

April 26, 1966

Dear Mac:

I trust Walt Rostow conveyed to you fully my immediate response on receiving your letter of April 18.

I do, indeed, miss you. I would have felt good to see you come walking into the office at that moment.

The message from David Bruce was interesting as was your wise comment.

I believe Wilson will make a most serious effort for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.

Mexico heartened us all. It was partly the greeting from the people and the look in their eyes. An old politician can tell whether it is a real response or a manufactured show. There was no doubt of their warmth.

But it was equally heartening to see how mature and truly congenial our working relations with Mexico have become -- how easy it was, for example, to create on the spot new initiatives such as the poverty programs on both sides of the border and the Lincoln-Juarez scholarships.

It is also clear that if we can really come through with orderly elections in the Dominican Republic, what we did there will prove something of which we all can be proud.

Please keep in touch. Tell us what to think about and even what to do, when the spirit moves you.

Warmest regards from Mrs. Johnson and myself to Mary and the children, as well as to yourself.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
477 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

LBJ:WWR:mm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 25, 1966
Monday, 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President

Here is the draft of a letter to Mac.

I, of course, reported fully and warmly your message, including Mrs. Johnson's regret at the airport in not being able to take Mary along.

I also enlisted Mac (along with my brother Gene and Max Millikan) in a quiet effort to get us lists of fresh talent.

Also started him on some other ideas.

I'll keep close.

W. W. Rostow

46a
April 26, 1966

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Honorable McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
477 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

LBJ:WWR:mm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Apr. 25, 1966
5:20 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Carl Rowan left me the attached memorandum which gives a good insight into what the Russians in Washington are seeking from -- and telling -- US reporters.

WWR

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-474

NOTES FOR FILES

April 22, 1966

By ig, NARA, Date 10-18-93

Went to the Soviet Embassy today, at their invitation, to discuss details of trip I am to take to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in June. Was to see Minister Tcherniakov and young officer, Kalugin, both of whom I have talked to several times before.

Most of Friday session spent with Kalugin, who offered fruit and wine, apologizing that latter was German. After brief discussion of which Soviet officials I ought to see, discussion drifted into matters of foreign policy. Kalugin, whom I have long suspected of being a top intelligence officer, asked if I could help him understand the "new U.S. policy toward China" that everyone is writing about. He said he realized that he had asked me the same question during a reception at the Soviet Embassy a few days earlier, but that surely I understood that "this is a matter of great interest to the embassy."

I asked if he had read Secretary Rusk's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He assured me he had, but could not ascertain any "new policy." I told him I had no inside information whatsoever, but that the only thing new that I detected was a feeling that it is unwise to have relations with China worsen to the point that Peking does things even more stupid than they are doing.

Kalugin asked if I thought this was President Johnson's attitude, or if the President had made up his mind on China, regarding the U.N. or anything else. I said I hadn't the faintest idea what the President's attitude was.

Kalugin then began pumping me on the significance of the air raids near Hanoi and Haiphong. He asked if I thought there would be a major escalation. I said I thought U.S. levels of military activity would be largely a reflection of what Hanoi and the VC tried to do during the monsoon--the military actions started, the acts of terror, etc.

I turned the tables and began to pump Kalugin as to Soviet policy and attitude toward Viet Nam. "There has been no change in our policy," he said, "we are still hostages to Hanoi."

I asked if he was saying that Peking was still the dominant influence, but Russia was forced to hang on. He said there had been "some significant change lately. We have clearly edged ahead of the Chinese in influence in Hanoi. The trouble is that neighbor of us has enough influence."

I allowed as how, for the life of me, I couldn't understand Hanoi. I said that if I were in their position, I would go to the conference table and see how much of the pie I could get there and then trust to less damaging methods of getting the rest. I said I couldn't see the sanity of their continuing to take the bombings when it must be obvious Hanoi cannot take the South militarily.

"Hanoi has placed its hopes in the deteriorating political situation in the South," Kalugin said. He added that Hanoi might have gone to the conference table during the recent bombing pause "but they did not believe the U.S. was serious. Hanoi was convinced it was just a stunt to affect world opinion. The U.S. should have done more to convince them." Pressed as to what more could have been done, he said he didn't know. He said Soviet officials thought Hanoi "had just begun to weaken when the bombs fell again."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

April 25, 1966 - 5:10 PM

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker Reports on Dominican Situation

Ambassador Bunker called Bill Bowdler this morning to report that first anniversary celebrations had gone quietly yesterday.

In the morning there was a mass demonstration at Independence Park in downtown Santo Domingo, and in the afternoon a wreath-laying ceremony at the western end of Duarte Bridge.

The Dominican police had been out in force during the day and had handled the situation well.

LAPF forces had been withdrawn from the center of the City the previous night and will not be going back in until after this week's anniversary activities are over.

Regarding the elections, Ambassador Bunker stated that Garcia Godoy had appointed a liaison officer to work between the Central Electoral Tribunal and the OAS Committee. His main task will be to develop a strong get-out-the-vote campaign.

W. *Walt* Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, April 25, 1966 - 4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram from ex-President Lopez Mateos of Mexico

Ambassador Freeman has forwarded a telegram from ex-President Lopez Mateos to you expressing pleasure over your visit to Mexico City (tab A).

I recommend a reply along the lines of the draft at tab B.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓.

Prefer another draft ____.

Attachments

- ✓ (1) Send to S/S by LDX
Copy of approved reply
for dispatch ^{to Mexico} as they
think best
- ✓ (2) Tell Bowdler

INFORMAL TRANSLATION
OF TELEGRAM FROM LOPEZ MATEOS

By means of this telegram I send you a cordial "abrazo" that I wish I could have given you in person, but I had to leave this morning for Boston. I hope that you will be very happy in my country.

Adolfo Lopez Mateos

Suggested Reply
to -ex-President Lopez Mateos

Thank you for your cordial telegram of good wishes.
My visit to your beautiful and hospitable capital was
one of the most enjoyable experiences of my life. I
am sorry that we were not able to see each other.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, April 25, 1966, 4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Development Strategy

You asked me, when we were going over the Indian project loans, whether I agreed with your emphasis on agriculture and your skepticism about electric power, etc.

I should like to give you a more complete and responsive answer.

My answer is: In part, I agree; in part, I disagree.

I agree:

-- the priority of agriculture production in development must be sharply elevated, or a good part of the human race is in danger;

-- it is proper and wise that we associate ourselves in discussing development not merely with factories, dams, and GNP, but with what people ultimately care about; that is, more food, more health facilities, more houses, more and better education.

I disagree that we should, for these reasons, cease to support industrialization and the back-up for industrialization in the form of electric power, transport development, etc.

These are my reasons:

-- the modernization of agriculture requires industry; for chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm equipment, etc.;

-- industrialization will and must take place in these countries; and politically we must avoid any implication that our support for agriculture is meant to drive them back towards what they regard as colonial status.

The best stance for us is that which was included -- and extremely well received -- in your Mexico City speech; namely, that industrialization requires the modernization of agriculture: as a source of food for the

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

April 25, 1966

cities; as a source of raw materials for industry; as a way to earn more foreign exchange; and as a way to widen out domestic markets for industrial products.

This new doctrine -- that industrialization requires a modern, productive agriculture -- is, I think, the right one for us to push.

As I said to you, our priorities right now should be:

1. Agriculture;
2. Measure to strengthen the private industrial sectors in developing countries, including wiser and more receptive policies towards private foreign investment;
3. Basic investment in power, transport, etc., where we should try to get the World Bank, Ex-Im, etc., to carry a good deal of the burden.

In addition, of course, we wish to press on with policies that would directly associate our Administration with those things that give the people directly what they want in food, education, and health.

In the end, however, to sustain higher standards of consumers' welfare, they will need well-balanced industrial as well as agricultural programs -- just as we needed industry in the U.S.

W. W. ^{alt} Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

SECRET

Monday, April 25, 1966
4:20 pm

51

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: India/Pakistan Aid, Tashkent, and Military Expenditures:
Information Memorandum**

I should like you to know that I have told State and AID that they should not read your relatively benign attitude on the India/Pakistan aid papers the other day as a signal that you were not deeply concerned about Indian and Pakistan performance with respect to the normalization of their relations and the limitation of military expenditures.

I am a little concerned that unless we keep the heat on, they might begin to resume assistance without sufficiently concrete performance in these two respects.

The problem is to find specific actions which represent progress.

With respect to Tashkent and normalization, there are two things that might be done:

-- a new round of ministerial meetings between India and Pakistan;

-- the beginnings of some work on multi-national India/Pakistan projects which would commit them to interdependence. Pakistan gas to India and Indian coal shipments to Pakistan are one possibility; the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesta River complex is another.

With respect to military expenditures, we apparently reached an agreement with the Indians some time ago about their overall military budget. The Paks are trying to get agreement that they should position themselves at a level somewhere between 25% and 33% of the Indian expenditures; say, 2/7.


On the whole, this is probably too high for both of them. But, given the agreement, it may be difficult to get India down right away, which George Woods would like to do; but at the minimum, we should make sure that the present Indian (and Pak) military budget levels do not continue to rise, but level off.

W. W. Rostow

Is this the right line to take? _____

Is it wrong _____

See me _____



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, April 25, 1966
4:15 pm

*AK transmitted by
here - 25 April
- caution on jeeps;
- not a nickel for
local currency expenditures.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With respect to Dr. Hornig's memorandum of April 23, I agree that something concrete should come out of Dr. Hornig's mission to Pakistan.

Of the four items suggested by Dr. Hornig, there are two reasons to be careful about the jeeps for family planning (about \$500,000): the jeeps are part of an AID package they would prefer not to disentangle; it would be necessary for Dr. Hornig to make sure that in appearance as well as, in fact, this item was asked for by the Pakistan government and not pressed upon them.

On the other hand, the provision of transport for family planning field workers is one of the few substantial ways in which we can accelerate family planning programs. I am, therefore, simply recommending caution in handling, rather than elimination of the item from the list.

With respect to the other three items, all are good.

Here is my priority and the approximate price tag for each (Dr. Hornig is refining the cost calculations).

-- Pilot program for involving medical schools in public health, etc.: about \$1 million per year for about 5 years.

-- Equipment for the new Ayub heart institute in Karachi: about \$1 million.

-- Equipment for new public health laboratory in Rawalpindi: about \$1,500,000.

The reasons for my priorities are these: the involvement of medical schools in public health is a direction in which we all wish to push educational institutions in developing countries. They tend to keep themselves somewhat remote from day-to-day public health problems.

The equipment for the Ayub heart institute would be extremely popular with Ayub and other high-level Pakistani officials. There is not only a prestige element involved in modern heart treatment equipment, but the need to extend the lives and health of the older men in the very narrow elite.

I rate the equipment for the new public health laboratory in Rawalpindi lowest on the list not because the preparation of vaccines is unimportant but because the enterprise seems to have considerable momentum already on its own.

If someone wanted to argue hard to alter these priorities, you should know the depth of my knowledge is not sufficient to be excessively confident. This is, in short, a quick assessment.

A final word: if balance of payments is uppermost in your mind the equipment items are the least strain, although they would probably contribute less profoundly than getting the medical schools dirty in practical work with the poor folk.

Only you can decide how many of these you wish to move on now, in the light of your talk with Ayub.

 Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1966
6:45 p

Mr. President:

Dr. Hornig requests an appointment
with you prior to his departure to
Pakistan on Tuesday.

Do you want to see Dr. Hornig?

Yes ☒

No ☐

*Not recommended
then will do him*

Marvin

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, April 23, 1966
12:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request to Discuss Mission to Pakistan

Since my forthcoming mission is an outcome of your talks with President Ayub, it seems to be that it is important to him and useful to us to have something relatively concrete come out of my mission on your behalf. This almost certainly would involve at least a general commitment to some new starts before the general matter of unfreezing aid has been settled. However, this would involve small amounts of money and be in the spirit of your International Health message.

In particular, if my talks with President Ayub work out well, I would like your approval to suggest at least some of a number of steps to help the Pakistanis help themselves, which they are perfectly capable of doing.


1) That we help establish a pilot program for involving medical schools in the family planning, nutrition, public health and rural health fields, both by developing resources and back-up services and by training personnel. This might cost about \$1 million per year for about five years.

2) That I announce we will move ahead on their request for about 200 jeeps which are needed to transport the limited number of family planning field workers (women) and their supplies to the villages. This has been approved by AID except for administrative details still being worked out. (about \$500,000)

3) That we provide assistance in equipping the new Ayub Heart Institute in Karachi, the construction of which has been financed by private philanthropy in Pakistan (it is unique in this respect). This is of great personal interest to President Ayub and other high level Pakistani officials.

4) That we provide assistance in equipping the new public health laboratory in Rawalpindi for the preparation of vaccines which are essential for large-scale disease prevention programs. The laboratory has already been constructed by the Pakistanis themselves and a staff assembled.

I am anxious to talk to you before I leave on Tuesday afternoon so that I can reflect your outlook in the discussions with President Ayub and members of his government.


Donald F. Hornig

cc: Mr. Walt Rostow

Secret 53

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday 1:30 p.m.
April 25, 1966

Mr. President:

Ambassador Lodge hopes to
see the Pope in Rome on
May 2.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

Tell Mayfield
— kill —
Bromley

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 25, 1966

FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 4188)

I spoke to Papal delegate Palmas about the possibility of my calling at the Vatican on Monday, May 2, during my stopover in Rome en-route from Saigon to the U. S. He said that he would send a telegram requesting an audience with the Pope immediately and that the reply would be conveyed through the American Embassy in Rome.

He said he understood Gromyko would be seeing the Pope soon, presumably to talk about Vietnam. He implied I might contribute information which could be useful in that regard.

#####

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-251
By inf, NARA, Date 2-26-88

me nt Pres

54

Monday, April 25, 1966 - 12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

**Herewith the full materials for this afternoon's
Viet Nam meeting, at 6:30 p. m.**

**Tab C, on the political track, is the only
paper new to you.**

**If you wish Bill, others of your staff, and me
to discuss the key issues before 6:30, I am, of
course, at your disposal.**

W. W. Rostow

55

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, April 24, 1966 -- 12:10 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I thought you would wish to have well in advance this "Viet Nam options" paper, with Secretary Rusk's recommendations, before the meeting at 6:30 p. m. tomorrow (Monday, April 25). The final agenda, which I will have for you by about midday Monday, will include these other items:

- Economic policy, with special reference to inflation;
- Political policy, with various subheadings, such as the unity of the military; political party formation; the constitution, etc.;
- Probing for VC contacts, which we will discuss in only a preliminary way awaiting Amb. Lodge's return;
- A possible Foreign Ministers meeting of our fighting allies, an interesting new proposal of Secretary Rusk's.

On the economic item the background is Robert Komer's report, plus latest thoughts on how to deal with inflation, especially by increasing the supply and keeping the prices down on the things the ordinary folk most need. I hope to have for you well in advance of the 6:30 meeting the paper being prepared on political strategy.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-252
By lip NARA, Date 11-16-89

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Memor to Pres

56

Sunday, April 24, 1966 -- 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I take it to be my business to see that you are not again painted into a corner as you were yesterday on the U Thant matter.

I shall take steps starting tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

to P 57

Saturday, April 23, 1966
6:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press contacts, April 18-23

1. At the President's request, Carl Rowan called on me to discuss the Panama Canal negotiations and China policy. I was called away before we could get to China. I spent my time explaining the economic development problems of Panama and their relation to the negotiation and the possible construction of a sea-level canal. He seemed to find this new material. He will call on me again Monday morning for a discussion on China. He understood that this was not merely background, but for no attribution whatsoever.

2. Joe Alsop called and asked to see me before he went away on a trip. After checking with Bill Moyers, I agreed to try to see him over the weekend, possibly on Sunday, a Saturday appointment having been washed out.

W. W. Rostow

Apr. 23, 1966
5:55 pm

58

For record:

Galbraith

I just talked with JKG on both
letters:

- asking for constructive ideas
on the letter of April 18.
He promised to follow through.
- welcoming suggestions on
letter of April 19, but urging
caution in public discussion.

W. W. Rostow

Galbraith ltr 58a
C.18-9
(orig. to Central Files)

18
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
207 Littauer Center

April 18, 1966

H
President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We were delighted by your telegram--an historic example of Johnsonian brevity!

The trick on these speeches is simple--and I first got the idea under F.D.R. They should be written to serve, not the small concerns of the State Department, but the larger interest of the President of the United States. Also, liberalism doesn't stop at the Rio Grande.

Sometime I would like to make a procedural suggestion or two on developing a good new program for Latin America. We haven't had the last idea on that part of the world even though we need to use the present foundations.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG/adw
Rortin
Please file this
on that am.
& Africa
L

6/10/66
4-2-2-106
9/10/66

April 19, 1966

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

H

For some months, a group of your well-wishers and supporters here, several on the scientific side derived from the original Scientists and Engineers for Johnson, have been meeting on the problem of Viet Nam. George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Frank Long, J. R. Zacharias, Carl Kaysen, Richard Neustadt, Frank Lindsay are among the members of the group. Our hope was to make a useful contribution to military and political policy in this area. As you will gather from the composition of the group, its purpose is assistance and not criticism. However, it is not about these larger issues that we now write. This letter, which is written on behalf of the group, is to reflect its views on more immediate issues.

Our most recent meetings have inevitably been much concerned with the disintegration of the authority of the present Vietnamese government. We have considered further possibilities, which are: (1) the continuation of the present government with varying degrees of disaffection; (2) its replacement by a military or civilian government which would commit itself to carry on the war with varying effect; (3) replacement by a government which would seek negotiations. It appears that continued disorganization or the appearance of a neutralist government are sufficiently probable so that we venture to suggest contingent action in the event of either development.

Should South Viet Nam cease to have a government capable of or willing to carry on the war, we trust that no steps will be taken to replace this with either a direct American or fully American-dependent regime. This would be to launch a long, painful and extremely costly venture which, given the past history of non-Asians in this part of the world, we could not expect to be successful. While it is not an ideal solution, we strongly feel that the only course of action would be a well-planned withdrawal. We do not think that this can


April 19, 1966

be interpreted in any discreditable way. We came to the assistance of the country so long as there was a government which we could assist. When there was no longer such a government or when our assistance was no longer sought, we naturally and inevitably withdrew. This is not a defeat. It is a sensible accommodation to circumstances in which it will be clear that we have fulfilled any commitment we have made. Our feeling is that the country would support you strongly in this course.

Our second concern is the temptation to cover either disintegration or the turn to neutralism by stronger military action in North Viet Nam. We have particularly in mind a continuation for any reason of the B-52 raids and granting that those just authorized may have been for a specific purpose. If these raids continue, there are bound to be losses. These planes are particularly vulnerable to missiles and strong counter-action against the missile sites could lead to Russian casualties. There is also some danger of intrusion on Chinese air space. Even more important, these raids draw attention at home and abroad to this one area of our foreign policy and in a form where the largest number of people both at home and abroad will regard it as either aggressive or dangerous. The resulting political damage is evident, and the return is negligible. Those members of our group who are closely familiar with air operations doubt strongly the general military value of the B-52 attacks in this kind of situation. They even question the wisdom of exposing the practical weakness of this weapon. You will see, I think, why we feel that any tendency to cover weakness in the South with air action in the North should be strongly resisted.

May we note again that we are writing you as friends and with full sympathy for the serious problems you face in this unhappy part of the world.

Yours faithfully,



John Kenneth Galbraith
for the Cambridge Discussion Group

JKG/adw

MEMORANDUM

23
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4-22-66
730P
CONFIDENTIAL

52
Rtd from Pres
SS notified 4/26
Saturday, April 23, 1966
5:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Ball here proposes a message from you to Prime Minister Wilson on British flag shipping to Hanoi.

The background is as follows.

We have been after the British for some time to get in line with other Free World shippers who have positively responded to our initiatives for taking their vessels out of the North Vietnam trade.

The most recent approaches to the British were in February of this year when State's delegation of Assistant Secretary Solomon and Assistant Legal Adviser Aldrich discussed the matter at high levels of HMG in London.

Following those discussions there was an exchange of letters in late February between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Secretary Stewart. Stewart's letter expressed appreciation for the clarification of our position from Solomon and Aldrich, but it reaffirmed that there was little that could be done about those vessels of Hong Kong registry under control of the Chinese Communists. As Under Secretary Ball's memo notes, this control, while the vessels are technically flying the British flag under Hong Kong registry, is the sticking point.

Our position remains that for these pressures on Free World shippers to have maximum effect, the British must also find the means to pull all British flag vessels from the North Vietnam trade.

The proposed Presidential message to Prime Minister Wilson, which was initiated by Under Secretary Mann, is justified by this and by the domestic political considerations noted in the Ball memo.

As you know, even if we halted all Free World shipping to North Vietnam, including British flag vessels, Communist flag vessels will continue to service most of North Vietnam's trade with the outside world.

No one is quite clear what Wilson can, in fact, do about this situation.

But the judgment is we should keep the heat on him and the issue on his conscience.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

W. W. Rostow

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JD, NARA, Date 5-21-98

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
APR 26 1966
CENTRAL FILES

its conscience.

But the judgment is we should keep the feet on him and the hands on

no one is quite clear what Wilson can, in fact, do about this situation.

relates most of North Vietnam's stance with the outside world.
including British and American. Communist and American will continue to
as you know, even if we pulled all the world's attention to North Vietnam.

Political considerations noted in the Ball memo.

initiated by Under Secretary Mann, is justified by this and by the domestic
The proposed Presidential message to Prime Minister Wilson, which was

British and American from the North Vietnam stance.

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Hong Kong's legitimacy, is the sticking point.

control, while the American are desperately trying the British and American
the Chinese Communist. As Under Secretary Ball's memo notes, this
could be done about these American of Hong Kong's legitimacy under control of
from Johnson and Vietnam, but it is emphasized that there was little that
Secretary's letter expressed appreciation for the clarification of our position
formally between Secretary's letter and Foreign Secretary's letter.

Following these discussions there was an exchange of letters in late

letter which Vietnam disclosed the matter at high levels of HMC in London.
last when State's delegation of Assistant Secretary Johnson and Assistant

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The background is as follows.

on British and American to Hanoi.

Mr. Ball's proposed message from you to Prime Minister Wilson

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2:00 pm
Saturday, April 23, 1966

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

59a

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want you to know that I continue to appreciate your efforts to stop British flag vessels from calling at North Vietnamese ports. I know how difficult the problem is, and the fact that there has been improvement in the situation is most helpful to me. Unfortunately, however, Congress and public opinion are still unhappy that this trade has not been halted altogether.

The names and the registry of free world ships in the North Viet-Nam trade are now published regularly by the Maritime Administration as is the case with ships in the Cuba trade. The latest list shows six calls by British flag ships and only three calls by ships flying the flags of other free world nations since January 25. This is giving rise to questions as to how my Administration can go on supporting Great Britain in economic sanctions against Rhodesia when British flag vessels are permitted to continue in the North Viet-Nam trade. Our officials explain the difficulties that your Government faces in dealing with the problem, but emotions are, unfortunately,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JD, NARA, Date 5-21-98

more powerful than logic. So long as the trade persists there is danger that the Congress may try to tie the Administration's hands in helping out on Rhodesia.

I appreciate the vulnerability of Hong Kong with respect to the Chinese Communists and our own interest in your ability to maintain your position there. I would accordingly not presume to suggest how you might pursue the matter. I can only tell you how deeply I feel that an early solution is necessary in the interests of both our countries.

7
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, Apr. 23, 1966
1:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Cattani is a wise, experienced man
with contacts all over Europe, including
France.

In fact, he was regarded at one time
as being a bit too pro-French.

The message, therefore, is worth
reading.


W. W. Rostow

60a
April 23, 1966

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Cattani,
Former Director General of the Italian Foreign Office

Ambassador Attilio Cattani, former Director General of the Italian Foreign Office, now retired, wished to convey the following message to the President:

1. We must stay steady on course with NATO, the Atlantic partnership, and European unity.
2. We should not lose hope with France. Cattani's business and political contacts, as well as the youths he meets while talking to university audiences, all have the same message: "hold the line until de Gaulle passes from the scene."
3. The President should speak out in support of European unity as well as NATO and the Atlantic partnership as still U.S. objectives.
4. In addition to movement forward on the nuclear issue in the course of the NATO reorganization, we should think in terms of "A Technological Marshall Plan." I said this needed concrete ideas, like the NASA proposal.
5. He ended by saying: "Be steady. Be of good heart. You have many many friends in Europe."

 W.W. Rostow

61

April 23, 1966

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I am very conscious of the importance of the role of the Secretary-General in the successful functioning of the Organization and of the contributions you have made to the cause of world peace since assuming that office. You have not only labored tirelessly in carrying out your formal responsibilities, but you have also given unsparingly of yourself wherever and whenever you thought you might be helpful in easing world tensions.

I am informed that your term as Secretary-General expires this fall, and I understand from Ambassador Goldberg that there is some doubt that you would accept reappointment. I recognize how onerous your responsibilities must sometimes seem, but I would nevertheless like to express my personal hope that you will make yourself available for another term in the service of the United Nations. In so doing, you may be assured of the wholehearted support of the United States Government.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
U Thant,
Secretary General of
the United Nations.

LBJ:
State:WWE:rnz

April 23, 1966

Dear Dean:

Thank you for your note which came to me last Wednesday.

I think you know how greatly I value what you are doing and admire the vitality you exhibit in doing it.

I trust the NSAM I examined and approved Thursday will make it easier for you to bring a phase of your work forward.

Then we can take stock together.

Sincerely,

151

The Honorable Dean Acheson
Union Trust Building
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWR:mz

to P
4/22/66
FIR 62

63

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1966

Dear Gene:

I am deeply grateful for your willingness to visit the Far East this spring as my personal representative.

I appreciated your description of the significant start that has been made toward setting in motion economic and social programs in the Southeast Asian community.


The Asian response to my Johns Hopkins speech and to your own efforts has been heartening to all of us. We must now seek new ways to build on those beginnings -- to carry forward regional cooperation in the great adventure of development, to lay the only firm foundation for peace.

As I suggested on February 26th, I am asking you to be my eyes and ears in discovering what Asia's leaders consider to be their most fundamental problems and how they believe we can assist in solving these problems. I hope that you can convey to them my concern not only with the achievement of economic growth, but also with the fulfillment of the educational, cultural, and scientific aspirations of the people of Asia.

I intend to give most careful and sympathetic attention to your report when you return to Washington.

With my appreciation and warm regards,

Sincerely,



The Honorable Eugene Black
Advisor to the President on Southeast
Asian Economic and Social Development

64
April 22, 1966

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated April 20, 1966, a proposed agreement amending the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Turkish Republic Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, together with proposed notes to be exchanged between the two Governments, which notes are to be considered as part of the proposed amending agreement, and has recommended that I approve the proposed amending agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

(a) approve the proposed amending agreement and determine that the performance of the Agreement as amended will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

(b) authorize the execution of the proposed amending agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

LBJ:CEJ:feg

McRostow-65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thursday, April 21, 1966 at
7:45 P.M.

SUBJECT: Tactics on East-West Trade Bill

I understand from Joe Califano that your inclination is to have the Secretary of State send up the East-West trade bill -- with an understanding that there will be no hearings this session.

I hesitate to raise the question -- especially in my ignorance of your conversations with the leadership -- but I wonder whether, in the context of the NATO crisis, you might want to reconsider covering the bill with a Presidential letter (if not a message). I recognize that the bill won't pass and that you pay a price for failure to get legislation you have asked for. But, at the risk of fighting the problem, I think I owe you a brief statement of the arguments.

The tactical issue is whether the bill should (1) go from the White House (with a letter from you); (2) go from State, or (3) not go at all. The arguments line up as follows:

1. A Presidential Letter (or message)

Against:

- (1) Ties President to controversial bill (-- this is hard to avoid even if bill sent up by Secretary of State.)
- (2) Results in a minus in the Fall legislative rackup (-- again, this may not be avoidable no matter who sends the bill up.)

For:

- (1) Enhances President's peace posture -- the more so in the Vietnam context.
- (2) Lends substance to bridge-building (and provides protection against the charge that we have talked bridge-building for two years but done little.)
- (3) Powerful evidence, as we try to hold NATO together, that we are not wedded to a rigid cold war posture -- that we recognize the possibility of constructive change in East-West relations. This would be useful against charges, here and abroad, that we take a narrow, cold-war view of the importance of NATO.

(4) Provides platform for making strongest argument for bill: the need of the Commander-in-Chief for every possible negotiating weapon in dealing with the Bloc. (It is very difficult for Dean Rusk to make this case on his own.)

(5) Gives a clear signal to the large group of Congressmen who will not know what they think about this issue until the President tells them.

(6) Makes best use of existing support for bill among business groups and labor unions (including George Meany, who has agreed to support the bill).

(7) Fulfills State of the Union commitment.

2. Transmission by Secretary of State

For:

Would make good on the State of the Union pledge with least wear and tear, minimize direct Presidential connection, and please the leadership which would probably prefer no new Presidential initiatives this session. It might also reduce the weight of the bill in the legislative box score.

Against:

Would be read and publicized as a Presidential retreat from bridge-building. Moreover, successful disengagement of the President in terms of public controversy and Congressional box score is unlikely.

3. No Bill this Session

For:

Would avoid controversy and please the leadership. To a point, it will also keep our powder dry for later transmission.

Against:

Would be taken, even more than a Rusk transmission, as a backing down by the President and at least a temporary giving up on bridge-building in the face of Vietnam. (There would be some harsh editorials in the liberal press.) Also would mean loss of opportunity for a clear Presidential statement of the need for a balanced posture.

Recommendation

Aware of my prejudices -- I am paid to worry especially about your foreign policy posture -- and also of the limits of my knowledge of the full range of your Congressional problems, I would vote for Presidential transmission, with Rusk transmission my second choice. (Joe may have shown you the first draft message we have prepared. If seeing it would help in deciding this question, we can produce it in short order -- though neither Joe nor Jack Valenti have had a chance to review it.)

In any case we need a decision on (1) whether you want the Bill sent up, (2) by whom, (3) when, and, if you want Rusk to do it, (4) how much use of the President's name is authorized.

Francis M. Bator

Send bill from White House within next two weeks _____

Rusk send bill within next two weeks, in my name _____

Rusk send bill with a marginal mention of President _____

Delay _____

Send no bill this session _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:djw:4/21/66

CC: Mr. Califano
Mr. Moyers
Mr. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday -- 7:40 p. m.
April 21, 1966

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk gives the back-
ground of the communique on
CENTO.

Bill Moyers has a copy.

W. *Walt* Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 21, 1966

FROM SECRETARY RUSK IN ANKARA (Secto 21)

You will be receiving text of CENTO communique in another message and through press channels. Quite frankly, I played minimum role on communique and did not attempt to get expression of views on non-CENTO matters of concern to us such as Vietnam because I wanted to emphasize our observer status and draw somewhat away from the notion that we are a full participating member of this particular Alliance.

British views on communique were similar to ours and they carried most of the fight.

You will note that reference to Kashmir is a direct quote from the Security Council resolution. Bhutto, whom I will see later this evening, was not in a contentious mood and did not battle hard for more.

Cyprus mention in the communique might disturb the Greeks somewhat, but they ought to be disturbed because their and Greek Cypriot role at the moment is unsatisfactory.

If press or anyone else worries about communique, I would suggest that it be brushed off as just another communique. I told my Foreign Minister colleagues that this is what I would do if it caused me any trouble.

I am coming to the conclusion that we should begin to play down CENTO, at least as far as we are concerned, and handle our affairs bilaterally with the regional countries. If the regional countries themselves want to find some substitute for CENTO such as the Shah's interest in an Iranian/Afghanistan/Pakistan grouping, I would buy it in a flash.

My most important bilaterals are with Bhutto this evening and tomorrow morning at breakfast with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Turkey.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-251

By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88~~SECRET~~

File
62

Thurs., Apr. 21, 1966
4:45 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

I thought you might wish to have available the full text of this particular report.

It's well-balanced, but probably tells you little you don't already know.

It is well summarized, in its first page and a half.

But there are other passages that might interest you, which I have marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment Cy. 216 Intell Memo 0806/66 20 Apr 66

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-30

By inf, NARS, Date 9-13-85

Thurs., April 21, 1966 11:45 am

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam - The Critical Issues

In Vietnam we face an enemy whose main hope is that American political life cannot stand the strains of protracted war and of baffling political turbulence in Vietnam.

They are playing us as they did the French in 1953. They know we are militarily stronger than the French. They are not yet convinced we have more stamina.

They do not believe they can defeat us in the field.

They do not believe they command majority support in Vietnam.

They are counting, like all the Communists before them, on the power a determined, disciplined minority can wield against a split and distracted majority.

Our task is to convince them at the earliest possible moment that they are wrong; and that time is their enemy, not their friend.

Our tasks break down into two groups:

- those things we must do to avoid defeat;
- those things that might help them decide to end the war sooner rather than later.

Minimum Essentials.

- to maintain present relatively favorable casualty rates with respect to VC and PAVN main force units;
- to keep supplies through Laos down to a level that prevents a major build-up of VC/PAVN forces;
- to keep sufficient Vietnamese military unity to maintain the ARVN as a reasonably effective force in the field;
- to avoid political violence and chaos during the transitional phase through which we are now passing;

~~SECRET~~

4/21/66

-- to keep inflation (and the weight of U. S. military and civilian personnel and expenditures) from tearing South Vietnamese society apart.

If we do these things we can stay in the game; but war-weariness in Vietnam and the domestic strains of the whole affair might well cause a break in Saigon or in Washington at some point, if it appears endless. We must, therefore, look to measures which will force a favorable decision in Hanoi soon rather than late.

To Force a Decision to Negotiate on Terms Relatively Favorable to Us.

1. Increase the cost to Hanoi of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong.
2. Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos.
3. Increase sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin to disintegrate.
4. Produce a relatively stable consolidation of anti-Communist political groups.
5. Get inflation under control and steadily build up rural reconstruction in the provinces.

4 and 5 (counter-inflation; stable politics) we must obviously try to do; but, unless we are extremely lucky, they will proceed at a pace not likely in themselves to impress the VC and Hanoi that they should give up their effort.

3 (higher attrition of VC-PAVN) could happen, if our build-up proceeds and we are extremely successful in finding, fixing, and destroying VC/PAVN main force units. But it depends on their not evading us and also on their rate of replacement and supply flows through Laos.

We are, therefore, brought back to look afresh at the Laos supply line and the Hanoi-Haiphong targets.

It is right that we should look hard at these. The Communists have obviously made an assessment much like this one. They have invested great military resources and diplomatic vigor in trying to keep us out of Hanoi-Haiphong; and, with Souvanna both incapable of closing the corridor and nervous about our moving troops into the corridor, Hanoi has felt free to build roads and mount a formidable truck-based supply line.

4/21/66

Hanoi-Haiphong Targets.

I am conscious of the international issues these raise; and there can be only one target officer in this government. I would only recommend a fresh look, bearing in mind that many of the targets can be attacked with relatively few planes: it took two aircraft to take out the Haiphong power plant the other night. They bombed at night on radar and were lucky. But for precision targets small well-planned operations often do better than big ones, due to smoke and dust obscuring the target.

The Laos Trail.

Here I'm sure we ought to concentrate our best brains and efforts. The VC are now dependent on that trail for ammunition. Since manpower reserves are low in VC-controlled areas, they are also dependent on the trail for fighting men. It is a true jugular. But it's tough to cut and hold cut. Roads can be repaired overnight. Trucks are hard to find. Nevertheless, we are improving due to spotter teams; small spotter aircraft; more sorties; more experience. The number of trucks shot up is increasing. The number of trucks seen coming down the road decreased in the past month rather sharply. We should push the new denial weapons program to the hilt.

* * *

The equation of victory in Vietnam is as complex as anything this nation has ever faced. No element in the equation can safely be neglected. But the key to shortening the war lies not merely in trying harder on items 3 - 5; but focussing sharply on Hanoi-Haiphong and, especially, the Laos Trail.

Against this background we could go to work to stimulate VC-Saigon contacts, dialogue, and, ultimately, negotiation.

* * *

Now a word about the home front. At some stage the moment will come for you to speak again on Vietnam. The theme might be: We are all being tested by this crisis.

- The Vietnamese by their desire to move towards constitutional government despite the war. We support this; but it will require great restraint and mutual accommodation, as democracy always requires. Our support can only be effective against the background of such restraint and mutual accommodation.

4/21/66

- The Vietnamese military, ourselves, and other fighting allies:
to maintain military unity and effectiveness in the face of a
difficult, thoroughly professional form of aggression. We're
doing well. Pride should be expressed in U.S., as well as
Korean, Australian, and Vietnamese forces.
- The Vietnamese and ourselves in carrying forward the Honolulu
program for the people, despite the war. Again the Vietnamese
have a great responsibility to improve the quality and vigor of
their administration.
- Finally, the American people: we are being tested to understand
the nature of the war; to understand the confusing but essentially
constructive struggle of a democratic nation to be born; and,
above all, by the fact that the Communists are counting on us to
despair and give up.

After such a statement we would need to follow up by a systematic campaign to make clear the constructive -- if precarious -- process of political development going forward in Vietnam. If our people really understood, I believe they would be quite tolerant of the birth pangs.

W. A. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday
April 21, 1966

Mr. President:

Herewith is Ambassador Lodge's
weekly telegram which is a good
summary of the Ambassador's
current views.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 20, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon #4085)

Herewith My Weekly Telegram:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

I. Taking Stock.

By sig, NARS, Date 8-19-86

Tri Quang has for the time being called off his "struggle." This may, therefore, be a good time to take stock of the damage, as follows:

The progress of the military and revolutionary development efforts have both been slowed down; and a writ of the Government of Vietnam does not run either Hue or Danang; the radio stations still spew out anti-Government and anti-American propaganda; and the city administrations, including the police forces of both cities, are thoroughly dominated by the Struggle Committee.

When I made my first trip to Danang early in September, I sensed that things were wrong with the police and assigned a U. S. police adviser solely to the city of Danang. This effort, like so many of our U. S. efforts in Hue/Danang, notably with regard to the so-called "university" at Hue, seems to have accomplished very little.

I have just been told by the U. S. adviser in Danang that the police chief of Danang was told that he would be killed and his house would be burned down unless he agreed to carry out the instructions of the Struggle Committee. He further advises me that the Danang police have arrested between fifteen and twenty-one nationalist, patriotic, anti-Communist Vietnamese citizens; and two have already been killed. This was done by the police and the regular army, practically all of whom are locally recruited and thus subject to the orders of the Struggle Committee which in turn is subject to the Buddhist Headquarters. The U. S. police adviser in Hue told me that the police there are also under Struggle Committee domination and attempted to arrest four Vietnamese patriots who heard about it in time and fled. I believe the use of the police to arrest patriots is a standard Communist device.

Revolutionary development has had a real setback in the First Corps and it also lost a "spark plug" major in Binh Dinh, who was relieved.

Signs of deep Viet Cong involvement abound, certainly in Danang (there are reports of French colonial pro-Viet Cong activity), and Viet Cong terrorist incidents in Saigon up to the 19th of this month are much higher than for December, 1965, the previous high point. This is as integral a part of the war as are the movement of the North Vietnamese infantry. A whole new approach in the First Corps is indicated.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

On the other hand, some of the things which we in Washington and Saigon have worried about didn't happen, as follows:

April 1966 was definitely not April 1963.

The Ky Government was not overthrown and it looks as though, when the time comes, it may, after all, phase out in an orderly way, which is the most we could have expected anyway.

No Vietnamese and no Americans were killed during the month-long crisis. This compares with nine people killed in the recent riots in Hong Kong. Frankly, I would not have thought this possible and not a day went by that I didn't worry about our Marines in Danang.

Although the military effort was slowed down, there was also some military success, notably in the attack on the North Vietnamese supply lines and I believe the lost time can be made up.

Except for the areas mentioned above, revolutionary development has been affected very little in the Fourth Corps (Mekong Delta) and Third Corps (around Saigon). "By and large," Ambassador Porter reports, "If you take a trip in the countryside, all is the same as it was before the crisis began." He mentioned this to me because "so many people get a mental picture of the population up in arms."

The National Political Congress operated in a much more orderly and constructive way than anyone thought. The Buddhists, who had said they would boycott, eventually sent a representative. The crisis was indeed a part of Vietnam's evolution towards nationhood.

As was to be expected, our big nets (military) for catching whales worked better than our fine-meshed nets (revolutionary development) for catching the small, but deadly, terrorist fish. The Marines at Danang could defeat big units in the field, but the city of Danang remained vulnerable. But revolutionary development, under your new reorganization, has better prospects than ever before.

There is also evidence that the rabid Buddhists lost ground with the Buddhists rank and file, and that Tri Quang realized he had over-played his hand.

II. The Press and the Crisis.

I try to keep up with the press at home and it seems to me that many of them were wronger than usual on the crisis. I cite these examples:

a. The atmosphere of hysteria and "all is lost" was obviously not justified. The U. S. press blew up the demonstrations in Saigon out of all proportion.

~~SECRET~~

Quoted from 1st page and 2nd page
Re: 1st page and 2nd page

b. The Associated Press story by Thomas A. Reedy, for example, who, speaking of the Honolulu meeting, said "all hinged on the Ky Government" made the classic error. The truth is that none of us thought that "all hinged on the Ky Government." Our military operations are sufficiently decentralized so that they could and did go on, even our economic and social operations, which need reorganization (and which I shall discuss further on) are more decentralized than the press realizes.

c. The greatest of all the press fallacies were in the slurs on the Honolulu meeting. As I pointed out in previous telegrams, you have from the beginning seen and understood the fact that this is basically a political war with overtones of military and criminal violence. The Honolulu meeting educated all concerned to this vital fact, following it up immediately with the visit of the Vice President, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. This has actually created the impression in some quarters here that the U. S. is more interested in social revolution than the Government of Vietnam is. The Government of Vietnam is aware of this and, in its feeble way, wants to catch up. For the first time in the history of this ~~medieval~~ country, some competitive spirit is in evidence on who cares the most for the underdog. This would not have happened without Honolulu."

d. Finally, the press seems to me to have failed miserably in conveying to the American public the fact that government in this country is radically different from what exists in the average American community, notably as regards assassination. This is a traditional and very effective way in Vietnam to persuade somebody to do what you want--much easier than arguing with him or outvoting him. You simply threaten to kill him if he doesn't "go along." It is, for example, simple to go into the fourth ward in Saigon, which is a three-minute walk from my office, and for a modest sum find a man who is willing to kill anybody you want to have killed. This statement is based on information given to me by the U. S. police adviser to the Vietnamese police, who told me today that the assassination rate in Ward 4 starts at 500 piasters (about \$4) and runs up to 2,500 piasters depending on the circumstances and the victim. No one here questions it. It is common knowledge. But I never see it referred to in the American press. This is one reason why I am not more optimistic about the future of democracy here. Democracy implies a willingness to settle questions by voting. There are still many people here who want to settle things by assassination and think it is much quicker and more efficient.

III. Vietnam's Move to Democracy

I referred to the work of the National Political Congress as one of the gains of the past month. I do so because I just naturally and incurably believe in democracy, because the present arrangement is so obviously defective, and because I saw many disadvantages in denying something which so many people wanted and which represents a healthy association to get a government somewhat like ours.

But I cannot over-emphasize my conviction that this does not mean that we are in for quiet and orderly days in Saigon simply because we may be inching towards democracy. Since the fall of Diem, there have been a succession of military governments interspersed with a few weak civilian governments and a good deal of uproar. Realistically, we cannot expect a much quieter time when the Vietnamese start having elections. We must assume that there will not be the wisdom and restraint here which animated the American Founding Fathers and that those who think they have a majority will try to ride rough-shod over the very tough and very big minorities.

a. There will thus be bitter struggles between the groups.

b. There is also the possibility of communist intimidation and subversion of the actual elections themselves, which is widely regarded as being relatively unlikely, but which cannot be excluded. I feel they are being held too soon. They must be very carefully watched.

c. After the Parliament is elected, we can then assume that the Viet Cong will start their assassination and threat of assassination campaign. The dickering with Hanoi will begin almost at once--and to dicker with Hanoi with the Viet Cong in aggression on South Vietnam soil means Viet Cong victory. This is really the main reason why I think that the President of Vietnam, under the new constitution, must have the power to dissolve the legislature once it has been effectively taken over by Viet Cong terrorism.

So I believe we face an uproar in the national government in Saigon for a long time.

IV. Reorganize U.S. Effort

This means that we should get ourselves organized on the basis that the national government in Saigon will be, for the most part, incapable of constructive positive impulses and that we can consider its performance satisfactory if it does not actually hinder operations being carried out at the grass roots. It means that our American efforts must be more decentralized than they now are and that our economic, social and police programs must be conducted under the direction of politically minded U.S. aid representatives in the provinces--good-humored leader-expeditors--who, though without legal power, would have tremendous influence.

By way of illustration, I cite the various ministerial crises in Paris in the years before DeGaulle. They were constantly changing, yet the Government of France went on because there was a high quality civil service. Vietnam has nothing of the kind. But our U.S. operation could be organized so that it would supply much continuity and guidance. The change of a Vietnamese province chief would be much less grave if an American were there whose experience and talent would provide continuity. There is something of this kind now--

in about 20% of the provinces. But there should be more. If, therefore, I were to make one "post mortem" about the events of the last month, I would point to this, concerning which we are already in contact with AID and the State Department.

Clearly, the schools, clinics, cement, wheat, fertilizer, etc., when allocated by bureaucratically and non-politically minded persons do not accomplish all that they could accomplish in the way of U. S. influence. When I say "influence," I do not merely refer to a province chief, but also to the heads of the great sects who now have no contact with any really potent American officials who can do them a favor. Our contact with the great sects is episodic and usually limited to an intelligent young man from the Embassy who speaks Vietnamese, but hasn't got anything he can give out.

The job of U. S. province representative should be considered a blue ribbon post. We should be able to attract the cream of the crop. It should appeal to everything that an able and politically-minded young man has in him: of love of adventure, of desire to serve, and of challenge to his strength and ingenuity.

We Americans who deal with Vietnamese--whether in Saigon or in Washington--are rather in the position of a man who is trying to ride a young horse--which I know you have done many times. Just as you get the horse quieted down and moving out nicely a sparrow flies off the branch of a tree and the horse starts to rear up and gets all excited and then has to be quieted down again. That's what so often happens here.

V. Revolutionary Development

In spite of all the uproar, there has been one extremely hopeful development as regards land reform. Secretary Freeman made available to us a presentation by Dr. Lawrence Hewes of the Department of Agriculture which was one of the ablest presentations I have heard in thirty years of government service. His plan for land reform is so practical and so intelligent and it could be put into operation so quickly that it could be not only a blessing to the Vietnamese, but, in the context of this war, a real body-blow to the Viet Cong. This is one of the direct results of your efforts, comparable to your having sent Dr. Humphreys here in the field of health.

We also had a visit from Mr. Roberto Heurtematte, Associate Director, United Nations Development Program. He thus acquired an intimate knowledge of what more the United Nations could do here in the economic and social field. It is now under very active UN consideration and will, I am sure, lead to some concrete accomplishments.

The Swiss surgical team arrived in Saigon April 14, and will be stationed at Kontum. It was sent by the Swiss Red Cross with the support of the Swiss Government.

The government has just held a nation-wide conference of provincial administrators and members of provincial councils to discuss how to replace military officers with officials in regional, district and village governments and how to improve administrative services. The government plans to establish a civilian deputy to the corps commanders, who function also as government delegates for the region.

The month of March established a new record for Chieu Hoi returnees--2,336--and the high rate continues this month, with 646 reported for the period April 2-8, the second highest week on record.

VI. Economic

Expert concensus here is that serious interruption of business activity and a significant increase in capital flight will occur only if the political situation becomes much worse. The problem of inflation remains, however, and prices rose again this week, led by condensed milk. Rice prices also rose, as did those for iron and steel products and fertilizer. The Saigon black market rate for U. S. currency also rose to near its peak level. On the encouraging side, deliveries of hogs and rice to Saigon have been at least adequate to meet consumption so far this week.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1966

To: The President

Via: Mr. Valenti

RECEIVED

4:30 PM

APR 22 1966

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, April 20, 1966 - 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statement for Meeting of Board of Governors of the
Inter-American Development Bank

Secretary Fowler has sent you a memorandum (tab A) concerning his participation in the seventh annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank which will be held in Mexico City from April 25 - 28. He inquires whether you have any thoughts or message which you would like for him to convey to the Latin American Governors in his plenary speech.

Linc Gordon and I believe it would be advantageous for you to send a short statement to the meeting through Secretary Fowler emphasizing your interest in greater emphasis on agricultural production, education, health and economic integration. At tab B is the draft of such a statement for your consideration.

W. W.  Rostow

Approve statement ✓.

Prefer not to send statement ____.

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

706

A

70c

Rec'd
4-19-66
Pres. J.C.
H. H. Fowler

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

APR 18 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In my capacity as United States Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank, I plan to attend from Monday, April 25, through Thursday, the 28th, the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank. The meeting this year is being held in Mexico City.

The two main business items before the meeting will be: the proposed establishment of a fund within the Bank to finance feasibility studies for multi-national projects; and the launching of a study by the Bank's Executive Directors of the need for a future increase in the Bank's resources. I plan to support both proposals. At an early stage of the meeting I am to make a formal address before the Governors. I plan to discuss on this occasion the evolving role of the Inter-American Bank during its first five years of operations, as well as the evolving role of the United States in relations with the Bank and with Latin America.

In view of your Mexican visit, I would want particularly to have the benefit of your guidance at this time, and to be sure to include in my speech any thoughts or message which you would wish me to convey to the Latin American Governors.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

The White House
Washington

1966 APR 18 PM 6 47
MEXICO CITY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Mexico City, April 18, 1966. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City.

Summary:

The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City.

Remarks:

The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City. The President's meeting with the Mexican President, L. Rodriguez Cordero, and the Prime Minister, Antonio Carrero Fernandez, on April 18, 1966, in Mexico City.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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B

(Ten) days ago it was my privilege to share the beauty and hospitality of this gracious city.

On that occasion I urged that all of us in this hemisphere work together to open up new paths and breathe new energy into our efforts to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum.

As we carry forward our truly revolutionary cause, four areas of major endeavor must be:

Higher agricultural production to feed our growing populations and to meet our expanding industrial requirements;

Better education to open the door to intellectual fulfillment for all our people and to equip them with the skills of modern technology;

Improved health facilities to protect our populations against the ravages of disease and to insure that they achieve maximum accomplishment in work and leisure; and

Wider economic integration to achieve a more rational utilization of Latin American resources and thereby to accelerate economic growth and social progress.

It is a great source of personal satisfaction to me that under my Administration the United States Congress has authorized the provision of \$750 million for the Bank's expanded Fund for Special Operations. The Bank, under Dr. Herrera's distinguished leadership, is making a strong

contribution to the success of the Alliance. By emphasizing in your new program the four areas which I have described, you are placing the Bank in the forefront of a new, dynamic effort. I commend you for your vision and initiative.

to P
4/21/66 21

Thursday, April 21, 1966

Mr. President:

Here are two aid problems on the agenda,
signed off by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Ball,
respectively.

I thought you might like to consider them
before we meet.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Is the yellow pen helpful?

Keep it up _____

Cut it out _____

cc: Bill Moyers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Monday, April 18, 1966
9:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India Aid Decision

1. Attached is a recommendation from Secretary Rusk and Dave Bell that you authorize the resumption of negotiations with India covering four project loans, already authorized, totalling \$85.3 million.

2. The history is this:

(1) They were held up when hostilities started last year.

(2) It was envisaged that you might release them to Mrs. Gandhi on her way home, as you released a similar package of loans to Ayub on his way home.

(3) Bob Komer at the time told Dave Bell that you were making a sufficiently friendly gesture to Mrs. Gandhi after her visit by your food message to the Congress. No action was taken on these loans.

(4) I explored whether Asoka Mehta, the Indian economic planner now consulting with the World Bank, would be making any commitments while here in the coming week which would justify our either granting or not granting these loans. Dave Bell says that he is likely to listen to the World Bank; make no decisions; but report to the Indian Cabinet upon his return.

3. Since they represent no new money, I would recommend that we see how the talks with Mehta go and release them on his way back to India to strengthen his hand as he gives the Indian Cabinet the tough medicine that George Woods will convey.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
State 575-78, NSC 11-22-78 (#158a)
By OCH per ip NARS, Date 8-21-86

SECRET

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

#5895

April 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resumption of Negotiations
with India on A.I.D. Loans

Recommendation:

That you authorize the resumption of negotiations with India covering four project loans totalling \$85.3 million dollars.

Administrator Bell supports this recommendation.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____

Discussion:

At the time of the suspension of new aid commitments for India and Pakistan, we were negotiating with the Indian government the terms and conditions for four A.I.D. project loans, which had been authorized from prior year funds. The loans in question are:

Beas Dam	\$33.0 million
Dhuvaran Thermal Power Plant Extension	32.3 million
Durgapur Thermal Power Plant Extension	16.5 million
Minerals Exploration	<u>3.5 million</u>
	\$85.3 million

Negotiations regarding five project loans for Pakistan were similarly suspended last year. You authorized resumption of negotiations concerning the Pakistan loans after the visit of President Ayub in December.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

In view of the recent visit by Prime Minister Gandhi,
I consider it to be appropriate to resume negotiations on the
four loans for India.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-192

By ig NARA. Date 3-30-90

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Shoab is here to learn from George Woods and us the shape of our aid deal so he can plan his June budget.

In this paper State proposes that we tell him our conditions are:

- defense expenditure limitation;
- Tashkent follow-through;
- "satisfactory appreciation" of U. S. interests in Asia;
- "satisfactory level of cooperation" with U. S.;
- meet World Bank standards of self-help;

We would let him know that, if these conditions are steadily met, we would:

1. Resume commodity aid in two slices: \$70 million to July-December 1966, \$70 million January-June 1967 (pre-war level).
2. Negotiate a six-months PL-480 agreement on a scale depending on size of Pakistan harvest.

There is a third point on which Dave Bell has second thoughts: the steel mill.

The present draft says we'll think about projects later.

Since agreeing to this Bell has discovered:

-- In 1961, Amb. Rountree brought major pressure on the Paks to get the steel mill out of German into U.S. hands. The Paks agreed because AID terms were more attractive;

-- An American private group then made a feasibility study, on top of the one done by the Paks;

-- At this point the Ex-Im Bank decided it wanted the deal at higher interest rates. It insisted on a third feasibility study;

-- In 1965 Ex-Im said it wanted the deal, but AID had to pick up one-third of the financing;

-- Then came the war. We held it up politically.

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

4/21/66

Shoaib and other observers tell us this mill (which would be run by National Steel) is a national symbol in Pakistan. If we want to restore relations on a popular level, this is our best bet. It will run off U. S. scrap metal.

I believe we should keep our minds open on this, until Dave Bell has a chance to sort it out with Harold Linder.

It may be our interest -- commercial and political -- to keep our word and do it.

W. A. R. Rostow

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1059 71d

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: An Aid Deal for Pakistan

We have told Mrs. Gandhi that we are prepared to do our part in support of an economic reform program. We must now decide how to proceed with Pakistan. Our economic decisions for Pakistan are complicated, however, by political problems.

Pakistan's Finance Minister Shoaib will be here through April 29. He must present his budget in early June and therefore his economic policies must be set within the next six weeks. We would ask the IBRD to take the lead in formally promoting the economic aspects of the aid package recommended below, and to support our effort to achieve an understanding on defense expenditures.


On the political side of the problem there are two basic policy questions: (1) Has President Ayub violated his understanding with you in acquiring Chinese Communist military equipment? (2) Has Ayub's political performance since his talks with you justified return to economically justifiable development lending?

Our recommendations assume that the steps so far taken do not represent a breach of your understanding and that we need to reach a combined economic-political bargain in order to help Ayub balance the pressures pushing him toward Communist China.

Recommendation 1: That you authorize us to describe to Pakistan's Finance Minister Shoaib the following bargain: We are ready to resume AID commodity lending in six-month slices beginning in July at a level needed to support Pakistan's development program and self-help policies (about the FY 1965 annual rate of \$140 million) provided other members of the IBRD Consortium do their fair share and that Pakistan: (1) limits its defense

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.



~~SECRET~~

-2-

expenditures to a level to be agreed upon (we will seek a comparable understanding with the Indians); (2) demonstrates a conscientious effort to maintain the "spirit of Tashkent" and to contain the intensity of India-Pakistan disputes; (3) demonstrates a satisfactory appreciation of basic U.S. interests in Asia; (4) maintains a satisfactory level of cooperation with the U.S., and (5) accepts the economic conditions advocated by the IBRD Consortium to restore the funding level of its development program and restore and extend import liberalization.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

Recommendation 2: That you authorize us to tell Shoaib that after we know the results of this spring's wheat harvest, we will agree to negotiate a PL-480 agreement and provide shipments for six months, subject to the understanding that the GOP would take further steps to promote greater agricultural output.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

Recommendation 3: Within the context of these two decisions to resume aid, we recommend that you authorize us to tell Shoaib at the same time, as a further carrot to performance, that we would be ready in December or January to open the door to AID and Ex-Im Bank loans for appropriate projects and to provide PL-480 shipments for another six months if GOP political and economic performance in the interim warrants.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

Administrator Bell concurs; Secretary Freeman concurs in those recommendations concerning food aid.

Background:

Pakistan-Communist Chinese Relationship: Fear plus India's attitude on Kashmir operate to pressure Pakistan to seek unqualified

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-3-

political support from a major power. The continuing Indian military build-up pressures Pakistan to seek suppliers of military hardware. The current power alignments and our withholding of MAP cast Communist China in both roles. Pakistan has recently received a number of MIG-19's (the best estimate cites 22 out of a reported planned total of 100) plus medium tanks from the Chicoms, who are offering substantial additional materiel. During the visit of China's President to Pakistan last week, the public theme of Chicom-Pak solidarity against India was intensified. But President Ayub appears to have resisted Chinese lures which would place impossible strains on Pak-U.S. ties. Ayub instructed Shoaib to tell us there has been no change whatsoever in the discussion and understandings which Ayub reached with you last December.

Ayub's Domestic Problems: In the present atmosphere, it is as impossible politically for Ayub to abandon his efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India as it is for Indira Gandhi to make meaningful concessions to Ayub before the elections in 1967. If he is to retain his power base, which has been weakened by recent events, Ayub has few options. He must continue a hard line against India, maintain his ties with the Chicoms, and seek to replenish his military stockpile.

U.S. Requirements:

1. Our requirements are peace and stability in the subcontinent and Pakistan respect for basic U.S. interests in Asia; we assume that the Chinese objectives are the precise opposite. Therefore we need to have continuing evidence from Pakistan that in managing its relationship with China it is meeting our requirements; e.g.,

- An evident effort to restrain the intensity of India-Pakistan disputes and a willingness to proceed with the resolution of lesser differences with India.
- A demonstrated appreciation of basic U.S. interests in Asia, as reflected by the uninterrupted operation of U.S. special facilities in Pakistan, in the Pakistani attitude on the U.S. effort in Vietnam, and in Pakistan's continued adherence to the SEATO and CENTO alliances.

~~SECRET~~

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-4-

--Building a climate (e.g., through restraint and accuracy in public statements and the controlled press), which is conducive to friendly relations with the U.S.

2. We will require an understanding, as we also will with the Indians, on limiting military expenditures.

3. We will also seek a restoration by Pakistan of its previous priority and funding to economic development in FY 1967, agreement to a resumed and extended import liberalization program by July and steps to increase further agricultural production, including active pursuit of potential foreign investors in fertilizer production.

Henry Ball

~~SECRET~~

92
Sent to Mr Hopkins
4/21/66

April 21, 1966

Mr. McPherson:

Will you take this from here? It
should go to the President through
you.

WWR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


April 20, 1966

NOTE FOR

- ~~1. Mr. Bromley Smith~~
2. Mr. W. W. Rostow

OK BLS

These papers are in order and the protocols are ready for Presidential approval and transmittal to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.


Charles E. Johnson

April 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The State Department, with the approval of the Department of the Interior and U. S. Coast Guard, recommends that you sign the attached message to the Senate transmitting for their advice and consent to ratification two Protocols to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. The New England fishing industry, which is knowledgeable of the protocols through the Industry Advisory Committee to the United States Commissioners, had indicated its approval. The Department of State, on the basis of its knowledge of the Senatorial and Congressional attitude concerning similar treaty provisions and of the policy issues involved, is of the opinion that the protocols will be favorably received.

These protocols appear to be a constructive step forward in the conservation of stocks of fish that are of particular importance to us since much of the Convention area lies off the east coast of the United States.

I support the recommendation of the State Department that you sign the proposed message.

W. W. Rostow

April 20, 1966

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April 20, 1966

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I support the recommendation of the State Department that you sign the proposed message.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1966

IN REPLY REFER TO: 5449

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Two Protocols to the International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Recommended for Submission
to the Senate

Enclosed is a message for signature by the President transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification two Protocols to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.


The protocol relating to measures of control would permit international inspection or enforcement by means of appropriate regulations. The United States has strongly supported the protocol and United States Commissioners have in discussions of the Commission established under the Convention advocated a vigorous international inspection or enforcement system. The implementation of such a system would result in more efficient and uniform enforcement of conservation regulations and would contribute to the achievement of the aims of the Convention. The United States has a particular interest in the conservation of these stocks of fish since much of the Convention area lies off the coast of the United States.

The protocol on entry into force of proposals provides a simplified procedure for entry into force of conservation regulations. This procedure will apply also to enforcement regulations when the first-mentioned protocol enters into force. The United States will be able to operate effectively under the change, as it does presently under similar provisions of the International Whaling Convention and will benefit from having necessary conservation measures enter into force within a reasonable period.

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← Johnson
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- 2 -

The protocols have the approval of both the Department of the Interior and the United States Coast Guard. The New England fishing industry, which is knowledgeable of the protocols through the Industry Advisory Committee to the United States Commissioners, has indicated its approval. On the basis of the Department's knowledge of the Senatorial and Congressional attitude concerning similar treaty provisions and of the policy issues involved, we envisage that the protocols will be favorably received.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Message to the Senate for
signature by the President.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 APR 20 AM 11 29

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1966 -- 4:32 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Amendment to Agreement with the Turkish Republic
Concerning Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve the proposed amendment to the existing agreement with the Government of the Turkish Republic for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, which was originally signed on June 10, 1955. The AEC also submits for your approval proposed notes to be exchanged between the two Governments and which are to be considered as part of the proposed amending agreement.

The proposed amendment would extend the Agreement for five years. The Government of the Turkish Republic has agreed to the transfer to the International Atomic Energy Agency of safeguards responsibilities for materials and facilities transferred under the Agreement for cooperation.

I recommend that you approve this draft amendment and the related notes. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved

☐ Disapproved

☐ See me

73a
April 22, 1966

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated April 20, 1966, a proposed agreement amending the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Turkish Republic Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, together with proposed notes to be exchanged between the two Governments, which notes are to be considered as part of the proposed amending agreement, and has recommended that I approve the proposed amending agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

(a) approve the proposed amending agreement and determine that the performance of the Agreement as amended will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

(b) authorize the execution of the proposed amending agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

LBJ:CEJ:feg

→ Mr. Bator 74
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 20, 1966

THROUGH: Mr. Marvin Watson

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Sub-Committee Chairmen of
Export Expansion Council

In the attached, Jack Connor suggests a ten minute report-presentation meeting with the Chairmen of the three sub-committees of his National Export Expansion Council:

Carl A. Gerstacker (Dow Chemical) chairman of the Export Council and of the sub-committee on taxation.

Robert F. Dwyer (Oregon lumber executive) chairman of the sub-committee on shipping.

Donald W. Douglas, chairman of the sub-committee on Export Financing.

The full Export Council will be in Washington on Friday, April 29 to approve the sub-committee reports. Connor suggests a meeting that afternoon. I understand that you may be in Texas. If so, they could come in on Thursday, the 28th, or sometime the following week. (Sincerthe formal reason for such a meeting is to receive their reports, it should probably not be long after the Council meeting on the 29th.)

This is not a must, nor do the reports contain any major solutions for our payments headaches. But your seeing these people would give the entire Export Council a sense of Presidential interest, and I know that Jack Connor would be grateful.

Francis M. Bator

Set up meeting on April 29 _____

Set up meeting on April 28 _____

Set up meeting for following week _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

75

April 20, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AEC CABRIOLET Proposal

At the April 5 luncheon you requested Bill Moyers and me to talk with Dr. Seaberg to see what he wanted to do about his PLOWSHARE nuclear excavation experiment, CABRIOLET, in view of the advice from State, Defense, and ACDA that it be postponed until Fall.

When I talked with Dr. Seaberg last Tuesday, I stated the case for postponement, but he pressed his case for proceeding -- as follows:

- (1) An agreement with the Soviets is unlikely within 6 months;
- (2) The AEC experts believe the Soviets are far ahead of us in actual experimentation;
- (3) The entire future of PLOWSHARE, as well as morale in the laboratories, depends on going ahead with CABRIOLET;
- (4) The criterion of international detectability of radioactive debris is no longer valid because even seepage from underground tests can now be detected; and
- (5) The domestic issue posed by radioactive iodine in milk will ultimately have to be faced if we are going to conduct PLOWSHARE excavations.

It was agreed that Dr. Seaberg would discuss his points directly with Secretary Rusk and then decide whether to ask for a Presidential decision.

Secretary Rusk met with Dr. Seaberg last Friday. At this meeting the AEC took the position that a negative decision on CABRIOLET would, in effect, be a decision to stop the PLOWSHARE excavation program. They maintained that CABRIOLET is as clean a test as can be devised at present or in the foreseeable future and if CABRIOLET cannot be conducted under the present Test Ban Treaty it seems clear that no worthwhile nuclear cratering experiments can be performed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 08-213
By id, NARA, Date 1-13-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The discussion also dealt with the Administration position at the time of the Test Ban Treaty hearings and the Congressional attitudes, pre and con, toward the PLOWSHARE program. Secretary Rusk expressed his conclusion that in view of the consequences for the White House of a decision on CABRIOLET, either to go ahead or to postpone, he thought it would be best to lay the immediate question before you and has asked me to arrange a meeting. Dr. Seaberg concurs in the Secretary's conclusion.

I have not reviewed the international and domestic arguments against conducting the test and would note that some of Dr. Seaberg's points would be contested by other agency heads and advisors.

This is to ascertain your wishes on this matter. Do you feel that a meeting with Dr. Seaberg and the other principals directly involved (Rusk, McNamara, Foster and Hornig) would be productive or should he be given an answer without such a meeting?

W. W. Rostow

- ☐ See me
- ☐ Arrange a meeting
- ☐ Tell him to go ahead
- ☐ Tell him to hold off until Fall.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tuesday, April 19, 1966
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

This contains an important message,
if it is true.

In the past the Paks have said: first,
Kashmir; then economic collaboration.

Shoaib now says they are ready to do
some constructive things right away.

Woods should get at this and maybe
lean on the Indians.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation
with Mohammad Shoaib

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-250
By ij NARA, Date 7-17-89 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1966

Memorandum of Conversation With Mohammad Shoaib, Minister of Finance, Pakistan

After I explained broadly our concerns about Tashkent and military expenditures, Shoaib made the following points.

1. He will take up with George Woods two multinational projects on which Pakistan is prepared to move now with India: the export of natural gas to India from the fields of West Pakistan; and the joint development and exploitation of the waters of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Teesla rivers. Shoaib says that, in the past, the Indians were unwilling to become "dependent" on Pakistan gas. And they have also been unwilling to discuss the joint development of the river waters. He hopes George Woods can interest the Indians in proceeding on these two fronts quietly but promptly.

2. He will also take up with George Woods a possible World Bank role as third party in India-Pak negotiations to limit over-all military expenditures between the two countries. He says Ayub is prepared to settle for Pakistan military expenditures between one-fourth and one-third of Indian military expenditures. In any case, Shoaib has been financing the increase in Pak military expenditures by increased taxation and is determined to preserve the level of development expenditure in Pakistan, earning the additional foreign exchange necessary for additional military expenditures by a special export drive. But this assumes that the old economic aid level to Pakistan will be restored.

3. Shoaib says the biggest single thing that we could do to restore U.S. -Pak relations would be to finance the steel mill. He will be seeing Harold Linder as well as Dave Bell on this. The management will be done by the National Steel Company of the U.S. The energy will come from natural gas. The raw material will be mainly U.S. scrap metal. National Steel, as well as Shoaib, believes it will be an efficient operation, making a profit.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-250
By sig NARA, Date 7-17-89

W. W. Roslow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 77
→ Mr. Rostow

Tuesday, April 19, 1966, 5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval and forwarding to the Senate, is a highly technical but quite routine protocol amending our tax convention with the U. K. Its principal effect is to keep the recently enacted British corporation tax from hurting American business. (It contains some other minor improvements in the existing convention.) According to Joe Barr and Stan Surrey, the protocol should go through with no difficulty. The entire package has strong business support.

Both State and Treasury recommend that you approve. (Dean Rusk's long formal explanation -- which is to be forwarded to the Senate -- is at Tab B.)

If you approve, we need your signature on the transmittal letter at the place marked.

I am putting this in through Harry McPherson for a lawyer's check.

Francis M. Bator

Attachments

FMB:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 19, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ideas for Foreign Policy: Inside and Outside the Government

You asked: how can we get more new ideas for foreign policy?

I propose the following program:

1. Outside Consultants.

a) Each regional bureau of the State Department would be instructed to develop a group of outside consultants, along the lines of those used by the Treasury, AID, the Policy Planning Council.

b) These consultants would be used for two purposes:

(i) to initiate new ideas, as the spirit moved them;

(ii) to consider and staff out specific problems and ideas put to them individually and collectively by the relevant Assistant Secretaries.

c) Members of my staff would be instructed to ensure that these consultants were effectively used and their ideas followed up in the bureaucracy.

2. Planning Inside the Government.

a) The Inter-Departmental Planning Group, which has met every week informally, should be converted into a group which would formally staff out problems which cut across the Departments; produce action recommendations; forward those recommendations to the Senior Inter-Departmental Group (SIG) or to other higher authority for decision and action. Starting this Friday the Inter-Departmental Planning Group will be considering a list of such possible planning problems and possibilities.

b) Members of my staff have been told that we shall be devoting a somewhat higher proportion of our time to generating ideas and planning proposals. They will each be submitting to me an initial list of such ideas and proposals. When we have screened them together I shall arrange to have those we select put into the governmental machinery at appropriate points.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-30

By ing, NARS, Date 9-13-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c) Against this background, we shall try to use the influence of the White House foreign affairs staff to ensure that the work of the Inter-Departmental Regional Groups (IRG's) is not merely addressed to inter-departmental negotiation and debate of current operational issues, but also to planning against contingencies and for the creative exploitation of opportunities for forward movement.

3. The Use of the President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs.

I have reviewed the history of this group. I have concluded that they are not likely to be useful to you meeting as a whole, except under exceptional circumstances. They could be useful if broken into sub-panels, for particular occasions, to examine specific major problems; for example

- Viet-Nam;
- major international monetary decisions;
- critical decisions on NATO;
- changes in China policy, should circumstances justifying such change arise.

The purpose of such sub-panels would be these: to render to you additional advice; to engage the support of influential citizens for major changes of direction in national policy.

There is one issue on which the whole panel might be concerned and engaged: the completion of Robert Bowie's report to Secretary Rusk on the problems of the 1970's. I started this at State. Bowie should be reporting by June 1. After we in the government have sorted out the major implications we might present these to the Panel as the start of a campaign of public discussion, at home and abroad, looking beyond Viet-Nam, Mao, and de Gaulle, to the world of the 1970's. You will recall that Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, and I raised this theme in connection with your State of the Union address in January 1966.

4. The questions, therefore, are:

- May I raise with Secretary Rusk the proposals for outside consultants to be attached to each regional bureau?

Approved ✓ Excellent

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

-- May I proceed with planning inside the government
along the lines indicated in Para. 2, a - c?

Approved ✓

Disapproved

See me

-- In light of Para. 3, how do you wish to proceed with
use (or non-use) of President's Panel of Consultants
on Foreign Affairs?

Instruction awaited.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

Jack Valenti

*as outlined
see / a*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, April 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the State Department account
of the Kalb broadcast about Secretary Rusk's
testimony before the Zablocki Subcommittee.

W. W. Rostow

79
4/17/66 - Mr. Smith
left with
Lt. Com for
next round to
Lunch.
Sent to Pres 4/19/66
Tuesday



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

APR 16 1966

6348

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Leak of Secretary's China
Testimony Before Zablocki
Subcommittee

In response to your request this morning, I can provide the following information about the leak to CBS of the Secretary's China testimony in executive session before the Zablocki Subcommittee.

On March 16, 1966, Secretary Rusk appeared before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in executive session to testify on China and U.S. policy toward China and Asia. The Secretary had a lengthy prepared statement, including a ten-point summary of the main elements of our policy toward Communist China, and he placed this statement in the record at the beginning of his testimony without reading it and proceeded immediately to the question and answer period. (Statement at Tab A.)

After a few days, the Subcommittee staff sent to the Department the transcript of the Secretary's appearance and the transcript was forwarded for review to the Far Eastern Bureau and Ernest K. Lindley, who had worked with FE in preparing the Secretary's initial statement. At the same time, FE was informed that the Zablocki Subcommittee wished to make public the Secretary's statement. FE recommended that this be done and Ernest Lindley concurred. With publication in mind, FE and Ernest suggested a few small deletions and clarifications in the prepared statement. These were submitted to the Secretary on March 30, but he wished to read the statement again with some care before deciding whether to authorize its publication, and before making his decision, the Secretary submitted the statement to the Policy Planning Council on April 5. Mr. Owen recommended that it be published, after a few additional small changes.

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Authority NLS 85-266
By ing, NARS, Date 12-18-85

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2

As the Subcommittee was pressing us, the corrected transcript was forwarded to the Hill on April 11 with the information that the Secretary had not yet decided whether to authorize publication of the statement and that, if he did, he might wish to make further changes. The text as finally approved by the Secretary was forwarded on the morning of April 13.

None of the changes made affected the substance of the exposition. Most merely reemphasized points that already had been made.

For present purposes, there is only one change that needs to be noted. The fourth point in the Secretary's summation in his opening statement reads as follows with the words that were added underscored:

"Fourth, we will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations or its agencies. So long as Peiping follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for membership, and the United States opposes its membership."

On his Wednesday night, April 13, broadcast, Marvin Kalb of CBS told his audience that he had seen the corrected transcript and pointed out that words indicating the U.S. opposition to Chinese Communist membership in the UN had been added after the testimony had been given. He drew the inference strongly that this amounted to a move by the Administration to promote a two China policy. Kalb's statement is attached (Tab B). Mr. Kalb told Mr. McCloskey in advance of his broadcast that he had been given access to the amended statement on the Hill. In our view, Marvin Kalb acted entirely properly throughout the incident, although we do, of course, disagree with the policy inference he has drawn.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

On Thursday morning, April 14, the Secretary called Congressman Zablocki to complain about this obvious breach of the rules of executive testimony and the Congressman apologized and said he would look into the matter. Although it cannot be established who gave CBS access to the Secretary's corrected statement, we have learned that some of the members of the Subcommittee had access to the Secretary's statement after it was made, but the Subcommittee staff claims that none of the members saw the amended version.

Although the implication of the sentence to which the phrase spelling out U.S. opposition to Chinese Communist membership was added clearly indicated our continuing policy of opposition to Peiping seating, the inferences that CBS and other journalists have placed on the addition of the words has caused concern to the Chinese Nationalists which we have attempted to allay by contacts here and in Taipei.

On April 15, Mr. McCloskey, the Department spokesman, told the AP and UPI that the Secretary's statement had been given in executive session and in accordance with long standing practice the transcript had been submitted to the Department for editorial review before publication. Since the corrected testimony has been released by the Subcommittee for Sunday A.M., the weekend stories on the matter should appear in tomorrow's press.

(S) M. W. Humphreys
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Tab A - Secretary's Statement

Tab B - Kalb's Statement

In Ed's file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Agenda for Foreign Policy
Discussion with the President
Tuesday, April 19, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-250
By 418 NARA, Date 7-17-89

Mr. Rostow
to use for
brief of Pres. 80

1. Vietnam.

- a) Raising force ceiling from 260,000 to 325,000. McNamara.
Decision required soon.
- b) Vietnam options and fall-backs.
 - (i) Situation and Prospects in Coming Months.
 - (ii) Options A, B, and C.
 - (iii) Decision on Vietnam meeting for about Thursday when Ball group will be ready.
 - (iv) Issues that will then require decision: military; economic, political; diplomatic.
 - (v) Vietnam Advisory Group: Milton Eisenhower, Arthur Dean, etc.

2. NATO

- a) NSAM and preparations for reply to Wilson. Decision required soon.
European clause issue between Secretary McNamara and Ball.
- b) McCloy talks. Report.
- c) NATO relocation issues. Secretary McNamara now staffing out JCS recommendations with purpose of cutting costs. He will report in fourth week of April. International negotiations begin during May. Report.
- d) NATO forward-looking proposals. Rostow memo. Comment.

3. Indian and Pak Aid Decisions.

- a) Should we resume negotiation on four Indian project loans totalling \$85 million already authorized? Briefing. Decision required.
- b) Forthcoming Pakistan Aid Package. Briefing on what is about to arrive from State-AID. Information.
- c) Will you see Shoaib? Briefing. Decision required this week.

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-2-

4. Cabriolet (Plowshare shot). Secretary Rusk and Seaborg wish a meeting with you after Secretary Rusk's return (Friday). They have concluded that the issues involved in a postponement are sufficiently political -- one way or another -- to require your decision. Decision on meeting required.
5. Black mission. Letter to Black requires signature.
6. Latin America.
 - a) Dominican Republic. Briefing. Do you wish to see Bunker and Bennett today?
 - b) Initial reactions to your Mexican trip. Briefing.
 - c) Mexican trip follow-up. Briefing.
 - d) Chilean copper. Briefing.
 - e) Ecuador, Guatemala. Quiet. Briefing.
7. Rhodesia. U.K. gropes towards an uncertain negotiating track in wake of U.N. resolution. U.S. will support. Briefing.
8. Indonesia. Indonesians move slowly towards rejoining U.N.; encouraging private enterprise; looking for foreign assistance; ending confrontation. 50,000 tons rice under PL-480 Title IV signed April 17. Communist-sympathizing Ambassadors purged. Briefing.
9. Oxcart Deployment (A-12 aircraft). Admiral Raborn will raise with you whether these new reconnaissance aircraft should now be deployed to Okinawa to increase our reconnaissance capacity. Raborn says yes. Defense and State say: not now. Briefing. Decision required on meeting.
10. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

April 19, 1966

Dear Mr. Partridge:

It is a pleasure to extend this message of congratulations to the Near East Foundation as it celebrates a half-century of distinguished service to the peoples of the Near East. From its early days as a relief organization to its pioneering role in technical assistance, the Near East Foundation has built an outstanding record of sustained American concern for the task of improving living conditions in that part of the world. You have shown what a private organization can do to help people acquire the skills needed to build better lives for themselves. This is the same objective that your Government is dedicated to, and we are proud to have organizations such as yours as partners in this enterprise. I wish the Near East Foundation another fifty years of equally successful and much appreciated service.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

**Mr. E. De Alton Partridge
President, Near East Foundation
54 East 64th Street
New York, New York 10021**

LBJ:State:HHS:jmt 4/18/66

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 18, 1966
9:30 pm

82

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Pakistan Aid Package

We will be receiving shortly from Secretary Rusk and Dave Bell the proposed message to give Shoaib, Ayub's chief economic minister, when he is here. Essentially, the message will be this: if the Paks follow through on Tashkent; set a ceiling on their total military expenditures; and meet the World Bank's economic standards, we will give them a program loan in two cuts: \$70 million till the end of calendar '66; \$70 million between January 1 and the end of fiscal '67. This is a bit less than their pre-war level.

There are two issues.

The initial draft had a provision that Ayub limit his purchase of arms from the Chinese. Secretary Rusk objected to this on the grounds that we would be committed to supply them arms if we insisted on their not getting them from the Chinese. He would prefer to stick with an overall ceiling and let them get their arms where they can without tying our hands.

The second issue concerns Dave Bell's second thoughts about the Pakistan steel mill. This is a proposal for a loan of something over \$100 million (2/3 Exim Bank; 1/3 AID). The AID experts say we should do not more than indicate a willingness to study this proposal.

Dick Gilbert, the American economist who works with the Paks, now makes a strong view -- with which Dave Bell is impressed -- that we grant the Paks this steel mill on two grounds: (a) National Steel Company (U. S.) says it will be a profitable concern, contrary to AID scepticism; (b) it might be decisive in changing the political atmosphere in Pakistan away from anti-Americanism and pro-Chinese views to a positive attitude which would stabilise the position of Ayub and Shoaib, who have had a tough time since Tashkent.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-250
BY 4-8 NARA, Date 7-17-89

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Monday, April 18, 1966
9:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India Aid Decision

1. Attached is a recommendation from Secretary Rusk and Dave Bell that you authorize the resumption of negotiations with India covering four project loans, already authorized, totalling \$85.3 million.

2. The history is this:

(1) They were held up when hostilities started last year.

(2) It was envisaged that you might release them to Mrs. Gandhi on her way home, as you released a similar package of loans to Ayub on his way home.


(3) Bob Kemer at the time told Dave Bell that you were making a sufficiently friendly gesture to Mrs. Gandhi after her visit by your food message to the Congress. No action was taken on these loans.

(4) I explored whether Asoka Mehta, the Indian economic planner now consulting with the World Bank, would be making any commitments while here in the coming week which would justify our either granting or not granting these loans. Dave Bell says that he is likely to listen to the World Bank; make no decisions; but report to the Indian Cabinet upon his return.

3. Since they represent no new money, I would recommend that we see how the talks with Mehta go and release them on his way back to India to strengthen his hand as he gives the Indian Cabinet the tough medicine that George Woods will convey.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET



84
April 18, 1966
9:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in the day and over the next week.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4033 of April 16, 1966

84a
Monday, April 18, 1966

~~SECRET~~

SAIGON TELEGRAM NO. 4033 OF APRIL 16, 1966

1. The results of the National Political Congress make the political situation in Vietnam calmer than it has been for several weeks. We can look a little farther ahead than was true a week ago. But there is still much uncertainty. There are many pitfalls. Explosive forces still exist particularly in the Hue-Danang area where the anti-government "struggle forces" remain in control.
2. The Political Congress appears to have been a success and well justified our faith in it. The government came out of it rather better than could have been expected, given the Buddhist boycott for the first two days. The issues between the Buddhist Institute and the government appear to be fewer in number and less angry in tone. The Congress changed the bilateral -- and the dangerous -- nature of the conflict and, by involving other groups, seems to have given the government a chance to develop some political allies to help it contain Buddhist demands.
3. The Buddhists find themselves, for the first time in the current crisis, unable to call the shots exclusively. The government gained time and it spared itself damage by using the shield of the Congress to deflect the direct impact of Buddhist demands.
4. While not yet certain, it appears tonight as though the danger of a complete turnover of the government has been averted. The Buddhists may be in the process of modifying, if not abandoning, their move to get rid of the Directorate and the military regime which flowed from it. Whether this probability will be sustained will emerge more clearly within a few days. It is still not clear what line Tri Quang will take and he could upset arrangements which have been laboriously and precariously achieved.
5. There are a series of factors which should operate to sustain a shaky, weakened, but nevertheless substantially unchanged regime for a transitional period. The Buddhists were not able to whip up a mass reaction in Saigon against the government. The Saigon demonstration did not get rolling as might have been hoped by their instigators. In fact, there was a visible reaction against agitation and violence, not only in the expected quarters, but among many Buddhists not associated with the Vien Hoa Dao.

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Authority NLS 85-27
By is, NARS, Date 5-9-85

6. Moreover, a reasonable solution has been agreed upon and is being put into effect, so that the government can defend itself against charges of unwillingness to work towards constitutional democracy.

7. A base of military power for political support for the government has been preserved outside of the Hue-Danang area. It is undoubtedly true that Ky's ability to count on a substantial military force in the Saigon area gave the Buddhists considerable pause. In addition, the relative solidity of the government's authority in II, III and IV Corps undoubtedly served to contain its adversaries. The government's control over the major military formations south of Danang is intact.

8. Finally, the arousing of Catholic fears of the Buddhists, and the support derived from the sects, minorities, and political party remnants, added momentarily to the government's ability to maneuver. There was also a southern reaction, although unorganized and ill-defined, against that had become identified as a struggle dominated by Buddhist leadership from the so-called central provinces around Hue and Danang.

9. The government now faces a set of problems deriving from the events of the past month. These are:

A. How to bring Hue and Danang back under control now that the first steps towards a generally acceptable political solution at the national level have been agreed to and begun. The situation in the First Corps is not good and it will take considerable time to correct it. Military involvement in the struggle forces is extensive, as is participation by police and civil servants. The writ of the Government of South Vietnam in Saigon definitely does not run.

B. How to exercise authority in the transitional period while continuing to execute utterly vital military, economic and social programs.

C. How to develop political institutions which can canalize normal political disagreements in an orderly way and produce a rational constitutional convention free from intimidation which is able to do its assigned task.

D. How to find a way in which the present military leadership can play its most useful role in the political future of the nation.

E. How to mollify a potent reaction among younger officers (the so-called baby turks) who are on the verge of a radical revolt against civilian political ambitions.

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- 3 -

F. How to settle differences which have caused strains within the ruling Directorate, while fending off possible further threats to continuity of the government.

10. Attempts must be made to solve each of these problems. Their solution is going to keep this country in a state of sustained political ferment for months to come.

11. It now looks as if the elections for the constitutional assembly will be held in August, barring any sudden upsets. Fortunately, the fact that a total change, or even a major change, in the government has not occurred will make it less difficult to get through the process. If the Directorate and the Ky government had fallen (or will fall), the situation would have been (will be) much worse.

12. With all the above considerations and circumstances in mind, we suggest the following as sagacious ideas for the immediate future:

A. We should work through the Ky government as much as we can-- not in the sense that we will be opposing its opponents and entering into domestic political contests, but because it is the established government.

B. We should continue to persuade the Government of South Vietnam to be calm, patient and persistent in its task of re-establishing its authority in Hue and Danang. A military campaign against that area should not be mounted. But this ^{taken} should not mean supine acquiescence. Clever police-type/^{steps} ~~plan~~ should be to shrink, whittle and subdivide. We should also consider what political and possibly economic measures can be safely used. First moves should be in the First Corps area of Hue-Danang. This could involve non-struggle forces in the countryside, and should be part of the process of isolating Hue and Danang, reserving them for later action. There are signs of a difference between extreme struggle forces and their less radical supporters, which can perhaps be exploited by the government. The problem of General Thi should be solved, probably by finding him a place in the government but removed from his base in First Corps. Little by little the gas should be let out.

C. We should divert the energies of the "baby turks" away from radical solutions to more normal political pursuits (see para. H below), and continue to advise Ky to avoid recourse to their emotional support. It appears that Ky can control these elements, and needs to be influenced to do so. Given their temperament they will need to be watched very closely.

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- 4 -

D. We should look for further and sustained involvement of various civilian elements with the government in the process of political evolution. The government would be wise to enlist their participation in the preparations for elections, using well-known methods of political organization, with specific allocation of a large number of small tasks to a large number of workers. This could be the nucleus of the presidential campaign to follow under the constitution.

E. If the situation looks as though it were becoming unglued again, we should immediately consider reconvening of the political congress in the hope that it can once again exert a moderating influence.

F. If possible, there should be little or no change in the Directorate. Whatever changes in the Directorate or Cabinet may come about should be gradual and selected so as not to prevent the re-establishment of equilibrium. Every addition or subtraction must be worked out in sharp focus on its individual merits, be it military or civil. If a proposed change seems to threaten a chain reaction, it should be dropped at once.

G. Political energies outside the government should be channeled into preparation for politics before and after the constitutional convention. They should not be focused on upsetting the transitional framework, but on working within it and gearing up for a longer term role.

H. We should consider what form of political organization could be fostered involving an alliance between civil and military elements, to include the "baby turks". This could hopefully form the basis for a political successor to military government which would act as a check on any tendency to military coups. A political role for the military probably cannot be avoided. Nor should it be, seeing that the military is the only major group in Vietnam thoroughly imbued with a national spirit. Perhaps a combination of military leaders, veterans, cooperating political leaders and groups of certain sects and minorities will emerge with a national organization based on rural construction cadre. The purpose would be to build a strong pro-government party before the end of 1966. We would seek the emergence of a unifying political group made up of nationalist elements. We will need to examine this in some detail before a clear-cut answer can be given as to its feasibility. There should be an election law to encourage development of a two-party system.

I. Finally, we should maintain the closest possible contact with all shades of political opinion, leadership and groupings. Our ability to influence events needs to be strengthened and then exercised with prudence. Our contacts with unofficial Vietnamese must grow.

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- 5 -

13. We are now faced with the prospect that political forces will be at work in Vietnam in great variety and without clear direction. The uncertainties are apparent. The consequences are not so visible. We must, as always, be pragmatic on method, while steadfast on the need to ward off the Viet Cong aggressors and to build an independent modern state.

14. We will undoubtedly not be able to control events but we should be able to influence them. We must expect that civil administration will suffer, particularly in the fields of economics and revolutionary development although there will be some progress. We do not believe that we need to suffer from lack of military progress where our own role is more definitive and where our influence can be brought to bear more directly.

~~SECRET~~

35
April 18, 1966
Monday, 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President

I believe you will wish to read
these capsule impressions of Ray
Cline after his Far Eastern tour.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~

1005

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Copies to: Thompson
Komer



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

13 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt Rostow ←

SUBJECT : Impressions from East Asia

As you requested, I am sending you a few notes on my impressions of the psychological climate in East Asia as observed on my just-finished trip to New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Manila. These impressions are based on rather intangible evidence, and I pass them to you as merely my own personal feeling about the situation.

Ray S. Cline

RAY S. CLINE

Special Assistant to the Director

Attachments:

Notes on-

1. Firmness of US Policy on Vietnam Cast in Doubt by Widespread Familiarity with US Congressional and Press Opposition Views.
2. Chinese Communists are in Serious Domestic Political Difficulties--Badly Need Strategic Victory in Vietnam.
3. Chinese Communists Predict and Other Asians fear Eventual Softening of American Policy on Vietnam and Withdrawal of Forces from Southeast Asia.
4. Free Chinese Government in Taiwan Tragically Low in Morale About US China Policy.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-41

By iss, NARA, Date 9-20-04

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

85-6

-1-

Firmness of US Policy On Vietnam Cast in Doubt by Wide-
spread Familiarity with US Congressional and Press Op-
position Views

One of the main impressions I came back with is that friendly governments and officials, as well as Americans resident abroad, need a great deal of repeated briefing and reassurance on US policy with respect to Southeast Asia. The overseas press in these areas and the thinking of even the friendliest of our Allies tends to be permeated with the views of Walter Lippmann, Senator Morse, and Senator Fulbright. There is not so much doubt about our good intentions as there is questioning of our persistence in the face of domestic, political, and journalistic opposition, the importance of which is greatly exaggerated everywhere. Judging by my reception, an almost constant flow of well-informed roving Ambassadors from Washington would be welcome throughout the Far East and would be very useful in persuading people that the President and his advisors have a clear appreciation of the dangers in Southeast Asia and a robust determination to do something definite about them.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-41
By is, NARA, Date 9-20-04

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-2-

Chinese Communists are in Serious Domestic Political
Difficulties-Badly Need Strategic Victory in Vietnam

The second general impression I formed on my trip, particularly as a result of discussions in Hong Kong and Taipei, is that the Chinese Communists are in serious domestic political difficulties. While the Peking regime has disastrously overplayed its hand abroad, especially in Indonesia and Africa, it has continued to temporize with its grave economic deficiencies at home and has barely been able to feed its people during the past five years. It has survived by the short-term devices of importing grain from capitalist countries and permitting the peasants to concentrate on their private agricultural plots at the expense of the Marxist-favored commune. At the same time, the Mao regime, by its own rigidities of thought, seems to have succeeded in alienating itself from most of China's youth, intellectuals, and political cadres (Party administrators) on whom the regime must depend to get its orders carried out. The increasingly paranoid tone of Mao and his immediate entourage suggests to me that they are trying to cover up their domestic difficulties by the shrillness of their invective. The main hope of the Chinese Communists at this point is that the American effort in Vietnam will somehow be defeated and discredited, thus giving the Mao regime the strategic victory which it so badly needs.

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-3-

Chinese Communists Predict and Other Asians Fear Eventual
Softening of American Policy on Vietnam and Withdrawal of
Forces from Southeast Asia

Ironically, the Chinese Communists, despite their own troubles, have succeeded in convincing many non-Communist Asians that the US is having so many domestic political difficulties in mobilizing support for the Vietnam effort, that it is only a question of time until the US withdraws from Southeast Asia, leaving everyone alone with the Chinese Communists, who will then seem to have been right in their militant policy all the time. Part of the Chinese Communist success in selling this theme may stem from the selective press coverage from the US to which people in the Far East are exposed. At any rate, the Chinese Communists drum incessantly in their own propaganda on the idea that the Communists in Southeast Asia need only to remain unyielding in their political and military struggle, trading off Asian manpower against Western technology in order to cause the Americans finally to lose heart and to withdraw from Vietnam. I met many basically friendly Asians, resolutely anti-Communist, who found it hard not to accept this Peking view. While they accept the good intentions of the President and his Administration, they fear that Chinese Communist willingness to drag the conflict out as long as possible and energetic Communist propaganda in the US will eventually lead to a softening of American policy, withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia, and perhaps an accommodation with the Chinese Communists.

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-4-

Free Chinese Government in Taiwan Tragically Low in Morale
About US China Policy

The most tragic case of lack of confidence in the future among non-Communist Asians is in the Free Chinese Government in Taipei. President Chiang Kai-shek [REDACTED] feel that the Americans would eventually do as the Chinese Communists hope and predict. His views are strongly colored by several factors which have disturbed him and which have made him exceedingly more [REDACTED] These factors are:

3.3
(b)(1)

a. The US has not had an Ambassador in Taipei for nine months, although President Chiang had appealed personally to the US Government for a candid high-level strategic dialogue concerning common US-Free Chinese interests in Asia;

b. The US Military Aid Program is tapering off and Taipei feels its Armed Forces are deteriorating in terms of military equipment and technology vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists;

c. The US is unwilling to discuss with the Free Chinese whether and when the US might want Free Chinese Armed Forces to fight against the Chinese Communists if the open war which President Chiang expects should break out between the US and the Peking regime;

d. Congressional and journalistic comments on China policy in the US speak of a reappraisal of American commitments in the Far East likely to lead to an accommodation with the Chinese Communist regime, an accommodation which can only be effected if the US is willing to jettison the Free Chinese Government in Taiwan.

President Chiang [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

[REDACTED] is apparently turning over the reins of day-to-day administration to his son, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, although he intervenes spasmodically. Ching-kuo, who is an able administrator and who has always had a realistic view of Free Chinese capabilities and Free China's dependence on the US for survival, is struggling to maintain morale and forward-motion in Taipei, but he also seems weighed down and depressed by his governmental burdens and by the gloomy estimate of the future which his father has derived from the factors outlined above. Curiously, the Taiwan economy is booming and the competence of the political administration in Taipei is very impressive. There is much strength on the Island to work with, but I am persuaded that we must find some way to improve morale in the top

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4 Cont'd)

echelons of government and hold out hopes for a constructive partnership with the US if we are going to maintain a viable non-Communist Chinese regime in Taiwan as a contrast and political counterpressure against the Chinese Communist regime in Peking.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

86


~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1966

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support United
Kingdom Air Forces in West Germany



3.3(b)
(4)(5)(6)
6.2(a)

As in the previous authorization you approved, these weapons were included in the figure approved for planning purposes in the overall annual dispersal authorization approved last June.

If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

W. A. Rostow

✓
Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 06-19 (#5a)

By iel, NARA, Date 1-22-10

86a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 19, 1966

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO
Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

It was noted that the
Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission concur in
the requested dispersal.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding
that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are program-
med for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160
and the current PAL schedule.

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-313
By Sj, NARA, Date 88-02

SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1966


~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO
Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany

34(b)(5), (6),
6.1(a)



If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense.

W. Averell Harrington

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

See me ☐

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-313
By Sj, NARA, Date 8-8-02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1966


~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support United
Kingdom Air Forces in West Germany


6.2(a)
3.3(b)
(4)(5)(6)



It was further noted that the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the requested dispersal authorization.

The requested authority, which was approved in principle on February 12, 1965, has been approved with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160 and the current PAL schedule. It is also understood that the yields of these weapons are within the limitations contained in NSAM 143, as amended by NSAM 197.

6.2(a)
3.3(b)
(4)(5)(6)



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NIJ 06-19
By id, NARA, Date 1-22-10

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

88

S/S *refused*
SICS

4/18

SENT
SICA

APR 17

EEA782
PP WTE 10
DE WTE 642

FROM: ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: VH60195

UNCLAS

GENERAL ABDEL RAHMAN AL-AREF HAS BEEN NAMED PRESIDENT OF IRAQ TO SUCCEED HIS BROTHER WHO WAS KILLED IN A PLANE CRASH LAST WEEK.

STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM YOU TO THE NEW PRESIDENT:

QUOTE
EXCELLENCY:

MY BEST WISHES TO YOU ON THE ASSUMPTION OF YOUR HEAVY AND IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I EXTEND ALSO WISHES FOR PEACE, PROGRESS, AND HAPPINESS OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

HIS EXCELLENCY
ABDEL RAHMAN AL-AREF,
PRESIDENT OF IRAQ,
BAGHDAD.

UNQUOTE

DTG: 17/1742Z APRIL 1966

4/18/66 - Marie Farn called for
Ravel to say President
approved above message.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

April 17, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March first and for the understanding it conveys of our effort in Vietnam. Vice President Humphrey has reported fully on his discussions with you.

I would like in this letter to share with you some of my views on the good talks I had with Prime Minister Gandhi. You may already have seen some of the public statements that Mrs. Gandhi and I made, but in the event you have not, I am asking Ambassador McConaughy to make a set available to you.

These statements I think provide a good summary of our talks, but I want to assure you personally that we discussed frankly the subjects which concern you most. I stressed to Mrs. Gandhi the importance we attach to the restoration of peace on the subcontinent and the continuation of the process of reconciliation begun at Tashkent. I explained to her the difficulty my government will have in providing sustained assistance unless we can be reasonably sure that India and Pakistan are now able to concentrate on peaceful development. I urged her to keep up the effort to resolve the underlying issues which divide India and Pakistan, including Kashmir.

I can report to you that I found Mrs. Gandhi to be firm in her commitment to carry out fully the Tashkent Declaration. At the same time, her views on relations with your country were moderate and constructive. She explained to me in complete candor the domestic political and economic problems she faces as her Government prepares for next year's elections. Both you and I have submitted ourselves and our Governments to the electorate in the recent past and I believe that you can appreciate, as I do, her very real problem in this regard.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI

86-250


By

ing

NARA, Date 7-17-89

I have read with concern of recent charges by both Pakistan and India that the other side is violating the Tashkent accord. I have also been troubled about the effect the visit of the Chinese Communist leaders might have on relations between the two great nations of the subcontinent. But I was heartened to read of the exchange of messages between you and Mrs. Gandhi as she returned to New Delhi from abroad. I earnestly hope that the moderation and keen sense of realism you both possess will keep alive the spirit of reconciliation so encouragingly begun at Tashkent.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mohammed Ayub Khan
President of Pakistan
Rawalpindi

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/13/66