

Mr. President

36

In response to your instructions to Jake to check  
w/ Rostow and if Rostow agrees -- then you agree --

Rostow says that he agrees fully. Jake then  
told him to go ahead -- that you were in  
concurrence with his recommendation.

L

ym  
5/9/66  
11:15 am



SENT  
WHCA

1966 MAY 9 15 30

EEA822  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 767

FROM: MR. ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP66277

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

MONDAY, MAY 9, 1966 -- 9:10 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

SECRETARY RUSK WISHES YOU TO SEE AND APPROVE THIS BEFORE IT GOES FORWARD.

ATTACHMENT

PROPOSED CANADIAN REVISION IN ORAL MESSAGE TO HANOI.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MAY 4, 1966

TO: THE SECRETARY  
THROUGH: MR. BALL  
FROM: FE - WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED CANADIAN REVISION IN ORAL MESSAGE TO HANOI:

ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. AS YOU RECALL, WE DELIVERED OUR MEMORANDUM TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 26. AMBASSADOR BUTTERWORTH REPORTED THAT PAUL MARTIN RESPONDED FAIRLY WELL, BUT THE CANADIANS SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO SEND AMBASSADOR RONNING HIMSELF, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. GOLDSCHLAG OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO DISCUSS WITH US THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME REVISIONS IN THE ORAL MESSAGE.

2. I LUNCHEDED ON MONDAY WITH RONNING AND GOLDSCHLAG, AND THEY DISCUSSED SOME POINTS. AT THE END OF MONDAY AFTERNOON, THEY SENT US A PROPOSED REVISED ORAL MESSAGE, WHICH WE HAVE NOW REVIEWED. THE EFFECT OF THE CANADIAN REVISION IS TO UNDERSCORE THE CANADIAN ROLE AND TO RE-PHASE THE KEY SECTIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE RECIPROCAL REDUCTION IN HOSTILITIES.

5/9/ - Jacobson  
telephoned Mr. Rostow  
subject to oral message  
of Ray of Mr. Rostow  
telephoned Ben Bell



3. I HAVE GONE OVER THE CANADIAN DRAFT AND ATTACH THE REVISIONS (TAB A) THAT WE OURSELVES MIGHT PROPOSE TO THEIR FORMAT. I THINK MY CHANGES, SHOWN BY UNDERSCORING AND BRACKETS, SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WITH THESE CHANGES, I THINK THE CANADIAN DRAFT WOULD BE IN ALL FUNDAMENTAL RESPECTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INTENT. THEY ARE ASKING FOR A PROMPT RESPONSE, AND I RECOMMEND YOUR APPROVAL OF THEIR DRAFT AS REVISED.

4. HOWEVER, I WISH TO NOTE THAT RONNING NOW TELLS US THAT HE HIMSELF WILL PROBABLY BE GOING. THIS PRESENTS US WITH SOME PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS SAIGON. RONNING WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE SPOTTED EVEN IF HE WENT THROUGH BANGKOK AND VIENTIANE, AND ON BALANCE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD RECOMMEND TO THE CANADIANS THAT HE GO THROUGH SAIGON AND REPRESENT HIS BUSINESS AS BEING A CONTINUATION OF HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI ON WAYS IN WHICH THE ICC COULD BE MADE MORE USEFUL IN THE WHOLE AREA. HAPPILY, THIS FITS IN WITH THE CURRENT ACTIVE STATE OF PROPOSALS FOR ICC ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA, SO THAT I SHOULD THINK THIS COVER STORY WOULD STAND UP. IT SEEMS TO ME VASTLY PREFERABLE NOT TO INDICATE TO THE GVN THAT RONNING IS CARRYING OUT ANY MISSION WHATEVER CONCERNED WITH VIET-NAM NEGOTIATIONS. ANY ACCOUNT WE COULD GIVE THEM, HOWEVER SIMPLIFIED, WOULD BE BOUND TO AROUSE THEIR SUSPICIONS. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO TELL THE CANADIANS THAT, WHILE THE ICC COVER STORY MAY WORK ON THIS OCCASION, IT CANNOT SUPPORT RONNING HIMSELF DOING THE TRIP AGAIN (IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THERE SHOULD BE ANY REAL RESPONSE), AND THAT FOR VISIBILITY REASONS ALONE WE WOULD URGE THE CANADIANS VERY STRONGLY THAT THE REGULAR ICC MAN BE THE FUTURE EMISSARY IF THE CHANNEL REMAINS OPEN.

5. I AM SENDING A COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROSTOW, IN CASE YOU FEEL IT SHOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH THE PRESIDENT.

1. RUSK APPROVED CANADIAN DRAFT AS AMENDED

2. RUSK APPROVED PROPOSED GVN HANDLING, AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 4, ABOVE.

ATTACHMENTS:

TAB A - US REVISION TO CANADIAN DRAFT.

US REVISION TO CANADIAN DRAFT

MAY 3, 1966

ORAL MESSAGE

A. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONVEYED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG TO AMBASSADOR CHESTER RONNING ON MARCH 11. IN DOING SO, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT ACTING IN A MEDIATORY CAPACITY WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN ASKED BY EITHER SIDE TO ASSUME. IT WAS ACTING AS A COUNTRY WHICH HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROBLEM IN VIETNAM FOR THE PAST ELEVEN YEARS AS A MEMBER OF THE I.C.S.C. AND WHICH WAS ANXIOUS AND DETERMINED TO DO WHAT IT COULD TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

AT THIS STAGE WAS TO FACILITATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, LOOKING TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATION OF A FORMAL SETTLEMENT.

B. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TOLD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPRESSIONS GAINED BY AMBASSADOR CHESTER RONNING, THE D.R.V.N. //WOULD// MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HAVE INFORMAL TALKS IF THERE WERE AN UNCONDITIONAL UNDERTAKING BY THE UNITED STATES TO CEASE BOMBING AND ALL ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. THE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A SUGGESTION IN THESE TERMS, THAT IS TO SAY, THAT IT MUST AGREE TO A PERMANENT CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AS A UNILATERAL AND NON-RECIPROCATED PRECONDITION TO THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS.

C. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT KNOWS, FROM THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVES, THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ITSELF PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS OR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IF THIS COULD NOT BE DONE ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF HALTING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROCEED TOWARDS TALKS ON THE BASIS OF A RECIPROCAL REDUCTION IN HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM OF WHICH A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE ONE ELEMENT. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS COFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY INDICATION THAT THE D.R.V.N. WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUCH A RECIPROCAL REDUCTION IN HOSTILITIES AND, IF SO, WHAT ACTIONS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE DRV. //OF WHAT SORT.// THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MUTUAL AND RECIPROCAL REDUCTION IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN ITSELF. //THIS MIGHT IN ITSELF SERVE TO CREATE THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS OR TALKS.//

D. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY RESPONSE, OR ANY INDICATION OF ITS POSITION IN ANY RESPECT, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT WISH TO COMMUNICATE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA.

E. //THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ARE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE CANADIAN CHANNEL KEPT OPEN.// THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY AND IN FULLEST CONFIDENCE THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE POSSIBLE MEANS OF RECONCILING THESE POSITIONS AND MOVING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

~~SECRET~~

NO DIS

DTG: 09/1409Z MAY 1966



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

37  
sent to Ranch  
by wire

Sunday, May 8, 1966 -- 12:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The final formulation in the attached is worth thought: If we could offer Hanoi and the world a conference of the four fighting forces to stop the bombing and stop the infiltration, on a monitored basis, as we take on POL, we have a pretty good package.

If the Swedish government bought it and offered a regiment, this might stop the imminent defection of Scandinavia on our Viet Nam policy and turn the flank of world opinion.

The two gut problems are:

1. Getting Ky aboard before we act.
2. See if the Swedish government really would accept the responsibility, if asked by Hanoi and Washington -- and announce it at the time we made the offer.

In fact, we might want some Ethiopian, Danish, etc. troops invited, as well as Swedes.

I am passing this to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bill Moyers on an eyes-only basis.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-25

By ing, NAKS, Date 7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

37a

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLJ 85-25

By

sig, NARS, Date

7-8-85

Sunday, May 8, 1966 -- 12:45 p.m.

# MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

On Friday evening, May 6, Gunnar Myrdal called me from New York. He said he wanted to see me for a few hours. I agreed to see him at my home at 3:30 p.m. Saturday, May 7. He said that he wished to lay before me certain ideas about how to end the war in South Viet Nam. He wished me to know that he would mention this conversation only to his wife; but, since she is a Minister in the Swedish government, it would be reported to that government.

Knowing, however, Myrdal's tendency in recent years to talk rather loosely, I made my comments as if they were on the record.

His points were as follows:

1. The pressures generated by the war in South Viet Nam were isolating the U.S. from "the good people" of Western Europe and many parts of Asia. As a lifelong friend of the U.S., who regarded himself virtually as an American, this troubled him deeply. Moreover, the war in Viet Nam was preventing all of us from getting on with the great problems of dealing with world hunger, trade, development, and reshaping of Europe.
2. To create a new favorable situation, the U.S. must announce two things: (a) it is prepared to talk with both Hanoi and the NLF; (b) it is prepared to leave the fate of South Viet Nam and future relations between North and South Viet Nam up to the people of that country.

I replied that we had made clear that we were prepared to talk with Hanoi. We had ample channels. The problem was the wholly negative response we received. As for the NLF, we had said that at a peace conference they would have opportunity to make their views known; at Honolulu the government of South Viet Nam had appealed to them to stop the war and join in making a modern, independent South Viet Nam; and we had said that the future of South Viet Nam was for the South Vietnamese people to determine. He should remember that the government in Saigon was a factor in this situation.

He then amended his proposal as follows: We should announce that those who are actually fighting the war should get together to stop it: the government in Saigon, the U.S., Hanoi, and the NLF. We should exclude the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the UN. The USSR and Communist

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

-2-

China would treat the negotiation as an aspect of the Sino-Soviet struggle; and the UN was totally incompetent to deal with a problem of this kind. But we must, he said, stop bombing the north.

I then pointed out that Secretary Rusk, on many occasions, had said that we were prepared to stop bombing the north if Hanoi would undertake an equivalent act of de-escalation. There had been silence on this point from Hanoi. I pointed out the scale of the logistical buildup of Laos contrary to the Geneva Accords of 1962 and then put to him this question, underlining it was a personal, not a governmental, inquiry: Would the government of Sweden be willing to put a Swedish regiment across the infiltration trails in Laos and monitor them? He said he felt absolutely confident that the Swedish government would be prepared to do this if Hanoi and the U.S. agreed. He underlined that this should not be done as a UN operation but as an ad hoc operation. I said we had not the slightest indication that Hanoi was prepared to accept a monitored end to infiltration in return for a cessation of bombing in the north.

He then produced a third version of his formula: Why does not the U.S. state publicly that, as a preliminary to peace negotiations, we wish the four fighting forces to meet (U.S., Saigon, GVN, and NLF) to discuss arrangements for ending bombing in the north in return for an end to infiltration, monitoring to be done by a Swedish division. (An extra gin and tonic had raised the Swedish regiment to divisional stature by this time.)

I thanked him for his suggestion and then underlined what my response had been:

- a. I had received and understood his suggestion and would convey it to my colleagues;
- b. We were prepared to talk to Hanoi;
- c. The future of Viet Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese through a free electoral process;
- d. The outstanding question about bombing the north remains: What is Hanoi prepared to do if we stopped the bombing?

His final observation was this: We should not try to impose on the South Vietnamese our kind of free electoral process. We should let them find their own formula. I asked him bluntly if he took this position

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

-3-

because he believed, as we did, that the NLF would do very poorly in a free election. He was evasive in reply, rambling on at some length about the underpreparedness of Asia for democracy in the Western sense.

*W W Rostow*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FEAS19  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 762

FROM: ROSTOV  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP66274

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOV

THE FINAL FORMULATION IN THE ATTACHED IS WORTH THOUGHT: IF WE COULD OFFER HANOI AND THE WORLD A CONFERENCE OF THE FOUR FIGHTING FORCES TO STOP THE BOMBING AND STOP THE INFILTRATION, ON A MONITORED BASIS, AS WE TAKE ON POL, WE HAVE A PRETTY GOOD PACKAGE.

IF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT BOUGHT IT AND OFFERED A REGIMENT, THIS MIGHT STOP THE IMMINENT DEFECTION OF SCANDINAVIA ON OUR VIET NAM POLICY AND TURN THE FLANK OF WORLD OPINION.

THE TWO GUT PROBLEMS ARE:

1. GETTING KY ABOARD BEFORE WE ACT.
2. SEE IF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT REALLY WOULD ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY, IF ASKED BY HANOI AND WASHINGTON -- AND ANNOUNCE IT AT THE TIME WE MADE THE OFFER.

IN FACT, WE MIGHT WANT SOME ETHIOPIAN, DANISH, ETC. TROOPS INVITED, AS WELL AS SWEDES.

I AM PASSING THIS TO SECRETARY RUSK, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, AND BILL MOYERS ON AN EYES-ONLY BASIS.

168 MAY 8 11 2 68

SUNDAY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fwj/g, NARA, Date 6-11-98



SUNDAY, MAY 8, 1966 - 12:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

ON FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 6, GUNNAR MYRDAL CALLED ME FROM NEW YORK, HE SAID HE WANTED TO SEE ME FOR A FEW HOURS. I AGREED TO SEE HIM AT MY HOME AT 3:30 P.M. SATURDAY, MAY 7. HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO LAY BEFORE ME CERTAIN IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO END THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET NAM. HE WISHED ME TO KNOW THAT HE WOULD MENTION THIS CONVERSATION ONLY TO HIS WIFE; BUT, SINCE SHE IS A MINISTER IN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD BE REPORTED TO THAT GOVERNMENT.

KNOWING, HOWEVER, MYRDAL'S TENDENCY IN RECENT YEARS TO TALK RATHER LOOSELY, I MADE MY COMMENTS AS IF THEY WERE ON THE RECORD.

HIS POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE PRESSURES GENERATED BY THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET NAM WERE ISOLATING THE U.S. FROM "THE GOOD PEOPLE" OF WESTERN EUROPE AND MANY PARTS OF ASIA. AS A LIFELONG FRIEND OF THE U.S., WHO REGARDED HIMSELF VIRTUALLY AS AN AMERICAN, THIS TROUBLED HIM DEEPLY. MOREOVER, THE WAR IN VIET NAM WAS PREVENTING ALL OF US FROM GETTING ON WITH THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH WORLD HUNGER, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESHAPING OF EUROPE.

2. TO CREATE A NEW FAVORABLE SITUATION, THE U.S. MUST ANNOUNCE TWO THINGS: (A) IT IS PREPARED TO TALK WITH BOTH HANOI AND THE NLF; (B) IT IS PREPARED TO LEAVE THE FATE OF SOUTH VIET NAME AND FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIET NAM UP TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

I REPLIED THAT WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO TALK WITH HANOI. WE HAD AMPLE CHANNELS. THE PROBLEM WAS THE WHOLLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE WE RECEIVED. AS FOR THE NLF, WE HAD SAID THAT AT A PEACE CONFERENCE THEY WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN; AT HONOLULU THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET NAM HAD APPEALED TO THEM TO STOP THE WAR AND JOIN IN MAKING A MODERN, INDEPENDENT SOUTH VIET NAM; AND WE HAD SAID THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET NAM WAS FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE. HE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON WAS A FACTOR IN THIS SITUATION.

HE THEN AMENDED HIS PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS: WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THOSE WHO ARE ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE WAR WOULD GET TOGETHER TO STOP IT: THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON, THE U.S., HANOI, AND THE NLF. WE SHOULD EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND THE UN. THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD TREAT THE NEGOTIATION AS AN ASPECT OF THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE; AND THE UN WAS TOTALLY INCOMPETENT TO DEAL WITH A PROBLEM OF THIS KIND. BUT WE MUST, HE SAID, STOP BOMBING THE NORTH.



I THEN POINTED OUT THAT SECRETARY RUSK, ON MANY OCCASIONS, HAD SAID THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO STOP BOMBING THE NORTH IF HANOI WOULD UNDERTAKE AN EQUIVALENT ACT OF DE-ESCALATION. THERE HAD BEEN SILENCE ON THIS POINT FROM HANOI. I POINTED OUT THE SCALE OF THE LOGISTICAL BUILDUP OF LAOS CONTRARY TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962 AND THEN PUT TO HIM THIS QUESTION, UNDERLINING IT WAS A PERSONAL, NOT A GOVERNMENTAL, INQUIRY: WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN BE WILLING TO PUT A SWEDISH REGIMENT ACROSS THE INFILTRATION TRAILS IN LAOS AND MONITOR THEM? HE SAID HE FELT ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT THAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO THIS IF HANOI AND THE U.S. AGREED. HE UNDERLINED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE AS A UN OPERATION BUT AS AN AD HOC OPERATION. I SAID WE HAD NOT THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HANOI WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A MONITORED END TO INFILTRATION IN RETURN FOR A CESSATION OF BOMBING IN THE NORTH.

HE THEN PRODUCED A THIRD VERSION OF HIS FORMULA: WHY DOES NOT THE U.S. STATE PUBLICLY THAT, AS A PRELIMINARY TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WISH THE FOUR FIGHTING FORCES TO MEET (U.S., SAIGON, GVN AND NLF) TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENDING BOMBING IN THE NORTH IN RETURN FOR AN END TO INFILTRATION, MONITORING TO BE DONE BY A SWEDISH DIVISION. (AN EXTRA GIN AND TONIC HAD RAISED THE SWEDISH REGIMENT TO DIVISIONAL STATURE BY THIS TIME.)

I THANKED HIM FOR HIS SUGGESTION AND THEN UNDERLINED WHAT MY RESPONSE HAD BEEN:

A. I HAD RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD HIS SUGGESTION AND WOULD CONVEY IT TO MY COLLEAGUES;

B. WE WERE PREPARED TO TALK TO HANOI;

C. THE FUTURE OF VIET NAM SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THROUGH A FREE ELECTORAL PROCESS;

D. THE OUTSTANDING QUESTION ABOUT BOMBING THE NORTH REMAINS: WHAT IS HANOI PREPARED TO DO IF WE STOPPED THE BOMBING?

HIS FINAL OBSERVATION WAS THIS: WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO IMPOSE ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE OUR KIND OF FREE ELECTORAL PROCESS. WE SHOULD LET THEM FIND THEIR OWN FORMULA. I ASKED HIM BLUNTLY IF HE TOOK THIS POSITION BECAUSE HE BELIEVED, AS WE DID, THAT THE NLF WOULD DO VERY POORLY IN A FREE ELECTION. HE WAS EVASIVE IN REPLY, RAMBLING ON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE UNDERPREPAREDNESS OF ASIA FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN SENSE.

SGD/W. W. ROSTOW

DTG: 081752 MAY 1966

~~SECRET~~

<sup>39</sup>  
Mr Rostow transmitted message  
to Mr Jacobsen by telephone  
5/7/66

Saturday, May 7, 1966 -- 3:00 p.m.

TO Jake Jacobsen from Rostow

In pouch ~~being~~ leaving here 3:00 p.m. there is item requesting approval of appointment Ambassador McConaughy as President's Special Representative at inauguration ceremony of President Chiang Kai-shek.

You should add following: Consent has been obtained from Senator Fulbright.



39a

To Pres via  
3pm punch  
to lunch

Saturday, May 7, 1966  
12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

I recommend you approve this  
familiar item.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-attachment

Memo for President from Sec Rusk, May 6, 1966  
"Appointment of Walter P. McCaughy as Your  
Special Representative to the Inauguration Ceremony of  
President Chiang Kai-shek."

John Jacobson  
called from Rusk 5/9/66  
Prm has OKed  
S/S notified

WWRostow:rlh



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment of Walter P. McCaughy as  
Your Special Representative to the  
Inauguration Ceremony of President  
Chiang Kai-shek



Recommendation

That you appoint Walter P. McCaughy as your Personal Representative to the May 20 inauguration of President Chiang Kai-shek for a fourth term as President of the Republic of China.

Approve ✓ Disapprove         

Discussion

President Chiang Kai-shek will be inaugurated for a fourth term as President of the Republic of China on May 20. A number of countries are planning to send special representatives to the ceremony. The Philippines and Korea will send their Foreign Ministers; Liberia will send its Secretary of State; and the Japanese Government is considering sending former Prime Minister Kishi.

The United States has been represented in Taipei by a Charge d'Affaires since the departure of Ambassador Jerauld Wright nine months ago. On May 2 you announced your intention to nominate Walter P. McCaughy, our present Ambassador to Pakistan, to replace Ambassador Wright. There is insufficient time to permit Ambassador McCaughy to return to Washington, obtain Senate confirmation and proceed to Taipei for the inauguration. However, I believe that the United States would

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-249  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

be very appropriately represented if Ambassador McConaughy were to proceed directly from Karachi to Taipei as your Personal Representative to the inauguration. Ambassador McConaughy's attendance in this capacity would give the United States proper precedence and would be very much appreciated by President Chiang and by the people of the Republic of China.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

40  
*Sent by wire  
to President*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 7, 1966 -- 9:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Ahmed of Pakistan gave me verbally the following message:

1. President Ayub had not understood in his conversations with you that he had undertaken a personal commitment to reopen the closed facilities.
2. Since this is your understanding, he will now give the matter his urgent personal attention.

W. *Walt* Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRHS 64-68 vol. 25-14335 (2/140)  
By JC/idl, NARA, Date 3-12-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SATURDAY

'66 MAY 7 AM 9:12



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

41  
Sent to J. Roberts  
5/9/66  
to call for Pres

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 6, 1966

Ret'd from  
Pres  
5/11/66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The underlying memorandum summarizes Senator Ribicoff's speech calling for UN supervision of elections in South Vietnam and the Department of State's statement in response to press inquiries about it.

As you can see, the statement does not deal with the real issue, i.e., the serious objection which the Saigon government would have to outsiders supervising its elections. We have asked our Embassy in Saigon to explain that we decided that it was better to emphasize the unreality of the proposition than to take the line that elections in South Vietnam were an internal matter not appropriate to UN action unless the South Vietnam Government so requested. Had we taken the latter tack it would have tended to create confusion as to our position on a Geneva-type election covering unification of North and South Vietnam. In addition, it would have put the South Vietnam Government on the spot to take a position as to whether or not it would welcome UN action.

It is hoped that the Ribicoff proposal will die on grounds of being unreal in view of the position taken by Moscow, Hanoi and Peiping in opposition to any UN action on Vietnam.

Acting Ambassador Porter reports from Saigon that any proposal to invite foreign overseers or even observers for the elections creates an extremely delicate political problem for the government of South Vietnam. Such a proposal might be used by enemies of the government to rouse the "sleeping dragon" of xenophobia in South Vietnam and give rise to accusations that the present government has compromised the nation's sovereignty. The government's critics might possibly view it as an effort to delay fulfillment of, or even to renege on, its promise to hold elections.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-25

By sig, NARS, Date 7-8-85

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, May 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

yesterday

~~Senator Ribicoff~~ in a speech on the floor/said it is time the U.S. committed itself to the success of elections in South Vietnam. He proposed:

- 1) That ~~we request a special session of the UN General Assembly;~~
- 2) That we should ~~propose a resolution requesting that UN observers be assigned to the forthcoming elections in South Vietnam;~~ and
- 3) That we should ~~lend the full prestige of the U.S. to this effort by having the President present our case to the UN in person.~~

Elections would be held within areas of South Vietnam which could reasonably be secured against violence and intimidation. Only by insuring promptly the creation of a representative government in South Vietnam could we prove that we are not a colonial power trying to conquer Vietnam by force.

Senator Ribicoff said the President "is bent on doing everything he can to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict." One of our objectives, he added, was to help strengthen the position of the South Vietnamese so that they will have bargaining power at the conference table. He said that with political stability and social and economic reform, we stand a chance of ending the war and restoring peace to South Vietnam.

~~In response to questions at the State Department press briefing today, the Department spokesman reaffirmed our position favoring a UN role in supervising elections designed to implement the Geneva Accords. He pointed out that the Soviet Union, Hanoi and Peiping have flatly refused any UN participation in the solution of a Vietnam problem. This opposition, he added, has apparently led the Secretary General and many members to conclude there is no effective role for the UN to play in the present circumstances. He concluded by saying the State Department was glad that Senator Ribicoff added his voice to those who believe the UN can play a constructive role in Vietnam.~~

W. J. ~~Walt~~ Rostow



~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 6, 1966, 10:15 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-248

By sig, NARA, Date 1-25-89

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Mrs. Johnson to Latin America

Secretary Rusk's recommendation for a trip by Mrs. Johnson to Latin America is attached.

You should know that ARA recommended that Mrs. Johnson also go to Panama. They judged it a safe area and felt also that a failure to visit Panama would be regarded as a rebuff. Secretary Rusk felt sufficiently uneasy about security and demonstrations to scrub Panama.

The advantages of a visit by Mrs. Johnson to Panama are sufficiently substantial -- including, perhaps, a flight over the Darien Gap area -- to justify, perhaps, a call by you to Secretary Rusk to probe how serious his reservations are.

As to timing, Mrs. Johnson's visit might begin in mid-June and end up in Guatemala for the inauguration of President-elect Mendez Montenegro on July 1. This will allow sufficient time for preparation of the trip and to bring Mrs. Johnson back to Washington well in advance of your daughter's wedding.

The other co-chairman for the Mendez inaugural might be the Chief Justice or the Attorney General. President Mendez has been the Dean of the Law School of Guatemala's National University.

W. W. R.

cc: Bill Moyers  
Bob Klatner

*5/13/66 - original returned from Mrs. Johnson with note by "Ashton" saying Mrs. Johnson will be available after Aug 20, 1966*

*5/11/66 - Mrs. Johnson telephoned Mr. Rostow to say she can't undertake a trip before first of Sept.*

~~SECRET~~

*Mr. Rostow notified 5/5 - Mr. Rusk*

1252  
422

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1966

SECRET-EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit by Mrs. Johnson to Latin America

Recommendation:

1. It is recommended that Mrs. Johnson visit Guatemala as co-chairman of the United States delegation to the inauguration of Mendez Montenegro on July 1. She could then visit several, or all of the Central American countries. The total time would be approximately ten days.

Approve\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove\_\_\_\_\_

2. The co-chairman with Mrs. Johnson of the delegation should be a Cabinet officer. The Secretary of Agriculture would be a good choice. The Cabinet officer need not accompany Mrs. Johnson on the visits to the other countries.

Approve\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove\_\_\_\_\_

Background:

Latin Americans desire that you visit Latin America. They will be pressing to have you visit each country. It is exceedingly difficult once you start on this process to leave out any countries. For security and other reasons, the Department does not recommend that you make a general tour of Latin America. We believe that the major desired political advantages for both the United States and Latin

SECRET-EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 84-302 (#6)	
By	Date
DLH per/cs	8-20-86
NARS, Date	



SECRET-EXDIS

- 2 -

America can be achieved through the Summit Meeting which we think should be held the latter part of this year, most likely in Lima. You might stop in Brasilia enroute to or from the Lima meeting.

At the same time, a high level representative of the Administration should try to visit every country in Latin America. We believe that Vice President Humphrey should plan to visit several countries in South America -- Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. The timing would depend on the dates finally determined for the OAS Conference on Charter Amendments (now scheduled for Buenos Aires beginning July 30) and the date and location determined for the Presidential Summit Meeting. We should also consider a second trip for Mrs. Johnson later in the year if it can be worked into the schedule conveniently with other activities now under consideration, such as the proposed Summit Meeting.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

SECRET-EXDIS

May 6, 1966  
Friday, 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have been trying to draw a clean line between occasions when I am acting as your agent and those when I am putting an idea into the town as a working colleague.

Therefore, I addressed this memorandum to the two Secretaries rather than directly to you.

Nevertheless, it may interest you.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment

SENSITIVE

cc: Bill Moyers

430

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

May 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This concerns the bombing of POL targets in North Vietnam.

I went through an experience in 1944 which may bear on the decision which is before us.

We used then with respect to the Germans exactly the same analytical methods we are now applying to North Vietnam; that is, we estimated civilian, over-all military, and front line military POL requirements. Assuming that they would and could cushion front line military requirements, we told our seniors that attacks on oil would be considerably cushioned and delayed in their impact on the military situation in the field.

We were wrong. From the moment that serious and systematic oil attacks started, front line single engine fighter strength and tank mobility were affected. The reason was this: it proved much more difficult, in the face of general oil shortage, to allocate from less important to more important uses than the simple arithmetic of the problem would suggest. Oil moves in various logistical channels from central sources. When the central sources began to dry up the effects proved fairly prompt and widespread. What look like reserves statistically are rather inflexible commitments to logistical pipelines.

With respect to North Vietnam we are dealing, of course, with much lower military expenditures of POL in absolute terms; but we are also dealing with a much less sophisticated logistical capacity.

As I remember, the estimate in 1965 was that something like 60% of POL in North Vietnam was for military purposes; 40% for civilian.

We can properly assume that the expansion in recent months is wholly for military purposes. Military requirements may now, therefore, be running at about 80% of total availabilities. This leaves a small civilian cushion, indeed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-26  
By inf, NARS, Date 11-4-85

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE



~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

- 2 -

May 6, 1966

With an understanding that simple analogies are dangerous, I nevertheless feel it is quite possible the military effects of a systematic and sustained bombing of POL in North Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than conventional intelligence analysis would suggest.

I would underline, however, the adjectives "systematic and sustained." If we take this step we must cut clean through the POL system -- and hold the cut -- if we are looking for decisive results.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Thursday - May 5, 1966 - 7:00 pm

*To Pres. 44*  
*Ret'd from*  
*Pres 5/11/66*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Intensification of Cultural Exchange with Mexico**

Pursuant to your request that we expand cultural exchange with Mexico, State reports the following:

1. Assistant Secretary Frankel will increase the number of American artistic presentations sent to Mexico and step up the exchange of outstanding cultural representatives. His memorandum to Linc Gordon describing what he plans to do is at Tab A.
2. State is considering negotiating a new cultural agreement with Mexico to replace the virtually inoperative 1949 agreement.
3. We will shortly receive from State a proposal for establishing a Juarez-Lincoln Scholarship Commission which would provide overall guidance in the use of the proposed Benito Juarez and Abraham Lincoln Scholarship Funds to be established in the U.S. and Mexico, respectively.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

DECLASSIFIED
State 11-22-78 (#100)
By DC.H per 158 NARS, Date 8-20-86

**CONFIDENTIAL**



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: ARA - Mr. Gordon

SUBJECT: Expanded Cultural Exchanges with Mexico

I refer to the memorandum of April 23, 1966 which the Executive Secretary of the Department has directed to you informing you that the President has placed very high priority on expanded cultural exchanges with Mexico. We shall indeed carry out the President's instructions in this regard, and we are taking steps to expand our present cultural exchange activities with Mexico to the greatest extent possible.

In the area of cultural presentations, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has in the past two years sent a number of performing arts attractions of high quality to Mexico. These attractions have included the American Ballet Theatre, the University of Illinois Symphony Orchestra, Marjorie Mitchell, the Paul Taylor Dance Company, the Roger Wagner Chorale, the New York Pro Musica, the Claremont Quartet, and the Mitchell-Ruff Duo.

In June of this year the Philadelphia Orchestra, under the direction of Eugene Ormandy, will visit Mexico for a series of concerts under our program. We have made plans with the Musical Theatre in the Round and the Hamline University Choir for visits to Latin America within the next year, and we shall offer these attractions to the Embassy for possible performances in Mexico.

We have also made preliminary arrangements with the acting team of Eddie Albert and Margo (Mrs. Albert) and with the Eastman Brass Quintet for Latin American tours in 1966 or early 1967. When arrangements are concluded we shall also offer these attractions to the Embassy for presentation in Mexico.

We are considering additional possibilities for presenting outstanding cultural attractions in Mexico. They are as follows: John Browning, pianist; the Isaac Stern, Eugene Istomin, Leonard Rose Trio; the Krainis Trio; the North Texas State University Jazz Band; and Robert Hamilton, pianist. These attractions have been recommended for use in the program by the Department's advisory panels. When

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
State 11-14-79 (#1006)  
By DC4 for 158 NARS, Date 8-20-86



~~SECRET~~

2

negotiations have been completed for these artists to participate in our program, we shall be pleased to present several of the attractions to the Embassy in Mexico for its consideration for calendar year 1967. To send these additional artists to Mexico will require that we go beyond our present budgetary plans for Mexico for fiscal year 1967. However, we are prepared to readjust our budget so that Mexico may be included in their visits to Latin America. ||

In addition to the artists under our cultural presentations program, we have given attention to the interchange of outstanding representatives of the cultural life of our two countries within our exchange-of-persons activity.

Some of the more prominent American cultural figures who have been in Mexico under the auspices of this Bureau are Katharine Anne Porter, novelist; Robert Gorham Davis, literary critic; Henry Steele Commager, historian and author; Romney Brent, theatrical director; Robert Eberhart, poet; Roger Sessions, composer; and Arthur Cohn, music director. In addition, a number of American professors have lectured on our culture in Mexico, and American students have gone to Mexico to study aspects of the culture of that country.

Mexican cultural figures who have come to the United States under CU auspices in the recent past included, for example, Carmen Marin Barreda, Director of the Museum of Modern Art, Mexico City; Miguel Sabido, theatrical director and writer; and two groups of art students, including one from the noted San Carlos Art School in Mexico City.

In particular, it is my belief that communication between intellectual and cultural figures of Mexico and the United States can make a truly significant contribution to good relations between the two countries, and I have directed my staff to intensify exchanges of this type. I have in mind the idea of high-level seminar discussions on matters of common cultural concern, which also fall in line with the fifth point of the President's Smithsonian address (and his message on February 2 to the Congress on International Education) "to assemble meetings of men and women from every discipline and every culture to ponder the common problems of mankind."

  
Charles Frankel

~~SECRET~~

Thursday  
May 5, 1966 -- 1:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

These two urgent requests for decision on visit invitations are consistent with the over-all schedule for the year, which will be coming up to you shortly.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Thursday*  
 Tuesday, May 3, 1966 1:10 pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit by Colombian President-Elect  
 Lleras

Ambassador Covey Oliver meets with President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo this coming Saturday, May 7. He asks for your authorization to invite him to Washington for an informal working visit at a mutually convenient time during the next six months. Linc Gordon and Secretary Rusk endorse this request.

The advantages of such a visit are:

1. It will enhance your image of close association with, and support for, progressive, reform-minded democratic governments in Latin America.
2. It will give you an opportunity to review with Lleras his development plans and our assistance programs for Colombia where we have such an important economic and political stake.
3. It will strengthen Lleras' position domestically as he tries to put together a working two-thirds majority in the Congress.

There are no adverse considerations.

I recommend that you authorize Ambassador Oliver to extend the invitation.

W. W. Rostow

Authorize invitation \_\_\_\_.

Prefer no invitation \_\_\_\_.

Let's discuss further \_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NLJ 86-248  
 By up, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



456

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Thurs*  
Tuesday, May *5*, 1966 11:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Private Visit by Nicaraguan President Schick

Nicaraguan President Schick is passing through the United States about June 10 on his way back from state visits to Spain and Israel.

Since he will be in the country, Lincoln Gordon and Secretary Rusk recommend that you invite him to Washington for a brief private visit. This is not essential, but it would be desirable.

In the three years he has been in office, President Schick has not been invited to pay an official visit to the United States. His administration represents a welcome change from the Somoza dynasty which will probably be resumed next year when "Tachito" Somoza is expected to win the scheduled elections. Under Schick, Nicaraguans have enjoyed a larger measure of personal freedom than before. He has brought unprecedented economic prosperity to his country. His record of cooperation with us has been excellent, including the decision to send troops to the Dominican Republic.

An invitation would be highly rewarding to him. It would give us a subtle way of manifesting our support for his independence from the Somoza clan and constructive administration, a point which will not be lost on the Nicaraguan people who will contrast it with our reserve toward the Somozas.

Some of the more far out liberal critics of the Administration may complain about your receiving Schick because of his association with the Somozas. The visit would be played in low key here, and the criticism is not likely to be significant.

W. W. Rostow

Approve invitation \_\_\_\_.

Prefer no invitation \_\_\_\_.

Let's discuss \_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-248

By lip, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

44

FS

12

Thursday,  
May 5, 1966 -- 1:10 p.m.

100  
79

Mr. President:

You should know of this cable which just arrived. It obviously has many angles. Will get it staffed out.

It relates to the negotiating procedures we wish to follow in the months ahead, which, in any case, ought to be brought up to you for examination soon.

W. W. Rostow

UN 4760 -- NODIS



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* #4

462

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

DT515  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUEHDT 515 1251440  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 051425Z  
FM USUN NEWYORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4760  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ MAY 05

3979

1966 MAY 5 AM 10 48

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-249

By sp, NARA, Date 2-26-88

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

N O D I S

RE: POSSIBILITY DE GAULLE-PRESIDENTIAL MEETING

SEYDOUX (FRANCE) ASKED ME TO LUNCH TODAY IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN FROM PARIS WHERE HE PARTICIPATED IN SYG'S VISIT TO DE GAULLE. OTHER ASPECTS MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM REPORTED SEPARATELY. THIS TEL DEALS WITH POSSIBILITY DE GAULLE-PRESIDENTIAL MEETING, MAINLY WITH RESPECT TO NATO.

ON THIS ASPECT OF DISCUSSION SEYDOUX SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE ME "SEYDOUX SUGGESTION" WHICH CARRIED CONCURRENCE OF COUVE, ALPHAND AND ETIENNE BURIN DES ROZIER. SEYDOUX SAID DE GAULLE WAS DISTURBED AT WAY NEGOTS BETWEEN US WERE PROCEEDING ON NATO. HE OBSERVED WE EACH HAD OUR RESPECTIVE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS AND THIS WAS PROPER. ON OTHER HAND DE GAULLE DID NOT FEEL NEGOTS WERE PROCEEDING AT LEVEL AND IN DIGNIFIED MANNER WHICH WAS REQUIRED BY IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT.

SEYDOUX SAID DE GAULLE HAD NOTED VERY FAVORABLY MOYER'S PRESS STATEMENT THAT PRES WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEE DE GAULLE IF HE SHOULD COME TO UN. HAD ALSO NOTED RATHER FRIENDLY STATEMENT BY ME ON MEET THE PRESS. SEYDOUX NOTED THERE WAS NO CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PRES AND DE GAULLE AND SAID THIS WAS UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE DE GAULLE LOOKED TO JOHNSON WITH GREAT RESPECT AS US PRES AND REGARDED NATO ISSUE AS ONE INVOLVING HIGHEST LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY.

WHILE I TOLD SEYDOUX I WAS NOT INVOLVED IN NATO DISCUSSIONS I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY HIS VIEWS ABOUT DESIRABILITY SOME NEW APPROACH AND LET HIM KNOW OF ANY REACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- 4760, May 5 From USUN New York (NODIS)

WHAT SEYDOUX CLEARLY WAS HINTING AT WAS DESIRABILITY DE GAULLE-JOHNSON MEETING WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT WITHOUT FRENCH HAVING REQUEST IT. SEYDOUX SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT FRENCH AMB IN WASH DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW ABOUT THIS APPROACH TO ME AND ASKED HE NOT BE INFORMED. SEYDOUX SAID HE DISCUSSING THIS ON PERSONAL BASIS AND NOT INFORMING HIS OWN STAFF. WHILE SEYDOUX WAS SPEAKING MAINLY IN CONTEXT OF NATO PROBLEMS HE DID INDICATE BROADER QUESTIONS OF FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ALSO WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS.

NOT BEING VERY CLOSE TO NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENTS ON NATO I PASS THESE VIEWS ALONG FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. I SENSE IT IS SERIOUS PROPOSAL, NOT JUST SEYDOUX IDEA, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY INASMUCH AS HE ASKED TO SEE ME IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN TO US AND CANCELLED ANOTHER LUCHEON TO DO SO. SEYDOUX IS CAREFUL AND SKILLED DIPLOMAT AND WOULD NOT CONVEY SUCH IDEAS UNLESS THEY WERE THOROUGHLY APPROVED AT HIGHEST LEVELS. HE REFERRED IN CONVERSATION TO HAVING SEEN DE GAULLE SEVERAL TIMES WHILE HOME FOR SYG VISIT.

GP-3  
GOLDBERG  
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5/5/66.

180  
60  
10 8.0

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 5, 1966  
1:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We will shortly be asking your approval of a new military credit sales package for Iran, running close to \$200 million. This will be the biggest issue in US-Iranian relations this year. In addition to the formal recommendation Secretary Rusk will be sending at the end of next week, it might be a good idea for you to hear Ambassador Meyer's analysis firsthand. The Secretary recommends you see him.

If you do, I suggest waiting till the end of his stay here (May 13) after he and the rest of the town have thrashed out our position.

*Walt* Rostow

I will see him ✓

My schedule is too full \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-248  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 5, 1966, 12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the light of Secretary Rusk's talk with Mehta I recommend:

1. Pick up his point yesterday about the new mood in India and say we wish to back it.
2. Indicate -- as did Secretary Rusk -- that our commitments of support must now be in general terms, awaiting Congressional action.
3. Indicate again your feeling that the larger nation had great responsibilities in normalizing relations with a smaller -- as we have done with Mexico.
4. Indicate we hope to see defense expenditures in both countries reduced.
5. Work out details with George Woods.
6. Perhaps use this occasion to tell him we shall resume negotiations on the four project loans (card attached).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-248  
By up, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



BEAS DAM 350 megawatts----- \$33, 000, 000

DHUVARAN Power Plant Extension ----- \$32, 300, 000

DURGAPUR Power Plant ----- \$16, 500, 000

Minerals Exploration ----- \$ 3, 500, 000

TOTAL----- \$85, 300, 000

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 5, 1966 -- 10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador William McC.  
Blair, Jr. (Philippines)

Bill Blair, our Ambassador to the Philippines, will be in town for a week of consultations beginning Monday, May 9th, and State recommends that you meet with him briefly, if possible.

I should think that this would be a useful thing to do. Blair is fresh from two long talks with President Marcos and has a clear view of the potential problems surrounding a Marcos visit. At the moment, Marcos is worried about coming here too soon after final passage of the Philippine Vietnam Aid Bill; he is also beginning to attach to the visit some large-scale economic and military aid requests which will need careful sorting and negotiation prior to his arrival.

It would be helpful to the Ambassador's negotiating position with Marcos if Blair were to see you toward the end of the week prior to his return to the Philippines.

Arrange for him to come in ✓

No       

5/6/66 per John Jacobson  
to Mr. Rostow  
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
State 4-7-77 (#179)
By <u>QH</u> NARS, Date <u>8-30-86</u>

CONFIDENTIAL



## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Memor to Pres 50*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 5, 1966 -- 10:15 am

When you approved going ahead with the four Indian projects hanging over from prior year programs, you asked how they would contribute to agricultural development. Three of them contribute directly:

1. The Beas Dam (\$33 million) will irrigate 6.5 million acres of desert, in addition to producing 350 MW's of electricity. We held up signature for several years until the Indians agreed to use the water for intensive irrigation of the best land rather than saving it for emergency use only. They have now bought our principle.

2. The Dhuvaran Thermal Power Plant extension (\$32.3 million) will electrify 4,000 additional villages and provide power for at least 10,000 new powered tubewells for irrigation--in addition to meeting various industrial demands.

3. The Durgapur Thermal Power Plant extension (\$16.5 million) will feed power into a loosely interconnected grid serving one of the two big industrial regions. Among the many power users would be fertilizer plants, rural development works, tubewell irrigation and a variety of multipurpose projects contributing to flood control and irrigation in the Damodar River Valley.

The fourth project for minerals exploration (\$3.5 million) is not directly related to agriculture. However, the purpose is to locate workable deposits of non-ferrous metals so that Indians can save scarce foreign exchange for other priority imports like fertilizer. India must now import almost all the non-ferrous metals needed to bring its industry up to full capacity.

All these loans were ready to go when we froze aid. Because the projects are geared into Indian development plans, State feels we should go ahead. We are assuming that your approval was contingent only on a hard second look. We will let these go and stick to your priorities in ranking future projects.

Let them go \_\_\_\_\_

Still hold \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-248

By sig, NARA, Date 1-25-89*Walt* Rostow~~CONFIDENTIAL~~






~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

1199  
500  
1 - *Parsons*  
2 - *Ret.*

S/S-7155



May 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Project Loans for India

Four project loans, the Beas Dam, the Dhuvaran and Durgapur power projects and the Operation Hardrock minerals exploration project, have been under negotiation with the Indian Government for some time and could probably be signed within a month of authorization. The Indian Government was notified prior to our suspension of aid that we had formally committed funds for these specific projects.

The President has indicated that he would prefer to see our resources at this time go to agriculture rather than projects of this type, but that if the funds cannot be transferred more substantially toward use in support of agriculture he approves the reopening of negotiations on the loans at an early appropriate moment. He also expressed interest in knowing to what extent the power projects would contribute to agriculture.

Three of the four loans will promote agricultural development:

- the Beas Dam, which we are committed to finance under the 1960 Indus Basin Settlement Agreement, will provide irrigation for 6.5 million acres of potentially productive land in the Great Indian Desert in western Rajasthan and will generate 350 MW's of electricity at full capacity. The signature of the Beas loan has been held up for several years because of our insistence that irrigation waters be used to support intensive agricultural efforts to which the Indians have now agreed with us in principle and the details are being worked out.

- the Dhuvaran project will add two 140 MW generators to an existing thermal power plant (partially AID-financed) and extend, inter alia, transmission lines to another 4,000 villages in the State of Gujarat, which will permit the installation of some 10,000 new tubewells.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

- the Durgapur

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

MAY 2 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- the Durgapur project will add 150 MW to an existing AID-financed thermal power plant. The additional power will tie into the grid which is fed in part by the multi-purpose Damodar Valley hydroelectric system and make possible better utilization of the Damodar River dams for flood control and irrigation.

All three of the above projects will increase the availability of power for rural electrification, not only to power tubewells and other irrigation facilities but also to help modernize the rural economy.

The minerals exploration project would not contribute directly to agriculture, but would, to the extent that it is successful in finding domestic deposits of non-ferrous metals which now must be imported, make more foreign exchange available for agricultural inputs.


All four projects are discussed in further detail in the enclosures to this memorandum.

The transfer of the loan funds to other purposes at this very late stage would create serious problems in our aid relationship with the Indians because:

- the four projects are geared into Indian development planning which, particularly in the case of the two power projects, would be seriously disrupted by the withdrawal of our financing;

- the diversion of these funds to projects having exclusively agricultural purposes would raise serious doubts with the GOI as to the reliability of our support for the economy as a whole.

In view of the considerations outlined above, we intend to proceed with final negotiation and signature of the four loans.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Beas Dam.
2. Dhuvaran Thermal Power Plant Extension.
3. Durgapur Thermal Power Plant Extension.
4. Minerals Exploration (Operation Hardrock).

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED  
RGSTOW'S OFFICE

1965 MAY 1 AM 10 10




CONFIDENTIALBEAS DAM - \$33.0 Million

In July 1959, the IBRD presented to the United States a proposal for financing the dams, irrigation works and other facilities required by the IBRD-sponsored Plan for allocation of the Indus Basin waters between Pakistan and India. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon gave Mr. Black of the IBRD assurances that the United States would participate in the Indus Basin Settlement Plan.

In July 1960, the Board of Directors of the Development Loan Fund agreed to United States participation in the financing of the Beas Dam by authorizing a \$33 million loan. Under Secretary Dillon - a Director of DLF - wrote Mr. Black the same day of the U.S. action making clear the Beas Dam loan represented fulfillment of the U.S. assurances extended in July 1959.

Beas Dam will provide reservoir storage for 6.5 million acre feet of water for irrigation purposes and generate about 350 megawatts of power at full capacity. The water storage will feed the 426 mile Rajasthan Canal and secondary systems and permit irrigation of about 6.5 million potentially productive acres annually in the Great Indian Desert region in western Rajasthan.

The issue which has delayed earlier agreement on the Beas Dam project is our desire for assurance that the water be used for intensive irrigation on the potentially most productive land. The Indians have now agreed with us in principle and the details are being worked out. We believe that the loan could be signed within about 30 days of resumption of negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

50c

CONFIDENTIAL


DHUVARAN THERMAL POWER PLANT EXTENSION - \$32.3 Million

The loan will finance the foreign exchange costs of two additional 140 MW generator sets for the existing Dhuvaran Thermal Plant, located in the State of Gujarat in West India. The plant output is fed into the Gujarat State power system to meet load requirements throughout the state.

In addition to meeting various industrial demands, the power from the proposed extension will help meet significant agricultural load requirements in the state. The extension of transmission lines associated with the increase in generating capacity will permit power to be distributed to 4,000 additional villages, raising the total number electrified to 5,750. Power availability will permit the number of powered tubewells for irrigation to be increased by at least 10,000. There is a serious backlog of demand for electricity for pump sets and tubewells by Gujarat farmers.

In 1962 A.I.D. provided a dollar loan of \$33.6 million for the basic plant, and about \$19 million equivalent of P.L. 480, Section 104 (g) rupee funds were loaned for civil construction costs.

No major issues remain to be negotiated. Loan agreement signature could be scheduled within about 15 days.



GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDURGAPUR THERMAL POWER PLANT EXTENSION - \$16.5 Million


The loan will finance foreign exchange costs of one additional 150 MW generator set for the existing 285 MW power station. The station is a coal-fired thermal unit utilizing plentiful and economically cheap coking coal by-products of several coal washeries in the Bihar coal fields.

The power output is fed to a loosely interconnected grid system serving the southern areas of Bihar and West Bengal, including the Calcutta metropolitan area. This region is one of the two major industrial heartlands of India, marked by a wide variety of power users; coal washeries, rail transport, steel plants, fertilizer plants, chemical plants, rural development works, tubewell irrigation systems and other industrial and agricultural users.

A.I.D. and predecessor agencies have financed four generator sets for this facility under two earlier loans totaling \$30 million. About \$7.2 million equivalent in rupees have been loaned to the project for civil construction costs. The plant began commercial operation in 1960.

The additional capacity would complement multipurpose projects in the Damodar River Valley. These projects are primarily flood control and irrigation oriented, with some hydroelectric generation. Durgapur and other thermal plants in the system meet continuous base loads for the region with the hydro plants providing peaking power as needed.

The loan was approved by A.I.D. in June 1965 and the GOI advised of the commitment of funds. No major issues remain to be negotiated. Loan agreement signature could be scheduled within about 15 days.



## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL



50e

CONFIDENTIAL


MINERALS EXPLORATION (OPERATION HARDROCK) - \$3.5 Million

The project contemplates conducting airborne geophysical surveys over 90,000 linear miles, and diamond drilling of promising test areas. The objective is to find and prove exploitable deposits of base metals, such as copper, tin, lead, zinc and nickel.

At the present time, India is almost entirely dependent on imported supplies of non-ferrous metals. Production of copper and lead is meager and there is no present production of zinc, tin or nickel. Presently known workable deposits of copper, lead, and zinc are extremely small and no deposits of tin or nickel have been discovered. Although restricted by the shortage of foreign exchange, imports of copper, lead, zinc and tin in 1963-64 were about \$100 million. This amount reflects only an artificially restricted demand; real demand is not measurable in the absence of definitive data on the extent of, or reasons for, underutilization of plant capacity.

Estimates of the 1970-71 import bill for non-ferrous metals are placed in the range of \$235-300 million. To the extent that exploitable indigenous sources can be located, a real opportunity will exist to conserve scarce foreign exchange for other priority needs, including agricultural inputs, and diminish waste involved in underutilization of plant capacity.

All issues had been resolved prior to suspension of negotiations. Tenders from U.S. engineering firms have been received by the GOI. Loan agreement signature could be arranged almost immediately upon authorization to proceed.



GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, May 4, 1966, 11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk recommends (Tab A) that you host a White House reception for the African Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission.

I agree with the Secretary's recommendation, and would add:

- (a) holding such a reception on the third anniversary<sup>26</sup> of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), May 25, would appeal to a vast audience of Africans on that continent as well as to Washington-based African diplomats; it would give USIA a chance to underscore your interest and project your image in Africa;
- (b) it could help us build up a reserve of good will among African governments on which we may have to draw to achieve our objectives in such hard problems in the UN as Chinese representation, "apartheid" in South Africa, the Rhodesian crisis, and the South West Africa mandate case;
- (c) it would provide you a public occasion to express your personal confidence in the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, II, thereby strengthening his hand in dealing with his African "clients."


I also suggest we add Bob Kintner to the guest list.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



CONFIDENTIAL

5/12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reception for African Ambassadors from OAU States

Recommendation:

That you agree to host a reception for African Ambassadors from OAU States:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The recent assumption of office by Ambassador Joseph Palmer 2nd and the third anniversary in May of the Organization of African Unity present a particularly suitable occasion to reaffirm continuing United States interest in Africa. A reception would afford an opportunity to meet with the African representatives at a time when our relations with African countries north of the Zambezi are generally the best they have been in some time. The absence of the South African Ambassador would not present an insurmountable problem, since South Africa is not a member of the OAU.

The exact date of the reception would, of course, depend upon your wishes. The reception could be held during the latter part of May. The Anniversary of The Charter of the Organization of African Unity is May 25.

I have enclosed a suggested guest list which represents a cross-section of persons in this country with a serious interest in Africa and a list of the Chiefs of Mission in Washington of the African countries which are members of the Organization of African Unity.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested Guest List.



516

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

African Diplomatic Corps

Algeria - H.E. Cherif Guellal (Ambassador)  
Burundi - Mr. Francois Kisukurume (Charge d'Affaires)  
Cameroon - H.E. Joseph N. Owono (Ambassador)  
CAR - H.E. Michel Gallin-Douathe (Ambassador)  
Chad - H.E. Boukar Abdoul (Ambassador)  
Congo(L) - Mr. Joseph Ugolin Nzeza (Minister, Charge d'Affaires)  
Dahomey - H.E. Louis Igancio-Pinto (Ambassador)  
Ethiopia - H.E. Tashoma Haile-Mariam, (Ambassador)  
Gabon - H.E. Aristide N. E. Issembe (Ambassador)  
Ghana - H.E. Miguel Augustus Ribeiro (Ambassador)  
Guinea - H.E. Karim Bangoura (Ambassador)  
Ivory Coast - Mr. Charles Gomis (Charge d'Affaires)  
Kenya - H.E. Burudi Nabwera (Ambassador)  
Liberia - H.E. S. Edward Peal (Ambassador)  
Libya - H.E. Fathi Abidia (Ambassador)  
Malagasy Republic - H.E. Louis Rakotomalala (Ambassador)  
Malawi - H.E. Vincent H. B. Gondwe (Ambassador)  
Mali - H.E. Moussa Leo Keita (Ambassador)  
Mauritania - H.E. Ahmed-Baba Miske (Ambassador)  
Morocco - H.E. Ahmed Laraki (Ambassador)  
Niger - H.E. Adamou Mayaki (Ambassador)  
Nigeria - H.E. Ade Martins (Ambassador)  
Rwanda - H.E. Celestin Kabanda (Ambassador)  
Senegal - H.E. Ousmane Soce Diop (Ambassador)  
Sierra Leone - H.E. Gershon B. O. Collier (Ambassador)  
Somalia - H.E. Ahmed Mohamed Adan (Ambassador)  
Sudan - H.W. Amin Ahmad Hussein (Ambassador)  
Tanzania - H.E. Michael M. Lukumbuzya (Ambassador)  
Togo - H.E. Robert Ajavon (Ambassador)  
Tunisia - H.E. Rachid Driss (Ambassador)  
Uganda - H.E. Solomon Bayo Asea (Ambassador)  
Upper Volta - H.E. John Borema Kabore (Ambassador)  
Zambia - H.E. Hosea Josias Soko (Ambassador)  
  
UAR - Mr. Hassan Hosny, (Charge d'Affaires)

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Other U.S. Government

The Vice President  
The Chief Justice of the United States  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Solicitor General  
The Secretary of Agriculture  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Secretary of Labor  
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare  
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

The Head of the National Institutes of Health  
The Head of the National Aeronautics & Space Administration  
The Head of the Export-Import Bank

Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, George L-P Weaver  
Director of Community Services, Department of Justice, Roger Wilkins  
Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, Hobart Taylor  
Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, Andrew Brimmer

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Department of State, AID, USIA, DOD

The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk  
The Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball  
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Thomas C. Mann  
Ambassador at Large, W. Averell Harriman  
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson  
The Chief of Protocol, Ambassador James Symington  
Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Joseph J. Sisco  
Legal Adviser, Leonard C. Meeker  
The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer 2nd  
Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Wayne Fredericks  
Deputy Assistant Secretary William C. Trimble  
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Sameul Z. Westerfield  
Deputy Chief of Protocol, Chester Carter

Administrator, AID, David E. Bell  
Assistant Administrator, AID, Edmond C. Hutchinson  
Deputy Assistant Administrator, AID, Herman Kleine

Director, USIA, Leonard H. Marks  
Assistant Director, USIA, Mark B. Lewis

William E. Lang, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security  
Affairs, DOD

White House

Walt W. Rostow  
Bill D. Moyers  
Ulric Haynes, Jr.  
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.  
Robert Komer  
S. Douglass Cater, Jr.  
Clifford Alexander



## PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

### Senators

J. W. Fulbright (D-Arkansas)  
Russell B. Long (D-Louisiana)  
Frank J. Lausche (D-Ohio)  
Frank Church (D-Idaho)  
Thomas J. Dodd (D-Connecticut)  
Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa)  
Karl E. Mundt (R-S. Dakota)  
Frank E. Moss (D-Utah)  
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)  
Birch Bayh (D-Indiana)  
Fred R. Harris (D-Oklahoma)  
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii)

### Congressmen

Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pennsylvania)  
Barratt O'Hara (D-Illinois)  
Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Michigan)  
William T. Murphy (D-Illinois)  
Robert N. C. Nix (D-Pennsylvania)  
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-New York)  
John C. Culver (D-Iowa)  
E. Ross Adair (R-Indiana)  
Frances P. Bolton (R-Ohio)  
William S. Bloomfield (R-Michigan)  
F. Bradford Morse (R-Massachusetts)  
John Brademas (D-Indiana)  
John V. Tunney (D-California)  
William S. Mailliard (R-California)  
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R-New Jersey)  
Ogden R. Reid (R-New York)  
Adam Clayton Powell (D-New York)  
Augustus F. Hawkins (D-California)  
John J. Conyers, Jr. (D-Michigan)

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR THE RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

International Organizations

The Secretary General of the United Nations  
Under Secretary, United Nations, Ralph Bunche  
Representative of the OAU in New York  
Head of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
Head of the International Monetary Fund  
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg (USUN)  
Ambassador Eugenie Anderson (USUN)  
Ambassador James M. Nabrit (USUN)

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Foundations and Organizations Interested in Africa

Mr. F. Champion Ward, Ford Foundation, 477 Madison Avenue, NY 22, NY

Mr. Laurence S. Rockefeller, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund,  
30 Rockefeller Plaza, NY 20, NY

Mr. J. George Harrar, President, Rockefeller Foundation,  
111 West 50th Street, NY, NY

Mr. Alan Pifer, Acting President, Carnegie Corporation of NY,  
589 Fifth Avenue, NY 17, NY

Mr. Arthur A. Houghton, Jr., President, Foundation for Youth and  
Student Affairs, 1 East 54th Street, NY 22, NY

Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen, President, African-American Institute,  
345 East 46th Street, NY 17, NY

Mr. Kenneth Holland, President, Institute of International Education  
1 East 67th Street, NY 21, NY

---



PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Academic

Dr. Samuel M. Nabrit, President, Texas Southern University,  
Houston, Texas

Dr. Martin D. Jenkins, President, Morgan State College, Baltimore, Md.

Dr. Howard Jordan, President, Savannah State College, Savannah, Ga.

Dr. Jerome Holland, President, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.

Dr. Stephen Wright, President, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.

Mr. Al Castagno, Director, Africa Studies Program, Boston University,  
Boston, Mass.

Dr. Marvin Wachman, President, Lincoln University, Lincoln University, Pa.

Very Rev. Edward B. Bunn, S.J., President, Georgetown University,  
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Stanton Wormley, Acting President, Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Luther Foster, President, Tuskegee Institute, Alabama

Mr. Howard Johnson, President, M.I.T.

Mr. James Perkins, President, Cornell University

Mr. Fred Harrington, President, University of Wisconsin

Dr. Thomas M. Jenkins, President, Albany State College, Albany, Ga.

Dr. Horace Mann Bond, Dean, School of Education, Atlanta University,  
Atlanta, Ga.

Dr. Adelaide Hill, Executive Assistant, African Studies Program,  
Boston University, Boston, Mass.

Mr. Oliver S. Willham, President, Oklahoma State University

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Dr. Davis E. Apter  
Institute of International Studies  
University of California  
2250 Piedmont Avenue  
Berkeley, California

Professor Henry L. Bretton to 6/66 Centre  
The University of Michigan for Econ Research  
Department of Political Science The Univ  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 of E.Africa, Nairobi

Dr. William O. Brown  
African Studies Center  
Boston University  
10 Lenox Street  
Brookline, Massachusetts

Professor Gwendolen Carter  
Program of African Studies  
Northwestern University  
Evanston, Illinois  
Tel: 492-7323

Dr. Rufus E. Clement  
President  
Atlanta University  
Atlanta 14, Georgia

Dr. James S. Coleman in Kampala to end 1967  
Director, African Studies Center  
University of California, Los Angeles  
Los Angeles, California 90024

Dr. L. Gray Cowan  
Columbia University  
411 Uris Hall  
New York, New York 10027

Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet  
American Council on Education  
1785 Massachusetts Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dr. Albert W. Dent  
President  
Dillard University  
New Orleans 22, Louisiana

The Honorable Edward R. Dudley  
Supreme Court Justice of New York  
100 Centre Street  
New York 7, New York

Mr. Ernest Dunbar  
Senior Editor, LOOK Magazine  
488 Madison Avenue  
New York, New York 10022  
Tel: MU 8-0300

Dr. Dorothy Ferebee  
Director, University Health Service  
Howard University  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Frank E. Ferrari  
~~Assistant to the President~~ African-American  
~~Cornell College International Institute~~  
~~217 North 4th Avenue~~ 345 East 46th Street  
New York, New York 10022 10017  
~~Tel: PL 2-1100 ext 227~~

Mrs. Rosa L. Gragg  
President  
National Association of Colored Women's  
Clubs, Inc.  
1601 R Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009  
Tel: DEcatur 2-8160

Dr. Manfred Halpern to 9/1/66  
Department of Politics Istanbul  
Princeton University  
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Dr. John A. Hannah  
President  
Michigan State University  
East Lansing, Michigan

Mr. George M. Houser  
American Committee on Africa  
211 East 43rd Street  
New York, New York 10017  
Tel: Code 212 TN 7-8733

Professor William O. Jones  
Food Research Institute  
Stanford University  
Stanford, California 94305

Mrs. Helen Kitchen  
Editor, Africa Report  
Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
Tel: 232-8525

Mr. Joseph Kraft  
2818 P Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20007

Mr. George N. Lindsay  
Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates  
320 Park Avenue  
New York 22, New York  
Tel: PLaza 2-6400.

Mrs. Oswald Bates Lord  
770 Park Avenue  
New York, New York

Professor John A. Marcum  
Director, African Program  
Lincoln University  
Lincoln University, Pennsylvania

The Reverend Frederick A. McGuire, C.M.  
Executive Secretary  
Mission Secretariat  
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Tel: 737-7474

Professor Vernon McKay  
School of Advanced International Studies  
The Johns Hopkins University  
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Professor William E. Moran, Jr.  
Dean, School of Foreign Service  
Georgetown University  
Washington 7, D.C.

Professor Ruth Schachter Morgenthau  
97 Lakeview Avenue  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts  
Brandeis University  
Tel: TW 4-6000 ext 396

Mr. F. Taylor Ostrander  
American Metal Climax, Inc.  
1270 Avenue of the Americas  
New York 20, New York  
Tel: PLaza 7-9700

Mr. Frederick D. Patterson  
President, Phelps-Stokes Fund  
297 Park Avenue South  
New York 10, New York  
Tel: GRamercy 3-8015

Mr. James H. Robinson, Director  
Operations Crossroads Africa, Inc.  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York 10011  
Tel: ORegon 5-4080

Dr. Carl G. Rosberg  
Committee for African Affairs  
University of California  
Berkeley 4, California

Mrs. Oscar Ruebhausen  
Chairman, Women's Africa Committee  
345 East 46th Street  
New York 17, New York  
Tel: YUkon 6-5320

Mrs. Ruth C. Sloan, Executive Director  
Ruth Sloan Associates  
2475 Virginia Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 7, D.C.  
Tel: FEderal 7-4453

Dr. Mabel Smythe c/o American Embassy  
The New Lincoln School Damascus.  
31 West 110th Street  
New York 26, New York  
Tel: ENright 9-5600

Mr. Kenneth Spang, Vice President  
The First National City Bank of New York  
399 Park Avenue  
New York, New York

Reverend Theodore L. Tucker  
Executive Secretary, Africa Committee  
National Council of the Churches of Christ  
475 Riverside Drive  
New York 27, New York  
Tel: RIverside 9-2200

Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein  
Department of Sociology  
Columbia University  
New York, New York 10027



PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Press

Mr. John H. Johnson, President and Publisher, Johnson Publications,  
Chicago, Ill.  
Mr. John Sengstacke, Publisher, Chicago Daily Defender, Chicago, Ill.  
Mr. Adolph J. Slaughter, Associated Negro Press, 918 F Street, N.W.,  
Washington, D.C.  
Mr. Ben Bradlee, Managing Editor, Washington Post, Washington, D.C.  
Mr. Carl Rowan, Columnist, Washington Star, Washington, D.C.  
Mr. John Finney, Washington Bureau, New York Times  
Mr. George Weeks, Washington Bureau, UPI  
Mr. Endre Marton, Associated Press  
Mr. Joseph Sterne, Baltimore Sun  
Mr. James Williams, Editor, Washington Afro-American  
Mr. Simeon Booker, Editor, Jet Magazine, Washington, D.C.  
Mr. Anthony Astrakan, Washington Post  
Mr. Marquis Childs, Washington Columnist, St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
Mr. Roland Evans, Washington Columnist, NY Herald Tribune Syndicate  
Mr. Joseph Kraft, Publishers Newspaper Syndicate, Washington Columnist  
Mr. Charles Bartlett, Washington Columnist, Chicago Sun-Times  
Mr. Philip Geyelin, Wall Street Journal  
Mr. Lawrence E. Laybourne, Assistant Publisher, TIME  
Mr. Edward Weintal, Newsweek  
Mr. Roscoe Drummond, Washington Columnist, NY Herald Tribune Syndicate

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Business Leaders

Mr. Walter Hochschild  
American Metal Climax Inc.  
1270 Avenue of the America  
New York, N.Y.

Mr. David Rockefeller, President  
Chase Manhattan Bank  
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza  
New York 15, N.Y.

Mr. James A. Farrell, Jr.  
President, Farrell Lines, Inc.  
26 Beaver Street  
New York 14, N.Y.

Mr. Edgar Kaiser, President  
Kaiser Industries Corporation  
300 Lakeside Drive  
Oakland 12, California

Mr. Juan T. Trippe, President  
Pan American World Airways, Inc.  
135 East 42nd Street  
New York 17, N.Y.

Mr. Robert P. Gerholz, President  
United States Chamber of Commerce  
1615 - H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. W. P. Gullander, President  
National Association of Manufacturers  
277 Park Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10017

Mr. William F. Kelly, President  
The American Bankers Association  
12 East 36th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Mr. Raymond C. Firestone, President  
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.  
1200 Firestone Parkway  
Akron 17, Ohio

Mr. Charles C. Tillinghast, President  
Transworld Airlines, Inc.  
605 Third Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Mr. Robert M. Norris, President  
National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.  
10 Rockefeller Plaza  
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Laurence A. Harvey, President  
Harvey Aluminum  
19200 Southwestern Avenue  
Torrance, California

Mr. Ralph Hatzel, Jr.  
Acting President  
Motion Picture Export Association  
of America, Inc.  
522 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10036

Mr. John F. McKiernan, President  
National Coffee Association  
120 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.

Dr. Lorimer Milton, President  
Citizens Trust Co.  
Atlanta, Ga.

Dr. Asa Spaulding, President  
North Carolina Mutual Life  
Insurance Co.  
Durham, North Carolina

Mr. Gilbert M. Weinstein  
Executive Director  
African American Chamber of Commerce  
99 Church Street, New York, N.Y. 10007

Mr. Frank Ikard  
American Petroleum Institute  
1101 - 17th Street  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. John H. Wheeler, President  
Mechanic and Farmers Trust Co.  
Durham, North Carolina

Mr. Doyle Mitchell, President  
Industrial Bank  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. William H. Beatty, Jr.  
The Chase Manhattan Bank  
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza  
New York, New York 10015

Cocoa Merchants Association  
(Name to be furnished)

Mr. Hans Ries, Vice President  
Continental Ore Corporation  
Suite 203  
218 North Canon Drive  
Beverly Hills, California 90210

Mr. Chad F. Calhoun  
5120 Baltan Road  
Sumner, Maryland

Mr. Christian Herter, Jr.  
Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc.  
150 East 42nd Street  
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Irwin Miller  
Cummunis Engine Company, Inc.  
Columbus, Indiana 47201

Mr. Norman Blake, Vice President  
Pan American World Airways  
Pan Am Building  
New York, New York 10017

Mr. L. Robert Castorr  
Asst. to the President  
National Federation of Independent  
Business  
Room 920, Washington Bldg.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Mr. Arthur B. Krim, President  
United Artists Corporation  
729 Seventh Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10019

Mr. Morris B. Abram  
575 Madison Avenue  
New York, New York

Chocolate Manufacturers  
Association  
(New President to be elected  
April 19)

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Labor

Mr. George Meany, President  
American Federation of Labor & Congress of  
Industrial Organizations  
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Walter Reuther, President  
United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural  
Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO  
8000 East Jefferson Avenue  
Detroit 14, Michigan

Mr. Joseph Beirne, President  
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO  
1925 K Street, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

Mr. A. Philip Randolph, President  
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, AFL-CIO  
217 West 125th Street  
New York 27, New York

Mr. Paul Jennings, President  
International Union of Electrical, Radio and  
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO  
1126 - 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

Mr. Jay Lovestone, Director  
Department of International Affairs  
AFL-CIO  
815 - 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Joseph Keenan, Secretary  
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO  
1200 - 15th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Irving Brown, Executive Director  
African American Labor Center  
345 East 46th Street  
Suite 200  
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Victor Reuther  
1126 - 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036



PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

The Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy  
New Bethel Baptist Church  
812 - S Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Val Washington  
Dawson Moreland Law Firm  
1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Miss Jean Noble  
Department of Education  
New York University  
New York, New York

Mr. Belford Lawson  
Attorney at Law  
1725 - K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Carl Holman  
Deputy Staff Director of  
U.S. Committee on Civil Rights  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
(After 4/15/66:  
801 - 19th Street, N.W.)

Dr. Charles Wesley, President  
Association for the Study of  
Negro Life and History  
1538 - 9th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Rayford Logan  
Historian, Howard University  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Floyd McKissick  
National Director Elect  
Congress of Racial Equality  
38 Park Row  
New York, New York

Dr. Kenneth O. Clark  
Professor of Psychology  
City College  
Convent Avenue and 139th Street  
New York, New York

Dr. John Hope Franklin  
Chicago University  
Chicago, Illinois

Mr. James Foreman  
Executive Secretary  
Student Non-Violent Coordinating  
Committee  
316 Nelson Street, S.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia

Mr. John Lewis, Chairman  
Student Non-Violent Coordinating  
Committee  
316 Nelson Street, S.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia

Mr. Marion Barry  
Director of Washington Student  
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee  
107 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. James Baldwin  
c/o Robert P. Mills  
640 - 5th Avenue  
New York, New York 19

Mr. Robert Fleming  
45 Livingston Street  
New Haven, Connecticut

Mrs. Marjorie Lawson  
1725 - K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Julius Hobson  
Action Community Team

Bishop George W. Baber  
Second Episcopal District of the  
African Methodist Episcopal Church  
100 Maryland Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Charles Stone, Special Assistant  
to Congressman Adam C. Powell  
House Office Building  
Washington, D.C.

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Mr. Whitney M. Young, Jr.  
Director - Executive Secretary  
National Urban League of New York  
14 E. 48th Street  
New York, New York

Mr. John Davis, President  
American Society of African  
Culture  
15 E. 40th Street  
New York, New York

Mr. Sterling Tucker  
Executive Director  
Washington Urban League  
626 Third Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Southern Leadership Conference  
330 Auburn Avenue  
Atlanta, Georgia

Mr. Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary  
National Association for the  
Advancement of Colored People  
20 W. 40th Street,  
New York 18, New York

Mr. Clarence Mitchell  
Washington Representative  
National Association for the  
Advancement of Colored People  
100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Dorothy Height, President  
National Council for Negro Women, Inc.  
1318 Vermont Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Theodore E. Brown, Director  
American Negro Leadership Conference  
of New York  
New York, New York

Mr. Louis E. Martin  
Deputy Chairman  
Democratic National Committee  
1730 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR RECEPTION FOR AFRICAN AMBASSADORS

Governor G. Mennen Williams

Mr. Edward Brooke, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts  
Boston, Massachusetts

Mr. Robert W. Kitchen (at FSI)  
4800 - 17th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

May 4, 1966  
Wednesday, 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

The issue here is of capital importance: whether your carefully hedged Rio commitment to extend mutual assistance in the Hemisphere beyond 1971 can be written into the new OAS Charter.

Morse leads the opposition, as the attached memorandum makes clear.

Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon wish to have a word with you at the Diplomatic Reception tonight.

What they need is a session with you tomorrow (Thursday) -- preferably in the morning -- before Linc leaves (Friday) for consultations on this matter in Latin America.

W. W. R.

May I schedule a Thursday  
morning meeting with  
Secretary Rusk and  
Linc Gordon \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



1233  
52a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: OAS Charter Amendments

Background

1. At the OAS Conference in Rio last November, it was unanimously agreed that the Charter of the OAS should be amended in three respects:

- (a) To improve the structure of the organization by holding annual meetings of Foreign Ministers and in other respects;
- (b) To strengthen the capacity of the organization to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes among member countries; and
- (c) To incorporate as treaty obligations the basic principles of the Alliance for Progress, including self-help and mutual assistance to accelerate economic and social progress. It was made clear that mutual assistance included actions by the Latin Americans for one another as well as actions by the United States.

2. A special OAS Committee met in Panama in late February and March of this year to draft Charter amendments in accordance with the decisions of Rio. Substantial agreement was reached on the matters of structure and peaceful settlement of disputes, but there was

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 79-74	
By <i>af pn/w</i>	NARS, Date 8-20-86

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

disagreement between the Latin American and United States delegations regarding the economic and social chapters. We believed that the Latin American proposals were unnecessarily elaborate, and that they might involve treaty commitments to aid and trade policies which would be opposed by the Senate as an unacceptable infringement on Congressional prerogatives. We, therefore, reserved our position, indicating that further consultations were required with the Senate on the basis of which we would offer counter-proposals. We stated, however, that the United States Government stands by the basic principles of the Economic and Social Act of Rio, and that our differences related only to the appropriate form for incorporation of these principles into treaty language.

3. After Assistant Secretary Gordon returned from Buenos Aires in early April, ~~a revised draft was prepared and presented to the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was discussed at length on April 25 with about 12 members of Senator Morse's subcommittee. Senator Fulbright participated as Chairman of the full Committee.~~

4. On Monday afternoon, ~~May 2,~~ Senators Fulbright and Morse, together with Senators McCarthy, Aiken and Carlson met again with Assistant Secretary Gordon. ~~Senator Morse, speaking for the group, stated that it was the Committee's considered opinion that commitments to mutual assistance, even with the safeguards contained in the State Department's draft, should not be incorporated into treaty obligations, but should be left to normal legislative action.~~ The Senators recognized that Article 26 of the present Charter (adopted in 1948) does include a broad commitment to economic cooperation. The discussion made it clear that ~~their objection to going further is related to concerns arising from the Vietnamese situation and generally from concern about the breadth of international commitments of the United States. All efforts to persuade them that the Western Hemisphere situation differs from others, in view of our long-standing special relations within this Hemisphere and the collective security engagements under the inter-~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

~~American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty) of 1947, proved~~  
~~unavailing.~~

5. ~~We have prepared a revised draft of the relevant articles~~  
~~which removes the qualified undertaking "to extend mutual assistance",~~  
~~thereby meeting the central objection of the Committee. ~~in an error~~~~  
~~to keep faith with the understandings of Rio, and to avoid a potential~~  
~~major setback in the climate of inter-American relations, we have~~  
~~drawn from the present Article 26 and then tied the use of resources~~  
~~under that Article to the self-help commitments and other provisions~~  
~~of the Alliance for Progress. Even this proposal will probably be~~  
~~regarded by the Latin Americans as a significant retreat from the~~  
~~Rio agreements, but we believe that it might barely suffice to bridge~~  
~~the gap. Anything less would not do so.~~

6. ~~Enclosure 1~~ contains in parallel columns (1) the "Panama  
Draft" on mutual assistance as approved by all the Latin American  
Delegations, (2) the draft submitted to the Senate Committee and  
opposed by them, and (3) ~~the new proposed draft~~, the first article  
of which is identical with Article 26 of the present Charter.

7. Enclosure 2. contains in parallel columns the entire Chapter  
on economic standards (1) as approved by the Latin American Delegations  
at Panama, and (2) as contained in the United States counter-proposals  
submitted to the Senate Committee.

8. ~~The problem of timing is very tight.~~ The Buenos Aires  
conference of Foreign Ministers to approve Charter amendments is  
now scheduled for July 30. To meet this date the OAS Council must  
submit its report by May 31. We do not want to maintain the present  
Buenos Aires schedule unless agreement on assistance among all the  
Member Governments can be reached before May 31. Assistant  
Secretary Gordon leaves Friday morning for Central America and  
Chile and hopes to discuss this matter on his trip. Any significant

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

slippage in the Buenos Aires schedule would affect adversely the proposed Presidential Summit Meeting.

Alternative Courses of Action

(LINC GORDON AND I WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY OF A FEW MINUTES' DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON THESE ALTERNATIVES AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE)

1. We can proceed to negotiate the revised language without further consultation with the Senate. In this case, we should inform them that we have taken their basic point into account and are seeking to negotiate the new language which would be given to them.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

2. We could take the revised proposals back for further discussions with the Senate Committee at the State Department level. In the present frame of mind of key members, this would run the risk that they would object on the ground that the proposed Article 7 gives a broader construction to the existing obligation under Article 6, and constitutes in spirit, if not in form, a commitment to mutual assistance.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

3. The new proposals (or a return to something stronger) could be discussed with the Senators with your own participation.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

**Enclosures:**

1. New Articles 6 and 7.
2. Chapter VII of the Charter.

CONFIDENTIAL

1.

A. PANAMA DRAFT  
Article 5

In order that the countries of the Organization may attain a balanced and sustained development as soon as possible, the member states accept the obligation, in accordance with their constitutional provisions and to the extent their available resources permit, helping one another and extending assistance, giving special attention to the relatively less-developed countries.

Article 9

The member states agree that mutual aid should be extended in appropriate amounts and under timely and flexible conditions, compatible with the needs of the assisted country and compatible with their own development plans and programs; and they will seek, individually and collectively, under similar terms, increased financial and technical cooperation from sources outside the Hemisphere and from international financial organizations. They also recognize that mutual aid in support of over-all stabilization and development plans and programs is an important factor in enabling such plans and programs to be carried out effectively, and in establishing or strengthening national financing institutions.

2.

B. U.S. DRAFT PROPOSED TO SENATE  
COMMITTEE  
Article 6

To attain balanced and sustained development as soon as feasible, the member states undertake as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide, to extend mutual assistance in support of national and multinational efforts to achieve the goals set forth in Article 4 giving special attention to the relatively less developed countries. The member states further agree that mutual assistance should be compatible with their own economic plans and programs, and, to be effective for the assisted country, should be timely and extended in appropriate amounts and under flexible conditions, consistent with the needs and efforts of that country. They will seek, under similar terms, financial and technical cooperation from sources outside the hemisphere as well as from international financial organizations.

3.

Enclosure 1.

C. NEW PROPOSED U. S. DRAFT  
Article 6  
(Repeat of Article 26 of Bogota Charter)

The member states agree to cooperate with one another, as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide, in the broadest spirit of good neighborliness, in order to strengthen their economic structure, develop their agriculture and mining, promote their industry and increase their trade.

Article 7

To attain balanced and sustained development as soon as feasible, the member states agree that the resources made available in accordance with Article 6 should be applied in support of the goals set forth in Article 4, giving special attention to the relatively less developed countries. They further agree that to be effective in achieving these goals, resources should be provided under flexible conditions and consistent with the needs to be met and the national and multinational efforts undertaken. They will seek, under similar terms, financial and technical cooperation from sources outside the hemisphere as well as from international organizations.

TEXT APPROVED IN PANAMA  
SUB-COMMITTEE

CHAPTER VII

Economic Standards

Article 1

The member states, inspired by the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, pledge themselves to a united effort to ensure social justice in the Hemisphere and dynamic and balanced economic development for their peoples, as conditions essential to the peace and security of the inter-American system.

Article 2

The member states pledge themselves to mobilize their own national human and material resources through suitable programs, and recognize the importance of operating within an efficient domestic structure, as fundamental conditions for their economic and social progress and for assuring effective inter-American cooperation.

PROPOSED U.S. DRAFT

CHAPTER VII

Economic Standards

Article 1

The member states, inspired by the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, pledge themselves to a united effort to assure social justice in the Hemisphere and dynamic and balanced economic development for their peoples, as conditions essential to the peace and security of the ~~inter-American~~ system.

Article 2

Recognizing that the economic and social progress of each state depends fundamentally on its own efforts, the member states pledge themselves to mobilize their national human and material resources and to establish efficient domestic institutions as essential to assure economic and social development and the effective use of mutual assistance.

Article 3

To accelerate their economic and social development, in accordance with their own methods and procedures and within the framework of the democratic principles and institutions of the system, the member states agree to dedicate every effort to achieve the following basic goals:

- a. Substantial and self-sustained increase in the per capita national product;
- b. Equitable distribution of national income;
- c. Modernization of rural life and reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure systems, increased agricultural productivity, use of undeveloped land, diversification of production, and improved processing and marketing systems for agricultural products;
- d. Accelerated and diversified industrialization, especially of capital and intermediate goods;
- e. Stability in the domestic price levels, compatible with sustained economic development and social justice;

Article 4

To accelerate their economic and social development, in accordance with their own methods and procedures and within the framework of the democratic principles and institutions of the inter-American system, the member states agree to make every effort to achieve the following basic goals:

- a. Substantial and self-sustaining growth in the per capita national product;
- b. Equitable distribution of national income through such measures, among others, as appropriate fiscal policies;
- c. Modernization of rural life and reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure systems, increased agricultural productivity, use of undeveloped land, diversification of production, and improved processing <sup>and</sup> marketing systems for agricultural products;
- d. Accelerated and diversified industrialization, especially of capital and intermediate goods;
- e. Stability in domestic price levels, compatible with sustained economic development and in the interests of social justice;



- f. Fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable working conditions for all;
  - g. Rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for all;
  - h. Protection of man's potential through the extension and application of modern medical science;
  - i. Proper nutrition, especially through the acceleration of national efforts to increase the production and availability of food;
  - j. Adequate housing for all sectors of the population; and
  - k. Urban conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full life.
- f. Fair wages with productive employment opportunities and acceptable working conditions for all;
  - g. Rapid elimination of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for all;
  - h. Protection of man's potential through the extension and application of modern medical science;
  - i. Proper nutrition, especially through the acceleration of national efforts to increase the production and availability of food;
  - j. Adequate housing for all sectors of the population;
  - k. Urban conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful and productive and full life;
  - l. Improvement and coordination of transportation and communications, essential to achieving economic and social progress and regional integration.

#### Article 4

The member states recognize that economic development can be advanced in important ways through increased private initiative and investment and that this should be promoted along with parallel action in the public sector, and through the additional economic activity which accompanies such investments.

#### Article 5

In order that the countries of the Organization may attain a balanced and sustained development as soon as possible, the member states accept the obligation, in accordance with their constitutional provisions and to the extent their available resources permit, of helping one another and extending assistance, giving special attention to the relatively-less-developed countries.

#### Article 5

The member states recognize that economic development can be advanced in important ways through increased private initiative and investment and the additional economic activity which accompanies such investment, and that these should be promoted, along with complementary action in the public sector.

#### Article 6

To attain balanced and sustained development as soon as feasible, the member states undertake as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide, to extend mutual assistance in support of national and multinational efforts to achieve the goals set forth in Article 4 giving special attention to the relatively less developed countries. The member states further agree that mutual assistance should be compatible with their own economic plans and programs and, to be effective for the assisted country, should be timely and extended in appropriate amounts and under flexible conditions, consistent with the needs and efforts of that country. They will seek, under similar terms, financial and technical cooperation from sources outside the hemisphere as well as from international financial organizations.

Article 6

The member states in adopting their policies, actions, and measures will avoid placing in jeopardy the economic and social development of another member state.

Article 7

The member states agree to join together in seeking a solution to urgent or critical problems that may arise if the economic development or stability of any member state should be seriously affected by economic or trade measures adopted by other countries, by severe and prolonged deficits in their balance of payments resulting from sharp decreases in income from foreign sources, or by critical or emergency situations, whatever their origin, that cannot be solved by the efforts of the affected state alone.

Article 8

Within the framework of mutual aid, the member states shall extend among themselves the benefits of science and technology by encouraging the exchange and utilization of scientific and technical knowledge, in accordance with existing treaties and national laws.

Article 7

The member states should to the maximum extent possible avoid policies, actions, or measures that will have serious adverse effects on the economic and social development of another member state.

Article 8

The member states agree to join together in seeking a solution to urgent or critical problems that may arise if the economic development or stability of any member state should be seriously affected by conditions that cannot be remedied through the unaided efforts of that state.

Article 9

Within the framework of mutual assistance, the benefits of science and technology should be extended among the member states by encouraging the exchange and utilization of scientific and technical knowledge, in accordance with existing treaties and national laws.

Article 9

The member states agree that mutual aid should be extended in appropriate amounts and under timely and flexible conditions, compatible with the needs of the assisted country and compatible with their own development plans and programs; and they will seek, individually and collectively, under similar terms, increased financial and technical cooperation from sources outside the Hemisphere and from international financial organizations. They also recognize that mutual aid in support of over-all stabilization and development plans and programs is an important factor in enabling such plans and programs to be carried out effectively, and in establishing or strengthening national financing institutions.

See Article 6

Article 10

The member states agree to cooperate with one another to promote the modernization of rural life, equitable changes in land-tenure systems, and increased agricultural production, for which purposes they recognize the importance of expanding and strengthening multilateral external assistance systems and institutions that will contribute to achieving these goals.

(Dropped)



### Article 11

The member states recognize that development plans and monetary stabilization programs require the adoption of suitable formulas to solve the problems arising from excessive accumulation of short-term obligations which are detrimental to the economic stability of a member state.

### Article 12

The member states agree to promote and strengthen national and multinational institutions and systems for encouraging the expansion of exports of manufactured and semimanufactured products of the developing member countries.

### Article 13

The member states, recognizing the close interdependence between foreign trade and economic and social development, agree to unite efforts to bring about the following:

a. Reduction or elimination by the importer countries of tariff and non-tariff barriers that obstruct exports from countries of the system, except when such barriers are applied for reasons of national defense, to diversify the economic structure or to accelerate the development of the less-developed

(Dropped)

### Article 10(e)

Diversification of exports and expansion of export opportunities for manufactured and semi-manufactured products from the developing member countries by promoting and strengthening national and multinational institutions and arrangements established for this purpose.

### Article 10

The member states, recognizing the close interdependence between foreign trade and economic and social development, agree to unite efforts to bring about the following to the fullest extent feasible, consistent with the needs of their balanced economic growth and full employment, national security and economic integration:

a. Reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers that obstruct exports from countries of the system;

member countries and intensify the process of their economic integration;

b. Elimination of trade preferences and other discriminatory practices that restrict the access to world markets of the products of the countries of the system;

c. Improved conditions for trade in basic commodities, especially through the conclusion and strengthening of agreements or other international arrangements designed to obtain increasing and dependable income for producers and adequate and assured supplies for consumers, at remunerative, fair, and stable prices; such agreements to be complemented by financial procedures, supported by international institutions, having as their purpose the diversification of production and exportation and the remedying of tendencies toward overproduction;

d. The reduction and, if possible, the elimination, within the shortest possible time, on the part of the member countries importing primary products from other member countries, of all restrictions on and discrimination against consumption and import of these products, except when they are imposed temporarily for reasons of national defense, or to diversify the economic structure or accelerate the economic development of the developing member countries;

b. Elimination of trade preferences and other discriminatory practices that hinder the access of the hemisphere's products to non-hemisphere world markets;

c. Improved conditions for trade in selected basic commodities through international agreements or other measures designed to obtain dependable income for producers, ample and assured supplies for consumers, and stable prices that are both remunerative to producers and fair to consumers;

d. Improved international cooperation in financial and other fields directed toward lessening the impact of sharp fluctuations in export earnings experienced by the countries exporting basic commodities, with a view to assisting them to maintain the continuity of their economic and social development;



e. International financial systems or other measures to lessen fluctuations in foreign income experienced by the countries exporting basic products, with a view to ensuring the continuity of their economic and social development;

f. Diversification and expansion of exports of manufactured and semimanufactured products from the developing member countries by creating favorable conditions for access of these products to the international market and improving their marketing; and

g. Maintenance of suitable and orderly marketing procedures for surplus products, to avoid disrupting the traditional markets of the member countries and obstructing expansion in the sale of their products to other markets.

#### Article 14

The member states accept the principle that when the more-developed countries grant concessions in international trade agreements that lower or eliminate tariff or non-tariff barriers to foreign trade so that they benefit the less-developed countries, they should not seek reciprocal concessions from those countries that are incompatible with their economic development, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past trade developments.

e. Diversification of exports and expansion of export opportunities for manufactured and semi-manufactured products from the developing member countries by promoting and strengthening national and multinational institutions and arrangements established for this purpose.

(Dropped)

#### Article 11

The member states reaffirm the principle accepted internationally that when the more developed countries grant concessions in international trade agreements that lower or eliminate tariff or non-tariff barriers to foreign trade so that they benefit the less developed countries, they do not expect reciprocal concessions from those countries that are incompatible with their economic development, financial and trade needs.

Article 15

The member states shall promote improvement and coordination of transportation and communication in the developing countries and among the member states in order to accelerate their economic development, regional integration, and the expansion and improvement of the conditions of their commerce.

Article 16

The member states, when shaping their policies on production and export of basic products, shall take into consideration the effect of such policies on world markets and the need to support and improve the effectiveness of international stabilization programs and mechanisms. They shall also attempt to avoid increasing uneconomical production of products that can be obtained under better terms in the less-developed member countries.

Article 17

The member states recognize that integration of the developing countries of the Hemisphere is one of the objectives of the inter-American system and, therefore, shall orient their efforts, and take the necessary

Article 4(1)

Improvement and coordination of transportation and communications, essential to achieving economic and social progress and regional integration.

(Dropped)

Article 12

The member states recognize that integration of the developing countries of the hemisphere is one of the objectives of the inter-American system and, therefore, shall orient their efforts to accelerate the



measures, to accelerate the integration process, with a view to establishing the Latin American common market in the shortest possible time.

integration process through measures that will promote competitive, harmonious and balanced regional development, with particular attention to the needs of the relatively less developed countries, and through giving priority to the preparation and carrying out of multi-national projects.

#### Article 18

In order to strengthen and accelerate integration in all its aspects, the member states agree to give priority to the preparation and carrying out of multinational projects and to their financing, as well as encouraging economic and financial institutions of the inter-American system to continue giving their broadest support to regional integration organizations and programs.

#### Article 19

The member states agree that technical and financial cooperation that seeks to promote regional economic integration should be based on the principle of harmonious and balanced development, with particular attention to the relatively-less-developed countries, so that it may be a decisive factor that will enable them to promote, with their own efforts, the improved development of infrastructure programs, new lines of production, and export diversification.

#### Article 12

#### Article 12

TEXT APPROVED IN PANAMA  
SUB-COMMITTEE

CHAPTER VIII

Article 1

The member states agree upon the advisability of developing their social legislation, institutions, and structure on the following bases:

- a) All human being, without distinction to race, nationality, sex, creed, or social condition have the right to material well-being and spiritual development under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security; and
- b) Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining, and for the dignity of the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health, and a decent and rising standard of living for the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health, and a decent and rising standard of living for the worker and his family, both during the working years and during

PROPOSED U.S. DRAFT

CHAPTER VII

Article 3

The member states agree upon the advisability of developing their social legislation, institutions, and structure on the following bases:

- a. All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, creed, or social condition, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual development under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security;
- b. Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association, for the right of collective bargaining, and for the dignity of the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living for the worker and his family, both during the working years and during old age, or when any circumstance deprives the individual of the possibility of working.

old age, or when any circumstance deprives the individual of the possibility of working.

Article 2

The member states agree as the basic purposes of their social development policy, to cooperate with one another to achieve the improvement of health, education, housing, and the land-tenure system, full employment, and equitable distribution of national income.

(Dropped)

Wed., May 11, 1966  
9:15 am 5/4

MR. PRESIDENT:

A last detail about Mehta.

At dinner last night, with many news-  
men present, he made a passionate  
plea for U. S. private enterprise to  
come into India and help develop the  
country.

The town is full of it this morning.

W. W. R.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

54

Tuesday, May 3, 1966  
4:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

King Faisal has accepted for a state visit 21 June through 1 July. Ambassador Hare conveyed the invitation orally to nail down the dates during his recent stopover in Saudi Arabia, so we still want to send your formal written invitation.

We have carefully stuck to protocol in this letter. Nasser just lashed out at the Saudis again over Yemen in his May Day speech, and we want to avoid any substantive comment in a message like this which is bound to become public knowledge when the visit is announced.

Attached for signature if you approve.

*Walt* Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-248  
By rip, NARA, Date 1-25-89

~~SECRET~~

54a

May 4, 1966

Sent as

Your Majesty:

I am delighted to learn from Ambassador Elts that June 21 through July 1 will be a convenient time for you to visit the United States, and I wish to assure you a most cordial welcome by the American people. I look forward with pleasure to this opportunity to meet you personally and to renew and strengthen the traditionally close friendship which binds our two countries.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,

plb

His Majesty  
Faisal ibn Abd-al-Aziz Al-Saud Riyadh  
King of Saudi Arabia  
Jidda

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/3/66

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 3, 1966  
3:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

King Hussein has written you an extremely warm thank-you letter for your decision to sell F-104's to Jordan. It requires nothing more than a friendly acknowledgment because all of our tough conditions are clearly spelled out in the secret memo of understanding which concluded the deal. So this letter just wraps up the niceties.

Attached for signature if you approve.

*W. A. Rostow*  
W. A. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *W*, NARA, Date *5-21-98*

~~SECRET~~

55a

May 4, 1966

*Message sent by  
wire by State.  
Letter will not  
follow.*

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter in which you expressed your appreciation for the opportunity to purchase F-104 aircraft. Our decision to sell these aircraft was based on our belief that you and the people of Jordan are firm and reliable friends of the United States. I hope that the sale will further strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust that exist between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for the future and I hope you will have every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities.

Sincerely,

*LBJ*

His Majesty  
Hussein I,  
King of the Hashemite  
Kingdom of Jordan  
Amman

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-248  
By mg, NARA, Date 1-25-89

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/3/66





536

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By JD, NARA, Date 5-21-98

THE ROYAL PALACE,  
Amman, JORDAN,  
April 9th, 1966.

Dear Mr. President:

It is with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation that I write to you, following the conclusion of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the supply to the Royal Jordanian Air Force with the United States built F.104 Starfighter type aircraft, and also following the return to Jordan of its negotiator General Amer Khammash Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces.

There is no way, Mr. President, by which I could express my deep gratitude and that of my Government and people, especially in the Armed Forces and particularly in the Air Force, for your personal understanding and support, and for the friendly spirit which emanated from it and with which, the Jordanian negotiator was met, throughout his stay up to the completion of his mission in the United States.

It is indeed only a new demonstration of the solidarity of the relations that happily exist between our two nations, the confidence, trust and the sense of unity in belonging to the family of free nations, safeguarding joint-principles and upholding the same ideals.

Mr. President, you came to our assistance as the great friend we know you to be, and we are proud to have, your personal assistance at an extremely delicate moment in Jordan's history shall never be forgotten and by providing us with the 104s, we know that the United States Government has provided us with the best. I am fairly confident that our Jordanian pilots will prove those aircraft to be the best, and once again that the strength of Jordan will be as it has always been that of freedom, stability and progress, that the strength of Jordan

shall never be used in any other way save in legitimate self-defence, for freedom, justice and in persuance of a better future for the people of this part of the world.

I seize this opportunity to wish you, Mr. President, continued good health and every success in fulfilling your great and demanding responsibilities.

*Your Sincere Brother*

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

President Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington D. C.

Tues., May 3, 1966  
3:10 pm

~~copy to Mr. Komer~~ 8

56

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Komer tells me you want  
a draft to guide the Department of  
State in dealing with the NATO crisis.

Here it is.

W. W. R.

5/4/66

56a

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

I would be grateful if you would make it known that I wish the articulation of our position with respect to NATO to be in constructive terms.

I see no benefit to ourselves or to our allies in debating the position of the French government.

That government has made known its position.

Our task is to rebuild NATO outside of France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible.

In so doing, we shall develop (as outlined in NSAM 345) proposals which would bind the Atlantic nations closer together; support, as best we can, the long term movement towards unity in Western Europe; and exploit the possibilities for easing East-West tensions.

Our discussions of the NATO problem should focus on the positive lines of action in which we are engaged.

15/ LBJ

LBJ:WWR:mz




57  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1966  
Rec'd  
1:45 pm

Mr. President:

Be clear: I don't want Bosch.

I'm not even sure I'm a liberal  
these days.



W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
Authority NLT 019-007-2-1  
By GD, NARA, Date 12-13-01

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 3, 1966

TEXT OF A C. I. A. REPORT:

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] Juan Bosch [REDACTED] had not decided exactly how to handle the issue of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) and the question as to whether it should leave the country immediately after the national elections scheduled for June 1, 1966.

While Bosch realizes that he would gain votes by making the IAPF a "whipping boy" during his electoral campaign, he also believes that if he is elected, he will need the IAPF in the country in order to govern successfully during the first few months of his regime. Bosch fears that he will be overthrown by the Dominican military, and he wants to make some necessary changes in the military structure and leadership.

He realizes that if the IAPF remains in the country for a short but indefinite time after the elections, it will serve as a deterrent force to the Dominican military who might otherwise consider or actually plan his overthrow.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

Bosch also is privately considering how to make known to the U. S. Government that he plans, if he wins the election, to control his anti-American attitude and to work closely with the United States for mutual benefit. [REDACTED] this does not necessarily represent a change in Bosch's political beliefs, but it does reflect his facing the fact that he cannot govern successfully without U. S. Government support.)

Bosch is now caught in the middle between his campaign ideals and the more practical position which he realizes he must take if he is to stay in power after election. He has expressed privately his belief that he is the victim of circumstances; he refuses to accept the explanation of some of his close non-political friends that his own machinations have put him in his present position.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: JUL 1999

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, May 3, 1966 -- 12:55 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senate Hearings on Tap Bennett's Appointment to  
Lisbon

Tap Bennett had his hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning and he reports that it went smoothly.

The Senators present were Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Symington, Aiken and Carlson. Both Clark and Morse were away.

Tap said that Fulbright was non-polemical in his line of questioning on the Dominican Republic and that Symington and Hickenlooper both said nice things about his service in the Dominican Republic. He was asked only one question on Portugal having to do with our Base in the Azores.

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

May 3, 1966  
Tuesday, 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

The marked passage on  
page 2 bears on your instruction  
to State to come back to us with a  
formula for: what must Hanoi do  
if we stop bombing the North.

W. W. R.

cc: Bill Moyers

Bob Kintner



592

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 3, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Rome, 2696)

I was received for almost an hour this morning by Pope Paul.

I found the Pope brilliant and extremely interested and concerned about Vietnam developments. He seems deeply to appreciate my calling on him.

The Pope told me he had received Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 27 privately and informally. He had asked Gromyko about persecution of Catholics in the Soviet Union, particularly Georgia, Latvia, etc., and Gromyko had replied, predictably, that there was absolute religious freedom in the USSR.

The Pope told Gromyko there had been no "Latin" priest in Moscow since 1940 and asked about the possibilities of assigning one. Gromyko could not reply.

The Pope showed me a complete account in English of his conversation with Gromyko which he promised to send Ambassador Reinhardt.

At the Pope's request, I gave a full situation briefing on Vietnam in the light of the President's April 22 press conference.

The Pope was specially interested in the breakdown of political alignments, particularly in Buddhist support of Tri Quang. I gave my views, of which the Department has already been exhaustively informed. I explained that some of the program -- military and revolutionary development -- had begun to go quite well. This had impelled some politically ambitious men, headed by Tri Quang, and taking advantage of the relief of General Thi, to work for a change of government. The Communists, in turn, had taken advantage of this. We faced a situation at once dangerous and evolutionary. It was still true, I believed, that if the Vietnamese were given something first rate -- land reform and education, for example -- that they would fight to defend it. But stability, as we know it in the West, did not seem likely.

The Pope asked whether there was any possible productive demarche towards Hanoi which had not been made.

~~SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-28**  
**By CB, NARA Date 7-21-97**

I said the U. S. Government had several open channels to Hanoi, particularly through the International Control Commission, which is in Hanoi every month.

To my surprise, the Pope was uninformed of the activities of the International Control Commission.

I stressed the importance of the International Control Commission channel, particularly through the Canadian representative. I said that in view of Canadian ICC member Seaborn's intelligence and immense political sensitivity, I was confident Hanoi was accurately and fully informed of U. S. Government views and positions.

I said the problem is not lack of channels to Hanoi but simply Hanoi's lack of desire for peace. The North Vietnamese believe they will win not due to American military weakness, but because Hanoi believes the U. S. Government lacks the will to win. Hanoi interprets appeals for peace as signs of weakness, largely due to the Oriental mentality with a Communist overlay. Thus, such appeals could actually lengthen the war.

The Pope seemed impressed and understanding that the real problem was a lack of Hanoi's desire for peace rather than a lack of channels of communication.

The Pope was impressed by the thought that, should the U. S. withdraw, South Vietnam would fall into Communist hands, thus giving Hanoi a diplomatic and political victory which they could not have achieved by military means.

I said one form of a cease fire would be to abandon the bombing in North Vietnam in return for a cessation of ground aggression in the South. No honest or complete cease fire could be achieved unless accompanied by a verified withdrawal.

The Pope said he found this concept of a cease fire particularly interesting.

Following the Papal audience, I paid a brief and cordial courtesy call on Secretary of State Cicognani.

60

Cys. Nguyen  
Kirsten  
Walters

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 3, 1966, 9:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is my one-pager for Mehta plus Secretary Rusk's longer briefing paper.

George Woods saw Mehta this afternoon from 3:45 to 6:45 p.m. He reports as follows:

1. On private fertilizer investment, Woods is satisfied that the Indian Government is ready to go, permitting 51% private foreign ownership. He is prepared to go to the oil, chemical and fertilizer firms in the U.S. and recommend that they negotiate afresh on the basis of this new Indian policy.

2. With respect to general economic negotiations, he felt the meeting went well although <sup>any</sup> it is not yet a full meeting of minds on certain gut issues. Of the 12 or 14 critical points, two are critical and they are related to each other: (a) the amount of money the Consortium can raise for a war chest to restart the Indian economy; and (b) the extend of the internal freeing up of the Indian economy.

3. The three Young Turks in the Indian Government (Mehta, the Agriculture Minister and the Finance Minister), are, Woods is convinced, serious about letting private industry have its head and about getting rid of controls. But it will take time. There will be political opposition.

4. Woods will be meeting again with Mehta tomorrow afternoon at 4:00 p.m.

Mehta told Woods privately that they plan to devalue in June. Parliament is away from May to August. A June devaluation will give them time for the commotion to die down and to get going.

In general Woods feels they are on the way to a good negotiation. They may not be able to lock it up tomorrow. Both the degree of decontrol and the exact amount of money are still not settled. But he feels pretty good about it. The one-pager I wrote before talking to Woods still holds.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

You should also know that Mrs. Gandhi is having a quite rough time with her left wing (Krishna Menon); Russian pressures; plus some nationalist right wingers -- all accusing her of caving in to American capitalist pressure via the World Bank.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 3, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Mehta: 10:30 A.M. May 4

Note: Mehta is a lot harder to warm up than Shoaib. He will be best if you encourage him to talk about the possibilities of the Indian economy. This is provided for under Point 3, below.

1. Reference to Mrs. Gandhi's visit and gratification that she moved so quickly to send Mehta to talk with George Woods.

2. You are anxious to see a resumption of U.S. aid to India. It is critical that Mehta and Woods come to agreement.

3. You'd be interested in how the discussions are going and Mehta's view of prospects for the Indian economy.

4. You understand Prime Minister Gandhi's political problems as you understand President Ayub's. But it struck you in Mexico again how, if a larger power works at it -- and takes some responsibility -- relations with a smaller neighbor can develop to great mutual advantage.

5. In particular, on the political side you hope:

-- the two governments can soon have a fruitful Ministerial meeting to carry forward the Tashkent Agreement;

-- understandings will be reached to limit military spending: you can't finance an arms race.

6. On the economic side you hope:

-- there will be continued emphasis on agriculture;

-- a better climate to increase private investment in chemical fertilizer.

-- India and Pakistan can soon normalize their economic relations and go to work on joint projects of mutual interest.

7. But above all, come to agreement with the World Bank.

W.W.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 3, 1966

to P 5/3 0900  
61  
20 Pres at 0900

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON:

I thought you would like to have advance notice that in his budget statement on Tuesday, the Chancellor is going to announce that our import surcharge of 10 percent will be removed when the powers to levy it lapse in November of this year.

This is something of a bold step since we have not got rid of our payments deficit yet, but we are making progress and I think this gesture of confidence may help. It will certainly help us in our dealings with the EFTA countries who were particularly resentful of the surcharge when we first introduced it.

You, and indeed all your people, have always been very understanding of our difficulty and I should like to take this opportunity of thanking you once again for your forbearance over it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority UK Guidelines

By fw . NARA. Date 2-10-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

23  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, May 2, 1966 - 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulations for Colombian President-elect Lleras

Ambassador Covey Oliver reports that with 95% of the vote tabulated in yesterday's presidential elections in Colombia, the National Front candidate Carlos Lleras Restrepo has won with more than 70% of the vote. This margin enhances his chances of obtaining a working two-thirds majority in the Congress. Ambassador Oliver concludes that "with this election Colombia has greatly increased its capacity for effective governmental administration".

The results are not official but the outcome is certain. State recommends that you send an informal congratulatory message (Tab A) through Ambassador Oliver right away and follow it up later with a formal message (Tab B) as soon as the results are officially announced.

W. W. Rostow

Approve informal message (Tab A) ☒

Prefer to wait for official results ☐

Approve formal message (Tab B) ☒

*S/S informed by plane  
5/3/66*

Attachments

2a





Informal Congratulatory Message

Dear Dr. Lleras:

Although tabulations of the election results are not yet complete, I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you privately my warmest congratulations on your election to the presidency of the Republic of Colombia.

I shall look forward to close cooperation with you in all matters of mutual concern during your coming term in office.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

B

22

Formal Congratulatory Message

Dear Dr. Lleras:

Please accept my warmest congratulations on your election as President of the Republic of Colombia.

Once again your country is to be congratulated for having carried out free elections in the tradition it has honored as one of the hemisphere's oldest democracies. I am convinced that under your leadership Colombia can take advantage of progress already made to increase the rate of economic and social development to which both our countries are pledged in the Act of Bogota and the Charter of Punta del Este.

I look forward to cordial relations and close cooperation with you and your government in all matters of mutual concern to our two countries and in the great challenges confronting the hemisphere.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely,

*To Pres*

Monday, May 2, 1966  
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

These observations of David Harlech  
may interest you.

W. W. Rostow .



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 2, 1966 -- 6:45 p.m.

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH LORD HARLECH

David Harlech called on me this afternoon and made the following points of possible interest.

1. The British are looking to an implicit or explicit agreement with Moscow to thin out Western and Soviet forces in Germany. This might happen in the course of the negotiations for revising NATO.
2. With both Labor and the Tories looking increasingly towards getting into the Common Market, the British are jumpy about excessive confrontation with the French, even though they don't expect anything so long as de Gaulle is operational.
3. The Tories have problems with their "Gaullist" wing. They think it would be rather nice to be a bit more anti-American; a bit more anti-German; a bit more cozy with Moscow on a bilateral basis. Harlech understands well that if this game starts, it's the Germans who have the best cards. Heath understands it, too; and he has asked Harlech to help educate these fellows of whom Enoch Powell is the most provincial. (Powell, incidentally, has never been in the U. S., according to Harlech.)
4. The bombing pause, Fulbright, Galbraith, et al, have cast some doubt on our determination to see it through in Viet Nam, among Europeans.
5. The fate of the pound in the months ahead depends, in Harlech's view, on the toughness of the U. K. budget. If, with all the advantages of his reelection, and four secure years ahead, Wilson doesn't bite the bullet and force some slow-down, the "gnomes of Zurich" will truly despair of the pound; and we will be in for devaluation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 2-10-98

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1966  
6:47 p

Mr. President:

Do you want to see Secretary Udall and  
Jack Vaughn as requested regarding Peace  
Corps volunteers in the Trust Territory?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

*Dep AC. Their going  
ahead - but don't  
Marvin  
involve me - Udall  
& Vaughn are big enough  
to handle Trust Territory.*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 2, 1966  
10:20 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Proposal for the Trust Territory of the  
Pacific Islands

1. Stewart Udall and Jack Vaughn are requesting an appointment with you to discuss a joint Interior-Peace Corps proposal for using Peace Corps volunteers in the Trust Territory. They seek your support and direct participation. Bill Moyers and I have reviewed their proposal and endorse it. In my view, it makes a substantial contribution to solving a serious and sensitive problem.

2. After visiting the Territory last January, Ambassador Eugenie Anderson wrote a very critical report on the Pacific Trust Territory, expressing her alarm over economic, health and social conditions in the islands. She viewed the situation as grave, and regarded it as a source of potential embarrassment in the United Nations. Arthur Goldberg and Joe Sisco share her view.

3. The Peace Corps reviewed her report and saw in it both an opportunity to provide wide-scale assistance in the immediate problem of the Trust Territory and to offer young Americans a dramatic and constructive opportunity for service in the cause of peaceful development in contrast to Vietnam. This latter thought is best summarized in a paragraph in the Peace Corps' suggested wording of the Presidential statement they want you to make:

"At a time in our history when I have had to make the unhappy decision to send young Americans overseas to fight, I find comfort in issuing here a call for young Americans to go abroad to serve peaceful purposes. It is a much happier task to issue to young Americans a summons to lend a helping hand than it is to issue a call to arms; to ask them to participate in mankind's struggle for a better way of life than it is to ask them to fight."

4. The Peace Corps offered its assistance to Interior and in cooperation with the Interior staff a proposed program was drafted. Secretary Udall has reviewed the proposal and enthusiastically supports it.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-248  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-25-89

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1966 MAY 2 AM 11 39



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

5. Last week a Peace Corps representative went to Honolulu to discuss the program with the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory and some of the Assistant Commissioners. They also were enthusiastic about the plan and indicated that there would be a good reception on the part of Micronesian officials in the Trust Territory Congress. They pointed out that Micronesian officials had often commented on the lack of Volunteers in Micronesia. The High Commissioner indicated that Micronesian officials would be eager to request Peace Corps assistance. Their request is now in hand.

6. The Peace Corps' proposal calls for a special recruiting effort, May 9 through May 20, which will send in its initial phase 200 elementary teachers/community development workers, 100 health aides, and 75 Volunteers for public works. Later installments will cover programs in agriculture, communications, credit unions and co-ops, and other phases of economic development.

7. Since it is so late in the college academic year, the Peace Corps needs special help in mounting the program. They ask for a Presidential statement endorsing the program and requesting the Peace Corps and the youth of America to respond in a special way to a request of the Micronesian people.

8. I and members of my staff have reviewed the Peace Corps' proposal in detail. I am in favor of it. The proposal has also the strong endorsement of Secretary Udall, Ambassador Goldberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco. In order for the Peace Corps to launch its recruiting effort on May 9, it will require an announcement on or about May 7. With this in mind, Secretary Udall and Mr. Vaughn would like to meet briefly with you on May 2 or 3. I hope you will be able to make it possible.

9. I have a draft of an announcement that could be released to the press toward the end of this week to start the ball rolling. I have asked Bill Moyers and others on your staff for their comments on the draft, a copy of which I attach (Tab A) to give you an idea of what is being proposed.

*W. A. Rostow*  
Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



140

A

DRAFT 4/29/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64c  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-248  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-25-89

SUGGESTED WORDING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF  
THE PEACE CORPS PROGRAM IN THE PACIFIC  
TRUST TERRITORY (MICRONESIA)

---

I have a brief announcement to make.

On May \_\_\_\_\_, there was relayed to me by the High Commissioner of the Pacific Trust Territory and the Secretary of the Interior a request from prominent leaders of the new Congress of Micronesia asking for Peace Corps Volunteers in the Pacific Trust Territory.

As you know, since World War II the United States has had the responsibility for administering the Trust Territory as a strategic trust under the United Nations. The day rapidly approaches when the people of Micronesia must decide what their self-governing status will be.

However, we all know that strong political and social institutions and a vigorous economy are prerequisites of stable self-government.

Since the war the United States has been interested in assisting the Micronesians to develop better schools, improved health programs, and the means of economic development. The pace of this development has not been as rapid as one would like to see. Critical shortages of effective middle level manpower -- of classroom teachers, of health aides, of community development workers -- have sharply curtailed the pace of development.

However, I am now happy to say that I see a solution to this problem.

In the last five years the Peace Corps has established itself as a principal supplier to the emerging nations of middle level manpower for programs of economic and social development. The Peace Corps now has extensive experience in the fields of education, health, public works, and community development. In addition, it has been able to instill in host country nationals the pride of self-help and citizen participation. All these are needed in the Trust Territory.

I, therefore, want to announce that I have asked the Peace Corps to mount an intensive, relatively short-term special project for the people of Micronesia. I am today calling upon young Americans, particu-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

larly those who are finishing their college careers next month, to respond to the call of the Micronesian people. I am also asking Volunteers who will complete their service in the next two or three months, and those who have already given two years to the Peace Corps to seriously consider another period of service in the Trust Territory. We will need teachers, health workers, and people to work in public works, agriculture, and construction. We, of course, invite people who have these skills, but I want to reassure those who want to make a contribution that they can develop the required skill in a Peace Corps training program.

At a time in our history when I have had to make the unhappy decision to send young Americans overseas to fight, I find comfort in issuing here a call for young Americans to go abroad to serve peaceful purposes. It is a much happier task to issue to young Americans a summons to lend a helping hand than it is to issue a call to arms; to ask them to participate in mankind's struggle for a better way of life than it is to ask them to fight.

In the days of the Old West there was an established custom where members of a community would assemble from time to time to assist a newcomer in establishing himself as a member of the community. In a gesture of friendship and fellowship members of the community would agree to give a certain portion of their time, and on a given day would arrive at the new homestead to lend a helping hand. Often the homestead would be without a barn, without fences, sometime even without a house. In a community effort a house would be built, fences erected, and a barn would be raised. In this spirit, as the people of Micronesia seek to establish themselves in the world community, however they see fit, I am asking young Americans to give a portion of their time during the next four years and take part in a modern day "barn raising" for the people of Micronesia. I am asking young Americans to welcome, through their helping hand and assistance, Micronesians to our world community.

###

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21  
45  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 2, 1966  
5:10 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to give guidance concerning these proposed Congressional consultations on aid to India and Pakistan.

On the one hand, AID feels Congress should be filled in on the broad lines of our discussions with Shoaib and Mehta, making it clear we are setting tough and serious conditions. Congress knows they have been around town talking.

On the other hand, they are worried about leaks which would fill the Indian and Pak press with stories of U. S. and World Bank pressure.

Attached is the list of those AID would consult, plus a proposed talking paper.

The list is OK ☒

The talking paper is OK ☒

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Walt Rostow

Telephone notes  
to Ethel - sent,  
Macomber's  
secretary: J  
5/3/66  
rhw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments



1209  
65a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

May 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

SUBJECT: Congressional Consultations: India and Pakistan

Following up on our conversation earlier today, we would propose, with White House concurrence, to consult with the following Members of Congress regarding our current aid stance with respect to India and Pakistan:

Senators

Leadership

Mansfield                      Dirksen

FRC

Fulbright                      Hickenlooper  
Symington  
Carl Marcy

Appropriations

Pastore                      Saltonstall

Congressmen

Leadership

McCormick                      Ford

FAC

Morgan                      Bolton  
Zablocki                      Adair  
Boyd Crawford

Appropriations

Mahon                      Bow  
Passman (if Mahon  
recommends)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-255  
By mp NARA, Date 3-1-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Attached is a "talking points" paper worked out by State and AID which would be drawn on by Executive Branch officials in these proposed consultations.

We believe now is an appropriate time to carry out these consultations because (1) the Shoaib and Mehta visits are likely to stimulate increased public speculation with respect to aid resumption, and (2) while on the one hand we know pretty well the kind of economic and political understandings with the governments of India and Pakistan that we are prepared to settle for, we will, in fact, be taking the Members into our confidence before any final deals are struck.

*WBM*

William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Near East and South Asia

/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 2 PM 4 38

1209  
65-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points

U.S. Discussions on Aid to India and Pakistan

New aid for India and Pakistan has been held up since the outbreak of hostilities last fall except for the several interim loans which have been the subject of earlier consultations. Both countries are anxious for a restoration of aid and both have sent high level officials for discussions with the World Bank and with us on their economic and financial program and needs.

We have not, as of this time, committed ourselves to a resumption of economic aid. We have made it clear to both countries that we are prepared to do so only if we reach understandings about how to get maximum beneficial results from our aid.

Discussions in Washington in recent days have resulted in progress toward satisfactory understandings with India and Pakistan. If agreements are reached, we would move to restore aid under appropriate controls.

A key understanding on which agreement is essential is that both countries continue to take steps to reduce tensions in the area. We will expect both countries to meet their

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-249  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

obligations under the Tashkent Declaration and the U.N. Security Council Resolution. We have made it absolutely clear that we will not subsidize an arms race or continue aid in the face of such a race.

In addition, we seek understandings on:

Respect for U.S. policies. (They are asked to recognize our interests in Asia--to cooperate with us to the maximum consistent with their national goals--and, at the minimum, to avoid unnecessary official public disagreement with our policies.)

Effective economic programs. (We insist upon priority attention to food production and pragmatic economic policies to insure sound utilization of aid and faster growth. For Pakistan this is largely a matter of returning to the trends so successfully established before the fighting. India, in recent months, has taken excellent steps in agriculture and needs now to adopt progressive measures of a more general nature.)

In the case of Pakistan, we also ask that it manage its relationship with China so as not to vitiate our working relationship which must rest on respect, cooperation and reduction of tension. We also ask maintenance of the CENTO-SEATO ties and of valuable facilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Caution: Insistence upon safeguards to our interests and the requirement of economic performance for our assistance is legitimate. The understandings we seek are in fact sound policies for the two countries and will be accepted by them only to the extent that they recognize this self-interest. It is imperative, however, that neither India or Pakistan have to appear to have capitulated to World Bank or U.S. dictation. It is therefore important that the understandings we have sought be kept confidential.

Attachments

- A. Military Supply Policy
- B. Appropriation Implications

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment A

Military Supply Policy

If asked, you may respond saying: our policy, as of now, continues to be one of approving only selective, limited sales of non-lethal military equipment, e.g. communications.

FYI - This policy is under active review at this time. We may shortly be consulting concerning exceptions to the suspension of grant Military Assistance for items which serve as a strong U.S. interest, e.g. radar installations, exchange of maps, etc. END FYI.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-249  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment B

Appropriation Implications

If asked about anticipated aid levels, you may say: we are not yet able to provide estimates pending further analysis and consultation with our Consortium partners. We expect that requirements can be met from uncommitted FY 1966 funds (\$49 million combined for both countries) and from the appropriation request for FY 1967 which includes \$385 and \$187.5 million respectively, for India and Pakistan. These program requirements for next year are the same levels as the A.I.D. pledges for the last pre-hostility year for India and Pakistan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

610

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mon., May 2, 1966 - 4:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Len Marks' Proposals on USIA's  
Latin American Program

Leonard Marks has come up with a good idea.  
Linc Gordon also likes it. I recommend you send  
Leonard a reply along the lines of the attached  
draft.

Walt  
W. Rostow

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1966 MAY 3 PM 2 16



May 2, 1966

66 a  
L P  
5/2

Dear Leonard:

Your memorandum of April 25 on how we might use the Voice of America to bring about a greater sense of unity among the Latin American countries and with the United States is gratifying. I am on a constant lookout for imaginative and practical new ideas in foreign as in domestic policy.

cc B. Rogers  
Kuntner

You have come up with a good one.

With respect to specific proposals, they all have merit, except perhaps the first. I doubt that the Latin Americans would wish to have our VOA service present itself as speaking on behalf of the Hemisphere.

But this is only a marginal point.

Much more important are your suggestions for broadening the content of our programs and working out closer relationships with public and private broadcasting stations in the other countries. In time you may be able to devise regional or Hemisphere-wide hook-ups for special broadcasts which might well be carried as the "Voice of the Americas."

Your suggestions contain the seed of a proposal which might be discussed at the next meeting of Foreign Ministers. Please take it up with Linc Gordon. Together you can decide how best to proceed. I will be waiting to receive your recommendation.

Thanks again for your initiative.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Honorable Leonard H. Marks  
Director  
United States Information Agency  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WGB:WWR:mz

66 b

14

Rec'd  
4-28-66  
9:00am

(3)



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

Call Wait to prepare  
reph -

April 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

I have analyzed reports and press clippings from Latin American countries relative to your recent visit to Mexico. There is no doubt that you scored a signal success and that there is a tremendous reservoir of good will towards you and the United States in these countries.

We have made some progress in developing projects for Alliance for Progress. We have shared with Latin American countries technology and culture. However, there is agreement that a great deal remains to be done to integrate all of Latin America with the United States and to establish a closer working relationship between the several countries in this continent.

I believe that the USIA can play an important role in bringing this about. For example, our Voice of America broadcasting facilities reach all parts of the continent with a clear signal. We are probably the only country with the necessary transmitting facilities capable of providing a network broadcast service for each of these countries. If we do so, people in Argentina would have a first-hand intimate knowledge of what was going on in Venezuela. The daily events in Peru would become as well known in Mexico as the local happenings in either of those countries. Accordingly, I propose the following:

1. Our Latin American service should be known as "The Voice of the Americas."
2. Our Latin American service should deal not only with happenings in the U.S. and international events but should stress the major news from all of the Latin American countries.
3. Our entertainment schedule should feature music and drama which would be of particular interest to Latin American countries -- a program by Cantinflas is just as interesting to a Chilean as it is to a Mexican.

I agree

4. Programs should be designed specifically to highlight cooperative ventures between Latin American countries so that a feeling of camaraderie and of mutual association can be developed. National independence days of each Latin American country should be celebrated via radio in all other countries.

The fact that all countries with the exception of Brazil and Haiti speak Spanish gives us a great advantage in carrying out this idea. For Brazil we would continue our Portuguese service and in some cases duplicate the Spanish language programs in Portuguese. This project can be carried out unilaterally. However, I would prefer that it receive the cooperation of all other Latin American nations in close arrangement either with the government broadcast station or privately owned facilities. Such cooperation would greatly assist in the development of news reporting, whether broadcasts or featured events. In other words, all of Latin America would receive through the Voice of the Americas remote broadcasts from each of these areas which would heighten the degree of participation by all.

In the event that a summit conference is held, such an arrangement can play a vital role in publicizing the event and in developing a continuing relationship to carry on economic and social projects which might be agreed upon at such a meeting.



Leonard H. Marks

MEMORANDUM

20

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 2, 1966, 4:15 p.m.

67  
relayed to  
Symington  
May 3

12:06  
PM

Mr. President:

Interpreting Ne Win, State would much prefer  
to leave open the option of a small black tie dinner  
(without dance) instead of limiting the option to a  
reception.

W. A. Rostow

Stick to a reception

if possible but not must -  
I think in the light of all of his admonitions  
A small black tie dinner is acceptable

& preference than would suit him better -  
So State required?

L

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

67a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


May 2, 1966

Note for Mr. Rostow:

Subject: Reply to Byroade on Ne Win Visit

This outgoing cable was botched by S/S and Protocol over the weekend, so Byroade saw Ne Win empty-handed. The damage is minimal, however, and the present draft -- with revisions that I have checked out at State -- should now be what Byroade needs.

One point on page 6: State would much prefer to leave open the option of a small black tie dinner instead of a small reception. Was the President adamant on the point of only big dinner or small reception?

  
James C. Thomson, Jr.

Mr. Rostow  
For your clearance.

RCS



676  
1201  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
CLASSIFICATION  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1-Thomson  
2-Rit.

May 2, 1966

Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Rangoon  
re State Visit.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
CLASSIFICATION

1201  
67c

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

~~Confidential~~  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-249

By sig, NARA, Date 2-26-88

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy RANGOON

Priority

Info:

Your 550 and 554  
Regret reply not in time for May 2 meeting with Ne Win  
The following is basic SOP for State Visits:

1. Members of official party limited to twelve. This number includes Ambassador of Burma to US and all wives in official party and is maximum can be accommodated comfortably at Blair House. Arrival larger groups has in past resulted in crowding at official functions, less favorable treatment for some members of party and caused friction during visit.
2. In addition official members of party, one or two persons (valet, secretary, etc.) may be included as unofficial members group, if desired. Expenses such persons borne by visitor except for period at Blair House in Washington and transportation furnished to official party.
- visit:  
3. Duration of official ~~xxxxxx~~ maximum ten days, of which two Washington, up to eight elsewhere in US.
4. USG will assume all normal expenses in US and will provide all transportation for official portion of visit. Long distance telephone, communication services and other personal

Drafted by: S/CPR:SLKing 4/28/66

Tel. Ext. 4367

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/CPR:James W. Symington

Clearances:

FE - EWING RLE  
S/S -

White House -

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy RANGOON

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

~~Confidential~~

expenses borne by RGUB.

5. Established procedure for State Visits is to coordinate programming responsibility in Washington between Department and RGUB Embassy. All members of party should consult with RGUB Embassy in Washington before accepting directly any invitation extended to them by mail, telegram, or personal approach, for engagements in US. RGUB Embassy will discuss such invitations with Department, in order avoid embarrassing conflicts and ensure establishment of varied, constructive program. Party's schedule should not be permitted become overcrowded. Some time should be left for rest, pursuit personal interests, transaction official business, and contingencies so that visit may be as profitable and enjoyable as possible. (FYI. Invitations to Amembassy RANGOON should similarly be reported Department, with appropriate comments. END FYI.)

6. As program should reflect visitor's desires to maximum degree feasible you should query Burmese soonest re Ne Win's interests.

7. Normal Washington Program for State Visits:

Visitor arrives in US the day before official program begins, spends night privately at a place other than Washington.

1st Day

11:25 a.m. Arrival at Ellipse by ~~xxx~~ helicopter, motor to White House South Lawn.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy RANGOON

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
Classification

~~Confidential~~

1st Day (Continued)

- 11:30 a.m. Arrival at White House. Met by President. Military honors - national anthems and 21 gun salute. Inspect honor guard. Exchange of remarks. Meet Welcoming Committee.
- 12:00 noon President Johnson accompanies visitor on Parade of (troops, bands, flags, etc.) Welcome on Pennsylvania Avenue, starting at 9th Street NW and ending at Blair House where Commissioner presents Key to City. Then President Johnson takes leave.
- 1:00 p.m. Luncheon by Secretary Rusk at Department (large mixed, but can be small stag.)
- p.m. Optional - visit Arlington National Cemetery (can be 2nd Day).
- 5:00 p.m. Visitor meets with President at White House.
- 8:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Johnson give dinner at White House. (100 or more mixed, followed by entertainment and/or dancing.) (Black Tie)

2nd Day

- a.m. Visitor may have breakfast guests at Blair House.
- 10:00 a.m. Meeting with Secretary Rusk at Department (or Blair House.)

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
Classification



Page <sup>4</sup> 3 of telegram to Amembassy RANGOON~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

~~Confidential~~2nd Day (Continued)

Luncheon open (press group or other)

p.m. Appointments and/or sightseeing.

p.m. Evening function scheduled by Embassy (usually reception and/or dinner). President does not attend return lunch or dinner, but will attend reception.)

3rd Day

a.m. Visitor may have breakfast guests at Blair House.

a.m. Departure ceremony at Washington Monument Grounds. Military honors - national anthems and 21-gun salute. No inspection. Exchange of remarks with Vice President who heads Farewell Committee. Bids farewell to Farewell Committee and boards helicopter for Andrews Air Force Base (10 minute flight).

a.m. Departs from Andrews aboard Special USAF flight.

Note: Visitor may remain Washington until afternoon for additional appointments or lunch.

Tour US up to eight days.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~



Page 5 of telegram to AKM Anembassy RANGOONLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

~~Confidential~~Policy on US Aircraft

We provide a special USAF aircraft (executive configuration) during visit, from point of arrival in US to point of departure. US aircraft not approved repeat not approved to pick up Ne Win outside of US.

Since White House has already announced that Ne Win has accepted

invitation for State Visit, it is desirable to retain this type visit.

*However, we are anxious Ne Win be happy with arrangements,*  
~~The~~ program can be modified to reflect some of his desires. We agree *and*

that lesser treatment than is given others might result in criticism and embarrassment, and believe *we should be certain that* any modifications from normal schedule *(particularly ceremonial aspects)*

*are made*  
~~should be~~ at specific ~~XXXX~~ request of Ne Win. In accordance with date preference expressed by Ohn Khin, we are prepared accept dates Sept. 8-9 for Washington part of visit.

In order to give flexibility, if Ne Win wishes, the program may be modified as follows: (President concurs in business aspect of visit)

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7

Arrive US, met by Chief or Deputy Chief of Protocol.  
 Proceed to Washington, arriving during evening. No ceremony.  
 Private evening at Blair House.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8

10:57 a.m. Depart Blair House, accompanied by Chief of Protocol.

11:00 a.m. Arrive at White House. Met by President.  
 Normal arrival ceremony. Eliminate Parade.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

Page 6 of telegram to Amembassy RANGOON

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
Classification

~~Confidential~~

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8 (Continued)

11:30 a.m. Meeting with President at White House.

1:15 p.m. Small stag lunch by Secretary Rusk at Department  
(30-40 guests)

7:00 p.m. Small reception at White House Total about 40 guests of  
which Ne Win may choose 20 or 25. Dress: Business suit.

*(if Ne Win would prefer  
this to small tie  
black-tie dinner)*

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 9

a.m. Golf.

Luncheon private.

3:00 p.m. Meet with Secretary Rusk at Department.

5:00 p.m. Meet with President at White House.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10

a.m. Normal departure ceremony

a.m. Depart Andrews Air Force Base aboard Special USAF flight.

p.m. Arrive Honolulu. Met by Governor. No military honors.

Minimum program at Honolulu. Possible reception by Governor.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13

or

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14

Depart Honolulu by commercial aircraft.

Report if above dates acceptable as soon as possible.

SECRET

Monday, May 2, 1966, 9:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Bowles has asked that two long cables of his be called to your personal attention. They are attached. But let me try to summarize them.

First, he sees us entering a period of acute competition with the USSR for leverage in India.

Straws in the wind indicate that the Soviets are trying hard to undercut the new Indo-US cooperation generated by Mrs. Gandhi's visit here and subsequent progress on economic programs. The attack focuses on the wide range of economic reforms we and the World Bank are pressing, which the Soviets and their Indian backers see as a threat to socialism. While we have a lot of momentum, Soviet prestige is high, and many Indians are uncertain of our intentions, so the battle will not be one-sided.

Second, Bowles sees military aid as an important key to this struggle. This is where the USSR can put the heat on most effectively, and where the Indians are most sensitive. We think Soviet deliveries of military equipment have already slowed. Bowles fears resumption of US military aid to Pakistan would play right into Soviet hands.

Third, Bowles has long felt that our military aid to Pakistan has been a mistake. India is the big power in the subcontinent, and it opposes China. He feels we muffed our opportunity in 1963-64 after the Chicom invasion by not moving into India with large-scale military aid to pre-empt the Russians, and he feels our unwarranted concern for the Paks led us down that false path. He would like to see us resume limited military aid to India now, but says that resuming lethal aid to Pakistan -- even spare parts -- would undo all the progress we have made with India in the last few months. He would not resume any military aid to the Paks unless they renounce Chicom aid and cooperate in the defense of the subcontinent against China.

\* \* \* \* \*

Our view is: 1. India is, indeed, more important than Pakistan. But 2. It is the Indian interest as well as ours to keep a Western option open to Ayub.

DECLASSIFIED
State 5-15-78 NSC 11-22-78 (#1486)
By RCH per 156 NARS, Date 8-20-86

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

May 2, 1966

In this spirit Secretary Rusk is considering an instruction to Bowles (which he will check with us) suggesting he discuss frankly with the Indians how we keep that door open for Ayub without endangering India. The Indians have to recognize that our dilemma is theirs because they have a bigger stake than we do in where Ayub and Pakistan go.

Most of the town feels we will have to get back into at least selective sales to both sides when we have established a better political and economic framework, and agreed force levels.

We are not, therefore, asking you for a decision now. We will wish to make some concrete progress towards limiting military spending on both sides before we put some operational choices to you.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 28, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 2914)

In view of our sad experience in recent years with military assistance in South Asia culminating in the Indo-Pak conflict last August and September and the current uncertainty over the Pakistan flirtation with China, our wait-and-see approach to military assistance is understandable. However, to postpone indefinitely the development of a coherent, realistic military assistance policy in respect to this key area is self-defeating and, if prolonged for too long, almost certain to damage our wider interests.

The absence of a policy decision is already enabling Indian leftist leaders, anxious to undercut Mrs. Gandhi's successful visit to the United States, to argue with some success that we are about to resume our former close military ties with Pakistan. At the same time, polite but none-the-less genuine resentment is being generated within the Indian military by our continuing holdup of non-lethal programs which we invited the Government of India in February to resubmit and for which they have made down payments. Finally, a large U.S. military mission for which the Government of India is helping pay the bills is now standing idle here in New Delhi with its support agreement running out on June 30th.

Against this background, I shall sketch both the dangers and opportunities in the present situation as we see them. My analysis will place particular emphasis on the overriding need for a politically stable, economically viable and friendly India which can eventually form the basis of an indigenous Asian counterweight to China which we can effectively support.

If we are to develop a truly fresh and realistic approach to the subcontinent, I believe that it is essential that we start by frankly recognizing the fact that U.S. military assistance policies in this area over the past twelve years have been something less than successful.

A. In the first phase, we provided the Pakistanis with nearly \$800 million worth of U.S. equipment overlooking the fact that the entire Pakistani military effort was openly aimed first and foremost at the Indians.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-317  
By is, NARA Date 4-5-99



B. In the second phase, following the Chinese attack in 1962, we moved promptly to India's support, thereby winning its heartfelt appreciation. However, in the face of strong Pak resistance, we passed up the opportunity to establish a close U.S. relationship with the Indian military and thereby to pre-empt the Soviet Bloc as primary military suppliers to India.

New policies to fit new requirements and to take advantage of new opportunities in the subcontinent should take into account the following factors:

A. Generally speaking U.S. military aid policies over the last ten or fifteen years have provided two kinds of military assistance:

(1) Military assistance to nations which are clearly exposed to the threat of communist aggression and which share our determination to oppose such aggression:

(2) Military assistance to nations which are not or which do not consider themselves so threatened for frankly political purposes (i.e. to establish closer relationships with military leaders who may later assume political power; to bolster sagging friendly governments which lack adequate popular support; to pre-empt Soviets, etc.)

B. Congress and the American people are largely persuaded of the necessity of U.S. military assistance in the first category. There is, however, deep mistrust of military assistance in category two which has repeatedly turned out to be a clumsy and unpredictable political instrument. This policy distinction is particularly relevant to our current dilemma in the subcontinent since India falls in the first category and under present circumstances Pakistan, of its own choice, in the second.

C. In the last two or three years India with one-seventh of the world's population has begun to assume major importance as a political and economic counterweight to China. Indeed India is now the only major nation in Asia or anywhere else which fully shares our concern about the Chinese Communist threat. As the rate of India's economic growth speeds up in response to pragmatic new policies and increased consortium help, India's political-military importance will steadily increase.

D. In respect to military power India already has the fourth largest army in the world, most of which is positioned against China's forces along a 2,500 mile common border. The defense of India does not require U.S. manpower. India has plenty of that. What India needs is more modern equipment.

E. Although India cannot be expected under present circumstances to intervene militarily in Southeast Asia, there is a strong probability that India would be willing to commit its well-trained guerrilla forces, and possibly its army and air force, against Tibet should the Chinese become militarily involved on a large scale elsewhere in Asia. If Nepal, Bhutan, or Sikkim were attacked by China, India would come to their assistance; the same would probably be true should China attack Burma.

F. We have lost, for the time being, the opportunity to become the primary external supplier of the India effort to modernize its armed forces. In 1963 and 1964, India was eager for an understanding with us under which they would agree to forego any significant purchase of Soviet equipment. However, following our refusal under Pakistani pressure to give India the kind of equipment it requested, the Soviets moved massively into the vacuum. Since 1962, U. S. military assistance actually delivered to India amounts to \$74 million. Deliveries from the Soviet Union in this same period of time are \$158 million with an additional \$385 million now under contract.

G. India sees China as her primary adversary. There is no incentive for the Indians to attack Pakistan. Although political, communal and strategic factors now make a transfer of the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan impossible, Mrs. Gandhi's new Government is prepared to make major concessions in regard to refugees, communications, and development plans and projects. In a military sense, Pakistan is of concern to India primarily because of the threat of Chinese-backed attack by Pakistan. Under these circumstances, to continue to equate India and Pakistan is unrealistic. Sooner or later, we must face this fact.

H. In spite of the fact that India is faced with two belligerent adversaries, the Indian military budget, which is 3.5 percent of India's gross national product, is still 10 percent under the ceilings which we negotiated in 1964; in real terms, there has been no increase in the current budget.

I. Under present circumstances, a welcome and highly effective US military assistance program for India can be put together within our former budget. Such a program need not include lethal equipment; it should, however, include defense production equipment.

J. In view of the present fragile political situation on South Asia and the importance of India's support against China, U. S. assistance to the Pakistan military would be difficult to defend at a time when Pakistan is flaunting her new military aid from China for common use against India, which represents our primary hope of building an effective Asian counterweight to China.

K. The view which I heard in Washington that while such a move would undoubtedly create difficulties the dust would ultimately settle and we would somehow muddle through is wholly unrealistic. The impact in India would be a political disaster. The Krishna Menon fellow travellers would persuasively assert that our action had vindicated their argument that U.S. interests are diametrically opposed to those of India and the benefits of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the U.S. would go out the window. At the conference yesterday of our consuls general this reaction from all over India was stressed and restressed by everyone present; it is a hard political fact which we will ignore only at a very heavy cost.

Against this background I propose the following steps in our military assistance program to the subcontinent.

A. Clearly distinguish in our basic policy between India, a nation of 500 million people, which is friendly to the U.S. and vigorously opposed to China, and its smaller neighbor, Pakistan, which has associated itself closely with our enemy China in an open threat against India.

B. Privately but clearly inform the Pak Government that the U.S. cannot assist either its economic development or its military defense as long as it persists in its present threatening military-political relationship with China.

(1) (Section badly garbled and illegible)

(2) Only if Pakistan renounces Chinese military assistance and political support and agrees to cooperate in the military defense of the subcontinent against China would we provide military assistance.

C. Admittedly the assumption of this position by the USG would include certain political risks. Nevertheless in view of the inability of the Chinese to support Pakistan in an adequate way economically and the recent devastating example of Sukarno's Indonesia this risk does not appear great. In view of the incalculable political cost of the alternative, this risk should be accepted even if it were far greater.

D. Limit our future planning for India's military assistance to non-lethal items. This would gradually provide India with the capacity to defend itself effectively, thereby freeing India over a period of time from its present heavy dependence on Soviet military procurement and the political pressures that go with it.

E. Within this policy framework process the non-lethal military assistance items which were authorized for India before the freeze occurred last September.

1. The following list of projects would be indicated:

A. All credit sales cases for which down payment has been made. \$53.4 million.

B. Ambajhari Ordnance Factory (\$25 million)

C. Dodge Power Wagons (\$5.5 million)

D. Star Sapphire (fy 65 and prior grant aid)

E. Border roads equipment and material (fy 65 and prior grant aid)

F. Transport aircraft spares and support (fy 65 and prior grant aid)

G. Medical material (grant aid)

H. Parcel post items being held by USMSMI.

2. The undelivered commitments would add up as follows:

Undelivered Programs (\$M)

	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Sales</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Non-lethal</u>
FY 63	4.508	-----	4.508	4.332
FY 64	24.407	9.065	33.935	33.577
FY 65	39.712	40.620	80.332	74.603
TOTAL	68.627	49.685	117.775	112.512

F. Work our way gradually towards secret joint studies with the Indian Government with respect to the defense not only of India but of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Burma against the Chinese threat.

G. Seek in an appropriate low-key manner to reestablish our former close relationship with top and medium level Indian military personnel. We refer to visits to the U. S. by Indian military leaders for training, provision of books and libraries for the Indian military, etc.

Comment: In this cable, we have dealt frankly and indeed bluntly with the highly complex and controversial questions that have plagued our relationships in the subcontinent for the last decade. We have dealt with policy programs which go well beyond our primary responsibilities here in India for the simple reason that they cannot be separated from the broader question of overall U. S. strategy in Asia.

In the next ten years, we believe that the United States will face three choices in Asia:

A. We can get out of Asia leaving this vast continent to the tender mercies of the Russians and the Chinese; this is unthinkable.

B. We can continue to pour more U.S. military forces into Asia to support our present grievously inadequate political base.

C. We can begin now to help shape an indigenous Asian counterweight which is anti-Chinese, non-Communist, and friendly to the U.S.; a consensus which we could eventually support at a small fraction of our present investment.

Such a counterweight must inevitably be based on India which has half of all the non-Communist peoples of Asia, which is fervently anti-Chinese, deeply committed to a Democratic government, possessed of substantial political stability and which, following the success of the Johnson-Gandhi visit, is now warmly inclined towards the U.S.

Faced with this opportunity, it would be folly compounded to give the Pakistanis what would amount to a veto power over our relationship with India. We have, in fact, tried this policy for ten years and in the process we have lost ground in both countries.

The time has come for a new perspective and for policies which at long last recognize both the forces which are shaping Asia and our limitations in respect to these forces.

BOWLES



68-6

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-317  
By us, NARA Date 4-5-99

Thursday, April 28, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 2931)

There have recently been a number of signs suggesting that the Soviets and their supporters here in India are taking vigorous steps to counteract what is generally accepted as significant improvement in Indian-U.S. relations following the Gandhi visit and to undercut the public position of Indian leaders who are favorable to the U.S. Although this thesis has been most concretely spelled out by "Times of India" correspondent G. K. Reddy in an April 21 conversation with me, there is substantial additional evidence which points in the same direction.

Reddy has good sources within the Indian Government and, while he is not above being used as a channel to persuade us of what his informants wish us to believe and may be acting as such in this case, we feel the thrust of his presentation, if not full detail, is probably accurate and his comments to be worthy of attention.

Reddy asserted the Soviets recently passed word through the Indian Embassy in Moscow (Kaul) that the Soviets prepared to be of help in the economic field, but only in public sector, and only if India maintains its previous dedication to the concept of a socialist society with a large and important public sector. The Soviets, according to Reddy, told Kaul that they are disturbed by the increasing scope apparently being contemplated by the Government of India for a private sector under U.S. pressure.

Soviet presentation, as given by Reddy, included recitation of what Soviets are already doing for India in economic aid with the suggestion that projects might be slowed or delayed if the present liberal trend in Indian economic policies continues. The Soviets are currently believed to be dragging their feet on the letting of contracts for Bokaro and in talks on proposed further expansion of Bhilai. It is certainly true that the Soviets have been going very slow (for the past several months) on commitments to the Indian fourth Five Year Plan, and reported dedication of Bokaro is now said to be off at least until late in the year.

Reddy also said Soviet military deliveries have been slowed down again after their resumption following the Tashkent Meeting. Our reports indicate that ships with military cargo still are arriving and enroute, but these may have started before these reported slow-down orders were issued by Soviet authorities.

~~SECRET~~

According to Reddy, Soviets also informed the Indians they would have to "look very carefully" at their position in the Security Council in the event Pakistan brought up Kashmir in that form.

Finally, Reddy stated there is growing doubt in Indian circles that Indian non-alignment will continue to be acceptable to Soviet leadership. Some believe the Soviet Party Congress marked the shift in Soviet policy away from endorsement of "non-alignment." The new emphasis in Soviet policies is said to place increased weight on "progressive" nature of a recipient country's social and economic structure and its willingness to support the USSR on political issues the Soviets consider important. Similar view was expressed to Embassy official by the Ministry of Economic Affairs Officer-in-Charge of Eastern Europe (Lal) who said he detected an increasingly "Stalinist" attitude on the part of the Soviets toward underdeveloped countries, including India.

Indian observers also note that the Soviet press has increased its criticism of India during the past weeks. When queried about this, Lal said the Soviets had informed the Government of India in advance about these critical articles and suggested that motivation for them was increased number of articles critical of the USSR which have recently appeared in the Indian press.

The Kosygin visit to India which had been rumored for spring, then reportedly expected for September-October, now is said by Lal to be going to take place "next winter, if at all."

Finally, attacks on specifics of the Indian-U. S. collaboration such as proposed Indo-American Foundation and fertilizer program have been stepped up by pro-Soviet Indian publications and individuals. At least to some extent, this is probably in response to Soviet urgings.

The increasing Soviet pressure on India is also indicated by flat statements by both C. S. Jha and L. K. Jha to me that the USSR would not actively assist India in case of a Chinese-Pakistan attack. Also, in Mrs. Gandhi's remarks to me that suddenly major attacks on her administration are coming not from Communist Left, but from Soviet-oriented Communist Right.

While each of these individual items can be partially explained on other grounds, taken together they suggest that the Soviets are, in fact, beginning to apply formidable pressures on India to counteract recent favorable developments in Indian-American relations; this course would seem to us consistent with general Soviet approach in India.

Military assistance is the area in which the Soviets can perhaps most effectively and quietly apply pressure (by simply delaying deliveries), and this will be a key situation to watch in coming days and weeks.

In launching what is undoubtedly a comprehensive effort to discourage a closer U.S. - Indian relationship and to undercut our political influence, the Soviets possess certain advantages together with certain liabilities.

A. Among their advantages are the following:

(1) India requires a continuing flow of modern military equipment to assure its defense against what is believed to be an increasingly coordinated Pakistan-China threat. Although the Indians are deeply grateful for U.S. support against China in 1962, their experience with U.S. military aid in 1963 and 1964 left them deeply skeptical of U.S. willingness to assist them to maintain an adequate defense posture.

(more)

(2) The present Soviet campaign against the Indian-U. S. relationship is being launched at a time when the Indian public is particularly well disposed toward the Soviet Union. (Note: in a February poll, 89 percent of an educated sample in Madras, Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay had a "favorable" or "very unfavorable" impression of the USSR.) Thus, the Soviets are in a position to carry on two policies simultaneously, i.e., to butter up Indian self-esteem in public and to put a heavy squeeze on the Indian Government in private. As a totalitarian power, the Soviets are never disturbed by discordant voices in their midst.

(3) Although the Soviet economic assistance will in all probability continue to be significantly less than our own, it is an important element of Indian development. Indians would be concerned about possible cut-off of such aid, particularly with respect to major projects such as Bokaro.

(4) The Soviets are in a position to effectively play on the widespread uncertainty about future U. S. policy in Asia. Although most Indians have a warm regard for and appreciation of the U. S., they have come to believe that our policies are inconsistent and unpredictable, for example; recent dope stories in the U. S. press that we are about to add U. S. military aid to Pakistan to that of China at a time when Chinese leaders are vigorously attacking the U. S. on Pakistan soil, etc.

(5) The deep-seated fear that the Soviets may at some point seek a rapprochement with the Chinese which would inevitably be at India's expense.

(6) India's own traditional emphasis on the need for a widespread political consensus on all major national questions which enables a small but articulate group (such as the Congress Party Left) to exert disproportionate influence on India's foreign policy.

B. Nevertheless, the Soviets also face some important disadvantages:

(1) By and large, the Indians do not communicate easily with the Russians. Although part of this is due to the language barrier, there are also deep differences in basic attitudes and values.

(2) When all is said and done, the Indian people are keenly aware of the support the U. S. has given India from the time of its struggle for independence through their food crisis of this year. We Americans may worry them and on occasion frighten them, but most Indians still have a warm regard for Americans as individuals and also for American institutions. This regard will not be easy to destroy.

(3) Although the Soviet effort is to present the USSR in India as a benign and powerful friend rather than as a state committed to an aggressive Communist ideology, the Communist image which does not appeal to the Indians is never fully lost sight of. As the Soviets appear publicly in the role of aggressive ideologists attempting to shape Indian policies and undercut Indian relationships, the less their influence will be.

(4) In their hearts, the Indians believe that, while the Soviets' response to a Chinese attack on India is to say the least uncertain, it is probable that the U.S. would again come to India's defense.

Comment: There is no doubt in our minds that we are about to enter a crucial political struggle here in India with the Soviet Union and its friends within the Communist Party. If the Soviets choose to make the present situation a test of strength and influence and if we are prepared to follow through vigorously and imaginatively on the heels of Mrs. Gandhi's visit, there is no reason why we should pull back from this confrontation.

I have repeatedly stressed to L. K. Jha, Swaran Singh and others that the Indian Government faces a clear choice between a close-working relationship with the United States Government in development and defense policies, or the continuing appeasement of the domestic Leftists who are working to push India into a junior partnership role with the USSR.

We have no desire to force India to choose between America and Russia. However, we should make it abundantly clear that it will be impossible for us to do what we would like to do if the Communists and Congress Left should in fact dictate Indian Government policies.

A major asset in this situation is Mrs. Gandhi and her Cabinet. If she sees the issues as clearly as she seems to, and if she has the courage and political skill to push through on her present course, and if we follow a positive and sensitive line, then a major breakthrough which the Soviet Union can't block, may be in the cards.

BOWLES



Sunday, May 1, 1966 -- 5:35 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you should consider a fireside chat -- perhaps delivered informally from the Oval Room.

The object should be not to clarify any particular issue -- or to put forward and defend any particular action -- but to clarify calmly for our people and the world your present perspective on policy as we enter a period of political campaigning.

The theme, nevertheless, should be operational: an appeal to the American people for stubborn patience, durability, and confidence that our course is right:

- in Viet Nam
- in Europe
- in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East
- towards the Communist world
- at home

Along the way you could announce the program Secretary Rusk is now mounting at our instigation, to comb out the constructive ideas in the country -- and in the government -- for new initiatives.

\* \* \*

My reasons for proposing this talk are these:

a. The Viet Nam debate is about over; it is time to rally the sound 60% of the country to sweat out the next stage with confidence; and some of Lodge's statements (and perhaps others) have made some feel we are not fully backing the movement towards constitutional government in Viet Nam.

b. It is a good time to clarify quietly the NATO crisis before de Gaulle hits the sawdust trail to Moscow.

c. The country and the world do not understand how seriously and purposefully you are pressing forward the battle for progress and order in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, despite the crises in Viet Nam and NATO -- nor are the constructive aspects of our NATO policy understood.

d. It would be stabilizing to indicate your efforts to look ahead and find the ideas for the future by tapping the best brains in the country on foreign policy, via the State Department, at a time when personnel in foreign policy are shifting about.

e. It would be an opportunity to relate what you are doing constructively at home -- and the need to keep wages-prices-balance of payments in order -- to our tasks on the world scene.

\* \* \*

In short, I believe it is time for us to get off the defensive and quietly lay the base for the campaign on foreign policy issues.

W. W. Rostow

Show me a rough draft of what it might look like \_\_\_\_\_

Drop it \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_