY McNamara and Ball have suggested that it might be useful for Lodge to fly back with McNamara next week for consultation. have the advantage of bringing him in here before the next round of decisions is fixed. E might have the slight disadvantage of putting an extra highlight on the MaNamara trip. On balance, if Lodge agrees To bring him back. himself, I think it would be very helpful. I think it will be important him for us to have a solid talk with Lodge before January, and this may be the quietest time to do it. Moreover, you could have a short talk with him yourself if you handle Erhard in Washington and avoid an additional problem of getting him later in December. We will need your judgment on this by Saturday, in order to give Lodge time to get organized and collect Mrs. Lodge from Bangkok.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-57
By 11, NARA, Date 7-27-10

November 25, 1965

TO JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

- 1. Ellsworth Bunker has telephoned from Santo Domingo to say that unless you object, he would like to go to Rio on Saturday to join in the process of educating Latin Americans about the real situation in the Dominican Republic. He reports that Santo Domingo is quiet after a week of real progress. The suppression of a right wing plot in Santiago has increased Garcia Dodoy's prestige with moderates, and he moved promptly to balance this success by firing his right wing Attorney General. Ellsworth thinks other constructive changes are imminent. Meanwhile, Bennett is on the job.
- 2. I told Bunker that I was sure you would agree with him on the importance of his trip to Rio and that he should go on Saturday unless we received a different signal from the Ranch.
- 3. Bunker raised again with me the question of Bennett's successor. As the situation gradually improves, and Bunker himself will obviously be more and more eager to get back to his OAS job and he obviously feels strongly that Bennett's successor should be on the job before he himself can leave. It appears to be a simple fact of life that Bennett and Garcia Godoy do not find it easy to communicate with each other.
- 4. I recognize that you have some doubts about Crimmins, and I have talked with Tom Mann about still another possibility, namely, William Rogers of the Fortas law firm. Rogers was a very distinguished Assistant Administrator

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NIJ 91-239 By NARA, Date 11-18-93

SECRET

quiet good sense that Bunker himself exhibits. He is, of course, a much younger man -- being in his early 40's. I have spoken to Abe about him and I am told that Rogers has good friends on the Hill, including particularly Senator Dodd. This might mean that he would have both liberal and conservative Congressional support of a sort that a young professional like Crimmins RARELY cannot expect to have. If you would like us to check further on Rogers, Mann and I will be glad to do so.

SECRET

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

This cable from Bowles matches a number of other reports we have had of a gradual but quite significant change in Indian psychology -- and not only on Vietnam. I think you will find it interesting.

McG. B.

CONF attachment

W: 911

Thursday, November 25, 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from Charlie Schultze presents revised procedures for approving new aid and PL-480 commitments. An earlier version of this paper was sent to you on November 5, but Charlie and I got it back from Emanita Roberts for revision in the light of some later comments which you made to us. The memorandum in its current form calls for approval by State, Treasury, AID, and Agriculture in ways which are designed to meet your instructions. (Charlie's memorandum does not refer specifically to State, but it is already standard procedure that any recommendation from AID must have State concurrence).

All Aid operations have been delayed while Schultze and I were getting this memorandum in proper shape to meet your requirements, and he and I hope it may now have early approval.

McG. B.

Attachment



Thursday, November 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a memorandum of conversation which I had yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin because it seems to me to lend clear force to your Armistice Day request that while we work on the Atlantic nuclear problem, we keep Soviet interests in mind. We will have more on this next week when Ball and McNamara have completed their exploration in London and Paris, but I begin to think more and more that it is an opportunity for a real Johnson break-through here. It is clear that the Germans no longer really expect that we will support an MLF, and I believe that if you and Erhard could reach a firm agreement in early December, that no new weapons systems is necessary, the way might be open toward a non-proliferation treaty and toward a new collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO.

Dobrynin also raised the question of the pause, and I am doing a separate memorandum on that which will come to you in a day or two. I continue to think that the considerations are very evenly balanced, but I how think there is just a little more to be said in favor of the pause than has yet been fully presented to you.

McG.B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-216

NARA. Date 3-23-90





THE WHITE HOUSE

November 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

With Ambassador Dobrynin Wednesday, November 24 1-3 p. m.

Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows:

1. European nuclear arrangements. The Ambassador raised this subject toward the end of the lunch -- which is where he has usually raised the thing most on his mind in our past talks.

The moment he raised the question, I told him that I was troubled by the lack of clarity in the Soviet position on ANF and MLF and other arrangements. Sometimes the Soviet Union seemed to be saying to us that it was only the MLF that was objectionable. At other times Soviet representatives seemed to be hostile to all possible arrangements, even those for simple consultation.

The Ambassador parried by saying that the Soviet Union had a hard time telling just what we had in mind. He said that he had been unable to satisfy repeated requests from his government for an accurate account of purposes and meaning of the McNamara special committee (even his NATO colleagues in Washington had told him that they honestly did not know what it was all about). The Ambassador said that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to comment on our policy if it knew exactly what that policy was. He said that he knew there was a difference of opinion within the USG as between believers in collective weapons systems and believers in consultation. He said that he had the impression that there was not a firm decision in the USG and he implied that the Soviet Union could not express a fully defined position until it knew what it had to deal with on our side.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 10-57

By ind., NARA, Date 7-27-10

TOP SECRET



I pointed out to the Ambassador that this position in turn created difficulties in Washington. We were determined to move ahead with necessary defensive arrangements, while at the same time we worked for the cause of non-proliferation. The Ambassador was certainly correct in believing that different kinds of arrangements were preferred by different groups here, but I pointed out that as long as it appeared that the Soviet Union was equally opposed to all arrangements, it would be hard for anyone in this government to believe the choice we made would have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador said very earnestly that he understood this point and that for this reason it would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government if he could have a wholly private and informal indication of the real plans and preferences of the USG as soon as they might be decided. He was sure that such a private indication of our position would be helpful, almost no matter what it was. The Ambassador cited as an example the announcement today of a 700-man reduction in our forces in Berlin. He thought that 24 hours private notice of this decision would have been most helpful in Moscow.

I told the Ambassador that I understood the value of private communication. The Ambassador, on his part, assured me that the Soviet Union would have no interest whatever in using any such private communication to undermine our relations with the Germans -- he said that he thought we worry too much about that, and that this simply was not the framework within which these matters were reviewed within the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government's concern about the Germans was real and deep, as he had told me often before. Ambassador remarked that he had often been told by his friends in the State Department that Soviet protests in the nuclear field were merely another example of Soviet hostility toward NATO, and that he wanted me to understand that this was not the case. Of course, NATO was not a Soviet favorite, but the problem of nuclear proliferation and Germany was far different and much more serious. On non-proliferation, he added, the Soviet Government had exposed itself to severe criticism from quarters he need not name (I inferred China); that should prove its sincerity.

I told the Ambassador that we understood the Soviet concern with Germany and that indeed we shared it. I told him that I could give him categorical assurance that there was no one in the USG who had the smallest intention of allowing the Germans to have national control of



-3-

nuclear weapons, and no one who would support the Germans in any effort to use any German nuclear role as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The Ambassador indicated that he believed me, but he made it equally plain that his confidence was not shared in Moscow.

My own private and personal conclusion from this extended exchange, the flavor of which I have not fully recaptured, is that we may well be able to win Soviet acceptance of any nuclear arrangement in the West which does not involve an immediate decision to build a new weapons system like the MLF, and which clearly avoids any increase in direct German access to the nuclear trigger. I believe that both the McNamara committee and the revised ANF now under discussion could meet this condition. I believe that Dobrynin is right and serious in his emphasis upon the value of early private communication with the Soviet Government when we know our mind on this matter.

Since in fact no one now wants the MLF, I think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly.

In sum, I believe that what Dobrynin said on this subject may open the way for us to meet our NATO responsibilities and move at the same time toward an agreement on non-proliferation. At the very least, the Ambassador's position seems to me to reinforce the importance of the President's stated view that we should approach the problem of Atlantic nuclear defense with a full awareness of the concerns of the Soviet Government. (I should add that I told Ambassador Dobrynin that this was the President's position).

2. Vietnam. Ambassador Dobrynin raised this question only briefly. He expressed again the well-known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful. He said that the brevity of the pause of last spring had caused many members of his government to regard it as cynical. He said that if there could be a pause of "12 to 20 days" we could be assured of intense diplomatic effort. But he acknowledged under questioning that his government could give no advance assurances about the results of such diplomatic effort. He repeated the well-known Soviet view that it is psychologically impossible for a country under bombardment to agree to negotiations.

- 3. Private communication. Not only in the context of the European problem, but more generally, the Ambassador emphasized his view that private and informal communications between our two governments are important. He referred nostalgically to the period in which there was intimate communication with President Kennedy both through his brother, and through informal written notes. I reminded him that in that period, everything that was said had been known to the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson. He agreed, but he seemed to believe that there was something valuable in direct access to the White House, and he asked me where he could establish such contact if necessary. I told him that the President preferred generally to conduct this important business, as he now does, through the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson, but I said that of course he could always reach me if he thought it necessary, and I also told him that I thought it would be helpful for him to be better acquainted with Mr. Moyers. (We also agreed that informal communication between his counselors and my deputies would be helpful, and I expect that Messrs. Komer and Bator will be getting luncheon invitations from their opposite numbers).
- 4. The Ford Foundation. The Ambassador said that he knew I was the subject of a current guessing game in Washington, and that he was interested to see how it would come out. I asked for advice, and he said that he thought it all depended on the sort of future I wanted. Similar problems arose in Moscow from time to time. A number of his friends had been successful in withdrawing from important official jobs into quieter and more academic pursuits -- although usually at the expense of some temporary unpopularity with the ministers whom they had abandoned.
- 5. Habits of the Soviet bureaucracy. In my opening remark to the Ambassador, I commented on his obviously healthy appearance, and he told me of his month on the Black Sea and his month of intense consultations with all the members of his government who are curious about the US. It became clear from these accounts that Dobrynin is a person of growing consequence in Moscow, and I think he rather expects to be offered a more important appointment at home soon. He agreed with me that men in our two foreign offices work too hard -- he said he had had only three Sundays off in his two and one-half years as the head of the American desk. He thinks it is easier to be an Ambassador, and he clearly likes his present job. I told him at the end of lunch that we liked having him here -- and I meant it.

hof. B. McG. B.



Tuesday, November 23, 1965, 5 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Through Mr. Valenti

I submit for your approval the annual report to the Congress on foreign aid, together with a draft Presidential letter of transmittal. I have revised the letter of transmittal to make it fully consistent with the President's major policy statement of September 6 on signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. It is hard to make a very fancy letter out of a summary of last year's work when that work has already been repeatedly publicized. But at least this version does no harm.

In his memorandum to me, Dave Bell points out that if we can get prompt approval of this letter and this report, the two of them can be published by the end of the year. This in itself will be something of a record in speed for AID, and Dave believes the publication will be helpful in next year's legislative campaign.

McG. B.

REVISED DRAFT

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance

Program of the United States for Fiscal Year 1965. This Report shows

how American resources were used in this 12mmonth period to help

other people help themselves.

The record is one of much physical accomplishment -- of schools and dams and fertilizer plants built with our help. It is also a record of people learning to profit from the knowledge of others. It is a record of the continuing and active commitment of the United States to the principle that foreign aid is in our own interest -- that our nation will be more secure and more prosperous in a world of independent, cooperating nations that are successfully directing their energies to the welfare of their people.

The record for fiscal year 1965 is good -- and it is enlivened by innovation.

In this year we began new programs aimed at the interlocking problems of food and population. The Agency for International Development agreed during the year to extend a broad range of technical assistance to countries that ask for help on population programs based on freedom of choice. At the same time, our overseas missions were directed to give priority to agricultural development projects. Additional resources of our great land grant universities have been brought directly into rural

development efforts abroad. A new program was started to upgrade the nutritional value of food shipped abroad under Titles II and III of P. L. 480 for programs to benefit children.

In this year, we announced our readiness to cooperate in an international program to relieve the world-wide shortage of salt-free, usable water. We look forward to new research on practical means of desalting water, and in this effort we seek the cooperation of other countries, including the Soviet Union.

In this year, work began to make education a more vital part of our assistance to other nations. The AID program has long been the major sponsor of partnerships between American centers of education and institutions in the less-developed countries. Today, 70 American universities are engaged in the development of 39 Asian, African and Latin American countries through this program, and one of every five AID financed technicians in the field is working in education. But we can and we must do more.

In this year, we took a major step forward for development in Southeast Asia. We have given our full support to the prospect of a new life for the people of this area through a regional development program -- a true and hopeful alternative to profitless aggression and internal disorder. Under the skilled and determined leadership of Mr. Eugene Black, our efforts in this direction are already bearing fruit, both in progress toward

the establishment of the Asian Development Bank and in the acceleration of multinational plans to develop the Mekong River Basin.

These and other new approaches make it clear that the foreign assistance efforts of the United States are as vigorous and up-to-date today as at any time since the beginning of the Marshall Plan.

I have repeatedly emphasized the importance of foreign aid, I have made it equally clear that I expect -- as the Congress and the people do -- our aid programs to be administered with realism and with maximum effectiveness.

Realism in foreign aid demands that we protect our balance of payments, that we not overreach our sesources, and that help to a country in need be linked to a clear capacity to use it well. Effectiveness requires that real self-help be the first condition for assistance, that the rich resources of the private sector of our economy be brought fully into our aid efforts, and that the "overhead" costs of administering assistance be held to a minimum.

This report documents the transformation in our aid programs over a period of time in response to these guidelines. Some of the highlights:

1. AID has become a smaller factor in our balance of payments.

In fiscal year 1965, more than 80 percent of every AID dollar was committed for the purchase of American goods and services. American products and skills went overseas as aid: most AID dollars stayed in this country to pay for them.

2. AID has become a smaller burden on our resources.

The \$3.5 billion committed for military and economic assistance in fiscal year 1965 was the lowest total since fiscal year 1961. It represented 3.5 percent of the Federal budget and one-half of one percent of the U. S. gross national product. At the height of the Marshall Plan, in comparison, foreign aid accounted for more tha 11 percent of the Federal budget and nearly two percent of our GNP.

3. Most economic aid today is directed towards the root causes of poverty.

Perhaps the most important single change in our AID programs has been the shift from assistance that simply helps other countries remain afloat to assistance that helps them become self-supporting, so that our assistance can be ended. Five years ago, nearly half our economic aid was used to finance imports other countries needed to survive in crisis. In fiscal year 1965, in spite of increased requirements for Supporting Assistance in Southeast Asia and in the Dominican Republic, this kind of aid accounted for less than one-fourth of our economic assistance. Three-fourths of our AID program in fiscal year 1965 was devoted to development assistance: programs of technical and capital assistance in agriculture, industry, health and education that strengthens the ability of other nations to use their own resources.

4. Economic aid today is highly concentrated for maximum effect.

In fiscal year 1965, 77 countries received some kind of AID assistance.

But nearly 80 percent of all Supporting Assistance went to four countries:

South Vietnam, Laos, Korea and Jordan. And 71 percent of all development assistance (Development Loans and Technical Cooperation grants combined) went to eight countries.

5. Private participation in AID programs is at an all-time high.

Through contracts with American universities, business firms, labor unions, cooperatives, and other private groups AID has sharply increased the involvement of non-governmental resources in international development. Two of every five AID-financed technicians in the field today are not federal employees but experts from Private American institutions.

6. AID has done a better job of managing our economic assistance while substantially reducing its staff.

At my direction, AID set out two years ago to cut its employment by 1200 people. AID exceeded this goal. Total employment was cut from 16,782 to 15,098 by the end of fiscal year 1965. We will continue to aim at the maximum in effectiveness and efficiency in carrying out our assistance programs.

* * *

There is much in the less-developed world that causes us deep concern today: enmity between neighbor nations that threatens the hard-won gains of years of development effort; reluctance to move rapidly on needed internal reforms; political unrest that delays constructive programs to help the people; an uncertain race between food supplies and population.

We are right to be concerned for the present. But we are also thight to be hopeful for the future. In this report are recorded some of the solid, human achievements on which our future hopes are based:

- --At the close of the fiscal year, the Republic of China became the 26th nation where economic programs under the Foreign Assistance Act have been brought to a successful end;
 --The pace of reform and self-help in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress was accelerated; by the close of fiscal year 1965, 14 Latin American countries had instituted land reform programs and most had undertaken tax reforms;
 --100,000 more teachers in the Far East were trained in AID-assisted colleges and normal schools; 2,000 new teachers graduated during the year from AID-assisted training schools in Africa;
- --More than '3 million people in Latin America used water and sewerage systems built with AID help;

--AID-assisted power plants in the area from Turkey to India produced an additional six billion kilowatt hours of electric power;

--AID-assisted institutions freed 1,700,000 farmers in the

Far East from usury in extending them credit to finance

better seeds, fertilizer and land improvements;

--Credit to buy a home, make improvements, finance a better education, became available to millions of Latin American families through 88 savings and loan associations and 1,650 credit unions organized with help from AID.

These are accomplishments of which we can be proud. We are reaching other people with things that matter: new farming methods, education, safe drinking water, electric power, and reasonable credit that opens the door to farm improvements and a decent home. We can also be proud that our aid has helped free 700 million people from death or debilitation from malaria.

* * *

We have properly paid tribute to the courage of American soldiers helping the Vietnamese withstand Communist aggression on the battlefield.

We also honor the brave AID civilians -- doctors, educators, health workers, engineers, agriculturists, and police experts -- who are working side by side with the people of Vietnam to build a better country.

These Americans are volunteers. They stay on their jobs in Vietnam at the cost of separation from their families and at the hazard of their lives. They stay because they know their work is important.

Whether it provides strength for threatened peoples like those in Southeast Asia, or support for the self-help of millions on the move in Latin America, in Africa, in the Near East and South Asia, our foreign assistance program remains an investment of critical importance to our own national future.

* * *

The progress of 1965 is withat we now build upon for 1966.

And the work we do in 1966 will be the basis for still better efforts in the years beyond -- so that a Foreign Assistance Program of constantly growing skill and strength may be in the future, as in the past, a vital instrument of American foreign policy.

The White House

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

December 1965

DRAFT

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit the Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program of the United States for Fiscal Year 1965. This Report show American resources were used in this 12-month period to other people in other nations to increase their security and to better their lives.

The record is one of many physical accomplishments -- of schools and dams and fertilizer plants built with our help. It is also a record of people learning to profit from the knowledge of others. Most significantly, it is a record of a continuing and active commitment by the United States to the principle that foreign aid is in our own interest -- our nation will be sefer and more prosperous in a world of independent, cooperating nations that are successfully directing their energies to the welfare of their people.

The record for fiscal year 1965 is a good record -- and one enlivened by innovation.

Among important new initiatives were programs directed towards the interlocking problems of food and population. The Agency for International Development agreed during the year to extend a broad range of technical assistance to countries that ask for help on population programs based on

freedom of choice. At the same time, AID instructed its overseas missions with distribution to give priority to agricultural development projects. More resources of appel.

American land grant universities have been brought directly into rural development efforts abroad, and a new program was started to upgrade the nutritional value of food shipped abroad under Titles II and III of P. L. 480 for school lunch and other programs to benefit children.

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cooperate in an international program to relieve the world-wide shortage

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Work also began during the year to make education a more vital part

of our assistance to other nations. The AID program has long been the major sponsor of partnerships between American centers of education and institutions in the less-developed countries. Today, 70 American universities are engaged in the development of 39 Asian, African and Latin American countries through the AID program, As this report notes, one of every five AID financed technicians in the field today is working in education. But we can and we must do more.

In this year we took a major step forward for development in South cent asia

A major new initiative was undertaken in fiscal year 1965 which demonstrates the direct relevance of AID to the issues of war and peace in Southeast Asia. Building on the foundation of successful aid programs by the property of a new life in Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand, the prospect of a new life for the people of Southeast Asia through a regional development program could be put forward as an alternative to profitless aggression and internal disorder.

Under the skilled leadership of Mr. Eugene Black, U.S. efforts in this direction hold for the acceleration of multinational plans to develop the Mekong River Basin.

These and other new approaches make it clear that the foreign assistance efforts of the United States are as lively and responsive today as at any time since the beginning of the Marshall Plan.

I have repeatedly emphasized the importance of foreign aid but I have made it equally clear that I expect -- as the Congress and the people do -- our aid programs to be administered with realism and with maximum effectiveness.

Realism in foreign aid demands that we protect our balance of payments, that we not overreach our resources, and that help to a country in need be linked to a clear capacity to use it well. Effectiveness requires that self-help performance be the first condition for assistance, that the rich resources of the private

sector of our economy be brought fully into our aid efforts and that the "overhead" costs of administering assistance be held to a minimum.

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1. AID has become a smaller factor in our balance of payments.

In fiscal year 1965, more than 80 percent of every AID dollar was committed for the purchase of American goods and services. American products and skills went overseas as aid: most AID dollars stayed in this country to pay for them.

2. AID has become a smaller burden on our resources.

The \$3.5 billion committed for military and economic assistance in fiscal year 1965 was the lowest total since fiscal year 1961. It represented 3.5 percent of the Federal budget and one-half of one percent of the U.S. gross national product. At the height of the Marshall Plan, in comparison, foreign aid accounted for more than 11 percent of the Federal budget and nearly two percent of our GNP.

 Most economic aid today is directed towards the root causes of poverty. Perhaps the most important single change in our AID programs has been the shift from assistance that simply helps other countries remain afloat to assistance that helps them become self-supporting and so that in an interest of the permits us to end our assistance. Five years ago, nearly half our economic aid was used to finance imports other countries needed to survive in crisis.

In fiscal year 1965, — despite increased requirements for Supporting Assistance in Southeast Asia and in the Dominican Republic — this kind of aid accounted for less than one-fourth of our economic assistance. Three-fourths of our AID program in fiscal year 1965 was devoted to development assistance: programs of technical and capital assistance in agriculture, industry, health and education that strengthen the ability of other nations to mobilize their own resources.

4. Economic aid today is highly concentrated for maximum effect.

In fiscal year 1965, 77 countries received some kind of AID assistance. But, nearly 80 percent of all Supporting Assistance went to four countries: South Vietnam, Laos, Korea and Jordan. And 71 percent of all development assistance (Development Loans and Technical Cooperation grants combined) went to eight countries.

5. Private participation in AID programs is at an all-time high.

Through contracts with American universities, business firms, labor unions, cooperatives, and other private groups AID has sharply increased the involvement of non-governmental resources in international development. Two of every five AID-financed technicians in the field today are not federal employees but experts from private American institutions with whom AID contracts for technical assistance in education, health, agriculture, industry and other fields.

 AID has done a better job of managing our economic assistance while substantially reducing its staff.

At my instructions, AID set out two years ago to cut its employment by 1200 people. AID exceeded this goal. Total employment was cut from 16,782 to 15,098 by the end of fiscal year 1965. I can assure you that We will continue to aim at the maximum in effectiveness and efficiency in carrying out our assistance programs.

* * *

There is much in the less-developed world that causes us deep concern today: enmity between neighbor nations that threatens the hard-won gains of years of development effort; reluctance to move rapidly on needed

internal reforms; political unrest that delays constructive programs to help the people; the uncertain race between food supplies and population.

We are right to be concerned for the present. But we are also right to be hopeful for the future. In this report are recorded some of the solid, human achievements on which our future hopes are based:

- --At the close of the fiscal year, the Republic of China became the 26th nation where economic programs under the Foreign Assistance Act have been brought to a successful end;
- --The pace of reform and self-help in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress was accelerated; by the close of fiscal year 1965, 14 Latin American countries had instituted land reform programs and most had undertaken tax reforms;
- --100,000 more teachers in the Far East were trained in AID-assisted colleges and normal schools; 2,000 new teachers graduated during the year from AID-assisted training schools in Africa;
- --More than 13 million people in Latin America used water and sewerage systems built with AID help;
- --AID-assisted power plants in the area from Turkey to India produced an additional six billion kilowatt hours of electric power;

- --AID-assisted institutions freed 1,700,000 farmers in the

 Far East from usury in extending them credit to finance
 better seeds, fertilizer and land improvements;
- --Credit to buy a home, make improvements, finance a better education, became available to millions of Latin American families through 88 savings and loan associations and 1,650 credit unions organized with help from AID.

These are accomplishments of which we can be proud. We are reaching other people with things that matter: new farming methods, education, safe drinking water, electric power, and reasonable credit that opens the door to farm improvements and a decent home. We can also be proud that our aid has helped free 700 million people from death or debilitation from malaria.

* * *

We have properly paid tribute to the courage of American soldiers helping the Vietnamese withstand Communist aggression on the battlefield. We also honor the brave AID civilians--doctors, educators, health workers, engineers, agriculturists, police experts and the like--working side by side with the people of Vietnam to build a better country.

These Americans are volunteers. They stay on their jobs in Vietnam at the cost of separation from their families and at the hazard of their lives. They stay because they know their work is important.

Whether it provides strength for threatened peoples like those in Southeast Asia, or sinews for the self-help drive of millions on the move in Latin America, in Africa, in the Near East and South Asia, our foreign assistance program remains an investment of critical importance to our own national future.

It is not enough to say we hope for a world in which all men are able to make progress in freedom. It is not enough to acknowledge that in this kind of world our own hopes for peace will be most secure.

The foreign assistance program remains the most practical course of action this nation can take to verify our hopes and to make common progress the anchor of our common security.



The White House December 1965 LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Monday, November 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request from Gene Black on our Asian Bank Subscription

Gene Black is coming down to the wire on the Asian Bank. Right now, the Bank looks as if it would fall \$50 to \$100 million short of the proposed billion dollars. Gene strongly recommends (Tab A) that he be authorized to increase our total possible subscription from \$200 million to \$300 million, thus underwriting the amount of the short-fall until others (like the French) can be persuaded to join. He thinks eventually the others will join, and he thinks, therefore, that most of the additional \$100 million would never be called.

The rest of the government is strongly opposed to this proposal, for a variety of reasons. At Tab B, Treasury says it would have a poor effect on the appearances of our balance-of-payments fight (though they agree with Gene that the actual effect would be small). Treasury also believes that the Asians would prefer not to have an increased US percentage, and Treasury believes that an increase of this amount would not sit well with Congress.

For somewhat different reasons, Tom Mann and Dave Bell also oppose the Black recommendation (Tab C), and at Tab D a couple of bright young experts in Aid tell Francis Bator of additional international reasons for opposing Black.

On balance, therefore, Bator and I join in opposing the Black recommendation, but Gene has asked that the matter be referred directly to you. Hence this memo.

Gene's best argument is that we started out to raise a billion dollars and we ought to carry through with it. But the billion dollars was not a target set by us -- it was set by the Asians. We have done a handsome share, and the Bank is a success, because of what you and Gene have done. I think this is credit enough, and that it does not make sense for you to overrule both your balance-of-payments team and your State Department experts in favor of Gene's own deep personal commitment to the billion dollar target.

Whatever you decide, of course, both Gene for his part, and the rest of us for ours, will join in loyally, and especially if you rule against Gene, I will undertake to explain the matter to him as sympathetically as possible.

h.f. R. McG.B.

Go with Black						
Go	with	the	rest of	the	government_	
Speak to me						

P.S. This matter has some urgency because Black leaves at the end of the week. He will be in my office for a meeting of the Clifford Non-Committee on Friday, and it would be helpful to be able to give him your answer then.

mel. B.

McG.B.

Sunday, November 21, 1965, 1 PM

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is Mansfield's report of his conversation with Kosygin. It tells us nothing new about Kosygin, but it shows Mansfield and Aiken telling the Russians that the MLF does not have support in Congress. Mansfield said the same things more strongly to Gromyko, and we are hopeful that what he said will not hit the papers because it will upset the Germans if it does. But we are reluctant to say this to Mansfield for fear that he would take it the wrong way. Unless you have different views, George Ball and I think it is better simply to accept the fact that a travelling Senator will do his own speaking.

A similar problem occurred in Mansfield's conversation with Gromyko in which he emphasized that his speech of September 1 had your personal approval. That speech called for a ceasefire and "stand still" in Vietnam, in forms which would be very much against our interest and because the Comminists would be free to move covertly and our people would be pinned down. You of course never gave formal approval to the substance of what Mansfield said, but only to say it as his own and to express his own views. But I think he tends to treat his September 1 statement as if it were official U. S. policy.

Here again, it seems better not to force the issue at this time, but when he gets to Saigon, there is likely to be quite an argument between him and Lodge.

McG. B.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ/RAC /0-57 By in NARA, Date 7-27-10

POUCH MATERIAL TO THE PRESIDENT, November 20 (Mr. Jacobsen)

11/18 Memo to Pres -komer, mcgb - Rhodesian export licensing for approval (Log 5019)

11/19 Memo to Pres - Saunders - re letter to Libya's King Kiris

11/19 Memo to Pres re suspending 1965 and 1966 Rhodesian sugar quotas 5029

Cooper Memo on Status of non-military actions in Vietnam

Draft telegram for de Gaulle's 75th birthday - Nov 22.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday, November 20, 1965, 11:55 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Califano and I think you ought to know, purely as a matter of information, that the Citizens Panel on Food and Agriculture, which is a part of the White House Conference for International Cooperation Year, will put out a report next week which is closely parallel to the food recommendations which have been floating around inside the government, and which nobody seems to be able to keep quiet. Like other ICY reports, this one will stir a certain amount of press comment about the problem of food policy in the next year. This is why some of us had hoped to get a preemptive statement from the White House so that it would not look as if other people were telling us how to do our business. But now that our friend Phil Potter, and everyone else, has tried to do exactly that, Califano and I would not now urge any White House statement in the near future. The deadline for decision is when you review your legislative program and your aid policy, and fortunately both the aid policy review and the legislative program are within our own tight control.

I might add that the meeting with Clifford's group went very well on Thursday. We plan to have another meeting the day after Thanksgiving, and shortly thereafter Clark will be in touch with you direct about the views of his group and the way in which you may want to review them.

my. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

SUBJECT: Finding Pursuant to Section 202(d)(1)(B) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965

In view of the unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and the tensions that have arisen as a result of that declaration. I find that it would be contrary to the national interest of the United States to continue the sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for 1965 or to establish a sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for 1966. You are directed to take the necessary steps to see that no sugar originating in Southern Rhodesia is imported to the United States from the date of this finding.

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To: Jake Jacobsen

From: McGeorge Bundy

This item is one which the President has already approved, but it does require his signature.

Mr. President:

If you have time for it, this report on the non-military program in Vietnam is worth your attention -this continues to be our toughest long-range set of problems, in spite of all the headlines.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED Authority NLJ 83-184 By is, NARS, Date 8-15-84

SECRET

November 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Status of Non-Military Actions in Vietnam

Attached is our status report for non-military programs covering roughly the past five weeks. It may provide the President with a useful feel for what we've been doing.

The very nature of the non-military struggle in Vietnam is such that we cannot realistically expect dramatic progress from one month to the next. During the past month there has been some concrete results and advances. Both our own efforts and those of the Vietnamese have been impressive, but these efforts must be measured against a backdrop of enormous economic, social, political and security problems. Much is being done. Much more has yet to be done.

At the national level, the most encouraging sign continues to be the growing responsiveness of the GVN leadership to the requirements in this field and its willingness to take new initiatives. This constructive attitude is particularly evident in the areas of pacification program planning, rural reconstruction, labor relations, land reform. But this is but a first step. New programs must be implemented, enlarged, and sustained over the long run. The capabilities of the GVN to perform well here have yet to be proven. Its appeal and ties with the people, especially the peasantry, remain tenuous.

At the GVN working level, the picture continues to be a dismal one of too much corruption, too little motivation. At the grass-roots level there continues to be decreasing effectiveness of local government. However, the GVN, supported by Ky personally, is giving renewed attention to this critical problem. Moreover, USAID efforts to improve the flow of funds to rural construction operations appear to be having positive results. It is the Mission intention, of course, to see that this attitude and trend continue and improve.

The most critical immediate problem is the inflation which could undo the good effects of all our programs. This is being tackled vigorously not only on the monetary front, but by increasing

the supplies of essential goods to areas outside of Saigon. Another critical problem, one that does not come through a program-by-program report, is the growing scarcity of manpower and materials. in Vietnam. This is a matter calling for a comprehensive program review both here in Washington and in Saigon. You will be hearing more on this subject shortly.

Chester L. Cooper

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Status of Non-Military Actions in Vietnam

This is a continuation of our reporting on major aspects of progress and problems in the key non-military programs in Vietnam. This report is based on a very substantial amount of material prepared by the Mission and relevant Washington Agencies.

INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

The ruling military Directorate, while failing to enjoy broad civilian support, has maintained its own internal cohesion and has not yet experienced concerted civilian opposition. Specific points of friction between the military and the civilian community, however, persist, as do numerous factional antagonisms. To counter this the Mission has concentrated on revitalizing pacification measures, on programs to meet inflationary pressures and shortages, on measures to improve GVN-labor and tribal relations. The Mission and Lansdale have also advised the GVN on general political and constitutional problems such as the need for careful groundwork in developing representative institutions and creating a national advisory council. None the less, we cannot report much progress of a lasting, fundamental nature in the labor, student, and military/civilian areas. For the coming weeks the Mission, therefore, will probably continue to concentrate on the pacification field. And it will continue to urge caution among intellectual, student, and political party groups seeking a return to civilian government.

The need for effective government institutions and programs which can reach into the countryside continues to be critical. A principal facet of the Lansdale Team's mission is to assist the GVN to develop such machinery through the mechanism of a revitalized pacification program. During October and early November concepts and initial planning for this program began to take shape. Recent GVN attention to pacification, and to refugees, has been encouraging. But only the barest beginnings have been recorded, and tangible results are still over the horizon.

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By St., NARA, Date 12/11/01

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
INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

With U.S. assistance the National Police are developing a "Police Field Force" which will eventually consist of 15,000 men. The purpose of this force is to secure areas already cleared by military action. Training is now underway and recruitment problems are not anticipated. The provision of certain items of equipment from U.S. suppliers, however, has posed transport and delivery problems. We are combating long lead times for the procurement and shipment of specialized equipment. (Note: Your Asian staff is looking into this to determine where the bottlenecks are.) To resolve these difficulties our AID Mission is exploring with MACV the possibility of borrowing some of its stocks and is requesting priority transportation for selected types of AID cargo. The Resources Control operations showed increased effectiveness with the arrest of over a thousand known and suspected VC agents.

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The program of harassment, counter-terror, and deception operations against the Viet Cong is beginning to develop proven techniques and tested capabilities. There have been several recent examples of the effectiveness of highly trained teams in disrupting

VC communications and support elements and shaking local confidence in the Viet Cong. Planning is now underway to utilize these teams in combating VC rice procurement in the rural areas. The Counter Terror program is expanding according to plan, and it is anticipated that by the end of this year we will have achieved our goal of having 2,500 team members operating in 35 provinces. The stress in this aspect of the program is now on capturing and apprehending VC target personnel.



PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS

At the leadership level the deep and consuming interest of Prime Minister Ky and his government in pacification and rural construction has been heartening. General Thang, newly appointed minister for Rural Construction, has sought ideas and planning support from the Lansdale Team, and has been receptive to U.S. suggestions. But at the local level the government continues to show little capacity or motivation. While plans are being laid for a revitalized rural reconstruction program, the present Hop Tac program (pacification of the provinces bordering Saigon) has continued to limp along. If the Ky Government continues its realistic and positive approach to pacification and rural construction, the barrier which has stood between the Vietnamese government and the people may at last be reduced. If this is to be achieved, however, we and the GVN must move from planning and programming into effective implementation at both the national and local levels. The Mission is well aware of this and is now concentrating on this phase.

With the resettlement phase of GVN/US refugee programs restricted by the limited security in rural areas, current emphasis is on providing temporary food, shelter, and medical aid in refugee camps (currently 461,000 are in temporary shelters; 258,000 have been resettled). None the less. AID with GVN agreement is pressing forward with plans and programs for long-range refugee rehabilitation and resettlement. Cooperation and coordination in the field among U.S. elements (USAID, JUSPAO, MACV) have recently shown marked improvement. There is also considerable improvement in delivery of refugee relief supplies. But inland transportation still remains a critical problem. The temporary AID refugee staff that began work in August is rapidly being replaced by permanent specialized personnel. A Voluntary Agency Vietnam refugee relief mission which visited Vietnam in late October was impressed by the GVN attitude of regarding refugees as "an obligation and opportunity" and by our own approach and programs.

The Chieu Hoi (rally back to the Government) appeal remains strong. The most recent report indicated 290 returnees, maintaining the average of over 1,000 per month since last April. Major problems continue to be getting the GVN to view the Chieu Hoi program as an essential element of their counterinsurgency program, and developing a GVN and U.S. organization which can implement the program effectively. The GVN has not yet reacted to a U.S. Task Force Report submitted last August. None the less, work continues on improving the existing program. The continued strength of the appeal and successful local exploitation are encouraging.

Essential to the successful resolution of the struggle in Vietnam is a competent and effective system of <u>local government</u>. To this end USAID has taken initiatives to improve provincial budgeting, further decentralize control of rural construction to the provinces, and provide emergency funds under AID control. Yet, the competence and effectiveness of local government continues to decline for several reasons: the Viet Cong is continuing to pursue its plan to destroy government in the countryside; the ill-advised draft into the army of officials at all levels; the frequent ousting of officials for purely political reasons; and the inadequate training of local officials. Over and above these specific problems, the Vietnamese system still reflects a legacy of

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French colonial administration superimposed on a Mandarin tradition in which any delegation of authority is a tacit admission of one's inability to perform. However, current GVN emphasis on the need for better training, organization and administration of local officials and rural construction cadre is an encouraging development which is strongly supported by all levels of our Mission. The recent appointment of one of the best province chiefs to head cadre development and administration, is a highly constructive move.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OPERATIONS

The need to keep inflation in check continues to dominate U.S. efforts in Vietnam. Price rises have been serious and could threaten political stability, but a doubling of the monthly rate of AID-financed imports has been largely successful in preventing run-away inflation and crippling shortages of basic imported commodities. Most prices continued to move upward in Saigon during October, though the price of the key consumption item, rice, moved down slowly. Transportation bottlenecks and VC road interdiction continued to increase prices elsewhere in Vietnam. Black market dollars and military script moved up sharply in price in the first two weeks of October, fell and then recovered more slowly. Fueling the inflation has been the steady growth in the GVN budget deficit. The heavy demand for manpower to meet U.S. military construction equipment has naturally resulted in labor shortages and rising wages. A comprehensive review of U.S. construction programs is pending and some projects (for example, urban housing) have already been shelved.

The current <u>rice problem</u> has been largely solved by purchasing rice from Thailand in addition to expedited PL 480 shipments and ample food, medicine and clothing have been made available to refugee camps. But coastal shipping is still over-burdened and port congestion at Saigon and Da Nang continues. Highways remain closed in many locations with partial closure of some main routes. The railroad is only partly operational. We are moving forward on several fronts to deal with transportation bottlenecks. Action has been initiated to deal with port operations and results are now becoming evident. In addition, studies for development of new facilities in the major South Vietnamese ports have been completed. The International Longshoremen's Union, following a study by their President, Ted Gleason, has offered cargo handling experts to the GVN. Plans are now also underway

to consolidate cargoes at a central point in the U.S. as a way of reducing some of the congestion at the Saigon port. There is now in operation a Pentagon-AID shipping Priority Designation System. Finally, the number of Air America contract aircraft for AID use has been virtually doubled in recent weeks.

To win over the peasant new land programs are urgently needed. In this vital area results continue to be slow. New policies were announced by the GVN on August 10 and a meeting of provincial land officials was held. Orders then followed to issue full titles to farmers buying expropriated land. In September Saigon issued instructions calling for the distribution of former French lands and this has already taken place to a modest extent. In two provinces, titles for GVN land occupied by squatters have been distributed. But much more remains to be done if the GVN is to match VC appeal among landless peasantry. A lively dialogue is continuing between the GVN and the Mission. We are recruiting a high level advisor to assist the GVN in this field and provide regular evaluations of progress.

The emphasis on domestic private investment continues. Through AID's Commercial Import Program and a high degree of financial liquidity, private investment has almost trebled during 1965 over the preceding five-year average. Investment has been concentrated on such small scale ventures as plastics, paper, tires and tubes, and textiles. In the Cam Ranh Bay area arrangements have been made to proceed immediately with construction workers' housing. A resource survey of the Bay area will soon take place. On the agricultural development front recent accomplishments include increased fertilizer shipments, irrigation improvements, and increased training of rural technicians. For security and funding reasons three pending large scale investment programs scheduled for Vietnam are now in abeyance. To attempt to secure U.S. business interest in Vietnam, two teams of Vietnamese industrialists have been sent to the U.S. and an American team is soon leaving for Vietnam.

An economic warfare committee in Saigon has been organized to deal with the most critical aspects of the VC's economic warfare operations. It is apparent that these operations are well organized and are part of a larger effort by the Chinese Communists and their allies, and that the organization has connections in other Asian and

European countries. Locally, the VC is diverting substantial resources not only from the GVN, but almost certainly from AID and MAP programs as well. This effort involves collusion of low level and perhaps even high level GVN officials; and has, at least potentially, serious political and military implications within Vietnam. This situation is now under intensive review by specialists in Washington. An experienced professional in economic warfare has been designated as Special Assistant to AID's Assistant Administrator for the Far East. He will be the focal point for assembly and collation of world-wide economic intelligence, and for coordinating the efforts of several U.S. agencies in Washington and at a number of overseas points.

With respect to our <u>medical programs</u>, a matter of current concern is logistical support for the Provincial hospital operations. A successful effort has been conducted to recruit medical supply personnel. Substantial progress can also be reported for other projects. Results of the October nurse recruitment drive in Chicago were far above expectations. By January, under a new AID contract, the International Rescue Committee is to have six surgical teams in the field composed of Cuban refugee doctors under an American surgeon. Under MAP funding, fifty-six Vietnamese paraplegics and fourteen trainees arrived in early November for rehabilitation and training during the next six months. (This was in response to Dr. Howard Rusk's proposal.)

PSY WAR AND INFORMATION PROGRAMMING

The high-level U.S. press interest in the <u>leaflet program</u> during the past weeks is largely due to the number of unique successes achieved. Wind dispersion techniques were successfully used and, for the first time, leaflets reached Haiphong (one million copies) and later Hanoi (more than a million copies). The themes stressed included the nature and effects of Red Chinese imperialism and the increased success and strength of South Vietnam. On November 1, Vietnamese National Day, a drop of 5,000 gift packages, purchased and packaged by the GVN, was made along a 90-mile stretch of the North Vietnamese coast. Joint U.S. and GVN efforts are expected to result in a monthly drop of 20 million leaflets. Broadcasts of the Voice of America in Vietnamese remain at the high level of more than 45 hours a week. These successes are encouraging.

But problem areas must also be noted. The increased number of SAM sites is inhibiting our reaching primary target areas. And there is the feeling among Vietnamese officials that the leaflet program has become too closely identified with the Americans. To meet the first difficulty, dissemination into missile-defended areas will primarily be by means of wind-dispersion, possibly supplemented by low-altitude "bomb toss" and high-altitude "toss-glide" techniques. To meet the latter, the Mission is exploring ways to emphasise the Vietnamese role in this binational program.

Our efforts to better community relations have produced some notable examples: MACV assistance to the GVN Political Warfare Department in solving indemnification payment problems; USIA advisory assistance in organizing an English teaching program in Danang using Marines as instructors: AID's massive airdrop of food and supplies to refugees. These, as well as other more tactical and localized efforts, have been well publicized. And the Vietnamese population, by-and-large, seems to be convinced that the VC cannot win militarily and does not seriously question the U.S. presence or intentions in Vietnam. But the rising cost of living -- often unfortunately equated with the American presence which some Saigon editorials see as also endangering Vietnamese culture and tradition - has posed problems of new dimensions for civilian-U.S. troop relations. Obviously, non-combatant casualties add to the problem. U.S. and GVN information programs have continued to give heavy emphasis to explaining the American presence, promoting better community relations and pointing out the real reasons for price rises and shortages. MACV's directive to all U.S. units on minimizing non-combatant casualties continues to produce positive results; in fact, this directive was adopted and promulgated by the Vietnamese Armed Forces High Command. However, measures to stabilize the economic situation cannot be expected to yield immediate results, and civilian-U.S. troop relations in the near future may suffer further setbacks.

The high state of Vietnamese military confidence and morale appears to be sustained. Vietnamese National Day provided an occasion to dramatize the role of the armed forces, and 320 civilian and military heroes were honored in ceremonies. The preparation

and publicity leading up to the departure of 56 paraplegics for treatment in the U.S. had favorable impact on general morale. An encouraging development has been the recent revitalization of the Vietnamese Veterans Legion. Despite the Legion's weak base, indications are that the organization will play an active and constructive role in promoting veterans' benefits. But there are soft spots, too. The wide-ranging troop indoctrination program announced a few months ago has yet to reach high gear, although selected units underwent pilot training. And, while plans for a comprehensive program of veterans benefits gained momentum in October, the GVN does not have the resources necessary if all the programs are to be carried out for the estimated 500,000 who might qualify. The Mission Council has taken the general position that, wherever possible, the needs of veterans should be met by granting them priority within the framework of existing programs and not by generating new programs.

Chester L. Cooper