

Wednesday  
February 16, 1966  
5:15 P.M.

Mr. President:

This is State's list of U.S. non-  
military programs in Vietnam.  
It does not include classified  
activities in the political area.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

Log # 420, Read-Bundy memo dtd 2/16/66

3/25/84  
2/16/84  
2/16/84  
✓ 48  
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-14

Wednesday, February 16, 1966, 5:00 P.M.

By isa, NARS, Date 10-4-84

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

I would like to add my comments to Ambassador Sullivan's cable summary (attached) of my conversations with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in Vietiane, Laos.

I found Prime Minister deeply concerned about increased Communist infiltration into Laos. He was also gravely concerned about the developments in Thailand. The primary problem there derives from the influence of the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The head of the Communist Party in Thailand has large numbers of well trained and well organized cadres, most of whom are Chinese in origin although having Thai nationality.

Thailand is further weakened by a second "Fifth Column," in the presence of the North Vietnamese refugees. These are well organized, have regular contacts with North Vietnam and are in touch with the Pathet Lao in Laos, to whom they supply money and arms.

To counteract this increased Communist pressure, Prime Minister desired to increase Laos fire power and hopes for early delivery of United States commitment of M1 and M2 weapons.

The Prime Minister also indicated his desire for further assistance from the United States in the field of secondary education and agriculture. The Prime Minister is eager to increase agricultural development, specifically the production of rice. Past year six million hard currency spent for rice alone. Drain for young manpower for military needs has slowed rice production. Hence greater need for tractors.

The Prime Minister indicated that he was not surprised that the bombing pause produced no results because China is interested in war, not peace. He laid great emphasis on the expansionist aims of China because of population pressure more than ideology. He stated bluntly, "you should take advantage of this period when China does not have the bomb."

And finally, he stated that the U.S. bombing raids in North Vietnam are helpful to Laos because they immobilize the North Vietnamese troops and make access to Laos more difficult.

Once again, I am impressed by the realism of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his determination to defend his country. Although appreciating the limitations placed on his Government by the Geneva Accords and the necessity to preserve a facade of neutrality, he is not only willing but eager to develop closer cooperation with the United States, including in the field of internal security.

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Therefore, his urgent request for military assistance indicates an appreciation that Laos future even though a neutral country, is linked to that of other countries in Southeast Asia.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

482  
DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-14  
By js, NARS, Date 10-4-84

Wednesday  
February 16, 1966

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REPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS IN LAOS

During a four-hour visit to Vientiane, February 14, the Vice President had conversations with Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, President King's Council and other members of the government. Conversations took place in the motorcade, at the Prime Minister's lunch and in restricted after-lunch coffee session.

Agricultural Development - Both the Vice President and Prime Minister agreed that future prosperity of Laos lay in the development of its agricultural potential. The Prime Minister pointed out that before 1945 Laos had been a rich exporter of rice and that this could be achieved again if agriculture could be developed. It was agreed that this required water conservation measures, seed improvements, mechanization, and farm marketing improvements.

Tractors - Souvanna pointed out that current critical shortage in Laos agriculture was manpower. So many able-bodied men were in the armed forces or had become refugees that much rich rice land was lying fallow. If there could be mechanization to make up for this lack of manpower, these rice lands could become productive again. Souvanna's suggestion for mechanization was the provision of light tractors. These light tractors could not only plow more land, but could begin spring plowing sooner, before the soil was soft enough to till by hand. He would like to have only a couple of tractors per province, to test. He would propose starting in provinces of Sanannakhet and Vientiane. The Vice President expressed great sympathy for the problem Prime Minister described and said he would attempt to obtain some satisfaction for the Prime Minister's request upon his return to Washington. He was informed that the matter had already been raised with David Bell and that AID was now engaged in testing different types of tractors to see which was most suitable for the peculiar problems of Lao agriculture.

Education - The Vice Prime Minister (and Minister of National Education) raised a problem which Laos encounters in attempting to educate its youth in both the native language of Laos and in international language which will permit more gifted students to continue higher education elsewhere. He said that French had traditionally been the second language but that France provided such limited educational assistance at the current moment that the overwhelming proportion of Lao students are unable to

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- 2 -

obtain secondary education in that language. He described the competitive drains upon the resources of his Ministry which is seeking to build up national language and at the same time prepare young people for higher education. He pressed his case for a secondary school in English language and his hope that the United States could assist. Again Vice President expressed great sympathy and said he believed that, under new concepts of U.S. International Education Program, we ought to be able to help out.

Thailand - In response to the Vice President's request for assessment of security problems in neighboring countries, the Prime Minister expressed his concern about developments in Thailand. He felt the primary problem derived from the Chinese. They were using former Prime Minister Pridi Phanouyong as their tool and were carefully building up a cadre of youth trained for subversion in China. Although these were few in number, they had tremendous potential for mischief because their efforts would appeal to the several million Chinese who have taken Thai citizenship, but whose "hearts are still in China." He felt that the Thai had a far greater problem than they themselves realized.

The second "fifth column" in Thailand was the North Vietnamese. Those Viet Minh who had fled Laos in 1946 with the return of the French and had settled in Northeast Thailand were partisans of Ho Chi Minh to begin with and had been subsequently organized by his agents in Thailand. These people were not only a menace to Thailand but also to Laos, because they were in touch with the Pathet Lao to whom they supplied money and other forms of assistance. Souvanna felt that the Thai Government had not yet coped with these people because it suffered from certain infirmities. He had no doubt of the competence and motivation of the senior levels in the Thai Government, but he knew there was a great deal of corruption at the lower levels. He and his colleagues know this because they had constantly been able to evade Thai laws by resort to bribery when they were smuggling arms into Laos to fight the French. In sum, he worried about the strength of his Thai neighbors.

North Vietnam - The Prime Minister answered the Vice President's inquiries about North Vietnam by admitting that he had very little information about that country. The Lao Embassy in Hanoi was a completely subverted creature of the Pathet Lao. He knew Hanoi and the Tonkinese from his student days, but they had been radically changed since then. He felt the change had been largely wrought by necessity -- the necessity to have more land and more food for the overcrowded population. He described certain conversations he had recently had with the North Vietnamese Charge, in which he found nothing but a dogged determination to continue fighting.

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Communist China - The Prime Minister went on in a similar vein about Communist China. He said that Mao Tse Tung probably seriously wanted (or was not afraid of) war, because he faced the great problem of getting rid of a good portion of his country's population. This led him to be willing to take great risks because he had nothing to lose which he was not already prepared to cede anyway.

Bombing Pause and Peace Offensive - The Vice President asked Souvanna for his evaluation of the bombing pause and the concurrent peace offensive. Souvanna said he felt it had been worthwhile because it had made clear to any objective observer that Hanoi was the basic obstacle to peace. He thought the U. S. had gained increased understanding throughout the world. The pause itself had, of course, permitted North Vietnam to build up its aggressive potential, and this was somewhat disturbing to Laos. He mentioned specifically Dien Bien Phu and the increased infiltrations in the Laos Panhandle.

Bombing of North Vietnam - Governor Harriman asked for Souvanna's evaluation of the bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Souvanna endorsed it unequivocally and said that it was doubtless effective in trimming down troops, damaging access routes and disrupting the economy.

Defense of Laos - The Vice President expressed his admiration for the manner in which the Lao armed forces were defending their soil. He said this was important not only to Laos, but also to the rest of Southeast Asia. This triggered Souvanna to say that his armed forces still lacked adequate arms and he hoped the Vice President could help them out. Ambassador Sullivan said that the Embassy had proposed and CINCPAC had endorsed an augmentation in the level of Military Assistance Program support from 50,000 to 75,000. The Vice President said he would try to accelerate Washington action on this upon his return.

Security of Southeast Asia - In luncheon conversation and particularly in the exchange of toasts at the end of the luncheon, Souvanna expressed himself in very vigorous terms concerning the Chinese threat to Southeast Asia. He felt that China wanted the wealth of the Mekong and the Menam Chao Phye valleys. Therefore, the Chinese had to be "confronted" to stop this ambition. It should be done now, before they acquire atomic weapons, and only the United States could do it. If the United States fulfilled its "duty" by blocking Chinese expansion, the states of Southeast Asia could survive in peace.

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February 16, 1966  
Wednesday, 1:30 P.M.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

Here is the latest from Ellsworth Bunker as reported to me by Bill Bowdler.

We have organized a meeting at 2:30 on this with Ball, Mann, Vaughn, Vance, Bowdler and myself.

My guess is that the unanimous advice will be to back up Bunker in keeping Garcia Godoy on the job. As possible ammunition for this purpose, we will have a draft message from you to Garcia Godoy for Bunker's discretionary use.

As you will see from Bowdler's memo, Bunker has at least gained us some time.

McG. B.



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Wednesday, February 16, 1966 - 12:30 a.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Report from Ambassador Bunker

Bunker reported at noon that in a two and a half hour meeting with Garcia Godoy this morning he made some progress in persuading him from doing anything precipitous. I asked him whether this meant that he had a firm commitment that Garcia Godoy would not announce his resignation in the television talk which he will make tonight. Bunker replied that he had no firm commitment but he thinks that he can get it during the course of the day.

Bunker said that he reviewed with the President at great length the seriousness of any hasty action in announcing his resignation. The three principal points that he made are:

1. If there is to be a change in government, it must be done very carefully, with all steps carefully worked out in advance.
2. What Garcia Godoy should do is first talk to the country to tell them that the strike is illegal and must end before the Provisional Government can find a solution. The Provisional Government cannot act under pressure. He should point out that the military problem is susceptible of solution under appropriate conditions.
3. The OAS has a great responsibility in the Dominican Republic, as does the United States Government. The OAS and we need his consideration in trying to work out a solution.

Bunker said that the new Minister of Defense and Navy Chief, who were present, were very helpful in pointing out to Garcia Godoy that they thought that the problem of the two Chiefs can be worked out once the strike pressure is relieved.

During the course of the conversation, Garcia Godoy asked Bunker whether he had considered the possibility of the Vice President, Castillo, taking over the Government and suggested that he talk to Castillo. Bunker said that he would be glad to do this and is meeting now with the Vice President and Garcia Godoy. Bunker commented that this may be the best way out of the present impasse if Garcia Godoy insists on resigning.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-239  
By ju, NARA, Date 11-18-93



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I asked him whether he thought a letter from the President to Garcia Godoy would be helpful in turning Garcia Godoy around. He said he wanted to think this over very carefully because he was not sure that he wanted to commit the prestige of the President in the present situation if Garcia Godoy is going to resign anyway.

William G. Bowdler

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: VC casualties and defections in 1966

NMCC now reports a total of 5748 VC killed through February 15, 1966. In addition, Westmoreland yesterday told me that both prisoners and suspects taken are running at much higher rates than ever before (but I do not have exact figures).

The Chieu Hoi (VC defector) program shows equal improvement. Through February 10 almost complete figures show 2461 returnees in 1966. This is more than twice the rate of the last four months of 1965. Moreover, February has been better than January, and the prediction of MACV and of Zorthian's office is that the rate will continue to go up. (Zorthian's people and Westmoreland's are doing a very good job of taping appeals by defectors to be used in airborne broadcasts to their colleagues.

Almost more important than these statistics is the clear evidence of gradually improving performance by Vietnamese troops. Both Vietnamese and American leaders told me in Vietnam that the extraordinary example set by American fighting forces, both in battle and in their decent treatment of civilians, is having a bracing effect on both the fighting and behavior of Vietnamese troops.

In sum, all the real military indicators are favorable. There are very tough problems ahead, especially in the villages and with guerrillas and terrorists. But the deployments of 1965 have been a magnificent success.

McG. B.

Mr Bundy 51

4/13  
10-4-84

February 16, 1966  
Wednesday 12:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Medics for Vietnam. I've checked with Vance and Gaud. We have no shortages on the US military side, though we expect to run into a bind toward the end of this year on nurses and enlisted technicians. Incidentally we can draft doctors up to 35.

The civilian side is much worse, of course. The problem here seems to be more lack of people willing to go than lack of available manpower. DOD has lent teams totalling 156 men to date, but fears political repercussions here if we draft doctors to treat VN civilians in hazardous areas.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 84-14  
By is, NARS, Date 10-4-84

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KOMER

1. Support of Military Medical Requirements.

Today there is no shortage of doctors, medical personnel, or beds to support operations in South Vietnam at presently approved levels.

We are now examining CINCPAC's new requirements and will have an assessment by Thursday of this week. Although the new requirements will present problems, we estimate that we will have sufficient doctors - with the exception of certain specialties - to meet the expanded requirements.

Deficits are projected among nurses and enlisted technicians. We have initiated a number of steps to cope with these deficits, including the recently approved draft of male nurses authorized by Executive Order. We are also studying the possibility of expanding our training of medical technicians.

2. Medical Support to Vietnamese Civilians.

Here there are serious shortages. We are informed that there are only about 800 indigenous doctors in South Vietnam, of whom about 500 are in the South Vietnamese Army.

The Department of Defense, Public Health Service, and AID have contributed teams to work in South Vietnam. These teams consist of doctors, nurses and technicians. Currently the Department of Defense has 156 personnel assigned to these duties, and this number will increase to 366 by July of 1966. That number will provide 24 teams.

Public Health and AID have 255 medical personnel in the country. In addition, all U. S. military physicians take every opportunity to teach Vietnamese medical people and render medical care and assistance to civilians as a part of our civic action programs.

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Authority NLS 84-27

By ris, NARS, Date 1-5-84

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It should be noted that there may be a potential political problem in drafting doctors to treat Vietnamese civilians under hazardous conditions.

3. We can draft doctors up to age 35.

Cyril Vance

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✓ 52

Bundy  
Paper  
Orig to the  
President  
Cy to Moyers

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED February 16, 1966  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House 12 33

The attached is submitted  
in accordance with the request  
of the President.

*GHR*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENT



GENERAL KY'S COMMENTS ON HITLER

General Ky remarked that he admired Hitler during an interview with a reporter from the Sunday Mirror of London in the Fall of 1964 when he was Air Force Commander, but more than six months before he became Prime Minister. The interview was published on July 4, 1965, some two weeks after Ky became Prime Minister. It bears the headline: "Our ally: a Premier whose hero is Hitler" and attributes the following quotes to Ky:

"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one -- Hitler."

"I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early Thirties."

"But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam."

The rest of the article, while glibly emphasizing Ky's flamboyance, and disparaging the transitory nature of Vietnamese governments, makes an effort to be objective about him.

Following publication of the interview, Ky authorized the issuance of a statement saying that "when I referred to Hitler incidentally during one of my conversations, ...I had in mind the idea that Viet Nam needed above all leadership and a sense of discipline to face the criminal aggressions of the Communists." Ky added that he had no intention of praising Hitler's views or his "inhuman methods," which the Communists were imitating on Vietnamese soil.

At the time of the interview the political situation in South Viet Nam was particularly unstable. General Khanh was near the end of his Prime Ministership, there was doubt as to the future form of government and there had been serious rioting in Saigon. Ky apparently made the remark in the context that this instability had to be ended, and strong leadership arise, if the Communists were to be defeated.

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The Sunday Mirror is a mass-circulation (5 million) tabloid, the second largest paper in the U.K. Its politics are generally associated with the Labor Party, though it does not stand on the extreme left wing. Its editorials have been critical of US policy in Viet Nam.


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SUNDAY  
MIRROR  
SPECIAL  
INTERVIEW

"PEOPLE ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Hitler." These are the words of Air Vice-Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, latest Prime Minister of South Vietnam, whose remote, unstable country has the whole world holding its breath. The comment of this flamboyant little dictator, who grasped office by a military coup while 70,000 American soldiers strove to keep the Communists at bay, highlights the whole tragedy of the thankless Vietnam war. Ky outlined his philosophy on Adolf Hitler in this remarkable interview some time before the take-over.

by Brian  
Moynahan

**KY** said: "I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early Thirties. But the situation here is so



Our ally:  
a Premier  
whose  
hero is  
Hitler

"I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together," says South Vietnam's latest leader.

'You mean

**K**Y said: "I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early Thirties.

"But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam."

We met in his huge office at Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon, when Ky commanded the Vietnamese air force.

Now, as the country's tenth Premier in twenty months, he and his fragile government face a situation more desperate than ever.

Outspoken and colourful, Ky looks every inch a pilot. He is small and lightly built. He wears an impressive moustache—surprisingly thick for an Oriental.

## Colour

**O**N flying missions, he sports twin, pearl-handled revolvers and purple chokers.

Even his private plane—a twin-engined Aero Commander, which he pilots on tours of the countryside—is purple. "It's my favourite colour, because it is my girl-friend's favourite colour," he explained.

His girl-friend, a slender and beautiful half-Chinese Vietnamese, who was an Air Vietnam hostess, is now his wife.

The big office reflected his character. It was splashed with bright blue flags and curtains. Orange and silver flying helmets hung from the walls.

Beatles' music—"Yes, I like them," he said with a smile—poured from a hi-fi set in the corner.

The man the Western



Madame Ky . . . her favourite colour, purple.

nations now find themselves supporting in the name of Freedom had a loaded 0.45 revolver as a paperweight on his desk.

The desk was stacked with thrillers and French paperbacks.

An automatic rifle, with the catch at "fire," was handy on the wall . . . "Just in case the Viet Cong try to catch me here instead of in the air."

The Viet Cong have, indeed, had plenty of chances. Before he became Premier last month, Ky flew his American Skyraider fighter-bomber on at least one mission a week. His plane was hit several times and he was nicked by fragments when leading a recent raid on North Vietnam. But he is a superb pilot, trained

in France, Algeria and America.

"One of the best," an American told me, "very brave, but not death-or-glory reckless."

On off-duty week-ends, Ky would go up to Dalat, a mist-shrouded officers' retreat in the mountains north-east of Saigon, where the luxurious villas change with every political shift in the capital. He likes to hunt from the backs of elephants.

The tough, political line he is taking now—he has clamped a curfew on Saigon's wild nightlife, publicly executed a terrorist and threatened the same punishment to profiteers—is not surprising.

## Tough

**W**HEN another terrorist was executed in Saigon last October, Ky told me: "I want an air force firing squad to do it and I want to be the officer in charge."

"We have to be tough. As tough as the Viet Cong."

"We are losing the countryside because the government here is weak and not trusted. The towns are getting rotten and corrupt."

"We must have, soon, a strong leader whom the people out in the villages can admire and trust and who can control the towns."

He was then leader of the officers who saved

General Khahn's government from an attempted coup last September—and who exacted growing concessions and influence in return.

## Purge

**K**Y was widely thought to have been responsible for Khahn's boast that the Vietnamese air force had "the capability of dropping bombs on military targets in North Vietnam and South China"—a move that could have escalated the war disastrously for the rest of the world.

His policy then was "to put all the country's effort into the war by purging the Army of incompetent officers, stopping wild rumours and defeatism and taking a firm hand with demonstrations."

Next, he would start to win the country back from the guerillas, village by village.


Whether Ky can live up to his hopes and prove strong and mature enough for his crushing responsibilities remains to be seen.

South Vietnam's "strong man" premiers—Diem, Big Minh, Khahn—have come and gone in quickening succession.

Even Ky himself smiled when I asked him if he was interested in the Premiership: "Here, that can only be a short-term ambition."

'You mean you just push a button and change the bands?'

'Naturally, it's a G.E.C.'



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Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 15, 1966 - Tuesday, 5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peruvian President's Reply to Your Letter

I received the Peruvian Ambassador this afternoon who wanted to deliver President Belaunde's reply to the letter which you sent to him via Walt Rostow.

The reply is in Spanish and I have sent it to State for translation. The principal points are:

1. He is profoundly grateful for your letter.
2. The conversations with Walt Rostow permitted a fruitful exchange of constructive ideas. Before replying to you, he wanted to talk first with Ambassador Jones.
3. The opening of the eastern slopes of the Andes offers a new frontier for colonization which will help win the battle over hunger and poverty. U. S. help in the initial phase of feasibility studies, as well as the new phase of actual work, will be of inestimable importance.
4. The cordial relations between our two countries is reflected in the growing participation of U. S. private capital in Peru. The contribution of these companies is much appreciated.
5. The only point that causes "certain preoccupation" is the "notorious difference" between the loan assistance given by "Official Institutions" to Peru in comparison to other countries. From his conversations with Rostow he gathers that there is the intention to "balance the flow of assistance" under the Alliance.
6. There is no reason for concern over the activities of U. S. businesses in Peru, which throughout the history of the country have never been the victims of arbitrariness or unjust treatment. Where problems have arisen, they have been discussed with a high sense of responsibility and without precipitous action. He is confident that the few cases pending solution will be resolved by harmonious agreement.
7. He greatly appreciates your personal support for his "Cooperacion Popular" program designed to bring the Indian communities into the mainstream of Peruvian life.

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8. He has sent through Ambassador Jones his pledge of support for the Pope's peace efforts in Vietnam.

The letter in tone and content is friendly and forthcoming. Point 2 is his way of referring to his understanding with Walt Rostow on the IPC case (Tab A). His reference to wanting to talk to Ambassador Jones before replying to you refers to his desire to review the memorandum of understanding which Walt prepared. Points 4, 6 and 7 are designed to provide additional reassurance.

Robert Komer

Attachment

Tab A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum of Understanding Prepared by Walt Rostow and Shown  
to President Belaunde by Ambassador Jones

The following memorandum will be the basis of my report to President Johnson:

- (1) President Belaunde wishes President Johnson to understand that he will try to settle within the next year the IPC case.
- (2) Under no rpt no circumstances does President Belaunde intend to confiscate IPC. (Ambassador Jones will say that he presumes that this is in response to the formula which we reiterated three times yesterday that the status of IPC "would in no rpt no way be further impaired.").
- (3) It is President Belaunde's judgment that his political possibilities for settling the IPC case would be improved by a resumption of normal aid relations with the U. S. along the lines of the sequence presented to him on Friday afternoon.
- (4) With respect to Viet-Nam President Belaunde wishes President Johnson to know that he will continue to support the peace initiatives of the Vatican.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines and NL 98-168  
By ju/is, NARA, Date 7-28-99

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON  
Monday, February 14, 1966 -- 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

As of 6:00 p.m. today, Ellsworth Bunker described the situation in Santo Domingo as follows:

1. The general strike continued throughout the day. In Santo Domingo, most of the government offices, private businesses and schools remained closed. In the interior, support for the strike was very spotty. He described the situation in the capital as calm but tense, noting that terrorist activities against the Dominican police and military and the IAPF take place at night. He said that there was nothing to indicate so far that there is a deterioration of public order. The IAPF is on the alert and assisting the police in patrolling the down-town area.

2. Last night he met with Garcia Godoy, Vice President Castillo, Minister without Portfolio Mendez, and Police Chief Marillo. The four Dominicans agreed that since the strike is political, the Provisional Government should stand firm against it and take whatever action is necessary. Bunker subscribes to this course and is urging Garcia Godoy to take his case before the people. Garcia Godoy said he might go on TV tonight or tomorrow.

3. Garcia Godoy spent all day talking with labor and business leaders in an effort to persuade them to stop the strike. Bunker said he was not sure what the results of these conversations will be. He has an appointment with the President later tonight.

4. Garcia Godoy has not come out publicly against the strike, nor has he gone before the people, as he indicated he would do last Saturday, with an explanation of his decision to permit the Army and Air Force Chiefs to remain if Defense Minister Rivera Caminero departed. (It is not clear whether his reluctance to meet the strike issue head-on is due to timidity or is a calculated move to use the strike as a means of pressuring the Air Force and Army Chiefs to leave. Bunker is inclined to attribute it to timidity and not to collusion with Bosch to force the Chiefs out. I am not so sure.)

5. Bunker concludes that while the situation bears close watching, things are under control.

WGB  
William G. Bowdler

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-239

By W, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1966  
Monday 3:30 p. m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Message to Hussein of Jordan. McNamara seems to have made a score with Eban, but the latter will have to consult Eshkol. Then we may run into a certain amount of Israeli stalling while they try to haggle a bit.

So we want to buy a little time by calming down Hussein with an interim oral message from you. His letter to you sounded quite nervous, and we don't want him to go off the deep end and buy MIGs while we're on the verge of meeting his need.

Attached message is designed to hold him for a week or two, but without committing you one way or the other. I recall that you were willing to send Hussein a similar handholding message last February.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Approve ✓

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-168  
By jis, NARA Date 4.28.99

See Me \_\_\_\_\_

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ACTION Amembasy Amman

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-108  
By WJ, NARA, Date 11-3-92

Relayed to  
State  
6:10 PM  
2/14/66

Please deliver following oral message from President to King Hussein:

"I appreciate your candid letter about the urgency and importance you attach to Jordan's need for supersonic aircraft. In the same spirit, I assure you that it remains our policy to support the integrity and progress of Jordan to the fullest extent. Within our capabilities and our many world-wide commitments we intend to continue <sup>viewing</sup> ~~to consider~~ Jordan's needs with understanding and sympathy.

"We have never hidden from you that Jordan's request for supersonic aircraft raises grave and complex problems for us beyond those we recognize it raises for you. From the beginning we have given this matter the most searching study. Aware of the increasing pressure being felt by Your Majesty, I have asked for an urgent and searching re-examination of how the problem can be met in a way that will be best for both of us. We will be in touch with you further, hopefully in no more than a few weeks. In the meantime, I earnestly hope you will be able to hold off any decisions on your aircraft needs that would put strains on our ability to maintain the closest ties with you and your country.

With highest regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

~~SECRET~~

204 2/15/66 56

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1966

Monday 11:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moroccan Special Emissary. King Hussein is sending a series of special emissaries to explain his side of the famous Ben Barka case causing such a stir in Paris. The one coming here is Driss M'Hammedi, the King's personal Man Friday and very close to him.

Rusk felt on balance that you should receive him, since Morocco is a special friend of ours, despite the possible annoyance to de Gaulle. To minimize the risk we've made the appointment off the record (although it can be mentioned later), and suggest that you do no more than listen politely. That is all the King really wants.

Attached is a memo from Rusk with some useful talking points.

*R. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

N. B. We have had a UPI inquiry about this appointment, so I have suggested Moyers say that Driss is coming in at request of King of Morocco to acquaint you with some of Morocco's current problems. Any more would gratuitously irk the French.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-168  
By us, NARA Date 4-28-99



*Handwritten:* Bundy  
17 57.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1966

Monday 11:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As part of the Israel/Jordan aircraft package, Rusk proposes another quiet probe to see whether the Soviets are interested in a freeze on arms shipments to the Near East. None of us believe that this will get anywhere (the Soviets keep saying they'd be delighted if only we'd include Turkey and Iran -- which they know is impossible for us).

But we all equally believe that another such probe is quite useful for the record -- to demonstrate that we are not just fuelling arms races but actively seeking means to end them. We would do so in low key, probably Thompson to Dobrynin. Such a probe helps put the burden on Moscow's back.

This matter got lost in last Thursday's discussion. So may I tell State and ACDA that you approve the proposal?

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-168  
By is, NARA Date 4-28-99

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Reita 2/15/66*  
*58*

Monday, Feb. 14, 1966 at

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Luns at 11:30 A.M.,  
Monday, February 14.

Luns will be accompanied by Dutch Ambassador Schurmann and Johan de Ranitz, a senior official in their Foreign Ministry. Leddy and I will be there on our side.

A major figure in European politics, Luns is an outspoken supporter of your policy on Vietnam, and a staunch advocate of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. He has played a leading role in standing up to the French in the Common Market.

A briefing memo from Dean Rusk is at Tab A.

Possible Topics of conversation

1. Vietnam

- He will be especially interested in your views, post Honolulu.
- You will want to thank him for sturdy Dutch diplomatic support, including the UN Security Council.
- You might stress the need for doctors in Vietnam. (The Dutch are thinking about sending some civilian medical people. So far they have provided medicines and a dredge.)

2. Asian Development Bank      You might thank Luns for the Dutch pledge of \$11 million

3. The Common Market Settlement      As you know, the French and the Five patched up their disagreement in Luxembourg last month. You might congratulate Luns for the way he played his hand, ask him for his prognosis, and tell him that we are particularly anxious to move ahead with the Kennedy Round.

4. Nuclear Sharing      He may ask that the Dutch be included in the discussions on nuclear sharing. You might tell him that they will be included when the discussions become more specific and substantive.

5. The Wedding of Dutch Princess Beatrix on March 2.      You might express your good wishes. Bill Tyler will be your personal representative.

*FM*  
Francis M. Bator

~~SECRET~~

59

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sunday, February 13, 1966  
12:55 P. M.

1

Mr. President:

The following cable has been received from General Westmoreland in Saigon:

Exclusive for the President from Gen Westmoreland.

I deeply appreciate your message of 11 February. Indeed you have good reason to view with satisfaction the outcome of the Honolulu Conference. I was gratified to have the opportunity to talk with you and to receive personally your guidance. I am in full accord with your policy and you can count on my continued support. Be assured we shall continue to press forward on the military front. Further, I shall support in full measure within the capabilities of my command the important and essential non-military programs of the mission.

You have endeared yourself to my family by bringing our Stevie to Honolulu on the occasion of Mrs. Westmoreland's birthday.

  
Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-28  
By ms, NARS, Date 11-7-83

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

60

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~Secret~~

Sunday, February 13, 1966  
11:45 A. M.

Mr. President:

The size of last night's Soviet underground nuclear test is now estimated at [REDACTED] The shot apparently did not vent but it will be several days before we know for certain.

1.3  
(a)(4)

The Soviet test is the largest foreign underground test detected by us but it is not as large as some press reports allege.

AEC will announce shortly in low-key that our system has detected a Soviet test of "intermediate" size. No specifics will be given but reporters are aware that the Commission uses "intermediate range" to cover tests from 20 KT to 1 Megaton.

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-193

By ing, NARA, Date 8-15-89

61

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1966  
Saturday 3:00 p.m.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have sent the following message  
from you to the Vice President as a  
result of your instructions.

  
R. W. Komer

Message  
Attached

~~Hold for Bundy~~  
6/1a

February 12, 1966

(2)

FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
FROM THE PRESIDENT

Your latest statements about our two-fisted war to defeat not only aggression but misery and unrest are coming through loud and clear. We especially like your citations from hospital officials comparing Vietnam medical care and casualty rates with World Wars I and II and Korea. Let me compliment you on such a good statement, and on your quick response to our concerns here.

List of Invitees for Vietnam Meeting with the President in the Cabinet  
Room at 12:30 PM, Friday, February 11, 1966:

Secretary Rusk  
Under Secretary Ball  
Secretary McNamara  
Deputy Secretary Vance  
General Wheeler - General Goodpaster  
Admiral Rayborn  
Deputy Director Helms  
AID Director Bell  
USIA Director Marks  
General Taylor  
Mr. Moyers  
Mr. Komer  
Mr. B. Smith

The following will not be able to attend:

The Vice President - (Speaking at National Press Club Luncheon)  
Ambassador Goldberg - (Out of the country)  
Mr. Rostow - (Out of the country)



19 63  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, Feb. 12, 1966  
2:00 P.M.

Mr. President:

(2)  
12/12  
For information. Congressional  
consideration of the SEATO Treaty  
is summarized in the attached memo  
from State.

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith

Attachment

375  
63a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM

This is in response to the request Deputy Under Secretary Johnson received from the White House this morning that a memorandum be prepared giving pertinent extracts of statements or comments by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who were serving on the Foreign Relations Committee when the SEATO Treaty was examined and who are today still members. The White House request indicated that the excerpts should come from:

- A. The Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 25, 1955
  - B. Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Nov. 11, 1954
  - C. The record of the Senate debate, February 1, 1955
- I. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 25, 1955

While we do not have the record of those signing the Committee Report, there is no evidence in the subsequent record of opposition except for Senator Langer. Present Members of the Committee who were serving at that time are Senator Fulbright, Senator Sparkman, Senator Mansfield, Senator Aiken, and Senator Morse. Senator Alexander Smith and Senator Mansfield were Members of the delegation to negotiate the Treaty. The Report, of course, contains a discussion of the provisions of the Treaty with special paragraphs on the scope of the U.S. commitment, the application of the Treaty to subversive acts, and the difference between the NATO and SEATO Treaties, with the notation that the SEATO Treaty applies the Monroe Doctrine formula on the ground that this avoids a constitutional controversy on Presidential versus Congressional powers. It is made clear that Laos, Cambodia and the free territory of Vietnam are by protocol included in the Treaty area. The conclusions of the Committee are stated as follows:

"CONCLUSIONS: It is the committee's view that the Manila pact constitutes a considerable accomplishment in bringing together a group of eight countries of divergent religious, racial and political backgrounds, in a common resolve to defend their freedom against the menace of international communism. By strengthening that resolve the United States will make a substantial contribution to the preservation of free governments and to the defense of its own security.

The principle underlying this treaty is that advance notice of our intentions and the intentions of the nations associated with us may serve to deter potential aggressors from reckless action that could plunge the Pacific into war. To that end, the treaty makes it clear that the United States will not remain indifferent to conduct threatening the peace of Southeast Asia.

Until now, our protective system in the Pacific area has been predicated upon a group of treaties of a bilateral and trilateral character. The Southeast Asia treaty is a long step toward a more comprehensive, collective security arrangement which has been regarded as desirable by the Administration and the committee.

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

For these reasons, the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty. "

II. Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Nov. 11, 1954

The following are the totality of the questioning and remarks of present Committee Members as contained in the hearing:

Relationship of the Treaty to the U. N. Charter

"Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, most of the questions that I would be interested in have already been asked, and I shall not plow the same ground twice. But I do want to ask you about article I:

The parties undertake-

I am reading from article I-

as set forth in the charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner-

and so on.

I am concerned as to whether or not that provision in this treaty enlarges either our responsibility under the United Nations Charter or alters in any way the relationship of the authority of our Government under the United Nations Charter. Does this have any effect on either enlarging or diminishing our relationships with the United Nations or our responsibilities under the United Nations Charter?

Secretary Dulles. No, sir. This article I is an article which is a substantially verbatim repetition of article II, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, which will be found in, I think, all of the other collective security arrangements which we have made since the adoption of the charter.

The charter language to which I refer reads as follows-

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand what the charter reference is.

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am only attempting to find out whether or not the reiteration of this statement in the treaty adds to or detracts from our responsibility or obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Secretary Dulles. I can say categorically, sir, that in my opinion this neither adds one jot or tittle nor subtracts one jot or tittle, from our objective as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.

Senator Hickenlooper. In other words, this reference to the United Nations in article I, in your view, is for reference purposes only, and has no influence in adding to or detracting from whatever obligations or lack of obligations we already have under the United Nations Charter. It has no effect on increasing or diminishing the authority, either ours or the United Nations, under the United Nations Charter?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir. In fact, in my opinion, this article has no substantive value, in fact, but has customarily been put in such treaties. In pursuance of that custom it was inserted here, but it, in my opinion, does not add anything to the obligations already assumed by the United States.

Senator Hickenlooper. Nor does the repetition in this treaty of a reference to the United Nations Charter increase or diminish, or alter in any way whatever, existing powers which the President of the United States, as Chief Executive or Commander in Chief, might already have? Do you think it alters those?

Secretary Dulles. It does not alter, increase or diminish those powers.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

Communist Aggression

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Chairman, I, like Senator Green, have not had a chance to study this, and I have only 1 or 2 questions. I was not clear about the status of this understanding of the United States regarding the aggression coming only from Communists. Is that in the treaty itself or is that an understanding just outside of the treaty among the various signatories?

Secretary Dulles. It is part of the treaty itself and is subscribed to by all the other parties to the treaty; they accept our understanding in that respect.

Senator Fulbright. That is contained in the last paragraph; is it not?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir; it appears just above the signatures.

Technical Cooperation

Senator Fulbright. All right, I had overlooked that.

I have one other point. Could you give your view as to the significance of article III, somewhat along the line of your last answer to the Senator from Iowa's remark? In what way, if any, does article III change our present policy regarding point 4 or technical assistance? Was it intended to increase our obligations, or just what did you mean by article III?

Secretary Dulles. It was designed to reaffirm our conviction that certain economic efforts, such as technical assistance programs, cultural exchanges, and the like, all play an important part in combatting communism, and that we intend to use all of the weapons in our arsenal to meet the threat of communism in this area.



Senator Fulbright. Then is it fair to say that this is a specific recognition of the importance of technical cooperation in helping to overcome the difficulties that exist in this part of the world?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Fulbright. I must say I think that is a very important article. I hope it may lead to further developments. As I said, I have no particular criticism to offer on the whole. It seems to me a proper approach, but I will reserve my observations for a later meeting when I have had a little more time to digest the treaty. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?

#### Membership of the Treaty

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, I have very few questions to ask. I think the subject has been pretty well covered. But I want to pursue a little further something that Senator Green touched upon, and that is the possibility of the inclusion of other nations in that area of the world.

It seems to me that if there is one weakness in this proposed treaty, it is the fact that there are only three really Asiatic nations parties to it. Those countries are Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Now, I assume that the other nations were invited to come into the conference?

Secretary Dulles. It was made clear to them that they would have been very welcome at the conference; yes sir.

Senator Sparkman. Was an invitation sent out or was it just more or less a gathering of those who were interested-- each one acting in its own interest and on its own accord?

Secretary Dulles. There was, as I recall, no formal invitation sent once it was ascertained that they would prefer not to receive such an invitation but, subject only to that, their welcome was made very clear to them.

Senator Sparkman. You made clear in your statement that you hope other nations may see fit to come in at a later time. I wonder if you might tell us if you have any real hope that Burma, for instance, might at some later date come in, or Indonesia? It seems to me that certainly those two nations are right in the midst of the treaty area, and would greatly strengthen the agreement.

Secretary Dulles. I think it would probably be indiscreet of me, Senator, to guess about their future.

Senator Sparkman. But the door is left-

Secretary Dulles. The door is wide open-

Senator Sparkman. Wide open, and they well understand that?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Commendation of the United States  
Delegation

Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I doubt if any questions which I might ask at this time would contribute to the information which we already have on hand.

I would like at this time, however, to compliment the Secretary of State, Secretary Dulles, on having conscientiously and apparently effectively performed what appeared to be an almost impossible task not only with regard to this treaty, but to the whole handling of our foreign relations. As far as this treaty goes, I would like to include Senator Smith and Senator Mansfield in my remarks, because I think so long as we operate as they have been doing, not only the people of this country but the people of other countries as well will have a great deal of respect for their efforts.

Senator Mansfield. I want to join with Senator Smith and Senator Aiken in congratulating the Secretary of State for the outstanding job that he did at Manila, carrying out the policies of our country on a bipartisan, statesmanlike basis.

I think that he and Senator Smith are to be highly commended for the magnificent work they did there. I am delighted to see Admiral Davis, Ambassador Sebald, and Douglas MacArthur, who also were there and did great work.

I believe special credit should go to Messrs. Spruance and Lacy, our representatives to the Government of the Philippines, and I think it ought to be brought out that while this is, perhaps, not the ideal solution, it is the best possible solution which could be arrived at during the time of consideration.

It is the first time, to my knowledge that countries in that part of the world, of different religious backgrounds--Buddhist, Moslem and Christian--got together, ironed out their differences, and arrived at a solution satisfactory to all.

I was especially impressed with the statesmanship shown by President Magsaysay and the Philippine delegation under Vice President Carlos Garcia, and our old colleague, Senator Francisco Delgado, who, I am happy to see, is with us this morning.

It seems to me that Senator Delgado is carrying his interest in this matter to the logical extreme, and it is a pleasure for me to state for the record that it was an honor and a privilege to be at this Conference and to work with Secretary Dulles and Senator Smith and the rest of the American delegation, and to come up with what I think is a sound solution to the difficulties confronting all of us in that area."

### III. The Floor Debate, February 1, 1955

Following the introductory speech by Senator Smith, Senator Mansfield, as the other member of the delegation, made the speech reproduced on the following pages:

the Communist menace in Asia. Admittedly, we would have been glad if there were more Asian members, but the door is not closed to them. Whenever these nations, within the confines of the treaty area, wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to join, they may do so, the only prerequisite being the concurrence of the present members. As a clarifying note, I will say that the name of any future members will be submitted to the Senate for approval.

When the delegations met in Manila, prior to the signing of this momentous document, the delegates had three major areas in which to find solutions: the definition of the treaty area, how much emphasis to place on the problem of subversion, and the economic clause, if there was to be one.

The treaty area is defined in the treaty itself and also in a protocol to the treaty which brings in Laos, Cambodia, and the free portion of Vietnam as treaty territory which, if attacked, would be under the protection of the treaty. Those nations themselves are not members of the Manila Pact. The reason is that the armistice provisions at Geneva at least raised a question in the minds of some of the parties to those agreements as to whether the Associated States could actually join such a pact. Nevertheless, those states welcomed the fact that the mantle of protection of the treaty was thrown around this area.

Broadly speaking, the treaty area includes the territory of the parties and the Pacific Ocean area which is south of 21 degrees and 30 minutes; that is a line which runs north of the Philippines. The area therefore is Pakistan, Thailand, and by protocol, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. This treaty does not cover the Hong Kong area, Macao, Formosa, Japan, or Korea.

The major difference in this treaty from any other security treaty is that it places more emphasis on the danger of subversion. It deals of course, as other treaties have, with an open armed attack and it is hoped that what is said in this respect will constitute a deterrent against such an act of aggression.

The problem of subversion is dealt with more specifically than in any other treaty. Subversion in this area is very strong and it has been recognized as such. The signatories are planning a meeting in Bangkok later this month at which time they can begin to think of ways and means to meet the subversive threat which is recognized by the treaty as being a particular danger in this area.

The proposal before the Senate is a significant new undertaking providing for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed from the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member states. This situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satisfactory at the present time, although it is improving, and it is hoped that something fruitful will come from the Bangkok meeting.

The treaty has a brief economic clause which says that the parties will cooperate together in economic matters. Secretary Dulles made it clear, when he

MR. MANSELD. Mr. President, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed in Manila on September 8, 1954, has been submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee and reported to the Senate for its approval. This treaty will be another milestone in the evolution of our policy to try and create a solid collective-security system in the western Pacific and southeast Asia areas.

It was my distinct pleasure, along with my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), to represent the Senate at this conference. Before I turn to the various sections and provisions of the treaty itself, I wish to make note of the outstanding job that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his party did at Manila in carrying out the policies of our Nation on a bipartisan, statesmanlike basis. The Secretary of State and Senator SMITH are to be highly commended for the work they did there.

The Southeast Asian Treaty is another part in the total pattern of strength which we have been trying to create throughout the free world. The armistice agreements at Geneva did not end the need for a pact in the southeast Pacific area; rather, it emphasized it. The need for the collective-security pact becomes more apparent each day as the aggressive tendencies on the part of the Communists become more evident. The nations at the Manila Conference have recognized this fact and have endeavored to form a bulwark against the aggressive intentions on the part of the Chinese Communists.

The members of the treaty organization are the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Eight member nations, and only three of them Asian, may seem to be an insignificant number for a southeastern Asia treaty, but it is sufficient to start a very substantial defense buildup against

QUICK COPY

appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November, as he did in Manila, that this is not meant to and does not bind the United States to any particular program of vast economic and military aid.

The situation in Europe after World War II was quite different than the one which exists in Asia today. In Europe our aid programs helped to recreate something that had been destroyed. We were working with people who were well versed in industrial life, and they needed a big boost to get on their feet again.

In Asia the problem is to create something that is totally new. Our first problem under this clause is to find a proper means to help before sums of money are requested. There are a number of economic problems of acute necessity in southeast Asia, particularly in free Vietnam. It is my understanding that a report will be forthcoming from the administration when a definite plan of approach has been formulated. This proposal merely recognizes the economic problem and lays the groundwork.

The treaty ends with a declaration that the armed aggression which is referred to and which the United States declares would be dangerous to its own peace and security would be Communist aggression. There was a great deal of discussion at the Conference as to whether the treaty, as a whole, should be exclusively directed against Communist aggression, or whether it should deal with any form of aggression. The United States does not have any territory in the treaty area, and therefore we are not interested in internal quarrels as such. Our interests would be involved only if there should be Communist aggression. The other countries were unwilling to limit the treaty to Communist aggression, so the issue was resolved by the United States including in the treaty a declaration that as far as it was concerned the open aggression which we would regard as dangerous to our peace and security would be Communist aggression. As a compensation the United States has agreed that if there should be local controversies in the area, we would join with others in consultation to see what should or could be done to alleviate them. This treaty is aimed primarily at Communist aggression, not at difficulties that might arise between friendly states.

At the conclusion of the Manila Conference the Pacific Charter was issued. It is in the nature of a declaration which is very important, in that it expresses by joint action of so-called western colonial powers and the Asian powers a common position with reference to self-determination and self-government by the peoples of Asia. This document was suggested by President Magsaysay, an outstanding statesman and leader, who exerted a great deal of influence during the entire conference. He thought it would be useful for the conference to draw up what he called a Pacific Charter declaration, affirming the intention of all the parties to this treaty to work for self-determination and self-government among the Asian peoples who wanted self-government and were capable of exercising its responsibilities.

This charter is a notable achievement in bringing together the divergent viewpoints of those concerned. This document should have a great deal of impact.

Mr. President, as my colleagues here know, it is not necessary for the Pacific Charter to be submitted to the Senate for action.

One of the first questions to arise out of any discussion of this new treaty is: What is the major difference between the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and NATO?

First of all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built up as a defensive force on the continent of Europe—a force strong enough to resist attack by the armies of the Soviet Union. That is not the purpose of the Southeast Asia Treaty. This new treaty does not dedicate any major elements of the United States Military Establishment to form any army of defense in this area. According to the Secretary of State's testimony, in this area "we rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power." A NATO-type organization in the Far East would be an overextension of our military power as it stands today.

This new treaty follows a formula similar to that used in the Philippine Treaty, the Anzus Treaties, and the Korean Treaty. This avoids the dispute which arose during the debate over the NATO Treaty relative to the powers of the President and the Congress.

The less controversial language declares that an intrusion in the treaty area would be dangerous to our peace and security and that we would, in that event, act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. The NATO Treaty says that "an attack on one is an attack on all." The former may not be as automatic, depending on the circumstances, but it avoids any constitutional controversy, and it stems from one of our oldest foreign policies—the Monroe Doctrine.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. This treaty would come under the provisions of article 51, providing that nothing contained in the U. N. Charter shall deprive any of the states from the individual or collective right of self-defense. Under article 51 regional enforcement measures do not need prior approval of the Security Council, where the Soviet Union has a veto.

One of the most fruitful things to come out of this conference was the initiative shown by the Asians themselves. The Filipinos, our long-time friends, were hosts, and the Asian delegates contributed immensely in working out the form that the treaty was to take.

In conclusion, I wish to stress again the importance of this treaty and the Pacific Charter. They are needed steps in building security for freedom in the Pacific area. I sincerely hope that the Senate will give its prompt approval and ratification.

Following this, Senator Sparkman engaged in an extended colloquy with Senator Wiley (who also supported the Treaty), designed to show that the Treaty was available to other area countries and that it was fully consistent with the UN and did not change our UN commitment in any way.

Mr. Mansfield inserted the full list of the U.S. delegation and paid tribute to the able job they performed. The vote was thereupon taken subsequent to which Senator Morse made an extensive speech as reproduced on the following pages with interpolations by Senator Case.



1960

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 1

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS] are absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS], the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE], if present would vote "yea."

Mr. GEORGE. I wish to announce that the junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], who is a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, voted for the treaty in committee. If he were present he would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hruska], and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] is detained on official business.

If present and voting the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hruska], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 82, nays 1, as follows:

YEAS—82

Allen	George	Morse
Allott	Goldwater	Munds
Anderson	Gore	Murray
Barrett	Green	Neely
Beall	Hayden	Neuberger
Bender	Hickenlooper	O'Mahoney
Bible	Hill	Pastore
Bicker	Holland	Payne
Bridges	Humphrey	Purtell
Bush	Ives	Robertson
Butler	Jackson	Russell
Byrd	Jenner	Saltonstall
Capwell	Johnson, S. O.	Schoeppel
Carlson	Kefauver	Scott
Casse, N. J.	Kerr	Smithers
Casse, S. Dak.	McClure	Smith, Maine
Clements	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Cotton	Kuchel	Sparkman
Curtis	Lehman	Stennis
Douglas	Long	Symington
Duff	Magnuson	Thurmond
Dworshak	Malone	Thye
Eastland	Mansfield	Watkins
Ellender	Martin, Iowa	Welker
Ervin	Martin, Pa.	Wiley
Flanders	McClellan	Williams
Frear	McNamara	
Fulbright	Millikin	

NAYS—1

Langer

NOT VOTING—13

Barkley	Hennings	Monroney
Bennett	Hruska	Potter
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Young
Daniel	Kennedy	
Dirksen	McCarthy	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall be exceedingly brief in my remarks on

the Southeast Asia Treaty, since the vote has already been taken.

I did not expect that the debate on the treaty would be as brief as it was. I was in conference with Mr. J. A. Hoffbuh and Mr. Glenn Jackson, of Oregon, on a very important Oregon problem involving the Talent Irrigation District project. That project was omitted from the President's budget message, and its omission does a grave injustice to the people of Oregon in respect to the development of the State's natural resources.

The matter is so important to my State that I was in conference with Mr. Hoffbuh and Mr. Jackson when the Senate debate on the Southeast Asia Treaty was progressing. I had expected to make these remarks during that debate and prior to the vote of ratification. But in view of the fact that they are remarks in explanation of my vote for ratification, the important thing now is simply to have them in the Record for future reference.

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, after listening very carefully to the hearings on the treaty, I voted to report the treaty to the Senate for ratification. I did so for several reasons, the most primary one of which is that there is no doubt in my mind that the treaty is in conformity with the United Nations Charter. There is no doubt in my mind that the treaty is in the same conformity with the United Nations Charter as was NATO, because the United Nations Charter contemplates and authorizes, within its term of reference, the making of treaties or alliances of this nature in the interest of preserving peace in the world.

But I wish to make it very clear in this brief speech that, in my judgment, the hope for peace in the Pacific rests with the United Nations. In these days, we in America ought to be frank enough to confess that the hope for peace in the Pacific does not rest with the United States, with Red China, or with Red Russia, on the basis of any unilateral course of action those powerful nations may follow in Asia. I am very fearful—and this explains in large measure the position I took last week in the historic debate in the Senate—that if the course of action, so far as peace or war in Asia is concerned, is left to the determination of the United States, Red Russia, or Red China, that the Communists will commit some provocation which will throw us into an Asiatic war. I am also fearful that the Nationalist Chinese may commit some act of provocation that will give the Communists some propaganda excuse for committing an act of war against our forces in the Straits of Formosa or on or near the Quemoy or Matsu Islands. Thus I think that the cause of peace is crying out today for action by the United Nations in the settlement of the Formosan crisis.

In my judgment, the hope for peace in Asia rests upon our conforming to the principle of international justice through law, which is the base on which the entire United Nations Charter rests.

Oh, I know that when one makes such a statement in the United States Senate, he will be subjected to severe criticism.

But I repeat what I said in the debate last week: There are in America at this hour powerful forces who want to go to war; and so long as those forces, many of whose representatives sit in high positions, continue their efforts, and so long as that great danger to peace in the world exists within my own country, I shall raise my voice in a plea for the assumption by the United Nations of jurisdiction over the threat to a third holocaust in Asia.

In my judgment, the southeast Asia treaty greatly strengthens the chance that the United Nations will be able to help preserve peace in the world. I voted for the treaty in committee, and I voted for its ratification on the floor of the Senate today, because article I provides, in principle, what ought to have been included in the joint resolution passed by the Senate last week. In the joint resolution passed by the Senate last week there should have been a clear rededication to the United Nations. Article I of the Southeast Asia Treaty rededicates the United States and the other signatories, at least through the framework of the treaty, to the principle of the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Listen to this language:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Mr. President, that is the lesson we ought to speak into the teeth of the Communists around the world 24 hours of the day and night in these critical days. We must make it clear and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of the Communist segment of the world that the United States of America stands shoulder to shoulder with the other free nations in fighting the cause of peace through the principles and the framework of the United Nations, and that it is not our purpose or desire by way of a resolution, as was done last week, or otherwise, to give to the President of the United States a pre-authorized power to commit an act of war on the mainland of China. Nothing which has transpired since the action which the Senate took last week raises the slightest doubt as to the soundness of the statement made by the senior Senator from Oregon in that debate that one of the acts authorized by the resolution was a strike against the mainland of China if the President should deem it desirable in defense of Formosa even though no act of war had been committed against us.

If we read the statements which are coming out of the capitals of the world these days, that is the fear of statesmen in other countries. That is why I think it is so important that before any more time passes the Senate of the United States should make it perfectly clear that we are working for peace through the United Nations. The Southeast Asia treaty pledges us to do that.

Mr. President, I call attention to section 2, article IV, of the treaty, as follows:

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

That is a pledge, in my judgment, to resort to peaceful procedures to settle disputes, and it is an indication of the realization on our part that we are not going to avoid war by resorting to military threats.

I call attention next to article VI of the treaty, as follows:

#### ARTICLE VI

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

There again we have made crystal clear and have emblazoned in the treaty the proposition that the United States repudiates itself to seek peace in the world through the procedures and policies of the United Nations.

That is why I voted in committee to recommend ratification of the treaty, and that is why on the floor of the Senate today I voted for the ratification of the treaty.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks a statement which I released to the press about an hour ago, expressing my deep regret and my great concern over the fact that at a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning the committee postponed consideration of the Humphrey resolution.

The Senate will recall that in the closing minutes of the debate on the joint resolution which was before the Senate last week, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] offered a resolution, of which I became one of the cosponsors, which in effect would make it clear that it was the sense of the Senate of the United States that the United Nations should proceed to use its good offices and procedures to the end of seeking to effect a cease-fire order in Southeast Asia, where the ominous threat of a Formosa war hangs over the world like an ugly cloud.

I say, Mr. President, as I said in the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning, and in my statement released to the press an hour ago, that had the principle of the Humphrey resolution been written into the joint resolution which was before the Senate last week, both the nature and the content of that debate would have been greatly dif-

ferent, because there were those of us, as the RECORD will show, who pleaded then for the Kefauver substitute, which was bottomed upon the proposal to have the United Nations take over jurisdiction of this very serious international crisis.

Mr. President, I am greatly saddened that there should be a postponement of the consideration of such a resolution; and I am greatly saddened that there is any colleague of mine in the Senate of the United States who would rationalize any postponement of such consideration on the ground that if the resolution should come to the floor there might be acrimonious debate, and amendments might be offered to the Humphrey resolution which might raise questions as to whether we in the Senate of the United States are unanimously behind the United Nations. The world ought to know. The world is entitled to know. The American people ought to know. The American people are entitled to know.

Mr. President, as a lawyer who has tried to understand some of the principles of international law, I desire to say that so long as this country is a member of the United Nations, never will I take the unwelcome position of saying that this country should serve a threatening notice on the United Nations, which has jurisdiction which it ought to exercise, that we will abide by a cease-fire order in southeast Asia if the terms of that order are to our liking, but we will not if the terms are not to our liking. We are not going to promote an international system of justice through law by proceeding on any such premise as that.

No member of this body is more opposed to the recognition of Red China than is the senior Senator from Oregon. However, Mr. President, I am not going to try to circumvent the United Nations or to bypass the jurisdiction of the United Nations by giving countenance to any fear arguments that the Humphrey resolution might put us in a position of having to abide by a decision of the United Nations that we might not like. One of these fear arguments being made by some of my colleagues in the Senate is to the effect that if we adopt the Humphrey resolution, any Senator voting for it would then be estopped from protesting any proposal of the United Nations that Red China should be admitted into the United Nations. This argument seems to be based on the false assumption that we should lay down a condition precedent to our calling upon the United Nations to try to settle the Formosan dispute and that condition should be that if Red China is admitted to the United Nations, we will not accept the decision of the United Nations. I cannot imagine the United Nations voting to admit Red China on the basis of the many violations of international agreements and diplomatic immorality of which Red China has been guilty. I think our opposition in the United Nations expressed time and time again by the American Ambassador against the admission of Red China has been a sound opposition on the merits of the issue.

It should be stressed in this debate that each time the issue has come before the United Nations General Assembly, an

overwhelming majority of the members of the assembly have agreed with us. However, I am willing to meet head-on what I think is a false assumption of some of the opponents to the Humphrey resolution. My answer to them is that if we should lose an argument on the Red China admission issue before the United Nations and are outvoted, we should not take the position of going it alone in international affairs outside of the United Nations. I believe that if we ever adopt a go-it-alone policy, the world will be plunged into war because of the consequences that are most likely to follow from such a unilateral course of action on the part of the United States.

We are not going to promote world peace in that way, Mr. President. In this great struggle of the century, a struggle for freedom which may last for a hundred years, we have got to learn that we are not going to have formulated overnight a system of international justice through law. It is going to require an evolution of thought to bring all people to a realization of the great superiority of settling international disputes by rules of reason instead of by resorting to the jungle law of military force or threats.

So long as I sit in this body, Mr. President, I shall never be a party, under the oath I took when I became a Member of the Senate, to a proposal that we should accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations so long as its decisions may conform with what our predetermined self-interests may dictate. That would merely be feeding the furies of Communist propaganda. That is why I issued my press statement an hour ago. It is pertinent to my position on the Southeast Asia Treaty, because I am worried, disturbed, and frightened by the attitude which exists in so many places in our country today. We cannot even talk about living up to the jurisdictional responsibilities of the United States under the United Nations without running into the fallacious argument of the preventive war advocates that unless we can have our way in the United Nations, we will go it alone in Southeast Asia.

My warning may fall on some deaf ears across the country, as it is falling for the most part on empty seats in the Senate of the United States at this moment; but I say to my colleagues in the Senate that what has happened in the last few hours—the last 72 hours—has convinced me that the rank and file of the American people are listening attentively to the warnings of the results which may follow unilateral action in the South Pacific. They are pondering the dangers of this war crisis more attentively than are some Members of the United States Senate. I think the voice of American public opinion is raising itself in clarion tones which should be heeded by Members of the United States Senate.

The people expect this body to rededicate itself to the jurisdiction of the United Nations as the greatest forum in the world today for maintaining peace in the world. I think the treaty to which we have just given our advice and consent to the President, is a great step

forward in an attempt to help preserve and strengthen the bulwarks of peace. It represents what I argued for last week, namely, one of the calculated risks for peace. Again today I am pleading that we assume greater risks for peace. I am pleading that we be willing to lay before the United Nations questions involving the fate of the world, whether there shall be peace or war, and, on the basis of its decisions, if they are made within its jurisdiction, to rest our cause. I am pleading that we use the United Nations as our forum for the presentation of America's points of view as to what should be done to secure peace, and that we try to convince the United Nations that any of the fears which may have been expressed this morning by some of my colleagues as to what the United Nations might do are groundless. That is my plea, and that also, Mr. President, is my explanation both for my vote upon the treaty and for my press release on the Humphrey resolution, which I now ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the press release was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Senator WAYNE MORSE, Independent of Oregon, issued the following statement today on the decision of the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone until a later date action on the Humphrey Resolution, of which MORSE is one of the cosponsors calling upon the United Nations to take prompt action to bring about a cease-fire in the area of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Strait:

"I deeply regret that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate decided at a meeting this morning to postpone action on the Humphrey resolution which states 'That it is the sense of the Senate that it would be in the interest of the United States and of world peace for the United Nations to take prompt action to bring about a cease-fire in the area of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Strait, and the President is requested to take appropriate steps to achieve that objective.'"

"It is my opinion that in this very critical hour of world history, when the issue between war or peace is nip-and-tuck, the Senate should pass the resolution without delay, and thereby give assurance to our allies in the United Nations that we accept and respect the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The passage of the resolution would also serve clear notice on Red Russia and Red China that we intend to stand shoulder to shoulder with the free nations of the world in preserving peace. The resolution also would be an effective answer to the vicious, lying Communist propaganda that the United States insists upon following a unilateral course of action in Southeast Asia, unless the United Nations accepts the American point of view on all phases of foreign policy questions which have arisen over the defense of Formosa and such coastal islands as Quemoy and Matsu.

I fear that the postponement of action on the resolution will be misunderstood and in some capitals of the world misinterpreted. It is important that the United States make crystal clear to the world that we seek an honorable peace in Southeast Asia, and that we accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations in its endeavor to bring about a solution of the serious threat of war by way of the procedures of the United Nations Charter, based upon the goal of settling international disputes by applying the principles of international justice through law.

It is my view that no postponement of consideration of the Humphrey resolution can

be justified on the basis of any threat or fear that an immediate consideration of it would result in debate on the floor of the Senate over amendments to the resolution which would be offered by some who seem to be of the opinion that we should seek to restrict the United Nations as to the terms and conditions that it might recommend for a cease-fire order. My answer to that rationalization for postponing action on the resolution is simply to say—let such a debate come. It would be a further lesson to people in other countries as to the superiority of our system of political freedom and constitutional processes. Further, I say let such a debate come because now is the time to find out whether we are going to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

The principles of the Humphrey resolution should have been written into the resolution that was passed by the Congress last week. If that resolution had clearly pledged the United States to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations over the Formosa issue, the entire nature and content of the Senate debate would have been different.

The failure to take early action on the Humphrey resolution only tends to strengthen the fears of many of us who believe that there are powerful forces in America both in and out of the Congress and in other branches of the Government who are seeking a showdown war with Red China and Red Russia now.

I am confident that we can and will fight such a war successfully, if it should be forced upon us by an act of war committed against us or against our allies. But I think we should be very careful to see to it that we follow a course of action that will leave no room for doubt in any capital of the world of our complete willingness to follow the jurisdiction of the United Nations under the charter of which we are a signatory with all the solemn obligations that flow therefrom.

MR. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, the junior Senator from South Dakota cannot let this matter rest on the remarks of the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], if his remarks would imply in any way a modification of what I definitely understood to be the portion of the President's proposal with respect to the place of the United Nations in meeting the situation in the Pacific.

During the debate in the Senate on January 28, last week, when I was speaking, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] asked:

Is it not a vital essential that we rely upon all means at our command, including our own Armed Forces, until such time as the United Nations has acquired the means to enforce its own decisions?

I read further:

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. When it comes to a matter of forces, yes. But I wish to affirm very definitely that the part of the message of the President in which he stated he would welcome action by the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits was an integral part of his proposal.

Mr. AIKEN. That is true.

At that point I wish to read into the Record today the precise words of the President of the United States in his special message to the Congress, namely, the special message of January 24, when he submitted the Formosa proposal. In his message, as it appears on page 2 of the House Document 76, the President said:

Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area

and indeed to the peace of the world. We believe—

The President said—

that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area.

Then the President said:

We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.

The President went on to say:

Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace.

So, Mr. President, that was the reason why, on Friday of last week, I said:

I wish to affirm very definitely that the part of the message of the President in which he stated he would welcome action by the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits was an integral part of his proposal.

Mr. President, I am not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I do not know what transpired in that committee this morning, or what statements which may have been made there have alarmed the Senator from Oregon. But, as one Member of the Senate and, furthermore, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, which heard the proposals as they were presented earlier last week by Secretary Dulles and by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, I wish to state very emphatically that my vote for the Formosa joint resolution and my statement of last Friday were bottomed on the part of the message of the President in which he said he would welcome "appropriate action of the United Nations under its Charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area."

That was an integral part of his proposal; and I repeat it today, and I wish to have it made a part of the legislative record.

Furthermore, I call attention to the other way in which the United Nations is implicated, insofar as we are concerned, in the action we took on last Friday; for, on last Friday, I said:

Furthermore, in my own thinking, I also place a good deal of reliance upon the fact that the authority the President requested would terminate when he reported to the Congress that the peace and security of the area had reasonably been assured through action taken by the United Nations or otherwise.

Mr. President, those words are taken from the last sentence of the joint resolution. So I pointed out that:

The last sentence of the joint resolution includes specific language to that effect.

Again I wish to read the last sentence of the joint resolution which was passed by the Senate on last Friday. That sentence reads as follows:

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

Mr. President, I recognize that no one Senator can bind any other Senator's expressions, opinions, or thoughts; but it seems to me that the recitation of the statement in the President's proposal, to which I have called direct attention, namely:

We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area.

And the further statement that "we would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body" should be conclusive.

I cite those sentences in the message of the President, in submitting to the Congress the Formosa joint resolution, and the further sentence in the joint resolution itself, namely, that the authority of the joint resolution will terminate when the President reports that a cessation of hostilities or a satisfactory arrangement has been obtained "by action of the United Nations or otherwise."

Those specific references to the United Nations have written a record; and what any individual Senator may say as to his fear about what the United Nations may do or may not do cannot change the fact that the Senate acted upon that submission by the President, in which he welcomed action by the United Nations, and also on the wording of the joint resolution itself, which says that the authority it grants will terminate when the President reports that "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise."

That record is written. While the junior Senator from South Dakota happened to call attention to those statements in his remarks of last Friday, they are a part of the Record; they are found in the President's proposal and in his message to the Congress, and a provision to the same effect is in the joint resolution itself.

Mr. President, my reason for emphasizing this is that I do not want individual expressions, either on the floor of the Senate or off the floor of the Senate, in any way to give to the country the impression that the Senate or the Congress is winking in any degree upon the express reliance, which was written into the President's message on the joint resolution, upon the idea of expecting or welcoming action by the United Nations. True, it is that we would take action, if necessary, alone; but that was conditioned upon recognizing action by the United Nations when it came.

So I call attention to that because I think the country and the world should know that we do welcome action of the United Nations, and that we earnestly hope and pray that it may be successful in attaining what the joint resolution describes, namely, "that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, my reply to the Senator from South Dakota will involve these points:

First, there is no question about the fact that the President of the United States would welcome United Nations

intervention and participation in the Formosa situation. He said so in his message.

Second, there is no question about the fact that he is cooperating in the United Nations' attempt now to put on its agenda, as they have voted to do, a proposal for a cease-fire.

But the President's message is not a part of the joint resolution which was passed by Congress, and in the joint resolution there is no wording which involves an affirmative petition that the United Nations proceed to intervene in the case.

The Senator from South Dakota has referred to the language in the last paragraph of the joint resolution, which provides, in effect, that the joint resolution shall come to an end if certain conditions are fulfilled, one of which might be action by the United Nations. But that is not an affirmative request that the United Nations proceed to take jurisdiction. It is not an affirmative statement on the part of the Congress of the United States that we want our President to proceed through the United Nations. In this hour of crisis we ought to deal in the affirmative, not in the negative. We should be direct and not indirect in our approach to this crisis.

The second point I wish to make is that I am satisfied that President Dwight Eisenhower will do everything he can to avoid a war in the South Pacific. I have complete confidence in his intentions of peace. When I said earlier this afternoon that I fear what the result will be of peace or war in the Pacific if it is left to the unilateral action of the United States and Red China, and Red Russia, I meant it, in the sense that I fear that if the United Nations does not take jurisdiction and does not impose some prohibition—to use a descriptive term, a preliminary injunction against the disputants—until the United Nations can decide the issues on the merits, there is great danger that others besides the President of the United States may follow a course of action in the South Pacific which will involve us in a war.

That is my fear, and that is why I think it is so important to bring the United Nations into this question affirmatively, openly, and effectively at the earliest possible hour.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I will not yield until I complete my reply to the Senator from South Dakota.

That is why I say I think it was so important that we should have incorporated in the resolution passed last week, the heart and substance of the Humphrey amendment or resolution. Do not forget, the Humphrey amendment was to be offered last week to the joint resolution. Do not forget that there were conferences in the cloak-rooms, as there always are when matters of such vital concern are before the Senate.

It was urged, because of a technical parliamentary point, that the Humphrey amendment with respect to the United Nations had to be offered to a "whereas" clause; and an amendment to a "whereas" clause in the preamble

could not be offered until a vote had been taken on the joint resolution itself. It was urged that perhaps what he ought to do was to submit the Humphrey amendment as a separate resolution, to be considered today. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee rose—and the Record will so show—and expressed approval of the so-called compromise of the parliamentary procedure which was entered into with the Senator from Minnesota and the others of us who were cosponsors of the Humphrey amendment to the joint resolution. It was stated that the proposed resolution would be taken up on Tuesday. We went along with that suggestion. There was no suggestion then by anyone that we would not proceed expeditiously and without delay to bring the resolution to the floor of the Senate.

I do not charge anyone with bad faith. I simply say that it is very disappointing, and I think unfortunate, that on the floor of the Senate today we are not debating the Humphrey resolution on the basis of a report from the Foreign Relations Committee. Instead, we are confronted with a situation in which the Foreign Relations Committee has postponed action on the Humphrey resolution.

What does that resolution provide? I am interested in finding out how many Members of the Senate dissent from it. I think the world ought to know to what extent the Government of the United States, through its legislative body, dissents from this resolution.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I will not yield at this point, until I conclude this argument. Then I shall yield.

First, we have the so-called "whereas" clauses of the Humphrey resolution. The first such clause is:

Whereas the President of the United States on January 19, 1955, stated that he would "like to see the United Nations attempt to exercise its good offices" with respect to arranging a cease-fire between Communist China and Nationalist China.

That is language from the message of the President, which the Senator from South Dakota has quoted. It is language in the message which I highly praised, because it reflects the spirit and intent of a policy which I think we ought to be following; but we ought to be following it as a matter of legislative action, and not by way of individual speeches by Senators or messages by the President.

The next whereas clause reads as follows:

Whereas the President in his message of January 24 stated that the situation in the Pacific area "is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter."

Again, a sentiment and a point of view with which I completely agree, and a statement by the President which I highly praised last week, because again, I think it is the course of action which the United States should follow:

Whereas House Joint Resolution 159 provides that it shall expire when he determines that peace in the area is "reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise"



Again, that is language which the Senator from South Dakota has quoted, and upon which, along with the message of the President, he bottoms his case almost entirely; but it is not an affirmative request that the United Nations proceed. It is only the negative recognition that it might proceed, and that after it shall have proceeded, if it settles the controversy, the joint resolution we passed last week would automatically end.

That is an entirely different thing from the Congress of the United States amending a joint resolution, or the Senate approving an independent resolution saying that it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations should proceed to exercise jurisdiction on this critical Formosan issue.

Next we come to the resolving clause. I should like to know now, as I expressed a desire to know in the Foreign Relations Committee this morning, what is wrong with such a request:

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that it would be in the interest of the United States and of world peace for the United Nations to take prompt action to bring about a cease-fire in the area of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Straits, and the President is requested to take appropriate steps to achieve that objective.

That is in the affirmative. In my judgment, that is in line with our clear moral and legal obligations to the United Nations, so long as the signature of the United States is attached to the solemn document creating that organization. Why do we not do it? Let us look at a hypothetical or two.

I think the fallacy in the "fear" arguments of those who want postponement of the consideration of this resolution is that it does not follow that if all their fears should come to pass, we would then be in any different position than we shall be in if we do not approve the resolution.

As was brought out by one of my distinguished colleagues in argument this morning—and I thought it was an unanswerable argument—"Cite any major issue in connection with Formosa or Southeast Asia on which our allies in the United Nations have turned us down." We have won every point to date. Why have we won it? Because I think, on the merits of the argument, we have been able to show that we are right. Ambassador Lodge has won issue after issue because of the unanswerability of America's case. We have won the arguments in the United Nations because they have been based upon America's historic policy of peace and justice. That is why we have won them.

What are we afraid of now? We have no right to be afraid when our cause is just. Our cause is what? Defense of Formosa and the Pescadores—the defense of America's line of defense from the Aleutians down through Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We have a legal obligation growing out of both the Cairo agreement and the Japanese Peace Treaty to see to it that no blood bath is visited upon the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa.

A new element has crept into this debate in recent weeks. In September the policy of this administration was that Quemoy and the Matsus were not vital

to American interests in the Pacific, and not essential to the defense of Formosa. Since then something has happened. Now there are those who even suggest—and I am shocked by the suggestion—that perhaps we had better pretend the islands are essential, in order to use them for bargaining purposes. Anyone who advances that idea is advocating a principle which cannot be reconciled with America's dedication to the highest moral standards in the positions she has always taken in international negotiations. I do not believe we have a right to go into international negotiations by way of a subterfuge any more than I believe one of us has the right to sit down with an individual in a bargaining position and seek by subterfuge to obtain an advantage.

Either the islands are essential to our defense in the Pacific, or they are not. Either we have a legal claim to them, or we have not. I believe that the debate last week proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that we have no legal claim to the Quemoy and the Matsus. We have no legal right to be on the Quemoy and the Matsus. I believe we jeopardize our position in the Pacific if we assert such a right.

And, furthermore, Mr. President, I believe we feed the furnaces of Russian propaganda and Red China's propaganda to whatever extent we suggest that we are going to defend the Quemoy and the Matsus.

As Professor Morgenthau said in his great article which appeared in the Sunday Chicago Sun-Times, the Quemoy and the Matsus are not steppingstones to Formosa; the Quemoy and the Matsus are steppingstones to the mainland of China.

If we take the position that we can strike against the mainland of China in the event our military intelligence indicates that a strike is about to be made against the Quemoy and the Matsus, we have maneuvered America into an intolerable position so far as international judgment is concerned. I happen to be one who believes that the judgment will be against us if we strike the mainland of China because we believe a strike is about to be committed, or has been committed, for that matter, against the Quemoy and Matsus.

These have not been nights of 8 hours continuous sleep for me. No one can face these problems—and all of us have been greatly disturbed by them during the past few days—no one can face these problems as a United States Senator and go to bed and enjoy continuous sleep.

The problem that gives me sleepless hours is the difficult one of what we are going to do to protect the Nationalist troops on the Quemoy and Matsus. We cannot walk out on them and leave them to a blood bath.

That is why I am pleading for the most speedy possible action by the United Nations by way of some kind of temporary order, to use legal language, that will make clear to Red Russia and to Red China that a blood bath imposed upon the Nationalist Chinese troops on the Quemoy and the Matsus will be considered a violation of the obli-

gations of peace which every nation under the United Nations Charter is obligated to defend and protect. Red Russia is a member of the United Nations, and she is the master of her servant, Red China.

Without being bound with any finality by this thinking out loud as to the kind of temporary order that should be made, I believe the United Nations ought to lay down, as soon as necessary procedures can be complied with, a clear statement that the Nationalist Chinese shall be allowed to withdraw from the Quemoy and the Matsus within a reasonable period of time, and that no attack against them will be tolerated by the United Nations. In that way we would be relieved of the unilateral threat that we have been making that we will respond alone.

I believe it is that threat that has so rocked the capitals of the world within the past few days.

Then, if the Nationalist Chinese take the position, in spite of the protection which the United Nations seeks to give them, that they nevertheless will stay on the islands, they will do so at their own risk as a participant in a Chinese civil war.

I do not believe the United States should become involved in a Chinese civil war over the Quemoy and the Matsus. If the Nationalist troops withdraw to Formosa, we will protect them on Formosa.

Our military authorities, although they point out it will be more difficult to do, say the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores nevertheless can be consummated without possessing the Quemoy and the Matsus. The American people should be on guard against the representation of some of those who are urging that we defend the Quemoy and Matsus Islands to the effect that maintaining control of those islands by the United States is absolutely essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Such a representation is not true. On the other hand, if we refuse to undertake the defense of the Quemoy and the Matsus we ruin and puncture the balloon of one of the Communist propaganda devices, namely, that we are trying to hold the Quemoy and the Matsus as stepping stones to the mainland of China. Let us make clear to the world that we have no intention of stepping onto the mainland of China unless China makes war against us. Let us make that perfectly clear.

I believe that is another one of the indirect accomplishments which would result from the adoption of the Humphrey resolution. I believe the greatest hope for preserving peace in the days immediately ahead—and now it is touch and go, and nip and tuck—is to make perfectly clear, affirmatively and directly, not negatively or indirectly, that we are calling upon the United Nations and that it is the sense of this Government that we call on it to take jurisdiction over the Formosan issue.

The last point I wish to make, before yielding to the Senator from South Dakota or yielding the floor, is that there is no justification for the fears of those who say they will not vote for the

Humphrey resolution without amendments, which would really destroy its spirit and intent.

What are some of those fears? One of them is that the United Nations will lay down a rule that Red China must be admitted to the United Nations. I do not believe it. I believe that our international lawyers can build up an unanswerable case to show that Red China does not have a single just claim for admission to the United Nations at this time.

She has no right to admission to the United Nations so long as she continues to violate her agreements over Korea. She has violated them in instances the recital of which would require a long time. She has no right to admission to the United Nations so long as she keeps imprisoned, without legal justification, in Communist jails Americans and citizens of other free nations. She has no right to admission to the United Nations until she demonstrates by record that she can be relied upon to keep her international commitments. She has no right to be admitted into the United Nations so long as she keeps the Iron Curtain dropped and continues by threats and propaganda and intrigue and subversion and espionage to undermine free institutions and the free governments in many of the free lands of the world.

Nor do I think there is any basis for the fear that if we adopt the Humphrey resolution we shall invite the United Nations to render some decision which would take from Formosa the protection of the United Nations, because, in my opinion, with our power in the Pacific and our vital interests in the Pacific, it is important for as many years as it is going to take to settle the issue on a juridical basis that we protect Formosa physically, through the United Nations, from domination and control by Red China.

That is my position on that point, Mr. President, and I see not one word in the Humphrey resolution that would indicate that the United Nations would hand down a decision such as some of our colleagues fear would be handed down.

Mr. President, I come now to the question which is supposed to put me under the desk, if I listen to some of my colleagues. Suppose the United Nations should hand down a decision contrary to the arguments and pleas we make in presenting our side of the Formosa issue? My answer is that if we have made the best case we can make, if we have argued our point of view, and the United Nations does not agree with us in all or some respects then at that point I would say it would be a historic mistake for our country to go it alone. It would be a historic mistake for our Government to establish the precedent that if we did not like the decision, we would go it alone, because we would throw back, I think for centuries, the goal which is the ideal of America, the goal of permanent peace based upon a system of international justice through law.

As a nation and as individuals we have to learn that when a court of last resort rules against us we must take the law handed down by the court. I pray for the future of mankind if the United

States, the most powerful Nation in the world, should ever take the position that because of our power and because of our present military might, we would go ahead with strong-arm methods and override the United Nations if it should hand down a decision against us. I pray my country will never resort to the jungle law of force. That is why, with a sincerity as deep as is that of the Senator from South Dakota—and I know of no man in the Senate more sincere or more devoted to the convictions of his conscience than is the Senator from South Dakota—I think the Humphrey resolution would be the most effective "atomic bomb" for peace that could be dropped on the world today. It would be clear proof that the legislative body of this Government, and the President, who, in his message, I submit, to all intents and purposes, has endorsed the spirit of this resolution, are looking to the juridical processes of the United Nations to settle the issue of peace or war in the Pacific.

I now yield for a question, or I shall be glad to yield the floor.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I deeply respect the sincerity of the Senator from Oregon, not only in this, but in other matters, and I respect the urge which drove him to make the statement which he has made. But there is one very great difference between the position of the senior Senator from Oregon and my position at this point. We both welcome action by the United Nations, but the Senator from Oregon stated that he would like to determine whether there was any dissent in the Senate to having action taken by the United Nations. He is interested in determining how many dissenters there are.

Mr. President, if there be dissent in the Senate over the point which was implicit in responding to the President's proposal that the United Nations take action, or that we rely upon the action of the United Nations, I am not interested in determining the number of dissenters. I would not, Mr. President, by any single word of mine today, weaken in any respect the responsibility which rests upon the Government of the United States to welcome action by the United Nations. I do not see how we can avoid in any way the fact that in this proposal the President did say that he would welcome the assumption of such jurisdiction by that body. Let me again quote a few words from the President's message:

We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would welcome the assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.

That was a clear-cut statement by the President of the United States of the premises upon which the resolution was being submitted to the Congress. I think it would have been weakened had we put a "whereas" clause into the resolution. That is why I did not favor that course of action being followed, I thought it would imply in some way that we were weakening the resolution, or that we did not take at face value the words of the President when he said we would wel-

come action by the United Nations, or the words of the resolution itself, in the resolving clause, the really effective part of the resolution, where in the concluding sentence recognition of the United Nations is written.

I would not want action to be taken which could be construed as weakening that position. I do not know to what extent there is any dissent from the view that the United Nations should take action or that we would welcome action by it. I did feel last Friday, when we were concluding our action, that for myself I wished to make it perfectly clear that my vote for the resolution and against amendments was bottomed upon the fact that a part of the proposal of the President was to welcome action by the United Nations and upon the clause in the resolution itself to which we have alluded so many times in the debate.

I also invite attention to the fact that in the conclusion of my remarks last Friday evening I recognized the situation which the senior Senator from Oregon has mentioned, namely, the necessity for somebody to take the initiative in securing action by the United Nations. As I thought about it, it occurred to me that it would be difficult, and it possibly would not be the best tactic, for the United States itself to take the initiative, because, whether we like it or not, to a certain extent we have become parties to the Formosa Strait issue by the presence of our troops there and by the orders given to the Seventh Fleet, and so forth, so that any solution we might propose would seem to be the solution of a party in interest. So I said this at the very conclusion of my remarks last Friday night:

I do not think we shall solve the problem immediately before the Senate by looking at the jurisdictional questions. There is a practical situation facing us. I am hopeful that the efforts of Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, all three of whom, I understand, are endeavoring to induce the United Nations to endeavor to obtain a ceasefire, will be successful. In my opinion, someone who is not a party to the immediate issues must take the lead right now. We might propose the action to the United Nations, but we are in a delicate position. So someone who is not a party must take the lead. The initiative will have to be carried by someone else and if Australia or New Zealand or the Prime Minister of Great Britain, by their representatives, are able to initiate action, I wish them success.

I concluded with this sentence:

I hope the expectation and the prayer of our President—

I wish to interpolate to say that I interpreted this statement to be essentially an expectation and a prayer on the part of the President—

that some way may be found to avoid conflict may be wholly achieved, and it is in that hope that I am supporting the resolution.

So, Mr. President, while I desire, just as earnestly, I think, as does the senior Senator from Oregon, to have the United Nations take the initiative and point the way to a solution of this problem, I do not desire to have the Record indicate that the failure of the Committee on Foreign Relations—and I am not a



member of that committee—to report the Humphrey resolution today shades or minimizes or modifies in any respect the clear understanding which I had last Friday night in voting for the resolution which was then before the Senate. There was a clear understanding that we would welcome action by the United Nations, as the President had said; and the resolution itself provides tremendous authority to the President for unilateral action until appropriate action is taken by the United Nations to achieve the desired result.

I think also that the obligations which rest upon the members of the United Nations in the difficult situation which today exists calls upon them to attempt to work out a solution.

Personally, I welcome the statements of various public leaders in New Zealand, Australia, and Great Britain to the effect that they would attempt to have action taken by the United Nations.

I welcome also a statement by Mr. Molotov that he would transmit to Red China the suggestion that the matter be referred to the United Nations.

As the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, was quoted as saying the other day, we cannot afford in these circumstances to close our ears or to close the door to any possibility of a peaceful solution of this situation. I think it is important that we try to get the issues before the United Nations.

I do not want the President to feel in any way that anything has happened to indicate any dissent in any degree whatsoever from the acceptance of his statement that we would welcome action by the United Nations.

#### CONSIDERATION OF NOMINATIONS

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, as the Senate is still in executive session, I ask that the nominations on the Executive Calendar be considered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McNAMARA in the chair). The nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated in order.

#### EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Glen E. Edgerton, of the District of Columbia, to be President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Lynn U. Stambaugh, of North Dakota, to be First Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Hawthorne Arey, of Nebraska, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of George A. Blowers, of Florida, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Vance Brand, of Ohio, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I move that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations, and also of the ratification of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO FRIDAY

The Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I move that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until noon on Friday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROGRAM FOR FRIDAY

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I desire to announce the program for Friday.

On Friday it is proposed to have the Senate consider Calendar No. 15, Senate Resolution 49, to extend the times by which the Committee on the Judiciary may conduct studies and investigations; Calendar No. 16, Senate Resolution 13, to investigate certain problems relating to interstate and foreign commerce; Calendar No. 17, Senate Resolution 25, authorizing the employment of an additional clerical assistant by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service; Calendar No. 18, Senate Resolution 34, authorizing the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to employ 4 additional temporary clerical assistants; Calendar No. 21, Senate Resolution 28, extending the authority of the Committee on Armed Services for hearings and investigations; Calendar No. 22, Senate Resolution 23, to investigate problems relating to economic stabilization and mobilization; Calendar No. 23, Senate Resolution 36, extending the time for a study by the Committee on Foreign Relations of technical assistance and related programs; Calendar No. 24, Senate Resolution 37, providing additional funds for the study of strategic and critical materials by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; and Calendar No. 25, Senate Resolution 39, authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to employ temporary additional assistants.

#### ADJOURNMENT TO FRIDAY

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, in accordance with the order previously entered, I now move that the Senate stand adjourned until Friday next at 12 o'clock noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 52 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned, the adjournment being under the order previously entered, until Friday, February 4, 1955, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 1, 1955:

##### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

George T. Moore, of Illinois, to be an Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

##### UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Curtis Clark, of Kentucky, to be United States marshal for the eastern district of Kentucky, vice John M. Moore, retired.

Lama A. DeMunbrun, of Kentucky, to be United States marshal for the western district of Kentucky, vice Dennis E. Cranor, retired.

##### IN THE AIR FORCE

The following named persons for reappointment to the active list of the Regular Air Force in the grades indicated, from the temporary disability retired list, under the provisions of section 407, Public Law 351, 81st Congress (Career Compensation Act of 1949):

##### To be major

Robert Crawford, 10333A.

##### To be captain

Leota H. Clark, 21095W.

The following named persons for appointment in the Regular Air Force, in the grades indicated, with dates of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force, under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, 80th Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947): title II, Public Law 365, 80th Congress (Army-Navy-Public Health Service Medical Officer Procurement Act of 1947); and section 307 (b), Public Law 150, 82d Congress (Air Force Organization Act of 1951), with a view to designation for the performance of duties as indicated:

##### To be majors, USAF (Medical)

David W. Davis, AO52157A.  
James T. Hardy, AO223447.  
Leon A. Knight, AO360147.

##### To be captains, USAF (Medical)

Edgar N. Gips, AO1906336.  
Clarence Longaker, AO727227.  
Donald J. Largo, AO2240757.  
John G. Wells, Jr., AO1906320.

##### To be captains, USAF (Dental)

Vance L. Crouse, AO862546.  
Robert W. Hayes, AO1906508.  
Edward Jones, OG1678.  
Julius G. R. Staerckel, AO1907285.

##### To be first lieutenants, USAF (Medical)

John A. Barrett, Jr., AO3000121.  
Robert R. Burwell, AO2260646.  
Richard L. Butler, O1939081.  
Launly J. Credeur, O1940138.  
Walter A. Fairfax, Jr.  
Billye G. Gant, AO694665.  
Theodore J. Haywood.  
James M. Lancaster, Sr., AO2260204.  
Victor J. Lash.  
Michael J. Maffei.  
Joseph A. Munnely, AO939124.  
Howard M. Pollack, AO3001185.  
Russell E. Randall, Jr., AO2261683.  
James P. Taylor.  
Robert Van Hook.

##### To be first lieutenants, USAF (Dental)

Sam E. Adkisson, AO1906540.  
Jack E. Troutt, O985900.

##### To be first lieutenant, USAF (Medical Service)

Frank M. Isbell, AO2239819.

The following named persons for appointment in the Regular Air Force in the grades indicated, with dates of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, 80th Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947), and section 307 (b), Public Law 150, 82d Congress (Air Force Organization

~~TOP SECRET~~

64  
Friday, February 11, 1966  
8:45 A.M.

P

FOR THE PRESIDENT

From McGeorge Bundy

1. The Vice President has had an excellent day of energetic public activity, and I believe others will be reporting on that.
2. My own time has been spent discussing strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers. I find strong agreement here with our Washington judgment that Ambassador Porter has all the necessary qualifications for the assignment you outlined in the Honolulu conference as chief of non-military activity under the Ambassador. A 3-hour talk with Porter reinforces my own support for this view. There is also strong agreement that this is the time to get Ambassador's own understanding and support of this position. Finally, there is agreement that the most important element in persuading the Ambassador is his understanding of your personal insistence on a strengthened effort on the side of peaceful action here.
3. I therefore plan to present this matter to the Ambassador as one of high personal concern to you, and to say that in my judgment a visible assignment of this responsibility to Porter by Ambassador Lodge will be an important follow-on step to the Honolulu conference, and a major reinforcement of the Johnson program for Vietnam.
4. Designation of Porter to do this job will require some administrative rearrangements among other Embassy officers, but in Hawaii Alexis Johnson informed me that these changes would be relatively easy for both Embassy and Department, and the first day of inquiry here confirms this judgment.
5. It will not be possible to resolve these matters with the Ambassador until the Vice President's visit is over, because the Ambassador takes one problem at a time. Meanwhile, I will work on other related administrative problems, and if you have reservations or questions about the central matter of Porter's designation, there is still time for me to pull back.
6. The general atmosphere here is enormously better than it was a year ago. There is a long and tough job ahead, but the Mansfield report is just plain wrong and we believe there can be a Humphrey report which proves it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-14  
By isa, NARS, Date 10-4-84

~~TOP SECRET~~



65

February 11, 1966  
Friday, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Hornig trip. I'm all set to wire the VP to quietly sound out the Paks on the Hornig mission, as you requested. Since the VP only gets to Karachi Tuesday the 15th, however, and Hornig's group is due to leave the 19th, this would leave only two days turnaround time to postpone it. Doing so at the last minute would risk some minor unpleasantness, besides inconvenience to the people Hornig is gathering.

So it might be better to decide now whether to go ahead or postpone. Hornig says you've asked him for a memo on this. One way would be for him to go ahead as scheduled and fly commercial, but to tell our Embassy to put its Convair at his disposal in Pakistan. I can hold off wiring the VP till Monday a.m.

R. W. Komer

OK \_\_\_\_\_

Wire VP \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

February 11, 1966  
Friday 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State has proposed the attached contingency messages for use if Turk President Gursel dies. One is to Mrs. Gursel, one to the Acting President and another to Prime Minister Demirel. We would release them upon delivery.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Approve ✓

Disapprove       

*State has been  
notified  
9:15, 7/12/66  
saw*

cc: Bill Moyers

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66a

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION: Ambassador ANKARA

LINDIS

~~XX~~

/Please deliver following message from President Johnson to

Mrs. Gursel:

QUOTE: Dear Mrs. Gursel:

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our heartfelt sympathy on the passing of your distinguished husband. The memory of his lifetime as a soldier and statesman in the service of the highest ideals will be a legacy of inspiration to us all. We in America share your bereavement in the loss of this great and good man. You can be assured that our thoughts and prayers were always with him in his illness and that they are now with you in your grief.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

~~XX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ White House plans release upon notification  
of delivery, unless objection perceived.

NEA/GTI:J.Mlowison/

EALare:sn:2/10/66

2732

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

S/S

White House

S/CPR - Mr. Armour

P-Mr. McCloskey

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

66-6

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION: Ambassador ANKARA

LIRDIS

~~XX~~  
/ Please deliver following message from President Johnson to

Prime Minister Demirel:

QUOTE: Excellency:

President Cursel's passing has saddened all of us who have observed with respect his selfless contributions to the Turkish Republic.

President Cursel's term in office spanned highly significant years in Turkey's development. His departure is that of a respected associate and valued friend. My associates and I and the whole American people share Turkey's grief during this tragic period.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

~~XX~~  
~~XXXXXX~~ White House plans release upon notification of delivery, unless objection perceived.

NEA:GTI:MLJ:Howison:sn:2/10/66 2732

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

S/S -

White House -

P-Mr. McCloskey

S/CPR - Mr. Armour

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66-c

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION: Ambassador ANKARA

LIMDIS

~~XX~~  
/Please deliver following message/to Acting President

Atasagun from President Johnson:

QUOTE: Excellency:

I extend to you and to the government and people of Turkey my condolences and those of my fellow Americans on the tragic passing of President Cemal Gursel.

We had hoped that, when he came to us for medical attention, we could look forward to his return to his country in restored vigor and health.. This fervent wish was not destined to be fulfilled but I want to assure you that his passing was among sincere friends ~~XXXXXX~~/who had long come to respect his ideals and accomplishments.

The close ties of friendship existing between our two countries make us feel deeply Turkey's loss of a wise and valiant leader. Our hearts are with you in your sorrow.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

~~Unless~~  
~~XXXXXX~~NEA:CTI:jellowison/  
RAHare:cn:2/10/66

2732

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

S/S -

White House -

P-Mr. McCloskey

S/CPR - Mr. Armour

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2

~~XXXXX~~ AmEmbassy ANKARA

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unless objection perceived.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1966  
Thursday 8:00 p.m.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Alex Johnson wants your OK on this circular  
advising key posts about Honolulu meeting.

*R. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

Approve ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*State has been  
notified by  
Pres. Smith*

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Authority

NLJ 84-29

By

NARS, Date 3-2-84

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO ALL DIPLOMATIC  
POSTS

1. Following report should provide guidance for your discussion of Honolulu meeting with host Government and other leaders, public and press. In developing theme set forth below you should call on Communique and Declaration of Honolulu, President's remarks at Los Angeles following meeting, ~~republican~~ statements by Vietnamese leaders at meeting, etc., available in wireless files:

2. Meeting in Honolulu Feb 7-8 between President Johnson and leaders of Government South Viet-Nam yielded solid benefits to help move us toward our objective of a free, prosperous Viet-Nam able to determine its own fate free of outside interference. The meeting was devoted primarily to programs in the social, economic and political fields which are of at least equal importance to our military efforts in achieving our basic goals in Viet-Nam. Although there was general discussion of the military

~~XX On the personal plane Honolulu provided an opportunity for the leaders of both nations to get to know each other and to speak personally about the wide range of common programs and problems, however~~

Drafted by:

FE :Lunger:hjh

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

R. Johnson

Circulation:

FE - Mr. Bundy

White House.

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Page 1a X of telegram to Circular

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situation and military strategy, no attempt was made to reach decisions in this area; this was not a "war" conference, much less a conference on how to escalate the war, but rather was overwhelmingly devoted to common action to improve the situation of the Vietnamese people.

3. On the personal plane Honolulu provided an opportunity for the leaders of both nations to get to know each other and to speak personally about the entire range of common programs and problems, however

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and  
delicate the latter might be. This frank/ friendly ~~and sincere~~ relationship  
collaboration.  
will provide valuable base for future ~~relations~~ Moreover, participation

many members  
by ~~the members~~ of Cabinet of both countries should help assure a

consistency of purpose and reduce bureaucratic blocks to programs

You should note output  
endorsed in Honolulu. (FYI: ~~the Honolulu~~ Honolulu/avoided ~~the pitfall~~)

~~Let~~ our seeming to rest our policy on association with one or several

personalities and any output ~~expressions~~ from your post should be similarly

framed, it being understood that our support goes to the Government of

rather than to any individuals as such.  
South Viet-Nam and to the struggle its people are carrying on. END FYI.

4. ~~the~~ Central theme of meeting was review of rural construction ~~program~~

PAREN formerly called QUOTE pacification UNQUOTE END PAREN program

/ and adoption of measures to assure on GVN side that it will be vigorously

and effectively pursued and on our side that it will receive all appropriate

support from us. Rural construction, briefly defined, is process

administered by GVN by which social and governmental fabric is reconsti-

tuted. This entails above all the work in areas (mostly rural) of cadre

covering fields of local security, political action and economic and social

development, who are supported by GVN civil and military machinery

and also by US assistance in all those fields. Without the close cooperation

and confidence between government at local level and the villagers, the

Viet Cong infrastructure cannot be rooted out of Vietnamese countryside



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Classification

and conventional military <sup>action</sup> ~~success~~ will not bring to Viet-Nam a security in which freedom can thrive.

5. ~~At~~ At Honolulu rural construction program received <sup>both</sup> ~~governmental~~ endorsement and exhortation to move forward as rapidly as it can be properly carried out. Secretary Freeman, Secretary Gardner, Mr. Keppel and U.S. Surgeon General were on hand to study with their Vietnamese counterparts how they and their agencies might best contribute to rural construction program and to other needs in Viet-Nam in fields of agriculture, health and education, and certain tentative conclusions and program goals were reached. These will be further studied and elaborated during the current visit to Viet-Nam <sup>by Vice President and</sup> ~~by~~ Secretary Freeman and his group <sup>agricultural</sup> ~~of~~ experts and later by Secretary Gardner, Mr. Keppel and the Surgeon General.

6. ~~The meeting also provided~~ ~~an opportunity for data exchange and~~ ~~the exchange of information on the situation in Viet-Nam and for a more detailed view~~ ~~of the situation in Viet-Nam~~ ~~which was provided~~ a most useful occasion ~~to~~ to review the complex of measures adopted in January during Administrator Bell's visit to Saigon to control inflation and foster economic stability and there were concrete decisions taken at the highest ~~level~~ level to pursue the requisite measures as a matter of urgency.

7. ~~American participants at Honolulu were struck by the progressive~~

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Page 4 of telegram to CIRCULAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Classification*

thinking and determination of the young Vietnamese leaders and their ~~exceptional~~ espousal of a program of real political, economic and social reform which they call their "social revolution". Those leaders appeared also to be realistic and both we and they are conscious that it is one thing to articulate good purposes and programs with sincerity but something else to put them into practice, particularly while they are at the same time fighting a most cruel and bloody war to defend their country, <sup>a war that is as much directed at</sup> the Government's administrative structure as at its armed forces. / The Declaration of Honolulu should give a picture of this spirit, having in mind in ~~in~~ particular that Part II, the "~~Declaration~~ <sup>Purposes</sup> of the Government of Viet-Nam" flows directly from the Prime Minister's own statement made at the first plenary session.

8. ~~XX~~ ~~XXXX~~ The Communique and Declaration also demonstrate the common purpose of our two Governments on the basic principle of continuing the diplomatic efforts for peace despite the demonstrated attitude of the Government of North Vietnam, and the necessity of our fighting side by side to turn back the aggressor as long as he persists in his plan for conquest. (FYI. P.M. Ky's statements reported by press re his unwillingness ~~any~~ to sit down to negotiate, specifically with the NLF, ~~does not pose a real threat to our situation where we have no other government groups who would deny us their total rejection of negotiation~~)

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Page 5 of telegram to CIRCULAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

arose in a response to a question which by implication was asking in effect whether the ~~main~~ NLF was the real key or should be the ~~main~~ sole negotiating agent. Obviously neither he nor we could have answered this form of question other than in the negative. Ky was not specifically responding to question about possible way NLF views could be heard in the event Hanoi repeat Hanoi was prepared to negotiate, and there is not now any real issue here in the face of ~~Hanoi's present attitude~~ Hanoi's present attitude. PAREN Our position on NLF representation remains as set forth in the President's July 28 press conference and in QUOTE fourteen points UNQUOTE END PAREN. In any case Ky has made it clear in his participation in the Declaration that he will QUOTE press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum UNQUOTE. course Neither he nor the US, of ~~course~~, is prepared to ~~take~~ take action which could be interpreted as recognizing the NLF as having the attributes of a government. Even Communist bloc has not recognized it as a government. If question raised on these subjects, use the foregoing as your guidance. END/FYI)

9. FYI. If question of prisoner treatment, bombing civilians, Cambodian involvement are issue in your country, your attention drawn to para 9 of Communique. If question raised on Vice President accompanying Vietnamese leaders back to Saigon, you can say that this was at Vietnamese own choice. END FYI.

10. The value of the Honolulu meeting was such that it was readily agreed that ~~more~~ further such sessions should be held. They will provide an occasion for, among other things, progress reports on the various decisions taken at the meeting.

GP-3.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

*Rec'd  
President's  
2-10-66  
4:20P*

MEMORANDUM

NSC PRIMARY INTEREST

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SANITIZED**

*file  
Send Xerox to Jim  
68  
Sent 2/11/66  
E*

February 10, 1966  
Thursday 4:00 p.m.

LBJ LIBRARY  
Mandatory Review  
Case # NLJ 86-191  
Document # 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our Ambassador to Indonesia will be here February 11-16. State thinks it would be useful for you to see him for a few minutes.

The power struggle in Indonesia between Sukarno and the Army is the second biggest story in Southeast Asia. In the last 4-5 months some 100,000 Communists have been killed. But the outcome in this key nation of 100 million is still uncertain. Our interest in it is great, however, that a first-hand report from Green might be useful.

[REDACTED]

(4)(5)

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Yes ✓

No \_\_\_\_\_

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-191  
By sig, NARA, Date 5-15-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*DP*

①

70

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

In the roundup of Latin American developments which I sent you last night I mentioned the shooting of student demonstrators in Santo Domingo yesterday morning. The incident turned out to be more serious than the initial reports indicated. The shooting of students at the Palace led to a series of terroristic incidents during the course of the day. The toll now stands at something like 8 dead (including 3 policemen) and 30-40 wounded.

As to be expected, yesterday's events adversely affected Garcia Godoy's negotiations with Minister of Defense Rivera Caminero concerning the latter's departure. Rivera Caminero is insisting on full compliance with his conditions before he leaves, particularly the complete dismantling of the rebel camp. Public attitudes toward the police and military have hardened to the point where Garcia Godoy is not sure that he can sell his compromise of having Rivera Caminero leave but retaining the Army and Air Force Chiefs.

Ellsworth Bunker reports that most of the businesses in Santo Domingo remained closed today and a general strike has been called. The IAPF, which was not involved in yesterday's events in any way, is again patrolling the downtown area to maintain order. Bunker and Garcia Godoy today continued their efforts to work out a settlement with the military. Bunker says that they did not make much headway but at least the channel of negotiation remains open.

WGB  
William G. Bowdler

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-239  
By fw, NARA, Date 11-18-93

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1966  
Wednesday, 7:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I understand that you have agreed to see, briefly, a Moroccan special envoy whom King Hassan wants to send to explain his side of the Ben Barka case.

State wants to advise the Morrocans that you could see him for 10-15 minutes on 14 or 15 February. Marvin Watson's office suggested that I check these dates out with you.



R. W. Komer

✓  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer \_\_\_\_\_



February 9, 1966  
Wednesday, 7:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You have just received the attached letter from Mrs. Gandhi. After thanking you fulsomely for the three million tons of food grains, she reinforces B. K. Nehru's plea for interim economic aid.

The \$100 million program loan should prove a more than adequate answer when the Vice President reaches Delhi. I will clear with you the instructions on this matter, either this evening or tomorrow morning.

R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - February 9, 1966  
5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Significant Latin American Developments

During the past two weeks there have been these important developments in Latin America which are of special interest to us:

Elections in Costa Rica. The first of eight national elections to be held in Latin America this year took place in Costa Rica last Sunday. In line with Costa Rica's democratic tradition, it was an honest election, and the opposition candidate, Jose Trejos, won.

Trejos, a highly respected professor and dean of the School of Economics of the National University, is a staunch democrat and friend of the United States. His political orientation is slightly to the right of center. He will assume office on May 8 with several disadvantages: (1) his margin of victory was very narrow -- about 1%; (2) he failed to win control of the unicameral National Assembly; (3) he is the candidate of a very loose coalition formed to oppose the candidate of the party in power. As a result, Trejos is likely to encounter rough going in getting much done. We should find it easy to work with him.

The next major election in the Hemisphere is the general election in Guatemala, scheduled for March 6. We are far from sure that the military group in power will permit free elections, if indeed they allow them to take place at all. For the past two months we have discreetly used our influence to prevent moves aimed at cancellation. Now we are examining what we might do to persuade the government to hold honest elections and permit the winner -- probably the civilian candidate of the opposition party -- to assume office.

Slow Progress in the Dominican Republic. Almost three weeks have passed since Gaamano left the DR, but the regular military have yet to comply with Garcia Godoy's orders to take up their foreign assignments. Garcia Godoy seems close, however, to obtaining at least partial compliance. Minister of Defense Rivera Caminero says he is ready to go provided Garcia Godoy (1) "demilitarizes"

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-239  
By W, NARA, Date 11-18-93

the camp where the remnants of the rebel forces are quartered, (2) improves the rations and clothing of the armed forces, and (3) commits himself not to remove the present service chiefs during the life of the Provisional Government. With certain qualifications, Garcia Godoy has accepted these terms -- the last one reluctantly because his original orders called for departure of the Army and Air Force Chiefs. There is a possibility that Rivera Caminero will leave before the end of the week.

So far, Bosch and elements of the left have withheld applying pressure on Garcia Godoy while he negotiated with Rivera Caminero. There are indications that this self-restraint is wearing thin. Students today marched on the Presidential Palace. Shooting broke out, and we understand that several demonstrators were killed or wounded. (The IAPF was not involved) More demonstrations and violence may follow after it becomes known that Garcia Godoy has not insisted on 100% compliance by the regular military officers, as he did with Caamano and his lieutenants. Ellsworth Bunker has doubts about Garcia Godoy's wisdom in allowing the Army and Air Force Chiefs to remain, but he says that this is a matter which Garcia Godoy had to decide for himself.

Latin American Reaction to the Tri-Continental Conference. The Soviet-sponsored Havana Tri-continental Conference continues to be a propaganda boon for us in this Hemisphere. Last week the OAS (Chile and Mexico abstaining) approved a strong resolution condemning the interventionist character of the meeting. At the UN yesterday, all the Latin American delegations (including Chile, but not Mexico) signed a letter to U Thant saying much the same thing. In several countries, the Foreign Minister has called in the Soviet Ambassador and asked for an explanation of Soviet intentions. Moscow has responded lamely, trying to label the Latin American reaction as a U.S.-engineered smoke screen to hide continued military intervention in the DR. Ambassador Kohler reports that the Soviets are squirming and urges that we maintain the propaganda pressure. State and USIA are doing this.

Sino-Cuban Rift Widens. Since late 1964 when Castro climbed off the fence on the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Cuban relations with Peking have been steadily deteriorating. Public airing of differences came last month when Castro, in the opening address of the Tri-Continental Conference, complained that the Chinese

were reneging on commitments to send increased rice shipments to Cuba. The Chinese promptly replied, saying in effect that Fidel is a liar. Castro last Sunday issued a public blast at least as vehement as his periodic attacks on us. The statement is peppered with abrasive terms such as "hypocritical," "repulsive," "cynical," "venomous intent," "criminal act," "perfidy," "malevolent insinuations," "absolute contempt," "total ignorance," "blackmail," "piracy," and "oppression". He went so far as to categorize the Chinese with the "U.S. imperialists" -- the ultimate insult among communists.

We do not know why Castro replied with such fury. His pride and sensitivity may have gotten the best of him. A more likely explanation is that the 1966 trade talks in Peking have broken down because the Chinese have imposed political and/or economic conditions to continued assistance.

Rostow's Mission to Peru. Walt Rostow last Friday delivered your letter to President Belaunde and orally explained our interest in resuming normal AID assistance if he would agree either to work out a settlement with the International Petroleum Company or maintain the status quo for the remainder of his term. Belaunde said he would reply to your letter shortly. On Walt's oral presentation, his response was: (1) he will try to settle the IPC case within the next year; (2) under no circumstances does he intend to confiscate the IPC or impair its status; (3) his political possibilities for settling the IPC case would be improved by resumption of normal assistance from the U. S. ; (4) on Vietnam he will continue to support the Vatican peace initiatives.

Walt put these points in a memorandum which Ambassador Jones subsequently showed to Belaunde saying that they would form the basis for Walt's report to you on his mission. Belaunde agreed that the contents of the memorandum reflected the substance of his conversations with Rostow.


We believe that Belaunde's response meets the conditions on IPC which we laid down for resumption of normal aid. State-AID are now examining some of the projects which have been held up.

~~SECRET~~

-4-

Gordon and Vaughn Hearings. Linc Gordon spent most of the day yesterday testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his nomination. A good deal of the questioning centered on Brazil and the issue of dictatorship vs. democracy. Linc made very clear that the Administration stands firmly behind promoting democracy but it cannot adopt an attitude which is automatically determined by a set formula. Some Senators (Clark and Morse) made a deliberate effort to drive a wedge between him and Tom Mann. He refused to be drawn into an argument on this, saying that you had charged him with running Latin American affairs but that he was also in the chain of command to the Secretary of State and would act accordingly.

Jack Vaughn had his turn before the Committee today. According to the press accounts he took issue with Morse on his charge that certain Administration advisers had "walked out on freedom in Latin America". Morse announced that he would vote against Vaughn's nomination. I understand that Fulbright and Clark said they would vote for him. No vote was taken on either the Gordon or Vaughn appointments, however, when Morse raised the question of no quorum. Fulbright said the vote will come tomorrow or later.

  
Bromley Smith

cc - Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~

rec'd  
2-9-66  
2-9-66  
8:48P

R. K. 74

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1966  
Wednesday, 5:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We now expect a UN food for India appeal on Friday. Following your earlier guidelines, I have asked that Goldberg make an immediate supporting statement, making no new US promises but seizing the occasion to call on others once more to do their share.

His proposed statement is attached and we will go ahead unless you prefer otherwise.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

☒ approve  
☐ disapprove  
☐ see me



DRAFT STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

The United States welcomes the eloquent appeal addressed to the world community which has just been issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Director General of FAO. The United States Government has been in almost constant discussion with the Government of India on its food needs. A team of U.S. Government experts recently toured India to work with the government there to get a clearer idea of the total dimensions of the crisis and what steps might be needed to meet it. A week ago President Johnson announced the immediate allotment of 3 <sup>additional</sup> million tons of grain to be shipped to India as quickly as possible, bringing United States emergency grain commitments to India during the current U.S. fiscal year to 6½ million tons.

My government has stated publicly its firm belief that all nations in a position to do so should join in a special international effort to help India meet

the grave

X FROM QUICK CO

- 2 -

the grave food problem it is now confronting. We have also said that we are fully prepared to participate in such an effort. India's problem is the world's problem. We believe that all men of goodwill have a stake in seeing that people do not starve. As President Johnson said last week -- "You can be sure America will do more than her part."

It is inconceivable to me that the world community will not do its part to help the people of India in their hour of need, for their needs are urgent and the time is short.

CLEARANCES:

AGR - Mrs. Jacobson *JA*

IO - Mr. Kotschnig *KK*

SOA - Mr. Sober *KS*

OES - Mr. Kiefer *AK*

*JA*  
IO/OES:LvanNort:cm  
2/8/66

**XEROX FROM QUICK COPY**

75

February 9, 1966  
Wednesday, 1:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Turk President Gursel had another stroke the night before last at Walter Reed. The doctors see a real chance that he might die. You have been sending flowers every other day. I hesitate to suggest a quick visit (and don't even know if he can receive visitors) but you might send another personal note like the attached.

R. W. Komer.

cc: Bill Moyers

75a

Dear President Gursel:

I have been staying in close touch with your doctors, and am rooting for your quick recovery. My thoughts are with you, and if there is anything further that we can do to make your stay more comfortable, do let me know personally.

With warm regards,

His Excellency  
General Cemal Gursel  
President of the Republic  
of Turkey  
Walter Reed Hospital  
Washington, D. C.

cc: Bill Moyers

LBJ:RWK:mm

Wednesday, February 9, 1966  
1:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Arthur Dean called to say that General Norstad had cornered him along the following lines: Neither Gavin or Ridgeway, top combat soldiers that they were, ever had much training or background in the general field of strategy. Neither were very competent in this respect. Norstad saw Gavin's letter to Harpers as a spur of the moment affair. However, Norstad suggested that since Max Taylor was an architect of our present Vietnam policy, he would have that much more difficulty in making an impression on the critics. Norstad suggested getting someone else with broad military experience as well. He did not volunteer, but Dean got the distinct impression that Norstad would be willing to write to Harpers or even testify if asked.

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers



22

JJ called Komer and told him to  
tell Bell to be sure to caution these  
people. That we haven't decided on  
the program yet. Humphrey is <sup>to be</sup> in  
New Dehli to negotiate.

2/9/66  
11 a.m.

Did or  
PWK



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, February 9, 1966  
10:15 A.M.

1030

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On Indian/Pak loans, Dave Bell says he forgot to mention the need for Hill consultation as promised by us last year before we resumed.

We have time before the V.P. hits Delhi, and propose to touch base with Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Fulbright, Albert, Morgan, Mrs. Bolton, and Mahon. However, Bell wants your okay before doing so.

RWK  
RWK

O. K.           V          

Add following

MEMORANDUM

78c

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

February 7, 1966

(~~SECRET~~ - ~~With Enclosures~~)

MEMO FOR BROMLEY SMITH

9

SUBJECT: Message of Reply to President Johnson from  
the Brazilian President

Do you know whether President Castello Branco's letter has  
been shown to the President? If it has not gone to him, I  
will prepare a short memo for his evening reading file for  
tomorrow, when I assume he will be back.

OK  
Bicy

WAB

WGBowdler

February 9, 1966  
Wednesday, 9:30 A. M.

79

Mr. President

This is not for daytime reading  
unless you want to take a quick  
look before you see Eban.

RWK

*Get to McGB for info*