

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

189

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	re: Vietnam & Europe secret <i>open 5-9-85 NLS 85-27</i> 3 p	04/30/66	A
#2 Memo	to President from WWR re: India secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-250 Sanitized 6/20/00 NLS 98-310</i> 1 p	04/30/66	A
#4a memo	re: Conversation between Presidents Johnson & Diaz Ordaz confidential <i>open 8-21-86</i> 4 p	04/14/66	A
#5 memo	to the president from WWR secret <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 2 p	04/30/66	A
#6 memo	to President from WWR re: Lodge Confidential 1 p	04/30/66	A
#6c memo	for President from Lodge secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 4 p	04/29/66	A
#7 memo	to President from WWR re: Israel Confidential <i>Sanitized 8-21-86 open 7/21/98</i> 1 p	04/30/66	A
#7a memo	to President from Rostow (re: Israel) secret <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p	04/29/66	A
#9 memo	to the President from Rostow confidential <i>open 9-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 1 p	04/29/66	A
#10a memo	to President from Lodge re: Vietnam secret <i>open 8-19-86 NLS 85-27</i> 4 p	04/29/66	A
#11a memo	to President from Amb. Bowles secret <i>open 8-21-86</i> 1 p	04/29/66	A
#14a cable	text of New York 4638 Secret <i>Sanitized 3-23-88 NLS 86-251 open 8-28-97 NLS 97-110</i> 4 p	04/28/66	A
#15 memo	to President from Rostow Secret <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/28/66	A
#15a memo	to President <del>xxxx</del> re: Rhodesia secret <i>Sanitized 6/20/00 NLS 98-310 Sanitized 8/25/02 more info released</i> 3 p	04/28/66	A
#16 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Shoaib visit confidential <i>Sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 98-309</i> 1 p	04/28/66	A
#16a report	page 2 only - secret <i>open 3-23-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	undated	A
#18 memo	to President and Sec State from Rostow re: Pakistan secret <i>Sanitized 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 2 p	04/27/66	A
	<i>Sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 98-309 open 3-14-07 FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 #327</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~SECRET~~  
MEMOS TO THE President - Walt Rostow  
Vol. 1 April 1-30, 1966

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19a memo	re: Vietnam by Owen <i>open 7/21/88</i> confidential 1 p	04/27/66	A
#19b memo	re: Gen. Eisenhower and Vietnam by Owen confidential <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/27/66	A
#20 memo	to President from Rostow re: Shoaib visit <del>secret</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p	04/27/66	A
#20a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk re: Pakistan secret <i>sanitized 3-23-88 NLS 86-251</i> 5 p <i>9-14-99 NLS 98-311</i>	04/27/66	A
#21a letter	to Raul Leoni from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p	04/28/66	A
#22 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Ethiopia confidential <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/27/66	A
#22a letter	to Haile Selassie from Pres. Johnson possible classified info 1 p	04/28/66	A
#25 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Santo Domingo confidential <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/27/66	A
#26a memo	to the President from Maxwell Taylor re: Vietnam secret <i>open 9-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 4 p	04/27/66	A
#28a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk re: Denmark secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 2 p	04/26/66	A
#28b report	briefing paper for meeting with Danish Prime Minister secret <i>sanitized 3-23-88 NLS 86-251</i> <i>open 7/21/88</i> 1 p	04/27/66	A
#28c report	bio sketch Prime Minister of Denmark Secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/64	A
#28d report	bio sketch Danish Ambassador confidential <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	undated	A
#36 memo	to the President from Komer re: Pakistan secret <i>sanitized 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p <i>open 3-14-07 FR4564-68, Vol. 25 #326 (#149a)</i>	04/26/66	A
#38a cable	text of Saigon 4217 secret <i>open 5-9-85 NLS 85-27</i> 3 p	04/26/66	A
#39 memo	to the President from Smith secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-256 Exempt 6/20/00 NS 98-310</i> 1 p	04/26/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#39a memo	to the President re: meeting between Gandhi and Kosygin secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-256</i> 2 p <i>Exempt 6/20/00 NLS 98-310; Exempt 2/02 NLS 019-0071</i>	04/26/66	A
#40 memo	to the President from Rostow <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/26/66	A
#40a memo	re: rice for India <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/25/66	A
#41 memo	to the President from Rostow confidential 1 p	04/26/66	A
#41a memo	re: rice for India <i>open 7/21/98</i> <del>confidential</del> 1 p	04/25/66	A
#42a memo	to President from Rostow re: Poland <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/26/66	A
#43a memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/26/66	A
#43b memo	NS National Security Action Memo #346 secret 1 p	04/26/66	A
#44a memo	to President from Rostow <del>Confidential</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/25/66	A
#47a memo	re: Vietnam <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-474</i> <del>possible classified info</del> 1 p	04/22/66	A
#51 memo	to President from Rostow <del>secret</del> <i>open 8-21-86</i> 1 p	04/25/66	A
#53a cable	text of Saigon 4188 <del>secret</del> <i>Open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/25/66	A
#55 memo	to President from Rostow <del>secret</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/24/66	A
#59 memo	to President from Rosotw re: Vietnam <i>open 7/21/98</i> confidential <del>Exempt per NLS 85-30</del> 1 p	04/23/66	A
#59a letter	proposed message to Prime Minister Wilson <i>open 7/21/98</i> <del>possible classified info</del> <del>Exempt per NLS 85-30</del> 2 p <del>Confidential per NLS 85-30</del>	undated	A
#66a memo cable	text of Seceto 21 from Sec. Rusk in Ankara Secret <i>Open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/21/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#68 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Vietnam <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-13-85 NLJ 85-30</i>	4 p	04/21/66 A
#69a cable	text of Saigon 4085 <del>secret</del> <i>open 8-19-86 NLJ 85-27</i>	6 p	04/20/66 A
#71a memo	to the President from Rostow re: India <del>secret</del> <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p	04/18/66 A
#71c memo <i>open 4-2-90 NLJ 89-192</i>	to the President from Rostow re: Pakistan <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 8-21-86 (dup #37c) NSC History, Indian Famine, 10/78</i>	2 p	04/21/66 A
#71d memo	to the President from George Ball re: Pakistan <del>secret</del> <i>open 8-21-86</i>	4 p	04/19/66 A
#75 memo <i>Edg #93, Subj. File, Nrc. Testing-Plushava Events, vii, 2, Box 29</i>	to the President from Rostow <del>xxx</del> <del>confidential</del> <i>Sanitized 2-13-90 NLJ 86-253 open 2-24-89 NLJ 08-213 (#93)</i>	2 p	04/20/66 A
#76 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Pakistan <del>confidential</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i>	1 p	04/19/66 A
#76a memo	conversation with Shoaib <del>confidential</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i>	1 p	04/19/66 A
#78 memo	to the President from Rostow re: foreign policy <del>confidential</del> <i>open 9-13-85 NLJ 85-30</i>	2 pp	04/19/66 A
#79a memo	to Rostow from Ben Read re: China <del>confidential</del> <i>open 12-18-85 NLJ 85-266</i>	3 p	04/16/66 A
#80 memo	agenda for Foreign Policy discussion with President <del>secret</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i>	2 p	04/19/66 A
#82 memo	to President from Rostow " <del>secret</del>	1 p	04/18/66 A
#83 memo	to President from Rostow re: India <del>secret</del> <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p	04/18/66 A
#84a cable	text of Saigon 4033 <del>secret</del> <i>open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	5 p	04/18/66 A
#85a memo <i>open 3-10-05 NLJ 04-41</i>	to Rostow from special asst to director <del>secret</del> <i>6-17-85 sanitized NLJ 85-23</i>	1 p	04/13/66 A
#85b report	re: Vietnam & Taiwan <i>open 3-10-05 NLJ 04-41</i> <del>secret</del> <i>6-17-85 sanitized NLJ 85-23</i>	5 p	undated A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#86 memo	to President from Rostow secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>same sanitization 3-17-10 NLS 86-19 (#52)</i> <del>sanitized 8/13/02 NLS 98-313</del> 1 p	04/18/66	A
#86a memo	to Deputy Secretary of Defense from Rostow secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <del>sanitized 8/13/02 NLS 98-313</del> 1 p	04/19/66	A
#87 memo	to President from Rostow secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <del>sanitized 8/13/02 NLS 98-313</del> 1 p	04/18/66	A
#87a memo	to Deputy Secretary Defense from Rostow Secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>same sanitization 3-17-10 NLS 86-19</i> <del>sanitized 8/13/02 NLS 98-313</del> 1 p	04/19/66	A
#89 letter	to Mohammed Ayub Khan from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 2 pp	04/17/66	A
#90a report	re: Vietnam secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 6-17-85 NLS 85-23</i> 1 p	undated	A
#90b cable	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 1 p	04/16/66	A
#94 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-9-85 NLS 85-32</i> 2 p	04/15/66	A
#95 memo	to President from Rostow re: India & Pakistan confidential <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p	04/14/66	A
#95a letter	to Mohammed Ayub Khan from PRES. JOHNSON possible classified info <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 2 p	4/17/66	A
#95b letter	to President Johnson from Mohammad Ayub Khan possible classified info <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 7-31-89 NLS 86-250</i> 1 p	03/01/66	A
#96 letter	to Lt. Gen. Ankrah from Pres. Johnson possible classified info 2 p	04/14/66	A
#97 memo	to President from Rostow re: Tunisia confidential <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/12/66	A
#97a memo	to President from Rusk re: Tunisia confidential <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 1 p	04/11/66	A
#98a memo	to President from Maxwell Taylor re: Vietnam Secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 5 p	04/12/66	A
#99 memo	to President from Rostow <i>same sanitization 3-18-08 NLS 06-3 (#3)</i> secret <del>EXEMPT NLS 86-253</del> <del>sanitized 8/13/02 NLS 98-313</del> 1 p	04/12/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#99a <del>memo</del> memo	to Deputy Sec. of Defense from Rostow <i>same sanitization 3-18-88 NLJ 86-253</i> Secret <del>Exempt NLJ 86-253</del> <del>Sanitized 8-13-82 NLJ 98-312</del>	1 p 04/18/66	A
#99b memo	to President from Vance <i>Sanitized 7-27-84 NLJ 98-314</i> secret <del>Exempt NLJ 86-254</del>	2 p 03/25/66	A
<del>#101 memo</del>	<del>to President from Rostow</del> <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLJ 86-252</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/11/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#102a memo</del>	<del>to Sec. Rusk &amp; Sec McNamara from Rostow re: Vietnam</del> <del>secret</del> <i>Open 9-13-85 NLJ 85-30</i>	<del>3 p</del> 04/09/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#103 memo</del>	<del>to President from Rostow re: Ghana</del> <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 12-4-89 NLJ 86-252</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/11/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#103a letter</del>	<del>to President Johnson from Ankrah</del> // <del>possible classified info</del>	<del>4 p</del> 03/24/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#103b letter</del>	<del>to Gen. Ankrah from President Johnson</del> // <del>possible classified info</del>	<del>2 p</del> 04/14/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#104 letter</del>	<del>to Mohammad Rez Shah Pahlavi from Pres. Johnson</del> <i>Open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i> <del>possible classified info</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/11/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#105a memo</del>	<del>to Rostow from James Thomson re: Vietnam</del> <del>secret</del> <i>Open 9-13-85 NLJ 85-30</i>	<del>4 p</del> 04/07/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#105b report</del>	<del>re: Vietnam</del> <i>Open 9-13-85</i> <del>confidential</del> <i>NLJ 85-30</i>	<del>2 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
<del>#106 memo</del>	<del>to President from Rostow re: Iran</del> <del>secret</del> <i>Open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/07/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#106a letter</del>	<del>to Shah Pahlavi from Pres. Johnson</del> <i>Open 7-31-89 NLJ 86-250</i> <del>possible classified info</del>	<del>1 p</del> 04/11/66	<del>A</del>
#107 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam possible classified info	1 p 04/07/66xx	A
<del>#107a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 3791</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>Open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	<del>3 p</del> 04/07/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#107b memo</del>	<del>re: Vietnam</del> <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/07/66xx	<del>A</del>
<del>#107c memo</del>	<del>re: Vietnam</del> <i>Open 5-9-85</i> <del>confidential</del> <i>NLJ 85-27</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/07/66	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#108 memo	to President from Rostow re: Santo Domingo confidential <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/07/66	A
#109 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-252 Open 7/21/98</i> 1 p <i>Sanitized 8-8-95 NLS 93-225</i>	04/06/66	A
#110 memo	to President from Rostow re: staff appointments confidential <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 2 p	04/06/66	A
#113 memo	to President from Rostow re: Panama confidential <i>Pani 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 2 p <i>Sanitized 6/20/00 NLS 98-310</i>	04/05/66	A
#114 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/05/66	A
#115 memo	for President from Rostow re: Vietnam top secret <i>Open 11-4-85 NLS 85-29</i> 2 p	04/05/66	A
#115a memo	for President from Rostow re: Vietnam top secret <i>Open 11-4-85 NLS 85-29</i> 4 p	04/05/66	A
#115c memo	to Valenti from Komer re: Vietnam <i>Open 6/20/00 NLS 98-310</i> top secret <i>Sanitized 11-4-85 NLS 85-29</i> 4 p <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 85-29</i>	03/29/66	A
#116 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Open 9-14-99 NLS 98-309</i> confidential <i>Sanitized 7-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#116a memo	to President from Charles Schultze re: Tunisia confidential <i>Open 7/21/98</i> 3 p	03/31/66	A
#116b memo	to President from David Bell re: Tunisia Confidential <i>Open 7/21/98</i> 5 p	03/11/66	A
#117 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic Confidential <i>Exempt NLS 86-252</i> 1 p <i>Open 8-8-95 NLS 93-225</i>	04/04/66	A
#117a report	re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>Open 9-30-86 NLS 86-257</i> 3 p	04/04/66	A
#118 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> confidential 1 1 p	04/05/66	A
#119 memo	to President from Rostow // Confidential 1 1 p	04/04/66	A
#120a letter ±	to Dr. Olivier from Pres. Johnson // possible classified info 1 p	04/04/66	A

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#121 memo	to President from Rostow re: Burma <del>secret</del> <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 86-252</i> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#121a report	re: Gen. Ne Win's visit <i>"</i> <del>secret</del> 1 p	undated	A
#122 letter	to Humphrey from Pres. Johnson <i>"</i> <del>confidential</del> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#123 letter	to President Chiang Kai-shek from Pres. Johnson <del>confidential</del> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#124 memo	to President from Rostow re: United Kingdom <del>top secret</del> <i>open 2/10/98</i> 1 p	04/03/66	A
#125 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 7/21/98</i> 1 p	04/03/66	C
#125a letter	to Humphrey from Pres. Johnson <i>open 7/21/98</i> <del>confidential</del> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#126 memo	to President from Rostow re: Cambodia <i>NLS 98-309</i> <del>secret</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 85-30 open 9-14-99</i> 1 p	04/03/66	A
#126a memo	to Rostow from Wm. Bundy re: Cambodia <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-311</i> <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 8-19-86 NLS 85-37</i> 4 p	04/02/66	A
#126b report	re: Cambodia <i>open NLT 97-265 10-6-98</i> <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 5-9-85 NLS 85-37</i> 3 p	undated	A
#127a cable	text of #1470 from Goreon to President and Secretary <del>confidential</del> <i>open 8-21-86</i> 2 p	04/02/66	A
#128a memo	to President from Rusk re: North Atlantic Treaty <del>Confidential</del> <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-251</i> 2 p	04/02/66	A
#129 memo	to President from Rostow <del>possible classified info</del> 1 p	04/02/66	A
#130 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam <del>confidential</del> <i>open 9-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 1 p	04/02/66	A
#130a letter	to President Chiang Kai-shek from President Johnson <del>confidential</del> <i>open 9-13-85 NLS 85-30</i> 1 p	04/04/66	A
#130b letter	to President Johnson from Chiang Kai-shek <i>NLS 98-309</i> <del>possible classified info</del> <i>Exempt per NLS 85-30</i> 4 p <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> <i>open 9-14-99</i>	03/01/66*	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#131 memo	to President from Rostow re: India Confidential <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p 04/02/66	A
#131a memo	to President from Rostow re: India confidential <i>open 8-21-86</i>	2 p 03/29/66	A
#132a cable	text of #2939 from Lodge <del>secret</del> <i>open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	1 p 04/02/66	A
#132b cable	Saigon 2939 <del>secret</del> <i>open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	2 p 04/01/66	A
#134b cable	Saigon 3630 [Ref. Embtel 3630] <del>top secret</del> <i>open 7-21-86 NLJ 85-28</i>	1 p 04/01/66	A
#134c cable	Saigon 3630 <del>secret</del> <i>open 5-9-85 NLJ 85-27</i>	1 p 04/01/66	A

FILE LOCATION NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]  
Memos to the President - Walt Rostow  
Vol. 1 April 1-30, 1966

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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~~SECRET~~

April 30, 1966  
Saturday, 4:45 P.M.

Mr. President:

Here are two major ideas worth your consideration, from Henry Owen.

The first you will wish to brood about on your own.

The second is likely to figure as a major item among the constructive ventures stimulated by our recent NATO NSAM.

W. W. R.

cc: Bill Moyers  
Robert Kintner

~~SECRET~~

D CLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Doc NARS, Date 7-27-84



1a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Acting Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

~~SECRET~~

April 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Two New Proposals

I. Introduction

1. Most great foreign policy advances have been made in the wake of crises. For it is only in time of crisis that people are moved to contemplate large changes: Marshall Plan, NATO, Mutual Security Program, Alliance for Progress, etc.

2. Both the Vietnamese and NATO crises offer a chance for this kind of constructive movement. This will convey, both abroad and at home, the impression of an administration which responds imaginatively, not defensively, to external challenge.

II. Vietnam

3. The Vietnamese war offers a chance to create a sound domestic base for providing greatly increased development aid by the end of the 1960's. Recent studies suggest that a quantum jump in present levels of aid will be needed in the next decade.

4. The President could indicate that he will ask the Congress to set aside for development aid, if and as the Vietnamese war abates, a fixed percentage of any savings achieved through cuts in the present level of our military expenditures in Vietnam. The money would only be spent if sound projects were forthcoming, which could not be financed under present levels of national and international

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

By is, NARS, Date 5-9-85

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

aid. This could be related to General Eisenhower's 1954 promise that a large part of any arms savings would be devoted to development aid.

5. This approach might commend itself to Americans, in and out of Congress, who would ordinarily resist a large increase in foreign aid:

(a) The prospective burden involved will seem small and distant, compared with the large and present danger which must be lifted before it need be faced.

(b) It could, moreover, be portrayed as insurance against the kind of conditions (poverty and despair) which could give rise to future conflict.

(c) "Liberals" would like it because it gave substance to the constructive, rather than defensive, aims of our war effort.

6. After the speech, some way of dramatizing the President's pledge and building a national consensus around it would be in order. Perhaps a Joint Resolution or authorizing legislation could be sought from the Congress.

### III. Europe

7. The NATO crisis offers an opportunity to dramatize the US commitment to European unity. This concept has more political sex appeal in most Common Market countries (and increasingly in the UK) than Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle is in trouble at home when he seems to oppose European unity - not when he opposes NATO.

8. The President could offer to sell advanced civil and military technology, now held preclusively by the US Government, if a grouping of interested Common Market

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

countries and the UK could be set up to use it effectively. This idea was conceived last month in the Italian Foreign Office; in studying it further, ~~we~~ have worked out examples of the kind of technology that might be involved.

9. Such a US offer would respond to deep seated European desires not only to link the UK closer to the Continent but also to narrow the technological gap between Europe and the US. A positive European response would, therefore, be assured. American pundits, noting that response, would applaud us for doing what the Europeans want.

10. Here is how the scheme might work: The European countries concerned would set up a public corporation to:

- (a) buy the advanced US technology;
- (b) provide it to European firms under license;
- (c) use it to promote multi-national European research, development, and production projects - in both the civil and military fields.

11. After coming together for this purpose, these European countries could mount other joint ventures as well - e.g., create a joint European air unit to replace the French aircraft in Germany, form a common European view on NATO defense questions, etc.

12. Given the present British government, we need not fear all this leading to a "third force." The degree of "Europeanism" that Wilson would tolerate would be just enough to steal Heath's clothes, -- no more.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

April 30, 1966  
Saturday, 11:30 a.m.

2  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-310  
By CG, NARA Date 6-15-00

Mr. President:

Although Alex Johnson signed this for Secretary Rusk, it has the Secretary's approval.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

It is a quiet way to build our links [redacted] in the security field in ways which counter Soviet leverage, [redacted].

Aside from the money, the key question is the effect [redacted]. There is no evidence [redacted] about the [redacted] effort which this is designed to support; and it is an effort clearly designed to protect the approaches [redacted].

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

There is another problem not referred to in the memorandum: whether [redacted] use of this [redacted] force could engage us, against our will, in an [redacted] conflict.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

The fact that the three [redacted] remain under U.S. ownership, [redacted] gives us some insurance.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

On balance, I support this venture.

W.W.R.

cc: Bill Moyers

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

att in Pres. Lols file

EO  
(C)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1966, Saturday, 10:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from ex-President Portes Gil of Mexico

Ex-President Portes Gil of Mexico (1928-30) has sent you a cordial message concerning your visit to Mexico. (Tab A).

I recommend that you send him the attached telegraphic reply (Tab B). A personal letter would not be in order because in the past he has not always been the best friend of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

2a





36

Telegram to President from Ex-President Portes Gil of Mexico  
dated April 15, 1966  
(from Mexico City)

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

As a citizen of Mexico I am proud of the acts carried out during your visit to my country. I express to you my enthusiastic congratulations for your courtesy in coming to Mexico with your charming wife and the highest representatives of the people of the United States.

E. Portes Gil

2

B

— — — —



Suggested Reply to Telegram from Ex-President Portes Gil of Mexico

Thank you for your cordial telegram. My visit to Mexico was one of the memorable experiences of my life. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending very best wishes.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30  
April 29, 1966

4  
10:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Your Conversation with President  
Diaz Ordaz

State has sent the attached memorandum covering your talks  
with President Diaz Ordaz for approval.

Distribution will be on a need-to-know basis.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCG NARS, Date 7/27/84

CONFIDENTIAL



1161  
42  
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: Evening of April 14,  
and morning of  
April 15, 1966

SUBJECT: Conversation between Presidents Johnson  
and Diaz Ordaz, Los Pinos, Mexico City

PARTICIPANTS: President Lyndon B. Johnson, United States  
President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Mexico


COPIES TO: S/S S/CPR  
G EUR  
S/P White House  
ARA Embassy, Mexico  
E INR/OD  
CU

Cotton

President Diaz Ordaz said that Mexico had suffered considerable losses because of a drop in cotton prices. He complained that the Soviet Union was depressing the international cotton market by buying and then reselling cotton for export at low prices. He said that the United States, and Mexico, plus the other cotton-producing Latin American countries, supplied over half of the world market, and were therefore in a good position to affect world prices. He expressed his appreciation for the position adopted by the U.S., which could easily dump cotton, thereby getting rid of its surpluses and in the process ruining the economies of many countries, including Mexico. This, he said, would be like winning all of the chips in a poker game: the game would be over. He was encouraged by the establishment of the International Cotton Institute, headed by former Mexican Agriculture Secretary Rodriguez Adame, but believed that a world agreement would be useful to help in the stabilization of prices.

President Johnson replied that he was aware of the importance of cotton to so many countries, and that the U.S. would continue to study possible means of stabilizing prices. He said that an overly high price for cotton might lead to a loss of markets, because of competition by synthetic fibers.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Sulphur

President Diaz Ordaz said that the Pan American Sulphur Company and the Mexican Government differed over the amount of sulphur reserves in Mexico, and that the company estimated the reserves as being higher than did the Mexicans. This was an important difference of opinion, since the reserve estimates had a direct bearing on the amount of sulphur that Mexico would allow the company to export. President Johnson suggested a compromise between the two figures, and requested Mexico to do everything it could to permit increased exports to the U.S., to alleviate the strong pressures for an increase in sulphur prices in the U.S., which in turn contributed to inflationary trends. President Diaz Ordaz said that he would look into the matter, and that Mexico would do anything it could in this direction. He wanted to point out that the above-mentioned company had maligned Mexico in many other countries, saying that Mexico was not living up to its agreements, while the truth was that the company had not been able to export its allocated quota the previous year.

Cultural Exchange

President Johnson recalled that when he was a Senator, he had visited the then President-elect of Mexico, López Mateos, in Acapulco, and that at that time there were a number of issues pending between the two countries: the Chamizal, Colorado River salinity, for example. Now, all of those problems had been settled, and he thought that this was a propitious time to launch a joint and positive effort, taking advantage of the absence of major differences. He suggested that the two Presidents each appoint a panel of imaginative men, to come up with suggestions for an exchange of persons; not of students or teachers, but in different fields. He proposed, for example, that the U.S. might send Secretary Freeman to advise Mexico on agricultural problems, much in the same line as the Secretary's trip to Vietnam. He also mentioned the possibility of Under Secretary Mann going to Mexico to consult with the Government on economic problems, including the cotton matter. He suggested that Mexico might send representative artists to tour the U.S., particularly in areas with a heavy concentration of Mexican-Americans. As an example, he mentioned Cantinflas. He also said that thought might be given to having Mexico send persons to provide leadership to Mexican-American citizens in the U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

President Diaz Ordaz said that he thought that this proposal was a good one. Mexico had a number of artists it could send to the U.S. He would exclude painters, since in Mexico, because of a certain snobbish approach, many painters were Communists, and he would not want to send them to the U.S.

Future Visits

President Johnson suggested that the two Presidents and their families might meet at Big Bend National Park, and in the adjoining Mexican forest area, to emphasize recreation and conservation. President Diaz Ordaz said that he was all in favor of this, and suggested that the two Presidents also visit the Amistad Dam nearby. His only concern, a minor one, was that he would have to obtain permission from the Mexican Congress to cross the border, and he did not want to have to go to his legislature too often for this purpose. President Johnson said that this problem could be obviated by having the two Presidents meet on the Mexican side of the border.

Mexican Economy

Both Presidents agreed that the Mexican economy was doing very well; President Diaz Ordaz said that his country had reached the "take-off" point. They both also agreed that Mexico should increase its efforts to assist less developed countries, particularly in Central and South America. President Diaz Ordaz said that he intended to follow this course. It had been amusing, he said, during his recent visit to Central America, to see how Mexico is considered there, and especially in Guatemala, as the "Colossus of the North." He said that the best Ambassadors Mexico had in these countries were Central Americans who had studied in Mexico, many of whom had married Mexican girls. There were large numbers of Central Americans studying in Mexican institutions at the present time.

In-bond Warehouses

President Diaz Ordaz said that he was interested in settling the problem of in-bond warehouses on the border, since sales from these warehouses produced no revenue to either government. President Johnson said that he agreed that the matter should be studied.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Ex-Im Loan to PEMEX

President Diaz Ordaz effusively expressed his delight that we have broken a long taboo against Exim Bank loans to nationalized oil companies. He stated that Mexico probably could have obtained the loan elsewhere but was happy that our policy has changed. He also referred to the unhappiness that arose in the United States over the credit Mexico obtained about two years ago for the purchase of Soviet drilling equipment. He said that Mexico was extremely unhappy about the Soviet equipment which is far inferior to the latest U.S. equipment and even to some equipment that Mexico has.

President Diaz Ordaz' Central American Trip

At the luncheon at Los Pinos, President Johnson asked Diaz Ordaz to tell Mrs. Johnson about his trip to Central America. President Johnson indicated that he might wish to send Mrs. Johnson on a similar trip.

Cuba, Dominican Republic and OAS

The two Presidents, in their conversation, did not mention Cuba, the Dominican Republic, or the OAS.

President Johnson mentioned the Dominican Republic briefly to Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores stating that he had to do something when Ambassador Bennett called while the Embassy was being fired upon. He also told the Foreign Secretary that Castro had told the British Ambassador in Havana that the Soviets had let Cuba down badly on two occasions, once over missiles and once over the Dominican Republic. The Foreign Secretary made no comment.

DFB  
OPR/LS:DFBarnes:aek:4/27/66

CONFIDENTIAL

5

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Saturday, April 30, 1966, 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ambassador Goldberg proposes here (and in a telephone call to me) that we:

1. Decide soon to encourage the Canadians to propose a "successor State" position on the Chirep issue at the next General Assembly (two China policy).

2. That he be empowered to tell Foreign Minister Martin of Canada on the occasion of his meeting about May 17 that if they take the initiative we would not oppose.

3. If Canadians agree, we inform the Nationalist Chinese we shall protect their Assembly seat to the hilt but cannot oppose Peking for General Assembly as strongly as in the past.

4. He is vague on Security Council seat.

When he called me about this, I said:

-- talk to Secretary Rusk;

-- let President have the resultant recommendation well in advance of any meeting with him.

The meeting with Secretary Rusk may take place next Wednesday, May 4.

My first reaction is that:

-- deciding now and telling the Canadians to go on this line with our support is premature;

-- we must weigh carefully, before we make this historic decision:

a. The impact on an already shaky Taiwan.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-252  
By *ing* NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~



April 30, 1966

b. The domestic political reaction, which could go either way; but I recall General Eisenhower told President Kennedy this is the one issue on which he would take after him in public. It is possible the General's view has changed since 1961. But we ought to know.

c. I believe we have a solemn, secret commitment to Taiwan we would use our Security Council veto to keep the Chicomus out. I'm sure you know, but in any case, we have to think about how to deal with this problem.

d. The relation of any such move to Vietnam.

You may wish to have Secretary Rusk suggest to Ambassador Goldberg that we not make up our minds before the meeting with the Canadians in May, but that Goldberg join in the work of the China ideas group which is being set up as a result of your decision of April 23rd.

W. W. R.

Have Goldberg talk to Secretary Rusk  
and bring issue to you shortly thereafter \_\_\_\_\_

Have Secretary Rusk set aside immediate  
decision and invite Goldberg to put views  
into China study group for later decision by you \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Bill Moyers

*Attachment in Pres hold file*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 30, 1966  
Saturday, 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Subject: Lodge's proposed off-the-record talk to members  
of House and Senate

Bill Bundy regards Lodge's proposed think piece as:

- in part, useful;
- a bit florid;
- proposes we send a short message saying that  
President and others will be discussing what  
he might best say at Congressional meeting.

I agree we should take stock with him before approving  
a statement.

*Walt*. R.

Have Bundy send proposed message ☒

*replied to Sam Berger  
4/30/66*

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-252  
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Mr. Boston*  
*Tonite* *6a*

April 29, 1966  
4:50 p. m.

*S*Mr. Smith:

Mr. Wm. Bundy left the following message for you:

Lodge's 4272 strikes us as one of his think pieces, much of which may be useful; some of which is a bit florid and our belief, unless you think otherwise, is that we should send a short message to Lodge saying that the President and others will be discussing the kind of thing Lodge might be saying to congressional committees and we will be able to have a much clearer picture after we have had some talk here.

This is the message Bundy proposes to send to Lodge from State tonight.

TJS



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, 29 April 1966  
4:00 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Lodge is asking your approval of the attached statement he would make to Congressmen, off the record.

Secretary Rusk may have some views. If so, we will get them to you promptly.

My own reaction is:

-- basically good;

-- a few sensitive phrases he might avoid, since it will probably leak;

-- at the end recall Korea, Pakistan, Mexico, Turkey, and other places that found their way in recent times toward relatively stable democracy.

*W. A. Rostow*  
W. A. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

(c)

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Friday, April 29, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE:

(Saigon, 4272)

Subject to your approval, the following is what I am thinking of saying to Senators and Congressmen on a strictly off the record, background basis. If this is too unconventional, I can always give them an off the record account of the situation here.

Begin statement: There appear to me to be some fundamental differences in ways of thinking and behavior between Vietnam and the United States which, if thoroughly understood, notably by high-ranking American officials and editors, would really help our effort in Vietnam. I shall try to set forth some of these differences.

In the first place, I question our stress of the word "stability." Vietnam is not going to be stable in our meaning of the word for a long, long time. The word here is not "stability," but "evolution." When we were fighting our war against Great Britain, we were not stable. The Colonies were squabbling among themselves. When the French were beating off their invaders, in the period beginning in 1789, they were not stable. They were evolving -- and their evolution -- and revolution -- gave them the enthusiasm to beat off the aggressors. They may go to elections and Constitution in an orderly way, but there is simply too much to be done here -- by way of security, economically, socially, and politically -- for them to be other than evolving. No modern Vietnam can stand pat.

One feature of their instability is that the type of man who gets to the top of the Government in Saigon is always pretty much the same. General Minh, General Don, General Khanh, Prime Minister Quang, and General Ky -- with all whom I have served and know well -- were all polite, pleasant and intelligent. They usually agreed with our advice and, having agreed, usually nothing much would happen -- for two reasons: one, the tremendous amount of sheer incompetence in the bureaucracy; and, two, the ruthless and coldblooded way in which private interests insinuate themselves, particularly if the matter involves land purchase or a chance to set up bars and whorehouses. In that case, the age-old Oriental propensity for assassination, maiming, and kidnapping, comes into play. Most of the outlandish and astounding things which happen in this country are due to the very simple fact of horrible and inhuman intimidation. It is a fact which is not believable to many Americans -- notably journalists -- who insist that there must be some much more complicated and intellectually respectable

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

NLJ 86-251

By mg, NARA, Date 2-26-88

reason for many of the things that go on. And a Vietnamese who has been intimidated naturally does not like to talk about it.

Some other differences are:

We think much more in black and white terms than they do. For example, two people in America run for public office with the result that one wins and one loses. We set a quota for accomplishing a certain goal: either it is accomplished or it isn't. There is thus a question of success or failure, of black and white.

In Vietnam, they try to get a consensus, to work things around so that nobody is unhappy. As Confucius says, "They bend with the situation."

Then, we have a highly developed community spirit -- for our town, for our state, and for our nation.

They have a strongly developed family feeling with practically, and in many cases (notable with the women), hardly any public spirit or community spirit at all. The old people and the crazy people are not sent to institutions, they are kept at home. Members of families look after each other. Looked at from an American viewpoint, this individualism and consequent lack of public interest is "dog eat dog" or "every man for himself and devil take the hindmost." That is not how the Vietnamese look at it.

Americans accept responsibility for their actions to a much greater degree. An American public official might feel angry and have hurt feelings as Ky did with regard to Thi, but he would probably not make his official actions respond, as Ky did, to his private emotions. This may be because we've had generations of self-government.

They have had one-hundred years of colonial domination followed by ten years of Diem's dictatorship and in their subconscious is the feeling that they don't have to take responsibility for their actions; that they can always blame it on somebody else (often the U. S. ); and that somebody else will always bail them out. At the same time, because of their colonial past, they are touchy about sovereignty and independence -- about "face."

They expect us to help them and they expect us to use our great power not only to help them but to influence them to do what is in our interest. The problem is to help them and to influence them without making them individually or collectively lose "face."

We operate with words; we "press" each other; we "argue" with each other. We submit "facts" to each other. We set quotas and goals and then see



whether they are achieved.

The Vietnamese subconsciously think that words are used to conceal thoughts. They really don't believe what we say. They are tremendously impressed by what we do.

When we pulled our Americans out of Hue and Danang without saying a word, it made a bigger impression than yards and yards of exhortation. In 1963, when we shut down on our commercial imports, it was the only thing which got Diem to deal with me about the things we wanted to do something about. Unfortunately, we have needlessly and uselessly given away a lot of leverage, and must now try the painstaking, and psychologically difficult, business of getting it back.

Silence and action; first-rate policies on land reform and universal education; talented and persuasive liaison men -- these things will enable us to be largely indifferent to the lack of "stability" and to the general uproar going on while this country carries on its "evolution" and finds its way.

And land reform and education will change the very blood and bone of the country.

There is a story which applies to the Vietnamese situation. It speaks of three men and their reaction to the announcement by God that on the next day the world would be entirely under 100 feet of water. One man went to church, got on his knees and prayed. The second man got the prettiest girl he could find and spent the night dancing, drinking and carousing. The third man immediately took lessons on how to live under water.

We can learn to "live under water" in Vietnam. We are largely doing it now as regards the military and we can change the country in its fundamentals regardless of the political uproar at the top.

These differences just described may be better understood in Vietnam than they are in the United States. The sooner we understand them, the better for us. As long as we judge events out here as though they were the crazy antics of a bunch of misguided Americans, we will constantly have a succession of nervous shocks. A coup in Saigon is not the equivalent of Goldwater taking over the White House by force. All of us -- the Vietnamese, the Americans in Vietnam, and, above all, Americans in the United States -- must learn to roll with the punch.

To sum up. In Vietnam there are: instability and unwillingness to set quotas and fulfill them; a lack of American-style community spirit; an unwillingness to be impressed with words and promises; an unwillingness to accept responsibility; a lack of a sense of nationhood; a tendency toward sectarianism -- or rather medieval gangsterism; a tendency to violence, childishness and cantankerousness; a great deal of bureaucratic incompetence; and an even greater amount of intimidation by assassination, maiming and kidnapping. But these things should not blind us to the other truth that with tact plus pressure-action much can be accomplished; that they have a strong sense of peoplehood; that they loathe foreign domination -- especially from the North; that as a race, the Vietnamese are exceptionally intelligent, hard working and stoic; that when properly led, they are as bold as any soldiers in the world, and that all the old ways are quickly changing.

The good traits will in the long run, I believe, overcome the unfavorable ones which I have listed. And these are the traits which make them valuable allies and which mean that in Vietnam today, about three times as many Vietnamese as Americans are under arms. End statement.

LODGE

2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday  
April 30, 1966

Mr. President:

Earlier this month we informed the Israelis of this year's aid level which was approved in December, but not communicated until later in order to strengthen our hand during the aircraft negotiations.

The breakdown of the \$52 million in economic and food aid for FY 1966 is as follows:

\$10 million in AID development loans

\$10 million in EXIM Bank loans

\$32 million in PL 480  
one-fourth - Title IV  
three-quarters - Title I

Our aid to Israel has averaged around \$80 million per year during the 1961-65 period. Last year, it was \$83.6 million, of which \$27.6 was a MAP credit for tanks.

W.R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 5-24-98



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, April 29, 1966  
5:45 p. m.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We will soon announce our aircraft sale to Israel. We have made every effort to stave off an explosive Arab reaction like the row over the German tank sales to Israel in 1964-65. But I want to forewarn you that, at worst, Arab reaction could endanger some of our embassies.

We told Nasser through one of his advisers in hopes that a little warning might keep him from exploding in public. This tactic worked well when we sold Israel their Hawk missiles in 1962. However, he will make his annual May Day speech Sunday. If he sounds off on the sale, State will issue a low-key confirmation. If we get over that hurdle, we will press the Israelis to delay announcement until about 13 May--after the Arab Defense Ministers' meeting in Cairo. Before that announcement, we will brief other Arab leaders.

Eshkol wants as early an announcement as possible, but will probably accept our timing. He has so far managed to contain his opposition reaction to the Jordan sale and can probably hang on a little longer.

This announcement will win loud plaudits from Israelis and from their friends here. I am working on other new things you might do for Israel as you asked. However, the \$52 million in economic and food aid just announced, this sale of about \$70 million worth of aircraft (though we will not publish the figure) and this year's slice of last year's tank sale (\$21.2 million) are handsome evidence of your current support for Israel.

*Walt* Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-250

By sig NARA, Date 7-17-89

SECRET

*Back  
B2 M  
Down*

*7a*

"Give me a break-down on \$52 million.."

71

LBJ/MW/yb

4/30/66

9:45am

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Friday, April 29, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Just to show that the new State Department is working for you, Acting Assistant Secretary Stoessel this afternoon had in the Danish Ambassador and indicated our displeasure at the Prime Minister's Vietnam performance.

Walt R.

cc: Bill Moyers

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



6P 9

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, April 29, 1966  
4:10 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Eisenhower made a reference to our lack of use of the formal NSC machinery. It could be picked up this year as a political issue. One way to head it off would be to budget for a few formal sessions. My first suggestion is: ~~a formal NSC session on Vietnam at the end of Lodge's visit, when all the major issues are settled between us and we can control what matters do and don't get into play~~

W. A. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-30

By ig, NARS, Date 9-13-85



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, 29 April 1966  
4:00 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Lodge is asking your approval of the attached statement he would make to Congressmen, off the record.

Secretary Rusk may have some views. If so, we will get them to you promptly.

My own reaction is:

-- basically good;

-- a few sensitive phrases he might avoid, since it will probably leak;

-- at the end recall Korea, Pakistan, Mexico, Turkey, and other places that found their way in recent times toward relatively stable democracy.

*Walt*  
Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

cc: Bill Moyers  
R. Kintner



~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

By ing, NARS, Date 8-19-86

Friday, April 29, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE:

(Saigon, 4272)

Subject to your approval, the following is what I am thinking of saying to Senators and Congressmen on a strictly off the record, background basis. If this is too unconventional, I can always give them an off the record account of the situation here.

Begin statement: There appear to me to be some fundamental differences in ways of thinking and behavior between Vietnam and the United States which, if thoroughly understood, notably by high-ranking American officials and editors, would really help our effort in Vietnam. I shall try to set forth some of these differences.

In the first place, I question our stress of the word "stability." Vietnam is not going to be stable in our meaning of the word for a long, long time. The word here is not "stability," but "evolution." When we were fighting our war against Great Britain, we were not stable. The Colonies were squabbling among themselves. When the French were beating off their invaders, in the period beginning in 1789, they were not stable. They were evolving -- and their evolution -- and revolution -- gave them the enthusiasm to beat off the aggressors. They may go to elections and Constitution in an orderly way, but there is simply too much to be done here -- by way of security, economically, socially, and politically -- for them to be other than evolving. No modern Vietnam can stand pat.

One feature of their instability is that the type of man who gets to the top of the Government in Saigon is always pretty much the same. General Minh, General Don, General Khanh, Prime Minister Quang, and General Ky -- with all whom I have served and know well -- were all polite, pleasant and intelligent. They usually agreed with our advice and, having agreed, usually nothing much would happen -- for two reasons: one, the tremendous amount of sheer incompetence in the bureaucracy; and, two, the ruthless and coldblooded way in which private interests insinuate themselves, particularly if the matter involves land purchase or a chance to set up bars and whorehouses. In that case, the age-old Oriental propensity for assassination, maiming, and kidnapping, comes into play. Most of the outlandish and astounding things which happen in this country are due to the very simple fact of horrible and inhuman intimidation. It is a fact which is not believable to many Americans -- notably journalists -- who insist that there must be some much more complicated and intellectually respectable

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~



reason for many of the things that go on. And a Vietnamese who has been intimidated naturally does not like to talk about it.

Some other differences are:

We think much more in black and white terms than they do. For example, two people in America run for public office with the result that one wins and one loses. We set a quota for accomplishing a certain goal: either it is accomplished or it isn't. There is thus a question of success or failure, of black and white.

In Vietnam, they try to get a consensus, to work things around so that nobody is unhappy. As Confucius says, "They bend with the situation."

Then, we have a highly developed community spirit -- for our town, for our state, and for our nation.

They have a strongly developed family feeling with practically, and in many cases (notable with the women), hardly any public spirit or community spirit at all. The old people and the crazy people are not sent to institutions, they are kept at home. Members of families look after each other. Looked at from an American viewpoint, this individualism and consequent lack of public interest is "dog eat dog" or "every man for himself and devil take the hindmost." That is not how the Vietnamese look at it.

Americans accept responsibility for their actions to a much greater degree. An American public official might feel angry and have hurt feelings as Ky did with regard to Thi, but he would probably not make his official actions respond, as Ky did, to his private emotions. This may be because we've had generations of self-government.

They have had one-hundred years of colonial domination followed by ten years of Diem's dictatorship and in their subconscious is the feeling that they don't have to take responsibility for their actions; that they can always blame it on somebody else (often the U. S. ); and that somebody else will always bail them out. At the same time, because of their colonial past, they are touchy about sovereignty and independence -- about "face."

They expect us to help them and they expect us to use our great power not only to help them but to influence them to do what is in our interest. The problem is to help them and to influence them without making them individually or collectively lose "face."

We operate with words; we "press" each other; we "argue" with each other. We submit "facts" to each other. We set quotas and goals and then see



whether they are achieved.

The Vietnamese subconsciously think that words are used to conceal thoughts. They really don't believe what we say. They are tremendously impressed by what we do.

When we pulled our Americans out of Hue and Danang without saying a word, it made a bigger impression than yards and yards of exhortation. In 1963, when we shut down on our commercial imports, it was the only thing which got Diem to deal with me about the things we wanted to do something about. Unfortunately, we have needlessly and uselessly given away a lot of leverage, and must now try the painstaking, and psychologically difficult, business of getting it back.

Silence and action; first-rate policies on land reform and universal education; talented and persuasive liaison men -- these things will enable us to be largely indifferent to the lack of "stability" and to the general uproar going on while this country carries on its "evolution" and finds its way.

And land reform and education will change the very blood and bone of the country.

There is a story which applies to the Vietnamese situation. It speaks of three men and their reaction to the announcement by God that on the next day the world would be entirely under 100 feet of water. One man went to church, got on his knees and prayed. The second man got the prettiest girl he could find and spent the night dancing, drinking and carousing. The third man immediately took lessons on how to live under water.

We can learn to "live under water" in Vietnam. We are largely doing it now as regards the military and we can change the country in its fundamentals regardless of the political uproar at the top.

These differences just described may be better understood in Vietnam than they are in the United States. The sooner we understand them, the better for us. As long as we judge events out here as though they were the crazy antics of a bunch of misguided Americans, we will constantly have a succession of nervous shocks. A coup in Saigon is not the equivalent of Goldwater taking over the White House by force. All of us -- the Vietnamese, the Americans in Vietnam, and, above all, Americans in the United States -- must learn to roll with the punch.

To sum up. In Vietnam there are: instability and unwillingness to set quotas and fulfill them; a lack of American-style community spirit; an unwillingness to be impressed with words and promises; an unwillingness to accept responsibility; a lack of a sense of nationhood; a tendency toward sectarianism -- or rather medieval gangsterism; a tendency to violence, childishness and cantankerousness; a great deal of bureaucratic incompetence; and an even greater amount of intimidation by assassination, maiming and kidnapping. But these things should not blind us to the other truth that with tact plus pressure-action much can be accomplished; that they have a strong sense of peoplehood; that they loathe foreign domination -- especially from the North; that as a race, the Vietnamese are exceptionally intelligent, hard working and stoic; that when properly led, they are as bold as any soldiers in the world, and that all the old ways are quickly changing.

The good traits will in the long run, I believe, overcome the unfavorable ones which I have listed. And these are the traits which make them valuable allies and which mean that in Vietnam today, about three times as many Vietnamese as Americans are under arms. End statement.

LODGE



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, April 29, 1966  
3:50 P.M.

Mr. President:

I have sent to John Macy a copy of  
this message from Ambassador  
Bowles suggesting that David  
Ginsburg be considered as Tom  
Mann's replacement.

*W. H. Rostow*  
W. H. Rostow

*cc: Bill Moyers*

*SP*  
*(over)*  
*Grey*

*111*



112

April 29, 1966

**SECRET**


**FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The announcement of Tom Mann's resignation reminds me that I had intended to suggest to you the availability of David Ginsburg whom I believe you have met.

Following a brilliant governmental career in late New Deal period, Ginsburg has been practicing law in Washington and I believe is now ready for a government post, if one is available, particularly in the foreign policy field where he has had considerable experience. He has great ability, loyalty and personal charm and I believe that Abe Fortas, who knows him well, will agree with this judgment.

Warm regards,

Bowles



**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM

12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, April 29, 1966  
1:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Queen Farah of Iran gave birth yesterday to another Prince. Given your personal relationship with the Shah, the attached message would be a nice gesture if you approve. For your signature if you approve.

We would send by cable the contents of the letter which would follow by pouch.

*Walt* Rostow



12a

4/29/66

**Your Imperial Majesty:**

On behalf of the Government and people of the United States, I send you and Queen Farah heartfelt congratulations on the happy event that took place Thursday morning. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending warmest regards and good wishes to Your Majesties on this auspicious occasion.

**Sincerely,**

**His Imperial Majesty  
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi  
Shahanshah of Iran  
Tehran**

**LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/29/66**

*Mr. Rostow 13*  
*to M Watson*

April 29, 1966

**MEMO FOR MARVIN WATSON**

I am sending this through you  
because of the scheduling request.

I understand Bill Hopkins  
already has the original of the  
proclamation, the text which this  
memo asks the President to approve.

W. W. Rostow

13a

Friday, April 29, 1966  
5:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk would like to start now to plan the annual celebration of UN Day in October. This is largely a grass-roots operation -- organizing observances across the country -- so it takes time to put it together. Every President since 1945 has supported it.

Secretary Rusk and George Ball recommend you ask Edgar Kaiser to run the celebration this year.

In a year when we will continue our military effort in Vietnam, we should not miss a chance to underscore our concern for the paths to peace.

I recommend you:

Sign the attached letter to Kaiser.

Approve the text of the proclamation.

Schedule an appointment soon with Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Kaiser and Robert S. Benjamin, President of the United Nations Association, to announce Kaiser's appointment and to sign the Proclamation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



DRAFT LETTER OF APPOINTMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. Kaiser:

I appreciate greatly your consenting to serve this year as U.S. National Chairman for United Nations Day.

UN Day should have special significance for Americans. The United States has provided both birthplace and homeplace for the United Nations; the UN has enjoyed warm bipartisan support from five U.S. Presidents, from the Congress and from an overwhelming majority of the American people. Support for the United Nations has been a major element of U.S. foreign policy since 1945.

As UN Day Chairman, I know that you, with the cooperation of the various State Governors, Mayors and other local officials, will encourage appropriate observances of this commemorative event throughout the country. This year the United Nations is twenty-one years old, and Americans should join other peoples of the world in welcoming it to majority.

I am happy that I can count on your outstanding talents and ability for this important job.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Edgar F. Kaiser,  
300 Lakeside Drive,  
Oakland, California.

PROPOSED TEXT

UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1966

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
A PROCLAMATION

The year 1966 marks the twenty-first anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter.

For two decades the United Nations has worked to bring about a better world, and, in so doing, has contributed to the security and welfare of the United States and all other nations.

It is in the interest of the United States that the United Nations continue to improve its activities, especially those concerned with peacekeeping, economic development, social justice and human rights.

Effective public support by United States citizens for the United Nations depends upon realistic appraisal of its accomplishments and upon sympathetic understanding of the problems, as well as the potential, of this world organization.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the date of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945, should be dedicated each year to making known the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United Nations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Monday, October 24, 1966, as United Nations Day, and urge the citizens of this

Nation to observe that day by means of community programs which will contribute to a realistic understanding of the aims, problems, and achievements of the United Nations and its associated organizations.

I also call upon officials of the Federal and State Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen-groups and agencies of communication -- press, radio, television, and motion pictures -- to engage in special and appropriate observance of United Nations Day this year in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this            day

of            in the year of our  
Lord nineteen hundred and  
sixty-six, and of the Inde-  
pendence of the United States  
of America the one hundred  
and ninetieth.

By the President

Secretary of State

Clearances: IO - Mr. Popper BOB -  
UNP - Mr. Moffitt Justice -



PROPOSED TEXT

UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1966

- - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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of                      in the year of our  
Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-  
six, and of the Independence of the  
United States of America the one  
hundred and ninetieth.

By the President

Secretary of State

*Mr. Rostow*  
13d

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I am happy that I can count on your outstanding talents and ability for this important job.

Sincerely,

Mr. Edgar F. Kaiser  
300 Lakeside Drive  
Oakland, California

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/29/66



*L* <sup>101</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thurs., April 28, 1966  
5:15 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

U Thant wasn't quite so much in the  
bag as Amb. Goldberg thought.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Following is the Text of a Cable from Ambassador Goldberg (New York, 4638)

I saw U Thant on Sunday, April 24, to deliver the President's letter urging him to accept another full term of five years as Secretary General.

He was most grateful and touched by the President's letter. However, in one of the most frank and candid conversations he has ever had with me, I found him much more pessimistic about extending his term of office than previously.

He revealed some heretofore unknown reasons to me which undoubtedly help to explain his reserve regarding another term. He anticipates Wilson and DeGaulle will also urge him to run, but his concern is focused largely on the Soviet attitude. U Thant said the only real indication he has had from the Soviets is that Fedorenko, just prior to leaving for Moscow a few weeks back, inquired about his health and expressed the hope that it was good. The Secretary General is fully aware that Morozov has indicated to Seydoux that the Soviets are prepared to support him for another term.

However, the Secretary General is still smarting from the serious confrontation he had with the Soviets during the Security Council's consideration of the Kashmir problem last fall. He recalled the Soviets, at the time they pressed their Troika proposal, sought a categorical commitment from him that he would, as a matter of regular practice, consult all of the Under Secretaries (including the Russian) on important matters. While he made no such commitment at that time, Thant said he did call one such meeting of senior advisers on his own authority shortly after his selection as Secretary General and that it turned out to be a brawl. Therefore, he has never held another such meeting and has pursued a regular practice of consulting high-level U. N. officials on an individual basis, as was the normal practice under Hammarskjold.

The whole matter was renewed by the Soviets during the Security Council's consideration of Kashmir. When the question arose regarding expansion of the United Nations Military Observation Group India-Pakistan

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-110

By iss, NARA Date 8-25-97

~~SECRET~~

and establishment of United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, the Secretary General received a letter from Fedorenko, delivered by Nesterenko, insisting the Secretary General consult all top political advisers, including the Soviets. The Soviets complained the Secretary General consulted only Bunche, whom the Soviets attacked as a tool of the Pentagon. The Secretary General rejected this proposal in a formal letter to the Soviets, while at the same time indicating that he would be willing to consult with Nesterenko or any other Under Secretary if any of them had any views on the matter. The Soviets followed up with a second communication in the same vein which the Secretary General similarly rejected.

According to Thant, the Soviets have also demanded that a Soviet national be put in Ralph Bunche's shop in an important position. The Secretary General said he rejected this proposal on the ground no vacancy existed. Moreover, the French have requested that one of its nationals be similarly assigned. In particular, they would want a Frenchman there if a Russian were selected.

The Secretary General also expressed a deep concern regarding the financial situation of the U. N. He was very critical of both the French and Russians, who he said were very uncooperative on this question. He feels that at best, the Russians and French will make only a nominal voluntary contribution which would in turn leave the U. N. in a continuing unsatisfactory financial situation. The Secretary General feels the U. N. is in a bad way financially and, as we indicated in the Committee of 14, the only way in which the U. N. can really become solvent is for recalcitrants to pay their bills.

He then also gave as a further added reason for his reservations regarding another term, his desire to go back to Burma and to play a role of political conciliation between U Nu and the military. As I reported orally to you on this matter some time ago, he feels he can play a useful and constructive role in this regard. In this connection, he stressed to me the importance he attaches to General Ne Win being treated with utmost of dignity when he comes to Washington this coming fall. The Secretary General said he wants us to know that the General is very sensitive in this regard in light of the unfortunate experience which he had in Washington during the Eisenhower Administration. As recounted to me by the Secretary General, Secretary of Defense Gates had invited General Ne Win to come to dinner and at the last moment cancelled the dinner. As an alternative, an



Under Secretary gave the General a lunch. Apparently the General concluded, after doing some checking, that this was a "diplomatic cancellation" and he has felt this slight ever since. Thant believes that if we can lay on some impressive protocol arrangements, this would be helpful. He stressed the General is an anti-Communist and that in the visit from the Chinese Communists last week, strongly resisted inclusion in the communique or anything adverse to us.

A final reason given by Thant for being reluctant to continue in office is that his wife has been having problems of adjustment as a result of the untimely death of their son.

Candidly, based on my previous discussions with him, I did not expect quite such a negative reaction, though I still do not preclude the possibility of his acceptance if we, together with the U. K. and France, continue to press him.

I have never seen him express such strong anti-Soviet sentiments as in this conversation. He bitterly resented Soviet attacks on Ralph Bunche, who he said is a great American and has done an outstanding job in the U. N. Secretariat.

Of course, I urged the Secretary General to keep this matter open, pointing out that it is unlikely an acceptable alternative will be available and that differences over this issue would weaken the organization. He agrees that it is unlikely there could be agreement on a Latin American, African, or Asian. However, he said he has the feeling that it might be possible to achieve agreement on a non-NATO European. He did not elaborate on this, but I can only assume he had in mind a representative of Sweden, Finland, Austria or Yugoslavia.

Comment: We are faced with a very difficult situation, and I believe it of utmost importance that we continue to press the Secretary General to stand for another term. Never have I heard him as pessimistic regarding the future on U. N. peacekeeping and as discouraged over the lack of cooperation from the Soviets and French. He agrees strongly with the view that the U. N. would be of only minimal value if it cannot help to keep the peace. He sees little hope of any real progress being made as the result of the work of the Committees of 14 and 33.

In view of the fact that alternatives to Thant are likely to be unsatisfactory, I intend to see him once again upon his return from his trip to London and Paris in the hope that we can help convince him to accept another term. In this connection, the President's letter was most helpful since the Secretary General has an extremely high regard for the President.

I am convinced that regardless of differences with us over Vietnam, and the fact that from time to time he has made statements which have been displeasing to us, it is unlikely we can get a man who would continue to resist, as he has done, Soviet attempts to increase its influence within the Secretariat and eventually to take it over.

GOLDBERG

15

(S)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1966  
Thursday, 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

I thought you might wish to read  
this analysis of the alleged Rhodesian  
negotiating paper.

As you see, our analysts do not  
regard it as forthcoming -- but then initial  
negotiating papers rarely are.

The specific issues at stake may  
interest you, because when the crunch comes  
it may take the form of a crisis on one or  
more of these five points.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 87-252  
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1966

15a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Constitutional Proposals by White Rhodesian Moderates

(Information Memorandum for the Secretary of State from Joseph Palmer)

We have received [REDACTED] two reports regarding proposals for a new Rhodesian constitution which their authors feel might serve as the basis for resumed negotiations between Prime Minister Wilson and the Smith regime.

3.3  
(b)(1)

The original drafters are reported to be Evan CAMPBELL, the colony's major tobacco grower and erstwhile High Commissioner in London, and Richard CHRISTIE, a young and relatively liberal lawyer who also lectures in the embryonic law faculty at Salisbury. The draft was apparently read with approval by the embattled Governor Sir Humphrey GIBBS and the Chief Justice, Sir Hugh BEADLE. Ian SMITH has seen it but his reaction is unknown.

The lengthy preambular rationale contained in the proposal is encouraging to read if only as an indication that some Europeans inside Southern Rhodesia are still able to view the country's plight and its continuing isolation with commendable clarity. But it is disappointing to note how essentially unadvanced the thinking of these middle-of-the-road Rhodesian whites remains. The concessions they would have Smith make on constitutional and franchise matters represent very limited improvements over the position Smith himself took during his negotiations with Wilson. In their present form they would be completely unacceptable to Rhodesian African nationalist leaders and, without considerable liberalization, probably impossible to sell to the Commonwealth, independent Africa and the United Nations as anything but a sell-out to Smith. The most that can be said for them is that they could represent a beginning to the process of negotiations.

Analysis of CAMPBELL-CHRISTIE Proposals

1. Principle One -- Unimpeded Progress to Majority Rule.

In October Smith offered a blocking third in Parliament consisting of the 15 "B" Roll seats plus a senate of 12 African chiefs. The proposal

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 10-456 (#552)  
By is NARA, Date 4-6-11

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1966

would provide for only a blocking fourth, clearly unacceptable to either the Africans or the British. In October Smith offered adult male suffrage on the "B" Roll, the present proposal would permit only African wage earners to vote. Without an appreciable lowering of the "A" Roll voting qualifications majority rule would not be possible for perhaps ten years.

2. Principle Two -- Guarantees Against Retrogressive Amendment of the Constitution.

Removal of the cumbersome and inequitable process for amending the constitution through referenda by the four races voting separately has some merit, but it would remove rights now guaranteed to the Colored and Asian minorities (30,000). Although the wording of the proposals is silent on the point, we presume the abolition of the Constitutional Council is envisaged. This would be a step backwards. The Constitutional Council, the guardian of the contents of the Declaration of Rights, should have its powers strengthened instead. This would be in the long term interest of the future minority, the whites.

3. Principle Three -- Immediate Improvement in Political Status of African Population.

The current proposals represent no advance at all from the unsatisfactory position taken by Smith in October. In fact, where Smith would have enfranchised 1,000,000 male adult Africans, the present proposals would probably limit the franchise to the African male working force of 600,000. We estimate that not more than 15,000 blacks -- as against 80,000 whites -- could qualify for the "A" Roll vote.

4. Principle Four -- Progress Towards Ending Racial Discrimination.

Even many African leaders agree that there is merit in a gradual phasing out, rather than outright repeal, of the Land Apportionment Act, since much of it protects vital African property and cultural interests. However, the current proposals provide inadequate alternative guarantees and fly in the face of political reality. The fact is that the Land Apportionment Act remains the cornerstone of the Rhodesian system of racial segregation. Most of it would have to go. The authors are very unrealistic in not giving greater attention to this critical area of importance.

5. Principle Five -- Acceptance by People of Rhodesia.

In October Smith had agreed in principle to the appointment of a Royal Commission to ascertain the acceptability of independence under the

April 28, 1966

1961 constitution to the people as a whole. The current proposals are intolerably paternalistic and racial in this regard and represent no advancement in white Rhodesian thinking since UDI. By no stretch of reasoning could this formula be sold to African or world opinion as an exercise in "self-determination."

#### General Comment

The only aspect in which there seems to be any sacrifice of Rhodesian Front principles is in the willingness of the authors to continue the unique "cross-voting"\* on "A" and "B" Rolls whereby a percentage of the votes on each roll will influence the outcome on the other roll and tend to discourage election of extremists of either race. Abolition of cross-voting has long been a Rhodesian Front objective. This, in effect, would represent ~~only the concession~~ of any importance by the Rhodesian Front.

It is noted that no comment has been made by the authors regarding assurances of the achievement of Prime Minister Wilson's sixth principle, announced in Parliament January 25, "the need to ensure that, regardless of race, there will be no tyranny of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority."

\*"Cross-voting." Everyone votes for all candidates regardless of roll. However, "A" Roll votes for "B" Roll candidates count only 1/4 of a vote. Similarly, "B" Roll votes for "A" Roll candidates count only 1/4 of a vote. "Unique," indeed!



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

16  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-309  
By CG, NARA Date 8-26-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Points for Shoaib Visit at 4 pm this afternoon

1. You value your close personal relation with Ayub and wish to maintain it.
2. The basic political problems you described to President Ayub still remain:
  - You cannot justify large-scale aid if there is danger of another India/Pakistan war.
  - You cannot finance an arms race.
  - However understandable Pakistan's Chinese Communist tie, it is a heavy political burden at a time when Peiping is encouraging a war in which our men are fighting and dying.

3.4(b)(1),(b)

[REDACTED]

Therefore, as we turn to the question of resuming assistance to Pakistan, you would wish Shoaib to outline to President Ayub the understanding we must have:

1. Concrete ways to demonstrate that Pakistan and India are actively working to settle their differences.
2. Ceilings for India and Pakistan on military expenditures and then active efforts to lower those expenditures.
3. Pakistan must limit its relationship with Communist China.
4. Pakistan should try to help us where our direct interests are involved and such help is possible.
5. Pakistan must meet World Bank economic requirements.

What is Shoaib's view? MAY 11 1966

(Then, if you are satisfied; Secretary Rusk will be talking with Shoaib before he leaves about the kind of assistance that we may be able to grant if these understandings are met.)

*W. A. Rostow*

16a

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Recommendation 1: That you authorize us to describe to Pakistan's Finance Minister Shoaib the following bargain: We are ready to resume AID commodity lending in six-month slices beginning in July at a level needed to support Pakistan's development program and self-help policies (about the FY 1965 annual rate of \$140 million) provided other members of the IBRD Consortium do their fair share and that Pakistan: (1) limits its defense expenditures to a level to be agreed upon (we will seek a comparable understanding with the Indians); (2) demonstrates a conscientious effort to maintain the "spirit of Tashkent" and to contain the intensity of India-Pakistan disputes; (3) demonstrates a satisfactory appreciation of basic U.S. interests in Asia; (4) maintains a satisfactory level of cooperation with the United States; and (5) accepts the economic conditions advocated by the IBRD Consortium to restore the funding level of its development program and restore and extend import liberalization. These conditions are defined more fully under U.S. requirements below.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendation 2: That you authorize us to tell Shoaib that after we know the results of this spring's wheat harvest, we will agree to negotiate a PL-480 agreement and provide shipments for six months, subject to the understanding that the GOP would take further steps to promote greater agricultural output.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendation 3: Within the context of these two decisions to resume aid, we recommend that you authorize us to tell Shoaib at the same time, as a further carrot to performance, that we will proceed to cost out the Karachi Steel Mill and, assuming that the political climate continues to be satisfactory and that costing problems prove to be manageable, we will look forward to a favorable decision within perhaps three to four months on a U.S. contribution of not over the \$120 million level (\$85 million EXIM Bank; \$35 million AID) earlier contemplated.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

We have

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-251  
By inf, NARA, Date 3-17-88

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, April 28, 1966

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Ambassador Bunker reports that the Communist demonstration in front of the Embassy this morning took place without incident. Between 1500 and 2000 persons turned up carrying flags and posters which clearly identified them as members of the three communist groups.

Bunker commented that the demonstrators were well organized and disciplined. He and Garcia Godoy were pleased over how the police had handled themselves throughout the demonstration.

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 27, 1966 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

~~SUBJECT: Conversation with Pakistan Minister of Finance Shoaib~~

The following points arose in my discussion with Shoaib this afternoon.

1. U.S. Installations. After Secretary Rusk raised this question he sent an immediate urgent message to President Ayub, expressing his personal shock at the fact these installations were not yet open. He hopes for a reply before he leaves on Friday.
2. Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta Project. He has talked with Mehta as well as the IBRD about this. The World Bank is prepared to take the initiative. Woods may now be looking in England for a third man to work with the Paks and Indians. It could form an item on the agenda of the next Ministerial meeting between the Paks and Indians.
3. Military Expenditures. These will take time to reduce. What is needed now is an agreed level for Pak military expenditures in relation to the Indian program (which is fixed by agreement between the U.S. and U.K.). We talked of the possibilities of introducing a political and psychological environment in both countries which would permit their leaders to get away with reduced military budgets. One method would be agreement between the Pak and Indian military to thin out the forces on the Pakistan-Indian frontier and substitute for them para-military and border guard units. Shoaib says Pakistan has such forces. He does not believe the Indians now have them. In any case a discussion on this question might form an item for the next Ministerial meeting.
4. Next Ministerial Meeting. The Indians would have to agree, without in any way changing their public position on Kashmir, to let the Pakistani talk about Kashmir as an item on the agenda. It would be understood that at some agreed moment -- perhaps after one morning on the subject -- they would proceed to the other two items. They might be: military arrangements; the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta joint project.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25#327  
By JC/ml, NARA, Date 3-12-07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

April 27, 1966

5. China. I raised with Shoaib the political difficulties we face with the Chinese equipment and the visits. I said that the problem was real and political even though the President had known in advance from President Ayub about them. He asked what, at the present stage, ~~Pakistan should do about China~~. I said: "Nothing. Keep your relations with China as quiet and inactive as possible." I went on then to explain the depth of the problem of what appeared to be close China-Pakistan ties at a time when the Chinese Communists were actively encouraging Hanoi to continue a war in which our men were being killed every day. It was not impossible for us to understand Pak policy and the reasons for it. But the Pak Government must be conscious that every pro-China move they make throws a heavy political burden on our relations.

6. A Story. In great confidence Shoaib said he would tell me of a recent incident in the Pak Cabinet. Ayub said: "I want it understood that never again will we risk 100 million Pakistani for 5 million Kashmiri -- never again."

I said that in equal confidence I would tell him that one of the reasons we were so anxious to end the war between India and Pakistan was we feared a military set-back for the Paks which might destroy the morale of the nation and Ayub. He said: "It was close -- very close."

W. A. R. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

17  
MEMORANDUM

12  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday, April 27, 1966 -- 6:35 p.m.

( 2 )  
Mr. President:

Here are two brief suggestions from Henry Owen.

I think reference to the contribution of the labor unions in Viet Nam is a good idea.

We will have to know a bit more about General Eisenhower's views and willingness to act before I would suggest the second. In any case, we might wish to explore through General Goodpaster before moving formally.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCW NARS, Date 7-27-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



19a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Acting Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

April 27, 1966

1. In some future speech why not have the President note, with appreciation, the contribution which labor unions are making in Vietnam. This could help to dispel the notion that Vietnam is only the preoccupation of generals, right wingers, etc.

2. Relevant data:

(a) The International Association of Machinists has assisted the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT) in operating one of its 20 social centers throughout South Viet-Nam to promote adult education, kindergarden classes, medical aid, basic hygiene courses and social meeting.

(b) Other American unions are exploring ways of supporting these social centers.

(c) The United Steel Workers' Union is raising funds for a pilot program of providing canned chocolate milk to children attending CVT schools.

(d) The United Auto Workers have given a pediatric out-patient clinic.

(e) The International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers is assisting the CVT to build a refugee resettlement center for 200 families.

Henry Owen

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jw, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

196

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Acting Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: General Eisenhower and Vietnam

1. The Need. It would be useful if General Eisenhower could spell out his views on Vietnam at some length, before a nationwide TV audience - say, in early September, before the election goes into high gear. This might help to keep the issue from getting too badly bogged down in partisan recrimination - which would not be in the interest of the country or of either political party.

2. Proposal: Ambassador Lodge might be encouraged to speak in this sense to General Eisenhower, when the Ambassador returns for consultation.

3. Mechanics. Such an Eisenhower appearance might be arranged via:

(a) One of the networks' regular Sunday TV question and answer shows. The trouble is that these do not generally occupy prime time.

(b) A special program in the evening - with Walter Cronkite (a friend and admirer of the General's) as interviewer.

(c) A round table discussion of Vietnam by former members of the Eisenhower administration: General Eisenhower, former Secretary of State Herter, and former Secretary of Defense Gates.

Henry Owen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-251  
By ijg, NARA, Date 2-26-88

13  
20  
rec'd  
4-27-66  
6:25P  
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

2  
Wednesday, April 27, 1966 -- 6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

In view of your decision to see Shoaib tomorrow, I do not wish to delay this memorandum for you from Secretary Rusk.

I will be sending up to you and over to Secretary Rusk a memorandum of my conversation with Shoaib, which opens up some further possibilities both you and the Secretary may wish to take into account.

Walt Rostow

Attachment

"An Aid Deal for Pakistan"

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-250  
By ig NARA, Date 7-17-89

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20a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1966

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 98-311**  
**By cb, NARA Date 8-26-99**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: An Aid Deal for Pakistan

We have told Mrs. Gandhi that we are prepared to do our part in support of an economic reform program, which is now being worked out between Indian Planning Minister Mehta and the IBRD. We must urgently decide how to proceed with Pakistan. Our economic decisions for Pakistan are complicated, however, by political problems.

Pakistan's Finance Minister Shoaib leaves Washington April 29. I will be seeing him shortly before his departure and would like your permission to present to him the aid deal indicated below. Shoaib must present his budget in early June and therefore his economic policies must be set within the next six weeks. The IBRD has taken the lead in formally promoting the economic aspects of the aid package recommended below, and to support our effort to achieve an understanding on defense expenditures.

On the political side of the problem there are two basic policy questions: (1) Has President Ayub violated his understanding with you in acquiring Chinese Communist military equipment? (2) Has Ayub's political performance since his talks with you justified return to economically justifiable development lending?

Our recommendations assume that the steps so far taken do not represent a breach of your understanding and that we need to reach a combined economic-political bargain in order to help Ayub balance the pressures pushing him toward Communist China.

Recommendation 1:

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Recommendation 1: That you authorize us to describe to Pakistan's Finance Minister Shoaib the following bargain: We are ready to resume AID commodity lending in six-month slices beginning in July at a level needed to support Pakistan's development program and self-help policies (about the FY 1965 annual rate of \$140 million) provided other members of the IBRD Consortium do their fair share and that Pakistan: (1) limits its defense expenditures to a level to be agreed upon (we will seek a comparable understanding with the Indians); (2) demonstrates a conscientious effort to maintain the "spirit of Tashkent" and to contain the intensity of India-Pakistan disputes; (3) demonstrates a satisfactory appreciation of basic U.S. interests in Asia; (4) maintains a satisfactory level of cooperation with the United States; and (5) accepts the economic conditions advocated by the IBRD Consortium to restore the funding level of its development program and restore and extend import liberalization. These conditions are defined more fully under U.S. requirements below.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendation 2: That you authorize us to tell Shoaib that after we know the results of this spring's wheat harvest, we will agree to negotiate a PL-480 agreement and provide shipments for six months, subject to the understanding that the GOP would take further steps to promote greater agricultural output.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendation 3: Within the context of these two decisions to resume aid, we recommend that you authorize us to tell Shoaib at the same time, as a further carrot to performance, that we will proceed to cost out the Karachi Steel Mill and, assuming that the political climate continues to be satisfactory and that costing problems prove to be manageable, we will look forward to a favorable decision within perhaps three to four months on a U.S. contribution of not over the \$120 million level (\$85 million EXIM Bank; \$35 million AID) earlier contemplated.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

We have

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

We have concluded that there will be adequate funds to finance this package. The first slice of commodity aid can be financed from money already appropriated. The second slice is only about half of the new money for Pakistan included in your appropriation request for this year. The \$35 million for the steel mill would leave a margin of \$40 million.

Administrator Bell concurs; Secretary Freeman concurs in those recommendations concerning food aid.

Background:

Pakistan-Communist Chinese Relationship: Fear plus India's attitude on Kashmir operate to pressure Pakistan to seek unqualified political support from a major power. The continuing Indian military build-up pressures Pakistan to seek suppliers of military hardware. The current power alignments and our withholding of MAP cast Communist China in both roles. Pakistan has recently received a number of MIG-19's (the best estimate cites 22 out of a reported planned total of 100) plus medium tanks from the Chicoms, who are offering substantial additional materiel. During the visit of China's President to Pakistan last week, the public theme of Chicom-Pak solidarity against India was intensified. But President Ayub appears to have resisted Chinese lures which would place impossible strains on Pak-U.S. ties. Ayub instructed Shoaib to tell us there has been no change whatsoever in the discussion and understandings which Ayub reached with you last December.

Ayub's Domestic Problems: In the present atmosphere, it is as impossible politically for Ayub to abandon his efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India as it is for Indira Gandhi to make meaningful concessions to Ayub before the elections in 1967. If he is to retain his power base, which has been weakened by recent events, Ayub has few options. He must continue a hard line against India, maintain his ties with the Chicoms, and seek to replenish his military stockpile.

U.S. Requirements:

1. Our requirements are peace and stability in the subcontinent and Pakistan respect for basic U.S. interests in Asia; we assume that the Chinese objectives are the precise opposite. Therefore, we need to

have continuing

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-4-

have continuing evidence from Pakistan that in managing its relationship with China it is meeting our requirements; e.g.,

- Maintenance Spirit of Tashkent: Pakistan must make an evident effort to restrain the intensity of India-Pakistan disputes. It must be willing to continue the dialogue with India at whatever levels necessary to achieve progress in resolving "matters of direct concern to both countries." Pakistan must be willing to seek agreement on other outstanding issues, particularly those left over from last September's conflict, without conditioning settlement on progress on Kashmir, although we recognize that for its part, India must be willing to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan. Willingness to agree to cooperative joint India-Pakistan economic projects would be evidence of a desire by Pakistan, as India, to maintain the spirit of Tashkent.
- Satisfactory Appreciation of Basic U.S. Interests in Asia: This should be reflected in the Pakistani attitude on the U.S. effort in Vietnam, and in Pakistan's continued adherence to the SEATO and CENTO alliances.
- Satisfactory Level of Cooperation with the U.S.: This should be reflected in the continued operation of the U.S. special facilities at Peshawar, Pakistan (which represent [redacted] and which have continued in operation without interruption): [redacted]  
[redacted] and in building a climate (e.g., through restraint and accuracy in public statements and the controlled press) which is conducive to friendly relations with the United States.

3.4(b)(1), (6)

2. Limit on Defense Expenditures: We will require an understanding with Pakistan, as we also will with India, on limiting military expenditures. We have examined various approaches to this problem and have concluded that the most realistic way to proceed is to do what we can this year to reduce the level of defense expenditures in both countries, starting from bargaining positions outlined below. We recognize, however, that, given the current state of India-Pakistan relations and political pressures in both countries, immediate results will be limited. Therefore, we will put the weight of our effort on achieving a downward trend in defense spending over the years by conducting with India and Pakistan an annual review of defense expenditures in connection with consideration of our economic aid program. We would ask both countries to disclose to us, at least in general terms, what equipment they are

receiving from

~~SECRET~~

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-5-

receiving from Communist China and the Soviet Union. We would also say that if they are unable to sit down together to work out an agreed limitation on defense expenditures, we would hope at least that each would ensure that the other learns of the steps it is taking to cut back on defense spending so as to encourage reciprocal cuts.

For discussions with Pakistan and India this year, we would start from negotiating positions as follows:

Pakistan: For the fiscal year about to begin, Pakistan should limit its over-all defense expenditures to 3-1/2% of estimated GNP for a total of about \$400 million (expenditures during the past year total \$525 million and constitute approximately 5.3% of GNP), and limit its foreign exchange expenditures to \$84 million, this figure to include the value of aid from all sources (expenditures in foreign exchange during the past year have been about \$147 million).

India: For the fiscal year just begun, India should reduce its actual defense expenditures from its budgeted level of \$2081 million to no more than last year's actual expenditures (\$1972 million or about 3-1/2% of estimated GNP) and should reduce its foreign exchange expenditures to no more than \$286 million, counting Soviet equipment on the basis of deliveries rather than payments. (The \$286 million figure comes from a Memorandum of Understanding we negotiated with the Indians in 1964, but the Indians have been counting Soviet equipment, which they get on long-term rupee credit, on a payments basis. On this basis they are probably within the ceiling, but on a deliveries basis they will be \$50-100 million over it. We propose a change since it is the deliveries of large quantities of Soviet equipment which is an important stimulus to the extensive Pakistani military procurement program.)

3. Economic Requirements: We will also seek a restoration by Pakistan of its previous priority and funding to economic development in FY 1967, agreement to a resumed and extended import liberalization program by July and steps to increase further agricultural production, including active pursuit of potential foreign investors in fertilizer production.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, April 27, 1966 -- 3:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to President Leoni on Venezuela's Rice  
Contribution to India

I suggest a letter along the lines of the attached draft to President Leoni expressing your appreciation for his government's contribution of 2,000 tons of rice to India.

  
W. W. Rostow

Attachment



2/a

April 28, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Bernbaum has informed me of your decision to send 2,000 tons of rice to India.

This contribution to alleviate the critical food shortage in that country will be greatly appreciated by the Indian Government and people. I earnestly hope that the cooperation born of the Indian crisis will bring about closer cooperation among all countries in attacking the food problem that the world will face in the years to come.

I wish to express deep personal satisfaction that so strong a friend and defender of freedom as Venezuela has joined the United States in this great humanitarian effort to help the Indian people.

With highest esteem and best wishes.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Raul Leoni  
President of the Republic of Venezuela  
Miraflores

LBJ/WGB/mm  
April 27, 1966

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-250  
By ig NARA, Date 7-17-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22

recd  
6:05p

Wednesday, April 27, 1966  
3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

On May 5 a grand style celebration will be held in Ethiopia to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Haile Selassie's return from exile and the end of the Italian occupation.

In view of the special significance which Ethiopians are attaching to this celebration, I agree with State's recommendation that you send a Presidential message of greeting and congratulations (Tab A) to the Emperor.

The proposed message, in effect, recognizes the Emperor's role in world and African affairs over the past twenty-five years. It also reaffirms the long-standing bonds of friendship between our two countries.

For signature.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



April 28, 1966

Your Imperial Majesty:


The American people join me in sending you our greetings and warmest congratulations on the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Ethiopia.

Your Majesty's return to Addis Ababa on May 5, 1941 was among the first hopeful signs in an otherwise somber world. It forged the first link in a chain of great events leading to a victory over aggression and the subsequent dawn of the era of independence for Africa. Your return was a vindication of your own early and prophetic insistence on the principles of collective security and of resistance to aggression. Then, as today, these principles are indivisible.

In the past quarter of a century your wise leadership has brought significant progress to Ethiopia. You and your country have also played a never to be forgotten role in Africa's march toward independence, unity and cooperation. However, of special importance to us is the steady strengthening of the long-standing bonds of friendship and understanding between the Ethiopian and the American people during this period.

As Ethiopia celebrates this historic occasion, I send you warm wishes for your continued good health and the assurance of America's continuing friendship.

Sincerely,



His Imperial Majesty  
Haile Selassie I  
Emperor of Ethiopia  
Addis Ababa

cc: W. W. Rostow  
LBJ:UH:em (4/27/66)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-252  
By ij NARA, Date 11-16-89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, April 27, 1966  
2:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Dean Acheson's testimony had been completed when I reached him at the National War College where he was about to give a lecture. I told him precisely the theme which you are interested in having expressed. He will see if an early occasion arises when he can act as your expositor in this matter, a job he said he was "delighted" to perform.

2. I got hold of Tom Wicker. I told him what concerned you about the loose use of the phrase "Johnson Administration." He said that reporters cannot always check with responsible officials because they are not accessible. They therefore come to rely on junior officials who over a period of time prove accurate in reflecting the Administration's views. In this case -- and perhaps in the Dominican case -- the New York Times goofed. This was a professional error of judgment. It did not indicate ill will on the part of the New York Times, or an effort to do a hatchet job on our Administration.

3. He expressed the hope that these incidents would not result in our losing faith in the integrity of his newspaper. He said that he had complete confidence in the integrity of the Administration, even where he might disagree with this or that action.

4. He used the occasion to ask if I would be willing to see him. I explained that I was trying to minimize the time I spent with the press; but if Bill Moyers thought it helpful for me to see him, I should be delighted.

Walt Rostow



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1966  
Wednesday, 1:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Eastern Orthodox Patriarch Athenagoras sent you his Easter blessings. Attached is a simple acknowledgment.

A message from you would help his sagging morale. Equally important, failure to acknowledge would be misconstrued by Greek-Americans as a sure snub. As you know from your talk with Archbishop Iakovos, we are under steady fire from them for not doing more to alleviate the Patriarch's plight. We have kept your reply as brief as his message in order to keep the Turks from making more of it than it is.

Walt Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2 .

MESSAGE FROM PATRIARCH ATHENAGORAS

The President:

United into same Christ and celebrating together His  
triumphal resurrection we thankfully wish your beloved Excellency,  
family, nation all Easter benedictions.

Patriarche Athanagoras

SUGGESTED REPLY

Your Holiness:

Thank you for your Easter blessing. The American  
people and I send our warm good wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 27, 1966

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Shooting Incident in Santo Domingo

Charge John Crimmins has phoned the following disturbing report:

"About 12:00 o'clock Santo Domingo time (1:00 p.m. Washington time) an American sentry posted at the gate to the Embassy residence accidentally shot a young Dominican boy. The story given by the sentry is that the boy was shining his shoes. The sentry took his rifle off his shoulder to put it on the ground and in doing so, discharged the weapon. The unconfirmed information we have at present is that the boy is dead. There is a small crowd of about 25 people now at the residence gate. The implications for tomorrow are apparent. We will keep you informed."

An incident of this nature on the doorstep of the Embassy on the eve of the anniversary of the landing of American marines could not have come at a worse time. To compound the difficulties, extreme leftist groups have planned for some time to stage a "peaceful" march by the Embassy tomorrow to protest the presence of American Forces. A child martyr killed at the gates of the Embassy will give them added incentive and increase the risk of trouble.

Bill Bowdler called Ellsworth Bunker right away to check on precautionary measures. Bunker reports that he has already explained the incident to Garcia Godoy, and he and General Linville are working on a press statement. Bill asked him whether Garcia Godoy could not cancel the march or at least reroute it a block or more from the Embassy. Bunker said this was not possible. The Dominican police are confident, Bunker reports, that they can take care of the situation. General Linville is meeting later this afternoon with Chief of Police Morillo to go over his plans.

*W. A. R.* Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By *48* NARA, Date *11-16-89*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15-11  
4-27-66  
5:40p

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., April 27, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

I urged General Taylor to put his interesting assessment of the blue chips on paper.

There has been considerable work on this in the State Department; but I agree we should get greater clarity when Lodge is home.

May I pass this paper to Bill Bundy and urge they be prepared to present their views during Lodge discussions?

Pass to W. Bundy ✓

Hold \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ attachment

*wait*  
*I think we should have public statement if all agree -*

*See memo to Sec. P. 153K done 4/28/66 mm*

*L*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips

While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained the military initiative.

One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached.

Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations.

A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a "cease-fire" to all peace-lovers and the attraction of a slogan such as: "Stop shooting and start talking." Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam.

Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong--sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.--do not depend on the use of fire-arms and could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of their weapons. While

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority NLS 85-30

By inf, NARS, Date 9-13-85

~~SECRET~~

-2-

it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go unchecked and unpunished.

To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions:

- a. Cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam.
- b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.
- c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.
- d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.
- e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.
- f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.

The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them.

- a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.
- b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations.
- c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.
- d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.
- e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong.

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If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory.

After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and, thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important) would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall "sweetener" which can be used to facilitate any step in the negotiations.

Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up any one in advance as a pre-condition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get

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negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand.

I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with Cabot Lodge when he returns next month.

  
Maxwell D. Taylor

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<sup>26</sup>  
Tues., Apr. 27 1966  
6:15 pm

SP 27

MR. PRESIDENT:

Admiral Raborn wished you to note  
the relatively optimistic item marked  
on p. 1-2 (paperclip).

W. W. Rostow

(TOP SECRET attachment SC 01367/66)

2P  
7/26

Tuesday, April 26, 1966 at 6:05 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Danish Prime Minister Krag (Noon, Wed., Apr. 27)

Attached is a package of papers for your meeting with Prime Minister Krag:

Tab A -- A memorandum from Secretary Rusk, outlining the points most on Krag's mind: (1) NATO, and a possible Summit Meeting in Paris to discuss the future of the Alliance; (2) Kennedy Round, and the possibility of a personal letter from you to the other heads of state urging forward movement on the negotiations.

Tab B -- State's rundown on both of these issues and the others Krag may raise.

Tab C -- A note on Krag's political situation (he heads a shaky coalition).

Tab D -- Biographical information on Krag and his wife.

Tab E. -- Biographical data on the Danish Ambassador and our Ambassador to Denmark.

Tab F -- Krag's schedule in the U.S.

Tab G -- State suggestions for your remarks and toast.

On the two main points Krag is expected to raise, you may want to reply that (a) NATO: We are not at war with deGaulle in any sense; our concern is to maintain NATO as guarantor of the security of the Atlantic Community and we will welcome France back to that cause whenever she is prepared to resume her role; (b) Kennedy Round We shall be happy to consider any action which would promote progress in the Kennedy Round, but we must be careful to use our influence at the right time. (This may be a good idea, but the time is not ripe.)

In addition you will want to hear him out on his visit to deGaulle and shore him up on Vietnam.

Francis M. Bator

cc Mr. Rostow

1119  
1- Butler 4/26  
2- R.T. 28a

APR 26 1966

Tab A

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Danish Prime Minister  
Krag - 12 o'clock, Wednesday, April 27

You have agreed to see Jens Otto Krag, the Danish Prime Minister, at 12:00 o'clock noon, Wednesday, April 27. He will be accompanied by Eigil Jørgensen, his Under Secretary, and Torben Rønne, the Danish Ambassador. Ambassador Katharine E. White, your Ambassador to Denmark, and Walter J. Stoessel, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, will be available to attend the meeting. Biographic material on the Danish officials, Mrs. Krag, and Ambassador White is enclosed.

The purpose of the Prime Minister's call on you is to discuss major international problems. He will be particularly interested in discussing NATO, the Kennedy Round and Viet-Nam. He had talks with President de Gaulle and Premier Pompidou immediately prior to his visit here. He has already seen Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball and Governor Herter, and I will be meeting with him just before he calls on you.

During earlier conversations Krag indicated that he intends to ask you to consider two important initiatives - (1) that you call for a meeting of NATO heads of government in Paris to redefine the political tasks of the Alliance; and (2) that you send a personal letter to the heads of government of the principal Kennedy Round participants citing the urgent need for moving the negotiations on to

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an early and successful conclusion. Other topics he may raise are U.S. butter import restrictions, U.S. poultry export subsidies, and U.S. shipping policies.

We have no important bilateral problems with Denmark and there are no specific issues that I would suggest you take up with the Prime Minister. A forthright discussion of our goals in Viet-Nam, however, would be useful to firm up his somewhat weakening support for our position. At the same time, it would be appropriate to ask if Denmark could provide some assistance to Viet-Nam, if not directly, then through multilateral institutions.

A short briefing paper, a copy of his schedule, and some suggestions for your toast at the dinner you are giving for the Krags are enclosed.

*At Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Briefing paper.
2. Biographic material.
3. Schedule of visit.
4. Suggestions for toast.

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BOSTON'S OFFICE

1966 APR 26 PM 3 15

- 4. suggestions for cover.
- 3. schedule of visit.
- 3. proposed meeting.
- 1. proposed budget.

enclosures:

DEAN BAKER

*Arthur K...*

for the present are enclosed.  
some suggestions for long term as the future and the future  
of the present budget, a copy of the schedule, and

enclosed are suggestions for the future.  
proposed some suggestions for the future, it is not possible, even  
some time, it is not possible to ask it to be made, even  
in the present meeting, and the future. It is not possible  
of the future in the future, however, it is not possible to  
make it in the future, it is not possible. It is not possible  
and there are no suggestions for the future, it is not possible  
to make it in the future, it is not possible.

enclosed are suggestions, and it is not possible to make it.  
there are it is not possible to make it, it is not possible  
in the future and suggestions for the future. It is not possible

~~SECRET~~BRIEFING PAPERThe President's Meeting with Danish Prime Minister Krag  
Wednesday, April 27General

The main purpose of Krag's call is to discuss major international problems, particularly NATO, Kennedy Round and Viet-Nam. We have no significant bilateral problems with Denmark. The Danes believe in keeping NATO strong, even without France, are members of the Special Committee, and are actively participating in the work of the Fourteen. They support a successful Kennedy Round; they have become members of the Asian Development Bank; no Danish ship has called at North Viet-Nam ports since early 1964; and, in Europe, the Krag Government has been second only to the Wilson Government in its general support for our policies in Viet-Nam.

NATO

The Krag Government strongly supports NATO, and the French actions have increased pro-NATO sentiment among the Danish public. Denmark is worried particularly about the impact of the French withdrawal on the integrated NATO force structure and on the future role of Germany in the Alliance. As a consequence, it wishes to retain as many France-NATO ties as possible. It would prefer, for example, that the NAC headquarters remain in Paris.

During his meetings with Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Ball, the Prime Minister said that he intends to ask you to consider taking the initiative in calling for a NATO heads of government meeting to be held in Paris in the near future to redefine the political tasks of the Alliance. If de Gaulle would not attend, he would propose that the meeting be held in Washington instead. In the absence of careful preparation and a clear idea of the results the 14 Allies would want to get out of such a meeting, we see many disadvantages and few if any advantages. The 1957 NATO heads of government meeting is not a happy precedent (e.g. the troublesome requirement for MRBM's on the Continent from which we have tried to escape ever since).

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By pn, NARA, Date 5-21-98

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### The Kennedy Round

The Danes strongly support a successful Kennedy Round and fear that the current near stalemate will continue until the expiration of the Trade Expansion Act. They are having increasing difficulties in exporting agricultural commodities to EEC countries and believe trade barriers will increase if something is not done quickly to move the GATT negotiations on to a successful conclusion.

In this connection, he has told us that he plans to propose that you send a personal message to the heads of government concerned stressing the importance of moving ahead with the Kennedy Round. Governor Herter's response to the idea was one of caution. He told Krag that we had been constantly warning interested parties not to count on an extension of the Act and stressing the urgency of the situation. We had been somewhat hesitant in getting out ahead of the other participants, however, particularly since the EEC seems already convinced that we are pushing entirely for our own economic advantage. In reality, he told Krag, the Kennedy Round benefits would be at least as great to the other participants as to the United States. We are as interested in the political implications of stronger trade ties among the Atlantic nations as we are in the purely economic gains that would be derived.

### Krag's Meeting with de Gaulle

The Prime Minister was kind enough to give us a memorandum on his conversation with the General which contained the following main points: Krag expressed concern with the French withdrawal from the NATO force structure and stressed the importance of France continuing as a member of the Alliance -- de Gaulle agreed with the latter point but said France did not wish to be subordinate to the policies of another power; in response to the Prime Minister's comment that the defense of Europe is dependent on the United States, the General admitted that cooperation with us is necessary but he wanted no American bases in France; Krag said that France should be more flexible in regard to British entry into the Common Market and de Gaulle

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remarked that they could join immediately if they would fully accept the Rome Treaty and related regulations and policies; in response to Krag's questions about his forthcoming trip to Moscow, the General said that "there will be many speeches and much politeness....but nothing will have changed when the visit is over".

#### Viet-Nam

In Europe, the Krag Government has been second only to the British in its general support of United States policies in Viet-Nam. We appreciate that support, particularly in view of the fairly widespread dissatisfaction with those policies among some highly vocal segments of the Danish public. In recent weeks, however, Krag and Foreign Minister Haekkerup have been forced to moderate their position on Viet-Nam, probably as a result of Krag's rather delicate political position and partly because they are being accused of being more pro-American on the subject than many United States leaders.

We would hope that a forthright discussion with you would help firm up his support for our goals in Viet-Nam. I know that he would appreciate anything he could pass on to the Danish public, particularly in regard to our efforts to promote economic, social and political progress in Viet-Nam and the sincerity of our desire for a negotiated solution. Additionally, and in view of Ambassador White's approaches to him on the subject, it would be appropriate for you to raise with the Prime Minister the possibility of Danish assistance to Viet-Nam. To date, the Danes have only offered to train Vietnamese nurses in Denmark. Several leading Danish surgeons have expressed an interest in sending private medical teams to Viet-Nam.

#### Bilateral Problems

We have no significant bilateral problems with Denmark. In order to please the Danish industries concerned, however, he may well mention the long-standing Danish desire for the

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elimination of or a substantial increase in our butter import quota, dislike for U.S. subsidies on poultry exports to Austria and Switzerland, and Danish approval of the recommendations in the Task Force Report on the United States Merchant Marine.

#### Butter

In regard to our butter restrictions, we have indicated that the run down of our stocks of surplus butter is a result of disposal through non-commercial channels and that we are not yet sure whether the currently high butter prices are a short or long-term phenomenon.

#### Poultry

United States subsidies of poultry exports to Austria and Switzerland were undertaken only after repeated efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with the other exporting countries, including Denmark, and we have told the Danes that we are always ready for further discussions of the issue. In any case, we have not subsidized these exports since mid-January.

#### Shipping

We have told the Danes that we believe that the Task Force Report is a good one but in view of the many interested parties which have differing views, its recommendations are still a long way from becoming official U.S. policies.

#### The China Question

Denmark recognized Communist China in 1950 and has consistently voted for its entry into the UN and opposed us on the "important question" principle. In a recent press interview, Krag said that the Chiang Kai-shek Government should be in the UN as representing Formosa, but we have seen little to indicate that his Government has officially decided to pursue a "two Chinas" policy.

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### UN/Peacekeeping

Denmark has consistently supported UN peacekeeping efforts and has about 1,100 personnel involved in Gaza and on Cyprus. Although no direct threat has been made, Denmark may withdraw its Cyprus forces because of the failure of the UN to pay its costs and the lack of progress in reaching a political settlement.

### South Africa

Denmark went further than we would have liked in announcing during the 20th General Assembly that it would henceforth view apartheid in South Africa as a threat to international peace and security and therefore would support the application of mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII. We do not believe that the Danes have thought through the serious implications of across-the-board mandatory sanctions.

### UN Bodies

The Danes have cooperated closely with the U.S. in the Committee of 24 (Colonialism). We understand that Denmark was promised Western European support to replace the Netherlands on the Security Council in 1967. Denmark does not participate on the Committee of 33 (Peacekeeping/Financing) or the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

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### Political Situation

Prime Minister Krag is currently facing the most difficult political situation of his three and one-half years as head of his Government and leader of the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats are and have been the largest party in Denmark for over thirty years. In recent years, however, the party has had to depend upon the parliamentary support of the Radical Liberals, which generally supports them on domestic issues but opposes many of its foreign policies. The following table shows party strength as a result of the last three elections.

	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1964</u>
Social Democrats	76	76	76
Radical Liberals	14	11	10
Moderate Liberals	45	38	38
Conservatives	30	32	32
Socialist Peoples Party	0	10	11
Others	20	5	4

Krag recently demonstrated his exceptional skill as a political tactician in successfully, if perhaps only temporarily, solving a Parliamentary crisis which arose when the Radical Liberals refused to support a Government tax proposal designed to stem inflation - Denmark's most serious economic problem. In order to effect a compromise, Krag was forced to obtain agreement not only with the Radical Liberals but also with the major opposition parties (Moderate Liberals and Conservatives) and to modify his economic legislation and to include proposals on housing -- perhaps the most controversial economic topic in Denmark today. While the compromise effectively stabilized his parliamentary position for the time being, it also alienated some of the

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left-wing members of his own party, who showed their displeasure by switching their votes to the Marxist, anti-NATO, and anti-U.S. Socialist Peoples Party in the recent local elections.

As a result, Krag's political position is considerably weakened. Should the recent efforts of the Radical Liberals and the Moderate Liberals to join in close cooperation succeed, Krag may soon be faced with the alternative of (1) compromising his party programs to gain indispensable legislative support of those two parties and thereby risking further defection from his own left-wing supporters; or (2) of turning leftward to the Social Peoples Party for support on domestic issues, thereby risking defection from his own right-wing. Krag has so far spurned the latter course but recent statements indicate that he would not refuse Socialist Peoples Party support if absolutely necessary.

Given the present situation, Krag will seek to avoid controversial issues. This may well hinder his efforts to solve Denmark's inflationary problems and might result in further modification of his general support of U.S. policies toward Viet-Nam in order to prevent defections from his own left-wing. He can, however, take personal credit, along with Foreign Minister Haekkerup, for preventing any serious rise in anti-U.S. sentiment among the Social Democrats and in educating the Danish people on the realities of the situation in Viet-Nam.

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~~SECRET~~His Excellency Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister of Denmark

Prime Minister of Denmark and Acting Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party since the fall of 1962, when he replaced the ailing Viggo Kampmann in these positions, Jens Otto Krag has had extensive experience in domestic and international political and economic affairs. He has served previously as Minister of Commerce (1947-50), as Denmark's economic counselor in Washington (1950-52), as Minister of Economy and Labor (1953-57), and as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1958-62).

Born on 15 September 1914, Krag received a degree in political science from the University of Copenhagen in 1940 and entered government service as a junior officer in the Ministry of Commerce. He joined the Social Democratic Party at an early age and was first elected to Parliament in 1947. Known in his younger years as the party's principal exponent of nationalization, an unpopular idea in Denmark, Krag has risen steadily in popular esteem, probably in no small degree as a result of the soft-pedaling if not disavowal of his doctrinaire socialism. A strong supporter of his country's pro-Western, pro-NATO and staunchly anti-Communist foreign policy, Krag seems to be favorably disposed toward the U.S. He speaks excellent English.

Youthful and attractive in appearance, Krag is a self-assured person, although he now appears to have none of the over-confident arrogance of his early years. He was married in 1959 for the second time to the Danish actress, Helle Virkner; they have two children. In November 1963 Prime Minister Krag attended President Kennedy's funeral. He and his wife visited the USSR in February 1964 and in June 1964 they paid a four-day unofficial visit to the U.S., during which Krag met with President Johnson and, together with his wife, was guest of honor at a State dinner.

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April 1964

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Torben Henning Rønne

ROON-nuh (oo as in good)

Danish Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Torben Henning Rønne, is a young, vigorous, well-informed career diplomat who has served solely in Western Europe and whose previous assignment was as Ambassador to Norway. He is favorably disposed toward the U.S., and U.S. officials in Norway found him cooperative, friendly, and easy to deal with, an indefatigable, working Ambassador, forceful in tracking down information and in presenting the Danish point of view. U.S. officials in Copenhagen reportedly enjoyed close and excellent working relations with him during the period 1959-62, when Rønne was the Foreign Ministry official responsible for NATO matters and military problems arising from our bases in Greenland. He made it clear in private conversation at that time that he supported the Danish Conservative Party views on defense questions; that is, he was a firm advocate of increasing Danish defense expenditures and preparedness. Like most Scandinavians, he is much interested in the UN, and, because of his background, he has a special interest in NATO. Although a senior officer, Rønne is one of the more junior Danish Ambassadors, and his selection would seem to reflect a desire on the part of the Danish Foreign Office to have an active and comparatively young man for the important Washington job, which they consider one of the most strenuous and demanding in their service.

Born on 14 April 1919, Rønne received a degree in economics in 1945 and in the same year entered the Foreign Service. He has been posted to Paris (Attaché, 1947-49), and Rome (Secretary of Embassy, 1954-57), as well as Oslo (1962-64), serving, between assignments abroad, at the Foreign Office in steadily rising positions culminating in his appointment as Chief of the Fourth Political Bureau (NATO and Military Affairs). A delegate of the 8th session of the UNGA in 1953 and to the NATO Council Meeting in Paris in 1952, Rønne made several trips to Washington with the Danish Foreign Minister and Defense Minister during his tenure as Chief of NATO and Military Affairs.

In 1949 Rønne married the former Bergliot Røwde, who is from a wealthy Norwegian family, and who was very popular in Norway. She is attractive, friendly in manner, keen, and well-read and they have been described as a "brilliant host and hostess in the modern manner," both straightforward and informal. Both Rønnes speak excellent English. Ambassador Rønne, whose father was a Danish sea captain for many years, is interested in sailing.

The Rønnes arrived in Washington April 5, 1965. The Ambassador presented his credentials to the President April 13, 1965.

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NJ 86-251

By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88



AMBASSADOR KATHARINE ELKUS WHITE

Mrs. Katharine Elkus White, Ambassador to Denmark, was born in New York, November 25, 1906. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Vassar College in 1928. She is married to Mr. Arthur White. Their home is in Red Bank, New Jersey. They have two children and six grandchildren.

Mrs. White has served as Democratic State Committee Woman on many occasions since 1940. She has been Delegate-at-Large to several Democratic National Conventions. In 1948 she served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee. From 1950 to 1956 she served three terms as Mayor of Red Bank, New Jersey. She served as Vice Chairman of the Democratic State Committee of New Jersey from 1954 to 1964. She served on the New Jersey Highway Authority, and was Chairman of that body for nine years. She was also Chairman of the Advisory Council to the President's Committee for Traffic Safety from 1961 to 1964.

Mrs. White was Treasurer of the Alumnae Association of Vassar College from 1949-52; National Treasurer of the American Association of University Women from 1950-53; and Assistant Honorary Treasurer of the International Federation of University Women from 1959 to the present. She is an Honorary Member of the Business and Professional Women's Club and a Trustee of the Fellowship Fund of the American Association of University Women.

Mr. White is semi-retired, having been active in the ready-made clothing industry in New York City. He served fifteen years with the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division and Wage Stabilization Board.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mrs. Helle Virkner Krag (wife of Danish Prime Minister)

Mrs. Krag was born September 15, 1926, in Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city. She was married to Prime Minister Krag July 31, 1959, while he was Foreign Minister.

She was trained at the School for Dramatic Art of the Royal Theater in Copenhagen, which is Denmark's oldest (from 1748) and most important theater. She made her stage debut in March 2, 1946, while still attending the school, and continued with the Royal Theater until 1951. Since then she has played in various theaters in Copenhagen. Among her many parts is the title role in "The Diary of Anne Frank", perhaps her most outstanding performance.

Mrs. Krag is one of the most popular film stars in Denmark. She played the lead in "Kispus" (Tricks), released in 1956 as the first color film made in Denmark. This film became a hit, and Mrs. Krag was given rave reviews for her performance. She also played in the movie "Den kaere Familie" (The Dear Family), which won first prize at the Moscow Film Festival in 1963.

Mrs. Krag is also very much in demand for radio and television appearances, and has participated in several benefit performances. From 1958 to 1959 she was co-director of one of the leading theaters in Copenhagen, "The Allescenen."

Mrs. Krag accompanies her husband on many trips in Denmark and other countries and takes a keen interest in his political activities. They live in a beautiful house in Copenhagen, and, whenever they can find time, they vacation at their 30-acre farm at Skiveren, close to the northernmost part of Denmark (the Skaw). Every day, in all kinds of weather, she and her two children Jens Christian (6) and Astrid Helene (3½) walk to the ocean, which is about a mile from their house. Whenever the Prime Minister is not busy on the phone, or with his favorite hobby (painting), he joins them in their walks.

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Mr. Eigil Jørgensen

Presently serving as Permanent Under Secretary and head of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Eigil Jørgensen was born on 26 February 1921 in Hulemølle. He received a bachelor's degree in Economics in 1947.

After serving as Secretary in the Trade Ministry, Jørgensen entered the Foreign Service and was assigned to the Embassy in Washington where he was first Attaché and then Economic Secretary (1949-53). He was next posted to the Embassy in Paris and attached to the NATO delegation (1956-59).

In 1961 Jørgensen was appointed Chief of First Office in the economic-political section of the Foreign Office which deals with inter alia those matters in GATT having to do with agricultural subjects and general agricultural affairs. He was promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 1962 and held that position until assuming his present duties in 1965.

April 1966

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### Members of the Party

Mrs. Krag

His Excellency Kai Johansen  
Director of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Eskil Svane  
First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

\*\*\*\*\*

2:30 p.m. EST      His Excellency Jens Otto Krag and his party  
                              (except Mrs. Krag) will arrive at John F.  
Kennedy International Airport, New York City.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20

8:30 a.m. Prime Minister Krag will meet with Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, suite 42A.



WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, (Cont.)

12:45 p.m.      Arrival at United Nations Headquarters where Prime Minister Krag will meet with His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations.

1:15 p.m.      The Secretary General will give a luncheon in honor of the Prime Minister.

                 Press conference after the luncheon in the Security Council Lounge.

8:15 p.m.      His Excellency Hans Tabor, the Danish Ambassador to the United Nations, and Mrs. Tabor will give a dinner in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag.

THURSDAY, APRIL 21

10:30 a.m.      The Columbia Broadcasting System will tape a television interview with the Prime Minister.

12:00 Noon      Mr. G.F.K. Harhoff, the Danish Consul General, will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag.

2:00 p.m. EST    The Prime Minister and his party will depart from Pennsylvania Station on "The Crescent".

5:50 p.m. EST    Prime Minister Krag and his party will arrive at Union Station, Washington, D.C.

Evening          Private

FRIDAY, APRIL 22

11:30 a.m.      The Prime Minister will meet with The Honorable George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State.

1:00 p.m.      Governor W. Averell Harriman will give a luncheon at his home in honor of the Prime Minister.

3:00 p.m.      Prime Minister Krag will meet with Governor Christian A. Herter.

FRIDAY, APRIL 22 (Cont.)

5:00 p.m. Prime Minister Krag will meet with the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense.

8:00 p.m. The Danish Ambassador and Mrs. Rønne will give a dinner at their residence in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag.

SATURDAY, APRIL 23

9:45 a.m. EST Departs Andrews Air Force Base.

11:25 a.m. EST Arrives Peterson Field, Colorado.

11:30 a.m. Arrive NORAD for briefing and tour of facilities.

2:15 p.m. Depart NORAD

2:45 p.m. Arrive U.S. Air Force Academy for tour by automobile and visit to the Cadet Chapel.

3:45 p.m. Depart U.S. Air Force Academy.

4:30 p.m. Arrive Broadmoor Hotel.

7:00 p.m. Dinner given by NORAD (informal).

SUNDAY, APRIL 24

12:00 Noon MDT Depart Peterson Field.

1:05 p.m. CST Arrive Eppley Municipal Airfield, Omaha, Nebraska.  
Press Conference at the Airport.

1:45 p.m. Arrive Blackstone Hotel.

6:00 p.m. The Chamber of Commerce of Omaha will give a dinner at Omaha Country Club (Black Tie).

MONDAY, APRIL 25

8:45 a.m. Arrive Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  
Briefing and tour of SAC facilities.

11:30 a.m. Depart Offutt Air Force Base for Sheraton  
Fontenelle Hotel.

12:00 Noon Public Affairs Luncheon arranged by Chamber  
of Commerce of Omaha at Sheraton Fontenelle Hotel.

3:00 p.m. Tour of Dana College and coffee reception.

Evening Private Dinner at Blackstone Hotel.

TUESDAY, APRIL 26

8:45 a.m. Morning drive to University of Nebraska at  
Lincoln, Nebraska.

The Prime Minister will address the annual Honors  
Day Convocation. Lunch at the University.

2:30 p.m. CST Depart Lincoln Municipal Airport.

6:45 p.m. EDT Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27

10:00 a.m. Reception at Danish Embassy for Embassy staff.

10:45 a.m. Call on the Secretary of State.

11:45 a.m. Prime Minister Krag accompanied by Ambassador  
Symington will depart for the White House.

12:00 Noon The Prime Minister will meet with the President of  
the United States at the White House.

1:00 p.m. Mrs. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach will give a luncheon  
in honor of Mrs. Krag.

1:30 p.m. Private lunch for the Prime Minister.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27 (Cont.)

7:45 p.m. Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag accompanied by Ambassador and Mrs. Symington will depart the Embassy of Denmark.

8:00 p.m. The President and First Lady will give a dinner dance at the White House in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag.

Dress: Black Tie

THURSDAY, APRIL 28

9:15 a.m. "Overseas Writers" will give a breakfast at the Hotel Sheraton-Carlton, in the Sheraton Room, 16th and K Streets, in honor of Prime Minister Krag.

12:30 p.m. Arrival at Senate wing of the Capitol.

4:30 p.m. Arrival at National Airport. Secretary and Mrs. Rusk will head the party to bid farewell to Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag.

5:00 p.m. EDT The Prime Minister and his party will depart from National Airport aboard National Airlines flight 289.

5:52 p.m. EDT Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.

7:30 p.m. EDT The Prime Minister and his party will depart from John F. Kennedy International Airport. SK 912.



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Visit of Prime Minister Krag  
April 19-28, 1966

Suggested Items for President's Remarks and Toast

1. Recall the Krag's' last visit to Washington (June 1964); as witnessed by many articles in our press, they are always very welcome visitors.
2. Recall your visit to Denmark (September 1963) and the warm and gracious reception by the Royal Family, the Prime Minister and his wife, other Danish officials, and the Danish public.
3. Point to Krag's meteoric career: Became Cabinet Minister (Commerce) in 1947 at age of 33. After two year tour as Economic Counselor in Washington, he progressed rapidly from Minister of Economy and Labor in 1953, to Foreign Minister in 1958 and to Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party in 1962.
4. Praise Krag's talented and charming wife: A celebrated stage and film actress. One of her films won first prize at the Moscow Film Festival in 1963. Considered one of the most beautiful women in Europe. Participates actively in politics.
5. Point to traditional friendship between the United States and its NATO partner, Denmark, based on mutual respect and common ideals -- respect for human dignity, dedication to social progress, support for UN and the rule of law.
6. Denmark needs no introduction to Americans. As Ambassador White will tell you, hundreds of thousands of us are

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

familiar with the lovely Danish countryside and the delights of fair Copenhagen. Danish glass, silver, and furniture are found all over America and many Americans recently ate Danish ham on Easter Sunday. Prime Minister would like to sell us even more Danish products.

7. Denmark has also sent many thousands of fine people to our shores. They have contributed significantly to our growth as a nation and as a people.
8. While Denmark has enriched us with her blood, she has also provided an example for us all of how freedom and progress can reinforce one another to build a better society - a goal to which we have dedicated ourselves.
9. While not a large country, the voice of Denmark is heard throughout the world. Through trade and aid, the important role it plays in the United Nations and other international bodies, its artists and writers, and not least its leadership.
10. Prime Minister Krag and his charming and beautiful wife exemplify the best of what we think of when Denmark is mentioned. They are successful and hard-working, forthright and honest, but most of all, they are attractive, warm, and gracious. They are always a great pleasure to have with us and will always be most welcome guests on our shores.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Krag, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen; I will now ask you to join me in a toast to a great man and a gracious lady .... to King Frederik IX and Queen Ingrid of Denmark, long may their country prosper.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

## MEMORANDUM

17

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FR 561-68, vol. 25 #326 (2/14/92)  
By JC/41 NARA, Date 3-12-97

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1966  
Tuesday 6:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Who Welshed on Whom? I know you'll forgive an old Pakistani (who likes Ayub too) for saying that we need not feel we failed to honor any commitment to the Paks. The shoe is on the other foot.

As Dean Rusk said, we've insisted from the outset that CENTO and SEATO were anti-communist alliances. But the Paks have always regarded them as reinsurance against India, and tried to get them skewed around this way. True, our arming India against China helped push the Paks toward China, but our policy here was quite consistent with the anti-communist purpose of our alliances. Thus, while one can't blame the Paks for being unhappy with us, it isn't because we betrayed them; it is because their own policy of using us against India has failed. They know full well we didn't give them \$800 million in arms to use against India (but they did).

Even so, we have built up Pakistan's own independent position and sinews -- to the tune of almost \$5 billion in support. We've protected Pakistan against India; we had more to do with stopping the war Ayub started than anyone else (just in time to save the Paks). In return, all we've gotten is a bit of quite valuable real estate (yet four of our installations are still closed).

So if there's any history of broken moral commitments, it's on the Pak side -- not ours. There is even a good case that the Paks lied to us about China; for example, did Ayub tell you about getting MIGs and tanks?

But this is history. Our need now is to keep the Paks from going off the deep end. But if we just return to business as usual (and let Bhutto convince Ayub again that he can have his cake and eat it too), we'll fall into the same trap all over again. We can't afford to let Ayub return to thinking that he can both get arms from China (and use China against India), while still getting massive economic aid from the US. The answer is to keep dangling the carrot (as you did last December), but to give only enough to whet Pak appetites that they can get back into our good graces if they start playing ball.

Granted that this is risky, and that we might lose Ayub (our best hope). But it is less risky than past policy, because if Pakistan keeps sliding down the slippery slope we'll lose Ayub anyway and Pakistan to boot. This has been the trend, and it was only your tough policy since April 1965 that slowed it down. So I'm for impressing on Shoiab (our best friend and pipeline to Ayub) that sizeable US aid, including military, depends on Pakistan avoiding Chicom arms or ties. In fact, it might be most effective for you to call Shoiab in privately and tell him just this.

*all work with Walt Rostow  
on this matter.*

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

cc: Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

*Walt - bring this  
to my attention, C.*

Apr. 27, 1966

3ka

TO: Secretary McNamara

Bob:

As you see, the President  
wished you to read -- but I assume  
not to circulate -- this memo from  
Bob Komer.

WWR

~~SECRET~~-attachment



*Recd  
4-26-66  
5:40p*

MEMORANDUM

*37 ✓  
S*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

Tuesday - April 26, 1966 -- 5:32 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Mexican Foreign Minister

*2.  
7*

Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores has sent you the following cable:

"The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

I have just received your generous letter of April 16,  
for which I am profoundly grateful.

Antonio Carrillo Flores  
Minister of Foreign Relations".

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

UNCLASSIFIED

*Memorandum to Pres* 37a  
*sent to Pres*  
*4/26/66*

UNCLASSIFIED

Tuesday - April 26, 1966 - 5:32pm

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Minister of Foreign Relations".

*/s/ Walt*  
W. W. Rostow

UNCLASSIFIED

C-151

cc state  
FVI Bunker

376

1966 APR 25 PM 6 22

WN1 16 VIA RCA

MEXICO DF 345P APR 25 1966

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

ACABO DE RECIBIR SU AMABLE CARTA DEL DIA 16  
DE ABRIL COMA QUE LE AGRADEZCO PROFUNDAMENTE

ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES

SECRETARIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 APR 26 PM 12 09



*Rec'd  
4/26/66  
5:25p*

*38*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Apr. 26, 1966  
5:20 pm *Rec'd 5:25p*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have two reflections on this interesting conversation with Ky.

1. People are pretty smart about their own politics.

2. We ought right now to get to work with the Vietnamese on a plan to get out a maximum vote. A 70% vote for non-communist candidates in August would give us the best political base in the U.S. and Free World we've yet had. We learned something about this in Venezuela at the end of 1963.

May I push this in the town?

*W. W. Postow*

~~SECRET~~ attachment

38a

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 26, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (4217)

Ky asked me to call on April 26 and spoke as follows:

There was a meeting yesterday of seven members of the Directorate. They had agreed that in the future the military men must continue to play an active role. They spoke of the emergence of three entities: the Assembly (Constitutional Convention) would be one and the Government of Vietnam would be the other. He drew a box and put the letter "A" in it for "Assembly," and another box to the right of the first box and put the letter "G" in it for "Government." Up above the two boxes, he drew another box and put the letter "D" in it, standing for "Directorate."

He believes that the Constitutional Convention -- "if there are good people" -- would stay on and would become a legislative body and that the Government of Vietnam would be the Executive. Thus, the Directorate and the Convention would in effect choose the Government "G" until elections were held under the proposed Constitution.

He thought that at least one quarter of the members of the Constitutional Convention should be military and he and his associates would get men to be candidates and would arrange a seminar in order to brief them on how to get ready for a campaign. He felt this one quarter of military men would be the leading minority and that the Buddhists couldn't provide nearly as many well-known men as the military could. The military men, he said, would be, speaking in French, "mirvant" and would be a rallying point ("centre de ralliement") around which the others would gravitate. He would like to see a party emerge, as in America, around which patriotic nationalist elements who were in favor of repelling the aggression could organize. He believes that this would act as a counter to the extreme sort of Buddhists. He was in touch with many good young people who would also work with the military. The military candidates, themselves, would be young.

As far as the Constitutional Convention was concerned, he had no objection to their staying on and becoming a legislature "if they're good people." He was doing everything he could to hand pick them now so that they would be. But, said Ky, if they are bad, we will say, "Your work is done, you can go home."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

~~SECRET~~

By ics, NARS, Date 5-9-85



He felt that the Directorate should be changed by inviting more civilians so that the composition would be half military and half civilian, or 2/3 military and 1/3 civilian and he asked me what I thought.

I said this could be a very good touch if civilians were chosen who were obviously not ambitious for themselves and about whom no suspicions whatever could be entertained. The name of Tran Van Do came up as being such a man. Also, Tran Dinh Nam in Danang.

Turning once again to the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, he said that as many as 70 percent of the people could vote because a man living in a dangerous area could nevertheless have his vote counted in a safe place such as a provincial capital. Also, he said the military were now authorized to vote where their unit is, and the ballots were then sent into a provincial capital to be counted.

Ky said flatly that five months would elapse before the election was held. His colleagues had agreed yesterday that normally the Government of Vietnam would stay until elections were held under the new Constitution. But now, he said, we may have a new government in five months. Ky had said to his ministers, "You can do a lot in five months. The thing to do is to stop politics and carry out our plan for the country."

It was in this connection that he spoke of his renewed interest in land reform and he wanted our help to get it moving. I told him we had had some encouraging ideas about this and I would discuss this in Washington and have something to present to him when I returned.

He then spoke of the fact that security in Vietnam depended on two elements: the military and the police. Much police housing was substandard, located in slum areas where there were political and security dangers. He asked for our help in providing housing for police families. He would provide the land. It was urgent. He hoped prefabs would be available and could be put up in two or three months. I agreed to get United States Operations Mission to support a reasonable, well-thought out plan to this end.

I then submitted to him particulars concerning the proposal to which the U. S. Mission Council had agreed and which I had discussed with Ky informally at the airport yesterday to: a) move the proposed MACV Headquarters out to Tan Son Nhut; b) to build the Trade School, which had been proposed by Secretary Gardner, at the Petrus Ky Triangle originally intended for MACV;

and, c) to move the existing Trade School which is now in back of the proposed U.S. Embassy to the Petrus Ky Triangle, thereby releasing necessary land which would enable the American Embassy lot to go through the block from Thong Nhut to Hong Thap Tu. He was impressed with the value of not having MACV so close to the Vien Hoa Dao and the extreme advisability of moving 7,000 Americans out of Saigon/Cholon. He also liked the idea of putting up the Trade School and of letting the Embassy have more room. As it is, our lot will not be as big as that of the French Embassy next door although there will be room for a residence which, in this country, should be on the same piece of land as the Chancery. He agreed to take this up with his staff and to give us definite word promptly.

LODGE



MEMORANDUM

18  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

40 S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1966 -- 2:45 p.m.

*Recd  
2:55 pm*

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Contribution of Rice to India

Venezuelan President Leoni told Ambassador Bernbaum yesterday that his government is giving 2,000 tons of rice to India in response to your appeal. He asked that you be informed.

Ambassador Bernbaum's report on the conversation is attached. State is looking into the transportation question.

*W. Rostow*

Attachment

*Letter with letter of  
agreement to  
press*

*cy sent to  
Boulder  
cy in  
conference  
4/27/66*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-252  
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

40 a

Message from Ambassador Bernbaum, Embassy Caracas, April 25, 1966

SUBJECT: Rice for India.

1. President Leoni told me that in response to President Johnson's appeal, his Government is making a gift of 2,000 tons of rice to India. He asked that President Johnson be informed.
2. Shipment will be made in the near future to Panama, or, if preferred, to an Atlantic port in the United States for transshipment to India. He expected that the United States would make arrangements from either Panama or the U.S. port. When asked whether his Government would be paying for full shipping costs, he said that it would be able to pay to Panama or a U.S. port where shipment could presumably be combined with other U.S. shipments to India.
3. Please inform us of the most expeditious manner of handling this. If the United States cannot defray the shipping costs from Panama or from a U.S. port, can necessary arrangements be made through the Indian Embassy in Washington?
4. Minister of Agriculture Osorio told the press that an interesting announcement will be made after Secretary Freeman's call on President Leoni April 26. The implication is that this will be rice to India. Therefore, I recommend that we allow the Venezuelan Government to break the news and that the United States Government not release the context of this telegram until after the Venezuelan Government's publicity effort.

Bernbaum.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-251  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

memos to Pres

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1966 - 2:45 pm

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Ambassador Bernbaum's report on the conversation is attached. State is looking into the transportation question.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Let's write letter of  
appreciation to  
Pres.  
L.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By ijg NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



41a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Bernbaum.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



April 28, 1966

42

TO WALT ROSTOW

The President wants to do this as a "possible major production." So proceed -- and more power to you!

Bill Moyers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Bill Moyers  
not to be  
done  
Mason Prodd*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42a  
Tuesday, April 26, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have checked personally with George Ball, and there is no objection in the State Department to a proclamation and a Presidential statement designating May 3, 1966 as the millennium of Christianity in Poland. To make sure, he will check quickly with Gronouski.

I assume that there is domestic political value in such a move.

So far as foreign policy is concerned, the art of the statement is to use the event not merely to celebrate the continuity of Christianity and Western civilization in Poland -- and its survival over the past difficult generation -- but to reconcile that kind of statement with a constructive bridge-building posture towards the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

I believe this can be done and should be pleased to help draft.

I, therefore, support the notion of a proclamation, a statement, and a hoedown on the White House lawn, unless Gronouski produces counter-argument that persuades us.

W. W. Easton

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-252  
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

Bob McNamara called me at home this morning saying that he urgently needs approval of this memorandum and asked me to bring it to your attention this morning.

OK  
N  
12/1/76

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

43a  
April 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Highest National Priority for Ammunition  
for South Vietnam and Mark 48 Torpedo (R&D only)

In the attached memorandum, Bob McNamara requests that critical ammunition items urgently needed for South Vietnam be added to the list of highest national priority programs in order to obtain a DX industrial priority rating. He also requests that a similar priority rating be given to the research and development phase of the Mark 48 torpedo, a new advanced torpedo for use against both submarines and ships, that is urgently needed. In order to keep the list of highest national priority programs limited, he also recommends that three programs that are essentially completed be deleted from the previous list.

The above recommendations have been reviewed and cleared by the Bureau of the Budget.

I recommend that you approve this action. In keeping with previous procedure, the attached NSAM will inform the agencies that either have programs on the highest national priority list or are otherwise concerned that this action has been taken.

Walt Rostow

Atts. (2)

cc: Mr. Moyers -w/cy/atts.  
Mr. Califano -w/cy/atts.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-252  
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

Approved 

Disapproved

Discuss

~~SECRET~~



43-6

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 346

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of Commerce  
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
Administrator, National Aeronautics and  
Space Agency  
Director, Bureau of the Budget  
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Priority to  
Critical Ammunition Items for South Vietnam and  
the Mark 48 Torpedo (R&D only)

In response to the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the Mark 48 Torpedo (R&D only) and the following critical ammunition items (and related fuses) for South Vietnam as being in the highest national priority category:

Cartridge, 20mm, all types  
Cartridge, 81mm, HE, M374  
Cartridge, 81mm, ILL, M301A2  
Cartridge, 105mm, ILL, M314A2  
Bomb, 250 lb. MK 81  
Bomb, 500 lb. MK 82  
Bomb, 750 lb. M 117  
Rocket, 2.75"

The President also approved removal of the following programs from the top national priority list: TITAN II, BMEWS, and PAL.

*W W Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By *sig* NARA, Date *11-16-89*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1042

43C

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

16 APR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: Request for Highest National Priority for Ammunition  
for South Vietnam and Mark 48 Torpedo (R&D only)

The programs that now enjoy the highest national priority and the resultant use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating are: TITAN II, BMEWS, PAL, DEFENDER, POLARIS/POSEIDON, NIKE ZEUS/X, 390, MINUTEMAN, 437AP, FOUR LEAVES, APOLLO, CENTAUR and the Supersonic Transport (R&D). Of these, the first ten are managed by the Department of Defense, APOLLO and CENTAUR by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Supersonic Transport (R&D) by the Federal Aviation Agency. The prescribed criterion under which the President has made these determinations is that the programs have key political, scientific, psychological, or military objectives. The Department of Defense recommends that certain critical ammunition, required for use in South Vietnam or training thereof, as detailed below, and the R&D phase of the Mark 48 Torpedo be approved for addition to the list. In order to keep the DX industrial priority limited, and thus meaningful, the deletion of TITAN II, BMEWS and PAL from the top national priority list is also recommended.

The dollar values of the critical ammunition items urgently needed to carry out our military mission in South Vietnam and the R&D phase of the Mark 48 Torpedo are:

	Million Dollar Value	
	FY66	FY67
Cartridge, 20mm, all types	159.5	295.9
Cartridge, 81mm, HE, M374	111.3	52.9
Cartridge, 81mm, ILL, M301A2	25.6	15.1
Cartridge, 105mm, ILL, M314A2	28.3	11.2
Bomb, 250 lb. MK 81	182.1	174.9
Bomb, 500 lb. MK 82	354.4	295.5
Bomb, 750 lb. M 117	231.0	103.8
Rocket, 2.75"	404.0	315.8
Torpedo, MK 48 (R&D only)	46.8	34.9
TOTAL	1,543.0	1,300.0

Assignment of top national priority is necessary to meet compressed schedules by preventing these programs from encountering shortages of critical machine tools, materials, subassemblies and components.



*Burt S. M. Naman*

4/6  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 2418

2636



44  
*matter dropped*

April 26, 1966

Jack --

This is what Bowdler dug up in  
a hurry.

Before I sign anything to the  
President, I should like to talk to you.

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Valenti



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - April 25, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Father Joseph Francis Thorning

Father Thorning has been active in Latin American affairs for many years. Most of this has been in the academic field. But he is a man who enjoys the limelight and he has promoted himself for a variety of official activities, particularly inclusion in inaugural delegations.

He is a controversial figure. Tom Mann and Ambassador Allen Stewart, who have known him a long time, say he is ultra-conservative. The FBI records show that he was an ardent supporter of the Franco regime and had such close association with Trujillo in the 1950's that he was investigated for possible violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act for failure to register. (No violation was found.) He now supports the Portuguese in their African policies. But in the past he has also been a strong advocate of the Alliance for Progress and has been helpful to Haitian exiles opposed to Duvalier. The FBI files show him as being anti-Communist and anti-Nazi.

John Macy's files contain nothing adverse. They do reveal that on six occasions between 1961 and 1964 Congressmen or Senators (Philbin, Garmatz, Dodd, Smathers) have asked the White House to include him on delegations to inaugurations. He has not made it for a variety of reasons: for example, host government, because of economy reasons, wanted only resident Ambassadors and not Special Missions accredited (Brazil - 1961); Church-State relations made it unwise to include a prelate (Colombia - 1962); the liberal government would not have looked with favor on so conservative a delegate (Venezuela - 1964).

None of the foregoing reasons apply to the Costa Rican inauguration ceremony. State has no objection to his being included in the delegation.

My view is that unless there is a congressional angle of which I am not aware, you do not stand to gain anything by his inclusion on the delegation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-252

By ij NARA, Date 11-16-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1966  
1:20 p.m. Monday

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

The President would like you to look into this. This is very urgent and ought to be examined quickly and carefully.

Jack Valenti

446

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, April 23, 1966  
12:35 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr. *HHW*

The Speaker is urging that you designate as a delegate to the inauguration of the President-elect of Costa Rica, Father Joseph F. Thorning of Frederick, Maryland.

Father Thorning is quite active in Latin American items and, according to the Speaker, has written a book on Latin America and is a personal friend of the President-elect.

Brad Morse also has urged that Thorning be so designated, and I attach letter from Morse.

It is our impression that Thorning is quite controversial among Latin Americans, and that his efforts to attend such ceremonies have earlier been thwarted by State Department objections.

I am asking the State Department to give me a current reaction on him, and I would not be calling this subject to your attention until after having received such reaction, except that I thought you should be prepared in the event the Speaker raises the subject with you.

I will forward to you the State Department reaction as soon as I receive it.

Attachment.

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44d

Congress of the United States  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives  
Washington

April 22, 1966

Mr. Henry Hall Wilson,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Pursuant to our conversation regarding Father Joseph F. Thorning and the appointment of the U. S. delegates to the inauguration of the President-elect of Costa Rica, I am pleased to provide the following background summary.

Father Thorning, who was graduated from Marquette Academy in 1914, was recently awarded the Order of the Quetzal, Guatemala's highest decoration. Guatemalan Ambassador Carlos Alejo said he was honored because of "his vision and courage, in the early 1950's, in upholding freedom and decency against the Soviet-dominated regime of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, which was overthrown by Guatemalan freedom fighters in June, 1954."

Father Thorning also has received the highest awards of Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Panama, Portugal, Cuba, Ecuador, Spain, and Venezuela. He is the only Honorary Fellow of the Historical and Geographic Institute of Brazil, and is an honorary professor of the Catholic University, a pontifical institution in Chile. He is professor of Latin American history at Marymount College, Arlington, Virginia.

"The Padre of the Americas", as he has been described by members of both houses of the U. S. Congress, was at various times a special correspondent of the Religious News Service of the National Conference of Christian and Jews. In 1940, he served as director of the first inter-American seminars at the University of Havana and at the National University of Mexico. He speaks fluent Spanish.

Prior to these appointments, Father Thorning acted as Dean of the Graduate School of Georgetown University; European correspondent of the magazine, America; and Far Eastern correspondent of the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service.

## Committee on Foreign Affairs

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At present, Father Thorning is an associate editor of World Affairs. One of his books, "Miranda: World Citizen", is a best seller of the University of Florida Press. This biography of Francisco de Miranda was cited twice by the New York Times as "one of the outstanding books of the year."

As you can see, Father Thorning has a wonderful and impressive background. He has long been an advocate of the Good Neighbor policy between the United States and our sister Republics to the south. Surely his contributions toward better relations between the two areas of this hemisphere can be exceeded by few Americans.

Any consideration given to Father Thorning will be greatly appreciated by me.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'F. Bradford Morse', written in a cursive style.

F. Bradford Morse

FBM/sh