

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

19810

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	to Robert W. Komer from Joseph W. Barr Secret (dup of #4a, Files of Komer, Chroni Mar 21-31, 1966, Box 1) 1 p	03/30/66	A
#4 memo	to President from R. W. Komer confidential (dup of #7, see above) open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255 1 p	03/30/66	A
#4a letter	to President from Maxwell D. Taylor confidential (dup of #7a, see above) open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255 1 p	03/29/66	A
#6 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential (dup of #16, see above) 2 p	03/29/66	A
#7 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential open 10-19-83 1 p	03/29/66	A
#9 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13 1 p	03/29/66	A
#9a letter	to PRESIDENT FROM MDT secret open 10-19-83 1 p	03/29/66	A
#12 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13 1 p	03/29/66	A
#12a letter	to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake from President Secret open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13 2 p	undated	A
#12b letter	to President from PM Keith Holyoake Confidential open 6-15-103 NLS 02-186 2 p	03/24/66	A
#13 memo	to President from R. W. Komer confidential open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255 2 p	03/28/66	A
#14 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13 1 p	03/28/66	A
#14a memo	NSC Memo #343 secret open 7-25-84 NSC letter 7-25-80 2 p	03/28/66	A
#15 memo	to the PRESIDENT FROM Wm. Bowdler Secret (dup of #36, Files of Komer, Chroni Mar 21-31, 1966, Box 1) open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255 1 p	03/28/66	A
#16 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential (dup of #37, see above) open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255 1 p	03/28/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~W. Allen Files~~
~~McGeorge Bundy~~ - Memos to the President, vol. 21
Robert Komer,

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18 memo	to the President from R.W. Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> confidential	1 p 03/28/66	A
#18a communique	re: Visit of PM Indira Gandhi confidential	4 p 03/66	A
#21 letter	to President Giuseppe Saragat from Pres. Johnson <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> Secret	1 p 03/28/66	A
#23 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 7-28-94 NLS 94-179</i> confidential	3 p 03/27/66	A
#25 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> top secret (dup of #59, Files of Komer, "Chrono: 3/21-31/66" Box 1)	1 p 03/25/66	A
#25a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> top secret (dup of #59a, see above)	2 p 03/18/66	A
#25b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk top secret <i>sanzitized 7-4-93 NLS 92-371</i>	2 p 03/16/66	A
#25c report	re: India top secret	12 p undated	A
#26 memo	to the President from William Bowdler Secret 1 <i>sanzitized 8-8-95 NLS 93-225</i>	1 p 03/25/66	A
#26a memo	re: Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	1 p 03/25/66	A
#26b report	re: Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	2 p undated	A
#26c report	Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	1 p undated	A
#26d report	re: Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	1 p undated	A
#26e report	re: Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	1 p undated	A
#26f report	re: Dominican Republic secret <i>exempt 12-2-95 NLS 93-227</i>	1 p undated	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~Aides Files~~
~~McGeorge Bundy~~, Memos to the President, vol. 21
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#30 memo	for the record by Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> secret 2 p	03/25/66	A
#31a memo	for the President from R. W. Komer confidential 1 p	03/24/66	A
#31b message	for President Park from Pres. Johnson confidential 2 p	undated	A
#32 memo	for President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 1 p	03/24/66	A
#33 memo	for the President from Wm. Bowdler confidential <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> 1 p	03/24/66	A
#34 memo	to the President from Wm. Bowdler confidential <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> 1 p	03/24/66	A
#36 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential 1 p	03/24/66	A
#36a message	text of message from Pres. Johnson to PRES. Park. confidential 2 p	undated	A
#37 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> confidential (dup of #83, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/21-31/66, box 1) 1 p	03/23/66	A
#38 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer top secret (dup of #84, see above) 1 p	03/23/66	A
#38a report	re: India top secret exempt per RAC 9/01 1 p	undated	A
#39 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential (dup of #85, see above) 1 p	03/23/66	A
#41 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 1 p	03/23/66	A
#41a memo	NSC Action Memo Secret (dup of #111a, see above) 3 p	03/23/66	A
#47 memo	to PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> confidential 1 p	03/22/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, vol. 21
Robert Komer,

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#48 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> 1 p	03/22/66	A
#49 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler <i>open 8/31/92</i> Confidential 1 p	03/22/66	A
#50 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> 1 p	03/22/66	A
#51 memo	to the PRESIDENT FROM R. W. Komer secret <i>(dup of #101, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/21-31/66, Box 1)</i> 1 p	03/22/66	A
#51a memo	to Deputy Sec, Dept. Defense from Robert W. Komer secret <i>(dup of #101a, see above)</i> 1 p	undate d	A
#55 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>NLS 89-192 open 8-31-92</i> confidential 2 p	03/21/66	A
#55a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk <i>open 8/31/92</i> secret 1 p	03/21/66	A
#55b report	re: India <i>Sanitized, 8/31/92</i> secret 10 p	1966	A
#55c report	re: India <i>Sanitized, 8/31/92</i> Secret 2 p	undated	A
#55d report	re: India <i>Sanitized, 8/31/92</i> Secret 2 p	undated	A
#55e report	re: China, Vietnam, Pakistan Secret <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> 2 p	undated	A
#55f report	re: India <i>Sanitized, 8/31/92</i> Secret 2 p	undated	A
#55g report	re: India <i>open 8/31/92</i> Secret 2 p	undated	A
#57a memo	to the President from A. J. Goodpaster Secret 1 p 03/21/66	03/21/66	A
#57b memo	for the record by A. J. Goodpaster Secret 1 p	03/21/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~Wides Files~~
~~George Bundy~~ - Memos to the President, vol. 21
Robert Komer,

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#58 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i> 2 p	03/21/66	A
#59 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer " Secret 1 p	03/21/66	A
#66 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>exempt NLS 94-82 open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> Secret (Poss. dup of #6, Files of Komer, Chron: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 1 p	03/19/66	A
#67 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>Sanitized 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/18/66	A
#67a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk Secret <i>open 7-4-93 NLS 92-371</i> 1 p	03/18/66	A
#68a letter	to Pres. Johnson from Erhard <i>exempt 3-4-96 NLS 94-248</i> SECRET (dup. of #10a, Files of Komer, Chron: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 3 p	03/18/66	A
#71 memo	to the President from Bowdler & RWK secret <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/17/66	A
#71b cable	copy of Santo Domingo 2126 Secret 2x 1 p	03/17/66	A
#71f List	Press Guidance Secret 3 p	undated	A
#72 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 1-18-12 NLS/RAC 11-47 (420)</i> Secret <i>Sanitized 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/17/66	A
<i>dup #20</i> <i>Komer Chron 3/1-20/66 Box 1</i> #74 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> Secret (Poss dup of #25, Files of Komer, Chron: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 2 p	03/16/66	A
#75 memo	to the President from Robert W. Komer top secret (Dup of #27, see above) 1 p	03/16/66	A
<i>Edg #4-b, Subj. File, Nrc. Weapons, Italy vol. 1, Box 34</i> #75a memo	to Deputy Sec. Defense from Robert W. Komer top secret (Dup of #27a, see above) 1 p	03/19/66	A
#75b memo	to the President from Cyrus Vance top Secret (Dup of #27b, see above) 2 p	03/11/66	A
#76 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential 1 p	03/16/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
- Memos to the President, vol. 21
Robert Komer -

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76a memo	Dean Rusk to American Embassy Colombo possible classified information 2p	03/11/66	A
#76b cable	copy Colombo 742 confidential <i>(dup of #9c, Files of Komer: Chrono: 3/1-20/66; Bv1)</i> <i>open 9-30-94 NLS 94-250</i> 2 p	03/14/66	A
#79 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/15/66	A
#80 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler confidential <i>(Poss. dup of #34, see above)</i> <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/15/66	A
#81 memo	to the President from Wm. G. Bowdler confidential <i>open 1-26-96 NLS 95-197</i> 1 p	03/15/66	A
#82 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/15/66	A
#84 memo	to the President from Francis M. Bator confidential 1 p	03/14/66	A
#85 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>(dup of #41, see above)</i> <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/14/66	A
#86 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 1 p	03/14/66	A
#86b letter	to President Johnson from Leopold Sedar Senghor confidential <i>Exempt per NLS 84-13</i> 2 p	02/26/66	A
#88 letter	to Harold Holt from President Johnson secret <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 2 p	03/14/66	A
#91a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 1 p	03/12/66	A
#92 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>sanitized 5-19-87 NLS 86-191 (dup of #54, Files of Komer: Chrono: 3/1-20/66; Bv1)</i> <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/12/66	A
#93a memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>sanitized 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i> 1 p	03/11/66	A
#94 agenda	re: Vietnam meeting secret 1 p	03/11/66	A
#95 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i> 1 p	03/11/66	A

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National Security File, ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ - Memos to the President, vol. 21
Robert Komer

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#96 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret (dup of #64, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 1 p	03/11/66	A
#97 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13 1 p	03/11/66	A
#98 agenda	proposed agenda secret 1 p 03/11/66	03/11/66	A
#99 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential open 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 1 p	03/10/66	A
#100 memo	To the President from R. W. Komer confidential open 8/31/92 NLS 89-192 1 p	03/10/66	A
#100a cable	text of New Delhi 2302 open 9-30-94 NLS 94-250 secret (dup of #73a, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 2 p	03/10/66	A
#101 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret open 8/31/92 NLS 89-07 1 p	03/10/66	A
#102 memo			
#103 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Confidential open 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 1 p	03/10/66	A
#104 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler open 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 Confidential Dup of #83, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/1-20/66, Box 1 1 p	03/09/66	A
#105 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential Sanitized 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 1 p	03/09/66	A
#107 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer secret (Dup of #86, Files of Komer, Chrono: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 1 p	03/09/66	A
#108 memo	to the PRESIDENT from James C. Thomson, Jr. & Komer Confidential 1 p	03/09/66	A
#109 memo	to the President from Wm. G. Bowdler open 8/31/92, NLS 90-170 confidential 1 p	03/08/66	A
#110 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer open 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 confidential (Poss dup of #91, Files of Komer, or 147 Chrono: 3/1-20/66, Box 1) 1 p	03/08/66	A
#114 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential open 4-17-85 NLS 94-249 1 p	03/08/66	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] - Memos to the President, vol. 21
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#118 memo	to the President from Wm. G. Bowdler confidential <i>7129 90-170</i>	<i>8/31/92</i>	
#119b letter	to Kaunda <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i>	03/07/66	A
#119 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential <i>(Dup. of #18, SHOSC, Kaunda, Box 61)</i>	<i>3/8/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#119a letter	from President Kaunda to Pres. Johnson confidential <i>(Dup. of #18a, Zambian, Kaunda, Box 61)</i>	<i>03/07/66</i>	<i>A</i>
<i>(Dup. of #119a, see above)</i>	<i>CF, CF, P03-2) [also #68 & 68a, NSF, Files of Haynes, Chrono Box 1]</i>	<i>undated</i>	<i>A</i>
#121a letter	translation of Gen. De Gaulle letter to Pres. Johnson secret <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	<i>03/07/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#122 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i>	<i>03/07/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#124 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer Secret <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i>	<i>03/05/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#124a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 2-14-84 NLS 84-17</i>	<i>03/02/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#126 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler Secret <i>open 8/31/92, 7129 90-170</i>	<i>03/05/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#127 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i> <i>(Dup. of #114, Files of Komer, Chrono: 311-20/66, Box 1)</i>	<i>03/04/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#128 memo	to the President from Chester L. Cooper top secret <i>(Dup. of #117, see above)</i>	<i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i> <i>03/04/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#128a letter	to President Johnson from Harold Holt top secret <i>(Dup. of #117a, see above)</i>	<i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i> <i>03/04/66</i>	<i>A</i>
<i>open 7-16-03</i>			
#130 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler confidential <i>(Dup. of #119, see above)</i>	<i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i> <i>03/04/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#131 memo	to the President from Komer confidential <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i> <i>(Dup. of #120 or 121, see above)</i>	<i>03/04/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#134 memo	to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer confidential <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i>	<i>03/03/66</i>	<i>A</i>
#135 memo	to the PRESIDENT from Francis M. Bator confidential	<i>03/03/66</i>	<i>A</i>

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, ~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ - MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT, vol. 21
Robert Komer

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#135a memo	to the president from Dean Rusk <i>open 8-20-92 NLS 92-371</i> confidential	2 p 03/02/66	A
#136 memo	to the President from R. W. Komer top secret <i>(Poss. duped #44, Intelligence File, Sanitized, 12, 8x4)</i>	1 p 03/03/66	A
#137 memo	to the President from William G. Bowdler secret	1 p 03/03/66	A
#137a cable	text of Santo Domingo 2034 confidential	3 p 03/02/66	A
#138 memo	to the President from R.W. Komer confidential <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i>	1 p 03/03/66	A
#139 memo	to the President from Chester Cooper secret <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i>	2 p 03/03/66	A
#16a letter	President Johnson to His Excellency Leopold Senghor <i>possible classified information</i> <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i>	No date	A
#16b letter	Leopold Senghor to President Johnson <i>possible classified information</i>	2p " 03/7/66	A
#29 letter	President Johnson to President Modibo Keita <i>possible classified information</i> <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i>	2p 03/25/66	A
#32a letter	President Keita to President Johnson <i>possible classified information</i> <i>Exempt from NLS 84-13</i> <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i>	3p 02/2/66	A
#32b letter	President Johnson to President Keita <i>possible classified information</i> <i>open 7-25-84 NLS 84-13</i>	2p No date	A
#35a letter	Keith Holyoake to President Johnson <i>possible classified information</i> <i>open 6/5/03 NLS 02-186 (#126)</i>	2p 03/24/66	A
#47b letter	President Aden Adulla Osman to Pres. Johnson <i>possible classified information</i> <i>Exempt from NLS 84-13</i> <i>open 8-24-95 NLS 94-255</i>	2p 02/27/66	A
#48h letter	VP Kuchuk to Pres. Johnson <i>possible classified information</i>	2p 02/7/66 "	A
#52 letter	Pres. Johnson to Pres. Diaz Ordaz possible classified information	1p 03/22/66	A

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#53 letter	President Johnson to President de Gaulle possible classified information <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	3p 3/22/66	A
#54 draft of	letter to President de Gaulle possible classified information	4p No date	A
#56a text of	letter from Pres. Ordaz <i>open 8-24-95</i> possible classified information <i>NLS 94-255</i>	1p 3/8/66	A
#57c draft	letter to President de Gaulle possible classified information	3p No date	A
#66a letter	Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan to Pres. Johnson possible classified information <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-248</i>	1p 3/66	A
#82a letter	Pres. Johnson to Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi possible classified information	2p 3/15/66	A
#82b letter	Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Pres. Johnson possible classified information	4p 2/26/66	A
#83 letter	Pres. Johnson to Leopold Senghor <i>open 7-25-84</i> possible classified information <i>NLS 84-13</i>	1p 3/15/66	A
#115 letter	President Johnson to President Kaunda possible classified information	1p 3/18/66	A
#123 letter	President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson possible classified information <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1p 3/7/66	A
#123a letter	President Johnson to President Aldo Moro possible classified information <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1p 3/7/66	A
#123b letter	President Johnson to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard possible classified information <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1p 3/7/66	A
#123c letter	President Johnson to President de Gaulle possible classified information <i>open 2-25-94 NLS 92-377</i>	1p 3/7/66	A
#138a letter	President Johnson to President Nasser possible classified information <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-249</i>	1p 3/4/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~██████████~~
Robert Komer - Memos to the President, vol. 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

March 30, 1966
Wednesday, 4:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Barr has touched base with the Hill on the Vietnam inflation package. His report is attached, and seems to be about as good as we'll get.

He also attaches McNamara's comments. Bob was concerned only about one relatively minor aspect.

Inflation being as critical a problem as we have on the civil side in Vietnam (and likely to get much worse as we continue sending in troops), I'd urge approving Joe Fowler's recommendations as soon as possible. Then the IMF Mission to Saigon can get going, and we get another chance to look at the merits when they return with their proposals.

I am leaving Ambassador Leonhart as my rear echelon. He'll be sitting in my old EOB office, and will be happy to move on this or any other Vietnam matter you may want to take up through us in my absence. We're only a two-man show as yet, but we're already operating.

R. W. Komer

Approve Fowler proposals _____

Leonhart see me _____

I'll call Fowler _____

*Komer memo of 3/25/66 to Pres on stopping inflation in VN
and Fowler memo also attached*

~~SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERT W. KOMER
THE WHITE HOUSE

After our discussion on Monday, I called Secretary McNamara and told him that I was sending over Secretary Fowler's memorandum of March 23 with my own covering memorandum detailing the conversations I had had with Senators Mansfield, Douglas and Symington, Speaker McCormack and Congressman Reuss. I also informed him that the President had asked that this subject be brought to his attention for comments.

Secretary McNamara called back on Tuesday to state that he objected to our reference to "inadequate port facilities" in the March 23 memorandum. He indicated that at this moment port facilities were adequate to handle any present volume of imports. He also indicated that if we deemed it desirable to increase this volume, he would accept the responsibility of providing the necessary port facilities.

Secretary McNamara added that with regard to the rest of the inflation program, he did not feel inclined to comment but indicated that he would accept and support our conclusions.

As of this moment Senator Mansfield has never called me back, and my advice would be to leave this situation alone. I seriously doubt that we can persuade him, but I do not believe (from my two conversations with him on Monday) that he will cause us any trouble. With Senators Douglas and Symington, plus Speaker McCormack and Congressman Reuss, solidly in support of the program, I believe that we are justified in recommending to the President that he should proceed promptly.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Htr 11/23/79
By glip, NARA, Date 4/22/94

J. W. Barr
Joseph W. Barr

~~SECRET~~

2

March 30, 1966
Wednesday, 4:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moyers/Komer trip. Rusk has given his blessing, now that Lodge is on board. Bill and I are ready and will plan to proceed for 9:00 a.m. departure from Andrews tomorrow unless you blow the whistle on us.

Bill agrees that we should sneak away quietly and let Bob Fleming announce our departure after we are somewhere over the Pacific.

R. W. Komer

March 30, 1966
Wednesday, 12:40 P.M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tom Mann and the Bureau of African
Affairs are the "who" in this case.

R. W. Komer

Att in suspense file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 30, 1966
Wednesday, 12:30 P.M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I'm not sure you ought to put the needle in to SecState quite as quickly as General Taylor suggests. It seems a little rude, when Taylor doesn't want to make a review till September. I'd suggest telling Taylor you want him to do this later, and to raise it again with you in about three months. Shall I?

R. W. Komer

Yes _____

No _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 40, NARA, Date 8-4-95

4a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 29, 1966

Mr. President:

Now that the new organization for handling overseas interdepartment matters, which you directed on March 4, has been initiated, the question will soon become how well it is being used and how effective it is in accomplishing its purposes. I would suggest a review of its operation about September 1 by which time it will have been in effect about six months. If you agree, I recommend that either the Secretary of State be directed to make such a review and report his findings to you or that I be directed to do so as your representative. A draft letter directive is attached.


Maxwell D. Taylor

- a. No action desired _____
- b. Directive to Secretary of State _____
- c. Directive to General Taylor _____

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 120, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft

Dear _____:

On March 4, 1966, I approved National Security Action Memorandum No. 341 which charges the Secretary of State with authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. Because of the importance which I attach to the improvement of the conduct of our interdepartment affairs overseas, I am most desirous that the organization and procedures prescribed in NSAM-341 be thoroughly tested and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in achieving the purposes which led to these changes.

In order to get an early sensing of how this new arrangement is working, I would like you to make a review of its operation and report your findings to me on September 1, 1966. Between now and that date, all officials involved in this new procedure will cooperate with you fully in providing the information and assistance necessary for the preparation of your report.

Sincerely,

~~The situation~~
big to Watson 5

big to Watson

March 30, 1966
Wednesday, 10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Archbishop Iakovos wants to talk about the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul, but your main reason for seeing him is to reassure Greek-Americans of your interest. Iakovos is just back from Istanbul, where he claims Turk authorities refused to let him celebrate Mass. Your best tack may be just to listen sympathetically and ask for his suggestions--but not promise anything.

The situation. The Turks have been harrassing the Church in Istanbul--all within the letter of Turkish law. This is retaliation for Greek Cypriot harrassment of the Turk minority on Cyprus. We don't like this, but we don't have much leverage unless we're ready to buy the Turks a Cyprus settlement--and we still don't see an opening for that.

Our position. We're afraid that any official support for the Patriarch would hurt more than help. The Turk government would resent our meddling in what they consider an internal affair and would take out its resentment on him. The Patriarch himself agrees that it's best if Americans lie low, but that message doesn't seem to have got through to Iakovos. This is chiefly an honest difference of opinion with Greek Americans over what will do the most good. Unfortunately, Iakovos thinks we're unsympathetic because we don't do anything.

Talking points (the best tack may be to get the jump on him):

1. You're pleased to see Iakovos but sorry to hear that the Church is having trouble.

2. You are deeply sympathetic to the plight of the Patriarch. You feel that public support from you might do more harm than good. But you would welcome Iakovos suggestions on how we might help quietly.

Response to his suggestions. He may say it would help for more US officials to visit the Patriarch. We can tell State to do that. But he may ask for financial help or use of our diplomatic pouches for his mail. You can turn these off by pointing out the problems of USG supporting any Church.

R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

Tues. March 29, 1966
10:15 pm

F-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

George Woods is eager to start working over the Indians on a self-help and aid package as soon as he knows where we stand. Therefore, if you are satisfied as a result of your talks that Mrs. Gandhi intends to adopt the major economic reforms that we and the World Bank have been seeking, the best way to move ahead might be for me to tell Woods on your behalf. State, AID and I suggest we tell him the following, which protects us with plenty of caveats:

1. You have concluded from your talks that she is prepared to liberalize India's import control policies as well as internal price, marketing and other business controls which have been inhibiting economic growth, provided the necessary financial support is forthcoming. Additionally, she is prepared to adjust exchange rates and tax policies to support liberalization.
2. In order to move more rapidly toward self-sufficiency in food production, Mrs. Gandhi has assured you that India will follow through in emphasizing agricultural development, making adequate fertilizer available to the farmers and vigorously seeking to attract foreign private investment in fertilizer production.
3. She has also spoken to you of India's efforts in the family planning field and of her determination to accelerate these programs.
4. In turn you have indicated to Mrs. Gandhi your realization that the liberalization program described above can be implemented only with assurances of substantial financial support. You are prepared to say informally that if India actually takes the necessary steps to the satisfaction of the World Bank and the other consortium donors (including ourselves) we are prepared to help provide needed support for such a program in phase with its execution, subject of course to Congressional appropriations.
5. You currently believe that we will be able to support the Indian economic reform program in FY 1967 with about \$385 million of AID loans (if Congress meets your aid request) and \$50 million of EX-IM Bank loans -- the same levels as pledged in recent years. Of this amount you are prepared to extend an increased proportion in the form of program lending. You also understand that the economic reform program will require a debt rescheduling in which the U. S. will take its share --

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 5/15/78 + NSC
By gip, NARA, Date 4/22/94

approximately \$30 million for FY 67 (much less than the Europeans). All this is, of course, conditioned not only on India's actually following through with its reform program, but also on the willingness of other consortium members to bear an appropriate portion of the burden.

6. Finally, in view of our continuing wish to provide our support in coordination with the World Bank and the other members of the Indian Consortium, you have suggested that Mrs. Gandhi have her senior financial and planning officials come to Washington as soon as possible in order to work out an agreement with the World Bank and the IMF regarding the details of the economic reform program and the financial backstopping arrangements. We expect the Bank to take the lead in coordinating the necessary consultations between India and the governments of the consortium members.

This package is the real McCoy -- much more so than emergency food. If George Woods, with our backing can drive the tough bargain which he contemplates, we will have accomplished more in moving India via our aid leverage than in the last six years combined. And we will have done so at little if any greater out-of-pocket cost than in 1963 or 1964. I stress again that this is a self-enforcing bargain -- if India doesn't make the reforms we and the Bank want, it doesn't get most of the dough. This puts the choice squarely up to them. I may be over-enthusiastic, but I see this as a major foreign policy stroke, affecting 500 million people in the largest country in the Free World.

R. W. Komer

Tell Woods _____

See me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 29, 1966
9:30 pm

F
2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moyers/Komer Trip. Bill did send out the message you wanted -- via Rusk to Lodge (attached).

Thanks to Saigon's leak, our going out shortly now becomes an issue of confidence. Not going would suggest undue worry here. I've checked with Rusk, who agrees to our leaving Thursday unless the VN political crisis grows appreciably worse.

I've gotten reservations for us to leave commercial at 2 p.m. on Thursday afternoon and go straight to Saigon (31 hours). We'd arrive around 9:35 a.m. Saigon time Saturday morning. Vance is due to arrive at 2:30 p.m. the same day.


We could reduce the likelihood of press speculation by making clear before we left and after we arrive that we were there to listen and learn -- not to intervene in local politics. We could reinforce this impression by avoiding other than courtesy calls on the GVN leadership.

May we proceed Thursday on this basis? I personally believe that Bill and I together could, after one week, give you an inside view of what's really going on, which could be of real value. If Bill cannot go for one reason or another, however, I think I must proceed alone. I have to be at least a one-week expert before I can be an effective czar. Neither Saigon nor State sees any problem in Bob Komer's travels, though if I go and Bill doesn't it will fuel a new round of speculation.

R. W. Komer

Approve _____

See me _____



minutes J-BC
8

Tuesday, March 29, 1966
9:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

India Food Message Final. At Tab A is the latest revised text incorporating the changes made on your copy, and omitting the caveat to which Ellender objected. Rusk, Bell, Freeman all agree to drop it, so I have. In my judgment, you'll probably want to go back for more come fall, but sufficient unto the day thereof.

Also dropped is the para. on our disappearing surpluses. Freeman was not as worried as Schultze or Schnittker that it would depress prices, but conceded.

The Press Office has mimeographed the message and is ready to roll.

At Tab B are the cost figures certified by Schultze and Freeman. They include both how much we've spent already since 30 June 1965 (6.5 million tons), and the cost of the new package in the message.

At Tab C is the draft Joint Resolution prepared by Schultze and cleared by McPherson. Who sponsors? Schultze would prefer to include the binational foundation in the resolution instead of going the legislative waiver route, but the rest of us disagree and have left it out.

Manatos reports that Mansfield thought your meeting went very well; even Ellender was much more cooperative than Mansfield expected. Mansfield says, however, that unless the resolution goes to the Agriculture Committee we're begging for trouble. He thinks that if you amend the message the way Ellender wants, it will help buy his vote (we've done so -- would you want to tell him?). Mansfield sees no other committee opposition, and promises to generate debate on the floor, but is eager to handle the resolution as speedily as possible.

R. W. Komer

8a

A

Final Revised Master
3/29/66 9:30 pm

In recent months I have been watching with deep concern the emerging problem of world food supply. And I have been especially concerned with the prospect for India. During this past week I have discussed the Indian food problem with the Prime Minister of India, who has been our welcome and distinguished guest here in Washington. I am persuaded that we may stand, at this moment, on the threshold of a great tragedy. The facts are simple; their implications are grave. India faces an unprecedented drought. Unless the world responds, India faces famine.

Strong efforts by the Indian government, and our help, have so far averted famine. But in the absence of cooperative and energetic action by the United States, by other nations and by India herself, some millions of people will suffer needlessly before the next crop is harvested. This, in our day and age, must not happen. Can we let it be said that man, who can travel into space and explore the stars, cannot feed his own?

Because widespread famine must not and cannot be allowed to happen, I am today placing the facts fully before the Congress. I am asking the endorsement of the Congress for a program that is small neither in magnitude nor concept. I am asking the Congress, and the American people, to join with me in an appeal to the conscience of all nations that can render help.

If we all rally to this task, the suffering can be limited. A sister democracy will not suffer the terrible strains which famine imposes on free government.

Nor is this all. The Indians are a proud and self-respecting people. So are their leaders. The natural disaster which they now face is not of their making. They have not asked our help needlessly; they deeply prefer to help themselves. The Indian government has sound plans for strengthening its agricultural economy and its economic system. These steps will help India help herself. They will prevent a recurrence of this disaster. I also propose action through the World Bank and the Agency for International Development to support this strong initiative by the Government of India.

THE CRISIS

Since independence India has done much to increase her output of agricultural products. Her agriculture has not been neglected. From 1950 to 1965 she increased food production 75 percent. This is a creditable achievement. But India has had to contend with a continuing and relentless increase in population. Her people have also consumed more from a higher income. Accordingly, she has remained heavily dependent on our help. Last year we provided, under Public Law 480, more than 6 million tons of wheat, equal to more than two-fifths

of our own consumption. To keep this supply moving, the equivalent of two fully loaded liberty ships had to put in at an Indian port every day of the year.

Now India has been the victim of merciless natural disaster. Nothing is so important for the Indian farmer as the annual season of heavy rain -- the monsoon. Last year, over large parts of India, the rains did not come. Crops could not be planted, or the young plants withered and died in the fields. Agricultural output, which needed to increase, was drastically reduced. Not since our own dustbowl years of the nineteen-thirties has there been a greater agricultural disaster.

Indian leaders have rightly turned to the world for help. Pope Paul VI has endorsed their plea. So has the World Council of Churches. So has the Secretary General of the United Nations. So has the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization. And so, in this message, does the President of the United States.

I have said that effective action will not be cheap. India's need is for at least 11 to 12 million tons of imported grain from January to December 1966.

Food in this world is no longer easy to find.

But find it we must.

Here is what I propose.

THE PROGRAM

Last fiscal year we supplied six million tons of food grain to India. So far in this fiscal year, I have allotted 6.5 million tons of grain for shipment to India -- more than the total of six million tons which we had planned to provide as a continuation of past arrangements. It is even more necessary in this emergency to keep the pipelines full and flowing and to insure that there is no congestion of rail or sea transport. India, furthermore, estimates an additional six to seven million tons of food grain will be necessary through next December beyond what has already been committed or expected.

I propose that the United States provide three and one-half million tons of that requirement, with the remaining three and a half million tons coming from those nations which have either the food to offer or the means to buy food. I invite those nations to match the amount which we will supply. For example, I am delighted to be informed that Canada is prepared to provide a million tons of wheat and flour to India.

Every agriculturally advanced country can, by close scrutiny of its available supplies, make a substantial contribution. I ask that every government seek to supply the maximum it can spare -- and then a little more. I ask those industrial countries which cannot send food to supply a generous equivalent in fertilizer, or in shipping,

or in funds for the purchase of these requisites. All know the Indian balance of payments is badly overburdened. Food and other materials should be supplied against payment in rupees, which is our practice, or as a gift. We will expect and press for the most energetic and compassionate action by all countries of all political faiths.

I have spoken mostly of bread-grains. The Prime Minister of India spoke also of other commodities which can meet part of the requirements or replace part of the need. In response to her needs, I propose that we allot up to 200,000 tons of corn, up to 150 million pounds of vegetable oils, and up to 125 million pounds of milk powder to India. The vegetable oil and milk powder are especially needed for supplementing the diets of Indian children.

In addition, India's own exchange resources can be released for food and fertilizer purchases if we make substantial shipments of cotton and tobacco. I am suggesting the allotment for this purpose of 325-700,000 bales of cotton and 2-4 million pounds of tobacco. Both of these commodities we have in relative abundance.

I request prompt Congressional endorsement of this action.

I urge, also, the strong and warmhearted and generous support of this program by the American people.

And I urge the strong and generous response of governments and people the world around.

India is a good and deserving friend. Let it never be said that "bread should be so dear, and flesh and blood so cheap" that we turned in indifference from her bitter need.

FURTHER ACTION

The Indian people want to be self-supporting in their food supply.

Their government has adopted a far-reaching program to increase fertilizer production, improve water and soil management, provide rural credit, improve plant protection and control food loss. These essentials must be accompanied by a strong training and education program.

I have directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation with AID, to consult with the Indian government to ascertain if there are ways and means by which we can strengthen this effort. We have long experience with short courses, extension training and similar programs. If they can be used, I feel certain that American agricultural experts would respond to an appeal to serve in India as a part of an Agricultural Training Corps or through an expanded Peace Corps. Many of our younger men and women would especially welcome the opportunity.

I am determined that in our assistance to the Indian government we not be narrowly limited by what has been done in the past. Let us not be afraid of our own enthusiasm. Let us be willing to experiment.

The Indian government believes that there can be no effective solution of the Indian food problem that does not include population control. The choice is now between a comprehensive and humane program for limiting births and the brutal curb that is imposed by famine. As Mrs. Gandhi told me, the Indian government is making vigorous efforts on this front.

Following long and careful planning and after discussions in recent days with Prime Minister Gandhi, I have proposed the establishment of the Indo-U.S. Foundation. This Foundation will be financed by rupees, surplus to our need, now on deposit in India. It will be governed by distinguished citizens of both countries. It will be a vigorous and imaginative enterprise designed to give new stimulus to education and scientific research in India. There is no field where, I hope, this stimulus will be greater than in the field of agriculture and agricultural development.

Finally, in these last days, the Prime Minister and I have talked about the prospects for the Indian economy. The threat of war with China and the unhappy conflict with Pakistan seriously interrupted India's economic progress. Steps had to be taken to protect dwindling exchange resources. These also had a strangling effect on the economy. Indian leaders are determined now to put their economy again on the upward path. Extensive discussions have

been held with the World Bank, which heads the consortium of aid-giving countries.

The United States interferes neither in the internal politics nor the internal economic structure of other countries. The record of the last fifteen years is a sufficient proof that we ask only for results. We are naturally concerned with results -- with insuring that our aid be used in the context of strong and energetic policies calculated to produce the most rapid possible economic development.

We believe Indian plans now under discussion show high promise. We are impressed by the vigor and determination of the Indian economic leadership. As their plans are implemented, we look forward to providing economic assistance on a scale that is related to the great needs of our sister democracy.

An India free from want and deprivation will, as Mahatma Gandhi himself once predicted, "be a mighty force for the good of mankind."

####

8c

B

8d
Feb B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The costs of the food aid program for India are set out below:

	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Market value</u> (millions of \$)
Cotton	325-700 thous.bales	49-105
Corn	200 thous. tons	11
Vegetable oils	150 mill. lbs.	24
Milk	125 mill. lbs.	25
Tobacco	2-4 mill. lbs.	2-4
Wheat & sorghum		
- already committed	6½ mill. tons	510
- proposed addition	3½ mill. tons	<u>275</u>
	<u>Total market value</u>	896-954

In addition there will be handling and shipping costs chargeable to CCC which bring the total value of the program to \$1 billion, if the upper end of the range is achieved.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Won't it risk spooking the Congress if we talk about giving roughly a billion dollars worth of PL-480 over what is essentially an 18-month period -- 1 July 1965 to 31 December 1966? The almost \$400-500 million called for through December in your new message looks whopping enough.

R. W. Komer

8e



March 29, 1966
Tuesday, 6:15 P.M.

9
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Before you meet with McNamara and the Chiefs this evening, you might look at attached memo from General Taylor on raising the air effort.

Even if you do not raise this matter tonight, you might want to make it the subject of an early meeting with Rusk as well as McNamara because of its major political implications.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
MLS 84-13	
By <u>DC</u>	NARS, Date <u>7-25-84</u>

SECRET

March 29, 1966

Mr. President:


As you know, on March 17 General Westmoreland cabled an urgent recommendation to increase at once the air effort against targets in North Viet-Nam and Laos in order to limit the accelerated influx of war materiel into South Viet-Nam in anticipation of the monsoon rains beginning in May. His cable is causing a comprehensive review of the past effectiveness of our air campaign and a consideration of possible changes in future target systems and levels of attack.

I presume that recommendations on this subject will soon reach you--indeed, a reply to General Westmoreland, in view of his sense of urgency of the situation, is now overdue. My own conclusion is that the time has now come to raise significantly the level of pressure on North Viet-Nam by attacking POL stocks, interdicting effectively the two railways linking Hanoi with China and mining Haiphong and the two secondary ports in the area. In the eyes of the Hanoi leaders, the ground war in South Viet-Nam must now appear to be going rather badly and it is important that they receive an equally discouraging impression from the air war. Not until they get a gloomy composite from both is there much hope of bringing them to negotiations. The risks involved in this course of action appear to me to be acceptable and, in my judgment, should be undertaken in view of the probable advantages accruing from a significant increase of pressures on the will of the leaders in North Viet-Nam.

Whatever the decision, I feel that General Westmoreland should have an early answer to his pending request.

MDT

SECRET



Tues. ,March 29, 1966
6 pm

top
2 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We've just completed a modern microwave telecommunications system linking Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. This is a CENTO project -- the longest such system in the world and a major engineering achievement. We put in \$20 million, and the locals about \$12 million.

Rusk hopes to attend the dedication ceremony on 20 April during the CENTO ministerial meeting at Ankara. He would like to read the attached brief statement from you (the other foreign ministers will read messages from their chiefs).

I'd recommend approval since this project has been a major part of our effort to build this minor military grouping into a base for regional economic cooperation as well.

R. W. Komer

Approve /

Disapprove



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

779
10a
1 - Corner
2 - RT

March 25, 1966

IN REPLY REFER TO:
S/S # 4257

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Statement by the President

I enclose for approval a suggested statement from the President which the Secretary would read in the course of his remarks at the dedication of the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications Project at Ankara on April 20.

At the dedication ceremony during the CENTO Ministerial Council sessions on April 20, the Secretary will symbolically turn over the U.S.-built microwave system to the three regional governments. The Foreign Ministers of the three countries are expected to include brief statements from their Heads of State -- the Shah of Iran, President Ayub, and the Acting President of Turkey -- in the course of the remarks which the Foreign Ministers will make at the ceremony.

The CENTO Telecommunications Project, which connects Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi by a modern microwave system, has now been completed and is in operation. It is the longest such system in the world (3,060 miles) and is generally regarded as a major engineering achievement. It represents an investment of \$20 million in U.S. Supporting Assistance grant funds and the equivalent of about \$12 million in local currency costs borne by the regional governments.

John G. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Statement

MAR 25 1966

MEMORANDUM

36
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, March 29, 1966 - - 1:30 p.m.

Tell SIS + Bowdler
Check drafts to
see if identical

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Alliance for Progress Anniversary Messages

State recommends that you express appreciation to the President of Honduras and the President of the Honduran Congress for their congratulatory messages (Tab C) on the Fifth Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress by:

1. sending to President Lopez the personal message at Tab A, and
2. authorizing Ambassador Jova to reply to Congressional President Rivera on your behalf along the lines of the message at Tab B.

I concur.

This is routine message.
RWK

WAB
William Bowdler

Approve ☒.

Disapprove ____.

Attachments

State informal (Honduran)
3/31/66
File sent to Central Files

11a



Suggested Personal Message from the President
to President Lopez of Honduras

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your thoughtful message on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. During the past five years, the people of Latin America and the United States have demonstrated what free men and women can accomplish when they join in purpose and effort as they have done under the Alliance. I am confident that in the coming years we will achieve even greater prosperity and unity for our Continent.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano

President of the Republic of Honduras

Tegucigalpa.

11c



Suggested Reply to be Made on Behalf of President Johnson

by US Ambassador Jova in Honduras to Congressional

President Rivera of Honduras

President Johnson has asked me to reply to your message on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

He is most appreciative of this expression of solidarity by yourself and the members of the National Congress. On his behalf I wish to convey to you the continuing purpose of the United States to move forward with Honduras and the other sister nations of the Hemisphere to enlarge our truly revolutionary cause, as expressed in the Alliance for Progress.

11e



11-f

Text of Congratulatory Message to the President from the President
of the National Congress of Honduras, Mario Rivera Lopez ,
on Occasion of Fifth Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

March 15, 1966

The President

The White House

On the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress I take pleasure in conveying to you and to the people and Government of the United States assurances of the gratitude of the National Congress of Honduras and of the continuing, enthusiastic adherence of this legislative branch to the program of the Alliance for Progress, on which we place our greatest hopes for bringing about in our countries a genuine economic and social revolution within the framework of free institutions.

Mario Rivera Lopez

President of the National Congress of Honduras

Text of Congratulatory Message to the President from President Lopez
of Honduras on Occasion of Fifth Anniversary of the
Alliance for Progress

March 15, 1966

The President

The White House

I have the honor to convey to you in my own name and on behalf of the Government and people of Honduras, our feeling of solidarity with Your Excellency and with the people of the United States on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, renewing to you the assurance of our intent to continue to cooperate in this most important program on which the American Republics rely in order to forge their progress and prosperity.

Oswaldo Lopez A.

President of the Republic of Honduras

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Holyoake (New Zealand)

We propose the attached response to Prime Minister Holyoake's decision to increase New Zealand's Vietnam efforts: from four guns to six for their artillery battery (a new total of 175 troops), and additional medical units on the non-military side.

This is about what we expected. But they can do far better on the non-military side, and we will keep up the pressure.

For signature

- a friendly acknowledgment
R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer



~~SECRET~~

12a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of March 24 brought the welcome news of your decision to increase the strength of the New Zealand artillery battery and to expand significantly your program of civilian aid to South Vietnam. I deeply appreciated this further contribution to our joint effort to assist in the defense of the valiant people of Vietnam.

In reaching your decision I know you have had to consider your existing commitment to the defense of Malaysia and the size of your armed forces. Your decision to increase your efforts in Vietnam demonstrates your clear-sighted appreciation of the meaning of the struggle for the future development of Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese, American, Australian, and South Korean forces now fighting in South Vietnam will be glad to hear of the strengthening of the New Zealand battery. The expansion of the New Zealand surgical team in Binh Dinh province and the establishment of two mobile health teams to work among the refugees in the camps in and around Qui Nhon will be welcome news, indeed, to these unfortunate victims of the Viet Cong.

Our two countries have in common a firm commitment to democracy and freedom. We also share vocal critics of our joint efforts in Vietnam. But I am convinced that, as our joint efforts begin to bear fruit and as Communist aggression is contained and turned back, our critics will

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By DCA	NARS, Date 7-25-84

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ultimately have to recognize that we have followed the proper course of standing firmly against surrender while at the same time avoiding a purposeless expansion of the war.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, C.H.

Prime Minister of New Zealand

Wellington.

~~SECRET~~

126
24 March 1966

Dear Mr President,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to deliver to you the following message by way of reply to your letter of 10 March about a New Zealand military contribution in Vietnam.

Message Begins:

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of 10 March and especially for your generous remarks about the value of the New Zealand Battery in Vietnam. The question of strengthening the Battery was being considered when your letter arrived, and it was most helpful to learn the views of General Westmoreland, as the Commander of the forces in the field, and also of course to receive your own. These reinforced my own conclusion that it would be desirable to increase the Battery from four to six howitzers, with an appropriate increase in personnel. A decision has therefore been taken to raise the establishment of the Battery in South Vietnam from the present level of four guns to a complement of six guns. I believe that in this way we will be able to make a more effective military contribution to the campaign in which we are engaged to help defend South Vietnam against Communist aggression.

We have also decided to increase significantly our civilian aid to South Vietnam. The surgical team based at Qui Nhon will be increased from seven persons to thirteen, two mobile health teams will be established to work among the refugees in the camps in and around Qui Nhon, and an Aid Coordinator will be appointed to act as Liaison Officer between the New Zealand teams in Qui Nhon and the Vietnamese provincial and local authorities. We hope that in this way we shall be able to play a larger part in the great humanitarian effort to alleviate suffering in South Vietnam, and we are also not unmindful of the fact that our increased presence in the country in a medical role will demonstrate more clearly than words the very real concern we feel for the victims of Communist ambition.

I shall be making a public announcement of these decisions shortly, but I wanted to let you know without delay what we have decided to do. I should be grateful if in the meantime you would keep this information confidential.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-186
By SJ NARA, Date 4-8-03

/The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The discussions we had with Vice-President Humphrey were - as he reported to you - extremely frank and cordial, and his visit served to maintain the understanding and reinforce the friendship that exists between our two Governments and countries. I thank you for making him available to visit us.

Sincerely yours,

KEITH HOLYOAKE.

Message ends.

Yours sincerely,

*Dispute
copy 1.*DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By *ij*, NARA, Date *8-4-95*

March 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mr. Arthur Stehling's letter of March 22 regarding
cotton for Indonesia

I have checked out the facts on the cotton deal which Arthur Stehling describes to you in his letter of March 22. Here is the picture:

1. The Indonesians do need raw cotton. (Indo mills have been running at 20 percent capacity for more than two years.)
2. Since last autumn a number of U. S. cotton dealers, including Stehling's clients, have attempted to sell cotton to Indo representatives who carry letters of credit issued by the Bank of Indonesia (Bank Negara). Because of the risks involved (the Bank of Indonesia's worsening condition), these dealers have sought CCC guarantees for the transactions.
3. At present, the Bank of Indonesia is virtually bankrupt. It will get only \$400 - 450 million in foreign exchange this year, but must pay out \$470 million of foreign exchange merely to service the now outstanding debt.
4. In the circumstances, a CCC guarantee for a Bank of Indonesia letter of credit is tantamount to direct U. S. assistance, since the chances of default on the letter of credit are extremely high.
5. Despite these risks, it might be in the interest of the U. S. Government to aid Indonesia via the CCC route, except for the fact that the top Indo leaders (Suharto, Nasution, etc.) have made it clear to our Embassy people throughout the past six months that they wish to avoid anything that looks like overt U. S. Government aid. It is our Ambassador's view that a CCC guarantee would be as identifiable a U. S. Government move as a PL 480 arrangement.
6. For this reason, State and Agriculture have consistently rejected the CCC route.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. Furthermore, in the particular case of Stehling's clients (Barnett Cotton Co., and Western Cotton Growers' Cooperative of Lubbock, Texas) there is no evidence that their claim to a special relationship with General Suharto is any more valid than a number of other claims made in the names of Suharto and Nasution. In each case it appears that the Generals have issued general hunting licenses for the commercial purchase of rice and cotton; but in no case does it appear that the Generals have so far been willing to accept overt U.S. government involvement in such transactions.

8. Obviously, this situation could change. Ambassador Green will be seeing Foreign Minister Malik in the next day or so and will broach the subject of assistance. It is possible that, now that the power of the Generals has been somewhat stabilized, Malik may request overt U.S. aid. In this event, a number of mechanisms -- including the CCC route and P.L. 480 Titles I or IV -- might be available to us. The CCC route would be somewhat more indirect, considerably more defensible in Congress, but would obviously involve a substantial profit to the middleman. A government-to-government PL 480 Title IV route would involve only a far smaller service fee to the private shippers.

R. W. Komer

Jim Thomson

13a

(Hal Saunders
said he was
going to ask
you to get
the facts,
Mr.)

Bob Komer:

I do not want to show any personal interest in
this at all, but see what the facts are and give
them to me on Monday. *March 28*

LBJ/mf

3-26-66

7:30p



26

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SECURITY STATE BANK AND TRUST
FREDERICKSBURG, TEXAS

ARTHUR STEHLING
PRESIDENT

March 22, 1966

Rec'd by Mr. [unclear] 25

Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson
President of The United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Our customers, Barnett Cotton Company and Western Cotton Growers Cooperative of Lubbock, Texas, have a contract of sale with Pentja Niaga of Djakarta to sell 40,000 tons of cotton to Indonesia, supported by irrevocable letters of credit issued by Bank Negara, Indonesia, for \$33,008,202.32. The order to issue these letters of credit was given by Lt. Gen. Suharto who was at the time Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Army. This bank, in association with its New York correspondents, has agreed to fund these letters of credit provided they obtain credit approval by CCC.

In the attempt to obtain CCC approval, I have attended a number of conferences at the State Department and the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA, which is now authorized to issue CCC guarantees of foreign letters of credit.

I was present when Mr. S. Sulaiman of Indonesia told Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, that Lt. Gen. Suharto desired this sale closed to show the Indonesian people he could do for them what pro-Chinese Sukarno could not do. It appeared to me at the time that Mr. Barnett felt that Sukarno was a mere puppet and that Suharto was really in control of the country. Since then I have had several conversations on the subject with Mr. Barnett and, while he has been very courteous, his attitude seems to be summed up in what he told me last week, "We still feel that the situation is not sufficiently clear to warrant the conclusion that Sukarno is not still in power".

When the new crop of cotton comes in we will have about twenty million surplus bales which will cost the United States \$20,000,000.00 a month to keep. Congressmen Poage and Mahon, among many other Congressmen, feel that with this situation confronting us we should guarantee Indonesian letters of credit even though that Country's economy may not be totally sound at this time.


Strangely enough, there are those in Foreign Agricultural Service who want to give the cotton away under the AID Program P.L. 480. Concerning this, Congressman Poage wrote me a letter which I received this morning, as follows: "I wrote you this morning and as I told you, I talked to Mr. Eskildsen. He suggested that the cotton might be included in the AID Program. I don't think we could do anything that would do greater damage to the standing of the Department of Agriculture than to shunt this off into a "give away" program. I told him so and I thought he was agreeing with me. I still hope he was."

Mr. President, there is attached an article by Marianne Means of Hearst Headline Service. I can attest that this article is remarkably factual. In addition to what she says, the Indonesian emissaries also said that Suharto was most anxious to obtain the raw cotton from us because Indonesian mills were idle and its workers without employment.

The letters of credit which our customers have from Indonesia expire within nine days. I strongly urge that you take a hand and cut the "bureaucratic fat" to which Miss Means refers, so that we may improve our relations with Indonesia and dispose of a large quantity of cotton for which we have no use.

With every good wish,

Respectfully yours,


Arthur Stehling

AS:km

Sluggish Bureaucracy

By MARIANNE MEANS

The Light's Washington Correspondent
with Hearst Headline Service

WASHINGTON — The late President Kennedy once sighed to a friend that "when I call up the State Department I get the feeling they think I'm intruding."

Now it is President Johnson's turn to flog the stubborn, stolid mass that is the State Department and despair of ever getting its sluggish bureaucracy moving in tune with fast-developing world events. The ponderous department is so blindly set in its ways that it has managed in the space of a few weeks to embarrass both the President and Secretary of State Rusk at least three times.

It would be an oversimplification to blame the department's failings on Rusk, and the President himself does not do so. Fielding one world crisis after another, Rusk simply does not have enough time to cope with the entangled and encrusted

State Dept.

layers of comfortable bureaucratic fat. Indeed, many observers here wonder if the problem might not be too much for any one man.

SERVES BADLY

But meanwhile the State Department has served the President badly in three situations of grave and far-reaching implications.

● Lt. Gen. Suharto, who became Indonesia's army chief of staff after the attempted Communist coup last October, sent special emissaries to the State Department in late January. The emissaries told high officials that President Sukarno was merely a puppet and Suharto was really in control of the country. They pledged Suharto's friendship for the West and reminded state of his long

record as an anti-Communist.

The emissaries requested permission to purchase U.S. rice and cotton so that Suharto could show the Indonesian people he could do for them what Sukarno, who was pro-Chinese, could not do. The U.S. is short on rice, because of the demands of the Viet Nam crisis, but possesses tons and tons of surplus cotton that the Department of Agriculture would be delighted to sell.

AGENCY DELAYS

State, however, refused to consider the request because it believed Sukarno to be still in command. Then last weekend, a month and a half later, Suharto openly pushed aside Sukarno.

But the State Department, as of this writing, is still playing it coy about the request. If they wait much longer, Suharto may grow so disgusted he will look elsewhere for friends.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1966
Monday, 7:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Califano and now Bill Moyers have finally worn down Secretary Rusk and others in State who wanted to fit the Vietnam job to their conception. As you know McNamara, Gaud and Raborn found no trouble whatsoever with the directive. Bill says that the attached draft is agreed with the Secretary of State, and has sent it to me to submit to you for signature. I am quite satisfied with it, as it leaves me a free hand to decide how much I should get in to actual operations as opposed to acting as a high-level expeditor. I simply see no point in deciding this issue until after I have a better feel for the real job that needs to be done.

The only items that have been sacrificed are specific authority for direct communication with Saigon (which I can manage anyway) and the clause about bringing to you any problems that cannot be resolved directly with the departments. Since I can do so in any case, I'll weep no tears over the absence of this specific injunction.

Signature recommended.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By DCA	NARS, Date 7-25-84

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mar 28, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 343

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

In the Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression. In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new initiatives and the effective marshalling of all governmental resources and programs being brought to bear in the civil sector of our commitments in Vietnam.

In my view it is essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam. I have accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this responsibility.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC LETTER 7-25-80By WPLU, NARS, Date 7-25-84

DCH/JK/JP

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador William Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared and coordinated covering all aspects of such programs and that they are promptly and effectively carried out. This responsibility will include the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification Program is properly coordinated with the programs for combat force employment and military operations.

His functions will include ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State.

In carrying out these duties, I want him to act in close and constant liaison with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies, and to draw on them for such administrative and other support as he may need. In addition to working closely with the addressee Cabinet officers he will have direct access to me at all times.

Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this NSAM.

LBJ

LBJ:RWK:mmm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 28, 1966 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Situation in Ecuador

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By lip, NARA, Date 8-4-95

For the past week the Military Junta in Ecuador has been faced with mounting pressures to step down. It began with a commercial strike in Guayaquil last Tuesday and has gradually spread to other cities. The base of the movement has also broadened to include other anti-Junta groups -- political parties, chauffeurs federation, students, etc. A deteriorating economic situation has added to the Junta's woes.

Last Friday the Junta, with the firm backing of the Armed Forces, seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Over the weekend, the picture changed as the strike continued and clashes between the Armed Forces and university students and other demonstrators increased.

Ambassador Coerr called State this afternoon to report that the Junta had announced that: (1) its members would "reintegrate" themselves into the Armed Forces and (2) there would be drastic changes in the plan for transition to constitutional government. Elections had been set for July 3. He did not know yet to whom the Junta would be turning over the government. The most likely possibility seemed to be a non-partisan civilian acceptable to the military and anti-Junta elements. A Guayaquil business-man -- Clemente Yerobi -- and former President Galo Plaza are rumored as likely candidates.

So far the Armed Forces remain united and firmly in control of the security situation. This afternoon's announcement reflects their decision that the present Junta should step down because it has lost public confidence and can no longer maintain a political climate which will permit meaningful elections in July. For the Armed Forces the way out is to put in a new face and adjust the date for elections to allow tempers to cool and make fresh preparations for elections.

Ambassador Coerr is active in this very fluid situation, using his influence to bring about a government of conciliation as rapidly as possible, while continuing to press for a return to constitutional government without delay.

There is nothing further at the moment that we can do from here. The Inter-American Interdepartmental Regional Group meets tomorrow to review the situation.

W.B.
William Bowdler

cc - Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~March 28, 1966
Monday, 6:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Senegal's President Senghor has written (Tab B) to ask you to extend Ambassador Mercer Cook's tour.

You recall that Cook (one of our six Negro ambassadors) submitted his resignation last August because he felt that AID was not giving enough attention to Senegal. (In 1964 he attempted to resign as Ambassador to Niger on the same grounds). We accepted, but delayed the effective date of resignation to avoid giving credence to rumors that the USG and its Ambassador were at odds.

While it's most unusual for a Chief of State to intercede again, Senghor and Cook have been close personal friends since the 1930s. So Rusk and Joe Palmer agree that a soft answer best suits our relations with Senegal, no matter how annoyed we are with Cook. State's recommended reply (Tab A) says that (a) we are gratified that our Ambassador enjoys Senghor's confidence, (b) Cook has already delayed his departure at our request, but (c) we would be pleased to extend him again if his personal affairs permit. I agree that this is the sensible way.

For signature.

R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By lig, NARA, Date 8-4-95

16a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing pleasure with my choice of Ambassador Mercer Cook to represent me in Dakar and satisfaction with the work he has done in increasing understanding in Senegal of the American people and the policies of their Government. It is always gratifying to know that an Ambassador enjoys the friendship and confidence of the Chief of State to whom he is accredited, and we fully concur in your high evaluation of Ambassador Cook.

Your suggestion that Ambassador Cook be asked to remain in Dakar is deeply appreciated. As you know, Ambassador Cook had earlier wished to resign and in response to our request consented to stay on until this summer, for which we have been most grateful. On the strength of your expressed desire to have Ambassador Cook remain, however, we will be pleased to ask him again to postpone his departure if he can possibly rearrange his personal affairs to do so.

I am also pleased that you chose to comment upon my Government's demonstrated desire to strengthen its assistance to Senegal. You may be sure that, within the limitations imposed by our worldwide commitments, my Government desires to help your country along the road to self-development.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94 255
By 128, NARA, Date 8-4-95

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 18, NARA, Date 8-4-95

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 42891
R-XXXII/R-XV
French

The President of the Republic

No. 280 PR/SP

Dakar, March 7, 1966

Mr. President:

In one of your previous letters you told me not to hesitate to address you directly when I needed to.

With that permission, I wish to inform you today of a problem that I consider important to the further strengthening of the friendly cooperation existing between our two countries.

If you had not asked His Excellency Mercer Cook, your Ambassador at Dakar, to remain at his post a few more months despite his resignation, I should not have informed you of the problem. The fact that you did not immediately accept Mr. Mercer Cook's resignation proves that you consider his continued presence in Dakar very useful.

That is also my opinion. As a former professor of French who has always taken an interest in the French-speaking Negroes of Africa, Mr. Mercer Cook was the ideal person to occupy a high diplomatic post in Africa. I can tell you that in Senegal, as well as in Niger, he has greatly contributed to a better understanding of the American people and the policy of their Government.

His Excellency

Lyndon B. Johnson,

President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

At a time when, as you know, the enemies of the United States are carrying on an intense campaign in Africa to present the American Government as the champion of imperialism, a man such as Mr. Mercer Cook, who has done a splendid job, must continue to assume the responsibility with which you have entrusted him.

I did not consult him before writing this letter, but it is my feeling that if you asked him to reconsider his resignation, he would agree to remain at Dakar. Indeed, your Government has, for several months now, clearly manifested its desire to strengthen its assistance to my country.

Thanking you for whatever reception you accord my letter, I beg you, Mr. President, to accept the assurance of my very high consideration.

[s] Léopold Sédar Senghor

Léopold Sédar Senghor

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Limited Official Use

Monday, March 28, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attempted High-jacking of Cuban Airliner

Last night, shortly after 8:00 p.m., a Cuban commercial airliner enroute from Santiago, Cuba to Havana suddenly changed course and flew toward Florida. We think that one or more persons aboard tried to high-jack the plane.

Two of our Air Defense Command fighters scrambled as soon as the Cuban airplane veered toward the United States and escorted it to Key West. When over Key West, the Cuban pilot, who reported that he had "political prisoners" aboard, asked permission to fly on to Miami. Air Traffic Control granted permission. The request may have been a gambit on the part of the crew to gain time in dealing with the presumed high-jackers because shortly thereafter the plane headed back to Havana.

We have unconfirmed press reports that the airliner crash-landed in Cuba and the would-be high-jacker -- the flight engineer -- machine-gunned the pilot and co-pilot and managed to escape.

I have asked the Cuban Coordinator in State to give me a full report on the incident. There is probably nothing we could have done to force the plane to land without endangering the lives of the 91 passengers reportedly aboard. But I think we should know what steps were taken, if any, to require compliance with instructions to put down either in Key West or Miami after the Cuban plane had entered our air space.

W415-
William Bowdler

cc - Bill Moyers

Limited Official Use

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 28, 1966
Monday, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is State's draft communique on your talks with Mrs. Gandhi. We're ready to make any changes you want to reflect today's talks.

These communiques never sing, because they're regarded as treaty language negotiated by the diplomats. But they never get much press play either. Your subsequent message to Congress will get the real play.

State will be sounding out Mrs. Gandhi's advisers. May I say that this text meets with your general approval?

R. W. Komer

Yes _____

No _____

cc: Mr. Valenti
Mr. Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ijg, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State letter 4/17/78
By JLHw, NARA, Date 4/25/94

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI OF INDIA
March 28-30, 1966

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President Johnson, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, has just completed an official visit to the United States of America. During her visit, Prime Minister Gandhi met the President and members of the United States Government.

During their discussions, President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi reviewed recent developments in South and Southeast Asia in the context of the universal desire of men and women everywhere to achieve peace that respects liberty, dignity and the pursuit of a better way of life. The two leaders agreed that at the present period of history, the primary threat in the area to the general achievement of this aspiration was posed by the aggressive and expansionist policies of Communist China. In this connection the President explained the policies the United States is pursuing to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam to defend their freedom

and

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

and to reconstruct their war-torn society. The Prime Minister explained the continuing interest and efforts of her country in bringing about a just and peaceful solution of this problem.

Prime Minister Gandhi in turn affirmed the determination of her nation to stand up with the utmost firmness to the Chinese Communist challenge to India. In this connection the Prime Minister and the President agreed that all free and peace-loving nations share responsibility for resisting this challenge wherever it may take place.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's emergency foodgrain requirements resulting from last year's unprecedented drought. They agreed that the problem should be viewed not in isolation but in the context of an incipient world-wide food deficit, a challenge to humanity as a whole that merits the sustained and serious attention of all nations. The Prime Minister described measures which the Government of India

is taking to achieve self-sufficiency in the nation's food production. The President assured her that the United States

Angus Young,
hopes to continue contributing more than its share of an
~~intends to continue to meet its responsibilities in the~~

international

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

international effort to alleviate India's immediate food deficit problem. It was agreed that further participation of other countries in this effort is desirable.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi agreed that there had already been considerable progress toward re-establishing the conditions of peace in the subcontinent and that it is necessary that this process continue in order that the peoples of both countries may concentrate their energies once again on the urgent tasks of national development and building an international great society. They also agreed on the importance of continuing to give full support to the United Nations and to its objective of resolving conflicts between nations through peaceful means, such as was recently demonstrated by mutual reaffirmation of both India and Pakistan of their obligations under the UN Charter.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of its people. Prime Minister Gandhi emphasized the high priority which India attaches to economic development. President Johnson assured Prime Minister

Gandhi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

Gandhi of the deep interest of the Government and the people of the United States in assisting India in its own massive efforts to raise the living standards of its people within the framework of a parliamentary democracy.

The President and the Prime Minister consider that the visit has reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship between the United States and India, based upon a shared commitment to constitutional democracy and a common revolutionary heritage. Their highly informative, frank, and friendly discussions have contributed to a valuable personal understanding between their two countries and their two peoples.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 28, 1966
Monday, 3:05 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Is there anything further you need in the way of briefing papers or talking points for Mrs. Gandhi -- either for tonight or tomorrow's 5:00 p.m. session?

I had the impression from your remarks and her's that the key session went remarkably well, and that the bargain was essentially struck. But I am eager to get ~~down~~^{done} whatever further is necessary.

R. W. Komer

March 28, 1966

Memorandum for Bob Komer

Please handle as we discussed by phone.

Marvin Watson

20

X

202

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, March 28, 1966
11:30 am

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Gale McGee is a little uncertain about whether to go with Vance or hold off and go with Bill and myself.

My own sense is that he should emphatically go with Vance. There's plenty of room, and he'll get the full picture. Moreover, I envisage Bill and me traveling out quietly via commercial line Thursday. This is an urgent matter if we're to get McGee squared away.


R. W. Komer

Tell him to go with Vance _____

Let him decide _____

(McGee will go with Vance)

3/28/64

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing this personal word to tell you what strength and comfort I draw from your stalwart friendship and support. I deeply appreciate the warm welcome you gave Ambassador Goldberg on his recent visit to Rome and also your strong reaffirmation of Italian-American understanding and solidarity.

The generous reference to the United States in your appeal to the Italian people for food for India was warmly received here as yet another proof of your dedication to the friendship between our nations and to the ideals we share. I have also much admired your efforts on behalf of the Alliance which has so well served all the free peoples of the North Atlantic area. Free men everywhere are in your debt.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Giuseppe Saragat
President of the Italian Republic
Rome

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 48, NARA, Date 8-4-95

FMB/vmr 3/25

~~SECRET~~

List of those invited to pre-briefing session on the Gandhi visit
--meeting with the President at 10 a. m. in Cabinet room, Monday, March 28

Secy Rusk
Amb. Ray Hare
William Handley
Amb. Bowles
Amb.unker
Secy McNamara (or John McNaughton)
Bill Gaud
Secy Freeman
Vice President Humphrey (will not return to city until 10:30 am)
Robert Komer

Those invited to TENTATIVE meeting at 1 pm with Pres (before
Moyers/Vance/Komer group leaves for Vietnam: Monday, March 28, 1 pm

Secy Rusk
Alexis Johnson
Secy McNamara
Cyrus Vance
Bill Gaud
Bill Moyers
General Taylor (out of town)
Robert Komer

cancelled

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, March 27, 1966

to P 23
w/attch

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Final Notes on Gandhi Visit. This is my valedictory as your Mid-East hand, but fittingly so because I don't think there's been a more important substantive meeting since Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna. The flow of people and memos citing this as a historic opportunity to settle on a new course with 500 million Asians suggests that this is more than a Chet Bowles promotion.

Moreover, I think that we finally have the Indians where you've wanted them ever since last April -- with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us asking for a new relationship on the terms we want. Circumstances helped (famine and the Pak/Indian war), but seldom has a visit been more carefully prepared, nor the Indians forced more skilfully to come to us (note how little press backlash about US pressure tactics -- when it's been just that for almost a full year).

The proof is that India is now talking positively about buying all the World Bank reforms; its line is now that it wants to go boldly in this direction, but can only do so if the consortium will help pay the inevitable cost. This is precisely where we wanted to maneuver the Indians -- into saying they'll help themselves if we'll respond in turn.

The Nature of the Economic Bargain. This is aptly described in Dean Rusk's memo at Tab A. I'd only add two points. First, I'd break away from the old pledge figure (435) and talk privately in terms of around a half billion dollars from all US sources -- it sounds more generous while the arithmetic is the same -- plus at least half a billion in food. This is over \$1 billion -- a generous response in anyone's league.

Second, I'd stress that this can be a self-enforcing bargain -- in two critical respects. Most of our dollar loan aid plus debt rollover (and the consortium's as well) can be tied directly to import liberalization, as we did with the Paks. If India doesn't liberalize to our taste, it just doesn't get the dough. Similarly, you have already proved how our holding back on PL-480 can force India into revolutionizing its agriculture. Once the famine is licked, I'm for continuing to ride PL-480 with a short rein -- it will be painful but productive. If these points don't add up to requiring self-help, I'll eat them.

That tough-minded George Woods and the World Bank are with us in reassuring. You've read the VP's report on his talk with Woods, and at Tab B is Gaud's memo on his views. Woods talks about "double or nothing"

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-179
By WJ, NARA, Date 6-24-94

3/27/66

being the only sensible course on India aid, and it's true that on any per capita basis our aid to India is very low (less than a dollar per person ex-food), while India's own self-help contribution to its development is higher than that of almost any other LDC (twice that of Pakistan).

But as I explained the other day I think we can get real results in the next two years without going to Congress for a lot more money.

Debt rollover is the backdoor financing key, and it's the same as aid. If India takes off as a result of our strategy, then we'll have a solid case to take to the Hill.

Political Conditions. We're not going to get as much from Indira on the political side, especially on Vietnam and Pakistan. She's new at being PM, scared of the coming elections, and lacking as yet in the confidence in her own position which would let her talk big. But we have a strong ally moving India toward us on these matters -- Mao Tse Tung. Just as he forced the Soviets in our direction, he's done the same with India. So the Indians are increasingly serious about China, and all we need do is nudge this trend along.

On Pakistan, the one thing that really grates Indians -- Dinesh Singh and B. K. Nehru are prime examples -- is that we "equate" 500 million Indians with 100 million Paks. If you would just tell Mrs. Gandhi that we can count, it would reassure her enough about our basic intentions that she'd stop any carping about our aid to the Paks.

If she raises military aid, I'd short circuit this by saying that it's far less important than economic issues and we plan no decisions for a while, beyond perhaps allowing sales. Nor do we intend to re-arm Pakistan to where it can threaten India. In fact, we favor both countries putting a ceiling on military outlays; we don't intend to finance an arms race indirectly via US economic aid. But India too must realize that forcing the Pak military to depend on Peking for arms would be folly from India's own viewpoint.

She's also ready to say in spades that India has no intention of taking over Pakistan. Get her to say so, and you can use it as powerful reassurance to Ayub. It's the best you can get him, because she simply can't give anything now on Kashmir (and it only creates useless trouble for us to try).

Emergency food is the trickiest problem. What's needed is both to give her reasonable confidence that Uncle Sam will help generously and to keep enough pressure on her to seek other help and push on with reforms. The best bet is to say you'll put it up to the Congress. But you should know that all your Executive Branch advisers are deeply worried lest Hill debate get out of hand, and create a sour aftermath to a successful visit. Even the sober Ellsworth Bunker reminded me of the 1951 experience when

3/27/66

Mr. Truman went for a \$190 million food loan to India; Bunker said the violent criticisms voiced in the debate set back our political relations far more than the food helped fill bellies. Ellender talking about sacred cows certainly won't help. You might ask Bunker about this.

You're the judge on Congress. I'd only urge that we design the message to create the least flap and give you the most room to maneuver. This means avoiding tight formulas which box us in, since the worst of the famine is yet to come. Also, what happens if you ask for only 3.5 million tons of wheat/milo, and then want to authorize another tranche around September when Congress is out of session?

Visit tactics. All those who know her urge you see her alone first, put her at her ease, and then trigger her spiel by asking where she sees India going.

If she says the right things, you have a whole range of responses. I'd be generous but general, telling her that if she does what she says we'll respond in kind. We'll abide by what India works out with the World Bank (up to around a half billion -- including debt rollover and EXIM).

The experts say there's a strong case for moving quickly in May/June, before India gets caught up in its election campaign and Indira loses room to maneuver. So you might urge that she send her economics ministers pronto to talk with the World Bank.

I'm also sending up State's briefing books, which have all the facts and background. You might want to reread the Strategy and Talking papers. I'll have an agenda for tomorrow's 10 a.m. pre-briefing session, at which we can clear up any last-minute points.

R. W. Komer

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Sat., March 26, 1966
6:30 pm

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reply to Sen. Tydings. I thought his speech generally first-class and down the line with your policy in most respects (we took several rough spots out of an earlier draft).

Indeed, it's too bad it got rather little press play except in the Sun.

It might be better to reply after the Gandhi visit, when you could massage Tydings (if it goes well) by saying that you've taken his good advice. Attached draft is done on this premise.

R. W. Komer

24a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Joe:

I much appreciate your sending me a copy of your India speech. It was a good one, and I find myself in most respects in full accord with your views.

In fact, I might say to you privately that it helped considerably to firm up my own thinking prior to my visit with Mrs. Gandhi. As our relations with India develop, I am confident that you will have no difficulty in strongly backing the Administration's course.

Sincerely,

Honorable Joseph D. Tydings
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Bel
Pres off
7:30 pm
3-24-66

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UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JOSEPH D. TYDINGS
MARYLAND

CARDED

March 24, 1966

MAR 24 1966

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a copy of
a speech I plan to make in the Senate on
Friday, March 25, on United States policy
toward India.

I hope you will find it interesting.
I would certainly appreciate any thoughts
you may have on it.

Respectfully,

ask Komer
to draft reply
L


Joseph D. Tydings

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, March 25, 1966
7:30 pm

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I've held this up as non-essential business. We have had later evidence that Mrs. Gandhi has no intention of going nuclear at any early date; hence I doubt that this problem need be aired extensively with her. Indeed, the only point which seems essential is to gently remind her that we would take a dim view of seeing our aid used indirectly to finance building the bomb. She'd get the point.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ing, NARA, Date 8-4-95

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ig, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

One of your trickiest jobs, with Mrs. Gandhi will be to stiffen her intention not to go nuclear, without promising too much. This won't seem hard because it looks as if she'll state this intention flatly. But while that seemingly lets us off the hook of deciding how much pressure to apply or how much to pay for that decision, we don't want to pass over the subject so lightly that she goes away thinking we don't take non-proliferation seriously or don't have a realistic alternative to offer if some day she decides she has to reverse herself.

Rusk has been over the alternatives extensively and concluded (attached) that -- even though we should try to head off India's going nuclear -- we should not now go as far as to offer India any solid assurance of nuclear help against nuclear attack. But he also feels we're not ready yet to close any doors. So he'd propose taking this line with Mrs. Gandhi:

- You agree wholeheartedly with her intention to limit India's nuclear energy development to peaceful uses and to concentrate on economic development.
- You agree that the nuclear powers should work out some way of assuring the non-nuclear powers against nuclear attack.
- You hope that, if the pressures to build the bomb mount, she will talk the problem over with us before deciding, because there may be ways to help India find the security it needs without assuming the heavy costs of nuclear defense.
- We are willing to share with her (as we did with Shastri) intelligence on the Chicom nuclear program.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Rusk's memorandum encloses a study reviewing all of our options -- non-proliferation treaty and comprehensive test ban, cutting off US aid if India goes nuclear, a US-Indian alliance, a Joint US-USSR guarantee or a US call for one, a private US guarantee of help against a nuclear attack, and nuclear sharing. These aren't all mutually exclusive, and Rusk's recommendations address chiefly the most difficult question of whether we're prepared to guarantee nuclear support to India.

While I agree with Rusk on the issue of nuclear support, I'd recommend you emphasize the importance you place on a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban and ask for Indian support in order to underscore your concern about the spread of nuclear weapons. I also believe that -- without threatening to cut off aid -- you might influence Indian thinking by making it clear how hard it would be for you through economic aid to underwrite an Indian nuclear weapons program.



R. W. Komer

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

256

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-371

By ju, NARA, Date 7-1-93

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 16, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Assurances and Nuclear Support
Arrangements for India

India may, at any time, decide to embark on a nuclear weapons program. While we do not expect such a decision soon, barring major unexpected changes in the situation the US Intelligence Board estimates that on balance India probably will do so within the next few years. I concur in this assessment. At the same time, it remains in the interests of the United States to curb nuclear proliferation, and an Indian decision to manufacture nuclear weapons would increase the probability that other countries would also decide to do so.

I believe that we should, therefore, attempt to head off an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons. To do so, we might in time have to be more responsive to Indian security needs, preferably in some way that will minimize our own commitment. However, we must recognize that this response would almost certainly involve an increased and more specific US commitment in the subcontinent and would entail important costs in terms of probable reactions of other states. The enclosed staff study reviews briefly our efforts to deal with this problem, defines the issue and sets forth the broad alternatives, and outlines some illustrative arrangements that could be considered if it is eventually decided to offer some form of [redacted] to India. I do not propose that you should now decide upon any one of these alternatives. These alternatives, including the possible [redacted] [redacted] are intended merely to illustrate for your background the possible general lines of action which may have to be considered.

1.3(a)(5)

1.3(a)(5)

I propose that when Mrs. Gandhi comes to Washington you let her know that we are sympathetic to her policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, and to her efforts to give priority to India's economic needs and development.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

- 2 -

I believe you should indicate that you agree that nuclear powers should try to work out some arrangements to safeguard the security interests of non-nuclear powers. As she is aware, we have raised the matter privately with the Soviet Union, and it has also been a subject of continuing discussion at Geneva.

I believe you should also say that in any case if a growing Chinese Communist nuclear capability should ever pose a serious threat to India, you hope she would frankly discuss the question with us so that we could examine together possible means to meet that threat without nuclear proliferation and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons program.

Implicit in the over-all question of assurances to India is the basic issue of what degree of nuclear support the United States is willing to proffer to non-nuclear nations. In this connection I recommend that you not offer India any bilateral nuclear assurances at this time.

1.3(a)(5)

Secretary McNamara and Mr. Foster concur in this recommendation. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer not to offer India at this time any nuclear assurances beyond those given by you in October, 1964.) We would of course wish to continue to examine other possible arrangements outlined in the enclosed study. We will continue to study these alternatives.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Possible Assurances and Nuclear
Support Arrangements for India

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SANITIZED

WASHINGTON

Friday, March 25, 1966, 1:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Readout of Dominican Poll

The preliminary results of the February-March poll in the Dominican Republic show few differences with the November poll, and the differences which do occur do not affect the standing of the main candidates.

- Balaguer still leads Bosch by better than 2 to 1 (50.4% to 21%). This represents a drop of .6% for Balaguer from the November poll and 1.0% for Bosch.
- In party strength, Balaguer's PR party leads Bosch's PRD party by 41.6% to 21.6%. This represents a drop of 0.6% for the PR from the November poll and 7.4% for the PRD.
- On the issue of our military intervention, 63.2% of the Dominicans continue to think that it helped. In November the figure was 65%.
- On the IAPF departing, 46.1% of the people now think that the Force should stay beyond elections, an increase of 7.5% over the November poll.

Two important factors must be borne in mind in assessing the figures on the candidates and their parties:

- The poll does not cover a period when Bosch was actively campaigning -- and he is a formidable campaigner.
- The poll's percentages are based on the assumption that the population of actual voters does not differ significantly from the population of eligible voters.

A copy of the CIA report is attached.

cc - Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

William Bowdler

WCB
climaking Bowdler to look at press and cover of surfacing this. RWR.

26

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-225

B7 CB - NARA, Dec 6-16-95

1.3(a)(5)

March 25, 1966
Friday, 10:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Good news on India food. The Canadians announced yesterday they will give India during this calendar year about one million tons of food, mainly wheat and flour, worth about \$71 million. The Canadians also plan to give about \$19 million worth of food to other countries and the World Food Program.

I can assure you that this didn't just happen, but was the result of a lot of indirect and delicate prodding about how the Canadians ought to respond on their own before we hand the Indians begin publicly pointing the finger.

R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 25, 1966
Friday, 9:45 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your talk with Dr. Sen, head of Food and Agriculture Organization. He wants to thank you for boosting the FAO in your food message (Tab A) and calling attention to the world food problem. You can tell him you appreciate his positive response to our suggestion that he increase FAO activities in Vietnam (though he hasn't done it yet).

But the real job is to encourage him tactfully to (a) make FAO more efficient and (b) spur India to drum up more help to meet current shortages. These talking points should do the trick:

1. Glad to see Sen, since you share a common desire to stave off a serious world food crisis. You also appreciate his desire to help in Vietnam and to get private investors more into the business of helping hungry countries increase food production.
2. You look to him for continued leadership. We hope he will take part in the July ministerial meeting of the OECD which will focus on the world food problem.
3. The US is taking an active part in reviewing the FAO's organization. You've just sent the Secretary of State a memo (Tab B -- which you could hand him) directing him to improve our participation in international organizations. /By giving him a copy of the release, you could let him absorb the tough implications on his own.]
4. You'd like to hear the latest on India food. You understand why India doesn't want to raise a big public furor about famine /Indians would panic and begin hoarding, speculating, rioting/. But you're disappointed that India hasn't been able to get more help from other donors. Other contributions now total only about \$70 million from governments and \$18 million from private individuals and groups -- a sad commentary.

Sen might ask your support for his re-election. The best bet at this stage is to say we'll certainly consider since we haven't made up our own minds yet.

R. W. Komer

MARCH 15, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have just sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk directing him to undertake certain measures to improve our participation in international organizations.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international organizations than the United States.

- Since the end of the Second World War, we have provided a total of \$3.6 billion in direct contributions.
- In the last ten years our annual contributions have grown from \$100 million to an estimated \$237 million -- an increase of 137%.
- We are today a member of some 65 international organizations.

We shall continue to meet our fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations. But we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs.

To strengthen these organizations and at the same time to make sure that the American tax dollar is effectively spent, we have an obligation to review carefully their activities and our participation in them. In my memorandum to the Secretary, I said that I would be looking to him to see that

- future expansion of the activities of the international organizations is governed by the tests of need and reasonableness,
- the programs of these organizations are carefully reviewed so that funds are allocated to high-priority projects which are in the best interests of the international community,
- each international agency operates with a maximum of efficiency, and
- we clarify the objectives of our membership in each organization and organize ourselves for more effective participation in international organization affairs.

I have asked the Secretary to direct and coordinate the activities of the U. S. departments and agencies involved in these organizations. He will instruct our representatives along the lines I have indicated above.

All departments and agencies will cooperate with him in carrying out this responsibility.

MARCH 15, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES ON UNITED STATES PARTICI-
PATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND PROGRAMS

I have today sent the attached memorandum directing the Secretary of State to take certain actions which I believe are essential to effective participation by the United States in international organizations.

I expect the heads of all departments and agencies that contribute to the Government's activities in this field to give their full cooperation to the Secretary of State in carrying out my instructions.

This work must receive high priority and the personal attention of the responsible officials in all agencies concerned if this Nation's interest in improving international organizations as instruments for peace and progress is to be fulfilled.

(Attachment)

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON
UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND PROGRAMS

The Federal Budget for 1967 contains this statement:

" . . . we intend to play an increasingly active role in reviewing the program and budgetary proposals of the various international organizations."

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth what I believe that increasingly active role should be.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations than the United States. We are today a member of some 65 such agencies.

Our continued strong support is necessary and desirable

- if the world community is to live in peace,
- if we are to cooperate internationally in extending the benefits of modern agriculture, health, and education to the less fortunate, and
- if international problems in such fields as meteorology, telecommunications, and aviation are to be given the joint attention required for their resolution.

The United States has by far been the largest financial contributor to the international organizations.

- Since 1946, we have provided a total of \$3.6 billion in direct contributions.
- Since 1956, our annual contributions have grown from \$100 million to an estimated \$237 million for the next fiscal year, an overall increase of 137%.

Moreover, we can expect the programs and budgets of these international agencies to expand further in future years to meet the growing needs of the world community. The United States shall continue to meet its fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations.

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping to strengthen the international agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs. Our purpose in this undertaking must be to see that

- future expansion of the activities of the international organizations is governed by the tests of feasibility and reasonableness.

MORE

(OVER)

- the programs of the organizations are vigorously scrutinized so that funds are allocated only to high priority projects which we are convinced are in the interests of the international community and of our own country, and
- each international agency operates with a maximum of effectiveness and economy.

To achieve this purpose, we must

- decide what we can best accomplish through multilateral action, as compared to action through our own direct programs,
- clarify the objectives of our membership in each international agency,
- organize ourselves for more effective participation in each organization, and
- insist that the money we spend through international agencies is in our national interest and in the best interest of the world community.

I expect you to continue to direct and coordinate the activities of the U. S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and to instruct our representatives to those organizations. I shall look to you to direct this Government's work in

- reviewing and establishing our long-term policy objectives in each major international organization,
- analyzing and determining the U. S. position on programs and budgetary needs of each organization on a timely and continuing basis, and
- recommending steps to improve the effectiveness of each organization in contributing to the objectives of the world community and the United States.

Ambassador Goldberg has unique responsibilities in a wide range of matters relating to the United Nations system. I shall continue to rely heavily on his advice and counsel.

The heads of other Federal departments and agencies have significant interest in activities of the various international organizations. I expect them to provide you with expert assistance in their specialized fields. In this work, the close cooperation of all agencies is needed to provide the essential unity of our effort.

I expect the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to work with you and other agency heads to help assure that the positions we take on the budgets of international organizations reflect a searching scrutiny of requirements and priorities for the expenditure of funds.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to all department and agency heads.

USA
100

A

Excerpt from the President's Message on Food For Freedom - February 10, 1966

An International Effort

It is not enough that we unify our own efforts. We cannot meet this problem alone.

Hunger is a world problem. It must be dealt with by the world.

We must encourage a truly international effort to combat hunger and modernize agriculture.

We shall work to strengthen the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The efforts of the multilateral lending organizations, and of the United Nations Development Program should be expanded -- particularly in food and agriculture.

We are prepared to increase our participation in regional as well as world-wide multilateral efforts, wherever they provide efficient technical assistance and make real contributions to increasing the food-growing capacities of the developing nations.

3/25/66

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary of State Rusk has told me how much he enjoyed meeting the President of your National Assembly, Mahamane Alassane Haidara, on March 19 and has conveyed to me your personal message of kind wishes. We are very pleased that the members of your National Assembly delegation will have an opportunity to visit areas of interest in the United States, and hope that their stay will be enjoyable.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for the frank expression of your views in your letter of February 2. I have already described to you in detail the circumstances which compelled us to renew bombing of military targets in North Viet Nam. I would only emphasize again that during the more than five-week suspension of our bombing, we did not receive the slightest indication from the North Vietnamese authorities of their willingness to reciprocate or to move toward a peaceful solution. I continue to believe that differences should be settled by peaceful means, not by war, and that violence should be stopped. However, if violence is to be stopped there must be a willingness on both sides to do so.

As for Hanoi's "four points", my Government has repeatedly stated that only the third point presents a grave problem. This is the demand that the program and policies of the so-called National Liberation Front be accepted as a precondition to any further discussions. The United States is firmly convinced and has ample evidence to prove that the Liberation Front is the creation and instrument of Hanoi. Furthermore, the Liberation Front position is totally without basis in the spirit and language of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. But,

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By	SCB NARS, Date 7-25-84

equally important, it is impossible for the United States to accept in advance any demand that relates solely to the internal political affairs of the people of Viet Nam.

I should like to stress again that we do not pose any pre-conditions for peace talks. We are prepared to discuss a peaceful solution anywhere, any time. At such a discussion, all viewpoints could be set forth to arrive at a basis for mutual understanding through reciprocity.

With cordial regards.

Sincerely,

LS/ LBJ

His Excellency
Modibo Keita
President of the Republic of Mali
Bamako

cc: Bill Moyers
LBJ:UH:em (3/24/66)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By lig, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

President's meeting with Ambassador B. K. Nehru. The President's Tuesday (March 22) appointment with B. K. Nehru was quite informal and largely social in character. The President first took Ambassador Nehru on a long tour of the White House grounds, during which he met several of Mrs. Johnson's luncheon guests, and then had Ambassador Nehru to lunch with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and members of the White House staff.

During this period the President made several points to Nehru along the following lines. First, he said that he was not asking India to go into the Dominican Republic or Vietnam; all we wanted was greater Indian understanding of our problems in such areas and such help as they could give in bringing peace. We did not want to command or direct the Indian Government, nor even to make a "trade" with it.

However, there were two things which we needed in order to be able to help India. Above all, we needed the support of the U. S. Congress, especially on food. It was essential to get other countries to help meet India's famine needs so that the Congress would not feel we were being called upon to do the whole job. We needed to be able to say to our people that we and the Indians had explored all other avenues. Moreover, we had to make an equitable proposal to the Congress -- we could start out by saying that we would do half the remaining job if others would contribute half. If this didn't work we could say we would do two-thirds. If this didn't prove feasible, then we might have to do yet more.

The second essential prerequisite was self-help. Anyone we were working with must be able to demonstrate that they were doing the most that they could for themselves. Subramaniam had made a big impression here by describing what India intended to do for itself in agriculture. Now the President wanted to move at Mrs. Gandhi's pace. But he had to be able to convince our people that Mrs. Gandhi was doing the best for her country first. Ambassador Nehru replied that India was doing more for itself than any other country in the ^{free} world. He offered to prove to the President that India was financing more of its own development effort than any other country, and was receiving far less per capita aid than most.

The President said that he had to prove three things to the Congress: first, that others were fully participating in help for India; second, that India was doing everything that she could do for herself; and third, that in providing aid for India and Pakistan, we were not fueling an arms race.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

3/25/66

On the political side, the President said that he understood the Indian position on China and wanted India to understand ours. In order to support Mrs. Gandhi we wanted to throw all of her enemies off balance. To this end, we would do the opposite of what people were claiming we were going to do in terms of pressing India. Ambassador Nehru replied that India was prepared to accept the World Bank's advice if the World Bank were prepared to put up the cost. He explained briefly how India would need a cushion of aid if it were to liberalize the economy.

The above were the highlights of a rather disjointed conversation. Later Ambassador Nehru left with Mr. Komer a set of charts which he had planned to give to the President to demonstrate that India's own development effort was extensively self-financed; that India's economic progress had indeed been substantial; and that India's recent economic growth compared quite favorably to that of Pakistan. He also left a memo on Indian aid requirements for the Fourth Plan which called for gross consortium aid during the 5-year period of \$8.65 billion; deducting debt service charges of \$2.6 billion during the period left a net aid requirement of roughly \$6 billion.

RWK
R. W. Komer

cc: Amb. Hare
Mr. Handley
Mr. Macomber
Mr. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

State has been notified.

✓31

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~March 24, 1966
Thursday, 8:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter of appreciation to President Park for
additional Korean troops to Vietnam

Earlier this week the Korean National Assembly gave final approval (95 to 27) to President Park's request that additional forces be dispatched to Vietnam: one regimental combat team to strengthen the Tiger Division already in place and one reinforced army combat division. Once dispatched, these new units will bring the Korean force total in Vietnam to over 41,000 troops. (On a per capita basis, this is greater than our own contribution.) These troops will start moving in April and will be in place by mid-summer.


Park has delivered on his commitment with remarkable speed despite considerable opposition. State and the Embassy now recommend that you send him a letter of thanks by cable. The attached text looks fine to me.

A. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY

INFO : Amembassy SAIGON

LIMDIS

1. Following is text of Presidential message for immediate delivery to President Park:

QTE: Dear Mr. President:

I have been informed that your Government's proposal to send additional troops to the aid of the Republic of Viet-Nam has been approved by the National Assembly.

It is deeply gratifying to the American people, to the U. S. Government, and to me personally to know that our staunch friend and ally, the Republic of Korea, is substantially increasing its contribution to the struggle to repel Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. I am confident that the additional forces will display the same superb fighting qualities which have been shown by the Tiger Division and the other Korean units in Viet-Nam.

I know that this decision was not taken lightly. I am aware of the concerns expressed by some in Korea that this action would jeopardize Korea's security or that it would hamper the continuing efforts of your Government and your people to promote the economic development of Korea. Let

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By <u>DCB</u>	NARS, Date <u>7-25-84</u>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

me therefore reiterate that the United States Government will undertake to ensure that the deployment of these troops does not impair the security of the Republic of Korea or place any additional burden on its economy.

Please convey to the Korean people, Mr. President, the deep appreciation of the American people for your country's invaluable contribution to world peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson QTE.

2. Department will release following post confirmation of receipt by addressee unless you see objection.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

32

Thursday, March 24, 1966
6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Reg. 3-10-66

THE PRESIDENT

President Keita of Mali wrote you (Tab A) his views of the Viet Nam conflict shortly after Governor Williams' visit to his capital on your behalf. He has now sent you his personal greetings through the President of the Mali National Assembly who is travelling in the US with a delegation of Malian legislators.

State's proposed reply for your signature (Tab B) acknowledges the greetings and answers the substantive points raised in Keita's letter by pointing out that (a) Hanoi made no moves toward a peaceful solution during the US suspension of bombing, (b) the US rejects Hanoi's demand that we accept the Viet Cong program and policies as a precondition to further discussion, and (c) that the US does not pose any preconditions for peace talks.

For signature.

*This is actually routine, Mr. President.
We've checked it carefully*
R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By <i>SCA</i>	NARS, Date <i>7-25-84</i>

HL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ing, NARA, Date 8-4-95

LS NO. 42913
T-39/T-3/R-XV
French

Republic of Mali

Office of the President of the Government
The President

Koulouba, February 2, 1966

Mr. President:

The Government of the Republic of Mali and I, too, greatly appreciated the interview in which you were good enough to inform us of the steps taken by you and your administration with a view to re-establishing a durable peace in Southeast Asia in general and in Viet-Nam in particular.

The Government of Mali is convinced that the maintenance of international peace and security can be guaranteed only by seeking a just, early settlement of the Vietnamese conflict.

The Government of Mali is further persuaded that the United States of America, one of the greatest world powers, will not recoil before any difficulty that might obstruct the attainment of peace in Viet-Nam, and that the efforts already undertaken will be pursued and supplemented by still greater endeavors.

In this connection, Mali reaffirms its conviction that no démarche with a view to negotiations can have any chance of success unless the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is stopped.

His Excellency

Lyndon B. Johnson,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

We also think that the Hanoi Government's failure to manifest an immediately favorable reaction to the American proposals should not be cause for a resumption of hostilities in North Viet-Nam, for an atmosphere of calmness alone is essential to the success of the exploratory efforts undertaken by the countries of good will in order to bring the contestants to the negotiating table.

In our opinion, the second condition that may aid in the search for peace appears to be the recognition by the Government of the United States of America of the National Liberation Front as an authorized interlocutor, for the National Liberation Front is, in fact, the combat force that is pitted against the American forces that are fighting beside the Saigon authorities:

It appears that it would be difficult for a lasting peace to be negotiated without taking into account the preponderant role of the National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam.

Lastly, as we have stated to your Special Envoy, it appears to us desirable for the Government of the United States of America to take official note of the four Hanoi conditions that are compatible with the Viet-Cong (National Liberation Front) program in the event that it is not prepared to consider them as bases for discussion.

The Government of Mali is convinced that the implementation of the aforesaid conditions can bring the opposing parties to a round table conference based on the Geneva Accords, which are unanimously recognized as acceptable by all the opposing parties, including the United States of America.

I should like to assure you, Mr. President, that these proposals have been given a careful and objective examination, with a maximum of practicality, by my Government, whose sole desire is to make a positive contribution to the solution of this tragic problem.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my loyal and very high consideration.

[Signed] M. Keita

Modibo Keita

[Stamp of the President of the
Government of the Republic of Mali]

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary of State Rusk has told me how much he enjoyed meeting the President of your National Assembly, Mahamane Alassane Haidara, on March 19 and has conveyed to me your personal message of kind wishes. We are very pleased that the members of your National Assembly delegation will have an opportunity to visit areas of interest in the United States, and hope that their stay will be enjoyable.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for the frank expression of your views in your letter of February 2. I have already described to you in detail the circumstances which compelled us to renew bombing of military targets in North Viet Nam. I would only emphasize again that during the more than five-week suspension of our bombing, we did not receive the slightest indication from the North Vietnamese authorities of their willingness to reciprocate or to move toward a peaceful solution. I continue to believe that differences should be settled by peaceful means, not by war, and that violence should be stopped. However, if violence is to be stopped there must be a willingness on both sides to do so.

As for Hanoi's "four points", my Government has repeatedly stated that only the third point presents a grave problem. This is the demand that the program and policies of the so-called National Liberation Front be accepted as a precondition to any further discussions. The United States is firmly convinced and has ample evidence to prove that the Liberation Front is the creation and instrument of Hanoi. Furthermore, the Liberation Front position is totally without basis in the spirit and language of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. But,



equally important, it is impossible for the United States to accept in advance any demand that relates solely to the internal political affairs of the people of Viet Nam.

I should like to stress again that we do not pose any pre-conditions for peace talks. We are prepared to discuss a peaceful solution anywhere, any time. At such a discussion, all viewpoints could be set forth to arrive at a basis for mutual understanding through reciprocity.

With cordial regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Modibo Keita
President of the Republic of Mali
Bamako

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 24, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Colombian Congressional Elections

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By sig, NARA, Date 8-4-95

Last Sunday Colombia held congressional elections. Going into the elections, the National Front Government (FTN) -- a coalition of the Liberal and Conservative parties which have alternated in power since 1958 -- appeared to be in deep trouble. An FTN defeat could have produced a fragmentation of the political party structure with very serious consequences for our interests in Colombia.

|| With 90% of the vote tabulated, the FTN -- to everyone's surprise -- has scored an impressive victory:

- It increased its margin of the popular vote to 57% and gained an equally large edge in congressional seats.
- It has left the opposition in disarray, with the non-communist left badly beaten and the far right under former dictator Rojas Pinilla, although somewhat strengthened, still far short of being able to challenge the FTN.
- It virtually assures the FTN candidate -- Liberal Carlos Lleras -- clear sailing in the May 1 presidential elections.
- || - It substantially improves the FTN chances of being able to get a 2/3 working majority in the Congress so that it can govern within the terms of the FTN agreement rather than under a state of siege decree, as it has so often had to do in past years.

The FTN victory for us means:

- improved prospects for more stable, efficient and progressive government in Colombia over the next four years.
- continued good performance on our Program Loan agreement.
- continued cooperation with us on major international issues.

Good news, contrary
to early press reports.
RWW
Cc - Bill Moyers

William Bowdler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 24, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Colombian Congressional Elections

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-255

By 48, NARA, Date 8-4-95

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- continued good performance on our Program Loan agreement.
- continued cooperation with us on major international issues.

*Good news, contrary
to early press reports.
RWK*

William Bowdler

Cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1000
3-24-66
5:10P

31

35
Fg

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., March 24, 1966
5:00 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

1

Here is some modest good news from
Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand.
He says in effect that he'll reinforce his
Howitzer Battery from 4 to 6 guns, and
increase his civilian aid in Vietnam.
We'll have State prepare a suitably warm
reply.



R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers



NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

24 March 1966

Dear Mr President,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to deliver to you the following message by way of reply to your letter of 10 March about a New Zealand military contribution in Vietnam.

Message Begins:

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of 10 March and especially for your generous remarks about the value of the New Zealand Battery in Vietnam. The question of strengthening the Battery was being considered when your letter arrived, and it was most helpful to learn the views of General Westmoreland, as the Commander of the forces in the field, and also of course to receive your own. These reinforced my own conclusion that it would be desirable to increase the Battery from four to six howitzers, with an appropriate increase in personnel. A decision has therefore been taken to raise the establishment of the Battery in South Vietnam from the present level of four guns to a complement of six guns. I believe that in this way we will be able to make a more effective military contribution to the campaign in which we are engaged to help defend South Vietnam against Communist aggression.

We have also decided to increase significantly our civilian aid to South Vietnam. The surgical team based at Qui Nhon will be increased from seven persons to thirteen, two mobile health teams will be established to work among the refugees in the camps in and around Qui Nhon, and an Aid Coordinator will be appointed to act as Liaison Officer between the New Zealand teams in Qui Nhon and the Vietnamese provincial and local authorities. We hope that in this way we shall be able to play a larger part in the great humanitarian effort to alleviate suffering in South Vietnam, and we are also not unmindful of the fact that our increased presence in the country in a medical role will demonstrate more clearly than words the very real concern we feel for the victims of Communist ambition.

I shall be making a public announcement of these decisions shortly, but I wanted to let you know without delay what we have decided to do. I should be grateful if in the meantime you would keep this information confidential.

/The

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.


The discussions we had with Vice-President Humphrey were - as he reported to you - extremely frank and cordial, and his visit served to maintain the understanding and reinforce the friendship that exists between our two Governments and countries. I thank you for making him available to visit us.

Sincerely yours,

KEITH HOLYOAKE.

Message ends.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. R. Hakin". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1966 MAR 24 PM 1 05

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter of appreciation to President Park for
additional Korean troops to Vietnam

Earlier this week the Korean National Assembly gave final approval (95 to 27) to President Park's request that additional forces be dispatched to Vietnam: one regimental combat team to strengthen the Tiger Division already in place and one reinforced army combat division. Once dispatched, these new units will bring the Korean force total in Vietnam to over 41,000 troops. (On a per capita basis, this is greater than our own contribution.) These troops will start moving in April and will be in place by mid-summer.

Park has delivered on his commitment with remarkable speed despite considerable opposition. State and the Embassy now recommend that you send him a letter of thanks by cable. The attached text looks fine to me.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me. _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 84-13
By *gldch*, NARA, Date *7/26/94*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY

INFO : Amembassy SAIGON

LIMDIS

1. Following is text of Presidential message for immediate delivery to President Park:

QTE: Dear Mr. President:

I have been informed that your Government's proposal to send additional troops to the aid of the Republic of Viet-Nam has been approved by the National Assembly.

It is deeply gratifying to the American people, to the U. S. Government, and to me personally to know that our staunch friend and ally, the Republic of Korea, is substantially increasing its contribution to the struggle to repel Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. I am confident that the additional forces will display the same superb fighting qualities which have been shown by the Tiger Division and the other Korean units in Viet-Nam.

I know that this decision was not taken lightly. I am aware of the concerns expressed by some in Korea that this action would jeopardize Korea's security or that it would hamper the continuing efforts of your Government and your people to promote the economic development of Korea. Let

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 84-13

By gldch, NARA, Date 7/26/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

me therefore reiterate that the United States Government will undertake to ensure that the deployment of these troops does not impair the security of the Republic of Korea or place any additional burden on its economy.

Please convey to the Korean people, Mr. President, the deep appreciation of the American people for your country's invaluable contribution to world peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson QTE.

2. Department will release following post confirmation of receipt by addressee unless you see objection.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 23, 1966
7:30 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You queried me on the report that Mrs. Gandhi may propose that we provide no further military aid to either India or Pakistan.

We have already had several low key Indian approaches arguing against any further MAP for the Paks. Since Ayub is kept in power largely by his Army, however, some MAP may well be indispensable to forestall a Pak switch to the Chinese. This point needs driving home to the Indians and I've already made it to B. K. Nehru, with State concurrence. Nonetheless, resumption of military aid to India or Pakistan should come last on the list and need not be a live issue during the Gandhi visit. I've asked State to help prevent its coming up by saying to B. K. Nehru that just as the President told Ayub that we weren't going to let Pakistan dictate our India policy, so too it would be a poor noise for Mrs. Gandhi to suggest how we run our Pak policy. I will make the same point and I hope that it will serve to keep this prickly matter of the Gandhi agenda.

Should the matter come up, however, I'd hope you would bridle a bit and tell Mrs. Gandhi that she ought to be as interested as we in keeping Pakistan from going the Chicom route. You might add that we have no intention of building up a Pak establishment beyond purely defensive purposes, and feel that neither India nor Pakistan should use our economic aid to finance an arms race. Nonetheless, we reserve the right to decide for ourselves how much in the way of defense help we will give to either country.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By WJ, NARA, Date 8-4-95

to P-39

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, March 23, 1966
7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

India matters. I'm sure I don't need to worry you with any talking points for Bowles' appointment tomorrow. Unfortunately, it may be a rather trying session because Chet is back full of piss and vinegar and eager to tell you how to handle our Indian affairs. I have not talked with him directly except to say hello, but my spies tell me that he will urge going big right away with 6 million tons of grain and untold billions of taxpayers' dollars.

My own view is that your strategy of holding off is still a good idea, as opposed to the Bowles approach of giving everything to Mrs. Gandhi in one fell swoop. If she speaks her lines properly, I would favor a generous but still general response, with the precise details and the conditions to be worked out at the Cabinet level later. I will give you my best thoughts on this over the weekend.

Attached is a rather wordy but quick-reading letter from John Lewis, our AID chief in Delhi. I asked him to give me his last-minute thinking because he is rather more operational minded than Bowles. Despite its apparent length, his letter is well worth scanning if you have the time.

Ellsworth Bunker returns from the Dominican Republic tonight to be on hand for the Gandhi visit. Would you like to have him sit in on your 1:00 p.m. session with Bowles? This might be a bit annoying to the incumbent Ambassador, but a good way for you to get a preliminary sense of Bunker's thinking too.

Ask Bunker _____

I'll see him later _____

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-192
By gkap, NARA, Date 4/22/94

*I told Walsh
S/E 2:55 PM.*

March 23, 1966
Wednesday, 1:00 p.m.

*Rec'd
5:30 PM
2-4*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Doctors agree that Turkish President Gursel can never regain consciousness, and the Turks are now thinking of taking him home to die. We'll go along with whatever they decide.

Rusk is asking your approval (Tab A) of contingency plans to send him back via Presidential plane, as he came. He also feels you would want to go to Andrews just briefly to see Gursel aboard (no ceremony at all).

State also asks approval (Tab B) on a contingency basis of a statement you might make if Gursel leaves this way.

Recommend approval just to prime machinery in case we want to move quickly.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

OK ☒ Approve/Disapprove Presidential plane. *OK*

OK ☒ I will/will not go to the airport if schedule permits. *OK*

OK ☒ Approve/Disapprove statement.

767 40a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Departure of President Gursel
of Turkey

Recommendation:

That you approve, subject to timing and circumstances, the contingency arrangements for President Gursel's departure from the United States discussed below.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Discussion:

I am informed that the Government of Turkey is considering requesting the return to Turkey of President Cemal Gursel, who came to this country for medical treatment at your invitation on February 2. President Gursel has been in a coma since February 8 and is not expected to regain consciousness.

Should President Gursel's return be requested he would, upon agreement between American and Turkish medical authorities that his condition permitted travel, be transported to Andrews Air Force Base by ambulance without ceremony. Transportation from Andrews to Ankara would be via Presidential aircraft. Medical equipment and staff support for the journey would be provided by United States Army medical authorities. On the Turkish side he would be accompanied by the Turkish Ambassador and by the medical and other personnel who accompanied him to Washington. As your personal representatives, a military officer and a civilian would accompany President Gursel to Ankara.

At departure from the airport, no formal ceremonies are appropriate, although an honor guard would be present. I assume you would wish to go to the airport to see the party aboard. I believe the Chief of Protocol, representatives of the Department of State, a senior military personage (probably General Wheeler), and the Commandant of the Military District of Washington should accompany you.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

A

3/22/66

SUGGESTED STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON
THE OCCASION OF PRESIDENT GURSEL'S RETURN TO TURKEY

Our distinguished friend, President Cemal Gursel of Turkey, came to the United States on February 2 for medical treatment. There was hope that new therapeutic procedures only recently developed in this country would be useful in treating his illness of several years.

We were initially encouraged by his progress at Walter Reed Hospital, only to be shocked by the news on February 8 that his health had suffered a grave new blow. Our best talent, coupled with the skill of the eminent Turkish doctors who accompanied the President, was exerted to the utmost in the hope that the President might return to his home in fully restored health. We are saddened that this hope was not to be realized.

We have been deeply honored to have President Gursel come to our country to seek medical treatment. As he returns to his homeland, our prayers go with him.

B