

10/6

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential 1 p	02/04/66	A
#5a memcon	re: Vietnam secret <i>Exempt per NLS 83-208</i> 4p	02/03/66	A
#6 memo	to the President from McG. B. top secret <i>open 1-9-83</i> 1 p	02/04/66	<del>A</del>
#6a memo	to SecDef from Pres. Kennedy <del>top secret</del> <i>open 1-21-94 NLS 91-82</i> 1 p	10/04/63	<del>A</del>
#6b memo	for the President from McNamara <i>sanitized 1-21-94 NLS 91-83</i> <del>top secret</del> 2 p <i>Downgraded per NLS 91-83</i>	10/12/63	A
#8a report	<del>re: Vietnam</del> top secret <i>open 8-6-93 NLS 92-376</i> 2 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#10 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy <del>secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i> 1 p	02/03/66	<del>A</del>
#12 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>confidential</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i> 1 p	02/03/66	<del>A</del>
#12a cable	Caracas 755 <del>confidential</del> <i>open 3-2-84 NLS 83-208</i> 1 p	01/31/66	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239</i> 1 p	02/03/66	<del>A</del>
#13b cable	text of Santo Domingo 1794 <del>Secret</del> <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-230</i> 3 p	02/01/66	<del>A</del>
#13d cable	telegram to Amb. Bunker <del>secret</del> <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239</i> 3 p	02/03/66	<del>A</del>
#23a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Confidential 2p	01/28/66	A
#23b report	re: India confidential 3 p	01/24/66	A
#24a memo	to Bundy from James C. Thomson, Jr. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i> 1 p	02/01/66	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~REDACTED~~  
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the PRESIDENT, vol. 19

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.  
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24b letter	draft message to President Pak from Pres. Johnson <del>Secret open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</del> 1 p	undated	A
#24c cable	Embtel 806 from Seoul <del>3-2-84</del> same sanitization 4-24-91 NLS 90-220 <del>Secret sanitized per NLS 83-208</del> 1 p	02/01/66	A
#24d cable	Embtel 805 from Seoul <del>exempt NLS 90-220</del> open 3-25-94 NLS 93-367 <del>Secret Exempt per NLS 83-208</del> 6 p	02/01/66	A
#24e cable	Deptel 777 to Seoul <del>exempt NLS 90-220</del> open 11-20-96 NLS 93-367 <del>Secret Exempt per NLS 83-208</del> 8 p	01/27/66	A
#25 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <del>Secret</del> sanitized 3-20-91 NLS 91-6 same sani per RAC 9/01 3 p	02/01/66	A
#26 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> confidential 1 p	02/01/66	A
#27 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential sani per RAC 11/24/09 1 p	02/01/66	A
#27a cable	TDCS 314/01304-66 Confidential exempt per RAC 7103 6 p	01/31/66	A
#30a cable	Saigon 2761 <del>Secret</del> sanitizing 7-19-84 NLS 83-209 4 p	02/01/66	A
<del>#31 #31a memo</del> open 7-16-03	from Amb. Sullivan in Vientiane <del>Secret Exempt per NLS 83-208</del> 1 p	02/01/66	A
#36 memo	from Lodge <del>Secret</del> open 7-19-84 NLS 83-209 2 p	01/31/66	A
#40a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk <del>Secret</del> open 7-19-84 NLS 83-209 4 p	01/29/66	A
#40b resolution	Draft Resolution <del>Secret open 3-2-84 NLS 83-208</del> 2 p	undated	A
#41a memo	to president from Dean Rusk Secret 10 p	undated	A
#42 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential 1 p	01/29/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42a memo	to the President from Lincoln Gordon Confidential 3 p	01/29/66	A
#42c letter	draft letter from Pres. Johnson to Pres. Belaunde confidential 2 p	01/29/66	A
#42e report	Guidelines for Rostow in Lima confidential 3p	01/28/66	A
#42g report	re: Peru confidential 3 p	01/29/66	A
<del>#45 memo</del>	<del>to the President from</del> <del>Secret</del> 1 p	<del>01/28/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#46a memo</del>	<del>to the PRESIDENT from Dean Rusk</del> <del>Secret Exempt NLS 86-190</del> 2 p	<del>01/27/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#46b letter</del>	<del>suggested letter to PM Wilson</del> <del>secret Exempt NLS 86-190</del> 2 p	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#47a memo	to the President from Walt Rostow Secret Exempt NLS 86-190 6 p	01/26/66	A
<del>#49a memo</del>	<del>to the PRESIDENT from McG. B.</del> <del>Secret sanitized 7-30-85 NLS 84-301</del> 3 p	<del>01/27/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#50 memo</del>	<del>to the President from McGeorge Bundy</del> <del>confidential</del> 1 p	<del>01/27/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#53a memo	Briefing Memorandum Secret sanitized 3-2-84 NLS 83-208 2 p	undated	A
#57 memo	to the President from R.W. Komer confidential 1 p	01/27/66	A
<del>#58a memo</del>	<del>text of Karachi 1510</del> <del>Secret</del> 4 p	<del>01/27/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#59 memo	to the President from R.W. Komer Secret 1 p	01/26/66	A
#60 memo	to the President from MCG. Bundy Secret 2 p	01/26/66	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 19

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#63 memo	to President from McG. B. <del>top secret</del> <i>open 1983</i>	1 p	01/26/66	A
<i>Pen 7-1603</i> #63a cable	text of Bangkok 1470 <del>top secret</del>	4 p	01/26/66	A
#67 memo	to President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	01/25/66	A
<del>#67a memo</del>	NSC Memo #340 <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i> <del>XXXXXX confidential</del>	3 p	undated	A
<del>#67b memo</del>	to the President from McG. Bundy <del>confidential</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	1 p	01/24/66	A
#68 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential	1 p	01/25/66	A
<i>Pen 7-1603</i> <del>#72b cable</del>	Deptel 3674 to London <del>top secret</del>	3 p	12/28/65	A
<del>#72d message</del>	Message to PM Wilson from President <i>open 10-27-79 NLS 88-467</i> <del>secret sanitized 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</del>	5 p	01/24/66	A
#73a memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	2 p	01/24/66	A
<del>#72f report</del>	OCI no. 0770/66 <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-2-84 NLS 83-206</i>	2 p	01/24/66	A
#76 memo	to the President from McG. Bundy secret	1 p	01/24/66	A
#76a memo	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read Secret	1 p	01/24/66	A
#76b letter	to Pres. Johnson from Pres. of Brazil Secret	3 p	01/21/66	A
#79 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p	01/23/66	A
#80 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret <i>sanitized 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	1 p	01/23/66	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~XXXXXX~~  
XXXXXX McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 19

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5086

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#82 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	<del>2 p</del>	<del>01/22/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#84 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <del>Secret</del>	1 p	01/22 21/66	A
#84a memo	to Robert Komer from John P. Lewis Confidential <i>open RAC 8/18</i>	10 p	12/28/65	A
#86 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. <del>Secret</del>	1 p	01/21/66	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #87 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p	01/21/66	A
#88 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	<del>1 p</del>	<del>01/20/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #88a memo	to the President from David E. Bell <del>Secret</del>	<del>12 p</del>	<del>01/19/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#88b report	re pacification & rural development <i>sanitized 5-11-03 NLS 03-244</i>	6 pp.		A
#90a cable	text of New Delhi 1865 <del>Secret</del>	3 p	01/20/66	A
#91 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	2 p	01/20/66	A
#93a memo	to the PRESIDENT from George W. Ball <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-209</i>	5 p	01/19/66	A
#93b cable	re: Vietnam <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 83-209</i>	3 p	01/19/66	A
#95 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239</i>	1 p	01/19/66	A
#96 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. <del>Secret</del> <i>open 10-24-84 NLS 83-207</i>	1 p	01/19/66	A
#96a cable	text of Saigon 2588 <del>Secret</del> <i>open 7-19-84 NLS 83-209</i>	4 p	01/19/66	A
#97 memo	to the President from McG. B. <del>Secret</del>	1 p	01/19/66	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~██████████~~  
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the PRESIDENT, vol. 19

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#98 memo	<i>new info released 10-21-92 NLJ 91-531</i> for the record by McGeorge Bundy Secret <del>sanitized 10-24-84 NLJ 83-207</del> 2 p	01/19/66	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #99a memo	for the record by McG. B. Secret <del>Exempt per NLJ 83-207</del> 2 p	01/18/66	A
#100a memo	for the president from George W. Ball Secret <i>open 7-19-84 NLJ 83-209</i> 5 p	01/20/66	A
#15 letter	President Johnson to Fernando Belaunde Terry possible classified information 2p	02/3/66	A
#18 memo	McG.B. to the President possible classified information <i>sanitized per RAC 4/24/09</i> 1p	02/2/66	A
<i>open 7-16-03</i> #28d letter	Harold Holt to President Johnson possible classified information <del>Exempt per NLJ 83-207</del> 2p	02/1/66	A
#57a letter	President Johnson to President Nyerere possible classified information <i>Dup #2a, NSF, Files of Hamilton "Tanzania" Box 4 Dup #92a, "Haynes "Christina", Box 1</i> 2p	01/27/66	A
#65 memo	McG.B. to the President <i>open 2/02</i> possible classified information <i>NS 019-006-26</i> 1p	01/26/66	A
#68a memo	Leonard Marks to the President <i>Restriction removed 8/28/92 per TA</i> 1p	01/21/66	C
#70a letter	Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from President Johnson possible classified information 1p	1/24/66	A
#74a letter	PM Indira Gandhi to President Johnson possible classified information <i>open 11/20/00 NLJ 00-172</i> 1p	01/24/66	A
#86 memo	McG.B. to the President possible classified information 1p	01/21/66	A

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National Security File, ~~██████████~~  
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Friday, Feb. 4, 1966  
2:20 pm

MR. PRESIDENT

The summary paragraph on page 1 of this CIA report is worth reading. It gives a much more relaxed view of the NATO problem than you are likely to get from my enthusiastic friends in the State Department.

McG. B.

Encl. SC NO. 00755/66A Cy No. 1 Developments in NATO

F-3

Friday - February 4, 1966  
1:00 p.m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Brazilian Foreign Minister's Statement on Vietnam**

Our Charge in Rio de Janeiro reports that Foreign Minister Magalhaes held an informal press conference on February 2 during which he is reported to have made a statement along the following lines:

Brazil concurs in President Johnson's decision to resume bombing of North Vietnam since the United States has made the greatest possible effort to achieve peace in this region. Brazil is a witness to United States striving for peace since Brazilian diplomacy gave its disinterested cooperation toward the objective of ending hostilities in Southeast Asia.

McG. B.



Rec'd  
Pres. Office  
2-4-66  
12:38P

4  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Fri., Feb. 4, 1966, 12:30

MR. PRESIDENT:

These pages from a standard  
book of reference show the general  
context in which President Kennedy  
was working on Caribbean matters  
in October, 1963.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

Washington's dismay, however, the coup it would perhaps have liked to see in Port-au-Prince now took place in Santo Domingo instead. On September 25, Dr. Bosch's seven-month-old government was unceremoniously overthrown by Dominican military elements who promptly installed a three-man, "anti-Communist" civilian junta under Dr. Emilio de los Santos. President Bosch, with more sincerity than political sense, had offended many influential and conservative-minded Dominican groups which perhaps felt no great enthusiasm for his democratic experiment, and professed themselves horrified at his failure to take stronger action against local Communists.

Coming on the heels of the coups in Guatemala and Ecuador, Dr. Bosch's overthrow found the United States by no means inclined to continue its acquiescence in a trend that by now seemed to almost everyone to be threatening the very foundations of the Alliance for Progress. While anti-junta groups rioted in Santo Domingo and the governments of Venezuela and Costa Rica called for action by the O.A.S., the United States determined to withhold recognition of the new Dominican regime until it at least agreed to some appearance-saving compromise, such as a transfer of authority to the President of the Dominican Senate. (President Bosch had gone into exile.) But neither the junta nor its Dominican opponents showed much readiness for compromise, and the U.S. position was further weakened as time went on by the recognition accorded the new authorities by Great Britain and other outside powers.

With the Dominican Republic still in full crisis, Honduras, too, underwent an "anti-Communist" military coup on October 3—ten days before a scheduled presidential election—as President Ramón Villeda Morales was deposed and forced out of the country by a military group under Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano. This second coup in scarcely more than a week evoked an extremely vigorous response from the United States, which immediately severed diplomatic relations and withdrew its aid missions from both Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Such developments, Secretary Rusk declared, were regarded in Washington "with



utmost gravity" and were wholly incompatible with the Alliance for Progress.<sup>43</sup> In Congress, a move was initiated to deny U.S. aid to any government that had come to power by the overthrow of legal authorities.

Although this particular effort was discouraged by the administration as unduly sweeping, President Kennedy now made it very clear that the United States regarded such coups in Latin America as inimical to the Alliance for Progress, favorable to the long-term advance of Communism, and "defeating for the hemisphere." In common with other hemisphere countries, he said, the United States was determined to use its influence to try to bring about an orderly restoration of constitutional processes such as had already occurred in Peru.<sup>44</sup> More than a month later, the President reported that the United States had been working "very assiduously" to find out what steps the Dominican and Honduran authorities were prepared to take with a view to returning to constitutional government.<sup>45</sup>

In the meantime, the United States had thrown its rather hesitant support to Venezuela's demand for an examination by the O.A.S. of the whole problem of such antidemocratic movements. The Venezuelan government, which had often been under pressure from the right as well as the left, had its own reasons for opposing military coups as a matter of principle; but unanimous support of its initiative was scarcely to be expected in view of the number of nonconstitutional governments now flourishing in the hemisphere. Nevertheless the O.A.S. Council decided on November 12, with only Guatemala dissenting, to schedule an early meeting of the American Foreign Ministers on the rather vaguely formulated subject of "strengthening representative democracy in the continent."<sup>46</sup> The place and date of this meeting, which were left for later determination, might be affected by Venezuela's plan to demand a separate O.A.S. meeting on the question of Cuban arms shipments to Venezuelan subversives.

5

5

February 4, 1966  
Friday, 12:15 PM

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

I think you will want to see Tommy Thompson's memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin last night. He holds to the view he expressed to me then -- that this is quite a routine expression of the Soviet position. In view of Dobrynin's own strenuous efforts on behalf of the pause, I am not surprised that he found delivering this message "an unpleasant task."

McG. B.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, Feb. 4, 1966  
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1963 memorandum on the Dominican Republic

-- From DOD files --

1. Here is the memorandum you asked for this morning, together with McNamara's answer. As you will see, the memorandum was signed by President Kennedy himself, and the typewriter looks to us like Evelyn Lincoln's. So we think it was done at his own dictation.

2. As I said this morning, I have no recollection of this matter except a general memory that the President was constantly concerned about our reaction time to various Caribbean contingencies from 1961 onward. The staff officer most concerned with these matters in 1963 was Ralph Dungan, and while I probably saw these memoranda, I don't remember paying any particular attention to them.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 4, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The events of the past few days in the Dominican Republic and Honduras show that the situation could develop in the Caribbean which would require active United States military intervention. I am not sure that we are prepared for this satisfactorily as there is a large area involved; for example, how many troops could we get into the Dominican Republic in a 12 - 24 - 36 - 48 hour period. How many into Honduras? How many into Venezuela?

I think this matter deserves the highest priority. The State Department should be informed of the results of your study as they may be under the impression that we are prepared - which might be unwarranted.

After you have surveyed the matter I think we should have a meeting on this.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-82

By ing, NARA, Date 12-7-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

SecDef Control No X6565

*Almanac p 381*

*4nd 63*

*Ann Linn*

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 October 1963

66  
SANTIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-83  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-11-94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Capability to React to Certain Emergency Situations  
in the Caribbean

1.3  
(a)  
(4,5)

Title  
5 USC  
552  
(b)(1)

Review pg. 381

44263

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 5

Sec Def Cont Nr. X -

6758



~~TOP SECRET~~

1.3 (a)  
(4,5)  
T:112545C  
SS2 (b) (1)

It should be noted that these movements by their nature cannot be rehearsed, and the time factors are thus not subject to verification. I intend to include mobility exercises in the 1964 maneuver program which will develop some experience data applicable to these contingencies.

We are sending a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.

SIGNED

Robert S. McNamara

*Cy to Pop Sec*

~~TOP SECRET~~

2/E  
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, February 4, 1966; 10:45 a.m.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with C. Burke Elbrick, our  
Ambassador to Yugoslavia, at 12:15, Friday, February 4


Your seeing Elbrick, on the record, will be a useful signal to Tito that you care about our relations with Yugoslavia. The meeting can be as short as you wish. Elbrick will not have much to talk about -- our Yugoslav relations are in reasonably good shape. Tito has been very nice in public about our Viet Nam peace efforts, and has made it clear that he doesn't think much of the Peking-Hanoi reaction. The resumption of bombing has produced a relatively mild -- for communists -- official statement of disappointment.

Elbrick will tell you about Tito's economic reform program, involving a decentralization of decision-making, more reliance on the market, devaluation, etc. As you know, we are giving them a helping hand, by rescheduling PL 480, Title IV, debt and easing credit terms on wheat. They appear to be meeting their commitments in return.

Some biographical information on Elbrick is attached.

  
Francis M. Bator

Attachment



7a

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF AMBASSADOR

### C. BURKE ELBRICK

C. Burke Elbrick was born in Kentucky in 1908. He graduated from Williams College in 1929 and was appointed to the Foreign Service in 1931.

In the course of more than thirty years in the Foreign Service, Mr. Elbrick has served in Panama, Southampton, Port-au-Prince, Warsaw, Prague (on temporary duty 1938-1939), Angers, France (with the Polish Government-in-Exile), Madrid (temporarily), Lisbon, Tangiers, returning to Warsaw in 1945. He served in the Department as Assistant Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, from 1946 to 1948. After attending the National War College, he went to Havana, London and Paris before returning to the Department in 1953 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. In 1957, he was appointed Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He attained the rank of Career Minister in the Foreign Service in 1958 and was appointed Ambassador to Portugal that same year where he served until 1963. He was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia on January 15, 1964.

Mr. Elbrick is married to the former Elvira Lindsay Johnson of Washington, D.C. and has a son and daughter.

L 41 8

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1966  
Thursday, 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been slow in getting you this  
copy of a memo from Bus Wheeler  
which gives his comments on Ayub  
Khan's views on Vietnam.

mb.

McG. B.



~~TOP SECRET~~

✓ 10

COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN'S MILITARY  
AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTS ON VIETNAM

1. ~~(TS)~~ I do not agree with Ayub's two main points that: (1) air strikes in North Vietnam would prolong the war and (2) if we "sit tight" and wait the enemy will negotiate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have previously given such alternatives full consideration and have rejected them.
2. ~~(TS)~~ Neither of the pauses in our air strikes has produced evidence of a DRV willingness to negotiate. Further restraint on our part would seem more likely than not to encourage the enemy to capitalize on this advantage and therefore refrain from meaningful negotiations. It would seem that voices of moderation in North Vietnam would be encouraged rather than silenced by the resumption of air strikes. Their counsel to negotiate would carry a new note of urgency based on the pressure of mounting damage impossible to ignore. I am convinced that an effectual means of persuading the DRV to cease its aggression in South Vietnam is offensive air operations against the north.
3. ~~(TS)~~ The argument for "sitting tight" in South Vietnam carries with it two inherent assumptions (1) that the withdrawal of US forces to enclaves would bring the communists to the negotiating table and (2) that the US is willing to negotiate itself out of South Vietnam despite what happens thereafter to that country. Further, the argument ignores the need to nurture the political/military structure of South Vietnam. A long waiting, passive defense is likely to result in the collapse of the GVN as a political entity. Additionally, the communists having undisputed control of the predominant land areas in South Vietnam could seek world recognition as a de facto government or, alternatively annex their holdings to North Vietnam.
4. ~~(TS)~~ Ayub's contention that interdiction within South Vietnam could block the southward flow of men and materiel is not militarily sound. The interdiction must extend back to North Vietnamese sources of infiltration and support to be most effective.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-376  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-22-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP - 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
Cy 1  
Pg 1 of 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. (TS) In short, I would rephrase President Ayub's comments as to our alternatives and state that they are basically to pursue the conflict aggressively, honoring our commitments and containing communism, or to "sit tight" in defensive positions and ultimately abandon our objectives in Southeast Asia.

6. (TS) I remain convinced that no clear advantage to the US would accrue from the adoption of a defensive strategy and that our balanced strategy in Southeast Asia best serves the interests of the US and indeed the Free World.

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP - 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1966  
Thursday, 7:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tommy Thompson just called to say that Ambassador Dobrynin has just called on him with an oral message for you from the Soviet Government to be delivered through Thompson. The message is a standard brand statement of Soviet disapproval of our decision to resume the bombing, and an equally standard brand of assurance that they will stand by North Vietnam. Tommy is writing a memo for delivery in the morning, and he wants to think about the message some more, but his current judgment is that this is a message for the record which neither adds or subtracts from what we know of the Soviet position.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.



~~SECRET~~

February 3, 1966

Thursday, 6:25 PM

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sweetener for another ROK Division in Vietnam

The attached memorandum from Bill Gaud asks your final approval of a commitment to make a \$15-million program loan to Korea during FY 1967, as part of the deal to get another Korean division and brigade into Vietnam. The loan commitment is \$5 million higher than we would probably make in normal course, but is much cheaper than any of the items on the long list the Koreans requested. Moreover, Park must show that he got something from us if he is to sell his electorate on the idea of a second division.

I gave conditional clearance to the program loan component, subject to your confirmation, in order to allow Win Brown to negotiate with Park. As you know, Park has now agreed, and you have sent him a letter of thanks. This is the last loose end. I recommend that you approve Gaud's request.

McGeorge Bundy

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-207  
By isa, NARS, Date 10-24-84

EKH:JCT:rw

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

✓ 43 11  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, February 3, 1966, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Phone call from Rowland Evans

Rowland Evans called today to "ask me a specific question," and I took the call to see what he was sniffing for. He asked me if I had seen your answer to the 15 Democratic Senators before it went up. I told him I never discuss this kind of internal staff question, and asked him why the question was on his mind. He said that your letter had caused considerable resentment on the Hill, and he was trying to find out how it happened to go up in the form it did.

I sparred with him by calling his attention to the two different letters -- one from the House and one from the Senate -- and the two different answers. It then developed that he thought that the letter from the Senators had been known to us privately before it hit the tickers, and I told him that the opposite was the case and that this was a relevant piece of information. He said the Senators had hoped that they might be called for a private discussion in the White House, and I suggested to him that Senators who want private discussions with the White House generally raised their questions privately. He took the point and even seemed to agree with it.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

*Met  
Pres. 2-4-66  
10:15am*

MEMORANDUM

12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *(B)*

Thursday - February 3, 1966  
5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Venezuelan President Leoni's Reaction to Your Message  
on Resumption of Bombing of North Vietnam

You will be interested in this report from Ambassador Bernbaum reporting on Venezuelan President Leoni's favorable reaction to your message on resumption of bombing of North Vietnam.

With respect to the offer of a medical team, State has told Ambassador Bernbaum that such a team would be very welcome and described the type of personnel most needed.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI 83-207  
By ics, NARS, Date 10-24-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador Bernbaum's report from Caracas -- Telegram No. 755 --  
dated January 31, 1966

1. After President Leoni this morning had read President Johnson's message announcing the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam, he said that he deplored the necessity for this decision but knew no other way for the United States to meet this difficult situation. He said that President Johnson had handled the matter well and had put the Communists on the spot. Leoni said that he appreciated the courtesy of President Johnson in giving advance notice, and asked me to assure the President that Venezuela fully supports the United States.

2. In answer to my query, President Leoni this morning told me he is seriously thinking of the possibility of offering a medical team to serve in South Vietnam and that the Minister of the Interior had raised this with President Johnson. President Leoni added that he did not wish to commit himself until a capable team of doctors and nurses who fully understood the nature of such an assignment could be put together. When I thanked him for his consideration about this aid and for the rice being donated by his government, he said that the least his government could do was to demonstrate its support. Embassy would appreciate an indication as to whether this medical team would be welcome. If so, any guidance which might facilitate government action in this matter would be timely.

Bernbaum.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-208

By is, NARS, Date 3-2-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - February 3, 1966  
5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

This morning I mentioned to you that we might be confronted with the need to use the IAPF to persuade the Dominican military Chiefs to leave the country (as we did with Wessin) if Ellsworth Bunker's patient efforts at persuasion are not successful. As you will recall, Garcia Godoy ordered them to step down and take foreign assignments last January 6. At the same time, he gave similar orders to Caamano and his principal lieutenants. The Caamano group left two weeks ago. The Chiefs are still resisting.

Yesterday Ellsworth thought he was moving very quickly toward a showdown where use of the IAPF would be necessary to make the Chiefs go. In the message reporting on the situation (Tab B) he asked to be reassured that he could use the IAPF if necessary and as a last resort.

The prospects for resolving the problem of the Chiefs suddenly improved overnight. But the situation could deteriorate just as quickly and, Ellsworth would like to be reassured that he has our blessing to use the IAPF if all other efforts at persuasion fail. We believe we should give him this reassurance and have prepared a message (Tab A) which we propose to send him, subject to your concurrence. ~~Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara have~~ approved it. We can be sure that Ellsworth will use this authority with great caution and wisdom.

McG. B.

*and Dean Rusk  
will review it  
as soon as we  
can catch him.*

Cable approved \_\_\_\_\_. (*Subject to Dean Rusk's  
concurrence*)

See me, wish to discuss further \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachments:

Tabs A and B.

~~SECRET~~

By *FW*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-239

, NARA, Date 11-18-93

13a

A



136

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET~~

NLJ 91-230

By ing, NARA, Date 11-12-91

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SANTO DOMINGO, NO. 1794,  
FEBRUARY 1, 1966

1. President Garcia Godoy told Brazilian alternate Barreiros and me last night (January 31) that information reaching him regarding the current attitude of Defense Minister Rivera and Chiefs was ominous. Valdez, Chief of DNI (intelligence service), had reported to him that Rivera's position against accepting changes in the high command had become "rigid" and that it was "useless" to discuss the question with him any further. Valdez said that Cortinas, who was DNI chief under former President Reid Cabral, had the same view. (Both Valdez and Cortinas are ex-Navy officers who have been close to Rivera.) They also asserted that Rivera and friends had decided to "go the whole way" if necessary, forcing Garcia Godoy to resign or even to staging a coup if it should come to that. According to their account, Rivera reasoned that the U.S. and the OAS would ultimately have no choice but to accept a fait accompli.
2. President Garcia Godoy also heard from Valdez and others that Rivera and the Chiefs were attempting to work on Vice President Castillo through Balaguer and his group. The idea, of course, was to ensure that Castillo would be prepared to take over and to continue the Provisional Government in office if Garcia Godoy were to resign or be forced out. The President called Castillo in this morning to sound him out on that possibility. The Vice President admitted having been approached by Lora on behalf of Balaguer's Party. Castillo assured the President, however, that under no circumstances would he attempt to carry on the Provisional Government if Garcia Godoy left office, not having any desire to appear as a "puppet" of the military. (My own impression, which Ambassador Bennett shares, is that Castillo lacks the necessary intestinal fortitude to run the risks that would be involved in assuming the Presidency under such a condition.)
3. As was to be expected, Wessin is also in the picture. One of his contacts (who is also a friend of Garcia Godoy unbeknownst to the General) showed the President a letter from Wessin to Balaguer offering to install the latter in the Presidency following a military coup. Balaguer reportedly turned down this offer while, at the same time, sending the President word that he fully supported the decision to oust the Chiefs. On the other hand, Jimenez told the President

~~SECRET~~



last night that Balaguer took the opposite line in a private meeting with Rivera on the night of January 30. (Complicated duplicities with which the Dominicans seem habitually to play their political games make it most difficult -- as in this case -- to sort out the truth. I can only guess that Balaguer is sincere in expressing the hope that the Chiefs will go. This has been his position in the past while at the same time being careful to cover his bets in case they do not.)

4. According to the President, the situation is even more serious because the other side is now preparing to make trouble. He had reports that students and leftists in general were planning new strikes and demonstrations, demanding the ouster of the Chiefs. President Godoy has sent word to some of those concerned that activity of this kind would only fortify the Chiefs' position, but he did not think they could be held off for more than a few days. It was his opinion -- and we agreed -- that action to force the issue with the Chiefs would have to be taken soonest. We decided to plan the strategy with Braga and Linvill. A meeting for that purpose was held this morning.

5. After thorough review with us of the situation, the President concluded that it might be necessary for him to make ~~greater~~ ~~con-~~ ~~cessions to the Chiefs.~~ It was agreed that IAPF Commanders Braga and Linvill would explore the possibilities with Rivera today. The next following telegram contains the text of a talking paper we have prepared as the basis for their approach.

6. Hopefully, Braga and Linvill can make some progress. However, we must be prepared for the possibility that the estimate of Valdez and Cortinas regarding the rigidity of Rivera's position will prove correct. In addition, not much time is left us for continuing efforts to bring the Chiefs to meaningful negotiations. President Godoy is now talking of going on radio and television the night of February 3 to lay the situation out in detail for the Dominican people. We might hold him for a day or two, but probably not past the end of this week. Under the circumstances, I believe we should be prepared to use IAPF -- or U.S. troops alone if other contingents will not go along -- to remove Rivera and possibly other Chiefs in the same manner. ~~We~~ brought about the departure of Wessin. I recognize the risks involved and will continue to do everything possible to achieve a

~~SECRET~~

-3-

less drastic solution. Nevertheless, no other alternative may be available. With this prospect in mind, I also recommend that we have sufficient forces standing by if the situation should require reinforcement of the IAPF on short notice.

Ambassador Bennett concurs.

~~SECRET~~

134

B



13d

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER

To AmEmbassy Santo Domingo  
AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro

Reference Embtels from Santo Domingo 1794 and 1795.

JOINT STATE-DOD message.

We understand that Garcia Godoy-Rivera Caminero conversation last night may provide satisfactory basis for resolving problem of regular military Chiefs' compliance with January 6 decrees, and that consequently possible need to use IAPF as contemplated para. 6 of Deptel 1794 substantially reduced.

We have followed closely OAS Committee's efforts support PG in its negotiation for peaceful and dignified solution present impasse. We were disappointed that military Chiefs did not carry out their part of bargain after successful discussions which led to departure Caamano et al. We were pleased that it was not necessary use IAPF as authorized Deptel 728. We are most reluctant see IAPF used in present circumstances and are hopeful GG-RC conversation last night will prove the solution present impasse. We recognize you are pursuing patiently every alternative that offered any possibility of success.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-239  
By gjs, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

-2-

If current efforts to reach negotiated settlement fail and other feasible alternatives to obtain what Garcia Godoy regards as satisfactory compliance do not work, we agree with you that IAPF should be used to get job done. In this case, we assume that Garcia Godoy would request such action in writing from the Ad hoc Committee. Committee, after consultation with IAPF Commanders Braga and Linvill, would in turn decide on use of IAPF and formally request General Braga to take necessary action, working in close liaison with Committee and Garcia Godoy. Committee consideration of Garcia Godoy request would give us indication Brazilian willingness use IAPF this mission and allow time for us to consult GOB (Rio Embtel 1735 to Dept. , rpt info Santo Domingo 107).

We also agree with you that if Brazilians are not willing use IAPF, US forces might have to be employed as last resort to remove the Chiefs. Before giving you and General Linvill green light to act, however, we would want to examine carefully circumstances prevailing at time and use every resource to secure Brazilian cooperation.

We assume that you have reached understanding with your colleagues on Ad hoc Committee and Generals Braga and Linvill that if Dominican

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

military make move to replace Provisional Government with one of their own, IAPF will move swiftly to stop it. Written request from Garcia Godoy in this case would also be advisable, if time permits.

Additional forces will be available to reinforce IAPF on short notice should this become necessary.

WGBowdler:mm  
2/3/66

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, February 3, 1966, 2:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Pressure on pacification, and Bundy's trip to Vietnam.

I think the time for us to act on organization for pacification is now. My talk with Rowland Evans and the undertones of Bob Kennedy's speech and Ted Kennedy's article, together with other straws in the wind, suggest to me that we need to grab this issue before it grabs us. Since we have in fact done a great deal of work to get organized, I hate to see us lose the initiative on it.

The best immediate way to hold the initiative is to have it announced that after intensive studies of the problem, you are sending me to Saigon to confer with Ambassador Lodge, at his request, so as to insure that we do everything we possibly can to strengthen our operational framework both in Saigon and in Washington for the purpose of putting pacification on a par with the political effort for peace and the military effort to turn back the aggression.

Such an announcement could be made at any time because Lodge is already primed to expect a visit from me and has expressed his warm satisfaction. If you announce the trip today or tomorrow, I could go at the first of the week and take with me a carefully selected team of people like McNaughton, Tony Solomon, and Chester Cooper of my staff, all of whom have good reputations for effective concern with this kind of problem. If you wanted to send Jack Valenti too -- so much the better.

There is an additional advantage in sending me away for a week pretty soon. It would give you a chance to try out different ways of dealing with these problems while I am out of town. You could ask Moyers to keep a watching eye on the office, for example. You could also try out Komer in a wider role and with less of a built-in need to advocate the cause of countries which trouble you, like India.

But the overriding point is that we must do something quick to keep the leadership on this basic issue of the effort to work the constructive side of the ~~strength~~<sup>street</sup> in Vietnam.

I attach at Tab A a possible announcement that Bill Moyers could use whenever he had your approval.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.



14a

A

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has today asked McGeorge Bundy to proceed promptly to Saigon for conferences with Ambassador Lodge and other members of the American country team, looking toward a major reinforcement of the efforts this Government is making, both in Washington and in Vietnam, to assist the people and government of Vietnam in the peaceful economic development of Vietnam. The President is determined that our increasing military campaign and our growing diplomatic campaign for peace shall be matched by a full-scale effort to support the Vietnamese people and their government in the works of peace on the scene in South Vietnam. The President and Ambassador Lodge are agreed in this purpose and they have agreed further that a visit from Mr. Bundy to discuss a mounting attack on this problem would be helpful.

Mr. Bundy will be accompanied by a number of senior officers of the State and Defense Departments, and of the Agency for International Development, and his trip grows out of an early visit by Mr. David Bell which was concerned with many of these same problems.

###

16  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., Feb. 2, 1966  
12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is an answer to a telegram you sent down to me for reply. If you do not want to send this, I can acknowledge it in your name. I find on inquiry that Mr. Colwell is the organizer, and it makes sense to send the answer to him. He is an old Yale football player and a responsible and conscientious man who feels concerned, but is in no sense a wild-eyed type.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


February 3, 1966

Dear Mr. Colwell:

I write to acknowledge with thanks the telegram sent me on January 28 by 145 clergymen of all faiths in the Washington area. I am deeply grateful for your offer of prayers, support and encouragement in the continuing effort to find peace in Vietnam.

Although your telegram is carefully worded to avoid taking sides on any particular question of judgment, I am sure that many of its signers must regret, as I did, that it should have become necessary to resume bombing in North Vietnam. My own reasons for this decision have been stated as clearly and carefully as I know how. But let me emphasize again that our effort for peace will continue with just as much energy and imagination as we can bring to it, and in that effort the prayers and support of groups like yours will be a real encouragement.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

Reverend David G. Colwell  
First Congregational Church  
10th and G Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.



Wednesday, February 2, 1966, 11:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have been looking for some days for an opportunity to make a quick trip to New York to carry forward negotiations for an apartment which Mary has found and likes. Today looks like a relatively quiet moment, and I now plan to take her on the 1 o'clock shuttle, unless you object. We would be back the first thing in the morning.

McG. B.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., February 2, 1966, 9:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Two hot items on Vietnam

25X1C

1. The Jordanians have agreed to vote with us in the United Nations this afternoon.

25X1C

2. I have had a careful look -- as an ex social scientist -- at Ollie Quayle's poll, and I continue to think that it is of enormous potential value. It is also quite dangerous in its current form, in that there are statements and inferences in it which need to be reinforced before they are used in any way that could lead to counterattack. We need to talk with Quayle about this before we make decisions, but my current thought is that we might wish to buttress the whole inquiry with a panel of professionals which would include some well-known "liberals." I believe that such a panel would give a general validation to the report if they can be brought in before the results are used in any public way.

So I continue to hope that we can keep the whole project very secure, and not yield to the very powerful temptation to use it prematurely.

I will be speaking to Bill Moyers to see when we can get Quayle down here.

*m.p.B.*

McG. B.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-006-002/2

By jc NARA, Date 11-23-09

Jul 2, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Welcome to the United States. I know from personal experience that our military medical facilities are excellent, and am confident they will give you the best care available. Our prayers and best wishes are with you.

Sincerely,

(S)

His Excellency  
Cemal Gursel  
President of the Republic of Turkey  
c/o Walter Reed Army Medical Center  
Washington, D. C.

cc: McGB

LBJ:RWK:em  
(typed 2/1/66)

✓ 20

orig sent  
back to  
MJOR  
2/2

Tuesday, February 1, 1966, 8:30 PM

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke to Bill Moyers about the phone calls which were giving you trouble today and after discussion with him I decided not to call Rowland Evans. I will of course do so in the morning if you wish me to but my own judgment is that it would be a mistake. No one is ever going to persuade Evans and his colleagues in the press that there was not some element of an attempt to watch over them and their activities when the system of requiring identification went into effect last fall. Moreover, while I have told Evans flatly that I never wrote a memo to you about it, I have not been able to tell him that I thought the order was justified except on the strictly temporary basis that Marvin Watson put it on when he first explained it to me. I told Marvin then that if the system were continued there would be very heavy criticism, and I don't see how such criticism can be avoided if any such system is reintroduced.

I have not bothered you directly with this matter because it really seems to me that the President of the United States should not be troubled with trivia of this sort. But since you raised it with me in two phone calls today, I think I should tell you that last month I fended off a very large number of phone calls, not only from people in the press but also from some of the most distinguished private citizens who have occasion to call the White House from time-to-time. All of them expressed very strong opposition to this system. Since this is Marvin's area I had made my opinions known to him. But in the light of your own present concern I think I should also report these outside expressions to you.

You spoke this morning of security. I most certainly believe we should have a careful system for the instant referral of all suspicious calls to the security people. I think we have long had such a system. But I recollect your own firmness in resisting security surveillance in 1964 when you rightly argued that it was necessary for the President to be in touch with the American people. It is important also, I think, for people who have legitimate business with the White House not to feel they are being constantly checked up on, beyond what is genuinely necessary. The country doesn't like to think of the White House as a suspicious and snooping place. Neither do I.

McG. B.



Tuesday, February 1, 1966, 8:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Tuesday, February 1, 1966, 7:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press follow-up on the decision to resume the bombing.

I promised you an accounting of press follow-up on this for tonight.

First I attach the reports of Defense and State activity which I received from Greenfield and Sylvester.

Second, I can report that Harriman talked to Kraft and also to Warren Rogers, Pete Lisagor and Richard Reston.

I talked to Russell Wiggins and two junior reporters. I have also talked to Eric Sevareid and Rowland Evans. All of these were in support of the resumption and none of them hostile to the UN effort although Sevareid thought we would get some criticism from over-sophisticated types.

Valenti has seen Bruce Biossat and is after Charlie Bartlett who is out of town.

Max Taylor saw Roscoe Drummond who also had lunch with Dean Rusk.

At Bill Moyers' request, I talked to John Oakes this morning but found him unresponsive to the suggestion that he might be wrong. I feel in John a deep-seated insecurity which will make him harder to shift than if he had more real confidence in himself.

This list falls short of complete coverage of all 25 columnists, but I know I have not covered all of Bill Moyers' contacts which I am sure he is reporting to you directly. The one bargain I have not kept is to poll Mary McGrory and I will do that tomorrow.

McG. B.

cc: Bill Moyers

22a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

The Secretary had four people to lunch yesterday:  
Ben Bradlee, Roscoe Drummond, Scotty Reston and Mark Childs.

Almost all of the conversation centered about the forthcoming Resolution in the United Nations and the termination of the pause. The group seemed somewhat puzzled as to why the matter had finally been brought to the UN, but did seem to understand the necessity for the resuming of the bombing. Reston and Childs were clearly dubious, however, that the resumption of the bombing would have any real effect on the war in the South and Scotty, in particular, did a good deal of musing about the future of a long war. His question: when the President rides down Pennsylvania Avenue in 1973 with his successor, would he be able to say, "I used the manpower and the resources of this country to the best possible advantage"?

The Secretary also met with a group of the State Department correspondents at 2:30 p.m. on a background basis. (list attached) They, too, seemed puzzled as to why we were taking the matter to the UN in the light of our reluctance to do so previously. Their questions also indicated skepticism that the UN could be effective in the Viet-Nam matter. They also showed a good deal of interest in direct contacts between Hanoi and the U.S. (the Secretary indicated there had been several contacts, but would not give time or place.) The New York Times people, in particular, indicated a skepticism that renewed bombing would make any difference in the war in the South. There was interest in the question as to why the United States did not exhaust the possibilities within the UN before resuming its bombing of North Viet-Nam.

*Jim*

James L. Greenfield

Enclosure: list







ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 1, 1966

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

This is in response to your telephone request to me this morning.

My check indicates that the sole backgrounding done in the Pentagon Monday, January 31, on the President's announcement that he had authorized resumption of bombing over North Vietnam was that done by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. McNamara met at two o'clock with about 22 regular Pentagon correspondents for a conference that ran about thirty minutes. He initiated nothing but responded to questions.

Some correspondents who arrived late and missed the Secretary's briefing listened to the tape afterwards.

I can discover no one else who participated in any similar background effort.

*Arthur Sylvester*  
Arthur Sylvester

*Rec'd  
Pres  
2-1-66  
9pm*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(K)

Tues., Feb. 1, 1966  
7:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This paper was slow in getting to my office and I send it just as it stands because I know you will not need any further advice on the opinions of *you* ~~local~~ the Indians.

*h*

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

*Don*

*Ask Rusk to see me  
about this & ask Freeman  
to make no further decisions  
until he gets instructions - L*

22

Tues., Feb. 1, 1966  
6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from my assistant Jim Thomson gives good news and is self-explanatory. I hope you will approve of the proposed message.

McG. B.

24a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

February 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Presidential message to President Pak on  
Korean troops for Vietnam

Win Brown reports President Pak has agreed to send additional Korean troops to Vietnam on the timetable we have requested -- one brigade and its support/service units in April, and one division and its support/service units in July. Pak, who leaves for a tour of Southeast Asia on Monday, intends to make no announcement of this decision until after his return to Seoul on February 17th. (See Seoul's 805, attached, in response to Deptel 777, also attached.)

Brown asks that we follow up on this favorable development with a letter of thanks from the President to Pak, to be delivered prior to Pak's departure on the 7th. Purpose of the letter is not only to express thanks for Pak's responsiveness, but to further hold Pak to his decision. (See Seoul's 806, attached.)

State's draft, which I attach, seems good to me, and we would appreciate your approval as soon as possible.

  
James C. Thomson, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ULS 83-207

By is, NARS, Date 10-24-84



Secret

246

D r a f t LIMDIS

~~SECRET~~

Unless you have changes to suggest, the following is text of  
Presidential message for immediate delivery to President Pak:

"Dear Mr. President:

"Ambassador Brown has informed me of your decision to send  
an additional brigade and division of combat troops to South Vietnam and  
of your intention to announce it after your visit to Southeast Asia.

"I know <sup>full well</sup> how hard it is to make these decisions. ~~for I have~~  
~~had some to make myself.~~ But it heartens me and it will hearten the  
American people and the people of South Vietnam to know that the  
Republic of Korea, which has itself suffered so much and so bitterly  
from Communist aggression, stands with us in still another struggle  
to make reason and peace prevail over those who preach and practise  
hate and force.

"The American people are proud and deeply grateful that our  
Korean allies see this great issue of our times so clearly.

"Mr. President, on behalf of the American people and friends  
of freedom everywhere, I extend to you heart-felt thanks for ~~you~~ this  
friendly demonstration of Korea's willingness to make the highest  
sacrifice in defense of freedom.

Sincerely yours"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-207  
By ics, NARS, Date 10-24-84

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

24c

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~SECRET~~5  
Action55  
Info

O VV MJA700ASA893ALA838 OSA829  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 005E 0320955  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 320950Z  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 806  
STATE GRNC  
BT

000091  
1966 FEB 1 AM 5 41~~SECRET~~ FEB 1

LIMDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR.

EMBTTEL 805

1. I RECOMMEND PROMPT HIGH LEVEL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT PAK OF  
APPRECIATION FOR DECISION REPORTED REFTEL, FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON  
IF POSSIBLE.

3. MESSAGE SHOULD EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING OF PRESIDENT PAK'S  
DESIRE KEEP THIS DECISION SECRET UNTIL HIS RETURN TO SEOUL  
FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA TRIP. BROWN

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2-1-66, 6:01 A.M.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-220

By 47 NARA. Date 4-16-91~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

NNNNVV MJA716ASA901ALA842 OSA834  
PP RUEHC RUEKDA  
DE RUALOS 003E 0320930  
ZNY SSSSS  
P R 320915Z

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 805  
RUEKDA/DOD PRIORITY UNN  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 121  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 283  
RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 275  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV PRIORITY UNN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ FEB 1, 66 SECTIONE OF TWO

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROK FORCES FOR RVN

000120  
1966 FEB 1 AM 6 55

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-367

By inf, NARA, Date 2-7-94

1. I MET WITH YI TONG-WON MORNING FEBRUARY ONE.  
HE ANNOUNCED IMMEDIATELY THAT HIS GOVT HAD DECIDED  
"IN PRINCIPLE" TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN  
OUR LETTER OF JANUARY 29. ACCORDINGLY, PRESIDENT HAD  
ORDERED THAT DETAILED MILITARY PLANNING AND PREPARA-  
TIONS BE STARTED WITH A VIEW TO MEETING OUR APRIL AND

PAGE 2 RUALOS 003E ~~SECRET~~  
JULY DEADLINES. AS WE KNEW, THESE HAD BEEN UNDER WAY  
JOINTLY WITH COMUSK SINCE BEGINNING OF WEEK.

2. HOWEVER PRESIDENT DOES NOT WISH TO ANNOUNCE  
THE DECISION UNTIL AFTER HIS RETURN FROM SOUTHEAST  
ASIA TRIP ON FEBRUARY 17. YI ASKED THEREFORE THAT WE  
STRIVE TOGETHER TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT NEGOTIATIONS  
ARE CONTINUING.

3. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT HAS AGREED TO DESPATCH  
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL FORCES, FONMIN ASKED THAT WE  
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO FOLLOWING REQUESTS OF ROKG  
WHICH HOWEVER ARE NOT PUT FORWARD AS CONDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-805, February 1, from: Seoul (Section 1 of 2)

A. PER DIEM ALLOWANCES. YI SAYS THAT THIS HAS BECOME A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE MATTER. BOTH OPPOSITION AND SOME MEMBERS OF DRP ARE ARGUING STRONGLY FOR INCREASE IN ALLOWANCES. YI HAD RESISTED SUCH ARGUMENTS ON GROUNDS THAT ROK SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM ARE MUCH BETTER TREATED THAN RVN TROOPS. HOWEVER MND INSISTS THAT THIS IS TRUE ONLY OF OFFICERS AND SENIOR ENLISTED GRADES, BUT NOT OF SOLDIERS IN LOWER GRADES, AND HE FEELS ROKG WOULD BE VERY

PAGE 3 RUALOS 003E ~~SECRET~~  
VULNERABLE IF IT COULD FAIRLY BE SAID THAT ROK GI'S WERE BEING PAID LESS TO FIGHT IN RVN THAN RVN GI'S.

B. ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCING. DPM CHANG KI-YONG IS VERY UNHAPPY AT U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO ANNOUNCE ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT. FONMIN HAD ARGUED WITH DPM THAT U.S.D.L. COMMITMENT REALLY OPEN-ENDED, WITH ACTUAL AMOUNT OF FINANCING DEPENDENT UPON ROKG ABILITY TO COME FORWARD WITH SUITABLE PROJECTS. STILL IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OUR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL LOANS AFTER \$150 MILLION IS FULLY UTILIZED COULD BE STATED MORE EXPLICITLY.

C. PROGRAM LOANS. DPM IS UNHAPPY WITH \$15 MILLION OFFER AND WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM YI HU-RAK WANTS TO HOLD OUT FOR \$30 MILLION. HE ALSO WANTS COMMITMENT UNTIED TO STABILIZATION PROGRAM WITH NO MENTION OF FURTHER WASHINGTON REVIEW.

4. ACCORDING TO FONMIN, DPM ALSO COMPLAINING ABOUT OUR REFUSAL EVEN TO DISCUSS HIS REQUESTS FOR FUNDS FOR EDUCATION AND REMUNERATION FOR PROPERTY UTILIZED BY UN FORCES. FONMIN HAD PERSUADED

PAGE 4 RUALOS 003E ~~SECRET~~  
PRESIDENT THAT THESE REQUESTS WERE UNDIGNIFIED AND IRRELEVANT. DPM ALSO PROFESSES NOT TO UNDERSTAND OUR UNDERTAKING IN REGARD TO PROCUREMENT FOR VIETNAM AND IS AFRAID THAT THEY ARE EXCESSIVELY QUALIFIED BY SUCH REFERENCES AS "NATURAL SOURCE", "REASONABLY COMPETITIVE PRICE" AND "SELECTED TYPES."

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3-805, February 1, from: Seoul (Section 1 of 2)

5. I EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF U.S. GOVT AND ASKED HIM TO CONVEY THIS AT ONCE TO PRESIDENT PAK. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD FULLY THE REASONS FOR DEFERRING ANY ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN AND SAID THAT I WOULD ENTREAT WASHINGTON TO GUARD AGAINST ANY PREMATURE DISCLOSURE. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER POINTS WHICH HE HAD RAISED AND EXPRESSED FURTHER APPRECIATION XETKIYLZKXUXALENT\*THAT THESE POINTS WERE NOT TO BE REGARDED AS MNITIONS.\* ON QUESTION OF ALLOWANCES I SAID THAT WE HAD RECENTLY LEARNED THAT IN SOME CASES ROK SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM IN LOWER ENLISTED GRADES MIGHT RECEIVE LESS THAN THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH LARGE FAMILIES AND IN CERTAIN

PAGE 5 RUALOS 003E ~~SECRET~~  
ASSIGNMENTS. WE WERE TRYING TO GET MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS. I UNDERTOOK TO LOOK AGAIN AT LANGUAGE OF OUR PROPOSAL ON DEVELOPMENT LOANS. FYI: I HAD IN MIND POSSIBILITY OF A SOMEWHAT REVISED OFFER ALONG LINES OF EMBTEL 792 AND DEPT'S AID TO UNN REPLY THERETO. ON PROGRAM LOANS I SAID I DOUBTED VERY MUCH IF WE COULD MODIFY OUR PROPOSAL. IN REGARD TO PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS, I STRESSED DIFFICULTY OF BLANKET A PRIOR COMMITMENT AND ASSURED FONMIN THAT WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING TO BRING ABOUT FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITIES. THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WE WOULD BE WORKING AT CONTINUALLY WITH ROKG OFFICIALS. BROWN  
BT

\*As received correction to follow.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43  
Action

~~SECRET~~

00011211

SS  
Info

1966 FEB 1 AM 6 54

VV MJA714SPA853  
PP RUEHC RUEKDA  
DE RUALOS 004E 0320945  
ZNY SSSSS  
P R 0320930Z  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 805  
RUEKDA/DOD PRIORITY UNN  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 121  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 283  
RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 275  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV PRIORITY UNN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ FEB 1, '66 SECTWO OF TWO

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROK FORCES FOR RVN

6. AT THIS POINT FONMIN ASSUMED AN INSPIRATORIAL AIR AND SAID, "NOW, MR. AMBASSADOR, WE MUST STAGE A LITTLE PLAY." HE ASSUMED WE HAD NOTICED THAT HE WAS UTILIZING THE PRESS TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH US WERE DIFFICULT AND GOING SLOW.

CERTAIN  
OBSTACLES HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS WHICH, AS

PAGE 2 RUALOS

WE KNEW, HAD ACTUALLY BEEN REMOVED BY OUR PROPOSAL. SUCH A STRATAGEM WAS NECESSARY AND WOULD HAVE TO GO ON FOR SOME DAYS LONGER SO THAT WHEN PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED THE KOREAN PUBLIC WOULD THINK THAT THEIR GOVT HAD EXTRACTED GREAT CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S. BY END OF STRENUOUS BARGAINING. TO ELABORATE THIS IMPRESSION, HE WAS ASKING THE VICE MINISTER TO HOLD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE DCM. HE HIMSELF WOULD CONTINUE TO REPORT LITTLE PROGRESS TO THE PRESS. IMMEDIATELY UPON THE PRESIDENT'S AND HIS RETURN FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA HE AND I WOULD MEET AGAIN, THE DECISION WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AND IMMEDIATELY SUBMITTED FOR ASSEMBLY APPROVAL. I INDICATED THAT I WOULD COOPERATE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF PROPRIETY, BUT URGED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 805, FEBRUARY 1 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM SEOUL

THAT HE NOT CARRY THE STAGE PLAY SO FAR THAT THE KOREAN PUBLIC WOULD HAVE AN EXAGGERATED EXPECTATION OF THE RESULTS AND THEN BE DISAPPOINTED.

7. FONMIN ALSO ASKED FOR MY COOPERATION AFTER *PRESIDENT'S DECISION* HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED IN MAKING RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS SEEM IMPRESSIVE TO KOREAN

PAGE 3 RUALOS 004E ~~SECRET~~  
PUBLIC. HE HAS IN MIND SOME KIND OF JOINT STATEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT EMBODY WHOLE CONTENTS OF OUR LETTER OF JANUARY 29, BUT MERELY THOSE HIGHLIGHTS, SUCH AS DEATH BENEFITS, MAP TRANSFER SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION OF "BUY AMERICAN" POLICY, WHICH SEEM SO IMPORTANT IN KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION. THE STATEMENT WOULD ALSO *STRESS THAT* KOREA WAS ACTING IN ITS OWN INTEREST AND IN COMMON DEFENSE RATHER THAN AS RESULT OF FINANCIAL BARGAINING WITH U.S. AT THAT STAGE ROKG DID NOT WANT IT TO APPEAR THAT ITS FORCES WERE BEING USED AS MERCENARIES. THE FAVORABLE CONCESSIONS WHICH HAD IN THE PREVIOUS ACT BEEN EXTRACTED FROM THE U.S. WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY WOULD AT THIS STAGE BE REPRESENTED AS SPONTANEOUS ACTIONS OF U.S. EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION FOR SACRIFICES BEING MADE BY ROK.

COMMENT:

8. I BELIEVE WE HAVE ATTAINED OUR GOAL EVEN IF WE ARE UNYIELDING ON THE POINTS ON WHICH FONMIN BE SOUGHT OUR RECONSIDERATION. I DO HOWEVER FEEL THAT U.S. AS WELL AS ROKG WOULD BE VULNERABLE IF ROK

PAGE 4 RUALOS 004E ~~SECRET~~  
SOLDIERS ARE PAID LESS THAN RVN SOLDIERS. WE ARE ASKING USMACV FOR FURTHER FACTS. WHEN THESE ARE RECEIVED WILL SUBMIT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHETHER ANY ADJUSTMENTS SHOULD BE MADE IN OUR RATES OF PER DIEM ALLOWANCES. WE MAY WISH ALSO TO PROPOSE SOME MODIFICATIONS IN LANGUAGE THOUGH NOT SUBSTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS ON BOTH DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRAM LOANS.

9. AS WE HAD BEGUN TO SUSPECT (EMBTTEL 804)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 805, FEBRUARY 1 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM SEOUL

FONMIN HAS BEEN APPLYING HIMSELF NOT ONLY TO ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT IN HIS INIMITABLE WAY TO PREPARING CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR A DECISION, THE POLITICAL HAZARDS OF WHICH SHOULD NOT ; UNDERESTIMATED. WE MUST GIVE HIM CREDIT AND, WITHIN LIMITS SET BY OUR OWN STANDARDS, TRY TO HELP HIM. IF TO OUR WESTERN EYES THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE THEMES OF ACT ONE AND ACT TWO OF HIS PROPOSED PLAY, WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO CONCERNED.

1), I GAINED THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT, WHILE DPM MAY FEEL THAT HE LOST OUT SOMEWHAT, PRESIDENT AND ROKG AS A WHOLE FEEL THAT OUR OFFER IS FAIR AND

PAGE 5 RUALOS 004E ~~SECRET~~

EVEN SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN SOME OF THEM EXPECTED, SO THAT DECISION WAS TAKEN IN ANY ATMOSPHERE OF SELF-RESPECT AND GOOD WILL WHICH HAS VALUE FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONS.  
BROWN

~~SECRET~~

24e

15070

# TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

91-81

~~SECRET~~

Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amambassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 777

INFO : CINCPAC  
COMUSKOREA  
COMUSMACV  
Amambassy TOKYO  
Amambassy SAIGON

2171  
2164

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENEY  
KORNER  
MOODY

JAN 27 7 51 PM '66

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE/AID MESSAGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 93-367  
By ing, NARA Date 11-8-96

- REF : A - Deptel 703, rptd info Tokyo 1980, Saigon 1944, CINCPAC unnn;  
 B - Seoul's 758, rptd info Tokyo 267, Saigon 105, CINCPAC 252;  
 C - Deptel 758, rptd info Tokyo 2131, Saigon 2120, CINCPAC unnn;  
 D - Seoul's 779, rptd info Saigon 112, CINCPAC 265;  
 E - Seoul's 767, rptd info CINCPAC 260, COMUSMACV 7;  
 F - Deptel 767, rptd info Tokyo 2155, Saigon 2145.

## TROOPS KOREAN/ FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM

1/ Following is approved draft letter based on refs a, b, c, and d which you are authorized forward to Foreign Minister ROKG at your discretion. This letter will be implemented when ROKG agrees to dispatch of one brigade and its support/service units in April 1966 and one division and its support/service units in July 1966, except that the death gratuities and wounded-in-action benefits (outlined para 2 below) may be put into effect prior to this ROKG agreement if you so desire.

2. You are authorized in case of death gratuities, disability and wounded-in-action benefits for ROK military personnel in South Viet-Nam to

Drafted by: DDD/ISA: Capt. J. Boyes/FE/EA/K: BAFleck	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Samuel D. Berger
Clearances: FE/EA - Mr. Fearey AID: FE - Mr. Poats OSD/General Counsel - Mr. [unclear] (draft) Bureau of the Budget - Mr. Rowan (subst) ISA/DMA - Vice Admiral Heinz (draft)		
DOD/ISA - Mr. Friedman (draft) Joint Staff - Brig. Gen. Baker (draft) White House - Mr. Coopers (substance) DASD/I&L - Mr. Gibson PRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"		



~~SECRET~~

make retroactive and future payments based on twice those rates, and no more, shown in the Fall 1965 U.S.-ROK Joint Study on Death Gratuities and Wounded-in-Action Benefits (ref E). ~~An in-country agreement will be done by~~

~~in-country agreement will be done by~~

~~in-country agreement will be done by~~

~~in-country agreement will be done by~~ The payments  
~~in-country agreement will be done by~~

will be made in U.S. dollars using same procedures as for payment of overseas allowances for ROK military personnel in SVN, and utilizing MAP GVN or at some later date the appropriate U.S. DOD budget. (~~Retroactive~~ Retroactive payments estimated as of January 17, 1966 to be \$164,000.) Prior to payment by COMUSKOREA, Minister of National Defense shall submit request which includes names of ~~wounded~~ wounded-in-action beneficiaries or survivors and amount to be paid each. All ~~new~~ records of payments and requests for payment will be kept as permanent records by COMUSKOREA. CINCPAC is requested to furnish ASAP dollar amount required now for retroactive payment and desired amount for February 1966 payments.

3. Text of approved letter follows:

QUOTE We have now had very useful discussions and exchanges of ideas on the question of the conditions under which additional ROK forces might be dispatched to RVN with yourself, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of National Defense. I think that we now understand more clearly your concerns in this matter and that the time has come to bring the threads of the matter together so that you will be able to make your decision.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The basic considerations were enunciated by President Park in his talks with Vice President Humphrey and myself.

These are that the integrity of Korea's defense should not be impaired and that no new economic burden should be imposed upon Korea. It was also agreed that there should be some net benefit to Korea for the deployment of these extra forces.

Our proposals for dealing with these basic considerations are contained in my memorandum to the Foreign Minister of January 12 and General Beach's letter to the Minister of National Defense of January 18. As a result of our further discussions we are now able to make these proposals somewhat more precise and to add somewhat to them. The proposals in these two memoranda are still valid. Rather than repeat them in detail I will sum up what the United States is prepared to do as follows:

A.1. To  as necessary equip/and finance all additional won costs of the additional forces deployed to RVN.

A.2. To pay overseas allowances to these forces at the scale now being paid ~~in~~ the Tiger Division, which, as you know, is as much as thirty times that currently being paid ROK forces in Korea even after the recent pay raise and approximately four times the pay of RVN troops. It covers all their expenses and has allowed for substantial remittances.

A.3. To provide death <sup>wounded-in-action,</sup> and disability gratuities <sup>resulting from casualties</sup> in Viet-Nam at double the rates recently agreed by the Joint U.S.-ROK military committee as being fully appropriate.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A.4. To equip, train, and finance complete replacement of the additional forces deployed to RVN.

A.5. To provide communications facilities for exclusive ROK use, the character of which is to be agreed between U.S. and ROK officials in Seoul and Saigon. These facilities will meet ~~your~~ requirements for communicating with your forces in RVN. In addition, to provide 4 C-54 aircraft to the ROKAF for support of your forces in RVN.

A.6. To provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for the modernization of ROK forces in Korea on the basis set forth in General Beach's letter of January 18 to the Minister of National Defense.

A.7. To provide for the improvement of military barracks and military sanitation facilities/ as set forth in General Beach's letter of <sup>January</sup> ~~January~~ 18 to the Minister of National Defense.

A.8. To contribute to filling the requirements determined by the two governments to be necessary, following completion of a joint U.S.-ROK study, for the improvement of the ROK anti-infiltration capability.

A.9. To provide equipment to expand the ROK Arsenal for increased ~~ammunition~~ ammunition production in Korea.

These undertakings, together with those already made in connection with dispatch of the Tiger division to RVN and backup provided by the general U.S. commitment to Korea's defense, will fully meet the need for maintaining the security of Korea.

b. To avoid new economic burdens for Korea, the United States is prepared, in addition to paying all overseas expenses of the units to be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

deployed and the allowances referred to above, to release additional won to the Korean budget equal to all of the net costs of the deployment of these extra forces and of mobilizing and maintaining in Korea the activated reserve division and brigade and support elements. Thus, the deployment will involve no extra costs to the ROK budget and will involve large benefits in foreign exchange through troop remittances and payment of gratuities.

C. To provide a substantial net benefit to the Korean economy the U.S. is prepared additionally:

C.1. To suspend MAP Transfer Program for as long as there are substantial ROK forces, i.e. at least two divisions in RVN, with off-shore procurement in Korea in FY 67 of items ~~which~~ <sup>substantial</sup> suspended in FY 66 plus those on the FY 67 list. This will provide budgetary relief and foreign exchange earnings ~~for Korea~~. Regarding off-shore procurement, the United States Government will review this matter and make a further determination for FY 68 at an appropriate time.

C.2.A. To procure in Korea insofar as practicable requirements for supplies, services and equipment for ROK forces in RVN and to direct to Korea selected types of procurement for U.S. and RVN forces in RVN in cases in which:

- I. Korea has production capability,
- II. Korea can meet specifications and delivery schedules,
- III. It may be reasonably determined that Korean prices are fully competitive with other possible sources in the Far East, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C.5. If justified by performance under the 1966 stabilization program, and subject to further review in Washington, to provide 15 million of program loans in 1966, which can be used for the support of exports to RVN and for other development needs.

We believe, Mr. Minister, that these proposals and assurances are not only fair, but generous, and should provide the basis for an effective presentation to the Korean people. We hope that on this basis the ROKG will be prepared to dispatch an additional brigade ~~to RVN~~ to RVN ~~in~~ <sup>a division force commencing in</sup> April and July 1966 ~~to RVN~~. I need not stress that the matter is urgent and the stakes ~~are~~ very high, for Korea as well as the Free World. UNQUOTE

4. ~~FII~~ Your concern with respect to the possibility that procurement to be placed in Korea might not be substantial is fully understood here. Apparently the volume of procurement presently coming from the U.S. Army Procurement Agency is not substantial. ~~How~~ However, from present planning information available here, we are confident that the amount of procurement which can be placed in Korea in the future as a result of the proposed "natural source listing" will, in fact, be substantial. In any event it is not possible to make specific commitments as to dollar volume until the necessary "natural source" list has been developed and reviewed here. We strongly urge that list be submitted soonest. In compiling list, it is important to provide a "general order of magnitude" estimate of the quantity or dollar volume of production expected to be within the capability of Korean industry to produce for export to RVN.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

5. Regret we unable authorize twenty-five percent increase in per diem rates or additional \$6 million modernization add-ons (ref D, paras 1a and 1d).

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM

SANITIZED

✓ 25

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 1, 1966  
Tuesday 5:30 p.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Interim Steps. Here is the list you requested today of the interim steps I'd suggest taking now with both countries. I'll also work up the best formula on food sharing that I can.

These proposals may be more forthcoming than your own thinking as of this moment, but I feel that the momentum we've achieved in moving Paks and Indians our way (Tashkent, troop withdrawal, new Indian agriculture program) is so promising that we ought to show just enough responsiveness to keep the process going.

A. Steps to help Ayub. We ought to do enough for Ayub to avoid undermining his position that his visit here was successful, especially when his Tashkent reconciliation policy is under fire. So I'd favor the following steps parallel to whatever we do for India:

1. An interim PL 480 agreement. Pakistan is much better off than India, but is pressing for food too as it sees India getting so much. We could move pronto with an \$18 million extension of the old agreement, or make a new 3 month deal for \$26 million (300,000 tons wheat and 25,000 tons of oils).
2. \$50 million program loan for fertilizer and raw materials to speed up Pak economy would be a major gesture and good economics too. We'd tie stiff economic conditions (same as for India below).
3. Ease up on military sales. Ayub himself just raised this issue. The Pak military are hurting and disgruntled; we want to ease their pressure on Ayub and guard against the Paks buying a lot from the Chicoms. It's hard to justify restoring MAP yet (this would also be ticklish with Congress). But we could lift our ban on non-lethal military commercial sales, plus telling Ayub we'll entertain requests for MAP credit sales once the 25 February troop withdrawal takes place (the Paks want to buy two civilian C-130s, have about \$3 million in orders for commo equipment stacked up, and need a lot of spare parts).
4. Hornig Medical Mission you promised Ayub will leave soon, and be a good gesture hopefully costing mostly surplus rupees.

*I don't agree --  
Don't make any promises  
to anyone until we can  
talk further --*

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

91-6

By *ing*, NARA. Date 3-11-91

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

This package should hold Ayub for at least two months (till after a Gandhi visit), but still leave at least \$30 million in FY '66 aid, \$85 million from EXIM for the Karachi steel mill, and more PL 480 to be doled out later. I'd dress it up via a letter to Ayub. Later you could send out Arthur Dean to discuss terms and conditions prior to further help.

B. Package for India. The following is carefully graduated to give Mrs. Gandhi a clear sense now that we want to help, but again save the bulk of our AID money and PL 480 for later bargaining. So when BK Nehru comes in tomorrow with an urgent plea for famine relief and emergency economic aid to keep India's faltering economy going, you could respond with:

1. Another interim PL 480 Allocation. Mrs. Gandhi will doubtless have told BK to plead for a pledge covering the whole emergency period. Our problem is to be responsive enough so that no one can say we're being niggardly, but not let India off the hook. So I'd tell him you'll allocate 1.5 to 2 million tons to keep the pipeline full, and may seek a Joint Resolution endorsing a major US anti-famine effort if others will join in appropriately. But you could emphasize that any further major US contributions will depend on what others do. We can't carry the whole load. So India better get humping.

2. \$100 million Program Loan. India's industry is running down badly owing to lack of raw materials. So a loan now would reap dividends, while still reserving the bulk of our aid (\$85 million from FY '65 and earlier, at least \$70 million from FY '66, and massive PL 480) for later parleying with Indira. As a means of bringing home what we expect, we'd tie on stiff conditions: (a) India must match our \$100 million; (b) the money must be used for revving up existing capacity, not to start new projects; (c) reassurance that India won't siphon off too much for defense; and (d) reopening of India's dialogue with the World Bank, [REDACTED]

3. Ease up on military commercial and MAP credit sales. This will help Pakistan more than India, but ought to be symmetrical.

4. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 3

5. Last, I'd authorize Freeman to tell the Indians that we'd reimburse them out of any future PL 480 if they go ahead now and buy wheat with their own foreign exchange. This involves no commitment or added cost, since we're going to give them some future PL 480, but has the great virtue of getting them off their duffs instead of sitting around waiting for a handout. This isn't a gimmick to get more food for India -- in fact it let's us play a tougher game.

-----

The above steps are in accord with current State, DOD, and AID thinking. We've had remarkable success to date in Pak/Indian policy and made both countries sing our tune. I'm convinced, as your guy who watches South Asia closely, that the time has come to ease up enough to keep Paks and Indians moving the right way, while retaining plenty of chips to play yet another hand when Indira comes. And we'd tie everything to performance.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

This is quite a package,  
but I am strongly for  
it -- sooner or later  
we'll have to show  
a carrot to match our stick,  
and compared to the size  
of our whole strategy & our  
planned commitments, these  
are small decisions --

~~SECRET~~

*Inf. B.*

McGB 26a

Feb 2, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Welcome to the United States. I know from personal experience that our military medical facilities are excellent, and am confident they will give you the best care available. Our prayers and best wishes are with you.

Sincerely,

/s/

His Excellency  
Cemal Gursel  
President of the Republic of Turkey  
c/o Walter Reed Army Medical Center  
Washington, D. C.

cc: McGB

LBJ:RWK:em  
(typed 2/1/66)



February 1, 1966  
Tuesday, 4:45 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached intelligence report is probably quite reliable as an indication of how Ayub is protecting his domestic political flank. I doubt that he actually plans to stay equi-distant between the US, USSR and China, but he clearly felt he had to convey to his elite that he is not giving up all Pakistan's past policies -- his aim being to buy time for the changes he'll probably have to make.

Nonetheless, bringing Ayub back into the fold will at best be a gradual process, and we need to measure our responses to the concrete moves on his part. If we return to business as usual too quickly, he may conclude that he does not need to sack Bhutto or lay off Kashmir.

R. W. Komer

mcGB

Att25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-006-002/4  
By           , NARA, Date 11-24-09


28

"Bill Moyers ought to read this and he may want to show the Prime Minister's message to some columnists..."

LBJ/vm

4:35 pm

2/1/66



This has NOT been to Mr. Moyers.

Please see note from the President.

<sup>on</sup>  
Sent to Bill Moyers - Feb 2, 1966  
A.M.

*Recd  
2-1-66  
4:15P*

MEMORANDUM

(3) *28a*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1966  
3:55 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Australian Prime Minister

Here is a very helpful and impressive letter from the new Prime Minister of Australia, Harold Holt (Tab A). In calling me to say the letter was on its way, Ambassador Waller said that he would hope very much to be able to tell his Prime Minister that you were glad to have his support. I told him to go ahead and say that anyway, but I think you might want to send a further message to the Prime Minister along the lines of the attached draft (Tab B).

*McG. B.*

McG. B.


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1966

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I send just these few lines to thank you most warmly for your public statement of support for my decision to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, and also for your most thoughtful letter of February 1.

The sincere and stouthearted support of the Australian Government and your own personal message of understanding and friendship give me great encouragement, and I am particularly glad to feel that, as you take on these great responsibilities, we have made such a good beginning together.

Sincerely,  


His Excellency  
Harold Holt  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra



28c  
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1st February, 1966

Dear Mr. Bundy,

I am attaching herewith copy of a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, The Right Honorable Harold Holt, to President Johnson, and also a copy of a press statement which Mr. Holt has issued indicating firm support for the President's decision to renew the bombing of North Vietnam. You will note that the statement also applauds reference of the dispute to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you could bring these personally to the attention of the President.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J.K. Waller'.

(J.K. Waller)  
Ambassador

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.





28d  
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1st February, 1966

My dear Mr. President,

I have been deeply gratified to have your warmly worded messages of congratulations. I know how much Sir Robert valued your friendship and the opportunities of direct personal communication on matters relating to what you have fittingly described as "our broad community of interest". I welcome your invitation to me to continue the same direct contact, and indeed am honoured by it. I subscribe fully to your belief that the paths of our two countries will grow even closer in the future. Geography, circumstance, history, friendship and a common devotion to democratic principles combine to cement our association. We in Australia feel that you have a lively personal awareness of our problems and our aspirations. It may be that what you have seen in your native Texas of the tough tasks of a pioneering people successfully cultivating a harsh soil while conquering distance and a hostile climate, gives you insight into the challenges which must be faced by eleven and a half million people on this vast, arid continent. You saw something of Australia during the war years. You would find a more stimulating Australia today, and whenever you and Mrs. Johnson can take up our long-standing invitation to visit us, you will find a welcome here to warm your hearts.

May I say how much we have come to appreciate your fellow Texan, Ambassador Ed Clark. Our personal friendship began at our first meeting, and has ripened quickly. He has impressed us highly with his practical mind and discernment and his devotion to our mutual interests.

I have read and fully understood what you have told me of your reasons for the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. When your Ambassador delivered your message, I said to him I would, promptly after the event, declare our strong support for your decision. This I have done. I would like to add just this, however - though perhaps I hardly need to - that what I have said in the statement on behalf of my Government represents very much more than a public posture. It reflects, Mr. President, the strong belief of myself and my colleagues that the conclusion you have so earnestly weighed and reached and acted upon, is the right conclusion.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OLJ 02-142 (102)  
By KLJ NARA. Date 7-9-03

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

/2.

Turning to another subject, we are, as you know, beginning a set of talks with the British Defence Minister, Mr. Denis Healey, concerning his Government's Defence Review. This follows his talks on this subject in Washington last week. We rate these talks as being of critical importance for the security of the whole South-East Asian region, and we are very conscious of the bearing they may have on the United States' position, not only in this part of the world, but also in relation to your global strategy. Conceivably also, they will have a bearing on the matter of a possible increase in the Australian military force in Vietnam. And it may be that after the talks here conclude, we shall want to suggest discussion of one aspect or another of them with members of your Administration.

I should like to conclude this, my first communication to you, by saying how much we Australians have admired the realism, the strength of purpose, and the resolution which you have brought to the tremendously difficult problem of Vietnam. We see the issue there as going beyond the security of Vietnam - important though that may be. We are engaged there in facing a critical threat to free peoples throughout the world, and a challenge to those great principles of human conduct to which your people and ours have been long dedicated. The cause of freedom is in good hands of leadership. Our hopes are with you for success and a just peace.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Holt



28e

TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY  
THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA THE RIGHT HON. SIR  
HAROLD HOLT ON 1ST FEBRUARY, 1966.

President Johnson has made a statement about the resumption of bombing in North Viet Nam directed against installations and transport routes used for the conduct of warfare in South Viet Nam.

The bombing was suspended in December, even though an earlier pause in bombing last May had evoked no positive response, and even though there were strong military reasons for the continuance of bombing. The North Vietnamese Authorities had, for a period of months, increased the rate of infiltration of armed men to South Viet Nam. In the last six months of 1965, many thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers entered South Viet Nam as units and equipped for open warfare.

The purpose of the bombing has been not to destroy the regime in Hanoi or break the economy of North Viet Nam, or to shatter the basis of the people's livelihood, but to damage or destroy those military installations and facilities which enable Hanoi to supply and support its own forces in the South and those of the Viet Cong.

The suspension of the bombing was of a very substantial military and political significance. It meant a self-imposed denial by the United States of the use of a valuable military weapon. It was part of a programme of action designed to encourage North Viet Nam to turn back from its course of increasingly open military intervention in South Vietnam. Having suspended the bombing, the United States undertook active diplomatic efforts to make known its genuine wish for an end to the warfare and for discussion leading to a just solution by peaceful means. Governments of Communist countries and of non-aligned countries which might possess some influence in Peking and Hanoi were approached. Direct contacts were made in some capitals where the United States and North Viet Nam were both represented.

From Washington and Saigon, the Australian Government was kept fully informed of these developments. Mr. Averell Harriman visited Canberra for discussions with us. The approaches made by the United States were widely welcomed throughout the world. But regrettably, brought no sign of any disposition on the part of the other side to modify its determination to continue the war. On the contrary, the North Vietnamese took advantage of the respite from bombing to repair and improve their system of infiltration. A considerable volume of traffic has passed through this system into South Viet Nam; certainly in larger volume and at a faster rate than would have been possible if bombing had been continued to impede it.

Private contacts brought forth no positive responses. Peking, Hanoi and the Liberation Front have denounced the United States efforts, describing them as a manoeuvre to cover up an intensification and expansion of aggressive war in Vietnam. The Liberation Front pledges itself to make greater efforts to strike harder at the heads of the aggressors, deal them heavier punishments and make them realise that their only honourable path at the present time is a quick withdrawal from South Viet Nam. The latest United States initiatives have thus been rejected as summarily and emphatically as have other efforts made in the past.

It has consistently been the view of the Australian Government that North Viet Nam must not be permitted to remain a haven immune from military risk, from which military aggression against the South can be mounted with impunity. Because we believe North Viet Nam cannot be left free to mount military operations against South Viet Nam and against the American, Australian, New Zealand and Korean soldiers who are helping to defend the country, we firmly support the American decision as realistic and necessary. It remains our hope, however, that the North Vietnamese and those associated with them will recognise that their aggression will not be allowed to succeed. We must hope that the time is not distant when they will join in finding a just and peaceful solution. While the aggression continues, it will be met firmly by resistance in which Australia will play its part. We know that the United States will remain alert and ready to explore any indication of willingness on the other side to move towards a settlement on just terms.

The United States readiness in this respect is indicated by the request of the United States Government for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Viet Nam.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1966  
2:00 pm

✓ 29  
re: P

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Max Taylor and I ask for your approval of the attached passage dealing with enclave wars, which he would plan to use in a speech in New York on Thursday. Russ Wiggins has half-way promised to print it textually, and I think we could also get some TV play if Max were to read it before the cameras. Bob McNamara has read this statement and strongly supports making it public. Max is a private citizen who works for us only part time, but he and I join in the feeling that a major statement of this sort should not be made if you are against it.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



Extract from an address by General Maxwell D. Taylor  
before the Rotary Club of New York at the Commodore Hotel  
February 3, 1966

Several critics of our current strategy in South Viet-Nam have come out in support of a "holding strategy" calling for a permanent cessation of the bombing of targets in North Viet-Nam, a halt to further United States reinforcements, a withdrawal of United States ground forces to enclaves along the coast and a renewal of efforts to find a peaceful solution in the United Nations or at Geneva.

The advantages claimed for a "holding strategy" are that it would permit us to limit our troop commitments while retaining a military presence in comparative safety along the coast of South Viet-Nam and would avoid the danger of escalation into a war with China fought in the wrong part of Asia--Manchuria being regarded as a better theater of operations for the application of military force. Once established in these enclaves, we would then hope to negotiate a settlement with our Communist adversaries.

The disadvantages of such a course of action seem so serious as to make a "holding strategy" equivalent to the acceptance of a crushing defeat of international proportions when there is no reason for such a capitulation. It suggests fleeing like the wicked "when no man pursueth." Among other things, it would result in the abandonment of many of the Vietnamese people whom we have promised to defend, except those lucky enough to live within the range of the guns of our coastal enclaves. The effect of such a retreat on the morale of our proud United States forces

(who have no doubt at all of their ability to cope with the Viet Cong) and on the attitude of our South Vietnamese allies with whom we are now linked in the comradeship of the common battlefield would be disastrous. Whether any Vietnamese government could survive such conduct by its American ally or, if it survived, whether it would resist the urge to seek an accommodation with the Viet Cong while time remained is hard to predict. It seems quite certain, however, that no other Asian country on the Chinese periphery--Malaya, Thailand or the Philippines for example--would ever feel inclined to accept United States forces on their soil--indeed, throughout the world, reliance on us as an all-weather friend and protector would rapidly disappear with disturbing effects on every alliance to which we belong.

What would constitute a great defeat for us would be an equally great victory for Hanoi-Peking and a vast accession to the Communist prestige. In fleeing a confrontation with China in Southeast Asia, we would soon find that the line of contact advanced as we withdrew. The "War of Liberation" would have been vindicated as the sure-fire formula for successful Communist expansion and we could expect to meet it again and again in Asia, Africa and Latin America just as the Communist leaders have been predicting. This country can not escape its destiny as the champion of the Free World--there is no running away from it. The impulse to withdraw our troops into safe enclaves in South Viet-Nam has much in common with the yearning for safety behind defenses at our coastlines and is equally illusory.

As to the possibility of acceptable negotiations following the adoption of a "holding strategy", it is difficult to find a glimmer of

hope. It is hard enough to negotiate with Communists from a position of strength. To accept defeat prior to negotiations and then expect to leave the table with something more than dishonor seems beyond the hope that reasonable men may entertain. If our negotiators refused to accept dishonorable terms, we would have no recourse under the "holding strategy" but to ask our troops to sweat indefinitely in their tropical enclaves, unable to use either their vaunted mobility or their modern fire power--all out of concern for the consequences of resisting the aggression of one small Communist Asian country. I would not like to be the commander of American troops with such a mission. While in such a situation the principal danger of our forces would be dry rot, it is not impossible that they might be overrun on occasion, particularly if the South Vietnamese forces defected in numbers to the Viet Cong as would be entirely possible under the circumstances. It is interesting to reflect that the French once tried out this defensive enclave concept at a place called Dienbienphu and the result should not encourage us to imitation.

*Although we should always have concern over a possible escalation of the war,*  
~~(When we worry about escalation of the war--and the concern should always be with us--)~~  
we should bear in mind that there are many reasons why Hanoi and Peking should wish to avoid any widening of the conflict. Apart from the obvious dangers from the military consequences of a head-on collision with us, both governments have important considerations which must tend to dampen any eagerness for escalation. To Hanoi, China is the traditional, distrusted enemy and the Vietnamese leaders will go far

to avoid creating any situation which might result in their having to accept such massive aid from Peking as to mortgage the independence of their country. In the meantime, they recognize and can appraise Peking's obvious readiness to fight to the last North Vietnamese and will hardly want matters to escalate that far.

Peking likewise has good reasons ~~[aside from military considerations]~~ to want to limit the war. After proclaiming widely that a "War of Liberation" is the safe way to expand Communism without danger, a serious military confrontation with the United States in Viet-Nam would, at a minimum, invalidate this dogma, demonstrate the superior virtues of the Russian formula of "peaceful coexistence" and convict the Chinese leaders of a serious blunder which their Soviet rivals could enjoy. The Chinese are also aware of the losses which they would suffer in a <sup>and</sup> ~~[military]~~ confrontation ~~[with the United States]~~ and must give serious thought to the effect such losses would have on their power position in relation to their Moscow competitors.

Thus, we see that both of our adversaries have their problems--it is important not to lose sight of them in concentrating solely on our own.

In closing, let there be no impression that the "holding strategy" receives the support of any substantial segment of our military leadership. Although there are many shades of opinion among those senior officers who, with an access to the essential facts, are qualified to appraise our strategy in Southeast Asia, I know of no such officer with a current responsibility

for our policy who has expressed support for the "holding strategy". While most of them would criticize it primarily as a policy of needless retreat, I personally am more impressed by the lack of consideration of the vastly important political factors which our Government must take into account in choosing among alternatives. Probably many of its proponents would modify their views if they had the opportunity to visit South Viet-Nam for a reasonable period and see how their pessimism contrasts with the high morale and confidence of our men and women who are carrying out our policy in that conflict. They do not think they are losing--and it would be difficult to convince them otherwise.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tues., Feb. 1, 1966  
11:30 A.M.

30  
f  
Rec'd  
1200

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here is Lodge's weekly telegram.  
I have already sent an answer to him  
asking him to get us a plane load of  
the evidence he speaks of for use  
in the UN. I have also asked him to  
send a warm invitation to Walter Lippman  
and Bill Fulbright.

h4.B

McG. B.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXCISE

LBJ LIBRARY

Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 83-209

Document # 30a

30a  
E (X5)

REVIEWED BY C.F. Darr DATE 5/22/84

SECRET NODIS

XDS or XDS EXT. DATE

REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED ( ) RELEASABLE (X)

EXEMPTION DENIED ( )

EXEMPTIONS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. LODGE (Saigon 2761)

Tuesday, February 1, 1966

NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed;

transferred to O/FADRC

Cat. E - Transferred to O/FADRC

with additional access

controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody

retained by S/S

Reviewed by: [Signature]

Date: 26 Sept 1983

Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Bombing Resumption

Resumption of the bombing renewed confidence in Vietnam. The Government understood why we had to have the "peace offensive," but they were relieved when it was over.

I agree that the 37 day pause has indeed "made a record"; and that we should rub this in and make the most of it, as we plan to do at the U.N. Also I am much gratified by the way in which Secretary Rusk took my views into account. I believe our U.N. resolution is in good shape.

Undoubtedly the fact that we are for peace and they are not is helpful with the U.S. public, with people in the United Kingdom and some other Western countries.

I doubt if it does us much good with the so-called non-aligned countries - in which I include France. I don't believe there is a greater waste of time than to try to carry out literally what the non-aligned countries advise. Even when we do precisely what they specify, they will for many reasons never applaud us and rarely approve. As was once said of a certain American politician, they are no help to their friends and no threat to their enemies. Obviously, we must consider their interests and our interests. But we should not give too much attention to their whims and attitudes.

The bombing pause, however, has created a much bigger opportunity than simply making a showing that we are for peace and they are not. I wonder if it does not create an opportunity to bring about additional enthusiastic popular support for your policy in Vietnam. To do this, we need something more than to prove that we are for peace and they are not. A colorful, somewhat emotion-stirring showing is needed to dramatize the fact that the Communists are in truth flagrant aggressors and not the moralistic, patriotic civil war fighters which Communist propaganda has, with considerable success, made them out to be.

The Security Council meeting provides a great chance for this, and, as I have reported, we have dramatic materials here in the way of North Vietnam uniforms, Chinese firearms, etc., with which to document a strong speech

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-83-209  
By [Signature], NARS, Date 7-19-84

~~SECRET NO DIS 2~~

by Ambassador Goldberg that this is a clear case of aggression- and that suppression of aggression is the rock on which the United Nations is founded.

In 1956, at the time of the Suez incident, Dag Hammarskjold said to me that the United Nations must always condemn the use of force except in self-defense if "it is to be a respectable organization - and I use the word respectable in the literal sense as meaning worthy of respect."

We face two kinds of aggression here: the Viet Cong with its rank and file recruited by terrorism in the South, but officered and directed from the North. This is the old aggression which has been with us for five years. And then we face a new and even more obvious aggression in the form of the Army of North Vietnam, which wear North Vietnam uniforms, carry North Vietnam identity cards, speak Vietnamese with Northern accents and have Chinese firearms. This second aggression is absolutely flagrant, classic and conventional, and I don't believe we should be gingerly or apologetic about saying so.

I believe that the bombing pause also has created other opportunities to educate U.S. public opinion so that Americans will not make utterly unreasonable judgments, using such asinine phrases as "a no-win" policy and expecting neat, gaudily packaged solutions. In most of the world today, there are no solutions, but there is the question of whether these tough problems will be well-managed or not. You should be judged on the extent to which you enable the United States to have some choice and not be pushed into a corner with a choice of being "red" or "dead," which is no choice at all. Your decision to move into the seaports and your decision to bomb the North has given the United States some real choices.

It would also be well to accustom the public to the idea that in the modern world you work through a balance of defense and diplomacy or of military and civil, and that while occasionally a decisive action at the right time is possible and desirable, there are some things which we must simply weather out.

In his biography of the late President Kennedy, Sorensen cites the case of the British statesman William Pitt, who was asked in the House of Commons in 1805 what had been gained by the war against France. He said: "We have gained everything that we would have lost if we had not fought this war." This is even truer of our war in Vietnam than it was of the British war against France, and, as far as Vietnam is concerned, what we would have lost had not we fought it is nothing less than a climate in which we as a free nation can exist at all.



SECRET

~~SECRET NODIS~~ -3-

## 2. Basic Political

We now have the figures for the number of returnees into the Chieu Hoi camps for the month of January. It is 1,426. This compares with a figure of 406 for January 1965 and 446 for January 1964 - a three-fold increase.

Of possibly even greater interest is the fact that since Tet, which fell on January 24, the daily rate of returnees is 84. The daily rate of returnees in December was 36. If, as some people think, the Tet campaign should be regarded as a start of a new trend rather than the culmination of a campaign, his figure of 84 per day could be tremendously significant.

Many of the returnees are coming in with Tet campaign leaflets, but we cannot tell how many.

There appears to have been a significant increase during the past three months of popular willingness to provide information on the Viet Cong to the Government of Vietnam. While difficult to ascertain in terms of numbers of reports, the volume of usable information emanating from the police informant effort has increased 50-75 percent since approximately October 1, 1965.

## 3. Current Political

The reporters spent a lot of time listening to coup rumors and some then filed stories based on these rumors. The most extreme story of this sort was a UPI item of January 7 suggesting that Prime Minister Ky had mysteriously disappeared. Ky knocked this down by strolling through the streets of downtown Saigon the next day.

Ky has told me that he knows about what plotting has been going on and that a few people have been arrested. E

] They were aiming,

either to kidnap or assassinate him - and myself.

The directorate is expected to meet on February 2 to pass on the membership of the "Democracy Building Council" whose formation Prime Minister Ky announced in his January 15 speech.

~~SECRET NODIS~~

SECRET

~~SECRET NODIS~~ -4-

4. Other

Since writing the above, I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks, which, of course, he has the right to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like all U.S. Agency Chiefs here, has and should have an open channel to his Agency. It is a statement of Zorthian's opinion which, of course, was sent without my approval or direction. I want to assure you that I am in no sense a candidate to do this, that I have a great deal to do here and that I believe Ambassador Goldberg would handle this whole thing beautifully.

~~SECRET NODIS~~



Rec'd  
Pres's  
2-1-66  
12:40P

31

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1966  
12:00 Noon

For the President.

31a

Tuesday, February 1, 1966  
11:50 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN IN VIENTIANE

I delivered President's letter to Souvanna and also gave him oral message of appreciation from the President. He read the letter solemnly and asked me to thank the President for both letter and message.

He then said that he feared North Vietnamese had used bombing pause to considerable military advantage. He was particularly worried about buildup which had been recently noted in southern Laos. He expressed conviction that the Viets intend to open "offensive" in Laos.

In pursuit of this, he expressed the hope that we would use our attacks to harass routes leading into Laos and that we would put Dien Bien Phu airstrip out of commission again.

In closing, he said that he would remain ready to function as intermediary with the North Vietnamese if Hanoi so desired. When the North Vietnamese Charge returns to Vientiane, he will call him in again to see if he has anything new to say.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-9-03

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Tuesday, February 1, 1966

7:05 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

South Vietnam

Based on currently available information, Communist-initiated activity increased over the last 24 hours with continuing emphasis in the 4th Corps area -- the Delta region south of Saigon. There were three enemy attacks, one each against a local defense group and a Ranger bivouac area and one against a watchtower. There were also 8 mortar actions, eight incidents of harassing fire, three anti-aircraft firings, and the sabotage of a bridge.

South Korean Marines, participating in a long-term combined allied operation, Van Buren, in coastal Phu Yen Province, were attacked twice early yesterday. The attacks were successfully repulsed, resulting in total reported enemy losses of 179 killed and two captured, as against total Korean casualties of 9 killed and 19 wounded. Since the operation was initiated on 19 January to protect the rice harvest in the area, cumulative Viet Cong casualties are listed as 344 killed, 26 captured and 475 suspects detained. Under protection of the allied forces, the South Vietnamese have harvested a total of 3,060 metric tons of rice.

In Operation Masher in northeastern Binh Dinh Province, US, South Vietnamese, and South Korean troops are continuing to press their offensive against stubborn resistance from entrenched communist forces. Communist losses in the operation to date stand at 461 killed, 130 captured, and 463 suspects detained. United States casualties are now 57 killed (a reduction of 11 due to reporting errors) and 192 wounded. South Vietnamese casualties are 48 killed and 168 wounded. Korean losses are 3 killed and 7 wounded.

A related US/Korean operation, Double Eagle, sweeping toward Binh Dinh Province in the southern part of adjacent Quang Ngai Province, is encountering only sporadic mortar and small-arms fire.

Last night 21 B-52's struck two adjacent Viet Cong target areas 19 miles northeast of Saigon. Three Viet Cong battalions and two Viet Cong companies have been sighted in the area. Immediately after the b-52 strike two South Vietnamese Ranger battalions entered the target area to conduct a three-day search and destroy operation. No contact with the Viet Cong has been reported thus far.



### North Vietnam

Weather continues to play a significant role in Rolling Thunder operations, with only 20 aircraft thus far reported able to carry out their armed reconnaissance missions. A total of 263 aircraft were scheduled for armed reconnaissance and SAM suppression missions. One aircraft is reported to have been shot down. He was seen to fall into the sea off the coast and rescue operations are now in progress.

An interesting report from yesterday's operations indicates the North Vietnamese have evidently devised new tactics to combat rescue operations. Although many small boats were noted in one area where a pilot's raft was sighted -- about 250 yards off shore -- there was no indication that they were attempting to capture him. When the rescue plane landed and began taxiing toward the raft, however, heavy automatic-weapons and mortar fire erupted from shore. The pilot was rescued only after US combat planes strafed the beach repeatedly to suppress the enemy fire.

White House Situation Room

*Arthur M'Carthy*  
Briefing Officer

33

Monday, January 31, 1966

8 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Contacts, January 31

1. I put Eric Sevareid at the top of my list at Bill Moyers' request. I managed to get him on the phone briefly, but he was unable to get here for a talk. He was most interested in what he thought was an unusually long time between the Leadership meeting last Tuesday and the actual strikes on Monday. I told him that time was needed for execution, and time for deliberation after the Leadership meeting, and time for other matters to be weighed. I suggested that you were working with much more important questions than whether or not a small group of Senators at either extreme might write notes or make statements.

2. I had a long talk with Russ Wiggins and a couple of his younger reporters. Wiggins in particular was sympathetic. His reporters asked some sharp questions about the UN aspect -- my guess is we will get some "sophisticated" second-guessing on this, and Dean Rusk tells me he expects the same from some of the Ph. D. candidates from the State Department press corps.

3. I talked to John Pomfret of the New York Times, who is doing a chronology of the decision-making process in the White House. I refused to answer his questions and referred him to Moyers -- whom he said he had already talked to.

4. I had a press backgrounder at Bill Moyers' noon briefing -- I think you have already seen the text of that.

McG. B.



Monday, January 31, 1966  
4:30 PM

Strikes on North Vietnam

300 sorties were scheduled to hit targets in North Vietnam last night;

61 made it to their targets;

72 were diverted to Laos for interdiction bombing there;

The remaining 177 were cancelled or aborted because of bad weather.

Continued poor weather over North Vietnam precluded reconnaissance missions for bomb damage assessment.

Pilot debriefing has identified the following damage:

<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Cratered/Cut</u>
4 trucks	1 ferry landing	1 road segment
1 bridge	2 bridges	4 bridge approaches

Three aircraft were lost, one Air Force and two Navy. All crewmen have been recovered with the exception of the Air Force pilot, who was seen to parachute into the water. Rescue efforts are still underway for him.

McG. B.

Mon., Jan. 31, 1966  
4:20 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the briefest memo I have been  
able to do on the overall aid package.  
If I had more time it could be shorter,  
but not much.

McG B

Two

35a

One-page memo on the President's New Directions for the aid program

1. Following out a 1965 understanding with the Congress, the President has made a searching review of the foreign aid program. The major review was conducted by Cabinet Committee led by Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Freeman and Bell, with M. Bundy as Executive Secretary. The President also had advice from important task forces on education, health, and food, and advice from distinguished private citizens.

2. Fundamental principle underlying all these reviews was principle of self-help and cooperation. President had set the tone in signing statement on FY 66 aid appropriation: (OCT. 20)

"Our assistance must and will go to those nations that will most use it to bring major and far-reaching benefits to their people.

"It will go to those willing not only to talk about basic social change but who will act immediately on these reforms. As I discharge my responsibilities under this Act, I will look not simply to the fact of an agreement that points toward reform but to action already taken to bring reform to fruition.

"Action, not promises, will be the standard of our assistance.

"Accomplishments, not apologies, are what the American people expect from their desire to help others help themselves."

3. Cabinet Committee concentrated on eight key countries which get over 80% of our development aid and developed bargaining strategies under President's own guidance for these critical countries.

4. The whole program will be redirected toward progress in agriculture, education, and health.

5. Food. Here the basic problem is the gap between food output and the growing needs of growing population. The President's plan is to apply U. S. food and know-how to stimulating food output in crucial countries. This will be presented to Congress in a special message Thursday.

6. Special Indian food crisis. A pressing immediate example is Indian food crisis which may need ~~total~~ <sup>10-15 (1)</sup> shipments of 8 to 10 million tons from the U. S., plus maximum contributions from other food producers. President is pressing Indians to help themselves and get help from others, and may wish to come to Congress soon for emergency approval of emergency program.

7. Health and Education. The President believes in a new commitment of the U. S. to international health and international education -- embracing both redirection



of aid programs and new programs within the U. S. strengthen American institutions for the service of world health and world education. He will ask two new acts which will state these new national policies and commit both Executive and Legislature to these long-range goals.

8. Organization. The President's review of the Cabinet Committee recommendations concurred in pressing these important legislative changes:

Multi-year authorization (we will request 5 years)

Separation of military assistance from economic assistance;

Increased concentration of aid;

Expanded use of multilateral agencies where possible;

Treatment of Vietnam as a separate and special case.

9. Overall aid requested -- Vietnam aside -- is no larger than last year's appropriation. This is still a tight, hard, program redirected to self-help and to food, health, and education.

Rec'd  
1-31-66  
3:50P

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

L 36

Mon., Jan. 31, 1966, 3:45

Mr. President:

This is the amended version,  
approved by Ambassador Lodge,  
for confidential use in briefings.

McG. B.



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-209

By ica, NARS, Date 7-19-84

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1966

FROM LODGE

1. I do indeed adhere to my previous recommendations that the bombing of North Vietnam be resumed and for these reasons:

A. To resume is to keep faith with our own troops and with the troops of the Vietnamese and of our allies. They face a deadly aggressor who must be hit wherever we can hit him -- in North Vietnam, in Laos, in the high plateau and on the coastal plain.

B. To resume will also increase the stability and confidence of the GVN and thus in a very real sense the effectiveness of the Vietnamese effort. To fail to resume might lead to grave governmental stability.

C. To resume will also cause a very real psychological let down in North Vietnam.

D. I understand it may now be expedient to bomb installations in North Vietnam which have hitherto been omitted. Bombing of North Vietnam, therefore, when taken in conjunction with intensified air, sea and ground effort in and around South Vietnam, may break the back of the Communist military offensive sooner than many have thought.

E. We should bring all possible conventional firepower to bear on the enemy, which is exactly what he is doing to us with every means at his disposal. If our forbearance and efforts have not by now convinced world opinion of our desire for peace, and their desire for conquest, it never will. We should stop worrying about it and hit the enemy with all available conventional means.

F. General Westmoreland (who is out of town) concurs in the general tenor of the above. He also specifically adheres to his previous recommendation that air strikes against NVN be resumed.

~~SECRET~~

37  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7  
Sun. Jan. 31, 1966, 10:45  
am

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Ed Hamilton to check with Dave Bell about suggestions for a general foreign aid briefing session here Monday afternoon and I attach his memorandum to me. If you will simply check the people you think ought to be there, or give me a call about it, we can take it from there with Joe Califano, Henry Wilson, and Mike Manatos.

Md.B.

McG. B.

✓ 37a

January 30, 1966

To: McG. B.

Subject: People for Foreign Aid Briefing

Dave Bell strongly suggests -- and I agree -- that the session include both Senate and House.

In both cases, we have three options: (1) keep it to the leaders and the chairmen and ranking members of the foreign affairs committees, (2) include the chairmen and ranking minority members of the appropriations committees, or (3) include the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees concerned with health, education, and agriculture. If the MAP bill is to be handled by the armed services committee in either house, we may want to add the chairman and ranking minority member of that as well.

(1) The smallest group (which Dave recommends) would include:

<u>Senate</u>	<u>House</u>
Mansfield	McCormack
Dirksen	Boggs (Albert will be away)
Fulbright	Ford
Hickenlooper	Morgan
Morse	Mrs. Bolton
Aiken	

(2) Adding the appropriations people (Bell is indifferent) would involve:

<u>Senate</u>	<u>House</u>
Hayden	Mahon
Pastore (usually	Bow
chairs aid	Passman
hearings)	Shriver
Saltonstall	

(3) Adding the health, education, and agriculture people  
(Bell would rather not):

<u>Senate</u>	<u>House</u>
Ellender	Cooley
{Aiken}	Dague
Hill	Powell
Javits	Ayres
	Staggers
	Springer

If MAP goes to Armed Services in the Senate, Russell should be added. (At last word, Fulbright had decided his committee wouldn't like his giving MAP away, and was insisting on jurisdiction over both bills just as Morgan demands in the House -- Manatos would know the latest.)

On our side, Bell suggests that a small group (#1 or 2 above) could be met by you, Rusk, and himself, with McNamara optional. For a larger gathering he would add Freeman and Gardner. He would specifically exclude Fowler.

You should know that this list does not include some of the anti-aid fanatics (e. g. , Gruening and Lausche) or the bleeding hearts (e. g. , McGovern). The accent is on power, not interest.

My vote is for the small meeting on Monday, with a special session on food later in the week -- with or without the President. Ellender, Whitten, and the ~~a~~griculture people are a special problem. They would be very tricky to deal with in the aid context, and to do so might endanger the political rationale which keeps the food programs in the agriculture committees.

I think a check with Manatos and Wilson would be worth doing before a final list is made up.

Ed Hamilton



Sun., Jan. 30, '66, 10:20  
am

38

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Lodge's answer. I have asked him if he would be willing to allow omission of the last clause of Paragraph C and the omission of the date in Paragraph D. We should have his answer late this evening or early tomorrow.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, January 30, 1966  
6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a redraft which incorporates three or four suggestions of Dean Rusk's. In the second paragraph he did not wish to mention specific European Communist capitals. He asked me to rephrase the paragraph on the role of military advice and I have done so -- to avoid the conclusion that the military have taken control of this judgment.

He asked me to include the Government of South Vietnam in the process of decision at the top of page 3, and I have done that.

I have talked to the Vice President and to the Secretary and between us we have agreed on about 30 Senators whom we will try to reach after the security seal is broken by signal this evening. We will try to have the results of this for you in the course of the evening or else early in the morning.

In the light of the uncertain weather, I am staying in the office and will call you before I go home at the end of the evening's work.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

1/30/66  
REDRAFT - 6 PM

For 37 days, no bombs have fallen on North Vietnam. During that time we have made a most intense and determined effort to enlist the help and support of all the world to persuade the government in Hanoi that peace is better than war, and that the road to peace is open. Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world -- but not in Hanoi and Peking. From those two capitals there has been only denunciation and rejection.

In these 37 days, the efforts of our allies have been rebuffed. The efforts of the nonaligned have come to nothing. We know of no response to such efforts as have been made by the governments of Eastern Europe. There has been no answer to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican. Our own direct private approaches have led nowhere. The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published three days ago -- persistence in aggression, and insistence on the surrender of South Vietnam to communism.

It is plain that there is no readiness for peace in that regime today.

And what is plain in words is also plain in acts. Throughout these 37 days -- even at moments of truce -- there has been unremitting violence against the people of South Vietnam, against their government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We yield to none in our determination to have peace if possible. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace. Some said even ten days might do it. Others said 20. Now we have paused for twice the time supported by some who claim understanding of the situation in Hanoi. Now the world knows more clearly than ever before who chooses aggression and who hopes for peace.

The Vietnamese, <sup>and allied</sup> ~~and~~ American troops that are engaged in South Vietnam -- with increasing strength and increasing success -- want peace, I am sure, as much as any of us here at home. But while there is no peace, they are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination.

Our military leaders accepted my decision to seek peace with a pause, and in this acceptance they showed the traditional self-discipline and loyalty of the American professional soldier. But as Commander-in-Chief I must give proper weight to their persuasive and unanimous conclusion that if continued immunity is given to all that supports this aggression in North Vietnam, the cost in lives - <sup>and American --</sup> ~~American~~, Vietnamese, ~~and~~ allied <sup>^</sup> can only be increased. In the light of the words and actions of the Government in Hanoi, it is my clear duty to cut down these costs.

So on this Monday morning in Vietnam, at my direction -- after consultation and agreement with the Government of South Vietnam -- U.S. aircraft have resumed action in North Vietnam, against lines of communication which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

Our air attacks on North Vietnam, from the beginning, have been aimed at military targets and controlled with great care. ~~But~~ Those who direct and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply.

The end of the pause does not mean the end of our own pressure for peace. That pressure will be as stern and unremitting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle. In continuing pursuit of peace, I have today instructed Ambassador Goldberg to ask for an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council. He will present a full report on the situation in Vietnam and a Resolution which opens the way to the conference table. This report and this Resolution will be responsive to the spirit of the renewed appeal of his Holiness Pope Paul; that appeal has our full sympathy.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with representatives of the press a little later this morning and to give to the country and to the world a comprehensive account of our diplomatic effort in these last five weeks, and a further exposition of our continuing policy of peace and freedom for South Vietnam.



40  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

29 January 1966  
7:30 P.M.

Mr. President:

I have not gone over this  
yet, but will be glad to review  
it with you in the morning.

McGeorge Bundy

✓ 40a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1966

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bringing Viet Nam to the  
Security Council

On the assumption the bombing of the North has been resumed, Arthur Goldberg and I are agreed that an almost simultaneous request for a Security Council meeting would help demonstrate that we want to stop not just the bombing but the whole war by seeking an honorable settlement. Furthermore, the Pope's appeal for UN mediation provides the United States with a favorable opportunity to convene the Security Council promptly on the Viet Nam problem. We recommend therefore that you approve a US move to convene the Council. You could announce this decision on Monday morning; Ambassador Goldberg would about the same time submit a formal letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting, and the Security Council could meet on late Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning.

Our plan is to have the United States preempt the situation in the Council in two ways: (a) a detailed speech by Ambassador Goldberg laying out the full record of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, the lack of constructive responses by the other side, and their continued aggression; and (b) a resolution calling for unconditional discussions among the participants of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.

It is true that our frequent soundings over the past year, including the last one two weeks ago, on the desirability of bringing the Viet Nam question to the Security Council have produced almost uniformly unfavorable responses. U Thant said in his press conference January 20:

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

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Authority NLJ-83-209

By ics, NARS, Date 7-19-84

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

-2-

"I felt, and I still feel, that at this stage the UN cannot be involved in the conflict". The Soviets and French whom we consulted as well as the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were decidedly negative.

The unfavorable reactions have been based primarily on the fact that Hanoi and Peking, because they are not UN members, have explicitly and repeatedly rejected any UN jurisdiction or involvement in the Viet Nam problem, and would therefore presumably refuse to participate in the Security Council debate or accept any decisions the Security Council might take. Consequently, it is assumed, no doubt correctly, that the Soviets would oppose any Security Council consideration or action, would feel obliged to attack the United States viciously during the debate, and would veto any substantive resolution that might be proposed. A debate could further reduce whatever capabilities the USSR may have as an eventual mediator and could further reduce their freedom to deal constructively with the United States on other matters such as disarmament. An additional argument against reference to the Security Council has been that it would cut across whatever moves toward negotiation were being made as a result of our peace offensive.

Nevertheless, there are two strong reasons for convening the Security Council, one psychological and one substantive. First, once our bombing of the North has resumed, it will be especially important that it be clear to the world that our peace offensive is still being vigorously pursued; also such a move would meet the persistent domestic criticism that the full resources of the UN have not been brought to bear on the Viet Nam problem.

Second, while we can assume strong Soviet opposition, a Security Council debate focusing on the need to move the Viet Nam problem to the conference table should at least

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

-3-

help stimulate further peace moves (the Pope, the non-aligned, free world friends) through diplomatic channels whether or not the Security Council is able to adopt a formal resolution.

This course is not without risks. We can expect that resumption of the bombing of the North will have dissipated to a degree the present favorable international climate and support for our position. The risks are threefold:

a. there would be pressure to include in the resolution a call for a ceasefire;

b. we will also be pressed to agree to a formulation on NLF participation in any negotiations which goes beyond our present publicly stated position; and

c. those who would be willing to support a call for unconditional discussions in some appropriate forum are also likely to insist that such a proposal be made in the context of further suspension of bombing.

The way to meet this is for the United States to preempt the situation with a resolution which formulates a number of key points in a manner acceptable to us. The attached resolution is submitted for your approval. We estimate there is a majority in the Council for such a resolution. Moreover, because of our peace offensive we should be able to prevent a majority being mobilized in the Council for a resolution or an amendment calling for another suspension of the bombing by the United States without any reciprocity by the other side.

There are two principal likely results:

1. Hanoi and Peking will deny Security Council competence and it may be that as a consequence the members would decide against pressing any formal resolution to the vote. Such an outcome would be satisfactory to us since it would then be clear to world opinion and our own that we seek peace but our adversaries do not.

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~

-4-

2. If the members prefer to vote on a resolution, we are likely to have the requisite majority.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure;

Resolution.

~~SECRET/NODIS/PINTA~~



~~SECRET~~DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council

Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Viet Nam,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the Viet Nam dispute,

Recognizing the legitimate right of the peoples of Viet Nam to determine their own future in peace free from outside influence,

1. Calls for immediate discussions without preconditions, among the governments participating in the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962, to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia,
2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities,
3. Offers to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators,

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~~SECRET~~Authority NLS 83-208By is, NARS, Date 3-2-84

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-2-

4. Calls on all concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution,
5. Requests the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.

~~SECRET~~

41  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

29  
Saturday, January 1966  
7:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memo from Dean Rusk to you will be part of the classified record of review of the Foreign Aid Program which we would like to have available for the Committees of Congress when presentation begins. Dean Rusk and Dave Bell have approved it, but before it is put in final form I thought you might want to see this draft in case you have any comments. I am the Executive Secretary but the actual drafting has been done by a brilliant youngster named Hamilton who works for Francis Bator, so there is even less pride of authorship than usual if you have any comments.

McG B  
McG. B.

426

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42 d

B



42-f

C

Friday, January 28, 1966  
8:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have just cleared this speech by George Ball for delivery Sunday. But he and I both think you may want to look at it tonight. Any changes you want to make can be made as late as tomorrow morning.

This is an unusually thoughtful and comprehensive speech and I think we will get a good response. We have needed something like this for a long time, and coming from him it is particularly helpful in light of recent gossip about his own current tactical views.

McG. B.

44

✓ 44

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, January 28, 1966  
7:40 PM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Andy Goodpaster has spoken to General Eisenhower and he will be delighted to make a good strong statement of support if and when bombing is resumed. I have asked Goodpaster to keep in touch with General Wheeler and make sure that General Eisenhower is given timely warning.

McG. B.  
McG. B.

*John Goodpaster*

7121 Bundy  
45

January 28, 1966  
Friday, 6:45 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I will stand by to talk Pak/Indian matters  
at 1 p.m. Saturday.

Ambassador Nehru is due back Tuesday  
afternoon. Would you like to see him on  
Wednesday?

AID tells me that we've now reached the  
point where shipping chartered by India to keep  
wheat moving will stand idle unless more wheat  
is made available. A simple administrative  
device to help maintain optimum flow, and ease  
the pressure on you for new allotments, would  
be a private Freeman letter telling the Indians  
that if and when we make any further PL 480  
allocations, we will use them to replace whatever  
they buy in advance with their own scarce  
foreign exchange. This would help overcome  
natural Indian hesitancy to keep booking shipping  
in advance without knowing when the next PL 480  
wheat will be available. It would encourage them  
to buy wheat to fill the bottoms they charter,  
instead of sitting around and wringing their hands  
waiting for US action. No US commitment or  
dollars involved.

I'll see Nehru 2 February \_\_\_\_\_

OK on Freeman letter \_\_\_\_\_

Wait till our discussion \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 28, 1966, 5:55 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a recommendation signed by Dean Rusk on Ambassador Bruce's mission to bring the British into a collective nuclear arrangement. The signature is the signature of Rusk, but the language is the language of Ball. I continue to believe that George is pressing much too hard in a direction that does not make sense, but the fundamental requirement here is that you and your Secretary of State should understand each other clearly. My suggestion is that you might wish to have a meeting on this subject with Rusk, Ball and McNamara after the pause decisions are made and before the letter goes to the Prime Minister, or any instruction goes to Bruce.

McG. B.

Set up a meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Rusk's memo approved \_\_\_\_\_



46a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
WASHINGTON OFFICE

January 27, 1966

~~SECRET~~

1966 JAN 27 PM 4 08

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Bruce's Discussions of Nuclear  
Sharing with Prime Minister Wilson

When Ambassador Bruce met with you on January 14 it was agreed that at the time of his return to Washington for the Stewart-Healey meetings he would be given further instructions for his talks with Prime Minister Wilson on nuclear sharing.

The Ambassador's task, as I see it, is to try to achieve an agreement in principle, initially among the British, the Germans and ourselves on a collective nuclear arrangement based on four British submarines, a like number of American ships, and substantial German financial contribution. This position rests on the ANF proposals, which the Prime Minister has indicated the British Government continues to support, and on Erhard's aide memoire, which you commended to Mr. Wilson in your letter of December 23. While it is important to reach an early decision in principle with the British on an arrangement of this sort, we need not surface the matter now. Active negotiations can be held back until the Germans see the end of the current Common Market crisis, the Prime Minister has his Rhodesian difficulties more in hand and we have developed a base of Congressional understanding. Meantime we can also keep in touch with the Italians and the Dutch.

I believe that Ambassador Bruce should be authorized to make it entirely clear to the Prime Minister where we want this matter to come out. If we fail to follow up on the German aide memoire and your letter to Mr. Wilson he will become increasingly committed to his independent deterrent, and it will be

more

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 94-410**  
**By us, NARA Date 10-8-98**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

more difficult to work out a collective solution. If we are clear with Mr. Wilson now, we and the British should be able to avoid getting at cross purposes during the Geneva negotiations or when he goes to Moscow, and we could return a constructive interim answer to the German memorandum.

I am enclosing a suggested note from you to the Prime Minister. In answering his letter to you of January 5 you could re-emphasize your interest in this subject and also let him know the outlines of your recent exchange with the Russians on non-proliferation.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested note

~~SECRET~~

46-b

~~SECRET~~

Suggested Letter to Prime Minister Wilson

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have talked with Ambassador Bruce about the nuclear sharing matter and he will be able to give you my further thoughts on this subject.

I am glad you agree that the German memorandum provides the basis for serious consideration of this difficult but important subject. Your own ANF proposal and the German paper should permit us to find a common ground. I have asked David Bruce to explain why we believe it wise to reach an early understanding in principle on a nuclear sharing arrangement even though it may be desirable to defer carrying it out for the time being.

There is no doubt that the Special Committee of Defense Ministers should pay solid dividends. But I do not think it would be an appropriate body to consider the nuclear sharing problem. In fact, in proposing the Special Committee we made clear our view that the problem of nuclear sharing would be considered in some other framework. We believe this is the way other governments understand the matter.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-409

~~SECRET~~

By ig, NARA, Date 4-7-95

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

We have had some further exchanges with the Russians about non-proliferation that are related to this subject. I want you to know I have made it absolutely clear to Moscow that we in no way accept their contention that a collective nuclear force would be incompatible with non-proliferation.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~