

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1966
Wednesday, 10:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a draft action memo which would complete the process you began so handsomely yesterday afternoon.

I have not shown it to the appropriate Cabinet officers yet, because to attempt to negotiate it before I can say it represents your own thinking may get me into a morass of bureaucratic infighting instead of helping to win the war. May I say that this is what you want, and then report it back to you for final approval?

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Yes _____

See me _____

Attachment not returned

SECRET	
DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By <i>DCU</i>	NARS, Date <i>7-25-84</i>

41a

DRAFT

SECRET

3/23/66

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AID
THE DIRECTOR, USIA
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

In the Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression. In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new initiatives and the effective marshalling of all governmental resources

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC letter 7/25/80
By gip, NARA, Date 4/22/94

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SECRET

- 2 -

and programs being brought to bear in the civil sector of our commitments in Vietnam.

In my view it is essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of U.S. programs carried out within Vietnam, other than with respect to the conduct of military operations. I have accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this responsibility.

I have charged him to assure that prompt and effective action is taken by all U.S. agencies to devise and carry out Vietnam civil programs, covering all aspects of non-military activities in Vietnam, including the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification Program and the programs for combat force employment and military operations are properly coordinated.

Another of his functions will be to ensure full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. The U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam may communicate directly with the Special Assistant as required.

In carrying out these duties, I want him to act in close and constant liaison with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies, and

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

to draw on them for such administrative and other support as he may need. In addition to working closely with the appropriate departments he will have direct access to me at all times, and I have asked him to bring to me any problems that cannot be resolved directly with the departments concerned.

Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this NSAM.

SECRET

March 23, 1966


Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your reply to my message to you describing our efforts to achieve peace in Viet Nam.

I can assure you that we will continue to press for negotiations with the aim of achieving an honorable and peaceful solution to the Viet Nam conflict. We welcome the efforts of any country to get such negotiations underway.

Mr. President, I appreciate your interest in this matter and share your desire for a peaceful settlement in which the Vietnamese people can genuinely determine their own future.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Aden Abdulla Osman
President of the Somali Republic
Mogadiscio

cc: Bill Moyers

LBJ:UH:em
(typed 3/16/66)

43

43


March 23, 1966

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your thoughtful letter regarding the tragic hotel fire in Kingston last month both saddened and pleased me. I regret the loss caused by the fire. At the same time I am very glad that our men on the USS Johnston and the USS Saribachi were able to work alongside your firemen in preventing the destruction from being more extensive.

I am grateful to you for taking the time from your busy schedule to write to me about this incident. I am sending your letter to Secretary of Defense McNamara so that he can convey to the captains and crews of the two ships your very generous words on their action.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Donald B. Sangster
Acting Prime Minister
of Jamaica
Kingston.

LBJ - WGBowdler:mmm
March 22, 1966.

3/23/66

44

Dear Bob:

It is always a great personal pleasure to hear of the gallantry of our service men whether on the field of battle or on humanitarian missions.

Acting Prime Minister Sangster of Jamaica has written me about the gallant help given by the men of the USS Johnston and the USS Suribachi in fighting a serious fire in downtown Kingston last month. I am enclosing a copy of his letter.

I request that you convey to Commander John T. Mingo and Captain D. B. Harris, and through them to the officers and men of the two ships, the Prime Minister's generous words of appreciation. I also want them to know how proud and grateful I am.

Sincerely,

LS LBJ

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington.

Enclosure

LBJ - WGBowdler:mm
March 22, 1966.



44a

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE,
P.O. BOX 512,
KINGSTON,
JAMAICA, W.I.

28th February, 1966

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Jamaica Government, I would like to bring to your attention the gallant help which was provided to our Jamaican Fire Brigade, by the navy men from the U.S.S. "Johnston" and the U.S.S. "Suribachi".

Last evening in the business section of downtown Kingston, we suffered a tragic fire which completely destroyed the Myrtle Bank Hotel. Had it not been for the quick assistance which the Captains of both these vessels provided, a major section of downtown Kingston would possibly have been devastated. Through Commander John T. Mingo and Captain D.B. Harris, the entire fire fighting units of both vessels voluntarily came to our assistance and their help cannot be over estimated.

As Commander in Chief of your country's armed forces, do accept, on behalf of the Jamaican Government, our heartfelt appreciation for this assistance.

Yours sincerely,

(D.B. Sangster)

Tuesday, March 22, 1966, 7:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AID available for India/Pakistan. As attached memo from Bill Gaud shows, we have very little left in the till -- only \$85 million in old pre-FY '66 India projects and \$49 million in uncommitted FY '66 money.

We also have \$165 million unprogrammed and available, but AID's new appropriation request is based on carrying this over to FY 1967. Thus if we use it this year we either have to go for a supplemental later or reduce what we give in FY 1967 by this amount.

In effect, what AID did (and I think wisely) was to reprogram some of the FY '66 money originally earmarked for India/Pakistan and to take its FY '66 appropriation cuts out of the rest -- beyond the \$200 million in loans you already approved this year.

AID's appropriation request for next year (FY '67) will allow us to go back up to \$385 million for India (plus \$50 million EXIM) and \$187.5 million for Pakistan (plus \$25 million EXIM). But this includes the \$165 million carryover.

We do of course have the PL-480 food, which is India's top priority need right now.

India has also asked for 327,000 bales of PL-480 cotton -- about \$50 million worth. Here's an easy gesture because our cotton stocks are sky high.

Finally, we could approve the \$15.8 million credit ~~contract~~ contract (charge to AEC) for the first "charge" of fuel for Tarapur nuclear power plant financed by AID.

R. W. Komer

45a

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

March 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Funds Available for India and Pakistan

Summary

A.I.D. now has available for India and Pakistan: \$106.3 million of prior year money earmarked for deferred projects, and \$49 million of programmed but uncommitted money from this year's appropriation. An additional \$165 million of current year loan funds are unprogrammed and could be made available for India and Pakistan.

Detail:

1. Deferred AID Projects. Loans for the following projects were obligated from prior year money. We have not gone ahead with the Indian projects due to the stop-order on aid to India and Pakistan that was issued last summer. We are now negotiating loan agreements on the two Pakistani projects as a result of your decision following the Ayub visit.

India - total \$85.3 million

Beas Dam - \$33 million
Dhuvaran Power Plant - \$32.3 million
Durgapur Power Plant - \$16.5 million
Aerial Mineral Survey - \$3.5 million

Pakistan - total \$21 million

Water and Power Consultants - \$6 million
Lahore-Multan Highway - \$15 million

2. Uncommitted Programmed Funds. The tentative program for this year, prepared several months ago, included estimated

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- 2 -

figures for India and Pakistan which exceed the amounts thus far committed as follows (\$ in millions):

	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Committed</u>	<u>Available</u>
India	\$169	\$150	\$19
Pakistan	80	50	30
			<u>\$49</u>

3. Unprogrammed Funds. The loan appropriation request for FY 1967 which is now before the Congress was predicated on the carryover of \$165 million of FY 1966 loan funds. This carryover is the result of an expectation that aid to India and Pakistan would be at relatively low levels during FY 1966. All or part of the \$165 million could be made available for India and Pakistan during this fiscal year if needed -- though this would leave us short for FY 1967.



William S. Gaud
Acting Administrator

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Thursday - 6:30 p.m.
March 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Jamaican Acting Prime Minister

Acting Prime Minister Sangster has written you expressing appreciation for the gallant help given by crewmen of the USS Johnston and the USS Suribachi in putting out a serious fire in downtown Kingston.

I recommend that you reply to the Prime Minister along the lines of the suggested letter at Tab A. I also suggest that you send the Prime Minister's letter to Secretary McNamara so that he can bring it to the attention of the Captains of the two ships. A suggested letter to Secretary McNamara is at Tab B.

William G. Bowdler

Attachments:

Tabs A and B.

tab A

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your thoughtful letter regarding the tragic hotel fire in Kingston last month both saddened and pleased me. I regret the loss caused by the fire. At the same time I am very glad that our men on the USS Johnston and the USS Suribachi were able to work alongside your firemen in preventing the destruction from being more extensive.

I am grateful to you for taking the time from your busy schedule to write to me about this incident. I am sending your letter to Secretary of Defense McNamara so that he can convey to the captains and crews of the two ships your very generous words on their action.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Donald B. Sangster
Acting Prime Minister
of Jamaica
Kingston.

LBJ - WGBowdler:mmm
March 22, 1966.

Feb 8

466

Dear Bob:

It is always a great personal pleasure to hear of the gallantry of our service men whether on the field of battle or on humanitarian missions.

Acting Prime Minister Sangster of Jamaica has written me about the gallant help given by the men of the USS Johnston and the USS Suribachi in fighting a serious fire in downtown Kingston last month. I am enclosing a copy of his letter.


I request that you convey to Commander John T. Mingo and Captain D. B. Harris, and through them to the officers and men of the two ships, the Prime Minister's generous words of appreciation. I also want them to know how proud and grateful I am.

Sincerely,

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington.

Enclosure

LBJ - WGBowdler:mmm
March 22, 1966.



46c

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE,

P.O. BOX 512,

KINGSTON,

JAMAICA, W.I.

28th February, 1966

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Jamaica Government, I would like to bring to your attention the gallant help which was provided to our Jamaican Fire Brigade, by the navy men from the U.S.S. "Johnston" and the U.S.S. "Suribachi".

Last evening in the business section of downtown Kingston, we suffered a tragic fire which completely destroyed the Myrtle Bank Hotel. Had it not been for the quick assistance which the Captains of both these vessels provided, a major section of downtown Kingston would possibly have been devastated. Through Commander John T. Mingo and Captain D.B. Harris, the entire fire fighting units of both vessels voluntarily came to our assistance and their help cannot be over estimated.

As Commander in Chief of your country's armed forces, do accept, on behalf of the Jamaican Government, our heartfelt appreciation for this assistance.

Yours sincerely,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47

See also 22
Wednesday, March 16, 1966
4:35 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

President Aden of the Somali Republic has replied (Tab A) to your letter to various Chiefs-of-State describing the US position in the Vietnam conflict.

In his reply, the Somali President welcomes your assurance that the US continues to explore every possible avenue for a peaceful and honorable solution. To this end, his government is enlisting the support of other nations to use their good offices to end the hostilities.

State's proposed draft reply for your signature (Tab B) re-emphasizes our desire for an honorable and peaceful solution and welcomes any nation's effort to this end.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-255

By *rip*, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

422

Tab
A

*Il Presidente
della Repubblica Somala*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 118, NARA, Date 8-4-95

Mogadiscio, 27th February, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter which was delivered to me by your Ambassador to the Somali Republic on 31st January, 1966, concerning the situation in Viet-Nam.

We welcome your assurance that the Government of the United States will continue to explore every possible avenue for a honourable and peaceful solution, and it is our sincere hope that all parties to the dispute will respond to the endeavour of those nations who seek the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam.

We here in the Somali Republic firmly believe that it is the duty of all Governments, international organisations and individuals to do all that they possibly can in the pursuit of an equitable solution to the Viet-Nam problem. Motivated by this desire, the Somali Government is for its part canvassing the support of other nations, especially those of Africa and Asia, to intervene in this dispute on the basis that it is incumbent upon all of us to contribute, no matter how little, in any way which may be likely to bring about fruitful results.

As a country dedicated to the ideals and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, we believe that all Member States are morally duty-bound to implement and manifest those principles, and not simply to stand mutely aside when issues arise which pose a real threat to world peace.

Millions of innocent and defenceless people are suffering the full horrors of war in Viet-Nam and the parties involved are unable to negotiate a peace. Surely, then this is a clear case for impartial intervention by other countries who should unequivocally insist upon those involved meeting at the conference table and not on the battle-field.

*Il Presidente
della Repubblica Somala*

-2-

It is in view of these circumstances that the Somali National Assembly and Government have called upon all democratic and peace-loving countries to use their good offices in bringing concerted pressure to bear upon the parties involved to agree to a cessation of hostilities.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the Somali Republic will continue to do all in its power to solicit the support of other non-aligned, neutral countries so as to seek the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam and the freedom of the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs without foreign pressure or influence.

It is appreciated that one should be realistic in this matter by accepting the fact that there should be inviolable guarantee which will ensure that any agreement reached is implemented fully both in the spirit and letter by the parties concerned; such guarantees to be given either by the United Nations, or alternatively, by other countries capable to entertain the confidence of the parties concerned.

I trust, Mr. President, that you will appreciate the genuineness of our efforts in this matter in that we only aspire to make what contribution we can towards the putting to an end of hostilities in Viet-Nam which also would mean removal of a grave threat to world peace.

Sincerely,



(Aden Abdulla Osman)

H.E. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON.

470



March 23, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your reply to my message to you describing our efforts to achieve peace in Viet Nam.

I can assure you that we will continue to press for negotiations with the aim of achieving an honorable and peaceful solution to the Viet Nam conflict. We welcome the efforts of any country to get such negotiations underway.

Mr. President, I appreciate your interest in this matter and share your desire for a peaceful settlement in which the Vietnamese people can genuinely determine their own future.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Aden Abdulla Osman
President of the Somali Republic
Mogadiscio

cc: Bill Moyers

LBJ:UH:em
(typed 3/16/66)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1966
Tuesday, 1:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Turkish Vice President of Cyprus has written you (attached), thanking us for voting against a UN resolution last fall which the Turks felt would have hurt their interests on Cyprus. We opposed because we thought U Thant had all the authority he needed to continue looking for a solution and because we thought the poorly worded resolution would do more harm than good.

We don't want a written reply floating around Cyprus -- especially since the Greek Cypriots who run Cyprus don't like to admit officially that the Turk Vice President still holds office. However, we do want to answer since we don't approve Makarios' efforts to submerge the Turk community. So we propose that Ambassador Belcher deliver the attached oral reply.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By rip, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed reply to Dr. Fazil Kuchuk by Ambassador Belcher

President Johnson has read your letter of February 7 and has asked me to express his appreciation for your favorable comments on the actions of the United States delegation in the recent UN General Assembly. As you know we have tried, not always with success, to uphold certain principles in the various UN bodies. In this case we continue to believe that the action of the General Assembly has complicated the task of the Security Council as set forth in the often reiterated Resolution of March 4, 1964, which speaks, as you know, of mediation and negotiation leading to an agreed solution. Let us hope that we may soon see a renewed mediation effort and that this will result in some progress toward a just solution to the Cyprus problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By 418, NARA, Date 8-4-95

February 7., 1966.

Your Excellency,

I was gratified to learn that during the recent debate of the Cyprus problem at the United Nations General Assembly, your delegate tried hard to curtail the machinations of the Greeks towards obtaining a lopsided decision that would help them further their ambitions for the annexation of Cyprus to Greece or to subjugate the Turkish Cypriot Community with a view to securing its elimination from the Island in the course of time. Despite the impartial and objective attitude of delegates like your own, however, it transpired, unfortunately, that justice and equity were thrown overboard on the basis of the votes of a minority of state members of the U.N.O. which possess no means of ascertaining the realities of the situation in Cyprus or the true nature of Greek ambitions and which, obviously, acted under the influence of totally irrelevant considerations. Consequently, a decision was adopted which is bound to be abused by those who pursue obsolete policies of expansionism and domination on the basis of a most repulsive racialism in the second half of the 20th century, through the prostitution of the most sacred principles of mankind, and the United Nations was made to appear as though it were ready to sacrifice the entire Turkish Community in support of the inhuman methods being employed by the Greeks towards the Turks in Cyprus.

/2....

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.

Irrespective of the result, however, I wish to assure Your Excellency that the Turkish Community of Cyprus has not lost its confidence in humanity's sense of justice and that it will remain eternally indebted to Your Government for the attitude of impartiality your delegate adopted at the U.N. and for his relentless efforts to uphold the basic principles and the real interests of the U.N. in its peace-keeping efforts.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Dr. F. KUCHUK', written in a stylized, cursive manner.

(Dr. F. KUCHUK),
Vice-President of the Republic
of Cyprus.

Mr. Komer 49

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, March 22, 1966, 12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Assignment for Milton Eisenhower

Bob Komer and I this morning discussed possible diplomatic assignments for which Dr. Milton Eisenhower might be considered.

It occurs to me that if Ellsworth Bunker wants a well-deserved rest and change of scenery after the constitutional government is installed in the Dominican Republic on July 1 -- as I have heard him say he would -- Dr. Eisenhower would make an excellent replacement. Given his background and interest in Latin America, I think he would be a natural for the job. He would give the office the prestige and competence which Bunker has brought to it. I think he would work well in tandem with Linc Gordon.

William G. Bowdler

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16 1983.

BY rg ON 8-31-92

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 22, 1966
10:20 am

50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Talking Points for B. K. Nehru. On the assumption that you want to save for Mrs. Gandhi any revelations of what we plan to do for India, I hope you'll hit B. K. Nehru on what India can do for itself.

1. BK should tell Mrs. Gandhi how much you look forward to this long-delayed meeting. You are anxious to hear her plans, so that we can firm up our own policies.
2. You intend to bone up intensively on India during the remaining days (we want Indira to realize that you won't be fobbed off with generalities).
3. All your people are disappointed with India's slow movement on fertiliser. Last December Subramaniam announced he intended to contract for a million tons of new capacity by 30 June. However, not a single contract is signed yet. Fertiliser is the key to India's agricultural revolution, and our PL-480 is going to be tied to India's progress.
4. We are carefully examining what we can provide in economic aid, if India takes the necessary steps to use massive outside aid effectively. You are serious about self-help, because no amount of outside help will count half as much as what India itself does to move itself forward.
5. You are prepared to respond generously if India does move forward. But our aid will actually be disbursed only in response to concrete Indian self-help measures -- such as those proposed by the World Bank.
6. We are also concerned lest our economic aid be used indirectly to fuel an arms race between India and Pakistan. There must be some understanding on this matter with both India and Pakistan.
7. We have no intention of imposing political conditions on our aid. But when two great countries are partners in a great mutual enterprise -- developing India -- and face a common threat, China -- there must be a higher degree of mutual political understanding. We count on India to play more of a wise great power role in Asia vis-a-vis both Pakistan and China.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ljg, NARA, Date 8-4-95

March 22, 1966

*this is F
copy Rotor Seal
53*

Dear Mr. President:

On March 7 you wrote to inform me of the general course of action your Government proposes to follow with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization and arrangements which have been set up to serve its purposes. The course you propose will so seriously affect the security and well-being of citizens of all the allied states that I felt it imperative to seek the counsel of the other Treaty members before replying in detail. I should like now to set forth what seem to me the fundamentals of this matter.

Let me begin with the American conception of the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance it creates. Under our Constitution, that Treaty is the law of the land. Like our Constitution, it is more than a legal document. It is the outward and visible form of a living institution --- not an alliance to make war, but an alliance to keep the peace. For nearly two decades this alliance has assured the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. It has greatly reinforced stability throughout the world.

The Alliance, in our view, reflects two important propositions. The first is that if war should come to the Atlantic area, we must fight together --- and fight effectively. The second is that if we act together for the common interest during peace, war will not come. The organization designed to carry out both these propositions, NATO, became in fact an Organization for Peace. To that Organization, which grew significantly out of France's own needs and urgings, France and many distinguished Frenchmen have made an inestimable contribution.

The Organization combined the contributions of the member nations into a common instrument for deterring war by preparing together to meet aggression if aggression should occur. I have no doubt that deterrence resulted not only from the military

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94

coherence achieved but also from the political unity of purpose it exemplified. If the dissolution of the former casts in doubt the latter, as it inevitably will, I fear that those who draw hope from Western disunity will be much encouraged.

As you say, conditions have changed since 1949. They have greatly changed for the better, due significantly in my opinion to our combined efforts under the Treaty. But should our collective effort falter and erode the common determination which it reflects, the foundation of the present stability would be undermined.

In your letter you restated the firm commitment of France to fight beside her allies if any member of NATO should suffer unprovoked aggression. I respect that pledge. But we believe more is needed to achieve effective deterrence and to maintain peace in the North Atlantic area.

I am puzzled by your view that the presence of allied military forces on French soil impairs the sovereignty of France. Those forces have been there at French invitation pursuant to a common plan to help insure the security of France and her allies. I have always viewed their presence as a wise and far-seeing exercise of French sovereignty.

For our part, we continue to believe that if the Treaty is to have force and reality, members of the Alliance should prepare the command structures, the strategic and tactical plans, the forces in being, and their designation to NATO in advance of any crisis and for use in time of crisis. NATO arrangements should reflect the technological and strategic imperatives of our age. Readiness to fight instantly under agreed plans and procedures, worked out and practiced in peacetime, adds immeasurably to our common strength. We will continue our past policy of full participation and cooperation in NATO. We believe the member nations, working within the Alliance with one another, should adapt to whatever organisational arrangements the needs of the hour may require.

I do not consider that such participation and cooperation involves any impairment of our own sovereignty --- or that of any of our allies. In my judgment it reflects the exercise of sovereignty according to the highest traditions of responsible self-interest.

The North Atlantic Treaty commits its signatories to assist any member subjected to armed attack within the areas specified. Governments, of course, must fulfill their commitments in accordance with their own constitutional procedures. But commitments should be honored as effectively as peacetime preparation can assure. It seems to me essential, therefore, that all members of the Alliance be prepared to act in any emergency through their mutual organization and in accordance with mutual plans. Reliance in crisis on independent action by separate forces in accordance with national plans, only loosely coordinated with joint forces and plans, seems to me dangerous for all concerned. It has proved disastrous in the past.

The other fourteen member nations of NATO do not take the same view of their interests as that taken at this moment by the Government of France. The United States is determined to join with them in preserving the deterrent system of NATO --- indeed, in strengthening it in support of the vital common purposes of the West. We do not intend to ignore the experience of the past twenty years.

Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
General Charles de Gaulle
President of the French Republic
Paris

MEMORANDUM

29
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, March 21, 1966
8:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Gandhi Visit. We've had a task force at work for some time now, and all is in pretty good order. I simply haven't wanted to bother you prematurely.

Now's the time, however, so I attach a strategy paper and talking paper cleared by Rusk. The guts of the matter are sidelined on pp. 9-10 of the strategy paper, and its attachment. No need to read the talking paper now; it is much too long and I'll do the usual job on it.

The message which we've busted a gut to get across to Mrs. Gandhi is that your real interest is in hearing from her where she proposes to take India -- in agriculture, industry, and vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. We don't want to impose our ideas on India, but by the same token if India wants massive US support it has to be earned. Our holding up on aid has powerfully reinforced this tune.

All signs are that the message has gotten through loud and clear, and that all you'll have to do is ask her about her plans. She'll take off from there. This leaves you in the solid position of being able to be as responsive or conditional as you want, depending on what she says.

While telling B.K. Nehru tomorrow how much you look forward to this long delayed summit meeting, I hope you will not reveal too much of our hand. Mrs. Gandhi needs to come here reassured of the friendliest welcome, but not so reassured that you've decided on more food and dollars that she relaxes on her lines. Nor, in all candor, do I regard BK as our most helpful interlocutor with Mrs. Gandhi -- he's too much a veteran of the old, easy handout days to realize that there's a new wind blowing. Moreover, having played poker with the Indians this long (and this successfully, in my judgment), let's keep our hole cards till the big pot is on the table.

BK may talk tomorrow about some pretty big sums -- he told Rusk and Gaud today that India needs \$8.6 billion from the western consortium for the Fourth Five Year Plan, if India is to carry out all the reforms we want. But if one deducts \$1.5 billion or so in debt rollover (which is feasible) and another billion or so in new project starts, one ends up with not much more than the \$5.5 billion the consortium allocated for the Third Plan (of which our pledge was running \$435 million per annum, as you'll recall). So by a judicious combination of debt rollover and shift

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to more non-project spending, we should be able to get far greater results for little if any more money over the next five years.

Moreover, our secret weapon is to make crystal clear that from now on we hinge aid to performance. However forthcoming you decide to be with Mrs. Gandhi, I'm sure you'll want to stress that sums like the above can actually be forthcoming only as (or after) the Indians do for themselves the things that are necessary to merit it. George Woods will be our great ally here.

In sum, your meeting with Indira will be the first major test of this new aid policy as it applies to our biggest client. If I read the signs right, it will be a successful encounter (which is why I'd save our key responses for her).

I'll have a talking paper for BK up before noon tomorrow, and will be sending you a separate package on India food.


R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Bill Moyers

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1966

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Strategy
Paper

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Briefing Papers for the Visit of
India's Prime Minister

I recommend for your consideration the attached
Strategy Paper and Talking Paper for Prime Minister
Gandhi's visit.

Subject to your approval, these papers will be
included in the Briefing Book which will be submitted
shortly.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Strategy Paper
2. President's Talking Paper

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By Chis/ry, NARA, Date 8-31-92

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3/21/66

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI OF INDIA
March 27 - April 1, 1966

STRATEGY PAPER

I. Purpose of the Visit:

A. We have asked Mrs. Gandhi to come to Washington so that we can reach a clear understanding with her, at the highest level:

- On a principle: our relationship is a two-way street, and as we help India meet its vital needs, so should India be responsive to ours;
- On a definition, of what each of us really requires from the other;
- On an appreciation, of the problems each of us faces in meeting the others priority requirements; and finally,
- On a bargain: in broad outline, what we will undertake to do for India and what India will undertake to do for us in the months and years ahead.

B. The bargain we seek to strike is a general one, producing no immediate, quantifiable results, but rather setting the stage for a gradual evolution in our relations, during which our community of interests will increasingly be translated into specific complementary actions.

II. The Setting:

A. Mrs. Gandhi has been in the United States a number of times, but never before as her country's leader. She will arrive sharing our view of the importance of her visit and anxious to make it a success. At the same time she will be uncertain of how far she can carry her country in any understanding she may reach with us, since she has been in power less than three months, is still very much feeling her way, and is mindful of the fact her Government will face general elections early next year.

B. She arrives, therefore, very much in need of our understanding:

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- of the difficulties she faces in sustaining present movement toward a lasting accommodation with Pakistan, as that reconciliation process goes beyond the frills to the gut issues of national power, national security, and Kashmir;
- of the immensity of the food and economic problems her country faces;
- and of the serious internal political problems she faces in attempting to carry out some of the steps that she and we agree need to be done (especially, economic self-help measures her critics will portray as "sellouts" to big business, and gestures toward Pakistan implying softness on Kashmir).

C. She arrives amid a waning of the trend toward reconciliation in South Asia: Ayub's visit here, Ayub's and Shastri's statesmanlike performance at Tashkent, and the steps that both countries have since taken to reknit their relations have been giant steps toward re-establishment of peace, but the pace is slowing as the two countries are brought face to face with the underlying issues.

- Progress to date has helped us to take certain limited but responsive steps in the economic and military assistance fields, culminating in those announced in connection with the Vice President's trip to India and Pakistan.
- But continuation of a favorable trend will require a continuing dialogue between India and Pakistan, a dialogue in which each is sympathetic to the minimum political requirements of the other and in which there is a genuine will to succeed and the political courage to see it through.

D. She arrives at a time when both we and the USSR are reassessing the roles we will play in Asia at large and in South Asia in particular.

- Moscow is seeking to build on the influence its success at Tashkent and its large-scale assistance vis-a-vis the Chinese have brought it in India, while at the same time capitalizing on the new "independence" in Pakistan's foreign outlook to improve its position there.
- Meanwhile, we are increasingly caught up with our conflict in Southeast Asia; we are asking more of the free Asian nations

we are

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we are assisting in our mutual interest at the same time that our recent policy in South Asia has demonstrated to both India and Pakistan just how much they need our support if their future is to be richer and better than in the past.

E. She arrives at a time when her Government has already agreed to certain basic changes in its economic policy (new priority for agriculture, including stimuli for chemical fertilizer) which we have been urging, but has not yet committed itself to a broader program of economic reforms which we, the World Bank, the IMF, and other Consortium members believe are also necessary to growth and effective aid utilization.

F. She arrives to continue at the highest level the dialogue we have already begun on the future of Indo-U.S. relations. The stage has been set for the President's talks by Food Minister Subramaniam's visit here in December, by our exchanges in preparation for the Shastri visit, by our talks with Ambassador Nehru here and Ambassador Bowles' talks in New Delhi, and last month, by the Vice President's talks with Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi.

III. Our Assumptions:

A. This is a friendly visit. We and the Indians have our gripes, but we also share broad common interests in wide areas with this Indian Government as with its predecessors.

- We share a strong commitment to the independence of free nations and to the democratic process.
- We share and encourage India's determination to work toward peace in the subcontinent while firmly resisting China's efforts to dominate Asia.
- We have given ample evidence that we share India's determination to better the life and the lot of her peoples.
- And, we share India's disinterest in a formal alliance.

B. Our major problem in Asia today is to contain Communist China with the minimum commitment of U.S. resources.

C. Because

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C. Because of its potential as a counterweight to China, India is more central to our interests than Pakistan. But India's ability to function in this positive context in Asia depends on how effectively it masters its economic problems, particularly food, and how it plays its hand vis-a-vis Pakistan.

D. India will continue to regard China as the prime, long-term threat to the subcontinent. India will also continue to cultivate close and cordial relations with the USSR; it sees its survival in any future Sino-Indian confrontation resting not only on U.S. support but also on a Soviet stance that is at least neutral. Within reasonable limits, a friendly Indo-Soviet relationship is not inconsistent with our own interests.

IV. What does Mrs. Gandhi Seek?

A. Above all other considerations, Mrs. Gandhi seeks from her visit here a strong reaffirmation of American interest in the future of the Indian Union.

- She will not beg for this, however; she is a nationalist, a proud woman, and the daughter of a great world figure.
- She is acutely conscious, moreover, of the limitations on her freedom of maneuver imposed by her new and delicate political position at home, more especially so in an election year.
- But she knows and we know that without tangible and continuing American interest in the future of the Indian Union, that Union does not have much of a future.

B. More specifically, she will use the occasion of the visit to convince us of India's determination to overcome centuries' old ignorance, poverty, hunger, and despair, and to stand on its own feet. She will acknowledge the importance of U.S. help and express the hope that the U.S. will continue to find it in the U.S. interest to provide:

- long-term economic assistance;
- Consortium pledging on which Indian planners can count;
- continued PL-480 food assistance.

C. She

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C. She will also seek to demonstrate the compatibility of India's foreign policy views with our own, even though our differing interests prevent them from being identical. In the process she may wish to identify the U.S. and Indian community of interests vis-a-vis China.

- She will emphasize India's concern for our continued support of India in its contest with Communist China.
- She will hold that India's neutral position in the ICC prevents it from openly taking sides in the Vietnam conflict, but that India will do all in its power to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table.
- She may seek to learn how we view our future relationship with Pakistan, especially in the area of military assistance; whether our past relationship with Pakistan will continue to lead us to equate India and Pakistan, despite India's greater size and importance in the confrontation with Communist China.
- She may try to get a sense of how wedded we are to a Kashmir settlement and to what extent our interest takes account of the "realities" of power--as seen by India--established in the conflict between India and Pakistan last fall.

V. What do we Seek?

We seek to use the visit to ensure that Mrs. Gandhi draws the conclusion from all that has taken place that the future of our relationship depends on reciprocity.

A. Specifically, this means that India has an obligation to do everything in its power in its own behalf to strengthen its economy:

- by following through in its recent decision to give higher priority to efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in food production;
- by following through on its new approach to fertilizer production and distribution;
- by mounting a massive effort to control population growth;
- by cooperating with the International Bank and the IMF on fiscal, import decontrol, and other related measures aimed

at freeing

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at freeing up the economy, stimulating the private sector,
and encouraging private foreign investment in India.

B. Specifically, this means that India has an obligation to do everything in its power to create and sustain the conditions for a lasting peace in the subcontinent:

- including a recognition of Kashmir as an issue that must be explored from a standpoint of preserving the national interest of both India and Pakistan;
- including efforts to deal rationally with Pakistan's fears about the military imbalance between India and Pakistan; and
- including a willingness, as the larger and more important power, to go the extra mile in that search for an enduring peace in South Asia.

C. Specifically, this means that if India is to win its long-term contest with Communist China, it must give first priority to internal economic development and social progress.

- India's military force levels and its military spending should be kept to the minimum consistent with this goal and with the threats as they actually are;
- India should forego the development of an independent nuclear weapons capability, for the same reasons.

D. Specifically, this means also that India must show that it recognizes that the Chinese Communist problem is Asia-wide, that it does not end at the eastern end of the McMahon Line in Assam.

- we appreciate the role India is playing in South Asia to contain the Communist Chinese;
- we recognize the limitations on India's ability to help us directly in Vietnam in terms of its position as neutral Chairman of the IOC's set out in the Geneva Accords, but we think this position would command greater respect if India would deal more forthrightly with evidence of North Vietnamese aggression;

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- we also understand India's reluctance to risk serious alienation of the USSR in view of India's valid interest in preserving Soviet support in its contest with Communist China;
- we recognize, moreover, that continuing Indian ability to communicate effectively with Moscow serves our mutual interests;
- nonetheless, we need private reassurance from India as to where it stands on the conflict in Southeast Asia, and we need some public sign that in any major conflict of interests between China and the U.S., India stands with the U.S.

E. Specifically, this means that the Government of India refrains from publicly criticizing U.S. policies and that when there are disagreements, they are dealt with privately.

VI. Tactics:

A. Tactically, our approach should take account of the fact that the Indian Parliament will be looking over Mrs. Gandhi's shoulder while she is here. 

- Thus we should emphasize the common paths we have followed in charting our own courses as new and independent nations, the interests we now share, and the bonds we now have, including our dedication to peace and progress, our commitment to the strengthening of democratic institutions, our vision of an international Great Society, etc.
- We should assure her that we seek in our relationship with India a healthy, interdependent relationship between sovereign and equal states.
- And we should indicate understanding and sympathy for her need to deal with her constituency in India.
- But, we should also help her to understand that our support of India requires her to pay attention to the American as well as the Indian constituency; only then can we discuss in meaningful terms the gestures needed from India as the sine qua non of a reciprocal relationship.

B. Tactically,

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B. Tactically, we recommend that the President's talks with Mrs. Gandhi focus on the three broad areas in which we have already had extensive discussions with the Indian Government; these are at the heart of the visit and must be dealt with satisfactorily if the visit is to be successful. They are:


- Peace in the subcontinent;
- ~~Economic Reform~~--the Food Problem and Self-help; and,
- Indian Policy vis-a-vis China and Southeast Asia.

C. More detailed discussions covering such items as an exchange of assessments on China, other questions, particularly those involving such matters as our military assistance policy in the subcontinent, disarmament, the question of nuclear proliferation, the Indian investment climate, etc., might appropriately be covered in talks at the second echelon.

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


* (See attachment for explanation of what this means in terms of timing and magnitude of our commitment.)

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ATTACHMENT

Economic Reforms and Aid

[REDACTED]

If Mrs. Gandhi proposes or agrees to carry out a basic economic reform program incorporating not only high priority to agriculture, but also incentives to private investment, import liberalization, and related fiscal measures.

Recognizing that, although some reforms could and should be installed without promises of aid, some - particularly the vital step of import liberalization - must be accompanied by assurance of financial support, Mrs. Gandhi should be told:

- That she can count on our economic support;
- That her Government should prepare a detailed program for Consortium consideration as early as June;
- That we will work with the World Bank and other Consortium members to secure backing for the intended reforms;

In addition, we should:

- Open discussions with the members of the Consortium to reconfirm the previous consensus on the nature of needed reforms and to seek support for a general financial package adequate to the reform program;
- Advise both the Consortium and the Government of India, shortly after the bargain is struck at the top, that we believe the full reform program can be sustained by new Consortium aid no larger than that of the recent pre-hostility years - specifically that we believe that what is needed is:
 - Consortium aid at about the pre-hostility level of \$1 billion but with a shift in composition so that about two-thirds is program assistance, not limited to use on specific projects,
 - Debt accommodation to cover the approximate \$200 million a year of principal payments due, and
 - IMF support, perhaps only as a contingent standby to cover the initial rush of orders when imports are liberalized;

- Consider

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By Chw/rg, NARA, Date 8-31-92

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- Consider being prepared to make a contingent pledge of \$435 million at the proposed June Consortium meeting, with \$300-350 million to be available for commodity loans; if formal pledge is found to be inappropriate, we should be prepared to seek a formula for expressing our support to the reform program, using among other things the anticipated carry-over of FY 1966 development loan funds of \$150 million or more.

Parallel in Pakistan

[REDACTED]

We should be prepared to make an economic development deal with Pakistan also.

Such a deal:

- Would require less stress on economic reforms because of Pakistan's earlier moves;
- Would still call for restoration of reform policies suspended during hostilities (e.g., import liberalization)
- Would be supportable by financing analogous to the Indian program - Consortium aid at pre-hostility levels, debt accommodation, and IMF standby; and
- Would be facilitated by U.S. willingness to pledge aid this summer (\$212.5 million) but could probably be carried off without a formal pledge - [REDACTED]

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI OF INDIA
March 27 - April 1, 1966

PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS

SUMMARY

We recommend that during his talks with Prime Minister Gandhi, the President touch on each of the following:

- 1) Shared interests and problems:
 - Let us better understand each other's internal problems, particularly as they touch on our bilateral relations.
- 2) China and Vietnam:
 - Our mutuality of interest (China) implies some degree of mutuality of policy (Vietnam).
- 3) Peace with Pakistan:

[REDACTED]
- 4) Food, Economic Policy, and our Aid:
 - Our willingness to help India depends on India's determination to help itself, and limit defense spending.
- 5) India's "No Bomb" Nuclear Policy:
 - We admire Indian restraint, and if the Chinese nuclear threat to India becomes serious, we hope India will discuss it with us.

We have also included a sixth talking point on future U.S. military aid to Pakistan. We recommend that it be used only if Mrs. Gandhi raises the issue. (She is reportedly under some domestic political pressure at home to do so.)

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SHARED INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS

1. India's commitment to a federal, democratic government, a mixed economy, a free press, and individual freedom gives it a character and outlook fundamentally similar to ours. Similarities are strengthened by the fact we are both vast, variegated subcontinental states.

2. The important thing is that we each understand each other's internal situations, particularly as they limit or otherwise relate to the conduct of our bilateral relationship. As working democracies, we each have a constituency in the other's country, which we each must heed and nurture.

3. The President's ability to enlist the support of Congress and the public for positive relations with India is strongly affected by India's public position and performance on subjects of such deep concern to Americans, particularly Vietnam, peace with Pakistan, and self-help.

4. Similarly, the President would appreciate hearing Mrs. Gandhi's views on the ways in which our actions most directly bear on her ability to carry her nation toward a more constructive relationship with the U.S.

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CHINA AND VIETNAM

1. As a democratic country working for the welfare of its people, India has a great potential for influencing other developing areas, including those where Communist China is actively competing for influence. We also set great store by India's future power potential as an Asian counter-weight to China, as well as its present role as defender of a major sector of the free world boundary with China.
2. India knows it will have our support if Communist China should start serious trouble with it. This is a pragmatic political estimate, not a formal assurance. We are no more eager for a formal alliance against China than India is. For one thing, we understand the high value India attaches to its present ties with the USSR, in terms of its security interests in any future confrontation with China.
3. But where would India stand if we got into a direct confrontation with Communist China? We are conducting our operations in Vietnam with great care and will continue to do so, to minimize any chance of misinterpretation by Peiping. But even though we are doing our best to avoid a confrontation with China, it is important to us to know who our friends are, should Peiping choose to force a confrontation.
4. Mrs. Gandhi knows that our interests in Asia are peaceful and constructive ones, that our primary objective is to help build up the societies of the Asian nations and to assist in their economic and social revolutions. But the militant and expansionist tendencies of Communist China's leadership are posing challenges to some of these nations that cannot be countered by peaceful means alone. We see the struggle in Vietnam as the focus of a broad effort to restrain the attempt by Asian Communists to expand by force. Americans feel strongly that the mutuality of Indian and American interests toward China implies some degree of mutuality in our policies in Vietnam.
5. We recognize that India is in no position to give significant material support to our struggle in Vietnam: India has its own frontier with China to defend, it needs for the present to focus on developing its economy, and it does not wish to alienate the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we need some clear sign that India recognizes our struggle in Vietnam serves Indian interests. We need a more forthright and effective Indian role in the ICC's in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. And above all, India's leaders should refrain from taking public positions on developments in Vietnam that needlessly antagonize the U.S. Congress and public.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 82-371

by *mg* NARA. Date *8-18-92*

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PEACE WITH PAKISTAN

1. Progress toward rebuilding peace on the subcontinent since last fall's tragic conflict ended has been most encouraging, and much credit is due to all parties involved, including the USSR.
2. But peace has not yet been secured. India and Pakistan must continue to maintain a process during the months ahead providing mechanisms for getting at the underlying issues which divide them, including Kashmir. The President needs Mrs. Gandhi's assurance that India will continue with constructive efforts to work for a peaceful solution of these issues, as a necessary contribution to its own prospects for development and for its security vis-a-vis Communist China.
3. Mrs. Gandhi should be clear on one point: if we should be forced to conclude that there were any appreciable prospect of renewed hostilities between India and Pakistan, it would be simply impossible for us to invest resources in either country on anything like the scale required for rapid economic development. And this would apply to both countries regardless of which one appeared primarily to blame. In an atmosphere of conflict, or an arms race between countries that should be friends, we would be unable to see how our efforts could be directed to constructive ends.
4. As the larger and stronger party to the dispute, India must be willing to go the extra mile in its search for an enduring peace with Pakistan.

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FOOD, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND AID

1. We intend to do what we can to help ease India's current food crisis. But we cannot keep on feeding India's growing millions indefinitely.

2. Our future aid will be linked quite directly to Indian performance on self-help measures. Specifically, we are most concerned with:

- Vigorous follow through on agriculture (particularly, more vigorous efforts to internationalize the current food relief operation, "hot pursuit" of foreign private investment in India's chemical fertilizer industry, and effective execution of the new policy on fertilizer pricing and distribution. (Population growth is, of course, the other critical element in the struggle to provide enough food.)
- Demonstration of priority for economic development through more rigorous limits on defense spending, particularly the foreign exchange component. We do not intend to finance an arms race between India and Pakistan. We hope we can shortly discuss this further at the technical level. We are levying the same requirement on Pakistan.
- Basic changes in economic policy, as recommended by the IBRD and IMF, designed to free up the economy, stimulate the private sector, stimulate exports and encourage private foreign investment through import liberalization, related fiscal measures, and incentives to private enterprise. (By contrast, the Indian Government's new Patent Bill seems to us a step in wrong direction.)

3. India can carry out most of these measures unilaterally. We recognize, however, that some - notably import liberalization - can only be undertaken on the basis of assurances that substantial foreign aid will be available when needed.

4. We seek

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4. We seek no final agreement during the visit on these matters, nor do we intend to work out specific new aid commitments.

SECRET But we do want a general understanding as to how far Mrs. Gandhi is willing to go toward meeting these self-help requirements in this election year. With such an understanding we can work out specifics at the technical level.

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INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

1. India deserves high praise for its wise policy of resisting pressures to acquire nuclear weapons and for not diverting its economic resources to a nuclear weapons program.

2. The President agrees that nuclear powers should try to work out some arrangements to safeguard the security interests of non-nuclear powers. As Mrs. Gandhi is aware, we have raised the matter privately with the Soviet Union, and it has also been a subject of continuing discussions at Geneva.

3. If a Communist Chinese nuclear capability should ever pose a serious threat to India, we hope Mrs. Gandhi will frankly discuss the question with us so that we could examine together possible means to meet that threat without nuclear proliferation, and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons program.

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FUTURE U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

NOTE: This is a contingency paper, recommended
for use only if Mrs. Gandhi raises the issue.

1. We have not decided on what sort of a military supply relationship we may have with Pakistan in the future. As we have already made quite clear, we have no intention of fueling an arms race on the subcontinent or of providing arms which will be used by one side against the other.

2. Whatever policy we eventually do decide upon will be determined by what we conclude is required to strengthen and preserve the security of the subcontinent as a whole, an objective on which India and the U.S. agree.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, March 21, 1966, 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Thank You Letter from Mexican President

Mexican President Diaz Ordaz has sent you the attached letter thanking you for the greetings which you sent him via the Mexican Congressional delegation which was here last month. He strongly endorses exchange visits by Congressional delegations and again expresses strong support for your peace efforts in Vietnam.

WGB
William G. Bowdler

RWT

Attachment

I -
Write him warmly -
L

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Text of Letter from President Diaz Ordaz of
Mexico, dated March 8, 1966, to President Johnson

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Mr. President and dear Friend:

I have received through the Mexican delegation which attended the Sixth Annual Mexican-United States Interparliamentary Conference that was held in this city, particularly Senators Manuel M. Moreno and Manuel Tello Baurraud, the cordial greetings you were good enough to send me, for which I wish to express my deep appreciation.

This group of legislators and I, in particular, are thoroughly convinced that, through these contacts between the people's representatives of both countries, more decisive steps are taken to strengthen the friendship between our peoples.

At this time when the tranquillity of the world is threatened and when you are endeavoring to find the best means of bringing about peace, I wish to renew to you the assurance that the people and government of Mexico give you their firm support to the end that this crisis may be speedily terminated.

Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and I send our best wishes for your personal happiness and that of your distinguished wife and renew to you the assurances of our highest and most distinguished consideration.

/signed/ Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ijg, NARA, Date 8-4-95

March 18, 1966

The President
The White House

On visiting for the first time, as President of the Mexican Republic, a town on the frontier which unites our two countries, it is a great pleasure to send from here a cordial greeting to the people and Government of the great homeland of Lincoln.

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

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THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

AL VISITAR POR PRIMERA VEZ, YA COMO PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA
MEXICANA A UNA POBLACION DE LA FRONTERA QUE UNE A NUESTROS DOS
PAISES, ME ES MU Y GRATO ENVIAR DESDE AQUI UN CORDIAL SALUDO
AL PUEBLO Y AL GOBIERNO DE LA GRAN PATRIA DE LINCOLN

GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ.

c c Bowdler
ste from / from
Wire filed

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57
Monday, March 21, 1966
4:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the draft reply to De Gaulle, for signature
if you approve.

Also attached is General Eisenhower's comment to Goodpaster on the letter, which Andy read to him. While accepting the force of Eisenhower's suggested add-on, I see a contrary argument that saying we're flexible on NATO organization might lay us open to more pressure for "give" to De Gaulle than we want at this point. So I'd favor having Goodpaster explain this to the General, rather than altering the letter.

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

MEMORANDUM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-255

By ig, NARA, Date 8-4-95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1966
Monday, 4:30 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Special Message on India Food. Here is a draft version which rings all the changes on how much we've done already, how a big international effort is needed, and how we'll do as much or more than anyone else if Congress approves.

The one tough problem is to build a workable matching formula which will encourage others to pitch in without putting us on the spot.

Any formula will put pressure on the Indians to beat the bushes harder --but it will also punish the Indians for what others refuse to give. Matching gives us leverage on the Indians but not directly on other donors. Our real leverage on them comes from bilateral arm-twisting. Pressing the Indians is useful because they could push harder than they have through diplomatic channels. But pressing them via a loud international alarm about famine in India could set off hoarding and price speculation and make it even easier for the leftists to stir up food riots. So while a matching formula would spur greater Indian effort, we'd want to be careful not to put all our eggs in that basket.

The other side of the story is that--right or wrong--other donors just won't come close to matching our total effort. Some don't have grain but are sending modest quantities of other foodstuffs, port-handling equipment or money. Those who do have grain are heavily committed to other buyers, though they're gradually raising India's share. But so far other governmental contributions total around \$70 million--not bad but not even close to the \$660 million value (world prices) of India's 11 million ton wheat deficit or to the \$300 million value of the emergency deficit (5 million tons) above normal import levels. The tough part is that very little of this \$70 million is grain. Agriculture guesses we might only get 1 million tons from other donors, so even if other donors come through with half the dollar value of the emergency deficit (\$150 million or about 2.5 million tons' equivalent), India will still need 4 million tons of actual grain. So while a formula might encourage donors, tying ourselves too rigidly to direct matching could leave us later facing a choice between backing down if other donors failed and letting Indians starve.

After several months with this incredibly complicated and frustrating problem, my answer is a simple three-phase formula: (1) We finish meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

India's normal ¹⁹⁶⁶ import level of 6 million tons. Another million tons would do that. (So far they have 1.5 million you authorized in December, 3 million from February's authorization and 0.5 million in spillover from old purchases). (2) As the next step, say in effect we expect other donors to pick up at least half the value (\$150 million) of the emergency grain deficit (5 million tons) as we now see it--by sending grain, other commodities, cash or services. We'll match the value of their contributions in grain. (3) Then we'll review India's remaining grain needs in June to see where we stand. There will be time then to see whether we want to put in another 1-2 million tons on our own.

The purpose of this is frankly to keep grain flowing while putting as much heat as we can on the Indians and other donors in the next three months without either tying our hands or looking inhumane. Another million tons of wheat by early April would keep ships leaving with both wheat and sorghum into June, and another 1-2 million tons in matching would keep them going another 2-3 months through the monsoon. I've written this approach into the attached draft message to Congress and possible joint resolution.

Mr. President, this is very rough but I wanted to give you a sense of our current thinking before going any further. Will have a report from Truman shortly

RWK
R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

March 7, 1966

THE WHITE HOUSE

MESSAGE ON COPING WITH HUNGER IN INDIA

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I proposed in my message on Food for Freedom that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger. The nation will profit from the deliberations of the Congress on that proposal.

But today in India we face crisis so urgent as to require a special immediate effort.

The Indian Crisis

Over one-fifth of the half-billion people in the world's largest working democracy live in areas stricken by their worst drought of the century.

Last year we shipped about 6.5 million tons of grain to India--about one-third of the amount of wheat we used here at home.

But the Government of India estimates it will need 11-14 million tons to meet essential requirements--even after drawing down meager stocks and tightening belts. A team of experts which I sent to India confirms this estimate.

The need is staggering. Eleven million tons of foodgrains, valued at around \$700 million, would equal about forty percent of India's total annual export earnings.

Responsibility of All Nations

India has asked for help.

The United States answered by allocating 1.5 million tons last December and another 3 million tons on 4 February, after I consulted with the Congressional leadership.

We must do even more.

Yet meeting human tragedy on this scale cannot be left to a beleaguered India and to the United States alone.

The whole community of nations must play a humanitarian role.

Indeed, India's needs are already recognized as demanding a truly international response .

--The Government of India has itself addressed urgent inquiries to all nations believed able to contribute.

--The Secretary General of the United Nations and the Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on 11 February made an urgent appeal to the world community.

--His Holiness Pope Paul VI has written to me and has appealed to other nations and peoples to help.

--The World Council of Churches on 10 February made a parallel appeal.

In an emergency of this magnitude, the obligation to assist a neighbor in distress should extend to every nation in the world.

To those who have no food to spare, we point out that India needs more

than food--transportation and equipment, fertilizer and chemicals, credit and cash.

To those who believe they have nothing to spare, we suggest another look--first, at the critical urgency of the crisis--and then once more at their own potential to help.

There is no nation on earth far enough from India to be immune from the effect of hunger and starvation there.

There are few nations on earth that cannot afford to give something.

And there is no great and rich nation on earth that can sustain its claim to greatness if it cannot find some way to assist its "neighbor" in this emergency.

Though some besides the United States have already responded handsomely, the general response to date must be termed disappointing. Of the world's uncommitted export supplies of grain, other nations have about half as much as the United States. Yet it is estimated that so far aid from others amounts to only about seven percent of India's total import need /to around twenty percent of the emergency need above normal import levels/.

An International Response

So I ask the Congress to join with me in calling on all other nations for a response equal to the need. Let us look on this as an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of international cooperation.

I propose that the United States' response reinforce this international effort and demonstrate our own deep concern for the people of India.

But before embarking on this task of mercy--which could involve substantial quantities of additional foodstuffs--I believe it appropriate to call on the Congress to discuss fully my proposals and to endorse them. I seek the endorsement of the Congress for a simple three-phase program including:

- Fulfilling US plans to help meet India's normal import requirements of about 6 million tons.

- A further special US contribution in grain equal to at least half of India's emergency grain deficit as now forecast, on the understanding that other donors will match this with contributions of equal value or more.

- Review with the Government of India of the results of this international effort to determine how remaining requirements shall be met when the situation becomes clearer.

I urge these emergency measures in full recognition that they must not obscure the need for a broader, longer-range attack on hunger and malnutrition in India as elsewhere.

DRAFT

March 7, 1966

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by selling to India under Public Law 480 agricultural commodities to meet India's normal import needs plus added quantities of agricultural commodities as the United States' share in the international response to the Indian emergency.

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of

- 2 -

India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

March 23, 1966

58-c

MEMO FOR JOE CALIFANO

Joe, I have been trying to get you because I recall full well your request that all messages, etc., be passed through you. However, the President told me explicitly, in Rusk's presence, to send Rusk my latest draft message for comment. The President's intention as of Wednesday was to send this to the Congress immediately after Mrs. Gandhi's visit.

So the problem is urgent. Also urgent is my desire to disengage and become a Vietnamese. So in sending out my draft, I took the liberty of asking the Departments to reply through you.

Bob Komer

Enclosure

59
59

Monday, March 21, 1966

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Goldberg and Geneva. Bill Moyers and I touched base with Secretary Rusk on this possibility. He was inclined to be even more negative than we at this moment, on the simple ground that you couldn't possibly go to Geneva and talk disarmament without everybody and his brother wanting you to talk also about our European affairs. To go to Geneva without touching base in Bonn, London, and even Rome would be difficult indeed.

Moreover, there do not seem to be any bright new disarmament initiatives in our cupboard at the moment which would justify such a dramatic step. Without this, Geneva could look a mite thin. However, I'm reviewing the bidding, and will give you a memo shortly on what disarmament options may open up soon.

R. W. Kerner

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-255
By ujp, NARA, Date 8-4-95

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

60

3/21/64

Mike

Breakthrough.

You take it from
here, along lines of
previous scenario warning
Lakovic not to make a thing
of the visit.

Also I'd have him On the
Record but take him in and out
without seeing the press, except
maybe for pictures in LBJ office.
RWK

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1966
Saturday, 11:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Archbishop Iakovos. After thorough exploration in State of the desirability of Secretary Rusk seeing Iakovos, we all concluded that this would only point the finger squarely at Iakovos' meddling in our foreign affairs, and thus really annoy the Turks. Since there could be no other clear purpose for his seeing Rusk than to complain about Cyprus and Turk harassment of the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, this would be borrowing trouble.

However, Iakovos and a Greek/American delegation have now called on Senator Dirksen. The latter referred them to Ball, but said they also insisted on seeing the President. Dirksen indicated he would raise this at the White House. So, despite the problem mentioned above, my instinct is to have them see Ball if they ask for an appointment. I've so told State. This buys you more time. But I feel in my bones that receiving these excitable people may be better than letting a head of steam build up.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

JC
see me later
7

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

61

March 19, 1966
Saturday, 5:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

African Ambassadors. Bill Moyers tells me that you would like to have them in, along with Joe Palmer once he is confirmed.

It strikes me that a good way to dress up the occasion would be to have Palmer sworn in over here at a reception for the ambassadors (the Secretary would presumably be attending in any case). You and the Secretary could each say a few words.

Palmer expects to appear before the Fulbright Committee on 29 March (word from Carl Marcy); the Senate itself would presumably act the following day.

However, I gather that you were thinking of having this affair next week. This would involve getting Fulbright to speed up his hearings. Perhaps Secretary Rusk could do this, if you so desired.

R. W. Komer

Ask Rusk _____

Wait till Senate acts _____

cc: Bill Moyers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1966
Saturday, 4:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is just to alert you to the possibility that Mrs. Gandhi may have to ask for a plane for the Paris/Washington leg of her trip here. Attached cable tells the story.

We need do nothing now, as the Air India strike may be over shortly.



R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Saturday, March 19, 1966, 4:45 P.M.

From New Delhi (2488)

Gandhi Visit

1. Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha called me Saturday morning with what he termed "an exploratory request for assistance" in getting the Prime Minister to the US. Here is problem:
2. On Friday 'Air India' navigators went on strike for higher wages therefore bringing all 'Air India' flights to a halt. Since the strike appears designed to embarrass Mrs. Gandhi with regard to her US visit it has caused deep resentment both inside and outside Government. However, there is grave doubt that strike will be settled this week.
3. According to present standby plan Mrs. Gandhi will leave on Friday, March 25 for Paris on Caravelle owned by Indian Airlines which is domestic service. As part of this plan Jha wants to know if a US Government plane could pick the Prime Minister up in Paris Sunday morning March 27 and fly her to New York, Washington, or better yet Williamsburg. I said I would inquire.
4. Although I did not suggest it and it may prove unnecessary I know it would be a dramatic and highly welcome gesture if we could offer to pick up Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi and bring her the whole way. Would appreciate reaction soonest.

Bowles

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 19, 1966
Saturday, 12:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State proposes attached brief message from you to be featured in the catalogue of the Turkish art exhibition you agreed to co-sponsor here in June. Recommend approval.

R. W. Komer

OK _____

Redo _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1966

IN REPLY REFER TO: 3953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message for Inclusion
in the Official Catalogue of the
Turkish Art Exhibit

The President recently approved the Secretary's recommendation that the President sponsor, jointly with the President of Turkey, the major exhibit of Turkish art which will open at the National Gallery on June 4, 1966, permitting his name to be listed as a patron of the Exhibit along with that of the President of Turkey. Our Embassy at Ankara has submitted to the Department the text of a message which the President of Turkey wishes to have included in the official catalogue, a copy of which is enclosed. The Department believes that a parallel message from President Johnson should also be included.

A draft message is enclosed for your approval. The Department does not anticipate any change in this matter in the event of President Gursel's death.

B. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft Presidential Message.
2. President Gursel's Message.

DRAFT TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

"The Turkish nation, by bringing to the American people an incomparable array of art objects which reflect the history and culture of many civilizations of Anatolia, contributes uniquely to Turkish-American understanding and friendship. It is my hope ^{and} ~~indeed my fullest~~ expectation, that Americans in every city in which this outstanding exhibit is displayed will ^{take} ~~exploit~~ this opportunity ~~individually to view and to study, and thereby to~~ deepen and strengthen their understanding of a land and people with whom Americans have much in common. The ties of friendship which exist between our two allied countries will be made stronger as a result."

PRESIDENT GURSEL'S MESSAGE

"Scientific progress and advances in technology in modern times have brought closer the nations of the world and humanity today feels the urge to understand better its common destiny through a scrutiny of its ancient civilizations, which have made possible the emergence of our modern world. Asia Minor has always been in history a bridge between East and West, as modern Turkey is today, and Eastern and Western cultural trends have continuously throughout history clashed on her soil to give birth to a unique succession of civilizations of world-wide significance. Many lands can boast of preserving the remains of a glorious past, but in no other country in the world can the archaeologist dig deeper in search of the earliest traces of civilization.

"I feel confident that this exhibition, which contains works of art belonging to all these cultures, from settlements dating back to the VIIth millenium B. C. to the Turkish Seljuk and Ottoman periods, will attract the interest of the American public as it offers a summary of the history of world civilization and that the knowledge that it will bring will contribute to a better understanding between the Turkish and American nations."

March 19, 1966
Saturday, 11:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Archbishop Iakovos. After thorough exploration in State of the desirability of Secretary Rusk seeing Iakovos, we all concluded that this would only point the finger squarely at Iakovos' meddling in our foreign affairs, and thus really annoy the Turks. Since there could be no other clear purpose for his seeing Rusk than to complain about Cyprus and Turk harassment of the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, this would be borrowing trouble.

However, Iakovos and a Greek/American delegation have now called on Senator Dirksen. The latter referred them to Ball, but said they also insisted on seeing the President. Dirksen indicated he would raise this at the White House. So, despite the problem mentioned above, my instinct is to have them see Ball if they ask for an appointment. I've so told State. This buys you more time. But I feel in my bones that receiving these excitable people may be better than letting a head of steam build up.

R. W. Komer

65
March 19, 1966
Saturday, 10:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

John Gardner gets back at 5:05 today from Saigon. He and his group will doubtless be beat after the long return flight, so this memo is merely to raise the question of whether and when you might like to have him report. I would regard at least a brief report as a public relations plus. Would Monday morning be a good time?

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 19, 1966, 10:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here's a quite pro forma letter from Ayub, acknowledging your post-Honolulu Vietnam letter and the Humphrey visit. It provides an occasion to report that the Paks seem to be reverting to their old ways again -- leaning on India and playing the Chicom angle. Despite Ayub's talks here, it's clear that he either can't or won't do a quick about face. So this hand will take time to play out.

Instead of showing a little give after Tashkent, the Paks have begun to put the heat on the Indians again. They pulled back their forces on schedule, but stonewalled at the recent ministerial talks. The Indians came ready to talk about limited ways of working out common problems, but the Paks insisted on talking Kashmir first. When the Indians heard them out, the Paks read this as a sign of weakness and refused to agree to anything until Kashmir is settled.

Now we have Liu Shao-Chi's state visit to Pakistan 24 March. The Chicoms obviously boxed Ayub in by choosing the eve of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to pick up the general invitation Ayub issued when in Peiping. We'll learn a lot from how he plays this visit but he's not ready to give up the Chicom string to his bow -- at least until he knows where his next round of military hardware is coming from.

On the other side of the coin, even Bhutto admits publicly that your talks with Ayub arrested the downward slide in US-Pak relations. Ayub obviously has Bhutto under wraps; Bhutto hasn't changed, but Ayub hasn't fired him -- possibly because Ayub still faces domestic opposition and doesn't want to rock the boat.

I'm urging State to let Ayub know Big Brother is watching by asking him to prod Liu Shao-Chi on the Chicom failure to respond to our Vietnam peace initiatives. This may be a pretty good test. Meanwhile it makes sense to keep the Paks guessing about more aid till they come to us.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-248
By CB, NARA, Date 6-27-95

~~SECRET~~



From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.Pk., H.J.

PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI.

185

March, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of February 11, 1966, which was delivered to me by Ambassador McConaughy on February 15.

I am deeply appreciative of your desire to keep me informed about developments regarding the situation in Viet Nam. I have studied the Declaration of Honolulu, the Joint Communique and your statement of February 8, 1966, on the recent conference at Honolulu, which you were good enough to enclose with your letter. They are impressive documents and I particularly welcome your decision to launch a massive attack on the socio-economic problems of South Viet Nam in order to help build a stable political, economic and social base in that country.

I have also since had the pleasure of meeting Vice President Hubert Humphrey and other officials of your Government who accompanied him to Karachi, and we had a very useful exchange of views on Viet Nam and other matters of interest to both our countries.

We fully understand the difficulties faced by the U.S. in the complex situation in Viet Nam, and I hope that your search for a peaceful settlement of this problem will bear fruit before long. It is my sincere hope that under your dedicated leadership the United States will find a satisfactory solution to this tragic conflict.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

M. Ayub Khan

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-248
By CG, NARA, Date 6-27-95

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67

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-248

37 CB, NARA, Dec 6-10-95

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 18, 1966, 7:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Invitation to Ne Win of Burma. Your staff here would most heartily endorse Secretary Rusk's suggestion that you invite Ne Win for a state visit. The background is that he apparently indicated to Jim Linen of TIME that he'd like to come.

With our increasing focus on Asia, having a neutralist statesman like this could be a plus. You should know that Ne Win has carefully avoided any statements pro or con on Vietnam.

State suggests that you invite him if any of the three visitors you have approved (Feisal, Kenyatta, or Freil) cannot come before 31 July.

1.3(a)(5)

It is still problematical whether Ne Win would come, but this is all the more reason for getting credit for an invite.

R. W. Komer

Approve _____

Approve if one other can't come _____

Approve instead of one other _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to General Ne Win for
State Visit

Recommendation:

That you invite General Ne Win, Chairman of Burma's Revolutionary Council, to pay a state visit this year possibly prior to July 31 if any of the three visits you have approved (Feisal, Kenyatta, Frei) cannot take place before that date.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Discussion:

A visit by Ne Win at this time would demonstrate our support of Burmese neutrality and reaffirm that our interest in Southeast Asia is not limited to our close friends and allies. It would also help dispel Ne Win's feeling that he was not given enough attention when he visited the United States as Chief of Staff of the Burmese Armed Forces in 1960 and his apparent suspicion that the United States is hostile to his regime and would like to see it replaced.

The visit would counterbalance his visits last year to the Soviet Union and Communist China. During both these visits he carefully avoided allowing himself to be associated with any derogatory statements on our position in Viet-Nam.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-371

By *fw*, NARA, Date 6-30-93~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

MAR 18 1966

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

TO : THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed visit to Hanoi by the President
State Visit

Recommendation:

That you invite General Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council, to visit the United States for a period of 10 to 12 days in the latter part of 1955. (The visit should be made before that date.)

Approved: _____

Discussion:

A visit by Ho Chi Minh to this time would be a significant step toward the normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It would also help to allay the feeling that he was not given enough attention when he visited the United States as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in 1950 and his apparent conviction that the United States is hostile to his people and well-being is not to be regarded.

The visit would counterbalance his visit last year to the Soviet Union and Communist China. During both these visits he carefully avoided alluding allude to be associated with any derogatory statements on our position in Viet-Nam.

1955 MAR 18 PM 3 46

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

SECRET

Group 1

Downgraded at 12-000000;
not automatically declassified.

68
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, March 18, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a not very important new letter from Erhard on our draft treaty on non-proliferation.

You will recall you assured him (in a reply to an earlier letter) that our new draft treaty does not rule out any nuclear arrangements involving hardware. This letter has the earmarks of his Foreign Office wanting to cross every "t".

We will work out a reply for you over the weekend. (There is no direct connection between this issue and the reply to de Gaulle.)

fu3

Francis M. Bator

March 18, 1966

69

Jack,

Here are the answers on the ship gift to India. As NSF indicated in its original memo (which Hornig sent in to the President), it is planning on new oceanographic research vessels, but they have no connection with this gift. The old Williamsburg is simply too expensive to operate any more.

R. W. Komer

Friday, March 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift of Research Ship to India

Don Hornig and I have double checked to the best of our ability on two key questions affecting whether we should offer the Anton Bruun (the old Williamsburg) to India.

1. Do you have unquestionable legal authority to do so? Both BOB and the General Counsel of NSF confirm that we do under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (memo attached), which authorizes the Foundation to dispose by grant of property of all kinds serving the purposes of the Act and authorizes NSF to enter into arrangements with foreign countries for scientific research activities carrying out the purposes of the Act. The Secretary of State must approve such arrangements, and State has already informally done so.

2. Will transferring this ship just mean that NSF will seek new ships as replacements? There is no direct connection between giving up this old ship and the NSF's desire for additional ships for oceanographic research. In fact NSF plans to lay up this ship in any case, because its operation is so uneconomical. It simply requires too large a crew. On the other hand, NSF clearly plans to build new research vessels and other facilities in the next several years (costing about \$5 million out of a \$530 million budget), not as direct replacements for the old Williamsburg but as part of its regular program. Dr. Haworth, Director of NSC, has indicated that NSF expects to request at least one new ship, costing around \$2 million, whether or not the Williamsburg is given to India. So we can't guarantee that no one will say that we're giving away one ship in order to buy another, but the fact is that NSF wants new ships in any case. Of course any NSF proposals will be subject to BOB review and Hill appropriation.

- - - - -

Touching base with Congress. Dr. Haworth of NSF has been holding up on this until he got some indication of whether the President was interested. If so, he will then check promptly with his Congressional Committees. This ship gesture is no more than a nice touch for the Gandhi visit; it could easily be dispensed with, or done later.

R. W. Komer

(21) 70
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., March 17, 1966
8 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

This is a pro forma inquiry as to whether you'd like a Saturday Vietnam group meeting.

There is not enough new business beyond the old agenda to justify one, in my view. We are still in the throes of the latest political crisis, but there is relatively little we can do about it from here.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Lay on Saturday meeting _____

Omit it ✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-248
By CL, NARA, Date 6-27-95

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Thursday, March 17, 1966, 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Assignment of Ambassador Bennett

Ellsworth Bunker has sent you a report (Tab A) on his and Tap Bennett's conversation yesterday with Bosch. The Dominican press gave full play this morning to the visit of the two Ambassadors to Bosch's house. NBC also had a reporter on hand to cover the story. Bunker and Bennett are today calling on Balaguer, and later Bonnelly, another announced candidate.

Bunker ends up his message by saying that he believes "the time is now appropriate to take the other steps we discussed last week". He is referring to the reassignment of Tap Bennett.

Bunker told me before he left that you had indicated a willingness to move ahead with Tap's reassignment provided the problem of Bosch's refusal to see Tap last week were satisfactorily resolved and the tranquil atmosphere continued. The cordial visit yesterday and the attendant publicity takes care of this aspect. The situation in the DR remains quiet.

We are in a position to announce Tap's reassignment to Lisbon as soon as you authorize it. The paperwork has been done and the agreement from the Portuguese obtained. The routine press announcement is at Tab B. Suggested press guidance for Bill Moyers on some anticipated hot questions is at Tab C.

My recommendation is that you authorize the announcement and that it be made either on Saturday, March 19 or Monday March 21. Linc Gordon, Tom Mann and Secretary Rusk concur in this recommendation.

William G. Bowdler

Authorize announcement _____

Prefer Saturday _____

Prefer Monday _____


Prefer some other date _____

Hold a while longer, see me ☒ .

WGB
Mr. President - This seems to be tightened up about as much as it can be.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

7/a



7/c



DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

March _____, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

- - - - -

President Johnson today announced the resignation of Ambassador George W. Anderson, Jr. as Ambassador to Portugal and his intention to nominate W. Tapley Bennett of Georgia, a Career Foreign Service Officer, to succeed him.

Mr. Bennett was born at Griffin, Georgia, on April 1, 1917. He received his Bachelor's degree from the University of Georgia in 1937. He attended Freiburg University in Germany from 1937 to 1938 and was awarded an LL. B. from George Washington University in 1948. Prior to his entry into the Foreign Service as an economic analyst at Ciudad Trujillo in 1941, he was employed by the Institute of Public Affairs from 1939 to 1940 and the Office for Emergency Management from 1940 to 1941.

He subsequently served at Panama City in 1944 and later in the Department in Latin American Affairs becoming Officer-in-Charge of Central American and Panama Affairs in 1949. He was named Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs in 1951. After an assignment to the National War College in 1954 Mr. Bennett was named a Special

Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State in 1955. He was assigned to Vienna as Political Counselor in 1957 and to Athens in 1961 as Counselor of Embassy with the personal rank of Minister. He has served as United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic since March 4, 1964.

Mr. Bennett received the Department of State Commendable Service Award in 1952.

He is married to the former Margaret Rutherford White and they have five children.

7/e



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, March 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Jets for Israel and Jordan. This is to tell you that both countries have met our basic terms; as a result, we will probably sign with Israel today and with Jordan shortly.

The Israeli package calls for 48 of the A-4F's which McNamara favored, in return for Israeli promises to help us quietly explain the Jordan sale, not go nuclear, and stop badgering us for any more planes for the next five years. The Jordan package calls for 36 rehabbed F-104's, to be sold in increments of 12 for cash on delivery over the next few years.

Now we will begin to get some public flak, and I have made everyone fully aware of your desire that we do all we can to minimize any domestic repercussions here. We have a detailed plan and hope to forestall undue trouble.

We will acknowledge the Jordan deal, but try to keep the Israeli one quiet (and enlist Israeli Embassy to help in doing so) for a few weeks at least. The purpose is to avoid a major Arab flare-up because the announcement of our earlier tank sale, and now that of the jets, come too close together. We may have more Arab trouble than we'd anticipated, because of the unexpected decision of the Arab PMs meeting in Cairo to mount a propaganda campaign against US arms aid to Israel.

To cope with our Zionist problem here we will tell the friends of Israel to relax, since we are taking quiet unspecified action to meet Israel's security needs. We will touch base to this end with the appropriate Hill people, and Zionist organizations if necessary.

There has already been a leak on the Jordan deal in a British paper, we think from UK sources. So you may be reading about the matter shortly.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ/KAC 11-47 (#20)
NARA, Date 1-4-12

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, March 17, 1966

73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State endorses Freeman's attached suggestion that you see B. F. Sen, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization. FAO has been the most responsive of the UN agencies we're trying to get more deeply involved in Vietnam. Sen will also be a key figure in dramatizing and organizing an international attack on the world food problem to complement your food message.

As an Indian, he can also be prodded on India's failure to beat the bushes harder for other help in meeting the current drought.

On the other hand, neither State nor I will argue that this call is essential. Despite Freeman's plea, it's a marginal case.

R. W. Komer

I'll see him _____

I'm too busy _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 16, 1966, 6:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Do we want a full-blown war with De Gaulle? Bator will be sending a brief for the session tomorrow, but this matter is of sufficient gravity that I want to weigh in too. In presenting you with a series of last-minute tactical decisions (a letter here, a statement there), we may be showing you only the trees and not the forest, with risk that we end up backing you into a war you may not want.

For example, a cardinal issue in the draft thrust before you this morning is not just its tone but what certain key phrases in it imply. We all have the natural impulse to get back at De Gaulle, and to explain to the French people why he is wrong. But the draft goes much further when it says that we not only intend to continue our past NATO policies "but to urge extension of these principles of common and joint preparation wherever they can be usefully applied" (p. 5), and that you dedicate us not just to preservation of NATO but "to the creative task of strengthening it ..." (p. 6).

This is not just rhetoric. As Dean Acheson told you, his group feels that we must seek to strengthen NATO by something new, so that we don't end up with "the same old NATO slightly weaker" (without France). In short, the best way to stop De Gaulle is to beef up the alliance -- make it more integrated rather than less.

This is great stuff if we can do it. But will it work?

Before we announce that we're going in the precise opposite direction from De Gaulle, let's first look at "how." To my knowledge, the only "new" idea we have for strengthening the alliance is the well-known MLF (or the UK variant -- ANF). Query -- is this proposed new strengthening of NATO simply an opening for a new push on MLF?

ANF/MLF has many advantages -- you've heard the arguments. Moreover, the NATO country most spooked by Gaullist wrecking will be West Germany. What better way to reassure Bonn than to give it a finger on the nuclear trigger, or at least a greater sense of nuclear participation? Bonn itself is already talking up this line.

But there may also be real disadvantages which need full airing before we jump. That France's withdrawal from the NATO structure inevitably enhances Germany's role will worry many allies -- Scandinavians, Italians, Benelux, UK. They may not be so eager to see a US/UK/German combination, without the continental counterbalance of the French.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-248
By CB, NARA, Date 6-27-95

March 16, 1966

Second, what we all fear now is new French initiatives toward the USSR. There are few issues in which Paris and Moscow might see a greater common interest -- or one more popular in Europe -- than in opposing a nuclear role for Bonn. So taking this road toward strengthening NATO may help bring about precisely what we want to avoid.

Third, and not least, does a political crisis in Europe help or hurt us at home? Exerting firm leadership of the Western Alliance is one thing, but what if all it leads to is a great ruckus with little concrete result? We already have one war in Asia, and I can see the Europe-firsters clamoring that Lyndon Johnson is leading us into trouble on both flanks. Don't we also risk Republican charges that we're losing two wars instead of one?

Finally, can we win a war with De Gaulle just now over more integration vs. less? I doubt it. He's just been elected for seven more years and nobody believes we can get him to reverse course -- whether what he's doing is popular in France or not. Even to try may risk splitting NATO further by giving play to all the latent centrifugal tendencies in Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Turkey and Greece. Can we afford to have yet others play the same game as De Gaulle?

Indeed, the lessons of recent history all suggest that we stop, look, and listen before flinging down the gauntlet to De Gaulle. He may well be right in thinking he has us in a spot where we can't react vigorously -- let's not underestimate him. Isn't he dead right in appreciating that the threat of Soviet aggression is less and that he can thus get away with more? He also has a receptive European audience for his mischievous contention that we might drag NATO into a larger war emerging from Vietnam. Nor should the basic merit of our own grand design for European integration blind us to the likelihood that moving it further forward may be an uphill fight till Britain decides to enter Europe or De Gaulle passes from the scene.

So before answering State's clarion call to propaganda battle, you deserve to be convinced that it's one we can reasonably expect to win. If not, it may be wiser to outwait De Gaulle -- while limiting the damage he can do. This alternative calls for a firm defensive stance whereby the rest of NATO proceeds with business as usual, while reserving an "empty chair" till France outlives De Gaulle. To thus prevent NATO from slipping backward may be the best that we can hope for just now. The real problem, as always, is not France but Germany -- and the more we agitate the alliance the more we may bring this potentially divisive issue to the fore.

This memo deliberately accentuates the negative, and my worries may be overdrawn. But our staff job is to give you both sides of any story -- and to show the options if others don't. In any case I see no reason for precipitate action on a letter or a statement; this matter could well stand mulling over for a week or so. Counsels of caution need not be those of cowardice.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

76-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: American Embassy, Colombo 742 DEPTTEL 422

14 March 1966

1. I am very pleased that the Secretary of State in his discussion with Prime Minister Senanayake emphasized the importance of having confidence in the integrity of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which would affect the attitudes of governments as well as private capital, and that the Prime Minister agreed with the Secretary's recommendation in this connection.

2. I think this is important inasmuch as I fear that Ceylon, given the World Bank's present attitude that Ceylon is not taking the necessary steps to get its own house in order, will endeavor to circumvent the Bank and obtain aid directly from interested countries.

3. In spite of all that I and my staff have said to Gamani Corea, Ceylon's economic czar, I think he still has the attitude that Ceylon deserves financial assistance on political basis because it turned back Communism, even though Ceylon is not doing all it should to solve its economic problems. Equally important, I doubt he believes us when we say economic progress is the prerequisite for continued aid.

4. Consequently I trust that in conversations with the Prime Minister and Corea during this week, top US officials will emphasize in all frankness what steps we feel should be taken by Ceylon.

5. It is true that Ceylon has done well in carrying out the obligations imposed in the stabilization agreement, produced a reasonably good budget, and initiated planning efforts, but so far it has not even faced up to the critical problem of rice subsidy nor has it made more than nominal progress on the question of a moratorium on exchange remittances.

6. Over the weekend I have talked with the British High Commissioner and members of his staff about this troublesome moratorium on remittance to Britain of profits and dividends. As a matter of fact, immediately before I signed the PL -480 agreement March 12, Corea had received the British Deputy Chief of Mission and Counselor for Economic Affairs who had told Corea in no uncertain terms that unless some plan were worked out for solution of this problem Britain would not be interested in furnishing aid

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-250

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By 48, NARA, Date 9-29-94

to Ceylon next year. In fact Britain would not even be interested in discussing use of the second part of the \$10 million loan offered for this year (approximately US \$4.5 million). As the British High Commissioner remarked to me, before furnishing new capital to a country it is certainly wise to see how it is treating past investments. However should Ceylon run into heavy sailing in its attempt to liquidate this problem, Britain would give favorable consideration to assisting Ceylon in its difficulties.

7. As State will recall, Sir Norman Kipping of the Confederation of British Industries and who was recently here offered hope to Ceylon that once this moratorium question was cleared up additional British private capital would be forthcoming.

8. Just as it was necessary from our point of view to find settlement for the oil problem, I think now it behooves all of us to assist in finding some solution for this moratorium question. A given fact that Ceylon's annual foreign exchange earnings amount to approximately US \$400 million and her external debt is comparatively small, the problem should not prove insoluble.

9. British officials tell me that since Mr. Dudley Senanayake cannot reach London before about March 25, it would be impossible for him to meet with the British Prime Minister and government officials who will then be in the last sprint of the election campaign. British officials here have urged nevertheless that Gamani Corea return via London for a serious talk with British officials.

GP-3

Lyon

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, March 16, 1966, 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Messages from the President of Honduras and the President of the Honduran Congress

President Lopez of Honduras and the President of the Honduran Congress have sent you the following messages (my unofficial translation) with respect to the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress:

From President Lopez -

"In my name and in the name of the Government and people of Honduras I have the honor to express to you and to the Government and people of the United States our feeling of solidarity on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, reiterating assurances of our determination to continue collaborating in this most important program which the American Republics have for forging their progress and well-being."

From Congressional President Rivera -

"On the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress it is a pleasure to convey the recognition of the National Congress of Honduras to you and to the people and Government of the United States, as well as the permanent and enthusiastic adherence of this legislative body to the program of the Alliance for Progress in which we place our best hopes to achieve in our countries a genuine economic and social revolution within a framework of free institutions."

WGB
William G. Bowdler

Copy: Jack Valenti

MEMORANDUM

25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1966
8:00 p.m. Tuesday

78
Pres. subsequently
agreed to see
Iakovos.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob Komer and Ray Hare (of State) agree that it may be important for domestic reasons for you to see Archbishop Iakovos.

He wants to complain about the way the Turks are treating the Greek Patriarch in Istanbul.

Komer and Hare would talk to the Archbishop before he sees you and warn him not to make any wild statements about the Turks - or to say publicly that he has the President's support against the Turks.

The Archbishop wants to see you. He is the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in North and South America.

Do you want us to bring the Archbishop in?

No

See Bush & make no statements
YES _____ NO _____

in advance of following action
of to be only if Bush says
it is must

Jack Valenti

REFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

2 79
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tues., March 15, 1966
7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

So you'll know it before it's in the papers, Chicom President Liu-Shao-Chi will begin a state visit to Pakistan 24 March -- the eve of Mrs. Gandhi's visit here.

We suspect the Chicoms boxed Ayub in on this one by choosing now to pick up the general invitation he issued during his Peiping visit last March. They're probably trying to recoup some of their losses over the past few months and embarrass Ayub with us. He probably didn't feel he could beg off -- especially after Chicom backing during the Indo-Pak war last fall. However, this may also be a bit of resurgent Bhutto-ism.

George Ball will let Ambassador Ahmed know we're unhappy. However, instead of too much complaining in Pakistan, we're considering pressing Ayub to urge the Chicoms toward unconditional negotiations in Vietnam. He'll know we're watching closely, and the real test will be whether he confines himself to ceremony or begins touching raw nerves.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-248

By CB, NARA, Date 6-27-95

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

cc: Mr. Moyers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 15, 1966, 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bunker's Report from the Dominican Republic

Bunker reports that he met with Garcia Godoy last night and found him more relaxed and confident than he ever recalls seeing him.

Garcia Godoy told him that the electoral climate is steadily improving. He mentioned specifically the change-in-command ceremony at the Santiago base recently, which representatives from the main political parties -- including Bosch's PRD -- attended. The PRD representative joined his colleagues in remarking how good the climate in the Santiago area was. Garcia Godoy observed that there was a great deal of pressure from the rank and file of the PRD for the party to stay in the race. This will certainly work to our advantage.

Bunker spoke personally with Bosch today and got his agreement to receive Bunker and Bennett tomorrow. Bunker said that he would be cabling you concerning this conversation, as he indicated he would do when he talked to you yesterday morning.

WGB
William G. Bowdler
RWK

OK
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-248
By cb, NARA, Date 6-27-95

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