

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE



WHASA

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

4/16/66
DATE

SSN: 633

CITE: CAP66214

FROM: **W. W. ROSTOW**

TO: **THE PRESIDENT**

SUBJ: **Lodge Estimate of the Situation in South Vietnam**
INFO:

CITE: _____

(Send attached)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Doc NARS, Date 7-27-84

PAGE _____ OF _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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90a

Latest developments
~~As~~ In an assessment of the ~~present situation~~ *in South Vietnam*, Ambassador Lodge observes that the situation is now calmer than it has been for many weeks, but is still dangerous and explosive, particularly in I Corps. *P* He believes that the political congress put the government in a more favorable position than might have been hoped for, and that the Buddhists have been forced to recognize certain weaknesses in their position, although they may yet upset arrangements. *P* Lodge sees as the major trouble areas ahead the restoration of control in I Corps, the question of authority in the transitional period prior to a permanent government, and the future position of the military, including not only strains within the Directorate, but the younger military officers who are on the verge of revolt against civilian political ambitions.

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Authority NLS 85-23

By isp, NARS, Date 6-17-85

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906

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OO VTE18
DE VTE 633

1966 APR 16 20 34

FROM: V.V. ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66214

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: LODGE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

IN AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AMBASSADOR LODGE OBSERVES THAT THE SITUATION IS NOW CALMER THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR MANY WEEKS, BUT IS STILL DANGEROUS AND EXPLOSIVE, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS.

HE BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL CONGRESS PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN A MORE FAVORABLE POSITION THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN HOPED FOR, AND THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO RECOGNIZE CERTAIN WEAKNESSES IN THEIR POSITION, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY YET UPSET ARRANGEMENTS.

LODGE SEES AS THE MAJOR TROUBLE AREAS AHEAD THE RESTORATION OF CONTROL IN I CORPS, THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRIOR TO A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT, AND THE FUTURE POSITION OF THE MILITARY, INCLUDING NOT ONLY STRAINS WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE, BUT THE YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE ON THE VERGE OF REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIAN POLITICAL AMBITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 162011Z APRIL 1966

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-30
By sig, NARS, Date: 9-13-85

April 16, 1966

My dear Mr. President:


I am in my home now, refreshed and encouraged by one of the most memorable receptions ever accorded me in all my years in public life.

The people of Mexico demonstrated their affection and friendship to the people of the United States, and they did it with warmth and cordiality. I cannot express adequately, Mr. President, the depth of my own emotions over this outpouring of sentiment from your people.

Mrs. Johnson and I were both deeply touched by the way you took us into your home and made us part of your family. When the leaders of two nations can talk together, and meet together as trusted friends, both our countries benefit.

My daughters, my wife and I send to you, Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, your family, and that handsome young man, Mauricio, who greeted me so cheerfully, our enduring affection and gratitude.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United
Mexican State
Mexico, D. F.

LBj/JV/vm

Approved by Brom Smith and Walt Rostow -- 4/16/66 - phone O. K.

April 16, 1966

My dear Tony:

On the flight home, I read again your speech at the dedication ceremonies. It is one of the most moving and eloquent testaments to leadership and loyalty of purpose I have ever read.

Your country, and your President, demonstrated in the most visible and cheering form, affection and warmth for the United States. For me personally, my brief visit to Mexico City will remain one of the most rewarding of my entire life.

To you, my old and dear friend, Lady Bird and I send our gratitude for making our visit so exciting, so pleasant, and helping build stronger the unshakable bonds of friendship and faith between Mexico and the United States.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Antonio Carrillo Flores
Minister of Foreign Relations
of Mexico
Mexico, D. F.

LBj/JV7vm

Approved by Brom Smith and Walt Rostow - by phone to vm
4/16/66 ---3:05 pm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93
April 15, 1966
Friday, 2:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Near East Foundation holds its Golden Anniversary Banquet in New York on 25 April. The Shah, King Constantine and King Hussein are sending congratulatory messages to be read there, and I think one from you would be in order.

The Foundation is an outstanding example of private American initiative in the aid field. It was founded in 1915 to handle famine relief in the Near East but since then has pioneered with grass roots technical assistance projects geared to teaching people how to help themselves.

Your message would be especially appropriate because you were unable to receive a Foundation delegation last fall during an earlier stage of this 50th anniversary celebration.

For signature if you approve.

Walt Rostow


93a

April 19, 1966

Dear Mr. Partridge:

It is a pleasure to extend this message of congratulations to the Near East Foundation as it celebrates a half-century of distinguished service to the peoples of the Near East. From its early days as a relief organization to its pioneering role in technical assistance, the Near East Foundation has built an outstanding record of sustained American concern for the task of improving living conditions in that part of the world. You have shown what a private organization can do to help people acquire the skills needed to build better lives for themselves. This is the same objective that your Government is dedicated to, and we are proud to have organizations such as yours as partners in this enterprise. I wish the Near East Foundation another fifty years of equally successful and much appreciated service.

Sincerely,



Mr. E. De Alton Partridge
President, Near East Foundation
54 East 64th Street
New York, New York 10021

LBJ:State:HHS;tmt 4/18/66

Typed copy
Pillars 4/14
delivered to the
on 4/15/66

94

Subject / V.O.T. - name

4/15/66

inside the government

Contingency:

1. The planning process you directed is now under way. Let Mr. George Ball be chairman, it will examine both policy options. It's now framed up almost right, I think. Ball and
will
be

Bill and I
will keep a close
eye on it.

2. With respect to General Taylor's memorandum... A systematic
State-Defense reply should be furnished by Saturday.

On specific points I can report as of the present as follows:

as of this morning (P.M.)

a) I now look ~~forward~~ ^{forward} through the Directorate (and ^{there} K.G.) will remain at the government. Saigon, State, Defense agencies. That should remain the objective, unless the Directorate itself decides to the contrary.

b) Ky and the ⁱⁿ Directorate are being tough - and thus
 less successful - without keeping civil order in Saigon.

c) K y has been trying to avoid making Buddhist martyrs, in keeping civil order. That is the right objective, if possible -

d) Bill Bundy and Lodge will organize an effort to explain the Buddhists in Viet-nam are not the same thing as Tin Quang's Buddhist Institute operation.

e) We began a few days ago moving out again on our
using our supply personnel on the I Corps area if
necessary.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 85-32

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-32

By rip, NARS, Date 7-9-85

for your consideration.

to the Nation

W. C. C. C.

He wanted and making progress made.
 If. I left behind with State and Federal this morning
 a list of 107 names of persons and their documents should
 be made in the day ahead and kept that by ^{him} himself
 then now promptly A Theatrical: a public relation meeting
 economic, political, and diplomatic fronts.

merel - mixed in steam suggested by Gen Taylor.
(n) ^{the density} working out for Taylor that one rotation per second

(2) The Bank has been working for two days on a U.S. government statement upon that with a Gov

the state of the Parliament - were deep up to date.

(c) I want you to work hard and study hard at

parking in 60 minutes was good indeed. in the Botanical.

h) wie lang, warum, wofür und welche Informationen

The book in the family. The original. 40' of 20' of the original.

(c) We have known (probably) Sargent for a while on golfing

See I. Corporal to adjoining and new (then) St. Andrew.

(f) ~~from the idea of using non-synthetic~~ communications

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1966
Thursday, 12:45 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With the Gandhi visit behind us, it is time to begin shoring up the Pakistan side of our affairs in the subcontinent.

A first step is to tell Ayub what you said to Mrs. Gandhi about Indo-Pak relations and Kashmir, since we promised to keep him informed. Kashmir is still his chief concern, and he will be watching sharply for signs that we are favoring India. The attached letter assures him that you pressed Mrs. Gandhi on this subject as hard as you pressed him. While we cannot report any specific progress, it will reassure Ayub to know that you have not forgotten your promise to him to say the same hard things to the Indians that you said to him. It is also a chance to let him know gently that we are watching the Chicom visit.

I recommend you take an especially close look at the State Department text. Because most of your talk with Mrs. Gandhi was private, they were drafting partly in the dark. Knowing what you told both her and Ayub, you may want to put your personal stamp on this one. The only caution is that we do not want to say anything the Paks could leak to our disadvantage in India.

Secretary Rusk will soon be sending you recommendations for possible next steps with Pakistan on the economic side. Ayub's finance minister will be here next week for informal talks with the World Bank and AID. Ayub is still pressing for resumption of military aid, and we will have recommendations on that in a few weeks. But we are ignoring both the economic and military questions in this letter in order to preserve your flexibility, while still maintaining a little movement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 5-21-98

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 17, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March first and for the understanding it conveys of our effort in Vietnam. Vice President Humphrey has reported fully on his discussions with you.

I would like in this letter to share with you some of my views on the good talks I had with Prime Minister Gandhi. You may already have seen some of the public statements that Mrs. Gandhi and I made, but in the event you have not, I am asking Ambassador McConaughy to make a set available to you.

These statements I think provide a good summary of our talks, but I want to assure you personally that we discussed frankly the subjects which concern you most. I stressed to Mrs. Gandhi the importance we attach to the restoration of peace on the subcontinent and the continuation of the process of reconciliation begun at Tashkent. I explained to her the difficulty my government will have in providing sustained assistance unless we can be reasonably sure that India and Pakistan are now able to concentrate on peaceful development. I urged her to keep up the effort to resolve the underlying issues which divide India and Pakistan, including Kashmir.

I can report to you that I found Mrs. Gandhi to be firm in her commitment to carry out fully the Tashkent Declaration. At the same time, her views on relations with your country were moderate and constructive. She explained to me in complete candor the domestic political and economic problems she faces as her Government prepares for next year's elections. Both you and I have submitted ourselves and our Governments to the electorate in the recent past and I believe that you can appreciate, as I do, her very real problem in this regard.

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
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-250

By lig NARA, Date 7-17-89

I have read with concern of recent charges by both Pakistan and India that the other side is violating the Tashkent accord. I have also been troubled about the effect the visit of the Chinese Communist leaders might have on relations between the two great nations of the subcontinent. But I was heartened to read of the exchange of messages between you and Mrs. Gandhi as she returned to New Delhi from abroad. I earnestly hope that the moderation and keen sense of realism you both possess will keep alive the spirit of reconciliation so encouragingly begun at Tashkent.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mohammed Ayub Khan
President of Pakistan
Rawalpindi

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/13/66

4515

95-6



From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.Pk., H.J.

PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI.

185

March, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of February 11, 1966, which was delivered to me by Ambassador McConaughy on February 15.

I am deeply appreciative of your desire to keep me informed about developments regarding the situation in Viet Nam. I have studied the Declaration of Honolulu, the Joint Communique and your statement of February 8, 1966, on the recent conference at Honolulu, which you were good enough to enclose with your letter. They are impressive documents and I particularly welcome your decision to launch a massive attack on the socio-economic problems of South Viet Nam in order to help build a stable political, economic and social base in that country.

I have also since had the pleasure of meeting Vice President Hubert Humphrey and other officials of your Government who accompanied him to Karachi, and we had a very useful exchange of views on Viet Nam and other matters of interest to both our countries.

We fully understand the difficulties faced by the U.S. in the complex situation in Viet Nam, and I hope that your search for a peaceful settlement of this problem will bear fruit before long. It is my sincere hope that under your dedicated leadership the United States will find a satisfactory solution to this tragic conflict.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-250
By 48 NARA Date 7-17-89

April 14, 1966

Dear General Ankrah:

Ambassador Williams has transmitted your kind letter of March 24 to me. Its honest, straightforward account of the conditions which led to the change of government in Ghana and its frank assessment of the problems to be solved have left a deep impression upon me.

I was particularly encouraged to see that you are alert to the dangers of subversion from alien sources. Indeed, we in the United States hail your Government's efforts to wipe out arbitrary rule in Ghana as you reinstate the rule of law and re-establish those institutions essential to democratic government. The swift diplomatic initiatives undertaken by your Government were reassuring and I look forward to the role which an effective and truly independent Ghana can play in the councils of Africa and of the world.

You are to be praised for your immediate recognition of the economic problems facing Ghana and the appointment of an able Economic Committee. Praise is also well-deserved for the prompt actions you took at home and abroad to deal with both your short-term and long-term economic difficulties. The United States is acutely aware of the critical state of Ghana's economy and of the immediate needs of the Ghanaian people. Our airlift of twenty-five tons of canned milk last week was tangible recognition of your emergency food requirements. It represents a partial delivery of five hundred tons of milk to help prevent the threatened famine situation you described in your letter. It is our hope that the PL-480 food commodity agreement which our two Governments recently signed will help substantially to tide you over the critical period ahead.

I greatly appreciate your expression of support for our common belief in democratic principles and the democratic way

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-252
By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

of life. This is one of the surest ways of achieving the world peace we so fervently desire.

It will be my pleasure to reinforce the ties of friendship which bind the United States and Ghana. Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and I look forward to hearing from you personally from time to time on developments in Ghana.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah
Chairman, National Liberation Council of
The Republic of Ghana
Accra

cc: Bill Moyers
W. W. Rostow
LBJ:UH:em (4/7/66)

97

April 12, 1966
Tuesday, 11:45 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In answer to your question (attached), Rusk does not think Bourguiba can visit Washington until later in the year, since he has a string of tenth anniversary celebrations this spring. So Rusk recommends going ahead with the \$15 million Tunisian program loan now and asks your approval for inviting Bourguiba for the second half of 1966.

The main reason for not delaying the loan any longer is that the Tunisians have geared their self-help measures for this calendar year to our aid and to the \$30 million which other donors pledged at a World Bank meeting in December. We originally promised a decision by the end of December but delayed during our aid review to give it an especially careful going over.

The Tunisians have done a good job on their side of the bargain and need to push ahead with their development imports for this year. We're afraid holding off any longer would make us look horribly inefficient and undercut our leverage in bargaining for a new round of reforms.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with loan ✓

See me _____

Invite Bourguiba for last half of 1966 ✓

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-252
By ing NARA, Date 11-16-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

approval per
John Jacobson
from Rusk
4/14/66
BKS modified Sh

S/S #5795

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of President Bourguiba and the
Tunisian Loan Package

Recommendations:

That you authorize us to extend an invitation to Tunisian
President Bourguiba to visit during the second half of 1966.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

That you approve the Tunisian loan package now pending.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Background:

I strongly endorse a visit by President Bourguiba but it
appears that this distinguished African leader would not be able
to visit Washington before the second half of 1966. As this is
the case I believe we should proceed with Tunisian Loan agreement.
The Tunisians wish to implement important portions of their
Economic Development Plan, and urgently need the US commodities
which would be provided under this agreement.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-251
By mg, NARA, Date 2-26-88


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1966
Tuesday, 11:45

38
To Rusk
by pouch

Mr. President

Attached is a memorandum from
General Taylor on the current
situation in Vietnam. Copies
have gone to Secretary Rusk and
Secretary McNamara.


W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Current Situation in South Viet-Nam

1. Over the weekend, I reviewed the available information on the current situation in South Viet-Nam and developed the following thoughts which I am passing to you for what they are worth. I am always aware of the danger that an idea derived from cables may look well in Washington but be wide of the actual mark on the ground.

2. The pertinent facts as known here

The factors which have dominated the situation from the outset remain the same: the Tri Quang-Tam Chau Buddhist Institute, the Center malcontents in Danang-Hue, General Thi and his friends, and the Viet Cong. These remain the sources of our troubles but we must not forget two other national elements of vast importance though presently quiescent, namely, the Armed Forces and the other minority groups which are watching with intent concern the Buddhist maneuvering.

3. At this stage, the most impressive fact is that Tri Quang and his associates have united all their resources to pull down the Ky Government and to replace it with one which they can control pending the creation of a constitutional successor equally subservient to Buddhist interests. They have formed their own political party for the first time and are in open revolt against Ky and the Directorate under the guise of supporting the "popular demand" for an immediate change to civilian government. With the support of General Thi and the Center malcontents, they are in de facto control of the I Corps area north of Danang and seem to have subverted at least a part of the 1st Division. Any attempt by force to restore government control of this region is likely to result in bloodshed (although there are lots of rabbits among the Vietnamese who will run from force).

4. Ky has had no success in placating or buying off his enemies. The Buddhists are out to win big and will not be placated by anything short of capitulation--at least, that seems to be their present mood. I do not find evidence in the cables that Ky has made any attempt to contact Thi directly and to find out what his price really is. On his recent visit to Danang last week, Ky talked only to General Chuan and apparently did not try to see Thi.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-252
By *inf* NARA, Date *11-16-89*

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5. Ky has shown good judgment in refusing to be rushed into general elections as the Buddhists desire. He knows the risks the country would run in its present state of political unpreparedness and foresees the political turmoil which elections with their attendant factional struggles would generate in South Viet-Nam, probably to the detriment of the conduct of the war.

6. The Ky Government has not yet used any real force to restore order, hence, its ruggedness as well as that of its opponents remains untested. While Ky has won good marks for prudence, he has appeared vacillating on occasion and has certainly not yet shown himself capable of ordering the "whiff of grapeshot" which may be necessary some day if his government is to survive. He may be influenced (as General Khanh was when challenged by the Buddhists) by a recollection of the American reaction in 1963 to Diem's strong actions against these same Buddhists.

7. We know very little about the attitudes within the Armed Forces toward the current situation. We do not know the degree of unity within the Directorate--how do the Generals view the Buddhist revolt? What about the younger officers? There has always been considerable resentment among them toward the senior generals and present conditions with indiscipline in the air might favor a new "Young Turk" outbreak. (Ky presumably is now regarded as an "Old Turk.") My point is that we can not take the solid support of the Armed Forces for granted in this resistance to the Tri Quang challenge. We need to take recurrent sensings of military attitudes, using the far-flung U.S. advisor net as a source of on-the-spot reports. I am not aware of use being presently made of this system.

8. In summary, the Ky Government is in real danger as are American interests. We can not work with anarchy or, in my judgment, with the kind of government which Tri Quang is likely to install. The problem is to restore order in South Viet-Nam under a cooperative government capable of an effective prosecution of the war, while progressing toward a constitutional, freely elected government. The ideal would be an indigenous Vietnamese solution without visible U.S. participation. This does not mean U.S. neutrality toward the issues involved--we have too much at stake. But we can do little in the open other than support the principle of an eventual constitutional government without incurring the charge of intervention and the blame for Vietnamese governmental failures.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Possible Courses of Action

9. After considering the facts as known here, I conclude that, acting from the wings and using all available leverage, we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the Directorate (with or without Ky who personally is expendable) and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transition to constitutional government. In execution of such a program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be encouraged to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short of attempting to reimpose government rule by bayonets on Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely contained and isolated.

10. More specifically, the following measures should be considered and those which appeal to you should be referred to Saigon for comment and, in appropriate cases, for subsequent implementation.

a. With regard to the Buddhists

(1) The government should first make clear what attitude it intends to take toward further political demonstrations and toward the harboring of illegal demonstrators. I am not sure now what the law is but it should be strengthened as need be to meet the current situation, then be thoroughly publicized, and afterwards rigorously enforced. To get strict enforcement, Saigon will have to give clear, specific orders to police and military commanders (something rarely done in the past) and then punish ineffective performance by responsible officers.

(2) If rioters and suspect characters continue to seek sanctuary in the pagodas, after due warning the police should raid them, looking not only for malefactors but also for evidence linking the Buddhists to the Viet Cong. I strongly suspect such evidence would be found.

(3) If Tri Quang, Tam Chau et al. violate the law, they should be arrested and tried.

(4) At home, we are allowing ourselves to be trapped by the unqualified use of the term, "the Buddhists." Our spokesmen should reiterate that we are confronted by a power grab by a small group of political bonzes who constitute a sort of Tammany Hall which speaks for only a minority of one wing of the Buddhists.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

b. With regard to the Center

(1) If the Center leaders continue to resist, the dissident area should be isolated and brought to terms by withholding various kinds of government assistance. For example, the area of the I Corps could be reduced in size to those provinces north of Danang and all troops, except perhaps the 1st Division, withdrawn south into a special zone created out of the southern part of the I Corps. The command of this zone might be given to the 2nd Division commander who appears to be loyal. There would be Homeric justice in giving the reduced I Corps with its problems to General Thi or to General Nhuan of the 1st Division in order to fix responsibility on them for the security and welfare of the area which they have led into trouble. Then, by controlling troop reinforcements, air support and economic aid, the government could bring increasing pressures to bear on this area. Such a program should, of course, be accompanied by a public explanation of the reasons why the people in the Center are suffering for the misdeeds of their leaders. Meanwhile, in the procedures for setting up a new government, great pains should be taken to give evidence of sincere consideration for the legitimate interests of the Center.

(2) Once the present crisis is settled, we should urge the GVN to change the practice of having military units in the Hue-Danang area composed of officers and men from that region. It is always going to be a center of political unrest and needs to be guarded by military forces without local ties.

c. With regard to General Thi

(1) I would like to see a final effort made to placate Thi who may be retrievable (whereas Tri Quang is not). The government could also give some assurance to his friends with regard to jobs and physical security. If this effort fails, we might try the proposal contained in subparagraph b above of putting him in charge of the mess in the North.

d. With regard to the Armed Forces

(1) I should think it very important to get an advisors' report on the attitudes in the principal military units toward this situation. Such a report would probably suggest actions which should be taken with regard to the Armed Forces. I suspect it would show that the troop information provided has not been enough to keep the Armed Forces properly informed and hence properly oriented toward current events.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5-


(2) A few senior American officers should take a similar reading of attitudes within the Directorate.

e. With regard to the U.S. position

(1) We know that the motives of the United States Government are being misstated and misinterpreted by many elements involved in this struggle. The question is whether we can or should try to say something useful, addressed both to the Vietnamese and to our own public. I would think it desirable to try a draft to see what might be said. Points for possible inclusion are such things as our attitude toward the establishment of a constitutional government, our concern over current disorders, our feeling for the heavy responsibility devolving upon the Armed Forces and our confidence in their continued loyalty and devotion to duty. More difficult to decide would be the inclusion of words of warning about the impossibility of our assisting South Viet-Nam in conditions of political chaos and the futility of continuing to introduce additional means if these disorderly conditions continue.

11. As I said at the outset, the foregoing observations have the fault of being formulated far from the scene of action and without personal contact with the principal actors. The suggestions are moderate because I feel it in my bones that over-reaction at this time either in Washington or Saigon is more dangerous than a continuation of restraint. Hence, I would recommend a prudent use of force within the law against the Buddhists, and an effective isolation of the dissident part of the Center while trying to buy off Thi and urging the military to close ranks. In Washington, we should continue to reject the slogan "take over or get out" which, unfortunately, will gain in advocates if the political situation does not soon stabilize.

12. Meanwhile, I feel that we should pursue with increased vigor the military campaign on the ground in the south and in the air in the north. If we are suffering a reverse on the political front, we need to seek compensations on the military front.


Maxwell D. Taylor

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd Rostow
4-12-66
4:30p

4

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

April 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support UK ☐

6.2(a)

[REDACTED]

6.2(a)

These additional weapons were included in the figure approved for planning purposes in the overall annual dispersal authorization that you approved last June in the form of NSAM 334.

There is nothing unusual about this request and it is a routine implementation of the policy decision you previously made. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Walt Rostow

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

See me ☐

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-3 (43a)
By sl, NARA, Date 3-12-08

~~SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

99a


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April 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support Non-U.S.
NATO Forces



6.2
(u)

It was noted that the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this requested dispersal action.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160.



6.2
(u)

Walt
W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-3 (#3)
By *isl* NARA, Date 3-12-08

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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25 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support
Non-U.S. NATO Forces

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The weapons for which dispersal authority is being requested are included in the PAL installation program in accordance with NSAM 160. U.S. unilateral communications to the U.S. custodial detachments are operational, and all other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications are programmed to support this dispersal.

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Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 98-314
By ctm, NARA, Date 6-21-04

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
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6.1(a)



The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this request for dispersal action.

Cyril Vance

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Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

Pres. 100

20 Rusk
by pouch
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Limited Official Use

Monday, April 11, 1966 -- 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to Inauguration of Costa Rican
President-Elect

Secretary Rusk has sent you the attached memorandum with his recommendation on the composition of the U. S. delegation to the inauguration of Costa Rican President-elect Trejos on May 8. The only problem which Henry Wilson and I have with it is that the inauguration festivities which run from May 7 through May 10 would keep Congresswoman Green out of town for at least three working days.

Henry joins me in suggesting that you approve the Secretary's memorandum subject to Doug MacArthur obtaining the approval of the Congressional leadership to Mrs. Green's being away from the Hill for this length of time.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Rusk's recommendation.
subject to consultation with
leadership on Mrs. Green _____

Approve list but dropping Mrs. Green _____

Let's discuss further _____.

Attachment
Rusk memorandum of April 9, 1966.

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1211a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1966

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Delegation to attend
Inauguration Ceremonies of the
President-elect of Costa Rica on
May 8, 1966

Recommendation:

a) That you designate Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon to head the delegation; b) that you designate Mr. Gordon and Ambassador Raymond Telles your Personal Representatives with rank of Special Ambassador; and c) that you designate Mrs. Edith Green, Dr. Robert S. Smith, and Mr. Charles R. Burrows, Director of the Office of Central American Affairs, Department of State, your Representatives on the delegation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

This Government has received the invitation of the Government of Costa Rica to be represented by a Special Mission at the inauguration of His Excellency Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez as President of Costa Rica, scheduled for San Jose on May 8, 1966.

Mrs. Edith Green, U.S. Representative from Oregon, has been an active supporter of the Oregon Partners of the Alliance with Costa Rica. Dr. Robert S. Smith of Duke University and President-elect Trejos are good friends of long standing, dating from the time when they both taught at the University of Costa Rica.


Dean Rusk

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 11, 1966 -- 3:00 p.m.

Page 101

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by power
Hir*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recent Dominican Developments

In the past four days these favorable developments have taken place in the DR which should help in maintaining a stable electoral climate and in encouraging a heavy voter turnout:

1. The Electoral Tribunal formally eliminated the troublesome special electoral card as a voting requirement. The identity card, which all Dominicans are required to have, will be used instead.
2. The Provisional Government waived usual fees for first-time applicants for identity cards and for replacement in certain cases. It will also permit voters to vote at their actual precinct of residence, even though the required changes of residence has not yet been entered on their identity card.
3. The PRD convention nominated Juan Bosch and Antonio Guzman to head the ticket. Both accepted. (Bosch was not successful in persuading Caamano to be his running-mate. Caamano has not returned to the DR.)
4. Garcia Godoy issued a public appeal for a peaceful celebration of the anniversary of the revolution on April 24. He warned extremists that the Government knows who is behind planned "acts of agitation". (Bunker has been urging him not to allow the "Constitutionalists" to pre-empt the anniversary celebrations and to make it clear to agitators of both extremes that he will not tolerate disturbances.)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By rip NARA, Date 11-16-89

Monday, April 11, 1966 -- 9:55 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Brom Smith reported his conversation with Jake reflecting your views of the last major cable sent to Ambassador Lodge. In the light of your view, as I understood it, I wrote early the next morning the attached memorandum: Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum. This approach seemed one way of getting at your sense that we had to use our influence soon to get a more orderly situation in Viet Nam. I addressed it to Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti urged that I make it available directly to you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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102a
April 9, 1966 -- 7:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara

SUBJECT: Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum.

1. We are a nation that cannot use force to shoot people apparently demanding a constitution and free elections; and we cannot support for long governments that do this.

2. But we can use force to suppress disorder designed to disrupt or pressure a Constituent Assembly, if it is decently representative; and we can support a government that is protecting such an Assembly.

3. It follows that it may be better to accept a constitutional gathering heavily weighted with provincial and municipal officials, as the Buddhists claim they want, than it is to try first to suppress the disorder in the streets. There is, in any case, no evidence that the present Directorate commands the unity, will, or force capable of achieving the latter result.

4. This means:

-- substantial concessions to the Buddhist formula for a constitutional gathering;

-- maintenance of the unity of the Directorate;

-- probably -- but not necessarily -- the replacement of Ky, who has shown guts and some political sensitivity;

-- then, at the right moment, a countrywide curfew, backed, if necessary, by U.S. forces, to permit the constitutional group to work.

5. Right now, with the latest Buddhist communique, we are faced with a classic revolutionary situation -- like Paris in 1789 and St. Petersburg in 1917. What we desperately need is a pause in its violence and momentum. So long as a constitutional gathering is not in

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Authority NLS 85-30

By ijg, N+RG, Date 9-13-85

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-2-

place, we can neither achieve that pause nor try, politically, to separate the sheep from the goats.

6. Tri Quang's tactics at the moment seem clear. He smells the indecision of the Directorate and its weakness. He sees the Directorate has managed to place in the hands of his organization the northern regional interests, idealistic students interested in democracy, even a part of the military itself. He is going for the jugular through the tactics of street agitation he knows best. Assuming he is not a VC himself, the VC obviously regard him as a potential Kerensky.

7. I see no power capable of stopping, by force alone, the revolution he has organized: the Vietnamese military cannot; and we are immobilized by the nature of our deepest commitments. We are on a road to disaster unless we can get a pause and create a situation where we can bring counterforce and counterpolitics to bear.

8. It is evident that Tri Quang and his men -- for example, the rector of Hue University (Saigon's 3846) -- have some ideas about the tactics they will use in a constitutional gathering. Both Lodge and we are under no illusion that we will be in the clear once the clan can be gathered -- if it can be. But it's my hunch that Tri Quang will have less leverage and we will have more in those circumstances than either of us now imagine. And, as I say, the alternative is sleep-walking into disaster.

9. The gut of the issue is to get enough Buddhists into the convention to give the Directorate -- and perhaps us -- a credible basis for suppressing disorder. To that end, we should be prepared to make compromises that do not leave us without a Directorate. Some deal with Thi may be a critical element.

10. There is no major literate struggle leader -- let alone the VC leadership -- who is not now thinking in terms of the Russian revolution: a war-weary people; an unrepresentative government; the beginnings of disintegration in the armed forces; the issue of a constituent assembly; etc. If we are to prove Marx's dictum -- that "history never repeats itself except as farce" -- we have to bring into play the factor in the equation that was not present in Russia in 1917: the presence of U.S. force. (I believe Khoa is right in Saigon's 3842

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-3-

from Thomsen, that the VC would have long since taken over Hue if the U.S. Marines were not there.) The problem is for Lodge and Ky to create the political setting in which this factor can be brought into play. The only way I can perceive this can be done is if we take considerable risks in assembling a constituent group and then unite with the Directorate in creating around it an environment of order.

11. If I rightly remember, the Russian Constituent Assembly gathered in June 1917; in July Lenin's first coup aborted; in the face of defeat in the field and Kerensky's weakness, Lenin took over in November. This is about what would happen in Saigon if we were not there; but we are there. And right now we have to try to find the ways to make that fact count.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Vance
Mr. U.S. Johnson
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. John McNaughton
Mr. William Bundy
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Jack Valenti

WWRostow:rlh

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday,
April 11, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Ankrah, the head of Ghana's post-coup Government, has written you (Tab A) to describe the conditions which led to the coup and the economic problems he faces. It is a mature, statesmanlike letter in which he pledges himself to the stabilization of Ghana's impoverished economy and pledges Ghana's support of democratic principles.

Ankrah's Government is decidedly pro-West and has already made significant strides towards putting in order the mess they inherited from N'Krumah. To meet Ghana's emergency needs, the Canadians have pledged \$2 million worth of wheat flour and the West Germans have offered credits in the amount of about \$10 million.

Your letter of reply (Tab B) commends Ankrah's efforts and informs him of the substantial contribution the US is making to meet Ghana's emergency requirements: (a) an airlift of 25 tons of canned milk with the balance of 475 tons to arrive shortly and (b) the signing of a PL-480 Title I agreement for \$7.46 million worth of surplus food commodities.

For signature.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-252
By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL

103a
THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA

24th March, 1966

My Dear President Johnson,

I am taking this opportunity to write to you personally in order to explain the circumstances that led to the recent change of government in Ghana, and to discuss some of the most crucial problems which the National Liberation Council inherited from the old regime since it assumed power on 24th February, 1966. In view of the fact that there had recently been changes of governments in a number of African States, I thought my explanation would enable you to make a correct assessment of events in Ghana and to view the military take-over in its correct perspective.

The Army and the Police Services were compelled to intervene to stem the tide of a growing communist menace in Ghana and the catastrophic deterioration of our economy. As I told the people of Ghana in my nationwide radio and television broadcast on 28th February, "this grave step was taken because no other means was available to restore to the people of Ghana the blessings of liberty, justice, happiness and prosperity for which we all have struggled for so long". By his arbitrary use of power, Nkrumah lost the confidence and support of the people of Ghana and in keeping with our tradition we had to remove him from power by the only means available to us.

We became convinced that the ex-President and his communist friends, not excluding his party renegades, were determined to use Ghana as a bridge-head for the dissemination of communism and subversion in Africa South of the Sahara. To achieve this, he began by systematically destroying the independence of the judiciary and the legislature. Nkrumah turned the civil service into a political instrument thus weakening its effectiveness and discipline.

We watched with dismay the destruction of our civil liberties. The cherished rights of the individual were contemptuously disregarded, and ideologies alien to our culture and traditions were imposed upon us. Trade Unions, Farmers' organizations and the National Council of Ghana Women were all made integral wings of the banned Convention People's Party. The press, radio and television services were all rigidly controlled and

Honourable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United
States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-252
By lip NARA, Date 11-16-89



THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA

CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL

- 2 -

used as the mouthpiece of the ruling Party. All legitimate opposition to the old regime was ruthlessly suppressed and the people of Ghana could not even voice their grievances without running the risk of arbitrary imprisonment or detention.

Nkrumah leaned heavily towards the East and brought into the country hundreds of so-called Chinese, Russian and East German technicians and experts. We knew, however, that some Chinese experts were in fact training saboteurs in special camps to subvert other independent African States. The Russians were also using East German nationals to train the ex-President's guard and security men. Secret arms and ammunition dumps had been built in many parts of the country by the deposed President and these were only discovered after his overthrow.

What is more, by their reckless political adventures and spurious economic theories, the deposed President and his Party drove Ghana to the brink of economic disaster and alienated the sympathy and support of our traditional friends in the West with whom we had enjoyed years of friendship and economic co-operation.

At this stage, it is not possible to make a complete assessment of the moral, intellectual and material damage which the former regime has inflicted on the people of Ghana. The National Liberation Council has fully assumed the onerous task of mentally rehabilitating our people. We on the Council are determined to make good the damage which the former President and his colleagues have created in the minds of our young people. We are determined to remove all traces of alien ideological influence from our country and improve relations with our traditional Western friends, among whom we count the people of the United States. We plan to re-educate the youth of Ghana and wean them from the pernicious ideologies with which their minds have been tainted. All these appear formidable for the new regime, but what is even more formidable, Mr. President, is the critical state of our economy.

When the National Liberation Council took over the administration of the country, the economy was in a very chaotic state, mainly as the result of gross

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THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA

CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL

- 3 -

mismanagement and unbridled spending of public funds on prestige projects of doubtful value. Ghana's balance of payments is in serious deficit, essential commodities are in short supply and inflationary pressures are mounting by leaps and bounds, while unemployment figures keep on rising. In the face of these difficulties we are being called upon to meet some of our most urgent overseas payments within the next few weeks.

The Economic Committee of the National Liberation Council is formulating realistic plans to stabilise the economy. This calls for a drastic re-examination of several projects with a view to eliminating those that are not economically viable. The Committee is also making contacts with friendly countries from the West, the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Africa and the International Monetary Fund for assistance. These will, however, entail some protracted negotiations, but something will have to be done immediately to improve our foreign exchange position, thus enabling us to make immediate payments for essential imports.

If we fail to take immediate steps to meet this emergency, Ghana will be plunged into an acute economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. To aggravate this ominous situation, we are also threatened with a famine within the next few months. Should this situation continue unchecked all our efforts to salvage the country's economy will be nullified and the hopes of millions of Ghanaians for a happier and brighter future obliterated.

To tide us over the critical weeks that lie ahead, the National Liberation Council has appealed to your great country, Mr. President, for aid and food, and I do earnestly hope that your response will be swift and substantial. Furthermore, it is my hope that we will establish a line of credit with the United States as soon as possible. While we look to our friends for whatever help they can give us, we are working hard with our very limited resources to ensure the survival of our economy.

If the National Liberation Council succeeds to arrest this economic disaster, the people of Ghana will be convinced that they have been ushered into a new era, bright with prospects for a better life. The Council will

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THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA

CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL

- 4 -

also have the satisfaction of achieving their objective of restoring to Ghana democracy, the rule of law and economic sanity.

The Council will thus hand over the administration, at the appropriate time, to a civilian government. As I said in my recent broadcast, "the Armed Forces and the Police who put their lives at stake to bring about this long-awaited change from Nkrumah's oppressive regime to a democratic form of Government have no ambition what-so-ever to rule this country indefinitely." In due course a Constitutional Reform Commission will be set up to produce a Draft Constitution acceptable to all sections of our people and their recommendations presented to the nation for adoption at a referendum. We will also re-introduce the separation of powers of the legislature, the judiciary and the executive which Nkrumah and his Party wantonly destroyed.

We know that a strong, viable and democratic Ghana will exert great influence in the councils of Africa and the world. The people of Ghana are determined to turn to their friends in the West. We are conscious of the goodwill and sympathy of the American people with whom we desire to maintain a close and warm friendship. As a developing country, our main pre-occupation is to build our nation as you have built yours since your independence.

You can depend on me, my Government and the people of Ghana to support your democratic principles and your way of life. As a great Power, we know you do not want us to play the role of a puppet state, but at least following your example, we can re-educate our children to admire the glories of real democracy. To be able to do this, we definitely need your help and encouragement

I look forward to keeping you informed personally of developments in Ghana from time to time and to hearing from you. I hope that it will be possible in the near future to meet you, exchange views and benefit from your ripe and varied experience.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Very Sincerely
Gen. J. A. Ankrah

-(Lieut.-Gen. J. A. Ankrah, O.O.V., M.C.)

April 14, 1966

Dear General Ankrah:

Ambassador Williams has transmitted your kind letter of March 24 to me. Its honest, straightforward account of the conditions which led to the change of government in Ghana and its frank assessment of the problems to be solved have left a deep impression upon me.

I was particularly encouraged to see that you are alert to the dangers of subversion from alien sources. Indeed, we in the United States hail your Government's efforts to wipe out arbitrary rule in Ghana as you reinstate the rule of law and re-establish those institutions essential to democratic government. The swift diplomatic initiatives undertaken by your Government were reassuring and I look forward to the role which an effective and truly independent Ghana can play in the councils of Africa and of the world.

You are to be praised for your immediate recognition of the economic problems facing Ghana and the appointment of an able Economic Committee. Praise is also well-deserved for the prompt actions you took at home and abroad to deal with both your short-term and long-term economic difficulties. The United States is acutely aware of the critical state of Ghana's economy and of the immediate needs of the Ghanaian people. Our airlift of twenty-five tons of canned milk last week was tangible recognition of your emergency food requirements. It represents a partial delivery of five hundred tons of milk to help prevent the threatened famine situation you described in your letter. It is our hope that the PL-480 food commodity agreement which our two Governments recently signed will help substantially to tide you over the critical period ahead.

I greatly appreciate your expression of support for our common belief in democratic principles and the democratic way

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By ijf NARA, Date 11-16-89

of life. This is one of the surest ways of achieving the world peace we so fervently desire.

It will be my pleasure to reinforce the ties of friendship which bind the United States and Ghana. Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and I look forward to hearing from you personally from time to time on developments in Ghana.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah
Chairman, National Liberation Council of
The Republic of Ghana
Accra

cc: Bill Moyers
W. W. Rostow
LBJ:UH:em (4/7/66)

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April 11, 1966

Your Imperial Majesty:


Iran's signal progress in education and literacy, in health, in social and economic development, and in agriculture, recounted in your letter of March 25, is most impressive. I sense your pride and I share your pleasure in these accomplishments.

I fully understand the importance that you attach to making the necessary defense decisions that will protect and promote Iran's security and progress. To that end my government is earnestly making a careful examination of the defense and security situation as it affects us both--what Iran's needs are and how the United States can help to meet them. The report of the military survey team is now under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. One purpose of this review, the necessity for which I am sure Your Majesty can appreciate, is to determine the most favorable prices that can be offered for the equipment recommended by the military survey team. Once this is completed, the report will be forwarded to you to permit thorough study by your government before the Annual Review.

Ambassador Meyer has informed me that he expects to receive soon from your government the economic data needed for the Annual Review. Once both military and economic data are in hand and have been analyzed, I believe our two governments should be able to reach a prompt conclusion as to our future military cooperation.

Let me assure you, Your Majesty, that the United States Government wishes to promote the dual objectives of economic advance and national security which you have outlined so effectively in your letter. And we mean to do this as expeditiously as possible.

Sincerely,



His Imperial Majesty
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran
Tehran, Iran

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-250

By ig NARA, Date 7-12-89

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/7/66

Friday, April 8, 1966
8:15 A.M.

Mr. President:

To provide material which will give you a maximum personal feel for the situation in Viet-Nam, I have been forwarding papers like these two:

1. A summary of Allen Whiting's report after three weeks in Viet-Nam. He is a first rate Far Eastern analyst in State.

2. A paper from an Embassy official on: corruption; ARVN passivity; extent but thinness of VC control; intelligence and reporting weaknesses.

W. W. Rostow

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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105a
April 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Allen Whiting's Report on Vietnam

Here, in rough, are the main points that emerged today from Allen Whiting's account of his 18-day visit to Vietnam:

1. Whatever the outcome of the current crisis, the basic problem remains the same: how to provide the basic political structure for the orderly transition from military to civilian government?
2. One theme was common to Whiting's discussions throughout the country: Ky will have to go; he cannot provide leadership for Vietnam and can never command the respect of the people. He was not a respected figure to begin with and derives his status only from the U.S. hand on his back.
3. The structure of Government is military in actuality but civilian in its relationships (e.g. province chiefs nominally under the Ministry of Interior but actually in the military chain of command).
4. The 200-plus district chiefs (nominally under province chiefs but actually under Corps Commanders): they are a promising element of potential civilianized leadership.
5. The Provincial Councils (produced in May 1965 elections) are presently analogous to American student councils (in amateurism and impotence).
6. Regional and religious divisions: North and Center versus South; Buddhist versus Catholic, etc. Actually, regional divisions can cut across religions (and sometimes heal) Northern Buddhists and Northern Catholics in alliance vs. Southerners. Special role of United Buddhist Association, which is forming provincial, district, and hamlet structures (strong in Central Provinces, much weaker in the South); it can provide a bridge upward from provincialism.

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Authority NLS 85-30

By inf, NARS, Date 9-13-85

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- 2 -

7. Political parties are largely conspiratorial and on the decline -- not very significant.

8. Possible resolution to Vietnam's divisions (similar to divisions facing Tito in post-war Yugoslavia) is US/GVN creation of a nominally federal system; but key ingredient must be a central authority capable of occupying the middle ground and sharing power with the moderates.

9. Local elections have generally re-elected those already central to the local power structure. Other side of this coin: local elections can be controlled, and will not result in feared "take-over" -- by "Buddhists", "VC", etc. Elections on a national basis will depend on direction of national government.

10. The following are significant points of political cleavage:

(a) Localism versus the central government (virtually no one speaks of "the nation").

(b) Military versus civilian elements (a deeply rooted and widespread resentment of military rule per se; civilian window-dressing of military ruling groups is no solution; Ky is scornful and contemptuous of civilians; the internal workings of the Directory remain relatively invisible to our people).

(c) Cleavages within the military: the Corps Commanders; six or seven other types of armed groups (ARVN, Special Forces, regional forces, population forces, constabulary, sometimes home guard, and U. S. forces). Divisions within the ARVN are much worse than divisions between the ARVN and the U. S. forces -- actually rapport between the ARVN and the U. S. advisors is quite good.

11. Nonetheless, outside of Saigon there does exist a basis for the development of a political structure. The United Buddhist Association is one type of instrument that can be effective in organizing an area and bringing together diverse personalities. Another potential instrument is the Provincial Council -- an initial screening point for talent (Dr. Dan in Gia Dinh has organized committees of correspondence among provincial councils and also conventions of provincial councilors.) Also significant are two U. S. creations: the Political Action Teams and Census Grievance Teams. (The PATs are recruited on recommendation of province chiefs and may therefore be furthering divisiveness

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- 3 -

within the country. If we are serious about this program and the Vung Tau Center, then it needs much more attention; if we are not serious, this program is creating too high expectations.)

12. Both the U.S. Mission and the GVN are suffering from over-pressures on persons and installations -- a crushing weight that provides no time to figure out "who/whom relationships". Add to these continuing pressures such periodic crises as the Ky/Thi confrontation, and one wonders how anything is accomplished. (Honolulu created a tidal wave effect that compounded these pressures in a race to meet sometimes arbitrary deadlines.)

13. The Vietnamese have a desperate need for self-respect and dignity -- and increasing dependence on the U. S. deprives them of such self-respect and dignity. We can expect inevitable and psychologically necessary flare-ups that are an expression of bottled up resentment along these lines. (They don't feel that they own their country.)

14. At the same time, our over-all relations with the Vietnamese are generally good. The only signs of anti-Americanism in the past four weeks were a few placards; our people are extremely vulnerable to anti-American violence in the urban areas, and the lack of it is an astonishingly good sign. Another good sign is that GVN military activities were generally unimpaired by the Ky/Thi crisis. (Nonetheless, ARVN may be assuming it is now our war, and that we -- not they -- will win it.)

15. Some conclusions about the VC:

(a) They are not expecting a quick take-over along the lines of China in 1947.

(b) Despite whatever pain we may be inflicting on the VC, the military situation has not demoralized them; they are well led, well equipped, and have high morale. However, the costs of the war are rising for them.

(c) The VC and PAVN are not out-gunned relative to the U. S. and GVN forces (except in regards to artillery and air power). They can continue to make use of this fact and the alternating monsoon situation to inflict considerable damage.

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
- 4 -

(d) Rather than looking at kill figures, it is more sensible from their viewpoint to look at battalions rendered ineffective. Here they continue to do well.

(e) As for the health of the VC, their major problem is malaria (a form not susceptible to their medication or ours). They generally have enough food and enough medical facilities, but this situation can change.

(f) As for VC morale, it seems clear that they are most demoralized by air strikes -- but air strikes cannot maintain sustained pressures against units. Our targeting is subject to range deflection errors of approximately 1,000 metres which, in conjunction with defective target intelligence, can cause a high percentage of misses. The VC fear the B-52s most of all; but far more damaging than the B-52s are the Sky Raiders.

(g) VC terrorism and sabotage are more widespread than ever -- not in numbers but in area covered. The main purpose of such attacks seems to be to remind the population of VC presence and VC power.


James C. Thomson, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

1056

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISSUES HARD TO LEARN FROM THE CABLES

1. CORRUPTION: small and big, almost universal, preoccupying to officials at all levels; VC probably involved in some, probably benefits potentially from all; aided by very loose US auditing, lack of end-use check, lack of effective protest (US implicated in SVN mind by silence, passivity); growing, "out of control," no rules.

Threats: a) Sudden explosion of scandal, in US press and Congress, that could freeze up USOM funds, damage Mission and Administration, blast us out of SVN and lose the war.

b) Slow costs to GVN conflict of: demoralizing contrast between corrupt GVN and "incorruptible" (in public eyes) VC; demoralizing effects on SVN public of corruption that they expect but do not accept; effective use of corruption as local political issue by VC; diversion of US resources (and GVN attention); direct aid to the VC.

Common attitude of US officials: Corruption is endemic and "accepted" in Asia; got to live with it, costs of "crusading" are greater than risks of failing to correct; only corruption that directly involves the VC is dangerous; issue is too hot to touch or to look into closely.

2. ARVN/RF/PF PASSIVITY: almost universal (exceptions: specific Ranger, Marine, airborne units, etc.); failure to act on intelligence readily available; failure to seek or to achieve contact (contact rate in small unit actions -- 1% -- 15-20 a day out of 15 -- 2500 reported small unit actions); failure to maintain contact or pursue when it is (more or less inadvertently) achieved; large-scale actions "designed to avoid contact" by size, tactics, direction, planning period (assuring compromise); small proportion of GVN casualties on the offensive, reflecting incentive system that penalizes commander for casualties suffered at his initiative, never for casualties suffered in static defense; almost total failure to patrol, recon or combat, work at night (most reported night action fraudulent). All of these characteristics to an extreme degree.

Reflects massive failure of the advisor system, as now operating (advisors give daily counsel against each of these practices).

3. BROADNESS, BUT OFTEN THINNESS, OF VC CONTROL: Both GVN and ARVN have virtually abandoned large parts of the countryside: leaving it

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Authority NLJ 85-30

By mg, NARS, Date 9-13-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

to a VC monopoly of propaganda, tax-collecting, recruiting, and general administration. Yet the VC has not moved into all this area aggressively with either troops or administrators; in many cases, GVN presence and practical authority could be restored "easily." Whatever the psychological bureaucratic obstacles, many US are convinced that more bodies would not be needed to do this; GVN was not, they believe, "forced" out by VC.

However, at present, lack of aggressive, effective use of available security forces has resulted in behavior by many provincial "GVN" officials that amounts to practical accommodation with the VC. Again this is a current reality; yet one that might not be hard in terms of resources (as distinct from will and inertia) to change.

4. INTELLIGENCE INADEQUACY: Failure to coordinate intelligence systems (ARVN police/Sprcial Branch, MSS, MACV, OSA Embassy); failure to focus adequately on political/"strategic" intelligence, aimed at rolling up the VC political/administrative apparatus (this paramount objective still receives only lip service); failure to get such police-type intelligence (the role of the Special Branch) by adequate, long-duration interrogation of prisoners and defectors (this is beginning to be improved); failure to spend money adequately to buy information or defection.

5. REPORTING INADEQUACY: reports continue to emphasize detail much of which the producers believe -- often correctly -- to be irrelevant, redundant, inaccurate or misleading; they do not serve to educate decision-makers as to the nature of the problem or inform them as to the current situation (as seen by field representatives). Moreover, exclusive reliance on reporting by officials responsible for the success of programs continues to produce a systematic bias towards optimism and progress, lack of "criticism" of GVN/ARVN efforts (whose shortcomings could be interpreted as failures of US influence), delayed reporting (or absence of reporting: as with corruption) of problems and uncertainties.

(Essentiality of field-trips by second-level officials who can discuss informally and privately with field representatives, in provinces and Saigon; they know and will tell much more than appears in official reports.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

106

Re: 4/11/66

April 7, 1966
Thursday, 4:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Shah answered your last letter almost immediately. He obviously wants to assure you that he is not neglecting his economic revolution in pressing for more arms. He details his achievements-- combatting illiteracy, improving rural life and public health, bringing new land under modern cultivation, development of a fertilizer industry. Then he explains how growing oil earnings should put Iran on its feet by 1970. Between now and then, however, he will need help in building an effective military while continuing to devote most of his resources to development.

We're walking a tightrope between bowing to his intention to be master in his own house and keeping his military spending within reason. JCS is now reviewing our recent survey of the Shah's military requirements. You will have a crack at the final package (much of it will be credit sale), and we will thrash it out with him in our annual military-economic review.

The attached reply, for signature if you approve, reassures him that we will not dismiss his security needs lightly but it does not prejudice your final decision.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-250
By lig NARA, Date 7-17-89

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1966

Your Imperial Majesty:

Iran's signal progress in education and literacy, in health, in social and economic development, and in agriculture, recounted in your letter of March 25, is most impressive. I sense your pride and I share your pleasure in these accomplishments.

I fully understand the importance that you attach to making the necessary defense decisions that will protect and promote Iran's security and progress. To that end my government is earnestly making a careful examination of the defense and security situation as it affects us both--what Iran's needs are and how the United States can help to meet them. The report of the military survey team is now under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. One purpose of this review, the necessity for which I am sure Your Majesty can appreciate, is to determine the most favorable prices that can be offered for the equipment recommended by the military survey team. Once this is completed, the report will be forwarded to you to permit thorough study by your government before the Annual Review.

Ambassador Meyer has informed me that he expects to receive soon from your government the economic data needed for the Annual Review. Once both military and economic data are in hand and have been analyzed, I believe our two governments should be able to reach a prompt conclusion as to our future military cooperation.

Let me assure you, Your Majesty, that the United States Government wishes to promote the dual objectives of economic advance and national security which you have outlined so effectively in your letter. And we mean to do this as expeditiously as possible.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Imperial Majesty
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran
Tehran, Iran

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-250
By ing NARA, Date 7-17-89

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/7/66

107

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs. April 7, 1966
11:30 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will note that Gen. Walt is sure
and Amb. Lodge is suspicious that Ky
is being fed false information by Loan
about the situation in Danang.

Bill Bundy is arranging that substance
of Walt's analysis goes to Amb. Lodge.

W. W. Rostow

SAIGON 3791

Miss Roberts
1143

0 270152
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO GEOSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3791
STATE GRMC
BT

SECTION ONE OF TWO APRIL 7

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

By me, NARS, Date 5-9-85

107a

1. KY SENT FOR ME AT 6 O'CLOCK THURSDAY AND SAID:

2. HE WAS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THICH TAM CHAU WHICH THANKS HIM FOR HIS OFFER TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITHIN SIX MONTHS AND THEN ASKED HIM THE FOLLOWING FOUR THINGS:

- A) NOT TO PUNISH THE SO-CALLED STRUGGLERS;
- B) TO RELEASE THOSE WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED;
- C) WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM DANANG, AND
- D) CHIEF OF STATE THIEU TO SIGN A DECREE LAW REQUIRING THAT THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BE CONVENED "WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS".

3. KY, OBVIOUSLY MUCH PERTURBED, SAID, "OF COURSE, THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE. IT FLIES IN THE FACE OF EVERYTHING I HAVE PROMISED EVERYBODY ELSE. WE ARE HAVING A BIG MEETING NEXT MONDAY TO PREPARE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. IT MEANS, OF COURSE, THAT THE MEETING NEXT MONDAY WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO. I WANT TO GIVE ALL THESE PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE. THERE WOULD BE ENDLESS CONFUSION. TAM CHAU'S PROPOSAL WOULD REMOVE THE RIGHT OF THESE PEOPLE NEXT MONDAY TO WORK OUT PLANS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. IT PREVED THAT THEY ARE NOT REALLY IN FAVOR OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, THAT WHAT THEY REALLY WANT TO DO IS OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. IF I WERE TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSITION, I WOULD BE FALSE TO EVERYTHING I HAVE SAID AND I WILL BE TURNING MY BACK ON EVERYBODY IN VIET-NAM - CATHOLICS, CAO DAI, MOA HAO - EXCEPT THOSE WHO FOLLOW TAM CHAU AND TRI QUANG."

4. HE SAID HE WOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE MEETING NEXT WEEK AND ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT.

5. I SAID I THOUGHT HE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE MEETING BUT I WOULD BE A LITTLE EASIER IN MY MIND IF I WERE SURE THERE WAS TIME

TO GET ORGANIZED. I POINTED OUT THE DANGERS OF AN UNORGANIZED MEETING. I TOLD HIM IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO AGREE ON A PROPOSITION AND THEN START LINING UP THE VOTES FOR IT, DIVIDING THE DELEGATES UP INTO SMALL GROUPS WITH A CAPTAIN FOR EACH GROUP, THEN HOLD A MEETING OF THE CAPTAINS AT WHICH EACH ONE WOULD REPORT AND A CHECK WOULD BE MADE AGAINST A LIST AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE FOR OR AGAINST OR ON THE FENCE, WHICH ONES COULD BE TRUSTED ETC.

5. KY THANKED ME AND SAID THIS WAS GOOD ADVICE AND THEY WOULD TRY TO FOLLOW IT.

7. THEN HE SAID, WITH EVERYTHING SOLEMNITY, THAT THERE WAS A SECOND PROBLEM AND THAT IS I CORPS. "FROM QUANG NAM THROUGH HOI AN AND SOUTH, WE CAN CONTROL THE SITUATION", HE SAID, "ESPECIALLY IN QUANG NGAI WHERE THE SECOND DIVISION IS STATIONED UNDER GEN. ... HE IS A VNQDD AND VERY DEPENDABLE. LAM AGREES WE MUST DO SOMETHING IN DANANG AND SUGGESTS MAKING A TOUR OF THE CITY WITH TANKS."

8. KY SAID HUE WAS "ALL LOST" AND THAT THE FIRST DIVISION HAS GIVEN GUNS TO THE CIVILIANS (WESTMORELAND SAYS THIS IS NOT TRUE). I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THIS AS I HAD BEEN TOLD THE UNITS OF THE FIRST DIVISION HAD BEEN ORDERED BACK TO THEIR TACTICAL POSITIONS. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT THE SITUATION FROM OUR CONSUL

AND WOULD LET HIM KNOW.

9. KY WENT ON TO SAY THAT DANANG IS NOW UNDER CONTROL OF THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE AND THAT FOR THREE WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN NO NATIONAL AUTHORITY THERE. "GEN. CHUAN CARRIES OUT NO ORDERS. THE PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING. THERE IS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF FOOD. RICE STOCKS ARE LOW.

10. "THE MAJORITY DOES NOT SUPPORT THE STRUGGLERS. THERE ARE MORE THAN 5,000 VNQDD ON THE EDGE OF TOWN, WHERE CHUAN STOPPED THEM. ALSO, MANY CATHOLICS ARE WAITING.

11. "WE MUST ACT AND SET AN EXAMPLE. IF WE WITHDRAW THE TROOPS, WHAT HAPPENS? IF WE TAKE NO ACTION NOW, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE LOST IT FOR GOOD. WE WILL HAVE LOST CENTRAL VIET.",--..

12. "ALL THE YOUNG OFFICERS ARE VERY ANGRY - SO ANGRY THAT THEY REFUSED TO ADMIT GEN. CO. INTO THEIR BASE. YESTERDAY THE STUDENTS CAME UP TO THE BARBED WIRE BARRIER, AND INSULTED THE MARINES, AND THE MARINES FIRED OVER THEIR HEADS. THE YOUNG OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASKING ME TO GIVE THE ORDER, OR AT LEAST MY AGREEMENT TO LET THEM ACT SEPARATELY. THE FIRST THING MUST BE TO SEIZE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND THEN THE MOVEMENT HAS NO HEAD." HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE ARMOR, SIGNAL AND MARINE UNITS, WHO ARE PART OF I CORPS, WOULD COME OVER. COL. LOAN WOULD BE IN COMMAND.

13. HE WOULD LIMIT LOAN'S ACTION TO THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS ONLY. CHUAN WOULD BE DETAINED. AS SOON AS THIS WAS DONE, HE WOULD SEND IN GEN. VIEN. HE ADDED:

14. " I HAVE NOT DEFINITELY DECIDED YET, BUT I THINK WE MUST DO IT OR WE MUST LOSE CENTRAL VIET-NAM. IT IS A NECESSITY".

15. I SAID THAT WE WERE WORRIED THAT AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN DANANG MIGHT LEAD TO BLOODSHED. WE HOPED TO AVOID A SHOW OF FORCE. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HOPED VERY MUCH THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD SETTLE THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE GREAT HOPES FOR THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. I WAS GLAD HE WAS GOING AHEAD WITH THIS IDEA. I HOPED HE WOULD DO SO VIGOROUSLY, AND HOPED THAT IT MIGHT STILL SAVE THE SITUATION. I SAID THAT, IN ADDITION, I HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO DO EVERYTHING I COULD TO HELP WITH A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

EXD 1 S

16. HE THEN SAID: "IF I WANTED TO DO WHAT WAS GOOD FOR ME REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY, I WOULD RESIGN NOW AND GO BACK TO BEING COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE, AND THAT IS WHAT MY FAMILY IS ASKING ME TO DO. BUT I AM AN IDEALIST, AND I WANT TO FIGHT FOR MY COUNTRY. IF I ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION OF THESE BUDDHISTS - COMMUNISTS (HE RAN THE TWO WORDS TOGETHER), WE WILL LOSE THE WHOLE OF VIET-NAM. I ACCEPT THE FIGHT. I AM SURE THE PEOPLE WILL APPROVE. I SHALL GIVE THE ORDER TONIGHT. I HAVE TALKED TO KHANG,

AND VIEU, AND THEY ALL AGREE. I WILL TALK WITH THIEN LATER. IF NECESSARY, I WILL AIRLIFT TWO MORE RANGER BATTALIONS UP THERE.

17. COMMENT: HE DID NOT ASK MY HELP ON THIS AS HE HAD DONE IN THE PAST. IN A LATER CONVERSATION WITH WESTMORELAND, I LEARNED THAT KY HAD ASKED WESTMORELAND FOR THE AIRLIFT AND I ADVISED WESTMORELAND TO REFER THIS TO WASHINGTON FOR DECISION, USING THIS AS A STALLING MEASURE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROVIDE AIRCRAFT FOR KY TO EVACUATE HIS FORCES AT DANANG AT THIS TIME.

18. I SAID I WAS SORRY THINGS HAD REACHED THIS PASS, BUT I FELT HIS ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITH BUDDHISTS HAD CREATED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN HIS (KY'S) FAVOR. AS WE WALKED TO THE DOOR, HE ADDED, "IT NECESSARY, I WILL OCCUPY THE COL DES NUAGES SO AS EFFECTIVELY TO CUT OFF HUE FROM DANANG". I BELIEVE THIS IS THE DESCRIPTION HE USED FOR AI VAN PASS.

19. UPON RETURNING TO THE OFFICE, I SAW THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THICH TAM CHAU WHICH SPOKE ABOUT "A DECREE SIGNED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE IN THE SHORTEST TIME". AS THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM A DECREE SIGNED "IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE B

DAYS" AS KY HAD SAID I GOT KY ON THE TELEPHONE

AND CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO THIS DISTINCTION. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT THE LETTER FROM THICH TAM CHAU HAD IN FACT USED THE PHRASE "IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS". I POINTED OUT THAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS VITAL, THAT THE PHRASE "IN THE SHORTEST TIME" COULD BE STRETCHED OUT AND THAT A DEAL WAS THUS POSSIBLE.

20. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GEN. WESTMORELAND WHO SAID IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT TROOPS OF THE FIRST DIVISION IN HUE HAD GIVEN THEIR WEAPONS TO THE CIVILIANS.

21. COMMENT: NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE REPORTS THAT THERE ARE CIVILIANS BEING TRAINED IN THE USE OF WEAPONS AT THE TRAINING CAMP NEAR HUE. ALSO, I FEAR THAT KY MAY BE GETTING INACCURATE INFORMATION.

DDG
BT

RECEIVED
JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 7, 1966

Following is an unofficial translation of a communique issued at 5 AM EST by Thich Tam Chau:

The Buddhist Church thanks and praises the protecting spirit of the church and the country of the Buddhists as well as the youth and students who have positively contributed to the campaign asking for freedom and democracy of the country as related in the communique (4-point Buddhist demand issued March 11). The Vien Hoa Dao informs the Buddhists of the following:

By an official note, the Prime Minister confirms that he will organize a constitutional assembly within a maximum of six months and possibly as soon as four months.

The Vien Hoa Dao has sent an official note requesting that the Chairman of the Executive Council confirm by an official document the points which have been agreed on in meetings:

Withdrawal or cancellation of all decisions to punish or transfer civil servants or military personnel who have contributed to the campaign asking for democracy and freedom of the country since March 11, 1966 in the First Corps and other places.

To free all the people, including the military, who have been arrested relating to the above campaign.

Withdrawal of all the troops the government has sent out for a political operation in Central Vietnam in order to create a peaceful atmosphere.

Confirm the promise of the realization of a constitutional assembly by a decree signed by the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee in the shortest time.

The Church will send a delegation to Central Vietnam to meet all the Buddhists and fellows relating to this campaign. The Church asks all Buddhists to prove their good will by temporarily stopping all forms of struggle, but to wait in a spirit of tension and discipline and to gather together in ranks to wait for the positive realization of what the government has promised.

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Authority

NLS 85-27

By

is, NARS, Date 5-9-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 7, 1966

Following is an unofficial translation of a letter addressed by Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky to the Venerable Thich Tam Chau, Chairman of the Institute for The Execution of the Dharma, of April 6:

Dear Venerable:

In pursuance of the conversation with you (the Venerable Chairman of the Institute) and the representatives of the United Buddhist Church on April 5, I wish once again to thank you (the Venerable Chairman of the Institute) and the representatives for helping us with constructive ideas regarding the early establishment of a democratic regime for the fatherland.

With regard to the matter of establishing a constitutional assembly, to draft the first basis for a popularly-elected government, I, in the capacity of Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, definitely guarantee to you (the Venerable Chairman of the Institute) that that is also the earnest wish of those leaders who presently hold responsibility for the fatherland. To put it in a more positive way, I consider that a constitutional assembly can be convened within a maximum period of six months.

I hope that (the Venerable Chairman of the Institute), as well as the representatives of the United Buddhist Church, will, with good will and a ready spirit of patriotism, take an active role and assist the government in stabilizing the present situation, which the government is obliged to bring under control in order to accomplish the program of democracy-building mentioned above.

Respectfully,

Nguyen Cao Ky

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Authority NLI 85-27

By is, NARS, Date 5-9-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 7, 1966

*To Rouch 108
in power
4/8/66*

Mr. President:

Ambassador Bennett called to report that the Santo Domingo daily, Listin Diario, this morning quotes Caamano as saying: "I am a military man and will continue to be one."

Ambassador Bennett said that this newspaper had particularly good contacts with Caamano. The quote is said to have been given out by one of Caamano's closest collaborators in London.

Let's hope it sticks.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-252
By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 6, 1966

109

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Return of Caamano to the DR

On your question whether Caamano, Wessin and other military are free to return, the answer is:

No if they follow their Commander-in-Chief's orders
Yes if they resign their commissions

Only moral suasion could stop them as civilians. We have been using it with Wessin -- successfully, so far. Caamano would not be responsive to an approach from us, but he might from the British. The British Ambassador in the DR has recommended to the Foreign Office that they discourage his return. Through the Embassy here we are sending the motion.

Bennett and Bunker's best estimate of what lies behind Bosch's ploy on Caamano (Tab A) is that it reflects a highly agitated state of mind and is intended to shock us into endorsing him as a better bargain than Caamano.

We relayed to Bunker yesterday your views on Caamano's return (Tab B). Garcia Godoy told Bunker (Tab C) that he did not think that Caamano would return and even if Caamano did, he was not overly concerned about the adverse effect as long as Caamano came back as a civilian running for public office. Garcia Godoy does not think he could win if nominated. Garcia Godoy said that his Defense Minister shares this estimate. Bennett and Bunker do too.

On whether we should respond to Bosch's ploy, both Bennett and Bunker this morning are having second thoughts on their recommendation last night that we should avoid a response for the time being. They will now go back to Bosch in a day or two through the same FBI channel which Bosch used to reiterate what Bunker told him on March 16: that we support the OAS program for free elections and will respect the results.

An Embassy officer (not Bunker) will follow up again before the political convention which starts Saturday.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 6, 1966

110
Rel's file
to R 7-11

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I am anxious to move rapidly on two appointments to my staff: first, to fill Bob Komer's role in the field of South Asia and the Middle East; second, to fill Chet Cooper's role in the Far East.

With respect to South Asia and the Middle East, I want Howard Wriggins.

His vita is attached.

He is about to be appointed as a permanent professor at Columbia and Director of the prospective Institute of South and Southeast Asian Studies. Without in any way committing us before you decided, ~~he~~ succeeded in getting Columbia University to agree to let us have him until June 1967.

Wriggins has worked with me in the Planning Council. He has shown great bureaucratic skill and effectiveness. As you can see, he is the author of a great many publications.

He represents the combination of intellectual quality, bureaucratic skill, integrity, and creativeness that we badly need.

I believe it would be possible to time the announcement of his appointment 15 months hence to Columbia with our announcement here. After talking with Bill Moyers, I believe that's the kind of kick-off you want for a new staff appointment. (He might have to work quietly over here for a few weeks before we could get the two announcements timed.)

Second, I come back to William Jorden.

I have surveyed all the alternatives known to me and here are my conclusions:

-- Carver - a brilliant young man; the ablest political analyst we have on South Vietnam. The whole town is relying on him for basic work in the Vietnam crisis. Moreover, even if he could work from the White House, I feel it would be unfair to Bob Komer to take him on my staff.

More than that, while a brilliant analyst, he has little experience in policy-making; and his knowledge is somewhat too specialized to handle the whole Far Eastern account.

I therefore recommend that he stay where he is.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By ijf NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/6/66

-- Lucian Pye. He would be an ornament to our staff. He has, however, no bureaucratic experience; and he also has commitments over the next year he feels he must meet at MIT.

In short, we cannot get him short of a Presidential order; and his lack of bureaucratic experience might be serious.

I recommend that we leave Pye at MIT and use him more systematically as a consultant along lines I am now exploring with Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti.

-- Robert Scalapino. Like Pye, Scalapino is a reputable scholar with sound views; but also like Pye, he is reluctant in middle life to undertake for the first time bureaucratic business. I am told there might be clearance problems.

I therefore recommend that Scalapino be used, like Pye, as a Consultant.

-- Paul Popple. I have interviewed Paul Popple. He is a good man. He is well recommended as a competent, sound bureaucrat by both Bill Bundy and Joe Yeager, my Far Eastern man on the Policy Planning Council. Like Carver, he is somewhat narrowly specialized. He would have to bring himself up to date on China. I don't think he can handle the whole Far Eastern account. My personal recommendation to him would be that he return to the Department of State and resume his career as a Foreign Service Officer.

On the other hand, I would be happy to have him as an expert on both Taiwan and Communist China under the senior Far Eastern man on my staff.

-- James Thomson. Thomson has decided, I think wisely, to return to the University -- Harvard -- this September. I think we could use him well between now and then. I have given him an assignment which will be constructive and non-controversial.

-- William Jorden. This leaves me with Bill Jorden, whom I want badly and soon.

I attach an account of Wriggins' career (Tab A), and a draft letter (Tab B) I would propose to send to Dr. Jacques Barzun, Dean of Faculties and Provost of the University, Columbia University, New York. Also, the Jorden rife (Tab C).

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with Wriggins ☒

Go ahead with Jorden ☒

See me ☐

1102

HOWARD WRIGGINS
Policy Planning Council
Department of State
(on leave)

Present Address:
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 20036

Tel: 232-1015
ext. 285/277

I. Present Activity: On one year's leave from Department of State, as Associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, preparing study on Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries. The Prime Minister's First Task: The Aggregation of Power in new states of Africa and Asia; Manuscript in hands of publisher's readers.

II. Government Service

- (1) Member, Policy Planning Council, Dep't. of State, April 1961, FSR-1 South Asian Affairs; India and Pakistan National Policy Papers; India's Approach to Nuclear Weapons; Policy Problems on the Sino-Indian Border, etc.
- (2) Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1958-1961, GS-16
Supervising staff of 15 research specialists, analysing US foreign policy problems for Congressional committees and individual members; foreign policy consultant to Congress.

III. Research and Publications

- The Status of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, with Edwin A. Bock, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954.
- Research assistant to Gabriel Almond in preparation of The Appeal of Communism, (Princeton, 1954)
- Two essays: "The Truman Doctrine" and "UN Mediation in Palestine" in A. Gyorgy, Problems in International Relations, (Prentice Hall, 1955).
- Ceylon, Dilemmas of a New Nation, (Princeton, 1960), 505 pp.
- "Foreign Assistance and Political Development," in Brookings Institution Development of Emerging Countries, An Agenda for Research, 1962.
- "Politics and Purpose" in Brookings Institution, Political Development, Reprint, 1962.
- "Ceylon and South Asian Studies in the United States: A Partial Agenda for Research," in R. Lambert, Resources for South Asian Area Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 1962.
- "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon," APSR. XV, #2, 1954.
- "The Aggregation of Power - An Approach to Politics in Emerging Countries," International Studies Association- Proceedings, April, 1965.
- "National Integration," in forthcoming symposium edited by Myron Weiner on The Processes of Development (or some such title) prepared for USIA.

- On the First Task of the Prime Minister: The Aggregation of Power in the new states of Africa and Asia, (forthcoming).
- Numerous book reviews in THE ANNALS, Journal of Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs, Dartmouth Alumni Bulletin.
- "The United States and Politics in Emerging Countries," paper to be published as part of proceedings of European-American Colloquium, Bellagio, October, 1965.

IV. Teaching

- Yale University, Instructor, 1951-1952.
- Vassar College, Assistant and Associate Professor, 1952-1957.
- George Washington University, Graduate Faculty, part time, 1958-1960. International Politics, US Foreign Policy, Problems of Developing Countries, Middle Eastern Politics.
- SAIS Visiting Professor of Political Development, 1965-1966.

V. Honors and Awards

- Sterling Fellow, Yale University - 1951-1952
- Two-Year Rockefeller Research Fellow, for political studies in Ceylon.

VI. Graduate Study

University of Chicago 1940-1941
Yale University, PhD 1951.

VII. Additional Administrative Experience

- Acting Resident Representative in Italy for Inter-Governmental Committee of Refugees - 1944-1945.
- Chief of Mission for France, American Friends Service Committee (staff of 200), 1945-1946.
- Geneva Representative to the United Nations for Arab Refugee Program, 1948-1949.

VIII. Education

- Germantown Friends School, Philadelphia, class of 1936 cum laude.
- Dartmouth College, Hanover 1936-1940, cum laude.
- Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1938-1939.

IX. Born 1918

X. Family

Wife: Sarah Edith (Sally); housewife, member of Headmaster Search Committee, Sidwell Friends School; President, Washington Chapter, Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asian Women's Association, presenting to Asian and American women in Washington seminars on problems of mutual concern.

Children:

Diana	15	born Geneva
Christopher	13	" New Haven
Jennifer	7	" Ceylon

REFERENCES:

- (1) Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Department of State
- (2) W W Boston, Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department

of State

(3) Arnold Wolfers, Director, Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research, SAIS.

110b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1966

Dear Jacques:

Howard Wriggins has reported to me that you are prepared to appoint him to your faculty as a permanent professor and Director of the prospective Institute of South and Southeast Asian Studies, as of July 1966, but that because of our need for his services here at the White House, you have been good enough to grant him a year's leave of absence at the outset.

On behalf of the President, I want to take this occasion to express his gratitude to you for being willing to postpone for a year the launching of your Institute. He fully understands your desire to ensure that if Dr. Wriggins does come to the White House now, he will be available to Columbia in the fall of 1967.

This letter is to confirm to you the President's and my intention to release Dr. Wriggins in June 1967 so that he can carry forward his mission at Columbia. We believe he will come to you enriched by this additional experience of foreign policy-making.

We might consider if it is feasible to arrange a joint announcement of these arrangements.

If you have any questions on this matter, I would be happy to discuss them with you by telephone.

Thanks!

Yours,

Walt

W. W. Rostow

Dr. Jacques Barzun
Dean of Faculties and Provost
of the University
Columbia University
New York, N. Y.

110c

Saturday, April 2, 1966, 6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I should like to appoint Bill Jorden to the NSC Staff in the post vacated by Chet Cooper. An account of his career is attached.

His assets are these:

- Scholarly training in Far East studies.
- Newspaper experience (New York Times).
- Intimate political knowledge of Viet-Nam since 1961: he was on Taylor Mission, wrote both Viet-Nam White Papers.
- Availability: I believe I could move him promptly from Department of State where he is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
- Independence of view plus bureaucratic experience: I believe he will accept easily your perspective, while working gracefully with the bureaucracy. Bill Bundy thinks he would be fine.
- Writing ability: he could help on speeches.
- Excellent character; mature judgment.
- I know him well. We would work easily together. He worked in the White House with Doug Cater during the 1964 Campaign.

Liabilities. Some colleagues think he is not forceful enough.

Knowing him on the Planning Council, I believe the assessment is not balanced. When he has a clear interesting assignment, with backing, he drives hard and effectively. Under my direction he went to Germany in the midst of the Berlin Crisis of 1961-62 and created single-handedly the Berlin Viability Program.

His jobs since then have been scrappy. He yearns to work regularly on the Far East.

Brom Smith, John Macy, and Doug Cater - who know him - support this proposal.

Bill Moyers suggests I put it to you.

Walt Rostow

Would you like to meet Jorden? _____

Approve his appointment _____

Disapprove his appointment _____

See me _____

cc: Bill Moyers and Marvin Watson

100

BIOGRAPHIC DATA (WILLIAM JOHN JORDEN)

Date of birth: May 3, 1923

Place of birth: Bridger, Montana

Education: Washington High School (Massillon, Ohio)
Yale University (A.B. with Honors) (1947)
Columbia University (M.S.) (1948)

Employment: Merchant Marine (1942-43)
U.S. Army (1943-45)
Instructor (Japanese) Yale, (1945-46)
Radio news writer, New York Herald Tribune (1948)
Foreign Correspondent (Japan, Korea), Associated Press (1948-52)
Foreign Correspondent (Japan, Korea, other Far East areas), The New York Times, (1952-55)
Council on Foreign Relations (fellowship), (1955-56)
Chief of Bureau (Moscow), The New York Times, (1956-58)
Diplomatic Correspondent, The New York Times, (1959-61)
Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, (1961-62)
Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1962-65)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Public Affairs), (1965-)

Awards: Pulitzer Travelling Fellowship (1948)
Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship (1955-56)

Publications: Numerous magazine articles (N.Y. Times Magazine, etc.)
Co-author, Japan Between East and West, (Harper)
Author of State Department white papers on Viet-Nam (A Threat to the Peace, Aggression From the North)

Marital status: • Married (1944) the former Eleanor Harz of New York, currently director of Far East languages at the Foreign Service Institute

Children: • William Temple (15), Eleanor Harz (8), and Marion Telva (5) Jorden

Bio data (JORDEN) cont.

Other data: Director, Interdepartmental Group on Psychological Operations (1962-65)
 Chairman, Interdepartmental Public Affairs Committee on Viet-Nam (1965-)
 Member, Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee (1965-)
 Member, Council on Foreign Relations (1955-)

Languages: Japanese, Russian (fair), Chinese (rusty),
 Spanish (also rusty)

References: Walt W. Rostow
 George C. McGhee (Ambassador to Bonn)
 W. Averell Harriman (Ambassador-at-Large)
 Chester Cooper (formerly NSC staff)
 Howard Wriggins (Policy Planning Council))
 James B. Reston (The N.Y. Times)

111

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, APRIL 6, 1966

5:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

1. Basic Strategy. Draft Cable. -- Secretary Rusk
2. Public Information Policy on Communist Role
Draft Cable -- Secretary Rusk
3. Further Tactical Moves: Thi, etc.
Draft Cable -- Secretary Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3,4(5)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DA NARS, Date 7-27-84

~~SECRET~~

**List of Invitees for Vietnam Meeting with the President in the
Cabinet Room at 5:00 P.M., Wednesday, April 6, 1966**

The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
 Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
 Assistant Secretary Bundy
Secretary McNamara
 Assistant Secretary McNaughton
Admiral Raborn
USIA Director Marks
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Moyers
Mr. Bromley Smith

The following will not be present:

Deputy Secretary Vance - out of country
General Wheeler - out of country
General Taylor - out of city

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By CB, NARA Date 6-15-00 113
T. day, April 5, 1966
11:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rowan Commentaries on Panama

Rowan's TV commentary and column in Sunday's Star underline the strong nationalistic drive of Panama to realize its historic ambition of extending its sovereignty over the Canal Zone and of obtaining substantially increased direct and indirect revenue from the Canal operation. There is nothing new in this. Our willingness to meet the Panamanians more than half way in their aspirations is clearly reflected in your joint statement with President Robles of last September.

The important changes in Canal Treaty relationships contemplated in that statement cover at least in principle specific points listed by Rowan, with one exception discussed below. It was realized at the time that the details of these changes were to be the subject of further negotiations and would undoubtedly raise further problems requiring important and difficult decisions for the two countries.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(C)

We have given the Panamanians our drafts of the three treaties with what we would like to see in the way of details. On the basis of what we know [REDACTED] (also reflected in Rowan's reports) of Panama's reaction to our drafts, the principal problems shaping up are:

1. Agreement on a satisfactory formula for a new tolls structure.

Both we and the Panamanians are engaged in comprehensive studies on toll formulas. On this point many other countries have a mutual interest with the United States that tolls remain "reasonable," and their influence will be felt in due course. There are other ways to handle Panama's needs for financing economic development which we are exploring.

2. Extent of application of Panamanian jurisdiction in the Canal Zone.

In the joint statement we agreed on the need to achieve the "appropriate political, economic and social integration" of the Canal areas with the rest of the Republic. In our drafts we spelled these out. We are waiting to hear Panama's counter proposal.

3. Ability to negotiate satisfactory arrangements for retention of United States military facilities in the Zone. Use of present facilities for "hemispheric security" is particularly sensitive politically to Panama.
The Panamanians have been studying the Base arrangements we have with Spain. Their counter-proposals may well follow this pattern.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

April 5, 1966

After two postponements, the Panamanians have indicated that they will be prepared to enter into detailed negotiations on the treaties on May 1 and would like Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin to meet with them in Panama. They are prepared to do this.

The exception to which I referred above is Rowan's reference to Panama's desire for "an end to the practice of appointing a U. S. 'Governor' of the Zone." From the wording, it is not clear whether this refers to the replacement of Governor Fleming now under consideration or to the post-new treaty period. We have a responsibility to appoint a Governor now, of course. Under the new treaty, we contemplate a mixed Board to run the Canal, which would in turn appoint an "Administrator."

The negotiating exercise should be accompanied by new and imaginative programs for Panamanian development. I have talked at length with Irwin and reported back my ideas from Panama, which you may have seen.

We shall need a good negotiation plus a good development program plus first-rate political and psychological leadership in Panama and at home to turn this corner in history.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 5, 1966, 11:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Electoral Picture in Guatemala

You will have seen from the intelligence reports that the Guatemalan Electoral Tribunal has certified that the moderate, left-of-center Revolutionary Party (PR), led by Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, won 30 of the 55 seats of the new Congress.

Barring extra-legal actions, this clear majority virtually ensures Mendez' election to the Presidency when the new Congress convenes on May 5 to choose between the two candidates receiving the most votes in the March 6 elections.

Ambassador Mein reports that Mendez' election has been generally accepted, and that the small group which opposes him lacks popular support and are not strong enough to initiate any action. He says there is no reason to expect that Mendez will not be permitted to take office. Unfortunately, there is an excessively long wait before his election by Congress (after May 5) and his inauguration (July 1).

The assumption of power by Mendez will represent an impressive victory for democracy in this hemisphere. The formula of civilian, reform-minded presidents with the political knack for reaching practical working relationships with the military and other conservative elements, is one which I hope will continue to prosper in this hemisphere. It is a formula for short-term political stability which allows the government to concentrate on development and reform.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-252
By ij NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File 115

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-29

By ing, NARS, Date 11-4-85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*cys to
Mayer
Valenti*

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Tuesday, April 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I drafted the attached comment on Sunday, in the midst of the worst of the Vietnam political crisis.

As a little light -- only a little -- breaks through, I would summarize its conclusions as follows:

1. If the Vietnamese work their way out of this -- and a civil constitution-drafting group is born -- we will have passed a great turning point; although there will be plenty of trouble before they actually find their political feet.

2. The Communists are serious and understand the importance of politics: they will take it as a major defeat.

3. Then will be the time to pour it on and see if we can't force, in the months ahead, a resolution of the conflict. The strain on our political and economic life and the strain on the South Vietnamese is all but intolerable. Specifically, as the memo suggests, we should on the military side:

-- continue maximum effort to impose attrition on VC and PAVN forces in South Vietnam;

-- work more effectively from the air on the supply routes from the North;

-- increase the costs to Hanoi of continuing the war by going for oil or other precision target systems that hurt without killing an excessive number of civilians.

4. On the diplomatic side we should:

-- keep close to the Russians, but not hope for too much until Hanoi and the VC are persuaded by the situation itself that the jig is up;

-- keep lines open to Hanoi;

-- begin to get word to the VC that their destiny is: to sit on the Hanoi delegation at the international conference; and to talk to Saigon about how to end the war and get back into the national life of South Vietnam.

-- request Mr. Rusk to conduct a high level review of negotiating papers developed at the working level.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

5. On the side of the Honolulu program the memo argues that the most critical dimension is political.

-- We should, of course, continue our present program of concentrated effort in four areas of rural reconstruction -- full blast;

-- but we should concentrate more effort, once they hire a hall and begin to talk, on political development; how to keep the Directorate together; the political party clause in the constitution; how to balance majority and minority interests; the formation of a national wide-ranging party, etc.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE Authority NLJ 85-29
WASHINGTON By sig, NARS, Date 11-4-85

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Tuesday, April 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You ask for comments on the attached. They follow:

1. The USSR and Negotiations.

I believe Russian leverage on Hanoi depends mainly on our persuading Hanoi that negotiation is the best course. Aside from what we do militarily and politically in Vietnam, the Russians have little leverage.

They can keep a presence by assisting with arms -- notably arms to defend Hanoi from the air.

Hanoi wants them as a presence: to balance Peking; to supply arms; and as an insurance policy, should negotiations be undertaken.

But only we -- not Moscow -- can push them over the hump into negotiations.

That means, in my view, that we must push harder on the second and third elements in the military equation.

The first element, which is going quite well, is to impose heavy attrition on the VC and PAVN main force units.

The second element is harassment of their supply lines from the North. Here I would be prepared to take the risks of B-52 bombing of Mu Gia pass and other elements of that supply route in North Vietnam and Laos. I would press to the maximum production and use of special interdiction weapons.

The third military element is making the war more expensive in the North to Hanoi. There I prefer oil to bombing the Northeast supply lines. The latter justifies more and more Chinese engineering and logistical forces. Oil hits the over-all military logistical capacity in the North, as well as industrial and civil operations. I'm certainly not the last word on this; but I do believe we should lean harder on Hanoi, on a precision bombing basis.

It is not, Mr. President, that I'm bloody-minded or a hawk. But the strain of trying to do the job principally by attrition of main force units places almost intolerable burdens on the political life of our country and on the war-weary South Vietnamese. We've got to try to shorten this war without doing unwise or desperate things.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

I believe the Russians would fully understand and accept this course; although they are keeping their oar in Hanoi as a contingency whether we succeed (for negotiations) or whether we fail (to balance the Chinese).

In short, I would suggest that, if we survive the present political crisis, we do more about the supply line from the North and we increase Hanoi's costs for continuing the conflict.

Meanwhile, we should remain close to the Russians; because none of us is so smart -- certainly not me -- to be absolutely sure they won't help end this earlier rather than later.

2. Peace Talks.

The negotiating papers are pretty good. They move toward what I have called a "two-track" negotiating plan: an international negotiation, involving the Geneva Accord powers, with the NLF on the Hanoi delegation, dealing with the restoration and strengthening of the 1954 and 1962 agreements; an internal negotiation, between Saigon and the NLF to end the war and create the conditions for absorbing the South Vietnamese now caught up in the VC insurrection into the life of the Country.

There is some fuzziness about this high in the government. Some of our public talk suggests we might settle internal South Vietnam affairs at an international conference; some suggests no one would ever talk to the VC -- ever. The surfacing of a two-track policy is a delicate matter. But in the meanwhile what we say should be consistent with it. Incidentally, the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique was consistent with a two-track negotiation.

The reason for the fuzziness is that the preliminary papers have been developed at the working level; and you may wish Mr. Rusk to render you a personal judgment on existing plans, negotiating concepts, and ways of talking about the problem.

It follows from this line of thought that it may be wise to find some way of suggesting to the NLF that we think they ought to be talking with the government in Saigon.

3. Political Tutelage and Organization.

Organization comes first. If there is one thing I regret about Honolulu it is that we didn't nail Ky down harder on a date for implementing the political side of his January 15th speech.

The unrest in Vietnam doesn't come from hungry people. The folks carrying banners and organizing all this eat regularly. And that's the way it is in most political disruptions in developing countries -- and even in our race troubles.

What they want is either personal power (Tri Quang and Thi) or participation in politics, which is the application of power. And the Communists are, of course, in there trying to make the most of it.

The most urgent non-military business is to cut the radicals out of the herd by getting the literate, urban leaders -- and others -- into a hall and around tables talking about the political future. Some force may well be necessary in this crisis; but essentially we're trying -- and the Directorate is trying -- to get the moderates off the streets and into a position where they have to think and talk responsibly about the future of their country.

Once they are there, we have a number of ways we can help them think along the right lines; Washington and Saigon are in pretty good shape, if and when we get over that historic hurdle which is what today's crisis is about.

There may be ways of beefing up Saigon's administrative capacity through a relatively few first-rate advisers working for the Vietnamese and acceptable to them; but we need a government with a bit of a future first.

4. The Four Key Areas.

Bob Komer will report.

I don't need to tell you that I support increased economic and social development in South Vietnam as elsewhere.

And I'm sure that something like the Lodge Plan -- and the four key areas -- is the right way to proceed: by concentration of effort.

But I don't think this war is going to end by pacification of most of the country.

It will end -- if we win it -- when some combination of the following four things leads Hanoi to knock it off:

-- sufficient attrition on the main force units to break up structures, produce a marked deterioration of morale, and an enlarged flow of defectors -- to our side and back home to their VC-controlled areas;

-- sufficient obstruction to the supply lines to make replacements expensive and, if possible, less than attrition of men, equipment, and ammunition;

-- sufficient cost to military, civil and economic life in the North to help tip the attrition-supply equation further in our direction;

-- sufficient order, unity, and stability in the South to rule out a Communist political takeover in the midst of chaos.

If this view is right, the war will not end when we have pacified every district, village, and province. When it ends there will still be a hell of a mess in South Vietnam -- as there was in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines.

There will probably still be some last-ditch VC to mop up; but, if other guerrilla wars carry any lesson, it is that when the organizational structure cracks, it cracks pretty well down the line. And the VC is the most tightly organized guerrilla structure we've seen except that of the Chinese Communist. For example, they are now feeding local guerrillas up to the main force units, in order to keep them up to strength. The main force and local guerrilla units are interlocked; if the main forces go, it will have a profound effect on the local forces.

In short, we should carry forward rural reconstruction on orderly concentrated lines; but we should not measure the probable length of the war by the rate of successful pacification.

The real job of rural reconstruction will be post-war.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jack Valenti
Bill Moyers

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

16

April 1, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will recall that I posed some thorny questions about Vietnam.

You asked me to get Secretary McNamara to answer the military questions and Bob Komer the non-military questions.

Attached are answers from Bob Komer.

Jack Valenti

Roston - Could this over
+ give me comments and
suggestions —
L

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

118c

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 29, 1966

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Your Key Questions on Vietnam

1. Re the USSR and Negotiations

You are right in assuming that the Soviet Union is probably the most promising asset we have to influence Hanoi to talk. As you know, we have made substantial efforts to induce the Russians to use whatever leverage they have with Hanoi. Harriman has pressed the leadership on several occasions, most recently during our December-January peace offensive. Dean Rusk saw Kosygin in Delhi at the time of Nehru's funeral in mid-January. None of our high-level approaches met with much success. The hard line taken by the Russians seems, in part, due to their sensitivity to ChiCom charges that they have been involved in a "deal" with the U.S. In part, too, the Russians appear to recognize that their leverage with Hanoi is very tenuous on such questions as negotiations (Hanoi still harbors, with good reason, the feeling that Moscow sold out the Viet Minh at the 1954 Geneva Conference).

When Harold Wilson was in Moscow in mid-February, he tried his hand at pressing the Russians to get Hanoi to talk. He, too, met with no success, although there was a brief and inconclusive contact between Lord Chalfont (a member of Wilson's party) and the DRV Charge in Moscow.

There are not, to my knowledge, constant covert attempts to get the Soviets to pull off another Tashkent. But I am not sure that such covert attempts would be very productive.

One approach that Chet Cooper has advanced, and which may be worth some thought, contemplates exploiting the current presence in Moscow of a high-level North Vietnamese delegation. Cooper points out that the fact that the North Vietnamese have sent such a delegation to the

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-310

By CB, NARA Date 6-15-00

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

I don't
 know much
 but I'll
 try to
 become
 better.
 PWT

2. Re the Issue of Peace Talks

3. Re Political Tutelage

One approach I understand Rostow and Cooper have kicked

EYES ONLY
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

*just not
desire on
large scale
needed.
Rwx*

around is to induce the GVN to hire non-U.S. experts to provide solid, sophisticated back-up to each of the GVN ministries. They feel that carefully selected (i.e., U.S. selected) British, Dutch, Swiss, Australian or Scandinavian "permanent under-secretaries" and key specialists would provide an education for the ministers above and the civil servants below; it would also give the American opposite numbers some experienced people to work with. (The idea of GVN paid-for non-U.S. personnel is to avoid the stigma of a French-type takeover of the government.) A system not unlike this has worked with success in other countries - Ethiopia, for example.

This, of course, does not provide an essential missing element in the present GVN structure - a vehicle or a format for popular political expression and participation. A lack of such a vehicle is in part responsible for the present crisis with the Buddhists - street marches and demonstrations are the only political outlet. I hope to give the matter of political development a high priority in both my visit to Vietnam and in my activities on my return.

4. Re Pacification

The four priority pacification tasks are extremely modest in terms of the resources we are committing to the effort. Even if they met with 100% success, there would be added only a few hundred square miles of additional GVN-controlled territory. (One of the four priority areas - the one in the Delta - is already under GVN control.) But the prospects for anything like 100% success are remote. Little apparent progress has been made since Honolulu. The current political crisis has stalled much of the planning and effort at the Saigon level and, of course, in and around Danang, one of the priority areas. On the other hand, the first cadre class (about 4700) has just started their training and we can't expect too much until they graduate at the end of April, when they will go to work in the priority villages.

Because of the attention the U.S. and the South Vietnamese press has given to Honolulu and the Pacification Plan for 1966, progress in fulfillment of the plan will be watched closely. A key question is the one you pose: How can we measure progress in a reliable and meaningful way? It would be dangerous to put too much emphasis on statistical measurement - x hundred school rooms, y thousand wells.

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

EYES ONLY

Perhaps a key measurement is whether General Ky (or even the GVN hamlet chief) is able to spend the night in a pacified hamlet without a platoon of troops guarding his house. Cooper was out at RAND last week and discussed this problem there. He urged them to develop some meaningful criteria of measurement for pacification progress. I will take an early occasion to inquire into their effort.

A look at the whole question of progress on the Pacification Program is, of course, high on the list of the tasks I will undertake when I go to Vietnam later this week.

Rf

R. W. Komer

Jack - your questions are mighty good ones; our answers not so good. Will hope to do better on my return.

Rf

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 28, 1966
5:15 P.M. Monday

115d

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT KOMER

Here are the questions I asked the President:

1. Are we pursuing the one key to settlement in Vietnam -- the Soviet Union?

One does not need to read intelligence reports to figure out that the only pressure that is usable, and effective, in getting the North Vietnamese to talk is the Soviet Union. I assume that covertly we are working everyday to urge them to pull off another Tashkent, this time with the NVN.

2. Have we really sorted out the sticky problems and issues of peace talks -- so that we are absolutely clear on our objectives and trading points?

If we got a call to a talking table tomorrow, would we have our position thought through so we would be confident of what we would say and how much we would give, and what we can reasonably expect?

3. Why shouldn't we organize in Vietnam a highly skilled group of political professionals to work with the current government in teaching them how to become democratic leaders -- and build a durable democratic party?

Once the fighting has stopped, are the SVN capable of really governing themselves? Why shouldn't the skills of democratic government be as important to teach as the implements of war? We are doing the latter and doing it well. Should not we be actively involved in the former?

2.

4. Are we keeping close tabs on the Lodge plan for pacifying four key areas in SVN?

You'll recall Lodge sent you a book with maps showing ~~you~~ these four key areas. For the truth is if we are not able to achieve this program, we cannot really expect to do a creditable job of pacification. How will we check on the progress to make certain what we hear and what we read is accurate? Some times in the heat of the cheering-on the reporter-of-facts wants to hear. Shouldn't we set in motion a checking system to get you the true information?

The President wanted your comments on what we are doing if anything on all of these questions.

Jack Valenti

JV:ny

Mr. Rostow

116

*Out to Pm
4/5/66*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 4, 1966
Monday, 2:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dave Bell asks your approval of a \$15 million non-project loan for Tunisia--all tied to US procurement. Fowler and Schultze are on board.

This is the bulk of our economic aid program this year, except for a little food and technical assistance. We will release it in two stages to maintain pressure for continued progress on self-help measures. At Bourguiba's urgent request, we are also considering additional military aid, but we will give you a crack at that later since it would be virtually a new commitment.

This is an outstanding example of using our aid to bargain for better self-help. Talks leading to this loan began almost a year ago. Rusk promised continued support for Tunisian development, provided the Tunisians made some economic policy changes. Out of those talks came a major new Tunisian procedure for budgeting development resources. Now we and other donors (\$30 million) working through a World Bank consultative group are ready to underwrite this year's program. It has been a long pull, but the Tunisians have done a good job. The World Bank has just voted its confidence by setting aside \$100 million for the next three years.

While this is a sound development loan, there is also strong political justification. As you recall from your last talk with Bourguiba Jr., President Bourguiba has put himself far out on a limb in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser and preaching a peaceful solution for the Palestine problem. He fears Nasser's retaliation by subversion and is desperately looking for somebody to tie to. He's even offered us both naval and air bases (which we don't need) as an inducement for closer ties. We do not want Tunisia to depend too heavily on us; it should look to its natural markets in Europe. But until Bourguiba can smooth deGaulle's ruffled feathers, we have an interest in keeping this effective little enterprise going.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-309

By CB, NARA Date 8-26-99

(5)

Approve _____

W. W. Rostow

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

906

116a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

MAR 31 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Loan for the Government of Tunisia

AID requests your approval to enter into negotiations and conclude a loan agreement for \$15 million with the Government of Tunisia. The loan will be used to finance commodity imports from the U. S. during 1966 to support Tunisia's development program.

Background

We have an interest in Tunisian development based on the special role of that country as a moderating force in the Arab-African world. We have provided them with program assistance since 1962, along with several project loans for agricultural, transport and electrical equipment, an agricultural school, a university, and irrigation. These are summarized below:

Obligations by Fiscal Years
(Millions of Dollars)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967 est.</u>
Program Loans	10	10	15	15
Project Loans	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	19	17	15	15
PL 480, Title I	4	15	3	4 - 5

The last program loan was made in June 1965, in connection with which the Tunisians enacted a series of self-help measures, including a wage-price stabilization program and a currency devaluation of 20 percent. These measures have worked well.

The Proposed Loan

The loan now proposed, along with assistance of some \$30 million from other sources including France, is designed to help Tunisia meet a balance of payments problem this year. The main source of the problem is low export

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earnings, partly because political issues cost Tunisia its special access to the French market last year. But the outlook is improving. Petroleum discoveries and tourism increases are expected to add substantially to foreign earnings; the World Bank is increasing its lending; and relations with France should soon improve to a point where French aid and trade will again become an important sustaining factor in Tunisia's balance of payments.

Meanwhile, the loan will be made contingent upon the continuation of sound economic policies as spelled out in the attached AID memorandum. These policies--including price and credit stabilization, and control over the use of short term foreign credits which have added to Tunisia's payments problem--have been developed and reviewed with the Tunisians by AID and other donors, including the World Bank and the IMF.

With sound economic policies, improving trade prospects, and increased French aid hopefully in the offing, it looks at this point as though Tunisia may no longer require balance of payments support from us by 1969-1970. The Tunisians have been alerted to the fact that our balance of payments support in the future will decrease with declining requirements. We can, of course, remain committed to Tunisian development through project and food assistance as requirements and/or opportunities arise.

The Military Assistance Program

Our military assistance program in Tunisia is running about \$2 to \$3 million per year. This figure implies a Tunisian budget and resource commitment to military purposes which seems to be in keeping with their economic development effort and with the level of U. S. economic assistance that AID would like to provide. However, our Tunisia military assistance program is now under review, and the possibility of a substantial increase in the MAP level is being considered. This might of course have an impact on Tunisia's ability to sustain its present rate of economic growth. It may also have important political-military implications. For these reasons, I think we ought to regard any proposal for revision of the Tunisian military assistance program as a new commitment, to be submitted for your explicit approval.

Balance of Payments Impact

Normal commercial trade between the U. S. and Tunisia is very small, less than \$5 million per year. AID funds have been used in the past to increase sales of U. S. goods in Tunisia. The proposed loan will be tied to U. S. procurement, which will serve to minimize the adverse effects of the loan

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itself on the U. S. balance of payments. In addition, at the request of Treasury, AID will take special steps to get Tunisian cooperation in adopting specific measures favorable to the U. S. balance of payments. These are outlined in the AID memorandum.

I recommend that you authorize negotiations to conclude the proposed loan. Secretary Fowler concurs in this recommendation.

Attachment

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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1166

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID Guidelines 10-16-95

By ju, NARA. Date 5-21-98

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAR 11 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$15 Million Program Loan for Tunisia

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of Tunisia a program loan for \$15 million to finance essential imports in Calendar Year 1966.

Tunisia serves U.S. foreign policy objectives by its moderating influence in Arab and African affairs. Tunisia has continued to assert its independence from Nasser's attempts to dominate the Arab community by refusing to break diplomatic relations with Western Germany after its announced intentions to recognize the State of Israel. President Bourguiba has also called for the end of the unrealistic position of the Arab League in attempting to settle the Palestinian problem through force of arms. More recently and in the African context, President Bourguiba did not hesitate to denounce publicly the OAU decision that all members break relations with the UK over the Rhodesian question. In January 1966, in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador and members of a U.S. military survey team, Bourguiba renewed his offer of permission to use the Tunisian naval facilities at Bizerte and alternative air bases in Tunisia should U.S. bases in Libya have to be relinquished.

In the spring of 1965, the Tunisian Government sought assurances for continued U.S. economic assistance. In April 1965, Secretary Rusk presented to the Tunisian Foreign Minister a memorandum stating that the U.S. Government is prepared to continue to provide major support to Tunisia's economic development efforts. The proposed program loan is essential to Tunisia's development efforts and is in partial implementation of the \$180 million U.S. commitment to Tunisia made in July 1962. As of December 31, 1965, approximately \$115 million had been obligated under the commitment. The Secretary's memorandum and our willingness to provide assistance are predicated on Tunisia's undertaking specific self-help measures.

Self-help steps already taken:

- 6% growth rate per annum over the last three years with little inflationary impact because of the effective implementation of stabilization program started in 1964.

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- Stabilization program included 20% devaluation of the Tunisian dinar; domestic credit ceilings running through 1966; 10% across the board tax increase in 1965 with a similar tax increase in 1966; and wage and price freeze.

- IMF has provided \$20 million in support of stabilization program and is prepared to provide another \$6 to \$7 million in 1966.

- Improved fiscal and budgetary controls. The U.S. obtained Tunisian agreement to implement the new Four Year Plan through annual economic budgets and the first budget covering CY 1966 has been prepared. The economic budget consolidates all government budgets, relates total investment to available resources, and provides a more effective vehicle for selecting priority investments.

- Government revenues and expenditures have increased 40% between 1962 and 1965. Total education expenditures increased by over 100% during this period and now account for about 30% of the operating budget.

- Enrollment of primary school children has doubled and now accounts for 80% of school age children.

- A nationwide birth control program has been initiated.

- Greater latitude being given to the private sector, e.g., replacing of government investment in a development bank with a combination of IFC, IBRD and private participation.

- On the basis of Tunisia's recent economic performance, the IBRD Consultative Group for Tunisia has been reactivated after a two-year lapse. Members of the Consultative Group agreed to provide substantial additional assistance.

- Tunisia qualified for a World Bank Commitment to provide loans and credits of up to \$100 million for suitable projects over the next three years.

Justification of \$15 Million Program Loan

The insufficiency of foreign exchange earnings to cover essential commodity imports is one of Tunisia's major problems. Recognizing this, the U.S. provided \$45 million of commodity assistance in the last three years. By 1969-70, Tunisian export earnings, particularly from petroleum and tourism, are expected to increase sufficiently so that commodity import assistance will no longer be necessary.

The Tunisian economic budget forecasts a need for approximately \$34 million in commodity import financing in CY 1966. Possible sources and amounts of financing are: the IMF \$6 million; West Germany \$5 million; Italy \$3-\$5 million; and IBRD \$1-\$2 million for a total of \$15-\$18 million,

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leaving a shortfall of \$16-\$19 million.

Without commodity import assistance, and given Tunisia's depleted foreign exchange reserves, Tunisia will be faced with the following alternatives:

1. Reduce investment substantially below the 1965 level. Commodity imports are very close to the absolute minimum. Imports of consumer goods and foodstuffs (other than cereals which are primarily P.L. 480 financed) have been reduced by about 20% between 1964 and 1965.
2. Resort to financing these commodity imports through short-term financing which would greatly aggravate Tunisia's already serious debt servicing problem.

The proposed \$15 million U.S. program loan will be provided so as to exert maximum leverage (a) to reduce the CY 1966 balance of payments problems by encouraging the Tunisians to undertake the necessary self-help efforts and (b) to obtain additional non-project assistance from other donors.

The loan agreement will seek Tunisian agreement to the following self-help measures:

- Restrict level of gross investment in CY 1966 to the availabilities of non-inflationary domestic and foreign financing.
- Adhere throughout CY 1966 to the specific quantitative domestic credit ceilings established by the IMF.
- Control the use of short and medium term suppliers' credits in the financing of total investment by establishing a control system through the Central Bank of Tunisia working in conjunction with the Ministry of Plan and National Economy.
- Liberalize the import licensing system for essential imports to stimulate private sector investment.
- Continue to increase government surplus on the current account in 1966 and in subsequent years to enable GOT to finance a larger amount of its investment program.
- Deposit local currency equivalent of the imported commodities to be jointly programmed by the GOT and the U.S. Government for specific investment projects after careful review of the CY 1966 investment budget. Earmark 20% of the local currency for credits to the private sector.
- Improve annual economic budget preparation and implementation by clearly indicating future years budgeting and foreign exchange implications of a given year's level of gross investment.

The loan will be released in two stages, the first \$8 million immediately and the remaining \$7 million in June 1966 after a joint review with

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the Tunisians to assure ourselves that adequate steps are being taken to implement the above self-help measures.

There are other key areas, e.g., agricultural planning and production and private investment which the Tunisians recognize as needing examination and assistance which could result in major policy changes by the Government of Tunisia. The initial steps to provide additional U.S. assistance have already been undertaken.

1. The first segment of a survey team of agricultural economists from the University of Minnesota is now in Tunisia working out a multi-year program of assistance to strengthen the capabilities of the Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture for improving agricultural planning and production including a study of agricultural pricing and subsidies.
2. A U.S. investment bank is preparing a contract to furnish two specialists to work directly with Tunisian private business to seek joint investment ventures for the U.S. investment bank, its U.S. clients and Tunisian businessmen and to make specific recommendations to the Government of Tunisia on improving the investment climate.

Effects on U.S. Balance of Payments

The proposed program loan can only be used for the purchase of commodities in the United States. The proceeds of the loan will be disbursed by letters of credit through U.S. banks. This loan will not adversely affect the U.S. balance of payments position.

Since much of Tunisia's short term debt is with France, there may be some apprehension that assistance of this kind--from any donor--may indirectly enhance France's ability to take action harmful to the U.S. balance of payments position. While we believe the impact of the proposed loan will be relatively slight in this regard, we will continue in our efforts to make sure that the Tunisians understand the balance of payments problems of the United States and, to the extent possible, induce them to adopt policies and practices favorable to the U.S. balance of payments position. In this regard we will:

- continue our efforts to promote the expansion of U.S. exports to Tunisia. The program loan itself introduces new U.S. goods and suppliers to the Tunisian market with the resultant potential for follow-on sales.
- make special efforts to acquaint Tunisian importers and businessmen with American products.

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- introduce additional U.S. businessmen to the Tunisian market potential through Office of Small Business circulars, trade fairs, and the establishment of a technical library.

- keep close tabs on the Tunisian short term debt position, especially on its debt with France. At our suggestion, a special group from the IMF and IBRD is currently studying the Tunisian debt problem.

- raise with the Tunisians, at the request of the Treasury Department, the possibility of their building up some dollar reserves in New York as total Tunisian reserve holdings increase.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.

/s/ David E. Bell

David E. Bell

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MEMORANDUM

15
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

audles informed 112
File B11,~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 4, 1966 - 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Return of Caamano to the DR

Since Caamano went to London in late January, he has indicated both to Garcia Godoy and Bosch on several occasions that he would like to return to the DR. Garcia Godoy has consistently told him not to. Bosch has taken the same line until his statement yesterday, which formed the basis for the press story which you saw.

This afternoon we received an FBI report on a conversation between Bosch and one of their sources which took place in Bosch's house this morning. Bosch initiated the visit and was aware that what he said would reach high U.S. government officials. The full FBI report is attached. The gist of what Bosch had to say was that since neither the U.S. Government nor the Dominican military will ever accept him as President, he had decided not to run and intended to propose to the PRD convention next week that they nominate Caamano.

Given Bosch's erratic temperament, it is hard to gauge how serious he is in this. It may be no more than a passing fit of depression. He may have called in the FBI source to see if he could elicit some indication from us that we would back him if he won. The danger of Caamano's returning lies not as a rival candidate to Balaguer (the November poll showed that only 3% of the population would vote for him, and in the poll just completed, this percentage dropped to 1.6), but in the disruptive influence that it would have on the presently good -- and improving -- electoral climate. In terms of the elections themselves, he would adversely affect Balaguer's chances only if he were to become Bosch's running mate.

Ellsworth Bunker returned to Santo Domingo this afternoon. His first item of business will be to discuss the possibility of Caamano's return with Garcia Godoy and what should be done to stop it. Caamano continues to be subject to Garcia Godoy's orders as a military officer on active duty. We can expect to hear from Ellsworth on this by tomorrow afternoon. I will keep you posted.

Let stop him. Don't let him back

Walt Rostow

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-225
By CL, NARA, Date 5-24-88

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FBI Report on the Dominican Situation - Received April 4, 1966 - 1:13 p.m.

A confidential source abroad has advised as follows:

During the early morning hours of April 4, instant, source was telephonically summoned to the residence of Juan Bosch, former President of the Dominican Republic (DR) and present head of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD - Dominican Revolutionary Party). Source, who has known Bosch for a number of years, stated he had never seen Bosch in a more dejected and obviously mentally and physically exhausted condition.

Bosch at first discussed a radio speech, which he had delivered on the afternoon of April 3 last over Dominican broadcasting stations wherein he, Bosch, had praised former Constitutionalist Provisional President Francisco Caamano as a great devoted Dominican patriot. Bosch said a thorough appraisal of the present Dominican situation in all its aspects has led him to the conclusion that "there is no conceivable solution of the Dominican problem." Bosch said he had reached the further conclusion that he should not seek the presidency of the DR in the forthcoming elections since he, Bosch, is now thoroughly convinced that neither the United States Government nor the Dominican Armed Forces, which Bosch described as "the two decisive factors in Dominican politics," will ever accept him as President. Bosch said that since he has definitely decided not to run as the PRD candidate for the office of President, he will suggest to the PRD National Convention scheduled for the weekend of April 9-10 next in Santo Domingo, that Colonel Francisco Caamano be nominated the party candidate for office of President of the DR.

Bosch said that he does not at this time know whether Caamano would accept the candidacy for President and he, Bosch, would not comment concerning who would be chosen to run as Vice President in the event Caamano should elect to run.

Bosch said he has no doubt that the PRD Convention will accept his suggestion and that if Caamano does run for the presidency there is no doubt in Bosch's mind that Caamano would be elected since Caamano has won the affection and confidence of the Dominican people during and after the recent revolution.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 86-257

By inf, NARS, Date 9-30-86

Concerning his own plans for the future, Bosch indicated he will dedicate himself to the task of guiding the PRD as this party's elected President during the critical times to come.

Bosch said his choice of Caamano as the PRD candidate most likely to succeed is based on the expectation that the Dominican Armed Forces and the United States Government would be willing to accept a military officer as the chief executive, even though Caamano fought on what many considered to be the "wrong side" during the 1965 Revolution.

Bosch said he considers Caamano to be an honest, patriotic and devoted individual. Bosch commented that due to Caamano's background as a military man, he obviously lacks political and administrative experience and will, therefore, need sound guidance. The PRD, according to Bosch, will be able to provide Caamano with proper advice and council. Bosch also mentioned the possible danger that Caamano could become overly influenced by Hector Aristy (former Constitutionalist Secretary of State to the Presidency) whom Bosch considers to be a rank opportunist and not to be trusted.

Bosch said there is no question in his mind that Caamano is an anti-Communist. Bosch pointed out, however, that a systematic press campaign has already begun in the United States to misrepresent Caamano as pro-Communist or at least as seeking Communist support. Bosch was of the opinion that this campaign against Caamano may eventually "drive Caamano into the arms of the Communists in a similar fashion to the way in which Fidel Castro became a Communist."

Bosch made it clear during the course of the conversation that although the election of a military man such as Caamano to the Presidency might possibly lead to a solution of the Dominican situation, he, Bosch, has personally lost all hope that a workable solution is at all feasible under present conditions. Bosch expressed the opinion that the two basic factors which prevent a solution of the Dominican situation and which have caused Bosch "to lose all faith in the future" are first, "the obvious inability of the American Government to understand the basic nature of the Dominican crisis"; secondly, the unbroken and continuing power of the corrupt and self-serving Dominican military hierarchy.

Bosch said his own experience since 1963 has caused him to lose all faith in American democracy since it has proved to him that American democracy is seemingly unable or unwilling to help Latin-American democracies to survive.

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The aforementioned confidential source abroad commented that whereas Bosch seemed most emphatic in making the statements set out above, Bosch has in the past been known to frequently change his mind and it can be expected that PRD activists will encourage Bosch to modify his position. It is to be noted Bosch's comments were furnished the source with the expectation they would be made known to high-level U.S. Government officials.

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April 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk, with the strong endorsement of Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg and Administrator Webb, has submitted for your approval a request that he be authorized to proceed with an approach to the Soviet Union on a Celestial Bodies Treaty.

The Secretary's recommendation has become urgent because there are signs that the Soviet Union may be planning to introduce its own treaty at an early date in order to preempt this subject. It would be to our advantage to act before they do.

It is recommended that you approve the three specific courses of action contained in the Secretary's memorandum and instruct the Secretary to proceed with immediate implementation thereof.

Walt W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-252

By sig NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

119
April 4, 1966
Monday, 5:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We now have first-round reactions to your food message, which our ambassadors have delivered in almost every foreign capital. A spate of local holidays has prevented a number of governments from responding yet, but we have enough answers to form a clear pattern. The sampling you asked to see is attached.

The most striking aspect of these answers is how many countries are themselves on the emergency list. They draw a graphic picture of the world's food problem!

Nevertheless your message has been well received. Even some of the marginally poor nations want at least to send India token help. A number of the wealthier ones are cranking up more substantial responses, and some that have already given are considering more.

To capitalize on this momentum, I have asked State to organize our follow-up. We don't want any potential donors to slip off the hook. We also need to get the Indians involved in this follow-up. The big danger is that they will sit back and relax, figuring that we have now assumed leadership -- something we had insisted they do.

It will still be an uphill job to get others to match our 3.5 million tons of grain, though we may well get more than equivalent dollar value (about \$210 million) in other commodities and services.

I will report again later when results are firmer.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-252

By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

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April 4, 1966

INITIAL RESPONSES TO THE PRESIDENT'S
INDIA FOOD MESSAGE

Considering contribution:

- Belgium - "Belgian Government has decided hold nation wide drive in near future for funds to aid Indians."
- Nicaragua - "President Schick has just telephoned me that after consideration President Johnson's message on aid to meet Indian emergency, which he said is another demonstration our President's humanitarian and generous impulses, he would 'of course' like to have Nicaragua make a contribution. He added that Nicaragua could not provide food or shipping, for example. But that Nicaragua would contribute a sum of money to buy food."
- Uruguay - Fonmin Zorrilla "agreed in principle to provide some assistance to India, probably in form of grains. . . Uruguay cannot fail to help at this time."
- Venezuela - "After reading message in translation Leoni said will take up matter at next Cabinet session Monday April 4. He will recommend Venezuelan contribution and will let me know decision same day. Since Venezuelan rice surplus already disposed of he anticipated monetary contribution."
- Nationalist
China - "Vice Former Minister Yang said he would appreciate whatever specific guidance or suggestion US might be able provide as to best means of Chinese assistance, as well as our estimate of Indian reaction. Yang said most effective aid will be that designed help Indian people help themselves. Commented that agricultural technical advice and projects might be most appropriate and feasible for China."

Already giving:

- Canada - "Ritchie expressed appreciation for President's inclusion in his statement of fact that Canada is prepared provide a million tons of wheat and flour to India. Ritchie went on to say that he felt this was all Canada could do on food for India and that in Canadian view a million tons from Canada represented a fair share of burden for Canada."
- Greece - "Greek Government is donating 5,000 tons wheat and 1,000 tons raisins to India."
- Kuwait - "According local press Kuwaiti Government within past two weeks has given KD 100,000 (\$280,000) to India for famine relief. Commerce Minister leaving April 3 for official visit to India and GOK might consider using his visit as an occasion to increase already generous contribution."
- New Zealand-"New Zealand has already given 1,000 tons of milk powder worth Dols 280,000 to India. However, possibility exists that additional gift of milk powder may be considered."
- Netherlands-"Press reports that private food for India campaign passed FL 24.5 million (\$7 million) mark March 31, or per capita voluntary contribution of FL 2. In addition, Government is providing FL 3.7 million of emergency food aid."
- Spain - "Fonoff Official noted Spain had recently made small contribution to India (500 tons rice) but did not rule out possibility of further measures."
- Yugoslavia - "Yugoslav Government has agreed in January to diversion of some 30,000 tons of PL-480 wheat from Yugoslavia to India, even though having its own food supply problems. More recently it has agreed make gift to India of 700 tons powdered milk and 1,700 tons of beans. Currently Yugoslav red cross engaged in highly publicized nation-wide drive for special contributions to fund for Indian relief."

- Austria - "Austria had moved quickly in approving late January gift of \$1 million to be used for powdered milk, pesticides and primarily for fertilizers. As Austria is not in surplus position for cereals or even powdered milk, this gift was generous and rapid response to meet humanitarian needs with which Austrian Government had great sympathy."
- Denmark - "Foreign Office indicated India expects use anticipated interest free twenty-year loan of about 30 million kroner (\$4.4 million) for milk powder. Loan with grace period of five years to be repaid in convertible currency. Meanwhile Danish Church and Red Cross conducting campaign for aid to India."
- Germany - "Officials contacted referred to the German response to the present crisis. DM \$20.4 million in credits for fertilizer purchases and DM \$10 million for technical assistance grant and DM \$400,000 grant for powdered milk."
- United Kingdom - "Sir John Johnston head of South Asian Department praised program outlined in message as imaginative and generous response to critical need. Johnston pointed out that UK as a food importing nation is endeavoring to assist India by meeting other almost as vital requirements. Most vital of these he said was foreign exchange."
- Malta - "Under auspices of the Archbishop and the Curia, Malta citizens raised 40,000 pounds for India relief. Malta Government states it is proud of this unprecedented achievement."

Token gift possible:

- Burma - "The Burmese are traditionally good on humanitarian matters of this sort and may take some action, but I do not see how it can be more than on a token basis."
- Malaysia - "DeSilva said that although Malaysia could not do much it might be desirable for her to extend some token assistance. He said he would discuss question further with his superiors and inform Embassy of reaction."

- Upper Volta - "Token gift peanuts or sorghum might be possible but would not like to suggest this unless can offer free transport to India as shipping costs extremely high."
- Jamaica - "Government sympathetic to India's problems but as Jamaica is a small country with serious food shortages, assistance to India would at best be only token."
- Costa Rica - "Sympathetic. Said conceivably food collection or similar charitable project might be undertaken with U.S. assistance. . . We anticipate difficulty implementing any project."
- Cyprus - "Serious local drought. Financial resources strained due military expenditures and it unlikely they would be willing provide cash although just possible some token gift would be considered."
- Hungary - "Hungary barely sufficient in grains and had to import at times and always deficient in fodder. Also that Hungarian food exports (fresh vegetables, meat and meat products) not suitable for India. He did not, however, rule out possibility of token shipment."
- Afghanistan - "Afghanistan is itself recipient US wheat shipments. I suggested Afghanistan consider making gift, even if not large, of something Afghans could afford to give, such as dried fruit. Farhadi said he would explore this possibility with Fonmin."

Cannot do anything--on the critical list themselves:

- Kenya - "Kenya unable provide even token help to India because it still requires famine relief itself. Only surplus food here is elephant meat on the hoof."
- Mali - "Mali is not likely source of food for India. In fact, will probably itself make request for PL 480 foodstuffs." . . . "Massive US support to India likely to encourage it in its expectations and hence, we inclined, unless instructed to contrary, to play matter in relatively low key."

- Jordan - "Since we deemed GOJ had capacity supply neither food or money, President's message brought to attention Jordanian Government but not request for assistance. Wheat crop has suffered extensive damage as result low winter rainfall and we are now making urgent effort supply PL 480 assistance. Any financial contribution would in effect simply be charge against U.S. budget support."
- Tunisia - "While Tunisia has not yet had chance study message, seems highly unlikely it can be helpful, as its own food situation less than satisfactory because of adverse weather conditions earlier this year. At moment GOT formulating supplemental request for PL 480 Title II wheat as well as for soybean oil and cotton under Title I."
- Cameroon - "Actually Cameroon in economic and financial crisis has neither food nor money to assist let alone capacity to ship."
- Congo - "Do not anticipate much GDRC reaction for India miles away and many Congolese dying of malnutrition in northeast and east due to effects rebellion and associated maladministration and transportation and communications breakdown. If I were to emphasize USG's gift to India, reaction might well be 'why not give more to Congo'."
- Malawi - "Malawi totally sympathetic but unfortunately not in position provide food or money."
- Haiti - "In view fact that Haiti itself is suffering from widespread malnutrition, lacks sufficient food for domestic consumption, and has no foreign exchange or other resources, I naturally did not urge any Haitian response."
- Peru - "In view of Peruvian imports foodstuffs to feed its own population i. e. , including 480,000 tons wheat in 1965, do not believe GOP would have capacity contribute Indian relief. Additionally, Peru through recent request to FAO for disaster relief in Southern Peru increasingly preoccupied with implications own food problems."

- Honduras - "It may be pertinent to recall that Honduras itself is on list of emergency food shipment recipients, and is still in precarious position as regards tens of thousands of persons affected by severe drought in its south coast region last fall and who will not be out of danger unless and until there is a good harvest there in July/August."
- Guatemala - "Guatemala has no capacity at this point for providing food or money to assist India."
- Dominican Republic - "Already inadequate food supply situation in Dominican Republic, reflected in major US food distribution program, precludes GODR contribution."
- Sierra Leone - "My judgment is that Sierra Leone, with extremely limited resources and financial crisis impending, does not have capacity assist India."
- Somalia - "Believe would serve no purpose urge Somalia contribute to India relief in view chronic food shortages and malnutrition here. Nevertheless, President Johnson's response to Indian needs is appreciated here as humanitarian act."
- Ceylon - "In view Ceylon's own well-known food problem, did not urge GOC Contribution to help alleviate GOI food shortage."
- Liberia - "Do not consider Liberia capable making contribution of either food or funds so have not pressed for participation and do not expect any response."
- Indonesia - "Indonesia in no position become food donor."
- Yemen - "After careful consideration we feel it would be appropriate send text of speech to Fonoff but that we should not make approach to Yemeni Government for contribution to India at this time. Yemen in throes of civil war, drought, inflation and food shortages. Moreover, our raising subject would inevitably lead to questions from the Government about the status of our suspended PL 480 program in Yemen which department has instructed us not to discuss."

- Zambia - "Doubt we will get any significant response as Zambia not in position make direct food contribution and almost certainly considers it must conserve financial resources to deal with growing problems arising from Rhodesian crisis for which it is itself appealing for outside assistance."
- Turkey - "Higher level approach deemed inappropriate here in part because as major recipient foreign assistance Turkey lacks much capacity provide food or money and, more particularly, because such approach would be singularly untimely on eve of Turkey's signature of PL 480 agreement in which US Government imposes restrictions on Turkish grain exports."
- Morocco - "In view serious drought which led Morocco to request supplementary PL 480 cereals program, as well as limited Moroccan financial resources, unlikely Moroccan response could be of more than token nature at best."
- Ghana - "Owing to Ghana's own severe foodstuffs shortages and urgent need for outside help to which U.S. through PL 480 and other western countries responding, did not consider appropriate to solicit contribution for India."

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April 4, 1966
Monday, 11:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Maltese Prime Minister Borg Olivier has just won a parliamentary majority in recent elections against heavy leftist opposition. He has stuck to his pro-Western position despite criticism and cooperates freely on naval visits and private investment. Since Malta is a small nation sensitive to being ignored, a friendly congratulatory message (attached) would be a nice gesture.

Incidentally, Maltese citizens have privately raised 40,000 pounds for Indian relief--an act the government says is unprecedented.


Walt Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

120a

April 4, 1966

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My warmest congratulations on your election victory. As you continue in the office of Prime Minister, I want to extend my best wishes for you and your Government and the people of Malta. I look forward to the continuation of the close and friendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence and trust, which binds our two countries.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier
Prime Minister of Malta
Valletta, Malta

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-252
By rip NARA, Date 11-16-89

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/4/66

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: White House Announcement of Ne Win State Visit

General Ne Win of Burma has accepted the State Visit invitation which you approved on March 18. He cannot come in May and would prefer an autumn date either during or after September.

In order to avoid distorted leaks and to reveal this plan prior to the expected announcement of a Rangoon visit by Chinese Communist Chairman Liu Shao-chi, the Burmese have requested that we announce the visit at once on April 6, without specifying a date.

I attach State's proposed language for a White House statement on Wednesday.

Such an announcement should be a solid plus for us: a friendly gesture towards the most meticulously neutral statesman in Asia, who has carefully avoided any statements on Vietnam, pro or con.

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Walt Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-252

By inf NARA, Date 11-16-89~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~ENCLOSUREPROPOSED TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
GENERAL NE WIN'S STATE VISIT

The White House announced today that the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma General Ne Win has accepted the invitation of President Johnson to make a state visit to the United States at a mutually convenient date during the fall of this year. General Ne Win will be accompanied on his visit to the United States by Mrs. Ne Win.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-252By ijgNARA, Date 11-16-89~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 4, 1966

Dear Hubert,

Please tell General Van Fleet how heartened I am by his support.

He will understand, from both his Greek and Korean experience, how tricky the political situation now is in South Vietnam. We shall have to set aside the proposal for his visiting the Korean and United States forces there; although his presence -- and the testimony of his personal experience -- would undoubtedly lift morale.

You should also know that Bob McNamara has other reservations.

You may wish to suggest that his help is needed right now at home. There could be no better theme than the one you suggest: we saw dark days in Greece and Korea, but came through.

Yours,

LBJ

The Vice President
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-252
By ijg NARA, Date 11-16-89

LBJ;WWR:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/4/66

123

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully studied your letter of March 1, transmitted by your Ambassador in Washington, and I am deeply appreciative of your counsel.

Your view that non-military measures in Viet-Nam must be pursued in close coordination with military operations is fully shared here. I am glad to note your agreement that a coordinated approach of firmness against military aggression, together with full support and encouragement for economic, political and social development, is the sure way to preserve the security and independence of Viet-Nam. In this connection, the United States will continue to join with other Free World nations in providing the Government of Viet-Nam with the understanding and support it needs in facing the difficult tasks before it.

I can assure you that the policy of the United States toward Viet-Nam is firm. While we will continue to explore every avenue to an honorable solution, we will persist with unshakeable determination in our commitment to assist the people of South Viet-Nam in preserving their right to shape their own future without external interference.

Sincerely,

Uij

His Excellency
Chiang Kai-shek
President of the Republic of China
Taipei

LBJ:State:JT:mm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-252

By *sig* NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

124
Sunday, April 3, 1966, 4:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Michael Stewart, No. 2 at the British Embassy, put the following matter to me today at lunch.

Last year Wilson sent over the Secretary to the British Cabinet to talk with Mac Bundy about salvaging the pound. The issues went beyond finance, involving defense and basic U.S.-U.K. relations.

About May of this year, similar questions may well arise, and Wilson again may wish to have exploratory discussions, in greatest confidence, at the White House level.

The question is: with whom should such conversations be initiated?

You may wish to give me guidance on what reply, if any, to make to Stewart.

The information itself is obviously interesting. Another round of help for the pound is the time to extract -- in parallel -- whatever we may wish to extract from Wilson on NATO and other matters.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 2-10-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, April 3, 1966, 3:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Van Fleet to Viet-Nam

Bob McNamara says no: Van Fleet has several times gotten off the reservation politically.

I agree: in the present situation, especially, the trip might do more harm than good.

Perhaps the Vice President could suggest his strengthening morale at home now, looking, perhaps, to some less precarious day for a visit to Korean and U.S. forces in Viet-Nam.

I do not suggest keeping this option open as a matter of courtesy: Van Fleet is, as the Vice President says, "a reminder we have done it before."

If you should decide later to send Van Fleet a tight soldierly briefing on what he should and should not say would be in order. In addition to persuading Bob McNamara, we would also, I presume, wish to check with Lodge and Westmoreland.

A draft from you to the Vice President is attached.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

125a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 4, 1966

Dear Hubert,

Please tell General Van Fleet how heartened I am by his support.

He will understand, from both his Greek and Korean experience, how tricky the political situation now is in South Vietnam. We shall have to set aside the proposal for his visiting the Korean and United States forces there; although his presence -- and the testimony of his personal experience -- would undoubtedly lift morale.

You should also know that Bob McNamara has other reservations.

You may wish to suggest that his help is needed right now at home. There could be no better theme than the one you suggest: we saw dark days in Greece and Korea, but came through.

Yours,



The Vice President
Washington, D. C.

LBJ;WWR:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1966
10:15 a.m.

*Rec'd
April 6
at 6:00*

MEMORANDUM

For: The President
From: The Vice President
Subject: General James Van Fleet

HHH

Yesterday I had a visit from that good Florida Democrat and great American soldier, General James Van Fleet. He is heartsick about Ridgeway and Gavin and is a strong supporter of your policies in Vietnam.

Do you think it might be a good idea to send him out for a personal look? His record of defeating Communist attacks in both Greece and Korea is still richly appreciated in those countries. A visit by General Van Fleet to our Korean allies in Vietnam, as well as to our units, would be a shot in the arm and a reminder that we have done it before.

Upon his return to Washington his views would undoubtedly be sought out by the media.

Porter - ask him to give me your judgment & reply by 4/6

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, April 3, 1966, 11:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bill Moyers passed to me your interest in the following question: would it be helpful to send an emissary to talk directly with Sihanouk about the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong. The attached memorandum argues strongly that such a mission would not be helpful; in fact, that it might be used effectively against it by Sihanouk.

It proposes that we press the Indians to be more effective in responding to his request to the ICC for more adequate patrolling and control of the Cambodian frontier. In the end the memorandum does not rule out the usefulness of an emissary to indicate our support of Sihanouk's request for an enlargement of the ICC to make it more effective. It poses at the bottom of page 3, five issues that would be raised by such a narrow mission.

If, despite the generally negative view of this memo, an emissary is sent, the names suggested are: Senator Mansfield, Governor Harriman or Ambassador Bonsal.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-309
By Cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

~~SECRET~~

126a
This document consists of 11 pages.
Copy No. 2 of 10 copies, series A.

APR 2 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Inquiry Regarding Emissary to
Cambodia

1. We have examined the possibility of sending a Presidential emissary to reason with Sihanouk regarding Viet Cong/North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory. We can see no hope of a successful mission, and a number of pitfalls:

2. Assuming the purpose is to persuade Sihanouk not to permit the VC/NVN to use his territory and to intern those who do cross the frontier in accordance with international law, the difficulties are these:

a. Cambodian forces are, in fact, incapable of patrolling, let alone controlling, the 600-mile Cambodian border. (In this respect they are far weaker than the ARVN whose inability to control the border from their side has been clearly demonstrated.)

b. We know that the Cambodian Army has secret orders to prevent VC/NVN incursions. We know of no case where the Cambodian Army has resisted a large intrusion, but they do occasionally drive back small numbers.

c. Any open action by Cambodia in support of the GVN, which this would be, is out of the question, if for no other reason than because it would alienate Peking, which Sihanouk regards as his last friend, save de Gaulle, in a hostile world. He remains confident of a Communist

/triumph

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-311

By cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

~~SECRET~~

-2-

triumph in Southeast Asia, and sees China as his only hope of salvation against his ancient enemies, Vietnam and Thailand.

3. An approach to Sihanouk would most likely elicit the response, which he has made repeatedly, that the VC/NVN do not use his territory for any purpose. He would cite the visits by US newspapermen Topping and Karnow, who failed to turn up any evidence, his request for a visit by US congressmen to certify his neutrality, and, most importantly, his repeated requests for action by the ICC to control his frontiers. In the latter connection he can point to still outstanding requests to the ICC and to the Geneva Co-Chairmen beginning last December and repeated most recently in mid-March. Although the British and Canadians, with our encouragement, have reacted favorably to these requests, nothing has come of them because of the flat opposition of the Russians and Poles (and, in the background, the Chinese), and the inaction of the Indians. A genuinely effective control operation, it has been estimated by our military, would require some thousands of men with helicopters, bases and good communications, and a willingness to engage the VC/NVN. Apart from the problem of where these forces would come from, we see no prospect of the Russians and Poles agreeing, and the Indians have never been willing to press this issue. A somewhat enlarged ICC operation with a few more teams might conceivably be mounted, but would at most serve as a deterrent and inconvenience to the VC/NVN. Moreover, the procedures would have to be carefully designed to prevent a whitewash.

4. Finally, it must be expected that any discussion with Sihanouk would promptly be made public. This would be particularly important to bear in mind if the approach involved any express or implied change in our rules of engagement. It is our estimate that Sihanouk's only response to such an approach would be to publicize it, to appeal for Chinese assistance, and to invite international condemnation of the US for violating his borders.

5. At this stage the problem is not so much to get Sihanouk to act, but one of supporting his request to the ICC for more

/adequate

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-3-

adequate patrolling and control of his frontier. The British have been urging this on the Russians with no success, and the Canadians and we have been trying to get the Indians to react favorably to Sihanouk's request.

6. Even if we could get the Indians to support and contribute more teams, the Russians or Poles would not contribute money or men, and would do everything they could to block any effective operations. The Indians have never shown any willingness to push positions in the Cambodian ICC in opposition to the Russians. (Attached is a memo on our efforts to reactivate the ICC.)

7. Conceivably an emissary could be sent to Sihanouk to impress on him the seriousness with which we regard the crossing of his border and use of his territory, but he might well refuse to receive an emissary for such a mission. If he did he might well ask the emissary to inspect the borders himself or send others. Such inspections have so far produced scant evidence of incursion or use--the VC/NVN all vanish--and invariably produce a white-wash of the charges. (For an analysis of the extent of VC/NVN use of Cambodian territory, see Intelligence Memo No. 3183/65.)

8. Conceivably we could send an emissary to indicate our support of Sihanouk's request for an enlargement of the ICC and make this a joint effort. The questions then arise:

- a. Are we prepared to pay for it?
- b. How do we overcome Polish sabotage of ICC operations and Indian reluctance to make them effective?
- c. We would have to insist that the ICC could act by majority rule, in order to overcome the Polish veto.
- d. We would have to insist that the ICC act on requests from the GVN and the US as well as Cambodia.
- e. We would run the danger that an expanded ICC would not seriously inhibit the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese but would tie our hands.

/9. The

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-4-

9. The foregoing suggests that there is no prospect that a mission to Sihanouk would produce any useful result, and that our main effort has to be directed at the Indians.

10. If an emissary is sent, the names which come to mind are:

Senator Mansfield
Governor Harriman
Ambassador Bonsal

William P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

~~SECRET~~

126-1

~~SECRET~~

RECENT EFFORTS TO ACTIVATE CAMBODIAN ICC

1. On December 7, 1965 the Cambodian Prime Minister wrote to the Indian Chairman of the Cambodian ICC, Mr. Bindra, referring to Western press allegations that Cambodia had been supplying arms to the Viet Cong through the port of Sihanoukville. He requested that the ICC conduct a strict control over the port, investigate the charges, and make a report to refute these allegations. On December 13, 1965, Prince Sihanouk announced that he would authorize the ICC to supervise not only Sihanoukville but also Cambodia's military facilities and its lines of communications. Then in a series of speeches and statements in late December Sihanouk made it clear that (1) he would envisage an expanded ICC which should exercise strict control to prove that no Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops were using Cambodian territory; (2) that he would accept only ICC supervision and not any form of UN intervention; and (3) that, if the United States were sincere, it need only provide the money for the men and materiel needed for an expanded ICC.

2. With U.S. encouragement, the U.K., in its capacity as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements, on January 5, 1966 produced for Soviet approval a draft letter responding to Sihanouk's proposal to expand the supervisory role of the ICC. The British draft suggested sending in several teams from the Vietnam ICC to begin the expansion. The USSR has made no response to the British draft.

3. On January 21 in a press conference and a discussion immediately thereafter with the British Chargé Fielding at Phnom Penh, Sihanouk reiterated his desire for an expanded ICC and specifically stated that Cambodia would welcome general control throughout its territory, especially in the border regions. He asked that the ICC be given the means and that the Co-Chairmen take the necessary action. Four days later the Prince sent a letter to Fielding, saying that he favored the British Co-Chairman draft (which Fielding had released to the RKG when it became clear that the Soviets were deliberately stalling) and that he hoped it could be implemented as soon as possible.

4. Despite these clear indications of Cambodian interest in an expanded ICC supervising its ports, lines of communications, and frontier regions, the Soviets have continued to delay replying to the British on their draft, although the latter have made repeated

/overtures

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-265

By: isa, NARA Date 10-6-98

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-2-

overtures noting that Sihanouk obviously favors their draft. The Indian ICC Chairman has also refused to take any action, or even to discuss the proposal in the Commission, despite Canadian efforts to get him to do so.

5. On March 18 the Cambodian Government again signaled its desire to get an expanded ICC through another letter from Prime Minister Kantol to the Indian ICC Chairman. Kantol specifically stated that Cambodia hoped the ICC, in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements, would be able to establish control posts at certain points along its frontiers as well as at Sihanoukville. The Chairman has passed copies of this letter to the Polish and Canadian commissioners but has given no indications of taking any action on it.

6. In response to the March 18 Cambodian letter the Canadian^o ICC Commissioner recommended to Ottawa that he be authorized to (1) urge the Commission to approve the proposal and so inform the Co-Chairmen and (2) move that the ICC begin an immediate study of the men, materiel, and costs involved in a significant expansion of the ICC's role in Cambodia.

7. According to the Canadian Embassy here, Ottawa will shortly authorize its Commissioner to press for immediate implementation of the proposal of a control post at Sihanoukville but to take a more cautious attitude toward the idea of control posts along the frontier regions. He will be authorized to move that the ICC seek guidance from the Co-Chairmen regarding the Commission's competence under the Geneva Accords to patrol along the frontiers and to propose that the ICC appoint a team of military experts to study the logistics of expansion and the likely effect of control posts in the frontier areas. The Canadian Government fears that too rapid an implementation of this part of the Cambodian proposal would lead to the same type of whitewash reports the current ICC has produced over the years -- that is, that a few posts are not likely to prove the existence of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the border areas and thus Sihanouk will use their negative reports as "proof" that American press allegations are totally incorrect.

8. On December 21, 1965 we informed the press of our interest in the Cambodian proposal and in January we had the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh convey this directly to the Cambodian Prime

/Minister

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-3-

Minister. We have several times since urged the government of India, Canada, and Great Britain to move forward on the Prince's proposal. We have also indicated to them that it would not be excluded that we would find a way of contributing to the costs of expanding the ICC if we felt that it would be more effective than the present ICC has proven to be. Most recently, we informed the Canadian Embassy that we favored the Canadian ICC Commissioner's recommendations based on the March 18 letter and that we hoped Ottawa would speedily approve them.

~~SECRET~~

April 2, 1966
Saturday, 7:00 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Linc Gordon's wrap-up of the Buenos Aires Alliance for Progress conference.

Looks like a good useful meeting.

Walt Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS

Saturday, April 2, 1966


PASS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

PERSONAL FROM GORDON (1470)

1. Fourth Annual Ministerial Review meeting on Alliance for Progress ended on schedule Friday evening in good spirit. Once I had been able to make clear that differences on charter revision at Panama would not signify substantive U.S. retreat from Rio Conference agreements, meeting settled down to constructive work. Despite press efforts to invent sharp differences between U.S. and L.A., meeting was in fact remarkably free from them. Emphasis was on realistic positive steps for accelerating economic and social development, more rapid L.A. economic integration, and expanded trade, rather than on sterile repetition on doctrinaire positions. Universal desire to focus on specific action measures is itself a substantial step forward in these meetings, even though terms of agreed action program for coming year are somewhat more diffuse than we would have liked.

2. Some press reports have alleged conflict on issue Western Hemisphere preferences. In fact, this idea not even mentioned during Ministerial discussions. There are serious concerns of four kinds on trade matters, degree of concern naturally varying from country to country: (a) limitations on access to U.S. market (such as cotton and wool yarn and textiles; Venezuelan oil, meat and meat products); (b) competition of subsidized U.S. agricultural exports in world markets (cotton, PL.480 in general), including vague fears on possible impact new food for freedom program; (c) desire for more rapid progress with international agreements on traditional basic exports; and (d) European Common Market import restrictions, agricultural protection, and discrimination in favor of Africa. I believe it especially urgent that we devise some form of consultation on food for freedom program.

3. Regarding aid, there was substantial criticism of 50-50 shipping requirements and milder criticism of our policy of tying aid to U.S. procurement, but also full recognition that U.S. balance of payments problem is serious and L.A. cooperation needed to help its solution. Other noteworthy attitudes on aid are preference for program over project loans and keen interest in securing foreign financing to supplement available local resources for education and health development, agricultural credit, new industrial and housing institutions, et cetera. On these points, provided national self-help standards are fully met, I believe L.A. position justified, and we should do our best to meet them.



CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS

April 2, 1966

4. Among positive steps agreed with real enthusiasm are (a) multinational feasibility studies and projects in road development for South America interior and Central America to promote L.A. integration, river basin development (including power), telecommunications, and possibly natural gas pipelines; (b) more clear-cut self-help measures to mobilize internal resources, including further tax reform and improved capital markets; and (c) sharper focus on agricultural development and reform and on education to meet modern developmental needs.

5. In contrast with previous such meetings, there were no repeat no really bad actors among the delegates. We received outstanding cooperation from Mexico, Chile, and Brazil; great help also from Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay and the Central Americans. Universal disposition, however, was to secure meaningful agreement.

6. Our proposal on multilateral investment guaranties, deliberately offered in very mild form, secured healthy majority support, and should be followed up by the Committee for the Inter-American Alliance for Progress. Reduction in number and status of panel of nine created substantial behind-the-scenes friction, mainly because of personal lobbying by some of the nine themselves, but end result coincided U.S. position and was also at mid-point of L.A. views.

7. I will report personally on background Argentina proposal for Presidential meeting, which I discussed at length with President Illia Friday evening.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LIMDIS

April 2, 1966
Saturday, 6:40 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is an account of activities we have generated for Monday April 4th to celebrate the 17th Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Also a statement proposed for you by Mr. Rusk on that occasion. You may wish to give us guidance for redrafting, if any.

Walt Rostow

cc: Jack Valenti
Bill Moyers

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Statement on the Occasion of the
Seventeenth Anniversary of the Signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty.

I believe you would be interested in an outline of the activities we have initiated to note the 17th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949.

Approaches have been made to two European signers of the 1949 Treaty, Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium and Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands (who incidentally are former Secretaries General of NATO), and we expect them to make anniversary statements in support of NATO. Our Embassies in Oslo and Luxembourg have been instructed to make every effort to prompt anniversary statements by Halvard Lange of Norway and Joseph Bech of Luxembourg who, as former foreign ministers of their respective governments, also signed the Treaty.

While George Ball was in Paris March 29 at the meeting of NATO's Group of Fourteen he urged the other representatives to have their governments speak out in a loud and clear voice in support of NATO. He took the opportunity himself to speak on the record in an interview with the newspaper Le Monde on March 31. George also plans to appear on the NBC "Today Show" on April 4 to explain the U. S. position in the NATO crisis. He also will appear on the CBS "Face the Nation" show on Sunday, April 10.

All USIA media, including the Voice of America, as well as our USIA posts in Europe using their regular channels, will

devote/

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-251

By inf, NARA, Date 2-26-88

devote maximum public attention to NATO anniversary themes over the weekend and through next week. USIA has an abundance of materials to draw on, including your speech of March 23.

It would be quite useful to have from you a specific anniversary statement of continuing United States support for NATO, to be made public Monday. A draft of such a statement is attached.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Draft Statement.

DRAFT STATEMENT

TO BE ISSUED APRIL 4, 1966

Seventeen years ago today, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western nations drew together in an historic undertaking to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples.

For the United States this meant rounding the last corner on the long road from self-imposed isolation to full acceptance of our responsibilities in the world. For our Allies the North Atlantic Treaty signified a departure, no less historic, from traditional pursuit of national interests narrowly construed. In the Treaty we together acknowledged a common destiny and the duty to pursue it together.

Nearly two decades of time have demonstrated the wisdom of those who read the lesson for the future in two world catastrophes. The Atlantic Alliance deterred the threatened aggression which brought it into being. Behind the military bulwark it raised from the Black Sea to the North Cape, an era of unprecedented growth and well-being began. The vision of a United Europe became a practical undertaking, now far advanced.

The Atlantic Alliance has succeeded perhaps better than its founders dared hope. Yet we must never forget why it has prospered.

The unique/

The unique quality of the alliance for peace lies in the joining of sovereign nations in an integrated system of collective defense. We and our partners, in painstaking effort, created the peacetime planning agencies and integrated military commands called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These institutions afford practical assurance that aggression would be met by allies acting at once and as one. They have insured the peoples of the Atlantic community seventeen years of peace.

Now there are those who argue that conditions have changed. We are told that we can relax our guard, dismantle our system of integrated defense and avail ourselves of the luxury of working out our destinies each alone.

I am deeply convinced that this is the counsel of error. To tread such a retrograde path would surely diminish our present security and lead us to division among ourselves. It would expose us to renewed dangers as long as the military power of the Soviet Union remains entrenched in the heart of Europe. It would reduce the hope that our continued strength and unity will lead in time to settlements ending the division of Europe.

Together with thirteen other Allied nations, we have declared our resolve to carry on, to strengthen and perfect our NATO system. We shall not abandon an institution which has proved itself in the

hour/

hour of peril. We shall not turn back to the dreary and defeated past.

Saturday, April 2, 1966, 6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I should like to appoint Bill Jorden to the NSC Staff in the post vacated by Chet Cooper. An account of his career is attached.

His assets are these:

- Scholarly training in Far East studies.
- Newspaper experience (New York Times).
- Intimate political knowledge of Viet-Nam since 1961: he was on Taylor Mission, wrote both Viet-Nam White Papers.
- Availability: I believe I could move him promptly from Department of State where he is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
- Independence of view plus bureaucratic experience: I believe he will accept easily your perspective, while working gracefully with the bureaucracy. Bill Bundy thinks he would be fine.
- Writing ability: he could help on speeches.
- Excellent character; mature judgment.
- I know him well. We would work easily together. He worked in the White House with Doug Cater during the 1964 Campaign.

Liabilities. Some colleagues think he is not forceful enough.

Knowing him on the Planning Council, I believe the assessment is not balanced. When he has a clear interesting assignment, with backing, he drives hard and effectively. Under my direction he went to Germany in the midst of the Berlin Crisis of 1961-62 and created single-handedly the Berlin Viability Program.

His jobs since then have been scrappy. He yearns to work regularly on the Far East.

Brom Smith, John Macy, and Doug Cater - who know him - support this proposal.

Bill Moyers suggests I put it to you.

Walt Rostow

Would you like to meet Jorden? _____

Approve his appointment _____

Disapprove his appointment _____

See me _____

cc: Bill Moyers and Marvin Watson

BIOGRAPHIC DATA (WILLIAM JOHN JORDEN)

Date of birth: May 3, 1923

Place of birth: Bridger, Montana

Education: Washington High School (Massillon, Ohio)
Yale University (A.B. with Honors) (1947)
Columbia University (M.S.) (1948)

Employment: Merchant Marine (1942-43)
U.S. Army (1943-45)
Instructor (Japanese) Yale, (1945-46)
Radio news writer, New York Herald Tribune (1948)
Foreign Correspondent (Japan, Korea), Associated Press (1948-52)
Foreign Correspondent (Japan, Korea, other Far East areas), The New York Times, (1952-55)
Council on Foreign Relations (fellowship), (1955-56)
Chief of Bureau (Moscow), The New York Times, (1956-58)
Diplomatic Correspondent, The New York Times, (1959-61)
Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, (1961-62)
Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1962-65)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Public Affairs), (1965-)

Awards: Pulitzer Travelling Fellowship (1948)
Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship (1955-56)

Publications: Numerous magazine articles (N.Y. Times Magazine, etc.)
Co-author, Japan Between East and West, (Harper)
Author of State Department white papers on Viet-Nam (A Threat to the Peace, Aggression From the North)

Marital status: Married (1944) the former Eleanor Harz of New York, currently director of Far East languages at the Foreign Service Institute

Children: William Temple (15), Eleanor Harz (8), and Marion Telva (5) Jorden

Bio data (JORDEN) cont.

Other data: Director, Interdepartmental Group on Psychological Operations (1962-65)
 Chairman, Interdepartmental Public Affairs Committee on Viet-Nam (1965-)
 Member, Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee (1965-)
 Member, Council on Foreign Relations (1955-)

Languages: Japanese, Russian (fair), Chinese (rusty),
 Spanish (also rusty)

References: Walt W. Rostow
 George C. McGhee (Ambassador to Bonn)
 W. Averell Harriman (Ambassador-at-Large)
 Chester Cooper (formerly NSC staff)
 Howard Wriggins (Policy Planning Council))
 James B. Reston (The N.Y. Times)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 2, 1966

Saturday, 12:15 P.M.

Rec'd 12:56 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to a Letter from President Chiang Kai-shek

On March 23rd the Chinese Ambassador handed Bill Bundy a letter to you from Chiang Kai-shek dated March 1. (There was no explanation of the 3-week delay in transmittal, but a reading of Chiang's text suggests that the letter was held up pending Chiang's conversation with Bill Bundy on March 11 and then sent on after Bundy's visit.) *(attached)*

The Generalissimo's letter departs from his recent communications in giving relatively warm support to our two-track policy in Vietnam -- both the military effort and the non-military effort along the lines of the Honolulu Declaration. At the same time, Chiang is troubled by our alleged "vacillation" between "winning the war" and "negotiating for peace".

State and Embassy Taipei suggest a brief response which (a) thanks him for his support for our two-track policy, and (b) rebuts his worry about "vacillation". The attached response seems satisfactory.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

See me ☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-30

By ing, NALS, Date 9-13-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/4/66

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully studied your letter of March 1, transmitted by your Ambassador in Washington, and I am deeply appreciative of your counsel.

Your view that non-military measures in Viet-Nam must be pursued in close coordination with military operations is fully shared here. I am glad to note your agreement that a coordinated approach of firmness against military aggression, together with full support and encouragement for economic, political and social development, is the sure way to preserve the security and independence of Viet-Nam. In this connection, the United States will continue to join with other Free World nations in providing the Government of Viet-Nam with the understanding and support it needs in facing the difficult tasks before it.

I can assure you that the policy of the United States toward Viet-Nam is firm. While we will continue to explore every avenue to an honorable solution, we will persist with unshakeable determination in our commitment to assist the people of South Viet-Nam in preserving their right to shape their own future without external interference.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Chiang Kai-shek
President of the Republic of China
Taipei

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 85-30
By isg, NARS, Date 9-13-85

LBJ:State:JT:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(TRANSLATION)

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

March 1, 1966

Dear President Johnson:

I appreciate very much your letter of January 31 informing me of the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and your letter dated February 12, transmitted by your Charge d'Affaires at Taipei, informing me of the discussions you had with the leaders of the Government of Vietnam at Honolulu and your impressions of the Vietnamese leaders.

The accomplishments of the Honolulu Conference have made it a historical meeting in the course of the Vietnamese war. The war of aggression conducted by the Communists in Vietnam is labelled by Mao Tse-tung as "the People's War." The main characteristics of this particular kind of war are the infiltration of villages and border regions where defenses are weak, the establishment of bases for guerrilla warfare to pave the way for gradual expansion to towns and cities, and the employment of sabotage in areas under government control in the destruction of existing communications systems and economic, social and educational structures, thus depriving the people of their means of livelihood and making it increasingly difficult for the government forces to fight against them. In the process, the Communists hope to create panic among the people, to strengthen their own rebellious forces and to enhance their combat capabilities.

At the moment, the allied forces, enjoying a superiority both in manpower and firepower, are fully capable of routing the Communist main forces and destroying their bases of operation. However, should the vast rural areas be left under Viet Cong control, and should no effort be made to rehabilitate the people's livelihood and to reconstruct the nation's economy, the remnant Communist forces, though defeated in major battles, could still re-group and re-coup and continue to wage the war.

It is our

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The white House,
Washington, D. C.,
U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-309
By cl, NARA Date 8-26-99

It is our experience, gained through a long period of dealing with the Communists, that it is far more difficult to consolidate the fruits of victory than to defeat the enemy in the field.

The importance of the decision made at the Honolulu Conference to adopt various non-military measures in coordination with military operations can hardly be over-emphasized. There is no doubt that it will have a far-reaching impact on the future development of the Vietnam situation.

In this connection, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to present to Your Excellency some personal observations for your reference:

1. In a series of announcements made during the past year, Your Excellency and Secretary of State Dean Rusk have made known to the world the basic policy of the United States on the Vietnam problem and the assurances of the United States to fulfill its commitments to its allies. The unequivocal language used and the firm stand taken have won admiration and praise in the family of nations. However, certain distinguished members of the United States Congress and some influential journals have continued to disseminate the defeatist ideas of appeasement and retreat from time to time. Such views, though expressed only by a few, have done grievous damage to the sound policy of the United States. Aside from whetting the appetite of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists for further aggression, they would also shake the confidence of the free nations in the United States.

2. Since the Chinese Communist regime is irrevocably committed to the dogma of world revolution in an attempt to gain control over Asia and the Pacific area with Southeast Asia as the immediate target of aggression, it is only to be expected that it will not permit the Vietnamese Communists to agree to participate in peace talks. However, your peace efforts, while failing to change the hard line of war of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists, have deepened the free world's sympathy with and understanding of the American policy.

Now that the hope for peace has become more elusive, the necessary conditions do not exist in Vietnam for holding free elections. In fact, to talk about free elections at this time would not only bewilder the people and the armed forces of South Vietnam, but also give rise to misgivings on the part of the anti-Communist allies of the United States in Asia.

It is highly

It is highly doubtful whether it would have any favorable effect on public opinion.

3. The Vietnamese people, having suffered from long years of hardship and political instability, are in urgent need of a breathing spell. The present leaders of the Vietnamese Government, notwithstanding their lack of political experience and prestige, are patriotic, staunchly anti-Communist, dedicated to the task of reform and progress, and gallant in combat. Given the opportunity to improve the military and political situation, they will eventually win the hearts of the majority of the Vietnamese people and successfully steer the nation through difficulties and crises. For any nation that has long suffered from destructive Communist action, its government will inevitably find it difficult to carry out its policies. In fact, what it needs most is international understanding and support.

As the war in Vietnam has reached a crucial stage, it is essential that a firm and clear-cut policy should be adhered to. Further vacillation between the policy of winning the war and the policy of negotiating for peace is not likely to improve the situation. On the contrary, it would only place the people in constant fear of merciless revenge by the Communists and would also demoralize the armed forces in their will to continue the struggle and to make the necessary sacrifices.

The consistent tactics of the international Communists is to conquer a free country by stages. It consists of the installing of a puppet regime in a free nation and then inducing and coercing the victim of aggression to accept the fait accompli at the conference table. Having successfully partitioned Vietnam with this tactics, the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists launched an armed insurrection in South Vietnam and then created the so-called "National Liberation Front" with a view to achieving a political settlement, should their military campaign fail to achieve its purpose. Should the free world eventually recognize the so-called "National Liberation Front", all sacrifices in battle and accomplishments in other fields made by South Vietnam and her allies would have been in vain, and the free world would have to continue to pay dearly for its serious political mistakes.

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, during his state visit here in February, has had occasion to review with me the situation in Asia. President Park expressed his deep concern over the risks involved, should the free countries either extend their recognition to the "National

Liberation

Liberation Front" or advocate the establishment of a "coalition government" in Vietnam. Your Excellency, I believe, would be interested to learn that in the Sino-Korean Joint Communiqué issued on February 18, a serious warning was served to the free nations not to fall into this Communist trap.

I wish also to take this occasion to thank you for your letter brought to me on February 28 by Astronauts Walter Schirra and Frank Borman. It is with deep admiration that the Government and people of the Republic of China have followed the achievements which your country has made under your leadership in the conquest of space. The rendezvous in space achieved by your Astronauts has won worldwide acclaim. I was most pleased to have met Walter Schirra and Frank Borman who were accorded a warm and enthusiastic welcome by the Chinese people.

Accept, Your Excellency, my sincere admiration for your tireless efforts in the pursuit of world peace and justice.

Sincerely yours,



Chiang Kai-shek

12:06 P
4-2-66
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
State 5-15-78, NSC 42-78 (#163)
By DAH per ISP NARS, Date 8-21-86

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, April 2, 1966, 11:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A piece of unfinished business.

You checked the attached memorandum from Bob Komer "see me."

The bureaucracy is still seeking assurance that Bob's carefully staffed-out summary is your understanding of where the aid matter was left with Mrs. Gandhi.

Since 29 March George Woods and Schweitzer saw Mrs. Gandhi, on the 30th. Woods urged her to send her Finance and Planning Ministers to Washington during the week of April 11th, if possible. Mrs. Gandhi promised a reply from New Delhi. As you know, we urged Wilson to press Mrs. Gandhi in the same direction.

The IBRD will hold a consortium meeting on April 5. This is to round up enough aid to keep India afloat and will not get into the longer range program which involves serious self-help undertakings by the Indians in the fields of: exchange rate adjustment; liberalization of import and internal controls and encouragement of private investment.

Since we have already given India a \$50 million fertilizer loan, a \$100 million non-project loan, and additional PL-480 assistance, we do not contemplate any further action at the April 5 meeting.

IBRD, however, is looking for \$180 million at that time; George Woods is prepared to put up a \$50 million IDA non-project loan.

You may have noted Segli Harrison's story in the Washington Post a few days ago about an Indian effort to raise a \$1.5 billion stabilization fund to cover fluctuations in foreign exchange availabilities if it should adjust its exchange rate and liberalize its import controls. AID has heard no talk from the Indians about such a proposal. The only figure we know of at that order of magnitude is the possible debt rollover for five years. We should be alert to any Indian move in that direction.

→ Against this background I would ask again whether Bob Komer's summary represents fair guidance to the Government as to where we stand with the Indians; or would you wish to discuss this further with me?

Walt Rostow

Let it stand _____

See me _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tues. March 29, 1966

10:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT



George Woods is eager to start working over the Indians on a self-help and aid package as soon as he knows where we stand. Therefore, if you are satisfied as a result of your talks that Mrs. Gandhi intends to adopt the major economic reforms that we and the World Bank have been seeking, the best way to move ahead might be for me to tell Woods on your behalf. State, AID and I suggest we tell him the following, which protects us with plenty of caveats:

1. You have concluded from your talks that she is prepared to liberalize India's import control policies as well as internal price, marketing and other business controls which have been inhibiting economic growth, provided the necessary financial support is forthcoming. Additionally, she is prepared to adjust exchange rates and tax policies to support liberalization.
2. In order to move more rapidly toward self-sufficiency in food production, Mrs. Gandhi has assured you that India will follow through in emphasizing agricultural development, making adequate fertilizer available to the farmers and vigorously seeking to attract foreign private investment in fertilizer production.
3. She has also spoken to you of India's efforts in the family planning field and of her determination to accelerate these programs.
4. In turn you have indicated to Mrs. Gandhi your realization that the liberalization program described above can be implemented only with assurances of substantial financial support. You are prepared to say informally that if India actually takes the necessary steps to the satisfaction of the World Bank and the other consortium donors (including ourselves) we are prepared to help provide needed support for such a program in phase with its execution, subject of course to Congressional appropriations.
5. You currently believe that we will be able to support the Indian economic reform program in FY 1967 with about \$385 million of AID loans (if Congress meets your aid request) and \$50 million of EX-IM Bank loans -- the same levels as pledged in recent years. Of this amount you are prepared to extend an increased proportion in the form of program lending. You also understand that the economic reform program will require a debt rescheduling in which the U.S. will take its share --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

approximately \$30 million for FY 67 (much less than the Europeans). All this is, of course, conditioned not only on India's actually following through with its reform program, but also on the willingness of other consortium members to bear an appropriate portion of the burden.

6. Finally, in view of our continuing wish to provide our support in coordination with the World Bank and the other members of the Indian Consortium, you have suggested that Mrs. Gandhi have her senior financial and planning officials come to Washington as soon as possible in order to work out an agreement with the World Bank and the IMF regarding the details of the economic reform program and the financial backstopping arrangements. We expect the Bank to take the lead in coordinating the necessary consultations between India and the governments of the consortium members.

This package is the real McCoy -- much more so than emergency food. If George Woods with our backing can drive the tough bargain which he contemplates, we will have accomplished more in moving India via our aid leverage than in the last six years combined. And we will have done so at little if any greater out-of-pocket cost than in 1963 or 1964. I stress again that this is a self-enforcing bargain -- if India doesn't make the reforms we and the Bank want, it doesn't get most of the dough. This puts the choice squarely up to them. I may be over-enthusiastic, but I see this as a major foreign policy stroke, affecting 500 million people in the largest country in the Free World.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Tell Woods _____

See me _____

W'd keep all of this very quiet for the time being, leaving it to the Indians to make the first move.

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sat., April 2, 1966 10:45 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will wish to read the cable Bill Bundy sent out last night and Ambassador Lodge's reply. Bill Bundy's cable was stimulated after a conversation Bill Moyers and I had. We both felt a need to sound out Saigon on whether there was anything further we could do from here to ease or resolve the dangerous crisis. It turned out that Bill Bundy was thinking along exactly the same lines.

Later in the day you will be receiving a round-up on the situation plus alternative courses of action we stimulated via Mr. Rusk.

Walt Rostow

132a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Saturday, April 2, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM LODGE

Reference: DepTel 2939 (Attached)

I am grateful for your thoughts in reference. There appears to be no great differences between our analyses of the situation.

As for the suggestion contained in paragraph 2 that a Presidential or other high-level message might be useful, we feel that it would not help us as of the moment. The situation is changing too fast to make possible precise wording. Also, such a message might appear to be putting pressure on Thieu and Ky to concede at a moment when they are taking a hard look at the present situation with an eye toward deciding their next actions. I believe that I can continue to convey our concern to them without putting them on the spot of having to reply to a high-level message.

As for the suggestion that a direct order be given to the First Division and other First Corps troops be tried before sending Marine elements to enter, it seems certain that some officers in the area are involved in the "struggle" movement and would probably interpose themselves between General Chuan's order and their troops. There is also a chance certain elements would respond while others stood fast, thereby creating a tense situation within the units. On balance, therefore, it would appear that we must defer to the Directorate's judgment on this decision.

We are sending you separately our latest estimate and description of options open to the Government of Vietnam.

(Saigon, 3671)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 85-27
By is, NARS, Date 5-9-85

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27By is; NARS, Date 5-9-85

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 2939 IMMEDIATE

APR 1 8 48 PM '66

EXDIS

L. Our reaction to GVN communique is that it is much too general and bland to elicit any wave of support or to separate moderate groups from those responsible for continued agitation in Hue, Da Nang, and elsewhere. It thus appears to us that choice is sharpening between use of force, with all its major difficulties as stated in Hue 322 (your 3642 to Department) and far more clear and explicit statement of immediate political program.

2. We sense Directory may be ~~hamstrung~~ ^{hamstrung} by unwillingness make greater explicit political concessions, but our feeling ~~is~~ tends more and more to view that this is most hopeful horn of dilemma. If you agree with this analysis, would it help to have Presidential message to Thieu or other high-level US message? Even if worst came to worst and government changed hands, message in this sense would tend to align us with new group (whoever they may be) who assume power.

3. If, on other hand, you think GVN has put ~~itself~~ ^{itself} in position where it could employ force with general popular support, it occurs to us that direct order to I Corps and two division commanders might at least be tried before

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

FE: WPBundy/bmm 4/1 4235

classification approved by:

William P. Bundy

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Rostow (substance)

S/S - John P. ~~Walsh~~ WalshREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2139
sending Marine battalions with its attendant risk of appearing to be a Saigon
4.
"occupation" in central Vietnam. / We agree completely with your statement
to Ky and Thieu that if action course is taken it should be sooner rather than
later. As we read it, authority of present GVN is simply frittering away by its
present tactics, and it must quickly decide to move one way or the other, or,
as possible third course, to make some political announcement significantly
more forthcoming than today's communique and then follow up by prompt
application of force if disorder continues.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 1, 1966 - 6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bunker's Return to Santo Domingo

Ellsworth Bunker is returning to Santo Domingo on Monday afternoon, April 4.

I am meeting with him before his departure to bring myself up-to-date on the Dominican situation. If you want to relay anything to him, I will be happy to do so.

Walt Rostow

cc: Moyers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FS
1 Apr. 1951

Moni Fehmer notified
us at 2115 that the
President had approved.
Called State Ops at 2117.

1362

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, April 1, 1966
8 PM

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommend that the attached cable be sent to Ambassador Lodge in reply to his message of this morning concerning possible retaliatory action following the bombing of the Hotel Victoria.

Walt
Walt Rostow

Approve ✓

See me

1346

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

It/201

EXDIS

Ref. Embtel 3630.

We appreciate point of reftel. However, under present circumstances we do not propose to go ahead with such action. As you are aware, Hotel Victoria explosion coincides with expanded pattern of Rolling Thunder targets about to take place (RT 50Q).

GP-2

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-28

By ing, NARS, Date 7-21-86

4/1/65
WM:RMiller:aoa

Tel. Int.
4535

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

FE -William P. Bundy

Cablegram
G - Amb. Johnson
White House -

XXXXXXXXXXXX

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS OFFICE

RECEIVED
WHCA

1966 APR 1 05 40

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EXB372
OO RUEKEX
DE RUEHC 03 0911535
ZNY SSSSS
O 010522Z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
NNFO WHITE HOUSE
O 010430Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3630
BT

~~SECRET~~ APR 1

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

EXDIS

1. I VISITED THE HOTEL VICTORIA EXPLOSION THIS MORNING. IT IS MARKEDLY GREATER THAN ANY OF THE OTHER EXPLOSIONS WHICH I HAVE SEEN. I AM RELIABLY INFORMED THAT IT IS MUCH GREATER THAN THE EXPLOSION AT THE EMBASSY A YEAR AGO LAST MARCH.

2. I SUGGEST THAT IF THERE IS SOME PUNITIVE ACTION WHICH WE WISH TO TAKE AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM, AND WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE, THAT THE BOMBING OF THE VICTORIA THIS MORNING GIVES US SUCH A PRETEXT.

3. THERE WERE 3 AMERICANS KILLED, 72 INJURED, 3 VIETNAMESE KILLED, 20 WOUNDED. LODGE
BT

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

66

APR

1

PM

12:49

FRIDAY

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-27

By is, NARS, Date 5-9-85