

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 5

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 2/10/98</i>	1 p	02/28/66	A
#2 memo	to the PRESIDENT from McG. B. confidential	1 p	02/27/66	A + C
#3 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	2 p	02/27/66	A + C
#4 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 1-28-93</i>	2 p	02/27/66	A + C
#9 memo	to the PRESIDENT from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 2/10/98</i>	1 p	02/25/66	A
#10 memo	to the President from WGB Secret <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239</i>	1 p	02/25/66	A
#11 memo	to the President from WGB Confidential	1 p	02/25/66	A
#12 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	02/25/66	A
#15 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret	1 p	02/25/66	A
#15a report	re: Vietnam <i>NLS 84-25</i> Secret <i>open 3-26-84</i>	14 p	02/11/66	A
#16 memo	to the President from McG. B. secret	1 p	02/25/66	A
#18a memo	For the record by Chester L. Cooper Secret <i>Constructive remove 7/1/92</i>	2 p	02/24/66	A
<i>open 2-26-04 NLS 03-245</i> #19 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret	1 p	02/25/66	A
#19a	duplicate #19			
#19b message	to Prime Minister Wilson from Pres. Johnson Secret <i>10-4-84 NLS 84-14</i> <i>open 2/10/98</i>	1 p	02/25/66	A

FILE LOCATION NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~McGeorge Bundy~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 20

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19d message open 7-16-03	to President from Prime Minister Secret exempt NLJ 92-377	1 p	02/16/66 A
#19e message	to President from Prime Minister Secret exempt NLJ 92-377	1 p	01/26/66 A
#19g message open 2-20-04 NLJ 03-245	re: China Secret exempt NLJ 92-377	1 p	02/16/66 A
#20 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239	1 p	02/25/66 A
#24 memo	to the President from McG. B. sanitized 4-8-99 some sanitized per RAC 9/01 secret sanitized 3-22-93 NLJ 91-231 NLJ 98-167	2 p	02/24/66 A
#28 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open NLJ 98-168 4-28-99	1 p	02/23/66 A
#29 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential open 2/10/98	1 p	02/23/66 A
#29a cable	text of cable from Amb. Freeman Embtel Mexico 1720 confidential	1 p	02/21/66 A
#32 memo	to the President from McG. B. open 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239 confidential	1 p	02/21/66 A
#34 memo	to the President from McG. B. Secret open 2/10/98	1 p	02/19/66 A
#34a message	to the Prime Minister from President secret open 2/10/98	4 p	02/20/66 A
#35 memo	to the President from McG. B. Confidential	1 p	02/19/66 A
#37 memo	to the President from McG. B. sanitized 12-17-93 NLJ 91-239 confidential open 2/10/98	1 p	02/19/66 A
#38 cable	text of Canberra 610 secret open 2-20-04 NLJ 03-245	3 p	02/19/66 A re
#41a memo	to the President from George W. Ball confidential	2 p	02/17/66 A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~REDACTED~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 22 20

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41b memo	for the secretary from Bruce secret	1 p	02/16/66 A
#43 memo	to the President from McG. B. confidential	1 p	02/17/66 A+C
#45 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential	1 p	02/16/66 A
#46a memo	to the President from McG. B. secret open 3-16-87 NLS 86-330	5 p	02/16/66 A <i>11C removed 7-31-86</i>
#48 memo	for the President from the VP secret open 10-4-84 NLS 84-14	2 p	02/16/66 A
#48a memo	re: Laos secret open 10-4-84 NLS 84-14	3 p	02/16/66 A
#49a memo	to Mr. Bundy from Wm. Bowdler secret open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239	2 p	02/16/66 A
#51 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential open 10-4-84 NLS 84-14	1 p	02/16/66 A
#51a memo	to Mr. Komer from Cyrus Vance confidential open 1-5-84 NLS 84-27	2 p	02/15/66 A
#53 memo	to the President from Robert Komer confidential Sanitized NLS 89-231, 8/31/90 Open NLT 98-168 4-28-99	2 p	02/15/66 A
#53a memo	to President from Walt Rostow confidential Sanitized NLS 89-231, 8/31/90 " " " " " " " "	1 p	undated A
#54 memo	to PRESIDENT from William G. Bowdler confidential open 12-17-93 NLS 91-239	1 p	02/14/66 A
#55 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret exempt NLS 91-108 Open NLT 98-168 4-28-99	1 p	02/14/66 A
#55a message	to President from King Hussein secret open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108	1 p	undated A
#56 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret Open NLT 98-168 4-28-99	1 p	02/14/66 A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 20

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#57 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>Open NLT 18-168 4-28-99 1 p</i>	02/14/66	A
#59 memo	to the President from Bromley Smith secret <i>open 11-7-83 NLT 84-28</i> 1 p 02/13/66	02/13/66	A
#64 memo	to the President from McGeorge Bundy top secret <i>open 10-4-84 NLT 84-14 1 p</i>	02/11/66	A
#67a cable	Circular telegram to all Diplomatic Posts confidential <i>open 3-2-84 NLT 84-29 6 p</i>	undated	A
#68 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>sanitized 5-19-87 NLT 86-191</i> 1 p	02/10/66	A
#69 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret 1 p	02/10/66	A
#70 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler secret <i>open 12-17-93 NLT 91-239</i> 1 p 02/10/66	02/10/66	A
#73 memo	to the President from Bromley Smith secret <i>open 12-17-93 NLT 91-239</i> 4 p 02/09/66	02/09/66	A
#78 memo	to the President from Bromley Smith confidential 1 p	02/09/66	A
#78a letter	text of letter to President Johnson from President Castello Branco confidential 1 p	02/01/66	A
#78b letter	text of letter to Pres. Johnson from President Diaz Ordaz confidential 1 p	02/03/66	A
#78d cable	Embtel 1591 Mexico confidential 1 p	02/04/66	A
#78e cable	Embtel 1591 Mexico confidential 2 p	02/04/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 memo	10-4-84 Sanitized per NLJ 84-14 McG.B. to the Pres. 1p possible classified information Confidential	2/26/66	A
#191 message open 7-16-03	Prime Minister Kosygin to Pres. Johnson 1p possible classified information exempt NLJ 92-377	2/23/66	A
#22 letter	President Johnson to His Holiness Pope Paul VI 1p possible classified information	2/25/66	A
#26 letter	President Johnson to His Majesty Faisal Al-Saud 2p possible classified information open per RAC 12-2017	2/24/66	A
#78b letter	Pres. Diaz Ordaz to Pres. Johnson 1p possible classified information	2/3/66	A
#60 memo	to President from Bromley Smith Secret 1 p [sanitized 8/16/89 per NLJ 86-193]	2/13/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~
McGeorge Bundy - Memos to the President, vol. 20

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 28, 1966
2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cubans Detain Two U.S. Marines

Yesterday two of our Marines stationed at Guantanamo fell into Cuban hands. They were out on what appears to have been a fishing trip and apparently wandered -- or drifted due to engine trouble -- into Cuban territorial waters where they were picked up.

The quickness with which the Cubans contacted Swiss Ambassador Stadelhofer in Havana to establish the identity of the two Marines -- they reportedly carried no identification with them -- may be indicative of a desire to return them promptly. This is what Ambassador Stadelhofer thinks. He is working to obtain their release.

Castro handles situations such as this one much according to his mood and purposes at the moment. We have no indication that he will try to make a major incident of it. But we know that he is in a frustrated, angry and strongly anti-American mood at the present time.

McG. B.

(P. S.) Stadelhofer has standing instructions from us to press very hard in such cases, and we have made it clear to him that they operate in this case. But it seems best to go in private channels to start with. Bill Bowdler has the duty on this.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-10-98

Copy - Mr. Califano

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, February 27, 1966

1:30 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Kintner Job

1. The more I think about it, the more nervous I am about Kintner. Three quite different people -- McCloy, Helms, and the Vice President -- have raised their eyebrows about his drinking in a quite spontaneous way, and that seems like more than enough to me. So I have been thinking hard about alternatives since yesterday. I have three or four to suggest:

(1) One is Lloyd Cutler. He has been put forward for a number of jobs, and the people who know his quality cover a wide spectrum -- like George Ball, John Connor, Clark Clifford, and myself. He is a man of real energy and strong liberal sentiments -- a "can do" type, as his work for both Kaiser and the drug companies has shown. There would be no hint of a conflict of interest in this appointment, and I think it would be strongly praised by the "opinion-makers" in places like the Post and the Times.

(2) Bob Komer. If for any reason you are going to put someone else in here, I think the Vietnam assignment would be the best possible use of Komer. He has a very unusual combination of energy and experience, and his abrasive-ness (which can be more accurately described as brashness) would be a positive asset in this particular assignment. Moreover, he has the quite special advantage of being Bill Porter's preferred candidate (Porter and Komer worked closely together on Algeria).

Finally, Komer is known as President Johnson's man, and that is going to be very important, especially if you fall in with the State Department's desire to have this man work in their building. (My own hunch is that it will be better if it is done in the EOB and if the man has clearcut White House standing -- the use of a White House car would be enough, if you are willing to accept this untidy but effective method of giving status.)

(3) John McNaughton. Bob McNamara will resist this suggestion because he thinks he needs McNaughton more where he is. I am quite sure he is wrong, just as he was about Joe Califano. Moreover, McNaughton is getting restless on his present assignment and would like something with more status. McNamara plans to meet this problem by giving him a job as a Secretary of one of the services, but this is a very wasteful thing to do with a talented man, as you know and as John Connally found out.

If you were to make McNaughton
HARRIS, CANCELLED FEB 20, 1966,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1963.

BY Dwt ON 1-28-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

your special assistant in Vietnam, the dirt would fly, and I would not be distressed myself by the fact that some feelings might be hurt in the process.

(4) Paul Nitze. Nitze is temperamentally a somewhat difficult man, but he has the respect of three people who are very important from the point of view of Vietnamese affairs: McNamara, Rusk, and my brother Bill. I think that with a good young staff and a clear mandate, he could turn in a fine job. I do not know whether he and Lodge would get on, and this point is of some importance.

(5) There are some names left over from the scouting I did with Jack McCloy and Sidney Weinberg at the time when we were thinking of putting a leading business executive in Saigon. The two best names which came out of that inquiry were Elisha Gray II of Whirlpool Corporation, and Roger Lewis of General Dynamics. I do not know either of them, but both got very strong recommendations from quite different men, and I had the impression that one or the other might be available for a real call to service. Bob McNamara could check this out for you and so could Clark Clifford.

(6) And that brings me to Clifford himself. The job of coordinator of peaceful operations for Vietnam just might be one of the few that could tempt him, especially if it were clear that he could hope to go on from there to a top job in State or Defense. Clark has the necessary standing and experience, and above all the necessary and clearcut relation of confidence with you. He also has in very high degree the necessary belief in the undertaking.

h. f. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2/26/68 5

List of those invited to meeting with the President at 2:45 pm, 26 Feb.,
in the Cabinet Room - general discussion of Vietnam

Secy Rusk	Vice President
Secy McNamara	
Gen Wheeler	General Taylor (he is in Indiana)
Admiral Raborn	
Mr. Helms	Ambassador Goldberg is in N. Y.
Mr. Marks	
Mr. Ball (he is in NY)	
Mr. Vance	
Mr. Moyers	
Mr. Komer	
Mr. Bromley Smith	
Mr. Rostow	
Mr. Gaud	

Wagner
Alex Johnson
Callifano
Valenti

6

List of those invited to meeting with the President at 1:45 pm, 26 Feb.,
in the Cabinet Room - general discussion of Vietnam

Secy Rusk	Vice President
Secy McNamara	
Gen Wheeler	General Taylor (he is in Indiana)
Admiral Raborn	
Mr. Helms	Ambassador Goldberg is in N. Y.
Mr. Marks	
Mr. Ball (he is in NY)	
Mr. Vance	
Mr. Moyers	
Mr. Komer	
Mr. Bromley Smith	
Mr. Rostow	
Mr. Gaud	

Saturday, Feb. 26, 1966
10:25 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gene Black's visit

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 84-14
Document # 7

1. Dean Rusk is at home, and I have not wanted to call him there this morning, so I have not yet fully cleared with him the special aspect of Black's visit which interests you most. I therefore suggest that you might discuss it all with Black as an idea which is not yet settled, but which you would like him to think about and talk with Dean Rusk about. What Black can tell us is the set of Asian countries that he ought to visit in his capacity as the friend of the Asian Bank. He can also tell us when he could work such a visit into his holidays and board meetings.

2. My own overnight thought is that there is no great hurry about this. Indeed, I think it would be better if Black were to go in April or May than in March. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is therefore some advantage in going on about our business for a month or two. Our present record is very good indeed, and we have wood to chop.

3. In principle I continue to think the Black idea is a very good one, and what this visit can do is to tell him of your interest and put him in a mood to do the necessary homework on the subject (we can easily send a good staff man down to Florida to brief him, for example, if you are in more of a hurry than I am). Moreover, I am quite sure that if you tell Dean Rusk that you would like Black to have a talk with him, it will call forth a sympathetic response from the Secretary because of his strong loyalties to you and your desires.

4. Gene Black may want to talk with you for a minute or two about Nasser, and he is well worth listening to on this subject. He thinks he can do something to bring Nasser and [REDACTED] and I doubt if there is a better man for the job. On this one you might wish to ask him to talk further with Bob Komer, who is very well informed and a strong admirer of Black.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 84-14By WJS, NARS, Date 10-4-84

McG. B.

COPY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

F 8

(cleared in substance with Secretary Rusk)

For Press Conference, Feb. 26

Draft statement on Gene Black

I have met this morning with Mr. Eugene Black, the great American who has done so much in company with Asian leaders to make the Asian Development Bank a reality. Mr. Black has told me of the strong support which he has found for the Bank in his discussions with Congressional leaders and Congressional committees.

I have asked Mr. Black to continue as my personal adviser on the great issues of economic and social development in Asia, and I am glad to say that he has agreed. In particular, I have asked him to visit major Asian capitals early in the spring as my personal representative to discuss the prospects for increased cooperative effort with Asian leaders. I hope that Mr. Black will be able to go to Tokyo, to Manila, to Bangkok, and to other major capitals. Mr. Black has told me of his own belief in the special importance of cooperative efforts in the field of education, and I have asked him to consult with Secretary Gardner and to give special emphasis to this subject during his trip.

###

~~SECRET~~

February 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Items for Evening Reading

1. Indonesia - The situation in Djakarta remains calm but, as a temporary precaution, we are instituting an unannounced ban on the movement of U.S. Government officials and dependents to Indonesia.
2. U.K. Election - We expect Prime Minister Wilson to announce a date for the general elections on Monday. March 24 or March 31 are likely possibilities.
3. Hill - Tom Mann testified this morning before the Cooley Committee on the Food for Freedom bill. The attitude of the Committee was generally friendly. Several members expressed support for our position on Viet Nam as outlined before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
4. Algerian Message to Ho Chi Minh - Algeria has released a message from Boumedienne to Ho Chi Minh which, inter alia, condemns our air strikes on North Viet Nam, suggests Viet Nam is under colonial occupation, characterizes the NLF as the sole spokesman for the people of Viet Nam and states that peace efforts cannot be sincere while our armed forces are being strengthened. We are examining our recently concluded PL-480 arrangement and our other programs and interests in Algeria to establish the options available to us for convincing Boumedienne that his behavior was unwise.

MC -
I had some doubts about this - don't think any more recommendations but must carefully
Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

gave Bator + Komer a copy 2/26

~~SECRET~~

REFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~

February 25, 1966
Friday, 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker reports that Garcia Godoy seems to be having second thoughts about proceeding with the formula for dealing with the Chiefs problem which he reported this morning. Apparently, Garcia Godoy's soundings throughout the day raised doubts over the public salability of the formula.

Ellsworth says that Garcia Godoy is now meeting with his Cabinet. He doubts that Garcia Godoy will go on radio-TV tonight to announce his solution to the Chiefs problem as he had planned.

W G B
~~McG. B.~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-239
By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

2
12
Friday, February 25, 1966
6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Ambassador Goldberg's Scheduled trip to
London and Geneva**

Arthur Goldberg is planning to go to some US/UK discussions on future UN business, which are scheduled for March 4 and 5. He would also hope to spend a couple of days before and after defending U. S. positions on Vietnam in London. After that he wants to go to Geneva for 3 or 4 days of UN business and then to the Caribbean for a week or two. He has asked me to report these plans to you because he does not wish to travel abroad without your consent. The attached memorandum gives a slightly longer account of his plans.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

13

February 25, 1966
Friday, 5:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Eisenhower and Hanson Baldwin

Andy Goodpaster has just telephoned to say that General Eisenhower called him in a state of some agitation over what he had heard of the Hanson Baldwin article. Eisenhower's first impression was that Baldwin's article discussed serious shortages in Vietnam. Goodpaster had the article on his desk, read it to the General, and pointed out to him that the article did not make any such claims about the situation in Vietnam, but discussed instead the question of supposed "thinness" in our reserve position. Eisenhower was greatly relieved and said that he was not troubled about the reserve position but only about meeting the needs in Vietnam. Goodpaster repeated his assurances that this is being done.

General Eisenhower then asked that his inquiry and Goodpaster's satisfactory answer be reported to you, and in addition he sent you the message that he has been thinking about you often and warmly as you carry your heavy responsibilities in these recent weeks.

In the light of this direct message, I thought you might wish to send General Eisenhower a short note and I attach a possible draft.

McG. B.

Dear General Eisenhower:

I have just been informed of your conversation with Andy Goodpaster about Hanson Baldwin's mischievous and inaccurate article, and of the warm and thoughtful message which you asked him to send on to me.

I don't blame you at all for being concerned when a man with Baldwin's reputation writes this sort of thing, and I do want you to know directly from me that I insist every day upon renewed assurances from McNamara and Wheeler that Westmoreland is getting all he needs. At Honolulu I got that reassurance straight from Westmoreland himself, and let me say in passing what a wonderful commander he is.

I am encouraged as always by the knowledge of your understanding and support, and I thank you again for asking Goodpaster to pass on your message.

Sincerely,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Palm Springs, California

F 14

February 25, 1966
3:30 p.m. - Friday

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Jamaican Prime Minister

When Ambassador Beale delivered your birthday message to Jamaican Prime Minister Bustamante yesterday, the Prime Minister expressed deep gratitude and asked that he convey to you his warm regards and his assurance that he continues to be "pro-American".

McG. B.

Friday, February 25, 1966
3:00 pm

xtra *put in V/M*
15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA memorandum on alternative programs of
air attack against North Vietnam

I have been slow in sending you this background memorandum from the CIA on alternative programs of air attack against North Vietnam. I do not think it will give you any surprises, but I think you will find it a thoughtful review of the principal options immediately before us, and it may therefore be helpful background for the continuing discussions you will be having with Bob McNamara on this problem.

McG. B.

SECRET attachment

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

399

15a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

11 February 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible Effects of Various Programs of Air Attack
Against the DRV

1. In this memorandum we examine the advantages and disadvantages of four different programs against the DRV. We weigh these programs against two US objectives: interdicting the movement of men and material to South Vietnam, and inducing the DRV to take steps to halt the support for the insurgency in SVN. In addition, we have been asked to consider the effects of each program only in the short run, over the next 10 weeks or so. We have, therefore, examined the questions in the light of present US air capabilities in the area.

2. The four assumed programs are;

- (I) a program along the lines of the pre-pause pattern
- (II) a program concentrating on LOCs in the southern DRV

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-25

By ms, NARS, Date 3-26-84

- (III) a similar program, but with the addition of POL storage facilities
- (IV) a much expanded program, exempting only population targets and sources of food supplies.

General Considerations

3. With respect to the first US objective, we do not believe that even the most extensive of the above programs of air attack would prevent the movement of men and supplies to the South in quantities sufficient to sustain or even increase the scale of VC/PAVN activity. Our best judgment is that an average of about 12 tons daily has been required by the VC/PAVN from external sources over the past year. Even if these requirements grow, the total amounts are likely to be well below the capability of the supply lines under the kind of bombing program in effect during 1965. The principal effect of the different bombing levels probably should be measured in terms of slowing down the supply effort, disrupting schedules and operational planning, raising the cost to the DRV, and setting a ceiling on future expansion of the supply rate. Critical to the significance of any ceiling established on DRV capabilities would be the rate of consumption of men and materiel which GVN/allied forces impose on the VC/PAVN forces.

~~SECRET~~

4. With respect to the second US objective, which bears on the DRV's will to sustain the war, the various US programs might have significantly different effects. These differences are discussed below. But we feel it should be strongly emphasized that all these programs would be less important in the DRV's calculations than the results of combat in South Vietnam.

Course I. The program would be roughly the same as the pre-pause pattern: armed reconnaissance, plus strikes against fixed targets throughout the DRV, but not including the industrial complex, POL or population centers. Presumably, the Hanoi-Haiphong "sanctuary" would remain and there would be a limit on attacks closer than 30 nm from the Chinese border.

5. The record of the last year offers little prospect that this course would accomplish either of the two US objectives. In 1965 the US conducted about 24,000 sorties against targets in the DRV, but infiltration seems nevertheless to have increased, and the DRV reaction to the last pause indicates a continuing determination not to make any concessions to halt bombings. It can be argued that the effects of air attacks are cumulative and that only the phase beginning last October represented a full test of this pattern. But we think it highly doubtful that the pre-pause pattern would move the US much closer to its objectives, and certainly not within ten weeks.

-3-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. It is likely that the DRV and Chinese expect a much heavier and extensive program from the US. In rejecting recent US diplomatic overtures, the DRV has almost certainly decided that it could absorb an enlarged program which would include targets within the Hanoi-Haiphong "sanctuary". Limiting the bombings in this fashion, therefore, would relieve Hanoi's immediate apprehensions and encourage the DRV to persist along present lines of policy. The chances of this program leading to an escalation of the war are thus quite small. The Soviets too are probably prepared to cope with the political and military problems stemming from at least the pre-pause pattern of bombing. They too are likely to be somewhat relieved and would avoid any radical new steps because of this US course. Thus, the US probably would not be incurring any new risks.

7. This program would have the advantage of damaging both the network supporting the infiltration trails and the supply lines into the DRV. But the US effort would be dispersed over a wide area and no single target complex would feel the maximum weight of a sustained US attack. Moreover, the northern targets and particularly the Haiphong-Hanoi rail line are heavily defended. There would be a risk of chance engagements with Chinese fighters. Because of the location of some of the northern targets, an air

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

war with the DRV might develop. Therefore the question might arise of whether to attack DRV air fields and SAM sites near to Hanoi or Haiphong, even if the original program had not included these targets.

8. World opinion would again be disturbed and various pressures for another pause would grow. The US political position might be damaged if UN consideration were still pending.

Course II. This program would concentrate the attacks on LOCs and other military targets in the area of the DRV south of the 20th parallel. It would call for a sustained attack including night bombing. It is further assumed that the existing programs in Laos and against coastal shipping would be continued.

9. In contrast to the previous US bombing effort, this program would focus on a single target complex directly and immediately related to the war in SVN--the LOCs in Military Region IV of the DRV. This area is the narrowest and therefore the most critical juncture of the supply routes coming down into Laos. The DRV now uses about 80,000 men in Military Region IV to maintain the supply effort through Laos. To sustain this force requires tonnages far in excess of the amount ultimately sent into South Vietnam. There is evidence that the total requirements for this southern area are growing, and may be at least 30,000 tons over a 90-day period.

-5-

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10. We assume that the forces presently available could provide a capability for almost constant armed reconnaissance against the main north-south and lateral roads as well as supply depots and military installations between the DMZ and Vinh. In practice, however, effectiveness would be limited by such operational factors as weather, darkness, and the characteristics and capabilities of the aircraft. The results would be further degraded by passive and active counter-measures by the North Vietnamese, including the use of secondary roads and trails, camouflage, and the build-up of conventional anti-aircraft artillery along the main routes. On the basis of the DRV's performance to date, we believe that they would be able to continue supplying the essential materials to Military Region IV and that they would even be able to increase the shipment of supplies to South Vietnam if necessary.

11. A concentrated air attack of the type could, however, put a ceiling on future rates of delivery to South Vietnam. This is true of all programs assumed in this memorandum, but we think that, in the short run, the one considered here probably would not only impose a lower ceiling than would the other programs, but would also lay the greater strain on the effort to support the VC/PAVN forces. Of course, this would only hold true if at the

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same time the Communists were prevented from expanding direct shipments to South Vietnam by sea, or by sea to Cambodia and then into South Vietnam.

12. So long as VC/PAVN requirements remained below this ceiling, the main effect of the program would be to slow down and disrupt supplies and increase the general strain upon the DRV. Considering the VC/PAVN penchant for long and detailed planning of offensive operations, the irregularity of deliveries and doubt as to the reliability of resupply might lead to the postponement or cancellation of major offensive operations. These effects would be felt more immediately under this program than under alternatives which were directed against the overall DRV capabilities to support the war.*

13. This course of action involves the least risk of escalation in terms of possible DRV, Chinese or Soviet responses.

* This does not mean that the VC/PAVN forces would be disrupted as soon as the program commenced. Our intelligence on stockpiles in Laos and South Vietnam is sketchy, and there is a time lag in confirming the presence of additional PAVN units. Thus, the forces and equipment could already be in a position to launch large scale operations which were planned some time back.

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Air defense in this area is conventional AAA, and it is unlikely that the regime would be willing to reposition its limited SAM system to defend this area, or risk its fighter force this far south. Hanoi could never be sure whether US bombings would again be extended to the northern areas.

14. Another political advantage might be the effect of this more limited program on world opinion. It could be convincingly defended as directly supporting the war effort in South Vietnam. The US probably has gained in world opinion from the pause; the resumption inevitably dissipates some of this credit. As it became clear that the US had not resumed in order to strike at economic and civilian targets, it might be possible to retain much of this political capital. Finally, a limited program would be a lesser commitment of prestige and would be easier to terminate or interrupt should the occasion arise.

15. The major disadvantages of this course would be the grant of immunity to the northern area of the DRV. Imports of all materiel, particularly such critical items as POL, could be stepped up; stockpiles could be created and dispersal of key items could proceed unhindered. Thus the DRV could without much cost increase the rate of supplies funneled southward to Military

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Region IV, and perhaps more than offset any reductions caused by the concentrated US air attacks. At the same time, they could continue the further development of their air force and air defense systems. Unless adequate reconnaissance coverage were maintained, they could conceivably develop undetected some kind of a missile strike capability.

16. To offset these disadvantages this program could be supplemented by occasional attacks upon the northern part of the DRV. If these were restricted to a scale and frequency which detracted only marginally from the weight of attack below the 20th parallel, these irregular attacks would not have the full effects of Course IV, but they would serve certain important ends. They would prevent the DRV from concentrating its anti-aircraft artillery in the southern part of the country. Attacks of this kind on rail lines and roads would require the North Vietnamese to remain in a state of alert and to limit daylight operations.

17. In terms of the second US objective, affecting the DRV's will to persist, this course of action would have little effect. The fact that the US had adopted a limited program might be interpreted as a symptom of weakness, reflecting either fear of Chinese intervention or pressure from domestic and world opinion. Economic life in most of the DRV would be unaffected and the political leaders would have less concern about morale.

- 9 -

~~SECRET~~

Course III. This would be the same program as the preceding one, but with the addition of attacks on major POL bulk storage facilities throughout North Vietnam.

18. This course would offer the advantages and disadvantages of Course II already mentioned. But by including a simultaneous attack on the entire POL bulk storage system, some immediate disruption would be caused, thereby adding to any effects of bombing in Military Region IV. Compared with other possible economic targets, such as power plants or factories, POL is more directly related to the support of the VC/PAVN in South Vietnam and to the maintenance of the DRV's military establishment.

19. However, we have estimated that the DRV could cushion the impact of POL losses from supplies already concealed or dispersed. This amount may be less than one month's normal supply (15,000 average in 1965). Moreover, it would quickly take steps to overcome its losses. And we estimate that eventually Hanoi could cope with the new difficulties and maintain the necessary POL for operating the supply system for VC/PAVN forces. To offset this would probably call for continued US attacks on LOCs in heavily defended areas. Armed reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance would probably be necessary to locate and destroy new storage facilities. If an effort were then made to seek out

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and attack the dispersed POL storage and distribution facilities in the northern DRV, it would involve a much more intensive program than initially intended.

20. This course would add somewhat to the risks of escalation. Most of the POL is located in sensitive, well protected areas not yet attacked, i.e. near Haiphong and Hanoi. The storage sites at Phuc Yen would almost certainly call for defense by the fighters at the airfield. If raids against POL facilities continued, suppression of SAMs or fighter bases might be necessary.

Course IV. This program would attack all categories of targets except population centers and food supplies. It would include power plants, POL storage facilities, and about 30 transportation targets, mainly around Hanoi, Haiphong and the rail lines to China.

21. With respect to the objective of interdiction, we doubt that this program would be any more effective in the short run than the ones outlined in Course II or III. Many of the added targets (e.g. power plants) are only indirectly involved in the logistic support of Communist forces in SVN.

22. With respect to the DRV's resolve, this program would confront the Hanoi regime with much greater problems and dangers

- 11 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

than the other Courses. It would probably lead the DRV leaders to give greater weight to the chances that, in a subsequent stage, the US would go even farther, e.g. attacks on cities, invasion, use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, if we continue to assume no major change in the military prospects within South Vietnam, in our judgment Hanoi would not respond by offering concessions; almost certainly it would not do so within the first ten weeks or so.

23. This program, however, would involve considerable risk of further escalation. Since almost all important targets would come under attack, the DRV would probably commit its fighters. The North Vietnamese leaders might call on China for air support. The pressures on the USSR to become more directly involved would also grow. World opinion would almost certainly be highly alarmed, and there would almost certainly be heavy pressure on the US from third parties to stop the bombings.

24. Another disadvantage would be that sustained bombing at this level would greatly narrow future US options. If we are correct in believing that, at least in the short run, a positive

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

response from Hanoi is highly unlikely, then a further set of decisions would be required. International tensions would be high, as would the pressures for another pause. But if the program were interrupted, the DRV would utilize the pause to repair some of the damage. Thereafter, the US would be confronted with the question of resumption and, since the Course IV program had proved unavailing, of resumption at yet a higher level, such as attacks on population centers. At this extreme level, the risks of Chinese or even Soviet intervention would be much higher, and world reaction would almost certainly be totally hostile.

* * * * *

25. On balance, the Course II program of concentrating on the DRV's southern provinces, in conjunction with occasional attacks further north and the program of bombing in Laos, offers the most immediate chance, although not a very great one, of limiting and disrupting support to the VC/PAVN at the lowest risk. It would also retain much of the political credit built up by the pause. It would not visit upon the DRV the kind of destruction which might possibly lead Hanoi to question the wisdom of continuing the conflict. But it would be the easiest from which to advance to higher levels gradually or to interrupt without much cost should

- 13 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

the occasion arise. A single, heavy attack on POL storage would probably add to the impact of this program in the short term, though there would be a greater chance of adverse world reaction and of escalation.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Sherman Kent".

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 14 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Friday, February 25, 1966
3:00 pm

16
File

(encl
filed in
V Nam
folder)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: CIA memorandum on alternative programs of
air attack against North Vietnam**

I have been slow in sending you this background memorandum from the CIA on alternative programs of air attack against North Vietnam. I do not think it will give you any surprises, but I think you will find it a thoughtful review of the principal options immediately before us, and it may therefore be helpful background for the continuing discussions you will be having with Bob McNamara on this problem.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

17

Friday, Feb. 25, 1966
12:45 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

1. You asked us to get back at you about the question of a delegation to attend the presentation to Mexico of a statue of Abraham Lincoln.

2. In order to move the work forward, I have obtained a list of proposed members of the delegation from the State Department and a covering memorandum from my assistant, Bill Bowdler.

3. I am sending this memorandum to you through Jack Valenti in the thought that he may be able to get your direct reaction and then put the arrangements in train.

McG. B.

18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fri., Feb. 25, 1966
12:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is an interesting account of
the observations of Ambassador
Vu Van Thai in Saigon.

McG. B
McG. B

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Mc B

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

18a

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Vu Van Thai

Ambassador Thai dropped in yesterday to discuss some aspects of his visit to Saigon. The following points are of particular interest:

1. Thai felt that the new Minister of Finance and Economics was a stronger personality than the outgoing one (Ton). He was encouraged, however, by the fact that Ton will be attached to the Prime Minister's office since he had great respect for Ton's technical and intellectual ability.

2. Thai expressed concern (and I believe he felt more strongly than he indicated) that the "other generals" would play a key, but not necessarily a useful, role in General Ky's "social revolution". Thai felt that it would have been better if "all the other generals in the Directorate" had been present in Honolulu. He recognized that this was impossible but, nonetheless, felt that Ky's program would have had a greater chance of success.

3. I asked Thai about General Co and whether he, in fact, had not represented the "other generals" at Honolulu. Thai expressed some distrust and distaste for Co. He said he was not generally respected among the people of Saigon. Co's wife was regarded with considerable suspicion. She is engaged in some large-scale real estate and other commercial transactions.

4. Thai felt that Ky had matured since he had seen him last September. The deterioration in the GVN's administrative structure has now been arrested but an improvement in its effectiveness has not yet taken place. Ky's honeymoon was over; although popular affection for him has declined, respect for him has increased. Ky was likely to continue to grow in stature and effectiveness. Thai was encouraged that Bui Diem was going to become Deputy Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Do was a nice gentleman but not very effective. Thai regarded Diem as his primary contact and source of support in Saigon. He was going to encourage Diem to come to the U. S. sometime soon.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-245
By ms, NARA, Date 1-20-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. Thai felt strongly that the GVN should throw the Agence France Presse out of Vietnam. He was bitter at the reporting emanating from the AFP generally, and, in particular, their reporting from Honolulu. Apparently Ky agrees.

6. Thai was visited on 23 February by a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN (an old acquaintance). Thai said the meeting was very friendly. The Soviet official was anxious to find out about Honolulu, and GVN views on negotiations and a peace settlement.

CLC
Chester L. Cooper

Distribution:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Unger
Mr. Poats
Mr. Colby

~~SECRET~~

19

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fri., Feb. 25, 1966
11:30 am

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Handwritten: Harold
We are rather behind with Wilson,
largely because of the pile-up on my
desk. So I have drafted this short
message to him which would catch
us up.

I attach at Tab A the relevant Wilson
messages to which this is an answer,
or an interim answer, or an acknowledge-
ment.

Handwritten: M.G.B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET attachment~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

(12-20-20)
We are rather behind with Wilson,
largely because of the pile-up on my
desk. So I have drafted this short
message to him which would catch
us up.

I attach at Tab A the relevant Wilson
messages to which this is an answer,
or an interim answer, or an acknowledge-
ment.

15/
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~-attachment

to P 19a
2/25

✓ approve

196

~~SECRET~~

Feb. 25, 1966

~~MESSAGE~~ MESSAGE

TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I am slow in sending you a line of thanks in acknowledgement for your messages of last week about aircraft sales and about your defense review decisions. It has been very helpful to us to have the benefit of full and private discussion with you ahead of time, and our people will be looking to your final conclusions with the greatest interest.

I have heard from Bob McNamara of the very important agreements which he and Denis Healey have worked out on some parts of this field, and have asked my people to think very carefully about the subject of aircraft procurement. I can tell you, without any staff study, that we are very glad of your decision not to sell that particular airplane to China right now.

While I am at it, let me thank you too for your personal account of the beginnings of your Moscow visit. Our good work together in recent months shows how helpful it is to keep in touch with each other on all these matters.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 2-10-98

~~SECRET~~

196

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WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19d

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RECEIVED
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1966 FEB 16 14 18

S

PMUK 001/16
1400 ZULU FEBRUARY 16, 1966
FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
~~SECRET~~
T.80/66

MESSAGE BEGINS

IN MY MESSAGE OF JANUARY 27 I SAID THAT I WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN WHEN WE HAD TAKEN OUR DECISIONS ON THE DEFENCE REVIEW.

THE CABINET HAVE NOW TAKEN THEIR DECISIONS AND THESE WILL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE WHEN THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE IS PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 22. I THINK YOU WILL FIND THAT OUR DECISIONS FOLLOW VERY CLOSELY THE OUTLINES I GAVE YOU OF OUR PROVISIONAL THINKING WHEN WE MET LAST DECEMBER. DENIS HEALEY WILL GIVE BOB MACNAMARA FULLER DETAILS WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS WEEK.

THESE DECISIONS HAVE NATURALLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION AND WILL DOUBTLESS STIMULATE SOME CONTROVERSY, BUT THIS IS INEVITABLE. I AM QUITE SURE THAT THEY ARE THE RIGHT DECISIONS, FOR BRITAIN AND FOR THE GENERAL INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD. I AM SURE THAT THEY PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR OUR CONTINUED CO-OPERATION WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, IS AT THE HEART OF ALL OUR OVERSEAS POLICIES.

INCIDENTALLY, DENIS HEALEY WILL BE ABLE TO TELL BOB MACNAMARA HOW HE GOT ON IN AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. I THINK HE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE MINDS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE ANTIPODES MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
MESSAGE ENDS.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/cam, NARA, Date 7-9-03

~~SECRET~~

19e

January 26, 1966

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

We finished on Sunday the series of meetings at which we have been reviewing our defense expenditure. Tomorrow Michael Stewart and Denis Healey will begin further technical discussions with their opposite numbers in Washington. Of course, we have not reached the stage of firm decisions: it was always intended that this should be delayed until there had been full consultation between our two Governments. In any case, I hope that we shall be in touch again personally when the talks at technical level have been concluded. For the fact is that these discussions and the decisions taken in the light of them are going to have consequences not only over the next few years, but for decades. I see them as confirming a pattern of interdependence, not only in Europe, but over the whole world. And we should not forget that they will determine our joint posture long after current anxieties over Vietnam, Indonesia and nuclear sharing with Germany have receded into the past.

We know from the talks we had in December how much we see eye-to-eye on these problems, and I am sure you attach the same importance as I do to our maintaining personal contact on them.

#####

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-10-98

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday
February 16, 1966
10:30 A.M.

12-
Rec'd 45a
10

Mr. President:

The attached message from Prime Minister Wilson is merely advance notice that the UK white paper on defense, to be published February 22, follows the outlines which the PM gave to you last December.

Done
RCS

I will send copies of this message, as well as the one of last January, to Secretary McNamara unless you think otherwise.

Bromley Smith

Bromley Smith

Attachment

fine has

Prepare Warm response
for my approval -
L

February 16, 1966.

TEXT OF MESSAGE

I should, I think, let you know that we have just had to take a most difficult decision on whether or not to allow the sale of a number of Trident aircraft to China. These are medium range civil aircraft with three jet engines which compare closely with the Boeing 727. The Chinese government have shown great interest in this aircraft and had invited Hawker Siddeley Aviation Limited to send a delegation to Peking. We have decided not to permit the sale.

This decision was however difficult for us. China is in urgent need of modern civil aircraft and represents a large potential market we cannot afford to deny ourselves. Our aircraft industry is badly in need of export orders and the frustration of this sale on political grounds will, when it becomes known, be unpopular in this country. Also, our refusal to sell these aircraft, which are not subject to the COCOM embargo, might well have an adverse effect on other aspects of our trade with China. Furthermore, we have had to bear in mind that the Chinese will have little difficulty in finding an alternative source of supply either in the Soviet Union or possibly in another western country.

Nevertheless, I decided that we must be prepared to sacrifice these clear commercial advantages mainly because of the present situation in Viet Nam and the inevitable reactions in India to such a sale.

I am bound, however, to mention that a great deal of public attention is being given here to our aircraft industry. As I say, this decision is going to be unpopular. It would be a considerable help to me if your authorities were able to look sympathetically on our efforts to secure sales of British aircraft in the United States. I have particularly in mind the HS.125 executive jet, an aircraft type for which I understand a requirement exists in the U.S.A.F. I should like to be able to say that you are giving this aircraft favourable consideration in that context.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-245
By iss, NARA, Date 1-21-04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19h

Wed., Feb. 23, 1966
8:45 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

This doesn't say very much, and
I don't think it requires an answer.

McG. B.
McG. B.

192

Wednesday, February 23, 1966

Following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Johnson

There has been some mutual plain speaking in my talks in Moscow, including useful sessions in private with Kosygin in the Kremlin and during intervals at the Ballet. It is disappointing that fears that there would be no give in the Russian attitude to Vietnam have been confirmed. Even so I think I may have been able to get across to Kosygin some sense of the anxieties you personally feel about Vietnam and of the sincerity behind the peace overtures which were made during the bombing pause.

You should know that the communique which will be issued tomorrow will refer to discussions on the urgent need for arrangements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to extend the 1963 Test Ban Treaty to include underground tests. I have put to the Russians, and it may survive in the communique, the idea that as a stimulus to the Geneva Conference there should be a high level political meeting of the nuclear powers concerned during the Spring to ascertain whether the conditions for definitive agreements have been established. I have in mind a meeting between, for example, Dean Rusk, Gromyko and Michael Stewart, rather on the lines of the one that Averell will remember attending with Quintin Hogg.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 25, 1966

Friday - 10:00 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bunker Reports Solution to the Chiefs' Problem in
the DR

Ellsworth Bunker just called to say that a solution had been found to the problem of the Army and Air Force Chiefs. The formula is to establish Vice Ministers of Defense for each of the three services, and to name de los Santos and Martinez Arana to occupy the posts corresponding to their respective branch. What this formula accomplishes is to get the two recalcitrant Chiefs out of their command positions. The drawback is that they will remain in the country and not fully comply with the January 6 decrees assigning them abroad.

Ellsworth says that the Vice-Ministerships are figure-head positions without any authority. I imagine that Garcia Godoy, having moved them this far, hopes that they will soon tire and quit. There is a good possibility that Army Chief Martinez Arana will retire rather than take his new position.

Garcia Godoy is going on radio-TV tonight to announce the solution. He is also working on a public exchange of letters with his Minister of Defense, spelling out in detail what the conduct of the Armed Forces should be during the electoral period, which begins next Tuesday.

Ellsworth indicated that in his conversation with Garcia Godoy this morning he used our authorization to express "White House" pleasure over the firm leadership which he had displayed since his public statement of February 16 which promptly ended the general strike. Ellsworth reports that this reassurance was "very effective" with Garcia Godoy.

Ellsworth said that he had told Garcia Godoy that he should get hold of Bosch as soon as possible to inform him of the solution, and to make very clear to him that there was to be no trouble. We suggested to Ellsworth that Garcia Godoy might get the same word to Caamano in London.

incl. B.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-239

By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93

21

Friday, February 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Request by Macapagal to see the President

Former President Macapagal of the Philippines will be in Washington March 4-12 on a private trip to see his daughter, who is enrolled at Georgetown University. He would very much like to make a call on you while he is here. The State Department thinks that a visit by Macapagal would have a good effect on Philippine politics, especially if you could emphasize to him the hope that he may keep up with his leadership in the field of Philippine/American cooperation. Macapagal last saw you in October 1964. He is firm and good on the issue of Filipino troops for Vietnam.

McG. B

Yes _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

Thursday, February 24, 1966, 3 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you go ahead with the Kintner idea, there is one argument worth looking at on the title he gets:

If you make him a Special Assistant to you, you can keep his nose to the grindstone and he'll never have to go to the Hill. With any other title he may have to spend as much time up there as Bell and McNamara.

McG. B.

I don't really think, either, that any one title is safer than another as insurance.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1966

Thursday -- 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: DR Situation

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-167
By cg, NARA Date 8-11-99

Ellsworth Bunker reports that Garcia Godoy is making slow but continuing progress in persuading the Army and Air Force Chiefs to step down. In talks yesterday, Army Chief Martinez Arana indicated his willingness to retire rather than to accept a post on the Armed Forces General Staff, as Garcia Godoy had offered. Air Chief de los Santos is still holding out, but his confidence may have been shaken. Behind Garcia Godoy's progress has been his success in winning the support of an important group of ranking officers who are far-sighted enough to see that the interest of the Armed Forces are better served by meeting Garcia Godoy's wishes rather than by risking a clash.

Talks with the two Chiefs are continuing this morning. Ellsworth, as of noon, did not have a reading on how they had gone. Garcia Godoy cancelled his radio-TV speech last night in the hopes that he can go on the air tonight and announce that the problem of the Chiefs has been resolved. Ellsworth is not at all sure that he will be able to do this.

Garcia Godoy told Ellsworth last night that he will shortly be taking additional measures to improve the electoral climate. He mentioned:

1. A request to the Supreme Court to replace extremist judges.
2. Removal of some government legal functionaries, including prosecuting attorneys.
3. A request to the OAS Electoral Commission to return to the DR and remain during the electoral period (March 1 - June 1).

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs
(C)

As we approach the start of electoral period, our [REDACTED] sources in Santo Domingo are picking up an increasing number of reports that Bosch would like to see the elections postponed for several months because of what he describes as the existing state of political insecurity. We have also received several reports that Garcia Godoy would be interested in a plebiscite to extend the life of the Provisional Government for a couple

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-2-

of years, believing that neither Bosch nor Balaguer could provide stability. It is very likely that Bosch would like to have more time in which to recoup some of his losses. We have nothing directly from Garcia Godoy, but as he sees his term drawing to a close, he may be thinking that the taste of power is not so bad after all.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

note
2-24-66
3:05 pm

MEMORANDUM

25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, February 24, 1966, 3 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you go ahead with the Kintner idea, there is one argument worth looking at on the title he gets:

If you make him a Special Assistant to you, you can keep his nose to the grindstone and he'll never have to go to the Hill. With any other title he may have to spend as much time up there as Bell and McNamara.

McG. B.

McG. B.

I don't really think, either, that any one title is safer than another as insurance.

24
F

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 24, 1966

Your Majesty:

I was glad to receive in Washington your distinguished brother, His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz. In meetings with me and members of my Cabinet and my personal staff he most ably and eloquently explained your views. I thank you for sending him and for the personal message from you which he delivered.

I share your concern that international Communism and Soviet and Chinese imperialism not extend their sway over free peoples. An abiding principle of our policy in the Near East, as elsewhere in the world, has been to insure that the peoples and governments have an alternative to Communism in support of their own efforts to develop in freedom. We have had this principle in mind with regard to the situation in Yemen. Accordingly, Your Majesty, we would welcome the opportunity to share our analysis of the present and potential threat of Communism in the Near East. After we have further studied your views, as presented by Prince Sultan, I will request Ambassador Eilts to discuss this subject in detail with you.

With respect to the other aspects of our talks with Prince Sultan, we feel that the Jidda Agreement negotiated between Your Majesty and President Nasser represented an act of statesmanship which still affords the best approach for peaceful resolution of the Yemen conflict and hope that a way can be found to move toward peace on this basis despite certain difficulties which have arisen. Since we fully share your view that renewal of hostilities in Yemen would be inimical to the best interests of all concerned, would seriously threaten the stability of the area, and provide further opportunity for Communist exploitation, I hope and pray that every effort will be made to avert this dangerous situation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0202-14-3-7

By CTS NARA, Date 12/13/17

His Royal Highness Prince Sultan has kindly offered to deliver this letter to you. With it he also brings my warm personal greetings and my prayers for your continued good health, and the prosperity and peace of the people of Saudi Arabia.

Your friend,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Faisal', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

His Majesty
Faisal ibn Abd-al-Aziz Al-Saud
King of Saudi Arabia

Mr. Bundy
27
informed
RWB
2/24

Wednesday, February 23, 1966
7:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Indira Gandhi visit. She has asked her Embassy here to inquire informally whether Monday, 28 March, would meet your convenience. If so, then she will officially propose this date and we can officially acknowledge. May we say OK?

Approve ✓

Prefer _____

R. W. Komer

cc: McGB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 23, 1966
Wednesday 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Peru Matter. After further checking, I feel obligated to report back honestly my private feeling that countering the unfortunate news leak runs too much risk of stirring up even more trouble -- and of a setback to the promising course set in train by Rostow's successful visit:

1. Disturbing as such leaks are, this one was a two-day wonder unnoticed in the country at large. But if we leak a counter-story, even as mild a one as Walt Rostow reluctantly suggests, we may open the whole issue up again. Will smart-aleck reporters like Kurzman and Eder settle for the Rostow line or start digging again? Our quiet deal with Belaunde also undermined Bobby Kennedy and others, who were planning to speak out on Peru -- we might stir them up again.

2. On the merits, we got the maximum politically possible from Belaunde on the IPC case. Moreover, things are going our way in Peru. Stirring up the IPC case again might put us right back in an impasse again.

3. Should we penalize Belaunde, who acted in good faith? We still want to be tough with Peru, but (as Tom Mann proposes) it's better to shift the argument to the much firmer ground of needed self-help and anti-inflation measures. If we press hard on these lines, no one can legitimately complain.

4. We could keep Peru on a short rein by stretching out the four small loans (actually totalling only \$15 million, since the rest is local currency), and saying that any help beyond this would depend on adequate self-help. Putting out this story 4-5 weeks from now when the first loan was ready for signature would create no problems.

5. Then in six months or so, if all goes well, we'll have ample opportunity to correct the record by demonstrating how the hard line on aid has paid off in such countries as Pakistan, India, Turkey, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru.

I have no special axe to grind on this Peruvian affair, and I fully realize the problems created by loose talk. It doesn't come from over here. But in this case correcting the record may hit the wrong culprits.

Jaguar, go ahead
1 gave Rostow's
2/26/66

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, February 23, 1966
10:30 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mexican Rejection of Chinese Communist Order
for Cotton

I think you will be interested -- and amused -- by the attached cable from Ambassador Freeman reporting the decision of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz to reject a large Chinese Communist order for Mexican cotton and the reasons therefor.

McG. B.
McG. B.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date *2-10-98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30

2/22/66 12 midnight

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is a third draft, and I will be ready to go to work on any final touches early in the morning. Meanwhile, I hear that the Vice President (whom I have mentioned) will be back on schedule at 5:10, after all.

I put in John Foster Dulles (page 5), and his quote is so hawklike that for the moment I have not tried to put in the brisk thought from the Economist which you mentioned on the phone.

M.C.B.
McG. B.

9

2/22/66 3rd draft 11 pm

Tonight in Vietnam 200,000 young Americans fight for freedom. Tonight our people are determined that these men shall have whatever help they need and that their cause -- which is our cause -- shall be sustained. But in these last days there have been questions about what we are doing in Vietnam, and these questions deserve answers. For the strength of America can never be sapped by discussion -- and we have no better or stronger tradition than open debate in hours of danger. And as we are united in our commitment to free discussion, so also we are united in the determination that no foe anywhere should mistake our arguments for indecision or our debates for weakness.

Consider these questions:

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited objectives.

The answer is plain: It is "No." Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not bases; it is not domination. It is to prevent the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by Communists.

Second, some ask if we are caught in some blind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer again is "No." We are using only the force that is needed to stop the aggression. Our fighting men are in Vietnam because tens of thousands of invaders came South before them. Our numbers have increased because the aggression of others has increased.

The high hope of the aggressor has been dimmed, and the tide of the battle has turned. Our measured use of force must be continued. But this is prudent firmness under careful control. There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation.

Third, others ask if our fighting men are to be denied the help they need. The answer is again, and will be, a resounding "No." A great Secretary of Defense and a great military command have moved 150,000 men across ten thousand miles since last July. These men have, and will have, what they need. Our soldiers have already performed miracles in combat, and the men behind them have performed miracles in supply -- they have built new ports, and landed new equipment, opened new roads, and reached out strongly from the nearby sea which brings their support. The force of freedom is strong today in South Vietnam. And we will keep it so. In General Westmoreland we have a great and brilliant commander in Vietnam. His troops are brave, but they are generous. He knows the needs of war and he supports the works of peace. If he should ask -- and I think he must and will -- for more Americans to help the men he has, his requests will be studied, and, as ~~we accept them,~~ I promised the country over television last July, his needs will be met.

Fourth, some ask if our men go alone to Vietnam and if we alone respect our great commitment in the Southeast Asia Treaty. Still again the answer is "No." We have seven Allies in SEATO and all but two of them -- Pakistan and France -- give stout support, each with his own strength and each in his own way, to the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia.

Fifth, some ask about the risk of wider war -- perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. And again the answer is, No, never by any act of ours -- and not if there is any reason left behind the wild words from Peking. We have threatened no one -- and we will not. We seek the end of no regime -- and we will not. We defend against aggression, and to any armed attack from any source we will reply. We have measured the strength -- and the weakness -- of others, and we know our own. We observe ourselves -- and we applaud in others -- a careful restraint in action. We can live with anger in word as long as it is matched by caution in deed.

Sixth, men ask if we rely on guns alone. Still again the answer is "No." The meaning of our Honolulu meeting and the clear pledge which joins us with our Allies in Saigon is a pledge of common effort for the peaceful progress of the people of Vietnam -- their progress in peace and safety -- schools for their children, care for their health, and bounty for their land. The Vice President returned today from ^{most constructive} his visit to Saigon and other capitals, and he tells me that he has found a new conviction and purpose in South Vietnam -- for the battle of peace as well as the battle against aggression. So the pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the pledge of Baltimore stands open -- to help the men of the North when they have the wisdom to be ready.

We Americans just must understand how fundamental is the meaning of this second war -- the war on want. I ~~have~~ ^{don't fall} talked on my farm with Secretary Freeman ~~months~~ ^{ago}, and in my office with Secretary Gardner ~~just this week~~ ^{last} -- and these talks and the resulting labors go to the same central point: The breeding ground of war is human misery. If we are not to fight forever in far away places -- in Europe or the Far Pacific or the jungles of Africa or the

document holder in 3 days

suburbs of

-4-

Santo Domingo, then we must learn to get at the roots of violence.

And as a nation we must lift the level of our struggle against disease and illiteracy and hunger. We must bring hope to men whose life now ends at 35. Without that hope -- without progress in this war on want -- we will be called to fight again and again, as we must today.

Seventh, men ask who has a right to rule in South Vietnam. *South Vietnam*
Our answer there is what it has been here for 200 years: The people *of*
have that right, and no one else. Washington will not impose upon the people
of South Vietnam *Communist & Army* a government not of their choice. We will insist for
ourselves on what we require from Hanoi: respect for the principle of
government by consent of the governed. We stand for self-determination --
for free elections -- and we will honor their result.

Eighth, men ask if we are neglecting any hopeful chance of peace.
And the answer is "No." A great servant of peace, Secretary Rusk,
has sent the message of peace on every wire and by every hand to every
continent. *and every country* A great pleader for peace, Arthur Goldberg, has worked at
home and abroad in this same cause. Their undiscouraged efforts will continue.

Ninth, some ask how long we must bear this burden. And to that question, in all honesty, I can give no answer tonight. When Britain stood alone in 1940, Winston Churchill gave no answer to that question. When General MacArthur promised to return, he could not and did not name the date. If the aggressor persists in Vietnam, the struggle may be long.

Our men in battle know and accept this hard fact. We who are at home can do as much. There is no computer that can ^{testify as to} tell the hour and day of peace, but we ^{do} know that it will come to the steadfast ^{-- and} never to the weak in heart.

^{Tenth} And finally, men ask if it is worth it. I think you know the answer. It is the answer that Americans have given for a quarter of a century, wherever American strength has been pledged to prevent aggression. The contest in Vietnam is confused and hard, and many of its forms are new. Yet our purpose and policy are unchanged.

Our men in Vietnam are there to keep a promise made 12 years ago ~~in the~~

The Southeast Asia Treaty promised -- ^{from} in the words of Secretary John Foster Dulles ^{who negotiated and signed it alone with Sen. Mansfield & Sen. Smith} -- "that an attack upon the treaty area would occasion

a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain." But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Vietnam. We keep the faith for freedom.

Let me close tonight by reminding you of the pledges of four Presidents:

First, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his State of the Union message 25 years ago:

"...we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom."

Second, Harry S. Truman, in 1947, at a historic turning point in the history of guerrilla warfare -- and of Greece and Turkey and the United States --

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

"I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way."

Third, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his first Inaugural Address:

"Realizing that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains."

And then five years ago, John F. Kennedy, on the cold bright noon of his first day in office:

"Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans -- born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage -- and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

This is the American tradition. Built in free discussion, proven in a hundred battlefields, rewarded by a peaceful progress^{at home}, that has no match in history, it beckons us forward^{how} to the work of peace in Vietnam. We will ask and argue as we go. We will build freedom while we fight, and we will seek peace every day by every honorable means. But we will persevere along

-7-

the high hard road of freedom. We are too old to be foolhardy, too young to be tired, too strong for fear, and too determined for retreat.

##

231
Monday, Feb. 21, 1966 7:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press contacts today, Feb. 21

1. Mary McGrory telephoned me today, and I also had lunch with Joe Alsop to celebrate his safe return from Vietnam.

2. Mary told me that she had been just won around to our position by Taylor and Rusk, but that now she was upset by Bob Kennedy's statement. I told her I really could not go beyond what I said yesterday on that subject, but she pressed me, and I think I got across the distinction between our forcing Saigon into a coalition with the Communists before elections and letting all parties win what they could in a genuinely free and fair election. She seemed to accept this distinction. Max Taylor has since told me that in a talk with Bob Kennedy he thinks he put across the same distinction. I have sent Bob a note saying that if my opposition to a forced coalition is opposition to a point he does not urge, I will be glad to say so the very next chance I get. I doubt if he will take me up on it, but Taylor's report suggests that the Senator may feel he got a little further out on a limb than he intended.

3. Joe Alsop tried to talk with me about calling up the Reserves. I told him that was none of my business, and that he should argue with McNamara on that issue. He will be doing so later this week. He said that he was terribly afraid we would not give Westmoreland what he needs and I told him this was a groundless fear. He said that he was only reporting the feeling of some senior officers in Saigon, but he retreated when I told him that I had talked myself with Lodge and Westmoreland and that they did not hold any such view. My guess is that there probably is some staff level impatience on the military side in Saigon with the fact that we approve their requests only step by step, instead of with a blank check. So I called Bob McNamara this afternoon to warn him of Joe's attitude and to ask him whether in fact he thought we were keeping the greedy staff officers on too short a rein. Bob did not give me the impression that he agreed with this point of view, and I think he will deal firmly with Joe. I did try to strengthen Alsop's conviction that our course is firm and that in fact Westy will get the things you decide that he really needs.

4. For the rest, Alsop is as much more optimistic than I am, as I am more optimistic than Bob McNamara. He says in effect that victory is certain if we do not spare the horses in South Vietnam and if we go after the POL in North Vietnam.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 21, 1966
7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation Report

Ellsworth Bunker reports that the situation in the DR continues to be tranquil while Garcia Godoy and his new Defense Minister try to persuade the Army and Air Force Chiefs to step down.

Garcia Godoy has advanced a new formula for getting this job done. It is to reconstitute the Armed Forces General Staff (an advisory body in the DR) and name the two Generals to it, effectively kicking them upstairs. After three days of talks with the recalcitrant Chiefs, Garcia Godoy has not been able to budge them -- but he is persisting in his efforts.

Garcia Godoy has taken Ellsworth's advice that he must maintain direct contact at regular intervals with the Dominican people to inform and orient them on what he is doing. He plans to speak again this Wednesday and hopes by then to be able to announce that the Chiefs have accepted his formula.

Ellsworth is making no predictions on the outcome of the current round of talks with the Chiefs. He has stayed out of it so far to let Garcia Godoy and Perez y Perez try their hand. He anticipates that he may have to become involved again in another day or two if the impasse continues.

We authorized Ellsworth today to express to Garcia Godoy our pleasure with the determined leadership displayed by him during the past week. Ellsworth said this would be helpful in backing up Garcia Godoy who tends to get discouraged rather easily.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-239

By rw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

F 33
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1966
1:00 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Here are the quotes I looked up yesterday on President Kennedy, Senator Fulbright, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

I have also added a number of quotations from President Kennedy's public statements in the latter half of 1963, directly on Vietnam. They are all good, and I think you may wish to make your own choice as to which is the most useful.

M. B.

McG. B.

President Kennedy - June 26, 1963
Address at Free University of Berlin

"I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger. But I do believe in the necessity of great powers working together to preserve the human race, or otherwise we can be destroyed."

Gulf of Tonkin - August 6, 1964
Senator Fulbright to the Senate (Congressional Record, Aug. 6, 1964, p. 18400)

these
"It should be made equally clear to/(the Communist) regimes, if it is not yet sufficiently clear, that their aggressive and expansionist ambitions, wherever advanced, will meet precisely that degree of American opposition which is necessary to frustrate them."

Senator Robert F. Kennedy in Saigon, February 1962, as described in his book, Just Friends and Brave Enemies, p. 10

"In a brief statement to the press about the struggle under way in Vietnam, I made the point that this is a new kind of war. It is war in the very real sense of the word, yet it is a war fought not by massive divisions but secretly by terror, assassination, ambush and infiltration. I added that the President 'has been extremely impressed with the courage and determination of the people of your country and he has pledged the United States to stand by the side of Vietnam through this very difficult and troublesome time. We will win in Vietnam, and we shall remain here until we do.'"

President Kennedy, Sept. 12, 1963

Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 673

(from Ps news conf 9/12/63)

"Q. Mr. President, in view of the prevailing confusion, is it possible to state today just what this Government's policy is toward the current government of South Viet-Nam?

The President. I think I have stated what my view is and we are for those things and those policies which help win the war there. That is why some 25,000 Americans have traveled 10,000 miles to participate in that struggle. What helps to win the war, we support; what interferes with the war effort, we oppose. I have already made it clear that any action by either government which may handicap the winning of the war is inconsistent with our policy or our objectives. This is the test which I think every agency and official of the United States Government must apply to all of our actions, and we shall be applying that test in various ways in the coming months, although I do not think it desirable to state all of our views at this time. I think they will be made more clear as time goes on.

But we have a very simple policy in that area, I think. In some ways I think the Vietnamese people and ourselves agree: we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am sure it is the policy of the people of Viet-Nam. But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war."

President Kennedy, October 25, 1963
Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 815

Message to President Diem on the occasion of the National Holiday
of Viet-Nam. (released Oct. 25, 1963. Dated Oct. 23, 1963)

"Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the American people I extend greetings and best wishes to the Republic of Viet-Nam on its 8th anniversary. On this occasion I wish once again to express the admiration of the American people for the unfailing courage of the Vietnamese people in their valiant struggle against the continuing efforts of communism to undermine and destroy Vietnamese independence. The United States of America has confidence in the future of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in its ability both to overcome the present communist threat to their independence, and to determine their own destiny. We look forward to the day when peace is restored and when the Vietnamese people can live in freedom and prosperity.

John F. Kennedy"

President Kennedy, November 14, 1963
Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 846

(from the President's News Conference of Nov. 14, 1963)

"Q. ... Would you give us your appraisal of the situation in South Viet-Nam now, since the coup, and the purposes for the Honolulu conference?

The President. Because we do have a new situation there, and a new government, we hope, an increased effort in the war. The purpose of the meeting at Honolulu -- Ambassador Lodge will be there, General Harkins will be there, Secretary McNamara and others, and then, as you know, later Ambassador Lodge will come here -- is to attempt to assess the situation: what American policy should be, and what our aid policy should be, how we can intensify the struggle, how we can bring Americans out of there.

Now, that is our object, to bring Americans home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and independent country, and permit democratic forces within the country to operate -- which they can, of course, much more freely when the assault from the inside, and which is manipulated from the north, is ended. So the purpose of the meeting in Honolulu is how to pursue these objectives."

~~SECRET~~

34
February 19, 1966
Saturday, 5:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

For some weeks I have been trying to get agreement within the Government on a proposed message from you to Harold Wilson as he goes to Moscow, on the subject of non-proliferation and our gentle efforts to bring the Germans and the English together on the problem of nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. The object of such a message would be to remind Wilson gently of the fact that the Soviets constantly try to drive a wedge between us on this issue, and to give him an even handed account of our own thinking.

As so often happens, the difficulties of clearing an agreed text have brought us up against the deadline. I now have such a text, attached at Tab A, but Wilson leaves tomorrow or Monday, and time is therefore very short for your own consideration. I apologize.

I do think, however, that the attached draft is worth sending, and we can deliver it through Kohler in Moscow if you wish to take another day or so to think it over.

McG. B.

Yes ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-10-98

~~SECRET~~

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2/20/66

34a

Message to Prime Minister Wilson from the President

As you leave for Moscow, I want to share my thoughts with you on one further problem that you may have occasion to discuss with the Russians. This is the problem of relations between the negotiations on non-proliferation and our efforts to get an agreed Atlantic nuclear policy. I think we have to walk a careful line between contending groups which would give one or the other of these related problems an overriding priority.

The Soviet Government continues to assert that any form of cooperation with Bonn in the nuclear field is dangerous. While this position may in part reflect a genuine concern about the Germans getting control over nuclear weapons, it is also plain that the Soviets are seeking to use the issue as a means of causing trouble in the NATO Alliance.

The main point of Soviet tactical pressure in the coming weeks is likely to be the language of the non-proliferation treaty. They will be pressing for language which would bar what they call "access" to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. Their evident purpose is to foreclose the possibility of nuclear arrangements in NATO which would involve the Germans more intimately in the business of nuclear defense.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. XIII, item 133

By ju NARA. Date 2-10-98

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- 2 -

We are inclined to think that the best way to counter the Soviets on this -- and to get on with a constructive treaty -- is to focus discussion on the true meaning of proliferation, and, at the same time, to convince Moscow that we will not sign a treaty which would rule out NATO nuclear arrangements which would not, in fact, involve proliferation.

In our new draft treaty, we have suggested that proliferation results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national control, or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. In addition, there should be no increase in the number of states and organizations which have control of nuclear weapons. In general, the draft represents an attempt to come to grips with the real problem of proliferation without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear members of the Alliance.

In any case, I think it most important that we not let the Soviets maneuver us into a position which would arouse strong and honest resentment in Germany. To let them do this would be no service to the cause of non-proliferation, since it would increase the very dangers that the Soviets constantly stress.

The Soviet Government is surely not blind to one further aspect of this matter -- namely, that there is, on this issue, a pronounced difference of emphasis between your public opinion and ours. They are bound to see advantage in trying to exploit that difference to set us

~~SECRET~~

against one another. We must be careful not to fall into that trap.

My own view is that we should keep an absolutely even handed view of these twin problems. A sound non-proliferation agreement and a sound Atlantic nuclear policy are in truth mutually consistent and reinforcing. I do not accept the argument that we must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty.

But I think we should equally reject the notion that we can push aside the Alliance problem now, and go along with a treaty which would rule out, or drastically narrow, possibilities for a NATO nuclear arrangement which would not result in proliferation.

On non-proliferation, we can meet the legitimate interests of the Soviet Government because they are the same as our own. But we must not let the Soviets use this most important issue to undermine German confidence in our willingness to treat their nuclear problem seriously and constructively. This course naturally tempts some in Moscow, but it is no more in the Soviet interest than in ours.

I thought it would be useful for me to give you this indication of my own thinking, because of the great advantage which comes to us both when we stand together.

I hope you will have a good trip and I send you once again my best wishes for success in your effort to get Soviet help in reconvening a Geneva Conference. I am doing what I can to keep the public

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

discussion here from complicating your task, but it is an understatement to say that I do not control it completely.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 19, 1966
Saturday, 4:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Handling the management of this office after I leave

I feel very strongly that the handling of business after I leave is none of my business, and in particular I don't wish to speak unless spoken to about the names and numbers of any possible successors, since I said everything I could on the subject back in December.

I do want to signal one problem. If there is to be any interregnum before a permanent successor or successors are named, it will be very important indeed to have it clear just who is responsible for the work of this office. Unless you give me different instructions, my inclination is to deal with this problem by saying that unless and until you make another appointment, Bob Komer should act in my place and have the same authority over members of the NSC staff that I have had. But I do not wish to make such a statement at all if, in fact, there will be someone else of your choice on the job on March 1.

Can you give me any guidance?

M. F. B.
McG. B.

EXCLUDED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT INT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *RAH* ON *8-2-83*

me
Act talk
over banking
of early in the week
N
TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Saturday, February 19, 1966
3:15 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Delegation to Attend the Presentation to Mexico
of a Statue of Abraham Lincoln

On April 15, 1966 there is to be unveiled in Mexico City a large statue of Abraham Lincoln donated by the United States to the Mexican people. Congress authorized presentation of the statue in 1960. The statue is a 12-foot standing figure with a 7-foot base. It is to be located in a small park in a very good location in the Mexican capital.

The legislation provides for an official delegation to represent the United States. State recommends that the delegation consist of an outstanding citizen as Chairman, four Senators, four Representatives, Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon, the sculptor, Felix de Weldon, and the Secretary of the Fine Arts Commission, Mr. Atherton. The delegation looks about right, although I would add the Governors of Illinois and Kentucky.

Do you have a preference for head of the delegation or would you rather let Secretary Rusk decide?

McG. B.

I prefer _____

Let Rusk decide _____

See me _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON
RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

IN REPLY REFER TO:
2382

1966 FEB 15 AM 10 40

February 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Delegation to Attend the Presentation
to Mexico of a Statue of Abraham Lincoln

In 1960 Congress authorized the presentation of a statue of Abraham Lincoln to the people of Mexico. The formal presentation ceremony in Mexico City is scheduled for April 15, 1966, the anniversary of Lincoln's death.

An official delegation to represent the United States at the ceremony was provided for in the legislation. The President may wish to name an outstanding citizen to head the delegation.

The remainder of the delegation envisaged at this time would consist of the following:

Four Senators

Four Representatives

The Assistant Secretary for Inter American Affairs
Mr. Terrance G. Leonhardy, Director, Office of
Mexican Affairs

Mr. C. H. Atherton, Secretary, Commission of Fine
Arts


Mr. Felix de Weldon, Sculptor

If this meets with your approval the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House will be requested to designate the members of the respective Houses to be included in the delegation.

362 406

1-Bowdler
2-Ret.

The enabling authorization in the Senate was introduced by Senator Kuchel for himself and Senators Morse, Chavez, Engle, Gruening, Goldwater, Mansfield, Dirksen, and Yarborough. In the House, Congressmen Glennard Lipscomb and Chet Holifield introduced bills to provide for the presentation of a statue to Mexico.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. H. Read", is positioned to the left of the printed name and title. The signature is stylized and cursive.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 19, 1966
Saturday, 2:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker says that the situation in the DR continues to improve. The strike is for all purposes over.

Garcia Godoy's success in breaking the strike seems to have given him new courage. In rapid succession he:

1. Warned extremists of the left and right that they face deportation if they continue their disruptive activities.
2. Issued decrees removing 91 provincial and municipal officials who are Bosch partisans. Twenty more changes are due today. Balaguer had complained that there was a serious political imbalance in governmental appointments which put him at a disadvantage in the electoral campaign. The changes are designed to redress the balance and improve the electoral climate.
3. Prepared a decree to be issued today prohibiting private security forces. This hits at some "constitutionalist" leaders, like Hector Aristy, who maintain a small army of personal body-guards. Ex-presidents are exempted to take care of Bosch, but their guards are to be regular policemen.

Ellsworth attributes the sudden change in Garcia Godoy's willingness to act like a President to the stern two and a half hour lecture he gave him last Wednesday morning. Ellsworth thinks the three measures listed above are designed to soften up the military. By reassuring them that the left will be curbed, Garcia Godoy hopes to ease the task of persuading the Air Force and Army Chiefs to leave voluntarily. Only time will tell whether it works.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 2-10-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-19-66
9:45 am
JH
~~SECRET NODIS~~

38 ✓

12
Saturday, February 19, 1966, 9:40 A. M.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM JACK VALENTI (Canberra 610)

This is a summary of a conversation I had with a man to watch in India. His name is Dinesh Singh, Minister of State, and very close to Mrs. Gandhi. The conversation took place before and during dinner at Mrs. Gandhi's residence, February 17.

Singh is a small, handsome man, introspective, with an opaque expression; self-assured, imperious, enormously arrogant, and irritatingly self-righteous.

He is obviously intelligent, deeply read, about 40 years old. He has been in government for four years, though his family has for years been involved in Congress Party activities (his grandfather was one of the founders). When I asked him what he did before entering the Government, he smiled and said: "I was one of the parasitical landlord class."

He is typical of an American whose forebears are wealthy and high born, who has in his veins a sense of mission, a Hamiltonian view of the position of the aristocrat in the management of a nation. Moreover, he deliberately veers from the normal conservatism of the lordly rajah concepts, to a leftist direction. (It is interesting to note that in a conversation with Bhutto two days before, Bhutto also exalted Hamilton as the wisest American political philosopher and described the federalist papers as the noblest political document he ever read. There is great similarity in the views, demeanor noblesse oblige attitudes of Singh and Bhutto; indeed in the fastidious way they dress, and the olympian air they assume; as well as the visible charm they project -- when they choose to.)

After sparring awhile, we talked of books and literature (Aubrey Menen - whom he disparages - to the ethnic history of the subcontinent - in which he displayed his expertise) -- and finally he became confiding and easy in his talk.

A summary of his views:

India must be self-sufficient. It matters not if some Indians must starve. This is the price a nation pays for its dignity. Our own American pioneers hacked their way by their own hands through the wilderness and built a nation. They didn't do it on foreign aid, they did it on their own, and the on-coming generations are the heirs of this dignity and subsequent wealth produced.

~~SECRET NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-245
By iso, NARA, Date 1-20-04

Dignity, self-respect (these are recurring themes in all of Singh's conversations) are the keys to the Indian future.

He would have all imports stopped (except most critical items) in a five year period, so that Indians would get adjusted to the fact they must produce their own, and be dependent on no one. "We are pleased with your aid, and grateful for it" he said airily, and promptly never referred to it again. If there are moments and even years of hardship by denying aid, then so be it, for this is the price a great nation must pay for its own self-infusion of dignity.

If there are scarcities of food, then the people must eat less. If thousands die from starvation, what of it. "A generation must spend itself in sacrifice so that future generations can live proudly and greatly," he said.

"You have failed in Korea, in Vietnam and wherever you have tried to substitute in other people money and materials for their sense of cause. Why do the North Vietnamese continue to fight, against great odds, and against the most powerful country in the world, and why are the South Vietnamese unable to build a country? Because the North fights for its dignity and its sense of achievement and the South does not. Put a lone North soldier in the field against a lone South soldier with his superior American weapons, and the North soldier will win because he is fighting for something that is precious."

He went on to tell why the Indian nation has survived as a nation, in spite of ethnic, tribal and language differences. The Hindu religion, he said, allows for diversity, and the prime and indispensable cement that binds Indians is the sense of their culture. India and the Hindu way of life have absorbed each new wave of immigrants and invaders. (Singh was proud of the fact that his clothes are all locally made, from Indian-spun cloth.)

Comment:

There is in Singh a high sense of nationalism -- he is contemptuous of India's being a mendicant, hat in hand begging for aid to keep the industrial machine going. He resents the U.S. as an honest broker, indeed, appears to want India to cut immediately all its assistance ties with the U.S. and go it alone. (Bowles told me that the attitude of the Indians is much the same as that of the U.S. in the early days of the republic, proud, ready to fling the gauntlet down to the British, anxious to be a nation on its own.) Singh is obviously attached to Mrs. Gandhi, and she appears to pay attention to his views and counsel. He is a cool

customer, and I suspect feels deeply that his heritage is far more sophisticated than the Americans he talks to. My judgment is Singh can be dangerous to our cause. His ultimate objective of India as a powerful independent force may in the long run accrue to our benefit, since he would, I judge, voice the same resentment of Russia or China if they tried to impose their will and purpose on India. At any rate, our people ought to focus attention on him as a possible power in the Indian councils. Right now, he appears to have no political base other than the aegis of Mrs. Gandhi. Should she be forced out of office, I have no judgment as to his worth and power without Mrs. Gandhi to give it substance.

But the key point is -- he is influential with Mrs. Gandhi, and therefore is important to us.

February 18, 1966
Friday, 6:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Marvin Watson

SUBJECT: Senator Morse on getting out of Vietnam

Last night in an exchange with Senator Long, Senator Morse flatly denied that he had ever said we should pull out of Vietnam. The attached excerpts from the Congressional Record prove that his memory is faulty. At Tab A are three quotations from remarks of his in March 1964 in which he says flatly he is "for getting out immediately."

It is true that Senator Morse later modified his position and has adopted the cover of seeking a SEATO or UN solution. Examples of this later position are attached at Tab B.

McG. B.

39a



Excerpts from CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the
88th Congress, Second Session

Proceedings of March 12, 1964 (page 4870):

Mr. Morse: As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee -- and my colleagues on the committee know it and many disagree with me -- I do not propose to vote another dollar for South Vietnam. I was against going in; I have been against staying in. I am for getting out immediately.

* * *

Proceedings of March 13, 1964 (page 5076):

Mr. Morse: If we would get out of there, the South Vietnamese would accommodate themselves quickly to an adjustment of their differences. The situation there involves split families. An overwhelming majority of Vietcongs, so-called Communists, in South Vietnam are really South Vietnamese. Families are split. That includes uncles and nephews on opposite sides. In some instances, sons and fathers are on opposite sides. A state of civil war exists there. In my judgment, people are fighting who would not be fighting at all except for the fact that we are "egging them on."

* * *

The time has come for my administration to recognize that Vietnam has become the basic domestic issue in the field

of foreign policy. I should like to be on the team; but as to this phase of foreign policy, I have left this administration completely because, in my judgment, we ought to get out. At least, we ought to work for a neutralization of this program and force other countries to assume their fair share of responsibility for what ought to be done in South Vietnam.

* * *

Proceedings of March 26, 1964 (page 6259)

Mr. Morse: I want to get all U.S. forces out to the extent that any are in. I want to get the issue before the United Nations.



Proceedings and Debates of the 89th Congress, 1st Session

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
January 6, 1965 (page 243)

Mr. Morse: "I say again that the senior Senator from Oregon has never favored our simply pulling out of Vietnam. The senior Senator from Oregon has taken the position that if the only course open to us is to remain on a unilateral basis, we cannot justify staying there under international law. What I have urged, in speech after speech and article after article, is that we should make use of existing international agencies for the settlement of this dispute, if possible, by way of neglected settlement, short of war. So I have urged, time and time again, and repeat this afternoon, that we ought to use SEATO; but the fact is that a majority of the SEATO nations want no part of it."

* * *

December 30, 1964 (press release printed in Congressional Record of January 6, 1965, page 250):

"Contrary to oft-published reports, it is not my position that the United States should merely 'get out' of South Vietnam.

"We should get out in the sense that we should stop making war there for U.S. interests, and stop making an American puppet out of South Vietnam."

Friday, February 18, 1966
6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Birthday greeting to Jamaica's Prime Minister
Bustamante**

State recommends that you send the enclosed birthday greeting to Jamaican Prime Minister Sir Alexander Bustamante, as you have for the past two years. He will be 82 years old on February 24. I concur.

McG. B.

Enclosure

**SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
TO JAMAICAN PRIME MINISTER**

**My best wishes and warmest regards to an old friend and
distinguished leader on his 82nd birthday.**

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Friday , February 18, 1966 at 4 PM

~~THROUGH: Mr. Valenti~~

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a strong personal recommendation from George Ball that you agree to see Tory leader Ted Heath sometime during the week of March 20-26. At Tab B is an equally strong request from David Bruce. (Bruce reports that Harold Wilson has been informed of Heath's plan to ask you for a meeting, and has made no objection.)

Ball and Bruce are confident that Heath understands that you will have to cancel such a meeting if Harold Wilson calls an election. (George recommends that -- if you agree to a meeting -- there be no announcement until just before Heath arrives, to avoid any pre-election embarrassment.)



Francis M. Bator



I will see him _____

Tell Heath he is welcome in the U.S., but I can't promise to see him _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Desire of Edward Heath, Leader of
the British Conservative Party,
to Meet With You

Recommendation

I strongly recommend that if at all possible you agree to see Edward Heath, leader of the British Conservative Party, during the week of March 20-26.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____


Discussion

Edward Heath, leader of the British Conservative Party has been planning a trip to the United States and hopes that he might meet with you sometime during the week of March 20-26. Ambassador Bruce strongly urges that this request be granted if at all possible (London's 3849 attached).

Heath is very likely to be Prime Minister at sometime in the future. He is very friendly to the United States and has assured the support of the Conservatives for our Viet-Nam policy. This in turn has reinforced Prime Minister Wilson's efforts to keep the Labor Party in line.

You

CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

You will recall that you received Wilson when he was leader of the opposition in March, 1964. Mr. Wilson knows of Heath's present request to visit you and has indicated he has no objection.

I know Heath personally very well and I am confident that you would like him. At the same time, a visit with you would increase his authority to defend our Vietnamese policy in the House of Commons where he acts as the Conservative spokesman. If Heath is not able to see you I doubt that he will come to the United States. He will certainly not try to force a visit by appearing on the scene.

It may well be that Prime Minister Wilson will call an election soon--probably for the end of March. For that reason there should be no announcement of any meeting with you until just before Heath's trip. Thus if an election is called Heath would certainly stay in England and there would be no embarrassment of a last minute cancellation.


George W. Ball
Acting

Attachment:

As stated

CONFIDENTIAL

4/1/82

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

16 February 1966

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

As you may recall, Ted Heath has for some time been discussing a visit to the U.S. and we have been stalling him since the first of the year on a possible date when he might see the President. At my request he has given us two alternative preferred times, March 6-11, and March 20-26. (As a practical matter, it is probably now too late for him to arrange his plans for the earlier of these two periods.) He has commitments for meeting the press and the National Press Club whenever the trip takes place, and he would understandably like to get a date settled.

In view of the fact that such a visit has been a live topic ever since his election as Conservative Leader last July, it is difficult not to be forthcoming now that he has made a specific request.

Heath understands the necessity of cancelling his trip if an election is announced. We would propose not to announce the fact of a Presidential meeting until just before his trip, so that, if necessary, it can be cancelled without any embarrassment. The Prime Minister, of course, has been informed of Heath's plans and has made no objection.

Heath has been, as you know, extremely good on some of the matters of most importance to us, such as defense policy East of Suez, and, particularly, the Viet-Nam problem. He was much impressed by what he saw on his recent visit to Viet-Nam.

I appreciate the heavy demands on the President and hesitate to add to his burdens. But I hope that it will be possible to schedule an appointment for Heath.

~~SECRET~~ - EX DIS

state 10-15-77	
By DCH	DECLASSIFIED NARS, Date 8-2-83

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 18, 1966

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Attached herewith is a memorandum submitted in response to a Presidential request.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memo re No. 8 Viet Nam
Urgent Action List of 2/14

456 42a
To Pres 2/18/66
w/o covering
note

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

February 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: No. 8 Viet Nam Urgent Action List of February 14,
1966: A Talking Script for Senators

I came in early this morning to draft on this, the last outstanding item on your action list telephoned to me last Sunday night.

Having listened to Secretary Rusk this morning on television, I believe I have been overtaken by events -- and, if I may say so, very well overtaken.

Assuming that we get some kind of affirmative Congressional action on Viet Nam matters in the days ahead what may be called for is a brief, healing, unifying statement from you.

- Welcoming the hearings and the debate;
- Welcoming Congressional support;
- Stating that now is the time for the nation to rally in unity behind:

1. our fighting men in Viet Nam;
2. our efforts to back economic, social, and political construction in Viet Nam;
3. our continued pursuit of an honorable peace.

-- A peroration along the lines of my draft of January 29, pp. 10-13 (attached).

W. A. Rostow
Rostow

-10-

* * *

How long, then, will this phase of war go on? How big will the war become?

I cannot tell you. The answers depend on the decision of others.

As for ourselves, we can only ask whether what we are doing is right.

Whether our objectives are decent and legal.

Whether the vital interests of the United States and of free men everywhere are truly involved.

I believe it is the consensus of this nation, having examined with attention and sympathy every contrary argument, that we must go forward. We must bring to bear, at any cost, the full power required to achieve our limited but essential purposes. At the same time, we must exploit every possibility that the imagination and good will of men can devise to bring this war peacefully to an end on terms consistent with those purposes.

I cannot promise you, then, a quick, easy answer in Viet Nam. But I am confident that our purposes shall be achieved.

One reason

One reason for this confidence is a slowly gathering tide of moderation and good sense in the world community. As I sit in my office and receive reports from every corner of the globe, I am every day convinced that men are slowly but surely learning that on this small planet they must settle their differences by peaceful means -- by negotiation and reconciliation -- not at the point of a gun.

They are learning that the real task before them is not to impose their will on others, but to work together against the common enemies of man: hunger, disease, and ignorance.

If we are strong and wise and united, there is a fair hope that this war in Viet Nam, coming at the end of the first postwar generation, may mark the end of a phase in history -- a phase in which all men have painfully learned that there is only one safe path for mankind: to live at peace with their neighbors and to work together to lift the estate of man.

I deeply believe that a united, purposeful America -- working patiently with others -- can bring this transformation to pass in our time.

But this

But this transformation will be postponed if we fail our duty in Viet Nam.

At every great moment in the history of our nation we have faced difficult choices of this kind. This is not the first time in our history that Americans have taken great risks or fought and died, side by side with others, for the independence of nations and the freedom of men.

In our own generation we have often faced this kind of hard choice: from the Berlin blockade to the Cuba missile crisis, from Greece to the Korean war. Always there have been those who felt that there must be a safer and a softer way.

Indeed, so it was with Lincoln at the critical stage in the Civil War.

So it was with General Washington at many difficult moments during our Revolution.

So it was even with the Pilgrim Fathers who debated among themselves whether to leave the safety of Holland and set out across the seas.

Their answer to the doubts and dangers then is our answer now: "It was answered, that all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties and must be
both

both enterprised and overcome with answerable courage. It was granted the dangers were great, but not desperate. The difficulties were many, but not invincible. For though there were many of them likely, yet they were not certain. It might be sundry of the things feared might never befall; others by provident care and the use of good means might in a great measure be prevented; and all of them through the help of God, by fortitude and patience, might either be borne or overcome."

F 44

Thursday, February 17, 1966, 12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Arthur Goldberg called me this morning to volunteer his services in lobbying the more reasonable Senators on the peaceful side of the line. He said he thought that Gene McCarthy and some of the others could be moved, and indicated his belief that he might be more helpful than some of the spokesmen now at work on the matter. I think he is right -- and I share his view that we need to do some more of the kind of lobbying that Averell Harriman had begun on before his present trip. Would you like me to get Goldberg down here for a session with you, after which he could go into action?

McG. B.

Yes _____

No _____

45a

Bob,


This came to me today. The President has NOT
seen it.

Thought you might want to add something
before bringing it to his attention.

mjdr
Feb 15

45b

Not
Goes to
3-14-905W



OFFICE OF THE
ARCHBISHOP

ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON

CHANCERY OFFICE
1721 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

February 11, 1966

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.


My dear Mr. President:

A cause of deep concern to me is the alleged persecution of members of the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey; especially against the venerable personage of the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I. It is claimed that the Patriarch is prevented from arranging meetings with foreign religious leaders and Christian representatives, and that he is further restricted from visiting these visitors outside. If this be true, the efforts to promote the cause of Christian unity are being interfered with, as well as the rights of practicing Greek Orthodox members.

The charge that Greek Orthodox Communicants are conspiring against the Turkish government because of their sympathetic attitude towards Greek Cypriots appears to me to be invalid, because the Greeks in Turkey have no political ties whatsoever with the Cypriots who are under the domain of President Makarios.

Anything that you can do through diplomatic channels, Mr. President, to relieve this interference with the freedom of worship and freedom of action by the Turkish government towards the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey, will indeed be supporting the cause of justice, as well as winning good will.

Respectfully submitted,


Archbishop of Washington

2/16/66

26 46

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., Feb. 16, 1966, 5:30 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

I attach a paper written on the airplane on our organization for nonmilitary action in Saigon and here. Because of your letter to Lodge, the problem in Saigon is now in pretty good shape, but we have a real problem of management here, and in the last paragraph of the memorandum there is a recommended procedure for moving forward with it. This procedure is deliberately designed to give you a Presidential result -- McNamara and I will both press in that direction. We have reluctantly reached the conclusion that this operation cannot be managed through State Department channels alone.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-230

By 43, NARA, Date 3-16-87

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 16, 1966, 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Non-Military Organization for Vietnam -- in Saigon and in Washington

1. The Ambassador

Lodge has weaknesses and blind spots, but their effects can be minimized by proper staff support. He has outstanding qualities which are not easily replaced. They make him a very valuable man in Saigon. He is 64 and he talks of resignation when he is tired or irritated. Since we have to accept the risk of bothering him on the big things, he should be humored on the little ones.

His qualities are these: First and foremost, he is a determined, perceptive, and disinterested servant of the President and the Secretary of State. He has no axes left to grind. This direct and disciplined loyalty is of great importance. It means that he always backs up a clearly explained decision and never tries to undercut. He can be less helpful when he does not know just what is wanted, but that is only to say that we need to be sure to keep him fully informed. On matters marked as truly sensitive, I believe him to be reasonably discreet.

Second, Lodge has a clear and strong -- if somewhat simplified -- view of the war. He knows and respects its military aspects, but he also knows that it is fundamentally a political and social struggle. He is receptive to good advice when it comes from men he trusts. He gives strong men wide discretion.

Third, Lodge is trusted and admired by the Vietnamese. He is popular because he stood up to the hated Diem (this may or may not have been wise as a matter of U. S. policy, but Diem had few Vietnamese friends in his last days -- he had become hated, and his family more so.) He is respected because of his personal dignity and courtesy (he has never affronted their pride as Max Taylor unintentionally did.) If he does not make full use of his influence, he does at least work hard for continuity, and he avoids the error of forcing splits by undue pressure. He is entitled to much of the credit for the relative stability and good sense of the Ky Government.

Fourth, Lodge has unusual human rapport with the U. S. military. In a country where fully 90% of all U. S. resources are under Westmoreland,

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TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

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- 2 -

this easy relationship is of great importance. It is not automatic. When Lodge was first appointed, in 1963, one important point in his favor was that he was presumed to be able to get along easily with his old friend General Paul Harkins. In fact, the two men did not get on at all, because they had radically different views of the real situation in Vietnam. (Lodge may not have been right, but Harkins was surely wrong, and his prolonged tenure was one of our major mistakes.) But now, with Westmoreland, all is changed. The two men see eye to eye on all fundamentals. They like each other as well. And now Lodge gets the full advantage of the fact that he did well in World War II, and knows the Army's ways. He gets much more cooperation from them than he would if he began with a chip on his shoulder, as too many civilians do.

Fifth, Lodge has the real -- if exasperated -- affection of nearly all of his staff. His weaknesses can make him a very difficult boss, but his dedication and decency come through.

Finally, Lodge understands the care and feeding of important visitors, especially Congressmen and U. S. newspapermen. He spends too much time on this -- as he does on diplomatic luncheons -- but he does it well, and he is right about its importance.

His weaknesses are equally real.

First, he has little taste for the hard work that lies between a general assertion of purpose and a concrete administrative achievement. The only things in Saigon that he really administers are the arrangements for comfort and security at his own house (they are excellent). He does not manage the U. S. program himself, and he does not insist that others do it. Because he does not watch details, he thinks many things are easier than they are, (although he is more realistic today than he was a few months back).

Second, his energy level is not high. He can spend two days on a single cable, with time out for social activity and a daily swim and a couple of diplomatic visits.

Third, he gravely underrates the importance of economics. The subject bores him, and he does not make it easy for his senior economic advisers to press their concerns. As a result, the voice of the U. S. is slow and weak at the highest levels on what is now a problem of the first urgency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Fourth, Lodge frets over trivia. Many great men have this weakness, but Lodge is not a great man, and he does not have the strength to spare. Seen against the stakes of Vietnam and the sacrifices of the fighting men (not the Saigon staffs), the matter of wives is a small one, at least for a man whose wife can take it, but it is never out of his mind and seldom out of his talk. He is loyal to the Rusk-Lodge understanding, but he frets about it. And the same characteristic shows in many other smaller matters.

This combination of qualities and defects makes Lodge the very model of a man who needs staff support. He needs a chief of staff; he needs a hand-holder on political affairs; he needs a second-level factotum; and he needs a bright young personal assistant -- and he needs the sympathetic understanding of all the top men on the American team. The wonder of the matter is that with the arrangements that the President has successfully pressed upon him, Lodge will now have exactly this kind of help (with a single exception noted below).

The first indispensable man in this enterprise is William Porter. Porter is shrewd, cool, strong, experienced and determined. He understands the war. He is admired throughout the mission. Lodge trusts him entirely. He knows and is known by Washington. He likes and understands management.

The second indispensable man is Westmoreland -- and if I put him second it is only because he has now set the shape of MACV so firmly that any successor will be guided by many of his standards. Westmoreland has made 200,000 Americans understand that they must make the Vietnamese be glad of their presence and not hate it. He has also made his large and strong-minded military command remarkably responsive to the needs of half a dozen other agencies, all of which would be gravely hampered if MACV should give them only grudging support. Finally, Westmoreland has never neglected the critically important task of persistent effort to strengthen the forces of the GVN (in this last respect his officers are not all as determined as he, and if he were replaced by a more single-minded U. S. fighting man, the future of the GVN forces could become bleak).

The appointment of Porter to be Chief of Staff for all aspects of pacification/rural construction is a major forward step. Several valuable secondary changes are already planned. The most important will put Philip Habib and Sam Wilson on Lodge's small floor of the revamped chancery, in place of Porter (who will have a staff of his own) and Chadbourn (transferred). The more gently these changes are handled, the less Lodge will fret -- and the less the Vietnamese

~~SECRET~~

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- 4 -

will gossip about "coups" among the Americans (the rapid turnover among senior Americans -- especially in AID -- has been a topic of Vietnamese talk). But the fact of change is more important than its manner, and the most important thing is speed. Lodge will fuss about all this until it is done. Then he will like it very much.

The one remaining weakness in the Saigon staff is in Economic advice and resource management. No easy remedy is at hand. The present head of USAID is Charles Mann, and he is the best officer to hold this assignment so far. Moreover, he has an excellent economic deputy, Roy Wehrle, who is fully competent to give good advice both to Mann and the Ambassador. But neither Mann nor Wehrle is really able to make Lodge listen. Economics irritate him, and so do Mann's teutonisms and Wehrle's dire warnings (though the latter are fully justified). It would be a mistake to change Mann now (he has many virtues and would be hard to replace), but Wehrle leaves in June and it is a matter of great urgency to find an economist to replace him who will have the tact and rank and persistence to make Lodge do what only he can do -- keep a steady and top priority pressure on the GVN. Meanwhile in this field (unlike others) there is a continuous need for prodding from Washington.

Organization in Washington.

The best way to attack this problem is to look at it first from Saigon.

The new arrangements in Saigon make a triangle. At the apex is Lodge. He is the President's representative and the senior American in Vietnam. In particular, he is charged with political advice both to Washington and to the GVN. He has direct access to the President, but he normally communicates through the Department of State. The staff agency which supports him is the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department. He is currently well served.

One line of the triangle goes from Lodge to Westmoreland. Westmoreland is the top military commander and he has a special responsibility to the President through the Secretary of Defense (the charts make it more complicated, but on major policy matters this is how it really is and how Westy thinks of it). He is responsible for U. S. military operations and for military advice to Washington. On day-to-day matters, he gets his support from CINCPAC and from the JCS. He too is well served.

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Porter will now be at the end of the other side of the triangle. He will get overall guidance from Lodge and from the President. He will have local authority over agency heads. But who will give him prompt executive support in Washington? That man does not now exist. It cannot be done by any one agency alone -- not AID and not the State Department; it cannot be done by a Committee of Assistant Secretaries; it cannot be done by the President himself; it certainly cannot be done by the Pentagon (though all of these means have been tried at one time or another).

My own belief is that we need a Director of Non-Military Operations in Vietnam (DINOMO?) appointed by the President and responsible to him through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense together -- with advice from the Director of CIA, the Director of USIA, the Administrator of AID. This officer should keep his military flank clear with DOD and his diplomatic and policy line clear with State -- but as far as possible he should stay out of both areas. His responsibility should be for non-military operations only. He should have the right of direct communication with Porter, and he should be charged with assuring that no needed action is delayed, for any reason, without a prompt report to the President. He should be an officer who prefers action to excuses and management to contemplation. He should count himself successful when both the President and Porter are happy. He will not be successful at once.

I recommend that the President request the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to prepare and submit a list of candidates for this appointment before the close of business on Friday, February 18.

McG. B.

Yes ✓

No

This is excellent

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