

1065

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE**  
**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3a <del>MEMO</del> cable	text of cable 285 from Rawalpindi Secret 3 p	1/18/66	A
<del>#4 memo</del>	<del>to the President from R. W. Komer</del> <i>NLS 84-184</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 7-31-84</i> 1 p	<del>01/18/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <del>secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 1 p	01/18/66	A
#6 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 1 p	01/18/66	A
#10a cable	<del>text of New Delhi 1820</del> <i>open 8/28/92</i> <i>NLS 84-184</i> <del>secret</del> 2 p	01/16/66	A
#11 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>top secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	01/17/66	<del>A</del>
#11a report	re: Vietnam <del>top secret</del> <i>open 6-7-84</i> <i>NLS 83-203</i> 4 p	<del>undated</del>	A
#13 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 6-19-84</i> <i>NLS 83-202</i> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	01/15/66	A
#13a cable	text of USUN NY 3131 <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-203</i> 2 p	01/15/66	A
#13b cable	to President from Amb. Goldberg <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-203</i> <i>open 8-18-87</i> <i>NLS 97-119</i> 1 p	01/15/66	A
#16 memo	to the President from McG. B. <i>open 6-19-84</i> <i>NLS 83-202</i> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	01/15/66	A
#17 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	01/15/66	A
#17a cable	text of Mexico 1430 Secret 1 p	01/15/66	A
#18 memo	to Secretary Rusk from McGeorge Bundy <i>open 6-19-84</i> <i>NLS 83-202</i> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	01/15/66	A
#18b letter	to President from Henry Cabot Lodge <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 1-10-85</i> <i>NLS 83-203</i> 2 p	12/29/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~SECRET~~  
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 18

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.  
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205

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22c memo	entitled "Bundy" possible classif. info. 1pg.	No date <i>open</i>	A <i>8/28/92</i>
#22d memo	entitled "Smith's Office" possible classif. info.	No date <i>open</i>	A <i>8/28/92</i>
#18c memo	to <del>the</del> McG. Bundy from Henry Cabot Lodge 1pg.		
#22g memo	<del>Confidential</del> Situation Room possible classif. info. 1pg.	No <del>date</del> 12/29/65	A
#21 memo	to the President from McG. B.	No date	A
	<del>top secret</del> <i>open 6-19-84 NLS 83-202</i> 1 p	01/14/66	A
#23 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer		
	<del>secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 1 p	01/14/66	A
#23a message	to President from Prime Minister Wilson		
	<del>Secret</del> <i>open NLT 98-166 4-28-99 3 p</i>	01/14/66	A
#24 memo	to the President from McG. B.		
	<del>Secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 2 p	01/14/66	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #26a message	to the President from Amb. Dobrynin		
	<del>Secret</del> 4 p	01/11/66	A
#27b memo	to Bundy from W. G. Bowdler		
	confidential 1 p	01/13/66	A
#28 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President <i>open 6/20/16</i>	01/13/66	C
#30 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer		
	<del>secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 1 p	01/13/66	A
#31 memo	to President from McG. B.		
	<del>secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	01/13/66	A
#31a cable	text of Saigon 2514 <i>open 1-10-85 NLS 83-203</i>		
	<del>secret</del> 2 p	01/13/66	A
#32a memo	to President from Prime Minister		
	<del>secret</del> 1 p	01/13/66	A
#33 memo	to President from McG. B.		
	<del>top secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	01/13/66	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #33a cable	from SecState to Amemb. New Delhi		
	<del>top secret</del> 1 p		A
#35 memo	to President from McG. B.		
	<del>secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	01/12/--	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #35a cable	from SecState to White House		
	<del>Secret</del> 1 p	01/12/	A

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3 of 5

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#37a memo</del> <i>open 7-16-03</i>	<del>to President and Secretary from Gov. Harriman</del> <del>secret exempt from NLJ 83-203</del> 2 p	<del>01/12/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#39a cable</del>	<del>text of Saigon 2503</del> <i>1-10-85 open NLJ 019-000-1-1 (12/01)</i> <del>secret exempt from NLJ 83-203</del> 3 p	<del>01/12/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Ans 2009</i> <del>#40 memo</del> <i>NLJ 83-203</i>	<del>McGeorge Bundy to the President</del> <i>(possible class. info)</i> 1 p	01/12/66	A
<del>#41 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <del>secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	<del>01/12/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#41a memo</del>	<del>to the President from R. W. Komer</del> <i>Open NLJ 98-166 4-28-99</i> <del>secret</del> <i>Exempt from NLJ 84-144</i> 1 p <i>Dupl # 23a, NSF Komer Files box 29 (1st. 1/65-3/66)</i>	<del>01/12/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#42 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <del>secret</del> 1 p	01/12/66	A
<del>#43 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	01/11/66	A
<del>#43a cable</del> <i>open 7-16-03</i>	<del>text of TOSEC 10</del> <del>secret</del> 1 p	<del>01/11/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#44 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <i>open 6-19-84 NLJ 83-202</i> <del>top secret</del> 1 p	<del>01/11/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#44a cable</del> <i>open 2-20-09</i> <i>NLJ 03-243</i>	<del>For Bundy from Ric, Hong Kong</del> <del>top secret</del> 2 p	<del>01/11/--</del>	<del>A+C</del>
<del>#47 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <del>secret</del> <i>open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239</i> 1 p	<del>01/10/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#48 agenda</del>	<del>agenda for 1:PM meeting</del> <del>secret</del> 1 p	<del>01/10/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#49 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McG. B.</del> <i>open 6-19-84 NLJ 83-202</i> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	<del>01/10/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#51a memo</del>	<del>to the President from R. W. Komer</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 2 p	<del>01/08/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#52 memo</del>	<del>to the PRESIDENT from McG. B.</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 1983</i> 1 p	<del>01/08/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#54b message</del>	<del>to Prime Minister Wilson from President</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 2/6/98</i> 1 p	<del>01/07/66</del>	<del>A</del>

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~  
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405

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54d cable	to President from Prime Minister <del>Secret</del> <i>Open 2/6/98</i>	1 p	01/07/66 A
#55 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 1983</i>	1 p	01/08/66 A
#58 memo <i>open 7-16-03</i>	to the President from McG. B. <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	01/07/66 A
#60 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 1983</i>	1 p	01/07/66 A
#60a message	to President from Prime Minister Wilson <del>Secret</del> <i>Open NLT 98-166 4-28-99</i>	1 p	01/07/66 A
#61a memo	to President from Orville Freeman <del>confidential</del>	2 p	01/07/66 A
#67 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del>	1 p <del>01/06/66</del>	01/06/66 A
#67b letter	To President from Harold Wilson <del>Secret</del> <i>Open NLT 98-166 4-28-99</i>	4 p	01/05/66 A
#69a cable <i>open 2-10-04 NLS 03-243</i>	text of Tokyo 2359 <del>secret</del> <i>transmitted per NLS 83-203</i>	2 p	01/06/66 A
#70 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239</i>	1 p	01/06/66 A
#70b cable	Santo Domingo 1583 <del>Secret</del> <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-230</i>	2 p	01/06/66 A
#70c cable	from USCOMDOMREP 0022 <del>Secret</del> <i>Open 11-10-97 NLS 91-233 per appeal</i>	2 p	01/06/66 A
#75 agenda	NSC meeting agenda <del>Secret</del>	1 p	01/05/66 A
#76a cable	text of Vientiane 713 <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 6-7-84 NLS 83-203</i>	2 p	01/05/66 A
#78 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Top Secret</del> <i>open 6-15-84 NLS 83-202</i>	1 p	01/05/66 A

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505

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#78b memo	for the President from George W. Ball <del>top secret</del>	open 1-10-85 NLS 83-203 3 p	01/05/66 A
#78d memcon open 7.16.03	re: Hungary <del>Exempt per NLS 83-203</del> <del>top secret</del>	2 p	01/05/66 A
#78e memcon open 7.16.03	re: Hungary <del>Exempt per NLS 83-203</del> <del>top secret</del>	4 p	01/04/66 A
#81 cable	text of Saigon 2399 <del>top secret</del>	open 1-10-85 NLS 83-203 4 p	01/05/66 A
#83 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del>	open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 1 p	01/04/66 A
#84a cable	text of Saigon 2376 <del>top secret</del>	open 6-7-84 NLS 83-203 2 p	01/04/66 A
#84b cable	text of Saigon 1865 <del>top secret</del>	open 6-7-84 NLS 83-203 1 p	01/03/66 A
#85a cable	text of Saigon 2372 <del>secret</del>	open 6-7-84 NLS 83-203 1 p	01/04/66 A
#85b cable	text of Tehran 954 <del>Secret</del>	open 1-10-85 NLS 83-203 3 p	01/04/66 A
#86 memo	for the President from McG. B. <del>confidential</del>	open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239 2 p	01/03/66 A
#88 memo	for the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del>	open 6-19-84 NLS 83-202 1 p	01/03/66 A
#88a message	to Prime Minister Menzies from President <del>Secret</del>	open 6-19-84 NLS 83-202 5 p	undated A
#90 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy <del>Secret</del>	sanitized 6-19-84 NLS 83-202 3p	01/03/66 A
#91 cable	text of cable from Harriman to President and Sec. <del>Secret</del>	Dupe in UN Co. file Box 195 "MARIA" Doc #12 open 1-10-85 NLS 83-203 2 p	01/03/66 A
#79 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the President <del>possible classified information</del>	open 6-19-84 NLS 83-202 1p	01/5/66 A

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*Rec'd  
3:00 PM  
1-18-66 4:49P*

MEMORANDUM

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*L*

Tuesday, January 18, 1966  
4:20 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I chased after Congressman Gallagher to get an answer for Paul Finley and UPI 118, but Gallagher is in New Jersey today. I then consulted with Doc Morgan, and he has undertaken to get Wayne Hays or some other senior member of the committee to do this job. I gave his staff man, Boyd Crawford, three basic arguments:

1. That we have absolutely no treaty relationship that would require us to back the Turks in a war over Cyprus
2. That your letter to Inonu very probably prevented a war in which all members of NATO would have been losers
3. That it is astonishing that the head of a Republican Task Force on NATO should be so dangerously misinformed.

Crawford assures me that these comments will be made by some appropriate spokesman this afternoon. We will hope for the best.

*h/B.*  
McG. B.

*a subsequent call from Morgan says  
Wayne Hays will answer tomorrow AM. better  
than nothing - but slow.*



Tues., Jan. 18, 196  
4:05 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Cabot Lodge has sent this letter with a covering note to me suggesting that you might want to send your written thanks to Gleason. Given the amount of trouble that Gleason gives us on other fronts, I would be against giving him this kind of ammunition, but I can draft something if you want.

McG. B.

Draft a letter to Gleason \_\_\_\_\_

Let it go \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

to P 2  
1/18

9/11/18  
copy of orig  
Ed will put  
in a Lodge  
file



2a

Saigon, S. Vietnam,  
January 10, 1966.

Dear Mr. President:

The long and consistent record of steadfast support for our policy in South Vietnam expressed repeatedly by organized labor in the U. S. has now begun to take the form of tangible actual helpful actions. Under the leadership of the AFL-CIO, a number of international unions are taking steps to help the government and their sister unions in Vietnam to resist Communist aggression and at the same time bring about needed economic and social reforms.

In this respect, the work of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) has been particularly noteworthy. Under the patriotic and imaginative leadership of its president, Thomas Gleason, the ILA has assigned to Saigon four experienced members of the union to help find solutions to one of the most serious problems we have been facing in the last few months--the congestion of the Port of Saigon. The team--financed entirely by ILA funds--arrived here on December 16 and has been at work every day, Christmas and New Year's included.

I want to single out the personal dedication and spirit of initiative of the ILA team and particularly Mr. Gleason who, since last October, has devoted no less than five weeks of his time personally observing the operations at the Port of Saigon, holding meetings with Port authorities, even standing on the decks of ships in the broiling sun, and writing a valuable report with recommendations on our logistics problem.

His efforts are in the best traditions of the United States and deserve special praise.

With warm and respectful regard,

Faithfully yours,

  
Henry Cabot Lodge

The President  
The White House:

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



Rec'd  
Pres's  
1-18-66  
of 4909

3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tues., Jan. 18, 1966  
4:00 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is an interesting interview  
between McConaughy and Ayub.  
The marked paragraphs on page 3  
show that Ayub is in favor of a very  
prolonged pause indeed.

McG B

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

January 18, 1966  
Tuesday/4:00 pm

*Handwritten notes:*  
L. Pres  
5:15  
1/18  
4  
Bundy  
✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It might be a nice gesture to be first under the wire with a message to the new Indian PM. So here's a message you might want to send out tonight, telling Bowles to deliver as soon as appropriate.

It's most likely to be Indira Gandhi, but whoever it is isn't likely to be able to come before the budget session of India's parliament, which begins 14 February (and lasts till 13 May). So you could also safely make the gesture of renewing the 1st February invitation but adding that the invite is also good for a later, more convenient time. State agrees.

Attached draft message would do the trick. Then Bill Moyers could put out, say in response to a question, that you had congratulated the new PM and renewed the invitation.

R. W. Komer

Approve           

See me           

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-144

By ms, NARS, Date 7-31-84

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo 1/18/66, subj. Msg of Congratulations to India's new Prime Minister



✓ Mr. Bundy <sup>5</sup>

~~SECRET~~

January 18, 1966  
Tuesday, 1:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Though an Indian visit is probably off for the moment, attached on the Indian economy is still well worth scanning. John Lewis, the author, was a member of the CEA and is now one of AID's best mission directors. He's so much more sober than Bowles that I listen hard when he speaks.

He confirms that our aid strategy has really moved the Indians, and argues that by using our money more wisely we can force an economic breakthrough without spending any more in 1966-68 than we have in recent years. Since George Woods is also an advocate of this school, the World Bank would be a natural ally. Incidentally, Lewis' memo is along precisely the same lines as the India strategy paper endorsed by both your cabinet committee and non-committee (which Lewis never saw).

Without trying to tie you down right now, would you entertain an aid bargain along the lines Lewis plugs? I do not envisage our making any early firm commitments, but rather a gentlemen's understanding that if the new PM actually does all the things called for, she will find us equally responsive in providing economic backing. India-lover or no, I see a big league opportunity shaping up here along the lines we want. If you like this concept, I'd favor getting word discreetly to the new PM beforehand (not through Bowles) on what we expect.

R. W. Komer

OK for planning purposes \_\_\_\_\_

Let's hold off a while longer \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

*pick  
Primo  
1-18-66  
12:40 P*

*Re: 2/15/66*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, January 18, 1966  
12:40 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is Gronouski's flash report of his conversation with Foreign Minister Rapacki today. As I said on the phone, it is polite but uninformative. I think Gronouski has slightly over-read its meaning in the last paragraph, and my guess is that is what the Poles intended. But then I am a veteran of similar treatment from Dobrynin.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

*Warsaw 1172  
filed*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jw, NARA, Date 2-6-98



2

"Just mark that -- O. K. L"

LBJ/vm

1/17/66

8:30 pm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, January 17, 1966, 7:45 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

I attach a quote of what Dan Schorr said. I have discussed it with McNamara. He says that the 75,000 is a figure out of thin air, but that there may well be a need to pull out some specialists and some supporting units. They will not know what these needs may amount to until after the Honolulu conference, which has just begun and will run for a couple of weeks.

McNamara thinks it is just as well not to react strongly to this kind of rumor, which grows out of things which Foreign Minister Schroeder has been saying since his return about the need for reinforcements in Vietnam and a reduction in U. S. troop strength in Germany. Bob would like to reduce that strength as long as the initiative comes from the Germans, and he thinks they may be getting into that frame of mind.

So I think we might well let Schorr alone and leave it to the Pentagon to knock down the 75,000 if the question comes to them. If the temperature goes up in Germany, we can always issue a soothing statement.

*Inf. S.*  
McG. B.



Daniel Schorr, CBS News - January 17, 1966

"A substantial number of American troops in Germany, perhaps as many as 75,000, may be pulled out before the end of the year to meet mounting needs in Vietnam. Negotiations with the Bonn Government have been in progress since Chancellor Erhard met with President Johnson last month. The Germans have been told that American strength in Vietnam may be more than doubled by the year end, and that apart from draftees it will be necessary to call on the 7th Army in Germany, the largest force America has ever maintained overseas in peacetime.

"In the past the West Germans have reacted with anguish to any prospect of reducing American troop strength in their country. But now Bonn is feeling a financial pinch and notes that a cutback would save some of the \$650 million it spends to offset the costs of stationing forces in Germany.

"Further, a cut in conventional strength bolsters the argument Erhard made to President Johnson on the need for German nuclear participation."

Mon. Jan. 17 1966, 3:05

8

MR. PRESIDENT:

8

I have kept a copy of this, and will draw from its second paragraph in my remarks to the Leadership and the press this afternoon.

McG. B.



9

Monday, January 17, 1966, 11:40 AM 9

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

**Possible topics for your talk with Porter**

Bill Porter has greatly impressed everyone in this last week with his understanding of the broad problem of pacification. I will have him primed to speak for about five minutes on the essence of this unless you want something different.

If you concur after talking with him, we now plan to go to work on Lodge to get him to agree that Porter should be given this broad field of responsibility. Bell, Ball, McNamara and I all strongly agree that he is the right man for it.

One thing Porter will need is strong Washington support, including the notion that he will be supported if he tells us that some particular proposal from him does not make sense. He needs to learn to think of himself as the field commander for pacification in the same way that Westmoreland is the field commander for the war -- and he should feel free to put claims on us in the same way that Westy does. The truth is -- as Ky himself said last week -- that the broad front of pacification is absolutely equal in importance to the more familiar and more advertized business of fighting organized enemy units.

I recommend a photograph, and a chance for Porter to speak briefly to the White House press after his talk with you. He knows how to handle himself.

McG. B.

10  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, 12:30 PM  
January 17, 1966

Mr. President:

Ambassador Bowles believes that Indira Gandhi is almost certain to be chosen as Shastri's replacement. Here are his views on the probable victor.

McG. B.

---

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, January 16, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES  
(New Delhi 1820)

As reported recently, Indira Gandhi now appears to be a ten-to-one favorite to become Prime Minister, and on balance, I believe that she will be a much better Prime Minister than would her principal opponent Morarji Desai.

Although Desai would be overtly pro-American and a vigorous promoter of the private sector, he is deeply antagonistic to Pakistan, opposed to population control measures and an avid advocate of prohibition; in addition he would almost surely create a bitter split in the Congress Party between liberal and right wing factions.

It is generally assumed that Indira Gandhi will not be a particularly strong Prime Minister and that this is one of the primary reasons why she has won support of the state political organizations, each leader assuming that he may be close to the throne.

Once in office, Mrs. Gandhi may turn out to be much stronger than is generally expected; but there is no doubt that a great deal will depend on whom she listens to.

Although she is an economic neophyte, in recent months she has worked most closely within the cabinet with Subramaniam and Chavan and has won the respect of such able supporters of our views as Asoka Mehta and Pitambar Pant of the Planning Commission. Together they have formed the most progressive group in the government in regard to economic and other matters.

With the above colleagues Indira Gandhi has been a persistent advocate of rebuilding relations with the U. S., and was one of those who most strongly supported Subramaniam's visit to the U. S. in December. Although Mrs. Gandhi has been personally fond of T. T. Karishnamachari, there is very little chance that he will return to the cabinet, since she has been generally positioned against his policies. Subramaniam's political position on the other hand, is likely to be strengthened; I would not be surprised to see him emerge as a kind of Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economic Policy and Administration.

In regard to foreign affairs, Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister may be expected to continue the present general line. Although I am convinced that rumors of her anti-Americanism are grossly inaccurate, she has been subject to flattery from the U. S. S. R. in the past and this may continue.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769-5454  
By ng/lsp, NARA, Date 8-28-92



Krishna Menon and K. D. Malaviya can be expected to make strong pitches to recapture some of their lost glory. However, in the recent maneuvering Krishna Menon -- according to one account -- has been aligned with Morarji Desai and Malaviya joined the Indira Gandhi band wagon belatedly. Moreover, both of these people have been generally discredited and, although anything is possible, it is difficult to see how they can stage an effective political comeback.

In regard to Pakistan and Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi has been consistently on the liberal side. She told me on several occasions that the worst mistake her father ever made was to permit Sheikh Abdullah to be imprisoned. More recently she expressed the view that the government has handled the whole Kashmiri problem clumsily; at least she said India should improve its relations with the Kashmiris.

During Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Congress Party President she strongly advocated the removal of the Communist Government in Kerala and finally convinced her reluctant father.

Among Mrs. Gandhi's strongest assets as Prime Minister may be her capacity to grow and also to attract and promote able young people. In her present position as Minister of Information she has demonstrated an ability to stimulate and administer a large bureaucratic organization.

I am personally disappointed that Chavan failed to make the grade. He is a proven administrator and a person of strong character and liberal views. Moreover, unlike the Nehru family he has deep roots in India and in Asia and is therefore less subject to the emotional conflicts of westernized Indians.

Chavan was at Shastri's side at Tashkent and according to L. K. Jha was the strongest advocate within the Indian delegation in support of the compromises required to permit the final settlement. However, I suspect that it was Chavan's strong personal qualities and the fear he would be too dominant a leader that persuaded the Congress Party Organization to bypass him in favor of Indira Gandhi. He may well have his opportunity in the future.

However, in considering Mrs. Gandhi's prospects as Prime Minister we should avoid jumping to negative conclusions. Experience has indicated throughout our own history that newly established heads of state are likely to demonstrate qualities which were not generally recognized before they assumed positions of power.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

In any event, I have known Indira Gandhi on a personal basis for more than twelve years and I am convinced that the newspaper stereotype of a leftist leaning, woolly minded daughter of a famous father does her a profound injustice. Moreover, as a result of this personal relationship I believe that I will be able to work closely with her and generally exert a constructive influence.

Although the final choice has yet to be made I thought you might like to have this preliminary rundown on the probable victor.

~~SECRET~~

12

11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mon., Jan. 17, 1966  
9:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I attach a memorandum on "Negotiating with the Communists" which Cabot Lodge has sent forward for your attention. It is a good straightforward account of the hard-nosed view of this problem, and I think it is much more right than wrong. There is a growing difference between European and Asian Communists, but for the latter, I think Lodge's guidance is pretty good.

*imp B.*  
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET-attachment~~



11a

~~TOP SECRET~~

**NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMUNISTS**  
(Based on Experience at the U.N. and  
Study of Negotiations Elsewhere)  
by H. C. Lodge

Preface

In spite of the fact that the Communists do not conceal that their pledged word is not good, negotiation with the Communists can be said to have value if, in fact, (a) it ends or reduces the bloodshed, and (b) sets down enforceable conditions which, if we are strong enough to maintain them, will prevent a relapse into the aggression which brought about the conflict in the first place.

Under (a) and as a sample of something which would not reduce bloodshed, I cite a negotiation in which we aim to force Ho Chi Minh into a corner by requiring him to admit that he has been defeated by signing a paper, thereby causing him to lose face and probably lose his job. This would drag out the fighting and increase the bloodshed. A prolonged negotiation, during which the Communists seek to improve their military position, would also drag out the conflict and increase bloodshed. A de facto end of hostilities would be preferable to either of these alternatives.

Under (b), note that while we must never depend on the given word of the Communists, an agreement can have value if it can be inspected and enforced. See the Austrian treaty.

The fact that under the above conditions (a) and (b) a negotiation can be said to have value does not, to be sure, mean that it is the only way to end hostilities. There is an impressive body of expert opinion which holds that it is not the way in which the Vietnamese war will be ended. But it is certainly a way and should not be overlooked.

In the case of Viet-Nam, a proper agreement could make possible subsequent discussions about common interests such as the value of South Vietnamese rice to North Viet-Nam, and the value of North Vietnamese coal to South Viet-Nam, out of which a beneficent and gradual evolution could come.

Special Precautions

But negotiation with Communists can only be beneficial if special precautions are observed which would not be necessary in a negotiation, let us say, between the U. S. and Canada. Some of these are:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-203

By ics, NARS, Date 6-7-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Fighting to Continue

Fundamental is the fact that fighting should continue while the negotiations are in progress. In the case of the Vietnamese war, this would mean bombing. There must also be the ever present possibility in Communist minds of our expanding the fighting. At the moment, if the enemy were to ask for an armistice, we should somewhat increase our pressure. Absolutely nothing can be done and the whole conference is worse than useless unless the U.S. has both the power and the believable will to use it.

2. Time Limit on Meeting

We must set a time limit on the meetings -- at a guess, not more than a month. Failure to set such a time limit will give scope to the favorite Communist tactic of delay which makes us look contemptible, impatient and undignified. It also means that they will use the time which their diplomats gain for them to bring about an improved military position which their soldiers, unaided, had been unable to achieve.

3. Be Ready for "Agenda" Fight

If previous meetings with the Communists are any guide, we must expect them to propose what they call an agenda, which is not what we call an agenda. By agenda, we mean a list of topics for discussion. By agenda, they mean their own conclusions -- their own political objectives enumerated as though they were topics.

4. Clear Political Objectives

For this reason, among many others, our political objectives must be absolutely clear before we even agree to a meeting -- so clear that we may offer them as agenda items, assuming that it is good tactics to do so.

5. Supervision First

The supervision of the proposed agreement should be the first item on the agenda because at that time, our military pressure is the greatest and can be most easily maintained.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

6. Meeting Not in Communist Area

If we were to make the tremendous mistake of having the place of the conference under Communist control, we could expect, as in Korea, a series of humiliating "incidents", using every kind of device having symbolic significance in the Orient, intending to give them another psychological advantage. I think particularly of the device of having the victors sit on the side of the table facing south and the vanquished sit on the side of the table which faces north. This has quite a psychological meaning and will surely be done to us if we agree to sit on the Communist side of the demilitarized zone. We could also expect some pushing around by armed men.

7. Parties to Talk

The talks should be directly between the Government of South Viet-Nam and the Hanoi regime, having in mind a protocol between the two. The U.S. should be at the table, prepared to take a stand on withdrawal, contingent on Viet Cong behaviour -- not on what they promise, but on what they do.

8. ARVN to Inspect

While the ICC can be given a rather ceremonial function to observe and report on the carrying out of the protocol, the real vehicle of inspection will be the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam which must be able to conduct a constant and thorough inspection throughout the country at all times while the meeting is in progress.

9. U.S. Representation

The U.S. should be represented by clear, quick, experienced thinkers -- not necessarily prominent men of high rank.

There should be a U.S. rule never to concede anything for nothing. If, for example, the Communists suggest that we recess until Wednesday, they should always be made to pay for it. Otherwise, they tend to get overbearing and even more unreasonable than they are anyway. This may seem silly to Americans, but it is nonetheless good advice.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

10. Beware of Communist Techniques

Other Communist techniques are as follows:

- (1) to adopt thoroughly unreasonable positions (having in mind what they consider the American desire always to compromise) so that they can give them away after a long lapse of time as bargaining points. I can remember at the time of the United Nations meeting for a Korean peace conference, the way they seriously proposed the Soviet Union as a neutral member simply to have something to take up time with and to back down from;
- (2) never to accept inspection or supervision;
- (3) never to give up terrain; introduce a veto wherever possible;
- (4) whittle down all the points which finally get into the agreement -- which, of course, they firmly intend to dishonor and will dishonor unless we are strong enough to prevent them;
- (5) always to distort the truth;
- (6) always to try to compel and never to try to persuade;
- (7) regard all concessions by us as a sign of weakness;
- (8) and when the protocol is finally completed, to start walloping on it at every opportunity by interpreting the language differently from its clear and plain meaning.

In the immortal Tammany phrase; "Claim everything; concede nothing; and when defeated allege fraud."

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Saturday, January 15, 1966  
5:00 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Interview with Joe Kraft

1. I saw Joseph Kraft today and found him in a relatively mellow mood. He was interested mainly in the progress of the European nuclear problem, and he seemed satisfied with my account of our careful policy of working for real agreement, not by pressure but by patient work to determine the ways of reconciling the real interests and needs of the parties.
2. Kraft probed gently on the Shelepin visit, and I told him we did not know anything beyond the communique. The final subject of the discussion was a rather ~~wandering~~ exchange on the kind of Americans who are now important in the conduct of foreign affairs. Kraft seemed to me to be emphasizing the role of the so-called "Eastern establishment" too much, and I directed his attention to the influence and importance of Congress and other elements in our society.
3. There was no probing on any sensitive White House business, and it was one of our less edgy meetings.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sat., January 15, 1966  
4:50 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two telegrams from Ambassador Goldberg

1. I attach two telegrams from Arthur Goldberg to you which he has written at my suggestion after telling me on the phone this morning of his conversation with Dobrynin.

2. One of his cables mentions the problem of getting a quick answer to the pen-pal message which Dobrynin delivered last week. We are working on this and expect to have a State Department draft at the first of the week. These things always take time because the State Department has considerable internal resistance to this channel, but I agree with Dobrynin that it is important to make a prompt answer, and we will do so. A couple of weeks for an important topic of this sort is not too much.

3. Goldberg's other telegram reflects a regular refrain of Dobrynin's. I am inclined to agree that an occasional private message from a White House staff officer is useful. I think, for example, that before we end the pause it may be helpful for me to have a second lunch with Dobrynin to point out how much more we have done than he asked for. But I think it will be better not to go quite as far as people sometimes did in 1961-63.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET attachments~~

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Authority NLS 83-202  
By is, NARS, Date 6-19-84

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Saturday, January 15, 1966  
4:00 P.M.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG (USUN NY 3131)

Last night I had a private dinner with Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington at his invitation, accepted after consultation with Secretary Ball. Only ones present were Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin, Mrs. Goldberg and myself. It was largely a social evening but inevitably the Ambassador and I engaged in a conversation on matters of mutual concern. The following points it seems to me are of interest:

1. In response to my inquiry as to his reaction to the President's peace offensive, Dobrynin said of course he shares his Government's official position but privately he thought it was a good move.
2. Dobrynin made a point of emphasizing that in Kosygin's discussion of some time ago with Governor Harriman, Kosygin had expressed the conviction that Hanoi was not a puppet of the Chinese Communists. Dobrynin observed that Kosygin was a careful man who did not make observations of this significance lightly.
3. Dobrynin observed that he is awaiting with great interest Shelepin's report on his conversations in Hanoi. In context, the implication was plain that Shelepin had discussed Hanoi's reactions to our peace offensive and presumably had expressed some Soviet viewpoints concerning the peace offensive to Hanoi. He did not, however, state what that attitude was.
4. On his own motion, Dobrynin mentioned a recent letter from Kosygin to President Johnson concerning MLF. Dobrynin particularly emphasized the desirability in terms of future Soviet-American relations of an early response from the President to his communication. Dobrynin said this would be a very important factor in resuming what he termed to be a dialogue between President Johnson and Soviet leaders which had been interrupted "too long." Having no knowledge about a Kosygin letter, I made no observations whatsoever to him on this point.
5. In answer to an inquiry from me as to his personal attitude about a Security Council meeting on Vietnam if the present peace offensive fails, Dobrynin said the Soviet attitude would be determined by Hanoi's reaction. He added that if the leaders in Hanoi were unresponsive to the peace initiative, they would undoubtedly oppose a United Nations Security Council consideration of Vietnam and in that event the Soviets would vigorously oppose us in the Security Council on this issue.

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

6. On a more personal note, Dobrynin stated that before very long he would be leaving Washington for an important assignment in Moscow. Without expressly saying so, he left me with the impression that his post would be of sufficient importance to support his election to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Rec'd  
1/15/66  
Mr. Mc.  
4:29pm

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, January 15, 1966  
3:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comment on story by Stuart-Fox from Saigon

1. Marvin Watson says you would like my comment on UPI 203-A (attached), a "think" piece by Martin Stuart-Fox from Saigon on a so-called "lull" period.
2. It is true that there have been no large-scale ground force actions initiated by the Communists in the last few weeks. The level of smaller incidents has been as high as ever, and indeed reached its highest level ever in the week between Christmas and New Year's. The reduction in the following week, which you noted in your press conference, was to a level much higher than the 1965 average.
3. Stuart-Fox's article looks like a good piece of thumb-sucking after talks with knowledgeable military and political officers in Saigon. The best current guess here in Washington is that this is part of a characteristic ebb and flow of major enemy initiatives, and that there will probably be pretty large-scale Communist action beginning right after Tet period. This morning MACV has reported a captured order calling on all the comrades to get going then.
4. We do not have anything to confirm large-scale withdrawals into Cambodia, although there may have been some of this, and we do not have direct confirmation of one or two technical details at the end of the Stuart-Fox article.
5. In sum, my impression is that the article does a pretty good job of examining the notion of a lull and discounting its political meaning for the present. This is about where our own experts come out.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Saturday, January 15, 1966  
3:30 P.M.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

In a telegram to the Secretary of State I have reported on a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at a private dinner at his house in Washington last night pursuant to his invitation which I accepted after consultation with Secretary Ball. I have asked that this telegram be passed to the White House for your information (attached).

In addition to matters reported, Dobrynin privately said to me he regretted very much there was no informal line of communication between the White House and himself on important matters affecting Soviet-American relations. He said that during President Kennedy's administration such informal channel existed in the presence of the then Attorney General. He quickly added that because of Senator Kennedy's present position this obviously is no longer feasible but emphasized that another channel would in his opinion be helpful. He went on to say this did not in any way denigrate from his very cordial and close relations with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson. Rather his point was that Soviet leaders felt reassured if another channel to the President was open to them.

Lest there be any misunderstanding concerning my reporting this to you, I hasten at this point to say I do not regard myself to be the appropriate channel for this purpose.

If you think well of the idea at all, and you are in a better position to assess the desirability of such a channel than I am, I should think it ought to be someone on your staff in whose discretion you have complete confidence and who is in daily touch with you. Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, or any other of your trusted aides could be such a channel.

I merely report this to you for your information.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-110  
By us, NARA Date 8-25-97

~~SECRET-NODIS~~



203A

142

JUL 15 NX

BY MARTIN STUART-FOX

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

SAIGON (UPI)--THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES AND NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR TROOPS SINCE THE CHRISTMAS CEASE-FIRE AND MANY PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO ASK WHY.

THE LACK OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CONTACT HAS LED TO SPECULATION THAT HANOI HAS ORDERED A REDUCTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AT LEAST UNTIL THE COMMUNIST LEADERS HAVE ASSESSED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S CURRENT PEACE OFFENSIVE.

AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS IN VIET NAM CONSIDER THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREASE IN COMMUNIST-INITIATED INCIDENTS DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS AS HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC.

THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE WITHDRAWN THE BULK OF THEIR FORCES, IN THE BORDER AREAS AT LEAST, BACK ACROSS INTO CAMBODIA. THE QUESTION REMAINS WHY?

THERE ARE THREE POSSIBLE REASONS:

THE FIRST IS THAT HANOI, FOLLOWING A MAJOR DEFEAT OF ONE OF ITS LARGER UNITS AT THE HANDS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY TROOPERS LAST NOVEMBER, HAS ORDERED A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR BACK TO THE SO-CALLED PHASE TWO, CONSISTING OF SMALL SCALE GUERRILLA WARFARE, SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM.

THIS WOULD MEAN THAT HANOI IS CONVINCED THAT ITS TROOPS CANNOT FIGHT THE AMERICANS IN A PITCHED BATTLE AND THIS THEY ARE BY NO MEANS WILLING TO ADMIT.

A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT HANOI HAS ORDERED ITS FORCES TO AVOID CONTACT TO PREPARE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THOSE HOLDING THIS VIEW SUGGEST THAT THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE RECIPROCATING THE CESSATION OF AMERICAN BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM.

TO MOST PEOPLE IN VIET NAM WITH SOME EXPERIENCE OF COMMUNIST INTRANSIGENCEANCE, THIS EXPLANATION SEEMS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE.

THE THIRD POSSIBILITY, GENERALLY FAVORED HERE, IS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE PULLED BACK OVER THE BORDER TO REGROUP, RE-EQUIP AND REASSESS THEIR TACTICAL POSITION PRIOR TO RENEWING THEIR OFFENSIVE AFTER THE CHINESE NEW YEAR PERIOD FROM JAN. 20 TO 23.

THE VIET CONG NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE "PUPPET TROOPS" FOR THE FOUR-DAY HOLIDAY BUT MADE NO MENTION OF A SIMILAR CEASE-FIRE AGAINST AMERICAN, AUSTRALIAN OR KOREAN FORCES.

IT IS UNLIKELY THE VIET CONG AND THEIR NORTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES WILL MAKE ANY MOVES BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THEY MAY STEP UP THE PRESSURE AFTER THE HOLIDAY. AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS BELIEVE THAT THE LULL IN FIGHTING IS IN PREPARATION FOR AN OFFENSIVE RATHER THAN FOR PEACE.

FOR INSTANCE, TWO NEW COMMUNIST UNITS HAVE RECENTLY INFILTRATED FROM THE NORTH. THESE MOVES INDICATE PREPARATIONS FOR A LONG ESCALATED STRUGGLE RATHER THAN A PHASING DOWN OF THE CONFLICT.

THE UNITS ARE AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALION DESIGNATED SIMPLY AS H13 AND A UNIT EQUIPPED WITH AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF HEAVY 120MM MORTARS. THE AA BATTALION IS KNOWN TO BE EQUIPPED WITH 18 12.7MM HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, THE CHINESE EQUIVALENT OF THE AMERICAN 50 CALIBER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN, AND IS ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST HELICOPTERS. THE INFORMATION CAME FROM THREE PRISONERS CAPTURED DURING THE LAST WEEK BY A RECONNAISSANCE PATROL FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION OPERATING JUST EAST OF THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.

THE 120MM MORTARS WERE USED FOR THE FIRST TIME ALSO TWO WEEKS AGO AGAINST THE KHE SON SPECIAL FORCES CAMP WEST OF DA NANG. THE MORTAR HAS A RANGE OF 6,236 YARDS AND IS A GOOD WEAPON FOR ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICAN BASES. IT IS BELIEVED TO BE TRANSPORTED BY ELEPHANT IN SOUTH VIET NAM SINCE IT IS TOO HEAVY TO BE CARRIED BY COOLIES.

THE COMMUNISTS STILL REMAIN CAPABLE OF INFILTRATING UP TO 4,500 TROOPS A MONTH INTO THE SOUTH BUT MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN SAIGON ARE UNWILLING TO ESTIMATE EXACTLY HOW MANY ARE COMING IN NOW OR EVEN IF THE FLOW HAS DWINDLED DURING THE PAST MONTH. FEW PRISONERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE BORDER AREAS RECENTLY. SINCE THESE PRISONERS PROVIDE THE BEST SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE, IT IS UNKNOWN WHAT THE CURRENT INFILTRATION RATE IS.

HG1253PES

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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15

Saturday, January 15, 1966  
1:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 48-Hour Stopover in Honolulu for Dean Rusk

1. George Ball and I think you ought to know that we are engaged in a conspiracy to urge Dean Rusk to take 48 hours in Honolulu on his way home. He now plans to go to Manila on Sunday and leave on Monday. If we can get him to stop for some sun in Honolulu, he would be back here around Thursday. This is the only kind of holiday he ever takes, and he would also have a chance to catch up with Sharp, which would be helpful for both of them, in the same way that the Harriman/Lodge conversations should be helpful for both of them.

2. But George and I recognize that you should have a right to squash this conspiracy if you want to.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

McG -

I think you & George are  
right - urge him to do  
this for me

N

to

Don via GWS

RECORDED TO HANDWRITING FILE



~~SECRET~~

Saturday, January 15, 1966  
12:00 noon

16  
F  
16

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: - Memcon between Gen. Wheeler and Chiang Kai-Shek

1. Bus Wheeler has asked me to forward the attached memorandum of a conversation between himself and General Chiang Kai-Shek. His reason for doing so is simply that Chiang reportedly requested him to make sure that his views were known to you, and to Rusk and McNamara.

2. There is nothing new in this, and I don't think we should acknowledge it directly in return. It is much better for the Generalissimo to stay in channels, and he is constantly trying to move from the normal political lines of communication to military or intelligence channels which would increase our involvement with him.

3. In a sense, the problem of avoiding too close a connection with Chiang is the same as our problem with Norman Cousins, except they are at opposite ends of the spectrum. We need them both, but not too close.

McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 83-202

By is, NARS, Date 6-19-84



Sat., Jan. 15, 1960  
11:30 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

I don't think you have seen this letter from Diaz Ordaz. It is one of the nicest we have had in the course of the peace offensive, and I think you will want to read it. It requires no answer, since it is a reply to your letter to him.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

1/15/66

~~SECRET~~

TO: EYES ONLY PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY JSK

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

P's reply  
to Lodge  
etc.

The President has a private letter from Ambassador Lodge dated December 29 which raises the question of the potential role of American wives in establishing useful connections with the wives of leading Vietnamese. The Ambassador's letter suggests that wives of certain senior personnel be authorized to come to Saigon for occasional visits, perhaps to be hostess at an official dinner.

The President remains entirely unconvinced that such an arrangement is necessary or desirable, but he believes that it is a matter which you should decide after careful discussion with the Ambassador. The President would expect to follow your judgment and would approve any arrangement which you believed to be in the best interests of the U. S. effort in Vietnam as a whole. He wishes you to discuss and decide this matter directly with Ambassador Lodge and to explain to him that your discussion and decision are the President's answer to his letter.

The President has received so many direct and indirect messages on this general question that he would be glad if you could settle it so that he would not hear of it again.

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority NLS 83-202  
By ics, NARS, Date 6-19-84

~~SECRET~~

Returned without comment.

File 18a  
marked  
by Calk

18-b

Saigon, Viet-Nam,  
December 29, 1965.

~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Dear Mr. President:

A situation has become apparent here of which you ought to know - since it can actually endanger the American effort in Viet-Nam.

There are three facts:

1. In Viet-Nam the wives of the head men are enormously influential and can, in fact, play a decisive role. Vietnamese society has, with some justice, been called a matriarchy.
2. Vietnamese wives, for the most part, have what we would call a medieval outlook, centering everything on the family. By American standards, they are not filled with public spirit, patriotism, etc. Mrs. Ky, to my knowledge, begrudges the time her husband must devote to being Prime Minister and has spoken to me twice about it. Obviously, in a tight situation, this might make the difference between whether he stays or whether he leaves.
3. Yet there is no effective, intelligent, high-level American contact with these highly influential persons. Obviously, there is a limit to what I can do where the ladies are involved.

This is a job for the Ambassador's wife. Nothing lower ranking will do. And the same applies with respect to the wives of high Vietnamese officials in the fields of military affairs, economics, pacification, psychological warfare, etc.

The President,  
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Authority NLS 83-203

By rcs, NARS, Date 1-10-85



~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

-2-

I, therefore, suggest that the wives of the U. S. Mission Council ("Country Team" - not more than ten in number) be authorized (without their children, of course) to come to Saigon for an occasional visit on a purely voluntary basis, perhaps to be hostess at an official dinner. The other night at a dinner which I gave in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Ky, I was constrained to ask the Australian Ambassador's wife to be hostess - clearly not a solution to the problem. Neither was the problem solved by my having a lady Foreign Service Officer from the Embassy.

If you approve of the idea, I suggest that there be no formal announcement to the press, but that the matter not be concealed either. If questions were asked, the statement could simply be made that the wives had come to Saigon on an occasional visit for the purpose of necessary diplomatic representation. For background, it could be pointed out that the Australian and Korean Ambassadors' wives are in Saigon for the same reason.

If you wish a smaller list, you could take the five officials serving in Viet-Nam without fixed tours of duty, that is Porter, Westmoreland, Mann, Zorthian and myself. A slightly larger list of not more than 30 would make possible coverage of wives of essential Vietnamese officers below the Cabinet level.

I do not bother you about this for personal reasons, but only because I believe it to be of great importance to the success of the American effort.

You are, of course, assured in advance that I cheerfully and loyally accept any decision you may make.

With warm and respectful regards,

Very sincerely yours,

  
Henry Cabot Lodge

~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

✓ 18c

Saigon, Viet-Nam,  
December 29, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(~~Top Secret~~ Enclosure)

Dear Mac:

Herewith two letters for the President.

With warm regards,

As ever yours,

*LCVH 1.*

Henry Cabot Lodge

The Honorable  
McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD  
NOT RUTH SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY QCH ON 8-2-83

CONFIDENTIAL  
(~~Top Secret~~ Enclosure)

19  
19  
January 15, 1966

My dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for sending me your views in your letter of January 10 which Ambassador Goldberg has handed me.

I much appreciate your words of welcome for our efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam dispute and your expression of hope for success.

Of course I am also glad that you look with favor on our present pause in the bombing with no announced time limit. As you are aware, we have conveyed to Hanoi our desire to suspend the bombing and indicated that a reciprocal action on its part would have a favorable effect on possible extension of the suspension of the bombing and contribute toward peace.

I remain eager to exhaust every possible means of bringing the parties to the negotiating table. I want to be certain that every possible opportunity is afforded the other side to hear, comprehend and answer our pleas for peace.

I continue to hope you will do whatever you can to help bring an end to the tragic conflict in Vietnam. I want to express also my continuing appreciation for your untiring efforts in the cause of peace in Vietnam and elsewhere in the world.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
U Thant  
Secretary General of the United Nations

LBJ:McG B:mz

"Put that on my desk for in the morning." 20

Rita 2/15/66

LBJ/vm  
1/14/66  
8:15 pm



Rec'd  
7:25 pm  
1-14-66  
Pres. office.

21

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, January 14, 1966  
6:30 pm

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Norman Cousins

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202

By is, NARS, Date 6-19-84

1. Norman Cousins came back in today and says that he now has further word from the Polish Ambassador to the effect that the people in Hanoi would like him to come there. This complicates the problem. If we let Cousins go, we will be putting a well-known American into Hanoi at a time when speculation on the end of the pause is bound to be growing. And even if the Cousins trip did not hit the press, we would know he was there, and it would be very bad for our future propaganda proposition for the pause to end during his visit.

2. In a rather difficult conversation, Valenti and I have extracted from Cousins that if we told him his trip was not in the national interest, he would find the statement "very persuasive." But it is very clear too that he passionately wants to go and that he has invested a great deal of emotional capital in this expedition. In these circumstances a negative decision from us would probably create a sore in his mind which would eventually fester. Since Norman does not under-estimate his importance in history, it would be only too easy for him to conclude that we had missed the last train for peace in turning down his trip. And his editorial page in the Saturday Review is one of the three or four most influential in the country with the more respectable peace-lovers.

3. In all the circumstances, my own inclination is to keep pushing this decision ahead of us by waiting to see when the people in Hanoi really set a time for the visit, which they have not yet done. If they do not come in in a very few days, I think we have Cousins conditioned to the notion that he should tell them that the passage of time and personal business have made it impossible for him to go at present.

4. On the other hand, if Cousins does get a direct invitation in the next day or so, then my own current thinking is that we should probably let him go. In that context, his visit could serve as one last clear proof of our willingness to leave absolutely no stone unturned. It is true that a Cousins visit to Hanoi would have much center and right-wing criticism, but our excuse would be simply that he went as a journalist -- and we have validated visas for journalists to hostile countries before now.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

22

Friday, January 14, 1966  
8 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Office Telephone System

1. I attach a memorandum from Bromley Smith to me on the White House telephone services of our offices. I have reviewed the reasons for his decisions and the justifications for the phones which he is not removing, and I am agreed that he has made the appropriate changes.

2. In the Situation Room itself we still have more lines than we need, except when there is a crisis. But Brom Smith has a very vivid recollection of the time last spring when there was deep inconvenience to some very senior people because of the strain which a moment of tension puts on all of the telephone lines down there. We put in one new White House line during that crisis, and we have decided to keep it on the theory that if you keep your umbrella with you, it may not rain.

McG. B.

January 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Office Telephone System

After a thorough review of our telephone services, I am ordering the following changes in our system:

1. In my office, the removal of an extension instrument and disconnection of 2216 from the White House board.
2. In the outer office disconnection of the direct Defense Department line OX 6-2379 and two direct lines, one to the Military Aide's Office and another to the lower level.
3. In the Situation Room we are disconnecting a direct line to the Navy Flag Plot, a direct line to the Army War Room and one number (429) from the Communications Agency switchboard.

Disconnecting the one line in my office and removal of the extension will bring a savings of \$19.00 per month, which is paid for by the National Security Council and therefore would not show a reduction to the White House charges. The Defense line in the outer office is paid for by the Defense Department but I will not have the exact cost until Monday. All three of the lines to be disconnected in the Situation Room are billed to the White House Communications Agency and will show them a savings of approximately \$24.30 per month for the direct lines and \$0.80 for 429.

Bromley Smith

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Bundy	2217	NSC
	2218	NSC
	3-560	NSC
	3-527	NSC
	3-528	NSC
	424 (Sig)	

Smith	2215	NSC
	✓2216	NSC
	425 (Sig)	
	✓OX 6-2379	

[Chase] McCafferty	2154	NSC
[Chase]	581	NSC
McCafferty	421 (Sig)	
	697	NSC

Situation Room	426 (Sig)	
	427 (Sig)	
	429 (Sig)	
	✓2153	NSC
	✓2137	NSC

Instruments

Bundy	1 call director	1 small
Smith	1 call director	1 small
Outer office	4 call directors	1 small
Lower office		6 small

Situation Room		
Duty Office	3 call director	
Conference room	4 small (1 PL)	



BUNDY

Mr. Bundy has the following numbers:

2217 (WH)	3-528 (WH)
2218 (WH)	424 (Sig)
3-560 (WH)	
3-527 (WH)	

There are also a number of special PL's

Mr. Bundy also has a Secure KY-3.

Smith's Office

1 - call Director with following numbers

*Bundy  
lines* | 2217 (WH)                      3-528 (WH) ] *Bundy lines*  
2218 (WH)                      424 (Sig)  
560(WH)                      2215 (WH) \*  
527(WH)                      ✓2216 (WH) \*  
   425 (Sig) \*  
   ✓OX 6-2379 (Defense)

INT.  
PL to McCafferty  
PL to Situation Room

✓ 1 - WH instrument with: (*Extension*)

3-528 (WH), 2215 (WH), 2216 (WH), 425 (Sig), OX 6-2379 (Defense)

1-KY 3 Secure Phone

~~*Extension*~~

OUTER OFFICE

4 call directors with following numbers:

(Seibert, Zayac, Martin)	3-528 (WH)	Int.
2217 (WH)	424 (Sig)	Int.
2218 (WH)	2215 (WH)	✓10KE 3191*
3-560 (WH)	2216 (WH)	✓Col. buzz**
3-527 (WH)	425 (Sig)	Bundy
	✓OX 6-2379	Smith

Note: \*Connected to Aides Office; \*\*Not connected; Miss Zayac also has President PL.

(Miss Boyce)

2217 (WH)	3-528
2218 (WH)	424 (Sig)
3-560 (WH)	2215
3-527 (WH)	2216
	President
	✓OX 6-2379

1 White House phone with 2215, 3-560 (extension)

LOWER OFFICE

4 White House and 2 Signal instruments <sup>as</sup> follows:

McCafferty - WH with 3 numbers: 421 (Sig), 697 (WH), 2154 (WH), PL to Smith, Int.

Gott - WH with 3 numbers: 421 (Sig), 697 (WH), 2154 (WH), int.

Roberts - WH with 3 numbers: 421 (Sig), 697 (WH), 2154 (WH)

Chase - WH with 3 numbers: 421 (Sig), 581 (WH), 2154 (WH), int.

Booth - Signal with 4 numbers: 421 (Sig), 581 (WH), 697 (WH), 2154 (WH), int.

Secretary - 1 Signal with 4 numbers: 421 (Sig), 581 (WH), 697 (WH), 2154 (WH), int.

257  
lines  
2154  
697  
581  
421 Sig  
for 7 people



JANUARY 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. MOOCK

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONES PAID FOR BY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AS YOU REQUESTED, HERE IS AN ANALYSIS OF OUR LATEST BILLING FROM THE TELEPHONE COMPANY COVERING WHITE HOUSE PHONES CHARGED TO AND PAYABLE BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

<u>BUILDING LOCATION</u>	<u>BRANCH NUMBER</u>	<u>ASSIGNED TO</u>	<u>CURRENT COST PER MO.</u>
EOB	2062	MR. COOPER	\$ 2.35
EOB	2065	MR. BOWDLER	\$ 2.60
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	527	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$ 2.60
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	528	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$ 2.60
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	560	MR. BUNDY	\$16.60
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	581	MR. CHASE	\$ 4.45
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	697	MR. MC CAFFERTY	\$ 6.85
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2137	SITUATION ROOM	\$ 4.20
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2153	SITUATION ROOM	\$ 2.60
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2154	MESSRS. CHASE--MC CAFFERTY	\$ 4.20
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2215	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$12.90
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2216	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$19.00
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2217	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$32.70
WHITE HOUSE W.W.	2218	MESSRS. BUNDY-SMITH	\$16.85
5225 PARTRIDGE LANE (MR. BUNDY'S HOME)	2377	MR. BUNDY	\$18.95

THE ABOVE BREAKDOWN SHOWS A TOTAL OF 15 WHITE HOUSE PHONES AND ALLIED EQUIPMENT PAID FOR BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AT AN AVERAGE COST OF \$149.45 PER MONTH.

C. F.  
C. FEICHTNER

222

JANUARY 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. MOOCK

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C7  
C. FEICHTNER

22j

22j

JANUARY 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. MOOCK

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C7  
C. FEICHTNER



Return to 226  
Mr. Mook

December 12, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR BROMLEY SMITH, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NSC

Through: Charles E. Johnson

Subject: Telephone Costs in White House West Wing - NSC Group

Mr. John J. McNally is reviewing the telephone costs at the White House. These costs have risen from around \$52,000 to well over \$100,000 and he is looking about for ways and means to cut down the direct charges to the White House. He asked me to attend a meeting this morning with him and his Administrative-Fiscal officers (Carson Howell and Wilbur Jenkins) for the purpose of reviewing the telephone situation in the West Wing as it relates to Mr. Bundy and the NSC Group located there and asking the NSC to pay approximately \$150 a month telephone costs for the following stations now charged to the White House:

Telephone no.

527	- Bundy	
528	- Smith	
581	- Situation Room	
654	- Kaysen	[Cooper] ?
2153	- Situation Room	
2062	- Kaysen	[Korn] ?
2065	- Smith, Room 368, EOB	[Boulden]
2154	- Smith	[Baker]
2215	- Smith	
2216	- Bundy	
2217	- Bundy	
2218	- Bundy	

12 stations @ \$11.49 per station = \$138.88  
(approximate \$150.00 per mo.) per month.

2377 - Bundy residence \$17.05 per month

Mr. McNally proposed that the NSC pay for 13 stations which includes Mr. Bundy's residence installation. I objected on the ground that this appeared to me a normal and proper White House charge. I also questioned our being asked to pay for all of the telephone stations charged to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Kaysen who are White House Assistants and whose use of the telephones is an appropriate charge to White House operations. I did agree that the NSC operations now established in the West Wing made it difficult from an administrative viewpoint to draw a line in the payment of expenses and I added that I felt NSC was contributing a fair share by paying the salaries of 8 persons who are working full-time on White House assignments at no cost to the White House.



-2-

At the close of the meeting I conceded that \$150 a month did not seem to be an ex~~or~~bitant charge but the final decision would be up to you.

*Lois G. Mooch*

Lois G. Mooch  
Administrative Officer

**Note:**

Since writing this memorandum we have checked with the GSA and find that station 2065 which is the White House line in your EOB office is paid for by the NSC. Therefore, the number of stations for which White House is requesting billing would be 11. If we are going along with the proposal to pay our share the difference in cost for one station would not appreciably alter the over-all request for \$150.

September 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL WHITE HOUSE OFFICES

The White House telephone operators have made all of our jobs so much easier and so much more pleasant that indications are that we have placed an undue burden upon them. The number of telephone calls into and originating from the White House have increased considerably from month-to-month.

Because of this, you are requested as of this date to dial direct on a code line whenever possible. I suggest a desk directory of those whom you call most frequently for you, your secretary and others making calls from your office. A Directory is attached for handy reference.

Your complete cooperation in this request will be much appreciated.

W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant  
to the President

Attachment

Friday, 5:00 p.m.  
January 14, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here's the latest from Wilson on Rhodesia. He's clearly anxious to keep you fully in the picture, partly because you've been more sympathetic than the rest of the USG and partly because he may want more help later.

This message is only to fill you in on the Commonwealth Conference and Wilson's visit to Kaunda, both of which went well. Now that most Commonwealth Africans agree to let Wilson have more time, the pressures from the radical Africans should be blunted for a while.

Perhaps the key point is the Wilson and Kaunda agreement that Zambia should not cut its economic links with Rhodesia till at least mid-February. When this happens, however, airlift demands will go way up. Also of note is that Wilson is quietly trying to position himself to use force for the final kill.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By rw, NARA, Date 2-6-98

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer  
m.d.s.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 98-166**  
**By ics, NARA Date 4-28-99**

~~SECRET~~

22  
23a  
Friday, January 14, 1966 - 11:20 AM

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

I am now back in London after my round Africa safari having seen all seven African heads of government with whom we are in relations, the only notable omissions being of course Nkrumah and Nyerere. It has been well worth while and I think my Commonwealth and African constituencies are now quiescent at least for the time being.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at Lagos went in the end far better than I could reasonably have hoped. The meeting itself was not without its moments, particularly my debate with Field Marshal Margai of Sierra Leone about an opposed landing in Rhodesia on the first day and a very rewarding closed session at the end of the second day when only heads of government were present without their advisers and in the course of which I was able to take them pretty fully into my confidence both about present policies and future objectives. As you will have seen from the communique the Commonwealth as a whole have reaffirmed their recognition that Rhodesia is a British responsibility and while in a sense I have had to account to them for that responsibility, they are now content to let me discharge it for the time being in my own way. There were some members -- a minority I am glad to say -- who still hankered after the use of force: but the Commonwealth collectively has agreed to give sanctions a fair run. Your own decision on asbestos and lithium could not have been better timed to make maximum impact. The meeting was I think a victory for moderation. It has strengthened the Commonwealth vis a vis the extremists of the Organization of African Unity and it has held at least for the time being, the position in the United Nations on Chapter VII. It has added to the prestige of the sound moderate leaders like Abubakar above all, I have avoided being pressed any further than my public position in the House of Commons. The price of this has been the very modest one of the establishment of two committees to meet in London and an undertaking to meet the Commonwealth again if, by July, sanctions have still not succeeded in their objective, to that extent time has been gained. All in all commonsense and realism prevailed.

I then went on to Lusaka where I have had very good meetings with Kaunda, both privately and with his ministers. Your own very helpful message had eased my path for me.

I had two main objectives: first, to secure Kaunda's agreement that plans for the quck kill (the closing of the Zambian frontier with Rhodesia) should be carefully coordinated between Zambia and Britain, Kaunda is no longer suicidal and I managed not only to secure acceptance that we should not

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

proceed to the second front before mid February, but I also have a fair prospect of getting their agreement, that even when the Zambian frontier is closed to Rhodesian industrial goods, coal will be exempt, with all that that means in airlift terms. This date of mid February is the earliest at which, on the best expert advice, it would be prudent to contemplate delivering the death blow to illegality. Even so it may mean that Zambia will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis for a period of indeterminate length.

My second objective was to try and persuade Kaunda to accept British forces in Zambia so that at the right moment, they would be ready to move into Rhodesia either invited or unopposed. On this I think I have got Kaunda away from his insistence on placing troops across the Zambezi and though he has not yet agreed to accept a Commonwealth presence on the Zambian side of the frontier with Rhodesia, he is now, I think, at least more ready to contemplate something along lines I could accept. All in all, he is a bit more relaxed, much more ready to give sanctions a chance, and does at least accept that we really mean to bring Smith down. He does of course feel himself very exposed economically and, politically, he finds it very difficult to accept a position in which Zambia, for purely practical reasons, is forced to take up a less uncompromising attitude than his fellow Africans towards commercial ties with Rhodesia, because of the inevitable interdependence of the two neighbor economies. For the time being, however, I think we have got him on the rails again.

In Nairobi I had an hour meeting with Kenyatta, and found him as usual wise, relaxed and completely sympathetic, both on sanctions and on the inevitability of gradualness towards majority rule in the reconstruction period.

As you will have seen, the Commonwealth Secretary did not in the end manage to get to Salisbury to see the Governor. But as I indicated in my earlier message, I can play at home the difficulties about personal safety and recognition as usefully as if he had gone in. My qualms about the Governor remain, home African and world fronts now in tolerable order -- and I realize of course that the most overworked phrase in this message has been for the time being -- I can now concentrate on the internal Rhodesian situation.

All in all, the past week has been time well spent. The situation has of course been transformed by the oil sanctions and the working of the Zambia airlift. In consequence the Commonwealth in general and Commonwealth Africans in particular now accept Britain's responsibility and good faith

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

and this means that we can now make the running ourselves. The point of major difficulty which lies ahead is how to translate economic hardship in Rhodesia into a political readiness to capitulate. For this the Europeans in Rhodesia will have to be given some assurances for their future as well as evidence of continuing and growing hardship if they persist in rebellion. The time is approaching therefore when I shall have to make a public statement on our peace aims. This I shall probably have to do before Parliament reassembles during the last week of January. This will have to be accompanied by a further tightening of the sanctions screw in order to demonstrate that we are not peace-making from weakness. You have experience in such strategy. I will be in touch with you again.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

24  
✓  
Friday, January 14, 1966  
3:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Top Level Reorganization in Saigon

Dave Bell, Bob McNamara, George Ball and I have now had a chance to talk some more about top level organization in Saigon which you asked me to work on at the end of December.

There is fairly general agreement now that the most important gap in Saigon is in the overall command of the pacification effort and establishing real security in a growing number of villages. According to Bell and others this is more critical than the task of resource allocation.

There is also considerable agreement that the right man to run this pacification job is Deputy Ambassador Porter. He has fully lived up to the expectations of his backers, and McNamara and I have both decided that our doubts of last summer are unjustified.

Porter's only trouble is that he has become fully indispensable to Lodge in a lot of day-to-day administration and hand-holding. The pacification job is a full time task, and if we settle on Porter, we shall have to get another senior diplomat type to support Lodge on the things that Porter is doing now. A lot of us lean toward Leonard Unger for this job.

In addition to a pacification chief, we need a stronger requirements planning group in Saigon to deal with the real problem of resource allocation. But we think this could be done by finding the right first-rate bureaucrats. We do not see room in Saigon for a business executive. There is agreement that MACV and AID have plenty of management. What they lack is coordinated planning and control, and we are now inclined to think that this job can be done by Lodge, Westmoreland and Porter with the right staff support.

A pacification chief in the field will need a back-up man here. We are still working on that problem of organization and should have a concerted recommendation for you soon.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

To persuade Lodge of the virtue of these changes is likely to mean a trip to Saigon for one of us, and I would like to do this myself. There is a slight problem of timing, however, as I do not think I ought to go to Saigon while the pause is going on because my last trip was so intimately associated with the initiation of the bombing. My current thought, therefore, is that Porter (who is here now) should go out and talk this matter over with Lodge in a preliminary way, and that I might follow early in February.

None of this requires immediate decision, but it is background for the suggestion that you might wish to see Porter briefly before he goes back. He will be here until Monday morning. Quite aside from the organization problem, he has a lot of interesting things to say about the situation in Saigon today, and he will give you good value for a fifteen minute appointment.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Arrange an appointment ✓

Let him go back \_\_\_\_\_



Fri., Jan. 15, 19 , 12:35 PM

25

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the text of the first Hanoi radio comment on the State of the Union speech, together with a preliminary comment from Embassy Saigon. Public comment is not decisive, but this is certainly not encouraging. However, it becomes an important part of the evidence to be used if and when we decide to resume bombing.

McG. B.

Pres. saw  
this - file  
completer file  
in PPal folder  
off file

PPal  
sent to P  
w/letter  
note 1/13

125  
L Pres  
1/17/66 -  
merely untitled

P. S. The message is well worth reading because it is more reasonable in tone than public Soviet statements. My first reaction is that it calls for a very careful and balanced reply, and a somewhat more responsive one than we may get from the State Department draft. We will watch this closely here so that the choices are plain when it comes to you.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

*Sent to  
P. W. Brown  
note 262*

TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE HANDED ACTING SECRETARY  
OF STATE BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN,  
JANUARY 11, 1966, 6:00 P.M.

Dear Mr. President,

We have decided to address this communication to you in order to set forth our views on a question, the urgency of which is recognized by everybody. This question is the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has been discussed for a long time on a bilateral basis and at international conferences, but the solution of which has not progressed so far.

The Soviet Government, as you undoubtedly know, attaches great significance to the problem of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We believe that if the dissemination of these terrible weapons of mass destruction is not blocked and these weapons continue to spread more and more throughout the world, that would inevitably lead to the growth of the threat of war and would immeasurably increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Having in mind the importance of this problem the Soviet Government submitted it for consideration by the twentieth session of the UN General Assembly, by introducing a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are aware of the official position of your Government on this question. We have taken note of the statement of the U.S. Government, transmitted on December 8, 1965, through Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that it is interested in reaching an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and that "the objective (of such an agreement) should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated". We also note that the U.S. Government agreed that such a treaty, as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1965 adopted at its twentieth session, "should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form".

If one proceeds from these statements it would not seem to be very difficult to work out a mutually acceptable text of a non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The American draft treaty and even more steps actually taken by the U.S.A. indicate that the Governments of our countries by no means give the same content to the very notion of "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".

The Soviet

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading  
and declassification.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 11, #108

By jc. NARA. Date 7-9-03

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

The Soviet Government has in mind such a treaty which would really exclude the possibility of any dissemination of nuclear weapons whatever which would make it impossible for non-nuclear powers to acquire access to these weapons in any form, directly or indirectly.

As for the Government of the U.S.A., our understanding is that while declaring its readiness to reach an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has in mind an agreement which would provide a significant exception to the principle of non-proliferation by permitting the implementation of plans, now under discussion within the framework of NATO, for providing access to nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear member states of this military alliance, including West Germany. It is precisely this that is the main difference between the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government has frequently drawn the attention of the U S. Government to the fact that statements on striving to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons are in no way compatible with actions actually leading to the spread of such weapons. We have invariably emphasized, since we have most weighty reasons for doing so, that what is especially dangerous is a policy of satisfying step by step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government, creating thereby conditions which make it easier for the West German revanchists to get access to nuclear weapons.

Indeed, it is a fact that the U.S.A. on an evergrowing scale provides the FRG and other NATO allies with atomic information. It is a fact that the U.S.A. trains military personnel of those countries in the methods of using nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the U.S.A. provides some of its allies, including the FRG with the very weapons which are capable of carrying nuclear shells, although it declares at the same time that the nuclear warheads for such weapons remain under the control of the U.S. Moreover, as it was recently reported in the Western press, American nuclear warheads are now not only assigned to the armed forces of several non-nuclear member-states of NATO and deployed on their territories but in some cases West German planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel are even equipped with these nuclear warheads.

There are going on in NATO and at bilateral meetings of representatives of Western powers active discussions of various plans, the essence of which, no matter what might be said, is only one thing: how and to what extent to satisfy the growing nuclear demands of West Germany. A new concession to West Germany which creates obstacles on

the road

~~SECRET~~



the road to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the proposal providing for the FRG's participation in decisions on the question of nuclear strategy in NATO within the framework of the so-called "McNamara committee".

And today the Bonn Government is now putting forward new claims and is getting ready to demand even more tomorrow. The final goal pursued by the West German Government is obvious, although it tries meanwhile to camouflage it, is the possession of nuclear weapons.

Frequent attempts have been made to convince us that West Germany allegedly has no such goals and its access to nuclear weapons is not involved. But what is left of these assurances if the Defense Minister of the FRG von Hassel openly states that West Germany will not be satisfied until it possesses atomic weapons, and other Bonn leaders now publicly say that the FRG will not sign a non-proliferation agreement if it blocks the creation of a NATO nuclear force.

Thus, the FRG Government in effect challenges the whole world, the United Nations, which called for earliest conclusion of a treaty to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons. And how can one evaluate statements by the head of the West German Government that during his recent visit to the U.S.A. he received not only a promise to provide West Germany with "appropriate participation in nuclear defense" of NATO, but also agreement that the settlement of NATO nuclear problems would be given priority over the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty?

These statements by leaders of the FRG Government were not refuted by the American side although their meaning is at variance with the position of the U.S. Government as it was stated to us in the communication of December 8 and earlier statements made to us by official representatives of the USA. Moreover, the Western press has carried a report that the United States indeed gives priority to NATO nuclear plans in the belief that the non-proliferation agreement can wait, since even if these plans should be resolved, the Soviet Union allegedly would not abandon its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In connection with such baseless speculations we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that no matter what intentions the United States and other Western powers may have in connection with those plans now under discussion in NATO, the Soviet Union will never agree that West Germany should acquire access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. No matter how one evaluates the FRG's policy, -- we know

that your



~~SECRET~~

-4-

that your assessment of this policy differs from ours , -- one thing is clear: the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons would create a direct threat to European states and would cause a new, sharp aggravation of the whole international situation.

The Soviet Government has already unequivocally stated that if the FRG got access to nuclear weapons either through a multilateral or an Atlantic nuclear force, on the basis of creating some "atomic committee" or in any other form, the Soviet Union would be forced to take all measures which it, along with its allies and friends, would consider necessary for securing peace in Europe. This is a question of the vital interests of the Soviet Union, and we not only have the right but believe it to be our duty -- this stems from the Potsdam agreements as well -- to prevent West Germany from becoming the source of a new war.

Now, Mr. President, the moment has come, when it is necessary to make a definite choice: either we shall firmly adhere to the position of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without any deviations from this position or the situation will inevitably lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is said that this whole question is still under consideration by your Government and that final decision has not yet been made. We would like to believe that this is so. Knowing that the decisive word on this rests with you, we hope that you will personally devote the most searching attention to this question.

The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is so important that it is necessary once again to weigh with utmost responsibility all possible consequences of the decision to be made. It would be a mistake in this matter to try to derive some unilateral advantages. A non-proliferation agreement must meet in equal measure the interests of all countries and all peoples.

For its part, the Soviet Government, consistently standing for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, is ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare such a non-proliferation treaty. Taking into account the considerations put forward by the American side in the statement of December 8, we propose that during the forthcoming session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, along with the discussions of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Committee itself, representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. carry on a bilateral exchange of views in order to expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty.

END.

~~SECRET~~

27

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thurs., Jan 13, 1966, 7:45 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have initialled the attached memorandum which Bill Bowdler prepared for my signature, but I ought to report that Tom Mann is lukewarm about this one. Partly this is because of Tom's coolness toward the Inter-American Bank, but more deeply it is because he has a temperamental distaste for this kind of public relations. Because he is very much the senior man in the Department on Latin American affairs, this attitude limits the number of suggestions of this sort that you get, and this particular one is the product of gentle pressure on Tom by Jack Vaughn, Bob Sayre, and Bill Bowdler.

*I agree  
think I ought to*  
I must say I hope you will do it. The hearts of the Latin Americans are ripe for the taking, and until you have the time to make a trip there, this kind of ceremony is the next best thing. *2*

*McB.*

MCG. B.

NOTED TO HANDWRITING FILE

*Yes! Mr  
Bowdler*



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, January 13, 1966  
11:00 a.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Loan Signing Ceremony

By the end of the month there will be ready for signature three important loan authorizations or agreements with three key Latin American countries. Two of them are our program loans to Brazil and Chile. The third is a \$20 million loan by the Inter-American Development Bank to Peru for development of Indian communities. This loan will come from the Bank's Fund for Special Operations, the assets of which are largely from us.

The signing ceremonies offer another good opportunity for you to identify yourself with Latin America and the Alliance for Progress. The three ceremonies could be combined into one and held at the headquarters of the Inter-American Development Bank here in Washington. The other participants would be Bank President Felipe Herrera and representatives of the three countries. We could probably also arrange for some Congressional participation. Your participation would have these additional advantages:

1. You could give the Inter-American Development Bank a boost for its good work and add to its prestige throughout the Hemisphere. You would be the first American President to visit the Bank since it was established in 1960.
2. Your signing the Brazilian agreement loan will be taken as a vote of confidence in the Castello Government and will probably serve as a stimulant to American private investment in Brazil.
3. The signing with Chile will associate you with President Frei's progressive "Revolution in Freedom" program. It will also undercut criticism that the Brazilian loan reflects the Administration's favoring of military governments.
4. By participating in a ceremony involving a substantial loan to Peru, you would undercut criticism from Senator Robert Kennedy and others that the Administration is withholding aid to Peru because of Peruvian refusal to settle its differences with the ESSO-owned International Petroleum Company.



If you would be interested in participating in such a ceremony, I will work out the necessary arrangements.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Wish to participate ✓.

Prefer not to participate \_\_\_\_\_.

Let's discuss further \_\_\_\_\_.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

28  
(2)  
JANUARY  
Thursday, ~~December~~ 13, 1966, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Talk with Scotty Reston

I had a long talk with Reston this afternoon. He thinks well of the State of the Union message, and he says that "along Embassy Row" it is being widely praised. He says that the diplomats praise it particularly because there were so many ways of saying something wrong about Vietnam, and you avoided all of them. (For diplomats, this is high praise.)

Reston said he agreed with the basic proposition that this country can do both its foreign and domestic business. He also agreed with the way you had stated the problem in Vietnam.

He then went on to express a strange worry. He said that the speech offered some comfort to Joe Alsop and some to Walter Lippmann, and some to him, on Vietnam. It offered some for the liberals and some for the conservatives domestically, but he said that he thought people really didn't believe in the comfort that was offered to them because there was a lack of confidence that the speech reflected a real set of policies and a real set of decisions in your own mind. I told him quite energetically that this was nonsense. I agreed that there were no predictions about Vietnam, but I said that I thought the speech very carefully set forth your own basic attitude and the national attitude, and that it was in fact an unusually precise exposition of the matter.

I went on to the domestic program (outside my field) to say that each item in it reflected a very substantial amount of staff work -- and more important, a basic decision on your part that these things belonged in your program and should have your support. I think I made some headway, but I fear that his next column will have something that will reflect his belief that the speech is not so much a declaration of policy as it is an effort to keep a verbal consensus together.

Reston complained about what he called a "certain touchiness" in the speech. I probed him as to what he was talking about, and he said he found the last paragraph of the speech a little defensive and even a little self-pitying. I said he ought to know you well enough to know that self-pity was not the

dominant quality in your character, and that he ought not to generalize in such a way from a few words about the burdens of the Presidency -- which after all exist.

He went on to say that he found much more of this self-pity and defensiveness in Dean Rusk, and even some in Bill Moyers. I attacked both propositions in the different ways appropriate to the two cases.

In an aside, Reston gave me quite a speech about Bill Fulbright, who is of course a very close friend of his. He thinks many of Bill's troubles derive from the unhappiness of his wife, and that her unhappiness in turn comes in large part from the knowledge that she is very ill, and Bill's unhappy struggle with a job he does not like is making life miserable for her too. Reston's feeling was that there was no real answer in policy terms or even in administrative terms to the painful position into which Fulbright's complex personality has led him, but that simple friendship between the Johnsons and the Fulbrights might be the most powerful single solvent. I myself have become persuaded that we will always have trouble with Fulbright, and that we ought to relax and enjoy them. I had not known about Mrs. Fulbright's illness, and I have to admit that I genuinely do not understand Senator Fulbright, although I like him personally as much as I dislike his basic view of international reality.

Reston has a deep disagreement with the argument about the relation between the press and the President's freedom of judgment which Bill Moyers developed recently in his interview with Niven. I told him I was not surprised to find a difference of view, and without arguing with him I made it clear that I did not share his view. In fact, I told him that some day after I left the White House I expect to tell the press a few home truths myself.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

Thurs., Jr 13, 1966  
1 PM

29

MR. PRESIDENT

Here is Dean Rusk's account of the meeting with Kosygin. It is characteristically well organized and thoughtful. Its conclusions sound right to me, and our end seems to have been held up very well indeed.

McG. B.

SECTO 10 New Delhi



Rec'd  
1-13-66  
101P

30

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

(2)  
Thursday, January 13, 1966  
11:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT - FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Rhodesian Sitrep. Wilson, who is handling Rhodesia personally, seems to have bought some time by his skillful handling of the Commonwealth Conference. However, the key remains Kaunda, whom Wilson is seeing today in an attempt to get Zambia to hold off cutting its own economic lifeline until sanctions have had a chance to work. Wilson's effort, backed by your message, should suffice for a time -- though many of us are skeptical that Kaunda will sit still long enough to give Wilson's strategy a full run.

Meanwhile, there are mildly encouraging signs that sanctions are beginning to bite in Rhodesia. We hear that the business community is hurting. State's best experts are now coming around to the view that it's no longer a question of whether sanctions will work but of whether Smith will cave before Kaunda or other Africans do something foolish.

If Smith caves, Wilson's plan is to restore direct UK rule via the Governor (who is still holding the fort in Rhodesia) and devise a new plan for gradual progress toward black majority rule. There is a risk, however, that even if Smith caves soon other extremists will take over, creating a chaotic situation in which Wilson may have to fly in troops.

In sum, even we skeptics are a little more hopeful now that Wilson's strategy may work. If so, he will have pulled our African chestnuts out of the fire along with his (although the success of economic sanctions will create an ominous precedent for the Portuguese and South African problems still down the road).

*A. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

*mph*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

34  
(2)  
The White House  
WASHINGTON

Thursday  
January 13, 1966  
11 AM  
McC. B.

Mr. President:

This is Lodge's weekly report. He is as optimistic as McNamara is pessimistic about the timing and likelihood of straight military success as against pacification. But I think he is right in his notion that the two should be kept separate in our minds.

incl. B.  
McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

✓

Thursday, January 13, 1966  
10:30 A.M.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 2514)

In my weekly telegram to you yesterday, I referred to the idea of the American public learning to live year in and year out with the Communist China style cold war in Asia as we had learned to live with the Soviet style cold war in Europe. I realize that I may have appeared unaware that it is not reasonable to expect American public opinion to live year in and year out with a hot war, in which substantial numbers of casualties are being incurred.

Let me therefore add to my telegram this thought:

The purely military war against the main force units of the Viet Cong and against the units of the North Vietnamese army must really have its back broken within the year 1966. (I assume we have the military wherewithal to do it.) But the pacification-uplift program to rebuild the countryside, which the Viet Cong have been systematically destroying for five years, necessarily will take longer. This pacification program, however, is a program which cannot involve heavy American casualties. While it does involve violence and killing, it is of a kind which must be done by the Vietnamese, and largely with police type techniques. The American participation is indispensable, but it is in the way of advice, providing the straight economic and social programs and being political catalysts for the whole.

I recommend, therefore:

A. That in this new war, which the North Vietnamese have recently inflicted on us and the South Vietnamese by bringing in North Vietnam troops, we take extremely drastic action against everything that pertains to North Vietnam, wherever it may be, so as completely and rapidly to neutralize and render harmless their military potential; and

B. In South Vietnam, continue to help the pacification-countryside-rebuilding-uplift program (which would not involve substantial American casualties) but which would go on for several years and which, I hope, the American public could learn to live with. Your handling of public opinion is so able -- particularly at this difficult time -- that I do not doubt your ability to do this.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Authority NLS 83-203

By ics, NARS, Date 1-10-85

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

- 2 -

I'm sorry if I was obscure on this point, but I try in all my telegrams to give you the thing that is preoccupying me at the moment -- in a way, to think out loud -- hoping that this may be suggestive and helpful.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~



Lead  
1-13-66  
P. H. H. H.  
1.00 am

32

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1

Thurs., Jan. 13, 1966  
9:00 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is still another message from Prime Minister Wilson. I will acknowledge that we have it, but I do not think it calls for an additional answer from you at this stage. You have answered him twice, and you have sent a message to Lusaka in response to his request.

M. B.  
McG. B.

Thurs., Jan. 13, 1961  
0845

F-33

MR. PRESIDENT:

This overnight message from George Ball to Dean Rusk gives a good summary of the current state of play on the peace offensive.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment



...NODIS PINTA FOLLOWS...

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INFO RUEHXC/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

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TOP SECRET JANUARY 13

NODIS PINTA FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SPECIAL SUMMARY NO. 5A

# 1. AYUB TALK WITH KOSYGIN

BHUTTO TOLD MCCONAUGHY THAT PURSUANT TO HARREMAN-AYUB TALKS IN PESHAWAR JANUARY 3 AYUB HAD DISCUSSED US PEACE INITIATIVE WITH KOSYGIN IN TASHKENT AND INSITED THAT THE US WAS SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDING TO BHUTTO, KOSYGIN TOOK HARD LINE IN RESPONSE, BLAMING US FOR COMPLICATING THE VIET-NAM SITUATION AND AFFIRMING THAT THE USSR INTENDED TO GIVE FURTHER AID TO DRV IN CORRELATION WITH CHICOM EFFORTS.

# 2. PRISONER EXCHANGE

WE HAVE INFORMED AMBASSADOR LODGE THAT ALTHOUGH FULLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ANY DISCUSSION OF PRISONERS WITH THE NLF, WE FEEL WE MUST PROCEED. DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE ICRC AND THE DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO MINIMIZE RISKS. FONMIN DO SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE ICRC PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE TALKS AND OUR INTENTION TO REPLY AFFIRMATIVELY.

# 3. DVN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

WE ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE APPEARANCE OF GVN/US DIFFERENCES ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HOPE THAT THE STATEMENT WILL REITERATE TRAN VAN DO'S FOUR POINTS OF JUNE.

# 4. DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER

PRIME MINISTER KRAG'S LETTER TO WILSON ON VIET-NAM IS FOLLOW-UP TO HIS NEW YEAR TV-RADIO ADDRESS. IT EXPRESSES ANXIETY IN DENMARK ABOUT VIET-NAM SITUATION AND WILLINGNESS NORDIC COUNTRIES TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

# 5. SHELEPIN VISIT TO DRV

AMBASSADOR KOHLER BELIEVES THAT SHELEPIN-PHAM VAN DONG SPEECHES AT JANUARY 11 SOVIET EMBASSY RECEPTION INDICATE SHELEPIN'S PRIMARY MISSION OF STRENGTHENING DRV-USSR TIES WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IT IS APPARENT ON THE OTHER HAND THAT IDENTITY OF VIEWS WAS NOT REACHED ON ALL TOPICS, NOTABLY THE SOVIET'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN DRV ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03



Wed., Jan. 12, 196  
4 45 pm

F-34

ME. PRESIDENT:

Arthur Goldberg has just delivered to me the attached letter to you from U Thant. It is not a helpful letter, because of the two lines at the top of page 2, and I doubt if we will want to give it any publicity.

I am asking Goldberg and the Department to think about an answer.

McG. B



10 January 1966

I am asking Ambassador Goldberg to be so kind as to deliver this message to you personally, since he has told me that he plans to go to Washington tomorrow.

It was very good of you to have Ambassador Goldberg come in to see me, immediately after my return from a week's absence, to inform me fully about the various aspects of the initiative you have taken towards bringing to a peaceful end the distressing situation in Vietnam.

My position on the various aspects of the Vietnam question has been made known to you and your distinguished predecessor over the past two years through my discussions with your representatives at the United Nations. You will readily appreciate, therefore, that I warmly welcome every effort designed to move the Vietnam conflict from the battleground to the conference table. I most earnestly hope that the efforts which you are now making in this direction will lead to a peaceful settlement of this tragic problem.

You are, of course, well aware also of my position with regard to the cessation of bombing and therefore you will know that I look with favour upon the present pause in the bombing; the more particularly so, since no time limit has been indicated for the present pause, which

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



is consistent with my conviction that any such pause, if it is to have the intended effect, must be of indefinite duration.

I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for keeping me fully informed of your efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Wed., Jan. 12, 19  
4:35 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

I think you will want to know that the Vice President, Dean Rusk, and Bowles have an appointment with Kosygin at 2:30 pm New Delhi time tomorrow, Jan. 13. This works out at 4:30 a.m. here. George Ball is bringing them fully up to date on the state of the play on Vietnam.

McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~

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END462

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

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FOLL SENT ACTION FLASH SECSTAE SECTO FOUR JAN 12

FM NEWDELNI SIGNED RUSK

MODIS-PINTA

FOR ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

VICE PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR BOWLES AND I HAVE APPOINTMENT  
WITH KOSYGIN AT 1430 LOCAL TIME JANUARY 13. WOULD APPRECIATE  
CABLE ON ANY LAST-MINUTE DEVELOPMENTS. RUSK

BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



36

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed. Jan. 12, 1966  
4 30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT: *re*

This is a short answer to a rather long letter from George McGovern, but I think it is probably best not to get into a debate with him on this particular far-out idea. My own reaction to his notion is that <sup>such</sup> a letter from you to Ho would almost surely be misread in Hanoi as a sign of U. S. weakness.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

January 12, 1966

Dear George:

I want to thank you for your letter of January 10 with its interesting proposal. I will have this particular idea carefully considered, and without commenting directly upon it I do want you to know once more that there is literally no place I would not go, and no person I would not meet in the interest of a decent and peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

Thank you again for writing.

Sincerely,

LS/ LBJ

The Honorable George McGovern  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:McG B:mz

321  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., Jan. 12, 1966  
4 PM

Mr. President: (2)

Harriman reports on his  
conversation with Menzies,  
who is as stout as ever. The  
third paragraph is particularly  
interesting.

McG. B.

Chas Cooper:  
You - Thompson will  
be interested in this  
myth

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRHS 64-68, 101.27, #10

By jc NARA. Date 7-9-03

Wednesday, January 12, 1966  
3:30 P.M.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS - PINTA

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM GOV. HARRIMAN

In call on Menzies at his request Tuesday afternoon, we had an hour's reappraisal of talks with cabinet in office and at Elinner. Although recognizing it is impractical to bring UK into Anzus Treaty, he emphasized the need for regular consultations on four-power basis. He considered it of prime importance that UK continue global responsibilities and it was not good for the U.S. to be only global power. He hopes we will make this plain to Healey in upcoming talks in Washington and not accept a British policy of gradual pull-out of the Far East.

In reply to my comment that he had a bunch of hawks in the cabinet urging escalation of North Vietnam bombing, he said he and the majority would urge caution and approved 100 percent present U.S. policies not to take dangerous action in North Vietnam but urged maximum pressure to break up and weaken the Viet Cong in the South even at the cost of more casualties. The Australian people are prepared for losses and fully support the government. He approves of the pause and hopes that it will be played to get maximum benefit of world opinion, and that it will be continued until after Tet with resumption if possible after some sort of provocation.

On the question of increased Australian troops in Vietnam, he asked me to report to the President that "we are moving towards a greater contribution but commitment must await talks with Healey in Canberra at the end of January. We are not walking out on Vietnam. The Australian public is with us although a few left wingers will try to make it a campaign issue." He maintains Vietnam is today central to global conflict with Communism not a regional matter and hopes that more European countries will recognize this and make a greater contribution in material assistance if not troops. De Gaulle should be ignored. In his opinion Red China is the greatest danger to Communist expansion and peace. He opposes admittance of Peking to UN as long as possible but we must act soon enough in promoting two China policy with Formosa membership assured. He wants continuing consultation with us on this subject.

Menzies decries attempt of African countries to use Commonwealth to tell U.K. what to do in Rhodesia and fears it might become an issue with Australia in New Guinea. When Nkrumah expounded one man one vote, Menzies had pointed out that the Ghanaians did not even have a choice since there was only one slate with opposition safely in jail. Although he

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS - PINTA



~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS - PINTA

himself will encounter difficulties he is confident of victory of coalition over labor in election.

He expressed appreciation to the President for my visit saying it was timely, useful and handled just right. He also very much appreciated the confidential information I had given him personally. All told he feels U.S. -Australian close understanding is certainly to the advantage of both but wants to bring in U. K., also Canada, if it wants. He visualizes development of responsibility of Japan, India and other Asian countries slowly as they grow in strength and stability.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS - PINTA

Wed., Jan. 12, 1966, 3 PM

Mr. President:

38

Here is an interesting account of the Yugoslav efforts as reported by Korry from Addis Ababa. It sounds plausible, and it shows the underside of Soviet thinking, which the Yugoslavs are in an ideal situation to see. The Soviet-Yugoslav view in Paragraph 3 is interesting because if they are really interested in moving in that direction, they will get some encouragement from the State of the Union which has a passage aimed at just this point.

McG. B.

Addis Ababa 890

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

39

Reid  
1/12/66

Wed., Jan 12, 1966, 1:45 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

(2)

Here is Lodge's weekly report. I think paragraph 10 on the top of page 3 argues against a direct reference to our contact with Hanoi in the State of the Union.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Wednesday, January 12, 1966  
1:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 2503)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Outlook for 1966

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 019-006-1-1  
By JP, NARA, Date 12-11-01

This is the period before the Vietnamese New Year and may be a good time for a backward glance and a look ahead.

2. The change in the situation here since your decision to commit U.S. troops has been spectacular.

3. Before your decision, we were at a smoldering stalemate which was gradually slipping us over the edge. The Government of South Vietnam was even worrying as to whether it could survive or would be forced to give up. The politically minded Vietnamese, being unsure of our position, were trying to make hedges for their own future, with government instability the result. There was real worry as to whether the Viet Cong would succeed in cutting the country in two and setting up a separate "capital" at someplace like Kontum or Pleiku. The Viet Cong main force units were absolutely impregnable in their jungle underground redoubts and could be counted upon always to destroy the government's efforts to rebuild the countryside and eliminate terrorism. Underlying all these troubles was the doubt as to whether or not we would stay.

4. Your decision signified an American commitment and, after it, the Vietnamese said to himself in effect, "If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself." The present government has thus been in power more than six months instead of the three weeks that was predicted (to be sure, no predictions can yet be made about government stability). Our military have learned how to cope with the main force units of the Viet Cong and with the redoubts, which has created an unprecedented opportunity for pacification and rebuilding the countryside. There is ground for some solid satisfaction because of signs of demoralization of the Viet Cong, which is reflected in the highest monthly total of defection on record during November. If the above paragraph were a complete report, we would all be feeling pretty good today.

5. But on the unfavorable side is the entrance of the army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam. This has transformed the nature of the war. It is in effect a new war. I believe, however, that while this can delay success, it cannot prevent it. The Viet Cong main force and the North

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS



Vietnamese army, according to the CIA station chief as of January 6, aggregate about 43,630 -- or about 25 percent of the total Communist manpower. We know much more about how to handle the Communist militarily and we also have made progress on a formula for dealing with Communist subversion/terrorism by means of pacification and rebuilding the countryside. If, therefore, we remain steadfast, I look for fundamental progress in 1966 -- decisive, perhaps, in the strictly military field and solid achievement as regards pacification.

6. You can thus take tremendous satisfaction from your decision of last summer. Even the bad part -- the entrance of the army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam -- is still a direct consequence of the fact that your decision created a favorable balance which they simply could not redress by Viet Cong troops from South Vietnam. Their only chance, therefore, of winning the war was to bring in the soldiers from outside the country. This is a real escalation of the war, and it is grim for us. It richly justifies a new look at the whole scene, as you are wisely doing. But it entails grave risks for them.

7. Hanoi or Peking?

Thich Tam Chau is the head of the Buddhist Institute and by any standard is one of the very top Buddhists in Vietnam. I find him sagacious, well-balanced and politically minded. He comes originally from Hanoi and has many connections there, religious and personal. For various reasons, I have built up a very good footing with him over the years. Last week, he surprised me by saying flatly that the Hanoi regime would like to stop the war, and that it was Peking which is stopping Hanoi from doing so, and that Peking had enough influence to stop Hanoi. He felt we were making a mistake when we thought in terms of Hanoi and did not realize that the real problem was Peking. Nothing would ever be settled until we had solved "the problem of China." He frankly did not know how to solve it but he knew that was where the trouble was. He also published the above in his newspaper.

8. Political

The government plans to announce policies and programs for rural construction, a constitution, and the budget at a convention of the armed forces on the eve of the lunar New Year holiday (Tet).

9. There were no overt signs of discontent among the montagnards but the situation remained highly unsettled and potentially dangerous. The government has privately acknowledged the failure of its previous approach.

10. There has been increasing speculation among Vietnamese as to the basic objectives of the Government of South Vietnam and the U.S. Bill Moyer's statement referring to a direct US-Hanoi contact has caused concern. I hope the visit of Secretary Rusk and Governor Harriman will clarify the problem. It is potentially a great danger to the war effort.

11. American reporters have also begun to speculate about serious differences between the U.S. and the Government of South Vietnam on the issue of negotiations, and I have instructed everyone here not to discuss the subject with the press.

12. Economic

Retail prices in Saigon rose to their highest level in the week ending January 3. The price increases reflected normal pre-Tet increases plus the consequences of Viet Cong action in cutting the road to Dalat, the center of vegetable production.

13. Dollar and gold prices, which had declined last week, returned to their previous high level.

14. Rice stocks on hand increased, reflecting both imports and increased deliveries from the rice-growing delta area which reached a three-year high in December. It is expected that there will be enough pork for Tet.

15. Military

The level of Viet Cong activity declined during the week while combined Vietnamese-free world task forces mounted major assaults in Phu Yen province of Central Vietnam and in the plain of Reeds southwest of Saigon. In the Phu Yen area, Republic of Korea forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy while suffering their own first serious losses.

16. Statistically the total of Viet Cong incidents dropped from 1,133 for the preceding week to 973. Of this total 17 were attacks or ambushes while 645 were acts of terrorism. The remainder were acts of sabotage, propaganda or anti-aircraft fire.

17. The total number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program dropped from 705 to 484, a figure which included 285 military and political cadre.

Wed., Jan. 12, 1966  
1:15 PM

40

Mr. President:

[REDACTED] makes it look like Shelepin  
is on his way out of Hanoi, and  
there is corroborating informa-  
tion [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

McG. B.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ / RAC 03-236  
By iso, NARA, Date 1-14-04

FBIS SS

*Back  
Pete's  
1-12-66  
2:45 p*

MEMORANDUM

✓ 41

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

( 2 )

Wednesday, January 12, 1966, 1 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last week we sent you a memorandum on Israel, and you asked me to speak to you about it, and because of the press of other business I did not. Now Bob Komer has written another memorandum on the problem, which probably is a better starting point because it is more up to date.

I must say I am disappointed that the Israelis are still trying to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business. I thought last year they were getting over this bad habit. But probably if I were an Israeli, I would do what they do -- the temptation is very great.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-166  
By isa, NARA Date 4-28-99

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1966  
Wednesday, 11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our Israeli Affairs. Mike Feldman says he hopes to see you in the next few days, probably to pass on a complaint about how poorly we're treating Israel. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you got a letter from Eshkol shortly.

Such gambits are part of a standard Israeli effort to put pressure on us for more military and economic help. I've been through them before and, as I wrote you, the best response is to play a little hard to get ourselves (and make clear we won't be muscled) before coming through. We end up spending less this way. Thus we've held up informing Israel of your economic aid decision just yet; we're also waiting till we can propose to you a solution on planes for Jordan and Israel.

One development has infuriated the Israelis. To counter all the public criticism they generated about US aid to Nasser and arms to other Arabs, somebody in the Pentagon defensively leaked that the Israelis were secretly buying fancy missiles from France. We haven't made them feel any better by pointing out that, while we deplore the leak, it serves them right.

Although Israel will complain about a crisis of confidence, this is par for the course. So is sending Feldman and Feinberg in to harry you. Thus, I'd see merit in telling Feldman to pass back word that we naturally bridle when Israel tells us how to run our business and that, if Israel expects help from us, it must be a two-way street. We could well afford to hold the line for another few weeks before easing up.

If you feel that we are trying to play too cozy a game, however, we can ease up. We can short-circuit most Zionist criticism by leaking the tank deal to Israel (even though this risks flak from the Arabs, especially Nasser). We could also go ahead with the economic aid package, and then with the planes. In sum, we have more than enough goodies in hand to stem any tide of criticism. The only real issue is whether to play hard to get a bit longer as a lesson, or to begin caving now.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Keep holding back till February \_\_\_\_\_

Start easing up now \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Jan. 12, 1966  
1 PM

42

42

MR. PRESIDENT:

This memorandum by Bob Komer gives the best summary I have seen of the success of your South Asian policy in 1965. It also asks for general guidance about the next steps.

McG. B.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Tues., Jan 11, 1966  
5 45 pm

43  
F

MR. PRESIDENT:

43

This is what George Ball has sent to  
Dean Rusk pursuant to a request  
from Rusk for comment on his  
forward travel plans.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS enclosure

For Secretary from Acting.

Reference: Note you left on travel plans for me last night; your message through Reinhardt from Rome today; Canberra 502.

(1) From study of flight schedules and other relevant factors here, we suggest that the Vice President plan to return from Delhi to Washington on the 13th or 14th in the plane in which you departed Washington last night.

(2) Harriman plane is being rerouted from Canberra to Bangkok (instead of Saigon) on January 12. Harriman will get off there and the plane will proceed to Delhi on the 12th or early 13th.

(3) We assume you may wish to spend all of Thursday, January 13, in Delhi on appointments with Kosygin, etc., and could leave Delhi at 0830 on January 14 for Bangkok, arriving there three hours and thirty minutes later at 1330 local time.

(4) You and Harriman could leave Bangkok January 14, 1935 hours, for Saigon (one hour and 15 minutes flying time), arrive 2200 local and overnight in Saigon on the 14th and 15th, allowing all of Saturday for appointments in Vietnam.

(5) Saigon departure at 1100 January 16 and return via Yokota, Japan and Elmendorf, Alaska would permit arrival at Andrews at 1850, January 16.

(6) All of us here strongly advise against a visit to Rangoon by you. The press is currently looking primarily at European capitals and capitals visited by President's special emissaries in search for place of US-North Vietnam contact referred to by Moyers yesterday. We do not think they will necessarily discover the actual point of contact in the next few days, but press attention on Rangoon for your first visit there would be "asking for it." We have reviewed memcons of your Aug. 20 and Sept. 30 meetings with Burmese Ambassador and Foreign Minister, and we do not find in those conversations more than an expression of hope that a stop in Rangoon following December NATO meeting would be possible.

(7) The President is leaving it up to you to work out your own travel arrangements without deadline at this end.

###

~~SECRET~~ NODIS PINTA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~Tuesday, January 11, 1966  
5:30 p. m.*Rec'd  
244  
Jan 11*

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is a thoughtful telegram from our able Consul General in Hong Kong recommending against any resumption of bombing in North Vietnam. I do not agree with him, but I do believe that the targetting in any resumption of bombing should be more carefully justified and planned much more carefully in advance than it was in the last year. McNamara shares this view although his choice in targets is much more extensive than my own.

My basic conviction is that the things Dave Bell was talking about this morning are very much more important than bombing the North. This is why I think the State of the Union should keep attention focused on the effort in the South.

## DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202By isa, NARS, Date 6-19-84*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

44a

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

Tuesday, January 11

For Bundy from Rice, Hong Kong

1. Resumed and intensified aerial attacks within Hanoi-Haiphong area plus mining of ports, as outlined in assumption 1-A of SNIE 10-12-65, will surely involve for us heavy total costs in terms losses U. S. aircraft and crews, much moral disapprobation, stiffened Soviet attitude, further solidification of DRV populace against us, and strengthening of position those within Hanoi leadership who most stoutly oppose negotiations. It would also involve substantially increased risks of war between U. S. and Communist China.
2. I cannot see how these costs and risks can be justified by results envisaged in SNIE. I note that intelligence community recognizes our following this course would not, per se, cause Hanoi's leaders to quit and that PAVN infiltration southward would continue. This leaves as only justification hope that over longer term damage inflicted might limit numbers of PAVN and VC who could be supported in South through the North. It is worth emphasizing that SNIE uses word "might" rather than "would," and even that only over "longer term." I also note that Director INR had additional reservations, footnoted on page 8, with which I agree. Moreover, I am myself very dubious we could really prevent relatively small tonnages discussed in Annex A from being moved, one way or another, across wide top of funnel which DRV comprises to Ho Chi-Minh route through Laos.
3. It seems to me far wiser, in this situation, to use elsewhere the increased effort which would be used against DRV under Assumption 1-A. I would suggest it be used: (1) against Communist routes to South Vietnam through Laos (where all traffic, unlike only small part total traffic in DRV, is for support VC and PAVN elements in South Vietnam), and (2) against Viet Cong base areas in South Vietnam itself (if we destroy and/or occupy those base areas, VC and PAVN are bound to have major difficulties in keeping their men supplied with food and ammunition). I think chances of Communists pursuing course described in SNIE as retrenchment are fairly good if morale and ability to fight of VC and PAVN main forces can thereby be eroded. Moreover we doubtless can get away with far more in areas removed from Communist China, without getting into wider war, than we could by pushing our actions ever northward.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-243

By iso, NARA, Date 1-14-04

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

4. Any resumption of bombing of North Vietnam will involve some of the costs and dangers listed above and create pressures for adoption of the extension and intensification described under Assumption 1-A. That course of action will not yield the results widely expected of it within Govt. and by public. This will cause deepened frustration resulting in increased fatalism about war with China and demands for attacks on supply dumps and transport lines in areas of China adjacent to DRV. These pressures will operate almost automatically, carrying with them ever-rising dangers. I am against our getting into such a vicious circle and hence I oppose resumption of bombings of the DRV. If we do not resume them we will thereby give the lie to Communist charges that our peace efforts are just smokescreen to justify further escalation against DRV and put ourselves in much better political and moral position. This is an opportunity to break out of vicious circle which may not reoccur.

5. I also would oppose mining DRV harbors -- an action which would not only meet the disapproval of our friends but greatly please the Chinese Communists who hope for trouble at sea between ourselves and the Soviets.

6. Finally, if we think the Communists may try to make major use of Cambodia as transport route to South Vietnam we should try to prevent further excitation of Sihanouk by Khmer Serai incursions and hot pursuit. The Prince employs the manners of an unhousebroken skunk, but I would be glad to see us pay the Chicoms' share of ICC costs if he remains willing for the ICC to monitor his neutrality.



File 45

Tuesday, January 11, 1966  
4:55 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: This morning's column by Rowland Evans and Bob Novak

1. I have not written a memorandum to the President on this subject. I did get asked about this matter by Evans about two months ago, and I told him at the time that I understood the matter was related to a survey of the telephone traffic in connection with the new switchboard. I told him that because that was what Marvin Watson had told me, and it seemed a good way to turn him off.

2. As I told Marvin at the time, I do think that this procedure is unfitting except in some such temporary technical context as a traffic survey. I do not believe it is healthy for any of us to be watching over the shoulders of others in this way. It is next door to wiretapping, which I know the President hates. I told Marvin I was sure that this practice would be criticized if it became permanent, and that I thought the criticism would be hard to deal with. It did not occur to me to raise the matter with the President because I got so clear an impression that this was purely a temporary matter.

3. Since I began dictating this memorandum, my secretary has reported to me that last Friday Rowland Evans called her and said he wanted to ask a question, and he wanted her to know that he was doing a column on the subject. The question was whether or not calls were monitored, and she said she didn't know anything about it. He said that was the answer he expected, but that the operator had asked him who was calling when he called in.

4. I am perfectly willing to have Bill Moyers make it clear that I did not write a memorandum, but unfortunately he could not give an honest negative answer to the next question (also asked of him this morning) whether I "raised any question about it." The only way I can possibly be helpful on this particular practice, if it is permanent, is not to comment on it. I think it is inconsistent with the trust that officers in this building should have for one another.

McG. B.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, January 11, 1966  
1:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dave Bell Meeting

There are some major issues of organization and management in Saigon. I doubt if they can be settled in this meeting although they can be opened for discussion if you wish.

But the main point of the meeting is simply to emphasize the importance of the non-military effort by having Bell report on the record to you. And a picture of him meeting with you and an appropriate statement by him in the Lobby on the way out would make that point.

McG. B

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*did not send 47*

~~SECRET~~

Monday - January 10, 1966  
8:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Ambassador Bunker reported at 6:30 that the general strike called by the extreme left for today met with some support but not sufficient to be called a success. It did succeed in producing disturbances downtown, however, which was probably one of their objectives. In one incident, an American paratrooper shot a Dominican who died on the way to the hospital.

On the negotiating front, Ambassador Bunker reports that the OAS Committee had talks with Caamano throughout the day. Caamano expressed concern over the security of his men if he were to leave the country, and asked what assurances could be given them. Bunker is working with Garcia Godoy, General Rikhye of the UN, Dr. Bianchi of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Papal Nuncio on a security plan. Bunker says he also talked with Balaguer today about making a joint statement with Bosch in support of the Government on the decrees sending regular and rebel officers abroad. He is willing to do this. Bunker and his colleagues are seeing Bosch tomorrow morning. Bunker did not sound overly-optimistic that Bosch would go along.

*in p. 13*  
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-239  
By pw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

# AGENDA FOR 1:00 P. M. MEETING

January 10, 1966

1. The current state of the peace offensive --

The Secretary of State

2. Discussions with Congressional Leadership --

The President

4. Next steps, both diplomatic and domestic.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCX NARS, Date 8-2-83



~~SECRET~~

49

Monday, January 10, 1966, 9 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach two overnight cables that are of interest. In the first (Tab A), Lodge gets agreement of the Saigon Foreign Minister Do that it would be better judgment not to resume bombing until after Tet.

In the second (Tab B), the Department summarizes the current situation in a message for delivery to the Pope. It is a good summary of the elements of the position that we are willing to have foreign diplomats know.

Behind all this there are a few still more private communications which are not being discussed with foreigners:

1. Our contact with Bo in Paris which has produced nothing so far, except the fact that we made it.
2. Some interesting negotiations on exchange of prisoners which have developed in Algiers and Berlin. These are complex and slow-moving matters, but they do indicate a certain reaching out from the Communist side.
3. The Soviet proposal for informal meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council.
4. The Hungarian effort to see if Hanoi is willing to talk directly with one of our representatives.
5. The Soviet suggestion that we establish direct contact with the DRV Charge in Moscow.

The Staughton Lynd story of yesterday was false in that we have indeed had direct contact with Hanoi. It is not altogether clear to my brother and me that we have had as much of this kind of contact as we need, for the record. The Department has been reluctant to enlarge these contacts for fear of misunderstandings in Saigon. We will be reviewing this side of it today. Probably the next step will be to have Kohler talk to his opposite number in Moscow, in following up a suggestion which Kosygin made to Shastri.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202

By ies, NARS, Date 6-19-84 McG. B.

A. Saigon 2466  
B to Rome 1431



Sunday, January 9, 1966, 12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I called Eldon James of the American Legion this morning to give him your message. He is in Guatemala for several days, so I got his assistant and told him that you wanted James to know of your own full understanding of the point of view in his letter. I pointed out the importance of giving due consideration to the presence of a Soviet mission in Hanoi. But I did not mention Tet because I did not want to run the risk of a leak from a man I did not know about the problem of the length of a pause. I told James' assistant that if we could get no response, we were determined to do what had to be done. He told me that Commander James fully understood this position and agreed with it. He seemed very pleased with the call, and undertook to report it fully to James the moment he gets back.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

51  
came back  
1/19  
L F

Saturday, January 8, 1966, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is Bob Komer's second try at a balanced statement of the alternatives before us on the Indian famine problem before Shastri's visit. He is addressing the issues that remain after your decisions on Freeman's good memorandum yesterday. I think he has stated the alternatives pretty clearly, and I agree with the recommendations in which he and Orville join. I think it is the best available way of keeping the ports fully used in the spring, while keeping the heat on the Indians and avoiding new public commitments in January (except for some help to children, if you want it.)

McG. B.

McG. B.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

51a  
January 8, 1966  
Saturday/11:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

More on India Food. Let me assure you that I'm not trying to push too hard here. My one aim is to be sure that you are given the full picture on this complex matter, because our two chief objectives tend to conflict with each other:

A. Our first aim is to keep up the pressure on Shastri, especially before he comes. This involves not letting India conclude that the US will take on the full load of coping with Indian famine, and thus relax on Indian self-help and appeals to others.

B. Our other aim is to help forestall mass starvation, not only on humanitarian grounds but because a stable India moving forward is essential to our Asian containment policy of boxing in Red China. Nor do we want to let the famine get so bad that we have to resort to highly expensive emergency steps on which we'll have to pick up most of the tab.

The first objective argues for not making another major PL 480 allocation before Shastri comes, even though this puts Shastri under the gun to appeal for more food when here. On the other hand, the big bottleneck in Indian port capacity argues for another allocation shortly if we are to assure the most efficient and economical flow of food before Indian port capacity is cut 200,000-300,000 tons by the onset of the rainy season in late May. The cheapest and most effective way to meet the port capacity problem is to move in as close to a million tons a month as we can up to late May. Because of lead time, we can no longer do so in January-February, but if India books ships and we provide wheat now we can reach the optimum level by March. The Indians are booking a lot of shipping in advance on faith, but we face a host of practical problems here in positioning boxcars, buying grain, and telling the Indians where to send the ships. All this is hard to arrange without firm contracts. So if our only aim were to do the job at least cost we'd be back at you now for at least a million tons.

Practical Solutions. But Freeman and I have tried to find a few ingenious ways to serve both our objectives. Here they are:

A. Hold up another allocation till just after Shastri visit, but decide now to allot 1.5 million tons on 5 February so it can then be moved as quickly as possible. This would probably work if we: (1) encouraged India to continue booking ships in advance; (2) did all the preliminaries so we could move at

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 2-6-98

~~SECRET~~

top speed on 5 February; yet (3) told the Indians we could make no firm commitments till after Shastri visit (they'd read this loud and clear). Agriculture's experts are quite nervous about this scheme; they'd much prefer a firm allocation so they could make firm contracts, but Freeman thinks it could be managed, and has told his people to prepare to do so.

B. If we wanted to do the minimum essential to keep up the flow into Indian ports in February, you could announce now a special Title II program for emergency child and aged feeding (say 200,000 tons plus some vegetable oil and milk). Children were Subramaniam's special worry. This would appear as clearly a special gesture following up his visit, and demonstrate your concern for women and children.

C. Call again before Shastri comes for a special international effort, and announce US willingness to contribute several million tons under Title II (we pay the freight), above and beyond normal Title I aid. India is already trying hard to get other help (with some success), but also faces the domestic political problem of not crying famine too loudly yet lest it precipitate hoarding, food riots, etc. So this gesture seems better held until the Indians themselves take the initiative.

D. Authorize Freeman to proceed with a reimbursement procedure (used by India and other countries in the past). The Indians would buy now for dollars, but Freeman would give them a letter to the effect that if and when a new Title I agreement is made their dollar purchases would be covered. If this system were followed real transactions would take place, and the complicated process of coordinating internal supply with ships in the absence of actual transactions could be avoided. As in A above, the Indians would have to run the risk that the Shastri visit might not result in more Title I grain. But that is not too much to ask in light of their desperate need.

Recommended Course. Freeman and I would tend to favor Plan A (privately get ready for a prompt post-Shastri allotment of 1.5 million tons). To keep up momentum in the meantime, you might also authorize now the small Title II children's program. This combination is a tricky but ingenious way to prepare for the worst but keep the Indians guessing a bit.

Approve Plan A \_\_\_\_\_

Add on small children's program \_\_\_\_\_

Try Plan D \_\_\_\_\_

Keep thinking \_\_\_\_\_

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer



~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Saturday, Jan. 8, 1966  
1:30 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Harriman fires all his arguments at us on keeping the Pause going.

McG. B.

Saturday, January 8, 1966, 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: East-West Trade Bill

After our talk on Thursday, I spoke to Dean Rusk about this, and he has now sent in the attached papers.

At Tab A is his own memorandum of yesterday. At Tab B is an earlier memorandum showing Tom Mann's political reservations, and at Tab C is the basic departmental memorandum, which reflects the position of George Ball, Tommy Thompson and the European and Economic experts. All three are worth a look.

I think the truth is that everybody believes in the Miller Committee's approach, but both Rusk and Mann have doubts about the political course of action on the Hill this year. My view is that we can have our cake and eat it on that. The bill will not be in hostile hands. Wilbur Mills would have it in the House and Bill Fulbright in the Senate, and in their quite different ways I think they would be reasonable and helpful.

Since we can control the legislative course of the bill, I think we can safely take the advantage of presenting it. That advantage will be substantial among "sophisticated" observers in connection with our desire for peace and our effort to show that we know there are different kinds of Communists. It will also give substance to our bridge-building policy which is otherwise open to criticism as more words than action.

There will be a sentence or so on this subject in Goodwin's draft of the State of the Union message, and that is the next point of decision.

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sat., Jan. 8, 1966  
11:30 AM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Komer has negotiated the attached rather short and straightforward message to Prime Minister Wilson (Tab A) in answer to his message of yesterday on Rhodesia. I think it meets the requirements. You may also want to look at a second message which came in yesterday (Tab B), but which does not require an additional answer.

M. B.  
McG. B.

54a





~~SECRET~~

January 7, 1966

MESSAGE

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

It was most considerate of you to share your thoughts on the Rhodesian crisis again on the eve of your departure for Lagos. We on this side certainly appreciate the delicacy of the situation you face, as well as the problem of supplying Zambia while applying sanctions to the Smith regime. After your meeting in Lagos, <sup>we</sup> I shall look forward to getting your latest estimates and plans. There may be serious difficulties ahead, particularly as to whether the African states will sit still long enough to permit sanctions to bring Smith down.

My best wishes for every success at Lagos.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 2-6-98

54c  
—





PAUK, 002/7

16.15 ZULU JANUARY 7

FROM PRIME MINISTER

RECEIVED  
WHOA

TO PRESIDENT

1966 JAN 7 16 48

*Bundy*

*Cy sent Kowal  
and State S/S*

~~SECRET~~

T. 20/56

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE BEGINS:

IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE TODAY, I MENTIONED THAT DROUGHT IN RHODESIA WAS PRESENTING SMITH WITH PROBLEMS AND MIGHT HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON OURSELVES.

MY COLLEAGUES AND I DISCUSSED THIS FURTHER THIS MORNING AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DROUGHT IS PREVA LENT THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AFRICA. WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT, ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, TO PREVENT STARVATION AND ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS TO PREVENT STARVATION LEADING TO RIOTING AND BLOODSHED TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP. AS WE ARE PROPOSING TO PRESS SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA ON OTHER FIELDS, WE MIGHT APPEAR TO BE INCONSISTENT: BUT I THINK THAT OPINION GENERALLY WOULD DRAW THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION.

I HAVE THEREFORE THIS MORNING BEEN IN CONTACT BY TELEPHONE WITH BOTH BOB MENZIES AND MIKE PEARSON AND WE HAVE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITIES OF A JOINT COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE TO RELIEVE THE FAMINE. IF WHEAT IS A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FAILURE OF MAIZE, THEN BOTH AUSTRALIA AND CANADA WILL BE ABLE TO HELP FROM THEIR OWN STOCKS: WE SHOULD OF COURSE MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION. IF MAIZE IS ESSENTIAL, THEN WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE THIS A COMBINED OPERATION BRINGING YOU IN. BUT YOU HAVE DONE SO MUCH ALREADY THAT WE SHALL NOT DO SO UNLESS IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. I KNOW THAT FAMINE IN INDIA IS IN ALL OUR MINDS.

I SHALL BE LETTING IT BE KNOWN, INFORMALLY, THIS AFTERNOON THAT MENZIES, PEARSON AND I ARE IN TOUCH ON THIS PROBLEM.

MESSAGE ENDS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw*, NARA, Date *2-6-98*

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



Saturday, January 8, 1966, 9 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have a date with Mansfield at 10 this morning and may not get back in time for your meeting with Mennen Williams.

I attach a telegram of direct conclusions and recommendations which came in overnight. I have checked the ones which it seems to me Williams might profitably cover with the press corps. It is a thoughtful and encouraging report. Williams' own seventh conclusion suggests that he may not be eager to say quite so much, and we certainly do not want to create a backlash in Africa, but my own guess is that the Africans enjoy being spotlighted, if it is skillfully done.

McG. B.

SECRET-ATTACHMENT



JAN 7  
Fri., Dec. - 1966, 7:10

56

MR. PRESIDENT:

56

Goldberg here reports an approach from the Soviet Under Secretary on U Thant's staff. It looks to me as if Goldberg has handled it very well, and I see no reason at all to object to the consultation which the Soviet member has proposed.

McG. B.

Friday, January 7, 1966  
3:45 pm

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Interview with Hugh Sidey**

1. I have just seen Hugh Sidey on TIME's peace offensive cover. He had had a good rundown from Dean Rusk and my brother Bill, and I went through my routine again. He now thinks the story will be reasonably friendly, although there is still some skepticism. I asked what they were skeptical about, and he said they still thought it had aspects of a gimmick. I tried to explain in detail that the public emissaries and the large number of diplomatic contacts were a necessary part of the double effort to bring public pressure on Hanoi and to establish effective private diplomatic communication as well.

2. Sidey wanted very much to know when the pause would end. I asked him what would be the worst time for them. He said anytime between Sunday 6 pm and Monday morning. I tried to make him nervous about that.

3. Sidey also tried to find out what the State of the Union message would say on Vietnam. I referred him to Bill Moyers. He said he had noticed Goodwin in the hallways, and that Goodwin said he was working on civil rights. Sidey professed great skepticism. I did not refer him to anyone.

McG. B.

57  
Friday, January 7, 1966  
3:15 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Interview with John Hightower

1. I saw John Hightower this afternoon at his request to give him my account of the peace offensive. I thought this worthwhile because he is far more sophisticated and experienced than Frank Cormier.

2. Hightower appeared to be in basic sympathy with what we are doing, and to understand it very well. He had been reading Mansfield's report and he was struck by the gloom of what Mansfield had to say. I tried to suggest gently that Mansfield had come back with the opinions he went out with, and my own impression is that while he was clear what he did not want us to do (escalate), he was not so explicit as to the course he recommended. Hightower asked me if I thought Mansfield would support the Administration, and I said that I would not presume to comment on the record in any way, shape or form, but that if I were a reporter I would be inclined to judge that Mansfield was a Majority Leader who took his responsibilities seriously. He agreed.

3. Hightower startled me by saying that he had heard that there was a Vietnam package cost of \$25 billion. I said I was not in the numbers game on this issue and changed the subject. He also seemed to know about Chinese maintenance and repair personnel in North Vietnam. I dodged that one too.

4. I don't think this interview will lead to any particular headline story. It does suggest that John Hightower is very well informed.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, January 7, 1966, 3 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

This second draft includes the peaceful effort within South Vietnam (bottom of page 5 and top of page 6), but it is 10% shorter than the one you had last night. I will work on it some more myself, but I am sending it now to Dick Goodwin for further sharpening. I am also sending copies to Messrs. Moyers and Valenti. Do you want me to begin checking with Rusk and McNamara?

Yes ✓

No         

h.f. G.

McG. B.

P. S. I removed one or two passages that you marked with question marks, and right now the only novelty in this statement on the negotiating front is that we will negotiate with "fronts as fronts and soldiers as soldiers."



McGB  
1/7/66  
2nd draft

The center of our hopes and fears, tonight, is in Vietnam. There is where Americans face death and danger every day in service for the rest of us -- and for the people of South Vietnam -- and for peace. I found at home that Vietnam touched the life of every human being -- young and old -- around our Christmas board. It touches all Americans.

I.

Events and prospects in Vietnam take their shape from two great realities. The first is the face of aggression from the North.

The cause of the war in Vietnam is plain. It lies in a decision of the Government of North Vietnam, taken more than five years back, to conquer South Vietnam by force.

This reality is surrounded in a thousand complexities. A complex kind of force is used -- assassination and intimidation more often than direct assault -- infiltration rather than open invasion -- covert command of a "liberation front" instead of open assertion of the plan to spread totalitarian control. This assault is mounted against a people and government who have their own internal ferment and their own colonial past to overcome. Moreover, there are many in the South who have been brought to join in the attack on their own government.

But the central cause of this war has been a decision for conquest by the dictatorship in Hanoi. Without that decision there would be no war. This is not cloudy rhetoric but brutal fact. Those who neglect that fact -- however well-intentioned -- are the prisoners of illusion.

Aggression is the first reality in Vietnam. The second is that the United States has joined with the people and government of South Vietnam in a firm decision that this effort at conquest shall not succeed. This decision is required by honor and interest. It is required for the freedom of South Vietnam, for the safety of the free nations of Asia, and for the hope of peaceful independence in every small and vulnerable country. All that we have done -- and all that we may yet have to do -- is governed by one fundamental purpose: to block the way of aggression.

## II.

In 1965 the war in Vietnam has grown more intense. This was the year in which the men in Hanoi hoped for a knockout. In 1964 they had sent regular troops to join their cadres and their agents in the South. By the end of that year, more than 40,000 men from North Vietnam had come South. Our own strength in South Vietnam a year ago was 23,000.

It was a time of hope in Hanoi, and a time of fear in the South.

But in 1965 we made two important military decisions. The first was a decision to take limited air action against military targets in North Vietnam. We had deferred this action for a long time -- some say for longer than we should have. But in February -- as the enemy grew bolder -- as outrages continued against both Vietnamese and Americans -- and as the infiltration of major forces increased -- we decided to reply.

We made this decision not because of any foolish hope that it would quickly end the war. Still less did we act out of an angry desire for revenge. Nothing could be further from the purpose of America than a decision to try to drive any country or any people -- whatever the offenses of their rulers -- "back to the stone age."

As I said at the time, we acted for three purposes:

first and foremost, to slow down the aggression --

second, to give new courage to the people in the South --

and third, to make our firmness clear in North Vietnam.

We knew that "air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes," but we also knew that they were "justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others."

Our second decision was to introduce a growing force of American ground troops for active operations in South Vietnam. Today we have 181,000

men there -- the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force along the northern coast, the 1st Cavalry Division and most of the 25th Infantry Division in the coastal highlands, the 1st Infantry Division and two Airborne Brigades nearer Saigon. We have been joined by a division of Koreans, a battalion of Australians, and a battery of artillery from New Zealand. We honor the skill and courage of these allies. All of these forces have the support of aircraft and helicopters on a scale unknown before.

Never in our history have fresh troops behaved with more skill and courage from the first. Our first forces arrived in time to disrupt a most dangerous monsoon offensive. They have now gone on to spread security around their bases and to find and fight the enemy in havens hitherto immune.

It was not easy to make the decision to commit American divisions in Vietnam. Cool heads warned of dangers that have not come true.

It was said that our forces might be left to do all the fighting themselves. This slander against gallant allies has been disproved. The South Vietnamese continue to fight, and their forces continue to grow in strength and fighting quality. The main burden still falls on those who fight for their own country. In all of 1965 the losses of the Vietnamese armed forces were ten times as great as ours. Setting their population against ours, the ratio of sacrifice is more than one hundred to one.



Others have feared that our forces would arouse the hostility of the people that came to help, reminding them of white men they had learned to hate in earlier times. It has not been so. In the face of furious propaganda from Hanoi and its agents, our men have been made welcome, and their mission has been understood.

The beginning of 1966 finds the enemy no longer close to victory. Many of his best units have been so badly beaten they still lick their wounds. His hidden camps are being found out. His desertion rate is growing. His efforts have been increased again, and his strength is still great. But time is no longer on his side.

For our share of these achievements the main credit belongs to the courage and good will of the American fighting man. But I ask the Congress to take special note of the leadership of the soldier who commands our men in South Vietnam. For his complete devotion to duty -- for his sympathy and respect toward the people and soldiers of the land he helps defend -- for his insistence that just as far as possible the innocent civilians be spared the rigors of war -- for his valor and his compassion -- our nation and our cause are deeply in the debt of General Westmoreland.

We owe an equal debt to another great American, Ambassador Lodge -- and to all who work in his team for peaceful progress in Vietnam. Their work for stability and education and health and relief is just as important

as the fight against the invader. Our economic aid program in Vietnam is now becoming the largest we have anywhere. Rice for the hungry; schoolbooks for the children; shelter for the refugees; these are all part of a policy of hope for the people of South Vietnam. There are some in Vietnam who report only on the smoke of battle. Ambassador Lodge is not one of them. Our efforts for the people there have expanded greatly in the last year. They will expand again in 1966.

### III.

Our decision to stand firm in Vietnam has been matched by our eagerness for peace. In April from Baltimore, in May from the Rose Garden, in June from San Francisco, and in July from the White House, ~~today~~ I said what I say again tonight on Capitol Hill: "The United States is ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table."

In these last weeks since Christmas we have made a new and still greater effort to open the door to peace. We have talked to more than a hundred governments. Special representatives have visited more than thirty foreign countries. Our Secretary of State has restated our commitment to peace in fourteen clear and simple points. Our peaceful purpose has been reported once again to the Security Council -- and once again we have asked all members and all officers of the United Nations

to give what help they can.

In further proof of our good will -- in response to the concerns of friends -- and out of our own national dedication to peace -- we have suspended our air action against North Vietnam. That suspension continues, and I make no prediction about its future here. This is the most delicate question I have faced in two years as President. I know the Congress -- in both parties and both Houses -- will wish this decision to be made without pressure -- one way or another -- from those who do not share my solemn obligation to weigh all the evidence of every sort.

This effort for peace is a most solemn and serious effort to bring it home to the aggressors -- and to all who watch this war in shared anxiety -- that the road to honorable peace lies open wide. Let me say to you what we are saying to all who will listen.

First:

Our readiness for unconditional discussion is now clear to all. In addition, we stand ready to work at a full cease-fire at any time. We will respond at once to any sign that others have reduced their use of force.

Second:

We continue in our determination that this war shall be limited. Our concern is with the safety of South Vietnam. We do not seek

to overthrow the regime in Hanoi -- but only to persuade it away from aggression. We respect the integrity and independence of all the lands which now find themselves affected by the movements of the aggressor. Our forces must defend themselves. But they will respect to the limit the independence of those who seek only their own peace and security.

Third:

The forum of discussion and the subjects of discussion are as open as can be. We stand ready to discuss the proposals of others -- as we shall ask them to discuss our proposals and the proposals of South Vietnam. We stand ready to meet with governments as governments, with groups as groups, with fronts as fronts, and with soldiers as soldiers.

Fourth:

The United States respects the principles of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. Their machinery has proven tragically weak, but their principles still guide our action.

Fifth:

In accordance with those principles, the United States seeks no continuing military presence or base in Vietnam and is ready to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam just as soon as South Vietnam is able to determine its own future without external interference.



The government in Hanoi which urges our withdrawal is the very government whose choices and whose actions have produced our powerful presence. By its own actions and decisions, that government can produce an early American withdrawal -- but never by force.

Sixth:

Since the purpose of our presence is to protect the right of free choice in South Vietnam, we favor free elections there. We respect the right of all states in Southeast Asia to choose their own friends and set their own alignment. We hold that the reunification of North and South Vietnam is a matter to be settled by the free decision of the peoples concerned. Those who seek support for free elections can count on us. They should ask themselves, however, if history shows that they can count on Communists.

Seventh and finally:

The United States is as generous in peace as it is stern in necessary battle, and we are ready to join in a massive effort of reconstruction and development open to all -- including North Vietnam. Since I first made this pledge in April, we have made progress. With the help of a great humanitarian, Eugene Black, the Asian Bank is a reality. This is only the beginning of what can be done when the aggression ends.

This is our Program of Peace. If there are other fair proposals, we will adopt them. If there are reasonable compromises, we will support them. What we will not do is to hand over South Vietnam to forceful conquest.

#### IV.

Whatever the next days may bring, we must be ready for long hard combat and for a long hard conference -- and perhaps for both at once. We must remember that in the past it has sometimes been necessary to continue the fighting as a part of the effort to make discussion effective. In one sense, indeed, we are engaged in both battle and discussion now. This is the nature of our adversaries. The conference table will not change them, and it will not necessarily stop the fighting. A cease-fire may be hard to negotiate. What discussion can do -- and this is very much -- is raise the chance for peace and lower the risk of spreading war.

Meanwhile the contest will be hard, and it may be long. I cannot and I will not promise early peace or total victory. Only if we are plainly ready for a long test can we have any hope that it may be short. Our patience and our resolution are now being tested by men of proven ruthlessness. If they are not yet ready for peace, it is largely because they do not yet know America. We must help them to learn.

The costs of the conflict are great. They are greatest in Vietnam itself. The military losses of the South Vietnamese are large; those of their opponents are heavier still. There are also tragic losses -- much as we strive to avoid them -- among civilians. Our own losses are less severe by far, but we grieve for every one.

And the struggle costs money, for battle is never cheap. Later this week I shall ask the Congress for prompt action to insure that our men in every service and every agency have all they need for Vietnam within the present fiscal year. That supplemental request will not be less than \$13 billion. We can afford it -- of course we can. We can meet this kind of cost for as long as it takes. But how much better it would be for all of us if we could move to put this kind of money into peace and progress for all.

V.

It is not an easy prospect. It is harder because the demands upon our people are uneven. Most of us are safe at home, while a few are in the hardest kind of jungle fighting. Most of us are prosperous as never before, while others must mourn a loss that has no price. In such a time of trial we must all hold together. Progress and prosperity at home are good, but sacrifice and sorrow deserve a special respect from all. So the men who fight and the women who pray for peace will have the support of all Americans. What gives me strength and courage as the American President -- both to resist the attacker and to seek for peace -- is the certain knowledge that the strength and the unity of the American people will prove equal to this test.

###

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, January 7, 1966  
1:15 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister Wilson

Here is a message just in from Prime Minister Wilson on Rhodesia. It gives us a better account than we have had before, though our people are still less optimistic than the Prime Minister.

I don't think it needs a formal answer, although Wilson would obviously be pleased to have one.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

Draft an answer ✓

*I like this letter and the way it reads / C*

Send an acknowledgement through the Prime Minister's office \_\_\_\_\_

Let it be \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET attachment~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-166

January 7, 1966

9:45 A.M.

By ics, NARA Date 4-28-99

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Before I set off for this rather extraordinary Commonwealth meeting at Lagos, I thought I would let you know how I see things developing in Rhodesia. I need hardly tell you that I have very considerable qualms about going: but I have decided that it would be more harmful to absent myself than to be present. Faced with this choice of evils, I have decided it was right to go: first, because I think it is in all our interests to try and keep the Commonwealth together and secondly because I am sure that we must do all we can to maintain the prestige and standing of moderate African leaders like Abubakar.

When we last met I told you that I thought that the euphoria of independence and of Christmas would carry the Smith regime over into the New Year, and that they would thereafter start to suffer from post-hogmanay gloom. Thanks to your Administration's ready agreement to join with us in an oil embargo and to help us with a consequential airlift to Zambia and to fairly general support throughout the free world for what we are doing, this is precisely what is now happening. With the introduction of petrol rationing, the dolce vita of the European population is starting to come to an end. Responsible business leaders are forecasting considerable European unemployment before long. Added to that there is severe drought in Matabeleland where the maize harvest has failed (though this throws up further problems) which we are looking into. Two Johannesburg papers, originally pro-Smith, are now saying he cannot win: the South African Government is cautiously neutral and the Portuguese seem to be hedging their bets.

As economic difficulties begin to press upon the regime, I think we shall find that, administratively, they will not have the experience or competence to deal with it. Indeed, the evidence is now starting to accumulate that many thinking people in Rhodesia realize that the Smith regime cannot win. It is only a matter of time before more and more people come to realize that life can only get worse and that the alternative of returning to constitutional rule is better than any prospect that Smith has got to offer. It is tempting but unwise to try and put a date to the turning point, and I will not attempt to do so: but I personally am convinced that it will come and that it could come sooner than we think.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I am therefore totally convinced, privately, that we have Smith on the run, and that it will not be long before this becomes clear publicly. It may soon be wise to start thinking of peace terms. While we want to bring Smith down and bring him down quickly, we must be able to discredit Smith utterly if we are to make sense of the reconstruction period. There can be no question of negotiating with Smith as equals. But this does not mean that we should not be thinking of methods of restoring the rule of law in Rhodesia and we are hard at work on this. As soon as our ideas are clearer I will be in touch with you again. Any public announcement of our peace aims will need very careful timing: I cannot afford to lose my African audience by giving them any reason to think that we are weakening in our resolve to bring Smith down: equally I must make a statement early enough to give the Europeans hope for better things if they reject Smith. The problem of my four constituencies is always with me.

The next immediate hurdle is of course the Lagos meeting. Now that, with your help, and with that of all our allies and friends, sanctions are clearly beginning to bite, I am more hopeful of being able to turn discussion into constructive channels than I was when Abubakar first made his proposal and visited London before Christmas.

I shall have to give our Commonwealth partners a very frank account of what we are doing and try to make them share my own conviction that this rebellion will be brought to heel. There will also be some talk about Zambia's problems. I shall, moreover, have to listen to some fairly severe lectures on the need to introduce one man one vote at the earliest possible moment. But I am resolved not to give way to demands for the use of force at once and I shall at this stage be able to do no more than listen to their advice about how to handle matters in the future. It would be fatal to spell out in detail our ideas for constitutional development. It would be bound to offend one or more of my constituencies. If I can keep the Africans quiet for a few more weeks and avoid senseless action in the Organization of African Unity and embarrassing initiatives in the United Nations the visit will have been worthwhile.

I will let you know how I get on and keep you in touch with my thinking for the future. My people were in touch with yours about the details of current strategy and tactics. I am much encouraged by your resolute support. We shall win.

~~SECRET~~

*put in  
Bass's file  
1-9-66  
1:10 pm*

*61*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Fri., Jan 7, 1966 - 1 PM

MR. PRESIDENT

I had a talk with Orville this morning after my conversation with you, and this memorandum is the result.

I hope you may find it more nearly what you want from him. At the bottom of the second page, he requests instructions.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

*Told Warren  
this  
6 PM 1/7/66  
as*



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

61a  
January 7, 1966

Administratively Confidential

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: India - Technical Team Visit

1. McGeorge Bundy has relayed to me your instructions. The technical team will not leave as scheduled.
2. The team will stand by for further instructions. Bundy informs me that it is not your intention to cancel the team but rather to delay it until the Pakistan India Tashkent conversations have concluded.
3. It is important that we keep as much pressure on Shastri in particular and the Indian Government in general as possible. To date they have conformed to our wishes in general terms. Public announcements implementing your expressions in your conference with Subramaniam and the Rome agreement have been made and a number of actions have been taken and instructions issued in New Delhi. However, that does not mean that the Indian Bureaucracy and the Indian States are acting. To the extent that we can measure the real commitment of the Indian Government and the Indian people by actions taken as well as announced, this should be done prior to the Shastri visit. We can make such judgments only from detailed information verified on the spot, not from generalizations. Hence the importance of getting the team to India and back as quickly as possible. They have been instructed not only to review and survey the Indian capacity for handling various volumes of grain (no commitments implied), but also to check thoroughly plans for the 1967 crop and how the long term Indian agricultural program is moving.

The team will be headed by Clarence Eskildsen, the Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service. He is a highly competent, experienced man. His rank is such that the team is clearly on a professional technical not a policy mission and there will be no basis for reading any commitment into it.

4. The Indians have been following up the possibility you suggested to Subramaniam that I might visit India before the Shastri visit. They have sent a number of inquiries this week about my plans. I expect I owe them a response one way or the other fairly soon.



## 2--The President

### Advantages

- (1) Obviously I would be able to advise the President more solidly after following up the technical team's conclusions personally on the ground.
- (2) Attention will be focused world-wide on the generosity of President Johnson and the U.S.A. where India's food needs are concerned.
- (3) It may be that I could put more pressure on the Indians to take actions we might think are necessary prior to the Shastri visit rather than after. Commitments we may conclude are necessary which I could not get the President might require from Shastri at the time of the visit.

### Disadvantage

An appearance by a Member of the President's Cabinet might well be interpreted as an overall commitment of the United States to provide whatever food is necessary in India in 1966. As you are well aware there has been considerable speculation to this effect already. We have done our best to prevent such speculation and to make clear that there is no commitment. Yet the very process of planning the logistics for the future (which we cannot afford to postpone) tends to stimulate speculative stories of U.S. commitment no matter how cautiously we proceed.

### Recommendation

On balance I would recommend my visit to India wait until after the Shastri visit.

Additional pressure that we might be able to build up by a pre-Shastri visit would on balance, I think, be negated by the inevitable publicity which would carry an implication of a far-reaching commitment by the United States Government should I visit India this month. On the basis then that we will keep the most pressure on the Indian Government by withholding my visit until after the Shastri visit I would so recommend.

### Action

- ① Postpone your visit until following Shastri.
2. Plan to go prior to the Shastri visit.
3. Discuss this with me further.
- ④ Send the technical team as soon as the Tashkent Conference concludes.
5. Talk to me further before you send the technical team.

Frid., Jan. 7, 1966, 11:15 AM

62

MR. PRESIDENT

This press summary is better  
than most, and I think it will  
interest you.

McG. B.

Friday, January 7, 1966  
10:00 a.m.

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Further to the Wall Street Journal story on  
the State of the Union and Vietnam**

I have checked with the three people in my office who know what I have been doing, and they tell me that they have not discussed the substance of the matter nor the content of the State of the Union in any way, shape, or form outside the NSC staff. They have asked for facts and figures mainly on matters that got crowded out of my own paper. I conclude that if there is a leak and not simply some very good guessing, it is not my people -- in this instance.

McG. B.

Friday, J . 7, 1966  
9:05 am

64

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is an interesting message from Shastri to you. He makes sense on all the topics he touches, and they are all important.

McG. B.

Encl

Shastri ltr Jan 6



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, January 7, 1966  
9:00 am

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Santo Domingo this morning

1. I talked last night to Bill Bowdler in Santo Domingo, and this morning the Department has talked with the Embassy. Garcia Godoy's announcement that all the top military on both sides were being ordered out of the country has created a public impasse. Bunker and his colleagues are going back and forth trying to find a way of getting both sides to back away from their positions of honor. Meanwhile, there is very little shooting, and some of the newspaper reporting is a little more explosive than the events.

2. While Palmer's temperature is high, he knows that Bunker is the top man, and Tom Mann and I continue to think that the best thing to do is to let him work on it. I asked specifically last night whether there was anything we could do for them, and the answer was negative.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(2)

Friday, January 7, 1966  
0845

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This item from this morning's Wall Street Journal's Washington wire is much too close to be funny. I have not talked to any newspaper man about this in any way, but I have asked for facts and figures from three or four staff assistants, and they in turn have asked around the Departments. I am doing a quick check, and will report again during the morning.

McG. B.



**JOHNSON WRESTLES** with tricky problems in drafting messages to Congress.

His State of the Union message will dwell on the Vietnam war. But it's awkward to take any clear line now amid peace probing. White House men don't want to issue open ultimatums to Hanoi at this delicate time. Yet they feel a need to deflate "excessive" expectations of peace—by restating the possibility of a long Vietnam struggle.

LBJ will strive to soften the sting of frank words about Vietnam. He'll pledge "adequate" spending increases for Great Society programs, despite arms needs. Big-city problems will get high priority. Johnson will dangle hope of fatter civilian outlays if the war slackens. He'll paint glowing prospects for economic growth without inflation, if business and labor show restraint.

Unusual difficulties also confront drafters of the budget message, the economic report. Reasons: Delay of key decisions till the last minute, uncertain outcome of the peace offensive.

Thursday, Jan. 6, 1966  
8:50 pm

1/6

67

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Prime Minister answers your letter about Erhard and the nuclear problem. As I ventured to predict, he is moving away from the common nuclear force just as fast as he politely can. I happen to think he is right, but I doubt if George Ball will.

McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~





BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 January, 1966.

*Dear Mr. President,*

I have been asked to transmit  
to you the enclosed message from  
the Prime Minister.

*Yours Sincerely*  
*Patrick Dean.*

The President  
of the United States of America.



~~SECRET~~

67-2  
10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

January 5, 1966

*Dear Mr President,*

Thank you for sending me in your message of December 23 such a full account of your discussions with Chancellor Erhard on nuclear questions. It was very good of you to send me the text of the memorandum handed to you by the Chancellor in Washington. I have also received a message from Professor Erhard, who is obviously pleased with his talks with you.

I entirely agree with you about the need for a stable and healthy Germany, playing a constructive part within the Western community, and for nuclear arrangements in the alliance which command the support of our three governments and are acceptable to other parties.

As you say, some aspects of the German proposal are likely to give rise to difficulties for both of us.

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 98-166**

**By ics, NARA Date 4-28-99**

I will not enter into details of these now. But I agree that we should respond by giving the proposals joint consideration as expeditiously as possible. I shall look forward to discussing all this with Ambassador Bruce on his return.

At the same time I am sure that it is right to press forward with the work of the NATO Special Committee. When the Nuclear Planning Working Group set up by the Committee has its first meeting, I am glad to see that the first item on its agenda is to be a discussion, to which the German Government will contribute a paper, on the questions to which the non-nuclear members of the alliance attach importance. This should give an ideal opportunity for the German Government to describe their problems and for the Group as a whole to discuss how best they can be met consistently with the general interest.

I have been sorry to hear of Herr von Hassel's illness. But I hope that this will not hold up

the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group unduly. It seems to me vitally important that we should keep up the momentum of the Special Committee and show that we are seriously tackling this nuclear problem and working to strengthen the cohesion of the alliance.

My hope which I believe you share, is that the Special Committee will result in the establishment of a permanent body for reaching collective decisions on the nuclear policies of the alliance. It is only by continuing consultation that we can achieve a common policy and remove such desires as may exist for less desirable solutions. The exact form and functions of such a continuing body can only be settled by discussion within the alliance. But whatever arrangements eventually emerge, it is of the highest importance that they should be seen to



be non-disseminatory, and I am glad to hear you say that the creation of a new weapons system is no longer contemplated. Possible ways of reorganising existing weapons systems might be a suitable subject for consideration by the Special Committee or a successor body.

I agree that we must keep closely in touch about all this, so that the views of our two Governments and of Germany may develop in step one with another.

*Yours sincerely,  
Herold Wilson*

The President of the United States of America.

Thursday, January 6, 1966  
8:45 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: First draft on Vietnam

1. This is a first draft on Vietnam for use in preparing the State of the Union message. Even I know that it is too long, but I send it to you, as well as to Dick Goodwin, because I think it very important to have your own first-hand reactions to the general thrust of the argument. The effort is to establish a bench mark for candor and completeness, and to combine firmness about our basic purpose with the limit of flexibility in our bargaining position. The formulations on pages 8 and 9 are just a little new, but I think they can be sold in the State Department with just a little effort.

2. Much of the rest is not new, but it will have a certain freshness from you, and it would settle once and for all the complaint that we have not stated our case in full. I can shorten it some myself on a second try, and I am sure Dick can do still better.

McG. B.

13 ✓  
69

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thurs., Jan. 6, 1965  
8:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

This shows how Harriman can make  
even Thanat of Thailand favor a  
lengthening of the pause.

McG. B.

69a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Thursday, January 6, 1966

(Text of cable from Embassy Tokyo 2359)

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

With Ambassador Martin I had a satisfactory talk with Thanat. Although the meeting lasted only a little over one hour, we covered the waterfront. Prime Minister Thanom was tied up at a court function. I explained the purpose of my trip and stressed that the U.S. is flexible on everything except the right of the South Vietnamese to decide their own future and the determination not to permit Hanoi to takeover the South by force. I reviewed for him my talks with government leaders I had seen and told him about the initiatives each had said they would undertake with Hanoi, Moscow, or Peiping. I told him all had pointed to the need for sufficient time for their efforts to be productive.

Thanat made the following points: He expressed his full agreement with the President's actions. He said "we genuinely feel President Johnson's peace offensive is a good and timely move, although we don't believe cessation of bombing will bring North Vietnam immediately to the conference table. I feel the pause is a skillful and worthwhile move."

Thanat commented that when Hanoi and Peking label the peace offensive as a fraud it shows they begin to fear the effects of such a peace offensive.

He said that in a recent discussion a non-western diplomat told him that the North Vietnamese consider that if they were forced to the conference table the myth of their success growing out of the French defeat and 1954 Geneva Conference would be destroyed. Consequently it should be made to appear that they are coming of their own volition without compulsion. I asked how Hanoi could be persuaded to choose this course and Thanat replied he felt if we can mobilize non-communist public opinion it would bring pressure to bear on Hanoi to negotiate. He said this could have some effect on Hanoi but less on Communist China. He also said he was considering an Indian suggestion that the Thai Government convene an Asian Heads of State Conference on Vietnam. He said it might be difficult for Thailand to take a successful initiative for a conference because the Thais are considered too committed by some. Nevertheless he is considering the matter. He agreed emphatically that it was necessary to give the countries now taking initiatives time to exercise their influence. He said that if the pause were to continue for another two or three weeks it would

DECLASSIFIED 11/03/243  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By p/is, NARA, Date 7-9-03 1-14-04



not be dangerous, adding however, he was not a general. He repeated "we don't believe the Communist side will hurry to the conference table" but mobilizing a common front of non-communist countries could bring pressure on them to do so.

In answer to my question, he expressed the strong opinion that the Viet Cong are creatures of Hanoi. He asked, How can one conceive that the Viet Cong are independent of Hanoi?

He told me he had mentioned to Vice President Humphrey in Manila that if irrigation dams in the North Vietnam Delta Area were destroyed, floods would occur and North Vietnam would be brought down to its knees. Thanat hastened to add that this was a last resort, a desperate move, but that it was better than bombing Hanoi.

We also discussed communist terrorist activity in Northeast Thailand which he explained was increasing somewhat, to which Martin agreed. I urged that his Government take necessary action to keep the situation under control before it got out of hand.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thurs., January 6, 1966

3:30 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Crisis in the Dominican Republic

1. I am not sure you have seen the intelligence report, showing that there is a moment of real crisis in the Dominican Republic. Namely, Garcia Godoy seems to have made up his mind to send all the top military people on both sides out of the country, and it looks as if the regular military would flatly refuse. At that point Garcia Godoy says he would resign.
2. Bunker is doing everything he can to prevent such a show-down, which would do nobody any good in the long run. Last night I sent Bill Bowdler of my staff to join Ellsworth, along with his two colleagues on the OAS committee. We therefore have our first team on the scene.
3. But the first meeting this morning (yellow cable attached, Tab A) showed no progress with Garcia Godoy. They are trying again this afternoon.
4. This looks to me like one of those desperate situations in which Spanish honor and common sense may be in headlong collision. There is no one in the world who can do more to head off such a collision than Bunker, and he has been repeatedly told that we trust his judgment. Thus at the moment all I can do is give you this warning as a pleasant addition to the troubles of the day. I do not think there is anything specific we can or should do from here.
5. We should know more by the end of the afternoon.
6. I also attach a rather hot cable from Palmer (Tab B). I think he considerably exaggerates the degree to which Garcia Godoy is the stooge of Bosch, but his feelings are significant just the same.

*in-10*  
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-239  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 11-18-93

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INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR. BUNDY  
Z 061710Z  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1583  
STATE GRNC  
BT

*Bundy*

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ JAN 06

EXDIS

FROM BUNKER AND BENNETT

1. WE MADE NO APPARENT HEADWAY WITH GARCIA GODOY THIS MORNING. HE INSISTED THAT CABINET WOULD RESIGN AND GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE IF HE DID NOT GO THROUGH WITH HIS PLAN; THAT THERE IS GREAT GROUND-SWELL OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT BEHIND DEMAND FOR CLEAN SWEEP OF PRINCIPAL MILITARY FIGURES ON BOTH SIDES THAT POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERS, INCLUDING BALAGUER, ARE PRESSING FOR THIS ACTION; AND THAT, FINALLY, HIS DECISION IS IRREVOCABLE.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 6845 ~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT SAID HE PLANNED CALL RIVERA AND JIMENEZ IN THIS MORNING TO INFORM THEM OF DECISION. DECREES CHANGING CHIEFS AND ASSIGNING OFFICERS ABROAD ARE THEN TO BE MADE PUBLIC, PRESUMABLY DURING COURSE OF AFTERNOON.

2. WE ATTEMPTED TO BRING GARCIA GODOY TO THINK OF HIS PROBLEM IN PRAGMATIC TERMS. HEART OF MATTER IS NOT WHETHER CHIEFS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED BUT, RATHER, WHETHER TAKING DRASTIC ACTION HE PLANS WILL ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE HE HAS IN MIND. WE POINTED OUT THAT ARMED FORCES MIGHT REACT BY LAUNCHING WAVE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION IN INTERIOR WHICH IAPF WOULD BE POWERLESS TO CHECK. WE AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT HE PROCEED BY STAGES, BEGINNING WITH SENDING ABROAD OF SECONDARY OFFICERS AND GOING ON FROM THERE TO DE LOS SANTOS-CAAMANO SWAP. GRADUALIST APPROACH WOULD PERMIT PRESIDENT LAY NECESSARY GROUNDWORK AND AFFORD US OPPORTUNITY BRING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON RECALCITRANT CHIEFS. IN ADDITION, WE SAW NO REASON WHY, IF HE WORKED BY STAGES, PRESIDENT COULD NOT MAKE OTHER CHANGES HE DESIRES IN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. ONCE CAAMANO GONE PROBLEM OF RIVERA

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-230  
By *ij*, NARA, Date 11-12-91



PAGE THREE RUESSD 6845 ~~SECRET~~  
AND MARTINEZ COULD BE RESOLVED AND WE WOULD OFFER OUR FULL  
SUPPORT AND COOPERATION TO THAT END.

3. PRESIDENT SEEMED UNMOVED BY THESE ARGUMENTS. HE SAID  
COUNTRY WAS ASKING WHY U.S. AND OAS DID NOT SUPPORT HIM. IF  
CHOICE IS TO BE MADE, WOULD IT NOT BE IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO  
BACK HIM RATHER THAN IDENTIFYING OURSELVES WITH MILITARY? WE  
POINTED OUT THAT U.S. AND OAS HAVE BEEN GIVING HIM FULL  
SUPPORT, AS EVIDENCED BY FIRM BACKING DURING VARIOUS POLITICAL  
CRISES SINCE SEPTEMBER 3 AND BY GENEROUS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.  
UNHAPPY FACT IS, WE OBSERVED, THAT CONFRONTED BY DIFFICULTIES,  
DOMINICANS TEND THROW UP THEIR HANDS AND SAY "LET U.S. DO IT".  
WHATEVER GOES WRONG, THEN, IS OUR FAULT. IN THIS CRISIS, WE  
EMPHASIZED, IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF OUR WAVING A MAGIC WAND  
AND BRINGING ABOUT HAPPY STATE OF AFFAIRELEREXFYNT DESIRES.  
OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE ARE LIMITED, DESPITE IDEAS TO CONTRARY  
HELD BY MANY DOMINICANS. WHAT WE CAN DO IS HELP FIND PRACTICAL  
SOLUTION TO DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 6845 ~~SECRET~~

4. PRESIDENT WAS APPARENTLY UNCONVINCED BY THESE ARGUMENTS.  
HE REITERATED THAT NO CHOICE REMAINS TO HIM BUT TO GO AHEAD AS  
PLANNED. IF HE FAILS, HE SAID, IT WILL NOT BE FOR WANT OF TRYING  
AND HE CAN GO WITH "CLEAR CONSCIENCE". THERE WAS GOOD DEAL MORE  
OF THIS KIND OF TALK, INDICATING PRESIDENT'S CONVICTION THAT  
HE HAS ADOPTED MORALLY CORRECT COURSE OF ACTION. ON SPECIFICS,  
GARCIA GODOY REPEATED HIS DETERMINATION TO ORDER CAAMANO AND  
COMPANY ABROAD AT SAME TIME HE MAKES CHANGES IN HIGH COMMAND.  
HE EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT REBEL LEADERS WOULD GO WILLINGLY  
BUT THAT CHIEFS WOULD BALK.

5. PRESIDENT IS NOW MEETING AGAIN WITH CABINET (PRESUMABLY  
MINUS RIVERA). PENNA MARINHO AND DUENAS ARE SCHEDULED ARRIVE  
EARLY AFTERNOON, FOLLOWING WHICH AD HOC COMMISSION WILL MEET  
WITH GARCIA GODOY. AT MOMENT IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT HE  
CAN BE PERSUADED TO GO SLOW BUT WE WILL KEEP TRYING. GP-1  
BENNETT  
BT

~~SECRET~~

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TO RUEKDA/CJCS  
INFO RULSAA/USCOMDOMREP  
BT

~~SECRET~~

*Bundy*

~~SECRET~~

FOR GENERAL WHEELER INFO GENERAL PALMER FROM MOORER

A. USCOMDOMREP USFDR-CG 0022 DTG 060600Z  
1. I FULLY SUPPORT PALMER'S COMMENTS AND STRONGLY  
RECOMMEND THAT YOU INTRODUCE THE SUBSTANCE OF  
PALMER'S MESSAGE INTO U.S. POLICY COUNCILS ASAP. UNLESS  
ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE IS PUT ON GODOY AT ONCE (INCLUDING  
DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, AND THREAT OF U.S. MILITARY  
WITHDRAWAL) WE ARE LIABLE TO LOSE ALL THAT HAS SO  
FAR BEEN GAINED. THE ASCENDENCY OF BOSCH CAAMANO ARISTY  
ET AL WOULD BE A CALAMITY WITH FAR REACHING EFFECTS  
ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA.

GP-4  
BT

~~SECRET~~

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Authority EO 11652 SEC. 5 (A) and (D)

By if, NARS, Date 9-4-81

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 91-233 Appeal  
By cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

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66 JAN 6 AM 5:16

THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~ USFDR-CG 0022  
FOR ADM MOORER AND GEN WHELER FROM GEN PALMER  
1. A. REPLY29: -, \$ 3 ORD, STRONGLY SUPPORTED  
BY OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS INCLUDING THREE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES,  
TO GODOY'S PROPOSALS IN HIS SPEECH OF 3 JAN IS NOW ABUNDANTLY  
CLEAR. BOSCH IS MAKING ALL-OUT EFFORT TO INTIMIDATE AND  
BLACKMAIL GODOY WITH DIRE THREATS OF GENERAL STRIKE AND  
COUNTRY-WIDE ARMED REVOLT AND VIOLENCE IF BOSCH'S HATED  
ENEMIES, THE DOMINICAN MILITARY CHIEFS, ARE NOT SACKED.  
BOSCH, LIKEWISE, IS MAKING CRUDE, BLATANT EFFORTS TO PRESSURE

PAGE 2 RULSAA 03 ~~SECRET~~  
U.S. AND OAS INTO YIELDING TO HIS DEMANDS AND THROWING SUPPORT  
OF IAPF BEHIND OUSTER OF CHIEFS. BOSCH HAS ALREADY SUCCEEDED  
IN HIS INITIAL OBJECTIVE - TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN GODOY  
AND HIS CHIEFS, AND DESTROY THE RAPPORT AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE  
THAT HAD BEEN SLOWLY BUILDING. BOSCH NOW SEEKS TO REPLACE  
THE CHIEFS AND WEAKEN THE ARMED FORCES, HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE  
BEING TO DESTROY THEM SO THAT HE HAS THE COUNTRY UNDER THE CONTROL  
OF HIS "PEOPLE'S ARMY".  
B. ALL INFORMATION GATHERED ON 4-5 JAN INDICATES THAT BOSCH,  
DELIBERATELY TEAMING UP WITH THE COMMUNISTS, WILL SEEK TO  
FRIGHTEN GODOY WITH A SERIES OF THREATENING COMMUNIQUE TO THE  
POINT WHERE GODOY WILL THROW IN THE TOWEL AND MAKE THE CONCESSIONS  
DEMANDED. BOSCH IS GAMBLING IN A RECKLESS AND IRRESPONSIBLE WAY  
SINCE HIS TACTICS COULD LEAD TO CHAOS IN THE COUNTRY, OR TO  
RESIGNATION OF GODOY AND HIS GOVT. HE FORMER SUITS HIS PURPOSES.  
THE LATTER HE SURELY DOESN'T WANT AS IT WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN  
A RIGHTIST JUNTA WHICH WOULD SEEK TO CRUSH HIM.  
BY INDICATIONS ARE THAT GODOY IS ABOUT TO  
CAPITULATE ABJECTLY TO BOSCH. ACCORDING TO BUNKER, GODOY NOW  
PROPOSES TO ISSUE DECREES WHICH WOULD ORDER THE LEADING REBEL



PAGE 3 RULSAA 03 ~~SECRET~~

LEADERS, CAAMANO INCLUDED, OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE SAME FOR EXTERMIST TROUBLEMAKERS IN THE REGULAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, HE WOULD REPLACE RIVERA WITH JIMENEZ AND APPOINT NEW CHIEFS FOR THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE. HE WOULD APPARENTLY ORDER THIS WHETHER THE CHIEFS AGREED OR NOT, AND THEN WOULD RESIGN IF THE CHIEFS REFUSED TO OBEY. TO JUSTIFY THIS ACTION, GODOY HAS GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE CHIEFS WHICH STRIKE ME AS UNSUPPORTED, NOT HAVING HEARD RIVERA'S SIDE OF THE STORY, AND CERTAINLY GROSSLY INADEQUATE FOR SUCH A DRASTIC AND DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION.

3. IN DISCUSSING THE ABOVE, I HAVE INFORMED AMB'S BUNKER AND BENNETT THAT I BELIEVE GODOY'S PROPOSAL THE HEIGHT OF FOLLY - THAT HE WOULD BE GIVING IN COMPLETELY TO THE LEFT AND THAT THE CHIEFS WOULD PROBABLY IGNORE HIM. HIS SUBSEQUENT RESIGNATION WOULD MEAN THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT AND WE WOULD LOSE ALL OF THE NOT INCONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN SEVERAL MONTHS. I STATED THAT GODOY'S PROPOSAL WAS NOT, IN MY OPINION, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S. OR THE OAS, AND THAT I WAS CERTAIN THAT GEN ALVIN WOULD FEEL VERY STRONGLY THE SAME WAY. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT GODOY IS WORTH SAVING IF IT MEANS GIVING IN TO THE DEMANDS OF THE LEFT UNDER DURESS

PAGE 4 RULSAA 03 ~~SECRET~~

AND THREAT OF ARMED REVOLT. ON THE OTHER HAND, I URGED THAT GODOY CALL BOSCH'S BLUFF AND TEST HIS TRUE STRENGTH AND INTENTIONS. BOSCH IS FAR WEAKER NOW THAN HE WAS IN SEPTEMBER. HIS PERSONAL MILITARY ARM, CAAMANO AND HIS "CONSTITUTIONALIST ARMY" IS NO MILITARY THREAT WHATSOEVER. THE DOMINICAN SECURITY FORCES AND IAPF CAN READILY HANDLE ANY ATTEMPT TO START A NEW REVOLUTION IN THE CITY-MOREOVER I DON'T BELIEVE THE PEOPLE WANT RENEWED VIOLENCE. BOSCH'S POPULAR SUPPORT, I BELIEVE, IS OVER-RATED, EVEN IN SANTO DOMINGO. OUTSIDE THE CAPITOL CITY, DOMINICAN SECURITY FORCES, PROVIDED THEY ARE NOT WEAKENED AND REMAIN LOYAL TO THEIR LEADERS, SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT LEFTIST LABOR GROUPS ARE LOSING GROUND. I KNOW OF NO BETTER TIME THAN NOW TO HAVE A DECISIVE SHOWDOWN WITH BOSCH WHO IS AT THE ROOT OF OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. GODOY SHOULD THEN ORDER THE OUSTER OF CAAMANO AND HIS REBEL LEADERS FOLLOWED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE 27 FEB CAMP GARRISON AS A ARMED FORCE. GODOY CAN THEN TURN TO THE QUESTION OF HIS CHIEFS AND MAKE TIMELY AND CONSIDERED REPLACEMENTS IN A BUSINESS-LIKE, ORDERLY WAY WHICH DOESN'T RISK INSTABILITY.

4. AMB BUNKER IS URGENTLY CONSULTING WITH GODOY, TRYING TO GAIN TIME WHILE HE GETS AMB'S PENNA MARINHO AND DE CLAIRMONT BACK TO

PAGE 5 RULSAA 03 ~~SECRET~~

SANTO DOMINGO FOR CONSULTATION. THE FEAR IS THAT GODOY MAY NOT WAIT, BUT FOOLISHLY PRECIPITATE AND IRREVOCABLE COURSE OF ACTION. I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS WITH GEN ALVIN, THE DOMINICAN CHIEFS, AND THE OAS AD HOC COMMITTEE, BUT BUNKER WANTS TO DELAY THIS UNTIL HE MAKES CERTAIN THAT HE HAS GODOY'S AGREEMENT TO WAIT BEFORE A FINAL DECISION. IN THE MEANWHILE, RUMORS, MOSTLY BOSCH-INSPIRED, ABOUND THAT GODOY WILL RESIGN TONIGHT.

5. RIGHT NOW, MIDNIGHT, THE CITY IS QUIET. WE HAVE OUR FINGERS CROSSED. GP-3

BT

~~SECRET~~

Thurs., Jr 6, 1966  
10:15 A. M.

71

MR. PRESIDENT:

Dave Bell's Saigon press conference is summarized in the attached telegram, and it may be that you would want to have Bill Moyers give it a boost by saying that you were interested in Bell's mission and looking forward to a talk with him on his return.

Alternatively, the whole thing could wait until Bell does get back next week after stops in Thailand and Laos, where he also has big programs.

McG. B.

Saigon 1726

CC: Bill Moyers

72

Thursday, January 6, 1966, 8:45 AM

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

I think the following cables in the overnight take will interest you:

1. A message of thanks from you to the Vatican which I assume was cleared with you somewhere by someone. It seems fine to me, but it did not happen to come through my office.
2. An interesting report on Kosygin's talk with Shastri on Vietnam, which I think will lead the Department to instruct Kohler to talk to the men in Hanoi.
3. Williams talks to Nkrumah and makes a surprising amount of headway with that unpredictable character.
4. and 5. The Secretary of State puts the needle to a Czech and a Swede. He is a formidable debater, and I am going to pillage these telegrams for parts of the draft Vietnam section on the State of the Union.

I am locking myself up today in the Situation Room to get that job done, but there will be a line open for the Boss.

McG. B.

1/6/66

to P  
1/4/66  
via Valenti

Dear Ken:

I would like to thank you for your contribution to our new Air Transport Agreement with Canada. I understand that your imaginative and constructive suggestions helped in an important way to shape the Agreement. Not only the travelling public, but all of us who prize the friendship between Canada and the United States are in your debt.

Once again, you have rendered a signal public service.

Sincerely,

| S |

Professor John Kenneth Galbraith  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

LBJ:FMB:mst

Tuesday, Jan. 4, 1966, 12:15 noon



Wednesday, January 5, 1966  
6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Frei's Statement on Vietnam Peace Offensive

Ralph Dungan reports that President Frei in a press interview on January 3 had this to say about the Vietnam peace offensive:

"I consider that this peace effort should be supported with the greatest determination by all governments and by all peoples. The war in Vietnam is a tragedy, not only for that nation, but for all the world. In addition to the enormous human suffering that it causes, there will also be present serious and disturbing economic consequences in the Hemisphere which naturally will effect Chile. For this reason I repeat that we support without reserve these peace efforts in the hope that any sacrifice which may be made to achieve peace deserves the gratitude of all humanity."

McG. B.

cc Moyes

75

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA FOR NSC MEETING, JANUARY 5, 1966  
5:45 P. M.

SUBJECT: Next steps in the effort for peace.

1. The Western Pacific -- The Vice President
2. Report on Rome, Paris and London -- Ambassador Goldberg
3. Report on public comment overseas -- Mr. Marks
4. Late diplomatic round-up -- The Secretary of State
5. Preliminary discussion of next steps -- The Secretary of State

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DLH NARS, Date 8-2-83

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., Jan. 5, 1966, 5:30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may be interested in Symington's views as expressed to Bill Sullivan. It may be that we ought to try to talk to him before he starts to say this sort of thing in public. He doesn't much like being muzzled by the White House, but he has played ball with us before.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-203By iss, NARS, Date 6-7-84

Wednesday, January 5, 1966

(Text of message from Embassy Vientiane 713)

1. At Senator Symington's request, I met with him privately at Udorn January 4. In order to preclude the possibility that some aspects of this conversation may be reported out of context, I feel it prudent to submit this summary record of our meeting.
2. The meeting opened with Senator asking for review of recent U.S. air action against infiltration routes in Laos. I showed him operational reports on last three days' action and list of sorties scheduled for January 4. There were 274 sorties for Steel Tiger Area scheduled for that day alone.
3. Senator pronounced this shocking waste of air power and said it was a crime to use high-priced, high-powered jets to "beat the bushes" in Southern Laos. He asked if I felt we were accomplishing interdiction by these air strikes. I said that I did not and felt that at best we were causing enemy some harassment. I pointed out that depots had been broken up into 5-10 ton storages troop concentrations were limited to few hundred men each and all were dispersed under the trees. There was very little that we saw moving on the roads themselves.
4. The Senator then said he understood it would take three divisions of U.S. troops to try to interdict Ho Chi Minh Trail by land. He felt such troops were not available, but wondered whether I thought they should be asked for. I said I thought three division estimate was probably conservative and doubted they could develop air tight plug anyway. I went over with him nature of terrain, methods of infiltration, etc. I doubted that ground troops constituted the answer.
5. The Senator then asked whether I didn't feel air power, instead of "beating bushes", should be used to "knock out fuel storage areas, power plants, Port of Haiphong, and hit dams and levees which would flood countryside in North Vietnam." I suggested Senator had better examine just how many such installations existed in North Vietnam before he reached a judgment on that proposal. I recalled a prime target list we worked up for North Vietnam in late 1963 which had less than 100 targets altogether. It was my impression the greater part of these had already been hit and, although certain significant areas remained unscathed, I wondered what practical effect their destruction would have on continuing North Vietnam ability to infiltrate troops into South and maintain them in combat against U.S. Forces there.



6. Our experience in Laos suggested that a fuel storage area, once destroyed, would reappear in the form of 50-gallon drums scattered under trees and in caves. It would cause North Vietnam much more work, but would not seriously degrade their ability to get fuel. Power plants would be either replaced by small generators or else products they nourished would be provided by China and Russia. As for dams, I doubted there were many available and busting levees on the Red River would make sense only in July and August, when the river was in flood. Breaking up Port of Haiphong would be a serious blow, but it would just mean that cargo would come in by small coastal vessels transshipping out of Port Wallut and elsewhere in South China. It would, furthermore, place North Vietnam completely in Chicom hands by excluding Soviet shipping. I felt that aspect had to be considered.

7. In short, I doubted efficiency of "Strategic Bombing Campaign" in North Vietnam, and especially doubted that it would have any significant effect upon North Vietnam infiltration into South Vietnam. My comments obviously pained the Senator, who said that "everybody else" he had talked to on this trip agreed with him that air strikes such as he proposed would "take North Vietnam out of the war." I said I regretted being in such isolated minority but thought I felt more comfortable in that position than I would be joining those who stood elsewhere.

8. The Senator then shifted discussion and said he understood I favored amphibious operations at Vinh. I confirmed that I had submitted recommendation for such operation and explained my reasoning for recommendation. He then asked whether I felt such an operation should be undertaken without air strikes against strategic targets he had previously described. I said that I frankly did not know; that this seemed to me a matter which military planners needed to study; and that they should recommend what preparatory or supplementary air action was required to make the invasion a success. The Senator asked whether he could then say that I did favor bombing his strategic target list in order to support "my invasion." I reiterated my previous position about military planners, etc., and we finished our meeting on this note.

9. Comment: It might be helpful to give Senator Symington, on his return to Washington, some idea of the specific targets available for type of campaign he envisages. Since he categorically says that he does not favor "bombing North Vietnam back to the stone age", he presumably proposes a fairly limited campaign, with, I fear, limited results. I have the impression he intends to propose this course of action in public statements and in Armed Services Committee.

27

77

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(2)

Wednesday, January 5, 1966, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Backgrounder with Frank Cormier and Merriman Smith

I talked to these two gentlemen for 45 minutes this afternoon and found them reasonably receptive to the following general account of the pause and its meaning.

I said that the pause had been under careful consideration since November, I had heard it discussed with you carefully both on November 11 and on December 7 during visits to the Ranch by Rusk and McNamara. I said that I thought you had decided to proceed with great care and to move very quietly until you were quite clear about the usefulness of a substantial suspension. I said that I knew in the week before Christmas you had decided to double and raise the other side in answering their 12-hour Christmas lull with one of 30 hours on our side.

I said that after that, when the incidents continued in the South, you had authorized resumption in the South but had carefully reviewed the whole situation in the North and had obviously decided that in the light of the world's response to the Christmas truce and the evident feeling in many quarters that there might be further hope for peace, if there were a continuation of the suspension, that was the thing to do at that point. (I saw no reason to conceal the fact that you had made the decision on December 27-28 and I said that I thought any man who had tried to make that decision without the evidence of the Christmas lull in front of him would have been irresponsible as well as foolish, since there was every reason for you to see how the Christmas days went before you made a final decision.)

I told them that it would have been very foolish to keep all of your special ambassadors on a tight leash in Washington until you knew how you were going to use them, and that it had been clearly to Harriman's and Goldberg's advantage to have as much holiday as they did have. I said I thought both of them had performed magnificently and that both were already familiar with your thinking when they were asked to undertake these missions, and had been able to get their last-minute briefings very promptly and effectively. In effect, I said that the notion of a hasty cloud of merely propagandistic maneuvers was nonsense.

I went at some length into the reasons for sending emissaries to so many capitals, and pointed out that in many cases visits to one capital had produced a need for visits or messages to another. I said that the network of real diplomatic communication -- and also of diplomatic pressure on Hanoi -- had turned out to be wider and deeper than anyone had expected at the beginning. I said I thought the world -- and Hanoi too -- was inclined to pay greater attention to our effort precisely because of the breadth and depth of the effort, and the visibility of many of its elements. I agreed that some Communist propagandists and the French were taking the opposite line, but I thought they would find along most of Embassy Row that the net effect of the program you had set in motion had been to increase understanding of our purposes and respect for our sincerity. I said that while our 14 points contained nothing really new in substance, they had won support for our purpose of peace in a way that would not have been possible without the dramatic way in which the pause had focussed the attention of the world upon our position.

I said further that while I reached no conclusions, I had seen comments to the effect that the broadcasts coming from Hanoi showed a certain defensiveness, precisely because our interest in peace was more widely accepted now than for many months past.

I did not direct their attention sharply to the more serious diplomatic efforts which are in train through the Poles, the Hungarians, and by direct contacts. I did say that we were still working on such more serious diplomatic channels and that I did not expect an "immediate" resumption of bombing. I agreed that just as the decision to suspend had been yours, so the decision to resume would be, and I said that I thought that whenever that decision became necessary, if the rest of this operation were conducted with the same care and skill that has been shown so far, the United States would be in a stronger position both at home and around the world to carry forward in its determined effort to get an honorable peace in Vietnam.

They said they expected to write their stories for PM papers tomorrow, Thursday.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, January 5, 1966  
3:40 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here are two papers you may wish to look at before the meeting this afternoon. One is a proposal from George Ball, <sup>TAB A</sup> for a private initiative on Vietnam which might be surfaced later if it does not work. The other is a set of memoranda from my brother's office, <sup>TAB B</sup> the net of which is that they want approval to tell the Hungarians that our Ambassador in Rangoon is available for direct discussions with the North Vietnamese Consul General there if such direct conversations are wanted on the other side.

I think the Ball proposal needs a lot of thought, and that the proposed answer to the Hungarians makes sense. But both of these are sensitive subjects and should probably not be discussed in the large NSC meeting.

This leads me to suggest that you may want to have a smaller meeting after the NSC meeting, perhaps in your office, for discussion of these proposals and of the possibility of going to the UN Security Council. Goldberg told me on the phone this morning that he is now in favor of going to the Security Council as the pause draws to an end. I have also heard from Bill Moyers of your own suggestion that we think about this for the State of the Union. If there is to be any discussion on this subject, it must be in a very tight circle -- limited perhaps to Goldberg, Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and whichever of your own people you want.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202

By ics, NARS, Date 6-19-84

hcl. B.  
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~



78a.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/MARIA~~

January 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposal for New Viet-Nam Initiative

1. The President would secretly send a letter to the  
Heads of Government of

- (a) The United Kingdom
- (b) The Soviet Union
- (c) Communist China
- (d) North Viet-Nam
- (e) South Viet-Nam

The letter to Mao could be delivered through our Embassy  
in Warsaw. The letter to Ho Chi Minh could be delivered  
through Rangoon.

2. These letters would call for a "meeting" of the six  
Foreign Ministers to be held in Vienna beginning January 17  
"for preliminary discussions of the problem of Viet-Nam."

The United States would maintain secrecy on the sending  
of these letters and would request that they be kept secret  
by the recipients.

Advantages

~~TOP SECRET/MARIA~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-203  
By is, NARS, Date 1-10-85

Advantages of Proposal

1. This letter would be delivered during Shelepin's visit in Hanoi and would hopefully arm Shelepin with specific proposals to press on the North Vietnamese.

2. The meeting would not be regarded as a formal conference but could be a prelude to a conference. There would be no formal agenda.

3. The letter would be sent secretly and hence would avoid the charge that it was merely a propaganda ploy; at the same time, if rejected, it could be surfaced later to our propaganda advantage.

4. The meeting would bring together the real parties in interest. It would omit the French who are not likely to play a helpful role.

5. It would put the burden squarely on Peiping and Hanoi of either sitting down with the GVN (which would go a long way to establish the status of the Saigon Government) or rejecting a meeting on that ground, which would be indefensible with most of world opinion.

6. The meeting would be outside the framework of the UN. As a consequence you would not be subject to the charge that you were making a grand-stand play because Red China and North Viet-Nam are not UN members.

7. The meeting would provide the basis for a further suspension of bombing; indeed it would require suspension of bombing while the meeting was in progress.

8. Such a meeting would provide the best possible opportunity now available for serious progress toward peace.

Arguments

~~TOP SECRET/MARIA~~

-3-

Arguments Against Proposal

1. The proposal might tend to draw the Russians and Chinese more closely together since they would tend to adopt a common front at the meeting. (On the other hand, Russian pressure on Hanoi for attendance at the meeting might provide an additional divisive element.)

2. The meeting might be deliberately protracted in order to keep us from resuming bombing. (However we propose to set a specific and early date for the meeting and our participation in such a small meeting would put us in an excellent position to judge whether any progress was really being made.)

3. The idea of the meeting might be hard to sell in Saigon. However, the arguments in paragraph 5 on page 2 should go far in persuading them. Some special efforts would be required to keep the Thais, Koreans and Chinese Nationalists from restlessness.

4. The call for the meeting might be interpreted as a sign of weakness; however, our continued deployments into South Viet-Nam and the announcement of the new budget would help to counteract this.

5. The failure of such a meeting of Foreign Ministers would increase the dangers of escalation even more than the failure of the present peace offensive.

  
George W. Ball

~~TOP SECRET/MARIA~~



78c



78d

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/PINTA

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 5, 1966

PARTICIPANTES: Janos Radvanyi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim  
of Hungary  
Endre Saluka, First Secretary of Hungarian Legation  
Secretary Rusk  
Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy

DISTRIBUTION: S FE - Mr. William Bundy  
U DoD - Secretary McNamara  
G WH - Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
S/AL

Radvanyi read the following oral message from Foreign Minister  
Peter:

"I received your message of yesterday. I thank  
you for it. I have informed my government.

Mr. Rusk's answer leaves the impression that  
he misunderstood the first part of our message. We  
did not speak of the type of meeting characterized by  
the example of Rangoon. We are speaking of that type  
of meeting where the official representatives of the two  
governments negotiate directly and an exchange of views  
takes place between them about their conceptions ("ideas"  
would be an alternate translation, according to Radvanyi).

We are asking you whether the U. S. Government  
is ready to participate in such-type meetings. On the  
basis of careful examination (which Radvanyi told Bundy  
later spoke for itself), we are of the opinion that the  
possibility of that type of meeting exists."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/PINTA

By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/PINTA

The Secretary responded that he would talk with his colleagues and let Radvanyi know our answer, possibly through Mr. Bundy.

The Secretary remarked that the Hungarians should realize that the Rangoon contact was made by our Ambassador, who gave an official communication to the Hanoi representative. There was no doubt of the official status of the exchange.

The Secretary went on to say that the question on his mind -- not to be put to Peter -- was whether, if such contact was not contemplated through the use of existing channels, then what else was in mind? (In their later short meeting to be sure of the text of the Hungarian message, the Secretary's remarks were reviewed for accuracy, and Mr. Bundy noted that the Secretary was of course referring to his statement yesterday that there were existing channels of whose nature Hanoi was well aware.)

FE: W. P. Bundy:bmm 1/5/66

78e

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 4, 1966

PARTICIPANTS: Janos Radvanyi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim  
of Hungary  
Endre Szluka, First Secretary of Hungarian Legation  
Secretary Rusk  
Edward J. Streator, Staff Assistant to the Secretary

DISTRIBUTION: S FE-Mr. William Bundy  
U DOD-Secretary McNamara  
G WH-Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
S/AL

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Radvanyi read the following oral message from Foreign Minister Peter:

"In order to be able to answer the message of Mr. Rusk, it is necessary for us to know the following: Is it possible to interpret what you said to Mr. Peter during discussion with him in New York last October and the publicly stated present proposals that the U. S. Government would like to get in direct touch with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam for the purpose of negotiation? We suppose the answer is yes. If that is the situation, then we can inform you, Mr. Rusk, our conviction is the possibility can be found for direct negotiation between the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the U. S. with the aim of explaining their viewpoints to each other. Naturally, it would be a matter of mutual agreement whether to publish or to keep in secret the fact of the negotiation as well as the contents of the negotiation. "

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03



The Secretary indicated that he appreciated the message from Foreign Minister Peter. He said that for a very long time there has been no problem about direct contact between the DRV and the U. S. ; there have been several channels. However, we have not received any response through these contacts. Though there are no difficulties about contacts in which the authorities in Hanoi and the U. S. can fully expose their positions to each other, it may be that Peter's initiative has produced a contact that is more acceptable to Hanoi than other contacts. If Hanoi wished to indicate the type of contact which would be meaningful for it, we would be interested in any suggestion Peter might make on this point.

The Secretary stated that he had indicated the foregoing to Radvanyi because Peter should know that we have had direct contact with Hanoi for some time. In view of Peter's message, the Secretary said he wished also to inform Radvanyi that the U. S. Ambassador in Rangoon had transmitted a message to the North Vietnamese Consul General in Rangoon. The Consul General received the message and said he would transmit it. His receptivity differed from the situation in May, when the Hanoi representative would not receive a communication from us. However, we since have heard nothing from the North Vietnamese Consul General in Rangoon. The Secretary further indicated, without going into detail, that we have other contacts with Hanoi and that Peter should know for his own information that there has been no reaction from Hanoi through these other contacts. The Secretary stated that he did not wish to exclude, however, the possibility that Peter may have information about another contact that might be useful.

Radvanyi said that he wished to reiterate the portion of the message which stated: "the possibility can be found for direct negotiation between the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the U. S. ".

The Secretary indicated that these possibilities already are present because we are in direct contact with Hanoi. Perhaps Peter could suggest another contact that would be useful.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

- 3 -

Radvanyi said that he was instructed to state to the Secretary that Peter strongly disapproves of the propaganda campaign surrounding the present U. S. peace effort, and that it risks compromising Peter's secret initiative. The Secretary indicated forcefully that he rejected categorically the allegation concerning a "propaganda campaign". We are genuinely interested in peace. If there cannot be peace, there will be war. The Secretary said that we are attempting to find out if there is a possibility for peace. He reiterated severely his rejection of Radvanyi's statement concerning the motives of the current U. S. peace effort. Radvanyi stated he would convey the Secretary's view to Peter.

Radvanyi then read the following question: "In connection with my first question, Mr. Secretary, do you have any suggestion or proposal as to who, where, and in which circumstances you would like to meet the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the representatives of the Democratic National Liberation Front?" The Secretary responded that, with respect to the first part of Radvanyi's question, Hanoi knows whom we have been in direct contact with. If Hanoi has further suggestions for Peter, it should let him know. The Secretary again indicated that Peter should know we are in contact with Hanoi. With respect to the Liberation Front, the Secretary stated that he could only repeat what he had said before. There has been no change in our position.

The Secretary said he wished to emphasize to Peter that it would be a great mistake to look upon the current U. S. effort to find peace as a "maneuver". An elementary question is involved. If Hanoi and Peiping push into Southeast Asia, the U. S. has two choices: to get out of their way or to meet them. We shall meet them with whatever is required. If they decide not to push into Southeast Asia, there can be peace today. The marginal questions, such as ideology and propaganda, make no difference. The elementary question remains: if the North Vietnamese decide to send men into the countries of Southeast Asia, we will have war. If they decide to have

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

- 4 -

peace, there will be peace. The tragedy of the situation is that there could be peace in twenty-four hours if Hanoi and Peiping decided not to try to take over Thailand, South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. This, he concluded, is the heart of the matter.

Radvanyi promised to relay the Secretary's comments to Peter.

S:EJStreator:fr

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS/ PINTA

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, January 5, 1966, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Lucet has just delivered to me de Gaulle's answer to your letter. Here is the typed version of his cable. An informal translation might go like this:

"Dear Mr. President:

I have given careful attention to the message which you were kind enough to send me through your Charge in Paris. I am grateful for this information and for your assessment, and I have of course noted the confidential character of this message. Ambassador Goldberg has undoubtedly given you an account of the interview which he had with me on December 31. He gave me a very clear and complete account of the situation in Vietnam as it now appears to you, along with your views on the subject.

I have carefully noted the information which he gave me on your behalf and from which it appears that by a temporary suspension of the bombardment of North Vietnam the United States hopes to create possibilities for contact and then for discussions. I have had to say to Mr. Goldberg that in my opinion this measure would not insure these results and that at least from the point of view of North Vietnam, it would be necessary in addition to have assurance that in the end any negotiations would conclude in the departure of all foreign forces.

Please accept, Mr. President, my assurances of high and friendly esteem.

Sincerely,

C. de Gaulle"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202  
By ica, NARS, Date 6-19-84

h. g.

McG. B.



Wed., Jan. . . 1966, 2:30

80

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is an important dispatch  
from Lodge. As you can see,  
he is still pulling hard for a  
quick end to the pause.

McG. B.

*Saigon 1377*

~~SECRET NODIS~~

Wednesday, January 5, 1966 - 2 PM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. LODGE (Saigon 2399)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Bombing Pause

The following are straws in the wind as regards Viet Cong and Vietnamese reaction to the bombing pause:

A. On Christmas Day, about 1,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were reliably observed entering South Vietnam.

B. Incidents during the period December 26 through January 1 totally 1,133. This is the highest total of incidents ever recorded in one week since the Communist aggression began. This includes the bombing of an American enlisted men's billet at Dalat.

C. Prime Minister Ky told me Monday that one result of the bombing pause was sharply to reduce the number of returnees coming into the Chieu Hoi Camps. He said that when bombing resumed, more people would come into the Camps. As you know, we are planning a big Chieu Hoi effort at Tet time for which we have great expectations. I am glad to say that for the week just ended the number of returnees has shown a modest increase in line with the general trend.

D. Vietnamese newspaper Tien Vang saw the bombing pause as an invitation for Hanoi to appraise the United States as weakening in its determination to carry on the war.

E. The Vietnamese newspaper Saigon Daily News carried four column cartoon showing masses of B-52's flying over the Vietnamese countryside with two Vietnamese men standing looking up at them. One of the men says to the other: "Are they going north"? The other says: "No". And the first man says: "Let us move to the north then".

F. The Vietnamese newspaper Tu Do, referring to Viet Cong peace gestures, warns: "You can make any concessions you want on your part, but you cannot depart from what has been held dear to us: South Vietnam must be the place for Vietnamese nationalists only. Under no circumstances can any Communist be allowed to set foot here".

~~SECRET NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-203  
By ms, NARS, Date 1-10-85

G. Colonel Pham Van Lieu, Director of National Police, seemed unhappy with the pause saying that the United States should not try to talk with Hanoi. "You Americans should talk to the Russians and the Chinese, and if there is any talking to be done with Hanoi, we should do it".

H. If resumption of bombing is delayed much longer, you may find that, when you decide to resume the strikes, it will be near the beginning of Tet--a celebration full of meaning for all Vietnamese. Resumption near Tet--say within the week or so immediately preceding it--might subject us to the criticism that while the United States observed the Christian spirit of Christmas, we violated the spirit of Tet. Such criticism could well force you to postpone resumption of the bombing until the very end of January or early February.

## 2. Letter to Menzies

In telegram transmitting text of your letter to Menzies you ask for my comments, which are as follows:

Seen from Saigon, the bombing pause is not only not repeat not evoking any reciprocal cessation of Communist military activity, it is marked by a definite increase. It is also interpreted as a sign of weakness, although Vietnamese in the Government familiar with American ways understand the motivation behind it.

The presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam added to the increase in Viet Cong incidents seems to me to make the bombing indispensable. It creates the need to hit this North Vietnam Army wherever we can hit it: In the sources of its power in the North, along its line of communication through Laos, in the high plateau of South Vietnam and, if need be, on the South Vietnam coastal plane. The resumption of bombing is, therefore, necessary from the standpoint of the purely military action against the Army of North Vietnam. It is also highly desirable as regards the psychological war against the Viet Cong, which, until the bombing pause, was definitely going in our favor.

My last talk with General Ky on this subject, other than his casual comment on January 3 repeated above, was on December 29. At that time, I told him, based on DEPTTEL 1805, that the bombing would probably resume by the middle of this week.

Of course, I have no first-hand contact with whatever results the bombing pause may be achieving outside of this area and do not know how widespread the appeal of the pause is as regards American public opinion and Congress. I realize that you must measure results here against results achieved elsewhere. But in this area, the pause has not only done us no good; it has definitely caused losses, as the "straws in the wind" mentioned under paragraph 1 clearly shows. From this vantage point, therefore, it would be well if you followed intentions set forth in DEPTTEL 1805 and resumed bombing now.

3. U. S. Opinion re Vietnam

A. I try to share your worries in the hope that I can produce some helpful advice. In this spirit I cogitate about American public opinion and the attitudes in Congress. I recognize that I am far away from home and yet I see a great many Congressmen and I have quite a lengthy experience in back of me, notably as a U. S. Senator during the Korean War when I was closely in touch with public sentiment in the face of mounting casualties.

B. I will, of course, always exert maximum pressure for the speediest possible results. I believe that as prudent men we must also make plans on the basis that the Vietnamese struggle will not be quickly ended. I notice that even Senator Morse admits that we cannot withdraw from Vietnam. Also, I believe the Communists are determined to drag this thing out until the 1968 elections.

C. This raises the question of whether an effort should not be made to get the American people to understand that this Chinese Communist imperialism, which manifests itself in so many subtle and disguised forms, is something with which we are going to have to live year in and year out. I remember in the late 40's and early 50's we thought in terms of "cleaning up" the situation in Europe. I can remember that dates were discussed by which time the situation in Europe should be cleaned up. We were impatient and somewhat petulant. Then we learned how to live with the Cold War. I think one of General Eisenhower's contributions as President was educating people to the idea that we had to live with the Cold War year in and year out. In those days when we said Cold War, we meant the Soviet Union.

D. I realize that public opinion will support greater or lesser casualty figures depending on the degree of feeling and conviction which it holds about the war. Also, for some reason, it accepts casualties on the highways for no particular cause more easily than it does casualties on the battlefield for causes that are noble and deserving of sacrifice. Psychologically, the thing is complicated because, concurrently



with all these feelings is the view that we must "fish or cut bait or row ashore" and this argues for more drastic measures. And more drastic measures in turn can sometimes mean fewer casualties.

E. I believe it simplifies thinking to have a clear idea in one's own mind of what constitutes a satisfactory outcome. I do not say a "perfect" outcome. I notice one Administration spokesman described a satisfactory outcome recently as one in "which the people of South Vietnam can determine freely their own government in the future." Does this mean elections which are free from intimidation all over the country? If so, I do not think we need to go that far in order to feel that we have achieved a satisfactory result. Neither do I think that we should insist on such goals as utterly destroying the North Vietnamese military potential or seizing the Valley of the Mekong in the Laos panhandle. "Satisfactory outcome," as the U. S. Mission tried to define it in Saigon 1377, still seems one reasonable definition, although undoubtedly not the only one. But even this implies heavier punishment of North Vietnam.

F. One conclusion from all this is that if public opinion is accustomed to the idea that we have to live with this dangerous and complicated Chinese Communist aggression year in and year out, it will stand casualties better and will not be as impatient because quick results have not been achieved. Also casualties will probably be fewer. And if we should get a few breaks and things started to go our way rather quickly, success would be especially sweet if it came at a time when no one really expected it.

#### 4. David Bell

I am most grateful to you for sending David Bell. His visit has been a great success because he brought with him from Washington carefully thought out, constructive and concrete measures for the problems which are bothering the Government most. His recommendations concerning the Port of Saigon and the threat of inflation are sure to make a tremendous difference. We can always use visitors like him.

#### 5. Economic

Retail prices in the Saigon area rose slightly in the week ending December. But these increases represented more or less normal market fluctuations. U. S. Operation Mission's index of both food and non-food prices remains virtually the same as it was one month ago. Gold and dollar prices receded from last week's high level.

Saigon's power situation was much improved on December 27 when a new plant producing 20 megavolts eliminated almost 50% of the power shortage, which has prevailed for the last 7 1/2 months. Another big American contribution.

82

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., January 5, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT

I passed on Birch Bayh's good report to Dick Goodwin. I have also drafted the attached acknowledgment for your signature.

*mb*  
McG. B.

Wed., January 5, 1965

File 82a  
copy

MR. PRESIDENT

Depassed on Birch Bayh's good report to Dick Goodwin. I have also drafted the attached acknowledgment for your signature.

McG. B.

Dear Birch:

This brings my warm thanks for your thoughtful memorandum of January 4 about your visit to Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Your suggestions make a lot of sense to me, and I am asking that they be given a hard and sympathetic look by Jack Vaughn and his experts. What you say about education, especially, fits right into my own current thinking.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Birch Bayh  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:McG B:mz



## MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: Senator Birch Bayh  
Date: January 4, 1966

During November, 1965, Senator Harris and I visited the countries of Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. I would like to convey my outstanding impressions to you.

1) The United States is suffering because of a severe communications gap which exists between our country and those to the South. We are not communicating with them effectively. It was clear, at all levels of government and society, most Latin Americans do not understand our policies or our motives and, most important of all, our friendship toward them.

2) Because of the frustration of their inability to solve the numerous and complex problems, there is a natural inclination to blame the United States for most problems which confront the individual countries. In my opinion, our available resources for assistance cannot begin to solve all of their problems. I suggest we concentrate our aid and efforts into more limited areas from which greater benefits can be derived. I specifically refer to the increased efforts which I feel are necessary on the part of the United States to provide Latin Americans with increased educational opportunities.

3) Agricultural techniques are most primitive and, without tremendous progress, food production will not meet food demands. Existent resources must be developed. This problem can only be solved by education.

To meet these problems, I suggest the following:  
The ultimate goal --- a Presidential visit to South America which would enable the President to capitalize on his personal warmth and charm to convey our feeling of friendship. This visit should climax an intensive campaign of at least a year's duration in preparation for the tour. This period of preparation should include:

a) a grand pronouncement by the President of a major dramatic new program of educational opportunity for Latin Americans. I have suggested the program be entitled "Operation THINK" - Total Hemispheric Investment in Knowledge. A better title can be found.

I suggest an educational program, first, because lack of education and technical know-how is at the root of all major Latin American problems. Education is needed to increase food production, to provide technical know-how and skills needed in a modern, industrial society, to train teachers to

further expand their educational system itself and, finally, to develop a citizenry which is capable of functioning within a democratic process. The average Latin American realizes the importance of an education to his children and, thus, the program can be dramatized. Finally, the President himself has long been associated with sacrifice and effort in the field of education.

b) Visits by officials of the United States including Vice President Humphrey to Latin American nations.

c) Invitations to Latin American heads of State to come to the United States for State visits. Here, again, the President can utilize his great skill at personal diplomacy.

A final word concerning my feeling that the chief United States effort should be in coordinated educational programs. The most impressive American AID project I saw was an agricultural college and extension service project in Minas Gerais, Vicosa, Brazil. This project conducted programs in basic agricultural research to find out what can feasibly be accomplished in the field of agriculture. It trains young college graduates in the art of teaching this research information and it establishes an extension system comparable to that in the United States which provides means to disseminate this information to the grass roots.

Investment of AID funds in education promises more return of lasting benefits for each dollar expended than any other area. Funds for such a major effort can be derived by consolidating existing programs as well as by appropriating new funds. I am convinced that United States funds which are presently expended in Latin America for military hardware can be much better invested in education.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday - January 4, 1966  
6:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Garcia Godoy addressed the Dominican nation last night on the Santiago incident. He avoided placing blame, saying in effect that all Dominicans must assume responsibility for the divisions which exist. He said that the present moment calls not for accusations but for renewed effort "to unite our wills for our common good". In the speech he also announced that an "important group" of officers would shortly be going abroad on different assignments. He did not get into specifics. After the speech, he told the press that the officers would be "from both sides".

The Embassy reports that the speech has been generally well received. So far the violence threatened by the extreme left if Garcia Godoy did not oust the military chiefs has not materialized. Garcia Godoy seems to be experiencing some difficulty in getting the group of officers to depart. Two Dominican planes have been standing by since yesterday afternoon to take them to Miami and San Juan.

As of 6:00 p.m., there had been no departures. Bunker indicates that the delay is due to Garcia Godoy's continuing efforts to get some of the top people to leave, presumably Air Force Chief de los Santos and Caamano.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-239  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tues., Jan. 4, 1966  
10:40 AM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Lodge's latest on negotiations. He takes a cold, hard view, but I think he is right about it, just as I think Harriman is right about the usefulness of lengthening the pause. Perhaps the two of them will compromise on this basis.

h.f.B.-  
McG. B.



~~TOP SECRET~~

84a

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE . Tuesday, January 4, 1966 - 9:40 AM  
(Outgoing Saigon 2376)

I have been mulling over your 1865, and its suggestion of a "Conference in Absentia" where the two co-chairmen would be the only ones to sit at the table to try to find a peaceful solution.

I do not think we can get much good out of this and we might get a good deal of embarrassment. I doubt whether the Soviets would, or even could, take on such a burden. Soviet influence in Hanoi is very slight.

Neither do I think the British could produce very much. Wilson and Stewart appear to be simply coping with pressures and if they have made any kind of a successful effort to educate public opinion on the realities of the Vietnamese situation, it has certainly escaped me.

About the most that could be expected out of a meeting of this kind would be an attempt to "put the monkey on somebody else's back" as regards whose fault it is that we haven't got peace. It is absolutely impossible to embarrass the Communists by this kind of tactic. They are indifferent to human life and are intent on conquest. We prize human life and deeply want peace. It is thus very easy to create embarrassment for ourselves. This activity has an unreality about it which is bound further to encourage the type of wishful and unrealistic thinking which seems to be plaguing some people at home.

The alternative idea of having the International Control Commission nations attempt the same thing suffers from similar drawbacks. Hanoi does not appear to trust the Poles; the Canadians, although very loyal to us, are under heavy domestic pressure and the Indians have many handicaps.

Nor do I like the idea of reconvening of the Geneva Conference powers. Such a meeting would be filled with representatives of governments who either are like the British in that they are motivated by wishful thinking, or like the French and the Chinese Communists who actively want us to fail. We could get into horrible and unnecessary complications.

I still come back to the conclusion that if the time comes when talks are in order that they should be between North and South Vietnam with the U. S. participating on all matters involving the American presence.

Much of this talk of negotiations reminds me of a man with smallpox trying to cure it by putting cold cream on his face. I see no real substance in any of it. The truth is the Communists think they can win. They will not

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority NLS 83-203  
By us, NARS, Date 6-7-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

think otherwise until we have done three things:

- A. Really punish them in the North;
- B. Decisively defeat the North Vietnamese Army; and
- C. Show them that we can overcome them when it comes to rooting out the terrorists and rebuilding the political structure in the countryside.

As soon as we have done these three things, they will then try to win at the conference table what they could not do on the battlefield, but -- alas! -- this prospect is not immediately in sight. I am confident that we can make very big strides in 1966. Until that time, most of this talk is a "Brutum Fulmen."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

848

Monday, January 3, 1966 - 5:20 PM

FOR LODGE FROM RUSK (Outgoing Saigon 1865)

Many thanks your 2343. Your reasoning is compelling and reflects my own evaluation of problem of Viet Cong representation. At heart of problem remains Hanoi's determination to grab South Vietnam by force. If that changes, other problems would begin to fall into place; until it does change I am not too much interested in shadow-boxing on side issues. We have put forward publicly about all we have to offer for a peace basket. Hanoi's only contribution is their four points; the third of which is what the fighting is all about.

If we get to negotiations, I am tempted by the possibility of a "Conference in Absentia" where the two co-chairmen would be the only ones to sit at a table to try to find a peaceful solution. An alternative would be for the three International Control Commission nations to attempt the same role. Such middlemen would have to get the agreement of, as a minimum, the Governments of South Vietnam, the U. S. and Hanoi. Each co-chairman would be free to consult anybody, including Adam's off ox, if he wished to, but peace would have to satisfy the essential three. On this basis there would be no conference table to quarrel about. I doubt that Soviets would take on such a burden, but I would appreciate your reaction.

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Authority NLI 83-203  
By is, NARS, Date 6-7-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

85

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday  
January 4, 1966  
9:00 AM

Mr. President:

Here are two interesting cables from overnight. Lodge reports an opinion of Ky in order to press the case for resuming the bombing, and Harriman reports the opinions of the Shah in order to argue the opposite. Harriman and Lodge should have an interesting meeting.

*M. P. B.*

McG. B.



Tuesday, January 4, 1966  
8:45

85a

~~SECRET~~

Following is text of cable from Lodge (Saigon 2372):

Prime Minister Ky told me that one result of the bombing pause had been sharply to reduce the number of returnees coming into the Chieu Hoi Camps. He felt that the more we bombed, the more people came into the camps and vice versa.

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Authority NLS 83-203

By is, NARS, Date 6-7-84

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 4, 1966  
10:00

~~SECRET~~

For the President and Rusk from Harriman reporting on discussions with the Shah of Iran (Tehran 954).

1. My discussion with the Shah on the evening of the third turned out to be interesting and useful. Most of the two and a quarter hours that Ambassador Meyer and I had with him dealt with Vietnam. I conveyed the President's greetings and warm appreciation for his support on Vietnam. The Shah asked that I convey to the President his respect and encouragement in the responsibilities which he was shouldering.
2. I explained the reason for my trip as the President's earnest endeavor to secure peace without surrendering South Vietnam to the Communists. I reviewed the highlights of my discussions with Ayub, Shastri, Rapacki, and Tito. I noted all want a peaceful settlement and the Communist leaders' fear that escalation may embroil them in a wider conflict. I pointed out the desire to solve the problem on the basis of the 14 points which would ensure South Vietnamese self-determination. I asked his views and also his support whenever appropriate opportunities arise in his contacts with foreign leaders.
3. The Shah said he had made his position clear on trips to various world capitals, including Latin America and Moscow. Stopping aggression in Vietnam, as elsewhere, was a matter of vital principle. The Soviets had not demurred when in June he emphasized the importance of not letting the Chicoms over-run Southeast Asia. I expressed appreciation for his effective support, particularly within the walls of the Kremlin.
4. The Shah said while he has been a "Hard-Liner," it is necessary to recognize world opinion. "Peacemongers" in Europe have been waving flags against American policy. While he recognized the overwhelming support for the President's policies in the U.S., still there has been widely publicized U.S. protests as

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Authority NLS 83-203  
By us, NARS, Date 1-10-85

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- 2 -

by professors, students, certain editorialists, etc. Finally the Pope, himself, has made a sensational appeal for cessation of the Vietnam fighting which appeared to condemn the U.S. bombing at least as much as Viet Cong aggression.

5. In view of the foregoing, the Shah said he unqualifiedly supports the President's initiative in the pause in bombing. Now, he strongly advises the pause be prolonged to the maximum extent which our "higher interests" will permit. He realized this might mean for the moment additional tragic U.S. casualties, but in the end it would do much to secure favorable world opinion for the American cause, including from such doubtful types as Tito, Shastri, Ayub, etc.

6. The Shah said the following factors argue for continuing the pause in the bombing even though eventually it may be necessary to take a military stance firmer than ever: A) Despite the Commies most intensive efforts, U.S. forces can never be driven out of Vietnam; B) the situation in Indonesia has improved so the possibility of an Indonesian-Chicom link-up in Southeast Asia is receding; and C) above all everything must be done to maintain and even widen the Sino-Soviet gap.

7. According to the Shah, an important purpose of the Chicoms in Vietnam is to "ridiculize" Moscow, i.e., demonstrate that the Soviets are unreliable defenders of other Commie countries, denigrate the Soviets as having lost revolutionary momentum, etc. When I asked at what point would the Chicoms actually intervene, the Shah said certainly not if the U.S. restricts itself to the defense of South Vietnam but surely if U.S. forces take action against China or move into North Vietnam (he drew the parallel of North Korea). Premature resumption of bombing would play right into the hands of the Chicoms.

8. The Shah noted the Soviets describing U.S. peace moves as a "facade" presaging further escalation. In his view, the U.S. should not attach undue significance to this line as an indicative of the real Soviet attitude as it was necessary Soviet stance in

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- 3 -

their rivalry with the Chicoms. Too early resumption of bombing, however, would inevitably lend credence to this Soviet propaganda whereas cessation for an adequate length of time helps drive a wedge between the Soviets and Chicoms. He mentioned that Kosygin had emphasized his embarrassment because the bombing commenced while he was in Hanoi and he appeared to assume that bombing would not be resumed while Shelepin is in North Vietnam.

9. The Shah said it is important that the South Vietnamese have something to fight for more than territory, e.g., institutions, way of life, etc. I noted it is difficult in a country like Vietnam to develop effective leadership. At the same time, I noted that over the past few years no South Vietnamese leader has defected to the Viet Cong. Moreover, troops continue to fight with courage and high morale.

10. I expressed the President's appreciation for the Shah's decision to send an Iran medical team to Vietnam. I noted they would have great responsibility in caring for an entire Vietnamese province. The Shah said he was gratified by the enthusiasm shown by team members who were volunteers.

Comment. The Shah was obviously greatly pleased that the President is interested in his views and his support. He gave us the impression that he had carefully thought out in advance his statement of his attitude and his advice.

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Garcia Godoy has decided to act today on the incident between the regular and rebel military in Santiago on December 19.

He plans to deliver a radio-TV speech at 7:30 p.m. EST, reviewing the Santiago affair and announcing a "series of changes in the armed forces". In the speech he would point out the difficulties in fixing blame for the Santiago incident and present it as merely one manifestation of a broader national problem. He would go on to say that in order to solve this problem changes in the regular and rebel military are necessary and announce his decision to send abroad (via diplomatic assignments) eight to ten officers from each side.

Garcia Godoy originally planned to include Army Chief of Staff Martinez Arana and Air Chief de los Santos, as well as Caamano, Montes Arache and La Chapelle on the rebel side. He subsequently decided that this was too big a bite, and now plans to make the changes at the second echelon. Bunker, Bennett and Palmer counselled against too many changes in one move. His Minister of Defense apparently gave him the same advice.

Garcia Godoy is hopeful that he can have the officers who are to leave on their way by this afternoon. He does not think he will have trouble persuading the officers to depart. He believes that Balaguer and Bosch will issue a joint statement supporting his decision, which hopefully will keep advance public reaction to a minimum. He has asked for the moral backing of the IAPF and mentioned the desirability of IAPF patrol activity in the city, accompanied by posting of guards at key installations.

Bunker and the Brazilian OAS Ambassador are in Santo Domingo. So is General Palmer, who in the absence of General Alvim is commanding the IAPF. If any trouble should break out, our first team is in place.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-239  
By fw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

While Garcia Godoy's plan is a move in the right direction, it does not get at the heart of the problem. As long as Caamano and his principal aides remain in the country, the rebels have a rallying point and will continue to regard themselves as an organized force. Incidents, such as occurred in Santiago, are almost certain to be repeated. Bunker shares this assessment. He reports that Garcia Godoy does too. The problem is one of method and timing which Ellsworth needs to work out with the President.

h.f.B.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 3, 1966, 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Laitin asked me about releasing the enclosed draft letter to the Houston Citizens for Action on Vietnam which you signed on New Years Day. I think this letter should not be released and indeed I should have pulled the draft back last week after it was decided to continue the suspension of bombing. The paragraphs of this letter at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 would be read in the current situation as hints of an ultimatum to Hanoi and I don't think you want that.

So my suggestion is that the Houston Citizens should wait for an answer until we see whether such an answer would be helpful later in January. For the moment I think we will do better to do our very best with the State of the Union. That is the most dignified place for a basic statement of your position, and I doubt if you want to tip your hand before then by advance comments to beatnics.

But if you want, I can try a redraft of this letter.

McG. B.

Let it go for now \_\_\_\_\_

Please redraft \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 1, 1966

Dear Mr. Wade:

I have carefully read your letter about peace in Vietnam. I want you to know, as I want all the American people to know, that not a day passes but what I ask myself what more I can do, as President of the United States, to open the way to peace in Vietnam. Not all of your proposals seem to me to be useful for this purpose, but it is certainly right that all of our citizens should concern themselves with this problem, just as their President does.

I am glad you approve the decision that our troops would not fire except in self-defense during Christmas. Unfortunately, this decision was not matched by any similar restraint on the Communist side. After a large number of Communist attacks on innocent civilians as well as military units, the Armed Forces of South Vietnam and General Westmoreland's forces have found it necessary to resume military operations in South Vietnam.

Let me turn now to your particular proposals:

1. We have made it clear again and again that we stand ready to terminate our air action against North Vietnam whenever anyone can show us any evidence that such a step would lead to a response that could open the way to peace throughout Vietnam. We suspended these attacks in May, and they have been suspended again over Christmas. But the aggression of the Communists

has continued both times. I cannot ask the South Vietnamese, and the Americans who are helping them, to accept the doctrine that there can be no military operations against military targets in the North, as long as the North remains committed to the command, supply, and reinforcement of the Communist campaign in the South -- and refuses to talk of peace with anyone.

2. The United States is firmly in favor of settlement along the lines of the Geneva Agreements. The United States is eager to see the peace-keeping offices of the United Nations used to the full. And the United States is also in favor of a cease-fire under terms and conditions which protect the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam. It is the Communists who insist on conditions which would nullify the Geneva Agreements, who reject all U. N. efforts, and who seek to impose their rule by force upon the people of South Vietnam.

3. We have repeatedly stated our adherence to the concept of self-determination for all peoples through the avenue of free elections. As I said on July 28, we favor such elections in Vietnam. The whole record of the last 20 years should make it clear to you and to all Americans that, whenever there is a difference between Americans and Communists, it is not the Communists who are in favor of free elections. What we seek in South Vietnam, and what the Communists would deny, is the right of the people of that war-torn country to shape their own destiny without coercion of any kind.


You quote a Buddhist leader in Saigon to the effect



that most of the Vietnamese people do not want the war to go on. I am sure this is so. It is only Communists who want the war to go on. The people of Vietnam want peace. The people of the United States want peace. The government of South Vietnam wants peace. The government of the United States wants peace. It is the government in Hanoi which makes war and refuses to move to the peace table.

As I said only days ago: "Our object in Vietnam is not war, but peace. There will be peace in Vietnam the very moment that others are ready to stop their attacks. We will push on every door for peace. We will go anywhere to talk. We set no conditions. We neglect no hopeful steps. But, as all of you know, it takes two to talk and it takes two, as well, to stop the fighting."

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

Mr. Houston Wade  
Houston Citizens for Action  
on Vietnam  
435 Electra  
Houston, Texas 77024

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~Monday, January 3, 1966  
7:00 p. m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is a slightly amended version of a draft letter from you to Menzies, which the State Department has prepared with Rusk's approval. We have not sent anything directly to Menzies and this seems like a bit of an oversight since he has his battalion there and we may be asking for more help soon.

This letter has the ultimate purpose that if you approve it we might send a copy to Lodge to give him an indirect idea of our current thinking. We would also plan to send a somewhat similar message to Holyoake.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

## Message to Menzies

Yes ☒No ☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-202By ics, NARS, Date 6-19-84

*Copy*  
~~Letter~~ to Lodge

Yes ☒No ☐

## Similar message to Holyoake

Yes ☒No ☐~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER  
MENZIES

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 83-202  
By is, NARS, Date 6-19-84

Through Ambassador Waller we have sought to keep you fully posted on our current action in delaying the resumption of bombing of the North, but I now want to give you my own view of where we stand and to seek your counsel on the decisions we may face a little down the road.

I need hardly tell you that I view this action as a serious diplomatic effort. We do not believe that the chances are great that Hanoi will respond in a way that would lead us toward the kind of peace you and we must insist upon. But we believe the effort may open up a round of intense activity among the Communist powers which, even if it does not succeed this time, may well serve to sharpen the divisions among the various elements on the Communist side.

Of course, a major further purpose is to solidify both domestic and international support for our position. If action or inaction from Hanoi compels us to resume, we should then be able to go forward with such total support that Hanoi would be disabused once and for all of any supposition that we will weaken in the struggle.

At this moment, I would say that the effort is proceeding well on all fronts. Harriman's visit to Warsaw has almost certainly produced a message to Hanoi which has at least stated our position accurately,

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- 2 -

and we have little doubt that this approach, and also Dean Rusk's talks with the Hungarians, have got through to Moscow without the disadvantage of our raising points directly with them at a time when their only response would probably be negative. As you know, we have also been able to deliver a direct notification to Hanoi itself in an Asian capital without any of the difficulties that Hanoi raised last May, and in the process we have given them a channel of direct access which they can use if they choose.

Harriman has also got commitments from Tito and Shastri that they will press the matter with the Soviets, and he has had a most sympathetic and useful response from Ayub. We have not asked Ayub to say anything to Peiping, nor have we tried to get any direct message to Peiping ourselves. We have little doubt that they too know fully what is going on, but we anticipate nothing but obstruction from them.

In addition, Ambassador Goldberg has enlisted the strong worldwide support of the Pope, who is now aiming his appeals at the Communist side, where they belong. As we expected, de Gaulle was quite negative with Goldberg, but it still helps to keep him in the picture. Harold Wilson is now sending a CONFIDENTIAL message to Kosygin, as between the two co-chairmen, which should further contribute to the pressure that we seek, but still without raising substantive points with them prematurely.

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- 3 -

Elsewhere in the world, Governor Williams' visits in Africa and Mr. Mann's in Latin America, together with our very complete diplomatic coverage, have certainly served to improve understanding of our position and to put these nations in a position to assist in whatever ways may come up through any international grouping. Among the important effects of our total activity is surely a far greater understanding of the merits of our position, so that, as we move ahead with our reinforcement in the South and if and when we decide to resume bombing, we shall do so with greater support and understanding than would otherwise have been the case, and with some hope that worldwide support for our total position will be stronger than ever in the past.

So far, so good. What we are weighing at the present time is of course the question of how long the suspension should continue. One factor in this is plainly the attitude in Saigon. So far, Cabot Lodge has been able to get their understanding, and we have every reason to believe that he can continue to do so for a further reasonable period.

The immediate present planning problem appears to revolve around the Soviet relationship with Hanoi and specifically the Shelepin visit. We suspect that the Soviets had intended Shelepin to arrive earlier than the presently announced dates of the 6th or 7th. This may mean that they need time to prior exchanges and for forming their own views; it could also mean that they are trying to push us off and make it difficult

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- 4 -

for us to resume. But until Shelepin has had some chance for serious talks in Hanoi, resumption of the bombing would undoubtedly be attacked in a great many important quarters as not having given Hanoi time to respond. Harriman in particular has found everywhere a broad understanding of our position but also a strong appeal for time in which to try to get it understood.

I am now turning over in my mind the possibility that the suspension will have to continue at least into next week. At the same time, I have always been well aware in assessing this whole project that there was a serious danger that Hanoi, possibly with Soviet advice, might seek to come up with actions or responses designed to make it difficult for us to resume. Already there have been indications that they may try to move us on the issue of representation of the so-called National Liberation Front. This is a fundamental issue and we are fully aware of its most serious implications. And other tricks may be tried.

I need hardly assure you that I have no intention of being taken in by mere gestures. As you know, we are continuing to do everything possible in the South and, in the absence of a major change on the other side, we expect to send major additional reinforcements during the first quarter of 1966 and beyond. We also expect to announce major budget increases for Viet-Nam.

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- 5 -

In short, that is the situation as I now see it. I would be most grateful for your frank comments and suggestions. Meanwhile the strong hearted help of Australians in the battlefield -- and your own strong leadership of your country -- give me fresh courage for the tasks that almost surely lie before us.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

✓ 89  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, January 3, 1966  
6:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Dean Rusk has sent me informally a memorandum which he commissioned from Doug Dillon on the de Gaulle problem. I find it quite persuasive and I think the advice he gives us is very good. In particular I think we should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, while not leaning over forward to curry new French favor. I think this is in fact the position you have sustained very skillfully for more than two years.

The implication of the Dillon memorandum would be slightly less anti-French talk at our second and third levels. I doubt that this is something you would want to put in a memorandum, but a few well chosen words on some informal occasion when both Dean Rusk and George Ball are around might make the point.

McG. B.

McG. B.

### Some Thoughts on U. S. Policy and Gaullist France

President de Gaulle's reelection requires a review of U. S. policy toward France. He is opposed to basic U. S. objectives, such as a strong NATO, a unified Europe and the maintenance of freedom in South Vietnam. These strongly held, personal views of President de Gaulle are unlikely to change. They are largely based on his messianic belief in the glory and importance of France, and thus are not subject to reasoned argument. Attempts to propitiate de Gaulle are unlikely to succeed and would probably only serve to increase the level of his demands.

Policy toward de Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part of our overall foreign policy. While it would be possible to devise a U. S. policy which could bring about an accommodation with de Gaulle, this would require abandonment or modification of major U. S. objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay, particularly in view of the recent evidence that de Gaulle does not now have majority support in France for his policies. The U. S. should make no substantial concessions to de Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of his position.

In arriving at decisions on overall U. S. policy, little weight should be given to Gaullist views. We should operate on the assumption that de Gaulle's leadership of France is temporary, and that he will be succeeded by a government more responsive to public opinion, hence more favorable to NATO, United Europe and the United States. However, in arriving at important policy decisions we should give due weight to basic French views and interests as opposed to de Gaulle's personal predilections. It may be difficult to sort things out in this manner, but we should make the attempt.

While continuing firmly on our course in spite of de Gaulle's views, we should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to de Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation. They cannot be effective, will only irritate de Gaulle and make him more difficult to deal with, and are likely to cause French public opinion to rally to his side against the United States.



If de Gaulle insists on the removal of U. S. forces from French soil, we should accede gracefully and should move promptly to reposition our line of communications through the Low Countries. Attempts to dissuade de Gaulle or to obtain various concessions would seem to be unwise, although it would be helpful if France would maintain the LOC in caretaker status. Forced abandonment of the French LOC would seem to provide a ready and plausible reason for reducing our forces in Germany by two or three divisions, since the blame would fall on de Gaulle. If France should decide to pull out of any active role in NATO, we should not replace our NATO tie with France by any bilateral agreement. Any such agreement would make it much more difficult for France to return to the fold at a later date and might set a pattern that could undermine the whole NATO structure. In the event of a French withdrawal, we should support the continuation of the NATO organization without France.

We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts.

In the event of French withdrawal from NATO, the Common Market or other international bodies, it should be made very clear to French public opinion that there is an empty chair always ready and waiting for France should she decide to return. This could be of major importance in maintaining the friendship and confidence of the French people as opposed to de Gaulle and his personal followers. We should continually work to preserve this basic friendship despite any annoyance with de Gaulle or his government.

Finally, de Gaulle's growing fear of Germany, plus his desire to cast France in a leading world position, may induce him to go to unusual lengths to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. This would be particularly likely if France should withdraw from NATO or substantially loosen her ties to the other Common Market countries. We should always bear this possibility in mind. If it comes about, we should react calmly and philosophically, based on circumstances at the time.

In summary, we should continue quietly and firmly on our course, ignoring Gaullist objections but always showing respect and friendship towards him and the French people, while awaiting the day when a more friendly and cooperative government comes to power in France.



A special subject that should be considered in any current review of U. S. policy toward France is the possible utility of a bilateral meeting between the President and de Gaulle. If such a meeting were to be held at U. S. initiative, the dangers would seem to outweigh any possible benefits. It is highly unlikely that de Gaulle could be induced to change his policy, except in a direction in which he has already decided to move. He is not given to personal negotiation. Rather, he could be expected to listen with great politeness to a Presidential explanation of U. S. policy, and then to reply in kind with an exposition of his own views.

The chief, and possibly only benefit from such a meeting held on U. S. initiative, could be the creation of a sense of personal obligation on de Gaulle's part, which might induce him to move somewhat more slowly. Such a sense of obligation could be established if de Gaulle felt that his importance, and that of France, had been publicly recognized in a full and satisfactory manner. But it is doubtful if this could be achieved without weakening our European friends, both in and out of France, by appearing to give an unacceptable measure of support to Gaullist policy. Also, should the meeting be satisfactory to de Gaulle, and should the U. S. thereafter take a position contrary to Gaullist thinking, his reaction might well be sharpened, as it was against the British when the Nassau agreements followed on the heels of a friendly de Gaulle-Macmillan meeting.

While the weight of these considerations argues against any U. S. initiative looking towards a meeting between the President and de Gaulle, a French initiative for such a meeting would be an entirely different matter. De Gaulle would deeply resent a rebuff if he sought such a meeting. Also, under such circumstances, it would be much easier to avoid the appearance of agreeing with de Gaulle's policies. Finally, should a French initiative be forthcoming, it might just possibly be a sign that de Gaulle had decided to moderate some of his policies and was looking for a proper stage setting to initiate such a shift. For all of these reasons a French invitation for a Johnson-de Gaulle meeting should probably be accepted even though such an invitation should not be sought by the U. S.

  
Douglas Dillon

*Dec. 1965*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 83-202

Document # 90

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Monday, January 3, 1966, 11:45 AM

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Peace Offensive -- where we are today1. With the Communists.

The Communists directly engaged -- Moscow, Peking and Hanoi -- have made no diplomatic comment and their propaganda continues to be negative. But only Peking takes an absolute position. The most recent semi-official Hanoi statement should not be taken as final. It is an excellent example of the continuing effort by Hanoi to secure major concessions on the four points, while seeming to be reasonable. The key word this time is that the U. S. should "acknowledge" the points. Hanoi also asks for a complete and unconditional cessation of all attacks on North Vietnam.

The Communists who are interested in getting negotiations started -- the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Yugoslavs -- are still at work, and we have no reports back. All three of them have emphasized the need for time -- the Hungarians speak of the problem of communicating with the jungle; Tito speaks of the need to let differences ripen in Hanoi.

2. Less direct mediators.

These include the British, the Canadians, the Vatican, U Thant and Nasser. The British are simply telling the Russians how serious and sincere we are, and the Canadians have already done likewise. The Vatican is sending Monsignor Ruffini to Saigon, and if possible to Hanoi. The Algerians have agreed to talk to all their Communist contacts, including the NLF. Harriman sees Nasser tomorrow. Here again, the lines are nearly all out, but we have no diplomatic answers back. One additional possibility is Japan.

3. The French

De Gaulle is in a class by himself. He has been fully informed and has expressed his warm appreciation. At the same time, he has made clear his conviction that nothing will happen until we announce that we will definitely withdraw at the end of negotiations. His Foreign Minister emphasizes the importance of a recognized role for the NLF. [REDACTED]


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- 2 -

 We have not asked the French for anything. This was wise.

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We have

#### 4. Our Pacific allies

These are more sympathetic to the peace offensive than we might have expected. There was slight nervousness in Taipei and Bangkok, but the Vice President has calmed one and the Secretary of State the other. There is deep understanding and support for our effort in Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. So far we have not sent presidential messages to Menzies and Holyoake, and I have requested drafts today. Their governments have been kept very fully informed and there has been no complaint.

#### 5. The Latin Americans

Here we have had unusually strong response from Dias Ordaz, Leone, and others, but no reply yet from Castello Branco. It remains for consideration whether we should follow up one suggestion and have an OAS meeting to reaffirm the need for peace.

#### 6. The Africans

The response to Governor Williams' trip has been excellent so far. He has been in Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Ethiopia, and is in Kenya and Tanzania today. Except for Algiers, there is no active interest so far in joining the diplomatic game, but there is general support.

#### 7. The United Nations

This is a special case. Goldberg recommends a letter which would become a Security Council document, and a draft will be at hand at noon. It has also been suggested that U Thant be asked to organize an advisory group of neutrals. I find the strongest opposition to this idea from McNamara and Rusk. Both of them feel that we must not hand over the diplomatic scales to this kind of a third party. Most of the world would like nothing better than to recognize the NLF in ways that would be very damaging in Saigon. This is only one of a number of issues on which we must do our own bargaining, because no one else can be relied on to do it for us.

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- 3 -

Issues for Discussion

1. Immediate tactical steps
  - a. Harriman to Japan
  - b. Letters to Menzies and Holyoake
  - c. Letter to U Thant
2. Public position for this week

Our 14 points have only begun to get the attention they deserve, and they have had a reaction of affirmative interest from such surprising quarters as Algiers, and even indirectly the New York Times. We should develop and expand them on a background basis, and we should challenge all concerned to say why they are not a perfectly solid basis for discussion. This job will best be done under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State.

We should continue to avoid any discussion of the duration of the pause, and we should continue to bat down any discussion of an ultimatum.

By the end of the week, attention will begin to move toward the State of the Union message. We should have a firm position as to what we do and do not say ahead of time on that subject.

So far we have had almost no public criticism of the pause. But Senator Symington's cable is a sample of what we will get more of as the days go by. Since it is entirely clear that the diplomatic power of the pause is directly related to its length, we need to study additional ways of maintaining its momentum. Properly orchestrated, the 14 points can help us through this week. Can the State of the Union take us as far as Tet?

*M. J. B.*

McG. B.

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January 3, 1966 - 11:35 AM 91

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CABLE FROM HARRIMAN REGARDING HIS TALK WITH PRESIDENT AYUB

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

With Ambassador McConaughy I met President Ayub at Peshawar Airport. As his plane was delayed by weather from Kabul, we talked in the airport lounge instead of Government House. Bhutto and the Director General of the Foreign Office were also present.

As time was short, I outlined briefly Vietnam developments since his talks with the President in Washington, gave him the 14 points, and highlights of my talks with Rapacki, Tito and Shastri. He asked a number of questions and seemed satisfied with my replies.

Bhutto expressed the opinion that representation of the Viet Cong at a conference might cause difficulty. Ayub appeared to understand our position of recognizing only governments, but thought that the National Liberation Front has opinions separate and distinct from North Vietnam and not necessarily always in agreement. I emphasized that an early indication from North Vietnam was pressing because of the military situation.

I pointed out that he was in a unique position to tell Kosygin from his own knowledge of President Johnson's sincerity in wanting a negotiated settlement and yet a determination to prevent North Vietnam taking South Vietnam over by force and to give the people of South Vietnam the right to determine their future. He replied that he understood this clearly and would have a frank talk with Kosygin. He expressed the hope Shelepin's visit to Hanoi would provide an opportunity for the Soviets to exert an influence. He believes the Soviets would like to end the conflict while Peking probably would be for continuing the war.

Bhutto asked if we wanted the subject raised with the Chinese. I replied that although I had no instructions, I felt we would not want to ask it since any initiation from us would be turned down. However, if President Ayub on his own initiative believed that it would be useful, I did not believe we would object and would leave it to his judgment. President Ayub did not appear to want to broach the subject with the Chinese. He repeated that of course Pakistan wanted peace in Vietnam and he would do all he could to encourage the Soviets to act.

I explained my talks with Kosygin last July had given me the impression the Soviets wanted to end the war and pointed to the fact that the Soviets as well as others in the Communist Bloc had pressed the U. S. to suspend North Vietnam bombing. After Ayub said he would do all he could, I told him the Canadian Deputy High Commissioner wanted to see him with a message from Pearson and I left the room when the Canadian was brought in.

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By sid, NARS, Date 1-10-85



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- 2 -

Later I recalled to Ayub that the President had asked him for his advice and that he might wish to communicate his reactions after he had seen the Russians. He replied that he hoped the President would be patient in extending the pause even though he understood the military considerations, and expained "we are dealing with a strange people who have been at war a long time, It may take time for them to make up their minds." He concluded by asking me to convey his best wishes to the President.

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