

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

185

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to the President from W. Rostow Exempt NLS 86-248 possible classified info Open NLT 98-316 4-21-88 "conf"	05/15/66	A
#2 memo	to the President from Rostow secret open 12/11/87 1 p	05/14/66	A
#2a memo	to Sec Rusk, Sec McNamara and Adm. Bell from Komer secret open 7-8-85 NLS 85-25 1 p	05/14/66	A
#2b report	action program to cope with inflation secret open 7-8-85 NLS 85-25 2 p	undated	A
#4a memo	to presidential luncheon confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 1 p	05/14/66	A
#4b memo	re: Vietnam confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 1 p	05/14/66	A
#5a memo	to Walt Rostow from Read re: president's visit to Mexico confidential open 8-20-86 8 p	05/13/66	A
#6 memo	to the President from W. Rostow open 1/21/88 secret 1 p	05/14/66	A
#10 memo	to the President from Bator confidential OPEN 1-25-88 NLS 86-248 1 p	05/13/66	A
#10a memo	to the President from Rusk confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 2 p	05/10/66	A
#11 memo	to the President from Rostow top secret - sanitized 9/19/01 NLS 98-318 1 p	05/13/66	A
#13 memo	to the President from Rostow secret open 7-8-85 NLS 85-25 EXX 1 p	05/12/66	A
#16b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 2 p	05/06/66	A
#16c chart	head of state visits confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 3pp	undated	A
#16d memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read secret open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 2 p	05/04/66	A
#17 memo	to the President from Ben Read secret open 01/25/88 NLS 86-248 1 p	05/12/66	A
#17a memo	to Rostow from Read - Secret open 3-11-88 2 p	5-12-66	A
FILE LOCATION	NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, CONFIDENTIAL NLS 86-249 Memos to the President, Rostow Vol. 2, May 1-15, 1966		

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18 letter	to President Ordaz from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 01/25/89 NLT 86-248</i>	1 p 05/12/66	A
#19 memo	to the President from Walt Rostow confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	2 pp 05/11/66	A
#20 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret <i>open 01/25/89 NLT 86-248</i>	1 p 05/11/66	A
#20a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLT 86-249</i>	4 p 05/10/66	A
#20b resolution	draft resolution on withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force confidential <i>open 3-7-88 NLT 86-249</i>	2 2 p 05/10/66	A
#21 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret <i>open 7-8-85 NLT 85-25</i>	1 p 05/11/66	A
#22 memo	to the President from Bator secret <i>open 01/25/89 NLT 86-248</i>	2 pp 05/11/66	A
#22a memo	to the President from Henry Fowler secret <i>open 8-26-88 NLT 88-169</i>	4 p 05/10/66	A
#25 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret <i>sanitized 4-4-85 NLT 85-26</i> <i>downgraded to secret per NLT 85-26</i>	2 pp 05/10/66	A
#26a memo	to President from Patrick Dean confidential <i>OPEN 01/26/89 NLT-86-248</i>	1 p 05/10/66	A
#26b message	to President from British Prime Minister possible classified info <i>Exempt NLT 86-248</i>	2 p 05/09/66	A
#27a letter	to Mr. Chairman from ? possible classified info <i>open 01/26/89 NLT 86-248</i>	2 p 05/10/66	A
#28 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret <i>open 7/21/98</i>	1 p 05/10/66	A & C
#31 memo	to the President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-8-85 NLT 85-25</i>	2 pp 05/09/66	A
#32 b cable	text of Santo Domingo 2416 secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLT 86-249</i>	6 p 05/09/66	A
#32c memo	to Rostow from WGBowdler secret <i>not yet open</i>	1 p 05/09/66	A

FILE LOCATION

XXXXXX NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]

Memos to the President, Rostow vol. 2, May 1-15, 1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#33a memo	to Walt from MDT confidential	1 p	05/09/66	A
#33b letter	to Walt Rostow from Leon Goure confidential	1 p	05/02/66	A
#34a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLJ 86-249</i>	2 p	05/07/68	A
#36a memo	for the President from Rostow #66277 secret <i>Exempt NLJ 86-248 open 7/21/98</i>	3 p ±	05/09/66	A
#37 memo	to the President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-8-85 NLJ 85-25</i>	1 p	05/08/66	A
#37a memcon	by Walt Rostow secret <i>open 7-8-85 NLJ 85-25</i>	3 p ±	05/08/66	A
#38 cable	to the President #66274 from Rostow secret <i>Exempt NLJ 86-248 open 7/21/98</i>	3 p	05/08/66	A
#39b memo	to the President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 3-7-88 NLJ 86-249</i>	2 p	05/06/66	A
#40 memo	to the President from Rostow <i>open 3-15-07 FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 # 335 (#140)</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 86-248</i>	1 p	05/07/66	A
#41 memo	to the President from Rostow Secret <i>open 7-8-85 NLJ 85-25</i>	1 p	05/06/66	A
#42 memo	to the President from WWR secret <i>q Open 01/26/89 NLJ-86-248</i>	1 p	05/06/66	A
#42a memo	to the President from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 8-20-86</i>	2 p	05/04/66	A
#43a memo	to the SecState & SecDef from Walt Rostow top secret <i>open 11-4-85 NLJ 85-26</i>	2 p	05/06/66	A
#44 memo	to the President from W. W. Rostow confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	1 p	05/05/66	A
#44a memo	to Mr. Gordon from Charles Frankel secret <i>open 8-20-86</i>	2 p ±	undated	A
#45a memo	to the President from W. Rostow confidential <i>open 01/26/89 NLJ-86-248</i>	1 p	05/05/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 Memos to the President, Rostow, vol. 2, May 1-15, 1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45b memo	to the President from W. Rostow confidential <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/05/66	A
#46a cable	USUN NY 4760 secret <i>open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249</i>	05/05/66	A
#47 memo	to the President from Rostow confidential <i>01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/05/66	A
#48 memo	to the President from Rostow confidential <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/05/66	A
#49 memo	to the President from W. Rostow confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	05/05/66	A
#50 memo	to the President from Rostow confidential <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/05/66	A
#50a memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	05/01/66x	A
#50b report	Beas Dam... confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	undated	A
#50c report	Dhuvaran Therman Power Plant Extension... confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	undated	A
#50d report	Durgapur Therman Power Plant ... confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	undated	A
#50e reprot	Minerals Exploration (Operation Hardrock)... confidential	undated	A
#51 memo	to the President from W. Rostow confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	05/04/66	A
#52a memo	to the Prexsident from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 8-20-86</i>	05/03/66	A
#54 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/03/66	A
#55 memo	to the President from Rostow <i>same classification 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i> secret <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/03/66	A
#55 letter	to Hussein I from pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248</i>	05/04/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]
Memos to the Preisident, Rostow, ~~xxxx~~ vol. 2, May 1-15/66

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55b letter	Exempt NLS 97-708 open 7/21/98 to the President from King Hussein Exempt NLS 86-248 possible classified info Confidential 2 p	04/09/66	A
#57a report	text of XXXXXX report sanitized 9-27-99 NLS 98-315 secret sanitized 2-24-87 NLS 86-258 1 p	05/03/66	A
#59a cable	text of Rome 2696 open 8-14-97 NLS 97-28 secret sanitized 9-13-85 NLS 85-24 2 p (dup. #227, Country File, VN, Vol. 52, box 317)	05/03/66	A
#60 memo	To the President from WWR secret Sanitized 01/26/89 NLS 86-248 2 p open 7/21/98	05/03/66	A
#60a memo	to the President from WWR Confidential Sanitized 01/26/89 NLS 86-248 1 p open 7/21/98	05/03/66	A
#61 memo	to the President from PM Wilson top secret 1 p	05/03/66	A
#63a memo	with Lord Harlech confidential Exempt NLS 86-248 1 p	05/02/66	A
#64a memo	to the President from Walt Rostow confidential open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248 2 p	05/02/66	A
#64c report	suggested wording for President's announcement of Peace Corps... confidential open 01/26/89 NLS 86-248 2 p	04/29/66	A
#65a memo	to Walt Rostow from Wm. Macomber, Jr. confidential open 3-2-90 NLS 86-255 2 p	05/02/66	A
#65b report	talking points confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 3 p	undated	A
#65c report	military supply policy confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 2 p	undated	A
#67c cable	Rangoon...your 550 and 554 confidential open 3-7-88 NLS 86-249 6 p	04/28/66	A
#68 memo	to the President from W. Rostow secret open 8-20-86 2 p	05/02/66	A
#68a cable	text of Amb. Bowles New Delhi 2914 secret sanitized 3-22-88 NLS 86-249 OPEN 6-3-98 NLS 98-317 6 p	04/28/66	A
#68b cable	text of New Delhi 2931 secret sanitized 3-22-88 NLS 86-249 OPEN 6-3-98 NLS 98-317 5 p	04/28/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~REDACTED~~
 Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 2, May 1-15, 1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#57 memo	W.W. Rostow to President 1 page <i>Jan 12/01- NLJ 019-007-2-1</i>	5/3/66	C
#13b report	re: Vietnam Secret 2 pages <i>open 7-8-85 NLJ 85-25</i>	n.d.	A
#13a report	re: Vietnam Secret 2 pages <i>open 9-13-85 NLJ 85-24</i>	5/12/66	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow

volume 2

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1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-316
By us, NARA Date 4-21-99

Sunday, May 15, 1966 -- 12:10 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT

The Ambassador of Portugal delivered this letter, to you from Dr. Salazar, at 11:30 a.m. today, Sunday, May 15, 1966.

His message is as follows:

1. He wishes a brief appointment with you tomorrow, Monday, May 16. The issue is important; and he has never had, he says, an interview with you.
2. In substance, the Portuguese wish you to persuade the U.K. to negotiate patiently on Rhodesia and not use force.
3. As the attached cable from Anderson indicates, the Portuguese believe the U.K. is assembling forces for a military show-down on Rhodesia in early June. (Secretary Rusk and I believe this is mainly a bargaining tactic by Wilson.)
4. The Portuguese believe African politics are now much more moderate than noises in the UN would suggest. (They are right.) They want us to oppose the attached draft resolution which will come up in the UN.
5. They are afraid that if the U.K. uses force, they will need us and this will produce a "tragedy" in Africa and the world.
6. The Portuguese deeply resent being used by the U.K. as a scape-goat on oil leaks to Rhodesia. (There is probably a little in this.)

I have sent a copy of the letter to Secretary Rusk and talked with him about its substance. He will be giving you his advice shortly.

His first reaction:

- a. This letter raises no great difficulty for us in rendering a responsive reply.
- b. He is not sure you should give that reply. He will be in touch.

The suggestion of a special trusted emissary to investigate the situation made in paragraph 4E by Anderson may have merit.

W. W. Rostow

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, May 14, 1966
5:30 pm

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

These are the basic papers that will be discussed at the meeting scheduled to take place at 12:00 noon Monday (May 16) on the political and economic aspects of our Vietnam policy. I have marked in red what appears to me the most important point for you to make on the political side in the course of the meeting.

The agenda will be about as follows:

1. Political Policy (Sect. Rusk)
 - a) Election and constitutional problems
 - b) Organizational proposals
2. Economic Policy (Mr. Komer)
 - a) Eliminating supply bottlenecks
 - b) Monetary policy
 - c) Negotiating strategy
 - d) Expansion of Pacification Effort
and Manpower problems
 - e) Land reform

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 12-11-84

~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY McNAMARA
ADMINISTRATOR BELL

Attached is a revised version of the paper sent you by Walt Rostow on 12 May. The most significant change is that proposed by SecDef in Para 1-A.

I am assuming from our discussion with the President and Ambassador Lodge on 13 May that these proposals stand as approved. If any further modifications are desired, however, we should discuss them at the noon meeting with the President on 16 May.

At that time I intend to go beyond Para 1-B and recommend that as soon as possible the US Army take over full operation of Saigon port, including delivery of civilian goods to the point beyond the port area, provided that a study currently underway in the Pentagon demonstrates that it is feasible. Discussions with Captain Cain, an AID consultant just returned from Saigon, have convinced me that this is the only quick and efficient way to lick the port bottleneck.

151

R. W. Komer

cc: W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 85-25
By rig, NARS, Date 7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I. ACTION PROGRAM TO COPE WITH INFLATION. Across the board three-pronged attack will be made:

A. DOD and AID will each make all-out effort to reduce to minimum inflationary impact of further US buildup. DOD is analyzing possibility of helping keep demands on local economy and manpower at FY 1966 rate, despite increase in deployments and construction program--the analysis and a plan for accomplishing an agreed-upon goal will be completed about 1 June.

B. US will make all-out effort to eliminate bottlenecks to massive flow of aid commodities, especially port and in-country transport congestion. US military will provide shipping, port aid, and in-country lift as required. US will insist that GVN take essential steps speed flow of goods, if necessary using leverage of suspension aid shipments and/or new aid tranches till bottlenecks removed. If GVN unwilling or unable act, US should request Ky approve US military takeover of Saigon port and delivery to importers.

C. As soon as IMF recommendations available, US will present to GVN revised Honolulu package of maximum realizable fiscal measures to sop up piasters. Goal should be an optimum package designed to sop up at least 10 billion piasters via: (1) tax and revenue measures sufficient to raise some \$VN 2-3 billion; (2) raising the piaster take from imports by at least \$VN 7-9 billion, probably via a combination of advance deposits on imports, earlier payments of customs duties, foreign exchange surcharges, and some degree of devaluation; (3) increased GVN sales of foreign exchange at penalty rates for "invisible" transactions, as necessary to bring the piaster recapture rate up to a minimum of \$VN 10 billion during the last six months of CY 1966.

D. Negotiating Strategy on Fiscal Package. Given the political weakness and administrative feebleness of the GVN, we must design an approach which will minimize political criticism of the GVN yet achieve the desired economic result: (1) while the radical surgery of devaluation may be the only way to achieve quick results, it should be disguised as much as feasible; (2) as carrots we should hold out US approval of a 30-50% GVN pay raise and some form of US help for Ky's PX system if feasible; (3) since sticks may also be necessary, we must consider threatening to withhold US aid or limiting further US buildup till inflation is brought under better control.

(1) Upon his return, Ambassador Lodge should again raise inflation with Ky as a matter of highest level US concern.

(2) As soon as IMF proposals are in, Bob Nathan should go out as high level negotiator to sell Washington package.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 85-25
By inf, NARS, Date 7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

II. EXPANSION OF PACIFICATION CAPABILITIES.

A. We will move promptly to increase annual rate of RD Cadre output from 19,000 to 30,000 as fast as instructors are available to maintain quality. DOD will provide construction resources needed to provide new training center. Komer will resolve issue of how estimated \$30 million add-on is apportioned among agencies.

B. We will expedite expansion of police forces to 72,000 end of CY 1966 goal, and promptly study further expansion of police as the preferred longer term internal security instrument.

III. MANPOWER SQUEEZE. Aside from RD Cadres, SecDef and Komer will withhold approval of any FY 1967 GVN manpower increases until overall agreement is reached on civil/military allocation. This means in effect a temporary freeze on all force ceilings at end FY 1966 approved levels until a manpower budget can be worked out.

ITEMS NOT YET RIPE FOR DECISION

IV. NEW LAND REFORM INITIATIVE. We favor if feasible a dramatic new revolutionary proposal for psychological impact. Since Cooper-Hewes proposals are not yet in shape for high-level decision, they will be further firmed up as urgent matter by Saigon and Washington, for top-level review the week of 5 June when Porter is in Washington.

V. OVERALL PACIFICATION DIRECTIVE AND MASTER PLAN. We must have these to give focus to the civil side. Saigon draft will be available late May. Komer is preparing complementary Washington NSAM directive setting priorities.

~~SECRET~~

5/17/66

3

Mr Smith said the attached
has been taken care of - there
is an item in night reading
- last night

L N

Recd
5-14-66
5:50 p

27

3a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sat. May 14, 1966
5:15 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sect. Rusk asked that this go into your evening reading.

The issue is the Church Amendment:

- Bill Gaud thinks we can live with it;
- Sect. Rusk accepts the line of argument in the attached memorandum that we should oppose it; but he does not wish to proceed without your personal judgment.

Sect. Rusk will telephone you tomorrow (Sunday) to get your guidance.

W. W. Rostow

I would try to keep any
Amendment out if not for
on Madeup amendment on
Word page - C

36

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

May 13

Bill Gaud called ~~this afternoon~~ to say that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be marking up the AID Bill on Monday.

We have submitted the Administration's position on every Amendment filed to date except on the Church Amendment (attached at Tab A) stating that "nothing in the Act shall be construed as a commitment to use armed forces".

Bill Gaud feels that we should not object to the Amendment, but point out that it is unnecessary (as set forth in the attached proposed position paper by AID). Bill Gaud noted that when Senator Pell asked you last Monday whether AID appropriations connote Defense obligations, you had stated that neither implied nor prohibited such commitment, and he feels the proposed position he has recommended merely spells this out.

Len Meeker and Doug MacArthur believe that we should object to the Amendment because of its unfortunate policy implications and our history of having opposed an identical Amendment at the President's request in March. Their proposed position is attached at Tab B, and includes a recommended modification of the Amendment if it cannot be successfully opposed.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Prefer AID approach (Tab A)

Prefer Meeker/MacArthur approach (Tab B)

Other

Attachments:

Tab A - Church amendment and AID position

Tab B - Messrs. Meeker + MacArthur position

but this requires WH approval
OR

MAY 14 1966

Senator Church's Amendment

Sec. 102 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

This Act, or the furnishing or economic, military, or other assistance under this Act, shall not be construed as a commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country.

Proposed Position

The Executive Branch would not object to this amendment, but points out that it is unnecessary.

The furnishing of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, of itself in no way implies or prohibits a commitment to use U. S. armed forces for the defense of any foreign country. Military commitments are made on their own basis for reasons vital to the security of the United States.

3d

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

May 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: L - Leonard C. Meeker *LCM*

SUBJECT: Church Amendment

We suggest the Church Amendment should be opposed. While Bill Gaud is undoubtedly right in stating that the amendment is unnecessary, we are concerned that the public and our allies will not grasp this point. It is true that the legislation relates to AID and not to our commitments to use our armed forces, but this point may be lost in the preparation of the Foreign Relations Committee report and on the floor of the Senate. Thus, we will be faced with the same problem we had with the amendments proposed in March -- there will be confusion as to the support by Congress of the President's policies in Viet Nam.

If outright opposition to the amendment is not successful, I think it should be modified along the following lines:

"This Act, or the furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance under this Act, shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country."

This language would be consistent with your response last Monday to Senator Pell that the AID bill neither implies nor prohibits any commitments to use armed forces abroad.

Concurrence:

H - Ambassador MacArthur *[Signature]*

L/E:MJBelman:jsf *[Signature]*

File

4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

*Rec'd
5-14-66
5:17p*

Sat., May 14, 1966
4:45 pm

Mr. President:

Our lively friend Henry Owen
weighing in again usefully.

W. W. Rostow

4a

4a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Presidential Luncheon

1. Proposal. As part of the regular program of White House lunches for foreign Ambassadors, there should be a lunch for the Ambassadors of the six Common Market countries. The President could come in at the close to stress:

- the importance we attach to European unity, generally, and the Common Market in particular;

- our pleasure that it is making good progress (recent settlement of the agricultural issue) and our hope that it will now go to tackle the Kennedy Round urgently and seriously.

2. Advantages. This occasion, which could be reported afterward to the press, would:

a. symbolize strong Presidential interest in Europe, and thus give the lie to charges that Vietnam has crowded Europe off the American stage;

b. be a good way of putting some gentle high level heat on the Common Market countries to get on with the Kennedy Round, before our negotiating authority under the Trade Expansion Act expires;

c. be an opportunity to be civil to the French, whose ambassador would be present, in a way which endorsed the more constructive aspects of French policy.

d. underline our dedication to European unity - which has been somewhat obscured by the NATO crisis.

100
Henry Owen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-249
By lif, NARA, Date 2-26-88

16
4-b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Acting Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Vietnam

That infallible source, CBS Radio, says Ambassador Lodge may resign this year. If so, here are some suggestions about his replacement. They all reflect the thought that it should be someone who understands "politics" - i.e., how elections are held and political parties formed in ways that bind a country together, instead of tearing it apart:

1. Governor Scranton is coming to the end of his term, and is not eligible for reelection. He has worked in the Department (1958-60).
2. Walter Reuther has won elections in his union as well as sought to influence them on the national level. In the Board of Consultants to the Policy Planning Council he has shown good judgment on foreign policy issues.
3. Ambassador Bunker presided over reasonably peaceful political competition in the Dominican Republic.
4. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Berger saw the Koreans put a national political party together and mount their first reasonably free election.

Henry Owen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-249
By ig, NARA, Date 2-26-88

5
Press React - Mexican Trip
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON *9*

5-14-66 1:35
(2)
Sat., May 14, 1966
1:00 pm *IS*

Mr. President:

I've marked key passages in this report
I asked State to prepare.

Clearly it was a good day's work.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

*(You saw some reaction
from USIA. This is more
comprehensive)*
K



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1966

S/S 7973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reaction to the President's Visit to Mexico

Summary

President Johnson's visit to Mexico was the principal news story covered by the Latin American media between April 15 and April 25. The Mexican coverage was, of course, exceptionally heavy. However, a majority of newspapers commenting throughout the hemisphere stressed the enthusiastic welcome accorded the President, supported the economic points in the joint United States-Mexican communique and supported the proposed summit meeting of American Presidents. In addition, reactions from Latin American officials and political leaders clearly indicate that the President's speech was well received and that the idea of a summit meeting has a great deal of support.

The visit received moderate news attention but little direct editorial comment in Western Europe. News agencies and correspondents' accounts, however, as well as the sparse editorial comment, noted the "warm welcome" given the "private" visit and called it eminently productive in improving United States relations with Mexico. Commentators gave favorable attention to the President's proposal for a summit meeting of Latin American leaders.

The Communist media in Moscow, Peking and Havana gave the visit limited coverage and stressed the anti-U.S. demonstrations.

Mexico

The Mexican media, which gave the visit heavy treatment, emphasized the rising current of friendship between the two countries. Mexico City's Excelsior expressed the feelings

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By DC/H per 15P NARS, Date 8-20-86

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reflected in many papers when it said that the President "has underscored what we judge to be a new U.S. policy toward Latin America."

An April 16 editorial in El Universal (conservative) declared that the visit symbolized "the high degree of understanding that has been reached in the relations between the two peoples. It is with pleasure that the Presidents decided to continue giving mutual cooperation to the achievement of the objectives of the 1960 Act of Bogota, the 1961 Charter of Punta del Este and the 1965 Economic and Social Act of Rio which summarize the aspirations of the people of the continent in economic matters." On the same day moderately conservative Novedades expressed satisfaction that the joint communique included "various of the important problems that we have with the United States, not only ourselves but all the sister republics, such as liberty, dignity, self-determination, non-intervention and the peaceful solution of problems that arise among our countries." In a homey touch moderate El Heraldo stressed that the President's visit was "an admirable gesture of a close friend who visits you unexpectedly, knowing that he is always welcome." The leftist Diario de Mexico stressed the international importance of the visit.

Mexican radio and television stations gave prominent coverage to the visit. Radio XERH stated that the President was arriving "with the reputation of a true friend of Mexico..." Radio INFORMEX carried comments from various Mexican officials indicating that the conversations between the two Presidents would be beneficial for both nations.

Recorded comments from prominent officials were numerous. President Gustav Diaz Ordaz stated that "The best comments on the visit of President Johnson have already been made by the people." Senator Manuel M. Moreno considered the visit "a logical outcome of the series of friendly contacts between officials and individuals representing Mexico and the United States..." Former President Adolfo Lopez Mateos said that

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"Relations between the United States and Mexico are at a peak of understanding and friendship." Secretary of the Interior Luis Echeverria described President Johnson's reception by the people of Mexico as "extraordinary" and was the "logical result of the friendship, affection and mutual respect that exists between Mexico and the U.S." Secretary of National Defense General Marcelino Garcia Barragan stated that "The words spoken by President Johnson made us feel proud and happy and gave us confidence in our friendship..." Amador Hernandez, Secretary General of the National Farmers Confederation, was quoted by Mexico City radio XERH as stating that "The visit of President Johnson constituted a transcendental event for the destiny of Mexico and the United States."

Overall Psychological Impact

San Jose's La Prensa Libre noted that the warm welcome given the President "reveals that in spite of the discord planted in the friendship between the Latin American and North American people, this discord has not prospered."

Several newspapers stressed that the reason for the visit was the United States' desire to stem the criticism caused by the Dominican crisis and by Latin American resistance at the recent Panama and Buenos Aires OAS conferences. La Prensa of Panama City said that the United States is "desperately looking for ways to close the breach that is appearing in its inter-American relations."

President Orlich of Costa Rica told Ambassador Telles that this "timely expression of friendly feeling for Latin America" showed President Johnson's "great sense of what is needed" and that it was a "very necessary shot in the arm at this time." President Lopez of Honduras sent a telegram to President Johnson in Mexico expressing his satisfaction that President Johnson was meeting with President Diaz Ordaz and his best wishes for the success of their talks.

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Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Alfonso Ortega in unsolicited comments to Ambassador Brown enthusiastically praised President Johnson's visit to Mexico as a personal demonstration of the President's sincere interest in Latin America. The Foreign Minister remarked that the President was "muy campechano," a term used in Nicaragua to indicate a combination of informality, good humor and warm human interest. Ortega suggested that additional brief visits of this kind by the President to Latin America (especially Central America) would have a tremendous effect.

Reaction to the President's Speech

The economic sections of President Johnson's speech were applauded widely in the press. El Tiempo of Bogota stressed that the Johnson Administration "is not abandoning the Alliance for Progress," while Caracas' La Republica heralded the speech as a "return to the Kennedy philosophy." However, some dailies while supporting the speech, emphasized that the President's words must be "translated into action" (La Gaceta of Tucuman, Argentina).

Argentine Foreign Minister Zavala Ortiz asked our Ambassador to inform Secretary Rusk that Argentina was very pleased with President Johnson's Mexico City speech, particularly his statement supporting President Illia's proposal to hold a meeting of American Presidents. In Colombia, the President's speech is being interpreted as a recognition that the problem of communism in the hemisphere cannot be combatted by force alone and as a promise of support to resolve problems related to the hemisphere's reliance on exports of raw materials. They emphasize particularly that a new impetus has been given to the Alliance for Progress as a result of the President's remarks.

President Leoni informed Ambassador Bernbaum that in his opinion President Johnson's speech had been a great contribution to inter-American relations, and characterized the reaction

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to it in Venezuela as "excellent." President Frei of Chile in a press interview praised highly the thoughts expressed by the President.

Reaction to Proposed Summit Meeting

El Espectador of Bogota called the summit proposal of "major importance," asserting that such a meeting would help improve inter-American relations. According to Rio's Jornal do Brasil the inter-American system is "stagnant and beset with such complex problems that only a summit meeting can hope to give new life and impulse to the OAS." In approving the call for the meeting, La Prensa Grafica of San Salvador predicted that at such a meeting the Latin American countries "will speak frankly. From this good understanding depends, in large part, the future of the continent." On the other hand, some concern was expressed lest the meeting have "negative results" like the Honolulu meeting between President Johnson and South Viet Nam Premier Cao Ky (Rio's Jornal do Comercio).

Official reactions to the summit proposal are being reported in a separate memorandum.

Western Europe

"The visit of President Johnson to Mexico," wrote the correspondent of London's liberal Guardian, "has turned out to be a great success, and has done much to improve relations between neighbors which have more often been touchy rather than tranquil... The three-hour motorcade from the airport to the Presidential palace was a triumphal success." The Guardian found several reasons for the ovation accorded the President's visit: "First, its spontaneity gave it the atmosphere of a party. Second, Mexicans were flattered that theirs was the first country Mr. Johnson had made an overnight visit to since he became President." Furthermore, said the paper, the visit came at a time when Mexico had no "real grievances" to air against the U.S."

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In Munich, the left-center Suddeutsche Zeitung front-paged its illustrated story with a caption reporting the ovation of two million Mexicans.

The Spanish press, as always particularly interested in Latin America, regarded the visit as highly successful. Under the heading "Against All Predictions, Johnson's Visit to Mexico Has Been an Amazing Success," the article of the Washington correspondent of the influential monarchist ABC of Madrid pointed out the initial doubts of Presidential advisers as to the likelihood of success in view of the Dominican and earlier Panamanian difficulties. He reported that "the reality is that the trip has been, on the popular level, an amazing success. The President received one of the largest and most enthusiastic street receptions in the annals of Mexico."

Regarding the proposed hemisphere summit, London's independent Economist said that "Mr. Johnson, by endorsing a summit meeting with Latin American leaders, managed to dispel some of the gloom that shrouded the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress... Last week he talked as if he had heard what his Latin American critics have been saying." The weekly thought that the visit might turn out to be a "public relations stunt" with practical results, unlike the "unfortunate dash to Honolulu." It added that looked at from the President's side, although it was only an overnight visit, "everybody agreed that he needed it... When he came back... he was visibly refreshed and free of the irritability which has goaded him lately." The conservative Daily Telegraph, London, observed that the President proposed a summit conference not only to seek ways of overcoming economic and political problems but also "to strengthen existing /Latin American/ bonds with the U.S. and to contain the threat of communism." West Berlin's independent Der Tagesspiegel, which ran an AP story with two-column photographs, suggested in its headline that the President "wished to give the Alliance for Progress a new drive."

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Communist Coverage

Radio Havana, April 18, quoted Cuban press comments on the meeting of President Johnson and President Ordaz as follows: "An El Mundo [Havana] editorial says...the Mexican President is not going to weaken the policy of respect for the independence and sovereignty of other countries, which is the basis for the respect Mexico demands for itself. El Mundo also says that if President Johnson expected a change in Mexican policy through his unexpected visit, everything indicates that he did not get it." The line taken by the Cuban Prensa Latina in broadcasts to the rest of the hemisphere suggested that the President's reception in Mexico was a hostile one and played up the "inevitable outcries in support of Vietnam and Cuba."

One Havana television service news broadcast on April 15, for example, commented that President Johnson was right in saying that there was still much to do in Latin America. "There is much to do," the broadcast went on, and "the oppressed and exploited classes will do it. There is much to do in order to do away with Yankee imperialist domination, and everything that has to be done will be done."


In Moscow (April 17) both TASS and Radio Moscow accused the United States of hypocrisy and claimed that while the American troops were engaged in aggressive action in Vietnam, President Johnson was trying to convince Mexico that the U.S. supports the principle of non-interference and self-determination. They also reported that the visit was "accompanied by a whole series of anti-U.S. demonstrations" in Mexico City. "The students of Mexico City greeted the President's motorcade with slogans demanding an end to U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the withdrawal of occupation troops from Santo Domingo." As usual, however, the radio to Moscow broadcast tried to link U.S. policy in Latin America with the war in Vietnam.

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On April 16, Peking NCNA International Service reported that "President Johnson was denounced to his face as a murderer yesterday by Mexicans as he was driving in the streets of Mexico City, according to a report from the Mexican capital." They cite the same report as stating that groups of people shouted anti-American slogans as the Johnson motorcade passed by.


for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 14 AM 9 24

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

Saturday, May 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Inter-American Summit Meeting

Secretary Rusk sends you the attached memorandum to obtain your approval on the date, site and agenda of the summit meeting for planning purposes and initial discussions with the Latin Americans.

I concur in the Secretary's three recommendations.

(S)

W. W. Rostow

Log 1386

Lina Gordon notified 5/16/66
JS notified 5/16/66
Boulder notified 5/16/66

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

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Ret'd from Pres 5/16/66
approved - mtg during period
Sept 15 - Dec 15, 1966
approved - mtg in SA,
preferably Lina but
in another SA country
if strong LA preference
approved main agenda item
intensified assistance
& self help under Alliance
LA recon. integration, &
US trade relations with
LA

Rec'd
5-16-66
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4:55 pm

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Friday, May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your suggestion at the National Security Council meeting Tuesday, the State Department has collected statements made by Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Morse during the hearings and Floor debate on the SEATO Treaty. These statements are attached at Tab A.

At Tab B is a copy of the Foreign Relations Committee report on the Treaty with interesting statements sidlined in red.

At Tab C is a paper prepared in the State Department in February analyzing the report and the debate on the SEATO Treaty.

This material is being made available to all Administration witnesses testifying on broad Vietnam subjects before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the days ahead.

W. A. Rostow

Attachments

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A

FULBRIGHT, J. W.

Senator Fulbright voted for the SEATO treaty in Committee and on the floor. He did not participate in the floor debate. During the Committee hearings November 11, 1954, he questioned Secretary Dulles, as follows:

Senator Fulbright: Mr. Chairman, I, like Senator Green, have not had a chance to study this, and I have only 1 or 2 questions. I was not clear about the status of this understanding of the United States regarding the aggression coming only from Communists. Is that in the treaty itself or is that an understanding just outside of the treaty among the various signatories?

Secretary Dulles: It is part of the treaty itself and is subscribed to by all the other parties to the treaty; they accept our understanding in that respect.

Senator Fulbright: That is contained in the last paragraph; is it not?

Secretary Dulles: Yes, sir; it appears just above the signatures.

Senator Fulbright: All right, I had overlooked that.

I have one other point. Could you give your view as to the significance of article III, somewhat along the line of your last answer to the Senator from Iowa's remark? In what way, if any does article III change our present policy regarding point 4 or technical assistance? Was it intended to increase our obligations, or just what do you mean by article III?

Secretary Dulles: It was designed to reaffirm our conviction that certain economic efforts, such as technical assistance programs, cultural exchanges, and the like, all play an important part in combating communism, and that we intend to use all of the weapons in our arsenal to meet the threat of communism in this area.

Senator Fulbright: Then is it fair to say that this is a specific recognition of the importance of technical cooperation in helping to overcome the difficulties that exist in this part of the world?

Secretary Dulles: Yes, sir.

Senator Fulbright: I must say I think that is a very important article. I hope it may lead to further developments. As I said, I have no particular criticism to offer on the whole. It seems to me a proper approach, but I will reserve my observations for a later meeting when I have had a little more time to digest the treaty. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

MANSFIELD, MIKE

Senator Mansfield, a member of the U.S. delegation to the Manila meeting September 6, 1954, on the Southeast Asia Pact, voted for the SEATO treaty in Committee and on the floor. While he was one of the principal speakers supporting the treaty on the floor, his remarks during the Committee hearings were largely in commendation of the U.S. delegation.

At the hearings November 11, 1954, he said:

"I want to join...in congratulating the Secretary of State for the outstanding job that he did at Manila...

* * * * *

"... I think it ought to be brought out that while this is, perhaps, not the ideal solution, it is the best possible solution which could be arrived at during the time of consideration.

"It is the first time, to my knowledge, that countries in that part of the world, of different religious backgrounds--Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian--got together, ironed out their differences, and arrived at a solution satisfactory to all.

* * * * *

"... and it is a pleasure for me to state for the record that it was an honor and a privilege to be at this Conference and to work with Secretary Dulles and Senator Smith and the rest of the American delegation, and to come up with what I think is a sound solution to the difficulties confronting all of us in that area."

Supporting the treaty on the floor February 1, 1955 he said:

"... This treaty will be another milestone in the evolution of our policy to try and create a solid collective-security system in the western Pacific and southeast Asia areas.

* * * * *

"The Southeast Asian Treaty is another part in the total pattern of strength which we have been trying to create throughout the free world.

* * * * *

"The proposal before the Senate is a significant new undertaking providing for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed from the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member states. This situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satisfactory at the present time, although it is improving, and it is hoped that something fruitful will come from the Bangkok meeting.

* * * * *

"The treaty ends with a declaration that the armed aggression which is referred to and which the United States declares would be dangerous to its own peace and security would be Communist aggression. ... Our interests would be involved only if there should be Communist aggression. The other countries were unwilling to limit the treaty to Communist aggression, so the issue was resolved by the United States including in the treaty a declaration

that as far as it was concerned the open aggression which we would regard as dangerous to our peace and security would be Communist aggression. As a compensation the United States has agreed that if there should be local controversies in the area, we would join with others in consultation to see what should or could be done to alleviate them. This treaty is aimed primarily at Communist aggression, not at difficulties that might arise between friendly states.

* * * * *

"... What is the major difference between the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and NATO?

"First of all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built up as a defensive force on the continent of Europe--a force strong enough to resist attack by the armies of the Soviet Union. That is not the purpose of the Southeast Asia Treaty. This new treaty does not dedicate any major elements of the United States Military Establishment to form any army of defense in this area. According to the Secretary of State's testimony, in this area 'we rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power.' A NATO-type organization in the Far East would be an overextension of our military power as it stands today.

"This new treaty follows a formula similar to that used in the Philippine Treaty, the Anzus Treaties, and the Korean Treaty. This avoids the dispute which arose during the debate over the NATO Treaty relative to the powers of the President and the Congress.

"The less controversial language declares that an intrusion in the treaty area would be dangerous to our peace and security and that we would, in that event, act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. The NATO Treaty says that 'an attack on one is an attack on all.' The former may not be as automatic, depending on the circumstances, but it avoids any constitutional controversy, and it stems from one of our oldest foreign policies--the Monroe Doctrine.

"The...Treaty is consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. This treaty would come under the provisions of article 51, providing that nothing contained in the U.N. Charter shall deprive any of the states from the individual or collective right of self-defense. Under article 51 regional enforcement measures do not need prior approval of the Security Council, where the Soviet Union has a veto.

* * * * *

"In conclusion, I wish to stress again the importance of this treaty and the Pacific Charter. They are needed steps in building security for freedom in the Pacific area. I sincerely hope that the Senate will give its prompt approval and ratification."

MORSE, WAYNE

Senator Morse voted for the Treaty both in Committee and on the floor. He became a member of the Committee in 1955 and therefore did not participate in the open hearings on November 11, 1954.

Following the Senate vote, he made a lengthy speech explaining his vote and stressing his conviction that the the solution of the Southeast Asia security problem was a proper matter for handling by the United Nations. He said:

"...I voted to report the treaty...for several reasons, the most primary one of which is that there is no doubt in my mind that the treaty is in conformity with the United Nations Charter. ...

"But I wish to make it very clear...that in my judgment, the hope for peace in the Pacific rests with the United Nations. ...

* * * * *

"In my judgment, the southeast Asia treaty greatly strengthens the chance that the United Nations will be able to help preserve peace in the world. I voted for the treaty in committee, and I voted for its ratification...today, because article I provides, in principle, what ought to have been included in the joint resolution (Formosa) passed by the Senate last week. ... a clear rededication to the United Nations. Article I of the ... Treaty rededicates the United States and the other signatories, at least through the framework of the treaty, to the principle of the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Listen to this language:

* * * * *

" Mr. President, I call attention to section 2, article IV of the treaty...

"That is a pledge, in my judgment to resort to peaceful procedures to settle disputes, and it is an indication of the realization on our part that we are not going to avoid war by resorting to military threats.

"I call attention next to article VI of the treaty ...

"There again we have made crystal clear and have emblazoned in the treaty the proposition that the United States repledges itself to seek peace in the world through the procedures and policies of the United Nations.

"That is why I voted in committee to recommend ratification of the treaty, and that is why on the floor of the Senate today I voted for the ratification of the treaty.

* * * * *

"The people expect this body to rededicate itself to the jurisdiction of the United Nations as the greatest force in the world today for maintaining peace in the world. I think the treaty to which we have just given our advice and consent to the President, is a great step forward in an attempt to help preserve and strengthen the bulwarks of peace. It represents what I argued for last week, namely, one of the

MORSE

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calculated risks for peace. Again today I am pleading that we assume greater risks for peace. I am pleading that we be willing to lay before the United Nations questions involving the fate of the world...

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THE SOUTHEAST ASIA
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ON

EXECUTIVE K

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1955.—Ordered to be printed
with an illustration

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1955

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THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1955.—Ordered to be printed, with an illustration]

Mr. GEORGE, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted
the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany Executive K, Eighty-third Congress, second session

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Ex. K, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and the protocol thereto signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, reports both instruments to the Senate, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL

This treaty constitutes an important step in the evolution of United States policy to create a system of collective security in the Western Pacific area. It is the latest addition to the protective network of mutual defense treaties which have been concluded by the United States with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea.

Designed to promote security and to strengthen the fabric of peace in southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the treaty is intended to deter aggression in that area by warning potential aggressors that an open armed attack upon the territory of any of the parties will be regarded by each of them as dangerous to its own peace and safety (art. IV, par. 1). In such circumstances the parties agree to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes.

They also agree to consult on measures to be taken for the common defense, whenever the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the parties is threatened in any way other than by armed attack, or by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area (art. IV, par. 2). Internal subversion directed from without would be an example of one such fact or situation calling for consultation.

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 ON WITNESS WHEREOF
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 1950 10 10 1950

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The treaty is thus a mechanism for collective defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion, and it is in this latter respect primarily that it differs from the previous bilateral and tri-lateral security treaties in the Pacific. As with the Korean Mutual Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and similar defense treaties, the parties to the treaty reaffirm their solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations (art. I). The treaty pledges them to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and, further, to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability (art. II). It provides for cooperation in developing measures, including technical assistance designed to promote the economic progress and social well-being of the parties (art. III), for immediate consultation whenever their territorial integrity or political independence is threatened by other than armed attack or any fact endangering the peace (art. IV, par. 2), and for the creation of a council to consider matters pertaining to the implementation of the treaty (art. V). Other articles define the area to which the treaty shall apply (art. VIII) and the circumstances under which other states may be invited to accede to its terms (art. VII). Finally, an understanding is incorporated in the text of the instrument itself by which the United States declares that the armed aggression referred to in article IV as dangerous to its peace and security would be Communist aggression.

The protocol designates the States of Laos and Cambodia and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam as states or territories for the purposes of article IV, thus bringing into play the obligations of the parties with respect to armed attack and indirect aggression against this addition to the "treaty area". At the same time those countries are made eligible for the kind of economic measures and technical assistance contemplated in article III of the treaty.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY

At the time that negotiations were begun in 1950 leading to the Japanese security treaty and to the series of separate security pacts in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather broad type of collective security arrangement might be worked out. It was not then possible to realize this goal, and further action on a multipartite protective umbrella over Southeast Asia had to be deferred as long as active hostilities continued in Indochina. The defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, which were approved by the Senate on March 20, 1952, were not regarded as ultimate ends in themselves, but were expressly conceived as measures taken "pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security" in the Pacific area. Following an address by President Eisenhower on April 16, 1953, in which he advocated "united action for Southeast Asia", Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought during the next year to complete a pact covering this area. Until after the Geneva armistice agreements were concluded, however, circumstances made that impracticable.

In the course of hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) the committee had stated its conviction that a

multilateral agreement for the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would be desirable. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that substantial cultural, political, and geographical differences existed among the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the desired development at an early date. The committee acknowledged these difficulties but nevertheless expressed the hope that the Department of State would continue its efforts to encourage the nations of the Pacific to work together for their regional and collective self-defense.

After 4 months of negotiations between the United States and other governments, it was announced on August 14, 1954 that upon the invitation of the Government of the Philippines, the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned had agreed to meet on September 6 to consider measures to further their common objectives. At the request of the President, two members of the committee, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator Michael J. Mansfield, accompanied Secretary Dulles to Manila as plenipotentiary delegates and, together with him, signed the treaty, the protocol and a "Pacific Charter" which was also adopted at the conference. The charter, a declaration of principles dedicating the signatory governments to the ideals of self-determination and independence, does not require ratification. The treaty and protocol were signed on September 8, 1954, and transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on November 10, 1954.

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

Because the administration was particularly concerned that the last session of Congress should not close without some preliminary consideration being given to the treaty, the committee decided to act with unusual dispatch. Accordingly, the first public hearing was held on November 11, 1954, the morning after the President had transmitted the pertinent documents to the Senate. There was no intention to press for further action on the treaty at that time; but it was hoped that such a demonstration of the Government's continued interest in the pact would provide additional impetus to other signatories to proceed promptly with their own ratification. At the hearing of November 11, extended testimony was heard from Secretary Dulles on the various legal and political implications of the treaty, and, more briefly, from Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense.

After the 84th Congress had convened, the committee considered the treaty in executive session on January 13, 1955, when additional testimony was received from the Secretary of State. This second appearance of Mr. Dulles was useful in bringing the committee up to date on events bearing upon the treaty since its transmittal to the Senate, and in reviewing for the committee and its two new members (Senators Barkley and Morse) the underlying conditions deemed by the Secretary of State to justify expeditious action.

A second public hearing was held on January 19. Hon. Hamilton Fish, former Congressman from New York, representing the American Political Action Committee, Miss Freda Utley, on behalf of the American China Policy Association, and Mrs. Agnes Waters appeared and were heard.

On January 21, the committee agreed, by a vote of 14 to 1, to report both the treaty and the protocol to the Senate for final action.

The committee desires to commend the executive branch for its efforts to keep the committee thoroughly informed during the course of the negotiations. In the preliminary discussions as well as at the conference itself a spirit of cooperation was exhibited between the legislative and executive branches which contributed greatly to the satisfactory outcome of the proceedings.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

The basic design of the treaty is similar to that of defense treaties previously concluded with Korea, the Philippines, and the ANZUS countries, but with several important differences.

In the preamble, the parties reaffirm their sovereign equality, their faith in the United Nations Charter, their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments and the intentions expressed in the Manila Charter to uphold the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The reaffirmation of these principles is accompanied by a declaration that the parties will strive to promote self-government and to secure independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. The preamble further sets forth as the fundamental purposes of the treaty, coordination of the parties' efforts for collective defense and the preservation of security, warning potential aggressors that the signatories stand together. Thus the character of the instrument as a peaceful arrangement for defense against aggression is plainly marked.

Article I reproduces the undertaking found in other security treaties to settle any international disputes in which the parties may be involved, by peaceful means, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This article takes cognizance of the status of all signatories as members of the United Nations.

Article II embodies the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.) characteristic of the other mutual security treaties. It pledges the parties, separately and jointly, through self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity not only to resist armed attack; but also—

to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

This recognition of the dangers of subversion and indirect aggression introduces an element not found in the system of defense agreements which preceded the Southeast Asian Treaty; in none of the prior pacts is there a provision for countering subversion, although the Japanese Security Treaty does contemplate the use of United States forces to put down large-scale riots and disturbances instigated by an outside power (art. I). Article II, therefore, seeks to stimulate positive action to defeat the erosive devices which international communism has utilized to destroy the freedom and independence of nations.

Under article III the parties agree to cooperate in developing economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote their economic progress and social well-being. This is accompanied by an undertaking to strengthen the parties' free institutions.

No comparable provision appears in any of the previous defense treaties. It is founded upon the conviction that if the free nations can develop their internal stability through economic cooperation the ground for Communist penetration will be rendered less fertile. However, the article does not commit the United States to a specific aid program, nor does it preclude continued economic cooperation with any country whose economic welfare is important to our own well-being and the stability of the treaty area.

5. OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE IV

Article IV contains the activating, operative core of the treaty. Paragraph 1 corresponds generally to article III of the Korean Treaty and article V of the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Treaty in the recognition by each party that—

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety.

In such circumstance, each signatory agrees that—

it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The obligation of the United States under article IV, paragraph 1, limited by virtue of an understanding in the treaty to a Communist armed attack. A significant difference likewise exists between the corresponding article of the Philippine and the Australia-New Zealand pacts, and the Southeast Asia Treaty in this respect: article V of the first two treaties is limited in its application to an armed attack—

on the metropolitan territory of any of the parties, or on the island territory under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

On the other hand, article IV of the treaty now being considered extends to what is described in the instrument as "the treaty area" (art. VIII), which is dealt with in more detail below. This "treaty area" may be enlarged by the unanimous agreement of the parties.

Paragraph 2 of article IV incorporates the language of article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Paragraph 2 is worded as follows:

If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

Article IV then concludes with a third paragraph specifically precluding any action on the territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 thereof except at the invitation or by consent of the government concerned.

It will be observed that the obligation of the parties under paragraph 2 of this article is not comparable to the obligation contained in paragraph 1. The latter contains an undertaking to "act to meet the common danger" through each government's constitutional processes, in case of an armed attack within the purview of the treaty.

But if the threat to territorial integrity or political independence arises from something other than an armed attack (i. e., subversion), the only obligation of the parties is to "consult" with each other on the measures which should be taken for the common defense. There is no requirement for reporting such measures to the Security Council as under paragraph 1.

6. OTHER PROVISIONS

By article V of the treaty, a Council is established on which each party is represented, to consider matters pertaining to implementation of the treaty and to consult on any military or other planning which might be required by the situation prevailing in the treaty area.

Article VI records the declaration of the parties that the Southeast Asia Treaty shall not be construed as affecting the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or the responsibility of that body for maintaining international peace and security. Each signatory likewise declares it is not party to any other instrument in force which would conflict with this treaty, and further undertakes not to enter any future engagement which would be inconsistent therewith.

Article VII provides for accession to the treaty by third states which might be in position to advance its objectives and contribute to the security of the area described. Such accession is effected by an invitation extended only with the unanimous agreement of the parties.

Article VIII defines the "treaty area" to which the obligations of the parties apply as the general area of southeast Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the southwest Pacific, not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. It provides also for amendment of the treaty area by unanimous agreement. This element of flexibility again differentiates the treaty from other defense treaties in the Pacific.

Article IX designates the Government of the Philippines as depository of the treaty and declares that ratification of the instrument and the execution of its provisions shall be in accordance with the parties' constitutional processes.

Under article X the treaty is to remain in force indefinitely, subject to a right of denunciation by any party effective 1 year after notice has been given to the Philippine Government.

Finally, there is embodied in the text of the treaty itself an understanding, which binds all signatories, that only in the case of a Communist armed attack will the obligation of the United States under article IV, paragraph 1, come into effect.

7. SCOPE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT: THE TREATY UNDERSTANDING

The obligation of the United States to take action in the event of an armed attack in the treaty area or against any duly designated State or territory is qualified by the understanding referred to above, which is worded as follows:

The United States of America in executing the present treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only

to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In other terms, the only armed aggression which the United States declares, under this treaty, to be dangerous to its own peace and safety would be a Communist aggression. During the Manila Conference there was considerable discussion whether the treaty as a whole should be directed exclusively against such aggression, or whether it should deal with any type of aggression. Other countries were unwilling to limit the treaty as advocated by the United States, and the issue was resolved by including in the text of the treaty the declaration of understanding quoted above. The understanding reflects the special position of the United States as the only treaty member which does not have any territory of its own in the protected area. It also establishes that our concern with that area is not primarily with local quarrels, but with the spread of international communism as a threat to the United States and the rest of the free world.

For the remaining signatories, however, the treaty deals with any and all acts of aggression which might disturb the peace of the area, and in such cases the United States agrees to consult with the other parties as provided for in paragraph 2 of article IV.

8. APPLICATION OF THE TREATY TO SUBVERSIVE ACTS

The threat of Communist subversion of free governments was first formally recognized in treaty terms in the security pact with Japan, signed on September 8, 1951. That pact provided that United States forces could be utilized for—

assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

The committee report on the treaty (Ex. Rept. No. 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess., February 14, 1952) noted that—

this right to act against foreign-inspired insurrection is essential to the security of United States forces in Japan and of Japan itself.

The problem of Communist subversion is dealt with more explicitly in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

As previously noted, article II requires the parties to maintain and develop their capacity to resist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability. This injunction is followed by an undertaking of the parties to consult together on the measures necessary to meet threats of that kind as well as any fact or situation other than an armed attack which might endanger the peace of the area (art. IV, par. 2).

The threat of subversion has been particularly acute in the region of southeast Asia where the Communists have attempted in several countries to capture revolutionary or anticolonial movements. The case of the Viet Minh is an instance where they succeeded. The Huk revolution in the Philippines was suppressed, but Communist subversion in Malaya and the threat in Thailand present problems which cannot be ignored.

The committee believes that it is necessary to include a provision of this kind in the treaty. Since the end of World War II the threat to the free world has come more often in the form of indirect sub-

ersion than in direct aggression, and freedom lost by subversion may be as difficult to retrieve as that lost by force.

The obligation of the parties to "consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense" under article IV, paragraph 2, was clarified by Secretary Dulles in these terms:

If there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or in Thailand, we would consult together as to what to do about it, because if that were a subversive movement that was in fact propagated by communism, it would be a very grave threat to us. But we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it.

In response to further questioning by the committee, the Secretary gave assurances that if any action were to be taken as the result of such consultation it would be in accordance with our constitutional processes.

When Secretary Dulles testified before the committee in November 1954, expressed the hope that there would be an early meeting of the signatories "at which we will begin to think of ways and means that might be made available to combat this threat of subversion." Such a meeting has now been scheduled for February 23, 1955.

9. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY

A number of significant differences exist between the present security pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The two treaties differ substantially both in their structural approach to defense against aggression, and in the principles which condition the obligations of the United States to act.

To begin with, the Southeast Asia Treaty does not contemplate anything like a joint military force with a joint headquarters. There is been an unfortunate tendency in some quarters to refer to this treaty as SEATO, which immediately conjures up the image of an organization similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the hearings Secretary Dulles took pains to negate any such implication in the present treaty. Pointing out that NATO, the case of the North Atlantic Treaty, was designed to build up a defensive force on the continent of Europe which itself would be sufficient to resist attack by the Red armies, the Secretary added:

We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the United States Military establishment to form an arm of defense in this area. We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power. That we made clear to our associates the treaty and that is our policy.

It would involve, in the opinion of our military advisers * * * an injudicious extension of our military power if we were to try to build up that kind of an organization in southeast Asia.

We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe that if there should be an armed attack in that area the most effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war.

As noted previously, another distinguishing feature of the treaty is that it includes a provision of major importance against subversive attempts by international communism to destroy the territorial integrity or political independence of any party to the treaty. In this respect the treaty also differs from prior security pacts in the Pacific.

10. THE "MONROE DOCTRINE" FORMULA

More fundamental than either of these differences is the employment in the Southeast Asia Treaty of what Secretary Dulles has called the Monroe Doctrine formula, as distinct from the more far-reaching commitment contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. In article IV, paragraph 1, of the Southeast Asia Treaty, as in article III of the Korean Treaty and article IV of the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand pacts, each party recognizes that the armed attack referred to therein "would endanger its own peace and safety" and agrees to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. By contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty had incorporated the principle that an attack upon one is tantamount to an attack upon all the other parties. Under this concept even if an attack were not one made against the territory of the United States itself, such an attack would nevertheless be so regarded. The provision gave rise to an extensive constitutional debate in the Senate, centering around the effect it might have on the President's powers to involve this country in warfare without the approval of Congress.

Because of that constitutional controversy, Secretary Dulles believed it preferable to adopt President Monroe's language when he announced in 1823 that any extension of the European system to this hemisphere would be considered by the United States as dangerous to our peace and safety. The formula was therefore used by Mr. Dulles when he negotiated the three earlier Pacific defense treaties. In his view—

the practical difference between the two [approaches] from the standpoint of * * * giving security to the other parties was not appreciable, and * * * it was better to avoid a formula which would reopen the constitutional debate * * * as to the relative powers of the President and the Congress under these different formulas.

In its report on the Korean Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), the committee noted that the Monroe Doctrine formula—

permits the United States to take any action we deem appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives adequate assurance of support to the other country which may be the victim of an attack. It has the additional advantage of never having been challenged throughout our history, from the constitutional standpoint, as altering the balance of power between the President and Congress.

These observations apply with equal relevance to the Southeast Asia Treaty.

11. RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The relationship of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty to the United Nations Charter is determined by four references in the treaty.

In the preamble, the parties reiterate their faith in the charter of the United Nations and the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Similar provisions are contained in the mutual defense treaties concluded with other Pacific nations.

By article I—

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

This provision is similar to articles in the Philippine, Australia-New Zealand, and Korean treaties. It reaffirms the United Nations Charter obligations of the signatories of the pending treaty, but in no way either enlarges or diminishes our obligations thereunder. When questioned on the point, the Secretary declared:

I can say categorically, sir, that in my opinion this neither adds one jot or tittle nor subtracts one jot or tittle, from our objective as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.

The most important reference to the United Nations Charter is in article IV, paragraph 1, which obliges the parties to meet a common danger in the treaty area in accordance with their constitutional processes. The paragraph then says:

Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

This language relates the treaty directly to article 51 of the United Nations Charter which provides:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Similar references to the United Nations Charter are to be found in the treaties with the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand. Discussing this article before the committee, Secretary Dulles emphasized that it was not founded upon the clauses in article 52 of the charter concerning regional arrangements:

I would say * * * that it comes under the collective security provisions of article 51 rather than the regional provisions of article 52. Article 51 is a provision that nothing contained in the charter shall deprive any of the states from the individual or collective right of self-defense. That is the provision we are operating under rather than the regional provision, one reason being that under a regional organization, no enforcement measures can be taken without the prior approval of the Security Council, where the Soviet Union has a veto, and we would not want to have an organization where action could be vetoed by the Soviet Union.

In other words, tying the treaty to article 51 of the charter obligates the United States and the other parties to report certain activities under the treaty to the Security Council. It does not, however, require the parties to await the prior approval of that Council before taking action. The committee and the Senate, when they approved the earlier defense treaties in the Pacific area, accepted this relationship between article 51 of the charter and the mutual defense treaties.

In a final reference to the United Nations Charter (in art. VI) the parties expressly declare that the present treaty does not and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way their obligations under the Charter document. This again corresponds to similar articles in the Australia-New Zealand, and the Philippine treaties.

12. THE TREATY AREA

As noted earlier in this report, the general pattern of the Southeast Asia Treaty is similar to the other defense pacts the United States has concluded in the Pacific, apart from several differences which

have been underscored. Another innovation of the treaty consists in the flexibility of the region subject to protection. The treaty starts out with a geographical delineation embracing most of the territory of the signatories and the Pacific Ocean area south of 21 degrees 30 minutes—i. e., a line running north of the Philippines. Although some of the parties do have territories north of that line, it was felt that inclusion of these would not be desirable. Broadly speaking, the basic area involved comprises Pakistan; Thailand; Laos, the Free Territory of Vietnam and Cambodia (by protocol); Malaya; Australia and New Zealand; and the Philippines. Hong Kong is excluded because of the limiting clause even though the United Kingdom is a party.

On the other hand, it has already been observed that article VIII, after defining the geographical zone of application, contemplates the possibility of enlargement or modification of the treaty area by future unanimous agreement of the parties. Such action has in fact been taken in the protocol which accompanies the present treaty.

13. THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY

By a protocol signed on the same date as the treaty, the treaty area was further defined so as to bring in Laos, Cambodia, and the Free Territory of Vietnam as areas which, if attacked, would fall under the protection of the instrument. It was hoped that by this action, aggression against these states might be deterred. None of these countries is a party to the Manila pact because, after the Geneva armistice agreements on Indochina, a question was raised as to whether the Associated States could properly join such a pact. Since the provisions of the armistice are complicated and in certain respects rather ambiguous, some of the parties thereto thought it would not be desirable to raise that question at a time when the armistice was still in the process of being carried out. However, the Associated States concluded that whether or not they ever became parties to the treaty, they would be pleased to have its mantle of protection thrown over them.

14. UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT REQUIRED TO ENLARGE TREATY COVERAGE

Provision is made in three articles of the treaty for modification of its terms by unanimous agreement. Thus, article IV, paragraph 1, as well as article VII, contemplates that the treaty area may be extended by the parties to any state or territory "which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate." Article VII refers to the accession of additional states "by unanimous agreement of the parties." To avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding on the significance of this clause, the President informed the Senate that the provisions with respect to designation of new territories and membership are to be construed as requiring the Senate's advice and consent. In other words, it is not enough that the executive branch should acquiesce in the addition of new members or in the modification of the treaty area, but these matters must also be brought before the Senate.

The point was emphasized during the hearings. Speaking of the addition of new members, Mr. Dulles said:

I would assume that the same practice would prevail here as prevails with relation to the North Atlantic Treaty. The language is the same, and it was agreed between the Executive and the Senate at the time of the North Atlantic Treaty that if additional states came in that would require an amendment of the treaty or a protocol to the treaty, on which the advice and consent of the Senate would be sought.

We would interpret this language in the same way that similar language in the North Atlantic Treaty is interpreted, namely, as requiring Senate action in that event.

15. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

In the course of the hearings on January 13, the committee gave consideration to a suggestion by one of the witnesses that a reservation be attached to the treaty which would prohibit the use of United States ground, air, or naval forces in any defense action unless Congress by a declaration of war, consented to their use against Communist aggression. This proposal led to a searching discussion in executive session. It was finally rejected as throwing open the entire controversial topic of the relative orbit of power between the executive and the legislative branches. It had been for this very reason, as noted above, that the executive branch adopted the "constitutional processes" formula. When pressed for an indication of what the phrase connoted, Mr. Dulles assured the committee that those words were used with the understanding that the President would come to Congress in case of any threat of danger—

unless the emergency were so great that prompt action was necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.

Except in that event—

the normal process would be to act through Congress if it were in session, and if not in session to call Congress.

The committee ultimately resolved that it would serve no useful purpose to seek to develop the meaning of "constitutional processes" beyond this statement of Mr. Dulles. In that connection, it is recalled that the committee, referring to the use of the same phrase in the North Atlantic Treaty, observed in its report:

The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war (Ex. Rept. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess.).

16. MUTUAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Article II of the treaty pledges the parties to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. By article III they agree to strengthen their free institutions and promote economic progress and social well-being in their areas.

This language directed the committee's attention to the relationship between the treaty and the Mutual Security Act of 1954 under which \$700 million was appropriated for expenses necessary for the support of the forces of nations in the area of southeast Asia and for other expenditures to accomplish the policies and purposes declared in the

act. Development and technical assistance of lesser amounts were also provided in that act.

In his report to the President, the Secretary wrote with reference to article III that it "does not commit the United States to any grant program." The committee wishes to confirm this assurance. The treaty places no moral or legal obligation on the United States to give vast sums of military, economic or technical assistance to nations in the area. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 and future authorizations of such nature are to be presented on their own merits and must be justified by a judgment of the Congress as to what action may be in our national interest at the time.

The committee inquired into possible future aid programs. It was informed that the scope and nature of these programs have not been decided and await a report of General Collins on the situation in the Associated States of Indochina. In this connection, the committee invites the attention of the Senate to the following statement by the Secretary of State:

As I said at a press conference * * * the possibility of usefully spending vast sums of economic money in this area has not been demonstrated.

* * * In this part of the world the problem is to create something that is totally new, and I am inclined to think that while the problem certainly needs our very best thought, the finding of ways and means to help is the most important first thing. The problem needs to be tackled first from that standpoint rather than the standpoint of first appropriating vast sums of money and then trying to think later on how it can be spent with advantage.

17. OUR MILITARY COMMITMENT

The committee, conscious of our other treaty obligations in the Pacific which, if the present treaty and protocol are ratified, will encompass 12 other nations, was concerned lest the United States might be overextending itself. It raised this question with the Secretary of State by asking for information concerning possible plans to create local defensive forces in the area. For the information of the Senate, his full statement on that question is reprinted here.

It is not the policy of the United States to attempt to deter attack in this area by building up a local force capable itself of defense against an all-out attack by the Chinese Communists if it should occur. We do not expect to duplicate in this area the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its significant standing forces. That would require a diversion and commitment of strength which we do not think is either practical or desirable or necessary from the standpoint of the United States.

We believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking power, and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe that is more effective than if we tried to pin down American forces at the many points around the circumference of the Communist world in that area.

It may very well be that other countries of the area will want to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the area under this treaty. But we made clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force including, for example, United States ground troops for that area, but that we rely upon the deterrent power of our mobile striking force.

18. THE PACIFIC CHARTER

At the same time the treaty and protocol were negotiated at Manila, the governments there represented drew up and signed a declaration known as the Pacific Charter. This was a proclamation of general principles and ideals by the delegates to the conference expressing their

deep interest in the further development of freedom and independence in the area.

In spirit, the Pacific Charter is not unlike the Atlantic Charter of 1942 in which the postwar aims of the allied powers were set forth. Appealing to the "highest principles of justice and liberty", the delegates to the Manila Conference proclaimed that they "uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and would earnestly "strive to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities." The charter proclaims further that the delegates of the governments represented were each prepared "to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement" of these purposes. They stated that they would continue "to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region"; and were determined "to prevent or counter * * * any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity."

The Pacific Charter grew out of a suggestion by President Mag-saysay of the Philippines who felt that it would be helpful to have the delegates proclaim the fundamental principles summarized above and the intentions and purposes which motivated them. It does not contain anything to which the United States has not frequently subscribed in past international instruments.

By this proclamation the Asiatic peoples are assured of the acceptance by the delegates to the conference of the common ultimate aim of self-determination and self-government for all areas in Asia.

19. NEED FOR EARLY RATIFICATION

The President transmitted the treaty and protocol to the Senate on November 10, 1954, with a request for "early and favorable consideration." At a hearing held on November 11, Secretary of State Dulles stressed the uncertainties in the treaty area and suggested that early approval by the Senate might be expected to promote stability in the region concerned.

The need for prompt ratification remains urgent. On January 3, 1955, the Department of State announced that the Foreign Ministers of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty powers had agreed to meet on February 23 in Bangkok at the invitation of the Government of Thailand. The announcement stated that—

The purpose of the meeting will be to consider arrangements for the implementation of the Manila Treaty and to exchange views on matters affecting the peace and security of the treaty area.

Although the proposed meeting need not await the entry into force of the treaty it would be helpful if all signatories had ratified by that time. The chances for this are good. Thailand has deposited its ratification and the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have completed parliamentary action but not yet consummated the formalities of ratification. In France and Pakistan, parliamentary action is not expected to be necessary. The Republic of the Philippines expects to consider the treaty shortly after its Congress reconvenes on January 24.

More important than the technical desirability of bringing the treaty into force by the February 23 meeting would be the psychological impact of prompt action. It would demonstrate to the nations of South Asia the seriousness of our purposes and intentions. Such a show of unity would also buttress the conviction of the treaty powers that they can work harmoniously together on problems affecting the southeast Asia area.

The general exposure of the area to the threat of communism, both internal and external, makes it doubly important and urgent that we and our partners to this treaty discuss measures for giving early effect to its provisions.

20. CONCLUSIONS

It is the committee's view that the Manila pact constitutes a considerable accomplishment in bringing together a group of eight countries of divergent religious, racial and political backgrounds, in a common resolve to defend their freedom against the menace of international communism. By strengthening that resolve the United States will make a substantial contribution to the preservation of free governments and to the defense of its own security.

The principle underlying this treaty is that advance notice of our intentions and the intentions of the nations associated with us may serve to deter potential aggressors from reckless action that could plunge the Pacific into war. To that end, the treaty makes it clear that the United States will not remain indifferent to conduct threatening the peace of Southeast Asia.

Until now, our protective system in the Pacific area has been predicated upon a group of treaties of a bilateral and trilateral character. The Southeast Asia treaty is a long step toward a more comprehensive, collective security arrangement which has been regarded as desirable by the administration and the committee.

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

For these reasons, the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty.

APPENDIX

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. CASEY

For France:
G. LA CHAMBRE

For New Zealand:
CLIFTON WEBB

For Pakistan:
Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.
ZAFRULLA KHAN

For the Republic of the Philippines:

CARLOS P. GARCIA
FRANCISCO A. DELGADO
TOMAS L. CABILI
LORENZO M. TAÑADA
CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
READING

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
H. ALEXANDER SMITH
MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD

I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

[SEAL]

Raul S. Manglapus
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

DESIGNATION OF STATES AND TERRITORY AS TO WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE TO BE APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. CASEY

For France:
G. LA CHAMBRE

For New Zealand:
CLIFTON WEBB

For Pakistan:
Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.
ZAFRULLA KHAN

For the Republic of the Philippines:

CARLOS P. GARCIA
FRANCISCO A. DELGADO
TOMAS L. CABILI
LORENZO M. TAÑADA
CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
READING

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
H. ALEXANDER SMITH
MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD

I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

[SEAL]

Raul S. Manglapus
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

79

C

Secretary's Appearance Before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
February 18, 1966

Analysis of Report and Debate on SEATO Treaty
Ratification - January-February 1955

1. History - The Foreign Relations Committee, during hearings in the spring of 1954 on the US-Korean Defense Treaty "stated its conviction that a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would be desirable." (SEATO Report, p. 2-3). The treaty with Protocol blanketing in Indo-China states was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954 by a delegation led by Secretary Dulles and including Senators H. Alexander Smith and Mansfield. It was submitted to the Senate November 10, 1954. Public hearings were held by the Foreign Relations Committees on November 11, 1954 (Secretary Dulles and Admiral Davis) and January 19 (Hamilton Fish and Freda Utley) and in Executive session on January 13, 1955. The Treaty was reported out by the Committee on January 25 by a vote of 14 for to 1 against (presumably Senator Langer). It was debated on February 1, 1955 and approved by a roll-call vote of 82 yeas and 1 nay (Senator Langer). Senators Smith, Mansfield, Sparkman and Wiley were the principal speakers in favor. Senator Morse made a six-page speech in explanation of his supporting vote stressing his conviction that the security problem was a proper matter for handling by the United Nations.

2. Interpretation of U.S. Commitment to South Vietnam Under the Treaty - Article IV, Para. 1, states: "Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any State or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The protocol designates "Cambodia, Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" under the above formula. An "understanding" incorporated in the body of the treaty limits the United States commitment to act to "communist aggression" only, although we agreed to consult

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(Where Indicated)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

on other cases of aggression. Paragraph 2 of Article IV requires consultation of the Parties, in the event integrity or independence is threatened in any way other than by armed attack, to agree on measures for the common defense.

The Report notes that Secretary Dulles in the hearings expressed the belief that a "revolutionary movement in Vietnam" would be "a very grave threat to us," but would call for consultation under para. 2. "We have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult about it."

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

COMMENT: Secretary Dulles obviously could not foresee the nature of the contingency which would arise. What actually happened in 1960-61 was aggression by armed attacks against the structure of the South Vietnam state, led and directed by elements infiltrated across the frontier from North Vietnam. And indeed, there were numerous consultations within SEATO and with the South Vietnamese Government about this situation both before the creation of the NLF and after.

END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3. The Problem of Presidential Authority - There was considerable discussion of the fact that this Treaty embraced the "Monroe Doctrine formula" recognizing that the attack would endanger each party's own peace and safety, rather than the North Atlantic Treaty formula that an attack on one is an attack on all. This formula was designed to avoid reopening constitutional debate by resting on a formula which had been accepted U.S. doctrine for a century and a quarter, but did not represent any concession by the Executive of a limitation on its power to act. Dulles found the difference in security to the other parties "not appreciable." There was some discussion in Committee of a reservation which "would prohibit the use of United States ground, air or naval forces....unless Congress, by a declaration of war, consented to their use against Communist aggression." It was rejected when Mr. Dulles assured

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(Where Indicated)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 -

the committee that the President would "come to Congress" ... "unless the emergency were so great that prompt action was necessary to save the vital interests of the United States." The committee noted that: "The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution."

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

COMMENT: The Administration has over the years repeatedly and continuously consulted the Congress in leadership and other meetings, hearings, appropriation requests and especially in obtaining the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. In the latter case Senator Dirksen and Senator Fulbright attested on the Floor of the Senate (CR, August 7, 1964, p. 18462) that the White House briefing of the leadership of both parties constituted full and frank disclosure with unlimited discussion. We have already exposed the specific reasons why we consider a declaration of war inadvisable at the present time. END
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

4. The Necessity of Consultation Under Article IV, Paragraph 2 - During the November 11 Hearings, Senator Gillette asked questions designed to bring out what our obligations were in the case of an armed attack by other than a Communist country and whether under Article 4, para. 2, we must first consult with the other Parties and obtain their agreement before we take any action. The following exchange took place:

"Secretary Dulles. No, sir; it does not say that we will consult before we act. All it says is we will consult.

Senator Gillette. And that may be subsequent to action that we take?

Secretary Dulles. It could be.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Where Indicated)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 4 -

Senator Gillette. That we take independently?

Secretary Dulles. As you say, it is quite unlikely as a practical matter that we would act first, because, as I indicated, unless the armed attack is of Communist origin, it is difficult to say truthfully that it seriously affects the security of the United States. If communism throws aside all restraints and goes in for armed attack, then I think we can reasonably conclude that it is starting on a course of action which is directly aimed at the United States, that we are the target. We could not say that truthfully in the event that there is an armed attack which occurred between two of the parties to this treaty, which would not be of Communist origin. That would not prove that there was any design against the United States. Therefore, we do not assume the same commitments in that respect.

We do say that we will consult. We do not say that we will consult prior to any other action. We merely say we will consult, period."

5. The Question of Land War in Asia - Point was made in the Hearings and Report that the SEATO Treaty did not set up a military command and we did not contemplate large ground and naval forces. Mr. Dulles said: "We believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking power and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs.... We made it clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force...." There was considerable discussion of the dangers of getting pinned down in another Korea or worse.

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

COMMENT: During the SEATO negotiations the Asian members had pressed us to create and station in the treaty area in peacetime a large and permanent NATO type forces. This we were unwilling to do in the absence of aggression, as it would

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(Where Indicated)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 5 -

have meant fragmenting and scattering our forces throughout the widely dispersed treaty area in small packages. Instead we relied on mobile striking power, air and sea, backed by reserve ground forces stationed in Okinawa and Hawaii that could be used against the enemy at a point of our own choosing where we could hurt him the most.

As the Administration has repeatedly stated, our tactics have had, and continue to have, as an objective, the avoidance of an all-out, intercontinental war. END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

6. The Relationship of the Treaty to the United Nations - Article IV, para. 1, provides for notifying the Security Council of action taken. Article I pays the customary obeisance to the Charter. Mr. Dulles testified that the Treaty was tied to Article 51 of the Charter (self defense) rather than Article 52 (regional arrangements) and thus does not require prior approval of the Council before taking action, although it must be advised of actions taken. It was brought out that the Treaty neither adds nor detracts from our UN commitment. Senator Morse devoted most of a long speech on the Floor to urging strenuous efforts to using the UN machinery to settle the peace of the area.

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

COMMENT: Note the history of UN notification and discussions, most recently our presentation of early January and the many features, including enemy opposition, which have so far prevented the UN from assuming an effective role. END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Clearances: L - Mr. Feldman (in draft) *RF*

FE - Mr. Unger (in draft) *RF*

(Clearances are subject to any other findings which may result from a more comprehensive analysis of the negotiating history being undertaken by "L" in response to White House request.)

H:HG/Torbert/DMacArthur II:dp

RF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (Where Indicated)

MEMORANDUM

17
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Friday, May 13, 1966 -- 5:50 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Our New Ambassador to Brazil

I recommend that you receive Ambassador Tuthill and Linc Gordon next week for an on-the-record visit. Ambassador Tuthill leaves for Rio on May 25.

The visit could be a call at your office. You may prefer to have him and Linc to lunch and invite Ambassador Vasco da Cunha.

Your receiving Ambassador Tuthill will:

1. Strengthen his hand in Rio.
2. Convey to the Brazilians the importance which you attach to our relations with Brazil.

Walt Rostow

Approve visit ☒

Prefer no visit ☐

Prefer visit in my office ☒

Arrange luncheon and
invite Brazilian Ambassador ☐.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friday, May 13, 1966 at 1:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: U.S. -UK Civil Air Bargain

For once, we have a draft air agreement which pleases almost everyone.
The British were forthcoming, and our U.S. airlines are pretty well satisfied:

- Five of the six U.S. airlines most involved -- TWA, Northwest, Seaboard, Trans Caribbean and Carib Air -- are strongly in favor.
- Pan American, which looked very sticky at the beginning, is not opposed. I talked to Jim Rowe. He says that Pan Am is not happy about a South Pacific route for BOAC, but that our negotiators (mainly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Loy) got so much in return that Pan Am can live with the bargain.
- American dislikes any inland stop for foreign carriers, and, therefore, doesn't like our offer of a stop in Chicago on the British polar route from London to the West Coast. But Warren Woodward tells me that it won't hurt much and that they will certainly not object to the agreement. He asked me to tell you that American is "behind you 5000 per cent". (He also made a pitch for rapid handling of the Trans Pacific case now before the CAB.)
- The other lines are reasonably content because the British have agreed to multiple carrier designation on all routes covered by the agreement.

Charlie Murphy and Tom Mann are both enthusiastic. The CAB is formally on board, as are the other relevant government agencies. No one expects any trouble on the Hill.

At Tab A is a concise, one-page listing of what we will get and what we have offered.

At Tab B is Tom Mann's memorandum asking you to approve the bargain. (A detailed explanation of the terms is at Tab C. State's report on the positions of our airlines is at Tab D.)

After ten years of trying, this is a good, mutually-profitable bargain. In round numbers, it offers each side about \$20 million in new markets. It should provide a solid basis for U.S. -UK air relations for several years.

Approved ✓ Disapproved _____ Speak to me _____

FM
Francis M. Bator

OK
HM

Attachment to Ed for file

State Bator informed 5/16/66

18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, May 13, 1966; 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a request from Secretary Rusk that you meet with Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel for 15-20 minutes sometime during May 19-20. This would be an important thing to do. Spaak's successor, and Prime Minister until last April, Harmel is a key figure in Belgian politics, and the Belgians will play a key role in our NATO relocation.

Francis M. Bator

Set up meeting ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

*I agree
Walt R.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-248
By spg, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1350
10a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Foreign Minister Harmel

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel for 15-20 minutes during his proposed visit to Washington May 19-20.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel will be in Washington on May 19 and 20 for discussions with American officials. I plan particularly to review with him the France-NATO question in preparation for the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in early June.

Prime Minister from June 1965 until this March, Harmel became Foreign Minister in the recent governmental changes which led to the departure of Foreign Minister Spaak, long the dominant figure in Belgian foreign policy. Harmel has undertaken his new duties vigorously, although continuing the policies of Mr. Spaak. His early statements on Atlantic and European developments, as well as on China, have from our viewpoint been very constructive.

Belgium is host country for the June NATO conference. We have recommended that certain US and NATO facilities, including the NATO Council and SHAPE, should be relocated there from France. Thus Belgium is a key country in the developing NATO question.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-249

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

By inf, NARA, Date 2-26-88

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

A 15-20 minute talk with Harmel would present an invaluable opportunity for you to impress upon this important Belgian leader your thoughts on the Atlantic, European and Far Eastern situations.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dean Rusk", with a stylized, cursive script.

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Amended May 16, 1966

To: Will [unclear]

11

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-318
By *abm*, NARA, Date 9-13-01

Friday, May 13, 1966 -- 8:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

(2)

This [redacted] intelligence summary is about as accurate an account of a confused situation as we have available. There are still elements of uncertainty.

It seems clear that:

3.4(b)(1)
1.5(c),(d)

1. The RB-66-C, [redacted] mission which took it within perhaps 30 miles of the Chinese Communist border, was attacked by a Chinese Communist MIG 17.

2. It is possible from our track [redacted] 1.5(c),(d) [redacted] data that the MIG 17 crossed the North Vietnamese border and may have begun the attack when the RB-66-C was over North Viet Nam.

3. It may also be the case -- but we cannot be certain -- that the protecting fighters pursued the MIG 17 across the border and shot it down [redacted] 1.5(c),(d)

Would you wish a definitive examination of the evidence and a personal report from Secretary McNamara ✓

-- from General Taylor

-- from Clark Clifford ✓

Brief Byrne

-- should we let it lie

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

*attached not returned
(left of report prepared by subject)
Per [unclear] claim
US 7 fighters
downed a Chinese aircraft*

1.5(c),(d)

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Friday, May 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to Guyanese Independence ceremonies

I recommend your approval of the following delegation to the Guyanese independence ceremonies:

Secretary Robert Weaver - Chairman
Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon - Vice-Chairman
M. T. Anderson - Austin, Texas
Frank McCallister - Chairman of Labor-Economics Department,
Roosevelt University, Chicago
William C. Doherty, Sr. - Past-President of National Association
of Letter Carriers, and former Ambassador to Jamaica.
Delmar R. Carlson - U.S. Ambassador-designate to Guyana.

Jack Valenti earlier cleared with you the names of Gordon, Anderson and McCallister and they have accepted. Three others suggested at that time (George Meany, Lena Horne and Clarence Dillard, Jr.) declined.

I have included Secretary Weaver because it is important that we send a Cabinet-level officer, and the fact that he is a Negro will appeal to Premier Burnham. The Guyanese will make comparisons with Jamaica and Trinidad. You went to the Jamaican, and AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton to the Trinidadian ceremony.

William Doherty puts a labor man on the delegation. Congressman "Doc" Morgan and Senator Brewster have urged that he be included.

15/
W. W. Rostow

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

See me ____.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 12, 1966

6:50 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are the basic papers prepared in State and by Bob Komer for tomorrow's 6:00 p.m. meeting on political and economic issues.

They leave aside the military issues and the two most delicate political issues:

- contacts with the VC;
- what must they do if we stop bombing the North.

On the political side, it will be important for Ambassador Lodge to hear directly from you that you expect the kind of tight, purposeful coordination of our political actions called for in para. C.2. (marked in yellow).

In fact, the way political events evolve cannot be either predicted now or controlled by us. The key requirement is a better, more purposeful, more united use of our assets -- Lansdale, Habib, etc.

My impression is that there are no great differences on political policy among the Saigon group -- simply a lack of tight organization and leadership.

On the economic side, Bob McNamara objects to a commitment now to use the threat of holding up our U. S. military build-up or our aid as a stick to beat the GVN on inflation. He will talk to Komer before the meeting.

Right now the most worrying aspects of Vietnam, aside from inflation, are:

- The danger of civil war in I Corps: we must make a hard try to get Ky and Thi together again.
- The political activities of the Buddhist chaplains with the ARVN.
- The weakened condition of Ky's government.
- The low level of contact between the ARVN and VC. I suggested to Bob McNamara to ask Westmoreland "Who's ducking whom?"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLJ 85-25

By

WJ, NARS, Date

7-8-85

WJ Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

~~SECRET~~~~Talking Paper for Meeting
with the President~~

Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections
and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam

A. General Principles of U.S. Action.

The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maximum influence toward the achievement of the substantive objectives stated in B below. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of interference in any event, but it is vitally important not to give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit us with.

In carrying out these general principles, the organizational proposals stated in C below should be used and coordinated by the Mission.

B. Objectives

1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15th, that is by September 15 of this year.

2. The issue of anti-Americanism should be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible.

3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the constitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question.

4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the various regions and groups within South Viet-Nam (except those actively participating with the Viet Cong), including the Army, Montagnards, Khmer minorities, et al.

5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in the United States and internationally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the voting and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Ideas to be explored are a brief election period ceasefire, international observation of the elections, students participating as poll watchers, etc.

6. The emphasis in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constitution; political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaign may provide the occasion for laying foundations for future party organization. We will wish to work quietly

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Authority NLS 85-24

By ing, NARS, Date 9-13-85

~~SECRET~~

with selected promising candidates all across the political spectrum in the expectation that some will be elected to the assembly and provide useful continuing contacts.

7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devoted not to stimulating the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to the adoption of the concept that these elections bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their country's independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts should not be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction.

8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the population in the democratic process and it should be used to launch political and psychological initiatives with youth groups, students, labor, etc.

9. Restore as far as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a government party designed purely to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the exclusion of other significant political groups.

C. Organizational Proposals.

1. Americans or others with practical experience in the fields of elections, political parties, and constitutions should be made available in Saigon to advise the Mission in connection with its contacts with the Vietnamese and in some instances to be directly available to the Vietnamese for consultation as they wish. This should be done with the strong national sensibilities of the Vietnamese in mind.

2. Ambassador Lodge may wish to set up a mechanism to carry out his decisions and to assist him in the immediate day-to-day actions of the U.S. Mission relating to the elections. This might take the form of a command post on which the various elements of the Mission having pertinent responsibilities would be represented. In this way the total resources of the Mission would be mobilized and their employment would be managed for maximum effect. As situations would develop requiring contact with a particular group to influence their position, or a crash study of a new proposal, or mobilizing support for a given individual or faction, the command post would allocate the tasks, set priorities and assure immediate reaction to needs. The command post would also assist Ambassador Lodge in mapping out election strategy and would develop the requisite tactics called for by the unfolding situation. In all this the sensitivity of the Vietnamese to our interference would be borne carefully in mind.

FE:LUnger;hjh 5/12/66

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 12 PM 4 43

~~SECRET~~

138

Decisions to be Requested of President

1. ACTION PROGRAM TO COPE WITH INFLATION. Across the board three-pronged attack will be made:

A. DOD and AID will each make all-out effort to reduce to minimum inflationary impact of further US buildup. If SecDef agrees, DOD goal will be to keep demands on local economy and manpower at FY 1966 rate, despite increase in deployments and construction program.

B. US will make all-out effort to eliminate bottlenecks to massive flow of aid commodities, especially port and in-country transport congestion. US military will provide shipping, port aid, and in-country lift as required. US will insist that GVN take essential steps speed flow of goods, if necessary using leverage of threatened suspension aid shipments till bottlenecks removed. If GVN unwilling or unable act, US should request Ky approve US military takeover of Saigon port and delivery to importers.

C. As soon as IMF recommendations available, US will present to GVN revised Honolulu package of maximum realizable fiscal measures to sop up piasters. Goal should be an optimum package designed to sop up at least 10 billion piasters via: (1) tax and revenue measures sufficient to raise some \$VN 2-3 billion; (2) raising the piaster take from imports by at least \$VN 7-9 billion, probably via a combination of advance deposits on imports, earlier payments of customs duties, foreign exchange surcharges, and some degree of devaluation; (3) increased GVN sales of foreign exchange at penalty rates for "invisible" transactions, as necessary to bring the piaster recapture rate up to VN \$10 billion.

D. Negotiating Strategy on Fiscal Package. Given the political weakness and administrative feebleness of the GVN, we must design an approach which will minimize political criticism of the GVN yet achieve the desired economic result: (1) while the radical surgery of devaluation may be the only way to achieve quick results, it should be disguised as much as feasible; (2) as carrots we should hold out US approval of a ^{30-50%} GVN pay raise and some form of US help for Ky's PX system if feasible; (3) since sticks may also be necessary, we must consider threatening to withhold US aid or limiting further US buildup till inflation is brought under better control.

(1) Upon his return, Ambassador Lodge should again raise inflation with Ky as a matter of highest level US concern.

(2) As soon as IMF proposals are in, Bob Nathan should ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ as high level negotiator to sell Washington package.

Authority

NLS 85-25

By

if, NARS, Date

7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

12 May 1966

II. EXPANSION OF PACIFICATION CAPABILITIES.

A. We will move promptly to increase annual rate of RD Cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 as fast as instructors are available to maintain quality. DOD will provide construction resources needed to provide new training center. Komer will resolve issue of how estimated \$30 million add-on is apportioned among agencies.

B. We will expedite expansion of police forces to 72,000 end of FY 1966 goal, and promptly study further expansion of police as the preferred longer term internal security instrument.

III. MANPOWER SQUEEZE. Aside from RD Cadres, SecDef and Komer will withhold approval of any FY 1967 GVN manpower increases until overall agreement is reached on civil/military allocation. This means in effect a temporary freeze on all force ceilings at end FY 1966 approved levels until a manpower budget can be worked out.

IV. NEW LAND REFORM INITIATIVE. We favor if feasible a dramatic new revolutionary proposal for psychological impact. Since Cooper-Hewes proposals are not yet in shape for high-level decision, they will be further firmed up as urgent matter by Saigon and Washington, for top-level review the week of 5 June when Porter is in Washington.

V. OVERALL PACIFICATION DIRECTIVE AND MASTER PLAN. We must have these to give focus to the civil side. Saigon draft will be available late May. Komer is preparing complementary Washington NSAM directive setting priorities.

Pres

Thursday, May 12, 1966 - 5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message of Congratulations to the Guatemalan President-elect

Last March Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro won a plurality in the Guatemalan general elections. The Guatemalan Congress on May 10 selected him from the two leading candidates to be the next President.

State recommends that you send him the attached congratulatory message. I concur.

JS/Walt
W. W. Rostow

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

See me ____.

Attachment

142

Proposed Message from President Johnson to President-elect

Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala

Limited Official Use

TO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA

FOR AMBASSADOR

Please deliver following message personally to President-elect Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro:

"I extend warmest congratulations on your election as President of Guatemala in a free and peaceful electoral process of which Guatemala is rightfully proud. The Government of the United States looks forward to cordial and constructive relations with your administration, based upon mutual respect between our two sovereign nations, upon the special ties that unite my country to its close neighbors in Central America, and upon the goals of the Alliance for Progress to which both our countries are dedicated.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Telegraph expected time of delivery so that message can be released to press simultaneously here and in Guatemala.

Limited Official Use

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May 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

SUBJECT: Private Visit of Nicaraguan President Schick

Yesterday Nicaraguan President Schick, while transiting the US on his way to Spain and Israel for state visits, cabled the President expressing his pleasure at being on US soil and accepting his invitation to stop by Washington for a visit on his way home.

The cable -- sent through commercial channels -- is in the hands of the press. You may be asked about the visit in your briefing today.

The President has invited Schick to make a private visit on his way back. June 9 at noon has tentatively been set for the appointment. We have made no announcement.

If the question comes up, I suggest that you say:

"When President Johnson learned that President Schick would be transiting the United States for state visits to Spain and Israel, he invited him to stop by Washington for a private talk. President Schick has accepted the invitation. No date has been set. A similar invitation was recently extended to President Trejos of Costa Rica but his schedule did not permit him to come."

I have cleared this with State.

WGBowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow

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Thurs., May 12, 66
4:45 pm

16

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the list you asked Sect. Rusk
to organize.

We have staffed it out here.

It requires your decision before
we can set arrangements in motion.

W. W. Rostow

File

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday

May 11, 1966

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk is asking your approval of the attached tentative schedule of foreign visits for the remainder of 1966.

The difficulties about an early visit of President Diaz Ordaz are given in a second memorandum also attached.

Walt Rostow

Approved _____

See me _____

Dist Sec 8:02 PM

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166

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Schedule of Foreign Visits for the
Remainder of 1966

Recommendation:

That for planning purposes you approve the tentative schedule of visits for the remainder of 1966. Exact dates for each will be subject to your approval.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

The enclosed schedule contains suggestions for state visits during the remainder of this year. A number of informal and private visits are also suggested with the thought that we will be requesting your approval of two, or at the most three, of these brief visits a month. Requests for such visits often come to us at the last moment in connection with private travel to the United States or official visits to other countries.

The schedule is of course tentative. Names can be rearranged and substitutions made. At the suggestion of your staff we have not listed any visits during the month of October. We are not proposing an early visit by Diaz-Ordaz for reasons set forth in a separate memorandum to Mr. Rostow. In the present schedule, Marcos is listed for August. He has told Ambassador Blair he would prefer to postpone his visit until the fall. However, he has been invited by the American Legion to address its

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-249

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By sig, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

National Convention at the end of August. This might be as close a date to passage of the Viet-Nam assistance bill as we can get. Besides those listed in the attached schedule, we have been in touch with the Australian Ambassador to see whether Prime Minister Holt's schedule will permit travel which could include an informal visit to Washington and will do the same for Prime Minister Holyoake (New Zealand) in the near future.

You have already approved visits from Presidents Kenyatta (Kenya) and Bourguiba (Tunisia). Invitations were extended to both. Kenyatta is not expected to accept the invitation at this time, and Bourguiba requested that the visit be postponed until early next year.

Although the schedule contains only one informal visit from a European, we can expect further requests for informal working visits on short notice from the European countries. I would therefore expect that by the end of the year there would be at least as many visits from European heads of government as from the other regions.

Justifications for those visitors you have not already approved are enclosed.



Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Schedule.
2. Justifications.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>Ap- proved</u>	<u>Disap- proved</u>
King Faisal	Saudi Arabia	state	<u>June</u> invitation accepted			
Chancellor Erhard	Federal Republic of Germany	private	approval hereby requested		—	—
President Schick	Nicaragua	informal	approved May 5	in connection with official visits to Europe and Israel		
			<u>July</u>			
President Senghor	Senegal	state	approval hereby requested	invited in 1965; unable to accept	—	—
Prime Minister Burnham	British Guiana	informal	approval hereby requested		—	—
President elect Carlos Lleras	Colombia	informal	approved May 5	expected to be elected May 1; inaugurated Aug. 6		

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NLJ 86-249
By sig, NARA, Date 2-26-88

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-2-

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>Ap- proved</u>	<u>Disap- proved</u>
July, (contd)						
President Shazar	Israel	private	approval hereby requested	in connection with official visit to Brazil	—	—
Prime Minister Margai	Sierra Leone	private	approval hereby requested		—	—
<u>August</u>						
President Marcos	Philippines	state	invitation accepted for fall			
<u>September</u>						
Chairman Ne Win	Burma	state	invitation accepted for fall			
Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung	Republic of Korea	informal	approval hereby requested		—	—

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<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>Ap- proved</u>	<u>Disap- proved</u>
<u>November</u>						
President Frei	Chile	state	approved by memo Feb. 25 invitation not yet issued	Bureau preferred postponing invitation for few months		
Prime Minister Maiwandwal	Afghanistan	informal	approval hereby requested		—	—
President Helou	Lebanon	informal	approval hereby requested		—	—
<u>December</u>						
President Sunay.	Turkey	state	approval hereby requested		—	—
Vice President C. K. Yen	Republic of China	informal	approval hereby requested		—	—

For the first part of 1967 I may later recommend to you visits from President Leoni of Venezuela, Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand and King Olav V of Norway as well as President Bourguiba.

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S/S # 7206

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1966

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2-Ret.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of the President of Mexico to
the United States

~~The Department of State recommends against a visit by~~
the President of Mexico to the United States in the next
three months. The reasons for this recommendation are the
following:

a. The President's visit to Mexico was a huge success
and accepted throughout the hemisphere as such. ~~The Latin~~
American countries other than Mexico now expect that the
President will visit other countries in Latin America or
that the Presidents of these countries would visit the
United States. They would take some offense at further
special attention to Mexico in the short-run future.

b. The Mexican Government was exceedingly anxious to
have a personal visit by President Johnson. The previous
visit by a U.S. President to Mexico was in June, 1962.
Prior to June, 1962, too close a relationship between a
Mexican and U.S. President was regarded in Mexico as bad
politics for the Mexican President. This attitude in
Mexico is rapidly changing, as President Johnson's visit
made clear. However, the President of Mexico must have
permission from his Congress to go outside the country.
If a visit were to take place within the next three months,
Diaz Ordaz would have to call a special session of the
Mexican Congress.

c. Neither Amistad Dam nor Big Bend National Park
provide an adequate basis for a visit. Amistad Dam is in

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-249

By uf, NARA, Date 2-26-88

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- 2 -

the process of construction (about 40% complete) and is not at the stage where the two Presidents could make a meaningful visit and leave their mark on the Dam. This would be better left for the summer or fall of 1968 when the Dam will be ready for dedication. The Mexican Government has consistently resisted the idea of a national park at Big Bend, Texas. This resistance is rooted in history and it will take some time to work it out, if it is at all possible.

d. A visit by Diaz Ordaz to the United States some time in the summer or fall of 1967 in connection with the transfer of the Chamizal to Mexico would be better timing. This is the subject of a separate memorandum.

e. Governor Campbell of New Mexico has written the President about a meeting at Santa Fe on June 24-26 at which time all of the Governors of the Mexican and U.S. states along the border will convene to create a new organization on border problems. The President might want to consider dropping in at this meeting to emphasize his continuing interest in Mexico, in border development programs, and in Mexican-Americans. This would keep up the momentum. The Mexican President, however, would not be able to attend this meeting unless he obtained permission from his Congress.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Walt: The Secretary has seen & approved this memo
Ben

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NLJ 86-248

By inf, NARA, Date 1-25-89Thursday, May 12, 1966
11:00 a.m.

orig Ret'd
from P 17
5/14
* in Ed's file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Meyer asked to see you tomorrow chiefly to get your personal greetings for the Shah. However, he is here to work out our position on a new \$200 million arms sales package, which he will be discussing with the Iranians next week at our annual joint economic-military review. You will get a formal recommendation shortly. AID feels the Shah should not spend his money on arms because the purchase could strain his resources to the point of requiring renewed U. S. budget support. State believes the Shah is determined to buy--he has told you so in his last two letters--so our best bet is to try to control his buying by selling ourselves. So you may want to hear Meyer's views firsthand.

Suggested talking points:

1. Meyer should carry your personal greetings to the Shah. You especially hope the new Prince is doing well.
2. He should express your appreciation for the Iranian medical team in Vietnam.
3. He should also give the Shah a private message from you: You are concerned about reports that the Shah feels we are trying to run Iran for him. You want to assure the Shah of your fullest respect for him as a leader. When you express your views, you are not advising him. But you are deeply interested in the progress of his economic revolution and often want to share your thoughts, as only friends can.
4. You are worried to hear that new arms sales will create a serious debt burden. You are interested in Meyer's views.
5. You count on Meyer to make serious business of the annual economic military review. (He feels it has already accomplished its purpose by forcing the Iranians to face up to shortage of resources and to set priorities. But we ought to continue to press them on economic issues in next week's talks rather than just negotiating the arms package.)
6. Meyer should understand that if these arms purchases cause a financial crisis, it will be very difficult for us to justify bailing Iran out. You count on Meyer personally to make sure the Iranians fully understand the economic consequences of these purchases and to raise the red flag at the first danger signal.

W. alt. Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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May 12, 1966

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1- Paugh
2- Ret.MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Meyer
on May 13, 1966 at 12:30 p.m.

Ambassador Meyer has returned to Washington for a week's consultation primarily to participate in discussions relating to the second Annual Review of our military program in Iran.

United States-Iranian Military Cooperation

We are currently engaged in final preparations for the second Annual Review under the terms of the 1964 Memorandum of Understanding. The review is expected to be concluded with the Shah about May 19. The Shah is determined to improve Iran's defense of its strategically and economically important oil interests in southern Iran and the Persian Gulf. He is concerned about our willingness to sell additional military equipment on favorable terms. We are endeavoring to fashion as reasonable and forthcoming a response as possible to the Shah's requests.

President's Relationship with the Shah

The Shah values greatly his special relationship with the United States and with the President personally. Their frequent exchanges of correspondence on substantive matters have strengthened this rapport. The Shah, however, is in need of frequent reassurance that we trust and respect him. In view of our significant security and intelligence interests in Iran, it is important to make explicit to the Shah from time to time the value we attach to his friendship.

Suggested Talking Points:

Request the Ambassador to tell the Shah that:

1) Iran remains a trusted friend and ally, making reference to United States appreciation of Iran's sending a medical team to Viet Nam.

2) The United

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
Not automatically Declassified.

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NLJ 86-249

By isg, NARA, Date 2-26-88


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- 2 -

2) The United States has a sound appreciation of Iran's security needs and, as in the past, will do whatever it can to help meet them.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador Meyer is enclosed.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Armin H. MEYER

UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

Ambassador Meyer was born in 1914 at Fort Wayne, Indiana, and is a graduate of Capital University in Columbus, Ohio. He received a Master's Degree from Ohio State University in 1941. He has received the Department of State's Commendable and Meritorious Service Awards.

Mr. Meyer's legal residence is Lincoln, Illinois. He is accompanied in Iran by his wife, the former Alice James of Washington, D.C., and their daughter, Kathleen.

Mr. Meyer is a career Foreign Service Officer. He entered United States Government service with the Office of War Information in 1943 and transferred to the Department of State in 1945. He has served abroad at Cairo, Baghdad, Kabul and Beirut and in the Department as Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Deputy Director and subsequently Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs. In 1961 he became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He was appointed United States Ambassador to Lebanon in December 1961 and continued in that capacity until his appointment as United States Ambassador to Iran in April 1965.

Mr. Meyer plans to return to Tehran Saturday, May 14.

5/11/66

F 18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Your generous letter of April 20 reminds me again of the warmth and enthusiasm with which Mrs. Johnson and I were received by you and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and your fellow countrymen.


The visit will remain a great and treasured memory of my time as President.

Looking back to the occasion, I am increasingly impressed by the address made by Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores. His masterful and sensitive analysis of the qualities of Abraham Lincoln deeply impressed members of our delegation and the American people. His comparison of the similarities in the thought, experience, and ideals of Juarez and Lincoln was a permanent creative contribution to the relations between our countries and to their literature.

I am gratified that my remarks at the dedication of the statue of Abraham Lincoln have been favorably received. As you know, I am deeply committed to accelerate our common effort under the Alliance for Progress to make it possible for the peoples of this Hemisphere to achieve a better life with social justice and human liberty.

Since my return, my advisers have been actively working on the best ways to bring to life the objectives you and I discussed in Mexico City. I expect to be able to make constructive proposals to you in the near future.

My wife and daughters again join me in sending to you and your charming wife our warmest personal good wishes.


His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States
Mexico, D. F.

Sincerely,

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-248

By lig NARA, Date 1-25-89

MEMORANDUM

MM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11:30 am
Thursday, May 12, 1966
19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 11, 1966 -- 7:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment With Ambassador William McC. Blair, Jr.

You have agreed to receive Ambassador Blair, Chief of Mission at Manila, at 11:30 a.m. tomorrow, May 12.

This additional information concerns the two matters that he may wish to raise with you: the timing of President Marcos' State Visit; and the status of Philippine Senate action on the Vietnam Aid Bill.

STATE VISIT

Marcos has informed Blair that he feels there should be fairly clear "areas of agreement" between the two Governments before he undertakes the State Visit. He is also worried that too early a visit following Philippine legislative approval of the Vietnam Aid Bill might cause him trouble at home. He is inclined toward an end of August date, which would also enable him to accept an invitation to address the American Legion convention. But he wishes Blair to test the atmosphere here on whether tangible results might be possible by then on the economic and military aid requests that he is attaching to the visit.

State considers it important to our future economic relations that his State Visit result in a meaningful exchange of views and hopefully some measure of agreement on such major issues as post-1974 US investment in the Philippines, impact of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, and US aid in Philippine economic development. However, we will not be prepared to reach these "areas of agreement" until much later this year after more extensive economic dialogue. State, accordingly, would prefer the visit in late October or November.

AID TO VIETNAM BILL

State believes final Philippine Senate action is now anticipated at the end of this week, with perhaps no more than five negative votes. One possible ramification is a proviso that Marcos consult with Congress before sending

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state 4-7-77 (#178)
By DCH per RMG NARS, Date 8-20-86

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-2-

troops. We are assured, however, that this is only a gesture designed to satisfy the sensitivities of Senators who might otherwise find it difficult to vote for the bill.

President Marcos' brother-in-law, whom I saw, believes it will be much closer, but will pass.

AMBASSADOR BLAIR'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENT

Secretary Rusk at one time suggested that Ambassador Blair be considered for one of the positions in the Department now vacant. However, no further consideration is being given to this suggestion because:

1. Ambassador Blair will not have completed the normal tour of two years until next December.

2. Ambassador Blair has let it be known that he prefers to remain in the field and that, after his completion of his tour in the Philippines, he would like to have another Ambassadorial assignment in preference to a Washington post.

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To Pres

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 11, 1966 - 7:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-248

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of the IAPF from the DR

By ig, NARA, Date 1-25-89

Secretary Rusk sends you the memorandum at Tab A recommending that we seek an OAS resolution before June 1 asking the OAS Ad Hoc Committee:

1. to consult with the President-elect and Garcia Godoy right after elections on withdrawal of the IAPF.
2. to report back to the OAS Council here before July 1 on its recommendations for withdrawal.

The principal purpose of this action is to pre-empt the initiative for withdrawal for ourselves and the OAS. Otherwise, the Dominicans (Garcia Godoy, if not the President-elect) will take the first step and put the OAS in the position of seeming to pull out the IAPF under pressure.

The text of the resolution which we would try to get the other IAPF countries (Brazil, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua) and the Dominican Government to sponsor is at Tab B.

Both Ellsworth Bunker and Bob McNamara endorse the recommendation. It is a prudent step to take. It does not commit us to any specific timetable for withdrawal. I recommend your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

Don't you think we should fully brief + background press on our views + desires

Mr Rostow notified Ben Read 5/12/66

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

1351
20a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF) from the Dominican Republic

Recommendation:

That the United States seek an OAS resolution before June 1 instructing the OAS Ad Hoc Committee: (a) to consult on the withdrawal of the IAPF with the President to be elected on June 1 and the Provisional Government, and (b) to report back to the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers before July 1 the Committee's recommendations for the withdrawal of the IAPF.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Garcia Godoy Initiative

Garcia Godoy has sent an emissary around the Hemisphere for the purpose of obtaining unanimous agreement that the IAPF should be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic before July 1. He is seeking to shift the responsibility for retention of the IAPF to the incoming President. He states that he has consulted with the candidates and has their agreement to his initiative, but we doubt that it was real consultation. His Foreign Minister claimed that Garcia Godoy had consulted with Ambassador Bunker. Garcia Godoy informed the Ad Hoc Committee of his desire to arrange the departure of the IAPF before July 1 in order to "restore Dominican sovereignty" but did not mention sending an emissary. The Garcia Godoy initiative is well known because all of the details were given to the press by the Uruguayan Government.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-249
By ijg, NARA, Date 2-26-88

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- 2 -

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. objectives in the Dominican Republic are substantially the same as those of the OAS:

- A. to carry the Dominican Republic to free elections on June 1, and by extension to see the duly elected President take office on July 1; and
- B. to prevent a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic.

The continued presence of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic until July 1 is probably essential to achieve objective A.

The presence of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic after July 1 would give us a guarantee against a Communist takeover, but

- A. it is unlikely that the political situation in the Dominican Republic, the U.S., or the Hemisphere would permit the retention of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic after July 1 for more than a few months at most;
- B. we may run the risk, if Bosch wins, that he would want to use the IAPF to reorganize the Dominican military. This would be completely unacceptable to the Brazilians and if we decided to go along with Bosch, it would cause a split in our relations with Brazil. Moreover, it is doubtful that we should try further reorganization of the Dominican military until it regains its morale and becomes a more cohesive organization for the maintenance of internal security; and
- C. it is doubtful that the marginal advantage that the IAPF now gives us against the risk of a Com-

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- 3 -

munist takeover outweighs the political disadvantages of having the IAPF in the Dominican Republic (hemispheric opposition to the IAPF presence and the lightning rod the IAPF provides in the Dominican Republic for extremist agitation).

Possibilities for Political Stability After July 1

If Balaguer wins he is expected to have good relations with the Dominican Armed Forces and with the Dominican people generally. The Communists will probably agitate against him. This is a problem which the Dominican Armed Forces should be able to handle. There is a possible risk that Bosch's followers and the extreme left will not accept a Balaguer victory, and may organize a coup against Balaguer, as they did against Reid Cabral.

If Bosch should win he is expected to have difficulty with the military over the long run. During the first 60 to 90 days after July 1, the military is expected to follow a wait-and-see attitude unless Bosch takes some precipitate action such as naming Caamaño Minister of Defense, or attempting to make basic changes in the Armed Forces. The odds that he will do this do not appear to be great, but the risk is that he may also see little chance of keeping the IAPF for very long and therefore make his move against the Dominican military while the IAPF is still in the Dominican Republic.

U.S. Alternatives

Unless the U.S. makes its position clear on withdrawal of the IAPF before June 1, the initiative passes to the person elected President of the Dominican Republic on that date. The present Hemisphere view of the situation is that Bosch, Balaguer and the Dominican people want to "restore Dominican sovereignty" but that the U.S. wants to keep the IAPF in the Dominican Republic. We can make sure that the

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- 4 -

initiative remains in U.S. and OAS hands if we adopt the recommendation above. At the same time, we would not be putting the new President in the position of making a request for the retention of the IAPF, something he would probably be politically unable of doing.

If we do not take action before June 1, but after, we run certain risks if Bosch should win:

- A. we could be accused domestically of leaving Bosch to the mercy of the military; and
- B. Bosch could ask us to use the IAPF to reorganize the Dominican military. Such a request by a democratically elected President may be politically palatable throughout the Hemisphere.

The best course for the U.S. would appear to be to indicate clearly through sponsorship of an OAS resolution before June 1 that we are interested in withdrawing our forces from the Dominican Republic at the earliest possible date, probably beginning on July 1. At the same time, we should continue to strengthen the Dominican police and sufficient additional forces within the Dominican military to maintain internal security. We may need to step up our military assistance program for that purpose.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WITHDRAWAL OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE

(For possible presentation to the 10th MFM by those countries whose forces make up the IAPF) .

WHEREAS:

In its resolution of May 6, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation created the Inter-American Peace Force for the sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that would permit the functioning of democratic institutions in that country;

In accordance with Article 49 of the Institutional Act accepted August 31, 1965 by the Dominican parties signatories to the Act of Dominican Reconciliation and promulgated by the Provisional Government on _____, national elections are to be held on June 1, 1966 to elect a President and Vice President of the Republic and members of the national Congress for a period of four years, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-249
By WJ, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Paragraph 5 of the resolution of May 6 provides that the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting of Consultation,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
RESOLVES:

1. To instruct the Ad Hoc Committee established by resolution of June 2, 1965 that, as soon as possible following the certification of the results of the national elections in the Dominican Republic, it consult with the President-elect, as well as with the President of the Provisional Government concerning the timing and manner of the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic and report to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the results of these consultations, together with its recommendations on the matter on or before July 1 1966.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/10/66

~~SECRET~~

21
Wednesday, May 11, 1966 -- 5:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

It is my judgment that, in addition to a second formal NSC meeting, two other sessions on Viet Nam may be justified before Lodge leaves:

A. A very small session on bombing policy;

B. A session with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Amb. Lodge, Mr. Bell, Mr. Komer, Mr. William Bundy on the hard conclusions at which we arrive concerning: election policy; anti-inflation policy; troop deployments; and other major issues requiring firm decision this week.

It would be against the background of those meetings that we could mount a second NSC session.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule A for _____

Schedule B for _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
NLJ 85-25
Authority _____
By rib, NARS, Date 7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday May 11, 1966, 5:45 p.m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Balance of Payments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-248
By ing, NARA, Date 1-25-89

1. The first quarter results are poor: an overall deficit running at \$2.4 billion per year. (The 1965 rate was \$1.3; 1964 \$2.8).
2. Unless we take drastic action, the rest of 1966 is not likely to improve *much*:
 - The Cabinet Committee is agreed on nut-and-bolt tightening which will gain \$600-\$800 million at most;
 - But that will only offset the deterioration which would otherwise be likely.
3. There are two reasons for this dismal picture:
 - (a) The rise in dollar spending in Vietnam.
 - (b) The rapid expansion of the domestic economy. Since November the GNP forecast for '66 has gone up by \$20 billion -- from \$712 billion to \$732 billion. This will probably produce about \$1-\$1.2 billion in extra imports.
4. To get the calendar '66 deficit much under \$2 billion would take drastic action. Direct investment and tourists would be the most likely targets. In both cases, a big improvement would require a tax (or a moratorium) almost immediately -- further "voluntary" measures will not do the job.
5. Any other direct action on components of our payments would involve enormous costs:
 - Import controls would lead to retaliation. With a still large export surplus, we would be the loser. Also, 30 years of trade policy would be in shambles.
 - Foreign aid provides no way out. To make a real saving of \$100 million, we would have to cut the aid program by about \$500 million or more. To get anywhere on this front, we would have to gut the program.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

6. The most powerful medicine would be a large general tax increase. This would begin to help by the 4th quarter of '66, and make a very large difference by 1967. (It could and perhaps should be supplemented by a tax on direct investment.)

7. Without a tax increase, we are likely to be in balance of payments trouble well into 1967. And the likely sharp rise in prices during 1967 would cast a balance of payments shadow well beyond 1967.

8. Whatever we do -- short of drastic and immediate action on tourists and direct investment -- there will be a substantial deficit in calendar 1966. Dollars will accumulate in the hands of foreign central and private banks and individuals. This does not necessarily mean massive conversion of these dollars into U.S. gold.

9. Stopping such conversions will take some effort -- Joe Fowler will have suggestions for you this afternoon. I think his program will almost certainly prevent a real run on gold during the rest of this year. The French will pose special problems, but we can probably hold the other Europeans in line.

10. Even at worst -- contrary to what some bankers will tell you -- a run on gold which would force us to declare a moratorium on sales is not the end of the world. Far from it. The present rules of the international money game place an excessive burden on the U.S. By moving with speed and skill following stoppage of U.S. gold sales, we could within a few months negotiate new rules which would make far more sense all around. Because of our economic strength, trading position, and competitive, our negotiating leverage would be enormous.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:mst

22a



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Wednesday Conference on Balance
of Payments

I am transmitting separately a comprehensive memorandum on the balance of payments situation dealing with the following topics:

- Appraisal of the 1966 Outlook
- What We Have Been Doing About It
- Fundamental Decisions that Face Us Now
- What We Say About It
- What We Do to Prevent A Crisis

I cannot overemphasize the importance of taking decisions on the issues presented.

Literally, I have gone as far as I can go in taking decisions, i.e., "coordinating". Much as I would like to avoid it in view of the consequences of the alternatives at hand, further decision making must involve you now. Otherwise, events may overtake us rather than our controlling events.

The elements of urgency and opportunity are as follows:

1. On next Wednesday, May 18, the Department of Commerce will release its quarterly report giving the official results and some detailed breakdown of the first quarter.
2. What we say and what we do will be of vital importance in preserving your options in both the international foreign policy and domestic economic and financial policy spheres in the period ahead and, in all probability, for the duration of the Vietnamese hostilities.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-169

By us, NARA Date 8-20-98

~~SECRET~~

3. On Thursday afternoon Under Secretary Deming goes to Rome for meetings of Working Party 3 of the OECD and further negotiations next week of the Deputies of the Group of Ten. From there he will go to the annual conference of international bankers sponsored by the American Bankers Association in Madrid which begins on May 23 and lasts through the week.
4. Chairman Martin leaves on Tuesday for Western Europe where he will be seeing a number of key financial figures including some of his central bank counterparts, ending up at the international bankers conference in Madrid.
5. Because Secretary Dillon always accepted and was the featured speaker at the annual international bankers conference (held in alternate years in the United States and some point in Western Europe), some months ago I accepted their customary invitation and am scheduled to speak on May 27. I intend to discuss our current attitude on international financial cooperation and avoid domestic economic questions.

The agenda for decision is roughly as follows:

- a. What do we say next Wednesday, May 18, in connection with the release of the Department of Commerce quarterly report?
- b. What do I say publicly in the international bankers meeting and what should be the approach of Under Secretary Deming and Chairman Martin in informal bilateral discussions?
- c. How should we take advantage of these visits to forestall any serious confidence reaction to the first quarter results? Should we also attempt to secure the

~~SECRET~~

informal undertaking by the central banks holding substantial quantities of official dollars that they will not use dollars to purchase gold in New York or in the London gold market for the duration of the Vietnamese hostilities?

If we could accomplish the latter in any substantial way even if the French would not (as I would expect) play, we would have accomplished a very great deal to preserve all of your options for decision making -- outlined in the memo I am transmitting separately.

- d. What to do about France? Last year the French Government purchased \$884 million of gold which accounted for the lion's share of our gold losses when one considers that the \$259 million for the International Monetary Fund served as a deposit. I have some interesting trading possibilities to suggest involving the French but they involve some delicate questions of foreign policy which transcend financial and monetary issues.
- e. If it is decided that Under Secretary Deming, Chairman Martin and I should attempt to establish an informal stabilization arrangement with central banks and Finance Ministers on dollar holdings for the duration of the Vietnamese hostilities, we will want to consider the desirability of having Secretary Ball or key Ambassadors support this effort through political channels. This is the time we will need to draw on our capital with the Foreign Service, particularly if they expect to try to maintain current foreign policies intact in this trying period.

~~SECRET~~

In the light of the foregoing, I recommend that an ad hoc meeting be scheduled late tomorrow afternoon or Thursday morning. // My suggestions would be that the following be included: Secretary McNamara, Chairman Martin, Chairman Ackley, Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Deming, Mr. Bator, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Knowlton of the Treasury Department.

Henry H. Fowler

Henry H. Fowler

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 11, 1966
12:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bob Kintner's Academic Brain Trust Suggestion

I have a variant to propose on Bob Kintner's interesting idea of May 9 for well-balanced academic dinners with you.

We already have -- and are generating more -- distinguished outside groups to work with the government on new ideas and projects.

For example, Dave Bell has a first-rate group of advisers headed by Ed Mason; the Policy Planning Council has an equally distinguished group; we soon will have others.

My proposal is that when these men have considered an important concrete issue in which you wish to engage, you have them over here for a discussion.

For example, at your instruction we are working up an initiative on Africa. Either before -- or preferably after -- you had launched such an initiative in broad terms, you might bring in Dave Bell's African advisory subcommittee plus Joe Palmer's stable of outside experts.

These will be the most distinguished men in the country outside the government in African affairs, economic and political.

In this way we can have the advantage of linking outside groups to serious concrete work in the town, plus a demonstration of your direct connection with their enterprises.

The problem with the college presidents is that discussions will tend to be diffuse, unprepared, and unconnected with actions you are undertaking.

W. W. Easton

cc: Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Watson
Mr. Jacobson
MR KINTNER

5 P 211

Wed., May 11, 1966
10:20 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I gather indirectly that you wish a second
NSC meeting to take place on the occasion
of Ambassador Lodge's visit.

Is this so? _____

Is Friday the day? _____

If not, when? _____

See me _____

The matter is urgent for Marv Watson
as well as for myself.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Marvin Watson

~~Secret~~

NLJ 85-26

11-4-85

25

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, May 10, 1966
3:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Politics and Diplomacy of Bombing POL

The Situation

Secretary Rusk believes that our launching of POL attacks in the North will greatly heighten international tensions. Although this is debatable (Gen. Taylor, for example, disagrees), the Secretary is probably correct if for no other reason than the Communists will, at the minimum, pull out their propaganda stops on a worldwide basis.

Some of us believe systematic oil attacks could have a major effect on the military and economic position of North Vietnam. Although this is also debatable, it is a contingency worth taking into account.

Taken together we may, therefore, be in a position where we:

- a) need a softening political-diplomatic track to reduce the noise level;
- b) have a better chance than ever before of inducing a serious negotiation with Hanoi.

There is a third element: U. S. domestic politics.

The polls show that something more than 30% of our people want a tougher policy: about the same percentage want a harder try for peace.

Bombing POL will look like an Administration move to the hard side -- giving in to the JCS, etc.

We need something new on the dove side to balance our account.

Recommendations

Taking all these elements into account, here are the elements we need for a political - diplomatic scenario.

1. A first-class television briefing by Secretary McNamara on:
 - a) the Laos logistical build-up;
 - b) the location of targets and low expected civilian casualties.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-42 and NLJ 93-62
By is, NARA, Date 1-21-04

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

(page 1 of 2 pages)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

-2-

May 10, 1966

2. Secretary McNamara and I believe you should override the inhibitions of the intelligence people and permit publication of the

This does not involve revelation that

3. A lucid statement of what the Geneva Accords of 1962 said about transitting Laos by Secretary Rusk.

4. Prior notification of the U. K., Australia, Korea, and New Zealand of our intentions and the reasons for them.

5. A Pen-Pal note to Kossygin of the kind I drafted.

6. Possibly a similar communication to the Chinese Communists indicating our intentions remain limited.

7. Possibly an open offer along the lines which Myrdal evolved from my prodding: to stop bombing the North if infiltration stops and stoppage is effectively monitored -- perhaps by the Swedes; plus a parley of the four fighting elements to bring this about as a preliminary to more general peace talks. Any formula for talking with the EC -- even on a limited military basis -- would be complex to arrange in Saigon; but it would also have a political wallop at home and abroad. I like the commitment to enter into talks because some infiltration is not via Laos but through Cambodia and even (a little) over the 17th Parallel. It only really makes sense to stop the bombing in the North if the war is going to stop. We need to hinge our commitment on a general intent of the four fighting parties to stop the killing.

8. Although we shall have to return to the key oil targets after repair and mop-up smaller ones -- including some underground storage -- we would do better, I think, to hit the major ones hard in a short space of time -- for political as well as military reasons -- rather than space them out.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. I have started some more detailed work on a political scenario in my shop; but you may wish to ask Secretary Rusk for his suggestions.

cc: Moyer only

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

26
To Pres

Tuesday
May 10, 1966 -- 12:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pat Dean's comment to me as he delivered the attached was: It's not too bad; but not as good as I hoped.

We will be checking with State about Prime Minister Wilson's effort to put the monkey on the Japanese back.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

26a

May 10, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked by the Prime
Minister to pass to you the attached
message.

Yours Sincerely
Patrick Dean

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-248
By ip, NARA, Date 1-25-89

The President
of the United States of America

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TEXT OF MESSAGE

266

DECLASSIFIED

May 9, 1966.

Authority UK Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 2-10-98

Thank you for your message about the British flag vessels going to North Vietnamese ports, which I received on April 27. I fully understand why you would like to see this traffic reduced still further and, if possible, eliminated altogether. So would I. While it continues it will be an embarrassment for both our governments because of the political and emotional feeling it engenders. I can also understand the disposition of Congress and public opinion to link the questions of Vietnam and Rhodesia, though I would hope that Congress would understand both our own difficulties and also the strength, indeed virtual unanimity, of world opinion, within the United Nations and elsewhere, that is behind us on Rhodesia.

I am satisfied that the participation by United Kingdom ships in the North Vietnamese trade has now been virtually eliminated, thanks to the influence exerted by our people on the British Chamber of Shipping, and, through it, on United Kingdom shipping companies. This leaves us with the problem of Hong Kong ships, though even with these the Governor of Hong Kong has had some success by means of influence and persuasion, so that the number of ships engaged in the traffic has gone down. I think that the figures in your possession do not yet perhaps reflect this reduction.

We are thus approaching the limit of what we can do either in Hong Kong or in the United Kingdom without legislation. I feel I must tell you quite frankly that political and public

/ opinion

- 2 -

opinion in this country would be strongly opposed to our enacting restrictive legislation: in any case we have persuaded all the ships without commitments to leave the trade and there is no longer a problem here. The danger is that the debates on such legislation would provide a custom-built and continuing platform for all those who are at all times bursting to make a speech on Vietnam, and this might endanger the ever-vulnerable control we have been able to retain in the House on the Vietnam issue.

As regards Hong Kong it would be difficult to legislate on such a matter except on the basis of some corresponding United Kingdom legislation. I am convinced that if we tried this it would only provoke reactions which would jeopardise the usefulness of Hong Kong to the United States effort in Vietnam.

In so far as two or three Hong Kong ships are still on charter to Japan, which has a comparatively big trade with North Vietnam, and these ships are liable to be sent to North Vietnamese ports, I wonder if you can help us by suggesting to the Japanese that they should reduce their trade. If the figures, and the reports we have from Hong Kong, then show that the problem is down to the irreducible minimum of Communist-owned Hong Kong ships, I think this is as much as we can realistically expect.

Tues., May 10, 1966
9:30 a.m.

to Pres
5/10/66

MR. PRESIDENT:

If we go for hitting POL in North Vietnam, we shall need a political track.

That track might include a Pen Pal letter to Kosygin.

Here is a draft.

I have talked about it only with Bill Moyers -- no one at State.

You can decide if and how the matter might be raised with Secretary Rusk.

W. W. R.

~~Secret attachment~~

cc: Bill Moyers only

eyes only



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-248
By rip, NARA, Date 1-25-89

DRAFT - May 10, 1966

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I should first like to tell you of the recent talks I have had with Ministers of the Indian and Pakistan governments.

In considering further support for their economic development efforts, I made it clear that we expected them to remain loyal to the spirit and letter of the Tashkent agreement, urging them to concentrate their resources in their economy rather than competitive military outlays.

Looking back over the past year, I believe both our governments have cause for satisfaction in the progress made towards stabilizing an important region where conflict would be contrary to the interests of the Soviet and American peoples.

I should also like to share with you my deep concern with the radical expansion by the government of North Vietnam of the road network in Laos, accompanied by a massive increase in the flow of men and military supplies from North Vietnam for combat against the government of South Vietnam.

As you know, the transit of Laos in this manner is contrary to the solemn obligations of the Geneva Accords of 1962, to which the government of North Vietnam, as well as our own governments, is signatory. You will also recall the special assurances which were given to the representative of the United States by the representative of the Soviet Union in Geneva

on September 12, 1961 concerning the obligation accepted by the Soviet Union as Co-Chairman, with respect to the enforcement of this aspect of the Geneva Accords of 1962. This obligation was later incorporated in Article 8 of the agreement.

The expansion of our military activities in Vietnam has, as you know, resulted directly from the failure of the government of North Vietnam to adhere to the 1962 Accords at any time since they came into effect.

It appears to me to be now urgently in our common interest to persuade the authorities in Hanoi to end this violation of the 1962 Accords and bring the issue of Vietnam to the negotiating table at the earliest possible time.

In the meanwhile, we shall be taking steps further to obstruct this illegal operation.

In so doing, I wish to assure you that our objective remains what it has always been in Vietnam and Laos; namely, to bring peace to the area and the effective restoration of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, with whatever strengthening of those Accords we might all agree.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Tuesday, May 10, 1966
10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You ask: Who are your candidates for the next Secretary of State?

The most important element in the answer is: with whom will you feel most comfortable?

The Secretary of State must be the most sensitive instrument of the President's interests and policy, plus all the other things he must be. All other considerations should be subordinated to your personal feeling in the matter: choosing a Secretary of State is a little like getting married.

Having said that, my first choice would be the team of:

Secretary: McNamara
Under Secretary: Clark Clifford

The job of Secretary of State is now so exhausting, it should be thought of as a team.

Alternatively, of course, Clark Clifford could be a great Secretary of State. He would need a tremendous work-horse as Under Secretary. My choice would be: Cyrus Vance, in that case.

Although he probably would not accept the job, I think Mac Bundy would be an excellent Under Secretary of State under a strong boss. From a quarter-century of knowing Mac -- and liking him -- I cannot yet recommend him as a Secretary of State.

Douglas Dillon would be my third choice for Secretary.

A fourth candidate crossed my mind -- no more than that -- Senator Gale McGhee. He has shown guts on Vietnam. He is articulate. But I simply do not know enough of his real fiber to judge whether he belongs on the list or not.

Although you probably can't spare him, Bill Moyers should be considered as Under Secretary with McNamara, Clifford, or Dillon.

If I have any further thoughts, I shall forward them.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Y, NARA, Date 5-28-98

SECRET - EYES ONLY

5-10-66
11:45a
MEMORANDUM

27

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1966

9:50 a.m. Tuesday

Next week - 29
substance
LN - please inform Ed H.

Notified Ben Reed's
office -
Notified Ed Hamilton

MR. PRESIDENT:

I suggest you schedule -- if you haven't already ordered it done --
a meeting with John Gronouski.

It would be good for a picture, and very good coverage in the European
capitals.

I extracted from State the information that Gronouski will be out
of the city Friday, the thirteenth through Sunday, the fifteenth,
visiting his mother.

Would you want Rostow to bring in Gronouski sometime this week?

YES ☒ NO ☐

Jack Valenti

5/11 8:30 pm
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Valenti
suggests you
bring him
in tomorrow
(12:41)

29a
Immediate

May 6, 1966

FROM: Bromley Smith BCS

TO: Mr. Jacobsen

Walt Rostow asked that the following memorandum be sent to the Ranch.

You will note that Gronouski would have to be brought to the Ranch if he is to see the President before repeat before Gronouski goes on Meet the Press Sunday.

(Begin attached memo.)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for Ambassador
Gronouski

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Ambassador to Poland John A. Gronouski to discuss, as a principal subject, the development of our bilateral relations with Poland within the context of our policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

During your March 22 press conference, you expressed an interest in having Ambassador Gronouski return to the United States for consultations. Ambassador Gronouski is accordingly returning to Washington on May 5. He will be available to meet with you at your convenience until May 20. However, since he is scheduled to appear on the NBC Meet the Press show on Sunday, May 8, it would be helpful if he could see you before that event.

Since Ambassador Gronouski arrived in Warsaw in November 1965 he has initiated economic discussions with the Poles. During this period, however, the internal situation in Poland has been characterized by an intensifying church-state controversy, which resulted in a Polish Government decision to deny visas

to the Pope, fifteen American Bishops, and other Roman Catholic clergy from all over the world, who had planned to attend Polish Millennium celebrations in Poland. Poland's public opposition to United States policies in Viet Nam has continued, although you are aware of Polish cooperation during Governor Harriman's visit to Warsaw in December. There also have been incidents where Polish authorities have used force in harassing our military attaches. Nevertheless, bilateral commercial, cultural, and educational exchanges have proceeded normally.

Ambassador Gronouski, who recently completed an orientation tour of other Eastern European countries, may wish to discuss with you the above matters as well as prospects for East-West trade, the Polish-German boundary, his talks with the Communist Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw, and the possibility of modifying the travel restrictions we apply to Soviet bloc diplomats assigned to the United States.

The fact that Ambassador Gronouski is a former cabinet officer has not gone unnoticed in the Poles' dealings with him, and it would be desirable from this standpoint for him to be able to convey your personal views upon his return to Warsaw. Ambassador Gronouski's meeting with you would lend additional weight, which Polish leaders would fully appreciate, to his efforts to emphasize that it is the continuing aim of United States policy to promote the further development of relations and understanding with Poland.



Dean Rusk

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 5 PM 4 01

→ Mr Rostow 30

Monday, May 9, 1966 at 7:00 P.M.

Mr. President:

Attached is a recommendation from the Secretary of State that you see Tory leader Ted Heath during his visit sometime during the week of May 30 - June 6. You will recall that your March date with him was cancelled because of the British elections.

All of your advisers are agreed that a short session with Heath would be useful.

Francis M. Bator

Set up meeting _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

CC: Mr. Rostow ✓

FMB:djw:5/9/66

noon - June 1, 1966

to Pres 31

(orig in
P's bnf
bb)

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a briefing book which consolidates the initial positions of Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bob Komer, as we enter our discussions with Ambassador Lodge.

Briefing
book
ret'd from
Pres
5/11/66

A summary precedes the tabbed briefing papers.

You will note that two items on the agenda are not included (bombing policy in the North and in Laos). These are being held for your discussion with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

We are not distributing the papers on items 17 and 19 (Contacts with the VC and What Must They Do if We Stop Bombing the North) except to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

The papers are meant as general initial background for the Lodge talks, not as the agenda for the NSC meeting scheduled for 5:30 p. m. on Tuesday.

As for the NSC meeting I would recommend the following:

1. You might open by explaining that its purpose is to permit an initial exploration and definition of the key issues. You do not envisage that we should come to firm decisions on this occasion.
2. Ambassador Lodge would then briefly outline his view of the situation and the key issues on which he believes decisions are required.
3. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Komer would then do the same.
4. You might guide a discussion of any matters raised by them you wish to hear further explored.
5. You might close the meeting by saying:
 - a) you will be talking with the principals later after they have had a chance for further talks and a focussing of the alternatives for decision;
 - b) guiding the group as to what line to take with the press about this NSC meeting in particular and the Lodge visit in general.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLS 85-25

By

inf

NARS, Date

7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5/9/66

I shall be exploring with Ambassador Lodge, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bob Komer what particular issues they will wish to underline at the NSC session. Just before the meeting I will be giving you a more precise agenda.

I have two questions: *(covered by conversation with Bill M., 9 May)*

Is this the kind of scenario you want for the NSC session? Yes _____

No _____

Should we put on the agenda a military briefing (10 minutes) on the situation and prospects in the field over coming weeks? Yes _____

No _____

W. W. Rostow

cc Bill Rogers

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 9, 1966

to P 5/10 a.m.
Shenille 32

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is long, but as good a picture as
we now can get of the DR election
situation.

W. W. R.

cc: Moyers
Kutner

320

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

This is long, but as
good a picture as we now
can get of the VP
election situation.

WWP

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 9, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SANTO DOMINGO (2416)

Electoral Campaign Analysis

At this point, less than a month from elections, there remains great lack of hard information to back predictions. Political, economic and social ingredients of the campaign are intricate web from which one is well-advised to derive patterns cautiously. Although nominations are now closed, electoral law allows changing of alliances among those nominated. Therefore, what follows in large measure is based on opinion that some accommodation will be made between Bonnelly and Balaguer with the result that by June 1, choice for almost all Dominicans will be a fairly clear-cut one between two candidates, with competition for lesser offices being strictly secondary in the voter's mind. It should also be understood that these tentative judgments have been made without the benefit of those polls and statistics considered vital to such analysis in developed countries.

The Embassy at this moment shares the opinion of most of the dispassionate observers here (who are not easy to find) that the race currently should be considered to be close to a toss-up, with Bosch probably being right now the man to beat. The Bonnelly campaign, never effective, is weakening. Balagueristas, although still talking victory, are less confident. Balaguer's top supporters want Bonnelly votes, although they are not unanimous that alliance with MIN would constitute a net gain. They claim Balaguer also needs funds for the balance of the campaign. We believe he needs new impetus, which support from MIN may give only in part. At the same time, Balaguer has considerable silent support -- among Campesinos, women and persons unwilling to appear publicly to oppose the 1965 revolution -- which is all but impossible to measure and which would provide surprises on Election Day. This is especially true should there be outbreaks of violence between now and June 1 which would tend to reinforce Balaguer claim to be the candidate of peace and order.

Many people who talked confidently two months ago of a Balaguer victory have modified their views. In large measure this is attributable to Bosch's late and sudden entry into the race and to aggressive, well-financed, well constructed campaign PRD waging. There is also legitimate reason to question to what extent Balaguer will hold on to the early big lead he built up in some areas --

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-249

By lig, NARA, Date 2-26-88

most notably in the Southwest, since that early lead in part was based on Bosch's absence from the race. (During the time Bosch was not openly in the race, PRD was actively preparing for the elections.) Most important in this regard is the psychology of victory itself. Almost everyone here agrees that the large segment of voters -- perhaps several hundred thousand -- will respond to the atmosphere at the end of the campaign, in an effort to be on the side of the winner and/or to please the dominant political and economic influence in their localities (e. g. local military commanders, chiefs of local government, parish priest, sugar mill or public works hirer, agricultural bank agent).

A number of basic factors which play a role in the campaign were spelled out in the Embassy's A-199 of January 6. That report remains essentially correct in somewhat changed circumstances of this moment. The major three issues remain as described therein: the Revolution, unemployment (and related pocketbook issues), and negative factors in candidates' backgrounds (mainly "trujillismo" and "comunismo"). Not really at issue is the continued Inter-American Police Force presence until after the elections. At this point in the campaign, Bosch appears to have had somewhat greater success at identifying himself with aspirations of the average voter, but has not been so good at stilling concern that he might bring new chaos (e. g. Communist support of his candidacy). Balaguer without doubt conveys to most voters greater hope of post-electoral stability and U.S. support. At the same time, strong U.S. backing for elections and promises of support to whoever wins, have as a side effect, been useful to Bosch in slightly clouding issue for many who still like to vote "con loa yanquis." It is hard to measure to what extent the candidates are hurt by charges of Trujillismo (Balaguer) and Comunismo (Bosch). We have been somewhat surprised by the substantial degree to which the PRD, which in 1962 had the votes of persons not enemies of Trujillo, is using the issue of Trujillismo. This, to a degree, developed out of bad effect of large and sometimes a bit unsavory Balaguer bodyguard on several Balaguer campaign trips. That Comunismo is hurting Bosch in some measure is demonstrated by Bosch's own lengthy defenses of himself.

Electoral machinery itself was discussed in some detail in our A-379 of April 10. It is not believed to favor either Bosch or Balaguer in any determining way. The single indivisible ballot to be used this time will tend to weaken only the smaller parties. Although there has as yet been no firm evidence that Bosch will have more sympathizers among officials at voting places, we suspect this may prove to be the case. If so, the opportunities for fraud will be greater for the PRD. (Although the 1962 elections were relatively clean, it is worth remembering there was apparently some fraud which was lost sight of because of overwhelming nature Bosch victory. It would not be in a close race.)

Also important will be the pressure the voter is subjected to as he approaches the polling place. Again, PRD's and extreme left's greater ability to control the streets should work on balance in Bosch's favor, although resentment of rough tactics may produce some backlash against him. On the other side, the military is now fishing for a role beyond being confined to barracks via the offer to transport people to the polls. Further, it would seem to be relatively easy to buy votes under the present system in which the voter is able to retain unused ballots, thus being able to present the purchaser proof he did what he was to be paid for. Of most importance for Balaguer in this area is the problem of Cedula distribution. His lead among Campesinos is cut in any case by relatively heavier voting in town (in the 1962 Campesinos, although 65 - 70 percent of the population probably provided no more than 50 percent of the vote). To the extent he cannot get Cedulas issued to Campesinos between now and June 1, his lead in the countryside is decreased further. Apparent apathy of Campesinos in seeking Cedulas so far is not encouraging for PR (Reformist Party).

Several of what have come to be almost truisms for Dominicans re campaign have some validity in our view, e.g., Balaguer is ahead among Campesinos, but no one is really sure by how much; Bosch is ahead in the cities, by a considerable margin in the Capital we guess, but by less in some other towns; Bosch has a considerable margin in and close to the sugar mills, but the margin in the fields may be small or even in Balaguer's favor; Balaguer seems comfortably ahead in most of the Southwest, although the margin appears to be dropping as the Bosch campaign builds. Balaguer is also probably ahead by a modest margin in non-sugar eastern provinces of Seibo and Altagracia and in parts of Northwest. The provinces of Valverde and Santiago Rodrigues in the northwest show signs of going to Bosch.

Geographically, elections may be won or lost by the candidate who receives the decisive margin (over 55 percent) in that roughly hourglass-shaped populous zone enclosing Santo Domingo, Santiago, Puerto Plata, San Francisco de Macoris and La Vega. This zone accounted for roughly 70 percent of the 1962 vote, (with Bosch getting 53 percent of the total) Bosch is well ahead in most populous sectors of Santo Domingo itself. However, as one gets into outlying areas of the Capital, Balaguer sympathies show themselves, so that in the national district as a whole -- and in populous San Cristobal province (82,602 votes in 1962) which draws a semi-circle around the national district -- Balaguer could be close on Bosch's heels. As one goes north from there through Bonao and surrounding rice fields (said to be strongly pro-Bosch) one enters the only territory in which the National Civic Union (and through it, Bonnelly) retains latent strength of any significance. The information available to the Embassy indicates that in all provinces that thrust into this zone (La Vega, Santiago, Puerto Plata, Espaillat, Salcedo, Duarte) final disposition of MIN may be important. At this moment it appears Bosch strength is growing in this key area and Bosch, if behind combined strength of MIN and PR, is able to win if Balaguer campaign is not fired up.

An April 28 report from Consulate Santiago stated PRD leaders there appear to be increasingly confident of victory, their most commonly expressed concern being not the outcome of the elections, but the fear that elements of Dominican Armed Forces will attempt to overthrow Bosch once elected. In contrast, reformists and moderates such as members of Santiago group show growing concern over the prospect of Bosch victory and believe Balaguer-Bonnelly coalition essential if Bosch is to be defeated. Bonnelly supporters there reluctantly admit the need for coalition. Some have said, however, that if a coalition is formed and Balaguer is a joint candidate, many Bonnelly supporters will vote for Bosch or abstain. Among other parties, Consulate reports, there has only been limited activity. Other information available to the Embassy tends to confirm the report from Santiago.

Except in Santo Domingo and eastern sugar areas, Social Christians do not appear to be appreciably stronger than in 1962. They should get a moderate amount of votes also in the provinces of La Vega, Sanchez Ramirez, Maria T. Sanchez, Salcedo, Santiago, Duarte, and Espaillat -- to a large extent in same areas comprising Bonnelly strongpoints.

One can spend considerable time constructing hypothetical sets of election results based on the best available information and broken down in various ways. None is particularly helpful, since sufficient statistical information is lacking. Months ago a summary of one such effort by political officer estimated the following breakdown of expected 1 - 1.2 million votes: Balaguer 35 - 45 percent, Bosch 35 - 45 percent, Rosario 5 - 10 percent, Bonnelly 10 - 15 percent. Today, on an assumption there may be only two candidates on June 1, that would read with some rough weighting of redistribution: Balaguer 35 - 50 percent, Bosch 40 - 55 percent. Another estimate breaks down by hypothetical 1 million votes by interest group as follows: 400,000 agricultural (55 percent Balaguer); 200,000 city and unemployed (55 percent Bosch); 100,000 sugar mills and fields (60 percent Bosch); 100,000 government and government-influenced, including laborers (70 percent Bosch); 100,000 other military and church influenced (80 percent Balaguer); 100,000 manufacturing, commerce and services (60 percent favor Bosch). Such rough calculation, which at best reflects only trends, would indicate a close race. Based on 1962 results, a total hypothetical vote of 1 million might break down as follows by region: National District and San Cristobal province -- 280,000; Cibao provinces of Santiago, Espaillat, La Vega, Salcedo, Cuarte and Sanchez Ramirex -- 325,000; eastern provinces of San Pedro, Seibo, Altigracia and La Romana -- 100,000; western and southwestern provinces of Peravia, Azua, San Juan, Estrelleta, Batoruco, Independencia; Barahona and Pedernales -- 140,000; northern and northwestern provinces of Samana, Maria T. Sanchez, Puerto Plata, Valverde, Santiago Rodriguez, Montecristi and Dajabon -- 155,000. What immediately comes to eye here is

that 19 of 27 Senate seats and 41 of 74 Chamber of Deputies seats are accounted for by under 40 percent of voters, partly because the vote is lighter in outlying provinces. This would seem to favor Balagueristas somewhat in the Congressional race, more in the Senate than in the Chamber since most provinces have only two deputies and to take both in a two-party race, the winner must, under the Dominican Proportional System, have over 2/3 of the total vote.

The 1962 elections are not a particularly helpful indicator. The Balaguer-Bosch contest has important differences from the Fiallo-Bosch race, with regard to personalities, issues and atmosphere. Bosch now draws his support from a considerably changed electorate. Compared to 1962, he has lost considerable strength to Balaguer among Campesinos, essentially because of the Campesinos' fear of political unrest and reluctance to put trust in Bosch a second time, and has gained strength in a number of urban areas and within the government he did not enjoy in 1962. At the same time, Bosch has largely lost that large but unmeasured negative 1962 vote -- composed of those subject to military influence and those who had been servants and accepters of Trujillo regime -- which helped so much to swing elections in Bosch's favor late in the 1962 campaign. It is impossible to measure the loyalty of the Dominican voter and thus to guess how many people will vote for Bosch in 1966 because they did in 1962. In 1962 the greatest Bosch victories were in the populous National District and San Cristobal. Among less populated provinces, he did best in the southwest and northwest, in northern provinces of Samana and Maria T. Sanchez, in El Deibo and San Pedro in the east and in Sanchez Ramirez on the edge of Cibao. Signs are he is winning again in the National District and Sanchez Ramirez and perhaps in Samana and Maria T. Sanchez, but has lost substantial support to Balaguer in Seibo, southwest and northwest -- areas in which Bosch won in 1962 in part because of military and anti-National Civic Union feeling. It would appear Bosch did extremely well in the government sugar mill areas in 1962, as he is doing again now. Sugar prices were high under Bosch and the PRD used government mills to provide employment, with no move toward unpopular reforms. The areas in which Balaguer has made the greatest inroads are also in most cases those in which anti-Trujillo sentiment had been weaker. One of the big unanswered questions is to what extent he can draw support in former National Civic Union strongholds.

Enumerating built-in advantages Bosch and Balaguer each enjoy going into the final stage of the campaign places more items of note in Bosch camp. We give Bosch: continued control or influence in most local government offices, including government hiring; control of government sugar mills; strong influence in Cedula offices and chance of placing more followers than Balaguer on staffs voting places; somewhat better press and radio (Listin and La Informacion lean to Bosch; anti-Bosch Caribe leans somewhat to Bonnelly; only important magazine, Ahora, is all Bosch; majority of politically-oriented radio stations are Boschista);

significant erasing of disappointments of Bosch rule in 1963 by greater unpleasantness since; guarantee of votes of all constitutionalist block without need to make any important concessions. There is no clear sign that Bosch's failure to travel has hurt him greatly. As for Balaguer, he has, for all the talk about Trujillismo, far fewer enemies than Bosch and has better record on actually helping the poor (he is also making bigger promises now than Bosch) even if Bosch is more a man of the people. Balaguer's support from the military, despite widespread demands for military reform, is important asset, in view of roughly estimated 150,000 voters who are directly linked by family ties to the military. He is also preferred by the church, although the church opposition to Bosch significantly soft-pedalled compared to that which existed in 1962. He is -- or rather will be if Bonnelly leaves the race -- candidate of all traditional rulers of the Dominican Republic, although some limit selves to grudging acceptance and many are reluctant to contribute to the campaign fund. For most Dominicans he also is and will remain the candidate of the U.S. Even with the Revolution and presence of U.S. troops, this remains over-all an advantage, one which Bosch has tried, perhaps with only minor success, to cut by publicly giving credit to numerous clear official U.S. statements of impartiality.

A small vote on June 1 -- whether caused by fear of disturbances, lack of Cedula, or even rain (June 1 is in the middle of the rainiest period here)-- will favor Bosch, since his supporters are stronger in towns and are more militant. It is conceivable that very light vote in the countryside could produce a situation in which Balaguer, with a majority of the popular sentiment actually with him, would lose.

Significant violence between now and June 1 could also change the results. Net results of young leftist toughs trying to interfere with Balaguer campaigning probably hurts Bosch. At the same time, Bosch is not in the public mind here the "candidate of violence" that some people claim he is, and clear-cut vote on a simple issue of peace or violence is not to be expected.

Finally, one is led to hedge all bets by sharp reversal in fortunes of the candidates in last weeks of the 1962 campaign. No one really knows how many people have minds already made up and how many votes can be influenced or bought late in the campaign; no one can really measure effects of the Revolution and events since; no one can be sure how much people really fear that Bosch will help the Communists or Balaguer will return to "Trujillismo without Trujillo" (with Campesino, Bosch gets the losing end of this debate) and -- most important -- no one knows how well Balaguer's lead among the Campesinos will hold up. The only thing close to the consensus at this point is that Bosch's publicly committed, firm vote is greater than Balaguer's and Bosch's campaign is more aggressive and zealous.

CRIMMINS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 9, 1966

*Type for
Pres.*

MEMO TO MR. ROSTOW

Embassy Santo Domingo's analysis and prediction on the electoral situation is contained in the attached telegram which arrived this morning. I recommend that you read it in preparation for this afternoon's meeting on the DR.

WGB
WGBowdler

Attachment

2416 from Santo Domingo,
May 8, 1966.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jd*, NARA, Date *5-21-98*

Monday, May 9, 1966

*evening
pda ok
Sil fur*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Gen. Taylor (red) and I (yellow) have marked out the passages on VC morale that may interest you, from the latest RAND report on prisoners and defectors.

These are "informal notes."

We shall have a more complete study in June or July.

It is distinctly encouraging, but does not indicate a decisive break in VC morale yet.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment dtd 28 Apr 66

"Some Informal Notes on the 'Viet Cong Morale Study' (U)
by Leon Goure encl to L-8557

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

Walt:

I have marked in red the paragraphs in the Rand Report which seem to me most worthy of Presidential perusal.

M.D.T.
M.D.T.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY DCM ON 11-21-84

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The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN ST • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA 90406

2 May 1966

L-8557

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Walt:

At your request I am enclosing some hasty notes about some of our recent findings on VC morale and motivation and also some tentative suggestions relating to a few of these findings. I am sorry that I was unable to send them to you earlier and hope that they will be of some use to you.

I was delighted to learn of your appointment to the White House and very pleased by your continuing interest in our project. We will be publishing soon a series of studies which analyze various aspects of the collected data in greater detail and depth.

It was nice to speak to you the other day. I hope in June-July to have a more complete story to tell about our findings over the past six months.

Sincerely,

Leon Gouré

LG:fn

Enclosure (1) of

Enclosure to L-8557, "Some Informal Notes on the 'Viet Cong Morale Study'" (U), by Leon Gouré, dated 28 April 1966, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, 26 pp., 1 copy.

NOTICE - THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18 U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

CONFIDENTIAL

If enclosures are withdrawn or not attached the classification of this correspondence will be cancelled.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Monday
May 9, 1966

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk is recommending
that you and Mrs. Johnson visit
Canada in July.

Ambassador Butterworth believes
there is no one thing which would
be more constructive in our relations

W. ~~Wall~~ Rostow

Attachment

1314 34a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Visit by You and Mrs. Johnson
to Canada

Recommendation:

That you approve in principle a visit by you and Mrs. Johnson to Canada in July of this year and that you authorize the Department to approach the Canadian Government with a view to making arrangements for it.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Our relations with Canada are good, and we have no acute bilateral problems at the moment. We can count on a measure of Canadian support on most major problems elsewhere in the world. There is, nevertheless, widespread doubt in Canada about the wisdom of our Viet-Nam, China and Cuba policies.

With these considerations in mind, the Department has been giving thought to possible constructive steps we might take with regard to Canada. Ambassador Butterworth in Ottawa has reported that in his view there is no one thing which would be more constructive at this time than a visit by you to Canada. He argues, and I concur in his judgment, that the political and psychological climate in Canada suggests that a visit by you could have a tremendous impact in focusing the attention of Canadians upon the "enduring common interests between our countries and in redirecting their fixation away from such problem issues between us as Viet-Nam and China, which they persistently view so astigmatically."

~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-249

By lif, NARA, Date 2-26-88

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A state visit to Canada normally lasts three days, although a shorter visit could perhaps be arranged. A Presidential visit customarily takes place when Parliament is in session so that the President can address a joint session of both Houses. Parliament is expected to remain in session until mid-July and will not reconvene until September. In addition, I would hope that you would consider a brief trip to Montreal to visit the American pavilion at the Exposition in the late spring or early summer of 1967. The need to space these visits suggests, therefore, that a visit to Ottawa in early July 1966 would be feasible and appropriate.

We are currently negotiating a treaty with Canada for the joint hydro-electric development of the Saint John River. There is good reason to expect that these negotiations could be completed by mid-July, and the announcement of such an agreement on the occasion of a Presidential visit would dramatize our continental partnership.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

to P 35

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 9, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report on Lippmann's positions over the past twenty years probably won't tell you anything you don't know; but I thought you might like to keep it handy.

It was done in the Policy Planning Council.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

cc: Moyers
Ripman

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CONFIDENTIAL

Lippmann Positions

The following are paraphrases of Walter Lippmann's position on ten major issues, involving confrontation with the Communists, on which he has differed from US foreign policy since World War II.

1. Greek-Turk Aid Bill. Accepting the bill as a limited counter-measure to Communist expansion, Lippmann opposed the "inchoate" and "idealistic" way in which it was sold. He opposed giving a "blank" check to the "unrepresentative" Greek government and thought we should build a "position of strength" in Turkey instead.

2. Truman Doctrine. Lippmann strongly opposed the "vast, indeterminate responsibilities" of this doctrine. He claimed that it committed us to anti-Communist "crusades" all over the globe and to support all non-Communist governments, whatever their popular credentials.

3. Containment Policy. He opposed this policy as one which risked "the mistake...of becoming engaged in the wrong place and at the wrong time." World-wide containment would exceed our resources. Instead, we should limit our commitments and build "positions of strength" at selected points.

4. German Policy. Lippmann opposed the merger of the three Western zones into the present Federal Republic - considering this divisive of Germany and provocative to the Soviet Union. He also opposed 1954 German rearmament - arguing that only a neutralized Germany could hope to become reunified.

5. Berlin Airlift. Lippmann viewed the airlift as a stop-gap measure, infeasible to continue for very long: "It would be a political disaster to let go; it is a technical absurdity to hold on very long." We should negotiate for a

German

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SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DCH ON 9-784

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-2-

German peace treaty and withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Soviet blockade of Berlin he saw as the Soviet response to our erroneous policy of creating a West German government.

6. NATO. Lippmann opposed German, Italian, and Scandinavian membership in NATO, holding instead that these nations belonged in a neutral "buffer belt" in Central Europe. He also opposed the 20-year duration of the Pact and its linking to our military aid bill.

7. Korean War. After the Communist Chinese intervention, although he had initially favored our defense of South Korea, Lippmann advocated a US withdrawal to Japan and a "revision of our global policy." He was skeptical about whether a viable, independent government could be re-established in Korea after the war, and believed Korea to be low on the list of priorities for limited US resources.

8. Quemoy-Matsu, 1958. Lippmann proposed withdrawal from the offshore islands - arguing that this would be "less bad" than risking a war with Communist China.

9. Berlin Crisis, 1961-2. Lippmann was deeply pessimistic about the future of West Berlin, which he termed a "doomed and dying city," and recommended that it be transformed into an international city.

10. Cuba Missile Crisis. Lippmann advocated paying for withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba with withdrawal of US IRBM's from Turkey, on the grounds of the obsolescence of our Turkish IRBM's and the liability of Turkey's geographical position.

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