

MEMORANDUM

*L*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 15, 1966, 5:00 p.m. *5:00 p.m.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cabinet Resignation in Venezuela *L*

The announcement this morning that the Cabinet of President Leoni had resigned does not represent a serious political crisis.

For several weeks there have been growing differences between the three parties which make up President Leoni's coalition government. The differences have centered largely on the question of patronage.

The smaller of the three parties has now pulled out of the coalition. Assuming that President Leoni's own party -- the AD -- and the URD party stick together, they will still have a majority in both Houses of Congress. At this juncture, we have no reason to believe that the AD and the URD will not continue to work together.

This afternoon Ambassador Bernbaum cabled this assessment:  
"There is no crisis atmosphere in Caracas. Disintegrating partnership has not led to bitter recriminations. Responsibility and moderation are the order of the day in statements by political leaders."

*WGB*  
William G. Bowdler  
*PWK*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-197  
By ijg, NARA, Date 1-16-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 15, 1966  
Tuesday 12:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Shah answered your message on Vietnam (bombing resumption) by saying he could see the same disruptive elements at work in the Middle East. As usual, he used this as justification for buying more military hardware. Since we've been weaning him from grant military aid to credit sales, he's been increasingly touchy -- especially when we tell him his economic problems are more serious than the military threats he imagines (largely from Nasser). At the same time, to the extent the Shah buys hardware we want him to keep buying it from us.

So State and we propose a friendly reply that balances deference to him as master in his own house with a gentle reminder that he can't have both an overgrown military budget and all the economic progress he wants. We've just had a military survey team looking at his new requirements, and we'll discuss them in a joint review of his economic and military situation later this spring. Your letter will set the stage for that.

For signature.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-248

By CL, NARA, Date 6-27-95

March 15, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I greatly value your thoughtful letter of February 26 spelling out your suggestions for resolving the current conflict in Vietnam.

Our two positions on a resolution of the Vietnamese conflict appear to be very close. The United States would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof. We believe the essentials of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 to be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. As I have said as long ago as last April, we would welcome negotiations without preconditions, and we believe a cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.

Unfortunately, our proposals and those of other well-meaning governments have been rebuffed by the other side, and it has not been possible to engage in any dialogue or negotiation thus far. Faced with this situation, we have been obliged to take those measures necessary to fulfill our commitments to the Government and people of South Vietnam. As you know, these measures have not only included an unavoidable military response to aggression, but have also been marked by extensive efforts in the political, economic, and social fields, efforts which we and the South Vietnamese have found to be essential if the lasting victory of a better life for all the people of Vietnam is to be achieved.


Thank you again for your letter and for your suggestions. I have found it always encouraging to know that our friendly relations permit us to exchange thoughts on problems of interest to our own nations and to the whole world.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency  
Leopold Sedar Senghor  
President of the Republic of Senegal  
Dakar  
cc: Bill Moyers

LBJ:UH:em (typed 3/14/66)





MEMORANDUM

37  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, March 14, 1966, 7:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Staying Loose on China Policy. I'm convinced that China is fast becoming a major foreign and domestic issue again, and needs careful watching. Though I gather that the VP's "hint" of flexibility was strictly his own (and rather premature, to say the least), why not let it serve as a sort of trial balloon?

To withdraw from what was rather grossly overplayed by the press would only start another debate with our VN critics, and also force us to eat crow later if, as Secretary Rusk has twice indicated, we may yet be forced to make a virtue of necessity and accept an adverse Chirep vote in the UNGA.

On the other hand, to start shifting our China policy now -- before we've carefully assessed all the implications, would be risky. We still lack any firm feel for where the electorate stands, or for how our Vietnam enterprise might be affected.

Yet there may be a way to have our cake and eat it too. It is to move gradually to the same stance toward Peiping as we now have toward Hanoi -- i. e., if these people will only stop their subversion and aggression and live peacefully with their neighbors, we are prepared to re-examine co-existing peacefully with them. It is not we who are isolating Red China, but Red China which is isolating itself. If we're going to be forced to adjust our China policy sooner or later anyway, there is virtue in doing so in a way which puts the monkey on Peiping's back.

I don't want to overdo this prickly issue, only to urge the case for staying loose till we can sort it out better. Signs of US flexibility would offend Korea, the GVN, and above all Taiwan, but be quite a plus with most other friends. More important is whether such signs would tend to undermine our Vietnam stance or serve rather as a diversion protecting our Vietnam flank.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-248  
By CB, NARA, Date 6-21-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



28  
86  
L  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 14, 1966  
Monday, 6:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

President Senghor of Senegal wrote to inform you (Tab A) that Ho Chi Minh was in touch with him. He did not reveal the substance, but we believe it was Ho's standard letter to other chiefs of state. Senghor also outlined Senegal's position on the Vietnam conflict.

Since Senghor is a good friend, he deserves a warm reply. State's proposed draft (Tab B) points out that the US and Senegalese positions seem close, as we both would welcome (a) a conference on Southeast Asia; (b) negotiations without preconditions; and (c) cessation of hostilities. However, we note that this approach has been rebuffed by the other side, thus requiring the US to take measures to fulfill its commitments to South Vietnam.

For signature.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS84-13	
By <u>OUT</u>	NARS, Date <u>7-25-84</u>

86a

Tab  
A

86c

Tab  
B



MARCH 14, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSESTATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON  
THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY FOR THE  
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

My fellow citizens of the Hemisphere:

Since becoming President, I have often re-stated my own, and our country's, resolute commitment to the goal of a better life for all the people of the Western Hemisphere.

Many Presidents have worked to shape that goal.

We are proud of the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Eisenhower broke new and fertile ground with the Act of Bogota in 1960 -- an act growing from the understanding compassion of one people for another.

President Kennedy built on these efforts and gave them increased emphasis with the announcement of the Alliance for Progress on March 13, 1961, five years ago.

Today, by word and deed, Americans are helping to fulfill the hopes of those who have little and pray that one day they can have more.

The Johnson Administration seeks history's description as a time when, the dreaming and the planning having laid the foundations, the doing and building were underway.

The last two years of this vast cooperative effort between the United States and the nations of Latin America are solid evidence that deeds are matching our words.

During these two years Latin America has achieved a per capita growth rate of 2.5%. The average rate for the preceding three years was less than 1%. This recent increase of 150% is a fact which friends of the hemisphere must note with pride -- and new hope for the future.

In fiscal years 1965 and 1966, those Latin American countries cooperating with U. S. programs of action are putting visible results before their people.

Together we are:

- improving 7,000 miles of road
- building 130,000 dwelling units
- irrigating 136,000 new acres of farmland
- adding 530,000 kilowatts to power generating capacity
- providing classrooms for one million students
- building 450 new health facilities
- spending \$200 million to provide financing for expansion and construction of over 5,000 industrial firms
- spending \$250 million in providing agricultural credit to 450,000 farmers.

MORE

Equally important, reforms are changing and modernizing these institutions in Latin America essential to the growth of a sense of community that stretches throughout the hemisphere.

Governments, business concerns, labor unions, and cooperatives are working with the people of our hemisphere to attain economic and social progress under free institutions.

- We are building the machinery of cooperation through the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.
- We are enlisting the support of private groups and voluntary agencies in ever-increasing measure. The Peace Corps, Partners for the Alliance, Council on Latin America, AFL-CIO, private foundations and universities are making vital contributions.
- We are introducing the principle of mutual aid among the Latin American nations. We are giving new energy to economic integration within Latin America. The Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro, approved last November, gives impetus to these concepts.
- We recognize that fulfillment of all our goals will require continuation of our joint efforts beyond 1971. I said last November that the United States is prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond the period originally foreseen in the Charter of Punta del Este. Self-help and mutual aid will be yardsticks in determining the scope of our contribution.

MORE

In country after country, nations in the hemisphere are acting to mobilize resources for public and private investment -- to reform and modernize the institutions -- to expand trade and market opportunities within and outside the hemisphere -- and to provide a solid base for the support and cooperation of imported capital and technical assistance.

External support is also coming in increasing measure from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and its affiliates and the United Nations. This support has increased by about \$200 million in the last two years.

For its part, the United States has already committed nearly \$5 billion to the nations of Latin America to assist them in their struggle to modernize and achieve a better life for their people. In recent months significant steps have been taken to give Latin America greater access to our markets:

- This Administration has insisted that our participation in the International Coffee Agreement be more effective.
- This Administration recommended the Congress withdraw the special import fee on sugar.
- This Administration removed the quota restrictions on lead and zinc.

After a temporary period of setback, there are now most hopeful signs of a renewal of large-scale private foreign investment in Latin American development, often in joint ventures with Latin American associates. Business leaders interested in Latin American investment have been invited to the Cabinet Room frequently to discuss steps to help the people of the hemisphere.

Three years ago the 19 Latin American countries were deeply concerned over their trade position in the world.

During the past two years the trend has changed.

Our experts now predict that export earnings for 1965 will show an increase of \$1 billion over the 1963 level, providing additional resources for investment in development.

Yet we must do more than provide money and technical assistance and improve trade. Investments must be made directly in human beings. In every forum, I have advocated and directed that American resources be invested in education, health, and improved living and working conditions. Such efforts are not easy to organize. They require the mobilization of human resources in scarce supply. But they are among the most rewarding of all investments.

Today I want to issue a new call to our sister nations in the hemisphere to enlarge our truly revolutionary cause -- the cause of enlarging the lives of all our people.

I am determined to contribute America's resources to this spirit of change -- a spirit now slowly, surely, confidently growing in the Western Hemisphere.

MORE



All of us in the Organization of American States have seen and understand the lessons of history. Together we are strong. Divided we are weak. Together, we must shape the future to our hopes.

In every nation in the hemisphere the needs and the beliefs and the prayers are the same. We want peace and opportunity -- the chance to live in dignity, to choose and plan and work and achieve the best for our families.

I believe that the next five years we will see a continent constantly growing in prosperity and in unity -- growing in its capacity to meet the desires and needs of its own people -- and in its contribution to peace and freedom in the world at large.

That is what Bogota and Rio and Punta del Este were all about.

For my own part, I want to help make all this a reality and "to create out of the human spirit, something that did not exist before."

This is fulfillment. And this is our commitment.

# # #

3/14/66

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of 11 March and for your assurances that the new Australian force will be sent to Vietnam as promptly as possible.

We have been giving careful thought to the matters raised in your letter to me of February 25. Mr. Healey's conversations here and in Canberra have helped to clarify the picture regarding British intentions in South-east Asia. I think you and the New Zealanders look at this in much the same way as we do, and I am pleased that we have a good understanding with the British on the future role of their forces in the area.

Ambassador Waller has been in touch with the State Department regarding Minister Hasluck's forthcoming visit to Washington. I can assure you Mr. Hasluck is most welcome. Both Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara are expecting to be in Washington then and are looking forward to meeting with him.

Ambassador Waller has also been in touch with the State Department concerning the possibility of consultations on Southeast Asia between the two of us, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. As you remember, representatives of our four countries discussed the situation in London at the end of 1965 and we would, of course, be pleased to resume such a discussion whenever it seemed appropriate. Officials of our Governments could meet in Washington, Canberra or Wellington without publicity as they did in London. Any meeting on the Foreign Minister level would naturally attract more attention and we would like to prepare the ground carefully if that is the kind of

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NLS 84-13	
By <u>D. C. H.</u>	NARS, Date <u>7-25-84</u>


~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

thing you have in mind. In any such discussion we are concerned to avoid giving any impression that our four countries are deciding the fate of Southeast Asia as a whole or that we are forming an exclusive club. I think we all agree on this point.

An approach that might meet these considerations would be to have Secretary Rusk meet in Canberra with Mr. Hasluck, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Holyoake the morning of June 30. This would seem convenient since the SEATO Council meeting is likely to end June 29 and the ANZUS Council meeting is scheduled to begin the evening of June 30. Their meeting under these circumstances need not attract undue publicity. To prepare for such a meeting I would also like to suggest a conference between officials of the State Department and the British, Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington at an early date. At such a meeting an agenda could be worked out and other preparations made. Alternatively, such a working-level meeting could be held at any one of the other capitals.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable  
Harold E. Holt, M. P. (Vic.),  
Prime Minister of Australia,  
Canberra.

LBJ:CLC:lw

~~SECRET~~



89

Saturday, March 12, 1966  
4:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Kraft. After checking with Bill Moyers, I agreed to see Joe to talk strictly about India/Pakistan -- he is on his way there tomorrow. Joe's questioning was almost entirely on the nature of the Indian problem, India's confrontation with China, its use or misuse of foreign aid, and the prospects that Indira Gandhi could hack it. I was eloquent on all counts. He did ask about the prospects for aid renewal -- military and economic. I told him that this was up to you and that our response would necessarily depend upon your own sense of the extent to which Mrs. Gandhi was determined and able to move India forward. However, I took the opportunity to get in some good licks about the success of our aid strategy vis-a-vis both India and Pakistan over the last year.-- all on deep background, of course.

Joe couldn't resist asking me about the State Department reorganization. I refused to comment beyond saying that I thought it a very good thing. His pitch was that the reorganization itself was a good move, but that it would not succeed without better people -- ergo, why hadn't you strengthened the Department first, and wasn't a strong Bundy shop an essential so long as the Department was so weak? I told him that I'd read all this in his last article and simply disagreed with his characterization of State. Moreover, it seemed to me that the so-called "adversary" relation between Mac Bundy's staff and State Department was almost entirely a figment of press imagination. For five years I had seen Mac operate -- and had certainly done so myself -- as an essential liaison between the Departments and the President. We were interrupted at this point, but I am satisfied that talking with Joe will at least marginally increase the likelihood of sensible articles from Delhi in the delicate period before Mrs. Gandhi comes.

Bob Estabrook. Bob called to inquire about the Indonesian coup. I backgrounded him unhesitatingly, because the press take has been about as good as our own traffic so far. No questions with respect to US policy arose. By the way, I have found Estabrook, an old friend, a thoroughly reliable and level-headed guy.

R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, March 12, 1966

4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congressmen to Cambodia

I won't bother you any further on this; it can be easily handled in the following way if you approve.

1. I've called Senator Aiken. He was most understanding when I explained how State and I had misinformed you. In fact, he was so pleasant that I told him how I was recommending we handle the matter. He completely agreed, and feels it makes great good sense not to slam the door on Sihanouk.

2. I've cleared with State a soft reply (Tab A) which neither rejects the Cambodian invite of three Congressmen nor accepts it -- but simply pleads the press of Hill business at this time. This leaves us maximum flexibility and offends nobody.

3. It seems to me better if the Vice President formally answers the Hill inquiries and, as President of the Senate, signs the letter to his Cambodian counterpart. This leaves you above the play. If you agree, I will so recommend to the Vice President.

Approve ☒

See me ☐

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

*Not  
Be sure to  
Have H.H. Check out  
With all Senators  
who might be interested  
Spencer, Fulbright  
(Hulshizer) Dickson  
et al*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

70a





(13/12/66)

906

**Draft letter to Hon. Ung Hongspath, President  
of the Cambodian National Assembly**

Dear Mr. President:

As presiding officer of the United States Senate, I have been asked by my colleagues to acknowledge your letter of January 30, 1966, in which you invited three members of the United States Congress to visit Cambodia.

My colleagues are most appreciative of your invitation. However, I am informed that such a visit will not be possible at the present time due to the great press of legislative business.

In the meantime, I can assure you that the United States seeks only the friendliest of relations with Cambodia.

Please accept, Mr. President, assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

HHH

90c

March 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

The Cambodian Congressional invite. Though the President got involved in this because of Senator Aiken's inquiry, he has agreed to leave it in your hands. I've cleared with State a soft reply (Tab A) which neither rejects the Cambodian proposal nor accepts it -- instead it defers the matter, pleading the press of Hill business at this time. This leaves us maximum flexibility and offends no one. The State people would have preferred a harder negative, but they grant that this in-between reply can hardly upset our Allies too much.

The President asked that you be sure to check out with all key Senators who might be interested, such as Mansfield, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Dirksen, et al. I have already talked with Senator Aiken and apologized handsomely for misleading the President as to our ability to translate Cambodian. The Senator was transported, and incidentally fully agrees with our proposed handling of the matter.

At Tab B is a draft letter to the Senators from which you might want to draw. It is mostly Jim Thomson's handiwork.

R. W. Komer



13/12/66)

90d

Draft letter to Hon. Ung Hongspath, President  
of the Cambodian National Assembly

Dear Mr. President:

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My colleagues are most appreciative of your invitation. However, I am informed that such a visit will not be possible at the present time due to the great press of legislative business.

In the meantime, I can assure you that the United States seeks only the friendliest of relations with Cambodia.

Please accept, Mr. President, assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

HHH



Dear Senator Aiken:

You will recall the Cambodian National Assembly suggestion that three members of the Congress visit Cambodia, in order to look into popular support for the Cambodian Government and also the question of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory. State Department's translators simply misinterpreted a 24 February Cambodian radio broadcast as saying that the Royal Cambodian Government withdrew the invitation. This was done on the basis of an ambiguous French text. I might add that other countries, too, gave this interpretation. However, a recent recheck of the original Cambodian text discloses that the Cambodians were in fact "reminding" us of the invitation, not "recalling" it.

Nonetheless, it is generally felt here that, given the terms of the invitation and the circumstances of its issuance, U. S. /Cambodian relations would probably not be advanced by such a visit at the present time. In addition, of course, this type of visit would cause considerable concern to the Governments of Cambodia's neighbors, our staunch Thai and Vietnamese allies.

At the same time, we regard it as important to keep open possible channels of communication to Prince Sihanouk and his government, with a view to improving our relations in the months ahead.

I therefore believe that the most sensible response to the Cambodian invitation would be a polite deferral for the time being,

(3/14/66)

but putting it on the grounds of the press of Congressional business. Senator Fulbright wrote on March 1 to this effect, so I assume that such a response would conform with the views of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I am attaching a draft reply to the Cambodian invitation which I would propose to sign on behalf of the Congress, provided that this procedure is satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George D. Aiken

United States Senate

Washington, D. C.



91.  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/12

Bob

Attached is a letter for Pres signature  
responding to P.M. Holt's letter of 25 Feb  
re consultations and his letter of 11 March  
giving more info on troops.

Both Holt letters are also attached.

So is a State draft reply to the  
letter of Feb 25 (received here on 11 March).

I have changed <sup>State's</sup> ~~the~~ draft reply to  
incorporate an acknowledgment of the 11 March  
letter and hopefully take the sting out  
of the tardy reply to the letter of  
25 Feb.

State SS has been consulted.

Ed Hamilton has expressed assistance.

Chad

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 12, 1966  
2:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Holt

Prime Minister Holt has written you three letters in the past few weeks.

On 25 February he wrote (Tab A) of his concern about British defense policy in the Far East and suggested a high-level (Foreign Ministers) meeting between the US, Australia, UK, and New Zealand to discuss strategy.

Then on 4 March he informed you of the Australian decision to send more troops to Vietnam. You answered this, and asked about the timing of the Australian reinforcements. Holt replied on 11 March, saying that the first new battalion would be dispatched in May and the remainder "as promptly as possible." (Tab B).

The attached letter responds primarily to Holt's February 25th proposal for consultation. It suggests in effect that the four Foreign Ministers concerned meet on the matter in Canberra on June 30, when they will all be there in connection with SEATO and ANZUS matters. It also acknowledges Holt's 11 March letter and the assurance of prompt dispatch of the Australian forces. *This is State's draft.*

For signature.

*R. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

*Handwritten initials: HOK, N*

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DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By <i>SCA</i>	NARS, Date 7-25-84

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R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


93 ~~XXXX~~  
Friday, March 11, 1966  
10:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter to you from Jerry Wiesner. He proposes that we explore the possibility of simultaneously assisting Israel and Egypt with nuclear desalting plants as a means of reducing nuclear tensions in the Middle East. In return he expects we might get international inspection of nuclear facilities on both sides and possibly a certain measure of conventional arms reduction as well. If such a bargain is realistic it would certainly be a real achievement. On this score I have asked Mr. Komer to comment.

One difficulty is that no really attractive desalting plant has been proposed for Egypt. The one under study would produce 5 million gallons per day of water, not enough to have any real impact, and the economics are not attractive. However, the Wiesner proposal could well take the form of a nuclear desalting plant in Israel vs. a nuclear electric plant in Egypt.

A suggested reply to Jerry is attached.

  
Donald F. Hornig

Attachments:  
Ltr frm Wiesner to President  
Suggested Reply

**SANITIZED**

**SANITIZED**

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4

NY 94-248

By cl, NARA, Date 6-10-95

cl

93a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wiesner letter. Jerry Wiesner is in with attached glorious scheme for using US-supplied nuclear power or desalting reactors as sweeteners to get the UAR and Israel to agree to (a) cut their military budgets; and (b) not go nuclear.

We'll send his proposal to State and ACDA for careful study, but as an old veteran of arms control probes, I frankly see this as only a long shot.

We have already made clear to Israel that we would insist on IAEA controls over any new desalting reactor we helped them build. But Jerry's idea that we go further and insist they also put their French-supplied Dimona reactor under IAEA would generate a violent Israeli reaction (as already occurred in response to a false leak that we were considering just this).

1.3(a)(5)

Israel might conceivably agree to Jerry's scheme if Nasser would agree to a freeze on any new conventional weapons. But none of us old Arab hands see a prayer of this happening. As for Nasser denying himself the nuclear option if we gave him a big reactor too, why should we pay this price?

1.3(a)(5)

In effect we already have nuclear self-denial in the Near East and are paying for it with aid to Israel and food to Egypt. At some future date, an offer to help Egypt on a major nuclear power project or irrigation scheme (like Bob Anderson's Salbia scheme) might be useful. I'm simply being realistic in doubting that it's a starter yet.

So probably the best move at this point is educational -- to start hinting to the UAR that our willingness to bank major UAR aid projects will necessarily depend on its not wasting its own resources on an arms race. If we get any nibbles which suggest Nasser is interested, then would be the time to start floating such schemes. However, I'll check with State and ACDA.

In the meantime, we suggest a friendly acknowledgment to Jerry Wiesner. For signature at Tab A (or I can send one if you prefer).

R. W. Komer



February 28, 1960

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I believe that your project to develop a nuclear desalting plant jointly with Israel might be expected to bring nuclear disarmament and possibly some reductions of conventional armaments to the Middle East. Apparently both Egypt and Israel would welcome an opportunity to reduce their arms spending if they could do so without increasing the threat to their security from each other. In addition Egypt can only do so much and not appear that she was making a deal with Israel. Egypt has a serious water shortage in spite of the Aswan Dam particularly in the desert region close to Israel and is I believe anxious to participate in a project similar to the one being planned with Israel. I have been told this by a visiting Egyptian and Arthur Goldberg has confirmed it in a discussion with the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N. Furthermore, the Egyptians are very worried by the prospect of the Israelis making a nuclear bomb and would like to head this off as would we.

Israel is anxious to cut its arms costs and would, I am told, be willing to experiment with a substantial cut in its defense expenditures next year if they could be assured that the Egyptians would not increase theirs.

In all of this there appears to be the hope of halting the Middle East arms race if we are bold enough in our approach.

The ingredients would be these: a nuclear desalting project with Egypt as well as Israel, declarations by both countries -- possibly registered with the U.N. -- that they will not undertake the development of nuclear weapons. Agreement to permit inspection of all nuclear facilities by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and U.S. reprocessing of all of the expended fuel elements from the desalting plants to prevent either country from acquiring plutonium. Finally and probably most difficult, would be agreements



The President

-2-

February 28, 1966

to limit the buildup of conventional arms. This could be one in many ways. An agreement to limit budgets at present or somewhat lower levels would be one course. A freeze on the acquisition of any new weapons is another. Without further exploration it is not possible to say just how much is possible in this direction, but it is clear that you have a powerful lever for use in pushing for some conventional disarmament in the desire that exists for nuclear water plants.

Not only is the need for water desperate in both countries, but also it is certain to get worse. The prospect for providing unlimited amounts of fresh water from the sea has the aura of a scientific miracle and in your hands, could bring about a political miracle. In fact, I think that it already has; I believe that your original announcement of the U.S.-Israel project had much to do with halting the Jordan River crisis. When you pointed out that there was a way to provide Israel with water from the sea, the Arabs lost whatever real interest they previously had in the difficult project of diverting the Jordan. The Israelis, in turn, were not quite so fearful of the diversion.

This morning's New York Times carried a story from Cairo which indicates that a plan similar to this may already be being considered. If I can be of any help with it, please call on me.

Sincerely yours,

Jerome B. Wiesner




File 93-1  
March 12, 1966

Dear Jerry:

Let me thank you for the suggestions contained in your letter of 28 February. As you well appreciate, there are many complicated problems in the Near East -- political and military rivalries, water, and the potential introduction of large-scale nuclear facilities with the accompanying possibility of nuclear weapons production -- which bear on what you suggest. You can be sure, however, that your thoughts will be most carefully considered in our continuing search for ways to alleviate tensions in that part of the world. I appreciate your writing me.

Sincerely,



Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner  
Dean of Science  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Cambridge, Massachusetts



94

~~SECRET~~

Proposed Agenda for Vietnam Meeting  
12:30 Friday March 11, 1966

1. Military briefing (Wheeler/Goodpaster).
2. Final instructions to Gardner Mission. It departs Saturday.
3. Handling of Saturday Governors' Conference.
4. General Thi affair.
5. Vietnam civil czar in Washington.
6. Man to deal with SVN inflation problem.
7. Administration line on China Policy.
8. Asian Task Force -- new ideas. President approved a quiet task force headed by Max Millikan of MIT to look at Asian development schemes. What about broader ideas?
9. Gene Black trip. State has briefed him.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCA NARS, Date 8-7-83

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 11, 1966  
3:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Bob Nathan. The opportunity did not arise at our Vietnam meeting to give you the results of the Vice President's approach to Bob Nathan on going to Saigon. I checked with the VP when I heard that he would not be present.

He says that Nathan would go to Saigon, but only for a limited 2 - 3 month period. For family reasons, he could not sign on for a year or two. Dave Bell thinks that Nathan would be useful even on a short-term basis.

Nathan does seem interested in the Washington job (for which Bell also thinks he would be excellent). However, the VP seems to think that he would only take it on a basis where he had full room to maneuver and was not layered down too far in State. I simply told the VP that I would report these views to you.

Ed Reischauer. With your approval, Bill Bundy felt out Reischauer on taking a "roving ambassador" job in Asia. Bill Bundy has reported that Reischauer might be had, but that it would require a great deal of arm-twisting, since Reischauer has a very good job lined up at Harvard.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer



CONFIDENTIAL



**SANITIZED**

**SANITIZED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-248

By CG, NARA, Date 6-10-95

CG

96

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 11. 1966  
Friday, 3:30 P.M.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

Issues to discuss with Ambassador Bunker. Since he is returning to Santo Domingo Monday morning, this is to remind you that you wanted to speak with him further on certain issues:

(1) Reassignment of Tap Bennett.

1.3(a)(5)

[REDACTED]

Bunker meets at 11:00 o'clock Saturday with Alex Johnson, Linc Gordon and [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5)

[REDACTED] Then he will be in a better position to speak with you about point 2.

Do you wish me to set up another appointment for him to see you or shall I suggest he phone you Saturday afternoon or Sunday?

R. W. Komer

Set up appointment \_\_\_\_\_

Have him call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Bill Moyers

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 11, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cambodian caper. On delving further into this, I have discovered a royal snafu.

First, Hayden, Fulbright and Aiken all referred this matter to the Vice President, as the titular presiding officer of the Senate. The Vice President was about to sign letters to Fulbright, Aiken and Mansfield pointing out that the Cambodians had withdrawn the invite. We have held this up.

Second, while Washington, Bangkok, Saigon, and even Peiping all interpreted the Cambodian radio broadcast of 24 February (an attack on Symington's criticism of VC use of Cambodia) as stating that the Cambodian government withdrew the invitation addressed by its Parliament to three U. S. Senators, a red-faced State Department, checking the French text yesterday, found out that the French word used also means "reminds." They then went back this morning to the Cambodian original and found that the verb is in fact "reminds." Thus the invite still stands.

Third, FE in State still feels strongly that we should not pick up the invitation because (a) the Thais and GVN would be sore as hops; (b) it would give Sihanouk another propaganda victory; (c) Fulbright says his committee is too busy to travel; and (d) the Mansfield expedition to Cambodia demonstrates how little can be accomplished through such contacts. Others, including Harriman (I am told), believe that it might be better simply to defer this matter and play for time, perhaps returning an interim answer that the Congress is too busy at this moment. They see merit in keeping open at least a tenuous channel to the Prince.

Queries: Should we leave this to the Vice President,  
or do a letter on your behalf?

On the merits, would you prefer a soft deferral or a polite turndown?

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED  
NLJ 84-13  
By Dut NARS, Date 7-25-84  
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This  
expended  
for total amount  
which Pres. 50  
RWK

help talk about this  
to all - L

SECRET

Rusk: ref 12 from 98  
Pres' office 3/12

Proposed Agenda for Vietnam Meeting  
12:30 Friday, March 11, 1966

We see this as a meeting where you can keep the needle in on various matters underway:

1. Handling of Saturday Governors' Conference.
2. Gardner Mission. Cater tells me this is on the rails, to depart Saturday. Its not quite usual for this type of session, but would you like to have Gardner there for final instructions?  
  
Yes ✓ No
3. Military situation (McNamara).
4. Vietnam civil czar in Washington.
5. Man to deal with SVN inflation problem. VP tried to get Bob Nathan (but was turned down, I believe).
6. Freeman's requests of McNamara. Has he made them yet?
7. Party line on China Policy. The VP, for example, is on TV Sunday and may get questions. Rusk testifies next Wednesday. D.C.  
R
8. Asian Task Force - new ideas. You approved a quiet task force headed by Max Millikan of MIT to look at economic development schemes, but might want to add that you're interested in broader ideas too.
9. Gene Black trip. State has briefed him, and Rusk could report.

*RWK*  
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By alt NARS, Date 8-2-83

SECRET

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98a  
Mr President

In re item on agenda about Asian Task Force. #8

Rostow before he left said that Max Millikan for good reasons (wife health) cannot serve -- but the top man in this field, Edward Mason of Harvard will be the top man.

jv

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 10, 1966, 8:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Outlook in Africa. Aside from the looming black-white issue already on us in the southern third of Africa, our African affairs are moving along quite well. Military coups like those in Ghana and Nigeria are not really a matter of civilians vs. military, but of a dynamic educated element of the new African societies getting fed up with the ineptitude or posturing (or both) of the original leaders of these young countries.

Telescoping the historical experience of the older nations of the world, the new nations of Africa are ending the first phase of their modern history. It was one of great popular euphoria -- sparked by the end of colonialism and the beginning of independence. Hopes and aspirations were high.

The military coups of 1965-66 in Algeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Ghana signal the beginning of the second phase of modern African history. This latest phase is born of frustrated hopes and aspirations, and disappointment with the performance of the independence leaders. While most of the coups, especially that in Ghana, are a distinct plus for us, there are dangers too because the military coup has left something of a political vacuum in each of the affected countries. The officer corps may in many cases be unable to meet a payroll any better than their predecessors.

So it is premature for the US to clap its hands in glee. Nor is it safe to assume that opposition to pro-Communist leanings on the part of leaders like Ben Bella or Nkrumah played a central role in their overthrow. In every case it was primarily internal conditions that caused the coups.

In a real sense, this new phase in Africa is a healthy one, because the dreams and myths which accompanied independence are being replaced by the realization that austerity and hard work are required for survival. The problem is to get this notion across to the masses of African people without dashing their faith in their new leadership.

Our interest is to encourage internal political stability and enough forward movement in Africa to keep it from becoming a Moscow or Peiping playground, while limiting our own investment in favor of other more critical areas. This seems to me quite feasible, provided we don't get caught on the wrong side of the Rhodesia, Portuguese, and South Africa issues which will essentially determine African attitudes toward the great powers over the next 2 - 5 years.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By           , NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72-989-192By isp/rg, NARA, Date 8-31-92~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 10, 1966, 7:00 P.M.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Indira Gandhi visit. With Mrs. Gandhi coming in about two weeks, we are well along on a scenario.

First, you should know that both Ellsworth Bunker and Barbara Ward have strongly urged on me that you should see Mrs. Gandhi as much as possible alone. I responded in both cases that this was the secret of your handling Ayub, and that I had no doubt you would deal similarly with Mrs. Gandhi. Indian officials are in (Tab A) with the same advice.

We have also been working discreetly behind the scenes to get across to Mrs. Gandhi your own deep interest in hearing from her where India is going and what she expects to do to see that it gets there. If she comes with a begging bowl (which she won't -- she's too proud), or if she lets her innate shyness overcome her, we will have a non-visit on our hands. I have not been using Bowles as much for this purpose as Barbara Ward, John Lewis (our excellent AID director in Delhi) and of course B.K. Nehru. Naturally all of these maneuvers have been directed to what Mrs. Gandhi should say to you and not at all to what US policy will be in response. I have my views, but I know my place.

Arthur Dean called down to say that he has very encouraging word from George Woods, who had Shastri all set to move on a series of most sensible economic reforms just before his untimely death. Now Woods says he thinks he has Indira on the track too. It is far better to have the World Bank out in front on these matters, to avoid Indian resentment at US "pressure." So I've asked Dean to get the picture from Woods, and do his own report to you. Incidentally, shouldn't Dean be on your Gandhi dinner list, even though using him as a special envoy is now on the back burner?

This Gandhi meeting is critically important, not just because I'm an Indian but because India must inevitably play a major role (second only to Japan) in any larger Asian initiatives we may develop. So with this visit only two weeks off, I'll start sending you more items.

R. W. Komer

*Spec put Dean on list at once as must*  
*Jack Valenti just sent me a copy of Chet Bowles' letter (all 11 pages).*  
*Sometimes Bowles doesn't know enough to come in out of the rain.*

CONFIDENTIAL

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Done  
RWK

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1966  
Thursday, 6:00 P.M.

100a

A

From Bowles (New Delhi 2302)

In the last few days I have had a series of informal and frank exchanges with Asoka Mehta and L. K. Jha in regard to Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the United States. Out of these visits have emerged the following points:

1. Regular discussions have been held throughout the Indian Government about the trip, how it can best be handled, its objectives, opportunities, etc. The discussions have reflected a large measure of agreement on the need for changed attitudes on the part of the Indian Government in regard to the outside world and particularly the US.

2. Mrs. Gandhi according to all reports is in a relaxed mood, confident that she can reach an understanding with President Johnson and looking forward to the experience.

3. Those concerned with the planning of the trip are hopeful that the President will arrange privately and at some length to discuss his concerns with Mrs. Gandhi. It is felt that face-to-face discussion will be far more productive than larger meetings.

4. While the Indians are hopeful that they will receive assurances of increased economic assistance to lift the economy out of its present doldrums, they are not particularly anxious that any announcement of such actions should immediately follow the meeting. They also understand that the President may not feel free to make final decisions until the outlook for the foreign aid bill is a bit more clear. However, what Mrs. Gandhi wants most is the feeling that the President understands her problems and that he will do everything in his power to help her build a viable and politically stable India.

5. The final decisions have not been made about the makeup of Mrs. Gandhi's party. L. K. Jha will surely go as will C. S. Jha. Dinesh Singh is anxious to go but Swaran Singh may decide to go himself. Asoka Mehta is a probability. Finance Minister Chaudhuri whom I believe would be a good addition will be too involved with the budget and Parliament to leave at this time.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-250

~~SECRET~~

By viq, NARA, Date 9-25-94

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. The Government of India is considering the possibility of sending one or two people (perhaps L. K. Jha) a few days in advance for a few informal preliminary talks. Someone might also stay on for two or three days after she has left.

7. The Indian leaders who are concerned with economic affairs and political sensitivities are convinced the visit will be decisive in determining the direction and stability of the Indian economy for some time to come. It is freely prophesied that if the meeting is successful, India will pull rapidly out of her current doldrums and steadily gain in confidence with the positive factors operating on a multiplier basis. On the other hand, a disappointing outcome, for whatever reason, would, it is felt, lead to even heavier fire from the Communists, the Congress Party leftists and the Neo-Gandhian Nationalists who blindly insist that India can somehow go its own way without foreign assistance.

Comment: I am satisfied that the Indian Government is proceeding soberly and realistically to prepare for this visit. They are determined to do everything in their power to make it a success. An earnest effort is being made to understand our problems and the Government of India hopes that we will understand theirs.

Please advise if you have any specific points that you wish me to emphasize in talks with Mrs. Gandhi and senior Government of India officials during the next two weeks.

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1966

10/  
*not used*

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1966  
Thursday, 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

First readout from the India-Pak ministerial talks last week shows that the spirit of Tashkent is still alive but there's room for some gentle encouragement when you see Mrs. Gandhi. Both Indians and Paks pulled their troops back on schedule, and they've left the door open for future talks. But now that they're getting down to the gut issue--Kashmir--the going is even tougher than at Tashkent, and they don't have Kosygin cracking the whip over them.

The Indians came out of this round looking better than the Paks. They went prepared to take limited actions restoring normal communications broken by the war. The Paks insisted on talking Kashmir first, and the Indians heard them out for a change. As a result, nothing concrete got done, though Bhutto says now some of these things can be handled through regular diplomatic channels.

The generally cordial atmosphere despite Indian disappointment makes it clear that there's still strong desire on both sides to get over the Kashmir hurdle; though no one yet has figured out how. Mrs. Gandhi's recent interview with Warren Unna is further evidence, and other reports indicate this may be the one problem facing her that she's fully up on and feels a legacy from her father to solve.

But it's still India's lack of give that clogs the bottleneck. We couldn't expect more at this early stage in her administration. However, while we still don't want to get in the middle, we do want to persuade her that she as chief of the greater power and de facto winner is going to have to find some magnanimous way to let Ayub out gracefully. Our best bet may be to play this subtly as her way of finishing her father's work.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 89-07

By 40p/18, NARA, Date 8-31-92

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd  
3-10-66  
2:45 p

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thurs., March 10, 1966  
3:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Even your foreign policy people occasionally win a battle or two. B. K. Nehru reports that the National Press Club has capitulated!

It agreed with the Women's Press Club that the latter could have as many seats as it wanted, including on the dais. B. K. himself is very pleased to have been of service, and I only promised him a million tons of wheat.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

*Good*  
*[Signature]*

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103

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By CB, NARA, Date 4-12-95

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, March 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Outlook in Africa. Aside from the looming black-white issue already on us in the southern third of Africa, our African affairs are moving along quite well. Military coups like those in Ghana and Nigeria are not really a matter of civilians vs. military, but of a dynamic educated element of the new African societies getting fed up with the ineptitude or posturing (or both) of the original leaders of these young countries.

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Our interest is to encourage internal political stability and enough forward movement in Africa to keep it from becoming a Moscow or Peiping playground, while limiting our own investment in favor of other more critical areas. This seems to me quite feasible, provided we don't get caught on the wrong side of the Rhodesia, Portuguese, and South Africa issues which will essentially determine African attitudes toward the great powers over the next 2 - 5 years.

R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 9 1966 - 8:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prospective Visit by Costa Rican President-Elect

Central American Presidents-elect have a habit of visiting Washington prior to their inauguration. Costa Rican President-elect Trejos has indicated a desire to come. One of his confidants has put out feelers to Ambassador Telles to see whether you would receive him. The visit is, of course, private and involves no official functions.

You will recall that Trejos won in a close -- but clean -- election last month. He is a staunch democrat and good friend of the United States. Politically, he stands somewhat right-of-center. As a student in this country in 1946, he learned to speak English well.

Lincoln Gordon recommends that you receive him. The advantage of having a substantive discussion with him is that it will give you an opportunity to sound him out on key issues, such as support for the Alliance for Progress, continuation of the Costa Rican contingent in the Inter-American Peace Force, his plans for getting his country out of the economic doldrums, and continued Costa Rican support in the OAS on peace and security matters. There are no political minuses to your seeing him.

If you will agree in principle to receive him for 15 minutes during the period April 11-23, (between Easter and his inauguration on May 8), I will work with Linc Gordon and Marvin Watson in arranging a specific appointment.

*WGB*  
William G. Bowler  
*RWK*

Approve appointment ☒

Prefer not to receive him ☐

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-249  
By CG, NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 9, 1966  
8:00 pm

SANITIZED

105

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Likely showdown between Prime Minister Ky and I Corps Commander General Thi. This trouble is apparently reaching a climax. Ky has called a special meeting of the ruling military directorate for 1000 hours tomorrow (9 p.m. tonight our time) to seek Thi's removal. Ky is convinced that there is no alternative other than to remove Thi.

1.3(a)(5) 2. Thi is to be accused of insubordination, "war lord" behavior, alienation of the population and general obstruction of the pacification effort. [redacted] reports indicate that Thi may have begun conspiring with such retired officers as General Tran Van Don, and this may have influenced Ky to seek Thi's dismissal.

3. Lodge had two urgent meetings with Ky today. He told Ky that he was not in a position to give advice on such an internal political matter. But he warned Ky of the disastrous consequences of any government crisis at this time, particularly in the wake of the Honolulu conference. He told Ky that if there was any possibility whatever that the ruling directorate could not enforce the removal of Thi, then the confrontation should be put off.

4. But Ky remains adamant, and claims that the removal will be painless since all the generals are with him. Thi would be given the graceful exit of either a study tour in the U. S. or the post of Ambassador to Bangkok.

5. State is worried too. If Thi is alerted to the action contemplated, he may refuse to attend the March 10 meeting and take unilateral action in his area. Tri Quang and the Central Vietnam Buddhists are also known to be close to Thi and unsympathetic to Ky's government. Ky has sent an emissary to speak to Tri Quang, apparently to mollify him in advance of Thi's removal.

6. So State told Lodge to do all possible to avoid a showdown. If Ky and the directorate still choose to proceed, Lodge is to insure that they handle Thi's removal, to the extent possible, as a normal change in corps commanders, with Thi's next assignment announced simultaneously. Lodge has clearly done as much as feasible, and State's instructions give him the leeway he needs to attempt to cope with the situation. We will keep you posted.

R. W. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-249  
By CG, NARA, Date 4-12-95



Wednesday, March 9, 1966

6:45 pm

let's 2  
P  
to P

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Hornig visit to Pakistan. We postponed this issue because of the Vice President's visit, but there are several reasons for deciding soon whether to lay it on again. First, Ayub himself at his February meeting with our Ambassador displayed much interest in the visit -- urging that Hornig put major emphasis on family planning. This, I think, meets your own reservation that Ayub might not have been really interested in the Hornig enterprise. State has now come in with attached (Tab A) strongly recommending the Hornig visit. If it took place in early April, as Hornig prefers, it would also serve as a useful gesture toward the Paks in the immediate aftermath of Mrs. Gandhi's visit.

Of course, the painful aspect is that Hornig still insists on a fancy aircraft as (a) essential to attract the high caliber people desired; (b) permit efficient conduct of business en route and back; and (c) provide quick transport in Pakistan so that the mission is not hobbled by erratic local airline schedules. I believe I know your views on this aircraft business; would a useful alternative be to ask McNamara to make available one of those converted tankers of his -- this would be a halfway house between a plush aircraft and the ignominy of going commercial.

R. W. Komer

Approve visit \_\_\_\_\_

no, let's postpone indefinitely  
L

Try tanker option on McNamara \_\_\_\_\_

Approve Presidential plane \_\_\_\_\_

(filled) Rogers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - March 8, 1966 - 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Electoral Picture

The Guatemalan Electoral Tribunal has been so slow in releasing results of Sunday's voting that we still do not have a clear picture of the final outcome. Meanwhile, the situation throughout the country remains outwardly calm.

With two-thirds of the voting districts reporting, Julio Mendez -- the candidate of the moderate left-of-center PR party -- is still ahead of his two military rivals. According to the Electoral Tribunal, Mendez's margin over the government-backed PID party candidate -- Juan Aguilar -- is narrowing. The figures issued by the PR party show Mendez still well ahead.

The odds are that no candidate will score an absolute majority, thereby tossing the contest into the lap of the newly elected Congress. Our Embassy's tentative projection of the Congressional race shows that the 55 seats will probably be distributed as follows: PR - 24; PID - 18; MLN - 7; uncertain - 6. Of the "uncertain" seats, the PR may win 4, for a total of 28, which would give the PR a bare majority.

Linc Gordon is continuing to follow the situation closely. He will be meeting again with his contingency planning group on Thursday, by which time the final results should be in.

William G. Bowdler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 90-170

By rg/lsp, NARA, Date 8-31-92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 8, 1966  
5:45 pm

file  
110

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Replacement for Soapy. Forgive me for barging in on this, although Mac said that you planned to ask for my two cents worth. The basic point is that any Africa Assistant Secretary worth his salt will inevitably be regarded as a softy by much of the 7th floor. This is essentially because of the long-standing differences of view between the Africans and the dominant Europeanists in the Department, which have required the new boys to fight hard to get a fair shake for their point of view.

Having served as your African man for the last 15 months, I regard Wayne Fredericks as a lot more tough-minded than Joe Palmer (though I like and respect Palmer and could work easily with him). Moreover, the answer to the charge that Fredericks is too "African" is that this is the posture which is really in the best interests of the U.S. Though I have frequently had to badger Soapy and Fredericks to be tougher, I submit that their line is basically right, and that the proof of this pudding is in the eating -- our African policy has been remarkably successful over the last five years for largely this reason, even though we've had some mighty tough problems (like the Congo and now Rhodesia) to contend with.

It is perhaps incautious to disagree with the Secretary of State at a time when my own status is so uncertain. But I would be less than honest if I did not give you my own judgment that Fredericks is far and away the best man to do the job -- which is essentially that of keeping our African affairs on an even keel at a time when we will necessarily be preoccupied with far larger affairs in other quarters.

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By CL, NARA, Date 4-12-95

✓  
Mr. Komer

Tues., March 8, 1966; 4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature and submission to the Senate, is a routine tax treaty with the Netherlands. It gives the Dutch withholding rights equivalent to ours, and modernizes and updates the present convention.

Business generally supports these treaties, and we have pleased the bankers by getting the Dutch to agree to the one change they wanted. Joe Barr reports that Gore is all for this ~~one~~, and that it should move through the Senate with no trouble.

The attached Treasury memorandum (Tab A) and the formal report of the Secretary of State (Tab B) discuss the ins and the outs of the treaty in detail. I do not think you need to read these papers.

I will send this in through Milt Semer.

Francis M. Bator

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1966  
Tuesday, 4:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Walt will be back in Saigon tonight. However, the Pentagon tells me that Williamson is still available Saturday if we want him.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Tell Williamson to stand by ✓

Hold off \_\_\_\_\_

*Downman to notify  
Gen. W.  
Park*

*Telephoned Jane  
to Bob K 8:50 am  
3/9/66  
super*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tuesday, March 8, 1966  
4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ted Kennedy's Amendment to AID Supplemental

1. Kennedy's effort to tack an additional \$10 million to the AID supplemental for the use of UN specialized agencies to meet refugee and other social needs in Vietnam was turned down in the Foreign Relations Committee. Kennedy's office says that the odds are against the Senator raising the issue on the floor.

2. Budget and AID agree that neither the legislation nor additional money is necessary. Under Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act, aid may be furnished to international organizations for work in Vietnam. With the requested supplemental there will be ample funds (\$12 million is programmed) for assistance to refugees.

3. If the issue does get to the floor, it may be difficult to block since both UN participation in Vietnam and aid to refugees are in the category of opposing sin. In case you feel we should attempt to block it, Cooper has given Manatos a position paper which marshals the arguments.

4. Of course, Senator Kennedy has been trying to get the UN into the Vietnam refugee act since last November. We were able to discourage him from pushing forward with a scheme to have the UN High Commissioner for Refugees take an active role. The presently proposed amendment is an outgrowth of this earlier interest.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Try to block amendment if it reaches floor

Take our chances on it being voted down

*Tell Cooper to tell  
AID.*

Tues., March 8, 1966  
12:00 noon

2-114  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-249  
By CL, NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Rusk recommends you see the Director General of UNESCO when he's here 24-25 March -- largely to butter him up and make him easier to work with.

This seems marginal except that Maheu is one of the people we'll be working with in pushing your international education program (though he's probably more eager to persuade you to make UNESCO your vehicle than we are to seek his help).

On balance, it's good to have a man like this on the same wave length, but skipping him would do no great harm. Cater thinks that receiving Maheu "on the record" will help further your international education program.

R. W. Komer

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



564  
114a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1966  
MONTAGUE LINDY'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 2 /M 11 40

Subject: Appointment for Monsieur Rene Maheu,  
Director General of UNESCO

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive Monsieur Rene Maheu, Director General of UNESCO, when he is in Washington on March 24 and 25. M. Maheu will be here to see Washington officials as a follow-up of his November visit in which he discussed the possible role of UNESCO in connection with implementing your proposed International Education and Health Acts of 1966 and to see officials at the World Bank.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

M. Maheu has been Director General of UNESCO since November, 1958. He is a Frenchman, and an astute international civil servant who joined the UNESCO staff in 1946. In the initial period of his service as Director General of one of the "big four" UN Specialized Agencies M. Maheu was not particularly helpful to the U.S. Over the past year he has, however, become much more sensitive to U.S. interests and wishes. He has on several occasions expressed his keen interest in your plans for international educational development and appears anxious to have UNESCO play a role in this context.

I believe you would find it constructive to talk with M. Maheu and that he can be useful in helping to further your policy as set forth in your message on International Education and Health. If it is convenient to your schedule, I recommend that you see him during his visit here.

Dean Rusk  
Dean Rusk

3/2/66

File  
114

Tuesday Lunch Agenda  
8 March 1966  
1:30 pm

1. De Gaulle and NATO -- handling of press, consultation with Allies, etc.
2. Vietnam: a. Civil czar (I am not clear where this stands).  
b. Flurry over mining Haiphong.
3. China Hearings in Senate Foreign Relations -- are we fully prepared?
4. Guatemala Elections. Rusk may give a brief progress report.
5. Yemen compromise. Nasser's reply to Feisal.
6. Copper problem. Ways and Means has Tariff Commission report saying Anaconda is behind import proposals.

F

Monday, March 7, 1966  
7:30 pm

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

1. You asked me to talk with Rusk, and then come back at you, on the attached invite from the Cambodian legislature for three Congressmen to come to Cambodia.

2. Fortunately, Prince Sihanouk withdrew this invitation a few days ago. State touched base with the Hill, and everyone is in accord that this would be too tricky to pick up. I gather, for example, that Senator Mansfield was rather miffed with the cavalier treatment he got in Cambodia on his last trip.

R. W. Komer



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - March 7, 1966 - 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Elections

We still do not have a clear picture of the outcome of yesterday's general elections in Guatemala. The Embassy says that the turnout was moderately heavy and that there were no significant disturbances.

Complete returns from Guatemala City show that Jose Mendez -- the candidate of the moderate left-of-center PR party -- won by an over-whelming majority over his two military rivals -- Ponciano of the MLN party and Aguilar of the government-backed PID party. The vote in rural areas has been coming in very slowly throughout the day and is not sufficient to permit a judgment on the general outcome.

The slowness in the report of the rural vote and the discrepancies in the tallies from rural precincts are giving rise to fears that the government, having been decisively beaten in the capitol, is now resorting to ballot-tampering to reverse the trend. Our Embassy reports that American newsmen in the provinces have noted various instances of pressure and coercion. The Embassy also says that while the ballot counts of the PR and MLN precinct representatives in rural areas are generally consistent, they vary sharply with what the official PID party representative and the government-controlled Electoral Tribunal are reporting. As a result, the calm atmosphere which prevailed yesterday and this morning began to change this afternoon.

We should have a clearer picture by tomorrow morning of what the rural vote looks like. It should also give us some basis for gauging how strong the feeling against the government is likely to be.

Linc Gordon is meeting in the morning with his Latin American Policy Committee to review the situation.

WGB  
William G. Bowdler

PWT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 90-170  
By 19/jap, NARA, Date 8-31-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

119b

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-249  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-12-95

3/8/66

B

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of February 14 regarding helicopters for the Zambia Air Force underscores your concern for the strain on your country as a result of the situation in Rhodesia.

Since your proposal involves several questions which can most profitably be discussed in Lusaka, I have asked Ambassador Good to pursue this matter with you.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

15/ LBJ

His Excellency  
Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda  
President of the Republic of Zambia  
Lusaka

Monday, March 7, 1966  
5:00 p.m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Anniversary of Alliance for Progress Speech**

We expect the OAS to celebrate the fifth anniversary of President Kennedy's March 13, 1961 speech which launched the Alliance for Progress.

The ceremonies will be at the OAS Charter reform meeting now going on in Panama, as well as at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council which is to open over this coming weekend in Buenos Aires.

I believe that a short statement from you, released through Bob Fleming, marking the anniversary, would be appropriate and well received. Furthermore, it would be read by our representatives at the two OAS meetings in connection with the anniversary ceremonies.

I am attaching a proposed statement for your consideration. It has been reviewed and approved by Tom Mann, Linc Gordon and Walt Rostow.

**William G. Bowdler**

Approve statement \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer no statement \_\_\_\_\_

Talk to me \_\_\_\_.

Attachment



March 7, 1966

PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS  
March 13, 1966

Today we recall a major initiative in inter-American relations, looking toward a great cooperative effort for the accelerated economic and social development of the Western Hemisphere. On March 13, 1961 President Kennedy called together at the White House the Ambassadors in Washington from the other American Republics. He spoke of his urgent hope that all the nations of this Hemisphere might join together in an Alliance for Progress. Five months later we and nineteen Latin American governments signed the Charter of Punta del Este, transforming the concept of the Alliance into a program for action.

On many occasions I have affirmed my own and our country's absolute dedication to the goals of the Alliance. Today I can do so again, with renewed confidence that the guidelines traced at Punta del Este were sound and that the hopes expressed then are gradually becoming the reality of a truly multinational effort. That confidence is based on a growing record of solid achievement. It is also based on the evidence in all parts of the Hemisphere that governments, business concerns, labor unions, cooperatives, and the public at large are increasingly focusing their energies on the pursuit of economic and social progress under free institutions.

During the past five years, we have added new dimensions to our vital Alliance.

We have strengthened the machinery of cooperation by establishing -- CIAP. the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress/. This multinational group has become an energizing force in identifying strengths and weaknesses in our cooperative effort, in pointing to needed new directions, and in reviewing, country by country, the performance, progress and ways in which external support can best reinforce each nation's own developmental effort.

We have enlisted the support of private groups and voluntary agencies in ever-increasing measure. The Peace Corps, Partners for the Alliance, Council on Latin America, AFL-CIO, private foundations and universities are now making important contributions to the Alliance effort, as are comparable organizations in the Latin American countries.

We have introduced the principle of mutual aid among the Latin American nations and given new impetus to economic integration within Latin America. These advances are contained in the Economic and Social

Act of Rio de Janeiro, approved at the Rio OAS Conference last November. As a result of decisions taken at this Conference, the objectives and principles of the Alliance are to be incorporated into the basic Charter of the Organization of American States.

And we have recognized that fulfillment of our Alliance goals will require the continuation of the joint effort beyond 1971. I stated last November that the United States will be prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond the time-period originally foreseen in the Charter of Punta del Este. In determining the scope of the United States effort, we will examine carefully with our sister Republics at that time the requirements of the Hemisphere, in the light of progress made through self-help measures and the contributions which by then some of them will be able to make to one another to further the common effort.

Self-help has always been the keystone of the Alliance. In country after country, actions are being taken to mobilize resources for public and private investment, to reform and modernize the institutional framework for development, to expand trade and market opportunities within and outside the Hemisphere, and to provide a solid basis for the support and cooperation of external capital and technical assistance.



Mutual assistance among the Latin American countries has recently started. We welcome this beginning and hope to see the effort steadily expand in coming years.

For its part, the United States has already committed nearly \$5 billion to the nations of Latin America to assist them in their struggle to modernize and achieve a better life for their people. External support is also coming in increasing measure from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and its affiliates, and the United Nations. And after a temporary period of setback, there are now most hopeful signs of a renewal of large-scale private foreign investment in Latin American development, often in joint ventures with Latin American associates.

As this great experiment moves forward, it has become clear that redoubled efforts must be applied to investment in human beings -- in education, health, and improved living and working conditions in agriculture. Such efforts are not easy to organize; they require the mobilization of human resources in scarce supply; but they are among the most rewarding of all forms of investment. Through the special programs in education, health and agriculture, which I have recently

proposed to the Congress, the United States will be better able to contribute effectively to progress in these vital fields.

So I call on all of our sister nations in the Hemisphere to take the occasion of this anniversary to join us in rededicating our efforts to this truly revolutionary cause. These first five years have been a good beginning, but only a beginning. We have no illusion that the task is easy but we are confident that there are no obstacles which cannot be overcome through the cooperation of free men organized through free institutions.

25  
file  
3-7-66  
3-30-66

121

2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, March 7, 1966  
3:30 P. M.

Mr. President:

De Gaulle's letter to you on NATO.

Secretary Rusk will be calling you  
shortly to talk about it.

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-377

By           , NARA, Date 2-8-94

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

1212  
Monday, March 7, 1966 - 3:35 PM

The following is an Embassy translation of General De Gaulle's handwritten letter to the President of March 7, 1966.

"Dear Mr. President:

"In three years our Atlantic Alliance will complete its first term. I am anxious to tell you that France appreciates the extent to which the solidarity of defense thus established between 15 free peoples of the West contributes to assuring their security and, especially what essential role the United States of America plays in this respect. Accordingly, France intends from now on to remain party to the treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. This means that except in the event of developments which might occur in the course of the next three years to change the fundamental factors of East-West relations, she will be in 1969 and thereafter determined even as today to fight at the side of her allies in case one of them will be the object of unprovoked aggression.

"However, France considers the changes which have taken place or in process of occurring since 1949 in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as evolution of her own situation and her own forces no longer justify insofar as that concerns her the arrangements of a military nature adopted after the conclusion of the alliance, whether in common under the form of multilateral conventions or whether by special agreement between the French Government and the American Government.

"It is for this reason that France proposes to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by constant utilization which is made of her air space, to terminate her participation in 'integrated' commands and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO. It goes without saying that for the application of these decisions she is ready to arrange with the Governments and in particular with that of the United States, practical measures which concern them. In addition, she is disposed to have understandings with them as to military facilities to be mutually accorded in the case of a conflict in which she would be engaged at their sides and as to conditions of cooperation of her forces and theirs in the event of common action, especially in Germany.

"On all these points, Dear Mr. President, my Government will therefore be in touch with yours. But in order to respond to the spirit of friendly candor which must inspire the relations between our two countries and, permit me to add between you and me, I have been desirous firstly to indicate personally to you for what reasons, for what purpose and within what limits France from its viewpoint believes the form of our alliance should be modified without altering its basis.

"I beg you to accept, Dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

C. De Gaulle"



File

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-249

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By CL, NARA, Date 4-12-98 Monday, March 7, 1966  
2:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State Visits. Bundy advised we avoid bothering you too soon on this matter, but some forward planning is needed.

1. Aside from Mrs. Gandhi and Marcos, State proposes in attached three more visitors prior to end July -- Frei, Feisal, and Kenyatta. It regards this as a minimum schedule. In all three cases, the pros outweigh the cons. Frei would give the Alianza a good plug, and we need his help on copper. Feisal visited in 1962 but needs periodic hand-holding, especially if we can't help him on Yemen. Kenyatta is one of the most stable African leaders and has had an open invite since March, 1965.

2. On the other hand, one can't honestly say that any of these visits is essential. They could all be put off till later without serious damage. You will also be receiving enough unscheduled visitors in the next five months to forestall any suggestion that you're neglecting the foreign flank (in fact, this is by now a dead issue). Moreover, Feisal at least could be largely satisfied if Secretary Rusk stopped by when he goes to CENTO session in Teheran this April.

3. So, if you prefer not to tie yourself down even tentatively as yet on all three visitors, you could: (a) tell State to resubmit after Mrs. Gandhi's visit; or (b) accept one April/May visit for scheduling now -- I'd let Rusk choose which one.

R. W. Komer

Approve Rusk proposal \_\_\_\_\_

Hold everything till 1 April \_\_\_\_\_

Approve one visit \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Bill Moyers



March 7, 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-377

By W, NARA, Date 2-18-99

123

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have asked David Bruce to give you a copy of the letter which I have just received from General de Gaulle.

I am responding to the General that his proposed actions raise the most serious questions for the Alliance and that I am consulting with the other governments affected.

I know that this comes at a difficult time for you. Germany lies at the heart of the problem of maintaining a safe and healthy Europe. You and I know how delicate questions of international affairs can intrude themselves into the course of a political campaign, as they did into the last German election. I feel that the crisis precipitated by the General should lead both sides in Britain to refrain from any comments in the campaign that might give aid and comfort to the General in his attack upon the great post-war structure of defense which we have all built together.

I understand that you also will be receiving a letter from General de Gaulle. Just as soon as that is received, it is essential that we be in touch so that the key allies can speak with a single voice.

Sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable  
Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

LBH:RWK:mf



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

123a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-377  
By fw, NARA, Date 2-18-94

March 7, 1966


My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

President de Gaulle has just sent me by way of our Ambassador to France a statement of French policy regarding NATO and particularly the intention of France to withdraw from all military aspects of the Organization. I am enclosing for your information a copy of President de Gaulle's letter.

I am replying to General de Gaulle that I am consulting with other members of the Alliance.

This is a matter upon which you and I must keep in the closest touch. It raises the most serious questions as to the relation of the benefits and responsibilities of the Alliance. I think it important that we make every effort to respond with a common voice to this attack upon our common defense arrangements.

Sincerely yours,



His Excellency  
Aldo Moro  
President of the Council of Ministers  
of the Italian Republic  
Rome



March 7, 1966

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-377  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-18-94

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I have just received a letter from General de Gaulle stating his intentions with regard to NATO and I am asking Ambassador McGhee to give you a copy of it immediately.

I am informing the General that his letter raises the most serious questions for all of us and that I am promptly consulting our partners in the Alliance.

General de Gaulle's decisions will have the most serious and far-reaching consequences for all the members of NATO. In view of the geographical position of the Federal Republic they are peculiarly significant and important to your Government. I want you to know that I am prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder with you in face of the serious problems which they pose. We are in this together and I know that our partners will look to us as nations which are carrying heavy burdens in the common defense to see to it that the Alliance is strengthened rather than weakened in the weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/

His Excellency  
Dr. Ludwig Erhard  
Chancellor of the Federal Republic  
of Germany  
Bonn

LBJ/GWK/vm

PRESERVATION COPY



March 7, 1966

123C

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-377  
By gn, NARA, Date 2-18-94

Dear Mr. President:

I have read with care your letter of  
March 7, 1966.

I am immediately bringing your views to  
the attention of our other allies. Since  
the course you propose to take so seriously  
affects the security and well being of not  
only the French and American people but  
all the people of the NATO Alliance, I am  
asking for their comment.

I would be less than frank if I did not  
inform you that your action raises  
grave questions regarding the whole  
relationship between the responsibilities  
and benefits of the Alliance.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

His Excellency  
Charles de Gaulle  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

LEJ:GWE:mf

PRESERVATION COPY

*can't back w/L*

**SECRET**

*F124*

Saturday, March 5, 1966, 2:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Asian Development Task Force. Attached is a memo from Rusk. Aside from discreet probes by Gene Black, it proposes (a) setting up an inter-departmental task force, headed by Max Millikan of MIT; (b) having it analyze the potential cost and feasibility of an Alianza-type program for Free Asia, as an essential preliminary to deciding whether to float such a concept.

I see merit in taking a first whack at the problem in this manner -- and Millikan is an excellent crew chief -- provided that it can be done quietly. The reasons I emphasize this are that (1) the complexities of any Asian regional initiative are formidable indeed; (2) we don't want this sort of thing to leak before we decide what's worth doing; and (3) in any case it would best appear as an Asian, not a US, initiative.

There is simply far less regional cohesion, or experience in working together, in Asia than in Europe or Latin America. The Turks or Iranians have little in common with the Pacific states. The political obstacles to common action involving such disparate major powers as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan are also immense. A scheme without at least two or three of these major powers would be rightly seen as just a collection of our own satellites. Finally, any Alianza-type undertaking could be terribly expensive -- at a quick guess at least double our present Asian aid level.

A variant might be an East Asian scheme, including SEA and led by Japan. Simply omitting India/Pakistan would cut the numbers at least by half. But this would arouse old fears of Japan's "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

All in all, there are so many hookers to Asian development schemes that it may be the way of wisdom not to take any steps, even probes by Black, till we do some more in-house thinking. A quiet team effort led by Millikan would be useful to this end, but I'd suggest sitting oneeven this till you can hear argument at the next Saturday Vietnam conclave.

Fianlly, I would add that the State response is much more narrowly economic in focus than your thoughts last Saturday. As I got it, you also wanted a top-level, imaginative group to examine bold new Asian initiatives (comparable to those in Europe 1947-52) which come to grips with the looming threat from Communist China, and give a positive cast to our Asian policy -- thus protecting our Vietnam flank. You also wanted equal attention to the tactics of getting

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-13	
By DWA	NARS, Date 7-25-84

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

the word out through suitable public statements and actions. These grand designs are much more Walt Rostow's meat than Max Millikan's -- an added reason for holding off till we can have another session.

Hold off \_\_\_\_\_

Tell State to go ahead \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

*Cy to Moyers  
Veltri  
Cooper  
Bator*

~~SECRET~~



573  
124

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON RECEIVED  
HONORABLE GEORGE DUNY'S OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 2, 1966 2 PM 3 22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Asian Development Task Force

Subject to your approval, following is the manner in which we propose to carry forward your instruction of Saturday, February 26, 1966, to staff out and set in motion a concept looking toward an enlarged long-term Asian regional development program.

1. We shall instruct Mr. Black, on his forthcoming trip to Asia, to sound out a very few discreet Asian leaders as to whether, in their judgment, Asians would be prepared to react positively to a Presidential offer and challenge to prepare an Asian regional long-term development plan. We have in mind, in particular, that he would speak with Watanabe of Japan, Puey of Thailand, and possibly a Filipino, but, from his intimate contacts in connection with the Asian Development Bank, he may have other suggestions. We would hope that Mr. Black would be able to form a judgment as to whether it would eventually be possible to establish an Asian equivalent of CIAP, possibly related in some appropriate way to the Asian Development Bank.

2. We will set up immediately a task force, within the Government, to examine the optimum organization and probable dimensions of a long-term enterprise of this kind, using, along with our own people, the distinguished A.I.D. Advisory Group.

3. We would like to bring in to head the task force

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-17

By ris, NARS, Date 2-14-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Professor Max Millikan of M.I.T. as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Professor Millikan is a development economist of world reputation, with long experience in government. He is also, I believe, a friend of Mr. Black. If this appointment is acceptable to you, I believe a direct request from you to Millikan will be helpful; for he bears many other responsibilities from which it will not be easy for him to disengage.

4. This task force would include representatives of State, Treasury, and A.I.D. It would maintain close and regular contact with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. It would maintain informal contacts with the World Bank, whose resources we will wish to mobilize in this enterprise.

5. Its terms of reference might be as follows: to examine the appropriate scale, duration, self-help measures and external assistance required in a long-term program to bring the countries of free Asia into a position of regular self-sustained growth at, say, 2-1/2 percent per annum per capita. Particular attention should be paid to the Asian regional organization of the effort; appropriate agriculture and population control policies; education and health policies; self-help criteria; sources of external assistance other than the U. S. Government; and the appropriate scale of U. S. contribution over, say, a ten-year period. For these purposes Asia shall include those Asian countries whose governments have committed themselves to be members of the Asian Development Bank.

6. The work of the task force should serve three purposes:

--To backstop Mr. Black's liaison with the Asians engaged in the enterprise, including the possibility of quietly making available to them some of our ideas and calculations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

--To provide you with an estimate of the character and scale of the U. S. commitment that would be involved in carrying the project forward.

--To provide materials which might, at the right stage, be made public in the U. S., just as the Harriman and Krug committee reports were used to backstop in the U. S. the initial work on the Marshall Plan done by the Europeans in the CEEC.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Kid for  
Pres -  
on Komer desk  
125*

March 5, 1966  
Saturday, 10:45 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Freeman Report on Indian Agriculture. I'll summarize this latest long progress report, so you won't have to read it.

1. Dimensions of India's deficit are still in 12 million ton range. Rationing is moving slowly.
2. Subramaniam is under sharp political attack for the policies agreed on with us.
3. Historically, India recovers slowly from a drouth, so we may have an abnormal (through less so) 1967 too.
4. India's fertilizer program is not picking up as fast as hoped (we're prodding on this). Freeman would like us to press for greater diversion of foreign exchange to this sector, and to push the Germans and Japs to help out.
5. We're looking at feasibility of getting India to shift more acreage from cotton to wheat, while we supply cotton from our enormous stockpile. Poage raised this during hearings.

R. W. Komer



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President

From: Orville L. Freeman  
Secretary of Agriculture *Orville L. Freeman*

Subject: Review of the India Food Situation

Official estimates of foodgrain production in India are still holding at 76 million tons. Grain imports from all sources are expected to average about a million tons monthly in March, April, and May.

Grain procurement and efforts at belt tightening are moving slowly. Rationing programs instituted thus far cover 34 million people or 7 percent of the total population. An additional 20 million may be added by June 1, bringing the total up to 11 percent. This will cover most of the major urban centers but very little of the country outside these centers.

The riots in Kerala protesting the lack of rice have subsided for the present, but scattered food protests and demonstrations are occurring elsewhere in India.

Dissatisfaction with food policies

At the annual convention of the Congress Party, the Government's food production and distribution policies came under fire. Minister Subramaniam, as Minister of Food and Agriculture, bore the brunt of the attack.

At times the Party Leaders nearly lost control of the convention delegates who were loudly demanding the abolition of the food zones. Most of the criticism came from the deficit states, which this year out-number the food surplus states by about 3 to 1.

## 2-The President-March 4, 1966

At one time Minister Subramaniam threatened to resign. This is not the first time he has used this threat, but there is probably a limit to the number of times this tactic can be effectively used. There is little doubt but that Subramaniam's position has been weakened somewhat by the current crisis and the unrest and dissatisfaction it has generated.

Subramaniam appears to be fighting hard to implement the policies agreed upon in Rome. Despite the fact he got Cabinet and Parliament concurrence, he has been facing some strong opposition. At the annual convention of the Congress Party, Subramaniam was openly reprimanded by Congress Party Chief Kamaraj for having signed an overly generous agreement with an American firm permitting it to construct and operate a fertilizer plant. Subramaniam insisted that the Indian Government must live up to its agreement and he prevailed.

Subramaniam was also criticized by Kamaraj for the recent decision to permit foreign private investors to price and market their own fertilizer. Again he held his ground and won out. Kamaraj later partially retracted his criticism of Subramaniam, saying that in fact this decision was made by the Government of India.

### The 1966/67 crop

We are thinking ahead to the 1966/67 crop in India. Historical records indicate that crop production does not usually recover completely after a serious monsoon failure such as that experienced this past year, even if the next monsoon is a good one.

Reports of serious and worsening power shortages indicate water levels in irrigation reservoirs are far from optimal.

Scattered readings of soil moisture levels indicate these are far below normal throughout most of the Indian subcontinent.

### Fertilizer supplies for 1966/67 crop

A third key factor affecting the 1966/67 crop and on which we already have some information is fertilizer supplies. As things now stand, supplies of all three major nutrients will be well below the levels for 1966/67 agreed upon in Rome.



3-The President-March 4, 1966

Nitrogen fertilizer supplies are expected to range between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. This is up from the 550,000 tons used in 1965/66 but far short of the 1,000,000 ton level agreed upon in Rome. We do not have complete data on phosphate and potash supplies for 1966/67 but the shortfalls may be even greater than for nitrogen.

The Indians have used all of the \$50 million loan you announced on December 10. They more than matched that loan with foreign exchange of their own as they had agreed they would. Even so, they are falling far short of targets. Several factors account for this.

Fertilizer prices have risen sharply over the past several months. Our \$50 million loan did not go nearly as far as it would have a year or two ago.

World supplies of fertilizer raw materials, particularly sulphur, are in short supply. The inability to obtain adequate supplies of raw materials coupled with the failure to allocate enough foreign exchange for spare parts has prevented domestic plants from operating at anything near full capacity.

Getting fertilizer consumption up to target

It now seems quite clear that fertilizer consumption will be well below target in 1966/67 unless strong action is taken. We might very well press Mrs. Gandhi to find enough foreign exchange to get fertilizer consumption up to the agreed upon levels. It appears that Subramaniam could not carry the point alone again. From a political point of view, it would be very desirable to involve Mrs. Gandhi more directly in agricultural policy making. This would take some of the direct pressure off Subramaniam.

I recommend we use every way possible to get them to free enough of their own foreign exchange to get fertilizer consumption up to target. If this does not work, I would suggest we urge them to go again to some of the other advanced countries such as West Germany and Japan asking them to supply specific quantities of fertilizer on concessional terms so they can meet their consumption targets. These additional fertilizer needs would total about \$100 million. After all, they did not have any great qualms about asking us for \$750 million worth of foodgrains.

4-The President-March 4, 1966

If we decide none of these will work, you might want to consider an additional \$100 million loan to be used specifically for fertilizer, fertilizer raw materials and spare parts. One pound of fertilizer produces on the average 10 pounds of grain. Fertilizer supplied now will reduce the amount of grain we will be asked to contribute next year. If we let them off this year, it will be almost impossible to get them back on target in subsequent years.

Preparing for Mrs. Gandhi's visit

Later this week I am sending Les Brown, my key India expert, to India to take a last reading of conditions there before Mrs. Gandhi comes here. He will take a close look at the progress, or lack of it, in getting new fertilizer plants under construction, and in carrying forward the Rome agreement.

Brown will also be investigating the feasibility of attempting to shift cotton land into the production of foodgrains in India. If this proves feasible, we could work off some of our heavy cotton stocks under P.L. 480 while reducing their import needs for U.S. wheat.

This proposition seems logical on the face of it, but will need to be examined in terms of the economic implications, particularly to the producers involved, as well as the political overtones.

The fact that Poage brought this up in an open hearing and that it got in the newspapers means it has already reached India. It may have created political problems for Subramaniam and will possibly create more if we try to move in this direction.

Nonetheless, I have discussed it with leaders in the cotton industry and also cotton Congressmen and Senators and we will thoroughly investigate it.

I will send you a complete up-to-date report when Brown returns.

*Rec'd  
Rover  
3-5-66  
1:20 pm*

MEMORANDUM

*126*

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ *L*

WASHINGTON Saturday - March 5, 1966  
9:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Elections in Guatemala

Guatemala is scheduled to hold general elections tomorrow. Whether they will bring tranquility or turmoil cannot be forecast with certainty. Much depends on the returns and whether the Guatemalan people accept them as a reasonably fair expression of popular will. Communist-dominated subversive groups are waiting on the wings to exploit discontent.

Despite protestations that the voting will be unhindered and the ballot counting honest, President Peralta has shown partiality during the campaign for the PID party which his regime created, whose standard-bearer is Juan de Dios Aguilar. The other two candidates -- Professor Julio Mendez of the moderately left of center PR party and Col. Miguel Ponciano of the extreme right MLN party -- are already protesting the government's partiality. Peralta has not wanted OAS observers. But there will be a large press representation on hand, some 25 reporters from the U.S.

Our Embassy's estimate is that none of the three candidates is sufficiently strong to win an absolute majority. If this happens, the new Congress which takes office on May 5 must select the President from the two receiving the most votes. We expect considerable political maneuvering during this period (assuming an immediate post-election blow-up does not materialize) accompanied by political unrest. The guerrillas and other elements of the extreme left are awaiting election results and popular reaction thereto before deciding the course which they will follow. If popular disturbances materialize, we can anticipate their adding fuel to the fire in a bid to get a revolutionary situation started.

In recent months we have tried to help the Peralta Government improve its capabilities for dealing with rural and urban insurgency. The Guatemalans were slow in responding to our offers of assistance. Last week they acted. AID and DOD have done a good job in getting equipment and experts down there to help them.

Unless the election results produce a more violent popular reaction than can be foreseen at the present time, the Guatemalan security forces can probably cope with the situation. As a precautionary step, Linc Gordon met yesterday afternoon with his interdepartmental Latin American Policy Committee to review the general situation and the contingency plans.

DECLASSIFIED

*WGB*  
William G. Bowdler

Authority MLG 90-170

~~SECRET~~

By MLG, NARA, Date 8-31-92

*PWK*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 4, 1966  
Friday, 6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. De Gaulle's Latest Squeeze. The problem here seems to me to be not merely how to deal with the Gaullist threat to NATO, which State/Defense have well in hand (and Bator is following closely), but how to cope with US domestic reactions.
2. We will almost inevitably get stories about how the Johnson Administration is now in trouble on its European as well as Asian flank. No matter how apparent it is that De Gaulle is the Samson trying to pull down the Temple, some criticism will be levelled at us. I also fear arguments that if we weren't so heavily involved in Asia, we'd be better able to handle Europe.
3. Perhaps I'm too worried, but I'd like to see us ready the necessary public relations counters -- which to an extent require us to exonerate ourselves by shifting the blame to De Gaulle. More important, however, will be a positive line that we can adjust to French withdrawal without a collapse of NATO, and that we and our NATO partners will proceed calmly and forthrightly to do so.
4. If you share this concern, you might want to talk with Rusk directly. Alternatively, Bator and I could do so.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

Talk with Rusk ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By Cb, NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

127  
3-6-66  
4 35p

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 4, 1966

5:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter to you from Australian Prime Minister Holt which was just delivered to me by the Australian Minister.

The Prime Minister informs you of the Australian decision to replace its present battalion in Vietnam of 1400 men with a "self contained task force" of 4500 men. This strong combat force will have its own helicopter support. This force will be sent in May of June.

The Prime Minister will announce the Australian decision on Tuesday morning our time (Tuesday night, Australian time). He hopes to prevent any advance leaks.

We are preparing a letter of acknowledgment and thanks from you to the Prime Minister.

*Chet Cooper*  
Chester L. Cooper

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-249  
By CB, NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4th March, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

The Government has now completed its consideration of what more Australia can do in Vietnam by way of military contribution at this time. Various possibilities were before us and in particular we understood that an additional battalion would have special value.

The position is that the existing Army Force in Vietnam totals some 1,400 men, of which the main element, the battalion, is due for relief in May/June of this year. We are proposing to replace the present force with a substantially enlarged contribution of forces in the form of a self-contained Australian task force of some 4,500 personnel under Australian command. The task force will contain in addition to its headquarters, two infantry battalions, an SAS squadron for deep patrolling and surveillance, and combat and logistic support units. We are advised that to operate most effectively, the task force will need intimate and continuous helicopter support. For this purpose we are providing a flight of eight R.A.A.F. Iroquois helicopters, including four to be withdrawn from Malaysia where they are now assisting security operations in the Thai border area. The flight of Caribou aircraft and the team of 100 Army advisers will be continued.

We have been informed by our military advisers that the provision of a force of this size represents the upper limit of our army capacity, having regard to our existing military commitments in Malaysia. They advise us that the force can be sustained, but make it clear that short of a major emergency it will not be practicable to enlarge it. But we believe that the task force we have in mind will be the most militarily effective contribution we can make to the allied effort in South Vietnam and it is our judgment that we should go this far at this time, in consequence of the high importance of the issues at stake in South Vietnam and to make a clear demonstration of Australian support for the massive efforts of your own nation.

The details of our additional commitment will require examination by Australian and United States military staffs of such matters as command structure, operational role and deployment organization and logistics, and I have arranged for the Chairman of our Chiefs of Staff Committee to take up the preliminary aspects of these matters at once with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Also, we have instructed our Ambassador in Saigon to inform the South Vietnamese Prime Minister of our decision, so that the formal request of that Government for additional

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority MLJ 98-175By jc/cb. NARA. Date 7-9-03



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2.

forces may be obtained. We are already aware of course informally of their interest in an increase on our part. We may wish to make the formal request public.

I am letting Harold Wilson and Keith Holyoake know of our decision in view of their concern with us and you in the defence problems of South-East Asia and the inter-relation between the disposition of forces in South Vietnam and in Malaysia.

My present intention is to announce the enlarged Australian contribution in Parliament on the night of Tuesday, 8th March, and until then we are taking steps to ensure that the decision is held in absolute security.

If I may switch down now to another level of topic, I feel that you may like to know that, as a small but interesting piece of emphasis which we place on the significance of the Vietnam conflict, we will be making what is a virtual innovation for us by the issue of a service medal. We plan to provide, jointly with New Zealand, a special Vietnam Medal. I am not sure how soon I can announce this here. I hope to say something about it on Tuesday evening also, but until then at least, it is confidential.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) *Harold Holt*

Harold Holt.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Friday, March 4, 1966  
4 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press contacts, 4 March

Dick Reston of the LA Times sneaked through my press barrier today, but all he wanted to know about was Ghana. I gave him 10 minutes of deep background on what the situation was, without even indicating that you planned to recognize Ghana en route to Texas.

R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday - March 4, 1966 - 1:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

130  
NO

(told  
Bowdler)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chilean Reaction to Tri-Continental Conference

We continue to reap propaganda benefits throughout the Hemisphere from the Soviet-sponsored Tri-Continental Congress held in Cuba in January. Chile is the country where reaction has been the sharpest and the most helpful.

Chile joined the other Latin American Governments (except Mexico) in a letter to the UN Security Council Chairman denouncing the Conference. Castro responded with an insulting reply. A Chilean congressional delegation visiting Cuba at the time abruptly departed on reading the Castro reply. Their critical public comments, and supporting statements by the Chilean Foreign Office and Executive Committee of the Frei PCD Party, upheld Chilean dignity and took Castro to task.

Ralph Dungan yesterday reported the latest windfall -- an interview in the government-controlled newspaper by the Minister of Lands and Colonization and PCD Party ideologue. One example is:

Q: "Is Fidel Castro in your eyes an authentic revolutionary?"

A: He was but he is not now. He is a man who possesses a group of qualities with which he was able to wage a revolution against a detestable dictatorship and win the affection of his compatriots. The key to his triumph was the promise of liberty to an enslaved people. In power, he has used the procedures of dictatorship to maintain himself there. He ceased once and for all to be a revolutionary in the Christian democratic sense, and came to be a dictator who arrogated to himself a world role -- the current Cuban revolution would encounter enormous difficulties if Fidel Castro were to concede the hundredth part of the liberty which there is in Chile to oppose the government."

This experience will take more of the gloss off the Castro image in Chile and should influence official attitudes toward Cuba and communist activities in Chile and the Hemisphere.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-249

WGB  
William G. Bowdler

By CL, NARA, Date 4-12-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 4, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

No problem in your telling the press that we are recognizing Ghana today. But Rusk and I suggest that an official statement from you would be sufficiently unusual to play into hands of Communist and African media which are loudly saying Nkrumah was overthrown by a CIA coup. Also it might have a bad effect on the OAU Conference at Addis.

Several other African countries plus UK, West Germany, Belgium, Israel, have already recognized (at least nine).

Basic reason for our going ahead is that new regime clearly in full control of country and prepared carry out its international obligations. Privately we think Nkrumah's demise is great.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By CG, NARA, Date 4-12-95

FOIA b 7 - EXEMPT

March 4, 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following summarizes the attitudes expressed to me with regard to the NSAM-341 which we are considering at the Cabinet meeting today.

Fowler: Favors the concept but is concerned over practical ways and means of assuring Treasury representation on the Senior Interdepartmental Group when important fiscal matters are involved. I pointed out that the Chairman is charged with bearing Treasury's interest in mind and with inviting representation. Additionally, the Secretary of Treasury can propose matters for the agenda of the Senior Interdepartmental Group when he wishes to use that forum. In either case, his representative who attends will have full rights of membership.

Freeman: Favors the concept but fears that it will create a problem with him in some quarters of Congress. These difficulties will arise from fear that all U. S. business abroad is being turned over to the State Department.

Connor: Favors the proposal without reservation.

  
Maxwell D. Taylor

LIST OF ATTENDEES FOR MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM

FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1966, AT 12:00 NOON

The President, Presiding

~~The Vice President~~

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State  
Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury  
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense  
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Attorney General  
Lawrence O'Brien, Postmaster General  
Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture  
John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce  
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor  
John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare  
Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

Admiral William F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development  
Leonard Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency

Charles L. Schultze, Director, Bureau of the Budget  
James Webb, Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Donald Hornig, Director of the Office of Science and Technology  
Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations  
Dr. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, Civil Service Commission

General Maxwell Taylor - N. Schwartz(?)

Bill Moyers

Jack Valenti

Marvin Watson

Henry Wilson

Harry McPherson

Joseph Califano

Robert W. Komer

Bromley Smith

Francis A. Biter

Goldberg in  
Udall



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By CB, NARA, Date 4-12-95

134

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Thursday, March 3, 1966  
7:15 pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Announcing new NSAM 341 Procedure for State Supervision of Foreign Policy Activities. We believe we've worked out the best scheme possible. The reason for the White House send-off is State's own strong feeling that launching this enterprise with your blessing is the most effective way. Moving tomorrow should forestall leaks and possible distortions.

We'll have completed Cabinet consultations by then. Aside from the key people already on board, Ball and Alex Johnson had no trouble with Wirtz and Gardner. Taylor ran into a bit more with Joe Fowler, who was worried about how it would affect his business. Taylor reassured him that Treasury could participate fully whenever it had an interest. Freeman was all for the NSAM, but thought it would cause him trouble on the Hill, where the agriculture people would see it as turning over our PL480 business to State at the expense of U. S. domestic interests. Taylor expects to touch base with them again tomorrow, but thinks they are relaxed. Such reactions are not surprising when they saw the NSAM for the first time.

The revised scenario is as follows, subject to your approval:

A. Cabinet plus other top officials at noon tomorrow (March 4).

At Tab A are some recommended lead-off remarks done by Taylor, which we hope you'll make. Then Taylor would brief, followed by Rusk, and then a few closing remarks by you.

B. Congressional Notification. We've parcelled out the list of Henry Wilson's which you approved. Rusk, Schultze, or others will call them right after the Cabinet meeting, to be followed up by an explanatory letter from Wilson and Manatos (Tab B). We'll ask the Cabinet officers to notify their relevant committee chairmen.

C. White House Press Briefing will be scheduled for 3:30 p.m., with Alex Johnson and Taylor on hand to answer questions. We'll have a press handout similar to the letter. We'll invite the State correspondents over here too. I've checked this all out with Bill Moyers.

We all believe that handling the matter this way will minimize the risk of press leaks and distortions. We'll play it as a strengthening of the State Department's role in interdepartmental coordination and direction

PRESERVATION COPY

March 3, 1966

of foreign policy activities, and slide over any excessive focus on Vietnam or on counter-subversion planning worldwide. Taylor's role, for example, should be billed as that of an experienced advisor, whom you drew on because of his wide experience -- most recently as an ambassador.

General Taylor thinks it highly desirable that he, Rusk, Brom Smith, and I meet with you before the Cabinet meeting to brief you on the consultations and take up any questions you might have. We've requested an appointment from Marvin Watson.

R. W. Komer

PRESERVATION COPY

134a  
Tab A

Comments on NSAM-341 Prepared for President Johnson  
for Use at the Cabinet Meeting, March 4

I have called you together today to inform you of a decision I have taken with regard to the manner of conducting our interdepartmental business overseas. As you know, by the nature of the structure of our government, there is no one below the President with authority to give overall direction, coordination and supervision to overseas interdepartmental activities which continue to grow more and more complex. Overseas, the Ambassador has this authority in a general way but, here in Washington, we have never had an organization directly comparable to the Ambassador and his Country Team specifically authorized to guide overseas interdepartmental business at this end.

As I indicated in my State of the Union message, I have been most anxious "to modernize and streamline the Executive Branch." With that purpose in mind with regard to overseas operations, I asked General Taylor following his return from Saigon to review the experience gained there in integrating the activities of several departments and to examine the operations of our government here to see whether we were properly organized to cope with complex overseas operations, not only in South Vietnam but anywhere in the world where our interests are involved. The basic problem seemed to me to be the difficulty of integrating the programs of a number of departments in the most effective way to attain the overall U. S. objectives in the country or region involved.



General Taylor, assisted by several interdepartmental committees, completed this review and submitted his report to me a few weeks ago. I have approved it and last Wednesday authorized the circulation of a National Security Action Memorandum implementing its principal recommendations. I would now like to ask General Taylor to explain the substance of the National Security Action Memorandum and give you some of the background which led to my decision.

(Break for General Taylor's presentation)

I want to emphasize further some of the points General Taylor has raised. First, there was nothing in this action which changes your responsibilities for your own programs overseas or your relations with me. As I view it, we are merely setting up a mechanism through which every head of department or agency involved in overseas activities can participate effectively and in a timely manner in the formulation of decisions bearing on matters of common interest abroad. Furthermore, these senior officials are provided a way whereby any one of them can carry an issue all the way to the President if he feels that a decision about to be taken is wrong. I have asked the Secretary of State to make it clear to the Executive Chairman of these Groups that they must be very careful to invite representatives of departments or agencies who are not regular members whenever there are matters affecting them on the agenda of their Groups.

I do not feel that we are doing much more than clarifying relationships which have been observed or should have been observed in past governmental

practice. In a sense, we are only codifying and regularizing good staff work. I think it important to present the matter in this light to your own people, to the Congress and to the public. I look for you to see that your own people take the right view of these new procedures and understand that the latter are intended to be a help and a protection to them in the conduct of their overseas responsibilities. Also, I hope that you will talk to the key Congressmen on your committees and see that they, too, have a proper understanding of what is taking place. I feel that we are taking an important, if undramatic, step in improving the conduct of our overseas business and I ask you all to help the Secretary of State and me to make it work.

(We suggest that at this point you ask the  
Secretary of State to comment on his role)

Fact Sheet on NSAM-341

In order to assist him in discharging his responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs, the President has directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the USG overseas (less exempted military activities). Up to now, the Secretary of State, assisted by the regional Assistant Secretaries, has performed a coordinating function in interdepartment matters abroad. Now he has received formal and specific overall directive authority from the President. While the term "interdepartmental matter" has not been specifically defined, in the present context it covers those activities abroad involving more than a single department or agency, or which is of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U. S. overseas program in a country or region.

To assist the Secretary of State in this new role, there will be a permanent interdepartmental committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) with the Under Secretary of State as its "Executive Chairman". The latter term is used to describe a chairman who has the authority and responsibility to decide all matters coming before his committee, subject to the right of any member to appeal from his decision to higher authority. This is an important provision which makes the difference between the normal committee and an incisive,



decision-making body.

The other regular members of the SIG are: The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman will invite representatives of other departments and agencies when they have an interest in the matters under consideration. The SIG will function as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas departmental matters which are referred to it by the Secretary of State or by an Assistant Secretary of State, or raised by the action of an individual member. Any department or agency not a member may also raise matters for action by the Group.

Beneath the Secretary of State and the SIG, the regional Assistant Secretaries of State will occupy important focal positions in the channel of responsibility for overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental matters in the regions of their responsibility. Supported by Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG) analogous in membership and responsibilities to the SIG (of which the Assistant Secretaries are Executive Chairmen), they will work closely with U. S. Ambassadors and the Country Teams abroad and assure the adequacy in their regions of U. S. policy, plans, programs, resources and performance. It is at this level that the volume of work will be done, leaving for the SIG only the major problems. As in the case of the SIG, the new arrangements are for the purpose of expediting decision and action.

Thus, the overall purpose of the changes directed by the President is to formalize relationships and clarify responsibilities in the conduct of our overseas business, operating within the framework of existing law. It does not affect in any way the statutory responsibilities of any of the key Government officials involved or their relations with the Congress. In establishing the SIG and the IRG, it creates a regular meeting place for the key officials involved in overseas activities and assures decisive action by giving unusual authority to the "Executive Chairman". These meetings also assure the departments and agencies primarily involved in overseas affairs a forum in which all views can be expressed in advance of decisions. The departments and agencies with an occasional interest will be invited to attend these meetings when there are matters affecting them on the agenda.

While these procedures are not for the purpose of injecting some kind of automaticity or production-line quality into the handling of overseas affairs, they will, it is hoped, bring greater method into the conduct of foreign affairs, permit a sharper and more rapid focus of the efforts of several departments on complex overseas problems and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem.

1342

TAB B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1966

Dear //://://://://:

The President asked me to write to you about a decision he has taken to improve the manner of conducting our interdepartmental overseas activities. What is involved is an organizational change which is an important step in his effort, as expressed in his State of the Union message, to "modernize and streamline the Executive Branch."

In order to assist him in discharging his responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs, the President has directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas (less exempted military activities).

To assist the Secretary of State in this new role, there will be a permanent interdepartmental committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental Group with the Under Secretary of State as its "Executive Chairman", an important provision which makes the difference between the normal committee and an incisive, decision-taking body.

The other regular members of the Senior Group will be: The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, the Director of the United States Information Agency and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman will invite representatives of other departments and agencies when they have an interest in the matters under consideration.

Beneath the Secretary of State and the Senior Group, the regional Assistant Secretaries of State will occupy important focal positions in the channel of responsibility for overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental matters in the regions of their responsibility. Supported by Interdepartmental Regional Groups analogous in membership and responsibilities to the Senior Group (of which the Assistant Secretaries are Executive Chairmen), they



will work closely with our Ambassadors and their Country Teams abroad and assure the adequacy in their regions of U. S. policy, plans, programs, resources and performance.

Thus, the overall purpose of the change directed by the President is to formalize relationships and clarify responsibilities in the conduct of our overseas business, operating within the framework of existing law. It does not affect in any way the statutory responsibilities of any of the key Government officials involved or their relations with the Congress. It does not change the responsibilities of a Department or Agency head for his programs overseas or his relations with the President.

While these procedures are not for the purpose of injecting some kind of production-line quality into the handling of overseas affairs, they will, it is hoped, bring greater method into the conduct of foreign affairs, permit a sharper and more rapid focus of the efforts of several departments on complex overseas problems and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem.

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1352

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
FOR THE SECRETARY

08

March 12, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Opening of Negotiations with  
Soviet Union on Renewal of  
Exchanges Agreement.

Today we opened negotiations in Washington to renew our over-all agreement with the Soviets for across-the-board exchanges ranging from science to tourism.

If successful, this will be the fifth agreement -- the first was in 1958 -- and will cover the period 1966-67.

The Soviets have been dragging their feet in starting these talks. Now they have given us a draft and want to wind up matters quickly. They talk of two weeks whereas the 1964-65 negotiations took 46 days. We are ready to cooperate in arriving at an agreement promptly but only if the Soviets do not persist in rehashing old arguments already settled in previous agreements and only if they give us satisfaction on clauses which will assure adequate reciprocity and a truly balanced agreement. | <

Repetition of the "Hello, Dolly!" episode must be prevented by making it clear that no Soviet performance will be allowed here unless we have a firm contract in hand for an American performance there. We must assure adequate arrangements for distribution of Amerika magazine in the Soviet Union. We must obtain reasonable access for American exhibits in the USSR. And we must keep the whole program under U.S. Government direction and not allow them to by-pass the State Department in their dealings with | <

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-371

by lig, NARA. Date 8-18-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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private American organizations. These are essentials on which we will insist. |←

We expect hard bargaining but no serious problems in the other fields: scientific, technical, agricultural, medical, educational, films, cultural, sports and tourism.

The Soviet draft of the proposed agreement would reduce the exchanges somewhat, in keeping with the Viet-Nam atmosphere. Significantly, the draft also omits the color words of previous agreements, which implied a desire for more friendly relations. They may have seriously debated stopping the exchanges entirely but evidently decided otherwise. We would like to put the emphasis on expansion of exchanges and on language conveying the idea of improving relations but will not fight hard on these points. The important thing is to keep the program going, if we can do so, on a fully equitable basis.

I will report to you further before negotiations are concluded. |←

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3, 1966  
Thursday, 3:30 P. M.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-249  
By Cb, NARA, Date 4-12-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reply to Nasser's letter. State thinks it a useful gesture if you'd make a written reply to Nasser's friendly message delivered by Sadat (Tab B).

The proposed reply (Tab A) is friendly but careful. Its only substance is to express your hope that the Saudis and UAR will get together over Yemen.

For signature.

R. W. Komer



138a

March 4, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-249  
By CB, NARA, Date 4-12-95

Thank you for the message which was delivered to me by Mr. Anwar al-Sadat on February 23. It was a pleasure to meet with him and useful to talk over matters of mutual concern. I was particularly gratified to learn from Mr. Sadat details of your Government's efforts to speed economic progress and social justice in Egypt.

It was also reassuring to hear of your continuing efforts to reach a practicable solution to the Yemen problem. I strongly hope that continued diplomatic talks between your country and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, possibly at a high level, will make it possible to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding.

I also hope that the visit of Mr. Sadat will have contributed to a better mutual understanding between the leaders of our two countries, and that it will serve as the basis for a continued improvement in relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic.

Sincerely,

/s/

His Excellency  
Gamal Abdel Nasser  
President of the United Arab Republic  
Cairo

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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March 3, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Management of Vietnam Policy


For the past year and a half I have spent much of my time pushing, prodding and needling the various elements of the Government with responsibilities in Vietnam. I have long felt strongly that something more than a committee arrangement was necessary if we were to win the pacification battle. (I have taken the liberty of attaching a brief memorandum on this subject that I wrote in March 1965.) I would like to forward the following views, now that the issue is on the front burner.

In brief (and I would be pleased to elaborate):

1. I believe "Mr. Vietnam" should not be located in the State Department, but in the White House complex: The operating, public information and policy management programs cut across many agencies; they are of the utmost importance to you personally; they require for their efficient, effective and expeditious implementation the kind of leverage that can only come from the knowledge that "Mr. Vietnam" and his staff are directly responsible to you. With all due respect to the Department of State, it has never had any experience in running a war - and your Mr. Vietnam will be spending his time running a very large chunk of the Vietnamese war. I would make one more point: If he is attached to the White House, he will not be forced to spend time before Congressional Committees - a matter that might become increasingly important as time goes on.

2. But, if the management function is to be assigned to State:

It should be regarded as an exception and not incorporated into General Taylor's reorganization plan. The problems to be dealt with relate primarily to fast and effective interagency implementation of established policy rather than the development of interagency policy. Furthermore, if the management of Vietnam policy is to be incorporated into the Taylor plan, Mr. Vietnam will, in effect or in actuality, be an Assistant Secretary of State. I submit that a "Bureau of Vietnam Affairs" will inevitably

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become a routine State Department organization operating under routine State Department procedures. As I understand it, this is just what you don't want to happen. I would further submit that the man put in charge of Vietnam should not be four layers down in the Department.

If, indeed, the assignment is made to the Department, your "Mr. Vietnam" should be designated, as was Tom Mann, a "Special Assistant to the President". He should have direct access to you, but should be posted to State, with a small staff, and work directly under the Secretary. Interagency guidance and the resolution of interagency problems should come from the Saturday Vietnam Group of which he should be a member. There are few precedents for this, but there are no precedents to the Vietnam war. Four names that occur to me as candidates are Bob Nathan, Paul Nitze, Dave Bell and Robert Nelson (Litton Industries).

As "a short timer" I have no personal stake in how this comes out. As one deeply committed to your Vietnam policy, I have a great stake in the outcome. For this reason I'm afraid I have been more blunt about my views than might be seemly.

Chester L. Cooper

Attachment

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Comments on NSAM-341 Prepared for President Johnson  
for Use at the Cabinet Meeting, March 4

I have called you together today to inform you of a decision I have taken with regard to the manner of conducting our interdepartmental business overseas. As you know, by the nature of the structure of our government, there is no one below the President with authority to give overall direction, coordination and supervision to overseas interdepartmental activities which continue to grow more and more complex. Overseas, the Ambassador has this authority in a general way but, here in Washington, we have never had an organization directly comparable to the Ambassador and his Country Team specifically authorized to guide overseas interdepartmental business at this end.

As I indicated in my State of the Union message, I have been most anxious "to modernize and streamline the Executive Branch". With that purpose in mind with regard to overseas operations, I asked General Taylor following his return from Saigon to review the experience gained there in integrating the activities of several departments and to examine the operations of our government here to see whether we were properly organized to cope with complex overseas operations, not only in South Viet-Nam but anywhere in the world where our interests are involved. The basic problem seemed to me to be the difficulty of integrating the programs of a number of departments in the most effective way to attain the overall U.S. objectives in the country or region involved.



General Taylor, assisted by several interdepartmental committees, completed this review and submitted his report to me a few weeks ago. I have approved it and last Wednesday authorized the circulation of a National Security Action Memorandum implementing its principal recommendations. I would now like to ask General Taylor to explain the substance of the National Security Action Memorandum and give you some of the background which led to my decision.

(Break for General Taylor's presentation)

I want to emphasize further some of the points General Taylor has raised. First, there was nothing in this action which changes your responsibilities for your own programs overseas or your relations with me. As I view it, we are merely setting up a mechanism through which every head of department or agency involved in overseas activities can participate effectively and in a timely manner in the formulation of decisions bearing on matters of common interest abroad. Furthermore, these senior officials are provided a way whereby any one of them can carry an issue all the way to the President if he feels that a decision about to be taken is wrong. I have asked the Secretary of State to make it clear to the Executive Chairman of these Groups that they must be very careful to invite heads of departments or agencies who are not regular members whenever there are matters affecting them on the agenda of their Groups.

I do not feel that we are doing much more than clarifying relationships which have been observed or should have been observed in past governmental

practice. In a sense, we are only codifying and regularizing good staff work. I think it important to present the matter in this light to your own people, to the Congress and to the public. I look for you to see that your own people take the right view of these new procedures and understand that the latter are intended to be a help and a protection to them in the conduct of their overseas responsibilities. Also, I hope that you will talk to the key Congressmen on your committees and see that they, too, have a proper understanding of what is taking place. I feel that we are taking an important, if undramatic, step in improving the conduct of our overseas business and I ask you all to help the Secretary of State and me <sup>to</sup> make it work.

*We suggest that at this point you ask the Secretary of State to commit on his <sup>role</sup>*